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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49

(79th Congress)

CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

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PART 5

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UNITED STATES
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(After January 14, 1946)

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LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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Shivers, Robert L.	1401–1447		3201–3225			88–96		
Shoemaker, James M. Capt., USN	1191–1205							
Shoemaker, Thomas B.			4366–4383					

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Short, Arthur T			3644–3650					
Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen	37–169, 1617–1647		276–541, 4411–4445	220–270				2921–3231
Shortt, Creed, Pvt	452–455							
Sisson, George A			3265–3286					
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN							4–9	
Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen					2	69		
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen						195–197		
Smith, William W., Rear Adm		32–65		528–572			335–375	3354–3378, 3521–3555
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN				1077–1081				
Smoot, Perry M., Col	1738–1742							
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr								5009–5027
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen					2			
Staff, W. F, CH/CM	1186–1190							
Stark, Harold R., Adm	1805–1808			2–194, 320–324, 774–810				2096–2223, 2244–2477, 5153–5175, 5202–5269, 5543–5555
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR		323–334						
Stilphen, Benjamin L			1539–1575					
Stimson, Henry L			4037–4094 C					5416–5440 [2] 5441–5463 [1]
Stone, John F						203–204		
Street, George							411–413	
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen						185		

Sweeney, J. J., Rev	1368–1372							
Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Capt., USA	1447–1469		3250–3257					
Taylor, Kenneth, Lt., USA	415–422							
Taylor, William E. G., Comdr	1229–1240	338–354	1071–1094	609–627				
Thielen, Bernard, Col								26–27, 34–36, 38–41, 49–55, 57–61, 64–65, 70–75, 79–80, 92–101, 103–111, 130, 138, 139–154, 165–172, 188
Thomas, James K., Lt., USA	484–486							
Thompson, O. N., Col								
Throckmorton, Russell C., Col			1387–1412			99		
Tillman, Thomas E			2134–2157					
Tindal, Lorry N., Col	390–393		4487–4500					
Tinker, Clarence, Brig. Gen	1706–1718							
Truman, Louis W., Col			1444–1453					
Turner, Richmond K., Rear Adm	1809–1829, 1861–1862	250–272		988–1024				1911–2063
Tyler, Kermit A., Lt. Col	368–376		1095–1105	446–460				
Ullrich, Ralph T., Sgt	486–489							
Underkofler, Oliver H., Lt., USNR								
Utterback, Charles J	509–517						465–470	
Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN		290–292						
Walker, Eugene B., Col			965–972					
Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen			1381–1387					
Waterhouse, George S	1262–1272							
Waterhouse, Paul B	1373–1381							
Weddington, Leonard D., Col	1213–1219		3012–3027					
Welch, George S., Maj	422–428		2008–2014					
Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt., USN		383–390						
Welles, Sumner								458–473, 477–549

[1] Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
[2] Sworn statement presented to committee.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen	1311–1329		2722–2744					
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col	496–499		3120–3124					
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col	1830–1842							
White, William R., Brig. Gen			1989–2007					
Wichiser, Rea B			2456–2478					
Wilke, Weslie T	1334–1340							
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm		279–288					389–410	1723–1911
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen						187–189		
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen	247–259		1345–1381					
Wilson, Erle M., Col			910–931					
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col			3663–3665					
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm				1083–1090				
Wong, Ahoon H			3677–3683					
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR						105–106	376–386	
Woodward, Farnsley C., Lt. (jg), USN							541–553	
							597–602	
Woolley, Ralph E			3750–3773					
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr		379–382					442–450	
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col			3357–3586					
York, Yee Kam	1525–1538							
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN	1683–1705							3233–3259, 3303–3354
Zucca, Emil Lawrence			2580a–2596					

[5461][1]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Murphy, and Gearhart.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[5462] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel informed the Chair that they first wish to put in some documents as part of the record before going ahead with the testimony.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

We have laid some of the documents before the members of the committee this morning. Some of the others we will refer to can be spread upon the transcript or made exhibits.

I would like to call attention to the very large bulky volume which is at the bottom of the pile of material before the members of the committee. That contains the testimony of General Short given in prior proceedings. We thought we would make that available in that form to each member of the commitete for study and we are preparing a similar volume containing all the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel which will be distributed as soon as it is received from the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What number will that be?

Mr. GESELL. That is not going to be given a number, I simply wanted to call attention to it. It occurred to us that each member of the committee would be particularly anxious to read that testimony before General Short appears as a witness.

At page 4477 of the transcript, when we were last presenting material covering responses to various committee member requests, I made reference to a draft of November 16 [5463] of the August 17 statement which the United States Government delivered to the Japanese. We have now obtained a photostat copy of that and I would like to offer it to be included with the other material as Exhibit 22–A.[2]

The CHAIRMAN. 22–A?

Mr. GESELL. 22–A.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 22–A.")

Senator FERGUSON. Have you marked these in any way?

[1] Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

[2] See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1694.

Mr. GESELL. No, they are not marked and that is not among the material before you. It is just another draft of that message, Senator, which we have presented several drafts on.

At page 1824 of the transcript there was a request by Senator Ferguson for the number of messages sent by Ambassador Grew to the State Department between November 26 and December 7, 1941. The State Department advises us that there were 58 telegrams, numbers 1853 to 1910, inclusive, and 15 dispatches, numbers 5993 to 6006, inclusive, and 6008, sent during that period. We have examined this material and it appears to be, for the most part, administrative documentation, the dispatches and telegrams, and if the actual documents are desired by Senator Ferguson we can arrange to have them photostated by the Department of State. Some of them, of course, are already in the record.

[*5464*] At page 1728 there was a request by Senator Ferguson for any information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Department as to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with the Japanese Government if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific. The State Department informs us that they cannot find any record of any such information being sent by the Department of State to Ambassador Grew.

At page 1831 to 1835 of the transcript there was a request by Senator Ferguson for any instructions sent by the Department of State to Ambassador Grew concerning the destruction of codes. The State Department has informed us that on December 7 there were in existence standing instructions to all American diplomatic and consular offices authorizing the destruction of codes and confidential files in case of necessity.

On December 5, 1941, the State Department sent Ambassador Grew the telegram, which includes instructions concerning burning of codes, which appears in the transcript at page 1967. It will be recalled that Mr. Grew stated in the transcript, at page 1966, that he did not think he had ever received that telegraph.

On December 18, 1941, after the Swiss Government had undertaken to represent the United States interests in Japan, the State Department sent a telegram to the American Legation [*5465*] at Bern, Switzerland, to be transmitted to the American diplomatic and consular offices in Japan and the Far East.

Paragraph 7 of this message refers specifically to the question of the destruction of records, and reads as follows:

> Officers shall destroy all seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, confidential files, et cetera. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, who shall prepare affidavits concerning the destruction.

I will ask to have the entire dispatch, which constitutes an additional dispatch on this matter of code burning, designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 90.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 90.")

Mr. GESELL. At page 1853 of the transcript there is a request by Senator Ferguson for any records of conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Grew while the latter was in this country. The State Department informs us that they cannot locate in their files any record of any such conversations.

At page 1951 of the transcript, there is a request by Congressman Keefe for memoranda dated December 1, 1941, prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck. These have been obtained from the War Department files and delivered to Mr. Keefe.

[*5466*] At page 1996 of the transcript there is a request by Senator Ferguson for the time when Ambassador Grew destroyed his codes. In that connection we have several exhibits which we will ask to have all marked under the next exhibit number, number 91.

First there are two dispatches dated December 15, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the Department of State concerning the burning and destruction of codes, ciphers, and cipher devices. I will simply state that we have not photostated the entire dispatches since they contain considerable reference to code designations. We simply left that part of the dispatch blank.

Senator LUCAS. What was the date of that?

Mr. GESELL. That is a dispatch of December 15, 1941.

Another dispatch dated February 16, 1942, regarding destruction of confidential material in the reporting section of the Embassy in Tokyo. Another dispatch dated March 25, 1942 regarding destruction of confidential material in Embassy files. These dispatches show no destruction of confidential codes prior to December 8 Japanese time or December 7 our time.

Those simply will be offered as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All in one?

Mr. GESELL. I should think so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so marked. They are all attached?

[*5467*] Mr. GESELL. Yes.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 91.")

Mr. GESELL. At transcript page 2002 Senator Ferguson asked whether Ambassador Grew had any knowledge of the withdrawal of United States shipping from Japanese areas. No record can be found in the Department of State files of the sending of any information regarding the re-routing of the shipping to Ambassador Grew.

At transcript page 2014 a request by Congressman Keefe for affidavits in connection with the burning of codes in the Embassy at Tokyo. In this connection we would like to point out that the material already previously introduced in Exhibit 90 shows that an affidavit was required only in connection with the burning of fee stamps; also as shown by the telegram dated December 5 to Ambassador Grew.

The photostats of Ambassador Grew's dispatches concerning code burning include certificates of the witnesses so that the material I offered a moment ago answers that request as well.

[*5468*] Mr. GESELL. At page 2045 of the transcript a request by Congressman Gearhart for any instructions sent to American consuls in Japan during the last 3d of November and the first 7 days of December directing the destruction of codes and code machines.

The State Department has found nothing in its files on this other than the telegram of December 5 and December 15 previously referred to and, of course, the standing instructions which were in effect for burning in the event of necessity.

At transcript page 2046 a request by Senator Ferguson for Army messages to the military attaché at Tokyo concerning the burning

of codes. I simply want to note that that material was placed in the transcript at page 2223.

At transcript page 1881 a request by Senator Ferguson for Ambassador Grew's reports to the State Department on his return to the United States in 1942. I believe other members of the committee expressed some interest in those reports as well.

We have examined approximately 30 written dispatches delivered by Ambassador Grew to the State Department upon his return in 1942 and except for two having to do with the destruction of confidential files and ciphers, which we have just introduced, the reports do not to us appear to be per- [*5469*] tinent. They relate almost entirely to administrative matters. We can arrange to have those documents photostated and made available if any of the members of the committee wish.

At transcript page 1630 a request by Senator Ferguson for material relating to the proposal of Prime Minister Hiranuma in the spring of 1939. That is also discussed at pages 1947 and 1948. That, I believe, is the so-called peace proposal made by Baron Hiranuma prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe.[1]

We have obtained from the State Department a series of seventeen documents relating to that subject, which I will transmit today to Senator Ferguson's office for his inspection. I won't take the time of the committee to read the list of the documents. There are some seventeen in number.

Senator LUCAS. What is the date of that?

Mr. GESELL. Those documents preceded the breaking out of war in Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1939?

Mr. GESELL. In 1939, yes. They went up, I think, until August 1939.

In the transcript at page 1288, a request by Senator Lucas for the official report of Prime Minister Churchill's speech of January 27, 1942, before the House of Commons.

We offer that report, a photostat of that, as the next exhibit, number 92, furnished by the Library of Congress, [*5469–A*] photostating pages 591 to 618 of volume 377 of the Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 92.")

[*5470*] Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that speech? Was that January 27?

Mr. GESELL. That is the January 27, 1942, speech.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GESELL. I believe a text of that speech is already in the transcript and this is simply the official record of the speech.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the record ought to be clear on this last statement. I do not think the whole speech was in before, just certain transcripts out of it at the time.

Mr. GESELL. Perhaps I was mistaken on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if that is true probably the whole speech ought to be made a part of the record and not simply as an exhibit.

Mr. GESELL. Very well, then, we will have that spread upon the transcript after making a double check. It is a substantial typing job. I am probably in error.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

[1] See Exhibit No. 177, subsequently introduced.

Mr. GESELL. At page 4930 there was read into the record a series of intercept messages during the period of January 1 to July 1, 1941 indicating varying degrees of knowledge by the Japanese or suspicions by the Japanese that [*5471*] their codes were being read.

The Army has completed the search and there are four additional messages which have turned up, which were submitted to us by the Army under date of December 19 and I will ask to have these messages spread upon the transcript to complete that part of the inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Mr. GESELL. I can advise the committee at this time that the Navy has completed its search, but that its search has not disclosed any messages which the Army search has not disclosed, so we now believe we have the complete documentation on that subject.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[*5472*]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C. Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 19 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

Completion of the search of Signal Intelligence Service files has disclosed four additional messages, here inclosed, during the period 1 January–1 July 1941, which may be pertinent to the question of the extent of Japanese suspicions that their code messages were being read.

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE,
BB
Lt. Col. GSC.

From: Tokyo (Matuoka)
To: Panama (Koshi)
23 January, 1941
(J17–K6)
#004

(Chief of Office Routing)

The statement issued by the president of the Japanese Association and others during (April ?) of last year, regarding the manipulation of the books in your office, was apparently based on communications between your office and mine.

This raises a very serious question of security. How did [*5473*] the contents of these official communications leak out to the above persons? Please investigate this matter immediately and submit a report.

We questioned Matumoto concerning this matter recently, and he explained that it was of your doing. Please explain.

JD–1: 568 14073 23 January, 1941 Navy trans. 1–29–41 (S)

From: Tokyo (Matuoka).
To: Chicago (Rioyoji).
7 February, 1941.
(J17K6).
#002.

(Secret)

If it is impossible to remove the code safe and transfer the telegraphic duties to the official residence, there is no way out (in view of the fact that certain circumstances require giving the codes added protection) except for your office to discontinue secret communication. You will have to rely on the nearest office to handle your secret communications.

For this reason, will you transfer the following codes to the Embassy in Washington for safekeeping, at the earliest opportunity:

"G"	
"i"	(H–1)*
"ho"	(KO)
"hen"	
"oite"	(PA–K2)*

[5474] "Tu" (J17)*
"So" (New Orleans Only) P–1)*

Please have the Embassy send us a receipt.

Relay copies of this message, as a "Minister's Instruction" to Los Angeles and Portland; also to Washington for information.

*Insert by translator.

JD–1: 956 14610 7 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2–14–41 (S).

From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
April 14, 1941.
Purple.
#407.

Intelligence wires emanating from our offices in the Near East and Egypt to our offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the German and Italian authorities. This procedure is advisable in order that there be no danger of giving the German and Italian authorities clues in decoding our codes. Therefore, in intelligences of this type emanating from the area, the "I" [a] code and the "SO" [b] code should be discontinued, using only the more efficient "O" [c] code. In communicating other secret matters I would like to have you use the "TSU" [d] code and other appropriate codes. Please follow this procedure.

[5475] Relayed to Italy and Turkey.

[a] An auxiliary code.
[b] P–1.
[c] PA (K–2).
[d] J series codes.

(J–18 (K7) now under study.)
Army 16312 Trans. 4–16–41 (W)

From: San Francisco (Muto).
To: Tokyo.
May 28, 1941.
J–18.
#86. (Part 1 of 2)

(Strictly Secret)

While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was coming into Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order to take on petroleum, under suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior of the ship was searched by customs officials about noon on the____[b]. In order to burn them, should the need arise, Naval "SA" code,[a] secret Naval documents in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the custody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central Meteorological Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret document, [5476] under pretext of passing inspection were taken away. As soon as I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately filed a protest with the local customs officials and demanded the return of these documents. They replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date to the fishing vessel after an investigation had been made into the facts of the case.

[a] ~~Unable to identify this code at present.~~ (NL) fully available. Now cancelled.
[b] 29th.

Army 18037 Trans. 6–11–41 (2)

[5477] Mr. GESELL. At pages 4102 and 3 of the transcript Senator Ferguson asked whether the British notified the United States prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor that they were fully alerted at Singapore.

The Army has submitted in response to that request two documents: First, a copy of a December 1, 1941, UP dispatch from Singapore as appearing in the New York Times and, second, a photostat of a 2

December report, received in the War Department, G–2, April 12, 1942, from the United States military observer in Singapore, concerning the status of the alerts. The net effect of that is that there was newspaper publicity about Singapore being alerted but that the official report, while sent on the 2d of December, did not reach here until April 12, 1942.

I will ask to have both the official report and the UP dispatch placed in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

Copy No. 6–1
For Record Section Only

[5478] Secret

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Attache Report: Malaya
(Stamp:) REC'D–G–2 APR 13 1942
Subject: ALERTING OF MALAYAN COMMAND I. G. No. 6900
Source: BRITISH—OFFICIAL
Reliability: EXCELLENT.
Summarization of Report:

1. System of Alerting.
2. Present State of Alert.

1. *System of Alerting.*

a. States of Alert in the Malayan Command are prescribed as three "degrees of readiness", each degree being indicated by a code word.

(1) The 3rd, or lowest degree of readiness is designated by the code word "AWAKE". When this code word is transmitted by Command Headquarters to the H. Q. III Indian Corps, Singapore Fortress; Australian Imperial Forces, Malaya, and to Sarawak and Borneo it has the following meaning: "The international situation is getting worse and you should make certain, as far as possible without causing public uneasiness, that all your precautionary measures are ready to be brought into operations at very short notice. Civil authorities have been informed accordingly."

[5479] (a) Commanders will take the following action upon receipt of the code message "AWAKE": "Ensure that all schemes are in readiness for instant action and will take such precautionary measures as may be possible covertly or under the guise of an exercise. Officers and other ranks on leave within Malaya will be recalled, but no movement of units to war stations without previous reference to Command Headquarters".

(2) The second degree of readiness is indicated by the code word "SEAVIEW". Upon receipt of this code message the following will ensue:

(a) Beach defenses will be manned on a skeleton basis and a constant night watch maintained.

(b) A. A. defenses fully deployed.

(c) Fixed defenses fully deployed.

(d) Commanding General III Indian Corps will secure the northern frontier.

(e) All other regular forces will be at not more than 12 hours notice to take up initial positions.

(f) Mobilization of impressed civilian motor transport to be put into effect as far as required for [5480] mobilization of Volunteers when and if ordered.

(g) Booms across rivers will be put into place.

(h) Off shore and river patrol vessels to be fully manned and on patrol.

(i) Operations room and Headquarters all organizations will be manned continuously on a skeleton basis.

(3) The first degree of readiness is called for by the code message "RAFFLES". Upon its receipt, the following steps will be taken:

(a) All forces will be deployed and ready for action.

(b) All airdrome defense schemes will be brought into operation.

(c) Operations rooms and Headquarters all units fully manned.

(d) War Code for communications go into effect 12 hours after origin of message "RAFFLES".

b. Other precautionary measures.

(1) Mobilization of Volunteer forces is called for by the code word "OILCAN" followed by the date of mobilization in words. Upon receipt, Volunteer force commanders prepare to mobilize on the date indicated. They report completion of mobilization to Headquarters Malayan Command.

(2) Guarding of vulnerable points. This is [*5481*] called for by the code message ARMOUR. Full precautions against sabotage is called for by this message. All military vulnerable points will be constantly guarded. Troops will leave barracks only on duty and will be under arms at all times.

(3) The code message "BROWNOUT" calls for the following:

(a) Permanently dismantle all advertisement lighting.

(b) Extinguish street and all other outside lighting.

(c) Shade interior lighting and lights on vehicles.

(d) Institute complete blackout on sounding of air raid signals.

(4) Internment of enemy aliens will probaly take place in 3 stages, i. e.:

(a) First phase, indicated by code message "COLLAR". This calls for arrest and detention of dangerous Japanese known to police.

(b) Second phase, indicated by code word "TROUSERS". All male Japanese will be interned.

(c) Third phase, "COLOUR". All Japanese will be interned.

(5) Complete closing of Thailand frontier is [*5482*] indicated by code word "BUNKER". Minor degrees of frontier restriction are indicated by other code words.

2. *Present State of Alert in Malaya.*

a. Malaya was placed in the second degree of readiness by the code message "SEAVIEW" on Monday, December 1, 1941.

b. Guarding of vulnerable points, prevention of sabotage, and restriction of troops to barracks, etc. was called for by the message "ARMOUR" on the preceding day, November 30, 1941.

/S/ B. A. TORMEY.

Distribution:

6 copies to AC of S, G–2, Major, General Staff. WD.
3 copies to AC of S, G–2, HPD.
1 copy to file.

(Stamp:) 1st Ind(?) U. S. Military Observer, Singapore, 12/4, 1941(?) To: AC of S, G–2, WD.,

Approved:

/S/ FRANCIS G. BRINK,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

[*5483*] [Extract from The New York Times, 1 December 1941, page 9, column 2.]

SINGAPORE PLACED UNDER EMERGENCY—VOLUNTEERS CALLED OUT—NEW FORCES LANDED IN BURMA TO MEET JAPANESE THREAT

AUSTRALIANS TO CONFER—BRITISH NAVAL AID TO U. S. IN FAR EAST STRESSED BY FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY

SINGAPORE, Monday, Dec. 1 (UP).—The Governor today signed a proclamation declaring that a state of emergency existed in the Straits Settlements, British Crown Colony. He called out the volunteer army, air and naval forces.

The proclamation was issued by Governor Sir Shenton Thomas after he had conferred with Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, chief of the British forces in the Far East.

* * * * * * *

[*5484*] Mr. GESELL. Senator Lucas requested certain information concerning the Philippines, to wit, the following:

The total number of airplanes in the Philippines on 7 December 1941, that request being made at pages 3993 and 4404 of the transcript; the number of bombers at Clark Field when the Japanese attacked, that request being made at page 3994 of the transcript, and any report on the number of bombers lost at Clark Field in that attack, that request being made at page 4405 of the transcript.

The War Department has submitted the best information which is available bearing on these requests at the present time in the War Department, in the form of a memorandum three pages in length containing the information in detail and I think the best procedure for handling it, again, would be to have it spread upon the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[5485] 27 DECEMBER 1945.

Memorandum for L & L Division
Att: Lt. Col. Duncombe
Subject: Information re Philippine Plane Situation

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Lt. Col. Duncombe to Lt. Col. Root, dated 18 December 1945, concerning request of Senator Lucas on pages 3993 and 4404 of the transcript for the number of planes in the Philippines on 7 December 1941, and on pages 3994 and 4404 for the number of bombers on Clark Field and the number of bombers lost there.

2. Information bearing on the above requests, supplied by the Army Air Forces, is inclosed herewith. No more definite information is at present available in the War Department.

3. Inclosure No. 1, a report by the Office of Statistical Control, AAF, regarding the status of aircraft in the Philippines 1–31 December 1941, indicates that 317 planes were on hand as of 1 December. Inclosure No. 2, an extract from the "History of the Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, December 1941 Installment" indicates that, of the total of 35 B–17's on hand, 20 to 23 were at Clark Field on 8 December prior to the attack. The 8 December cable from the Philippines on plane losses, noted in inclosure No. 1, states that 17 heavy bombers remained after the attack, but does not disclose how many of the bombers lost were lost at Clark Field.

/S/ E. E. ROOT,
Lt. Col. GSC
Current Group, OPD

[5486] 2 Incls—
Copy Status of Aircraft in Philippines 1–31 Dec 41.
Copy Table III, pages 8 & 9, "History of Fifth Air Force and Its Predecessors, Part I, December 1941 Installment" (on file at AAF Historical Office).

Restricted

Status of aircraft in Philippines, 1–31 December 1941

Model	On hand as of 1 Dec 1941	Losses* during month	On hand as of 31 Dec 1941	Model	On hand as of 1 Dec 1941	Losses* during month	On hand as of 31 Dec 1941
B–17	35	21	14	O–46	7	7	----------
B–10	12	11	1	O–49	3	3	----------
B–18	18	16	2	O–52	10	10	----------
A–27	8	8	----------	OA–9	1	1	----------
P–26	15	15	----------	C–39	1	----------	1
P–35	51	51	----------	C–49	1	1	----------
P–39	13	13	----------				
P–40	141	141	----------	Total	317	299	18
O–19	1	1	----------				

*Due to the lack of adequate aircraft reporting facilities [5487] during the early part of the war, the cause of these losses and the dates on which they occurred are both incomplete and inaccurate. However, after extensive research and based on the few cable reports which were transmitted, the following observations are made:

1. Cable from Philippines dated 8 December 1941 states: "After attack now have 15 P–35's, 17 heavy bombers and 50–55 P–40's; no losses other types". This would indicate that 18 B–17's, 36 P–35's, and 86–91 P–40's were lost before or on 8 December 1941.

2. Cable from Philippines dated 12 December 1941 states: "Must conserve to maximum the 27 P–40's for reconnaissance to make a show of strength." This would further indicate that approximately 23–28 P–40's were lost between the 9th and 12th of December 1941.

3. We have no way of determining how or when the balance of the losses were incurred.

Office of Statistical Control
18 December 1945 AFSSC–2B

[5488] A True Copy as found in *History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predecessors)*. Part I, December, 1941, Installment.

(S) RICHARD L. WATSON, Jr.
Maj. A. C.

FEAF DISPOSITIONS ON DEC. 7, 1941

TABLE III.—*Status and location of aircraft (44)*

C. O.	Unit	Location	Type	Number operat.
Major O. L. Grover	24 Pur. Grp			
Lt. W. B. Putman	Hq. & Hq. Sq	Clark		
Lt. H. G. Thorne	3rd Pur. Sq	Iba	P-40E	18
1st Lt. Boyd Wagner	17th Pur	Nichols	P-40E	18
1st Lt. J. H. Moore	20th Pur	Clark	P-40B	18
1st Lt. Sam Marett	21st Pur	Del Carmen	P-35	18
1st Lt. W. E. Dyess	34th Pur	Nichols	P-40E	18
Total pursuit				90
Cpt. J. Y. Parker	2nd Obs	Clark	O-46, 52, 79	10–12
Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank	19th Bomb G Group			
Captain MacDonald	Hq. & Hq. Sq	Clark		
Major C. E. Combs	93rd Sq	Del Monte	B-17D	12
Major E. O. O'Donnell	14th Sq	Del Monte	B-17D	
Major Wm. Fisher	28th Sq	Clark	B-17D	
Major H. Gibbs	30th Sq	Clark	B-17D	18
NOTE: Two planes out of commission at Clark, also three planes of 93rd and 14th Squadron at Clark.				
6th Pursuit (Phil. Air Force): Captain Jesus A. Villamour.	6th Sq	Batangas	P-26	12
Miscellaneous		Clark Nichols Neilson	B-18	10
		Cabantuan	B-10	3
		Clark	A-27	2
		Del Monte	B-18	2

[5489] Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19 Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd Obsv.) ..... 135 or 137
All other operational tactical planes 29

Grand total operational ..... 164 or 166

44. This table has been compiled from the History 24th Pur. Grp. * * * and Journal 19 Bomb Gp. * * * Gen. Marshall in his biennial report gives the number of P–40's as 107. The discrepancy is due to the fact that table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected or out of commission.

Copy

[5490] Mr. GESELL. At page 3273 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson requested that the records be checked for any memorandum by General Marshall concerning our preparedness, similar to the memoranda for the President of 5 November and 27 November 1941 signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. A search of the War Department files for the year 1941 has disclosed no such memorandum.

At pages 4178–79 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked what codes the so-called winds messages had been sent in. Both messages—SIS Nos. 25432 and 25392—were sent not in the "Purple" code, but in the code known as "J–19".

At pages 3758 and 3760 of the transcript, Congressman Keefe asked when the first Army troops were sent to Iceland, and when the Army

relieved the Marines there. Records of the Adjutant General in connection with the memorandum we have received from the War Department indicate the following:

The first Army unit on Iceland was the 33d Pursuit Squadron, which arrived 6 August 1941.

The first Army ground troops arrived 16 September 1941.

The Marines in Iceland were not relieved at the time the Army ground troops arrived; by a Presidential directive of 22 September 1941 they were placed under General Bonesteel, the Army commander.

At page 4235 of the transcript Congressman Murphy asked [*5491*] for the initials of Colonel Bundy, head of the Plans Section of the War Plans Division in 1941. The Army Register for 1940 gives Colonel Bundy's name as Charles W. Bundy.

On December 22, 1945, the War Department advised as follows with respect to a request appearing at page 4104 of the transcript made by Senator Ferguson, who asked when the Batavia message from Thorpe for Miles (CRO222) was received in G–2—that is the so-called Batavia "winds" message. The Army has submitted to us a photostat of page 2 of the December 5, 1941, register of incoming cables of the G–2 record section, indicating that the message in question was received in that section at 8: 16 a. m., 5 December 1941.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 93.")

Mr. GESELL. On December 10, 1945, the War Department made its reply to a request by Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster concerning the original Opana plot. These requests were made at pages 372 and 373 of the transcript and at other points.

In response to these requests they have made available to us the following information which we have available for Senator Brewster's and Senator Ferguson's inspection:

Letter dated 24 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, inclosing the original radar plot of the Opana station, and various related original records.

Letter dated 21 November 1945 from the Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, in- [*5492*] closing 4 original plots of radar stations in operation on Oahu, 7 December 1941, as plotted at the information center and covering the period from 10:43 a. m. to 12 p. m., local Hawaiian time, 7 December 1941.

Letter dated 18 November 1945 from Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, with 6 inclosures.

At page 4051 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson inquired about orders relating to the relief of General Short in addition to the cable of 16 December 1941 read into the record at pages 4050 and 4051 of the transcript.

Two photostats of two cables on this subject, dated December 17, 1941, and January 6, 1942, have been made available to us by the Army and I will ask to have them spread upon the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[5493] [Telegram]

From: War Department
Bureau: Secretary, GS
OCS: WBS

DECEMBER 17, 1941.

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

For general Short only stop Chief of Staff believes it important that you remain in Hawaii during the presence there of the President's Commission stop Orders for you will issue later stop Regards end

BRYDEN.

I hereby certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

[S] W. B. Smith,
W. B. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

[Telegram]

From: War Department
Bureau: A. G. O.
AG 210.31 (1-5-42) OD-F.
JED-hrm-hg-1509-1.

JANUARY 6, 1942.

Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

[5494] Secretary of War relieves Major Generals Walter C. Short O dash 1621 US Army and Frederick L. Martin O dash 2507 US Army present assignment and duty in Hawaiian dept effective upon departure of Roberts Commission then assigns them to western defense command presidio of San Francisco, Calif to proceed that station and report to CG for duty stop travel directed necessary military service stop FD 1401 P 1 dash 06 comma 15 dash 06 A 0410 dash 2

ADAMS.

Official:

/S/ J. E. DALY,
Adjutant General.

[5495] Mr. GESELL. I would like to read at this time a memorandum submitted to us by the War Department under date of December 21, 1945, in response to a request made by counsel's office for certain information which will be apparent. The memorandum reads as follows:

In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service have been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which contained the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 1 as the word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruction of codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word "haruna" were transmitted from the following places on the dates listed (the date on which the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances where it is shown by the records.

This memorandum, the full text of which will be put into the record, discloses that the word "haruna", which was the code word, was sent by Japanese offices on December 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 located at the following points:

Panama, New York, New Orleans, Havana, Hollywood, Vancouver, Portland, Menado, Surabaya, Seattle, Ottawa, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, Dublin, Songkhla.

I will ask to have the whole memorandum put in. I thought that that would be of benefit to the committee to show that [5496]

that word "haruna" was in fact implemented and followed up and transmitted from these various points.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that put in as part of the transcript?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I think we should put that whole thing in the record and have the whole memorandum spread of record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator LUCAS. As a matter of information, Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel if that is a record showing that the messages went to these various places just indicated?

Mr. GESELL. It was the reverse, Senator. The Japanese sent out a circular message which asked for the destruction of codes and said, "When you have destroyed the codes, send the word back to show that you have done it," and on these various dates these various points reported to Tokyo that they had destroyed their codes.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether all of these had been intercepted and deciphered prior to the time of the attack? Is there any showing of that?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, there is a showing to the extent available, Senator Ferguson. Apparently the records in not every instance are complete as to whether or not they were intercepted and received, but there appear to be in that group [*5497*] nine which were intercepted and received prior to that time and then a group of five on December 8, 10, 12, and 17 which were not received until later.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GESELL. That will all appear in the full body of the memorandum in the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

(The document referred to follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 21 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell:

In response to your request, the records of the Signal Intelligence Service have been searched to ascertain if Japanese messages were intercepted which contained the word "haruna" (specified in the messages at page 215 of Exhibit 1 as the word to be used to signal compliance with Tokyo's orders for destruction of codes). The records disclose that messages containing the single word "haruna" were transmitted from the following places, on the dates listed (the date on which the intercept reached S. I. S. is also given in those instances where it is shown by the records):

[*5498*]

Message sent by Japanese office at—	Date transmitted by Japanese	Date intercept received by SIS	Message sent by Japanese office at—	Date transmitted by Japanese	Date intercept received by SIS
Panama	2 Dec	4 Dec.	Surabaya	3 Dec	(?).
New York	2 Dec	3 Dec.	Seattle	4 Dec	5 Dec.
New Orleans	2 Dec	3 Dec.	Ottawa	4 Dec	6 Dec.
Havana	2 Dec	3 Dec.	San Francisco	4 Dec	8 Dec.
Hollywood	2 Dec	5 Dec.	Chicago	6 Dec	8 Dec.
Vancouver	2 Dec	5 Dec.	Washington	6 Dec. 8:21 p. m.	10 Dec.
Portland	3 Dec	4 Dec.	Dublin	?	12 Dec.
Menado	3 Dec	?.	Songkhla	7 Dec	17 Dec.

/S/ Harmon Duncombe,
BB
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

[*5499*] Mr. GESELL. Another request made by counsel related to obtaining the intercept, if any, from Washington to Tokyo transmitting Secretary Hull's message of November 26, 1941. That intercept has been obtained and we would like to have it marked as Exhibit 94.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94."

Mr. GESELL. I would now like to read into the record a memorandum from the War Department dated December 31, 1945, reading as follows:

At page 4114 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for (a) the information which G–2 had between 26 November and 12 noon 7 December 1941 indicating that Japanese ships were moving southward, and (b) the War Department copy of the 6 December 1941 cable from Ambassador Winant to the State Department concerning Japanese ship movements.

All the documents found in the G–2 files relating to the first request are contained in Inclosures No. 1–1*d*. In addition, MID was on the distribution for the ONI Intelligence Reports for 26 November (#65), 27 November (#66), 29 November (#68), 29 November (#70), 1 December (#71), and 3 December 1941 (#72–41)—all contained in Exhibit 85. Also, attached as Inclosure [*5500*] No. 2, is a 26 November 1941 Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of War concerning a possible Japanese convoy movement toward Indo-China.

A thorough search of the War Department files has disclosed no evidence that a copy of the Winant cable was received in the War Department. However, Inclosure No. 3 shows that the 6 December despatch from CINCAF to CNO (Exhibit 66), containing similar information, was received by the Executive Officer, War Plans Division of the War Department at 1710, 6 December 1941, and the G–2 comment in item 1*d*. of Inclosure No. 1 shows that the contents of that despatch were known to G–2.

That is a very comprehensive memorandum covering that request and I think the best way of handling it would be not to read the various enclosures but to have them appear in the transcript immediately following this memorandum.

(The document referred to follows:)

[*5501*] SECRET

Controlled Information

Re: Operations of Friendly Powers

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT., AT 11:05 A. M. DECEMBER 1, 1941

From London: Filed 4:22 p. m. December 4, 1941
Received in I. H. 8:15 a. m. December 5, 1941 No. 1275

1. *Libya:* Authentic information here indicates the British have at this time approximately 180 tanks ready for battle in Libya after reinforcements were rushed to the Desert. British estimates have placed Axis tank strength at the outbreak of hostilities at 500 light tanks, 400 of which were tanks of nine tons or over. Estimates on their strength, admitted to be pretty much guesswork, were at the beginning of the present let-up in fighting around 120 tanks in combat trim.

2. *Far East:* Japanese movement for the present appears to be all out-bound, supposedly moving southward. The Commander-in-Chief at Hong Kong is the only late news from the Far East also reports there are no signs evident of Japanese concentration on Hong Kong.

3. *Russia:* British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps is protesting to the Soviet Government on the very incomplete information given the British Military Mission in Russia. The Mission Chief, still in Kuibishev, is being given nothing more [*5502*] than official Red Army communiques.

ROYCE.

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT. AT 8:45 A. M. DECEMBER 2, 1941

From London: Filed 1:40 p. m.
Received in I. B.: 11:30 a. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1249

The following is the December 1st estimate by the War Office of Japanese dispositions:

Central China Army	8 Divs.—4, 3, 13, 6, 15, 22, 34, 40.
	Ind. Brigs.—11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20.
South China Army—Canton	3 Divs.—104, 48, 18.
Swatow	1 Ind. Brig.—19th.
Formosa Army	3 Div.—28, 116, one unidentified.
Hainan Army	1 Div. unidentified.
Indo-China Army (north)	1. Div.—Guards.
(south)	3 Divs.—5, 38, 88 (from Formosa).
Navy—	
Hainan	4 large cruisers.
Saigon	1 small submarine.

[*5503*] The 2nd and 3rd China fleets moving South made up of 4 heavy and 12 light cruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 52 destroyers, and 18 submarines.

Air Force Distribution:

Formosa	71 pursuit
	24 light bombers
	42 heavy bombers
	9 reconnaissance
	10 seaplanes
Total	156
South China and Hainan	103 pursuit
	100 light bombers
	129 heavy bombers
	14 seaplanes
Total	346
French Indo-China	64 pursuit
	58 light bombers
	55 heavy bombers
	9 reconnaissance
Total	186

[*5504*] Air Ministry's note as to Indo-China airforce states that 157 of these planes are in the south and the plane strength may be reinforced in the near future. The light bombardment planes seem to be equipped with extra gas tanks for distant reconnaissance.

ROYCE.

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT. AT 12:53 P. M. DECEMBER 2, 1941

From Manila, P. I. Filed 11:29 a. m. December 1, 1941
Received in I. B. 4:05 p. m. December 2, 1941 No. 1038

A reliable American source reports that since November 10th, 6 Japanese Divisions (100,000 men) have landed at Haiphong. Also:

150 medium bombers
350 fighters
450 light tanks
50 medium tanks
200 75 mm. guns.

Source states figures taken from ship manifests.

Source states 6 Japanese Divisions on Formosa, and 3 light cruisers and 20 Japanese destroyers at Saigon.

ENGLEHART.

[*5505*] G–2 Comment:

Doubtful that Japanese transports have manifests which could be checked as indicated. The troops reported disembarked at Haiphong (in this 20-day period) are almost three times the unloading capacity of the port (ONI estimate), although on November 25th the Consul at Hanoi stated that within the last few days troop landings had mounted to 4,000 a day. On November 29th, however, the Consul at Hanoi reported "past few days no great increase in number of Japanese troops." Consular reports from Saigon, on the other hand, since November 21st, have indicated heavy arrivals to include the end of the month. G–2 accepts this radiographic report with reserve, and believes that the bulk of this force about 80,000 may have been landed in Southern rather than Northern Indo-China. (With 25,000 in Northern Indo-China the total is about 105,000.) Estimated also that not more than 3 divisions are on Taiwan, 3 on Hainan, and 2 on transports located December 1, in Camranh Bay (N. E. of Saigon).

[*5506*]

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence, Division G–2

WASHINGTON, *December 4, 1941.*

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2:
Subject: Japanese Troop Movements.

1. The following information has just been received from the State Department:

a. Taingtao, Shantung Province, North China, December 1. In the past ten days an average of 3 loaded troop transports has left this port daily. The men are believed to be from the Yangtze Valley, as they wore summer uniforms, whereas all troops in this area are in winter uniforms. (*Note:* This is estimated to imply a movement of 15,000–30,000 men, that is, one or two divisions. It probably supplements to some extent the previous sea-borne movements reported.)

b. Canton, December 2. Large land troop movements continue through Canton. Estimated 8,500 men passed eastward through the city up to noon today. It is now believed that these movements are local and indicate operations to the north and east of Canton, rather than preparations for overseas move- [*5507*] ment.

2. It is recommended that the foregoing be *not* brought specifically to the attention of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. They are details of the general picture that is already known.

In the absence of Colonel Kramer.

(S) TJB
T. J. B.

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF A SECRET MESSAGE RECEIVED AT WAR DEPT. AT 4:29 P. M. DECEMBER 6, 1941

From Singapore: Filed 5:13 p. m. December 5, 1941
Received in I. B.: 1:35 a. m. December 7, 1941 No. 96

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at 106° 8′ E., 8° N.; this was the first report.

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at 106° 20′ E., 7° 35′ N.

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.

BRINK

G–2 Comment: It is G–2's opinion that these are the same convoys reported in ONI's December 6 from "C in C China" [*5508*] through "C in CAF."

SECRET

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:
Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from 10 to 30 ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

[*5509*] I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

[s] sgd
Secretary of War.

OCS/18136–125 10

ART 411 (P COMINST, 1939)

Paraphrased versions of translations of *secret* messages may be prepared on the authority of the flag or commanding officer in cases where necessary. . . . They shall have the same classification as the original messages, and shall be safeguarded accordingly as prescribed by navy regulations. Their possession shall be vouched for by signed receipts retained by the communication officer, to whom they should be surrendered for destruction when no longer required.

NOTE: *This is the only copy of this secret message being distributed in the Navy Department. When no longer required, it should be returned to the Navy Department Communication Officer, Room 2625, for destruction and return of receipt.*

DEC. 6, 1941.

Received from the Navy Department Communication Officer one paraphrased copy of CINCAF dispatch (secret) with [*5510*] reference numbers 061255 CR 0151.

/s/ C. R. GARLING,
Maj. GSC.

Orig ------
Action ------
Cog ------ Army
Record Copy:
Delivered at 1710, by

/s/ H. S. HALL.
NAVCOM–15

[*5511*] Mr. GESELL. Now there is before each member of the committee a mimeographed statement of four pages in length entitled "Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages at pages 14–29 of Exhibit 2." These are the messages in the so-called set of military intercepts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that this paper?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; that is it. Exhibit 2 of the military intercepts at pages 14–29 are the various intercepts which were translated on the days of the 5th and 6th of December, and some of them translated subsequently.

The committee has expressed interest in what documentary information there is as to those various messages, as to when they were intercepted, when they were enciphered, when they were decoded, and when they were translated. The documentary material is summarized in this memorandum, which I think should also be spread upon the transcript at this point.

This is prepared along the lines of the memorandum which has already been submitted to the committee concerning the 14-part, 1 o'clock messages, and will facilitate subsequent testimony before the committee concerning these messages.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be spread upon the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

[*5512*] INFORMATION FROM DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON MESSAGES AT PP. 14–29 OF EXHIBIT 2

NOTE.—Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; information based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".

SIS 25817, dated 18 November, translated 6 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 14).

Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 18 November (A). Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS on or before 21 November (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25773, dated 18 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).

Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, 18 November (N & A).
Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy, 21 November (N).
Sent by Navy to Army SIS.
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 3 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25694, dated 20 November, translated 4 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).

Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, [*5513*] 20 November (N).
Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy 24 November (N).
Sent by Navy to Army SIS.
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25823, dated 29 November, translated 5 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 15).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 29 November (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 1 December (A).
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 1 December (A).
Decoded by Navy, 3 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).

SIS 26351 (Part 1) and *SIS 26352* (Part 2), dated 24 November, translated 16 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, pp. 16–17).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 25 November (A).
Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 26 November (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 16 December (A).
Decoded by Army SIS, 16 December (A).
Translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25880, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 18).

[*5514*] Intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, 28 November (A).
Airmailed to Navy; received by Navy, 2 December (N).
Sent by Navy to Army SIS.
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 25928, dated 28 November, translated 8 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 19).

Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 28 November (A).
Received by courier by Army SIS, 29 November (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 7 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 26053, dated 1 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 20).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 2 December (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS, received by Army SIS, 4 December (A).
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A).
Enciphered in a key not recovered until about 8 December (N).
Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).

SIS 27065, dated 2 December, translated 30 December, sent in code system J–19 (Exhibit 2, p. 21).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS. The translated [*5515*] message contains the notation: "This message was received here on December 23." This decode and translation was based on a copy of the Japanese coded text received by Army SIS on 23 December, by airmail from Station 5, Hawaii (A). It had been mailed from Station 5 on or after 11 December (A). The files also contain a copy of the coded text, which is marked "dupe" ("duplicate") and therefore appears to have been received by Army SIS later than the airmailed copy noted above; the "dupe" copy is on a Mackay Radio (Honolulu office) form, and appears to have been the basis of the airmailed version forwarded by Station 5.*

SIS 26065, dated 3 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 21).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS (A).
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A).
Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).

[*5516*] *SIS 26145*, dated 3 December, translated 11 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 22–24).

Intercepted by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., 3 December (N).
Received by Army SIS by courier.
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 4 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Navy (N).

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*A transmission of the message was intercepted by Navy Station S. Bainbridge Island, at 1131 GMT on 2 December (N). This version, received by the Navy on 6 December by airmail, was badly garbled and was not further processed (N).

SIS 26066, dated 3 December translated 10 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 24).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, 4 December (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS.
Sent by Army SIS to Navy, 5 December (A).
Decoded by Navy, 8 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).

SIS 26161, dated, 4 December, translated 12 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 25).

Intercepted at Army Station 2, San Francisco, 5 December (A).
Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS 8 December (A).
Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

SIS 26029, dated 5 December, translated 10 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26).

Intercepted by Army station 2, San Francisco, 6 December (N).
Airmailed to Army SIS; received by Army SIS, 8 December (A).
Sent by Army SIS to Navy.
Decoded by Navy, 9 December (N).
Translated by Navy (N).

[*5517*] *SIS 26158*, dated 6 December, translated 12 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 26).

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

This decode and translation was on the basis of a Japanese coded text received by Army SIS by radio from Army Station 5, Hawaii, apparently on 11 December. The files do not show whether the Japanese text was obtained by intercepting the transmission or from the commercial cable company (the date on which it was obtained is now shown).*

SIS 25877, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, pp. 27–28).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0022 GMT, 7 December (7:22 p. m., Washington time, 6 December) (A).

Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Va., was received by Army SIS not later than 7 December (time now shown), and is marked "dupe" (A), indicating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.

Decoded and translated by Army SIS (A).

[*5518*] *SIS 25874*, dated 6 December, translated 8 December, sent in code system PA–K2 (Exhibit 2, p. 29).

Intercepted by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0542 GMT, 7 December (12:42 a. m., 7 December, Washington time) (A).

Sent by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time sent by teletype. Another copy, sent by Station 2 by airmail, was received by Army SIS at 2:33 p. m., 8 December, and is marked "dupe" (A), indicating that the teletype copy had arrived previously.

Mr. GESELL. Now I come to the somewhat confused question of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck. We have had a number of requests concerning his memoranda, and I will try, if I can, to make clear to the committee the present situation as to those memoranda.

There was first a request by Congressman Keefe, to which I have already referred, asking for memoranda dated December 1. Those were made available to him, and I believe were read into the record by him at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Just one. The other one was not.

Mr. GESELL. I believe there was one that was read, you are right, Congressman Murphy, and the other was not.

*The Army files also contain a copy intercepted by Navy Station S, Bainbridge Island, which was received by the Navy by airmail on 8 December (N), and sent by the Navy to Army SIS.

There was a request by Senator Ferguson for Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum read at the Joint Board meeting of November 3, which should be included among the documents relating to the [*5519*] November 5 joint memorandum, and we have obtained Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum of October 31, 1941, which I would like to introduce at this time and have spread upon the transcript in response to that request.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one dated October 31?

Mr. GESELL. October 31, 1941. That is before the members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that the one I hold here, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. I think so, Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Dated October 31, 1941?

Mr. GESELL. That is the one.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Which is headed "Memorandum by Doctor Hornbeck"?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it does not show to whom it was distributed?

Mr. GESELL. No. It was read at the Joint Board meeting.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. GESELL. The people attending that meeting appear in the other documentation. I think it is tied in. I think it was not addressed because he simply had it before him to read, apparently.

(The document referred to follows:)

[*5520*] MEMORANDUM BY DOCTOR HORNBECK OCTOBER 31, 1941

I believe that there is warrant for an opinion that for several days the Japanese have been see-sawing in an effort to come to a decision. While watching the situation in Europe and on the Atlantic, they have been putting additional troops at the rate of about "1,000 per day" and some equipment into Indo-China and have been carefully watching to see whether we say or do anything indicative of any determined objection on our part. They have been given no indication of any intention on our part to place any effective obstacle in the way of their continued penetration of Indo-China. It is my feeling that, in the absence of such indication, they have about made up their minds to go ahead more strongly. It is my further feeling that if such an indication were given by us now, the interjection of that indication might substantially influence the situation and cause the Japanese further to postpone coming to a decision.

Another line of action, not exclusive of the line above suggested, open to us is to rush aid, especially planes and pilots, with or without parallel action by the British, to the Chinese. This would, of course, involve a difficult decision and it is perhaps politically impracticable, but it is not physically impossible.

Another course open to us is—to do nothing.

I am convinced that it would be highly inadvisable politically to make to Chiang Kai-Shek any evasive, noncommittal [*5521*] or merely hortatory reply.

If we are not prepared and willing to follow one or the other or both of the first two courses outlined above, it would, in my opinion, be best that we at this moment preserve silence.

If we do not follow one or the other or both of those courses, we should expect to see the situation in the Far East deteriorate rapidly. If we will follow one or the other or both of those courses there is a chance that Japan will continue to hesitate and that Chinese resistance will continue, temporarily at least, at its present level of defensive effectiveness.

That there is risk in making firm representations to the Japanese no one can deny or should try to deny, but that there is greater risk in not making such

representations I for one am and long have been convinced. By taking the risk which such action would entail, we at least have the chance of further restraining Japan. By not taking that risk we would permit it to become almost a certainty that Japan will strike hard at the Chinese and Chinese power to resist (to say nothing of morale) will be substantially diminished.

If, having taken the risk, we should find armed hostilities between Japan and ourselves thrust upon us, there would then exist a situation than which a good many other conceivable situations might be worse.

[*5522*] With Japan as comparatively weak as she is today and with this country as comparatively strong as it is today, we need not fear unduly the military outcome—or even the immediate consequences—of such a conflict. This country is physically capable now of waging a properly conducted war with Japan and at the same time carrying on in the Atlantic all operations which it would be advantageous for us to make our business up to such time as production of materials on our part may make it practicable for the British, with or without us as associates in war, to take the offensive in the struggle with Germany.

Mr. GESELL. Now there was also a request made by Senator Ferguson for certain specific memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck bearing various dates. One of those was for any memorandum dated November 27, 1941.

That memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck has been located by the Department of State. It is dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations." When it was found in the files there were attached to it two subsequent memoranda, apparently provoked by some reference to this memorandum that appeared in Mr. Drew Pearson's column. Accordingly, we have had reproduced all of the memoranda, not only Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum of November 27, but his subsequent comments on it. That is the document the top page of which is dated November 2, [*5523*] 1944, memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck to the Special Assistant to the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have that?

Mr. GESELL. That is before the members of the committee. I ask that all of these memoranda be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The documents referred to follow:)

[In handwriting:] Not to be *removed from file* except with permission of Chief.
(Signature illegible.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

NOVEMBER 2, 1944.

The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities," indexed as 711.94/2512 PS/GD., Confidential File, is a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation.

For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the memorandum of November 27, 1941.

(s) SKH

SA/H;SkH:MZS

[*5524*] FEBRUARY 28, 1944.

On Sunday evening, February 20, Mr. Drew Pearson made in his radio broadcast certain statements regarding Mr. Stanley Hornbeck. Among these, as reported to Mr. Hornbeck on February 21 by the State Department's recorder,

was a statement that: "On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a memorandum stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen days later she did attack Pearl Harbor."

On February 27, Mr. Pearson made in his column of that day certain statements regarding Mr. Hornbeck. There, inter alia, he stated that: "* * * on November 22, 1941, just 15 days before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack the United States."

Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts?

Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any memorandum of estimate or prediction. He did on November 27 write a memorandum giving an estimate of "probabilities." Knowledge of the existence of such a memorandum was at some time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who had knowledge thereof to some member or members of the press. There appeared in a Washington newspaper in August 1942 under the dateline "By United Press" an article purporting to compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Grew with that of Mr. Hornbeck—unfavorable to the latter. In the course of that article there was given an account of "Hornbeck's 5–1 odds," as follows:

"In contrast to that record (citations of occasions on which Mr. Grew had 'advised the United States to guard against a possible surprise attack') was the viewpoint of the State Department adviser on political relations, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck. Hornbeck was of the opinion, even after the truculent statements of Japan's two ambassadors, Kichisaburo Nomura and Sabusu Kurusu, that Japan was bluffing.

"Hornbeck's idea was that Japan would not dare attack the United States, that it was bogged down in China and that the most that need be feared was an intensified campaign against the Burma Road.

"In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants that if the situation was viewed as a gambling proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would still be at peace a month later. He said it was even money that the United States and Japan would not be at war some months later."

The contents of that story indicate that there was a "leak," with apparently prejudicial purpose, somewhere and at some time antedating the moment of the publication of the UP article under reference. It may be presumed that Mr. Pearson [*5526*] has had knowledge of that article or has been told by someone somewhere a story identical with or similar to the story on which the statements in that article were based.

Now what are the facts regarding a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck is alleged to have written to the Secretary of State on November 22?

To begin with, Mr. Hornbeck did not write on November 22 *any* memorandum of the type indicated. With regard to a memorandum which Mr. Hornbeck did write (on November 27), see *infra*.

Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an encounter with some other country, such a collision was bound some day to occur. During the "exploratory conversation" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position that the only "peaceful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement on her own terms wherein she might have the assent of the United States to her program of conquest in the Far East. By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of [*5527*] force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the possibilities of the situation.

On September 3, in the light of all information at that time available to him, Mr. Hornbeck expressed an opinion that Japan would not attack the United States within the next three months.

On November 3, Mr. Hornbeck advised that the last remaining United States landed armed forces in China be promptly withdrawn.

On November 20, Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu presented to the Secretary of State the last of various proposals advanced by the Japanese Government or agents thereof during 1941 or an agreement between Japan and the United States. Six days later, on November 26, the Secretary of State gave to Messrs.

Nomura and Kurusu papers which became the last of the statements of counter-proposal made by the American Government during the course of the "exploratory conversations" which had been going on for several months.

On the next day, November 27, Mr. Hornbeck wrote an informal memorandum entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of Situation and Certain Probabilities." That memorandum began with a statement, "The Japanese Government has [*5528*] made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations." He then stated that Mr. Kurusu's mission had had two principal objectives, and that Mr. Kurusu had achieved neither of those objectives. He then moved into the field of "forming conclusions as to what is probable". He stated that in his opinion, "The Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward 'bringing China to her knees' "; he expressed the opinion that, "The Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have *forthwith* armed conflict with the United States"; and he said that, "were it a matter of placing bets", he would give odds of 5 to 1 that the United States and Japan would *not* be at "war" on or before December 15, he would wager 3 to 1 that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January, and he would wager even money that the United States and Japan would not be at "war" on or before March 1. "Stated briefly", he said, "the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." Continuing, he said: "The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both." And, in conclusion, he said: "There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards [*5529*] the interests of the United States, by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms of 'concessions' by us in return for 'pledges' (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at *war* in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific. The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Washington, not in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo."

Examination of the whole content of the memorandum of November 27, 1941 shows that its author was offering not a long-range forecast but an estimate of situation in terms of short-range *probabilities;* that he nowhere suggested that Japan would not (or that she "would never") attack the United States; that, although he was of the opinion that the Japanese Government was not intending "to have armed conflict *forthwith* with the United States", he clearly perceived—and so indicated, as he had done many times before—that the situation was rapidly moving toward such conflict. In suggesting odds of 5-to-1 against "war" within the next *three* [*5530*] *weeks*, at 3-to-1 against "war" within the next *seven weeks*, and at 1-to-1 against "war" within the next fourteen weeks; in affirming that within that period "there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic"; and in refraining from even a tentative prognostication *beyond* that period, he implied that he considered that the sands were fast running out. In stating, in conclusion: "The question of more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington", he both admitted and affirmed that in the situation then prevailing in American-Japanese relations almost anything *might* before long happen.

All this is a far cry from the purport of the charge that "On November 22 (*sic*), 1941, just fifteen days before Pearl Harbor he (Hornbeck) wrote an important memorandum to the Secretary of State advising that Japan would never attack the United States."

Especially to be noted regarding this whole matter is the fact that Mr. Hornbeck's memorandum under reference was written not on November 22 (which was during the period while the question of reply to be made to the Japanese proposals of November 20 was under consideration) but on November 27 (which was after the American Government had reached its [*5531*] decision and the Secretary of State had—on November 26—made this Government's reply).

(NOTE.—The memorandum of November 27, 1941 is in the confidential files of the Department of State under index number 711.94/2512.)

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

PROBLEM OF FAR EASTERN RELATIONS—ESTIMATE OF SITUATION AND CERTAIN PROBABILITIES

The Japanese Government has made certain plans, some of which are absolute and some of which are conditional, for new military operations.

Mr. Kurusu's mission has had two principal objectives: (1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms of agreement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if possible, what action, positive or negative, the United States might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by Japan.

The American Government has now given clear indication that it has no intention of making "concessions" to Japan which would be inconsistent with the declared principles and the general objectives of American foreign policy and that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to policies and practice, past and present and future, or ag- [*5532*] gression on Japan's part.

(Handwritten note): Tallied to PA/H on Dec. 4, 1941 and returned to file on November 8, 1944. (Signature illegible).

Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the first objective of his mission.

The Japanese Government has given, during the course of the "exploratory conversations", clear evidence that it is not that Government's intention at the present time to disassociate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other regions in the Far East, and establishing a "new order" and a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the western and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly designed for offensive rather than merely defensive operations. It has shown that it clearly intends to persevere in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by the methods of threat of force or use of force—which means continuance of contribution to instability rather than stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.

The United States has not shown what action it will take on the positive side in the event of Japan's taking one or another of several possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may have gained certain impressions, but he cannot be sure. Mr. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of his mission.

The business of prophesying involves a procedure of [*5533*] examining facts and, as among various developments conceived to be possible, forming conclusions as to what is probable.

A prophecy is an expression by an individual or a group of individuals of an opinion as to what is going to happen.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese intend at this moment to persevere in and to intensify their operations toward "bringing China to her knees". They have hoped that out of the conversations with the American Government they would extract something which would facilitate their effort toward that objective. Even now, they have not entirely abandoned hope of getting from us either positive or negative action helpful to them in pursuit of that objective.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have *forthwith* armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned [*5534*] there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15 (the date by which General Gerow has affirmed that he would be "in the clear" so far as consummation of certain disposals of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January (i. e., 7 weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have "time" for further preparation and disposals). These ventures into the field of speculative prediction are posited on an assumption that our definition of "war"

must be the same in reference to activities and events in the Pacific that it is in regard to activities and events in the Atlantic; the indicated wagers are offered on an assumption that, although there may be some armed encounters similar to those to which we have been and are a party in the Atlantic, there will not be a recognized "state of war" such as to disrupt substantially or put an end to the present program of our Army and Navy for disposal [*5535*] within the periods mentioned of equipment and men for "defensive" and general purposes—Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of "war" in the Pacific.

Japan has her disposals so made that she might now move against Russia or move against the Dutch East Indies or move against Thailand or launch some new operations in and against China. *But*, a move against Russia would be a major operation involving very substantial hazards for Japan; and it would be a move from which, once begun, it would be hard for Japan to withdraw. A move by Japan against the Dutch East Indies would involve for Japan a risk of armed embroilment with Great Britain and possibly the United States; it would involve a risk of developing into a major operation.

A move by Japan now against Thailand would be a move which need not require great effort or involve great risk; if made, it would have a twofold objective, on the one hand and exploration of British and American reaction, and on the other hand a possible gaining of advantageous position in connection with and for operations against the Burma Road and therefore toward bringing closer to an end the "China incident". A move on Japan's part via Indochina into Yunnan and toward putting the Burma Road out of commission (especially by continuous air attack) would involve little risk of embroilment with Great Britain or the United States, [*5536*] would not necessarily involve a major effort, and could be halted or be withdrawn from at any time should developments in the general situation render such action advisable in the opinion of Japan's military leaders.

The reasonable probability is that Japan's new military operations of the near future will be directed either toward gaining position in Thailand or operations against Yunnan and the Burma Road or both.

If, when and as Japan makes either or both of those moves, Japan will ipso facto be further disclosing what are her political and military policies and will be further extending herself as regards military disposals and effort and as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity (economic, social, political and military); she will be weakening her position in the event of there coming, later, armed conflict between herself and the United States; she will be exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank and from rear, if and when, by the United States; and she will be adding to the number of her enemies and the weight of a public opinion adverse to her in the United States and the British Empire.

There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that the situation in the Pacific has been made worse, as regards the interests of the United States by refusal on the part of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms [*5537*] of "concessions" by us in return for "pledges" (qualified and hedged around pledges) by Japan to keep the peace while continuing to make war and to prepare for more war. Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every one of her near neighbors and even on the United States. No price that we might have paid to Japan would buy or produce peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) in the Pacific.

The question or more war or less war in the Pacific rests at this moment in the control of minds and hearts in Tokyo, not in the control of minds and hearts in Washington.

/s/ SKH

PA/H: SKH: FLB

Mr. GESELL. Now there was also a request made and an interest expressed in memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck relating to the question of the basing of the fleet. We have now in hand three memoranda which seem to have some relation to that subject.

The first is a memorandum dated July 12, 1940, which contains a handwritten note on the front page with the initials of Captain Schuirmann and Admiral Stark saying:

Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking officer [5358] mentioned is Admiral Richardson.

I think the paper is slightly academic.

That memorandum apparently refers to a conversation between Admiral Richardson and Dr. Hornbeck of July 11, 1940. I would like to have it marked as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. May we get that exhibit number?

Mr. GESELL. Number 95.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95.")

Mr. GESELL. The next is a very substantial document of 50-some pages in length, which is before the members of the committee, bearing the date July 16, 1940, the second sheet of which gives the title of the memorandum as follows: "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of U. S. Far Eastern Policy. July 4, 1940."

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that from page 7 to page 15 is a detailed discussion of the question of the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. We have reproduced the entire memorandum feeling we should not take any portion of it out of context. This memorandum is not signed by Dr. Hornbeck but we believe it is Dr. Hornbeck's memorandum, since in the Navy Department files it appears with his other memoranda and, as best can be told from surrounding circumstances, it is in his style.

[5539] The CHAIRMAN. What do you want to do with it?

Mr. GESELL. That will be Exhibit 96, Senator, if you please.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96.")

Mr. GESELL. Now I have here a series of memoranda of which the top one is dated September 21, 1940, prepared by Dr. Hornbeck and made available by the Department of State, also relating to the question of the fleet dispositions, which we will have marked Exhibit 97.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 97.")

Mr. GESELL. Now, in addition, there are a number of Hornbeck memoranda which relate to other topics bearing various dates, December 1940, November 20, 1941, May 20, 1941, November 30, 1941, and others as well, obtained from the Navy files or Army files and State Department files.

These memoranda we have bunched together and are sending to Congressman Keefe in response to his request for all memoranda of Dr. Hornbeck. I believe that the ones we have here cover the matters in which the committee has expressed particular interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have that memorandum before us in this file?

[5540] Mr. GESELL. You have all the ones we introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the one you sent to Congressman Keefe.

Mr. GESELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not let us all have that?

Mr. GESELL. We thought perhaps he would send those around. We will try to reproduce them, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought maybe you had them here.

Mr. GESELL. No, we haven't any copies. We have not been able to find anything in them that is pertinent, but perhaps they may be of background value.

The CHAIRMAN. We will see how that will work out after you pass them out.

Mr. GESELL. Now our attention was called to a matter which we felt we should immediately bring to the committee's attention.

The committee will recall that the G–2 estimates were introduced when General Miles was on the stand in the pink volume designated Exhibit 33. Among those was an estimate dated October 2, 1941. Examination of the memorandum in its photostatic form—that was the memorandum to the Chief of Staff, October 2, 1941, subject: Japanese-American Relations, signed by Hayes A. Kroner, Colonel, General Staff—discloses there is written on a copy, which is apparently the copy distributed to Secretary Stimson, a note in his handwriting, [*5541*] and in order to make the record complete I would like to read that note into the record now, and offer the photostat of that particular memorandum as a related exhibit to exhibit 33, that is, Exhibit 33–A.

The note reads:

Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them strongly. I believe, however, that during the next three months while we are re-arming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an explosion by the Japanese army. Put concretely this means that while I approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President and P. M.—

I think that means Prime Minister and not a New York newspaper.

I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally important relations with China.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33–A.")

Senator LUCAS. Who was responsible for that memorandum?

Mr. GESELL. Col. Hayes A. Kroner, who was General Miles' chief assistant, and Secretary Stimson wrote what I have just read.

The CHAIRMAN. That handwriting is the handwriting of Secretary Stimson and not Colonel Kroner?

[*5542*] Mr. GESELL. That is right. It is on his copy which was distributed to him. He was one of the distributees.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I try to get this straight a moment? This is the memorandum that came out of the Secretary of War's files?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you found that note written only on his paper?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not in any of the other papers in other files?

Mr. GESELL. That is right, Senator. So that the record is clear on it we offer the actual document with his handwriting in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that printed or made an exhibit?

Mr. GESELL. Made an exhibit. I read the portion that we want in the record. Copies of that are before each member of the committee. You will find one among your set.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel undertake to say it is in the handwriting of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson?

Mr. GESSELL. Yes. As Exhibit 48–A, simply to complete the documentation, I would like to introduce the memorandum from the Chief

of Staff to General Gerow concerning the subject matter of exhibit 48 which General Marshall made [*5543*] available after his testimony. It is of no particular importance, but simply fills out the documentation.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 48–A.")

[*5544*] Mr. GESELL. Also, we would like to offer as the next exhibit, Exhibit 98, a memorandum from the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, to the President, dated November 26, 1941, concerning the Japanese convoy movements toward Indochina.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have that?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. That is before the members of the committee.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 98.")

Mr. GESELL. Now, there has been distributed to the committee, but we noted that we have failed to introduce it as an exhibit, a mimeographed statement of two pages entitled "Telephone calls from outside through White House switchboard on 11/25–26, 11/27, and 11/28/41 as compiled from operators' notes available." I think it might be well to have that memorandum spread upon the transcript so it becomes a matter of record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

[*5545*] TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD ON 11/25, 11/26, 11/27, AND 11/28/41 AS COMPILED FROM OPERATOR'S NOTES AVAILABLE

Nov. 25.
730A VP Wallace cld Secy Wickard—OK.
854A AG cld VP Wallace—LWC—OK 940A.
930A Judge Patterson cld Robert Lovett—OK.
1050A Judge Patterson cld McCloy—O of C—OK.
1045A Secy Ickes cld AG—LWC—OK 1130A
11AM Mr. Stettinius cld Jesse Jones—OK.
1205P Jesse Jones cld PMG—OK.
1215P Mr. Blandford cld Secy Wickard—OK.
1227P PMG cld Secy Hull—LWC—OK 330P
1245P Secy Wickard cld Mr. Blandford—OK.
1254P Mr. Blandford cld Wickard—OK.
100P Secy Jones cld Mr. Knudsen—at Lunch—NM.
154P Ad'm. Stark cld Gen. Marshall—LWC.
259P Mr. Stettinius cld Gen. Marshall—LWC.
345P Gen. Marshall cld Ed. Stettinius—OK.
405P PMG cld Secy Hull—OK.
415P Secy Knox cld PMG—OK.
420P General Marshall—cld Ad'm. Stark—OK.
425P Secy Stimson cld Secy State Hull—OK.
500P Ad'm. Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
510P General Marshall cld Ed. Stettinius—OK.
[*5546*] 510P James Forrestal cld Secy Stimson—Talked Judge Patterson—OK
515P James Forrestal cld Knudsen—OK.
520P Wayne Coy cld Judge PattersonPP—OK.
530P PMG cld Secy Hull—LWC—530P OK.
Nov. 26.
707A Secy Stimson cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
915A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
950A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
1022A Mr. Forrestal cld Donald Nelson—OK.
1025A Mr. Forrestal cld Leon Henderson—OK.
1030A Mr. Forrestal cld Judge Patterson—OK.
1030A Ad'm. Stark cld. General Marshall, Miss Thomas talked—OK.
115P Secy Hull cld Ad'm. Stark—OK.

125P Ad'm. Stark cld General Marshall—NM.
159P Secy Perkins cld Wells—LWC.
235P Ad'm Stark cld Secy Hull—OK 345P
253P Gov'r. McNutt cld Secy Stimson—OK.
508P Secy Welles cld Secy Perkins—OK.
530P James Forrestal cld Judge Patterson—OK.
615P Ad'm Stark cld Secy Knox—OK.
Nov. 27.
852A Mr. Forrestal cld Sumner Welles—LWC—RTD Call 954A.
853A Mr. Forrestal cld Secy Morgenthau—LWC—OK 11AM.
[5547] 917A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
1025A James Forrestal cld Secy Welles—OK.
1044A Secy Knox cld Ad'm. Stark—OK.
1045A Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—LWC—11 AM OK.
1048A Ad'm. Stark cld Secy Hull—LWC—OK 11A.
1135A Secy Morgenthau cld Ben. Cohen—OK.
1230P James Forrestal cld Jesse Jones—OK.
1240P Judge Patterson cld Wayne Coy—LWC.
302P Wayne Coy cld Mr. Stettinius—OK.
337P Judge Patterson cld Mr. Forrestal—LWC.
350P Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
410P Jesse Jones cld James Forrestal—LWC.
500P Secy Hull cld Ad'm. Stark—LWC—O of C, Capt. Sherman talked—OK.
530P James Forrestal cld Judge Patterson—OK.
545P James Forrestal cld Jesse Jones—OK.
842P J. Rowe cld Miss McDonough—LWC—Mr. Rowe WCAM.
900P Jesse Jones cld Secy Hull—OK.
901P Jesse Jones cld AG—OK.
Nov. 28.
839A Ad'm. Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
900A Judge Patterson cld Robert Lovett—OK.
1032A Ag cld VP.—OK.
1058A Jesse Jones cld Knudsen—OK.
1129A Jesse Jones cld James Forrestal—OK.
[5548] 1150A Judge Patterson cld Wayne Coy—LWC.
1230P James Forrestal cld Don Nelson—
1245P Secy Welles cld Ad'm. Stark—in Conf—NM.
207P VP cld Secy Morgenthau—OK.
217P VP cld Nelson Rockefeller—LWC.
249P Ad'm. Stark cld Secy Hull—Talked to Mr. Stone—OK.
411P Wayne Coy cld Dir. Smith—OK.
525P Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—Talked with Hornbeck—OK.
525P Secy Stimson cld Secy Knox—OK.

[5549] Mr. GESELL. In order to complete the documentation as we go along on the events of the 6th and 7th we would like also to introduce and have designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 99, a memorandum prepared by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Hamilton, Department of State, dated September 26, 1944, stating their then recollection of what took place in Secretary Hull's office on December 7 concerning the Japanese intercepted messages. That has already been distributed to the committee at an earlier date.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99.")

Mr. GESELL. It may be helpful to have it set forth in the transcript, for the convenience of the committee. It is a short memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be copied in the transcript.

(Exhibit No. 99 follows:)

[5550]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
September 26, 1944.

Top Secret

There is attached a page from the *Congressional Record* of September 21, 1944, in which there is a statement by Congressman Church in respect to the delivery of

a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant Commander Kramer of the Navy Department.

Our recollection of the matter is as follows: At about 10 a. m. on December 7 Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer office of the Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with Japan. They were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then serving as an assistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of which were pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the Secretary and which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was present in the room. The document contained no reference to any Japanese military movement. Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine are positive that no statement was made in their presence by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, as alleged, to the [*5551*] effect that "this looks like a sunrise attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines."

The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scattered among those present in the room. In other words, each person was not a party to all of the conversation. Mr. Hornbeck has a distinct impression that there was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most recent advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam.

Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked on that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on December 7, that the naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese movement. No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines.

With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether this was a fact.

/s/ JWB.

FE: Ballantine: HST

/s/ M. M. H.

[*5552*] Mr. GESELL. Now, there is also a committee request for copies of the interrogation made by intelligence officers of the Japanese prisoner of war No. 1, a Japanese officer in charge of the midget submarine taken prisoner at Bellows Field December 8, 1941. We have made copies of that available to each member of the committee. This document was previously used as exhibit 68 in the Hewitt investigation. I would like to have it designated as the next exhibit, Exhibit 100. Copies of it are available to the members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100.")

Mr. GESELL. Also to make the record complete we have the question of the logs of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* and U. S. S. *Lexington*. Those logs were made available to Congressman Keefe and used by him in questioning Admiral Turner, I believe. We subsequently obtained them back and had them photostated. I think we would like at this time to introduce as Exhibit 101 a duplicate copy of the log of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* covering the period November 24, 1941, to December 16, 1941, and as Exhibit 102 a duplicate copy of the log of the U. S. S. *Lexington* covering the period of December 5, 1941, through December 8, 1941, and Exhibit 103 a duplicate copy of the action reports of the air group of the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, Serial No. 579 of December 15, 1941, and as Exhibit 104 a duplicate copy of the war diary [*5553*] of the U. S. S. *Lexington* for December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 101, 102, 103, and 104, respectively.)

Mr. GESELL. The Navy Department has advised that according to the Office of Naval Records and Library there are no action reports

of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* and the U. S. S. *Lexington* previous to February 1942.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question on that last?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Is there anything in those exhibits which bears directly on things that the committee ought to know?

Mr. GESELL. Those exhibits cover the activities of the *Enterprise*, for example, in the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. They establish the time when the planes were launched from the *Enterprise*, which subsequently became engaged in combat with the Japs over Pearl Harbor. They will undoubtedly be useful to the committee when Admiral Halsey, who was in command of the *Enterprise* and who is on the list of witnesses, is a witness. I think they are useful background information.

Now, we have obtained clearance from the British for the so-called British estimates, and I would like to introduce that as the next exhibit, Exhibit 105, dated October 21, 1941, and [*5554*] November 21, 1941, respectively. They are before the members of the committee. I introduce them as one exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be what number?

Mr. GESELL. No. 105, Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 105.")

Mr. GESELL. I think that completes the partial report on the committee's requests for various material. In connection with some of the requests, we are going to be in a position to distribute in the next day or so material in response to those requests.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks the counsel for their diligence in making the interim report on the various requests made.

Are you ready now to proceed?

Mr. MITCHELL. We are ready to call Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark.

[*5555*] TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY[1]

(Admiral Stark was first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, what is your present rank and station?

Admiral STARK. Admiral, United States Navy. I am on terminal leave.

Mr. MITCHELL. You served as Chief of Naval Operations from August 1, 1939, until March 25, 1942?

Admiral STARK. I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that you have a statement you would like to present to the committee at this time. Is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Before you refer to the statement, I would like to offer in evidence as Exhibit 106 a file, which the committee has, giving Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Kimmel's replies.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 106.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, if you will present your statement.

[1] See suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm. Stark in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2671 et seq.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me a moment, please, General Mitchell. It is noted here on the receipt to be signed for [5556] this document, "Please hand the bearer for delivery volume entitled 'H. R. Stark letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel' which is superseded by the volume referred to above." It is understood that this covers all correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. MITCHELL. All papers that they were asked to surrender. That came about this way: The letter was written by Admiral Stark at one time and was replied to by Admiral Kimmel at another time, so we just put them together in one volume in chronological order.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure the committee appreciates that very valuable assistance given by the counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. This does not contain all the correspondence between them, because they had some letters that were personal, that had no relation to the case. These are the letters that both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel agree, as I understand it, are the ones to be brought to the attention of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My purpose of inquiring was to know whether I could disregard the previous copies that were furnished and consider that this contains everything that is pertinent to this inquiry, as to the letters passing between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct, sir.

[5557] Senator FERGUSON. May I make an inquiry in order to straighten out a matter that is in my mind? Are there any new letters in this volume that are not in the two previous volumes?

Mr. GESELL. I think there are one or two new letters in there. In the main, they cover the material in the other two documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Sometime will counsel point out what the new ones are?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; we will do that after the recess.

Senator LUCAS. As I understand now, counsel for Admiral Stark and counsel for Admiral Kimmel agree that these are the letters that are pertinent and material to the inquiry?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is the understanding.

Admiral, will you proceed with your statement, please?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I should like to ask the indulgence of the committee. This statement is rather long and there are a good many parts in it that have already appeared in the testimony, some of which I will not read, with the committee's permission.

Also it was made, with the exception of possibly four words which have been deleted, before any of the hearings before this committee.

In other words, this statement has been influenced not [5558] at all by what came out before this committee. It is the picture as I wanted to present it at this time, not knowing whether I would be the first witness or the last.

The CHAIRMAN. You will indicate, Admiral, such parts, when you read them in your statement, that you will leave out?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But the whole document will go in as your statement.

[5559] Admiral STARK (reading):

1. I served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1 August 1939 until 25 March 1942. During that time the position of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and that of Commander in Chief, United States

Fleet (CINCUS), were not combined, but were separate. The Commanders in Chief, United States Fleet, during the period from 1 August 1939 to 7 December 1941, were Admiral Claude C. Bloch (29 January 1938 to 6 January 1940), Admiral James O. Richardson (6 January 1940 to 1 February 1941), and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (1 February 1941 to 17 December 1941).

2. Navy Regulations, made pursuant to an act of Congress, charge the Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the general direction of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.

3. When I became Chief of Naval Operations, the situation in Europe was tense, and war broke out early in September. The President immediately (5 September 1939) proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and declared the existence of a national emergency (8 September 1939). He also authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps to 145,000 and 25,000, respectively.

[*5560*] DUTY TO PRESENT NAVY'S NEEDS TO CONGRESS

4. In November 1939, I appeared before the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee for the funds necessary to bring enlisted strength of the Navy and Marine Corps up to the numbers authorized by the President. The Department was also asking for funds to recommission 80 ships, including 68 destroyers and supporting units, to safeguard our neutrality. I pointed out that in spite of the Navy's feeling that our ships should always be 100 percent manned, we had been getting along for years with allowances which were only 85 percent of complement. The additional men for which funds were requested immediately were only enough to enable us to man the recommissioned ships and increase the allowances on all ships to an average of just over 89 percent. I told the Committee that it was essential that the fleet be at least 100 percent manned. I felt it highly desirable that we be 15 percent overmanned in order to provide a seagoing reservoir to assist in the manning of ships going into commission—both old and new. At that time, however, the Bureau of the Budget permitted us to request only sufficient increases in manpower to put new ships in commission and to maintain our allowances at about 90 percent of complement. In this connection, I told the Committee that the Department expected to ask for funds for enough men in the next regular appropriation bill to bring the fleet up to 100 percent of complement.

[*5561*] 5. In January 1940 I appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee in support of an increase of 25 percent in the size of the Navy. I would like to read an extract from the statement I made at that time:

> The international situation has altered substantially. World conditions today presage a greater menace to our peace than was the case a year ago. The events which have taken place since then are so fresh in the mind of everyone that I do not need to detail them. I believe everyone will agree that the international situation has deteriorated and that there is no immediate prospect that it will improve. The situation is rife with possibilities of a general European war and, in conjunction with Far Eastern conditions, presents a threat of world conflagration.

In the world of today it seems only a fair and moderate statement to say that the best interests of our Nation will be served by keeping our own force sufficiently strong to be an effective deterrent against foreign aggression.

Although the building programs of other naval powers are not definitely known, and in some cases not even approximately known, it is a reasonable supposition that those nations now at war are building to the maximum augmented wartime capacity of their shipbuilding industries. All other considerations aside, if the United States does not take [*5562*] immediate action toward increasing the strength of its fleet, the end of the present war will find us in a relatively weak naval position.

Therefore, it is my considered opinion, as I believe it will be that of the great majority of our people, when the significance of the situation is understood, that a substantial expansion, approximately 25 percent, of our Navy should be planned and undertaken at once.

6. The bill, as passed by the House, provided only an 11 percent increase, and although I pressed the Senate Committee in April 1940 to restore the provision for a 25 percent increase, the bill as finally approved carried only 11 percent. While the result was not what we wanted, it did not substantially hamper our development, for it allowed us all we could start work on at that time with the facilities then available to us.

7. In May 1940, we asked Congress to authorize us to acquire as many planes as might be necessary to maintain the stock of useful naval planes at not less than 10,000. As a part of our request for a 25 percent increase in the Navy as a whole, we asked that the authorized number of naval aircraft be increased from 3,000 to 6,000. After that program was submitted, the international situation became much worse, and it was apparent that we would need even more naval aircraft. In presenting the program for 10,000 planes to the House and Senate [*5563*] Naval Affairs Committee, I said:

We have in the world today classic examples of the lack of preparedness and readiness which are being borne home to every thinking man and woman.

The importance of time, which I stressed when last before this committee and which every student of war appreciates, has also been brought home to us, as it has to those in their life and death struggle, and where in some cases there has already been written "too late".

We have been prone to criticize others, feeling that somehow or other we have been sitting over here in comparative security. That feeling, too, has been given some rude jolts in recent weeks and I believe that wishful thinking is finally being replaced by consideration of cold facts and the necessity that we ourselves take immediate steps toward greater preparedness in order that we too may not some day write "too late". The word "speed" has taken on new significance.

* * * * * *

We can put our trust only in ourselves and it is self-evident we must be strong, both within and without, to have any real sense of security.

Nations desiring peace must be stronger than those desiring war.

[*5564*] * * * * * * *

* * * The need for immediate and expedited rearmament has become more apparent. The handicap to a Navy engaged in continuous war operations at sea, of an inadequate naval air arm, has received, and continues to receive, tragic demonstration. The indispensability of naval aircraft constructed for, trained for, and organized for prompt and continuous action at sea with ships, and against ships and aircraft has challenged the attention of all.

* * * * * *

The number of aircraft provided in this bill is adjusted to the initial war needs as they can be estimated at this time. Such a number is not obtainable in the immediate future unless available construction capacity is quickly and drastically expanded. Aviation expansion can only be accomplished by large appropriations, appropriations for procurement of aircraft, appropriations for

aircraft facilities, and appropriations for increases in aircraft personnel and for their training.

* * * * * *

* * * If we really wish to face at this time the needs of the future, as now indicated—authorization and appropriation must contemplate a greatly expanded aircraft procurement program, the establishment of facilities, and a [5565] personnel program that will provide before the event of war, not less than the naval aviation strength set forth in this bill. To meet these needs, we are placing the immediate stress on training.

Naval operations in the Atlantic in protection of the Western Hemisphere should be supported by such naval aircraft as can be ship-based by carriers, cruisers, and battleships, and by naval shore-based or tender-based aircraft strategically distributed, wherever it may be necessary to oppose enemy naval operations, or to oppose the approach overseas of enemy forces of any character.

In the Pacific, in addition to ship- and tender-based aircraft, it is necessary to provide naval aircraft distributed throughout the United States possessions, as well as along our west coast, and also to be ready to provide for a suitable distribution of naval aircraft off the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal.

8. This bill, as finally enacted, authorized us to acquire 10,000 naval aircraft. However, as the committee well knows, the passage of this bill did not give us overnight 10,000 planes. We next had to come back to Congress for funds with which to procure them.

9. Early in June, the House subcommittee held hearings on the bill to give us the money necessary to begin the acquisition of these planes. We also asked for money to implement [5566] the 11 percent increase authorized in the size of the Navy. At this time, we had 1,813 useful airplanes on hand and 933 on order toward our immediate goal of 10,000.

10. On June 16, 1940, France fell. The seriousness of the situation, which had not been fully appreciated in many quarters before, now became apparent. On June 18, I appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee and recommended a further increase in our Navy by some 200 combatant ships with an over-all tonnage increase of about 1,250,000 tons. This represented an increase in combatant tonnage of something over 70 percent. We also requested an additional 20 auxiliaries of 100,000 tons.

11. Congress granted the 70 percent increase and the funds to implement it, and thus the foundation was laid for the so-called two ocean Navy.

12. Hand in hand with the expansion of the fleet went the continued building up of facilities on shore to support the fleet and its air arm. Once funds were obtained the work was pushed, for example the big drydock at Pearl Harbor was finished some months ahead of time, fortunately in time to accommodate ships almost immediately after Pearl Harbor.

13. During my tour as Chief of Naval Operations I was under continual pressure from the successive commanders in chief of the fleet—Admirals Bloch, Richardson, and Kimmel—to bring personnel allowances up to 100 percent and to provide extra men [5567] for training to man new construction. The inevitable result of not having these extra men was to reduce the efficiency of existing ships in order to obtain the experienced men necessary to form basic crews for new construction. I explained some of the difficulties in getting more men for the expanding Navy and to increase allowances to 100 percent in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941:

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary

and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have was obtained by my finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything they agree to." However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.

14. In July 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel as follows:

We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can [*5568*] and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man.

15. As late as November 15, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me as follows:

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet, efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. * * *

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

16. As badly as I wanted to reply that we could and would give him what he wanted and what we knew he needed, I had to tell him on November 25, 1941, that:

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as we have to [*5569*] have special legislation to use our funds for this purpose. * * *

Believe it or not, the *Reuben James* set recruiting back about 15 percent. We are increasing our advertising campaigns extensively; not only that, but Navigation is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees, however, constitute something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The President in giving final approval said he just hated to do it; but sentiment is fast getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.

17. Another large program which was developed under my direction and which Congress approved in February 1942, was the 1,799 ships and other items for the British under Lend-Lease at a cost of approximately $4,000,000,000. The ships included a large number of landing craft and escort vessels. I assured Congress at the time—and it was thoroughly understood by the British when this bill was passed—that we reserved the right to retain anything in this program which we felt we needed, and that final allocation would be made only when units were completed.

18. Everything I said and did to increase the size, strength and efficiency of the Navy as a fighting force was motivated by what I considered the absolute necessity of preparing as quickly as possible for war.

[*5570*] DUTY TO MAKE ADEQUATE AND REALISTIC WAR PLANS

19. Shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations the War Plans Division began devoting their energies to bringing our war

plans up to date. Late in 1940 we completed work on the plan known as Rainbow No. 3, and copies were sent to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. In transmitting the plan to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic, on 12 December 1940 I wrote:

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is informed that a plan designed for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are forwarded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered as the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under this plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are requested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel.

2. The officer messenger carrying this plan, Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N., is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He [*5571*] is prepared to present you the general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as to various political and strategical matters which have influenced the preparation of "RAINBOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to forward to the Department via Commander McCrea recommendations and suggestions for changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation, to effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan.

3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in London and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is believed that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There is a considerable doubt as to the extent [*5572*] of the conversations which may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan.

Commander McCrea had left a copy of the plan at Pearl Harbor on his way to Manila, and returned via Pearl Harbor to get the reaction of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and his staff.

20. I avoided, wherever I could, giving specific and categoric instructions to the commanders in chief. War plans developed under my direction as Chief of Naval Operations were broad outlines of tasks and objectives, leaving the detailed operating plans to the commanders in chief, who were on the spot and familiar wth the peculiar problems affecting their own forces. Rainbow No. 3 was such a plan.

21. In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might also be faced—perhaps concurrently—with a war in the Pacific. With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC–1, dated March 27, 1941.

[*5573*] 22. Based on the understandings arrived at in ABC–1, the Army and the Navy developed a Joint Basic War Plan, known as Rainbow No. 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

[*5574*] You will note that I have crossed out the words "and by the President." That is the only change made in this statement.

23. In May 1941, the Navy's Basic War Plan, implementing Rainbow No. 5, was promulgated. The highest priority was assigned to the detailed planning which had to be done by the fleets to fill in the broader outlines of the Navy's Basic War Plan, referred to sometimes by the short title—WPL–46.

24. In connection with WPL–46, two things must be kept in mind. First, that the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the initial decisive theater. The Joint Army and Navy Plan, Rainbow No. 5, in the chapter entitled "Concept of the War," provided:

Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

Second, the plan was a realistic one; that is, it was predicated on the availability of forces actually in hand. There were not initially available to the Associated Powers all the facilities necessary to wage all-out war in both [*5575*] oceans. We were not able to give the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, all the ships and men he wanted; but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted.

25. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Admiral Kimmel), was fully advised of the situation confronting me as Chief of Naval Operations, for we had discussed it at length during his trip to Washington in the summer of 1941. On 7 November 1941, I called his attention again to the fact that we just didn't have the ships needed to go around when I wrote:

I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet—particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles

Admiral King at that time was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet—

but he is up against it for DDs for escort—and defense against raiders.

26. Admiral Kimmel pointed out that he could not fight an all-out war in the Pacific with the forces allocated to him. [*5576*] On 15 November 1941, he wrote:

In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs of the Pacific Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the material and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific Fleet.

In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under any circumstances; one requiring a major effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in ships we now have limits their effectiveness.

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have sufficient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese home waters. We should have [*5577*] the strength to make any enemy operations against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain that ship, unit and fleet efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and men has already dangerously reduced efficiency of this fleet and they continue. Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize an additional 10,000.

If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment.

27. We are painfully aware of the situation. On 25 November, I replied:

[*5578*] This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC–1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC–1 nor Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now [*5579*] have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

* * * * * * *

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail some of the recent changes—Nimitz at that time was Chief of Bureau of Personnel—and he will write you the details. There is a problem here as well as elsewhere; and while we expect you and want you to hammer away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize our only [*5580*] existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can with increasingly vexing problems.

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of men now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any of us.

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establish-

ment". I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which gives real interest. I thing I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, etc. etc.

[*5581*] 28. There were shortages and deficiencies in material and manpower, both for the Navy and the Army forces in Hawaii, beyond our ability to remedy, limited as we were by considerations of industrial capacity and time. However, the ships and planes available were allocated to the fleets and forces according to the tasks assigned to them in the War Plan. I considered, as did my principal advisers, that the forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet were adequate for the execution of the tasks assigned.

DUTY TO ORDER MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEET IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE WAR PLAN

29. It seems appropriate at this point to say something about the movements of the United States Fleet during my tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations. In October, 1939, the so-called Hawaiian Detachment was sent from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor. This detachment consisted of 8 heavy cruisers, 1 aircraft carried and 18 destroyers plus certain auxiliaries. I felt that basing such a detachment at Pearl Harbor would demonstrate the weaknesses of that most important base and that the remedies for those weaknesses would thereby be facilitated. I wrote Admiral Bloch, then Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to that effect on 8 September, 1939. My letter reads in part as follows:

Again I urge you to keep your eyes toward the [*5582*] West for I feel most anything may happen any time.

Not only from a strategic, psychological standpoint do I believ the sending of a good detachment to Pearl Harbor to be worthwhile, but I also am hopeful it will show up the weakness in the habitability of that yard to support even a moderate sized force. I am out to plug every hole I can as soon as I can.

30. Moreover, basing a detachment on Pearl Harbor offered a valuable opportunity for training and for familiarizing officers and men with our various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area. I explained to Adimral Richardson on 15 March 1940 that:

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its [*5583*] presence there may have on the Orange (Japanese) foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

31. The Pacific Fleet held its spring maneuvers in the Hawaiian area in 1940, and after the maneuvers were completed, the fleet was ordered to remain in that area temporarily. At first it was thought that the delay in returning to the West Coast would be not more than two weeks, but the stay was extended from time to time. On 22 May 1940, Admiral Richardson wrote me, asking why the fleet was being

kept in the Hawaiian area and how long it would probably remain there. I answered him on 27 May as follows:

You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

* * * * * * *

[*5584*] Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

The above I think wil answer the question "why you are there." It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. [*5585*] Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

[*5586*] I pointed out to Admiral Richardson that I hoped the time spent in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results, such as:

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
(c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

Admiral Richardson pointed out the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a Naval Base. These deficiencies were appreciated, both by the Navy Department and by the President, [*5587*] but it was decided as a matter of policy to keep the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area. During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied. The Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet for the year ending 30 June 1941, states:

(h) *Bases*

* * * * * * *

(3) *Hawaiian Area.*

Pearl Harbor. Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report, either have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facilities for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists.

It is probable that this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of the work at Barber's Point—sometime in the future.

Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net depot and target repair base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity of the yard will be materially increased.

Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are:

(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.

(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other requirements of the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situaion in regard of such forces is as follows:

(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.

(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, [*5589*] though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available.

(3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available.

(c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities.

34. We recognized the deficiencies in small craft and local defense forces referred to by the Commander in Chief, but again it was a matter of not having enough vessels. I summed up this situatiton in a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated 10 February 1941:

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars cannot buy yesterday."

Again, on 28 August 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

I note what you say about not resting until you get the patrol vessels you have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I." You know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we [*5590*] are constantly fighting material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs."

35. That fleet gunnery improved during the stay at Pearl Harbor is demonstrated by Admiral Kimmel's letter of 12 August 1941:

I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything else and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be prepared for battle than for a target practice. * * *

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target practices on a much more realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives. We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accordance with these directives now and I hear from all sides that it is [*5591*] considered much more satisfactory than anything we have ever had before.

36. About mid-1941, to meet the immediate needs in the Atlantic, we moved certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy Basic War Plan, WPL–46.

37. In this connection, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, expressed concern in a letter to me dated 12 September 1941 regarding possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic. He wrote:

> The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "status quo" out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced, and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive.

On 23 September 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

> We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month [*5592*] after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year.

38. We had pursued the policy of making no transfers of units from one fleet to another except as such transfers were provided for in WPL–46. The last transfers prior to 7 December 1941 of surface combatant units from the Pacific to the Atlantic were accomplished in June 1941. A comparison of the forces allotted the Pacific Fleet in the Navy Basic War Plan (May 1941) with the Administrative Organization of the Pacific Fleet published 1 October 1941 (13CN–41) shows that the forces—both surface units and aircraft—under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, immediately prior to 7 December 1941 were—with no substantial differences—in accordance with the Navy Basic War Plan.

39. In accordance with WPL–46, there were assigned to the Pacific Fleet 107 patrol planes suitable for long-range reconnaissance. Of this number, 24 planes of PATWING 4 were in the United States or Alaska just prior to 7 December. Of the remaining 83 patrol planes, approximately 60 were available in the Hawaiian area during the period immediately preceding the Japanese attack.

[*5593*]

DUTY TO KEEP FLEET COMMANDERS INFORMED OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

40. During my tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations, my office maintained a close liaison with the State Department and the Army. The Central Division—a part of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—was charged with the duty of keeping in touch with activities of the State Department which affected the Navy. The head of the Central Division met frequently with representatives of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and he kept me informed regarding important diplomatic and political developments in the Far East. I was a member of a liaison committee which was established by the State, War, and Navy Departments for the consideration of matters of mutual concern, the committee consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff (Army) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Navy). This committee usually met weekly, and in addition, I had many conferences with the Secretary of State. I consulted with General Marshall concerning military matters, and we worked very

closely together, either by telephone or by personal visits. My duties also required frequent consultation with the President.

41. In addition to the information gained from the above sources, I had available the information obtained by the [*5594*] Office of Naval Intelligence. A meeting was held in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy each morning which was attended by the heads of the various divisions of Operations and certain other key officers in the Navy Department. At these meetings the Director of Naval Intelligence gave a résumé of the information received since the last meeting on the military situation throughout the world, and other information such as that on international politics which he believed to be of value. He also brought to me at other times such information as he considered important. From time to time the Director of War Plans prepared estimates of the military situation in the Pacific for my information, and the information of the key officers of my staff.

42. It was my duty, of course, to keep the fleet commanders in Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters informed of significant developments in political and military matters of concern to them. It was always my purpose to give these commanders the best information and estimates of the situation available to me, not only through official letters and dispatches, but also by means of frequent and regular personal letters. I might point out, in passing, that there was nothing unusual in this so-called "personal" correspondence between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief—it was a long-established custom when I took office.

[*5595*] 43. Admiral Richardson became Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, on 6 January 1940. On 18 January, I wrote him in part as follows:

* * * I have a letter from Tommy Hart (Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet), Just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch (Admiral Bloch, retiring Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet), and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason for existing here. * * *

44. Throughout 1940, I continued to write these personal letters to Admiral Richardson two or three times a month and during some periods as often as once a week. On several questions raised by Admiral Richardson, my answers were in- [*5596*] definite and as unsatisfactory to him as they were to me. I was entirely sympathetic with his desire for information and for the answers to such questions as, "How long is the fleet to stay in the Hawaiian Area"?, or "Suppose the Japs to go into the East Indies, what are we going to do about it?" I, too, wanted the answers to those questions and to similar questions. I had asked them myself in the White House and in the State Department, but like Admiral Richardson, I was unable to get the answers. Moreover, my honest opinion was that no one knew the answers to such questions.

45. During this same period, Admiral Hart also had questions he wanted me to answer. I was up against the same situation—they were

not matters on which I had the final say, and I was unable to get answers for him. On 22 October 1940, I wrote Admiral Hart:

I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a right-about-face in present day policy.

46. On 12 November 1940, I wrote Admiral Hart, giving him the current picture as I saw it, sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Richardson. It is an example of the estimates of the situation which I passed to the fleet commanders from time [*5597*] to time and reads in part as follows:

"The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore the fields of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives;

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

"I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so.

I invite attention to the fact that this letter was written in November 1940.

"In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position of readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less [*5598*] gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

"But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch, and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

"(a) Occupy Guam, and reinforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;

"(b) Establish naval control of Philippine Waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;

"(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;

"(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

"I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the [*5599*] most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

"One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

"You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse)."

47. In the last letter I wrote to Admiral Richardson as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet—on 23 December 1940—I said:

There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my own part, I would say at any time after the [*5600*] next 90 days. Our

heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit—and I don't mean maybe.

48. Admiral Kimmel succeeded Admiral Richardson as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on 1 February 1941. On 13 January, just after his selection for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I wrote Admiral Kimmel in part as follows:

* * * I am hoping J. O. (Admiral Richardson) will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all the slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our front door step or with some of our ships bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another undeclared war, the ramifications of which call for our strongest and sanest imagination and plans.

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading straight for this war, that we could not assume anything else and personally I do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our deliberately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks or of days. I would like to feel that I could be perfectly complacent if some day someone opens [*5601*] the door of my office and reports that the war is on. I have been moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move here, even though I know much has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.

My estimate of the situation which I presented to the Secretary and Rainbow 3, both of which you should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I do not want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and to put it mildly, it will be one H—— of a job, and that is one reason why I am thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your guts and your good head, at the seagoing end.

49. It was my constant endeavor to keep Admiral Kimmel informed of significant events of a political or military nature which affected the interests of the United States.

On 10 February 1941 I wrote:

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the [*5602*] transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll.

Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors.

51. On 25 February 1941, I wrote:

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a *visit* of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time *might* come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war—to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East—I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on [*5603*] the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having

to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog." This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain.

52. Enclosed with this last letter was a memorandum for the President in which I had recommended against sending a detachment of the Pacific Fleet to the Philippines. In this memorandum, I said:

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then [*5604*] be able to spare forces for the Atlantic.

* * * * * * *

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 February from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out the portion which supports my view.

53. Admiral Kimmel, in a letter dated February 1941, had asked that the responsibility for sending him secret intelligence information be fixed in order that he would miss nothing of interest to the Fleet. In my reply of 22 March, I wrote:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CincUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly [*5605*] to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by dispatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route.

[*5606*] 54. On 26 April—a month before the promulgation of Rainbow No. 5—I wrote:

This is just to get you mentally prepared that shortly a considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the Japanese situation.

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1CV, 4CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on any efficient scale.

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 or WPL–49.

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now rounding to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5.

[*5607*] Action on the above; that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time, and in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference yesterday in the White House.

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.

55. On 14 May 1941, I sent a letter to the commandants of 12 of the naval districts, including Panama and Hawaii, with copies to Admirals King, Kimmel and Hart, in which I said:

What will happen to the Pacific is anyone's guess; but here, too, there is only one safe course; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the danger of mines, raiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany does—possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?

56. My letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 points up some of the problems we were facing with respect to *both* the Atlantic and the Pacific. I wrote:

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, hospital ships, etc., to [*5608*] the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received. Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In this I include Bloch.

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt.

I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such thoughts are water over the dam, and I am confronted with the problem *as is* and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare the necessary train.

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems—our own and the British. He has nothing like what he would like to have or what we [*5609*] would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate *for the moment* ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries in connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show."

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned but the Army has neither the equipment, the ammunition nor the aircraft to defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will happen if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do not believe they can hold out indefinitely without *effective* aid from us. We are being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics—not a happy situation—and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc.

57. Admiral Kimmel had raised the matter of the uncertainty of his information before his trip to Washington in mid-1941. Among other things he mentioned his uncertainty as to the future strength of his fleet. In a letter dated 26 May 1941, he said: [*5610*]

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of

what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasions, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishings of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improve- [*5611*] ment. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training, by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

58. Admiral Kimmel brought this letter with him when he came to Washington. I considered the matters raised so important that I had the letter circulated among the principal [*5612*] officers of the Department and later assembled them for a full discussion of these problems with Admiral Kimmel. While there was no formal reply to this letter, I feel sure that when Admiral Kimmel left Washington, he was fully informed of the situation as we knew it.

59. On 24 July 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel. I told them that:

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals [*5613*] of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, *unless* we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If the Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia.

Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a [*5614*] possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am.

[*5615*] 60. On 26 July 1941, following the Japanese move into Indochina, the President issued an executive order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of various European countries were frozen on 14 June 1941. I sent a priority dispatch to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, commander in chief Asiatic Fleet, and commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, on July 25 reading as follows:

This is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff U. S. Army. Appropriate adees deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii, Philippines and Caribbean defense command and to General Chaney in London.

You are advised that at 1400 GCT July 26th United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain material. It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products, cotton, and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk. Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not, repeat not, expected [*5616*] that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time. United States Flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan. CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date.

This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Navy and Army subordinates. SPENAVO inform CNS but warn him against disclosure.

61. The foreign policy of the United States has never been very clearly defined—certainly not fixed—and it must have been necessary for the President and the State Department to feel their way along carefully in many situations. It was impossible, however, for the Navy to plan on the basis of a well-known and clearly defined foreign policy, desirable as that might have been. In discussing our planning problems in a letter to Admiral Hart dated 9 February 1940, I wrote:

In view of the actual situation existing today in the Far East and elsewhere, we might well say that [*5617*] we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War Plans." But to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning machinery that includes the State Department and possibly the Treasury Department as well as the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have planning machinery for the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordination of planning effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, have regularly set up planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we have frequent consultation with the State Department, but things are not planned in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Department action which might well have affected our own activities.

It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as ours feel its way allong to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete programs of their intentions.

* * * * * * *

Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State [5618] Department. Whenever it is possible to do so, we will keep you so advised, and whenever State Department policies for either temporary or longer contemplated periods can be set forth, I will keep you informed of them.

62. We had gone on record at the State Department with our views regarding an embargo on oil. I made it plain to the State Department—as I had in my letter to Admirals Kimmel and Hart—that I believed if Japan's oil supply were cut off, she would go to war to get it. I did not think that necessarily meant war with us, but with some power from which she could take oil.

63. In its official publication "Peace and War," the State Department confirms the fact that the State, War, and Navy Departments all understood this position. It states at page 88:

Throughout this period (1938–1940) the United States Government had under active consideration various ways and means which might be used to induce Japan to renounce its policies and programs of conquest and domination through the use of force or threat of force. Among other methods, this Government frequently had under consideration the question of applying economic pressure—advocated in many quarters [5619] as a means of checking Japanese aggression. It was the opinion of the responsible officials of the Government, including the highest military and naval authorities, that adoption and application of a policy of imposing embargoes upon strategic exports to Japan would be attended with serious risk of retaliatory action of a character likely to lead to this country's becoming involved in war. Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by show of superior force, involves serious risk of war.

The President and the heads of the Army and the Navy and the Department of State were in constant consultation throughout this period in regard to all aspects of the military and diplomatic situation confronting the United States.

* * * * * * *

They were in agreement that prevailing public opinion in this country and, with the imminence of and finally the outbreak of war in Europe, the comparative military unpreparedness of this country were such as to render it inadvisable to risk, by resort to drastic economic measures against Japan, involvement in war.

[5620] The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12:30 having arrived, we will recess until 2 o'clock, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. All right, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[5621] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Stark, you may proceed with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. The top of page 41, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. 64. On 28 August 1941, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the

American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

65. On 22 September 1941, I wrote Admiral Hart, sending [*5622*] Admiral Kimmel a copy of my letter. It shows not only the picture existing at that time in the Pacific, but also reminds us of our pressing and immediate problems in the Atlantic. I quote:

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this; in fact, our orders had been issued.

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly spread, working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys [*5623*] regularly from the United States to points in the Iceland area, where these convoys are picked up by the British and escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, the Canadians are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under King's direction.

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas through which convoys for the Near East via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which the British heavy units will be required to be responsible. Moreover, ships for other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be released.

The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows: all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain [*5624*] to occur. The rest requires little imagination.

That line, sir, runs up 26, which runs through the Azores and then it slopes up to the eastward of Iceland and then on north.

* * * * * * *

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. Since the President's speech, it has taken on *added* significance. Since July, we have had 4500 Marines there, and on Monday last we landed some 6000 Army. While this Army convoy was enroute, the Germans had by far the strongest concentration of U-Boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly correct and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoys was in the immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times in an effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable circumstances.

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory [*2625*] settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlemen are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nomura is working hard on his home government and while he appears to be making *some* progress, I am still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is negotiation there is hope.

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation has apparently quieted down. One can not help being impressed with the optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in this regard. For my own part, I feel that false hopes are beng raised. While on the surface the Japanese ap-

pear to be making *some* effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and waiting until the situation in Europe becofes more stablized. If Russa falls, Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position in Sbera. If Russa can hold out (which at the moment, hardly appears possible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with Japan.

The same sort of false hopes are being raised [*5626*] in our press with reference to the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year. If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the Russ Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials is being much lessened. When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow (Admiral Standley is our senior Navy member), we will probably get some real news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russian Military Mission that is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials, and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair.

[*5627*] You now have our reply to your official recommendation concerning the withdrawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your arguments, pro and con, and we put more weight on those questioning withdrawal. We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. I know you will open it up again by letter or despatch if you consider it should be again reviewed; and it very well may be—there is little that is static in this old world at present.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock and barrel.

Tommy Holcomb was major general of the Marine Corps, major general commandant.

I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood letting." In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token force." He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have [*5628*] "our foot in the door—the door that once was "open," and if I had the say so, it would remain there until I was *ready* to withdraw it—or until the door opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100 per cent with you.

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personally, I am delighted, and I am sure you will be, too. I think it should have a pronounced effect in prevention—or, if not, then in execution.

66. In sending a copy of the foregoing letter to Admiral Kimmel, I sought to also put at rest some fears he had expressed about the possibility of taking additional units from the Pacific to bolster our thinly spread forces in the Atlantic. I told him, in a letter dated 23 September 1941:

We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt [*5629*] until next year.

In this same letter I also added:

I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying *that conversations with the Japs*

have practically reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China—and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of understanding just now—is—or—*is not*—a good thing—I hesitate to say.

Admiral Nomura—that is Ambassador Nomura—came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

67. I would like to point out that while I have stressed, in the extracts I have read, the information I gave the [*5630*] commanders in chief on political and military developments affecting the international situation, I also maintained a very great interest in seeing that the commanders in chief were adequately informed on technical matters affecting their forces. For example, on 26 July 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me a six-page letter, most of which had to do with material preparations for a Pacific war. It raised questions concerning such matters as additional transports, ordnance equipment for the Marines, ammunition handling and stowage facilities, the further development of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard to make major overhauls of large ships possible, additional personnel, the equipping of light craft with depth charges and listening gear, small craft for patrol purposes, the supply of communication, radio, radar, and sound equipment, and the many requirements for aviation.

68. I distributed extracts from this letter to the appropriate bureau chiefs and asked for their comments. As a result, a 22-page letter went out to Admiral Kimmel on 22 August 1941, giving him all the information on these matters available at that time. This is only one example of letters giving the commander in chief information concerning progress on material problems.

69. The fall of the Japanese Cabinet on 16 October 1941 marked the beginning of a critical stage in Far Eastern af- [*5631*] fairs. On that day I sent a secret priority dispatch to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, which reads as follows:

> The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapproachment with the U. S.
>
> In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility.
>
> Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.
>
> Second and third adees inform appropriate Army and Navy District Authorities. Acknowledge.

70. It is noteworthy that also on 16 October, I diverted all our merchant shipping in the Far East to the south in order to get it out of the danger zone in case Japan attacked [*5632*] us. I kept it diverted until war broke. As a result, we lost only one merchant ship—and that was one on which we deliberately took a chance.

71. On the following day (17 October 1941), I wrote to Admiral Kimmel (with a copy to Admiral Hart), commenting on the dispatch

concerning the Cabinet change and enclosing an estimate regarding the change prepared by the head of the Central Division. In this letter I said:

Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in [*5633*] August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.

With regard to mercsant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong.

Offhand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task [*5634*] forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction.

The memorandum referred to reads as follows—that is a memorandum prepared by the central division, which I sent out so that I might get that division's point of view.

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

[*5635*] The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

[*5636*] The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extermists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power.

72. I invite attention to the fact that both the despatch and the letter speak of war against the United States only as a possibility. Based on the information available to me at the time (17 October 1941), I felt that such language was all the then existing situation warranted, and in my letter I told Admiral Kimmel that I had tempered the original draft of the message, because I did not think the Japs were going to sail into us. I recognized the possibility, however, and for that reason thought we should be "on guard."

73. On 22 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote me, telling me of the action he had taken and the dispositions he had made following receipt of my despatch regarding the change [*5637*] in the Japanese cabinet.

74. On November—just a month before the attack—I O. K.'d the dispositions he had made, and added:

* * * The big question is—What next?!

* * * * * * *

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go forever—particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

75. My letter was sadly prophetic. One month did see "most anything"—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—exactly one month from the date of this letter.

76. Also on 7 November, I wrote Admiral Hart as follows:

Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country dosen't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in a considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the [*5638*] Senate is dragging out the debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether the country knows it or not, *we are at war.*

* * * * * * *

You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Kurusu's trip to the United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real influence.

And on 8 November, I again wrote Admiral Hart a letter which contained a paragraph quite similar to that quoted from my letter to Admiral Kimmel of 7 November. It read:

The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't be surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear to be simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.

77. On 14 November, I wrote Admiral Kimmel:

The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the Uniter States and Japan [*5639*] come of his visit. I note this morning in the Press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the

United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

And I enclosed an estimate of the Far Eastern situation which General Marshall and I had prepared for the President. I think the whole of that memorandum will bear reading:

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attaché. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The [*5640*] Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with [*5641*] poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, or favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of [*5642*] naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese [*5643*] operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

[5644] (b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening [5645] Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommended that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

"Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for interventon against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated [5646] consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

78. On 24 November, I sent the following despatch for action to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandants 11th, 12th, 13th and 15th naval Districts, and for information to Special Naval Observer, London, and Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

I do not know whether the Committee is familiar with those Districts.

Starting south, the 11th at San Diego, the 12th at San Francisco, the 13th at Puget Sound, and we jump to Hawaii for the 14th, and back down to the Panama Canal for the 15th.

The Far Eastern, Manila, is the 16th.

This is the despatch which was sent for action:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines [5647] or Guam is a possibility.

Chief of Staff has seen this despatch, concurs and requests action adees to inform senior Army Officers their areas.

Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

79. On November 25, I wrote Admiral Kimmel a letter which ends with these two paragraphs (the only part bearing on the dispatch of November 24):

I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. [*5648*] You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

I wan't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be 'anything'.

80. This letter gave the background for the dispatch and indicated opinions which went to make up the dispatch. It must be understood that official dispatches, though sent in the name of and on the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, often reflected not only his personal opinion but also a consensus of the opinions of his principal advisers; and at times in cases as represented here, those of the State and War Departments and of the White House. The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. Some felt that such an attack would come in the Philippines because of the consequent embarrassment to us. While appreciating this, I did not give it the weight some [*5649*] of my advisers did, but stressed more strongly the attack in southeast Asia. They keynote that the letter and the dispatch were intended to convey was the possibility of "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction," and the necessity of being prepared for anything.

81. On November 27 Mr. Hull informed us that negotiations with the Japanese had ceased and that it was now up to the Army and Navy. I later learned that a note had been handed to the Japanese on November 26—the so-called ten-point note. I feel confident in stating that I did not see or know of this note at the time it was given to the Japanese Ambassador.

82. General Marshall and I completed and sent to the President a memorandum dated November 27, stressing that—

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time.

and that—

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as consistent with national policy.

83. On November 27, I sent to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet and to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, for action, and to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, and special naval observer, London, for information, the following priority dispatch:

[*5650*] This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Tai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPANAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

84. This message begins with the words "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." These words were carefully weighed and chosen after considerable thought and discussion with my principal advisors and with the Secretary of the Navy. The words "war warning" had never before been used in any of my dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. They were put at the beginning of the message to accentuate the extreme gravity of the situation. We considered the picture as we saw [*5651*] it and we felt that there was grave danger of Japan striking anywhere. We wanted our people in the Pacific to know it, and we used language which we thought would convey what we felt.

85. The message further stated that certain signs indicated an "amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." This indication from evidence we had, did not, in our opinion, rule out or preclude an attack elsewhere. Our dispatch of the 24th (only 3 days before) should be read in connection with the dispatch of the 27th. I warned against "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction."

86. We went to what we thought was an all-out on this dispatch of the 27th. We considered it an unequivocal war warning. Previously, we had talked about possibilities, but by this dispatch we intended to convey the thought that war was imminent. In fact, we gave most careful consideration before making this a war warning, for we had no definite information or evidence indicating an attack on the United States. We could not tell whether Japan in her next move would or would not attack United States territory. The only movement of which we had definite knowledge, indicated an amphibious expedition, with the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo as its potential objectives. We decided, [*5652*] however, that the situation was so grave that we should warn our forces to be prepared for the worst.

87. I had long shared the concern of the commanders in chief for the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and of the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in the Hawaiian area. After the successful attack by the British Fleet Air Arm on the Italian Fleet at Taranto, my concern increased, and on November 22, 1940, I wrote to the then commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Richardson, as follows:

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem compre- [*5653*] hensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy

Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

* * * * * * *

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

88. I asked that the matter be considered with the Army because "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy," approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and in effect during 1941, provided for coordination by the Army and Navy in meeting attacks against our coastal frontiers, of which the Hawaiian coastal frontier was one. Joint action states that in carrying out its functions, the Army will provide and operate or maintain among other things:

(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary searchlights and fire-control installations.

(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

[*5654*] (3) A communication and intelligence system to inclue an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

The Navy, in carrying out its functions, will provide and operate, among other things:

(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Army.

Joint action also states the functions of Army and Navy air components, and in order to minimize duplication, it provides:

(a) The functions assigned to the Army Air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its [*5655*] overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

(b) The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum distance within the capacity of aircraft development.

In accordance with joint action, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the commanding general, Hawaiian Department had entered into a "joint coastal frontier defense plan" for the Hawaiian coastal frontier dated April 25, 1941. Among other things, this agreement assigned responsibility for the aircraft warning service and antiaircraft and fighter defenses to the Army, while responsibility for distant re- [*5656*] connaissance was assigned to the Navy.

89. On receipt of the reply from Admiral Richardson—in reply to the letter in which I had asked his comment on how the War and Navy Departments could help them out out there—and largely predicated on

it, I caused the Secretary of the Navy, on January 24, 1941, to send the following letter to the Secretary of War:

The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, promoted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned [*5657*] above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two—that is, air attack, both bombing and torpedo—of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problem encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

[*5658*] (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a)—

that is, the location and the engagement of the enemy carriers and their destruction—

are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present [*5659*] system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3″ fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3″ guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3″ mobile twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on

hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of [5660] 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the question of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

[5661] (3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

90. Copy of this letter was sent to the then Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. On February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote:

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We [5662] are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—destroyers and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

91. In the meantime on 7 February 1941 the Secretary of War had replied to the letter of 24 January as follows:

In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P–36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P–36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to [5663] Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P–36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P–40–B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

"There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total projects calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. In-

quiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages [5664] and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eight-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Copies of this reply were sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

92. Subsequent to the receipt of the letter of 7 February [5665] from the Secretary of War, the matter of antiaircraft defense and of planes for the defense of Hawaii was the subject of frequent conversations with General Marshall and I offered to transport planes via carrier whenever they could be made ready. On at least two occasions during 1941, I sent a carrier from the west coast to Pearl Harbor to ferry Army fighter planes.

93. You will note that the Secretary of War in his letter of 7 February stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning service had been ordered and would be delivered in Hawaii in June 1941, and that all arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. I was informed that this equipment was delivered in Hawaii about the middle of 1941.

94. On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor and Commander of Pacific Fleet Task Force Nine, made, with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area and entered into an agreement covering joint air operation. A copy of this agreement and estimate was forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District on 1 May 1941. The estimate, under the [5666] heading "Possible Enemy Action," reads in part as follows:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

On 20 June 1941, I sent a copy of this agreement entitled "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base" to the Commandants of all the naval districts and to the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, calling their attention to the importance of the problems presented therein.

95. Admiral Kimmel left with me, during his trip to Washington in mid-1941, a memorandum dated 4 June, which reads as follows:

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth [*5667*] Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied [*5668*] and the personnel drilled in its use.

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."

96. In mentioning the Army's responsibilities with respect to the defense of Pearl Harbor, I don't mean to minimize the problems which were facing the Army at that time. They, too were faced with a shortage of equipment and men.

97. My war warning despatch of 27 November must be considered in the light of what had gone before. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were action addressees of the war warning despatch, and they were directed to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46" (Navy Basic War Plan).

98. I might mention that on 26 November, we sent to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, two despatches asking his [*5669*] reaction to the possibility of reinforcing Wake and Midway by Army units. These were routine matters having to do with the general strengthening of our Pacific bases—a matter we had long been pushing.

99. The same day that I sent the war warning, the Army also sent a despatch to its field commanders. In order that Navy coastal frontier commanders and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet might be informed of what had been sent their Army opposites, I sent the following priority despatch on 28 November to Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier and Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier for action and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier for information:

* * * Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This [*5670*]

policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

"Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

[5671] "A separate message is being sent to G–2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub-area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

100. On 30 November, I sent a despatch to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, making Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet an information addressee, which reads as follows:

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition.

In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to be observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked.

Understand British Air Forces will search arc [5672] 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora.

If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British Mission here informed.

101. On 3 December, we sent to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District the following priority despatch:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

102. Also on 3 December, I sent a priority despatch to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District for action, and to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District for information, which reads as follows:

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple, all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. [5673] British Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied.

103. I considered that the urgent destruction by the Japanese of their codes and ciphers and secret documents was one of the most telling items of information we had received, and our despatch informing Commanders in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts of this fact was one of the most important despatches we ever sent. We felt that war was just a matter of time.

104. On 4 December, because of Guam's highly vulnerable position, we sent her the following message:

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence, retaining

minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report crypto channels retained.

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District and Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District were all information addresses on this despatch.

105. We were also concerned lest Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, might feel that he needed specific authorization [*5674*] from us before he could authorize destruction of secret papers and codes in the outlying Pacific Islands. Accordingly, we sent him a despatch on 6 December which reads as follows:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

106. In the few days immediately preceding 7 December, Admiral Ingersoll (then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations), Admiral Turner (then head, War Plans Division), and I went over the information we had sent to the fleet commanders. We were all of the opinion that everything we could do had been done to get them ready for war, and that we had sent them sufficient information and directives.

107. During the night and early morning of 6–7 December, the Japanese transmitted to their Ambassador in Washington an answer to the ten-point note which had been handed to the Japanese on 26 November by Mr. Hull. The answer was in fourteen parts, the fourteenth part being received some time early Sunday morning, December 7. I was not acquainted with this despatch until I arrived at my office Sunday forenoon. I would like [*5675*] to invite attention to the meat of the fourteenth part of this message and compare it with the meat of my war warning message. The Japanese message concludes:

* * * Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Our war warning message stated:

* * * Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased * * *.

Thus, what we learned on the morning of 7 December only confirmed what we had sent out on 27 November.

108. During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and the time of its presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann) when General Marshall called me on the 'phone to ask if I knew of it. I told him [*5676*] I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the information concerning the time of presentation on to the various commanders in the Pacific. My first answer to him was that we had sent them so much already that I hesitated to send more. I hung up the 'phone, and not more than

a minute or two later I called him back, stating that there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p, m. and that I would go along with him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his communications were such that he could get it out quickly because our communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He replied that he felt he could get it through very quickly. I then asked him to include in the despatch instructions to his people to inform their naval opposites.

I am informed that this despatch* was sent "First Priority" to the Army Forces in the Far East (Philippines), Caribbean [*5677*] Defense Command (Canal Zone), Hawaiian Department, and the Fourth Army (San Francisco). I am told that the message was sent at 1217 EST (0647 Honolulu time) to the Hawaiian Department, but was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack.

109. My presentation of the manner in which I discharged my responsibility to keep the fleet commanders fully informed of all significant military and political developments would not be complete without a reference to certain very secret information which we were receiving during this period. This information was gathered by the intelligence centers at the headquarters of Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District (Cavite), Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor), and the Office of Naval Intelligence (Washington). There was a considerable volume of this material received in Washington during 1941, but it increased substantially during the last half of the year. The volume was so great and the personnel qualified to handle it so limited that we shared the work with the Army—they processed the material one day, we did it the next.

110. To be useful, the diplomatic information obtained from this source required careful evaluation, a task which could be better performed here in Washington where the officers charged with this task had access to other sources of information, such as the State and War Departments.

111. After this information was evaluated and distilled— [*5678*] so to speak—we sent our conclusions and recommendations to the fleet commanders for their information and guidance.

112. I considered that the letters and despatches I sent to Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet were sufficient to keep them informed on the important military and political developments in the Pacific as we knew them, and that they had received adequate information and directives to be on guard.

113. I have gone into considerable detail—though by no means mentioning all my letters and despatches—to indicate to the committee how I discharged my duties as Chief of Naval Operations with reference to the expansion of the entire naval establishment, its strength and efficiency; with reference to plans for the use of the fleet in war; with reference to assignment of forces available in accordance with war plans; and with reference to keeping the fleet commanders informed of important political and military developments affecting them.

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*The text is quoted for the convenience of the committee:
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum; also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately.
"Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication."

114. I have endeavored to stick to the record of events as they happened, rather than to give present impressions of what has happened, or of conjectures as to what might have happened if some things had been done differently.

115. My correspondence with the Commanders in Chief in the Pacific during the years 1940 and 1941 indicated that for almost two years before the attack on Pearl Harbor the lack [*5679*] of physical resources was fully known to all the Navy officers in critical positions, and that the danger of war with Japan and a possible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and methods of meeting it had been fully considered.

116. By way of summary, I would like to point out that during the critical period October, November, and December 1941, I sent the following specific warnings to the Commanders in the Pacific:

(a) Secret dispatch, dated 16 October 1941, containing the statement:

> The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-America. * * * Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. * * *

(b) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, copy to Admiral Hart, dated 17 October 1941, containing the following words:

> Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

[*5680*] (c) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 7 November 1941, containing the paragraph:

> Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable polices cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the set up. It doesn't look good.

(d) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 14 November 1941, in which I stated:

> * * * I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view.

With this letter, I enclosed a memorandum for the President, prepared jointly by General Marshall and me, in which the following conclusion is stated:

> War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, [*5681*] until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.

and in which we recommended:

> That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

[5682] (e) Secret dispatch, dated 24 November 1941, stating that——

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

(f) My letter to Admiral Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, including the statement that neither the President nor Mr. Hull——

would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.

(g) Secret dispatch, dated 27 November 1941, including the paragraph:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46 (the war plan).

(h) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts [5683] at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

(i) Secret dispatch, dated 3 December 1941, stating:

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy purple machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy purple, all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today report Embassy London has complied.

(j) Secret dispatch, dated 4 December 1941, stating:

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 and OPNAV. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report crypto channels retained.

(k) Secret dispatch, dated 6 December 1941, stating:

[5684] In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to suport our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

That concludes the statement.

[5685] Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, in 1940, when the discussion arose between Admiral Richardson, then Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and officials in Washington, about basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, according to the record we have to take, no question was raised by anybody prior to November 1940 about the safety of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor; is that in accord with your recollection?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall anything up until the letter which——

Mr. MITCHELL. Which you wrote?

Admiral STARK. Which I wrote at that time. There may have been.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson gave the Secretary of the Navy a memorandum dated September 12 in which he listed all the objections he had to keeping the fleet based at Pearl Harbor, and in that list there was no suggestion about the dangers to the fleet while in Pearl Harbor. Can you remember any instance where the safety of the fleet was discussed before that? I mean, safety while in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. I do not, specifically. I have a rather hazy remembrance that before I wrote Admiral Richardson asking him to get data with Com. 14, with the Army, I had written Admiral Bloch, in fact, I think a letter to Admiral Richardson stated that I had gotten some information but it wasn't specific [*5686*] or complete enough for our purposes, and we wanted the entire situation gone over.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the first document in evidence we have in this case that anybody was worrying about the safety of the fleet while in Pearl Harbor is your letter of November 22, 1940, written to Admiral Richardson in which you referred to a dispatch that you had sent in October to Admiral Bloch asking him for a report on the question of safety.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What inspired you to write that letter, how did it happen that it occurred?

Admiral STARK. The incident at Taranto and the British success there in torpedoing ships at anchor in harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that was an attack that the British made on the Italian fleet in the harbor with torpedo planes, was it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And bombers. Which was quite successful?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. Of course, we had long and often thought of an attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility and something which might some day be pulled. Our fleet exercises always contained an exercise of an attack in which the two sides, the attacking force wanted to get in, if it could, and the defending force, of course, would first want to get the [*5687*] attacking forces carriers. I mean, it has been much discussed. So, I am answering your question by saying that was the first time I am thinking of what documentary evidence I can recall at the moment. Whether or not I had mentioned it previously in some of my letters to Admiral Richardson, I would have to look it up.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson didn't raise any question about the safety of the fleet as a reason for going back to the coast?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You agreed with him, didn't you, about the better training facilities?

Admiral STARK. I did agree with him, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't raise any question at that time about the safety of the fleet?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was after the decision had been made to keep the fleet out there and a little time had passed that then you began to think about the problem; is that it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. When the fleet went out there for that fleet problem I had no thought, and so far as I know, no one else

had any thought whatsoever of the fleet remaining there. It all developed when we talked about bringing the fleet back. We had not, not having envisaged the [*5688*] fleet going out there, we had not sent many things which they would need to carry on their routine target practice, which was one of the things Admiral Richardson was worried about. The fleet had left with the idea of coming back. The people on the coast all expected the fleet to come back. The question of morale came up. Of reenlistments. In other words, personnel and morale and material conditions affecting training of the fleet, and also getting it ready for war quickly, that was what he was concerned about. Now, the drill out there, and so forth—and we did get them ready, but if he came back to the coast he could strip a ship more effectively and quicker than he could out there. It could be done out there. But those were his primary reasons.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, as the result of your letter to Admiral Richardson of November 22, 1940, you remember he undertook an inquiry.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. He went right out into the Army defenses and inspected those, did he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We asked—the letter to him stated not only the fleet but the commandant of the naval district, and also the Army—so that all hands out there would be in on that estimate.

[*5689*] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, do you recall that it was as a result of an inquiry, started and conducted in that way, that Admiral Bloch made his report of December 30, which is in evidence here?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The report came in and our reply was largely predicated on it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice here——

Admiral STARK. That is, our action, I should say.

Mr. MITCHELL. There has been handed me a copy of the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Districts Division, dated December 31, 1940, a memorandum signed by R. E. Ingersoll, Acting Chief of Naval Operations. I have never seen it before. Have you any knowledge of that?

Admiral STARK. I would like to see it.

(Short pause.)

Mr. MITCHELL. This is one of the papers that you have in the brown envelope.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the one we got today?

Mr. MITCHELL. In the same envelope.

[*5690*] Admiral STARK. I think I saw that. It had slipped my mind for the moment.

Mr. MITCHELL. That letter was written before Bloch's report came in, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. His report was dated the 30th of December, indorsed by Richardson at Hawaii on the 7th of January.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to put that in evidence and I will read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is (reading):

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject: Defense of Pearl Harbor by Army.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has for some time felt considerable concern over whether the Army's anti-aircraft defense of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, including vessels of the United States Fleet berthed there, is adequate in view of the probability of an early surprise attack by carrier aircraft if Japan decides to make war on the United States.

2. It is, therefore, requested that information be obtained concerning the details of the Army's Hawaiian defense plan in this regard. We should be informed as to their present and also the projected anti-aircraft defense, including such features as the following:

(a) Number, caliber, and proposed location of anti-aircraft guns, including machine guns.

(b) Use that is to be made of smoke screens from either fixed or mobile sources.

(c) Number and location of pursuit planes to be used for this purpose, with probable percentage of availability.

(d) The character and extent of the wraning net to be used, from shore or floating stations, and the present percentage of availability of such stations.

(e) Whether or not the present defense elements have received adequate training.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Now, here is another letter dated January 9, 1941, that has not yet been offered in evidence, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Chief of Staff. That is again signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Did you know of that at the time it was sent to the Chief of Staff?

Admiral STARK. January 9th?

Mr. MITCHELL. January 9th.

[*5692*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think I saw that. I think I have seen that despatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will read that into the record. [Reading:]

JANUARY 9, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations:
To: The Chietf of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject: Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.

1. The Navy Department considers that improvement of the antiaircraft defenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of those defenses, in the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941 enemy air operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area and in Alaska than in Puerto Rico, Panama and the Continental United States.

2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation of the fixed anti-aircraft detection equipment being procured by the Navy is as follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantanamo. It is requested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before proceeding with [*5693*] installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United States.

3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 January 1941 in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisions of both services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.

4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that delays are anticipated in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended that the highest priority be given to production of this equipment and supplying the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtaining the necessary priorities.

R. E. INGERSOLL,
Acting.

Now, following that this Bloch report came in. You remember that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In which he condemned the situation at Hawaii as inadequate for defense against an air attack?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

[*5694*] Mr. MITCHELL. And then you said in your statement today that you caused that letter to be written by Secretary Knox to Secretary of War Stimson?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. What part did you take in that?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Turner said that he did, too.

Admiral STARK. That letter was formed in the War Plans Division, gone over very carefully in the front office and then submitted to the Secretary for signature.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were in full accord with the conclusions in that letter?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; in complete accord with it.

Mr. MITCHELL. From that time on, following that letter to the Secretary of War, steps were taken by both the Army and the Navy to prime the defense, both naval and military, in Hawaii against a possible air attack, were they not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, we have had here in much of the correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, as to the latter's desire for more planes and guns and other equipment. What did the Navy do? What did you do toward supplying Admiral Kimmel with any additional equipment that he needed or that was available for defense against an air [*5695*] attack in the way of anti-aircraft equipment on the ground or fighter planes or reconnaissance planes, PBY's?

Admiral STARK. We increased—I have forgotten just how much, of course it is a matter of record—the number of squadrons he had out there capable of long distance reconnaissance. With regard to surface vessels, we were able to do very, very little for him and we——

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, were surface vessels of real significance in the detection of an incoming enemy carrier force?

Admiral STARK. They would have been helpful, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. They would have had a great deal of ground to cover, would they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, they would have had a great deal of ground to cover but still you will note in his letters his constant request for them and my statement to him that we could not supply them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I inferred from his letters that he was referring a good deal to patrols against submarines.

Admiral STARK. Yes, but they might have helped him in an emergency to use his eyes. For example, we told him that we did not have them and that he would have to detail such craft from his own fleet, which meant a detail of destroyers. I told him—I think it appears in one of these personal [*5696*] letters—that statement and we also sent him an official letter to that extent.

Mr. MITCHELL. Am I wrong in thinking that that patrol by surface craft was merely for the purpose of determining submarines approaching and vessels?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was all to be used in that, in the distance. It would have helped him for use in shore patrol, but he might have extended them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you were familiar with the plans that were made from time to time thereafter affecting Hawaii, directed toward the coordination and the union of action between the Army and Navy forces in defense against an air attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral STARK. Very clearly, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In which they practically described the Jap attack as it afterwards occurred?

Admiral STARK. Well, we thought that report was so good when it came in that we distributed it as noted in the statement.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, in August 1941 there was a report or study by General Martin, the Army air commander, [*5697*] that went directly to the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Did you see that, that study of reconnaissance by Martin?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having seen it at the time. I may have. I have seen it since.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that report showed very clearly that in order to insure against the complete thwarting of an air attack by the Japs it would be necessary to detect their carriers at sea the afternoon before and bomb them?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was the conclusion that Martin and Bellinger reached together, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, the conclusion was to spot them, if you could, before they could launch their planes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is what I am leading up to.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, in order to be sure that your fleet was not going to be bombed from the air they agreed that you would have to catch the carriers before their planes were launched, did they not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And they figured out that the natural way for the Japs to come in there would be at daylight, that is, with the planes.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*5698*] Mr. MITCHELL. And it would be necessary to run a reconnaissance out for seven or eight or nine hundred or a thousand miles and detect them the afternoon or the night before in order to damage them before their planes were launched, is that right?

Admiral STARK. It is always the objective to get the carriers before they can launch their planes.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it was also equally true, as they said, that actually if you could not do that, if you had to rely on catching the planes in the morning after they had left the carriers and had been launched at a distance up to two or three or four hundred miles, they could not be confident that the attack would not get home to some extent.

Admiral STARK. It is pretty difficult to stop all of an air attack once it gets started. You might break up its effectiveness somewhat but some planes, we have always felt, are very likely to get in.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, as a result of all those studies and all those plans, which indicated very clearly that unless you had a certain number of reconnaissance planes and a certain number of bombers you could not count on discovering the Japs before they had launched their planes, you were taking some hazards by having your fleet in Pearl Harbor, isn't that correct?

[*5699*] Admiral STARK. There is always a hazard to have a fleet on the firing line, sir, or in an exposed position and there has been ever since the war started.

Mr. MITCHELL. The number of planes that the Army had and the number of planes that the Navy had were admittedly known at both ends, both at Hawaii and in Washington by the Army and Navy to be inadequate to run a full reconnaissance over a 360-degree circle at a distance of seven or eight hundred miles, is that true?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And isn't it a fact that your PBY's, plus the bombers that were there for the Army, were so limited in number that the best you could put out, or that the commander out there could put out would be to run a sectional reconnaissance, taking one sector one afternoon or morning and another one another day?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. He did not have enough for a 360-degree search.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, even assuming that he left out the west and southwest, where your task forces were operating and Guam and Midway intervening and all that, and he even tried to cover the area to the north, which was apparently the dangerous area, there being little traffic up there, the commanders out there could not have run a reconnaissance that would [*5700*] cover more than a third of the area in one day, could they?

Admiral STARK. Well, I do not understand just what you mean by "a third of the way" or "a third of the area."

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am speaking of a sector. There is 180 degrees on the north side on a horizontal line.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am speaking of a reconnaissance to the north.

Admiral STARK. Yes. He did not have enough for that whole northern semicircle.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, could they have covered more than a third of that northern semicircle daily?

Admiral STARK. The air people have testified on that, as to what they could cover, or if they have not testified they can testify, considering the upkeep of their planes and their pilots, and so forth, and I hesitate to get into detail on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Martin said he needed 189 big four-motored planes to run a 360-degree reconnaissance daily out to a distance of 700 or 800 miles. That would mean half that number at least to run the 180-degree sector, would it not, and you did not have that many?

Admiral STARK. Kimmel had available, without regard to Army planes, approximately 60 operating planes at that time. [*5701*] He had 82, I believe, out there, of which 60 were operating. There are always a certain number laid up for repairs.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, he had a little less than a third of the planes that Martin reported he needed for the 360 degrees.

Admiral STARK. As I say, that has been studied both by the Army and the Navy. There has been testimony submitted, not before this court, but I believe before the Navy last summer, or perhaps before the Army, as to what could have been done and witnesses can be called for that. I would hesitate to pronounce an opinion.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was hoping possibly that you had given that subject some thought in 1941 when the question of the safety of the fleet was at stake and that maybe you had formed some ideas yourself about the extent of the hazards and the difficulty of their discovering the Jap carrier fleet in that way. Did you not give it some attention then?

Admiral STARK. Yes. What we did was to give them in distributing all we had to different areas, all that we felt that they needed—all that we felt that we could give them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Admiral STARK. They needed more.

Mr. MITCHELL. You gave them everything you had.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*5702*] Mr. MITCHELL. But it was not quite enough.

Admiral STARK. No, it was not.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is just what I am getting to. I think I am not making any statement exactly as to what the record will show, but the impression one gains from it to date is that admittedly they were away short of the reconnaissance planes, fighting planes and antiaircraft of Hawaii and that the chances of detecting a carrier force in time to destroy the carriers before the planes were launched was a rather slim chance, as Mr. Churchill said about the Chinese.

Admiral STARK. When you haven't got enough planes to search the entire area which you would like to search, whether it is planes or what not, you narrow down to where you think is the most likely area of travel and your next study is how can you cover that or how much of it you can cover. That had been studied out, I believe, and witnesses who have made that study can be available.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was trying to get your views on it.

Admiral STARK. I know it only by hearsay. I never made a personal study of the number of degrees they could cover, and so forth.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, were you troubled about the possibility of an air attack at Hawaii after the 1st of November 1941 as a possibility? Did it seem to you to be a real [*5703*] hazard?

Admiral STARK. We always recognized the possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, when you had a fleet out there and you did not have an adequate antiaircraft defense why were you not worried about the safety of the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I stated in my letter that I was worried about it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is in November 1940.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am bringing you down now to the period between November 27th and December 7, 1941. Had you lost your fear of an air attack?

Admiral STARK. No, I won't say that I was fearing an air attack. We recognized the possibility of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, had you changed your views?

Admiral STARK. And we recognized that we should be ready so far as what we had available to use.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, suppose you did not have enough and you thought there was a substantial hazard, didn't the question arise in your mind and those of your staff here as to what you ought to do, whether you ought to move the fleet east a ways or make arrangements to keep a smaller number of the vessels in the harbor at a time and things of that kind?

[*5704*] Admiral STARK. There are certain hazards which you have to anticipate. As to just what should be kept in port and what should be kept at sea of what was out there, that was clearly up to the man on the spot.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your idea was that having done everything you could for him and given him all the equipment that you could scrape up and he was still inadequately prepared to defend against an air attack, that the responsibility of just what he did to meet that situation was up to him, is that the idea?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That was all we could do, except we were pressing continually to get more material.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I know, but I am talking now about on November 27th, when the clock had struck and the codes were being burned and war was a matter of days and you could not get any material in that length of time. You were up against a second problem, weren't you, of how to handle the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was then up to the Commander in Chief on the spot. I would not have presumed, sitting at a desk in Washington, to tell him what to do with his fleet. There were many factors involved, of which he was the only person who had the knowledge, and once I had started, if I had started, to give him directives, I would have been [*5705*] handling the fleet. That was not my job.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was wondering why when you sent the warning message at that time, what does this "defensive deployment" mean that was in your message of November 27th? What does that mean as applied to the conditions that existed there?

Admiral STARK. My thought in that message about the defensive deployment was clear all-out security measures. Certainly, having been directed to take a defensive deployment, the Army having been directed to make reconnaissance, but regardless of the Army, our message to Admiral Kimmel, that the natural thing—and perhaps he did do it—was to take up with the Army right away in the gravity of the situation, the plans that they had made, and then make dispositions as best he could against surprise for the safety not only of the ships which he decided to keep in port but also for the safety of the ships which he had at sea. He had certain material which he could use for that and we naturally expected he would use it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the word "deployment," at least in the Army sense, is to scatter, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that what you meant when you applied it to the Navy command?

[*5706*] Admiral STARK. He should deploy what planes he had; submarines are splendid craft to see without being seen. They might have been employed. He could have used a light force if he had seen

fit and had them available. He had certain forces at sea. We were not handling them. That was his force. Just what deployment he was using them for, that also was up to him. He could search—I am not stating that he should and it is difficult to testify on this, particularly in the light of hindsight.

Mr. MITCHELL. I know.

Admiral STARK. It is awfully difficult to keep away from it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am just trying to get a translation of the words "defensive deployment."

Admiral STARK. Well, a defensive deployment would be to spread and to use his forces to the maximum extent to avoid surprise and, if he could, to hit the other fellow and in conjunction with the Army, to implement the arrangements which had previously been made for just this sort of thing.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you think the possibilities of a successful surprise attack by the Japs in the way that it was done was increased by moving the shipping out of the northern ship lanes in October? Did that give the Japs a little better chance to get through without being observed?

[*5707*] Admiral STARK. It never occurred to me, I never thought of it in that light until I heard it brought up recently, because there were not many ships up there, not an awful lot anyway. It was easy to cross the lanes. A fleet that does not want to be seen and that has adequate air scouting does not have to be seen as a rule. They can steam darkened at night. Also, they can search out the night area that they propose to go through and I would not have said that it had any bearing.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were aware, of course, that the Jap espionage system in Hawaii was working without any real hindrance?

Admiral STARK. The Jap what, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Jap espionage system, their spies in Hawaii.

Admiral STARK. We had always felt—and again there are other witnesses available to you there who can tell you just what the Japs were doing. We had felt that not only in Hawaii but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew everything we were doing.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you told us here, and you, yourself, knew then in 1941, that the Japs not only had every opportunity to watch the movements in Hawaii and to know whether the forces there were alert or not alert, but they also had other means of communicating it to their superiors in Tokyo. They had access to the radio and to the cable companies?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Don't you think that really the key to this attack at Pearl Harbor was not only the fact that our forces were not alerted but that the Japs knew it?

Admiral STARK. You mean they knew our forces were not alerted?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That would be conjecture. I do not know, sir. They may have, but I do not know. We have nothing, I believe, of record to show it. I think it is very likely.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have plenty in this record to show they were getting dispatches from Hawaii every day telling exactly what was going on and they were inquiring about the conditions there. Some

of these dispatches that we did get and decoded in time talk about aircraft reconnaissance and all that sort of thing.

Admiral STARK. That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a fact, isn't it, that they must have known everything he was doing and had every means of reporting that fact to their government.

Admiral STARK. That is true, yes, sir. Just what they reported in the last hours I do not know, but what you say is [*5709*] quite true.

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not mean over the last hours but I mean over the last weeks.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As a matter of fact, that was a considerable hazard normally in the Japs making an attack of that kind, a hazard to them, was it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And in order to decide whether they would take it or not they would have to know something about the extent of preparedness at the other end, wouldn't they?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know here in Washington between November 27 and December 7, 1941, that our D. F. system, direction finder system, had lost track of all but two divisions of Jap carriers and that they did not pick them up again before the 7th?

Admiral STARK. I was familiar at that time in general with the general picture. It is a long time ago and what I heard recently that is so definite on that.. Just how much I am colored by hindsight on that I do not know. I do distinctly recall their changes of call signs and that sort of material and also we asked—it shows in the record, I believe—the Army to make reconnaissance over the Mandates [*5710*] and we were not too sure at that time, in fact I say we were not too sure; the last information we had as to the carriers had come in some time previously as I recall.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your report sheets that we have here about the location of carriers seem to differ a little bit from the ones that they were using out in Hawaii. Didn't you get your informtaion from Hawaii or did you pick it up directly here in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. The information that came in with regard to material of that sort came from the field. That is, it came from Hawaii and it came from the Philippines. We were dependent upon them for that information.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had about the same data to work on that they did?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there are two in one of the old records that has not been presented yet here, there is evidence by one of the officers in charge of that work in Hawaii, of the direction finding reports and ship locations, that they lost track of the Jap carriers around the 26th or 27th of November and that he reported it to his chief.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did anything like that occur around that time? Did anybody call it to your attention, anything to [*5711*] that effect?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of it now.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to suspend?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The committée will stand in recess until 10 o'clock on Wednesday morning. The chair desires to hold a brief executive session with the committee and everybody else will please retire from the room.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., December 31, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 2, 1946.)

[5712]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Murphy, and Gearhart.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

[5713] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Counsel may proceed with Admiral Stark.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, there is a letter from you to Admiral Richardson dated December 23, 1940, in which you offered the prediction that war with Japan would come at any time after the next 90 days and then I notice on October 17, 1941, there is a letter from you to Admiral Kimmel in which you state: "Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us."

What caused your change in view about the possibility or probability of war with Japan during that period?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was the information that developed as time went on.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, just what information was it that indicated any less tension with Japan up to October 1941 that led you to reach that conclusion?

Admiral STARK. Well, it is the information which is on file and which I have read, you may recall, I think, in my statement, I remember distinctly of having written it, that at one point in 1941 Japan seemed to have developed one of those waiting attitudes, that there was sort of a lull, and that may have accounted for that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was your view the same as that expressed [5714] here by Admiral Wilkinson, that you thought the Japs would nudge along slowly and grab what it could without a fight? Did you have the same view as Wilkinson about that?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had in mind and I think—well, I will say that I had in mind the possibility of Japan playing the same game that Hitler did, that is, one at a time. That was just one factor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, when it came to November 24, 1941, and your warning of November 27 you changed back to the view then that war with Japan was only a matter of days.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is the message of November 27, 1941.

Admiral STARK. The message of the 27th or the 24th?

Mr. MITCHELL. Both of them I should have said.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am referring now to the two messages of November 24 and 27 which you sent to Admiral Kimmel, the warning messages in which you then appeared to have the view that war was only a matter of days.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was that based on?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had at that time the intercepts giving dead lines, which I think you will recall, the first being the 25th, the next the 29th. That furnished some [*5715*] background. We had the note of the Japanese of November 20, I believe it was, which was irreconcilable with our viewpoint.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have before you the intercepts which Japan had sent to their Ambassadors here, which said that unless they get an affirmative agreement from us to abandon China and start furnishing them oil that they would go ahead, or something would automatically happen?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had that also. I have forgotten just when the intercept came in. I may also state, since you included the message of the 27th, we had Mr. Hull's reaction to the Chiang Kai-Shek notes regarding the *modus vivendi*.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean you learned from him that he had abandoned the idea of the *modus vivendi* because of the objections of Chiang Kai-Shek that it would collapse China's army?

Admiral STARK. I may state with regard to the message from Chiang Kai-Shek that Mr. Hull called me up, I am not sure just when, it may have been the 25th or it may have been the 26th, I kept no record and I have tried to straighten that out, but he called me up stating how very much he was put out by the action of Chiang Kai-Shek in sending that despatch and rather broadcasting it and it worried him very greatly and I gathered that that, along with other reactions that he had, might lead him to abandon the *modus vivendi*, and then we had [*5716*] also his statement about that time that it was now up to the Army and Navy. It was the first time that Mr. Hull had stated definitely to me, indicated to me, that he considered there was no chance of a settlement through diplomatic intercourse with the Japs.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, in your warning messages of November 24 and 27, 1941, you had taken into account and evaluated all these Japanese diplomatic intercepts and the exchanges which showed the dead line and the refusal of Japan to go along unless we affirmatively agreed to their ideas, you took all that into account and evaluation?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, assuming for the present at least that you gave your commander at Pearl Harbor a sufficient warning of the imminence of immediate war generally with Japan in a few days, I am interested in knowing what your attitude was about the possibility of that war

involving an attack on Pearl Harbor. They are quite two different things, are they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, the commanders at Hawaii were evidently of the opinion that there wasn't any chance of an air attack and what I am interested in bringing out is what the views and the attitude of the high command in the Navy Depart- [5717] ment were on that very point. Now, what was your personal view about the possibility of an air attack on Hawaii as of November 27 to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. I was not expecting an air attack on Hawaii at that time. I was surprised at that attack. I knew it to be a possibility, which I think is plain from the letters that I have written and our efforts to help them out there to be in position to guard against such an attack, but as to actually expecting an attack at that time, I did not. The evidence which we had and the only tangible evidence was that the action, the initial attacks by the Japs, would come in the Far Eastern area.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, did your view accord with that of your chief assistants in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. I believe Admiral Ingersoll is to be one of the witnesses here and in his testimony of last summer it is my recollection that he stated that he also was surprised at that attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am referring not so much to his testimony given since as to their expressions at the time you had consultations with them.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, it is my recollection that he was surprised at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, before the attack did Admiral Inger- [5718] soll or any other of your assistants in their consultations with you make any expressions to you as to their views about an air attack before December 7? Was it the subject of discussion?

Admiral STARK. It was a subject of discussion so far as possibility is concerned. As I recollect, we went into all phases of it but we did not have anything definitely pointing toward an air attack. However, it was our intention to put the forces in the Pacific, to put Hawaii on guard against an air attack. It is my recollection that the words "in any direction" appearing in the message of November 24 was at my suggestion. In other words, we had some definite indications of an attack in certain directions, and which proved to be correct as regards the main campaign, but that did not preclude attack elsewhere, and by the words "in any direction" we intended to convey that it might come anywhere, but personally I did not expect an attack on such a broad scale by Japan in the initial stages, that is, not only all over the Far East but as far east as Hawaii. I knew it to be a possibility; and as regards submarines, I would not have been a bit surprised if some submarines had appeared, for example, off San Francisco or anywhere else in the Pacific, but we looked for the main effort in the Far East but it was our intention to convey to Hawaii the possibility of an attack there; that is, it was [5719] our intention, at least, to put them on guard against such an attack and we thought we had done so.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, if you had that in your mind when you wrote these messages of November 24 and November 27, why did you

say merely, "Including the Philippines and Guam" as a possibility, or mention even Borneo as a possibility? Why didn't you say something to the effect that an attack on Hawaii is a possibility?

Admiral STARK. Well, the Philippines and Borneo and that area in general and Guam was in our thoughts not only as a possibility but as a likely point of attack. I think perhaps my best answer to your question would be that we did not put Hawaii down as likely of attack as we did these other places.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I know but, still, if you thought that there was any possibility, if your intention was to put the commanders at Hawaii on alert against a local attack, why not say so in the messages? Doesn't the message really reflect your view, your personal opinion that Hawaii was really not in substantial hazard of any attack?

Admiral STARK. No, I would not go that—I would not say that, sir, because if we had thought that there was no possibility or no danger of that we would not have given them the directive which we did, which directive was intended to have them take up a position or take action against surprise; [*5720*] that is the directive to make a defensive deployment.

May I just refer to this message of the 27th for a minute and look at it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It will be noted that when we stated "Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days" we stated, which was from the information we had, that "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo," and then we gave the directive. We gave the information which we had. We had nothing which we thought at that time—I may say certain messages have been developed since regarding which I assume you will ask me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. But at that time we had nothing, or at least I do not recall having anything which indicated an attack on Hawaii, while we did have rather definite information regarding an amphibious expedition and an attack in southeast Asia.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, who prepared this warning message of November 27th and the one of the 24th?

Admiral STARK. Those war warnings were initially prepared in War Plans, Admiral Turner.

[*5721*] Mr. MITCHELL. Who suggested that you mention Borneo as a possibility?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall who mentioned it. The NEI was always a possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you were drawing those messages, did the people that helped you prepare them and yourself have any discussion as to whether Hawaii might be an object of attack?

Admiral STARK. Well, it is my recollection that we discussed all phases of the matter. I do not specifically recall just what the conversations were. I may state, though, that regardless of anything which I say now or hereafter in the development of this as you may ask me that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, the messages really reflect the view that you had that Pearl Harbor was not in substantial hazard, do they not, at the time they were drawn, that were in your mind?

Admiral STARK. Well, they were in my mind also and, as I stated, we had intended to convey that an attack there was a possibility and to that extent that we should be on guard. I also want to make that real plain.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you intended to do so, but what is there in your messages that said so?

[*5722*] Admiral STARK. There is nothing in the message, that is, there is no definite statement in the messages which we sent to Admiral Kimmel or, as I recollect, in any of the messages of that time, which mentioned Pearl Harbor as a possibility in so many words, but we did mention that we expected war, we mentioned that it might come in any direction and we directed a development, which we thought would put them on guard against such a possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that warning message of November 27 sent to the President before it was issued?

Admiral STARK. I did not put that in my statement because I could not swear, for example, that it was, but it is my rather clear recollection. If he were here I would have verified it with him, if I could have, and put it in. The message was of such importance that I went personally to see the Secretary of the Navy about it because it was an all-out.

We had nothing definite at that time to say that Japan was going to attack the United States. It was an inference on our part and I remember at the time that I thought I might be taking my hand off my number a little bit in going so far, but we had to make a decision. Time was creeping up on us, this thing had been going on for a long time. We had the State Department reaction, as I have mentioned before, that it was now up to us. I either told the President beforehand [*5723*] or immediately after. I do know that within 24 hours, if not before, that it had his full approval and that he gave us an O. K.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, my attention was attracted by the fact that this message you sent said nothing about not committing the first overt act and that appears to have been the point that the President was very much interested in, so it raises a question as to whether he saw it before it was sent. Your idea is that he saw it either before or afterwards, you are not sure which, is that right?

Admiral STARK. I think it was before but I would not like definitely to say so.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you a copy of the Army message before you at the time you sent your own?

Admiral STARK. We had discussed it; yes, sir. Gerow came over to my office, as I recollect, on the afternoon of the 27th with that message and I sent for Turner, probably also Ingersoll because Ingersoll generally was called in on everything of that sort, just as was Turner. As a matter of fact they usually came through Admiral Ingersoll first and——

Mr. STARK. Well, Gerow had been advised on the 26th that the President wanted this overt act business in the warning message and if he saw you don't you think he brought that to your attention?

[5724] Admiral STARK. I am certain that he did—you mean that who brought it to my attention?

Mr. MITCHELL. Gerow.

Admiral STARK. The President or Gerow?

Mr. MITCHELL. Gerow. You say you saw him and conferred with him about the warning messages and your messages before they were sent and Gerow certainly was impressed by the need for following the President's direction about that.

Admiral STARK. Well, the Army despatch differs in some particulars from our despatch. It was their despatch and I personally was not worried about an overt act in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area so far as the Navy was concerned. You will recall, for example—I think it is in an exhibit here, I am not sure, but I recall Admiral Kimmel having told me about his orders to bomb a submarine which should come within certain areas in the Hawaiian area and I took no exception to that whatever.

[5725] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your only statement in the message of November 27 which you think put the people in Hawaii on guard against an attack at Pearl Harbor was this direction to conduct an appropriate defensive deployment under WPL–46?

Admiral STARK. Preparatory.

Mr. MITCHELL. Preparatory?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now the main part of WPL–46 involved an offensive attack against the Jap Mandate, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Preparatory defensive deployment according to WPL–46 might well be construed to be some preliminary movement preparatory to carrying out that offense against the Japanese Mandated Islands, might it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. And was it not susceptible to that interpretation by the man who received the message?

Admiral STARK. It was, but along with it a defensive deployment which we regarded as taking a position as best he could with what he had for the defense of his fleet, whatever he had either at sea or in port, to the best of his ability and to guard against being caught unawares.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your idea is when you told him to [5726] take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out that WPL–46, which involved mainly offensive action against the Jap Mandate, you mean that in doing that he might incidentally be guarding himself against an air attack, is that the idea?

Admiral STARK. I would say it was more than incidental. I would say the defensive deployment was to guard against being caught by surprise, and the preparatory to carrying out WPL–46 we thought showed, in our minds, that war might eventuate at any time and that WPL–46 would then come into full sway. If he were to take these measures it would be the first measures to be followed in case of war by the implementation of the war plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, did this defensive deployment which you mentioned in the message of November 27 involve the movement of battleships in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I left that entirely to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am asking you whether your idea in carrying out this defensive deployment with a view for the preparation of WPL–46 called for the movement of any battleships out of the harbor of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I did not consider that particular point at that time, so far as I recall. It is very difficult to give any categorical answer as to what I believe is the purport of your question—if I do not will you correct me— [5727] as to whether he should have left the Fleet in Pearl Harbor or taken it out.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is not what I am asking you. I am asking you whether or not the directive for further deployment of the Fleet with the view to carrying out WPL–46, a defensive deployment, would reasonably call for the movement of battleships to sea—not an air attack movement but a deployment.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that I thought at that time of that particular detail. It was a matter entirely within his province.

There were many factors which would affect the movement of ships, with regard to what he had available in the air there at that time, and a number of other things. That was his job and I did not go into it.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had a map in your room somewhere in the Navy Department that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific Fleet day by day, did you not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did not you have a ship movement division there that kept track of where the Fleet was?

Admiral STARK. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian area, but their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their target practice ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing, to my best knowledge and [5728] belief we did not know. I know I did not know it. He was not required to report that. If he wanted to move the Fleet to the West coast, for example, he would not have done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to go 100 miles in this or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some special maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would not have reported that to us.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not then have a system of keeping track of the daily location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know that the battleships were in Pearl Harbor prior to the 7th, that they were collected there?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall at that time. I might say with regard to the previous answer that there were certain things laid down in the schedule calling for repairs of ships at a certain time which had to be dovetailed with the shore establishment, and those what might be called fixed positions we knew, but as for the general movement in and out of Pearl Harbor under his local arrangements, we did not know that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I believe on November 26, at the very same time that this message was sent or thereabout, orders were given to Admiral Kimmel to send two of his carriers to the west, the *Lexington* and *Enterprise*, that is, [5729] he was ordered to do it if he considered it feasible.

You knew that his 2 carriers had left to the west with their air screen? That was the movement that called for the shipment of 25 Army pursuit planes to Wake and 25 to Midway from Pearl Harbor, and was stripping Pearl Harbor to that extent of defenses against an air attack.

Now do you think that was a movement that you ordered, or at least suggested he take, was consistent with the idea that Pearl Harbor was in immediate or possible danger of an air attack?

Admiral STARK. With regard to the movement of those carriers, the order for carrying that out at that particular time was Admiral Kimmel's order, not the Department's. We had taken up the movement to which you refer, as I recall, a month or a little over a month before hand. Admiral Kimmel had made a plan as to how that movement was to be made also as I recall about 3 weeks prior to its being made in which he directed how it should be made. He stated, as I recall, in that order that he would implement it later on, which he did. But the order to go at that time was his own, and as I recall, we were told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and other things, about the *Enterprise*, I believe it was, which left around the 28th.

Mr. MITCHELL. The *Lexington* left December 5.

[*5730*] Admiral STARK. Yes. I do not recall, and I recollect of no evidence of his reporting to us about the movement of the *Lexington* which left the 5th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you knew that they were both designed to move to the west, that plans had been made to carry the planes out there.

Admiral STARK. Yes; but the date was set by him.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I know——

Admiral STARK. We had covered that over a month beforehand.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know that they had not departed prior to November 27? Did not you know that the movement was taking place right about the time that you were sending these warning messages out there?

Admiral STARK. Not until his message came in in reply to the one in which we asked his advice on the relief—on the movement of certain Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever were informed about the movement of the *Lexington*.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you knew that 25 Army pursuit planes to Wake and 25 to Midway were to be taken from Hawaii, did you not?

Admiral STARK. I think you are referring to the message of the 26th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[*5731*] Admiral STARK. In which we put up a proposal——

Mr. MITCHELL. It is on page 42 of your correspondence, I think. I guess I have the wrong place here. What dispatch have you before you, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. I have the dispatch 270038 and it bears the date of 26 November, which was the one I was looking for and to which I thought you referred.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you read that into the record, please?

Admiral STARK (reading:)

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army

pursuit planes at Midway and the similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable.

This being to CincPac.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your dispatch to Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats. Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips on regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes [*5732*] must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Phillippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Navy bombs now at outlying positions to be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

I note in the dispatch that we state "provided you consider this feasible and desirable," and he is also requested to "confer with the Commanding General" out there about it, and to advise us as soon as practicable.

Now Admiral Kimmel's answer to that, if you would like to have it——

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire, does that dispatch appear in the exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 37 is the one it should be in.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is not in Exhibit 37, the basic Navy dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this dispatch appear in any of the exhibits?

Mr. MITCHELL. It does not. It is something we have put our hands on more lately. I am bringing it out this morning. It is the dispatch dated November 26 from the Chief of Naval [*5733*] Operations to Kimmel and provides for the removal of 25 pursuit planes from Hawaii to Wake and to Midway as on the 26th of November, the day before the warning message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the time of sending it, if they have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. The hour you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; when it arrived out there.

Admiral STARK. Our message number is 270038, which means 38 minutes after midnight on the 27th, Greenwich time.

Mr. MITCHELL. What time is that in Washington?

Admiral STARK. Well, Washington is five hours earlier, so the message actually went out on the 26th Washington time.

The CHAIRMAN. About 7 or 8 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. Well, 5 from 12 would be 7. I should say about half-past 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Morning or evening?

Admiral STARK. In the evening.

Mr. MITCHELL. The evening of the 26th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Don't you think that the fact of your agreeing to take 25 pursuit planes out of Hawaii and sending them to Wake and Midway on the 26th indicated pretty plainly to the Commander at Hawaii that you did not think they were needed there for defense against an air attack?

[5734] Admiral STARK. We left that to him to balance against the needs.

Mr. MITCHELL. I know you left it to him, but I am trying to find out what your frame of mind was and what inferences he could fairly draw as to your attitude about it.

Admiral STARK. I do not know what he drew from our attitude except as was answered by his dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. He thought it was all right because he was not worrying about an air attack, and you thought it was all right because you were not worrying about an air attack, isn't that the plain fact about it?

Admiral STARK. Yes. It was toward strengthening that general area, and it strengthened it obviously against an air attack should it occur further westward in those outlying islands.

Mr. MITCHELL. It obviously strengthened Wake and Guam and it weakened the most important base you had—Hawaii.

Admiral STARK. This was Wake and Midway.

Mr. MITCHELL. I mean Wake and Midway, yes.

Admiral STARK. And we considered Midway in particular a very vital point because of its closeness to Hawaii. Wake stuck out in a sort of an area which we realized would be difficult to defend from the fleet standpoint, but we were sending planes to the Philippines via those two islands at [5735] that time. That movement was also important, and this was in connection with it.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did Admiral Kimmel reply? Would you read that, so we will have it in the record?

Admiral STARK. His message is dated 28 November 1941. The time group on it is 280627. That is 6:27 in the morning, which would be 1 o'clock our time, and 5½ hours earlier his time.

Mr. GESELL. That is the sending time?

Admiral STARK. It would be back on the 25th.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the sending time, is it?

Admiral STARK. I mean the 27th. That is the sending time, yes. He refers to our two dispatches 270038 and 270040; the last one I believe I have not read yet.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose you read 270040 before you read his reply?

Admiral STARK. 270040 dispatch reads as follows—

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Admiral STARK. That is the 27th also, just after midnight, our dispatch, which would have been about 7 o'clock in the evening of the 26th.

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reinforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare [5736] in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommend armament.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that relate to the garrisons of some of these Islands to the west?

Admiral STARK. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now read his reply.

Admiral STARK. In his reply he refers to the two mesasges from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have read, and he states:

Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron Marine planes. Afterwards proceeds Midway to land similar items.

Already arranged to send each those places leaving Pearl about 1 December essential ground material for temporary operation 12 B–17 Army bombers, but at present only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu in operating condition.

Acute shortage Army bombs precludes any shipment to outlying bases but Navy bombs now available there usable by Army with minor alteration.

Doubtful capability Army pursuit planes to operate over 20 miles offshore radically limits their usefulness for [*5737*] insular defense. Their use possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed. Flexibility disposition thereby curtailed.

Additional AA guns required this area for Army and Marine defense battalions. Plans for Army troop reinforcement outlying bases being made however consider such use inadvisable as long as Marines available. All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command.

Twelve Marine fighters leave 28 November in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending twelve patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. Will investigate more thoroughly feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuit.

Now I would like to state that, so far as I know or recall, the part of that dispatch which I read, which speaks about the 12 Marine fighters leaving on 28 November in a carrier for Wake was the only information sent to us giving the definite time of the movement of the *Lexington* group or the *Enterprise* group.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; he did refer in that message to a later shipment to be made without giving a date.

Admiral STARK. Well, the earlier shipment he informed us about probably were not carriers.

[*5738*] Mr. MITCHELL. What is that?

Admiral STARK. The *Wright* was out there with supplies, if you are referring to the first part of the dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the last part of it he says "we are going later to send some bombers out there."

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How were they to be sent?

Admiral STARK. He says "on December 1 sending 12 patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl." They would fly.

Mr. MITCHELL. They would fly?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*5739*] Mr. MITCHELL. Did Admiral Kimmel——

Admiral STARK. Would you like my reply to that, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, if you have it available.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire: Is his reply in exhibit 37?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. These are new messages. We have not had them available for the committee before, or ourselves for that matter.

Admiral STARK. We have a file that we have had made up covering that which I am sure, if the committee so requires, the Navy Depart-

ment will be glad to furnish. It covers the dispatches I have just read and other matters bearing on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that copies be prepared for distribution to the committee. You may read them into the record now and they will become part of the hearings, but for convenience it might be well for the committee to have copies.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made available in connection with the dispatches from October 17 on, when this thing started. There are dispatches from October 17 giving the reasons for these things. They are already in the record of the Navy Board at page 321 on—the Navy narrative.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, during the noon hour we will review the file and get them together.

[*5740*] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I might say that the narrative is not an official document.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just saying that they are available. They have been available.

The CHAIRMAN. The narrative is not an official document but it is available here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Admiral, you have another document that you want to read?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, just to have the record clear on that matter—may I ask counsel if he would get the time from the witness now, so that it will be at this place in the record, as to when the Navy prepared the document that he is now reading from?

The CHAIRMAN. Will counsel inquire as to that?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't know what he is reading from.

Senator FERGUSON. He indicated that the Navy had made up a file on this matter and other matters. I would like to get the time when the Navy made it up.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who made that file up for you?

Admiral STARK. I directed it be prepared, because the question of movement of these carriers came up in the hearings last summer, and I thought it possible it might come up again, and I wanted put together the dispatches in convenient form, which I have here.

[*5741*] Mr. MITCHELL. And who did the work?

Admiral STARK. I wanted it in convenient form for reference. The work was done by counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your counsel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is my own. I mean, the Navy Department did not do this for me. I asked for these from the Navy Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

Does the document that the admiral now holds in his hands cover all of the messages that were sent by the admiral and received by Admiral Kimmel on this question?

Admiral STARK. I think it does; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How many documents are there? You have read three of them.

Admiral STARK. Well, there is another dispatch, and then there is the order to which I referred where Admiral Kimmel laid the plans for this movement.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose you read the other dispatches?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask if this is something that you have had dug out from the Navy Department or whether the Navy has dug it out for you that they didn't dig out for us.

Mr. MITCHELL. He explained that it was dug out by his counsel.

[5742] The CHAIRMAN. Why didn't the Navy dig it out for us?

Admiral STARK. The Navy had not dug anything out for me, sir. I have done my own digging.

Mr. MITCHELL. I didn't ask him for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, does that indicate that if we don't inquire about it that we are not getting it from the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that it necessarily indicates that. Probably Admiral Stark knew about it, and nobody else did, and nobody, certainly outside of the Navy, would have known about it. I can't explain why it wasn't included in these other documents, although it is included in the narrative story furnished by the Navy.

I think it advisable that all these be read into the hearings and made a part of the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. These dispatches—there is nothing secret about it—I understand that they were dug up in previous hearings. The significance of them didn't strike us very hard at one time, and now it has, so we are going into it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that the message of the 26th is on page 325 of volume 2 of the narrative; it is Exhibit 70 in the Hewitt Report, Document No. 24, Exhibit 70, in the Hewitt Report; it is Exhibit 38 at page 50 in the Naval Court of Inquiry. So there is nothing [5743] secretive about it. This matter has been in the hands of the committee for at least the last month.

[5744] The CHAIRMAN. Let us make it a part of the record here.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, in order that there is no question, I make the suggestion that the liaison man from the Navy who is handling these documents make a further search on behalf of the committee to ascertain whether or not there are any more documents bearing upon this question.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean on this question of shipping planes?

Senator LUCAS. Upon this one question.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you were about to make an observation, Mr. Mitchell, when I interrupted you.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I have forgotten what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, suppose you read the rest of this file into the record now so that we will have it there and we can get mimeographs of it afterward.

Admiral STARK. If I may interject: I don't want any inference made from my remark about the Navy not digging out material for me that it has held back anything or not given me everything I have asked for, but I have done my own digging.

Shall I take this up in sequence?

Mr. MITCHELL. Take it up in sequence and omit the three you have already read.

[5745] Admiral STARK. The first dispatch here is 17 October 1941 and reads:

Because of the great importance——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From whom to whom?

Admiral STARK. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief Pacific.

Because of the great importance of continuing to reinforce the Philippines with long-range Army bombers you are requested to take all practical precautions for the safety of the air fields at Wake and Midway.

The next paper I have bearing on this is from the Commander in Chief United States Fleet to the Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing Two.

Subject: Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station Midway—Basing of Aircraft at.

1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements for basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway, while minimizing logistic demands of these places for the present, the Commander in Chief desires that the following action be taken immediately:

(a) Make preparations at Wake for basing:

(1) 12 patrol planes.

(2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters.

(b) Make preparations at Midway for basing:

[5746] (1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24).

(2) 18 Marine scout bombers or 19 Marine fighters.

2. These preparations shall include the following provisions and assumptions:

(a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it shall be necessary only to fly the patrol planes and land planes (from a carrier in the latter case) to the designated places and it shall be practicable to operate on arrival without attendant transportation of material or personnel by ship.

(b) It shall be practicable to continue operations on this basis for a period of six weeks, at the end of which time relief may be expected, either by air exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision of additional support transported by ship, or by combination of the two.

(c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include transportation to Wake and Midway of:

(1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for minor repairs, adjustments and checks.

(2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel to meet the requirements of subparagraph 2 (b) above, assuming the full availability of Naval Air Station personnel and Marine defense personnel already present for non-technical manpower assistance.

(3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary [5747] additional bomb handling equipment. (Note: With delivery of the 48 1,000-pound bombs approved for the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for patrol planes will be satisfactory at both Wake and Midway. The following additional bombs are needed for the Marine planes: Wake, 12 1,000-pound, 24 500-pound; Midway, 18 1,000-pound, 36 500-pound, 150 100-pound bombs each, of those already available at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the Marine planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition already at Wake and Midway is sufficient).

(d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and subsist in excess accommodations available in Contractor's Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol plane personnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air Station with additional accommodations, if and as necessary, to be provided by the use of Contractor's space.

(e) Marine squadron personnel at Wake shall base and subsist adjacent to the land plane runways. Marine squadron personnel at Midway shall base and subsist on Eastern Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suitable tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense personnel shall be used to accomplish this.

(f) Commander Patrol Wing Two shall provide, by patrol plane tender, the necessary personnel and material transportation [5748] for both patrol plane and Marine aircraft preparations.

3. By copy of this letter the Commandant 14th Naval District is directed to take immediate steps to:

(a) Make available the 48 1,000-pound bombs still due for patrol planes at Wake and the additional bombs for the Marine planes.

2 (b) (3) above.

(b) Provide for necessary stowage of bombs and ammunition for Marine land planes adjacent to land plane runways at Wake and Midway.
(c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations needed for patrol squadron personnel at Wake and Midway.
(d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water requirements of the personnel of the foregoing preparatory parties and anticipate the additional requirements resulting from actual aircraft basing.
(e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation gasoline at Wake and anticipate the aviation gasoline and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake and Midway resulting from actual aircraft basing.
(f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of Marine aircraft personnel at Wake and Midway.
(g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval Air Station and Marine defense personnel for camp construction [*5749*] and, on arrival of aircraft, for aircraft operations.

Copies of this preparatory letter of Admiral Kimmel's were sent to:
COMBATFOR
COMSCOFOR
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRSCOFOR
COM–14
NAD, OAHU
C. O., MARINE AIR GROUP 21

Copy was not sent to Chief of Naval Operations. It was a local operation order of Admiral Kimmel to his own people on how to carry out that which he directed.

The next message is 270038, the message which I have already read.

The next message is 270040, wherein I stated Army has offered to make available some units and which I have also read.

The next message was the message from CINCPAC to OPNAV, 28 06 27, which was in reply to the two previous ones.

The next message, which I have not read, is 282054 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief Pacific.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The date?

Admiral STARK. The 28th, sir. 2054, which would be 10 [*5750*] hours and a half earlier, which would be about 10 o'clock in the morning on the 28th. From Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Arrangements described in your 280624 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transporting VMP221 from San Diego to Hawaii via *Saratoga* period War Department will instruct commanding general Hawaiian department to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and army troops in support of landings period War Department will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon period Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen thirty-seven mm. anti-aircraft guns and receive ammunition in February period Do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake period Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future period

That is from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC.

The next dispatch is a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel to his own people, namely, to the Commander of Task Force Two and to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and for information to Combat Wing Two, COMBATFOR, and COMBASEFOR.

It is dated the 28th of November, 0447, which would bring it, in our time, back to the 27th, about 6 o'clock:

[*5751*] Twelve planes marine fightron two eleven are to base Wake accordance myser 101825 of 10 November period *Enterprise* provide transportation

period After departure Pearl on 28 November form task force eight consisting of *Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City* and *Desron* six and past command task force two to Rear Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry out normal operations in Hawaiian area period Proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 degrees from Wake period At 0700 on 3 December period Fly off marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl period Enroute to and from Wake pass through Point Afirm 400 miles south of Midway period Patrol planes from Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake period Communications radio condition nineteen guard MPM primary fox continuously period Comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 3 December and direct Wake report comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes available there period Comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight period Wake submarine patrol *Tambor Triton* will be advised period. *Narwhal* and *Dolphin* are enroute Pearl at 1200 GCT on 27 November they were about 300 miles east of Wake period

The next message is 040237, which is 4 December, 2 o'clock, [*5752*] 0237, Greenwich. We would be 5 hours earlier, which would be half-past nine, and the time in Hawaii would have been about 4 o'clock in the afternoon on the 3rd.

Myser 01825 of 10 November Marine Scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway period *Lexington* provide transportation period on five December after sortie Pearl form task force twelve under comcruscofor consisting of *Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland* desron five less desdiv ten period task force twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from Midway at 2230 October on seven December period from that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway period return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway period comtaskfor nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover *Lexington* flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight period communications radio condition nineteen guard continuously MPM primary fox period comfourteen inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on eight December and require Midway report arrival to comfourteen by coded dispatch period comfourteen pass this report to comtaskfor twelve period Midway submarine patrol will be advised period

That last message, I believe I didn't give you the heading. It is from CINCPAC, to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, [*5753*] and COMPATWING 2, by mailgram, and info to COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRBATFOR, *Lexington*, also by mailgram.

[*5754*] Mr. MITCHELL. That completes the file, does it?

Admiral STARK. That completes it so far as the correspondence on that particular subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, in order to complete the record on this item I call the committee's attention to a letter in Exhibit 106, which is already in evidence, which is the file marked, "Correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel", and that letter is a letter dated December 2, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark and it refers to these despatches.

I won't read it all, it is in evidence, unless you want it read into the record.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering, Mr. Mitchell. There is only one letter here and there were two written on that day by Kimmel on the same subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, this document is not paged. It is December 2, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it might go into the record at this point, unless the committee wants it read, as if read.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose I have the reporter transcribe it in the record without my reading it.

To get the thing cleared up here, the thing that the Congressman is asking about, I only see one letter.

Mr. MURPHY. There is only one in the exhibit, but there [5755] were two letters written. The second letter is referred to on page 528 of the narrative.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is it a letter relating to this subject?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, and covered in the previous inquiry.

Mr. MITCHELL. Both the same date?

Mr. MURPHY. Both the same date.

Mr. MITCHELL. Both the same subject?

Mr. MURPHY. Apparently. One is at page 528 of the narrative and the other is on page 524.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose both letters are printed here then.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will have both letters put in the transcript here, the one I have in Exhibit 106 and the other one of the same date which the Congressman has referred to.

Mr. GESELL. I think the other one is an official letter and would not be in this folder.

Mr. MITCHELL. This is one of these personal letters and not an official communication.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know, but it is in regard to the same subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then we will put them both in. I only want to mention one thing in this letter that is now being written into the record of December 2 that is rather suggestive.

[5756] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I——

Mr. MITCHELL. Could I finish this, please?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. On this question of moving marines and antiaircraft equipment out to Wake and Midway, Admiral Kimmel says this:

On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands.

(The letters of December 2, 1941, referred to follow:)

[5757]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA

FLAGSHIP

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
December 2, 1941.

Ser. #8
Secret

DEAR BETTY:—

We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time

that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating [*5758*] from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway.

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Commandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impossible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, we put six 5″ guns and twelve 3″ anti-aircraft guns, together with a number of machine guns on [*5759*] the island, well knowing that we did not have sufficient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the battery at Wake. In case the present situation should cease, we can readily withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of these planes.

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of the four 7″ guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four of the 3″–50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries already installed there, which comprise six 5″-51's and twelve 3″ anti-aircraft. You will also note from our official letter submitted today that the defenses of Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless not entirely inadequate.

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel [*5760*] is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army antiaircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of antiaircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber

machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items include, as I have previously stated, provision to berth a ship at Wake, completion of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gasoline, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official correspondence that: (a) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 800 men each; that steps be taken in Washington to supply [*5761*] them with guns, both surface and antiaircraft; supply them with .37 mm. or .50 caliber machine guns; to make up a well-balanced defense battalion; that prior to the time the equipment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the 5-inch guns of the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be utilized for training purposes; (b) that these Army defense battalions be held in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to relieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be occupied.

The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.

That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man them; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.

The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedi- [*5762*] tion is now due to leave here on December ninth.

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly.

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there.

In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take

over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an [5763] agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the *Wharton* we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval personnel from the West Coast to the Fleet. The other transports, to a total of six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expendition even on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty to fifty percent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy the Marshall's and Caroline's in an advance across the Pacific.

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture.

With kindest regards and best wishes, always.

Most sincerely yours,

[5764] H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes.

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.

H. E. K.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they authorized him to charter [5765] ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know the considerations which prompted the Navy to turn over the development of the island bases to the Army; I do know that it has complicated our problems considerably.

The Commanding General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but frequently the information is so late that I have been unable to plan adequate protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General Short has taken hold of this problem which was dropped in his lap.

H. E. KIMMEL.

P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fiji and New Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume the protection [5766] of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved in these affairs. I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive.

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going to have seven cruisers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts may decrease if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.

(S) H. E. KIMMEL.

[5767]
EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W
Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
2 Dec. 1941.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.
References:

(a) OpNav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
(b) OpNav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
(c) Cincpac despatch 28067 of November 1941.
(d) OpNav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
(e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
(f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of December 3, 1941.
(g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of October 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to *reinforce* defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, *might occupy* but that they could provide no antiaircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to [5768] strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in *support* of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which referred to commander in chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advanced bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

4. Reference (g) contained a study by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battal- [5769] lions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, *trained* assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of antiaircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7'' and 5'' guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155-mm. guns from Hawaii and Marine 5'' guns might be replaced but the 155-mm. guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm. guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a [5770] considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37 mm.

(d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reenforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time [5771] to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.

(f) In emergency Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been assembled.

(h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a quadron of Marine light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on [5772] both Midway and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B–17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions at those bases made feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooperation in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

[5773] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already [5774] brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, provided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions);

(b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, available on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;

(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination;

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or [5775] developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The internationl situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It

would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. If our progress in the war has brought more [5776] advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. [5777] The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

16. It seems appropriate here to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago, and [5778] other places.

17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

(d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local [5779] Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see reference (g));

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be maintained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans; and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy (see paragraph 8);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions; [5780–5781] or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to: C. G., Haw. Dept. Com–14.

[5782] Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Senator, what did you have to say?

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to get the record clear on this Exhibit 106. Did I understand counsel to say that that only has the personal letters and not all official letters?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. That is a correspondence file and the official letters would have a way of starting out, "From the Chief of Naval Operations."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do we have any exhibit that has the official letters in them so that we would know where to find this other letter that Congressman Murphy talks about, being an official letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not think we have ever compiled a separate document with the official letters, have we? They have been put in from time to time in evidence but there has never been any compilation made of them as we have in the correspondence file.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask counsel whether this thick document here, which is a compilation of Admiral Stark's letters to Admiral Kimmel and his letters back, are to be regarded as official or personal?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, they are official but they are written in the personal style as distinguished from a formal communication. This is in the personal style. Those formal com- [5783] munications were phrased differently. They did not call each other "Dear Betty" and so on in them. They start out with, "From: Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC. Subject: So and so and paragraph so an so." They are more formal in style, but Admiral Stark obviously had a practice of communicating in this form with his commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Sometimes he would send a formal dispatch and then he would write a letter about it afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. They are mixed in here, I see. Here are some from the commander in chief to the Naval Operations and others addressed "Dear Betty" and "Dear Mustapha." I suppose that was a nickname given to Admiral Kimmel because it sounded like Mustapha Kemal of Turkey.

Mr. MITCHELL. That may be so.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; that was the reason for my addressing him in that way. That was an affectionate term I had of addressing him by Mustapha Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you get the nickname Betty?

Admiral STARK. A lot of people have asked me that question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You might as well clear it up now.

Admiral STARK. When I went to the Naval Academy the history which we studied there had the statement of old General [5784] John Stark, who was one of my forebears, that "We win today or Betty Stark will be a widow tonight." The histories that I had always studied at home were, "We win today or Molly Stark will be a widow tonight."

I was called both Molly and Betty off and on for a number of months and finally dropped into the name of Betty and I have been known as Betty Stark ever since. Every time an upper classman came in my room when I was a plebe I had to get up and say, "We win today or Betty Stark will be a widow." I did the same thing when I went from the youngster floor; that is, the third-class floor, up to the fourth-class floor, I would stop and say, "We win today or Betty Stark will be a widow."

That name has stuck. It probably will be given to all Starks subsequent to my time. For example, Governor Stark of Missouri was known as Molly Stark, which is how names carry on as a rule in the Naval Academy.

The CHAIRMAN. You came very near being a widow at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, just so that we may keep this record straight: Now, in Exhibit 106, they are the personal letters and not the official letters, but I find, for instance, on July 10, 1941 a memorandum for [5785] Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral King, commander of all Naval Districts, signed "H. R. Stark." Now, would that be classified as a personal one or an official one, so that we get the record straight?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the record will show for itself. There are some communications interspersed in this Exhibit 106 that are in the formal form.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Stark, did Admiral Kimmel ever inform you that he had made a decision not to conduct any air reconnaissance after November 27 around Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to some intercepts in exhibit 2. As I understand it, the intercepted and decoded Jap diplomatic messages and military messages that were decoded by the Army and Navy were delivered to you regularly, copies of them.

Admiral STARK. If you are referring to certain particular dispatches, I would like to see them. Generally——

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am talking about the practice. The record, I think, shows that the Army and Navy at Washington here had those means of decoding and translating the secret Jap messages and we have one volume here, Exhibit 1, that was what we call diplomatic intercepts, that were mes- [5786] sages between the Tokyo government and its diplomatic representatives abroad back and forth, and then we have in as Exhibit 2 another type of those messages that the Japs sent out to representatives abroad, that are of a military nature and not a diplomatic nature. You are familiar with that, are you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, there was a system for having these messages decoded and translated by sometimes the War Department, sometimes the Navy Department.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And a regular dissemination or distribution or delivery to certain officials. You were one of the officials to whom it was the practice to deliver copies of those intercepts, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you got them regularly?

Admiral STARK. I got them regularly. I would state with regard to that that when the book came to me, which usually came through my aide, there were clipped certain dispatches which they considered important that I should read. Those not clipped were considered not necessary for me to read. I always read those clipped. Those not clipped I might sometimes go through the file just to check up to see whether I [5687] was getting all that in my opinion was also important. I believe my aide generally went through all of them. The same book that I read Admiral Ingersoll read.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did it come to you in one of the pouches?

Admiral STARK. Locked; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Locked pouch?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it was a book in which the messages were bound or tied together?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And when you say "clipped" you mean with little paper clips, that little paper clips were stuck on those that you were expected to read?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will call your attention now to exhibit 2 commencing at page 12. That is an intercepted Jap message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, translated——

Admiral STARK. Did you say page 2, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 12, translated October 9, 1941. It is the message with which we are familiar, that divides the waters of Pearl Harbor into five areas and requests information as to the location of ships in those areas and you will note on pages 13, 14, and 15 there is a series of messages [5788] relating to that subject, all of them translated and available here in English form before December 7.

Did those messages come to your attention at or about the time they were received?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of having seen those particular messages. I believe that I did not see them. However, I may have seen them. They may have been brought to me and they may have slipped my mind, but I think I did not see them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why do you believe you did not see them?

Admiral STARK. Because I have no recollection of them, and if I may go on I would like to comment on these messages.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

Admiral STARK. These messages are of a class of message which gives positions of ships in harbor, gives locations. The message, however, is distinctly different from the usual type of ship report, which simply would say, "So many ships," or give their names, in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch is different in that it calls for the location of a ship in the harbor in her particular berth.

I recall no such request from Tokyo to the field; that is, to the Japanese people, to report like that except for Pearl Harbor. There might have been. We did not see it. I believe there are one or two places where ships were reported, [*5789*] like in Puget Sound, in a certain berth or a dock, alongside of a dock, but this dispatch while of a class is of a character which is different.

In the light of hindsight it stands out very clearly, with what we can read into it now, as indicating the possibility or at least the groundwork for a Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor. That significance which we now have in the light of hindsight was not pointed out to me by anyone, nor do I have the slightest recollection of anybody ever having given that significance at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Whose hands would this message pass through in the Navy besides your own—in the Department I mean?

Admiral STARK. That message would come in and be decoded and translated and go to the office of naval intelligence, it being information. If naval intelligence had thought it important enough—and there were good men looking over those dispatches in intelligence—if they had thought it important or of unusual significance, they had full authority to send it out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Send it out to whom?

Admiral STARK. Send it out to the field. This particular dispatch would have been of particular interest, if they had so considered it, to Admiral Kimmel. They could have simply sent it out as it was. If they had thought it vital, they [*5790*] could have also brought it to what we call the front office; that is, to Ingersoll or myself, or come through Turner, but I have no recollection of this dispatch having been discussed, certainly not with regard to what in the light of hindsight we would now read into it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it is clear in the light of handsight what it means, we will agree to that, but how about foresight? Don't you think this message, because of the very things you point out, would have been or ought to have been a very significant thing to a careful intelligence man before the attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. It is very difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. I can only say that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were likewise vitally interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed it out. There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japa-

nese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put down as just another example of their great attention to detail.

If I had seen it myself I do not know what I would have done. I might have said, "Well, my goodness, look at this detail," or I might have read into it because it is different, I might have said, "Well, this is unusual. I wonder why they [*5791*] want it?" I might have gone on, and diagnosed it or I might not. I simply do not know. We read it now in the light of what has happened.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it was of interest to the Army, but don't you think because it asked for ships and ship locations that it was a little more pertinent to the Navy Intelligence to analyze it and evaluate it than it was the Army people?

Admiral STARK. Well, both were analyzing, but it is of a naval color.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It is also of an air raid color.

Mr. MITCHELL. What could it mean? Looking at it now and reading the words of it what could it mean other than the formation of a target plan? What do you conceive would be the purpose of the Japs in having the precise location by areas of the ship's location in each section in Pearl Harbor unless it was that?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I look at it now in the light of what I know——

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I did not ask you to do that. I am asking you what it could have meant? Read it and tell us what it could have meant if it did not mean that?

Admiral STARK. Well, it could have meant that they were just down to getting the detail. Whether a submarine might [*5792*] have come in, whether the small submarines might have come in, whether the so-called suicide, one-man submarine attack might have been in their minds, that might have been possible. I am thinking now in the light of hindsight. I did not see the messages.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that was of vital interest if it were all of those things to Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes; if it could have meant that, if it had been clear at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. If it meant sabotage or small submarines or air attack or anything, and it must have meant one of them at the time, it was very important for him to know that, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. It meant they wanted to know what was in particular spots and its significance now is quite clear.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was your impression prior to December 7, 1941, as to whether Admiral Kimmel or the Navy out at Pearl Harbor had the equipment or the forces trained to decode and translate these diplomatic and military messages to which I have referred, these Jap messages?

Admiral STARK. I inquired on two or three occasions as to whether or not Kimmel could read certain dispatches when they came up and which we were interpreting and sending our own messages and I was told that he could. However, I want [*5793*] to make it plain that that did not influence me in the slightest regarding what I sent.

I felt it my responsibility to keep the commanders in the field and to see to it that they were kept informed of the main trends and of information which might be of high interest to them. Regardless of what dispatches I might have seen, they may have formed background for me but I saw that affirmative action was taken from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in the field on matters which I thought they should have.

[5794] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if it was your responsibility, and you say it was, to keep him informed, was it not of vital importance that you know what means of information he had by himself? What sort of a system is it when the commander in chief of the Navy Department having the duty of keeping his field commanders well posted does not know whether the field commander has certain means of informing himself?

Admiral STARK. Well, I took the means to inform him.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you ignored the fact then that you felt he had it all anyway and gave him what you thought was worth while?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I worked on the principle that it was my responsibility and by official letter dispatch and personal letter endeavored to give him my thoughts.

Mr. MITCHELL. Don't you think if he already had copies of these intercepts that his forces had decoded out there that it was taking some chances for you to expose your code-breaking system by sending him copies over the wires of those same messages?

Admiral STARK. I had confidence in the security of our highest codes.

Mr. MITCHELL. More than you had in the Japs?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. So far as we know, they had not been broken.

[5795] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as a matter of fact, notwithstanding somebody told you Admiral Kimmel had a decoding and decrypting outfit out there, you did send him from time to time not only the substance but practically verbatim copies of some of these Jap intercepts, did you not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was it that told you that they had a system out in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor of decoding and decrypting Jap messages?

Admiral STARK. Admiral Turner.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did he say he had done to try to find out about it?

Admiral STARK. He did not say. As I said, I remarked to him—I remembered on one or two occasions not of having talked with Admiral Turner but I recall last summer that I was under the impression Kimmel could translate these messages. I do not mean that he could have translated all of them. The volume was very great at times. It is my understanding that people, who I believe you have down on the call, can give you far more than I can.

There was a mass——

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was it in the Navy Department——

Admiral STARK. May I finish?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[5796] Admiral STARK. There was a mass of material that came in and a portion of it was decoded into the book, part of that which we

thought was worth while was, and furthermore it was clipped, that which was really important.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was it in the Navy Department here that did know whether Admiral Kimmel had the decrypting and decoding of the code available to him?

Admiral STARK. People who were doing the same work for us in the Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. To find the truth out it was only necessary to go to them and ask them, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, when Admiral Turner told me he could do it I did not consider it necessary to go any further.

Mr. MITCHELL. How is that?

Admiral STARK. I say when Admiral Turner told me that he could do it, I mean Admiral Kimmel could do it, I did not consider it necessary to go any further.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Kimmel came here on a visit at one time, and he wrote a letter in which he said how important it was that he should know all about the diplomatic negotiations, and that sort of thing.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did not you know at that time, and in the discussion did not it come to light that he did not have any [*5797*] difficulty in decoding these diplomatic top messages?

Admiral STARK. No; he did not mention that. I do remember distinctly his wanting everything which was pertinent. We had conferences on everything he wanted, and I told him all I knew, the main trends at that time, and I continued to tell him.

I might make this observation at this time and that is that the intercepts formed only a part, though a very vital part, of information which we here in Washington had.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that, Admiral. I am driving at the question of how it came about that Admiral Kimmel came here, and the letter that he presented personally, asking that he be informed of all of these political developments and diplomatic developments, and you thought he had a code decrypting outfit there that would break these messages, why the subject was not mentioned? Why he should be asking for these things if he had a system of his own of getting them?

Admiral STARK. Well, there was more than just the material that came from Japan, much more, and that is their interpretation, such as you could get from the State Department, Mr. Hull, from the White House, from the Army and other sources, the Treasury, that we had and which we welded together as our responsibility and sent them out. Our picture was [*5798*] complete, and I felt it was our job to send him that. Of course I would have far rather sent him too much than too little. I felt I was keeping him informed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you haven't any recollection, in your conference when he was here about that subject, of ever having mentioned the subject of having a crypt analytical unit out in Honolulu?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not recall it.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say that between November 27 and December 7 you had some conferences with people in your department over the situation as to whether any other messages were needed by way of warning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In any of those discussions did any of your people or yourself mention or bring the question up as to whether Pearl Harbor was at any risk from an air raid?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I have stated before, we went into the picture continuously.

Mr. MITCHELL. I asked you before with reference to the preparation of the November 27 message. Now I am talking about the conference you say you had after that, between the 27th and the 7th of December, in which you reviewed the warnings you sent. That is what I am asking about now.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall that we particularly [*5799*] mentioned an air raid after we had sent out our messages. We did go into what we received subsequent to that time. We felt that we had received nothing which would change or strengthen the messages which we sent out on the 24th and 27th, except the fact that the Japs were destroying their means of communication with their representativetives in the American, British, and Dutch Governments.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you tell us when the last time was that any communication was exchanged between you and Admiral Kimmel that mentioned the question of an air raid? We have this record that you initiated yourself of November 22, 1940, bringing out the necessity for investigating that problem and that was followed by the Clarke Report, the Knox-Stimson letter, and great activity for months on the Army and Navy part in reviewing the situation, estimating the danger, how it would happen and how to defend against it.

The last official document I have seen of that kind was the Martin Report of August 21. Now I am wondering if there is anything you know of a communication between you and Admiral Kimmel that took place after September, October, November, or December, up to the 7th, that mentioned the air attack possibility. We have read a letter this morning of December——

Admiral STARK. I was going to say talking about anti- [*5800*] aircraft.

Mr. MITCHELL. December 2, or 1, it was, a letter from Admiral Kimmel, in which he mentions the fact that he thought the antiaircraft defenses of Hawaii were inadequate and he complained about it, and they had not been remedied.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wondered whether you could lead us to any other communication in which you raised the point, or he raised it. There may be some. It is a hard question to answer, but I am looking for a pointer in some document that maybe we have not noticed.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall at present.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you look it up?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And come back later, if you will, please, and see if we can dig up anything more on that subject.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I want to say I do not recall anything except our general discussion and pressure to increase the antiaircraft defenses. I will look into what I have got and see if I can find anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. How late did that take place in the year, about?

Admiral STARK. It was mentioned in what we read this morning.

[5801] Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Admiral STARK. That you mentioned a minute ago. I think I know what you want, sir, and I will endeavor to find it.

[5802] Mr. MITCHELL. I want to find out when the idea vanished completely from the people's mind here and in Pearl Harbor, if I can, the idea of an air attack.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished your observation on what you were trying to find out?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in connection with——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Have you finished your observation on what you were trying to find out about when the idea vanished?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; I have finished. I wanted to find out when the idea of an air attack vanished from people's minds, that was lively for a while.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to suggest that there is a reference in the letter of November 25 to it.

Mr. MITCHELL. November 25?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the Stark-Kimmel communications?

Mr. MURPHY. In the Stark-Kimmel communications, in the postscript.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I remember that letter, and I would like to state that the idea of an air raid had not vanished from our minds.

[5803] Mr. MITCHELL. I am looking for documentary proof of that fact.

Admiral STARK. After the White House meeting on the 25th, in a postscript to a letter to Admiral Kimmel—I better get the document. My remembrance is I told him that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised. I will read that. It is the letter of the 25th of November.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is in Exhibit 106.

Admiral STARK. Shall I read that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; we would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Admiral STARK (reading):

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still [5804] rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where do you find anything in that that talks about a surprise attack on Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. That does not talk about an air raid on Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. That what?

Admiral STARK. It does not mention an air raid on Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I am asking about.

Admiral STARK. I will endeavor to see if I can find anything subsequent to the date you gave.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to suggest there is one more paragraph that was not read. The paragraph says that was the only thing to be prepared for.

Admiral STARK. The final paragraph in that postscript was in my statement, in which I stated:

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be "anything".

Mr. MITCHELL. What are you reading from there?

Admiral STARK. I am reading from the postscript of that [*5805*] letter of the 25th of November, which was also in my statement and in which I stated that the letter and the dispatch were intended to convey to be ready for anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, if you will just read that again, you will see when you are talking about "anything" you are talking about what we are going to do and not what the Japs are going to do, if you read that carefully. It is what we are going to do. We may do anything or nothing.

Admiral STARK. No; but I state, "The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for"—in other words, the dispatch and this postscript I had hoped would convey the thought that anything might happen and we should be prepared for anything, and I think that is what it states.

Mr. MITCHELL. It states we will be prepared for anything we may want to do. That is the plain English of it, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. I would take it, when I say "we"—"We have got to be prepared for anything," that means the men in the field.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are referring to the last sentence in the postscript?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, let me read it. It may be wasting time to discuss English.

I won't go into the pros or cons [*5806*] of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for—

that is to say, prepared for anything we may decide to do. That is not in preparation against anything the Japs may want to do, is it?

Admiral STARK. My thought here, when I said—

we may do most anything—

I was telling the men in the field we might do anything, and as I stated—

that's the only thing I know to be prepared for.

In other words, they should be prepared for anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it was Lord Bacon who said that the man who wrote the document was the poorest man to interpret it, because he was always thinking of what he meant to say instead of what he did say.

Admiral STARK. I will have to stand by what other people think of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, let me turn your attention to the mysterious document known as the winds message for a moment. You are familiar now with the Jap decoded secret messages appearing on the bottom of page 154 of Exhibit 1, are you? You just look at them at the bottom of page 154. That is the message from Tokyo to Washington, a diplomatic intercept, dated November 19, 1941, and translated November 28, 1941. It [*5807*] states:

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese Language shortwave news broadcast", and in which certain Japanese words were "east wind rain", "north wind cloudy", "west wind clear", if used in the broadcast meant diplomatic relations were in danger or broken, and to burn the codes.

Did you see that message prior to December 7, that is, the message setting up that code system?

Admiral STARK. My recollection is not clear on the winds message. I undoubtedly saw it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, when you saw the winds message, the question is whether this is the one message that everybody knows was received, and there is another real question as to whether any such code message was ever later sent out. I would like to be clear as to what you are referring to.

Admiral STARK. I probably saw this message setting up the code at the time it was received.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say "probably," you heard it talked about recently?

Admiral STARK. I heard it pretty well covered.

Mr. MITCHELL. You cannot remember what you knew prior to [*5808*] December 7?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We talked about it a lot since.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know prior to December 7 that any naval monitoring stations had been alerted to try to intercept such message?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not know—I did not get your question.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know prior to December 7, 1941, that any Navy monitoring station had been alerted to try and listen in on Japanese weather broadcasts?

Admiral STARK. I undoubtedly knew that.

Mr. MITCHELL. You undoubtedly knew it?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. If you knew that then you must have seen this message.

Admiral STARK. I said I assumed that I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say you undoubtedly knew it, you assume you knew it, but do you know now that you knew it then?

Admiral STARK. I know now.

Mr. MITCHELL. But you cannot really support your memory before and after the 7th of December to say what you did know about this code system prior to that date?

Admiral STARK. I am anticipating your next question which I suppose will be as to whether I knew of its implementation.

[*5809*] Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, I haven't gotten to that yet.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will in a minute.

Admiral STARK. When this message came in it was undoubtedly brought to my attention. I state I must have seen it. I do not recollect particularly the details of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you have any present recollection that you did see this code system message prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. Well, that is not clear, sir. I have seen it so much since then——

Mr. MITCHELL. It is hard to tell.

Admiral STARK. I assume I undoubtedly saw it at the time, but it is one of those things. My mind has not been burdened with it for over the 4 years in question.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you have the same answer with respect to the message at the top of page 155, which was on the same date and used an abbreviated system, with the Japanese words "east, north or west" instead of "east wind rain, north wind cloudy and west wind clear," which was to be used in general intelligence broadcasts. Do you remember ever seeing that prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. I assume I saw it. I do not remember the details of the "Higashi" and "Kita," and the rest that went with it.

[*5810*] Mr. MITCHELL. Prior to December 7, 1941, was there ever brought to your attention any copy or any information about the implementing message sent out by the Japs in a weather broadcast which used the significant words that were set up in this code?

Admiral STARK. No, there was not, sir. I am sure of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. How about a message sent out under the second code system set up at the top of page 155 of Exhibit 1, which was an abbreviated system to be used in general intelligence broadcasts?

Prior to December 7, was any implementing message under that brought to your attention?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever hear, prior to December 7, of any implementing message under this winds code system, or a message thought to be that, having been received and decoded in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Federal Communications station was alerted I think by the Army to try to listen in on these Japanese weather broadcasts to see what they could get, and their report shows the two messages between November 28 and December 7 that did not quite fit the exact wording of the [*5811*] code system but came pretty close to it in regard to a possible war with Russia. Did you see those? Were they brought to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I do not recollect. I have heard it discussed since in all its detail. I do not recollect the Russian situation at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will next call your attention to what we have been calling here the 14-part and 1 p. m. message. It appears of record here that on December 6 there was intercepted and decoded here in Washington a pilot message sent from the Jap Government to their ambassadors here stating there would come shortly a longer message containing their answer to the American Government's position, and then it appears on the evening and before midnight December 6–7, the first 13 parts of that message were translated, decoded, and made available to certain officials here, and on the next morning, the 14th

part and 1 p. m. part, which directed the presentation of the message to our Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on the 7th, were translated and disseminated. When did any part of that message first come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. It first came to my attention Sunday forenoon when I came to the office in the Navy Department. I had no information of it prior to that time.

[*5812*] Mr. MITCHELL. Nobody endeavored to reach you, that you know of, Saturday evening, about the early 13 parts?

Admiral STARK. Nobody reached me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where were you, if you know?

Admiral STARK. I don't know, sir. I thought I was home but if they had tried to reach me I should have been there. Also if I were not there word would have been left where I was. Also the duty officer was generally informed of my whereabouts. Unfortunately, Mrs. Stark has destroyed her date calendar of that time. I have tried to run down two or three blinds. There was a party given in the Navy yard that night for Governor Edison, ex-Secretary of the Navy. I knew that I had been there on a party with him. I wrote the Commandant at that time. He said that he had completely forgotten they had given the party and his wife said she was sure I wasn't there, in any case. So that blind went by the board.

Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that Secretary Knox had it that night; your Chief of Naval Intelligence had it that night.

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. MITCHELL. And Knox called up and made an appointment with Stimson and Hull the next morning. You didn't hear anything about that?

[*5813*] Admiral STARK. No, sir, not a word.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the afternoon of the Saturday before, during office hours, this pilot message came in, which was the preliminary message from the Japs to their ambassadors stating that they were going to send this message along.

Did you see that?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of having seen or heard of the pilot message. The first information that I had on the subject was Sunday forenoon.

Mr. MITCHELL. I noticed in your statement about this incident you make no mention of the hour you got in the office or the hour you first saw this 13- or 14-part message Sunday morning. Have you no recollection about the hour?

Admiral STARK. I can only guess on that and I did guess last summer. I usually got down to the office Sunday mornings around 10:30 and I just assumed that I had gotten there somewhere around 10:30 or 11 o'clock. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there was some special reason for getting up early. I usually took a walk around the grounds and greenhouse at the Chief of Naval Operations' quarters and didn't hurry about getting down and my usual time, as I recall, was about 10:30 or 11. What time it was on this particular Sunday morning I couldn't go beyond that.

Mr. MITCHELL. I believe there are some officials in [*5814*] your Department, who have not yet been called as witnesses, whose job it was to deliver and consider messages of that type, who think

you got there at 9 o'clock and saw a part of this message as early as that and the balance of it, the fourteenth part, at least by 1:30.

Would that be contrary to the fact if they should so testify?

Admiral STARK. They have told me the same thing and they are also estimating. You will have those people before you. And as regarding the 1 o'clock message I think you will have, probably, from one of the witnesses who kept some track of his time, the fact that he got to my office, and he can testify, about 10:40, with the 1 o'clock message, but I have no recollection.

Mr. MITCHELL. The records show, the White House phone records show that General Marshall called you at 11:30 about it, he had written out a message to Pearl Harbor, to the Army commander there about this 1 p. m. business.

Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. That is the one thing on that morning which stands out very clearly in my memory, was General Marshall's call to me about that message. At that time I was talking over that message with Admiral Schuirmann, as to what it might mean. He pointed out, he said, we don't [*5815*] know what the significance of it is, but it might mean something, and he said he thought it would be a good thing to inform the people in the Pacific.

My first reaction was that we had sent so much out that—and as there was no deduction from the message, as to what it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be just as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion whether to send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not to send too much, it might create the story of "wolf."

That was my first conversation with General Marshall.

I put the phone up and, as I recall it, I put it up and stopped, and in a matter of seconds, or certainly only a few minutes, and thought, well, it can't do any harm, there may be something unusual about it, General Marshall states he doesn't know what the significance is, but there might be something, and I turned back and picked up the phone, he had not yet sent the message, and I said, perhaps you are right, I think you had better go ahead and I would like to have you make sure that it goes to the naval opposites where this message was going, which was throughout the commands in the broad Pacific.

I also asked General Marshall, knowing that the time was rather short, whether or not he would get it out quickly. [*5816*] I told him our own system under pressure was very fast. And he said, no, that he was sure he could get it out quickly also. And with that I did nothing more.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was your system?

Admiral STARK. Radio.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had a powerful sending apparatus, did you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; very.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if we are right in our assumptions as to the fact that you had this 1 p. m. message in your hands an hour before Marshall did, that is at least 10:30—you are not willing to concede that, are you?

Admiral STARK. My remembrance, as I said, was 10:40. When you say "at least 10:30," I think you will find testimony to that effect by a witness, and if he states that, and I think he probably has good

supporting data, I accept it, that it was delivered to my office and then after that was given, by whomever he gave it, to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is it fair to say that if Marshall hadn't spotted that message and started to send word out to Pearl Harbor that you probably wouldn't have sent anything?

Admiral STARK. I don't know that I would. I think that might be a fair deduction.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now didn't you have somebody more than [*5817*] Schuirmann in there discussing this 1 p. m. business?

Admiral STARK. Well, sir——

Mr. MITCHELL. Didn't Commander Kramer——

Mr. GESELL. I believe one witness says there were 15 officers in there.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Schuirmann.

Admiral STARK. Admiral Schuirmann. I said when Marshall called I was talking it over with Schuirmann.

Mr. MITCHELL. After you got the 1 p. m. message wasn't there some discussion in your office then about it?

Admiral STARK. There may have been. I don't recall it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Commander Kramer——

Admiral STARK. I can give you what I know by hearsay.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't want that. I just want whether any of these officers spoke to you about it.

Admiral STARK. I don't recollect it that morning. I recollect it since.

Mr. MITCHELL. There were some younger officers that spotted the 1 p. m. business and made some suggestion about it being daylight at Honolulu?

Admiral STARK. I am certain nobody mentioned Honolulu with reference to a daylight attack. I am positive of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, this was what we lawyers call a last clear chance. These people were not ready at Pearl Harbor; [*5818*] the Jap Fleet was piling in; here was a chance to get a message to them that might have saved them; it reached your hands, we will say, at 10:40; the chance wasn't taken.

Does that sum up the situation as you see it?

Admiral STARK. Well, I gather from your——

Mr. MITCHELL. You might have intervened and done something.

Admiral STARK. I gather from your question you are now pointing that dispatch directly at Pearl Harbor. It didn't mention Pearl Harbor. It gave no inference with regard to Pearl Harbor any more than it did the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you right about that? 1 p. m. here was dawn at Pearl Harbor and 1 p. m. here was in the middle of the night in the Philippines.

Admiral STARK. I would say that dawn at Pearl Harbor was about an hour—that can be checked by the Naval Observatory—before the time specified in the message; and as regards midnight in the Philippines, as to whether that would mean anything, that could have been an attack at night. Taranto was an attack just a few minutes after midnight.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why not send a message to all three of those places saying something is liable to happen at 1 p. m. Washington time?

Admiral STARK. In the light of hindsight, if we had read [*5819*] into that message that it meant an attack at that hour, and had sent it

out, of course, it would have been helpful. I wish such an inference could have been drawn.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fixing of an exact hour to deliver the diplomatic message and rout out the Secretary of State on a Sunday at 1 p. m., wasn't it obvious that there was some special significance, having in mind the history of the Japs striking first and declaring war afterwards?

Admiral STARK. If so, Mr. Mitchell, I would like to say that so far as I know the Secretary of War didn't read that inference into it, the Secretary of State didn't read that inference into it, the Secretary of the Navy didn't read that inference into it, General Marshall and his staff didn't read that inference into it, and nobody mentioned it to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you quite right about General Marshall? The first thing he did was to spot that message and he wouldn't even allow his answer to be typed, he put it into longhand and told them to encode it without typing it.

Admiral STARK. May I read his dispatch?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, we are all familiar with it.

Admiral STARK. I would like to read this:

Just what significance the hour set may have been we do not know.

[*5820*] Mr. MITCHELL. Of course, you didn't know.

Admiral STARK. (reading):

But be on the alert accordingly.

Mr. MITCHELL. That means, to you, being alerted at 1 p. m. Washington time, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but I would like to invite attention also to the fact that we had thought that they were on the alert. I am not attempting to argue the fact, sir, that I don't think it would have been a good thing to have gotten this message out, drawn the inference and sent it. I wish we could have. We didn't.

Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't know they weren't on the alert?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. On the contrary, we felt they were.

Mr. MITCHELL. You don't know what time Stimson and Hull got this 1 p. m. message, do you, or saw it?

Admiral STARK. I think, if I may say so, Kramer can tell you that. And if Kramer says that message was delivered to my office at 10:40, I accept it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It has been suggested to me that Kramer may have told you about the text of that message before delivery of the document. Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think I will not ask the admiral any [*5821*] more questions. Do you want to go on with the committee examination or take it up at 2 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as we want to have an executive session we might suspend now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[*5822*] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The chair understands counsel wishes to ask some further questions.

Mr. GESELL. A few additional questions, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Mr. GESELL. First, Admiral Stark, with respect to the events of the 6th and 7th. With respect to your whereabouts on December 6th, did you have a duty officer at your home on the evening of the 6th?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. If someone had wanted to reach you in a hurry could they have gotten you?

Admiral STARK. I left word at home when I went out as to where I could be reached; also before leaving the Department the duty officer in Operations was informed if I would be out.

Mr. GESELL. Was it generally known that the duty officer knew your whereabouts in the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. I think so. Also it was a general Navy custom or at least it was a departmental custom, they would probably have called one of my aides.

Mr. GESELL. Was there anyone at your home on the 6th who could have taken the calls if you were absent?

Admiral STARK. Yes. There was always a servant avail- [*5823*] able at the telephone.

Mr. GESELL. Well, did your servant, or did the duty officer at the Navy Department, or did any of your aides ever telephone that anyone had sought to reach you at any time on the 6th?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GESELL. Now, with respect to the 7th, I think we want to have a little clearer idea of when you got to your office. Admiral Wilkinson testified that you reached your office at least by 9:15 that morning because his recollection is that at 9:15 he discussed the first thirteen parts of the message with you or handed them to you. Do you recall that you were at your offiee that early?

Admiral STARK. I do not. I may have been but I do not recall just what time I got down that Sunday morning. I made a guess when I was asked at the hearing before the Naval Court of Inquiry last summer about half past 10.

Mr. GESELL. Your best recollection is that you got there at half past 10?

Admiral STARK. Well, that was about the usual time and I had no reason to think otherwise. I may have gotten in earlier.

Mr. GESELL. Whenever it was you got there was your first order of business the 14-part message?

[*5824*] Admiral STARK. I do not recall that.

Mr. GESELL. Well, do you recall when you saw the fourteen part message first?

Admiral STARK. I saw it after I got in the office. Just what time I do not recall.

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall how soon after you got to your office that you saw it?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GESELL. Now, do you recall anyone telling you that the 1 o'clock message was in before you were shown the text of the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall that Captain Kramer or anyone else passed oral word into your office that the 1 o'clock message was in?

Admiral STARK. I not only do not recall it, I think I had no such word.

Mr. GESELL. Now, during the 6th and the 7th prior to the attack, did you have any conversations with anyone at the White House, President Roosevelt or anyone else?

Admiral STARK. I may have; I do not recall.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any conversation that you had with anyone at the White House concerning the 14-part message and the 1 o'clock message?

[*5825*] Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any conversations prior to the attack concerning those messages with Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that I did. I may have. I simply don't remember.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, there are two or three other points, picking up some loose ends at this time, which are somewhat unrelated and I will just go right down them with you.

General Marshall indicated that he was not certain what the length of time was which the Navy had in mind as being the minimum necessary for it to get ready for combat in the Pacific. Did you have some date in mind and, if so, did you state your estimate of that at any time?

Admiral STARK. I am not sure of your question unless you mean the delay that we wanted in connection with the Philippines?

Mr. GESELL. I believe that is it; yes.

Admiral STARK. If that it what you refer to and I believe he testified I wanted somewhat longer.

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Admiral STARK. And if I go a little further, I believe he testified that he thought by 10th December or something of that sort he would be ready and that I wanted that into Feb- [*5826*] ruary.

Mr. GESELL. I was not clear about that. He was not clear how long you wanted and that is what I am trying to get now.

Admiral STARK. That is to what you refer?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I was asking for 3 months. I based that request on the Army air schedule which, as I recall, they anticipated completing their quota of planes out there in February or March and, of course, the Army can give you that testimony.

Mr. GESELL. And when you say you were asking for three months who were you asking for three months? To whom were you talking?

Admiral STARK. Largely Mr. Hull, in endeavoring to keep the negotiations going if possible until the Army schedule was completed.

Mr. GESELL. Did Mr. Hull keep you advised of the progress of the negotiations with the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. Mr. Hull kept me I think rather closely advised as to the progress of negotiations. It was his habit frequently, sometimes day after day, to call me up in the late afternoon and let me know if there was any progress.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, you said, I think, in your pre- [*5827*] pared statement something to the effect that you do not recall seeing the 10-point note of November 26th at or about the time that it was delivered.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. The evidence here shows that that note was intercepted in the regular course and was among the Japanese intercepts; in other words, the text of the note being transmitted by the Japanese representatives here to Tokyo.

Admiral STARK. That is true. I think that was on the 28th.

Mr. GESELL. Do you think you saw it then on the 28th?

Admiral STARK. I could not be sure. I would like to say with regard to that 10-point note, while not recollecting having seen it at that time, that I had discussed in the State Department a memorandum by Mr. Morgenthau and expressed my opinion on it and confirmed it in writing. The note of the 26th, the 10-point note, as I recall contained nothing, or at least very little or only minor differences from the note of the Secretary of the Treasury and also did not contain anything which I had objected to in the other note, so in general I knew of the substance of that note but as to having seen it in its actual form when it went out or whether I saw it on the 28th I could not say.

Mr. GESELL. With respect to the basing of the fleet in [*5828*] Pearl Harbor we have had a great deal of discussion concerning whether or not the fleet should have been based out there in 1940. Did you state any opinion or take any position as the days grew more critical in 1941 as to whether or not the fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion when the situation was tense and critical the fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor; that is, should have been based in that area.

Mr. GESELL. Commencing in your opinion at about what date, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. Well, I never tried to narrow that down. It would be purely a guess. If I may go back a little bit, I do not want that confused with the fact that when the fleet first stayed out there I pointed out, and pointed out very clearly, in conversations with the President the advantages from the standpoints which Admiral Richardson mentioned of the fleet's return.

Mr. GESELL. We are talking now about a wholly different thing.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I know we are.

Mr. GESELL. You testified that you were in agreement with Admiral Richardson on his position that he took in 1940.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Now what I am asking you is what view you [*5829*] took, if any, with respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as the days became critical in 1941?

Admiral STARK. Well, the fleet was then based at Pearl Harbor. I would say that by the time Admiral Kimmel had command of the fleet we had practically wiped out of our minds, or at least we no longer considered and talked about bringing the fleet back.

Mr. GESELL. And you have stated that it was your opinion that at least by the last quarter of 1941 the place for the fleet was in the Hawaiian waters?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion that was a covering position in the Pacific.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what information did you have in the latter part of 1941 as to the preparedness of the fleet for combat? Was it ready for war or was it not ready for war?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion it was. Of course, no commander in chief is ever satisfied, even those we had in Europe, they were not satisfied. I know of no one who was ever satisfied but generally speaking I have quoted from Admiral Kimmel's annual report. I did not mention that he also—I think it was in the same letter—he said that his shooting was good judged by any standards, which showed that the fleet was performing satisfactorily in target practice, and he also said the morale was good.

[*5380*] Mr. GESELL. So that it was your opinion that the fleet was ready for war at that time and was that opinion shared by other officers advising you?

Admiral STARK. I think so. Now, when you say "ready for war" it is subject to two interpretations there. It was ready for war in accordance with the war plans. It was not ready for an advance into the western Pacific, which would have required a large train and which we did not have.

Mr. GESELL. It still had no train and was not ready for offensive action?

Admiral STARK. It was ready for offensive action in the way of raids as envisaged by the war plans and it had a train of certain dimensions but it did not have the great fleet of supply vessels required to take it and maintain it in the western Pacific.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what about this dispatch that the President sent concerning the placing of three reconnaissance or patrol vessels in the China Sea, in the South China Sea waters? We have in evidence the dispatch, which I believe you were the issuing officer of, which was sent at the direction of the President asking that three patrol vessels be put out there. Do you remember that?

Admiral Stark. Very well.

Mr. GESELL. Before we discuss the circumstances I want [*5831*] to get one thing clear in my mind. Was that ever done? Were those vessels put out there or weren't they?

Admiral STARK. They were not. The ship *Isabel* I think got out there just about the time the attack broke, was out a few hours and came back. That, to my recollection, Admiral Hart told me. The other vessels were not sent out.

Mr. GESELL. Now, did the President give the direction for the sending of that dispatch to you personally?

Admiral STARK. He did.

Mr. GESELL. Will you state to the committee what discussion you had with him at that time, please, sir?

Admiral STARK. Well, if I may read the dispatch, I think the dispatch speak for itself as to why it was.

Mr. GESELL. We have the dispatch in mind I think, Admiral. I don't mind your reading it as part of your answer, but what I am anxious to have in addition to that is any conversation you may have had with President Roosevelt concerning the surrounding circumstances.

Admiral STARK. Well, of course, at that time I was discussing with the President, as we were discussing in the Department, what might

happen; that is, as to where this expedition going south was likely to hit. His thought was the Kra Peninsula. I was in complete agreement with that. The Philippines was a possibility and the other places which have [5832] been mentioned, the East Indies, and just where it would go we did not know and these three small vessels were to assist in that determination.

Mr. GESELL. I think we have fairly well in mind the points where the vessels were.

Admiral STARK. Well, if you have fairly well in mind the points where the vessels were you will see where the President put them they were well placed to get information either positive or negative and it was for that reason and for the reasons as stated in the dispatch, to get information, that he directed that be done; and I would like to state and just take out of the dispatch what the reasons were.

He says "to form a defensive information patrol; to accomplish a purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam," and then he himself designated where those vessels were to be placed and they were well placed for the purposes for which he wanted them.

Mr. GESELL. Well, did he indicate to you in any way why he wanted the information, other than the general desire to have information concerning Japanese movements?

Admiral STARK. No, that is all. We are all after information. We were scouting by air, and I simply think that he thought that was additional precautions. He was intensely [5833] interested in every move at that time, as we all were.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you attended these various war council meetings which were held immediately preceding these warning messages, did you not, with General Marshall and the Secretaries of War and Navy and President Roosevelt?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall President Roosevelt stating at one of those meetings that he thought it was possible that there would be a surprise attack before the following Monday?

Admiral STARK. I think he stated "as early as the following Monday." Yes, I recall that.

Mr. GESELL. You heard General Marshall's testimony concerning those meetings, did you not?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer again? I had difficulty in hearing the Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I said yes, sir, I recall it. I think that he stated "possibly as early as next Monday." I have forgotten just exactly what his exact words were, but that is my impression.

Mr. KEEFE. When did that occur?

Admiral STARK. That was the Monday after the 25th, I believe it was at that time.

Mr. GESELL. I believe we computed that on a calendar which was furnished us, which is in evidence and I think it [5834] showed December 1 as the Monday.

You heard General Marshall testify concerning those meetings, did you?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Did you hear or read Secretary Hull's testimony concerning those meetings?

Admiral STARK. I am not sure that I did.

Mr. GESELL. Well, have you anything to add to what General Marshall said concerning what took place at those meetings? Have you a more detailed recollection of the discussions?

Admiral STARK. No, nothing more than I mentioned in the postscript of my letter to Admiral Kimmel which was mentioned this morning. We went over the situation and we looked at the charts and were wondering when they were going to strike and where.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion of Hawaii in those meetings as a possible point where they would strike?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that there was.

Mr. GESELL. You participated in the drafting and preparation of the joint memorandum signed by yourself and General Marshall to the President of November 27, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, General Marshall and I were responsible for it.

[*5835*] Mr. GESELL. Right.

Admiral STARK. That was formed up by the two war plans divisions.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us under what circumstances that was written? It is still a little vague on the record why that particular memorandum was written.

Admiral STARK. Primarily we wanted to gain time. I was extremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We stood together on that. We had going out in December—and again the Army could give you perhaps more accurate information—but as I recall twenty-odd thousand troops and that meant a lot in the Philippines. The air program as I recall involved about 600 planes, Army. It meant a good deal to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine Scouts were being trained.

I might mention a point which I think has not been brought out before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his mines in the Philippines for protecting Manila Bay, it was either June or July. At that time I considered the situation such that we had better get that job done and not be suddenly confronted with it. But the primary reason for that was to gain time and that is what the memorandum sought to stress.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, what you were doing was stressing how much you could tolerate in the way of activity [*5836*] by Japan before you felt some action had to be taken by this country?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us when that memorandum was delivered to the President? I notice it is typed on the stationery of the Navy Department. It is dated November 27. General Marshall did not get back until late that night and did not get to his office until the morning of the 28th. Now, he has identified his signature on the message as being his own signature, so with that before us the question of when the memorandum was delivered to the White House is now before us and I wondered if you could help us on that.

Admiral STARK. I am sorry I cannot. We have gone over the dates, I have personally, and tried to recall that 4-year-ago picture, particularly of the 25th, 26th, and 27th, with regard to the Chiang

Kai-shek note, with regard to the joint board meeting of the 26th, with regard to just when Mr. Hull first informed us. I believe he has testified that he came to that conclusion on the 25th or the 28th. He mentioned the Army and Navy taking over.

In my statement I said that he informed me on the 27th and, as I stated, that statement was completely written before hearings here started and I may be wrong on that. I may have gotten it from him on the 26th. I was in very close touch with [*5837*] him and whether or not, when he called me greatly perturbed about the Chiang Kai-shek note, he told me at that time he was going to throw it over, or whether he did later on the 27th, whether he called me on the 25th or the 26th I do not know. Now, Marshall left the joint board meeting on the 26th and whether he signed it on the 28th or not, I do not know.

Now, to come back to the White House part of that question, we have done our best to try and find that out, but we have been unable to. We do know that it was in the White House, we have ascertained that, but just when the President got it I do not know.

[*5838*] Mr. GESELL. Well, now, one other question closely related to that perhaps has to do with this question of overt act.

You testified this morning that the Navy message of November 27 did not contain any direction that Japan should commit the first overt act. However, we have in evidence here a dispatch sent by you under date of November 28 transmitting an Army message, but in addition to reciting the text of the Army message it has some additional Navy direction in it, and included in that direction is a direction concerning the overt act in these terms "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act." That indicates that sometime between your message of the 27th and your message of the 28th this idea of an overt act came forward.

Your dispatch was not sent to Admiral Kimmel except for his information?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. GESELL. It was sent to the west coast department, but I wondered if that in any way refreshed your mind as to the conferences and discussions on this question of the overt act.

Admiral STARK. At this time I could not say positively as to just why we put that in. I do know, for example, that we used to worry somewhat about the location of the Japs [*5839*] around our naval ammunition depot, for example, up in Puget Sound. The same was true in Los Angeles harbor. It may possibly have been if they had gotten this message they may have corraled some of the people who were close by, some that they had suspected. It was only the continental districts, as I recall it, that were covered in that dispatch.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Admiral STARK. Who were ordered not to make an overt act. The Army had issued a similar warning to those people, and it may have been to go along with that.

I could not answer the question definitely, but I know it is there.

Now as far as going along with the Army, that might not necessarily hold, because we did not go along with them in the Hawaiian Islands, and again it might hold because their problem in the Hawaiian Islands

was quite different from ours. With the large Japanese population we were thinking more in terms of the high seas.

Mr. GESELL. You attended the meeting at Argentina, the Atlantic conference meeting, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you at that time, or at any other time prior to December 7, receive any information or advice to the effect that the United States Government had undertaken [*5840*] to declare war against Japan in the event Great Britain was attacked in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Never.

Mr. GESELL. I think that completes the questions I have.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just one that I would like to ask you, Admiral. This morning you spoke about the fact that the Navy Department was not volunteering any help to you in preparation for your testimony. I understand you did not mean that the Navy was delinquent in any way.

Admiral STARK. I qualified that later. I thought it was possible that an inference might have been drawn that the Navy Department might have been withholding something from me.

Mr. MITCHELL. What you meant was that they were not volunteering aid to you but they were giving you everything that you asked for.

Admiral STARK. That is correct; they were giving me everything that I asked for, and helping me out wherever they could, or they detailed to help me, and Lieutenant Commander Richmond was detailed to help me, and Lieutenant Johnson, and in general the department has been cooperative in giving me help where I have asked for it. But in attempting to prepare myself for this investigation, I have done it [*5841*] largely on my own memory as to what I wanted to bring out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had any difficulty or lack of cooperation in the office of the counsel of the committee in giving you everything that you wanted?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, everything has been fine, and I might say it has been all right with the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet was sent out to the Hawaiian area early in 1940, was it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ostensibly on maneuvers, is that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course the Government had spent a large sum of money in blasting through the land to get into what is now Pearl Harbor, with a view of making it a suitable base for the fleet over the years.

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now apparently the fleet was kept out there longer than Admiral Richardson either knew or thought that it would be kept, and he kept prodding you to find out why it was kept out there, and in the letter he wrote you prior to his visit to Washington in October 1940, and in many of these letters, he wanted to know why he was out there, why the fleet was out there, and in a good many of your letters, at least one or two of them, you wrote back that you did not [*5842*] know why it was out there, that you wished you did know why it was out there.

How long did that lack of information on your part as to what the Navy was doing out there remain?

Admiral STARK. I think I might say, Mr. Chairman, if I may suggest to you, where you stated I said I did not know why they were out there, I did not know how long they were going to remain there. The reason for their being there, which I wrote Admiral Richardson, was that their presence there might act as a deterrent against Japanese aggression in the Pacific.

When they went out there I thought they were coming back, and Admiral Richardson did, and I might say so far as I know the President had no other thought when those maneuvers began.

But when it came time for them to come back, in view of the conditions in the Pacific it was decided to keep them there for a while. We did not know how long.

The CHAIRMAN. I might have misquoted you, because I am referring to your letters from memory. I do not have them before me. I overlooked bringing them down this morning. I remember in one or two of your letters you stated you did not know how long they were to be kept there, and I got the impression you stated also in your early correspondence with Admiral Richardson that you did not know why they were being [*5843*] kept there.

If I am mistaken about that I want to be corrected.

Admiral STARK. Here is a letter in which I reply to Admiral Richardson, and I quote:

"Why are you in the Hawaiian area?" Answer: This was my answer, "You are there because the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."

[*5844*] The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that letter?

Admiral STARK. 27 May.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, Admiral Richardson was not convinced of the wisdom of your course, because when he came back here in October he and the President evidently engaged in a very earnest argument as to the wisdom of the policy of keeping the Navy out there as a deterrent. Were you present at any of the conferences between the President and Admiral Richardson?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I was not. Admiral Richardson went over himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Richardson talk with you about his conference with the President?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he gave me, as I recall, a short memorandum on the subject of the discussion, so that I would have it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in October. By that time, had you reached an agreement with the attitude of the President, the Secretary of State and others, to keep the fleet in the Hawaiian area or Pearl Harbor was a wise course, as a possible deterrent against Japan?

Admiral STARK. It was one of those things which at that time, as I recall, was carrying along because, if I also recall correctly—and I will check this, and if it is not [*5845*] correct I will ask for a change in the record—as I recall at one time we had about come to the conclusion we might bring the fleet back in the fall or for Christmas in that year, I am not certain, and that later we decided not to do it but to keep it there, and after that time, about the last of 1940, it just became a fixed policy to retain the fleet there.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as the fleet was out there, no matter what the purpose for which it was originally sent, to have withdrawn it back to the Pacific Coast had possibilities of misinterpretation on the part of Japan and on the part of our own people, did it not?

Admiral STARK. It might have. Also sending it back again might have been more difficult. I testified this morning I thought that was the place for the fleet when things were tense might also have its disadvantages.

The CHAIRMAN. That was my next question. If it had never been sent to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940, had not remained out there, if it had remained on the Pacific Coast where Admiral Richardson testified there were better facilities for reaction and training, and one thing and another, it did not have anything to do with the safety of the fleet, but if it had been kept on the Pacific coast until things became tense and then sent to the Pearl Harbor region or the Hawaiian area, what would have been the effect of such a movement as that at the time [*5846*] when things did become critical?

Admiral STARK. Of course, no one knows, but it might have been difficult diplomatically to do it. It might have been interpreted by the Japs as a move for our getting ready for war out there in the Pacific, and it might possibly have precipitated something.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, everybody understood, I suppose, including the Japanese, that the Hawaiian Islands were American territory and Pearl Harbor was an American base and we had a right to send our fleet out there whenever we saw fit.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Without giving an explanation.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the critical situation as it developed and tenseness of relations between the two countries, to have kept the fleet back at the Pacific Coast and then have sent it out there in the midst of one of these tense situations you think might have given rise to the feeling that it was a threat against Japan and therefore, in a sense, might have been a sort of moral overt act?

Admiral STARK. It might have been; yes, sir. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that when we first decided not to bring the fleet back—and I was talking to the President about the advantages, from a matériel and personnel standpoint of bringing it back, [*5847*] balanced against the political reasons, I can remember just as though it happened seconds ago; the silence—I was with the President alone—and the tense thought that he gave to it then for a few minutes, and he finally looked up and he said—and you may have heard him say the same thing—"Well, I hardly know, but," he said, "when I am in doubt and I am not sure just what is best, I am inclined to sit tight," and he said, "I think we better do that for the present." That continued.

The CHAIRMAN. That was with reference to keeping the fleet out there?

Admiral STARK. That was with reference to keeping it out or bringing it back, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall, as a naval officer, that a similar situation existed in the Far East back in 1932 following the Shanghai incident, I believe, when the American fleet was kept out there in

those Pacific waters, following the Japanese attack upon China, or following her invasion of Manchuria, and following the Shanghai affair, that the fleet was out there and was kept there, according to Secretary Stimson, who was at that time Secretary of State, for a similar purpose, that it would have its moral effect upon Japan. Do you recall anything about that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the fleet, as we usually [*5848*] refer to the fleet, being out there at that time. We had an Asiatic squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. It may not have been a full fleet, but it was a detachment of the Navy.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and it may have been kept in Chinese waters at that time rather than possibly used for a cruise south in the wintertime, or something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you referred this morning to a couple of letters or dispatches that you sent to Admiral Kimmel between the 24th and 27th of November, with reference to the sending of certain airplanes from Hawaii to Midway and Wake.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get very clearly in my mind whether they were sent.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; they were sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they the planes that were on the *Lexington* that was supposed to be headed west while the *Enterprise* was headed east from the Philippines?

Admiral STARK. No. There were two detachments of Marine fighters, I believe, that were sent. One carrier took some to Wake and one to Midway. The dates of the sailing of those carriers were fixed by Admiral Kimmel. We gave no specific dates for it. We knew of one of the sailings, which was in answer to another dispatch of ours, and as to the other we were [*5849*] not informed.

I would like to state in that connection, if I may, I do not know whether or not there has been the impression created in the committee that by doing that the defenses in that area were decreased. Pearl Harbor was mentioned. If you look at the map you will find, of course, that Midway is—I have forgotten—1,000 or 1,200 miles farther westward, and Wake is still farther. That was a general area of defense. Anything we could find in those areas, from scouting or otherwise, lent itself just that much to the defense of Oahu. So it was strengthening the general island position there. That was particularly true with regard to the patrol squadrons, of which I think one squadron was sent to Wake, and two to Midway. It enlarged the scouting area. It might have decreased it temporarily in a concentrated way around Oahu, but as against that there was the getting of information, or the possibility of getting it, farther west, and also of defending those carriers.

Incidentally, originally General Marshall asked us to watch for and to give them any warning we could, because we were ferrying planes to the Philippines via those two outposts.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to the purpose for sending them to Wake and Midway, in view of what happened it may have been better if they had all been there?

[5850] Admiral STARK. We would have lost fewer of them; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The fewer ships and planes were at Pearl Harbor, the fewer we would have lost?

Admiral STARK. That would have been incidental to what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have been incidental to what happened, but still it would have probably happened.

Now, in regard to the overt act, of course it was in view of the fact that both you and General Marshall, as heads of the Army and Navy, were seeking to gain time and to postpone any conflict as long as possible, it was perfectly consistent with that attitude not to commit an overt act on the part of the United States and not precipitate a war which you were seeking to avoid or postpone as long as possible, would it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Regardless of the omission of this phrase in your telegram in regard to an overt act, were the commanders in the field, in the Pacific area, Panama, and on the Pacific coast and the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, sufficiently aware of that general attitude of our Government so that they knew it?

Admiral STARK. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Without having it especially called to their attention in a message on any particular date?

Admiral STARK. I think so. They all knew we wanted to [5851] avoid war in the Pacific if possible. Each one of them was a very responsible man, and I think none would have created an overt act if they could have avoided it. On the other hand, each one unquestionably would have defended himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Admiral STARK. The message which Kimmel sent, which is in one of his letters backing up a dispatch about bombing submarines within a certain area, I think was thoroughly justified, and I would not have called it an overt act I think if a submarine was found there without any business.

The CHAIRMAN. You were assuming that everybody in authority, while holding off actual hostilities, if they had to come, was to prepare, as well as it was possible under all the circumstances, for any eventuality whenever it did come?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in your message to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th, which has been read into the record several times, you say, "The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility."

Did you know at that time, at the time you sent that [5852] first paragraph of your message, what the movement of the Japanese naval and military forces was?

Admiral STARK. The movement of which we had knowledge was the movement south, the amphibious movement.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew at the time you sent this message of the 24th of November that they were moving south?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With a considerable naval and military force?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you say, "An aggressive movement is indicated in any direction." That would include the whole 360° of the circle, would it?

Admiral STARK. It included the broad Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it included any direction from Tokyo?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would mean anywhere they could come?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That might be an offensive movement against us?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. My thought was it covered widely a movement against us anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, you go on to state, "The Chief of Staff has sent this dispatch and requests action addressees", and so forth. This dispatch of yours of November 24 does not [*5853*] seem to correspond with any similar correspondence dispatched on that date. Was it to be distributed to the Army officers?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I showed that dispatch to Marshall and he agreed with it. I generally took things of that sort up with him, and he with me, and we put that memorandum in about showing it to Army opposites.

The CHAIRMAN. On the next day you wrote Admiral Kimmel a letter. It went by the ordinary course of sending letters. Do you know when that letter was received?

Admiral STARK. I think we have that. As I recall, it was about 5 December, but I think the letter shows it.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate it was not received until after you sent the message of the 27th of November?

Admiral STARK. It was received on the 3d of December.

The CHAIRMAN. On the 3d?

Admiral STARK. Yes. That was about 6 days after he had received the war warning of the 27th, or about 9 days after he received the war warning of the 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, on the 27th you sent your other message, in which you start out by saying: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Did you understand and did you intend that that language should make this message of the 27th more acute and emphasize more the danger than the one of the 24th in which you said that the Japanese might start an [*5854*] aggressive movement in any direction?

Admiral STARK. I consider the message of the 27th much stronger. I never had heard of the words "war warning" in any message before anywhere, at any time.

[*5855*] The CHAIRMAN. This may be speculative, but if you had not seen fit to send the message of the 27th and had relied on the message of the 24th, would you have regarded the terms of that message of the 24th sufficient to require that the Naval Forces in Pearl Harbor and in the Hawaiian area be constantly on the alert for any movement in any direction?

Admiral STARK. Well, it showed the possibility and to that extent—and again I may say it is difficult to get away from hindsight——

The CHAIRMAN. I know.

Admiral STARK. But my feeling is that if I had received a message that the Japs might make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, I would say, well, we better look out and be ready for it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the purpose you had in sending this message of the 24th?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but we made a much more positive message on the 27th, because on the 24th we stated that favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful; there was left a loophole there that there still might be a change, through negotiations, to obtain a settlement in the Pacific. We closed that loophole in the message of the 27th.

But even so I think the message of the 24th showed the imminence of trouble anywhere.

[*5856*] The CHAIRMAN. In your message of the 24th you say that the Japs are liable "to make an aggressive movement in any direction", and after saying in the 27th message that "this message is to be considered a war warning," you say "negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased. An aggressive movement by Japan is expected within the next few days."

In that language you did not say "in my direction."

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you intend for that to implement your message of the 24th or did you intend to withdraw the suggestion that they might make an aggressive movement in any direction?

Admiral STARK. No, we did not intend to withdraw it, and I think the two messages tie up together. Probably it might have been better if we had put it in. I put it in personally in the message of the 24th and I do not recall discussing it with the message of the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it regarded in Naval circles as logically following a warning given to a commanding officer anywhere that a nation is liable to make an aggressive movement against us, is the mere sending of such a message to an officer of that kind within any possible area of attack regarded in Naval circles as a warning that they should be [*5857*] on the alert?

Admiral STARK. I thought so at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't that be the rule in any Navy?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And any commanding officer in a responsible position, like Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, or any other commanding officer, would know what that meant if he received such a message?

Admiral STARK. I think so, yes, sir. It is something that doesn't happen very often.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you used the words in your message of the 24th, in the middle paragraph "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo," did you mean or intend that to be interpreted as in any way modifying your message of the 24th that an aggressive movement might be in any direction?

Admiral STARK. No, we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you, your purpose in sending this message was to emphasize the greater possibility, in your mind, of an attack on the Philippines or Thai or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, than elsewhere, particularly even the Hawaiian Islands?

[*5858*] Admiral STARK. Our purpose was the imminence of war, that so far as looking toward stabilization of peace in the Pacific negotiations were through, and then we gave the information we had, and the only direct information we had, of what the Japanese were doing, that is, that the information we had indicated that southern movement.

I think it should be read in connection with the message of the 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that that movement was in progress?

Admiral STARK. We had definite information of that and we gave that information.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know what else was to be done or was in process of being done by the Japs?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know anything about the 6 carriers that had sneaked out from the Island north of Japan and were going through this unfrequented lane?

Admiral STARK. We had no information on that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that obviously this moving of this big contingent of ships and men down through the China Sea toward the south was for the purpose of deceiving you and everybody else with respect to their immediate action against Pearl Harbor, by the sending of this force of 6 airplane carriers and the three hundred-some-odd planes; is that your interpretation?

[*5859*] Admiral STARK. I don't think it was deceit. That was a carefully planned campaign, that expedition south.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they didn't go to pains to conceal that?

Admiral STARK. They couldn't very well.

The CHAIRMAN. No, but they didn't go to any pains to conceal it, but rather ostentatiously let it be known that they were heading that way, while at the same time sending this other force to the north to make the attack on Pearl Harbor if the situation justified it when they got there; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, that may have been in their thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. The truth is that they just outsmarted everybody didn't they?

Admiral STARK. Well, they certainly concealed their intentions so far as we were concerned of any definite indication of any attack on Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an unusual situation when an assassin intends to attack someone, he knows what he is going to do, but the other fellow does not.

Admiral STARK. We play that in our war games.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the part of the war games, not to let the other fellow know what you are going to do?

[*5860*] Admiral STARK. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And a nation planning a sudden surprise attack has the advantage over the nation that may be thinking one may occur but doesn't know where or when it will occur, any more than a man going along a highway knows that a man is concealed in the

corner of a fence and is going to shoot him. He may have his pockets full of guns but unless he knows the man is there he won't have them ready. Is that a fair simile?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have your suspicions aroused by the fact that this task force, or this force of airplane carriers, was missing, that for several days there was no report about them, or did that come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall any suspicion directly bearing on that. We, in locating the Japanese Fleet, you might put certain ships on what you might call a pinpoint. You would know where they are. In other cases you would get them in an area by your cuts from them and radio intelligence. If they went to a navy yard, just as when our ships go to a navy yard, their radios are bottled up, the shore station may do it for you, and there are people down the line who will testify more directly on just how they evaluated that information, but the ship going into a home port, for [*5861*] example, you might not hear from her for a while, and they might assume that she was still there until they did hear from her again.

And, of course, at this particular time they had changed call signs. I remember that feature of it very well. And it takes time to pick up and identify again.

But as to whether or not we discussed at that particular time these 6 carriers I have no remembrance of it. I do have a distinct remembrance of our request of the Army to take a look at the Marshalls and the Carolines and their fitting up two planes to do that for us about that time, and which I recall not in connection, perhaps, with these 6 carriers, but with two other carriers that we had rumors were in there. We wanted to get anything we could of anything in the eastern Marshalls or further to the westward. And that reconnaissance, due to bad weather, and other things, was held up, we didn't get it. It wouldn't have been helpful, except as negative information.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Japs have better facilities for locating our ships than we had for locating theirs?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had, I would say, very little, if any, but there again the people in Naval Intelligence might give you something on that, of locating ships in Japanese ports. That is, telling us what was in Tokyo Bay, or elsewhere, [*5862*] out there. But in Hawaii, in the Canal, in the Los Angeles area, in San Francisco area, in the Puget Sound area, the Japanese we felt were reporting regularly with regard to our movements.

In one or two places I think we got hold of their people who were doing that reporting. I am not too clear on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably they had a more universal spy system than we did?

Admiral STARK. They had an enormous spy system.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of your message to Admiral Kimmel of the 24th and the 27th, and General Marshall's dispatch to General Short of the same date, that is, the 27th, which he instructed him to convey to Admiral Kimmel, what was the duty of the naval commander there during the days following the receipt of that message on the 27th?

Admiral STARK. Well, my thought was, we assumed that there would be a conference between the senior Army and Navy commanders

there, that a conference would occur, and that they would implement their plans against surprise, and in the protection of the Island of Oahu, particularly of the Fleet, Pearl Harbor, for what ships were kept there, and the alerting of ships at sea, with the fact that Japan was expected to attack and the officers in charge of the ships at [*5863*] sea, of course, would be very much on the alert against surprise anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that alertness include day and night?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of these instructions contained in the Army and Navy dispatches to Pearl Harbor, was it or was it not in compliance with or in violation of them not to have any reconnaissance, say on the 6th day of December, the day before the attack. The evidence shows there was no reconnaissance of any kind on that day. I am speaking now of the 6th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We had assumed when we sent out dispatch that reconnaissance would be started and kept up.

The CHAIRMAN. That is from the 27th or the 24th?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would say from the 27th in any case.

The CHAIRMAN. 27th.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether it was kept up from the 27th until the attack?

Admiral STARK. I don't know just what they did at that time. Marshall's dispatch particularly directed reconnaissance. Ours directed the deployment. And just what action was taken there I don't know.

[*5864*] The CHAIRMAN. Deployment means the arrangements of whatever forces there are, the grouping or separation or movement in such a way as to facilitate the greatest possible defense in the event of an attack?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you didn't answer my question as to whether if there was no reconnaissance of any kind on the 6th that that would be considered as being in violation of the orders or in compliance.

Admiral STARK. I would say it would be not carrying them out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very diplomatic way to answer my question. It was not in compliance with the instructions.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not?

Admiral STARK. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they did not obey the instructions that were received?

Admiral STARK. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if they had no reconnaissance at all on that day, that was in disobedience?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you agree with—first, did you hear Admiral Turner's testimony in which he said that if [*5865*] they had been properly alerted, with the material and with the men they had, and the forces they had, if they had been alerted on the day of the attack, that the damage done to us might have been considerably lessened and the damage done to the Japanese might have been considerably increased and thereby lessening the success of the raid—what is your view on that?

Admiral STARK. I agree with that. That is, of course, on the assumption they might have scouted for that Japanese attack and might have missed it. But there was a chance of their getting it. And if they had located it, if the radar station which did pick it up, if that had been reported, there was a chance of the Army fighters being in the air, and other measures which could have been taken with antiaircraft batteries which, I think, unquestionably would have considerably lessened the damage which the Japs inflicted.

The CHAIRMAN. It is conceivable the planes might have gone up and missed the Japanese planes, but if they didn't go up they were sure to miss them.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It made it easy for the Japanese planes?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. If they had used everything they had they still might have missed that flight; depending on where they made their estimate as to where the [*5866*] Japanese might come in.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean if they had gone out it would have been possible to have gone out on a reconnaissance and not discovered the approaching Japanese airplanes?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, whose duty was it, whose obligation or responsibility was it to decide whether this Fleet should have been in Pearl Harbor at that particular time, or at any other particular time?

Admiral STARK. That was the Commander in Chief Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. That was Admiral Richardson's responsibility when he was Commander of that Fleet and it became Admiral Kimmel's after he took charge?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the frequency of the visits of the fleet to Pearl Harbor and the length of its stay was altogether then within the control of the Commanding Officer out there?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And were there any general instructions from Washington about that, or was that left entirely to the Commanding Officer?

Admiral STARK. That was left to the Senior Officer there. There may have been a general understanding of the fact on the so-called employment schedule that ships periodically have [*5867*] certain periods assigned for repairs, but generally speaking, which I believe you refer to, the fleet going in or out, except for vessels that might be sent to the navy yard, or might be repairing there on a periodic overhaul, that was up to the Commander in Chief there.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, how long have you been in the Navy, please, sir?

Admiral STARK. I have been in the Navy a little over 46 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you enter the Academy?

Admiral STARK. I entered the Academy in October 1899.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From what State?

Admiral STARK. From Pennsylvania.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And during what period of time did you serve as the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. From August 1939 to March 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did your period of service as Chief of Naval Operations compare with the usual length of time that an officer served in that capacity?

Admiral STARK. The appointment as a rule is for 4 years. It sometimes happened that an officer's term was up before his 4 years—I mean, he retired before his 4 [*5868*] years was up. I did not serve out the full term of 4 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you at any time during your long period of service in the Navy been stationed at Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. Not stationed there; no, sir. I have been there with the fleet but I have never been stationed there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You never were in command there?

Admiral STARK. Never in command there; no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider war with Japan inevitable?

Admiral STARK. Ultimately I considered it inevitable. Do you want me to enlarge on that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I would like you to be as specific as you can, sir, whether you ever considered war with Japan as inevitable.

Admiral STARK. I did, and, to come down to a specific term, I considered it inevitable the latter part of November. Mr. Hull had been working continuously, he had not given up hope, and as long as there was negotiations there was some hope. I couldn't say that it was inevitable until we had come practically to the final clinch. I considered it possible. I went on the basis, in everything I did, on the assumption that it was going to happen. It was the only safe, sane, sensible course to take and my record here, what I had to say before Congress and in everything I did, bears that out. [*5869*] But we might have reached an agreement in late 1941. I couldn't say we wouldn't until we knew that that agreement was practically unattainable. The chances grew more and more slender.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that, but I am trying to ascertain as to whether you in your own mind ever reached the point that you considered war with Japan as inevitable.

Admiral STARK. Well, I did at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral STARK. That was in late November.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 1941?

Admiral STARK. 1941; but I stated in some of my letters that I considered that we were heading straight for this war long earlier.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you reach the conclusion that we were heading straight for war with Japan? About what time? I don't mean the hour or minute or day. About what time?

Admiral STARK. I am thinking over the whole picture. When Japan jointed the Axis, which I believe was in September of 1940, there certainly was a distinct danger sign flying there. I thought—I didn't see how we could avoid sooner or later, the way things were shaping up, getting in this [*5870*] world conflict that put Japan on the other side of the fence from us. I have forgotten just the dates of my letters, but I continually stressed the fact I didn't see how we could avoid it, either by being forced into it or getting into it. I stated

in a letter of November 7—I made wrong estimates at other times—I happened to hit it then—that I didn't see how it could last, didn't see how we could avoid it more than another month.

I pointed out that there were two irreconcilable forces and one side couldn't live with the set-up. I also always thought that the China incident, so-called, was a stumbling block we could not get around until either Japan backed or we backed, and, as I wrote Admiral Kimmel, or Admiral Hart, I have forgotten which, I didn't think there would be any change here. I felt we were heading for it at least a year before we got into it.

As to the inevitability of it, by just saying, here, Mr. Hull, you might as well stop, don't try any more, of course we were playing for time, it was in the fall of 1941, it just looked like we couldn't keep out or from being attacked much longer.

[*5871*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I can well understand, of course. You have made it quite clear that you wanted and the President wanted and General Marshall wanted and all responsible officials of the Government wanted to stay out of war if possible.

Admiral STARK. We were extremely anxious to avoid a two-front war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I can well understand that, we all shared that view, but what I was trying to get at, you, the head of the United States Navy, holding that responsible position, whether you reached the conclusion in your own mind that war with Japan was inevitable?

Admiral STARK. Well, I believed we were going to get in it many, many months before we did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you say that in November 1941 that you reached the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.

Admiral STARK. That is the time when we thought so and it is when we said it definitely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral Turner was your Chief of War Plans, wasn't he?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He has testified here that he reached the conclusion about June or July 1941 that war with Japan [*5872*] was inevitable and that he discussed it with you and I got the impression from what he said that you were in agreement with him.

Admiral STARK. Well, of course, as to just what "inevitable" means, I have tried to give different points of view I have had on that. About that time the freezing of assets took place, that was in July as a matter of fact, and, as I say, when Japan joined the Axis I had written I thought we were heading for this war and I thought that that would pull us all in together. I would not have differed with anyone who had told me at that time that they thought we were surely going to get into it, I would not have wanted to differ with them so far as getting ready for it was concerned.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that Admiral Turner did discuss that with you about that time?

Admiral STARK. Well, we discussed it more or less continuously.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. Again I knew an attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. We had stressed it in all our correspondence, we had

endeavored to build up against it, we had talked to them out there about it, we had approved their plans which also envisaged such a thing happening and we thought it might [*5873*] very well happen some day, but as to that particular time,—and I previously testified that I did not want anything that I might say to be construed as otherwise than the fact that at that time I was not expecting an attack on Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even though you saw the 14-part message and the so-called pilot message and the 1 o'clock message you still did not think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor at the time it was made?

Admiral STARK. I was thinking of the situation so far as actual action was concerned further to the westward. On the other hand, I recognized the possibility clearly that they might hit there or elsewhere and on that possibility I had sent a message which I had thought would convey to them that possibility and that they would be on guard against it and I wrote to that effect also, about being on guard.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your message of November 24, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the purpose of that message?

Admiral STARK. The message of the 27th and the 24th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, first take the message of November 24, 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*5874*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the purpose of that message?

Admiral STARK. The purpose of the message of the 24th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the 24th.

Admiral STARK. Was to show the situation regarding the negotiations, about which we had corresponded so much. We were not getting anywhere. It looked like a break-down. The break-down had not yet actually occurred. Also we had the definite information of the movement south, which looked like Japan was going to strike somewhere to the southward. Whether it might hit the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or Borneo, I think the despatch covered it. I will check it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Those points are mentioned in the November 27 message but they are not mentioned in the November 24 message.

Admiral STARK. Well, the message of November 24 states:

> Naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

And that message was meant to show the critical situation then existing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you intend the message of November 24, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel as a war warning message?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think if I had gotten it I would have considered that it was a war warning.

[*5875*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your intention in sending it then?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral STARK. In the critical situation that something might break.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, your message of November 27, also sent out to Admiral Kimmel as well as Admiral Hart, was certainly intended as a war warning message because it so states in the opening expression of the message, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is stronger.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, in these two messages, Admiral, the one of November 24, in which it is stated:

> Indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is possible—

and in the message of November 27, 1941, among other things it states:

> The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Now, in neither of those messages is any direct reference made to Hawaii, is there?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; there is not.

[*5876*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And all of the points mentioned in both of these messages are not within the area coming within the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, are they?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. We in those despatches gave the information we had. In my opinion an attack elsewhere was not precluded by the fact that we had no tangible evidence of an attack elsewhere. It was for that reason that, take the message of the 24th, it was not only sent to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Force and the Pacific; it also went to the Canal and to the commandant of the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Districts, which are on the west coast.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, the message of November 27, 1941, also includes this language:

> Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.

That would be a direct order to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I believe, as you stated to the chairman in response to his question, at least that part of the order was not complied with by the commander, was it?

Admiral STARK. So far as the use; I said, so far as I knew with regard to the use of patrol planes he had not complied with it.

[*5877*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, do you know of anything he did to comply with that part of the order?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what orders he had given to his two task forces which were sent out. I do not know what order he had given to his submarines. He may have given orders there. I do not know just what additional orders he may have given to his ships in Pearl Harbor with regard to antiaircraft batteries, and so forth.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the fact that practically all of his fleet was caught in the harbor 6 days after this message was sent to him would not indicate that he moved many of them out, would it?

Admiral STARK. Well, he had a considerable portion out in the two task forces.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many battleships did he have out?

Admiral STARK. I think he had no battleships out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many cruisers did he have out?

Admiral STARK. The ships attached to the Pacific Fleet that were at sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor on the date of the attack—this is information from the Office of Naval Intelligence—there was 1 battleship not there, which was on the west coast, the *Colorado*, under repair. His 3 carriers were not in Pearl Harbor. He had 10 of his heavy cruisers that were out, 10 out of 12 if I re- [*5878*] call correctly. Three of his light cruisers were out and of his destroyers 24 were out.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many of those, if any, were moved out after he received your message of the 27th?

Admiral STARK. I think most of them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Left the harbor after he received your message?

Admiral STARK. I think so. He can testify to that but I think that they were in the two task forces, one of which left on the 28th as I recall and the other early in December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, most all these vessels that you have mentioned as not being in the harbor at the time of the attack were in the task forces, were they?

Admiral STARK. In the task forces; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Except for one battleship which was under repair on the Pacific coast?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Most of the others you have mentioned as not being in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were in the two task forces?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I think it is not generally understood that our fast ships, what might be called our fast striking forces were not much hurt at Pearl Harbor. I doubt if people realize how many ships were in Pearl Harbor that [*5879*] were not hurt. I told the President the morning after the attack, or the afternoon or night, I think it was the morning after, while there wasn't much comfort in the fact, but that I wanted him to understand that our fast striking forces were practically intact.

Now, I will just give you a list of ships which were not in Pearl Harbor at the time. It might be of interest to you to know what was there and was unhurt.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It would be.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a moment, please.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, if I am not mistaken the committee has a mimeographed copy of the exhibit that he apparently is now using, that was distributed, which shows all these figures about that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think that is true, yes. It has already been put in evidence, has it?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, but I was going to suggest that it be put in right now and read into the record at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will just hand it to the reporter. I did not mean to interrupt your examination.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am glad you did.
(The document referred to follows:)

[5880]

STATISTICAL SECTION,
DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Nov 6 1945.

Confidential

Names of Major Vessels in Pacific Ocean on December 7, 1941

I. SHIPS SUNK OR PUT OUT OF COMMISSION AT PEARL HARBOR

	Date stricken or returned to duty
BB *Arizona*	Stricken 12/1/42.
BB *Oklahoma*	Stricken 11/22/44.
BB *Pennsylvania*	Available for sea 1/28/43.
BB *Nevada*	Ready for sea 12/12/42.
BB *Tennessee*	Repaired and converted 5/10/43.
BB *California*	Repaired and converted 1/15/44.
BB *Maryland*	Repairs completed 2/21/42.
BB *West Virginia*	Repaired and converted 7/1/44.
CL *Helena*	Ready for sea 7/14/42.
CL *Honolulu*	Ready for sea 3/16/42.
CL *Raleigh*	Ready for sea 6/—/42.
DD *Cassin*	Repairs completed 2/19/44.
DD *Downs*	Repairs completed 12/1/43.
DD *Shaw*	Repairs completed 7/13/42.
CM *Oglala*	Ready for sea 12/7/42.
AG *Utah*	Stricken 11/13/44.
[5081] AV *Curtis*	Ready for sea 12/15/41.
AR *Vestal*	Ready for sea 12/17/44.
Total	18

II. SHIPS AT PEARL HARBOR BUT UNHURT IN THE ATTACK

CA *New Orleans*	DD *Dale*	DD *Henley*
CA *San Francisco*	DD *Aylwin*	DD *Bagley*
CL *Phoenix*	DD *Monaghan*	DD *Mugford*
CL *St. Louis*	DD *Conyngham*	DD *Ralph Talbot*
CL *Detroit*	DD *Reid*	DD *Jarvis*
DD *Phelps*	DD *Case*	DD *Patterson*
DD *Dewey*	DD *Cumings*	DD *Allen*
DD *Hull*	DD *Tucker*	DD *Chew*
DD *McDonough*	DD *Selfridge*	DD *Schley*
DD *Worden*	DD *Blue*	DD *Ward*
DD *Farragut*	DD *Helm*	

III. SHIPS ATTACHED TO PACIFIC FLEET BUT AT SEA OR LOCATED AT BASES OTHER THAN PEARL HARBOR

[5882] BB *Colorado*	CL *Concord*	DD *Flusser*
CV *Enterprise*	CL *Richmond*	DD *Lamson*
CV *Lexington*	CL *Trenton*	DD *Mahan*
CV *Saratoga*	DD *Balch*	DD *Clark*
CA *Northampton*	DD *Maury*	DD *Cushing*
CA *Chester*	DD *Craven*	DD *Perkins*
CA *Salt Lake City*	DD *Gridley*	DD *Preston*
CA *Chicago*	DD *McCall*	DD *Smith*
CA *Portland*	DD *Dunlap*	DD *Rathburne*
CA *Astoria*	DD *Benham*	DD *Dent*
CA *Minneapolis*	DD *Fanning*	DD *Talbot*
CA *Indianapolis*	DD *Ellet*	DD *Waters*
CA *Louisville*	DD *Porter*	DD *Litchfield*
CA *Pensacola*	DD *Drayton*	

[5883] *Numbers of vessels in Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941*

Sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor	Unhurt in the attack on Pearl Harbor	At sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor	Sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor	Unhurt in the attack on Pearl Harbor	At sea or located at bases other than Pearl Harbor
BB 8		1	AVD	3	2
CV		3	AVP	2	3
CA	2	10	AV 1	1	1
CL 3	3	3	ASR	1	1
DD 3	27	24	AS	1	1
SS	5	17	AG 1	2	
CM 1			AR 1	1	
DM	8		AO	2	9
DMS	4	9	Misc	8	10
AM	6	3			
AD	2		Total 18	78	97

[5884] Admiral STARK. It shows that 10 of his 12 cruisers were out. The other 2 of the fast heavy cruisers were in, not damaged. There were 3 light cruisers not damaged. And of the destroyers in port there were about 27 that were not damaged. So practically out of his destroyers of, as I recall, somewhere around 55 or 60, there was only 1 damaged. I do not see anything about submarines here, so I assume no submarine was damaged. The battleships were the worst sufferers in proportion to their strength by far.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the reading of that document?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then I beelieve you have already stated, Admiral, that you considered the messages of November 24 and especially the message of November 27 as adequate and sufficient war warning message to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. We thought so. We sent them for that purpose.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And in response to the question by the Chairman, if the naval forces there had been on the alert as you had expected to place them by your message and likewise the Army command there had been properly on the alert, you think the damages inflicted upon our forces would have been [5885] much less?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, in talking about war being inevitable with Japan I gather that you mean to say that we were moving towards war and you felt that a conflict would actually come at some time?

Admiral STARK. I felt so.

Senator GEORGE. But you did not necessarily think that a conflict was imminent until late in 1941, that is, in October or November of 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You did not see, I believe you testified this morning, the intercepted Japanese message of September 24, the one referring to Pearl Harbor and the location of ships, the tie-up at docks, and so forth, in Pearl Harbor of the Fleet. I believe it is contained in Exhibit 2 at page 12.

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch until I saw it recently.

Senator GEORGE. Well, Admiral, that dispatch is more than a mere ordinary message or dispatch dealing with the movement of ships, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. It is; yes, sir.

[*5886*] Senator GEORGE. Decidedly so.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, did you ever hear that message of September discussed by anyone in your department or division?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I did not.

Senator GEORGE. So far as you know Admiral Ingersoll did not know anything of it or did not see it?

Admiral STARK. Admiral Ingersoll has told me that he did not see it.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I mean of your knowledge prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. No; I have no recollection of ever having seen that message or of any conversation or reference with regard to it before December 7 and I also stated that it might be that my memory is faulty there, but I have no recollection of it whatsoever.

Senator GEORGE. Did you testify this morning that you did not see the 1 o'clock message, I believe it is designated as the 1 o'clock message of December 7, the one directing the delivery of the fourteen part message to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, until about 10:40 or something like that?

Admiral STARK. Until somewhere around, I would say not before, 10:40 and I am basing that on what I have since heard. [*5887*] My own recollection is not clear. I believe Captain Kramer will be able to give a rather definite time on that, which I will accept if he does.

Senator GEORGE. You did say that you did recollect the discussion of the 1 o'clock message or intercept when you were called by General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is the only clear——

Senator GEORGE. It is the only really outstanding recollection that you have of it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it is, because thinking the whole thing over afterwards that message is the only thing of that morning that stands out like a beacon light.

Senator GEORGE. Well, now, so far as you know no information reached Admiral Kimmel about that 1 o'clock message until after the attack?

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. I know it is, yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You did not make an effort to send, except direct a request that Admiral Kimmel be notified in the Marshall message?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But you did not know that the Marshall message, the Chief of Staff's message, had not gone through?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

[*5888*] Senator GEORGE. You did not, however, take any steps to send directly to Admiral Kimmel a notice of that 1 o'clock message?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not parallel it.

Senator GEORGE. You did not parallel it.

Admiral STARK. And that is the thought I have often had since, that if I had paralleled it it might have gone through. I let it go the way

it was. That is, Marshall stated that he would get it through. I offered to get it through but I did not. I had no reason to believe hat he would not get it through just as quickly.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, there was a time, as you have testified about and others, other officers in the Army and Navy, when the possibility and strong, maybe, probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy circles, that is in 1940 and up during some early months even of 1941 and in your correspondence with the commander of the Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility of an air attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And then there did seem to come a time when there was a lapse of interest in that point down here in Washington; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. I wouldn't say there was a lapse of interest. We initially pointed out what we thought was necessary [*5889*] and we took steps to correct the deficiencies as far as we could and my conversations with Marshall on that continued, not only with regard to radar and things for which the Army was responsible, but also craft and antiaircraft weapons. We continued to talk about that and the war plans covered what we had to give them and which were made available substantially as the war plans stated.

We had received and O. K.'d what we thought was a very splendid arrangement out there for meeting the situation and from then on, except to follow up on matériel, there was no particular mention, as I recall, about the continued danger. We had set it forth. We did not talk particularly about other types of attack which might occur, but I think you are right in stating that. I do not recall of it having been specifically mentioned. I will look through the record and see if I can find anything.

[*5890*] Senator GEORGE. I did not mean that you had lost all interest in the possibility of an air attack, but I have been unable to escape the conclusion that little emphasis was placed upon the possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor late in the year 1941. That is what I meant to say. Of course, you did not have adequate preparation at any of the outlying posts, especially you did not consider that you had all of the preparation that you needed at Pearl Harbor to repel an air attack or a combined attack.

Admiral STARK. That is true. I think I might say, Senator George, what we said earlier in the year still stood.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that. I understand you now to say that we are to take it that that still stood, that nothing happened to change that or no changes had been made and you were relying upon the plans as they had been developed.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And the conversations as they had gone on during the previous months.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you were making an effort to strengthen your defenses at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and we also had word about their carrying on their weekly drills, and so forth.

Senator GEORGE. I believe you have agreed, Admiral, [*5891*] and I recall also General Marshall's agreement, that while we did not

have as strong defenses at Pearl Harbor as we desired, as we expected to build up, that if the two services, that is, the Army and Navy, had been fully alerted during the week preceding December 7 the attack might have been diverted or might have been so broken up as to have saved the losses to the Navy in men as well as matériel, or substantial injury at that time.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, I just want to ask you a few questions about what seems to me to be the two important messages that you have sent out, that is the message of November 24—that did go to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And then the message of November 27 also went to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Then, there was a message of November 28 in which you quoted the full message of the Chief of Staff to the commanders of the Armed Forces. Did that go to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That reached him?

Admiral STARK. That went to him, as I recall, for informa- [5892] tion. The other two were for action.

Senator GEORGE. That went to "INFO." That means "Information"?

Admiral STARK. "Information", yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That did not go to him as a command message, or an action message?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was subjoined to the quoted Army message a further statement which he was, of course, assumed or presumed to recognize and follow, was he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And that cautioned against offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act?

Admiral STARK. That part of it for action was to the two naval coastal frontiers on the West coast. It was sent to Admiral Kimmel for information.

Senator GEORGE. I see. The whole of it was in the nature of information, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I might mention, Senator George, in that connection that the two action addressees in the dispatch automatically came under Admiral Kimmel in case of war, as shown in WPL–46, so we wanted Admiral Kimmel to know what we had told the naval coastal frontiers.

Senator GEORGE. I see. They automatically came under [5893] his control in the case of war?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Do you know what time Admiral Kimmel received that message?

Admiral STARK. Of the 28th?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. I do not know, sir. We obtained from naval communications the fact that that message was sent out at half past

2 on the morning of the 29th. That would mean Hawaiian time half past 2. He probably got that in the late afternoon or early evening on the 28th.

Senator GEORGE. Could you give us the time of receipt by Admiral Kimmel of the November 27 message, or at least the date of the receipt?

Admiral STARK. Well, we obtained the information from communications that that message went out, Greenwich Time 2801—or, rather, 0106 in the morning of the 28th. You take 10 hours and a half off from that and he probably got that the afternoon of the 27th.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, have you before you the several messages regarding codes and the destruction of codes?

Admiral STARK. I think they are in this file. I remember them.

Senator GEORGE. Beginning, I believe, December 2 or [*5894*] 3, the one I am referring to, and going through, maybe, to the 5th of December. I merely wish to ask you about those messages, whether they were addressed to or received by Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; they were sent to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, the commandants of their two naval districts.

Senator GEORGE. That statement is generally true of all of those code destruction messages?

Admiral STARK. The next one was sent to CINC Asiatic and COM 16 for action, and to CINCPAC, Admiral Kimmel, and COM 14 for information. That is the one that speaks about Singapore, Manila, destroying purple machines, Batavia, and so forth.

Senator GEORGE. But the receipt by Admiral Kimmel either for action or for information——

Admiral STARK. It was for information, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Is indicated with respect to all of those messages referring to the destruction of codes?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral as to the message of November 27, which is the strongest war warning message that was sent to Admiral Kimmel, a portion of that message is also by way of information, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It was sent to him for action [*5895*] but the message does contain certain information.

Senator GEORGE. The message does contain certain informational matter?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. It contains, for instance, this statement, the factual statement that the negotiations with Japan had broken down, had ceased, and that Japan is expected "within the next few days, to commence an aggressive move," or to make an aggressive move, and then reference is made to the size of the Japanese forces that were being mobilized or put in action, and then this statement is made, "an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo" is specifically pointed out. That is by way of information, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. By way of information of what was in the minds here, in Washington, that you thought?

Admiral STARK. They gave them what we had.

Senator GEORGE. What you had?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In other words, that statement is based on the evaluation you made of all of the information that you received or that you had?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

[5896] Senator GEORGE. Then you come to the action——

Admiral STARK. I might state with regard to that, about all the information we had with regard to the rest of the Japanese Fleet, any information that we had concerning that was also known to the commanders in the chief in the Pacific, because they were the ones that sent us information on that.

In other words, the stations could cut in and locate and evaluate the information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese Fleet, that information which blowed into the department came from Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart. So any other information that was available, that would have been available to us, they already had.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, the enumeration of the possible points of attack with no reference whatever to Pearl Harbor was calculated, was it not, to weaken the warning message, so far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?

Admiral STARK. I can only say with regard to that, that that did not occur to me, and, so far as I know, did not occur to anyone else. We gave the war warning. It was sent to the two commanders in chief for action with a directive, and what information we had and what indications we had we sent along as information. Now, the reaction that it had in the minds of the commanders in chief is something to which they can testify. I can only state that we thought we had given them [5897] an unequivocal war warning to be on the alert against any possibility. Whether what we sent was sufficient or insufficient is something I would say for the committee to decide. We thought it was, and we intended to convey that.

Senator GEORGE. Your message of November 24 had definitely stated that action in any direction might be anticipated.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Might be expected.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But in this message there is, of course, no mention of Pearl Harbor, and there isn't any message, in late November at least or early in December, that did specifically refer to Pearl Harbor, and the enumeration of possible points of attack which omitted Pearl Harbor might, will you not say, tend to weaken the force of the warning to a commander of a fleet who was at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I can only say we did not think so at the time. In the light of hindsight it may have.

Senator GEORGE. Now, the very concluding sentence in this war message is:

"Continental District Guam-Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage."

Isn't that also calculated to indicate a complete all-out defense or reconnaissance was meant to be undertaken by Admiral Kimmel, or might have led him to believe that he was not to take an all-out [5898] reconnaissance?

Admiral STARK. I do not think so.

Senator GEORGE. You did not think so?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. If I had thought so I would have worded the message or caused it to be worded differently. About the only thing that Guam could do was to take action against sabotage. We knew that Guam could not hold out. And about the only thing the continental district could do was to take action against sabotage.

Senator GEORGE. I am not asserting, admiral, that these points that I am pointing out in this message were calculated in fact to weaken the effect of this warning message, so far as the commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was concerned, but I am asking you as an experienced officer in the Navy if the enumeration of certain points of possible attack with no reference to Pearl Harbor and with the reference that is contained here to Guam, Samoa, continental districts, and so forth, might not have the effect of leaving the Commander of the Pacific Fleet in some doubt as to what action he should take to defend his position?

Admiral STARK. I can only say we did not think so. I can also agree with you now that it might have, particularly in the light of hindsight. However, we did not think so. In mentioning those places we simply indicated the information we [*5899*] had. It was not necessary for us to tell Admiral Kimmel to be prepared against sabotage or destruction of codes, for example, which we also mentioned for Guam, because he would automatically take care of that, although we did, so far as the outlying islands were concerned, authorize it. We, in sending that message to him for action—not for information but for action—had thought it would activate his command, and we gave him the only information we had. If we had had any indication of an air attack from the movement of ships we would have given it. We had nothing. But the absence of that information, in my opinion, did not preclude the possibility of an attack.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, I believe that you said earlier in your testimony that you regarded the fleet reasonably secure at Pearl Harbor. Did you state that?

Admiral STARK. Reasonably secure?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Based at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having stated that they were reasonably secure. I stated that I would not have hesitated to put the fleet there. The fleet, even though it was a dangerous position or not a dangerous position, it was the furthest point westward that we could approach at that time.

[*5900*] I pointed that out shortly after Pearl Harbor in a meeting of Senators in which I was called about the position of the fleet and the danger to the west coast, and the question about bringing the fleet back to the west coast, and they were very much perturbed that the attack might come on the west coast. I remember the meeting very well. General Marshall was called before it. I pointed out the place of the fleet was as far west as we could put it, and we would continue to push it back until it accomplished its purpose of defeating Japan. But I would not state that the fleet was secure there, in view of the possibility of an attack. The fleet was never secure in the

possibility of war, unless it was back in the navy yards somewhere on the home coast.

Senator GEORGE. It was reasonably secure against submarine attack?

Admiral STARK. Against submarine attack in port quite secure; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That comes down to this last and final question, Admiral. What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, that is, our entire naval forces in the Pacific, were concentrated at Pearl Harbor the first week in December, or late November and early December? What proportion of the entire naval forces in the Pacific area was concentrated there or based there?

[*5901*] Admiral STARK. Was based in Pearl Harbor?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, at Pearl Harbor. I am not asking what specific ships were there at that time, but what proportion of our entire naval strength was there.

Admiral STARK. Of our entire naval strength?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, in the Pacific.

Admiral STARK. In the Pacific?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I could work that out as a percentage. I might state Admiral Hart at that time had two cruisers, and 13 destroyers—if that is not correct, I would have to refresh my memory on it—28 submarines, 28 or 29 patrol planes.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are looking that up I might say to one or two of the members of the committee who were absent Monday, the committee formally agreed to sit to 4:30 in the afternoon until Congress reassembles.

Admiral STARK. Senator George, I want to make sure I have got the question right.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. You do not mean the percentage of the whole Navy?

Senator GEORGE. No.

Admiral STARK. But the percentage of the ships that were in the Pacific?

[*5902*] Senator GEORGE. In the Pacific area.

Admiral STARK. The percentage that were in the Hawaiian area?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir. Now, admiral. I do not care to have you go to the trouble of making an accurate statement, or a mathematically accurate statement, but just about the proportion of the strengh.

Admiral STARK. Of course, he had the very great proportion.

Senator GEORGE. Well, admiral, you may put it in the record if you wish to. I will be very glad to have you do so.

Admiral STARK. All right, sir. I can give it to you from memory—I thought I had it here—which would be fairly accurate, but I think it would be better to give you a detailed statement. For example, there were 13 heavy cruisers in the Pacific of which the Pacific Fleet had 12 and Hart had 1. There were 45 new submarines in the Pacific of which—well, I may be 2 or 3 out. It is just as well, I think, to give you this accurately. There were no battleships in the western Pacific.

Senator GEORGE. No battleships?

Admiral STARK. No battleships out there. There were 13 destroyers. In the southeast Pacific, there were 2 destroyers. I will give you the table in the morning.

Senator GEORGE. If you do that will be sufficient for my purposes.

[*5903*] Mr. MITCHELL. How do you make the comparison?

By so many destroyers in the Atlantic and so many destroyers in the Pacific, so many battleships figuring the weight in metal, or how would you give the relative strength of the fleet?

[*5904*] Admiral STARK. I have a table which has just that on it. I thought I had it with me. I think it shows it fairly accurately.

Mr. MITCHELL. You can present it then in the morning and we will put in the record.[1]

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. When you come to strength it is a very difficult thing. Until we reinforced the Atlantic, for example, by three battleships, we had on paper three battleships in the Atlantic. They were battleships. Any aged cruiser in clear weather could take its range on them, outside of those three battleships' guns, and pound them to pieces, because they were old.

When you get in to the strength and penetrative effect of 12, 14, 16-inch guns, and so forth, it would be a pretty tough problem, and if any such evaluation as that were wanted I suggest the Navy Department, but I will give you the number of ships.

Mr. GEARHART. Along this line I wonder if the Admiral will give the figures so as to show the number and type of ships in the Asiatic Fleet and the number and type in the Pacific Fleet, and in giving the strength of the Pacific Fleet if you would indicate how much was in Pearl Harbor and how much was out of Pearl Harbor on December 7 it would be [*5905*] very interesting to me.

For instance, there were two task forces at sea, as you remember, under Admiral Halsey, and another admiral whose name I don't remember—Admiral Newton. Then there was one battleship, I think, on the Pacific coast in drydock or for overhauling.

Admiral STARK. That is correct; the *Colorado*.

Mr. GEARHART. So if we could have the figures reflecting not only the number of ships in the Pacific but where they were it would be very illuminating.[1]

Admiral STARK. It is very easy to obtain. As a matter of fact, I think it is in the exhibits now. But I have one of my own and I will fix it up from the data furnished me by the Department and a table which I think will make it very plain.

Mr. GEARHART. In making this present request I don't want to interfere with the requests made by the Senator from Georgia.

Senator GEORGE. No, no, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they are practically identical anyway.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I merely wish to get a rough view of the relative strength.

[*5906*] That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I believe some of the witnesses here, Admiral, probably including General Marshall, have testified that a surprise attack by air was considered the chief danger to Pearl Harbor.

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[1] See Mr. Hannaford's statement on p. 2492, infra.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. In this message of the 27th, in which you referred to the possibility, or maybe likelihood, of an attack on the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula, and Borneo, and so forth, when you were undertaking to tell what the Japanese were likely to do, based on your information——

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; we stated "our information indicated".

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Now, if it had then occurred to you that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was at all likely, you would have included that, perhaps?

Admiral STARK. If we had expected it at that time I certainly would have included it. If I had been expecting it.

Mr. CLARK. You did not expect it?

Admiral STARK. I was surprised. I was not expecting it. I was thinking of what was going on further west.

[*5907*] Mr. CLARK. Still the circumstances that existed then really created almost an ideal situation for such an attack, did they not?

Admiral STARK. As it existed, yes, sir; and we thought——

Mr. CLARK. I am referring to the diversionary movement southward by the Japanese, the fact that traffic had been diverted to the north and south across the Pacific, and so forth. Wouldn't that indicate to a strategist an opportune momement for a surprise air attack?

Admiral STARK. Of course, in a surprise attack the other fellow had the initiative, and he took it and it proved that his estimate was correct, that it was a good time.

Mr. CLARK. Now, may I ask you this, please, sir: At the time you were preparing this message as to what the Japs were doing, did you even then consider the likelihood of a surprise air attack, or had you dropped that consideration?

Admiral STARK. No, we hadn't dropped it. And with regard to the message of the 24th, my memory on that is very clear, although I didn't mention air attack, to include the words "in any direction," and if an attack had come on Hawaii, that would have been the most dangerous form.

It might have come that way. It might also have, of course, come from submarines. And, as I have already said, it might have come on the Pacific coast. I was thinking of [*5908*] the broad Pacific, not only Hawaii but our other points of possible attack, at that time.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I am completely ignorant of all matters military and some of my questions may sound rather silly to you, but I was trying to get at the time when you were framing this message to the man in charge of the fleet out there, as to what the Japs were doing and what the Japs were likely to do, at which time they were making this movement to the southward, and did lead you actually to believe that is where they were going to strike.

Why did you not then consider the likelihood at that time of a surprise air attack?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think we did consider it to the extent that we gave a directive to take a deployment preparatory to putting a war

plan into effect, a defense deployment. That was what we intended it. It was a direct order to that effect.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. I see that, admiral. I appreciate that.

Admiral STARK. Perhaps my background on that could be explained, for not having diagnosed the thing as it did happen, and which I didn't, by stating that I wasn't expecting, in view of the magnitude of the attack which might come, and we expected it to come and it did come, much farther west, that they would strike all over the Pacific, practically. [*5909*] That is, as far as Hawaii, at that time. I just didn't expect it. I was surprised. I don't know that I can add much to it. I knew it was a possibility. I thought we had gone at the thing from every angle before.

If we had not thought of it being a possibility we could have just sent that message to Hart for action, but we included Kimmel in it, and thought—we had intended to alert them against an attack, which we said might come anywhere, in the 24th and the war warning of the 27th.

Now——

Mr. CLARK. If you will pardon me just a moment, admiral. I thoroughly understand that. I heard you say it. My point was this, when in the later message you undertook to point out, as Chief of Naval Operations, where you thought they were likely to strike, and what you thought they were likely to do, you entirely omitted any likelihood or possibility of an air attack. Is that because you didn't think of it at that time or because you didn't think it likely or possible?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall a discussion of an air attack on Hawaii at that time. Now, I was thinking only in general terms other than information we had.

Mr. CLARK. You mentioned specific points where the attack might go.

[*5910*] Admiral STARK. We had information indicating that.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir. You knew, of course, that there was a movement that way and that there was a set-up there that would be almost ideal for a surprise air attack, did you not?

Admiral STARK. In Hawaii?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That there the situation was ideal?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I wouldn't call it ideal. I think there was a great deal of risk involved.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Assuming that the radar stations had been in full effect, that Marshall's order to make reconnaissance had been in effect, that everything had been manned, and so forth, I think they might have given a right good account of themselves.

Mr. CLARK. I agree entirely with that, but I had in mind the movement of Japanese forces south, and, of course, you didn't know it, but it seemed to have been a fact that there was a report or reports being made from Hawaii that there was not any reconnaissance down there, the Japs seemed to have known that, although the Navy here didn't seem to know it; but taking those circumstances into account, I was [*5911*] trying to find whether, as you framed that message, it

passed into your mind at all that there might be a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. I believe I have asked you that question.

Admiral STARK. I can only say that we always thought it possible but I was not looking for it at that time and I was surprised that it occurred.

Mr. CLARK. You were as much surprised as Admiral Kimmel was, of the air attack?

Admiral STARK. I was surprised at the air attack. I also was surprised that there were no steps, or that certain steps had not been taken to intercept it and be on the lookout for it.

Mr. CLARK. That brings me to another question that I would like to ask you, if it is a proper question:

As an experienced naval officer, having long and fine experience, if you had been in command at Pearl Harbor, with the equipment that was there, and had received the message that Admiral Kimmel did receive, of the 27th of November, exactly what would you have done?

Admiral STARK. Separating the answer from hindsight, it is so easy for me to say what I would have done which would have caught this attack.

Mr. CLARK. I don't think it is a question of hindsight. I am asking you this simple, plain question, leaving hindsight [*5912*] out of it.

Admiral STARK. Well, my thought is that I certainly would have started the radar going 24 hours a day.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral STARK. That I would have made an estimate, and, I believe estimates had been made, as to where an attack, if it came by air, might come, from what direction. I would have known, of course, he did know, how many planes he had that were usable for reconnaissance at that time, long distance reconnaissance. I would have assumed that that would have been put into effect.

I don't know just how many submarines he had available at that time, but I certainly think I would have used them to supplement my other means for getting early information of a possible attack.

As to the light forces, I don't know just what I would have done with them. The carriers. I don't know what orders he had given them. They were on an expedition to the westward. He may have given them orders, either by radio or before they went out, about sweeping and assisting in reconnaissance. If the carriers had been available to him he might have sent them out in a certain direction, supplementing his other efforts. In other words, used what he had as best he could to avoid being caught aback.

[*5913*] Mr. CLARK. One other question. It may be that I am anticipating and if so counsel will advise me and I will wait.

With regard to this message that divided up the harbor into sections, which you say you are not sure you saw, have you looked at that since?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Was it clipped?

Admiral STARK. Was it what?

Mr. CLARK. Was it clipped?

Admiral STARK. I don't know. Most of those dispatches were burned, except the file copy. When you say have I looked at it since, I don't recall having seen the dispatch at all before. I have seen it. It has been photostated and copied from the file copy in the Navy Depart-

ment. It was one of those things that in going through the mass of material, it was one of those dispatches that was picked out.

Mr. CLARK. I didn't know whether the fact that it was or was not clipped might enable you to say whether you had seen it or not.

Admiral STARK. Well, there is nothing left clipped in the Navy Department now. I think all those dispatches have been burned except the file copy.

Mr. CLARK. Who exactly would be the one to determine— [*5914*] well, I will say, to clip the messages, as you referred to in your testimony?

Admiral STARK. They were clipped in Intelligence. And I think you have Captain McCollum down. There were two or three of them working there. McCollum, Kramer. Which one did the initial clipping I am not sure. And that booklet also would go on up to the head of Intelligence.

Mr. CLARK. Now, just one other thing. It appears in the record here that there are some intercepts that were intercepted but not decoded and made available.

In other words, some, what we call magic, appear.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Intercepted but intercepted prior to December 7 and not decoded until after that date. I was wondering whether after this situation reached the crucial stage, say the 24th, 25th, 27th of November, any effort was made to give priority to the decoding of these messages from Japan over the great mass of stuff that you have testified was intercepted.

Admiral STARK. I think that the people who actually handled that would be better qualified to answer that question than I could. My understanding is that they at times would look at a message and see right away that it wasn't particularly important and throw it aside and look for something more [*5915*] important and use the best judgment they had with the people they had available to get the maximum amount of important stuff into our hands. But they can tell you the procedure better than I. I am not familiar with just how they did it.

Mr. CLARK. You did not yourself initiate any movement or give any direction to give priority so far as possible to decoding the Jap intercepts after, say, the 27th of November?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. There were people working on that who I think fully realized the situation.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, it is 4:25. I don't believe I can finish in 5 minutes with the admiral.

I would like to recess at this time until tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Not taking that as a precedent for any future recesses earlier than 4:30, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock to morrow morning.

(Pursuant to Senator Ferguson's request at p. 2068, supra, Exhibit No. 92 follows:)

[*5916*] Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. James Stuart.)

Mr. STEPHEN (Camlachie). May I ask whether, if a Vote of Confidence is to be put on the Paper, it will be in the hands of Members today?

The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Churchill). That will be for the next Sitting Day.

From time to time in the life of any Government there come occasions which must be clarified. No one who has read the newspapers of the last few weeks about our affairs at home and abroad can doubt that such an occasion is at hand.

Since my return to this country, I have come to the conclusion that I must ask to be sustained by a Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons. This is a thoroughly normal, constitutional, democratic procedure. A Debate on the war has been asked for. I have arranged it in the fullest and freest manner for three whole days. Any Member will be free to say anything he thinks fit about or against the Administration or against the composition of personalities of the Government, to his heart's content, subject only to the reservation which the House is always so careful to observe about military secrets. Could you have anything freer than that? Could you have any higher expression of democracy than that? Very few other countries have institutions strong enough to sustain [*5917*] such a thing while they are fighting for their lives.

I owe it to the House to explain to them what has led me to ask for their exceptional support at this time. It has been suggested that we should have a three days' Debate of this kind in which the Government would no doubt be lustily belaboured by some of those who have lighter burdens to carry, and that at the end we should separate without a Division. In this case sections of the Press which are hostile—and there are some whose hostilitiy is pronounced—could declare that the Government's credit was broken, and, it might even be hinted, after all that has passed and all the discussion there has been, that it had been private intimated to me that I should be very reckless if I asked for a vote of Confidence from Parliament.

And the matter does not stop there. It must be remembered that these reports can then be flashed all over the world, and that they are repeated in enemy broadcasts night after night in order to show that the Prime Minister has no right to speak for the nation and that the Government in Britain is about to collapse. Anyone who listens to the fulminations which come from across the water know that that is no exaggeration. Of course, these statements from foreign sources would not be true, but neither would it be helpful to anyone that there should be any doubt about our position.

There is another aspect. We in this Island for a long [*5918*] time were alone, holding aloft the torch. We are no longer alone now. We are now at the centre and among those at the summit of 26 United Nations, comprising more than three-quarters of the population of the globe. Whoever speaks for Britain at this moment must be known to speak, not only in the name of the people—and of that I feel pretty sure I may—but in the name of Parliament and, above all, of the House of Commons. It is genuine public interest that requires that these facts should be made manifest afresh in a formal way.

We have had a great deal of bad news lately from the Far East, and I think it highly probable, for reasons which I shall presently explain, that we shall have a great deal more. Wrapped up in this bad news will be many tales of blunders and shortcomings, both in foresight and action. No one will pretend for a moment that disasters like these occur without there having been faults and shortcomings. I see all this rolling towards us like the waves in a storm, and that is another reason why I require a formal, solemn Vote of Confidence from the House of Commons, which hitherto in this struggle has never flinched. The House would fail in its duty if it did not insist upon two things, first, freedom of debate, and, secondly, a clear, honest, blunt Vote thereafter. Then we shall all know where we are, and all those with whom we have to deal, at home and abroad, friend or foe, will know where we are and where they are. It is because we are to [*5919*] have a free Debate, in which perhaps 20 to 30 Members can take part, that I demand an expression of opinion from the 300 or 400 Members who will have sat silent.

It is because things have gone badly and worse is to come that I demand a Vote of Confidence. This will be placed on the Paper to-day, to be moved at a later stage. I do not see why this should hamper anyone. If a Member has helpful criticisms to make, or even severe corrections to administer, that may be perfectly consistent with thinking that in respect of the Administration, such as it is, he might go farther and fare worse. But if an hon. Gentleman dislikes the Government very much and feels it in the public interest that it should be broken up, he ought to have the manhood to testify his convictions

in the Lobby. There is no need to be mealy-mouthed in debate. There is no objection to anything being said, plain, or even plainer, and the Government will do their utmost to conform to any standard which may be set in the course of the Debate. But no one need to be mealy-mouthed in debate, and no one should be chicken-hearted in voting. I have voted against Governments I have been elected to support, and, looking back, I have sometimes felt very glad that I did so. Everyone in these rough times must do what he thinks is his duty.

Mr. SHINWELL (Seaham). A free vote?

The PRIME MINISTER. A vote under all the conditions [*5920*] which hitherto have made the conduct of Parliamentary government possible. Surely the hon. Gentleman is not the man to be frightened of a Whip? The House of Commons, which is at present the most powerful representative Assembly in the world, must also—I am sure, will also—bear in mind the effect produced abroad by all its proceedings. We have also to remember how oddly foreigners view our country and its way of doing things. When Rudolf Hess flew over here some months ago he firmly believed that he had only to gain access to certain circles in this country for what he described as "the Churchill clique"——

Mr. THORNE (Plaistow). Where is he now?

The PRIME MINISTER. Where he ought to be—to be thrown out of power and for a Government to be set up with which Hitler could negotiate a magnanimous peace. The only importance attaching to the opinions of Hess is the fact that he was fresh from the atmosphere of Hitler's intimate table. But, Sir, I can assure you that since I have been back in this country I have had anxious inquiries from a dozen countries, and reports of enemy propaganda in a score of countries, all turning upon the point whether His Majesty's present Government is to be dismissed from power or not. This may seem silly to us, but in those months abroad it is hurtful and mischevious to the common effort. I am not asking for any special, personal favours in these circumstances, but I am [*5921*] sure the House would wish to make its position clear; therefore I stand by the ancient, constitutional, Parliamentary doctrine of free debate and faithful voting.

Now I turn to the account of the war, which constitutes the claim I make for the support and confidence of the House. Three or four months ago we had to cope with the following situation. The German invaders were advancing, blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost heroism. But no one could tell what would happen, whether Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov would fall, or where the German winter line would be established. No one can tell now where it will be established, but now the boot is on the other leg. We all agree that we must aid the valiant Russian Armies to the utmost limit of our power. His Majesty's Government thought, and Parliament upon reflection agree with them, that the best aid we could give to Russia was in supplies of many kinds of raw materials and of munitions, particularly tanks and aircraft. Our Forces at home and abroad had for long been waiting thirstily for these weapons. At last they were coming to hand in large numbers. At home we have always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against. I will speak about the situation in the Middle East presently. Nevertheless we sent Premier Stalin—for that I gather is how he wishes to be addressed; at least, that is the form in which he telegraphs to me—exactly what he [*5922*] asked for. The whole quantity was promised and sent. There has been, I am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up by the early days of February. This was a decision of major strategy and policy, and anyone can see that it was right to put it first when they watch the wonderful achievements, unhoped for, undreamed of by us because we little knew the Russian strength, but all the more glorious as they seem—the wonderful achievements of the Russian Armies. Our munitions were of course only a contribution to the Russian victory, but they were an encouragement in Russia's darkest hour. Moreover, if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our Ally, albeit at a heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been a lack of comradeship, and the lack of comradeship might have spread reproaches on all sides. Far from regarding what we did for Russia, I only wish it had been in our power—but it was not—to have done more.

Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling onwards, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forcing the Don River, the capture of Rostov and the invasion of the Caucasus, and the

reaching of the Baku oil wells before the winter by the Panzer spearheads of the German Army. Everyone who has been giving careful study and independent thought to this war, knows [5923] how deep an anxiety that was in all our breasts three or four months ago. Such an advance would not only have given the Germans the oil which they are beginning seriously to need, but it would have involved the destruction of the Russian Fleet and the loss of the command of the Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey, and it would, in due course, have exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, Iraq, Cyria and Palestine, and beyond those countries, all of which are now under our control, it would have threatened the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time as this menace defined itself with hideous and increasing reality as it seemed, General von Rommel, with his army of 10 German and Italian divisions entrenched in his fortified positions at and behind the Halfaya Pass, was preparing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk as a preliminary to a renewed advance upon Egypt from the West. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simultaneously by a direct attack from the West and by a more remote but in some ways more deadly attack from the North. In such circumstances it is the classical rule of war, reinforced by endless examples—and some exceptions—that you prepare to fight a delaying action against one of the two attacks and concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer attack. We therefore approved General Auchinleck's plans for building up a delaying force in the vast region from Cyprus to the Caspian Sea, along what I may call the Levant- [5924] Caspian front, and preparing installations, airfields and communications upon which larger forces could be based, as time and transport allowed. On the other flank, the Western flank, we prepared to set upon Rommel and try to make a good job of him. For the sake of this battle in the Libyan Desert we concentrated everything we could lay our hands on, and we submitted to a very long delay, very painful to bear over here, so that all preparations could be perfected. We hoped to recapture Cyrenaica and the important airfields round Benghazi. But General Auchinleck's main objective was more simple. He set himself to destroy Rommel's army. Such was the mood in which we stood three or four months ago. Such was the broad strategical decision we took.

Now, when we see how events, which so often mock and falsify human effort and design, have shaped themselves, I am sure this was a right decision.

General Auchinleck had demanded five months' preparation for his campaign, but on 18th November he fell upon the enemy. For more than two months in the desert the most fierce, continuous battle has raged between scattered bands of men, armed with the latest weapons, seeking each other dawn after dawn, fighting to the death throughout the day and then often long into the night. Here was a battle which turned out very differently from what was foreseen. All was dispersed and confused. Much depended on the individual soldier and the [5925] junior officer. Much, but not all; because this battle would have been lost on 24th November if General Auchinleck had not intervened himself, changed the command and ordered the ruthless pressure of the attack to be maintained without regard to risks or consequences. But for this robust decision we should now be back on the old line from which we had started, or perhaps further back. Tobruk would possibly have fallen, and Rommel might be marching towards the Nile. Since then the battle has declared itself. Cyrenaica has been regained. It has still to be held. We have not succeeded in destroying Rommel's army, but nearly two-thirds of it are wounded, prisoners or dead.

Perhaps I may give the figures to the House. In this strange, sombre battle of the desert, where our men have met the enemy for the first time—I do not say in every respect, because there are some things which are not all that we had hoped for—but, upon the whole, have met him with equal weapons, we have lost in killed, wounded and captured about 18,000 officers and men, of whom the greater part are British. We have in our possession 36,500 prisoners, including many wounded, of whom 10,500 are Germans. We have killed and wounded at least 11,500 Germans and 13,000 Italians—in all a total, accounted for exactly, of 61,000. There is also a mass of enemy wounded, some of whom have been evacuated to the rear or to the Westward—I cannot tell how many. Of [5926] the forces of which General Rommel disposed on 18th November, little more than one-third now remain, while 852 German and Italian aircraft have been destroyed and 336 German and Italian tanks. During this battle we have never had in action more than 45,000 men, against enemy forces—if they could be brought to bear—much more than double as strong. Therefore, it seems to me that this heroic, epic struggle in the desert, though there have been many local reverses and

many ebbs and flows, has tested our manhood in a searching fashion and has proved not only that our men can die for King and country—everyone knew that—but that they can kill.

I cannot tell what the position at the present moment is on the Western front in Cyrenaica. We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great General. He has certainly received reinforcements. Another battle is even now in progress, and I make it a rule never to try and prophesy beforehand how battles will turn out. I always rejoice that I have made that rule. (AN HON. MEMBER: "What about the Skaggerak?") That was hardly a battle. Naturally, one does not say in a case like that that we have not a chance, because that is apt to be encouraging to the enemy and depressing to our own friends. In the general upshot, the fact remains that, whereas a year ago the Germans were telling all the neutrals that they would be in Suez by May, when some people talked of the possibility of a German [*5927*] descent upon Assiut, and many people were afraid that Tobruk would be stormed and others feared for the Nile Valley, Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal, we have conducted an effective offensive against the enemy and hurled him backward, inflicting upon him incomparably more—well, I should not say incomparably, because I have just given the comparison, but far heavier losses and damage—than we have suffered ourselves. Not only has he lost three times our losses on the battlefield, approximately, but the blue waters of the Mediterranean have, thanks to the enterprise of the Royal Navy, our submarines and Air Force, drowned a large number of the reinforcements which have been continually sent. This process has had further important successes during the last few days. Whether you call it a victory or not, it must be dubbed up to the present, although I will not make any promises, a highly profitable transaction, and certainly is an episode of war most glorious to the British, South African, New Zealand, Indian, Free French and Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who have played their part in it. The prolonged, stubborn, steadfast and successful defence of Tobruk by Australian and British troops was an essential preliminary, over seven hard months, to any success which may have been achieved.

Let us see what has happened on the other flank, the Northern flank, of the Nile Valley. What has happened to Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia? There we must thank Russia. [*5928*] There the valour of the Russian Armies has warded off dangers which we saw and which we undoubtedly ran. The Caucasus and the precious oilfields of Baku, the great Anglo-Persian oilfields, are denied to the enemy. Winter has come. Evidently we have the time to strengthen still further our Forces and organisations in those regions. Therefore, sir, I present to you, in laying the whole field open and bare and surveying it in all its parts, for all are related, a situation in the Nile Valley, both West and East, incomparably easier than anything we have ever seen, since we were deserted by the French Bordeaux-Vichy Government and were set upon by Italy. The House will not fail to discern the agate points upon which this vast improvement has turned. It is only by the smallest margin that we have succeeded so far in beating Rommel in Cyrenaica and destroying two-thirds of his forces. Every tank, every aircraft squadron was needed. It is only by the victories on the Russian flank on the Black Sea coast that we have been spared the overrunning of all those vast lands from the Levant to the Caspian, which in turn give access to India, Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal.

I have told the House the Story of these few months, and Hon. Members will see from it how narrowly our resources have been strained and by what a small margin and by what strokes of fortune—for which we claim no credit—we have [*5929*] survived—so far. Where should we have been, I wonder, if we had yielded to the clamor which was so loud three or four months ago that we should invade France or the Low Countries? We can still see on the walls the inscription, "Second Front Now." Who did not feel the appeal of that? But imagine what our position would have been if we had yielded to this vehement temptation. Every ton of our shipping, every flotilla, every aeroplane, the whole strength of our Army would be committed and would be fighting for life on the French shores or on the shores of the Low Countries. All these troubles of the Far East and the Middle East might have sunk to insignificance compared with the question of another and far worse Dunkirk.

Here, let me say, I should like to pay my tribute to one who has gone from us since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith, who, I remember, spoke with so much profound wisdom on this point at a moment when many opinions were in flux about it. His faithful, selfless and wise conduct of the important work

which he discharged in this House was undoubtedly of great assistance to us all, not only to the Government but to us all, in the various stages of the war. His memory as a distinguished Parliamentarian will long find an honored place in the recollection of those who had the fortune to be his colleagues.

Sometimes things can be done by saying, "Yes," and sometimes things can be done by saying "No." Yet I suppose there [*5930*] are some of those who were vocal and voluble, and even claimant, for a second front to be opened in France, who are now going to come up bland and smiling and ask why it is that we have not ample forces in Malaya, Burma, Borneo and the Celebes. There are times when so many things happen, and happen so quickly, and time seems to pass in such a way that you can neither say it is long or short, that it is easy to forget what you have said three months before. You may fail to connect it with what you are advocating at the particular moment. Throughout a long and variegated Parliamentary life this consideration has led me to try and keep a watchful eye on that danger myself. You never can tell. There are also people who talk and bear themselves as if they had prepared for this war with great armaments and long, careful preparation. But that is not true. In two and a half years of fighting we have only just managed to keep our heads above water. When I was called upon to be Prime Minister, now nearly two years ago, there were not many applicants for the job. Since then, perhaps, the market has improved. In spite of the shameful negligence, gross muddles, blatant incompetence, complacency, and lack of organising power which are daily attributed to us—and from which chidings we endeavor to profit—we are beginning to se our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad time, but provided we all start together, and provided we throw in the last spasm of our strength, it [*5931*] also looks, more than it ever did before, as if we were going to win.

While facing Germany and Italy here and in the Nile Valley we have never had any power to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East. My whole argument so far has led up to that point. It may be that this or that might have been done which was not done, but we have never been able to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East against an attack by Japan. It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. We even had to stoop, as the House will remember, when we were at our very weakest point, to close the Burma Road for some months. I remember that some of our present critics were very angry about it, but we had to do it. There never has been a moment, there never could have been a moment, when Great Britain or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight Germany and Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of the Middle East—and at the same time stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against the impact of a vast military Empire like Japan, with more than 70 mobile divisions, the third navy in the world, a great air force and the thrust of 80 or 90 millions of hardy, warlike Asiatics. If we had started to scatter our forces over these immense areas in the [*5932*] Far East, we should have been ruined. If we had moved large armies of troops urgently needed on the war fronts to regions which were not at war and might never be at war we should have been altogether wrong. We should have cast away the chance, which has now become something more than a chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible plight in which we have been plunged.

We therefore have lain—I am putting it as bluntly as I can—for nearly two years under the threat of an attack by Japan with which we had no means of coping. But as time has passed the mighty United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest and safety but also out of chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and democracy, has drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle. And now that the blow has fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon united forces and unified nations, which are unquestionably capable of enduring the struggle, of retrieving the losses and of preventing another such stroke ever being delivered again.

There is an argument with which I will deal as I pass along to sursue my theme. It is said by some, "If only you had organised the munitions production of this country properly and had had a Minister of Production (and that is not a question which should be dogmatised upon either way) it would have made everything all right. There would have been [*5933*] enough for all needs.

We should have had enough supplies for Russia, enough well-equipped squadrons and divisions to defend the British Islands, to sustain the Middle East and to arm the Far East effectively." But that is really not true. As a matter of fact, our munitions output is gigantic, has for some time been very large indeed, and it is bounding up in a most remarkable manner. In the last year, 1941, although we were at war in so many theatres and on so many fronts, we have produced more than double the munitions equipment of the United States, which was arming heavily, though of course a lap behind on the road. This condition will naturally be rapidly removed as the full power of American industry come into full swing. But, Sir, in the last six months, thanks to the energies of Lord Beaverbrook and the solid spadework done by his predecessors and the passage of time—he particularly asks me to say that—(An Hon. MEMBER: "Who did?")—Lord Beaverbrook; I should have said it anyway—our munitions output has risen in the following respects: We are producing more than twice as many far more complicated guns every month than we did in the peak of 1917–18 war period, and the curve is rising. The guns are infinitely more complicated. Tank production has doubled in the last six months. Small arms production is more than twice what it was six months ago. Filled rounds of ammunition have doubled in the last six months. I could go on with the catalogue, but these are not doublings [*5934*] from early very small totals, they are doublings from the totals we boasted about, as far as we dared six months ago. There has been an immense leap forward. In aircraft production there is a steady increase not only in the numbers but also in the size and quality of the aircraft, though I must say there has not been all the increase which I had hoped for.

But all this has nothing to do with the preparations it was open to us to make in Malaya and Burma and generally in the Far East. The limiting factor has been transport, even assuming we had wished to take this measure and had had this great surplus. From the time that this present Government was formed, from the moment it was formed I may say, every scrap of shipping we could draw away from our vital supply routes, every U-boat escort we could divert from the Battle of the Atlantic, has been busy to the utmost capacity to carry troops, tanks and munitions from this Island to the East. There has been a ceaseless flow, and as for aircraft they have not only been moved by sea but by every route, some very dangerous and costly routes to the Eastern battlefields. The decision was taken, as I have explained, to make our contribution to Russia, to try to beat Rommel and to form a stronger front from the Levant to to Caspian. It followed from that decision that it was in our power only to make a moderate and partial provision in the Far East against the hypothetical danger of a [*5935*] Japanese onslaught. Sixty thousand men, indeed, were concentrated at Singapore, but priority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery was accorded to the Nile Valley.

For this decision in its broad stagetic aspects, and also in its diplomatic policy in regard to Russia, I take the fullest personal responsibility. If we have handled our resources wrongly, no one is so much to blame as me. If we have not got large modern air forces and tanks in Burma and Malaya tonight no one is more accountable than I am. Why then should I be called upon to pick out scapegoats, to throw the blame on generals or airmen or sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon to drive away loyal and trusted colleagues and friends to appease the clamour of certain sections of the British and Australian Press, or in order to take the edge off our reverses in Malaya and the Far East, and the punishment which we have yet to take there? I would be ashamed to do such a thing at such a time, and if I were capable of doing it, believe me, I should be incapable of rendering this country or this House any further service.

I say that without in the slightest degree seeking to relieve myself from my duties and responsibility to endeavour to make continual improvements in Ministerial positions. It is the duty of every Prime Minister to the House, but we have to be quite sure that they are improvements in every case, and [*5936*] not only in every case but in the setting. I could not possibly descend to, as the German radio repeatedly credits me with, an attempt to get out of difficulties in which I really bear the main load by offering up scapegoats to public displeasure. Many people, many very well-meaning people, begin their criticisms and articles by saying, "Of course, we are all in favour of the Prime Minister because he has the people behind him. But what about the muddles made by this or that Department; what about that general or this Minister?" But I am the man that Parliament and the nation have got to

blame for the general way in which they are served, and I cannot serve them effectively unless, in spite of all that has gone wrong, and that is going to go wrong, I have their trust and faithful aid.

I must linger for a moment on our political affairs, because we are conducting the war on the basis of a full democracy and a free Press, and that is an attempt which has not been made before in such circumstances. A variety of attacks are made upon the composition of the Government. It is said that it is formed upon a party and political basis. But so is the House of Commons. It is silly to extol the Parliamentary system and then, in the next breath, to say, "Away with party and away with politics." From one quarter I am told that the leaders of the Labour party ought to be dismissed from the Cabinet. This would be a return to party Government pure and simple. From [*5937*] opposite quarters it is said that no one who approved of Munich should be allowed to hold office. To do that would be to cast a reflection upon the great majority of the nation at that time, and also to deny the strongest party in the House any proportionate share in the National Government, which again, in turn, might cause inconvenience. Even my right hon. Friend the leader of the Liberal party—(An HON. MEMBER: "Who is he?")—the Secretary of State for Air, whose help today I value so much and with whom, as a lifelong friend, it is a pleasure to work, even he has not escaped unscathed. If I were to show the slightest weakness in dealing with these opposite forms of criticism, not only should I deprive myself of loyal and experienced colleagues, but I should destroy the National Government and rupture the war-time unity of Parliament itself.

Other attacks are directed against individual Ministers. I have been urged to make an example of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who is now returning from his mission in the Far East. Thus, he would be made to bear the blame for our misfortunes. The position of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the head of the Council which he had been instructed to form at Singapore was rendered obsolete by the decision which I reached with the President of the United States to set up a Supreme Commander for the main fighting zone in the Far East. The whole conception of a Supreme [*5938*] Commander is that, under the direction of the Governments he serves, he is absolute master of all authorities in the region assigned to him. This would be destroyed if political functionaries representing the various nations—for it is not only this country which would be represented; others would have to be represented as well as ours—were clustered around him. The function of the Chancellor of the Duchy was therefore exhausted by the appointment of General Wavell to the Supreme Command. I may say that regret was expressed at his departure by the New Zealand and Australian Governments, and still more by the Council he formed at Singapore, which, in a localised and subordinate form, it has been found necessary to carry on. When I am invited, under threats of unpopularity to myself or the Government, to victimise the Chancellor of the Duchy, and throw him to the wolves, I say to those who make this amiable suggestion, I can only say to them, "I much regret that I am unable to gratify your wishes,"—or words to that effect.

The outstanding question upon which the House should form its judgment for the purposes of the impending Division is whether His Majesty's Government were right in giving a marked priority in the distribution of the forces and equipment we could send overseas, to Russia, to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the Levant-Caspian danger front, and whether we were right in accepting, for the time being, a far lower [*5939*] standard of forces and equipment for the Far East than for these other theatres. The first obvious fact is that the Far Eastern theatre was at peace and that the other theatres were in violent or imminent war. It would evidently have been a very improvident use of our limited resources—as I pointed out earlier—if we had kept large masses of troops and equipment spread about the immense areas of the Pacific or in India, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, standing idle, month by month and perhaps year by year, without any war occurring. Thus, we should have failed in our engagements to Russia, which has meanwhile struck such staggering blows at the German Army, and we should have lost the battle in Cyrenaica, which we have not yet won, and we might now be fighting defensively well inside the Egyptian frontier. There is the question on which the House should make up its mind. We had not the resources to meet all the perils and pressures that came upon us.

But this question, serious and large as it is by itself cannot be wholly decided without some attempt to answer the further question—what was the likelihood of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by a Japanese attack? I have

explained how very delicately we walked, and how painful it was at all times, how very careful I was every time that we should not be exposed single-handed to this onslaught which we were utterly incapable of meeting. But it seemed irrational [*5940*] to suppose that in the last six months—which is what I am principally dealing with—the Japanese, having thrown away their opportunity of attacking us in the autumn of 1940, when we were so much weaker, so much less well-armed, and all alone, should at this period have plunged into a desperate struggle against the combined Forces of the British Empire and the United States. Nevertheless, nations, like individuals, commit irrational acts, and there were forces at work in Japan, violent, murderous, fanatical and explosive forces, which no one could measure.

[*5941*] On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation had not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet. However to strengthen the position as the situation seemed to intensify we sent the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* to form the spear-point of the considerable battle forces which we felt ourselves at length able to form in the Indian Ocean. We reinforced Singapore to a considerable extent and Hong Kong to the extent which we were advised would be sufficient to hold the island for a long time. Besides this in minor ways we took what precautions were open to us. On 7th December the Japanese, by a sudden attack, delivered while their envoys were still negotiating at Washington, crippled for the [*5942*] time being the American Pacific Fleet, and a few days later inflicted very heavy naval losses on us by sinking the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*.

For the time being, therefore, naval superiority in the Pacific and in the Malaysian Archipelago has passed from the hands of the two leading naval Powers into the hands of Japan. How long it will remain in Japanese hands is a matter on which I do not intend to speculate. But at any rate it will be long enough for Japan to inflict very heavy and painful losses on all of the United Nations who have establishments and possessions in the Far East. The Japanese no doubt will try to peg out claim and lodgments over all this enormous area, and to organise, in the interval before they lose command of the seas, a local command of the air which will render their expulsion destruction a matter of considerable time and exertion.

Here I must point out a very simple strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands and 100 valuable military key points and you put 1,000 men on every one of them or whatever it may be, the Power that has the command of the sea and carries with it the local command of the air, can go around to every one of these places in turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, ravage and pillage them, ensconce themselves wherever they think fit, and then pass on with their circus to the next place. It would be vain to suppose that such an attack could be met by local defence. You might disperse 1,000,000 men over these [*5943*] immense areas and yet only provide more prey to the dominant Power. On the other hand, these conditions will be reversed when the balance of sea power and air power changes, as it will surely change.

Such is the phase of the Pacific war into which we have now entered. I cannot tell how long it will last. All I can tell the House is that it will be attended by very heavy punishment which we shall have to endure, and that presently, if we persevere, as I said just now about the Russian front, the boot will be on the other leg. That is why we should not allow ourselves to get rattled because this or that place has been captured, because, once the ultimate power of the United Nations has been brought to bear, the opposite process will be brought into play, and will move forward remorselessly to the final conclusion, provided that we persevere, provided that we fight with the utmost vigour and tenacity, and provided, above all, that we remain united.

Here I should like to express, in the name of the House, my admiration of the splendid courage and quality with which the small American Army, under General

MacArthur, has resisted brilliantly for so long, at desperate odds, the hordes of Japanese who have been hurled against it by superior air power and superior sea power. Amid our own troubles, we sent out to General MacArthur and his soldiers, and also to the Filipinos, who are defending their native soil with vigour and [5944] courage, our salute across those wide spaces which we and the United States will presently rule again together. Nor must I fail to pay a tribute, in the name of the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air and with their submarines, their surface craft, and their solid fighting troops, are playing one of the main parts in the struggle now going on in the Malaysian Archipelago.

We have to turn our eyes for a moment to the hard-fought battle which is raging upon the approaches to Singapore and in the Malay Peninsula. I am not going to make any forecast about that now, except that it will be fought to the last inch by the British, Australian and Indian troops, which are in the line together, and which have been very considerably reinforced. The Hon. Member for the Eye Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a very sound military idea the other day, when he pointed out the importance of sending reinforcements of aircraft to assist our ground forces at Singapore and in Burma. I entirely agree with him. In fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before I left for the United States, on 12th December, the moment, that is to say, when the situation in Singapore and Pearl Harbor had disclosed itself, it was possible to make a swift redistribution of our Forces. The moment was favourable. General Auchinleck was making headway in Cyrenaica; the Russian front not only stood unbroken but had begun the advance in a mignificent counter-attack, and we were able to order a large number of measures, which there is no need to elaborate, but which will [5945] be capable of being judged by their results as the next few weeks and the next few months unfold in the Far East.

When I reached the United States, accompanied by our principal officers and large technical staffs, further important steps were taken by the President, with my cordial assent, and with the best technical advise we could obtain, to move from many directions everything that ships could carry and all air power that could be flown transported and serviced to suitable points. The House would be very ill-advised to suppose that the seven weeks which have passed since 7th December have been weeks of apathy and indecision for the English-speaking world. Odd as it may seem quite a lot has been going on. But we must not nourish or indulge light and extravagant hopes or suppose that the advantages which the enemy have gained can soon or easily be taken from him. However, to sum up the bad and the good together, in spite of the many tragedies past and future, and with all pity for those who have suffered and will suffer, I must profess my profound thankfulness for what has happened throughout the whole world in the last two months.

I now turn for a short space—I hope I am not unduly wearying the House, but I feel that the war has become so wide that there are many aspects that must be regarded—to the question of the organization, the international, inter-Allied or inter-United Nations organization, which must be developed to meet the fact that we are a vast confederacy. To hear some [5496] people talk, however, one would think that the way to win the war is to make sure that every Power contributing armed forces and every branch of these armed forces is represented on all the councils and organizations which have to be set up, and that everybody is fully consulted before anything is done. That is in fact the most sure way to lose a war. You have to be aware of the well-known danger of having "more harness than horse," to quote a homely expression. Action to be successful must rest in the fewest number of hands possible. Nevertheless, now that we are working in the closest partnership with the United States and have also to consider our Alliance with Russia and with China, as well as the bonds which units us with the rest of the 26 United Nations and with our Dominions, it is evidence that our system must become far more complex than heretofore.

I had many discussions with the President upon the Anglo-American war direction, especially as it affects this war against Japan, to which Russia is not yet a party. The physical and geographical difficulties of finding a common working centre for the leaders of nations and the great staffs of nations which cover the whole globe are insuperable. Whatever plan is made will be open to criticism and many valid objections. There is no solution that can be found where the war can be discussed from day to day fully by all the leading military and political authorities concerned. I have, however, arranged [5947] with President Roosevelt that there should be a body in Washington called the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, consisting of the three United States

Chiefs of the Staff, men of the highest distinction, and three high officers representing and acting under the general instructions of the British Chiefs of the Staff Committee in London. This body will advise the President, and in the event of divergence of view between the British and American Chiefs of the Staff or their representatives, the difference must be adjusted by personal agreement between him and me as representing our respective countries. We must also concert together the closest association with Premier Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as well as with the rest of the Allied and Associated Powers. We shall, of course, also remain in the closest touch with one another on all important questions of policy.

In order to wage the war effectively against Japan, it was agreed that I should propose to those concerned the setting-up of a Pacific Council in London, on the Ministerial plane, comprising Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch Government. Assisted by the British Chiefs of the Staff and the great staffs organisations beneath them, I was to try to form and focus a united view. This would enable the British Commonwealth to act as a whole and form part of plans—plans which are at present far advanced—for collaboration at the appropriate levels in the spheres of defence, foreign affairs [*5948*] and supply. Thus the united view of the British Commonwealth and the Dutch would be transmitted, at first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee sitting in Washington. In the event of differences between the members of the Pacific Council in London, dissentient opinions would also be transmitted. In the event of differences between the London and Washington bodies, it would be necessary for the President and me to reach an agreement. I must point out that it is necessary for everybody to reach an agreement, for nobody can compel anybody else.

The Dutch Government, which is seated in London, might be willing to agree to this arrangement, but the Australian Government desired and the New Zealand Government preferred that this Council of the Pacific should be in Washington, where it would work alongside the Combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee. I have therefore transmitted the views of these two Dominions to the President, but I have not yet received, nor do I expect for a few days to receive, his reply. I am not, therefore, in a position to-day to announce, as I had hoped, the definite and final arrangements for the Pacific Council.

I should like to say, however, that underlying these structural arrangements are some very practical and simple facts upon which there is full agreement. The Supreme Commander has assumed control of the fighting areas in the South-West Pacific called the "A. B. D. A." area—A. B. D. A.—called after the [*5949*] countries which are involved, not the countries which are in the area but the countries which are involved in that area, namely, America, Britain, Dutch and Australasia. We do not propose to burden the Supreme Commander with frequent instructions. He has his general orders, and he has addressed himself with extraordinary buoyancy to his most difficult task, and President Roosevelt and I, representing, for my part, the British Government, are determined that he shall have a chance and a free hand to carry it out. The action in the Straits of Macassar undertaken by forces assigned to this area apparently has had very considerable success, of the full extent of which I am not yet advised. The manner in which General Wavell took up his task, the speed with which he has flown from place to place, the telegrams which he has sent describing the methods by which he was grappling with the situation and the forming of the central organism which was needed to deal with it—all this has made a most favourable impression upon the high officers, military and political, whom I met in the United States. This is all going on. Our duty, upon which we have been constantly engaged for some time, is to pass reinforcements of every kind, especially air, into the new war zone, from every quarter and by every means, with the utmost speed.

In order to extend the system of unified command which has been set up in the "A. B. D. A." area—that is to say, the South-West Pacific—where the actual fighting is going on, [*5950*] in order to extend that system to all areas in which the forces of more than one of the United Nations—because that is the term we have adopted—will be operating, the Eastward approaches to Australia and New Zealand have been styled the Anzac area, and are under United States command, the communications between the Anzac area and America are a United States responsibility, while the communications across the Indian Ocean and from India remain a British responsibility. All this is now working, while the larger constitutional, or semi-constitutional, discussions and structural ar-

rangements are being elaborated by telegrams passing to and fro between so many Governments. All this is now working fully and actively from hour to hour, and it must not, therefore, be supposed that any necessary military action has been held up pending the larger structural arrangements which I have mentioned.

Now I come to the question of our own Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. The fact that Australia and New Zealand are in the immediate danger zone reinforces the demand that they should be represented in the War Cabinet of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. We have always been ready to form an Imperial War Cabinet containing the Prime Ministers of the four Dominions. Whenever any of them have come here they have taken their seats at our table as a matter of course. Unhappily, it has not been possible to get them all here together at once. General Smuts may not be able to come over from South Africa, [*5951*] and Mr. MacKenzie King could unfortunately stay only for a short time. But Mr. Fraser was with us, and it was a great pleasure to have him, and we had a three months' visit from Mr. Menzies, which was also a great success, and we were all very sorry when his most valuable knowledge of our affairs and the war position, and his exceptional abilities, were lost. For the last three months we have had Sir Earle Page representing the Commonwealth Government at Cabinets when war matters and Australian matters were under discussion and also, in similar circumstances upon the Defence Committee. As a matter of fact this has always been interpreted in the most broad and elastic fashion. The Australian Government have now asked specifically, "that an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction of policy." We have of course agreed to this. New Zealand feels bound to ask for similar representation, and the same facilities will of course be available to Canada and South Africa. The presence at the Cabinet table of Dominion representatives who have no power to take decisions and can only report to their Governments evidently raises some serious problems but none, I trust, which cannot be got over with good will. It must not, however, be supposed that in any circumstances the presence of Dominion representatives for certain purposes could in any way affect the collective responsibility of his Majesty's Servants in Great [*5952*] Britain to Crown and Parliament.

I am sure we all sympathise with our kith and kin in Australia now that the shield of British and American sea power has, for the time being, been withdrawn from them so unexpectedly and so tragically and now that hostile bombers may soon be within range of Australian shores. We shall not put any obstacle to the return of the splendid Australian troops who volunteered for Imperial service to defend their own homeland or whatever part of the Pacific theatre may be thought most expedient. We are taking many measures in conjunction with the United States to increase the security of Australia and New Zealand and to send them reinforcements, arms and equipment by the shortest and best routes. I always hesitate to express opinions about the future, because things turn out so very oddly, but I will go so far as to say that it may be that the Japanese, whose game is what I may call "to make hell while the sun shines," are more likely to occupy themselves in securing their rich prizes in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and the Malayan Archipelago and in seizing island bases for defensive purposes for the attack which is obviously coming towards them at no great distance of time—a tremendous onslaught which will characterise the future in 1942 and 1943. (An HON. MEMBER: "1944 and 1945?") No, I do not think we can stretch our views beyond those dates, but, again, we must see how we go. I think they are much more likely to be arranging themselves in those dis- [*5953*] tricts which they have taken or are likely to take than to undertake a serious mass invasion of Australia. That would seem to be a very ambitious overseas operation for Japan to undertake in the precarious and limited interval before the British and American navies regain—as they must certainly regain, through the new building that is advancing, and for other reasons—the unquestionable command of the Pacific Ocean. However, everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or persuade America to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and recriminations of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain will not take part in them.

Let me, in conclusion, return to the terrific changes which have occurred in our affairs during the last few months and particularly in the last few weeks. We have to consider the prospects of the war in 1942 and also in 1943, and, as

I said just now, it is not useful to look further ahead than that. The moment that the United States was set upon and attacked by Japan, Germany, and Italy—that is to say, within a few days of December 7, 1941—I was sure it was my duty to cross the Atlantic and establish the closest possible relationship with the President and Government of the United States, and also to develop the closest contacts, personal and professional, between the British Chiefs of Staff and their trans-Atlantic deputies, and with the American Chiefs of Staff who were there to meet them.

[*5954*] Having crossed the Atlantic, it was plainly my duty to visit the great Dominion of Canada. The House will have read with admiration and deep interest the speech made by the Prime Minister of Canada yesterday on Canada's great and growing contribution to the common cause in men, in money, and in materials. A notable part of that contribution is the financial offer which the Canadian Government have made to this country. The sum involved is one billion Canadian dollars, about £225,000,000. I know the House will wish me to convey to the Government of Canada our lively appreciation of their timely and most generous offer. It is unequalled in its scale in the whole history of the British Empire, and it is a convincing proof of the determination of Canada to make her maximum contribution towards the successful prosecution of the war.

During those three weeks which I spent in Mr. Roosevelt's home and family, I established with him relations not only of comradeship, but, I think I may say, of friendship. We can say anything to each other, however painful. When we parted he wrung my hand, saying, "We will fight this through to the bitter end, whatever the cost may be." Behind him rises the gigantic and hitherto unmobilised gigantic power of the people of the United States, carrying with them in their life and death struggle the entire, or almost the entire, Western hemisphere.

At Washington, we and our combined staffs surveyed the entire [*5955*] scene of the war, and we reached a number of important practical decisions. Some of them affect future operations and cannot, of course, be mentioned, but others have been made public by declaration or by events. The vanguard of an American Army has already arrived in the United Kingdom. Very considerable forces are following as opportunity may serve. These forces will take their station in the British Isles and face with us whatever is coming our way. They impart a freedom of movement to all forces in the British Isles greater than we could otherwise have possessed. Numerous United States fighter and bomber squadrons will also take part in the defence of Britain and in the ever-increasing bombing offensive against Germany. The United States Navy is linked in the most intimate union with the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval moves together as if we were literally one people.

In the next place, we formed this league of 26 United Nations in which the principal partners at the present time are Great Britain and the British Empire, the United States, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia, and the Republic of China, together with the stout-hearted Dutch, and the representatives of the rest of the 26 powers. This Union is based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and manifestations in every corner of the globe. We will march forward together until every ves- [*5956*] tige of this villainy has been extirpated from the life of the world.

Thirdly, as I have explained at some length, we addressed ourselves to the war against Japan and to the measures to be taken to defend Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and India against Japanese attack or invasion.

Fourthly, we have established a vast common pool of weapons and munitions, of raw materials and of shipping, the outline of which has been set forth in a series of memoranda which I have initialled with the President. I had a talk with him last night on the telephone, as a result of which an announcement has been made in the early hours of this morning in the United States, and I have a White Paper for [the] House which will be available, I think, in a very short time. Many people have been staggered by the figures of prospective American output of war weapons which the President announced to Congress, and the Germans have affected to regard them with incredulity. I can only say that Lord Beaverbrook and I were made acquainted beforehand with all the bases upon which these colossal programmes were founded, and that I myself heard

President Roosevelt confide their specific tasks to the chiefs of American industry and I heard these men accept their prodigious tasks and declare that they would and could fulfill them. Most important of all is the multiplication of our joint tonnage [*5957*] at sea. The American programmes were already vast. They have been increased in the proportion of 100 to nearly 160. If they are completed, as completed I believe they will be, we shall be able to move across the ocean spaces in 1943 two, three or even four times as large armies as the considerable forces we are able to handle at sea at the present time.

I expect—and I have made no secret of it—that we shall both of us receive severe ill-usage at the hands of the Japanese in 1942, but I believe we shall presently regain the naval command of the Pacific and begin to establish an effective superiority in the air, and then later on, with the great basic areas in Australasia, in India, and in the Dutch East Indies, we shall be able to set about our task in good style in 1943. It is no doubt true that the defeat of Japan will not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, whereas the defeat of Hitler would enable the whole forces of the united nations to be concentrated upon the defeat of Japan. But there is no question of regarding the war in the Pacific as a secondary operation. The only limitation applied to its vigorous prosecution will be the shipping available at any given time.

It is most important that we should not overlook the enormous contribution of China to this struggle for world freedom and democracy. If there is any lesson I have brought back from the United States that I could express in one word, it would be "China." That is in all their minds. When we feel the [*5958*] sharp military qualities of the Japanese soldiery in contact with our own troops, although of course very few have as yet been engaged, we must remember that China, ill-armed or half-armed, has, for four and a half years, single handed, under its glorious leader Chiang Kai-Shek, withstood the main fury of Japan. We shall pursue the struggle hand in hand with China, and do everything in our power to give them arms and supplies, which is all they need to vanquish the invaders of their native soil and play a magnificent part in the general forward movement of the United Nations.

Although I feel the broadening swell of victory and liberation bearing us and all the tortured peoples onwards safely to the final goal, I must confess to feeling the weight of the war upon me even more than in the tremendous summer days of 1940. There are so many fronts which are open, so many vulnerable points to defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, so many shrill voices raised to take advantage, now that we can breathe more freely, of all the turns and twists of war. Therefore, I feel entitled to come to the House of Commons, whose servant I am, and ask them not to press me to act against my conscience and better judgment and make scapegoats in order to improve my own position, not to press me to do the things which may be clamoured for at the moment but which will not help in our war effort, but, on the contrary, to give me their encouragement and to give me their aid. I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand by my original programme, blood, [*5959*] toil, tears and sweat, which is all I have ever offered, to which I added, five months later, "many shortcomings, mistakes and disappointments." But it is because I see the light gleaming behind the clouds and broadening on our path, that I make so bold now as to demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional weapon in the armoury of the united nations.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 3, 1946.)

[5960]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[5961] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have here a letter from Admiral Turner dated December 26, 1945, addressed to the counsel. He asked to have some corrections and changes made in his testimony, in line with our practice.

(The letter referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
Washington MMK

26 December 1945.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MITCHELL:

Subject: Amplication and Correction of Testimony of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, U. S. Navy, on December 21, 1945.

Reference: (a) Volume 30 of Report of Proceedings of the Joint Committee.

Enclosures: (A) Copies of Documents relating to reenforcement of Midway and Wake Islands.

(1) CNO Secret Despatch 171450 of October 17, 1941.
(2) CincPac Confidential Ltr. L24/VZ/(95) Serial 01825 of November 10, 1941.
(3) CNO Secret Despatch 270038 of November 26, 1941.
(4) CNO Secret Despatch 270040 of November 26, 1941.
(5) CincPac Secret Despatch 280627 of November 28, 1941.
[5962] (6) CNO Secret Despatch 282054 of November 28, 1941.
(7) CincPac Secret Despatch 280447 of November, 1941.
(8) CincPac Secret Despatch 040237 of December, 1941.

(B) Copies of photographs of OpNav Fleet Location Boards of 1 to 7 December 1941, with explanation diagram.

1. There are two series of questions in reference (a) to which I believe I unintentionally did not give clear and explicit answers; I, therefore, believe that my answers should be clarified. These are:

(a) The questions from page 5444 to page 5450, relating to the employment of two carriers for the reenforcement of Midway and Wake Islands. Enclosure (A) constitutes a series of papers relating to these operations.

(b) Included in the foregoing are certain questions, from page 5444 to page 5446, concerning information shown on the Chief of Naval Operations' daily chart of ship locations. Enclosure (B) consists of photostats of the photographs of the daily set-up of the chart from December 1 to December 7, 1941.

2. You will note, from Enclosures (A) (1) and (A) (6), that the task for the reenforcement of Midway and Wake, with forces attached to the Pacific Fleet had in October been placed entirely in the hands of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific [*5963*] Fleet, for execution at his discretion. The Commander in Chief's plan and directive, Enclosure (A) (2), was not sent to the Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, the exact status of the reenforcement plan was not known in the Department until the receipt of Enclosure (A) (5), replied to by Enclosure (A) (6). The chief point in the clarification of my testimony is that the orders for the movement of reenforcements to Midway and Wake were issued by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and not by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. From Enclosure (B) it will be noted that exact locations of the ships of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian Area are not shown on the daily location charts, but only the main concentration itself. My recollection is that, though the Ship Movements Division had an accurate list of the ships of the concentration, it was not informed as to details of the deployment. I trust this information will serve to clarify my testimony.

4. In addition, it is requested that the following corrections be made to other parts of my testimony shown in reference (a):

(a) Page 5321, line 21, insert the word "not" after the word "would".

(b) Page 5342, line 6, change the words "such material" to the words "decryption means and personnel".

(c) Page 5344, lines 11 and 12, delete the words "and three members from the Army".

(d) Page 5350, line 25, change the word "agree" to the [*5964*] word "disagree".

(e) Page 5367, line 8, delete the word "boat".

(f) Page 5373, lines 5 and 6, delete the words "my report", and insert in their place the words "me mistaken".

(g) Page 5380, line 18, replace the word "proper" with the word "preliminary".

(h) Page 5381, lines 7 and 8, change the last sentence in the paragraph to read, "the only war warning sent was that on the twenty-seventh".

Line 10, change the comma after the word "overhaul" to a period.

Change the sentence after this period to read as follows: "Reconnaissance planes can be operated over a long period of time under more severe conditions than he had there in Pearl Harbor or Kaneohe", replace the word "sheltered" with the phrase "or in partly sheltered waters".

(i) Page 5383, lines 6, 7, and 8, delete all after the word "Kimmel", and replace the deleted words with the following: "because when Admiral Richardson was there, the Naval Air Stations at Johnston Island and at Midway had not been activated". Line 9, replace the word "radii" with the words "air stations".

(j) Page 5386, line 2, replace the words "the Axis" with the word "Japan".

[*5965*] (k) Page 5400, line 14, insert the words "Admiral Turner" at the beginning of the line to show that this was an answer by the witness.

(l) Page 5412, line 10, after the word "situation", insert the words "so far as possible".

(m) Page 5415, line 5, after the word "not", insert the word "written".

(n) Page 5416, line 7, change the word "have" to "had".

(o) Page 5423, line 6, change the word "it" to read "we".

(p) Page 5442, line 4, change the word "other" to read "his".

(q) Page 5444, line 15, change the word "have" to the word "had".

(r) Page 5447, line 19, change the answer to read, "Correct. Planes were to go to Midway and Wake".

(s) Page 5448, line 22, after the word "on" insert the words "the enemy force attacking".

(t) Page 5449, in line 12, change the word "cruiser" to the word "cruisers"; line 17, change to read "the carriers could then be free to act on the offensive".

(u) Page 5452, in line 11, change to read "down in the Gilbert Islands, which was certainly to be expected"; line 21, change the word "the" to "by", the word "patrol" to "patrols", and delete the word "areas".

Respectfully,

/S/ R. K. Turner,
R. K. TURNER,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

[5966] Mr. MITCHELL. Now all the enclosures he refers to there were read into the evidence yesterday, so I need not describe those.

Now paragraph 3 was written in relation to the questions I asked Admiral Stark as to whether he did not here in Washington know day by day what ships were actually in Pearl Harbor, and the enclosure (B) that he refers to are the ship location maps, or copies of them, taken from the Navy Department which were in use here today, and we will have them available if anybody wants to look at them, or the witness wants to refer to them.

Now I have two other documents that counsel for Admiral Stark would like to put in the record now, with the idea that the subject of it may be subject to further examination.

I will read the letter of May 1 for the information of the committee. You have copies of it before you. I will ask that it be just spread upon the record instead of being labeled with an exhibit number.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. "Office of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.

S–A16–3/A7–3(3)/ND14
(0410)
Secret 1 MAY 1941
From: Commandant Fourteenth Naval District
To: Chief of Naval Operations
[5967] Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor
Reference: (a) Correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on this subject dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941.

Inclosures:
(A) Copies of two joint letters HHD–14ND dated 14 February 1941.
(B) Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD–42).

That is part of Exhibit 44 in the record.

(C) Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

1. In connection with reference (a) there are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principal directives issued in cooperation with the local Army authorities in accordance with which operation plans have been prepared, put into effect, and are in process of test and improvement, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure (A), two joint letters HHD–14ND dated 14 February 1941, initiated study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in reference (a), and also included study of additional problems which were raised by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. Inclosure (B), Annex No. VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, is a new joint agreement with the local [5968] Army authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Section II in particular relates to joint air operations.

I will interpolate by saying that that is also in Exhibit No. 44.

4. Inclosure (C), Joint Estimate by Commander Hawaiian Air Force and Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, serves as the basis of joint air operation orders which have been issued, placed in effect, and are in process of test, with a view to improvement in their effectiveness.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification *other than* secret.

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

The other document which I will read into the record is dated June 20, 1941.

Op–30B2–BP
(SC)A7–2(2)/FF1
Serial 059230

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, Jun 20 1941

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

[*5969*] To: The Commandants, All Naval Districts
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet

Subject: Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.

Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.

2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

/s/ H. R. STARK

HEADQUARTERS
14TH NAVAL DISTRICT
PEARL HARBOR, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

JOINT

COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 1939

28 MARCH 1941

ANNEX NO. VII SECTION VI * JOINT AGREEMENTS

JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

[*5970*]

I. GENERAL

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF–39, (14ND–JCD–13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment [*5971*] strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the [*5972*] tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication.

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
18th Bombardment Wing	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
14th Pursuit Wing	Ewa Landing Field
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Waialupe Radio Station

b. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
*Headquarters Hawaiian Department	Waialupe Radio Station
Headquarters, HSCA Brigade	Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade	Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force	Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
	Marine Air Group, Ewa

*Net Control Station.

[*5973*] 18th Bombardment Wing

14th Pursuit Wing

c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows:

ARMY	NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G–3 Office)	14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B.	14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam)	14th Naval District

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during combat and joint exercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Commander, Base Defense Air Force.

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the movements of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the following means of joint communication:

a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.

b. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations:

ARMY	NAVY
CP, PH Gpmt. Ft. Kamehameah	Waialupe
[*5974*] CP, Hon. Gpmt, Ft. Ruger	Destroyer Patrol
Additional Stations that may be determined to be necessary	Mine Sweepers

c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 *c.* above.

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service [*5975*] Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES

8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*

During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an [*5976*] emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*

Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.*

When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning anti-aircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installations, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition and bombs will exchange informa- [5977] tion concerning the types, quantities, and locations of these munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made without specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.

VI. SMOKE SCREENS

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor—Hickam Field area from air attacks.

VII. HARBOR CONTROL POST

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

Inclosure A

Annex No. VII HCF–39; 14 ND—JCD—13.

[5978] *Aircraft Departure, Approach, and Recognition Procedure*

Oahu Area

To Be Published Later

Inclosure B

Annex No. VII. HCF–39; 14 ND—JCD—13

Harbor Control Post, Honolulu and Pearl Harbors, Oahu, T. H.

To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the Joint committee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study and report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for Communication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor Defenses.)

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before the committee resumes questioning you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I have one or two things [*5979*] which the committee asked for yesterday.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Admiral STARK. I would also like to comment on the so-called Narrative Statement of the Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, which the committee had before it and mentioned yesterday.

I am sure the committee appreciates full well that this only represents the idea of some representative or representatives of the Navy Department as to what the evidence in the previous proceedings will show.

I have not had an opportunity to study this statement—it is some 700 page—but I do want to point out to the committee what, to my mind, is a very imporant error. There may be others.

On page 699 of volume 2 and also on page 699 of the loose pages distributed yesterday, you will find the paragraph beginning:

> Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel.

In this paragraph, the stateemnt goes on to quote what purports to be my war warning message, and at the top of [*5980*] page 700 it omits a part of the concluding sentence. The last two sentences of the quoted material read:

> A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Appropriate measures against sabotage.

This should read:

> A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

As the message stands in this so-called narrative statement, it is so inaccurate as to be misleading. I am very anxious to have this error corrected if the document is to be referred to by the committee.

Now, the committee asked me yesterday to search my correspondence to see if I found anything additional in the way of air comment to Admiral Kimmel, and I would like to read this as my answer.

I have searched my personal correspondence with Admiral Kimmel and also the official documents I have secured from the Navy Department for any mention, subsequent to August 1941, of anything which would indicate my continuing concern over the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

I find no such letters in this later period. I would like to point out, however, that on May 1, 1941, the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District—Admiral Bloch at Pearl Harbor—sent me an official letter on the subject of air defense of [*5981*] Pearl Harbor. That letter referred to the correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy on the subject of the air defense of Pearl Harbor dated January 24, 1941, and February 7, 1941, to both of which letters

I have referred in my statement and with which I am sure the committee is familiar. Enclosed with the commandant's letter were three documents. The first does not appear pertinent here. The second was annex VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan entitled, "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base." Among its provisions were those for joint air operations and joint antiaircraft measures, including an aircraft warning service. The third enclosure was a joint estimate by the commander, Hawaiian Air Force, and commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, commonly known before this committee as the Martin-Bellinger agreement.

This estimate included a summary of the situation which reads as follows:

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

[*5982*] (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

The estimate also included, under posible enemy action, the following two paragraphs:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

A copy of the letter of May 1, 1941, had been sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, by the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

[*5983*] After reviewing these documents I was impressed with the soundness of the arrangements arrived at between commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District with respect to joint security measures at Pearl Harbor. In fact, on June 20, 1941, I caused copies of the joint agreement to be sent to the commandants of all naval districts and to the commanders in chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, and in my forwarding letter I stated:

Attention is invited to the importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.

I had shown considerable concern, as far back as the fall of 1940, for the security of the fleet and the base at Pearl Harbor against air attack, and I had caused the people in Hawaii to make an exhaustive investigation, which Admirals Bloch and Richardson followed by a report to me at the beginning of 1941. I then caused the Secretary of the Navy to write to the Secretary of War, pointing out the danger

of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, to which the Secretary of War replied, recognizing the danger and setting forth the steps which the Army had taken and proposed to take to meet this danger. I further mentioned from time to time during the first half of 1941 the matter of an air attack, and when Admiral Kimmel was here in May and early June I discussed fully with him the joint measures which were being taken, and he left with me a memorandum dated June 4, 1941, on this [*5984*] subject.

As I said, I was so impressed with the agreement made at Pearl Harbor that I sent it out to all concerned, stressing the importance of the subject matter.

In view of the fact that the matter of the air defense of Pearl Harbor had been surveyed and machinery put in action to implement the defense, and in view of the fact that the authorities at Pearl Harbor had arrived at a satisfactory joint arrangement for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, with which I was thoroughly familiar, I felt it no longer necessary to emphasize this matter in my letters.

I assumed that having made this agreement and having agreed with me that the danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was present, the commander in chief, Pacific fleet, would continue his efforts to prepare himself to meet the possible air attack.

I feel sure my assumption was well founded, for he wrote on October 14, 1941, in the revision of his confidential fleet letter on the subject of security of fleet at base and in operating areas, as follows:

The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) Is left out as being nonrelevant.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) a surprise attack on ships in [*5985*] Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, (3) a combination of these two.

This letter also provided, under the head "Defense against air attack," the following:

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(6) The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (NBDO). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns implaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing 2 for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and Navy.

A copy of this confidential fleet letter was distributed to the Chief of Naval Operations.

I had no reason to believe, from any communications which came to me from the Pacific Fleet, that the concern shown by the responsible officers there over a possible air attack on [*5986*] Pearl Harbor had diminished in any respect during 1941. I am certain that my concern had not.

Now, the other paper, sir, I have is the table——

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a minute. Do you want to add to that statement a reference to the letter of December 2, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to you in which, among other things, he made this statement:

With respect to sending aircraft equipment farther to the west to the outlying islands I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor, with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far very little has been done to improve this situation.

Have you found any other references than those you mentioned?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. It is perfectly satisfactory to me to include what you have just read.

Mr. MITCHELL. I remembered this one.

Admiral STARK. We searched primarily my letters to him.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not his to you?

Admiral STARK. Not his to me, over that period.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

Admiral STARK. We have this official document of his of October.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

[*5987*] Admiral STARK. If you would like, I will go through his letters to me and bring the subject up tomorrow.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wanted to be sure we had everything.

Admiral STARK. I will search and if I find anything I will bring it up.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you had another statement?

Admiral STARK. The other statement is the table which I was asked to prepare yesterday on the distribution of our fleet.

I think I have covered everything. It won't take but a minute to read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before going into that I would like to say that we already have in the record the distribution of the fleet. You got that in the first exhibit in the Navy folder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to have this clear, concise statement at this point in the record, because questions have been asked General Stark directly on this point.

Admiral STARK. Aye, aye, sir.

In each case, I will first read the total number of ships in the Navy:

Battleships, 15: Total in the Atlantic, 6. That does not include the *North Carolina* and *Washington*, both of which were on trials. Total in the Asiatic, none. Total in the Pacific, nine. Total in Pearl Harbor—that is, on December 7—eight. Total sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor, eight.

[*5988*] Then, under the next heading is, "Total Pacific Fleet, vessels undamaged: Battleships in Pearl Harbor, none." In the task forces, 8 and 12, which, you will recall, included the *Enterprise* and the *Lexington* which we discussed yesterday.

None of those was hurt.

Fleet vessels elsewhere in the Pacific not hurt, was one, and which was the *Colorado*, under overhaul.

In the next heading, I put carriers. We had a total of seven. Four were in the Atlantic. That excludes the *Hornet*, which was on trial, and it includes the first of the so-called escort carriers, the converted *Long Island*. In the Asiatic Fleet, no carriers. In the Pacific Fleet, three. Total in Pearl Harbor, none. Total put out of commission or sunk at Pearl Harbor, none. And then the next, the latter column, shows that two of these carriers, the *Lexington* and the *Enterprise*, were absent in connection with distribution of planes at Wake and Midway, and the one other I just put down "Elsewhere."

I would like to point out that the data I am giving here is from Exhibit 86. I haven't gone behind that in any way.

Heavy cruisers: The Navy had a grand total of 18—5 in the Atlantic; 1 in the Asiatic; 12 in the Pacific; 2 were in Pearl Harbor. None were put out of action. None were damaged in Pearl Harbor. Six of them were accompanying the two task forces previously referred to. And elsewhere in the Pacific [*5989*] outside of Pearl Harbor were four, undamaged.

Of light cruisers, we had 19. Eight were in the Atlantic. That excludes the light cruisers *Juneau*, *Atlantic*, *San Diego*, and *San Juan* which had not yet joined the fleet but were in the process of completion and shakedown. One in the Asiatic, and that excludes the *Boise*, which was escorting in Asiatic waters but attached to the Pacific Fleet. Ten in the Pacific Fleet. That included the *Boise*. In Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, six. Total sunk or put out of action, three. In Pearl Harbor, undamaged—which were undamaged—three. And vessels elsewhere in the Pacific, four. The location of those four is shown in detail in the Navy folder, item 5. My recollection is that two were in the Southeast Pacific and two were on escort work, but the exhibit will show that if the committee wants to follow it up.

Destroyers, 159: 92 in the Atlantic; 13 in the Asiatic; 54 in the Pacific, which includes four destroyers assigned to the fourteenth Naval District, and does not include the destroyers which were assigned to the west coast naval districts. There were 30 in Pearl Harbor, of which three were sunk or put out of commission, leaving undamaged in Pearl Harbor, 27. And there were 14 destroyers which were accompanying the two task forces previously mentioned, and there were ten on other missions in the Pacific.

[*5990*] Of submarines, we had 111. There were 158 in the Atlantic, 29 in the Asiatic Fleet; 24 in the Pacific Fleet; and of which the status of two of them was not clear. I took that from the former exhibit and didn't follow it up as to why it is not clear. Total in Pearl Harbor on December 7, five; none of which were damaged. And elsewhere in the Pacific were 19 submarines. So that left 98 vessels of the Pacific Fleet undamages. And of the 51 which were in Pearl Harbor, 14 were sunk and variously damaged from light to heavy damage.

Now, if that table is what the committe wanted, I will let it stand as is. If there is anything further that is wanted I will be glad to get it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I suggest that the table be placed in the transcript in the tabulated form right at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The table referred to follows:)

[5991] *Dispositions of Atlantic, Asiatic, and Pacific Fleets on Dec. 7, 1941*

Types	Grand total	Total in Atlantic Fleet	Total in Asiatic Fleet	Total in Pacific Fleet	Total in Pearl Harbor	Total sunk or put out of commission at Pearl Harbor	Total Pacific Fleet vessels undamaged		
							In Pearl Harbor	In task Forces No. 8 [1] and No. 12 [2]	Fleet vessels elsewhere in Pacific [3]
Battleships	15	[4] 6	0	9	8	8	0	0	1
Carriers	7	[5] [6] 4	0	3	0	0	0	2	1
Heavy cruisers	18	5	1	12	2	0	2	6	4
Light cruisers	19	[7] 8	[8] 1	[9] 10	6	3	3	0	4
Destroyers	159	92	13	[10] [11] 54	30	3	27	14	10
Submarines	111	58	29	[12] 24	5	0	5	0	[12] 19
Total	329	173	44	112	51	14	37	22	39
							98		

[1] Task Force No. 8 included *Enterprise*.
[2] Task Force No. 12 included *Lexington*.
[3] Locations of these ships shown in detail in Navy folder, item 5.
[4] Excludes *North Carolina* and *Washington*, both on trials.
[5] Excludes *Hornet* on trials.
[6] Includes *Long Island*, escort carrier.
[7] Excludes *Juneau, Atlanta, San Diego* and *San Juan* carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but not completed or commissioned.
[8] Excludes *Boise* escorting in Asiatic waters but attached Pacific Fleet. (See (9).)
[9] Iucludes *Boise* which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
[10] Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor).
[11] Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts.
[12] Status of 2 submarines not clear.

Source: Exhibit 86 and transcript, pp. 5880–5883.

[5992] Mr. MITCHELL. I call attention to the fact that you have two prior sources of information. One is the one that Congressman Murphy has called attention to, put in by Admiral Inglis, giving the statistics at Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941, and later we have Exhibit 86, which tabulated the fleets in both oceans.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I might mention that the committee will note that this includes only major categories of vessels. I haven't got down net tenders and that type of ship. It is just combatant ships of major categories.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete the material you desired to submit to the committee at this time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Before proceeding with the examination of Admiral Stark, I feel it necessary to call to the attention of the committee the fact that quite some time ago I made a request of counsel that he secure from the State Department and make available to the committee a memoranda prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, [*5993*] which was delivered, according to the information which I had, some 3 months prior to the resignation of Mr. Salisbury from the Far Eastern Section of the State Department.

I had already placed in evidence some material of Dr. Hornbeck and my advices were that this communication from Mr. Salisbury to the Secretary of State contains material very material to this inquiry.

Counsel has submitted to me this morning his correspondence with the State Department in respect to my request and includes a copy of a letter dated December 19, 1945, from Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, in which he concludes that the Department is unable to comply with my request and gives as the reason that Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 establishing the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack provides that the committee shall "make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941." Mr. Acheson continues in his letter:

> The President's Order of October 23, 1945 addressed to this and other departments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the Joint Committee, for such use as the committee may determine any information in his [*5994*] possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this Department has made available to the Committee Counsel all information in its possession which is material to the investigation.
>
> The memorandum requested by Congressman Keefe relates exclusively to exchanges of American and Japanese nationals after the war began. In these circumstances the Department does not understand how this memorandum could possibly be considered material to the Committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's Order of October 23, 1945. The Department is therefore unable to comply with the request of Congressman Keefe.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I interpret this letter correctly it is to the effect that the State Department is determining in advance whether or not material requested by a member of this committee is in its judgment material to this inquiry, having before it the full text of the statement which I requested. I have not seen that text, and yet I am foreclosed from a determination of materiality as a member of this committee by the determination of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, who concludes that in his opinion it is not material and therefore is not to be made available to the committee.

It seems to me that this presents to the committee a very definite question as to the responsibility of this investigat- [*5995*] ing committee. I may say that I have very definite and certain information that this communication which I have asked for is material and while it may contain some matters which are not material, it does contain matters which are definitely material and are necessary in order that I may pursue the introduction at a subsequent date of certain memoranda prepared for the War and Navy departments by Dr. Hornbeck.

Now, I want to ask this question: When a request is made by a member of this committee to the State Department or any other department of Government, am I, as a member of this committee, to be

bound by the determination of an executive department of Government that in their opinion the material which I requested is not material to this inquiry and therefore I am not permitted to see it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question propounded to the Chair?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has not been the Chair's understanding that an individual member of the committee could determine the materiality of any evidence requested of a department, but that the committee as a whole had jurisdiction and authority to determine that matter, and if the committee as a whole determined that any record was material its determination governed instead of that of the executive officer who might assume to pass upon the question.

[*5996*] Mr. KEEFE. May I ask then, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department be directed to bring this communication to the committee in order that the committee, itself, in executive session, may determine whether or not it is material.

How can the committee, or any member of the committee, determine that question in the absence of seeing the communication itself? That is the point I am getting at.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter we might well discuss in executive session without taking the time of the hearing, but inasmuch as it has been brought up, before any action is taken, the Chair would like to ask counsel if he has additional information about that, in regard to Mr. Acheson's letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. I have never seen the document, so I do not know whether it is material or not. Heretofore when any question has been raised, I haven't found that the State Department has objected to somebody looking at certain material. They haven't yet closed the door on me. I don't see any reason why I shouldn't agree with Mr. Keefe that the committee ought to have an opportunity to examine it for the whole committee to decide whether it is material.

The CHAIRMAN. From the beginning it was the committee's understanding—it was certainly mine—that the committee would determine the materiality of evidence and not the Secretary of State or any officer of any department, and if it [*5997*] is agreeable to the committee, the committee will request counsel to get that document and submit it to the committee for its determination as to whether it is material.

[*5998*] Mr. KEEFE. My point, Mr. Chairman, is that if it appears upon an inspection of the document in connection with other matters which they have submitted that it is immaterial and not material to this controversy, certainly I would not want, nor would I expect, to pursue the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks the point made by the Congressman is well taken and the committee will take such action.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas will now examine.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, throughout the course of these hearings it becomes more clear as we move along that Japan knew everything that we were doing in this country previous to Pearl Harbor and apparently we knew little or nothing about what Japan was doing.

Let me ask you just briefly about our naval and military intelligence service in Japan at that time. How many people did we have employed in Japan in December 1941 who were actively engaged in obtaining military and naval intelligence for this country?

Admiral STARK. I do not know, Senator Lucas, of any, and information of that kind could come far better from Intelligence. I am not familiar with the details. My recollection is we had none. I may be wrong. I hesitate to testify [*5999*] as to the details of who we had and where.

Senator LUCAS. Well, upon yesterday you testified before the committee that in your opinion Japan had a complete spy system in this country through which they were obtaining and forwarding intelligence to their home country about every movement that took place in our naval and military circles here in America.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. My thought in asking you this question was whether or not in view of the fact that you have been a naval officer all of these years that you could suggest to this committee as to what Congress might do in the future to remedy what seemed to be a very, very serious situation in Hawaii and other command posts when the Japs struck us in December 1941.

Admiral STARK. Well, only a considered answer, I think, should be given to that question and I would not like to make an offhand answer to it.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I appreciate it may be somewhat a surprise question to you, but it does seem to me to have very considerable importance in connection with this hearing as I move along and listen to the testimony, that Japan knew every move that we were making in connection with the movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and had all [*6000*] this information and apparently we were getting nothing from Japan. While I appreciate that under our form of government it is almost impossible to keep anything a secret, yet, on the other hand, looking to the defense of this country in the future, it does occur to me that perhaps Congress might be able to do some things to remedy certain conditions that existed at that time and I thought perhaps you might have given it some thought.

Admiral STARK. Well, I quite agree with you that it would be well to look into the subject and the question of legislation to correct it. I am hazy on just what we had proposed but I do recall that there was some legislation proposed, I think, which did not get through, about our ability to arrest people on suspicion and that sort of thing, but it has been studied and in the light of present experience, in my opinion, and I take it in yours, I am agreeing with you, should again be reviewed with a view to our not getting into such a position again if it is possible to avoid it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, how many naval attachés did you have in Tokyo at the time, do you remember that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not. Of course, there was one naval attaché and some assistants and usually we had language students over there, but I haven't got the details.

Senator LUCAS. Well, from whom did you get this informa- [*6001*] tion upon which you based your reports for certain evalua-

tion and certain information that you had to send your commands in the field?

Admiral STARK. We got it from what we got from the State Department, the War Department, sometimes the Treasury Department, intercepts from our people in the field, which was rather world-wide.

For example, in Hawaii we had the district intelligence officer and the fleet intelligence officer and a radio communication man studying those subjects. We had them spread in different places in China and, in fact, a rather broad coverage. We also, of course, in connection with the movements of the fleet had the stations which were constantly, through radio, studying through direction finder and through the system of calls to assist us in location, but we used to say, and I may possibly have expressed to you in some of the hearings, that as regards Japan, even in peacetime, we felt our information more or less stopped at the 3-mile limit.

For example, they built stockades around their navy yards, they pulled down the curtains, I have been told, in trains if they passed a section where people might look out to see what was being done.

You will recall when I was asked how many battleships Japan had we could only estimate. We could get their hearings, [*6002*] For example, we could get from the amounts of money they had appropriated and working on every scrap of information that we could get, backed by previous experience, we would make an estimate, but over here, as you will recall, a Japanese frequently sat in committee hearings and knew everything about what we were proposing.

I remember when I was asking for the large increases shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations, seeing a Japanese naval attaché among those listening to the hearings and in which we put all our cards on the table.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the reason that I asked these preliminary questions is followed by this one: According to the report received from the supreme commander of the Allied forces in the Pacific, and which has been made a part of the record, that part of the Japanese Fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was sent by the Imperial Headquarters of the Naval Staff on December 7, 1941, to a place which I cannot pronounce, which is spelled H-i-t-o-k-a-p-p-u.

Now, I was wondering whether or not you as Chief of Naval Operations were familiar with that Japanese harbor previous to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. We knew of the harbor; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Were any of our Intelligence men or any of the Navy men working in there at any time, or did they ever [*6008*] get in there to make an inspection and see what that bay was like?

Admiral STARK. Not that I know of. It might be that you will get something on that if you repeat the question to our far-eastern man who is due here.

Senator LUCAS. Well, at least as far as you are concerned you do not recall that in the information you received any direct report about this particular bay in the months of, say, September, October, November, and December of 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. I think it might be helpful with regard to what has been termed the "lost carriers" and which were not lost so far as we knew at that time, but whose appearance later

showed that our estimates as to where they were were incorrect, you will recall there has been introduced into the testimony that on December 24 Admiral Wilkinson sent a dispatch to the two commanders in chief in the Pacific regarding their size-up of where the Japanese fleet was.

You will notice that sometimes there were conflicts, but that we felt the estimates made by Admiral Hart, who had a very large force working on it and was very much closer to Japan, were probably the best we had.

Now, I would also like to point out that, of course, Admiral Kimmel was informed of that, it went to Kimmel and to [*6004*] Hart and there was a complete interchange.

Senator LUCAS. You meant November 24. You said December 24.

Admiral STARK. Well, if you say so that is all right. On November 24. I will read that dispatch if you would like to have it read. It is short.

The CHAIRMAN. You said "December," Admiral.

Admiral STARK. Oh. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. We are asking to have it corrected.

Admiral STARK. There was a conflict. We thought that Hart's estimates appeared to us to be the better, but Kimmel had estimates, Kimmel had his estimates, Hart had Kimmel's estimates, we had both their estimates and all three of us were working on that. Now, on the 26th——

Senator LUCAS. Just before you get to the 26th. With respect to those estimates, they were not the same. Hart had one set of figures showing where the carriers were and Kimmel had another set of figures which were different.

Admiral STARK. I am coming to that.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir.

Admiral STARK. On the 26th we received two dispatches, one from Kimmel, who thought that possibly there might be some carriers in the eastern Marshalls, and one from Hart putting them in home waters.

[*6005*] You will recall that we endeavored to get a coverage on the eastern Marshalls but due to weather were not able to do so. Hart put them in home waters.

On the 28th and again on the 1st we had from the Asiatic no change, which still put, in his opinion, the carriers in the home waters from what he had been able to gather or not gather. On the 1st of December Intelligence made an estimate, our own Office of Naval Intelligence, to me and from the information as they sized it up from Hart and from Kimmel they put them in home waters. So we thought we knew where the carriers were. You never can be certain in the absence of anything definite in the way of call signs and cutting them in.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you accepted the information that Admiral Hart gave you with respect to this task force or this supposed lost fleet and concluded that the fleet was not lost but it was in home waters some place?

Admiral STARK. That was the best we had to go on. Yes, sir; we accepted them.

Senator LUCAS. Well, do you know whether Admiral Kimmel accepted that same viewpoint and in view of that he gave you a report that the fleet was lost?

Admiral STARK. The only difference that I recall in Admiral Kimmel's information was that there might be two carriers in the eastern Marshalls and, of course, as time went on [*6006*] and there was no further change, or in the absence of information, why, one might wonder, but the best at the time we had from those who were making the estimates was that the carriers were in home waters.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is what you are telling the committee at this time, that upon the information that you evaluated at the time and sent to the commanders in the field it was your opinion that there was no lost fleet but that the ships of the Japanese Navy were all accounted for through the Hart report?

Admiral STARK. We did not send it out. That estimate was just given to me by Intelligence. Hart and Kimmel both had their own estimates and whether Admiral Kimmel after receiving Admiral Hart's latest information agreed with him or not, whether his Intelligence officer did, I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you will agree that that was an extremely important message that came from Admiral Hart at that particular time with respect to the location of the Japanese fleet, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but I will say, and the people in the field, I believe, would bear it out, that it was the best information we had. You never could count on it a hundred percent of accuracy. Every naval officer knows that ships can maintain radio silence.

[*6007*] Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that. Well, now, after this task force went into this bay the name of which I cannot pronounce, they were ordered, according to the report that is in the record here, to stay there until November the 22, 1941, and take on supplies and then upon that date they were to sail for the Hawaiian waters.

Now, as I understand it, there was no one in the Hawaiian area connected with the fleet, there was no one in the Asiatic area that was connected with the fleet that ever heard a single thing about this task force being at this bay or having the slightest knowledge of when it went there or when it sailed.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. I would suggest, Senator Lucas, that you repeat that question to McCollum and Kramer as to whether or not Admiral Hart in making that evaluation,—that would be home waters, and whether he had them there or not I am not certain.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I thought, Admiral Stark, in view of the crisis that we were fast approaching with Japan that you as Chief of Naval Operations would have probably known about any movements of ships in the Japanese waters at that time; that was the reason I was asking you the question.

Admiral STARK. Well, the data they gave me was home waters. I have the dispatches here, if you would like to hear [*6008*] just what they sent in.

Senator LUCAS. All right, please read those dispatches.

Admiral STARK. This dispatch is of November 26, from the commandant, Fourteenth District, Fourteenth Naval District, which is Hawaii, to OPNAV and for information of the commander in chief

of the Pacific and the commander in chief of the Asiatic and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. It reads:

For past month commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units:

Second Fleet, Third Fleet including first and second base forces and First Defense Division, combined airforce, Desron Three, Airon Seven, Subron Five and possible units of BatDiv Three from First Fleet.

In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indochina force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama Bako and Takao.

Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet Commander.

Combined air force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan.

Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.

[*6009*] Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan.

Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and Submarine Division or Squadron.

CruDiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be enroute South China.

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twenty Four at least one Carrier Division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

From Com. 16, that is Asiatic, to the CINCPAC and to OPNAV and to COM 14 and to CINCAF, which was Admiral Hart.

Morning comment—

Mr. MITCHELL. The date of that?

Admiral STARK. This is the 26th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of November?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Morning comment Comfourteen two one ten of twenty-sixth—

The message I just read bears "2613"—it refers to the [*6010*] one I just read, which was Admiral Bloch's dispatch.

"Morning comment Comfourteen," to the despatch I have just read from Hawaii. [Reading:]

Morning comment Comfourteen two one ten of twenty sixth X Traffic analysis past few days indicate Cinc second directing units of first second third fleets and subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarity units expected to operate in south China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate in mandates will be referred to as second section X Estimated units in first section are Crudiv seven X Airron six defense division one X Desron three and subron six XX Second section—

which is the one he put in the Marshalls—

Crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X Desrons two and four X Subron five X Desdiv twentythree X First base force of third fleet X Third base force at Palao X Fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance third fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Desron five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south X There are slight indications [*6011*] today that Desron three Crudiv seven and Subron six are in Takao area X Combined airforce units from Empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China coast X Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X Our lists indicate Cinc combined in Nagato X Cinc first in Hyuga and Cinc second in

Atago in Kure area X Cinc third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X Cinc fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from central or north China probably torpedo boats XX Southern expeditionary fleet apparently being reinforced by one base force unit XX Directives to the above task forces if such are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations X Cinc second X Third and Cinc southern expeditionary fleet appear to have major roles X Traffic from Navminister and Cngs to Cincs of fleet appear normal X Evaluation is considered reliable.

That shows differences in opinion as to at least the carriers in the Marshalls.

[*6012*] Senator LUCAS. In view of subsequent events, Admiral Kimmel's report was more accurate than Admiral Hart's?

Admiral STARK. I beg pardon, Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. In view of subsequent events, Admiral Kimmel's report was more reliable than Admiral Hart's with respect to where the Japanese carriers were?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that either one of them was reliable. I do not know yet whether there were any carriers in the eastern Marshalls, and I have been unable to ascertain.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is a certainty, however, there was a task force that was lost, and Kimmel in his message was talking about the loss of part of a fleet that he could not find; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes; and Admiral Hart thought they were in home waters.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And the very carriers that Admiral Hart talked about being in home waters turned out to be in the task force that struck Pearl Harbor; that is correct, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes. I think the information is they were not in the eastern Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. I do not know where they were. At least they were lost and were finally discovered where they were on December 6, 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

[*6013*] Senator LUCAS. Assuming you had taken the other position, Admiral Stark, that there was a lost fleet out in the Pacific, would that give you any greater concern with respect to the Hawaiian area?

Admiral STARK. Well, it might have. I do not know. That would be hindsight.

Senator LUCAS. What was the Navy's principal business in the Pacific Ocean? What was our chief problem out there in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. To protect the United States interests.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; to protect the United States with what? With what would we protect them?

Admiral STARK. With the fleet.

Senator LUCAS. After all, the fleet was the chief interest of the United States, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That should have been the chief interest of every naval officer in the Navy, both here in Washington and in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was.

Senator LUCAS. Now, no one knew where the Japs were going to attack, but whether it was the Philippines or Wake or any other American possessions, the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was the watch-

dog for American safety and security, [6014] not only for our possessions but for the continental United States as well; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it seems to me, in view of the fact that the fleet was in the Hawaiian area, the sole purpose being the defense of our country and our possessions, that there should not have been anything left undone on the part of any naval officer either in Washington or in the Pacific area to protect that fleet, because without it we were in pretty bad shape, were we not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, any of these places that you mentioned, any of the places that were mentioned there in those messages, like the Kra Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines, and other spots, if they had been struck by the Japs there would not have been any danger to our fleet, would there?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. You are speaking of the southern——

Senator LUCAS. I am speaking now of the message that you sent to the commander of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Asiatic Fleet wherein you mentioned certain points that you thought, from the information you had, Japan might strike.

Admiral STARK. Well, if Japan struck the Philippines, that part of our fleet out there was certainly in danger.

[6015] Senator LUCAS. That part of our fleet was in danger, but the principal part was based at Hawaii, and insofar as the principal part of the fleet was concerned it was not in danger with respect to any of those places that were mentioned in the message; isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, so far as the places mentioned in the message. I would like to point out, Senator Lucas, with regard to the places mentioned in the message, that they referred to an attack by an amphibious force.

Senator LUCAS. Well, what would an amphibious force be, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. Well, an amphibious force—for example, there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 transports in that force.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It was a force of ships with men for landing and with equipment for landing, and with boats for landing them, such, for example, as our own amphibious forces when they strike.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We mention in that dispatch, or I think it may have been read into the dispatch and perhaps understood, that the dispatch referred only to that. I would like to go through that dispatch once again, if I may.

[6016] We state that—

negotiations * * * looking towards a stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

That is an aggressive move.

Now, we state that—

the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition—

and the amphibious expedition, not any strike that might come but this amphibious expedition, to be either against the Philippines or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Then we go on with—

execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46. Inform district and army authorities.

Now, we knew there was an amphibious force and we knew its possible objectives. We had stated in a previous dispatch that an attack might be coming in any direction. This dispatch speaks of a surprise aggressive movement.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. The fact that it is sent to any man for action means that we are thinking of him with reference to the material contained in this dispatch. If it were simply informatory and of interest to him we would have on there, as has been pointed out, "for information." I think the distinction between "for information" and "for action" should be cleared up.

[*6017*] Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Admiral STARK. We would not have sent this to Admiral Kimmel for action unless we had been thinking of him and the possibility of an attack in his direction, and for that reason he was put down "for action." I do not know whether I made that point clear before, as to the difference between "for action" and "for information."

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate the distinction and it was very fairly put to us by General Marshall on that score. However, it does seem to me that whenever, even in a command action of that type, where you mentioned these various places as the theater and Hawaii was not mentioned, it just occurred to me it was calculated to take just a little away, perhaps, from Hawaii. Maybe I am wrong.

Admiral STARK. Again, I invite your attention to the point that we were putting down the points of a possible attack of an amphibious expedition. We had no thought of an amphibious expedition striking at Hawaii. We were not thinking of an assault on Hawaii and a landing on Hawaii as a result of an amphibious expedition.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming that they did strike as was suggested, which they did later on——

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; the forecast was correct.

Senator LUCAS. The point I am trying to make is that none [*6018*] of that information that was sent was as vital as the protection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor. That was the main thing, was it not?

Admiral STARK. And for that purpose we gave a directive to take a defensive deployment; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, do you believe, as Chief of Naval Operations, that in November and December 1941, you exercised that high degree of care and caution which the nearing Japanese crisis compelled you to do in sending to Admiral Kimmel all the information, and the timely information, upon which he could base a wise decision?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I had thought so.

Senator LUCAS. And you still believe it?

Admiral STARK. I still think so; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You know he had many difficult decisions to make out there?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, of course, you had many difficult decisions to make here.

Admiral STARK. I not only had many to make here with regard to the Pacific, but we were operating and were practically at war on the high seas in the Atlantic with the Department alerted for material coming in, dodging submarines, and troop convoys, and so forth, day and night. We had attacked [*6019*] for example, between September and the 1st of December, as I recall, three destroyers that were attacked, one sunk. We also had the *Salinas* attacked but it managed to get in; it was torpedoed. We had attacks going back as far as June. That was in addition to all the rest of the build-up, and so forth. We were extremely occupied with many heavy problems.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that. I want to ask you one other question along that same line. Do you feel that on the morning of December 6, 1941, when you received the last part of the 14-part message——

Mr. MITCHELL. December 7.

Senator LUCAS. I mean December 7, 1941, when you received the last part of the 14-part message, that you acted with that high degree of care that you should have under those circumstances in sending or failing to send, rather, a message to Admiral Kimmel at that time?

Admiral STARK. I thought so, because if you take out one or two words in the Japanese 14-part message, just took the meat of it, it is almost a paraphrase of what we had sent. I read that in my statement, and if you would like I will read it again.

Senator LUCAS. You took the position at that time, as I recall, when you first talked to General Marshall, that you had already sent sufficient information to Admiral Kimmel, [*6020*] and if you sent him more it might confuse him.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I thought there was a possibility of sending too much. That was with reference to the 1 o'clock message which, as I have stated, was the thing which stood out so clearly, because naturally, in the face of hindsight and in thinking that situation over, and in searching my conscience for what I might have done that I did not, I stated both to the Naval Committee and to the Roberts Commission, in looking over the whole field, I had, in the light of hindsight, regretted that I had not paralleled the Army message rather than just let the Army message go for me as well as for the Army. But I did not diagnose it to mean an attack at that time, and, as I stated a day or two ago, no one else pointed that out to me. Marshall said he did not understand the significance; nevertheless, it did alert him to the point that he thought something ought to go out. He read into it a possibility which I had not up until the time he called me.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, you had much communication with Admiral Kimmel, both from the standpoint of letter writing and the standpoint of messages. Let me ask you if you ever talked to him over the telephone?

Admiral STARK. I never had talked to Admiral Kimmel over the telephone.

[*6021*] Senator LUCAS. And it did not occur to you on the Sunday morning there that this message was important enough that you should call him on the telephone and give him the contents of the last part of the message?

Admiral STARK. It did not. I brought that out before the Roberts Commission as one of the things, and that is one thing I have thought so much about since, and that was the use of the telephone. I frankly did not think of it. I never heard it mentioned by anyone else until I volunteered the fact that I did not think of it.

Senator LUCAS. It is true that had you immediately picked up the telephone at that time, or even sent a message at 10:30 or 10:40, that morning, to Admiral Kimmel, giving him the complete digest of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message, it would have placed Kimmel on a complete war alert, would it not?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Why do you say that?

Admiral STARK. Because I do not. I did not know what his reaction would have been to the fourteenth part of that message, which was merely confirmatory of what we had sent. After the 1 o'clock message, if I had told him that the message had come in from the Japs as confirming what we had already told him, with the simple statement that they were directed to deliver that to the State Department, to Mr. [*6022*] Hull, at 1 o'clock, I do not know what his reaction would have been. That is all it stated. As to whether he might have read a significance in it which nobody here read into it, I do not know. He might have.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you go back to the message of November 27 and state to the committee now, if Admiral Kimmel was not on the alert on December 6 as the result of the message you sent him of November 27, then whatever you might have given him subsequently on December 7 would not have made much difference?

Admiral STARK. For example, I sent him that information. If I had made the evaluation which we now make in the light of hindsight, and told him that, that would be one thing, but if I simply sent him the information, whether or not he would have read into it what we did not read into it here, I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you sent him some four or five messages, as I recall, between November 24 and December 6. Do you feel that you sent him all of the vital and material information that was necessary, upon which he could properly alert the naval command of the Pacific at that time?

Admiral STARK. I do; yes, sir. I feel that the message about the burning of the codes was just about as strong in its implications as anything could be. Now, as you know— [*6023*] and I haven't mentioned it before—I have been criticized by the Department, for example, for not having sent out Mr. Hull's 10-point note.

Senator LUCAS. I was going to ask you that in the next question.

Admiral STARK. I was hoping it would come up. I did not want to volunteer it.

Senator LUCAS. I have it here. I want to ask you whether you are familiar with the 10-point note that was prepared by Mr. Hull and given to the Japs.

Admiral STARK. With the ground work; yes. Just when I saw it, I do not know, but if you read my message of the 27th carefully, as to what it says, with the knowledge that I did not know of the 10-point note at that time, and if I knew of it subsequently and had sent it to Admiral Kimmel, I do not know what he would have thought, but it could be said, "Here is a note from Stark that negotiations have

ceased; here is one from Mr. Hull which offers to carry on negotiations, or may be considered an ultimatum," there has been much argument about that, but, in any case, it could not have strengthened the unequivocal statement which I made. It might have confused him or it might have weakened the statement. If he was confused he could, of course, have sent me the dispatch, "You state the negotiations are over; here is an offer to [*6024*] continue." Unless I told him Mr. Hull's own opinion was that the whole thing was over, it could have confused him. That opinion was expressed in my dispatch of the 27th. My own feeling, even in the light of hindsight and careful study of the message, is that to have sent it would have either weakened my dispatch of the 27th or would have been confusing to the man at the other end of the line.

Senator LUCAS. In your opinion the 10-point message of Mr. Hull, had it been sent to Admiral Kimmel verbatim, would have confused the issue rather than have clarified the issue?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; or weakened it.

Senator LUCAS. Now, your message of November 24 merely states—

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

Then, on November 27, as I get the distinction in the two messages, you said:

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

Now, that is the message that went on to Kimmel, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and to Hart.

Senator LUCAS. And Admiral Hart. That was a command message?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And it was a message that anyone who could read the English language ought to be able to understand, [*6025*] was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. When diplomatic negotiations between two countries have ceased—and that is all that Admiral Kimmel knew at that time—it means that imminent and serious danger between these two countries is near at hand; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. It is, coupled with the statement that this was a war warning.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. Now, there has also been some complaint about your failure, as I understand it, not to send to Admiral Kimmel the message that you received on November 27, 1941, in which Japan informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreamed. Do you think that would help Admiral Kimmel any, to have sent that out to him?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I think that dispatch was pretty well distilled and covered by our own which said that Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. I think it was also distilled, so to speak, in the Army dispatch which said war might happen any minute.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, if I understand you correctly, it is your contention that the messages of the 24th and the 27th, especially the last one, which commands, that every commander at every post should have thoroughly [*6026*] understood the important significance of it and acted accordingly?

Admiral STARK. We felt so; yes, sir; and we studied that situation, as to sending anything more out, and decided that the message stood and we qualified it in no way whatever. We supported it in the "codes burning" message.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. And with respect, Admiral Stark, to the "codes burning" message, do you know of any time in history where nations have burned codes that war was not imminent and did not take place?

Admiral STARK. I do not know of any. There might be some, but I do not know of any.

Senator LUCAS. There may be, but it is the exception rather than the rule, is it not, that that takes place?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We thought it pointed right toward war. We thought it was just perfectly confirmatory of what we had sent.

Senator LUCAS. And there was no question but what Admiral Kimmel knew about the burning of the Japanese codes in Hawaii at that time?

Admiral STARK. No. We got our information of the burning of codes in Hawaii from Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I say. There is no question but what he knew about it?

[*6027*] Admiral STARK. There was no question in our minds; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It was through his command that you received the information that they were burning codes, am I correct about that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The dispatch came from Com. 14, which was Admiral Bloch, to us, and we assumed that Admiral Kimmel was familiar with it.

Senator LUCAS. Was that on December 5?

Admiral STARK. December 6.

Senator LUCAS. December 6?

Admiral STARK. Yes. The dispatch reads, "local consul has destroyed all but one system, although presumably not included your 18005 of the 3rd."

Senator LUCAS. Then you sent a message to Admiral Kimmel following that, to destroy certain papers, did you not?

Admiral STARK. We sent a message out on the 6th, authorizing him to authorize at his discretion his outlying islands to destroy their codes, retaining such as were necessary for talking with him up until the last minute, is the way the dispatch finished up.

Senator LUCAS. Now let me ask you this question, Admiral Stark. When these messages went to Admiral Kimmel between November 24 and December 6, and especially the mesages of [*6028*] the 24th and 26th, and "code burning" messages——

Admiral STARK. You mean the 27th, don't you, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. The 27th; yes, sir. To whom in the fleet would that information be distributed? What officers in the fleet should have received that information besides Admiral Kimmel? I am especially referring to your war messages.

[*6029*] Admiral STARK. Well, the distribution in the fleet would be by Admiral Kimmel. We addressed it to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. The distribution within his command would be at his direction.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, that would be under his jurisdiction, as to whom he delivered the contents of that message?

Admiral STARK. Entirely; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you wouldn't have anything to do with that on this end of the line?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know now who Kimmel talked with about the message that was sent on November 27?

Admiral STARK. I couldn't be sure; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. If you had been in command of the fleet at that time and had received a war warning message, what officers in the Fleet would you have talked to?

Admiral STARK. My feeling is that I would have brought in my key officers.

Senator LUCAS. Who would they have been?

Admiral STARK. COMFOURTEEN would be one of them, my battleship commanders, submarine commanders. In general the people in command of task forces and my air force commander. And we would have gone over the situation. And, of course, [*6030*] out there we would have assumed also that he would have taken it up, and he probably did, he can tell you, with General Short.

Senator LUCAS. Now, if there was any question about the proper interpretation of any of these messages, if Admiral Kimmel was confused in any way as to what they meant, there was nothing in Navy regulations which would not have permitted him to have gotten you on the telephone or obtained from you by message just exactly what you did mean, was there?

Admiral STARK. Nothing whatever in Navy regulations, and my knowledge of Kimmel, and his of me, from that I would have expected that if he didn't understand what I sent him he would have asked me.

Senator LUCAS. There is nothing that prevented Kimmel from conferring with you at any time upon any situation?

Admiral STARK. Nothing whatsoever.

Senator LUCAS. And did you receive any replies from Admiral Kimmel to any of these messages between the 24th and the 6th of December which would give you any indication whatsoever that Admiral Kimmel didn't thoroughly understand what these messages meant?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, I did not.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, I want to talk just a moment with you about the anti-torpedo baffles that were [*6031*] discussed between yourself and Admiral Kimmel, as I recall, along in the spring of 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I have before me an exhibit that is not in evidence here, a statement made by Admiral Kimmel, in which he refers to an official letter which you wrote and which is a part of Exhibit 49 in the Naval Court of Inquiry, in which is stated the following:

Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height of [6032] dropping is 60 feet or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

Now, at one time you considered seriously placing these anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor to protect the battleships?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And you, as I understand it, made an exhaustive search with the British as well as our own naval experts and engineers, scientific men, with respect to what could or could not be done in shallow water?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And this letter that you wrote is the consequence of that, am I right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb a secret weapon in the nature of a robot bomb which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America at this time. Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral STARK. A robot bomb?

Senator LUCAS. This torpedo bomb was in the nature of a secret weapon, they said, along the lines of a robot bomb, which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America and Britain at that time. I ask if you agree with that? Do you agree that it was [6033] unknown to the best American and British opinion at that time, that a bomb of that kind could not operate in water as shallow as it was in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not agree with that. There is a later letter of ours that states that no capital ship was safe in any water which she could float in, where there was sufficient run for the torpedo to arm itself.

However, the letter was further qualified by stating depths which were desirable. I have got the letter here.

Senator LUCAS. I wish you would produce that letter and read it into the record, as I have been under the impression that there was an opinion among British and American experts that you couldn't use a bomb of that kind in that shallow water.

Admiral STARK. That was true at the time it was written. There is a later letter of 13 June from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator LUCAS. 1941?

Admiral STARK. 1941. To the Commandant, 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Naval Districts. The subject is:

Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Then there is a reference to the letter of 17 February, [6034] which I believe may be the one you just mentioned:

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases.

In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

That was in the letter you just referred to. 2:

Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

I would like to read the rest of that. If the letter [*6035*] stopped right there, there wouldn't have been any doubt, but it does show that possibility.

Paragraph 3:

While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depths of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13 to 15 fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in 11 or 12 fathoms.

In other words, we pointed out the danger that any ship was subject to if she were afloat, had enough water to float in and enough room to fire the torpedo, if they could get the approach, and enough length of run for arming, and we then go on to say, and I would like to repeat that "it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water," from this type of attack, and then we go on to say that we feel the attacks are more likely where the depth of water is greater.

Senator LUCAS. That letter was written in June, 1941?

[*6036*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and a copy of that letter was sent to the commander in chief, Pacific; commander in chief, Atlantic; commander in chief, Asiatic; and commander in chief of some of the naval net depots, Bureau of Ordnance, and OP–12.

Senator LUCAS. In view of that discovery in June of 1941 that these torpedo bombs could operate in shallow water, was there anything done by the Navy Department toward the construction of torpedo nets to go into Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. We had directed the Bureau of Ordnance, I have forgotten the date, but it is here, to go ahead and design and develop antitorpedo nets for harbor work. The letter of February 11, which I would like to read, shows the action we took as far back as that, because of this possible contingency.

Senator LUCAS. Is it a long letter?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; one page.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Admiral STARK (reading):

1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.

2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done other than the making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, [6037] additional personnel for this purpose should be secured.

3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes and with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with a metal net.

4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms.

That was our initial letter on directing the Bureau of Ordnance to go ahead with that work.

Senator LUCAS. The date is February 1941?

Admiral STARK. February 11, 1941; yes, sir.

[6038] Senator LUCAS. When did you first get any nets?

Admiral STARK. We didn't get any nets until 1942.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why?

Admiral STARK. I have forgotten the date but we did not have them up to the time of Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know why the delay?

Admiral STARK. The Bureau of Ordnance just didn't produce on it.

Senator LUCAS. Was any follow-up made on that letter of February 11 with respect to the Bureau of Ordnance insisting that the nets be produced?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; there were several.

Senator LUCAS. A lot of ships could have been saved at Pearl Harbor if the nets had been out; isn't that right?

Admiral STARK. If an effective baffle had been there it undoubtedly would have minimized the effect. Of course, the bombs also did considerable damage.

Senator LUCAS. I understand the torpedo planes did the real damage to the battleships, according to previous testimony; more than altitude bombs.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know how long it took us to perfect this type of bomb that we could use in shallow water?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not have that information. The [6039] Bureau of Ordnance could furnish it.

Senator LUCAS. And you don't have the information as to how long it took the Japanese to perfect that type of bomb?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I remember the original specification. I was Chief of Bureau of Ordnance. Our first specification was 100 knots and 100 feet. We were continually trying to raise the speed and increase the altitude from which they could be fired.

Senator LUCAS. Undoubtedly Japan had Pearl Harbor in mind when she first started experimenting with this type of bomb; do you agree?

Admiral STARK. Unquestionably she had us in mind, just as we had any possible enemy in mind. We were all after a high-dive and shallow-water run.

Senator LUCAS. Very few harbors are as shallow as Pearl Harbor, however?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was a shallow-water harbor. So is Colon. So is Guantanamo. So are many others. Too shallow in many cases for comfort.

Senator LUCAS. I want to change the course of the questioning just a little and ask you this, Admiral.

Did you have any definite or direct advance information that Japan was going to strike us?

[*6040*] Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

Senator LUCAS. You have told the committee the various sources from which you obtained information in the Far East and upon which you made your evaluations and estimates and which were sent to the respective naval commands.

Have you given to the committee every source of information that you had, including magic and information from Intelligence officers, and what not, upon which you based these estimates and upon which your Intelligence officers made the proper evaluations?

Admiral STARK. I think so, yes, sir. I can't think of anything more at the moment which I may have omitted.

Senator LUCAS. And the Army exchanged its information with you as to what they received in the Hawaiian area, through the Eastern Asiatic section of the world?

Admiral STARK. Complete and daily exchange and very close liaison and continuous between General Marshall and myself.

Senator LUCAS. You also had the advantage of seeing all the diplomatic messages that came in through the codes, at least?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; such as were considered as important were given to me; and I had confidence in the people, as to their selections.

Senator LUCAS. You were in frequent communication with [*6041*] the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, at that time?

Admiral STARK. Very frequent, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, as a result of your close association and your intimate knowledge with all the cabinet officers, with all the people in the Executive Branch of the Government at that time, do you know of a single man in the Army or Navy, State Department or other branches of the Executive Government, who had any direct, clear-cut information that Japan was going to attack this nation?

Admiral STARK. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any individual in the Executive Branch of the Government, including the Navy, Army and State Department, that had any information as to the precise point and hour that Japan was going to attack this country?

Admiral STARK. I do not.

Senator LUCAS. So far as you know all these rumors and speculations, newspaper articles that have been written in the past, that men high in the Navy, Military, and official life of Washington knew the precise time and place the Japanese would attack was utterly without foundation in fact?

Admiral STARK. That is my opinion.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations [6042] you appeared, in April 1940, before the Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate as a witness in behalf of HR–8026. Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. I recall the number. I don't recall the subject matter of the bill.

Senator LUCAS. You recall the time you appeared before the Naval Affairs Committee, of which I was a member, at that time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As a member of that committee I remembered a statement you made, a statement which I have never forgotten, and I had occasion over the week-end to review these hearings in order that I might find your direct quotation. You made the following statement after a colloquy with the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Tydings, the late Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Barbour, and the Senator from Illinois, here it is—it is on page 92. You stated, in answer to a question of Senator Tydings:

> If we can get peace on earth and good will to men we are all for it. The Naval officers are not in favor of war. If there is any officer in existence who wants a war I would like to find him. Our recommendations are solely with the view of the peaceful interests of this country in mind. If anything happens we have got to bear the brunt of [6043] it. Our job is taking care of you people.

Do you remember making that statement?

Admiral STARK. I recall it now, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that?

Senator LUCAS. That is under date of April 1940, when Admiral Stark appeared before the Committee on Naval Affairs. Admiral Stark, that was your position in April 1940?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that your position in November and December of 1941?

Admiral STARK. That has always been my position.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of a single high ranking officer in the Army or Navy in November or December of 1941 who wanted to plunge this country into war with any nation?

Admiral STARK. With any nation?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, Japan or any other nation.

Admiral STARK. I certainly didn't want to with Japan. I would like to say with regard to Hitler that I spent many hours speculating myself as to what was the best course for this nation to pursue. Every thinking man of responsibility did. I had seen Hitler's game of one at a time. I felt that without our help England might fail. That along with that picture came the possibility of a break-up of the British Empire and its control by Germany and a Europe controlled [6044] by Germany.

That was also paralleled by the possibility of a war in Asia. And the combination might have worked a squeeze play on us which would have been a terrible thing for this country. We might have armed to the teeth and steered a course that would have kept us out, but it may just have postponed the day. That was something over which I thought a great deal.

However, I did have this background, that Congress, through lend-lease, and the knowledge of what we were doing, had, in my opinion, taken the position and the country was committed to seeing that Hitler should not win, and on that basis I felt we might wait too late, and I therefore, recommended that if we were going to get in, and if we were going to have a war psychology which would produce what it was necessary to produce, and if we did not wait until it was too late, that, in my opinion, the time had come for us to get in it, based on what I considered the country's policy.

[*6045*] Senator LUCAS. Well, that was your feeling towards Hitler at that particular time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that, of course, was not followed out by the President of the United States. War was not declared upon Germany until Germany declared war upon us.

Admiral STARK. That is true.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this question: In your connections with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States did you reach the conclusion that any one of these men, or any group of men, wanted to take this country into war with Japan for the sole purpose of just going to war.

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. To the best of my knowledge and belief all were in sympathy from the military standpoint to avoid that war if we could do it without walking back on our principles.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the high ranking Navy, War, State, and other officials of the executive branch of the Government were seeking through an honorable way to obtain peace with Japan but at the same time preparing ourselves for war in the event Japan and other dictator nations attacked this Nation or any of our possessions?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6046*] Senator LUCAS. Do you agree with me that if we had followed any other course it would have been necessary for us to yield to this new order of might, which would have meant that we would have had to give up the freedom of the seas, we would have been submitting to mass subjection and the world trade would have been run by the edicts or decrees of the dictators of this world?

Admiral STARK. I think that might very well have happened and I think Mr. Hull's testimony and his writings and what he was after shows that it was not just theory with him but working on what Japan had done and was doing where she controlled, that any extension by her would have been very restrictive to our own intersts.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with the testimony of Mr. Hull, are you not?

Admiral STARK. With most of it I think, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you agree in principle with what he said before this committee?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you agree with me that had we yielded to Japan at that time we would have been yielding to might and we would have deserted every belief and every liberty and every tradition and every concept on which this Nation is founded?

[*6047*] Admiral STARK. I think so, yes, sir. My feeling with regard to a Pacific war and in which my letters state this fact, I think,

many times was that we would not forsake China and back out from the stand we had taken and that Japan, on the other hand, also would not back out and that regardless of all else there was a stumbling block which could not be overcome.

Senator LUCAS. That is what you continually say in your letters to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You go over that several times, as I recall it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You talk about irreconcilable conflicts here that exist between Japan and this country.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That some day they would probably meet and have to be decided through war. I think that was your position.

Admiral STARK. That is true, yes, sir. Other things Japan might have promised she would do, but personally I had no faith in her promises and there is good factual data to base that on.

Senator LUCAS. One other question: From your intimate [*6048*] knowledge of the naval, military and diplomatic conditions as they existed in the United States in the summer and fall of 1941 was there any one man or group of men who maneuvered the Japanese crisis so as to deliberately invite the Parl Harbor attack?

Admiral STARK. Not to my knowledge, or I had never thought such.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you were in on the conversations, practically all of the conversations with respect to Pearl Harbor previous to December 6, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. As Chief of Naval Operations that was one of your duties, to know and understand what was going on?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, and I may say that on the contrary we were trying to maintain peace in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any man or group of men high in the Executive branch of the Government that trapped the Japs or lied to the Japanese to get them to attack us in Pearl Harbor in order to make it easier to get Congressional action to declare war against Japan?

Admiral STARK. I did not get the first part of that question.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know of any man or group of men high in the Executive branch of the government, including the [*6049*] naval, military and diplomatic group, who trapped the Japanese or who lied to the Japanese in order to get them to attack Pearl Harbor so as to make it easier for Congress to give a declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not.

Senator LUCAS. You had frequent conversations, you have told me, with the President of the United States from time to time. You also had frequent conversations with Col. Frank Knox, who was then Secretary of the Navy. I take it that he was familiar with all of these messages that were sent to Admiral Kimmel between November the 24th and December the 6th?

Admiral STARK. He was. I had no secrets from the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, from your intimate knowledge of the diplomatic and military activities and your conversations with the

President and the Secretary of the Navy, did the President of the United States have every reason to believe that the naval command in Hawaii was properly alerted for any emergency when the Japs struck us on December the 7th, 1941?

Admiral STARK. He knew of the despatch that we had sent there, he knew how I felt about it and I felt that he agreed with me.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did he have every reason to believe [*6050*] from all that had been done by yourself and Marshall at that time with respect to alerting the commands that the Hawaii command at the time was properly alerted? That was your belief, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think he felt that they were properly alerted. I may say, and I have hesitated to quote the President unless I am dead certain, but I specifically recall his statement to me that he was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor and he stated that to me as late as last summer and I told him that I had just previously a day or two before that testified to that effect myself before the Navy Court of Inquiry. It was some comfort to me to have him reiterate it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I guess everybody was surprised except the Japs, were they not?

Admiral STARK. The Japs were the real cause for the attack on Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I want to refer to your statement briefly on page 7, where you again talk about the President of the United States, in which you stated in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on February the 10th, 1941:

> I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary [*6051*] and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men.

Can you elaborate a little on that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Explain that to the committee. This was in 1941, a short while before the crisis, some 8 months, and will you explain that to the committee just briefly?

Admiral STARK. I always found men the most difficult thing to get in working on naval appropriations. I had found it difficult many times on the Hill, I found it difficult in the budget, I found it difficult with the President. I think many Congressmen and Senators will recall some of the arguments we had about it.

So far as Congress was concerned I had attributed it to the fact that while you might cut ships, ships wore out and were scratched and scrapped. Once you increased the size of the regular military establishment it looked like a permanent increase in expense to the Government. I was cut in a request for men during this period by Congress, although later on practically anything that I asked for went over.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in that same——

Admiral STARK. May I go just a little further, sir?

[*6052*] Senator LUCAS. Certainly.

Admiral STARK. Now, as regards the President: The President knew the Navy, he loved it, he studied it and he spent a great deal of time aboard ship and he had reports that the ships were overcrowded. We had letters coming in, anonymous at times, which were sent to the White House, about the terrible living conditions on board ship and I was asking to increase the number of men on board ship.

He had taken trips and Ross McIntire could probably tell you, but I dare say one Board that he had had some cause for apprehension from certain medical officers with regard to—I don't mean that Ross was one of them but I know that he is familiar with the subject. He had that report. He also knew that every additional man that we put aboard ship, a considerable increase in weight was involved. I have forgotten what it was but the Bureau of Ships objected that for every additional man we put on at that time we would have to take some weight off. I do not mean just the weight of the man but it might have been two or three tons that went with him. There were a good many things of that sort which the President considered.

Now, as regards overcrowding: Admiral Kimmel had made a very careful study with a board and it had been shown on one ship how the men could be placed without undue over- [*6053*] crowding. I stood back of Admiral Kimmel on that. The President had to be convinced of these matters, it was only right that he should and when I struggled, I made sure, and I think I stated it here, that I had my own way.

Now, another question. I have a letter, I do not know whether it is on file or not, I mean I do not know whether it has been submitted, it may have been one of those irrelevant letters, but it is not hindsight because it was as of that time, that I first asked the President for 500,000 men. He threw back his head and laughed and there were a lot of people in the room and he said, "Betty usually begins working early, he starts in working a year ahead of time and he follows it up" and I usually did. But I did struggle for additional men during the time I was Chief of Naval Operations. I struggled back and forth; we always had to struggle for that, and we probably will again.

Senator LUCAS. These ships that the President was talking about of course, were laid down a good many years ago, were they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There were a number of things that required increases in complement. We had greatly increased the anti-aircraft defenses on the ships. Early in 1940 we had a very careful study made, Admiral King made it, it is known as the King Board, as to how to increase our anti- [*6054*] aircraft defenses. In addition to that, heretofore we would put enough men on board a ship to man all the guns, everything manned when we went into a battery. We foresaw that in a war, in what we might call an air war that it would be a very pertinent thing to consider that you might have to keep men at the guns 24 hours a day because you could not be sure when an air attack might develop. We could not just go to general quarters and have look-outs in the tops for an engagement which might come in an hour or two hours. They had to be there day and night, particularly moonlight nights, for operations against submarines and possibilities of an air attack. There were many things that made more men necessary.

In addition to that, I personally wanted to fill the complement up to a hundred percent complement and I wanted to run it 15 percent over complement so that I would have a pool to draw on in the manning of ships and I found a number of ships that we had coming in that they continued to cut into the personnel that ships already had and more or less disrupting them.

Senator LUCAS. And right along that line or train of thought, the letter from Admiral Kimmel of November 15, 1941, points out that the fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill the complements. It can utilize an additional 10,000 men.

[*6055*] My question is that as a result of what happened at Pearl Harbor would 9,000 or 10,000 more men on battleships and destroyers there have had any appreciable effect upon what happened?

Admiral STARK. I think none.

Senator LUCAS. We would just have lost more men if we had 9,000 or 10,000 more men there, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. If that had been so we might have lost considerably more on some ships.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in this same letter, you stated in a letter to Admiral Kimmel on July 24 as follows:

> We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been.

Now, here is the point that I want to direct your attention to. This is July 1941 and you state:

> If we could only have gone full speed 2 years ago—

I presume now you mean at that time, that if you could have had 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines 2 years ago?

Admiral STARK. Well, I mean if we could have gotten all that we wanted at that time. I have forgotten just what the [*6056*] figures were.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, why was it, Admiral Stark, back in 1939, in, say, July 1939, you were not able to get all that you wanted? What was the reason?

Admiral STARK. Because we could not get it by the budget. May I have the page number that you are reading from on that?

Senator LUCAS. Page 8.

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes. I may state that when I finally got what I referred to as the green light I went directly to Senator Byrnes. He will recall the incident, I think, very well. He called me the most persistent, stubborn man on personnel he had ever known, but he finally gave me what I had asked for. There were one or two other rather amusing incidents in that conversation that it is not necessary to go into here but we did get what we asked for.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you got what you asked for but the point I am making is that you lay particular stress upon the fact, as I read the letter, that if you could have had what you were entitled to 2 years before that you could really have been somewhere with the Navy and that would have been in 1939, in the early part of 1939.

Admiral STARK. If we could have gotten authorization and money for full complements plus 15 percent it would have made our problems very much simpler and very much easier. We [*6057*] solved it as best we could with what we got and the results speak pretty well for themselves.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you on that. Public opinion had something to do with what you got and what you did not get back in 1939, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Things were not as grave. When I went before the Naval Committee there are some things that stand out very clearly and we were struggling on this situation with regard to men, pointing out that the fleet was only 85 percent manned and what a great mistake I thought it was. I remember Congressman Ditter turning to me and saying, "Nobody has ever talked to us like that before about men." "Where do you get this stuff?"

I went back to the Department and went over some of my recommendations and some of the previous recommendations of what is now known as the Bureau of Personnel. I had them back up what I am about to say, that the Navy's pleas had been constant for men. The Navy was cut down to a so-called 85 percent complement some years previous when economy was a very potent subject and the Navy was faced—I think Admiral Pratt was Chief of Operations at the time—with either keeping fewer ships fully manned or a greater number of ships in commission partially manned and as I recall 85 percent was put down as the lower limit of what we could keep ships going with [*6058*] with any degree of efficiency. So we came to accept that 85 percent and I always thought it was dangerous and the minute I got where I could raise my voice against it, this practice which we had gotten to accept, I started doing so.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it took a national emergency almost before you could get what you really wanted?

Admiral STARK. It took a national emergency to blast it out; yes sir.

Senator LUCAS. And that was due to the temper of the people of this country?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think so.

Senator LUCAS. That it took——

Admiral STARK. At that early time.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. And the people, after all, usually make more or less the military and naval policy.

Admiral STARK. In the last analysis the man on the street is the first line of defense.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. And I think it is pertinent, too, along this line of inquiry, to just refer just briefly to the Treaty of Limitation of Naval Armaments signed in Washington on February 6, 1922, and ratified by the Senate March 29, 1922, as indicating how we felt at that particular time about peace and how far we were willing to go in order to maintain peace.

[*6059*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and we found out to our very great cost that disarmament by example did not pay.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask you just one or two questions about the disarmament conference and see if you——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, it is practically 12:30.

Senator LUCAS. I can finish in 5 minutes I think.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We want to have an executive session.

Senator LUCAS. It may be 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead if it won't take more than five minutes.

Senator LUCAS. I want to ask Admiral Stark if he will agree with these facts. In 1918 the United States had a total combatant tonnage of ships 1,087,000 and had building additional tonnage of 953,876 tons. Do you recall those figures?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the figures but if you have it in front of you I assume they are correct.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you recall that in the 1922 disarmament conference which I have talked about we sank or demilitarized 767,800 tons of combatant ships?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We did the sinking.

Senator LUCAS. And for the next eight years for all practical purposes ceased to build ships of war?

Admiral STARK. We had a period there where we practical- [*6060*] ly stopped.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you this: Did the limitation of armaments conference signed at London April the 27, 1930, and ratified by the Senate on July 1, 1930, was there anything in that treaty which prevented construction of our antisubmarine vessels and yet permitted Germany and Japan to build all the submarines they desired? Do you recall anything about that?

Admiral STARK. I think there was not. I think in the hearings that—as you recall, I was nearly nine days straight morning and afternoon early in 1940 struggling for the increase in the Navy, for what I thought was a modest increase of 25 percent that was cut in half by Congress. I pointed out we had not lived up to that very—I mean we had not built up to the 5–5–3 ratio.

Senator LUCAS. We had not built up to it?

Admiral STARK. We had not built up to it. We were disarming by example and it did not pay. I do not want to let that stay in, talking about Congress cutting it in half. They stated that; I accepted that because it was not just a straight cut in half. It was a question whether we could get through with 25 percent and we might lose the whole thing, but the figure of about 13 percent, as I recall, was all we could consider at that time and I accepted that as something sure [*6061*] and was told that I could come back up later. I did and got a very heavy increase, so it is not fair just to say Congress cut me. It did not hurt and they did give it to me when I came back afterwards.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in 1940 when you testified before this committee Japan had as much ship tonnage, practically as much as the United States?

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. We did not know exactly how much they had but they claimed that they were practically on a 5–5 ratio with us, some of their public speakers did.

Senator LUCAS. That was not true, of course.

Admiral STARK. No, but it was not 5–3.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order to further demonstrate the point I am trying to make here as to how public opinion dominates the affairs of this country I want to read a statement made by the Honorable David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committe, who about this same time, in April 1940, placed this very illuminating statement in the record (reading):

From 1922 to 1925 the United States laid down no ships. In 1925 it laid down 1 submarine. In 1926 it laid down 1 cruiser and 5 river gunboats. In 1927 it laid down 1 cruiser and 2 submarines. In 1928, 6 cruisers. In 1929 [*6062*] none. In 1930, 3 cruisers and 1 submarine. In 1931, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 cruisers and 2 submarines. In 1932, 3 destroyers. In 1933, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers and 4 submarines. In 1934, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser (a), 1 cruiser (b), 21 destroy-

ers and 2 patrol gunboats. In 1935, 1 cruiser (a), 7 cruisers (b), 14 destroyers and 5 submarines. In 1936 the United States laid down——

and that is true, that we lived up to this treaty closely while Japan did not, as I understand it?

ADMIRAL STARK. We leaned over backwards the other way. We did not build up.

Senator LUCAS. In 1936 the United States laid down one aircraft carrier, one cruiser (b), six destroyers and seven submarines. In 1937 we laid down one battleship—and I call attention to that because that is the first battleship we laid down since at least 1922 or before, I guess.

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. There were no battleships laid down between 1922 and 1937 during the 15 years.

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Senator LUCAS. And the date the last was laid down is not stated here.

In 1937, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers and 6 submarines.

In 1938, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 [*6063*] destroyer tenders, 1 seaplane tender, 3 tugs, 2 oilers.

In 1939, 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 12 destroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sub chasers, 2 minesweepers, 1 submarine tender, 1 seaplane tender, 1 oiler.

And that is all that I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock and the chair asks the public to retire as rapidly as possible. We want to have an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[*6064*] AFTERNOON SESSION—2:45 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Chair wishes to announce that after the executive session the committee has decided that following the testimony of Admiral Stark it will recess the hearing until the 15th of January in order that the new counsel collaborating with Mr. Mitchell and his staff may become familiar with the testimony adduced up to now and get into the case so he may go forward with it following the retirement of Mr. Mitchell.

Also the committee decided, upon the urgent request and in accordance with the wishes of counsel for Admiral Kimmel and General Short, when the committee reconvenes on the 15th of January Admiral Kimmel will be the first witness, to be followed by General Short when Admiral Kimmel has concluded.

You may go ahead now.

Mr. Murphy, I believe you are the next.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. May I make just a short statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. My attention has been called to the fact that this morning I stated that it was last summer that the President expressed to me his surprise over the Pearl Harbor attack. It was a year ago

last summer, during the [6065] proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry which were held a year ago last summer.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an obvious error, because President Roosevelt was not alive last summer.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, I would like to direct your attention to the message that was sent to Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941.

Do you have a copy of it?

Admiral STARK. The 7th of December?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, the message of General Marshall.

Admiral STARK. I think I have it in the statement.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, the earliest moment you have any recollection of being aware of the 1 p. m. message was somewhere between 10:30 and 11 o'clock that morning. Is that right?

Admiral STARK. I think that is right, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And, as I understand it, General Marshall's testimony was that he was aware of the 1 o'clock message sometime subsequent to that on that same morning.

Admiral STARK. I believe it was sometime later.

Mr. MURPHY. And then General Marshall sent a message to Hawaii, and I would like to read that message and discuss it [6066] with you a bit.

The message reads:

The Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum;

Now, setting aside for the moment the 1 p. m. part of it, you had already told Hawaii, had you not, that negotiations had terminated with the Japanese, and as on the 27th you sent that message setting that particular date, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the message continues, "also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately."

You had, during the previous days of December, told Admiral Kimmel exactly that, had you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And continuing, "Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly."

And then finally, "Inform Naval authorities of this communication."

Now outside of the 1 p. m. part of that message, was there anything in the message itself that you had not previously conveyed to Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. In my opinion there was not.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you at any time looked into the matter of the condition of the ships and planes at Hawaii on the [6067] morning of December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. Prior to the attack.

Admiral STARK. I had not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is testimony that has been adduced, and will be adduced before the committee, as to the condition of readiness of the ships. Assuming that you had sent the message the very moment you had gotten it, somewhere between 10:30 and 11 o'clock, and

assuming that the attack occurred about 2:30—that is when it was, was it not, about 2:30 Washington time?

Admiral STARK. About 1:57, I think, somewhere in there.

Mr. MURPHY. About 1:57 Washington time?

Admiral STARK. Shortly before 2.[1]

Mr. MURPHY. Then what change in ships by way of sorties could have occurred between 10:30 and 10:40 and 1:57 to 2:00 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. Well, if I had sent a message, assuming I got the 1 p. m. message about 10:40, I have since asked the question, and recently, from communications—if I had given them a dispatch which they had coded and sent and decoded on the other end and delivered, what their estimate of the time was, and they gave me an hour and 7 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. That would make it 11:47.

[*6068*] Admiral STARK. Assuming I had acted instantaneously on the message.

Mr. MURPHY. Instantaneously, yes. Without any conference at all, if you had instantaneously acted, they would get it there at 11:47?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Does that take into consideration the decoding at Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then at 11:47, from then until 1:57, what change could be made in the position of ships at that time? That would be approximately 2 hours, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Approximately 2 hours. That is more or less of a technical question. For example, I do not know which way the ships were headed. If they were placed in docks so they were heading out it would be one thing; if they had to be turned around it would be another. I think only Admiral Kimmel could give you real testimony on that.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if the battleships themselves were berthed, 8 of them, in Pearl Harbor it would take some considerable time, would it not, to get them out of the harbor?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The last time we sortied out of there we had to be turned around by tugs, but during the [*6069*] preceding months in which the fleet had been there they undoubtedly had become used to being handled in there. Just what their time would have been I do not know. They would first have to have been notified to get under way, and assuming that they would have to raise steam for propulsion purposes, and if tugs were required they would have to have been brought alongside and they would then have had to be sortied, and they would, of course, have had to have destroyers ahead of them, and probably planes searching for submarines, which they would do if they thought the attack might be there, and just what the total time would have been I would rather Admiral Kimmel gave you that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, to make a rough approximation, it would be a matter of hours, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, you can force when you have to. Normally, as I recall, we gave a ship with one or two boilers about 2 hours' notice to get under way.

[1] Corrected to 1:25 p. m. Washington time. See page 2346, infra.

Mr. MURPHY. That 2 hours, Admiral, would be dependent upon the fact that as soon as Admiral Kimmel received the message from Washington he would have immediately and instantaneously had the reaction that there was to be something happening at 1 o'clock?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In order to consume the time between then [*6070*] and the attack, would he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I did not quite finish my answer.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, you may finish.

Admiral STARK. If he had forced them and the emergency were understood, they could have cut that time in half, or perhaps less than that. They would have taken a chance on raising steam without regard to the normal precautions of raising it slowly so as not to affect the boilers adversely.

Mr. MURPHY. That would be also assuming that his mental processes were different than they were on the message of the 27th, which said it was a war warning?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That is assuming he forced them. He can give you, I think, better testimony on that than I can, because of his familiarity with the picture.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been some testimony already in the record, and some to be covered, as to the condition of the readiness of the planes.

As I understand it, so far as the Army and Navy planes were concerned, in a great measure they required as much as 4 hours before they could go in the air. This 2 hours difference would not have gotten them in the air then, would it, if it required 4 hours from the time your message arrived at Hawaii to the time of the attack?

[*6071*] Admiral STARK. If it required 4 hours you could not have gotten them off in that time.

Mr. MURPHY. I think there will be considerable testimony along that line.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So far as the planes are concerned, if they could not get off in the air the next best thing would be to push them somewhere for protection, would it not?

Admiral STARK. To spread them.

Mr. MURPHY. To spread them?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Instead of having them bunched together the best thing would be spread them and maybe get them into bunkers?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. They did have some bunkers, there, did they not?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, there have been some questions asked about the so-called bomb plot message. You know about that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That message actually was sent from Tokyo in September, was it not?

Admiral STARK. That is right, yes, sir.

[*6072*] Mr. MURPHY. It was not translated in Washington until October 10, is that true?

Admiral STARK. I think so; sometime later.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there anything unusual about our diplomatic relations in September, and was not the date of the forwarding of that message in Tokyo prior to the submission of the Japanese note of September—or do you know that?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not. I am not quite sure of your question, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, my question is this: The change in Cabinet did not occur until October 16, and on October 16 they did send a message to the Pacific.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, this socalled bomb plot message was already translated on October 10.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And had been forwarded from the Japanese in the month of September. Would not there be less likelihood of that particular message being clipped or called to your particular attention then because of the state of the relations between America and Japan at the time?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that that would have entered into the minds of the people who were going over that message. I would rather be inclined to think that the message [*6073*] would have stood on its merits, that they would have looked at it as a message without regard to the Japanese Cabinet change.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you do not know anybody that saw any particular significance in that, do you?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. MURPHY. It was never called to your attention, that you know of?

Admiral STARK. It was never called to my attention, so far as I recollect.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, this 1 o'clock message referred to 1 o'clock on Sunday, and there has been some considerable discussion about the fact that the Japanese were going to see the Secretary of State on Sunday. There was a discussion that morning about that, was there not, about the fact they were doing it on Sunday, or calling on the Secretary of State on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. When we got it we were a little puzzled as to just why they were making it at 1 o'clock.

Mr. MURPHY. And on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. And on Sunday, yes, sir. We had covered the possibility of an attack on Sunday, if it came, in a previous message.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if there was any discussion [*6074*] then about the fact that we also delivered our message on Sunday. When President Roosevelt came back from Argentia he asked to see the Japanese on Sunday, too, did he not? It was Sunday afternoon at 4 o'clock when he saw the Ambassador, was it not?

Admiral STARK. I believe it was. I am hazy on it. I recollect there was another instance when the message was to be delivered at a certain time. I think that occurs occasionally.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, President Roosevelt did send a wire to Secretary Hull and asked Secretary Hull to arrange to come to the White House on Sunday morning, and he asked the Japaneses to see him at the White House that afternoon, did he not?

Admiral STARK. I recall that, yes, sir.

[6075] Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, one of the reasons that prompted you in delaying or in not wanting to send the 1 o'clock message to Hawaii was that you had already sent so much you thought maybe you might be confusing Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you seen Admiral Kimmel's statement given to this committee?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. I suggest that you have your counsel get a copy.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. In fairness to the witness I think he should have it. We may want to ask him some questions on it at some time.

Admiral STARK. Counsel, I think, has been furnished a copy.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you thing that the tenor of your papers that were sent to Admiral Kimmel throughout the year of 1941 were such as to take away the effect or the meaning of your war warning message?

Admiral STARK. I do not.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood you to say that you had never heard of a war warning message in the precise words that were used having been sent before to anyone in the Pacific.

[6076] Admiral STARK. That is true. I never heard of such a message before.

Mr. MURPHY. You had never, prior to 1941, December 1941, sent anything to Admiral Kimmel about codes being burned?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. When you sent your message to Admiral Kimmel in October, Admiral Kimmel wrote you a letter saying that he had sent submarines in certain directions and that he had made certain movements as a result of receiving your October message; you recall that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I do.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it Admiral Kimmel takes the position that since he told you about what he had done subsequent to October and since you had not criticized the arrangement he had made then, that he was justified in continuing the position which he had assumed in October right on down after receiving your war warning message. Do you think he was justified in that position?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not. The message that was sent in October, as I recall, he sent out some submarines to the outlying Islands, and informed me about it by letter, and I wrote him back "O. K.," but the situation in December was a decidedly different one.

Mr. MURPHY. You think——

[6077] Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I interpose to raise the question of propriety, as to whether or not the testimony to be given by Admiral Kimmel should be referred to. It has been furnished to us in confidence with a release date on it that it was not to be released until he takes the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say——

Mr. GEARHART. I don't think that should be pursued so as to destroy the effectiveness of Admiral Kimmel's testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think that should be met by the committee. I have read Admiral Kimmel's testimony in the Narrative. I have it here. I am quite familiar with what his testimony was.

He has, however, given a statement to the committee and he has restricted the use of it until he takes the stand. Am I to understand

that we are not to go into Admiral Kimmel's case at all and that if there are accusations made against the witness on the stand we are not to ask him about it?

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to point out that the testimony is marked plainly not to be released until the witness takes the stand.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you see it here? Where is it? I am referring to the Navy Narrative.

Mr. GEARHART. You are not referring to the testimony that has been placed in our hands?

[*6078*] Mr. MURPHY. I want to meet that now.

The CHAIRMAN. If that matter is put up to the Chair, the Chair would hold that inasmuch as a confidential description has been put on the advance statement of Admiral Kimmel, that it is not to be released until he goes on the stand, members of the committee would be bound by that instruction no less than the members of the press, but that does not restrict a member of the committee from using any testimony that Admiral Kimmel may have given at the numerous hearings at which he testified.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Stark read this morning from the previous testimony that the Navy Board had referred to the message as being of the same tenor.

Do you recall reading that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I have Admiral Kimmel's testimony here and if the wish is that we not go into it, I suggest that it will be necessary to recall Admiral Stark back. At least I want to ask him some questions about what Admiral Kimmel said.

Mr. GEARHART. I am not objecting to any reference to any other testimoney, except that which was handed us recently with a release date upon it.

Mr. MURPHY. If you can see that here I would like to see it.

[*6079*] The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral STARK. I think we were furnished a copy of that statement. Counsel was furnished it on New Year's Eve. I have not read it. I didn't know that I would be questioned on it.

Mr. MURPHY. I have read a small part of it but I read what he said before.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Admiral, the message about which I was asking you at the time the gentleman from California spoke about the confidential statement of Admiral Kimmel, as I understand it it is in this exhibit here. Do you have a copy of that? Your letters and Admiral Kimmel's letters.

Admiral STARK. I have a copy of my letters to Admiral Kimmel and his to me.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read his letter to you and your letter to him, where you say "O. K."?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6080*] Mr. MURPHY. At the time that you said "O. K.," would Admiral Kimmel be justified in assuming that the preparations that he had made subsequent to your October message had your approval to be the same that should be applied to the war warning message?

Admiral STARK. I think not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there has been reference in one of your letters about the routing of ships, and I believe you meant to refer to the routing of the ships through the Torres Straits; is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And in your letter you suggested that you were perhaps making that as a preliminary move to meeting the situation when things got more critical; is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. In your judgment, was it necessary to route the ships at the time you did through the Torres Straits, and if so for what reason?

Admiral STARK. It looked like trouble ahead. It was our job to prevent capture of our merchant ships on the high seas if we could in a sudden emergency of a declaration or war act of Japan. For that reason we took ships off the usual routes and sent them on the southern where they could be better protected and where there were ports to which they could go in [*6081*] case of trouble. It also took time to get vessels routed and get into a groove as to just how to handle them, because it required routing across the broad Pacific, and we thought it advisable to initiate it at that time, and we did.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, you did it as a precautionary measure and as a security measure?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. And I might add, it was a matter of considerable pride to us that the only ship we lost of American tonnage was one on which we took a deliberate chance.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. It was in the Pacific. A ship we sent out for the remaining Marines in China, and we didn't know whether we would have time or not. She was captured.

Mr. MURPHY. Were there any German raiders in the Pacific prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; there were raiders off and on in the Pacific prior to December 7—German raiders.

Mr. MURPHY. In your judgment who was at fault, if anyone, for the failure to have the torpedo baffles or nets on the ships on December 7, 1941? You have already testified that Ordnance was working on it. There were three or four letters between you and Admiral Kimmel on the subject. Do you know of anyone particularly to blame for not having them on that day?

[*6082*] Admiral STARK. I was asked this morning if I instituted any follow-up of my original request of Bureau of Ordnance to design and build those baffles. I perhaps can best answer the question by reading into the record the follow-ups which we made and if the committee so desires I will read them. They are not very long.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it is important enough to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Read them into the record.

Admiral STARK. The original letter was in February. On April 9, Chief of Naval Operations wrote this letter to Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, inviting attention to certain references and stating that the:

* * * the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity for experimental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and especially the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is directed to reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much lighter net now used by the Germans.

Signed: R. E. Ingersoll, Acting.

On September 16, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Bureau of Ordnance.

Subject: Experimental and Developmental Work on Nets and Booms.

with four references.

[*6083*] The letter reads:

It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvement in net and boom designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested, may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport. It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental and development work.

In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be laid and removed in harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to placing the ship or ships in a "dry dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed that the currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances, [*6084*] and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive than for the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As such nets may be desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of material as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up by the nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space.

Designs of A–T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating off of ships at anchor are requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be designed.

Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a torpedo net defense for merchant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of Ordnance in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar development work for the protection of ships under way at sea.

It is possible that in our Navy the assumption that has been reached that anchorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive measures, and, in general, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunction with net defenses, and of the two [*6085*] measures of defense, the vessels, capable of offensive action, are probably the more important. It is believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been conducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. It may be worth while to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net.

Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is realized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indicate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed.

[*6086*] On 3 October 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote again to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance on the same subject, with references and a copy of reference A, which were proceedings of meeting of local joint planning committee, northern California sector, Pacific coastal frontier, of September 17. The letter reads:

Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pontoons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this question; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.

That is the correspondence up to December 7 that Operations had with the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject of getting nets.

[*6087*] Mr. MURPHY. What I was referring to previously was the Hewitt report contained in the appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence which was given to me. On page 43 there is a reference made to a letter of February 15, 1941, from you to Admiral Kimmel and again to a letter of February 17, 1941, from you to Admiral Kimmel and again to a letter by Admiral Bloch of March 20, 1941, and again a letter of June 1941 from you to Admiral Kimmel, to which you referred this morning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in the Hewitt report I find the following:

> Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.

In the light of the fact that Bureau of Ordnance were working on it and none had been furnished to Hawaii was Admiral Kimmel justified in that statement?

[*6088*] Admiral STARK. I think the statement is not justified in view of the letter which I read this morning.

Mr. MURPHY. The letter in June 1941?

Admiral STARK. Of June 13 of 1941, in which appears the paragraph in part:

> Hence it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack—that is torpedo attack—if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Now, you will recall that I follow that with other paragraphs which while not changing that paragraph may have minimized it to the extent that it would not occur.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Those letters are all in the record and you read them this morning.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did Admiral Kimmel have the facilities at Pearl Harbor for manufacturing or preparing torpedo nets?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. If he had gotten them wouldn't he have to get them through the CNO or would he go direct to Ordnance?

Admiral STARK. Well, he probably would have written us about them. He could have written the Bureau of Ordnance but [*6089*] I think he would have come to us, undoubtedly, on it.

Mr. MURPHY. What is your judgment subsequent to June of 1941? Should he or should he not have initiated a move to get them before December and if he did initiate it, in your judgment would they have been available?

Admiral STARK. Well, we had initiated it and we did not have them, but we were pressing the Bureau of Ordnance. You will note that I also mentioned the Bureau of Ships. I remember personally suggesting to the Bureau of Ships the possibility of developing something like our targets to be placed alongside of ships in Pearl Harbor. Just

what they had arrived at at that time I do not know, but they had not produced.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, why was the President opposed to the use of draftees on ships by the Navy?

Admiral STARK. I may state with regard to that that I also was initially opposed to them.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you explain why?

Admiral STARK. It was a matter of sentiment, a matter of pride. We had always been a volunteer service and we think a service where men come into it because they want to, if you can get them, is a good thing and initially I was also opposed to it. The time came when wages were high ashore, when a man on a merchant ship could get several times what a man on [*6090*] board a Navy ship could get, when it was not so easy for us to get volunteers. It then became necessary for us to resort to the draft.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, in studying the message of November 27 and in studying the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and General Short in previous hearings I am wondering if the people in Washington and the people at Hawaii were not influenced more by the war plans that had been drawn up in the mind of messages and in the kind of defense that was instituted, than they were by what actually occurred between the end of November and the beginning of December and I refer particularly first—I am now referring to page 23 of the appendix to the Narrative Statement. Do you have a copy of that available, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, there is one here. I haven't read the narrative.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you have read what I am going to speak about but it is more easy for me to refer to it here.

I would like to direct your attention first to the United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five. It first sets forth the introduction, mobilization, and the assumptions, and then the assumption that would include war with Japan, under section 1211 would be A–2. Do you see that?

Admiral STARK. "A", yes, sir.

[*6091*] Mr. MURPHY. A–2.

Admiral STARK. A–2?

Mr. MURPHY. A–2 would be war with Japan. A–1 would be war without Japan.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, if you go over to the next page, page 24, under section 1332 there is a statement, "It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows", and I read first section "a":

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

Now, then, I do not see anything in there about Hawaii. Do you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. He mentions there the principal offensive effort and we approved this plan, so I will accept responsibility for it also.

[*6092*] Mr. MURPHY. That is right, but these places——

Admiral STARK. In another part of this plan I think he specifically mentions possibilities of air raid even before war is declared or anything done.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just taking this step by step. At least, these places that are referred to in 1–a are the places that were referred to substantially in your telegram, weren't they?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you speak of defensive efforts. Then you come over to section 1333:

To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

a. Capture of Guam.

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light [*6093*] naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

Now, I do not think Hawaii is included in any of those either, is it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Certainly, they would not refer to our main naval base as an outlying position, would they? That would be one of the smaller islands, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Smaller islands are referred to in that particular section I believe, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the places that you refer to there in 1333 are the places that you refer to in your telegram, are they not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and I think they were also referred to in our own war plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will come to that but I am trying to get what was the background for the telegram and why Hawaii was not included.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in section 1334 you speak of the initial [*6094*] Japanese deployment. It says:

The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

Then you speak of A, B, C, D, and E and then when you come to F:

Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area.

There is nothing about an attack on Hawaii via the air, is there?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come over to the tasks assigned by the Navy basic plan and the mission and in section 2101 you come down to "H", "Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area."

That might include Hawaii but that was offensive action, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then I come over to section 2202 and I find, "tasks formulated to accomplish the assigned missions" and I go on through "A." I come to "B":

Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

That would definitely be Hawaii, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6095] Mr. MURPHY. And then on down to "K":

Continue training operations as practicable.

That would be for Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That always holds in war as well as peace.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, regardless of what plans there were by anyone, the first law of nature is self-preservation, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And the fleet belonged to Admiral Kimmel and those at Hawaii, and General Short, and self-preservation, regardless of when it was, dictated that they should protect that fleet in order to save themselves and be able to operate, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then I come to "M":

Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

That would be definitely the obligation of those at Hawaii and at the base, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, and, of course, they had covered that in other plans.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Admiral, at any rate I have studied these different plans and I come to the air raid but it seems to me that the air raid itself, or the possibilities of an [6096] air raid—in fact, in the plan at Hawaii a submarine attack was listed as probable, an air attack was listed only as possible, and I was wondering if the thought in the Navy, particularly, perhaps, when these plans were prepared and manufactured was not to work that air attack in Hawaii down the line a little from what was expected in the event that war started?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had not thought of that, particularly in view of the special letters which were written on the subject and the follow-up of special plans made to guard against air raid, such as the Bellinger agreement, Bellinger-Martin agreement and the letters exchanged between Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson and the drills which were being implemented and the fact that when we got these very excellent plans of Admiral Kimmel we had distributed them throughout the service.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, it is your feeling that these supplemental plans that pertained particularly to Hawaii and the danger of an air attack and the letter of the Secretary of War and the correspondence you had kept that to the forefront regardless of where the attack on Hawaii might be in these several other plans?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, and the final letter which I read this morning dated in October, which was gotten out on [6097] that subject.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I have this last question, Admiral. In all of the messages that were sent to Hawaii and in all of the considerations

in Washington about the possible move to the southward, the reason why you were fortifying the Philippines was so that the Japanese would fear an attack on their flank specifically and, therefore, would hesitate going into the South China Sea, that is right, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir. Whether we could deter them or not—I believe I stated that we hoped that they might have some weight toward prevention, if not then in execution, but that flank position, unless the Japanese had made up their minds that we would not come in, was a serious threat to their communications to their main offensive to the south.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, isn't it also true that if the Japanese were going to go to the South Seas that the fleet, once it was in the Pacific, was always a danger to their flank and, therefore, had to be taken into consideration every time you thought of what the Japs might do, because they would have to get the fleet off their flank to be safe, wouldn't they?

Admiral STARK. Ultimately they would have to lick the fleet or be licked by the fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

[*6098*] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman Gearhart is at bat.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, what is the tour of duty of a Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. The normal tour, provided an officer has that much time in his active service left, is 4 years. That is true of the bureau chiefs also.

Mr. GEARHART. That was not the thought I had in mind. I meant the tour of duty on a 24-hour period.

Admiral STARK. You mean how long is he supposed to—I do not know just what you mean. You mean how many hours a day?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not think there is anything. It depends on the individual and particularly on the work.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, Admiral, I think under Navy regulations he would be on duty constantly during the time that he is serving in that office.

Admiral STARK. Always available; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. He must never be beyond reach; isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes. It always must be known where he is. He might be in the West Indies but he would still be within reach by radio or he might be with the fleet on an exercise [*6099*] but his whereabouts is always known and there is always a means of communication with him.

Mr. GEARHART. That is also true of the Chief of Staff of the Army; is it not?

Admiral STARK. I suppose so.

Mr. GEARHART. In fact, that is the rule applying to all high-ranking commanding officers; is that not true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I would say it would be true, certainly, of the commander in chief of the fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. Then a commanding officer, a Chief of Naval Operations, should not at any time put himself beyond communication by his subordinates; is that correct?

Admiral STARK. That would be correct, except some special circumstance might arise, which would be thoroughly understood, but I have never heard of such special circumstance.

Mr. GEARHART. And that is also true of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Admiral STARK. Well, I suppose it is, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. When you left the office on Saturday night didn't you leave word there as to where you were going to be and where you could be reached on December 6, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes; when I went out I always left word. I do not recall of any time when I did not, and occasionally I had it checked just to see if I were absent whether the [*6100*] follow-up would be effective. I do not recall being out that night but I also do not recall whether I was out or not; so there it is.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, isn't there a record kept in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations as to where he is every minute that he is away from the office?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When you leave——

Admiral STARK. When you say "every minute," yes; if I were going out at night my aide would usually leave word with the duty officer where I could be found, assuming that my intentions to go out were before I left the office. If after I got home I suddenly decided to go out somewhere, I would leave word with the house and usually call up the duty officer in addition.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, have you searched the records in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to ascertain where you were on Saturday night, the 6th day of December 1941?

Admiral STARK. We have found nothing as to where I was and it follows my assumption that my thought was that I was at home. There is nothing I have been able to find out which locates where I was that evening.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the Chief of Staff cannot remember where he was on that night is it pos- [*6101*] sible that you and he could have been together?

Admiral STARK. I think we had no such conspiracy at that time, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you shut it out as being an utter impossibility that you and he could have been in each other's company that night?

Admiral STARK. I do not shut it out as an utter impossibility that we could have been in each other's company, but I think we were not.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not remember that.

Admiral STARK. No; but I feel that perhaps we both would have remembered it if that had occurred.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you not remembering where you were certainly you cannot remember that you were not with General Marshall on that night, can you?

Admiral STARK. Well, I think that may be a reasonable assumption.

Mr. GEARHART. You were together a great deal all the time, were you not?

Admiral STARK. We were together either talking by telephone or interoffice visits a great deal during office hours. We were not to-

gether a great deal in the evening. Once in a while we would have just a little family supper party but neither one—I was not going out much at that time. I could [*6102*] not. If I got home in time for dinner at half past seven I was rather lucky and my brief case always went with me.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you, as General Marshall did, have orderlies at your quarters at all times?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I might add that the servants in the house were given my address and there was one always on duty.

Mr. GEARHART. You have been informed that an effort was made to locate you on Saturday night, have you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I have heard that an effort was made to locate me.

Mr. GEARHART. And you also have learned that a courier called at your quarters and you were not there?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not heard that.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have any telephone call that evening from Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you testified in your written statement, page 51, that the Navy was in the war in the Atlantic on the 7th day of November 1941. You remember that testimony?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. If we were at war on the 7th day of November of 1941 in the Atlantic when did that war begin?

Admiral STARK. I would like to say as to that statement [*6103*] that we were at war that it should be interpreted as in effect. We were not belligerents, we did not have the right of belligerents, but when we had orders to shoot any German or Italian on the high seas to the westward of the twenty-sixth meridian and when they in turn were attacking us and we were endeavoring to sink their attacking vessels and they were endeavoring and had wounded our vessels at that time, we were in effect engaging them and to that extent we were at war, and so far as the high seas were concerned when we actually entered the war there wasn't much change in that particular case.

On the other hand, there was at one time a request come to me to apprehend a certain vessel, a German vessel which was, we found, approaching Germany with rubber and we refused to do it because of the fact that we did not have belligerent rights.

On the other hand, again as regards being in war, we were in the position of having command of Canadian vessels or they might have of ours, or we might under certain circumstances under the shooting order command British vessels, Britain being at war with Germany, or a British officer might have command of ours, so in effect I made the statement we were at war. There were certain belligerent rights technically and the thing had not been openly declared, but in the ways which the President had defined and of which he had informed the [*6104*] country in his speech in September, there was practically war on the sea for any Axis power that came within that limit.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you described the conditions as existing on the 7th day of November 1941 as indicating a condition of war. Now I am asking you when did the condition come into being?

Admiral STARK. I think perhaps I might read a brief which I had made up thinking it might be of use to the committee—primarily I

wanted it for myself to get the sequence—of the hemispheric defense orders and whether or not I have enough copies here to give the committee at this time I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there an order commanding commanders of American ships in the Atlantic to fire upon German submarines or surface ships under any conditions?

Admiral STARK. There was.

Mr. GEARHART. Who issued that order?

Admiral STARK. I did, by direction of the President.

Mr. GEARHART. And when was it issued?

Admiral STARK (reading):

On October 8, 1941 by despatch 082335 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1400 G. C. T.

that is Greenwich Civil Time—

11 October 1941. The plan remained in effect until December 11, 1941 at which time the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and [*6105*] replaced by WPL 46, Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5.

I think it might be helpful if I would read this correspondence which lays down the sequence and is a brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it, Admiral.

Mr. GEARHART. I will be glad to have you do that, Admiral, with permission of the Chair.

Admiral STARK. It is six pages long.

Mr. GEARHART. Go ahead.

Admiral STARK. But it gives the picture and consolidation of a good many pages.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

[*6106*] DIGEST OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PLANS

Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan #2 (WPL—49), promulgated April 21, 1941, issued by the Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the President, was based on the general concept:

"Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere."

The General Task assigned the Navy was:

" * * * warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger, and defend United States flag shipping against attack."

The specific tasks assigned the Naval Operating Forces were:

"(a) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener if necessary.

"(b) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty [*6107*] over Western Hemisphere Territory) if suspected of acting as supply vessels for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

"(c) Prevent interference with United States flag shipping by belligerents.

"(d) Avoid intervening in or interfering with the armed engagements of belligerents."

The above plan became effective in the Atlantic on April 24, 1941, the dispatch placing it into effect stated "The execution of this plan shall give the appearance of routine exercises where the departure of units from port are being made." (Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch 211520 of April 1941 to Holders of WPL–49.)

Hemisphere Defense Plan #4 (WPL-51), issued by the Chief of Naval Operations on July 11, 1941, at the direction of the President, was based on the following general concepts:—

"(a) Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.

[*6108*] "(b) The President of the United States, in a message to Congress on July 7, 1941, made the following pronouncement:

"'The occupation of Iceland by Germany would constitute a serious threat in three dimensions:

" 'The threat against Greenland and the Northern portion of the North American Continent, including the Islands which lie off it.

" 'The threat against all shipping in the Atlantic.

" 'The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain—which is a matter of broad policy approved by the congress.

" 'It is therefore imperative that the approaches between the Americas and those strategic outposts, the safety of which this country regards as essential to its national security, and which it must therefore defend, shall remain open and free from all hostile activity or threat thereof.

" 'As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to insure the safety of communications in the approaches between Iceland and the United States, as well as on the seas between the United States and all other strategic outposts.

[*6109*] " 'This Government will issue the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a soverneign state.' "

The General Tasks assigned the Navy were within the Western Hemisphere and were as follows:

"(a) Insure the safety of communications with United States strategic outposts;

"(b) Insure the adequate defense of Iceland;

"(c) Defend United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack or threat of attack; and

"(d) Warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger."

When the order to execute this plan was issued, Change #1 had been incorporated. The Tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet were:

"(a) Protect United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack, by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as required by circumstances, and by destroying hostile forces which threaten such shipping.

"(b) Escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland.

[*6110*] "(c) Provide protection and sea transportation for the initial movements and continued support of United States overseas garrisons.

"(d) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory and other than belligerent vessels and aircraft involved in encounters in executing a, b, and c); and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener if necessary. Amplify such broadcasts by encrypted despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations.

"(e) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), if suspected of acting as supply ships for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

"The Atlantic Fleet will be organized into Task Forces of the approximate strength indicated:

Ocean Escort—6 BB, 5 CA, 27 DD, 23 ODD, 48 VPB.

Striking Force—3 CV, 4 CL (10,000 tons), 13 DD, 12 VPB.

[*6111*] Southern Patrol—4 CL (7500 tons), 8 DD (1850 tons),

Force—4 CGC (327 tons), 12 VPB."

The plan stated that Canada had made available Shelburne and Halifax as operating bases for United States Naval vessels and patrol planes, and Sydney for United States Naval vessels in case of necessity.

The Chief of Naval Operations would exchange information on movements of British and Canadian convoys and Naval forces and United States Naval forces

and United States and Iceland flag shipping with the British and Canadian authorities.

On July 25, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 251600 ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1200 (GCT) July 26th, except that only United States and Iceland flag shipping was to be escorted, i. e., the words in Task (b), "including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland," were not to be executed until necessary arrangements had been made.

Change #2 to WPL–51, issued on August 13, 1941, transferred the task of providing sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of the Army and Navy forces overseas, other than those which are to be transported by the Operating Forces, to the Naval Transportation Service. It also contained detailed instructions for the [*6112*] operation of convoys and escorts in the North Atlantic which were to become effective when the escort of convoys including ships of nationality other than those of United States and Iceland was ordered.

On 25 August, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet by dispatch 252000 that WPL–51 was to be interpreted as requiring Atlantic Fleet forces to destroy surface raiders which attacked shipping along the sea lanes between North America and Iceland or which approached these lanes sufficiently close to threaten such shipping.

Change #3, issued on September 3, 1941, stated:

"Hostile forces will be deemed to threaten United States or Iceland flag shipping if they enter the general area of the sea lanes which lie between North America and Iceland or enter the Neutrality Zone in the Atlantic Ocean described in the Declaration of Panama of October 3, 1939."

This change revised the detailed instructions for the operation of convoys and escorts, which were to become effective when the inclusion in United States escorted convoys of other than United States and Icelandic ships was ordered.

Change #3 established a Southeast Pacific Sub-area consisting of that part of the Pacific Ocean outside of [*6113*] territorial waters south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and north of Latitude 57° South and between the West Coast of South America, and Longitude 100° West.

On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a Southeast Pacific Force of two 7500-ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific Sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping.

On 13 September, Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 131816 ordered deletion of the Task—"Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, etc."

Change #4, issued on September 3, 1941, enlarged the Western Atlantic Area (which had been the area west of longitude 26° West, as far west as the continental land areas to the area west of the following line:

"Beginning from the North along longitude 10° West as far south as latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line to the position lat. 53° North long. 26° West, thence South along long. 26° West."

On 13 September the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch [*6114*] 131645 ordered that commencing on September 16, 0001 (GCT), the Atlantic Fleet was to execute the words, "including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland."

This order also placed into effect the detailed instructions for the operations of convoys and escorts. Under these instructions the United States assumed responsibility for transatlantic trade convoys on the North Atlantic route when west of the line from the North Pole along the Meridian 10° West to Lat. 65° North thence to the point Lat. 53° North Long. 26° West and thence along the Meridian of 26° West.

On 13 September 1941 Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, by dispatch 131855 that the President had modified previous instructions regarding convoy and escort, and that the United States Naval vessels could escort convoys in which there were no United States or Iceland flag vessels and that United States flag vessels could be escorted by Canadian ships.

Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #5 (WPL–52), issued September 26, 1941, superseded Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #4. It was to be placed into effect by the Chief of Naval Operations after Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, had submitted a readiness report.

It stated that approximately 60 Royal Navy and Royal [6115] Canadian Navy destroyers and corvettes would be engaged in escorting convoy in the Western Atlantic Area under the strategic direction of the United States. It quoted extracts from the President's speech of September 11, such as:

"Upon our Naval and air patrol—now operating in large numbers over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean fell the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas—now. That means * * * our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—not only American merchant ships, but ships of any flag—engaged in commerce in our defensive waters."

* * * *

"From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril. 'The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy—at once."

It is stated in the Concept of the Plan:

"It must be recognized that, under the concept of this plan, the United States is not at war in the legal sense, and therefore does not have any of the special belligerent rights accorded under United States law to States which are formally at war.

[6116] *"The operations which will be conducted under this plan are conceived to form a preparatory phase for the operations of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46)."*

The Tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet were:

"(a) Protection against hostile attack United States and foreign flag shipping other than German and Italian shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling as circumstances may require, and by destroying German and Italian Naval, Land, and Air Forces encountered.

"(b) Insure the safety of sea communications with United States and strategic outposts.

"(c) Support the defense of United States Territory and Bases, Iceland, and Greenland.

"(d) Trail merchant vessels suspected of supplying or otherwise assisting operations of German and Italian naval vessels or aircraft. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations."

On October 8, 1941, by dispatch 082335, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1400 (GCT) October 11, 1941. This plan remained in effect until December 11, 1941, at which time the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and replaced by WPL–46 (Navy Basic War Plan, [6117] Rainbow No. 5).

Mr. GEARHART. Now is this the order that you made pursuant to the direction of the President under which the Navy began to wage war in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. It is the order under which we operated and under which we told the Germans, and Italians in the later stages, that if they came to the westward of the 26 Meridian, as I recall, that their intent would be regarded as hostile and they would be dealt with accordingly, and regarding which the President had previously informed the country.

Mr. GEARHART. Then pursuant to this order shells were exchanged by American surface warships carrying American flags and German submarines?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; we attacked German submarines under this order.

Mr. GEARHART. How many instances can you recount at this moment?

Admiral STARK. I do not know just how many instances there were we attacked submarines with depth charges, in cases, for example, like when we were sending troops into Iceland, and which I mentioned. There are three rather outstanding cases in this connection.

There was the *Greer*, which was attacked, as I recall [*6118*] in September. There was the *Reuben James*, which was attacked and sunk, I believe, in November. There was the *Salinas*, a tanker, which was attacked and damaged and got into port about that time. There was some one other of our destroyers.

Mr. GEARHART. Was the *Reuben James* one of them?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. The *Reuben James*, was that one of them?

Admiral STARK. The *Reuben James* was one. I have a paper here on those four cases. The other one was the *Kearney* on October 17, which was attacked by an enemy submarine, position 57.04 North and 23 West, 300 miles southwest of Iceland. One torpedo struck the boiler room. Seven men killed, four missing and ten wounded.

The *Salinas*, a naval tanker, was torpedoed without warning during the night of October 29–30, 1941, in waters southwest of Iceland. Ship was sufficiently damaged to require 6 weeks or more in drydock, but a Navy press release stated there was no loss of life and no serious injury to personnel.

The *Reuben James* was sunk west of Iceland while on convoy duty during the night of October 30–31.

The *Greer* was not damaged.

We had a ship, the *Robin Moore*, torpedoed and sunk off Brazil in June. There was a ship called the *Steel Seafarer* [*6119*] I think, that was attacked. I have forgotton whether it was sunk, but that was another case, and there was still another to which I believe the President referred in his September speech, called the *Sessa*. I have forgotten just what she was.

Mr. GEARHART. Were any American transports carrying the American flag transporting the troops of any of the nations that later became our allies, after the declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall such at the time. We were escorting British ships at one period, carrying British troops. One of the Queens was sent over to this side of the Atlantic and routed south and down around the southern tip of Africa. She was sent here as a matter of safety, that being a safer route. Whether or not we let the British have any of our ships at that time, or allocated them to carry troops to the Middle East I am not certain. I do not recall any at the moment.

Mr. GEARHART. We did later?

Admiral STARK. We did later; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now we occupied Iceland prior to December 7, 1941, did we not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And our American Navy took to Iceland not [*6120*] only Marines but soldiers?

Admiral STARK. Army; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Soldiers of the Army?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. And we established seaplanes up there also.

Mr. GEARHART. We also occupied Greenland, did we not?

Admiral STARK. We developed certain air stations, as I recall, in Greenland, to help get aircraft across the Atlantic. I do not remember of any occupational forces other than those in connection with air bases.

Mr. GEARHART. And we also dispossessed some Germans who established some air stations in Greenland, did we not?

Admiral STARK. I think what you refer to may be some Germans up there in connection with weather reports.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but they were German Army people, were they not?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall whether they were German Army or not. They were Germans.

Mr. GEARHART. Anyway, we ousted them from Greenland?

Admiral STARK. Either ousted them or they got out themselves at that time. I do not know what the situation was.

Mr. GEARHART. They were ousted prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now let us take a look at the Pacific. Did [*6121*] you have any orders comparable to the one that you have given me a copy of applying to the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. We did in the Southeast Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you a copy of that order here?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not. I can get it.

Mr. GEARHART. Would you be so kind as to get it and have it inserted in the record at this point, if you come to it in time?[1]

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARTHART. Now what was the substance and effect of that order?

Admiral STARK. In the Southeast Pacific?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall any incident in connection with that.

Mr. GEARHART. What was the order?

Admiral STARK. That commanders of the Army and Navy continue similar, as I recall, to that as I recited in October, that if any German or Italian raider came within the boundary line which we set there, and which we published, they were to be engaged.

Mr. GEARHART. Did that only apply to the Germans and Italians?

Admiral STARK. They were the only ones at that time.

[*6122*] Mr. GEARHART. What was the date of that order?

Admiral STARK. It is covered in this digest which you have there, on page 5, and reads:

> On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 282121 ordered Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish a southeast Pacific force of two 7500-ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack United States flag shipping. The approach of surface raiders within the Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag shipping.

The effect, therefore, of that was to engage any German or Italian raider which might appear in that area.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, was any order promulgated by you which had direct application to Japan prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

[1] Included in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2666 et seq.

Mr. GEARUART. Well, did you regard the freezing of the assets of Japan on July 26, 1941, as an overt act?

Admiral STARK. I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you regard the imposition upon Japan [6123] of economic sanctions on the same date as an overt act of the United States?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. If you read, and you have undoubtedly read, with regard to that, there were certain stipulations there whereby it was made possible for the unfreezing of assets as necessary to carry on certain trade, if we so desired to do so. It was not a loophole, but it was left open for certain essentials, that it could be done.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I think you testified, and certain other high ranking naval officers have testified, that an expedition was being prepared in Hawaii at the time of the attack, an expedition which would have been instructed to fly over Truk for reconnaissance purposes. If that flight had occurred, would that have constituted an overt act under international law?

Admiral STARK. I think not. The original decree, as I recall, regarding the mandates made it possible, or we should have been able to go into them at will practically at any time. They were a trust rather than Japanese territory. Whether that had been abrogated subsequently, I do not know, but I do recall very clearly when I wanted to send some submarines through the mandates—not while I was Chief of Naval Operations, however.

Mr. GEARHART. But regardless of the conditions under [6124] which Japan received the mandated islands, it was understood, was it not, by everybody that the Japanese were not allowing any persons to come within those areas?

Admiral STARK. She had taken that stand, and in my opinion it was not a legal stand for her to take.

Mr. GEARHART. But legal or illegal, we were avoiding going in there and creating an incident by reason of our presence there, is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir. We had abided by her decision not to let us go, a decision which, on our part, I thought was wrong at the time. That went back some years. Once it had been made, we stayed out.

Mr. GEARHART. When you considered sending an air reconnaissance expedition over Turk, did you consider the question of whether or not that would constitute an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. Those ships, airships—I am referring to aircraft—had they made that reconnaissance flight would have gone very high. They might have been seen or might not, so the argument probably falls out. They would then have taken the pictures. The Japanese had been doing the same thing. We know of flights over our territory. It was taking a chance, but we thought the chance worthwhile. Whether it would be regarded as an overt act on our part, I do not know. I primarily [6125] wanted the information and I was prepared to take the chance.

Mr. GEARHART. If Japanese planes flew over Pearl Harbor, would you regard that as a sort of reconnaissance, the same as was to be conducted by the United States?

Admiral STARK. At that time, if I had seen them I would have shot them down, if I had been on the spot and in command.

Mr. GEARHART. Had there been any reports to you of Japanese ships flying over Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you read the story in the Saturday Evening Post of October 9, 1942, a story written by the then flying naval lieutenant, Clarence Dickinson, did you not?

Admiral STARK. No; I think not.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you read that story?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GEARHART. The story which is entitled "I Fly for Vengeance"?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. He recites in that story, that he flew under war orders to keep his mission secret at all costs, to sink all Japanese ships he encountered on the surface of the sea or in the air. How would you classify such an order as that? Would that be considered an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. At what time was that?

[*6126*] Mr. GEARHART. That order was issued November 22, 1941, 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it. I would like to see the order.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it was printed in the Saturday Evening Post of October 1942. The first 6 inches of type in that story "I Fly for Vengeance" has never, to my knowledge, been denied.

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it before. I did not read the article. I say, I would not believe it regardless of whether it was printed, unless I saw the authenticated original order.

Senator LUCAS. Congressman, will you yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I will yield.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman tell me who gave the order, according to the article?

Mr. GEARHART. I think it was given by Admiral Halsey. That was what I was going to inquire. I thought you might have information about it at this time.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. There was widespread publicity given to it. It was printed ever since.

Admiral STARK. I missed it somehow. I missed it or it may have been I just dismissed it as something crazy.

[*6127*] The CHAIRMAN. What was your last word?

Admiral STARK. I say it may have been I just dismissed it as something crazy, because I never had any knowledge of any such order.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, since that time the then flying Lt. Clarence Dickinson has been twice promoted. He is known today as Commander Clarence Dickinson.

Admiral STARK. Well, I would be very much interested in seeing the order.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you have testified that the President told you about a year and a half ago or 2 years ago, that he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Hawaii. That is correct, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And in your statement, on page 57, you testify:

> The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.

That is your testimony, emphasizing and repeating that which you have said in a letter of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral STARK. To Admiral Kimmel, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That quotation being:

The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation, coupled with a statement of the Japanese Government [*6128*] and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.

Then, going on further down:

I held this (the letter) up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk that I sent the message to you a day or so ago showing the gravity of the situation. Will confirm that in today's meeting by the President. Neither will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing that could happen to us.

Do you sense any inconsistency in your statement if I told you that the President was surprised when the Japanese attacked Hawaii? Isn't that what you said in your letter to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not know that I do. I can give you practically the exact words which the President mentioned to me a year ago last summer. I was in the White House, and he said, in effect: "Betty, you were surprised at that attack and so was I." And my reply was: "Yes, sir, I was, and I just testified to that fact." Now, the previous surprise I think was more general in nature. I am not trying to make out a case for the President—I want that understood.

[*6129*] Mr. GEARHART. We just want the facts. I am not trying to prove anything.

Admiral STARK. That neither Mr. Hull nor the President would be surprised at a surprise attack anywhere. In my opinion, the President was not expecting that attack on Hawaii anymore than I was. I had gone over the situation with him very carefully on the chart, and the movement of vessels. He was expecting it to the southward and so was I. We did not know whether it would hit the Philippines or not. But I think there is no particular inconsistency there.

Mr. GEARHART. Since you referred to a meeting with the President, I direct your attention to a meeting of the war council, of which you are a member according to the report of the Army Board, a meeting which occurred at the White House on the 25th of November 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6130*] Mr. GEARHART. I will quote from Secretary Stimson's diary as follows:

Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do.

Do you remember that meeting and do you remember those remarks by the President of the United States?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. With respect to whether or not he was surprised, do you think there is any inconsistency between what he said then and what you have just recited to us?

Admiral STARK. I think not. You can look at this thing in two or three different ways. And again I would repeat that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor. And I want to make sure that anything I state is not intended to weaken that, because I was surprised. When one had been talking about the possibility of an attack for a year or more, when you had been pressing for means to counter such an attack should it come, when you had laid out a plan to counter [*6131*] it, and stated that war might well be initiated, and the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us there was an attack on Hawaii, and you had gone over it forwards and backwards, to that extent you were not surprised, it was not as though it were something that suddenly came on you.

But regardless of the fact that we had been over it, we countered and we talked about the possibility, and we had done what we could, and we had made it our strongest outpost, when it came at that particular time, and in view of the fact that we had no leads to indicate it was coming at that time at Hawaii, and we did have leads only of an amphibious force pointing to the southward, and we had no indication that the Japanese carriers, the last thing I had in that line was information in the Pacific of the whole Japanese Fleet laid out as of 1 December showing the carriers in home waters—I was surprised.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you say that you were surprised?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That the Japanese should attack Hawaii on the 7th day of December 1941?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You were taken by surprise as well as the President was taken by surprise?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. All these things I had talked [*6132*] over with the President.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces, the President of the United States, a student of naval affairs, a frequent visitor on board ships, and you, the Chief of Naval Operations, were taken by surprise by the news that came that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii, does that mitigate or does that aggravate the fact that the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was taken by surprise?

Admiral STARK. The possibility of that attack existed. We knew of the possibility though we weren't expecting it. I had specifically written, by letter, that I thought we should be on guard. We had sent a dispatch of a war warning and we had directed the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific to take a defensive deployment. That direction was because of the possibility of an attack. We didn't expect it, but we felt we had to be on guard against it.

I was surprised at the attack, and I lso was greatly surprised that more steps had not been taken to endeavor to guard against it and counter it, if possible.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you condemn Admiral Kimmel for being taken by surprise over there, do you not in the same breath condemn yourself?

[*6133*] Admiral STARK. I am not condemning Admiral Kimmel for anything. And in my statement and in what I said I would do I have left that up to others. I have stated the situation as I saw it. I acted in accordance with my best judgment and I assume he did, too.

What I intended to convey apparently did not get over. Whether the fault was mine for not having expressed it properly or whether the fault lay elsewhere if I did express it properly is something which is not for me to say.

Mr. GEARHART. Now——

Admiral STARK. I felt I had, we all felt, that we had given warning and a directive which would have fully alerted the forces out there, and, as I say, what we thought we had done did not materialize, to the best of my knowledge and belief, at least as far as we thought it had. What Admiral Kimmel did do he can testify to.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the fact that you admit that you were surprised when Hawaii was hit, and you inform us that the President told you that he was surprised when Pearl Harbor was attacked, does that not account for the fact that you left out of all these warnings that you sent to the Islands any mention of Hawaii?

Admiral STARK. The only specific objectives we gave were objectives of an amphibious force. It is all we had. [*6134*] The war warning was broad. The amphibious objectives we gave. And in an earlier dispatch we put "in any direction."

Mr. GEARHART. But all of the war warnings that you sent, all that General Marshall sent, all, after calling attention to the imminence of war, all narrowed down to the message later on by pointing out that you expected the attack to occur in the Far East.

Does that not spring from the fact that the President, yourself, and General Marshall, and all of the officers that stood around you close and advised with you, were of the opinion that Pearl Harbor was impregnable and that it would not be attacked?

Admiral STARK. No, I never thought Pearl Harbor was impregnable and that it would not be attacked. I did not think it would be attacked at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, going back again to that meeting with the President on the 25th day of November of 1941, that was held at the White House, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The three Secretaries were there, the two Chiefs of Staff were there, and the President brought up the subject of Japan and pointed out that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning, a sneak attack, and that we might expect an attack as soon as next [*6135*] Monday, referring to the Monday following the 25th day of November 1941.

Do you know whether the President had any reason for believing that an attack might occur on the 1st of December or 2d of December?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I don't know just why he made that statement, except that it was a guess that it might come within the next few days. I never went—I don't know that anybody questioned it. We had the 29th as a deadline.

Mr. GEARHART. That was what I was going to ask you next. Did anybody bring up in the discussion the Japanese intercept that the 29th was a deadline?

Admiral STARK. I don't remember that that was specifically discussed at that time. We all had it—wait a minute. I think we had it prior to the meeting of the 25th. It was about the 22d, I think, that we got it.

Mr. GEARHART. First they fixed the 25th as the deadline and then a later message came through before the 25th extending it to the 29th.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. It could have been before you.

Admiral STARK. I think it came in about the 22d. If so, we all had seen it.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, you discussed it, did you not?

[*6136*] Admiral STARK. It was translated on the 22d.

Mr. GEARHART. And it had been served upon you by Captain Kramer and it had been served upon the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff by Colonel Bratton; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You all had knowledge of that 29th deadline?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It had also been delivered to the White House.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull bring up any discussion of his associations with Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu?

Admiral STARK. The situation was undoubtedly discussed. I have forgotten the exact trend of it. It is a long time ago.

The one thing that I remember is that we went over the situation but as to details I don't recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull——

Admiral STARK. I kept no diary.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull say anything about the kind of message he was going to give the Japanese in reply to the one they served on him on the 20th?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall, at that time. We were still thinking, at least under the impression, that he [*6137*] was still considering the modus vivendi.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Did he read you his modus vivendi?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that he did at that time. However, we had a copy of it in the Navy Department.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you and General Marshall disturbed by what Secretary Hall had to say about his impending answer?

Admiral STARK. About his impending answer—you mean to the Japanese?

Mr. GEARHART. The one he was about to turn over to the Japanese.

[*6138*] Admiral STARK. Of the 20th. Well, we were playing for time. I do not recall that what was said in the White House on the 25th was responsible for our message of the 27th. As I have stated, I have been unable to separate and clarify just what happened on the dates around the 25th, which was when the Chiang Kai-shek note was delivered, and the 26th, and the 27th, except as to what happened during that over-all period.

Mr. GEARHART. Refreshing your memory, weren't you very much disturbed, and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed, by what Secretary Hull told you that he planned to do?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall at that time that he told us. We did not know of the note of the 26th until after it was sent.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't he tell you at that time that he was thinking about not answering at all, that he was thinking about ignoring the whole thing, letting it go on?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall that he did. You are referring to the——

Mr. GEARHART. Meeting of the 25th.

Admiral STARK. To the 25th. I have stated that whether he spoke to me about that note on the 25th or the 26th or the 27th, I am not sure. I know that we got it, that he called me with regard to it. It may have been the 25th, it may have been the 26th. I don't recall its having come up at the White House meeting. It may have. I do not recall the details.

[*6139*] Mr. GEARHART. This is very, very important, and I want you to try to remember.

Admiral STARK. I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, as to time. I have discussed it with others. We came to an impasse as to any agreement every time we do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details of just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I just can't do it.

Mr. GEARHART. To refresh your memory, reading from the Army report—I am not picking this out of the air—didn't Mr. Hull say in that meeting and during the course of the discussion that he was about ready "to kick the whole thing over and tell them (the Japanese) that he had no other proposition at all"?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that he did.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, what caused you and General Marshall to immediately meet again together and to prepare and send to the President immediately after that meeting of the 25th of November 1941, your memorandum recommending to the President that he should do everything in his power to gain time?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that it was immediately after that meeting of the 25th that we did that.

Mr. GEARHART. The instrument is dated the 27th, isn't it?

[*6140*] Admiral STARK. It is dated the 27th, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It contains General Marshall's signature, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. It contains his signature which, his best judgment is, if I recall his testimony correctly, he put on, on the 28th.

Mr. GEARHART. Either the 28th or the 26th, because he wasn't in Washington on the 27th, the date that the instrument bears; that is correct, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So if you and General Marshall worked out that instrument which bears the date of the 27th, you had to do it on the 26th, didn't you?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Because General Marshall was not here on the 27th.

Admiral STARK. We didn't have to start it on the 26th.

When I first asked Turner about it, because it was drawn up by the War Plans of both sections, he was under the impression—I don't know whether he has testified on it or not—but my impression is, in asking him, he thought it started about the 24th. We are not clear just when we started that memorandum.

Mr. GEARHART. You are not in the habit of sending memoranda to the White House without the signatures of the people [*6141*] who are responsible?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, it must have been prepared and signed on the 26th for delivery on the 27th; is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. No, that is not necessarily correct. I might have signed it on the 27th. You have Marshall's testimony. I have no reason to doubt it. You have his testimony that his best judgment is that he signed it on the 28th when he came back.

Mr. GEARHART. Is there any reason he should have signed it on the 28th rather than the 26th?

Admiral STARK. According to Secretary Stimson's diary, as I recall, he made some minor changes in it on the 27th. It was not up in smooth form at that time. I say his diary. I believe Gerow testified to that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4:30. I presume you cannot finish soon?

Mr. GEARHART. No, I will need 15 or 20 minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, January 4, 1946.)

[6142]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION,
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6143] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Congressman Gearhart had not finished examining Admiral Stark.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. May I say just a word before the examination starts, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The committee will come to order.

Admiral STARK. It had reference to Senator Lucas' examination yesterday, and I think perhaps it might be better to wait until he gets here. I didn't realize he wasn't present.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Go ahead, Congressman.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, yesterday I asked you a few very brief questions about the flying orders under which then flying lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Wake, or Midway, whichever it was, on November 22, 1941.

At that time you replied you did not know about the orders that he flew upon or anything about the incident.

Have you in the meantime discussed the subject with anybody connected with the Navy Department?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, I have not pursued it at all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I have referred to this [6144] incident time and time again during the course of these hearings. On the second or third day of these hearings I made the request that copies of those orders be supplied me and though 6 weeks have gone by they haven't been supplied to date.[1]

May I inquire as to whether or not any effort has been made to locate those orders, and if so, whether or not they are not available?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, I beg your pardon, but I was

[1] See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5476.

looking at some papers and I didn't hear just what the orders were.

Mr. GEARHART. During the course of these hearings and at different times in my cross-examination of various witnesses I have referred to the flying orders under which then Flying Naval Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway or Wake, whichever it was, I have forgotten, on November 22, 1941, 3 weeks before Pearl Harbor, and on the second or third day of these hearings when I first referred to this incident I requested the orders, a copy of the orders under which now Commander Dickinson flew. I have not been supplied them. I was wondering why they have not been made available.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you let us report at 2 o'clock about that?

[*6145*] Mr. GEARHART. I will be glad to do so.

Mr. MITCHELL. He was in Halsey's command, was he not?

Mr. GEARHART. I think so.

Mr. MITCHELL. My dim recollection is that I felt we didn't have any written orders and that when Halsey was on the stand we would be able to find out what orders he gave to his own people. He is lined up as a witness. I haven't asked him myself whether he has any orders, written orders, or if he knows what the oral orders were, but I will check during the noon hour and try to satisfy your interest there.

Mr. GEARHART. Commander Dickinson in his article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October 2 or October 9, 1942, I am not precise as to the date, somebody has helped themselves to my copy of the article, which is being replaced——

Mr. MITCHELL. In that article does he say whether he had written or oral orders?

Mr. GEARHART. He doesn't say whether they were written or oral, but he definitely says what those orders were. He said he was flying under absolute war orders, period, under instructions to sink any Japanese ships that he encountered upon the sea and to shoot down any flying craft that he met in the air, and to keep his mission secret at all costs.

Now, if there were any such orders issued in the Pacific [*6146*] prior to Pearl Harbor that is a fact, it is a fact of which the country should be informed. I do hope that those orders are furnished me if they are in writing, or if not in writing, a statement in respect to what the situation was.

I ask about it now because under the ruling of the committee yesterday we are going to proceed to the examination of Admiral Kimmel and General Short upon the conclusion of the testimony of the distinguished witness who now occupies the stand. I will want to examine those witnesses in respect to those orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Might the Chair ask Admiral Stark if those were orders, if there were any such orders, and if they were given by Admiral Halsey, would they appear as a matter of record in the Department here?

Admiral STARK. I think not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral Halsey is to be a witness, I believe, isn't he?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And, of course, if there are no written orders in the Department, or in his files, he would be the best witness as to whether he gave any such oral orders.

Admiral STARK. I would think so; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. We may get hold of Admiral Halsey, and if it was oral, get his statement preliminary to his going on [*6147*] the stand and we can furnish it to the Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I imagine, in view of the very alluring picture of the admiral in the paper this morning, you may have difficulty in locating him today. [Laughter.]

Mr. GEARHART. That reminds me, are we going to get a chance to see that saddle? [Laughter.]

There is one other matter. This was not a request of mine, Mr. Chairman, but the request was made by another member of the committee, that we be furnished with the copy of the Roberts Report as it was originally submitted to the White House, together with such changes, alterations, additions, subtractions, that were made.

I want to point out again, in view of the fact that we are going to have Admiral Kimmel and General Short before us shortly, that we ought to have that report before the committee at the earliest possible moment. The request for that report and interlineations, changes, additions, and subtractions was made the earliest day of this hearing, and the request has been repeated by different members of this committee. Now we are right up against the gun. We are going to examine the witnesses concerning whom those changes and that report are going to be material.

I am constrained to inquire as to whether or not we are going to have the original Roberts Report with such [*6148*] information as would be important to this committee in respect to changes that were made in it.

Mr. MITCHELL. The answer is that we have been searching in all of the departments ever since then to try to find the original report, and have failed utterly, in the War, Navy, State, and every other Department, to find any such document. Two days ago I wrote to Justice Roberts and told him we had failed and that the committee wanted it and asked him if he could kindly give us any sort of relief as to where to find it and who had it. That is the best we have been able to do.

Mr. GEARHART. Thank you very much. Up to date the information is we have not been able to locate the original report?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exactly; not because we haven't put an effort on it, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. It that all of the preliminary matter?

Mr. GEARHART. That is all for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, in your statement, Admiral Stark, you referred to a Presidential direction to prepare the Navy within 30 days for the capture and occupation of the Azores Islands?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

[*6149*] Mr. GEARHART. Will you tell me something more about the details of that direction you received from the President?

Admiral STARK. The basis for that directive was, I believe, our apprehension that possibly Germany might go down into Spain and

Portugal. We often discussed what the effect of it might be, and particularly if Gibraltar should be taken at the same time. The Azores in nonfriendly hands, or in Axis hands, would have been a very great threat to our communications on the sea, and the preparation to take the Azores, if necessary, was predicated on that possibility, namely, that Germany might go into Spain and into Portugal.

We had hoped ultimately, and ultimately we did get permission to go into the Azores and operate from there, and it was extremely advantageous, particularly with regard to patrolling the seas with long-range aircraft against submarines.

The President gave me that order and told me to be ready in 30 days.

Now, just why he gave it to me at that time and just why the 30 days, I don't recall. He gave me the direct order and right away I went to preparing the plans for it. It was a good thing, in any case, to have the plans ready.

For example, we likewise laid plans to take Martinique, if necessary, on the assumption that that island might join [*6150*] the Vichy Government under circumstances which would be detrimental to our communications in the Caribbean.

Mr. GEARHART. You mentioned the Azores preparation in your letter to Admiral Kimmel of 24 May 1941 and stated that the President gave you that positive direction 2 days before. That would make the date upon which you received your instructions from the President the 22d day of May 1941; is that approximately correct?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was because of action which the President was directing from day to day against the Germans—the consequent exchange of fire with German submarines which resulted—that caused you to state that we were at war in the Atlantic before Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, if you reached a conclusion sometime that we were at war in the Atlantic prior to Pearl Harbor, there must have been a time when that became fixed in your mind. I asked you the question yesterday but I think we became diverted and you didn't reply as to when you considered that the war in the Atlantic with Germany commenced.

Admiral STARK. Well, it commenced about the time of the shooting order, along after the President talked, I would say, in September—that is, his talk to the Nation. And the [*6151*] actual shooting orders we gave in October.

I would invite attention, however, to the fact that when I say we were at war, we were at war in effect so far as attacking German craft, subsurface or surface, which crossed a line which we had defined, and which slid down the east coast of Iceland to the twenty-sixth meridian and south on the twenty-sixth meridian, and later there was a line drawn to the westward of the west coast of South America.

Technically, or from an international standpoint, we were not at war inasmuch as we did not have the right of belligerents because war had not been declared, but actually, so far as the forces operating under Admiral King in certain areas, it was war against any German craft that came inside that area. They were attacking us and we were attacking them.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, actually there was no difference between the situation which existed and which would have existed if a formal declaration of war had been declared by Congress?

Admiral STARK. Not as regards that particular phase. I might however, read two dispatches, they are short, which I think will exemplify the differences which I have mentioned.

On 1 December 1941 I received a dispatch from our special naval observer in London, Vice Admiral Ghormley, which reads as follows:

[*6152*] The Admiralty believes that the French merchant vessel, Pierrel D. Mas, of long cruising radius, has sailed for Europe or North Africa via Cape Horn about 25–27 November with cargo rubber for trans-shipment to Germany. One of German ships at Kobe believed preparing to sail for Europe carrying rubber and nationals about 1 December. Report has been received that Germans are planning to send ships to Europe monthly. The Admiralty asks if Navy Department will cooperate as in the Odenwald case and intercept these vessels off Cape San Roque. If so information will be available as at Bad Washn.

That is, the British Admiralty detachment in Washington.

I replied to that dispatch the following day, 2 December, and the dispatch reads:

U. S. not being at war does not enjoy full belligerent rights and Navy Department cannot be committed to interception referenced vessels in specific locations. Your 010922. Odenwald made mistake of flying American flag and crew abandoned ship thus becoming subject to boarding and salvage. Such American men of war as may be in the vicinity can operate only under directives contained in WPL–52 and current operation orders of Commander-in-Chief Atlantic based thereon.

Mr. GEARHART. Despite the assertion there that we did not enjoy full belligerent rights because we were not legally at war, what belligerent right were we not exercising?

[*6153*] Admiral STARK. That is one, the belligerent right of what is known as visit and search.

Mr. GEARHART. Weren't we exercising that whenever the occasion arose?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The reason why we were not exercising it was simply because the Germans were using submarines and it was not practical to go aboard submarines, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. Well, any vessel—a raider, we likewise would have attacked. We laid out an area in which we told them to keep out and if they came into that we would attack them, that is, an Axis man-of-war.

Mr. GEARHART. Then by declaration we were already exercising the right of search and would have exercised it if the occasion arose because we told them that we would, is that not correct?

Admiral STARK. We told them we would attack. In this particular case of a merchant ship, we refused to intercept her. The *Odenwald* case—I do not know whether you recall it, it was in the press at the time—was loaded with a very valuable cargo for Germany. She was flying a flag, the American flag, and one of our cruisers in the South Atlantic became suspicious of her and when the cruiser approached her the crew abandoned the vessel and as I recall—I am not sure—prior [*6154*] to that had dumped a good deal of the cargo. We took that vessel into Puerto Rico, as I recall, and the subsequent action with regard to that vessel I think was predicated on international law. I have forgotten for the moment just what happened to it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, on that one occasion that you point out we did exercise the right of search, didn't we?

Admiral STARK. But the vessel had been abandoned and she was flying—she was operating under—false colors. We did go aboard and put a crew aboard and take her and bring her into port.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. She was abandoned because they expected shells from the American contingent, didn't they?

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, of course, as a reasonable individual you would expect that, you would accept that inference, wouldn't you?

Admiral STARK. Well, I don't know. I think if I had been skipper of that vessel I might have hung on until an American visit and search party had come aboard, but she had made the mistake of flying false colors and that put her open to capture, and she was captured after the crew had abandoned the vessel.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Well, now, there is no use quibbling. [*6155*] We were prepared to do anything that was necessary to end Hitlerism, is that not correct? That was the orders to the American Navy.

Admiral STARK. No, sir. The orders to the American Navy in certain areas was to insure the safety of communications and the delivery of the hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of material which were being sent to Britain under the terms of the lend-lease. Congress having made the United States Treasury practically available to manufacture war material and to deliver it, the President took steps to insure the delivery of that material so far as we could by escorting, guarding, and covering our ships across to the United Kingdom.

Mr. GEARHART. In insuring the delivery of American goods to England we were merely indirectly insuring the destruction of Hitlerism, were we not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And that was our objective.

Admiral STARK. That was the objective of the lend-lease law, as I understand it.

Mr. GEARHART. And there was no limit upon your belligerent rights insofar as serving that objective, was there?

Admiral STARK. Our areas were limited. I gave them to you yesterday. They show what they were. For example, we were not sending anything into the Mediterranean to fight [*6516*] Italy allied with Germany, nor were we going outside of what I believe the President defined as our waters. It was not all-out. It was limited, but it was effective, and it was war, to my mind, inside those limits.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, but not considering what you were not doing but considering what you were doing, the things that the American Navy was doing was war, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. As I said yesterday, when you are shooting at the other fellow and he is shooting at you, it to all intents and purposes is war, even though of a restricted nature. We were not, for example, flying planes over Germany.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, to quote from President Roosevelt's inspiring speech of October 27, 1941, he says very bluntly here, in effect, that

the objective of the United States military operation upon the high seas was to destroy Hitlerism, does he not, when he uses these words:

The forward march of Hitlerism can be stopped—and it will be stopped and very simply and very bluntly—we are pledged to put our own oar into the destruction of Hitlerism.

That indicates very clearly what was in the mind of the President on the 27th day of October 1941, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. I think there is no doubt about it and [*6157*] I think there was no doubt about it before that. His speech in early September was likewise very clear.

Mr. GEARHART. In another part of his speech he says:

Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One American destroyer was attacked on September 4th. Another destroyer was attacked and hit on October 17th. Eleven brave and loyal American men of our Navy were killed by the Nazis.

That shows they were making war on us, too, doesn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it does. I am simply trying——

Mr. GEARHART. I know, you are trying to point out the legalistic differences.

Admiral STARK. Just the legal points. We had not gone all-out. We were not basing planes in England to fly against Germany, all those things that came into effect the minute war was legally declared. Legally we were, in our opinion, at war on the high seas so far as guaranteeing the safe transit of our vessels towards Iceland and continental Europe—or the United Kingdom would be better than continental Europe there.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, the activities of the American Navy that we have just referred to constitute, do they not, legally overt acts against the Axis.

Admiral STARK. I should say we were both making overt [*6158*] acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by—I have forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a number of them regularly—and I stated and it will undoubtedly be in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would be most effective.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 constituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese. We were endeavoring—that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in my opinion, and I was close to them—not to precipitate a war in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussions as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the Japan- [*6159*] ese?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until you just asked the question.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph:

> On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Germany and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attacking Germany?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is correct, although I believe that the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision and she would or would not, [*6160*] according to whether or not it would be useful to her.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the Secretary of State of that day:

> The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that they had us in mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they entered into that agreement?

Admiral STARK. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as anything that has ever been acquired along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made towards separating the Japanese from their Axis [*6161*] obligations.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we didn't get to first base on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And the intercepts told you, all of the time that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering strictly to their Axis obligations?

Admiral STARK. I believed there was one intercept showing Germany's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more, at least one.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I won't take the time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands the Congressman is through.

Mr. GEARHART. I will announce to the Chairman when I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you said you would not take time.

Mr. GEARHART. I would not take time to look up that intercept because it is already in evidence.

Now, getting back to the meeting of the war council of November 25, 1941. Now, according to the Army report there are three different kinds of informal organizations which have been referred to colloquially as the war council.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I was originally a little confused as to just which one they referred to. I believe at one time Mr. Hull referred to his meetings with the Secretary [6162] of War and Secretary of State as a war council—or Secretary Stimson referred to it—but I do understand when you refer to it you mean the meetings of the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff with the President.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there was a meeting in the morning of the smaller war council, the three Secretaries, in which Mr. Hull explained to them what he was trying to do with the Japanese. According to the Army report he explained definitely the 3 months' truce agreement which has been referred to as the modus vivendi.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And at that meeting Mr. Hull expressed doubt as to whether or not he would present it. To quote Secretary Stimson:

> Hull showed me the proposal for a 3-months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow,

which is on the 25th that this is.

> It adequately safeguarded all our interests I thought and secured it but I did not think that there was any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.

Quoting further:

> [6163] We are an hour and a half with Hull and then I went back to the Department and I got hold of Marshall.

Now, that indicates quite clearly and it is the conclusion of the writers of the Army report that the Secretary of War was very much concerned over the developing situation and very much worried as to what the result was to be.

Now, in the afternoon or, rather, at high noon there was a meeting of the full War Council, so-called, at the White House. You were there, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You met at 12 and those present were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stimson, and yourself?

Admiral STARK. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, did Secretary Stimson bring up the subject of the kind of an answer that Secretary Hull was contemplating delivering to Mr. Nomura the next day?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall. I do not remember just what occurred at that meeting. We unquestionably got together to go over the situation and I assume that it was discussed from all angles, but just what those discussions were I have been unable to recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember whether or not Mr. Hull said anything about being in doubt as to whether he would serve the 3-months

truce statement or whether or not he [6164] would serve another one on them or whether or not he would just do nothing at all?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember. I think perhaps the best bit of evidence we have as to what Mr. Hull was thinking of at that time is contained in, I think, a memorandum of the 27th when he mentioned, as I recall in effect, that on about the 25th, as early as the 25th he was considering abandoning the modus vivendi and on the 26th he did abandon it.

You recall the paper to which I refer, in which he was discussing the matter with one of the foreign diplomats. I have that paper, it is short, and I think that gives his viewpoint very clearly.

Mr. GEARHART. I am more interested in your memory of that proceeding than I am in any other witness who is not on the stand. I am talking to you about that.

Admiral STARK. Yes. I do not recall it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, weren't you very, very much disturbed by the progress of that conference and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed by the progress of that conference in the things that were said and the things that were being planned by Mr. Hull?

Admiral STARK. We were disturbed because we thought things were heading up so fast towards a show-down, if you [6165] will, and we wanted more time and it began to look as though we were not going to get it.

I am sure with regard to the modus vivendi—I do not know whether this thought has crossed your mind or not. If you read the modus vivendi in itself it is nothing like so drastic as the so-called 10-point note which he handed to the Japs on the 26th, but it is my understanding that the 10 points mentioned in the note on the 26th were the points which were going to be taken up, perhaps one at a time, under the modus vivendi and that the modus vivendi would provide a period of some weeks or 3 months to discuss these particular points and that then the modus vivendi was thrown overboard and the points with which you are all familiar were handed to the Japanese.

Mr. GEARHART. It has been stated that the modus vivendi was abandoned because Chiang Kai-shek vigorously objected to it. Was any mention made of Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards the modus vivendi in that meeting of the 25th?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that it was. I have an extremely clear recollection of Mr. Hull telling me how he felt about the modus vivendi separate from that meeting of the 25th.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you hear Mr. Stimson say at that meeting anything about whether he approved the 3 months' truce, [6166] the modus vivendi, or not?

Admiral STARK. I have tried to reconstruct that meeting and what was said.

Mr. GEARHART. I am trying to help you reconstruct it now. That is why I am taking the time to talk around the question, hoping that I will bring to life something in your memory which you have for the moment passed by.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall. I remember the tense atmosphere and the discussions in general of the period, that is the thing which I am trying to reconstruct, and every time we have tried to reconstruct it for about 3 hours we just cannot do it. That is around

the 25th, 26th, and 27th. But as to what actually transpired at that meeting and what Mr. Hull may have said and Mr. Stimson may have said, I have been unable to recall.

Mr. GEARHART. But you do remember that the Japanese dead-line intercept, which said that after the dead line had passed things were going to automatically begin to happen, that was discussed; you remember that, don't you?

Admiral STARK. I remember the message, I remember the dispatch very clearly and whether at that particular time it was read or discussed I could not say. It very well may have been, probably was, but I do not recall the discussions at that meeting.

[*6167*] Mr. GEARHART. You heard the President say in the course of that meeting, in substance or in effect, that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as, perhaps next Monday?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I recall that. I believe that—I am not sure; I think I put that down in one of my letters. What I wrote, and in which my statement abounds, is factual, written at the time, but I do not recall the conversation at that time. Of course, it covered the seriousness of the situation. That was what the meeting was called for.

[*6168*] Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember that the President said that the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and that the question was what should be done about it?

Admiral STARK. I assume he did. We at one time before had already mentioned that ourselves. Now the one thing that I do remember—and I do not know that it is necessary to read again—is my postscript to my letter of the 25th in which you will recall that I held up the letter for a day because of that meeting. I will read it again if you like. It is on the record. That is what I do remember.

Mr. GEARHART. How long is it, Admiral Stark?

Admiral STARK. It is short.

Mr. GEARHART. Read it in again. It will make it easier to follow:

Admiral STARK. (Reading:)

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but [*6169*] I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as most likely.

Then I went on to state I did not know what we would do, and the rest of the paragraph was meant to be prepared for anything.

Mr. GEARHART. This being surprised or not being surprised reminds me of "on again, off again, Finnegan." Why is this assertion made one moment that the President was surprised, and the assertion made the next moment that he was not surprised?

Admiral STARK. I might say in regard to surprise, I was endeavoring last night, in regard to surprise and war warning, to get down to some simple statement which might show my feeling about it. For example, one takes a step or steps, at times, to avoid being hurt,

even though he does not really expect to be hurt or he may regard it only as a possibility.

Now with the war warning our feeling was, except for taking the offensive, that the officers to whom that message was addressed would practcially assume we were at war, so far as taking measures against surprise was concerned. I believe had we not been attacked at that time—and I am [6170] assuming this and you can verify it because I may be wrong—but had we not been attacked at that time but had Japan declared war against us, we would have started reconnaissance and those other measures in the outlying stations to guard against surprise.

I assumed when we stated the imminence of war that those measures would be put into effect.

For example, I doubt if anybody in Washington, or perhaps anybody in the Hawaiian area, in Oahu, Pearl Harbor, would have expected an attack in late 1944 or 1945 when we were knocking at the gates of Japan, nevertheless, I dare say they were taking continuous 24-hour effective measures against being caught aback by any Japanese raid.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, to come back to the meeting of the 25th, the War Council——

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you have an impression now that you left that meeting disturbed by what Secretary Hull said he contemplated handing to the Japanese the next day?

Admiral STARK. I was disturbed before the meeting. As to what he was going to hand the Japanese the next day, I have no recollection of it. You can question Admiral Schuirmann on that who was daily at the State Department, and to the best of my knowledge and belief the Department [6171] . had no forewarning of the note of the 26th, nor did we know that it was not sent at that time, but it was sent later.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not mean to have me infer from that answer that Secretary Hull assumed the great responsibility personally of handing the 10-point note to the Japanese without informing the President and the War Council of his contemplated action?

Admiral STARK. I think he would not have done it without informing the President. He did do it, to the best of my knowledge and belief, without informing either the Army or the Navy.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not he inform you and General Marshall, and did not you and Marshall protest against the handing of the 10-point note to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. Not to my knowledge or remembrance. The memorandum to the President by Mr. Hull, of which I have a photosatic copy, of November 26 states, if I may read it——

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, if it is not long.

Admiral STARK (reading):

With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government—this is dated the 26th, the day after the meeting—1. A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad basic peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be [6172] carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject.

2. The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a *modus vivendi* intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations.

In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the *modus vivendi*, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the *modus vivendi* proposal.

That is signed "Cordell Hull."

That was sent on the 26th to the President, and as I read it, asking the President's permission to take the course which he did take, and evidently one might infer from that, [*6173*] although again I have no clear recollection of the November 25 meeting, that he had not made such a request or possibly proposed it on the 25th.

I think there was boiling in Mr. Hull's mind the message from Chiang Kai-shek and it jelled on the 26th.

Mr. GEARHART. Anyway, you and General Marshall left that meeting feeling it was incumbent upon you to make a last-minute appeal in writing to the President to do everything you could to gain time?

Admiral STARK. Whether the memorandum to the President started then or before I do not know. I would recall our message of the 24th showing my apprehension, and to which General Marshall agreed. In endeavoring to fix the date that that started, about the only one whom I have heard state anything about it, who fixes it rather clearly in his own mind and who was one of the draftees of it, was Admiral Turner; who believed it started about the 24th.

Mr. GEARHART. Now this meeting adjourned about 1 o'clock, did it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You returned to your office then, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. At 1:54 you put in a call for General Marshall, did you not?

[*6174*] Admiral STARK. Well, if the record shows that, I probably did; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It does. To refresh your memory, wasn't it for the purpose of getting together with General Marshall immediately to prepare a written memorandum pleading with the President to do whatever he could do to gain time for the Army and Navy?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall, Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall and I were together on that proposition. Just when we started it I cannot say.

Mr. GEARHART. Then at 4:30 in the afternoon General Marshall called you on the phone, according to the record of White House calls. Now was not that call to further discuss the hastily prepared memorandum to the President?

Admiral STARK. That is going on 5 years ago, and when you ask me what we said over the telephone at a certain hour in the afternoon, I just cannot answer it.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I notice in the same report on the afternoon of November 25 at 5 p. m. you again called General Marshall. I will ask you, to refresh your memory, wasn't it for him to come over and put his signature on the document, or for you to send it to him where he could put his signature on it?

Admiral STARK. On the afternoon of the 25th?

[*6175*] Mr. GEARHART. On the afternoon of the 25th.

Admiral STARK. The document shows the date of the 27th.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but you also heard the testimony of General Marshall that he was not in Washington on the 27th.

Admiral STARK. I knew that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Therefore he could not sign it on the date it bears, he had to sign it ahead of time.

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily. He thinks he signed it on the 28th. It might have been dated the 27th. It was dated the 27th for his signature and mine, and he being absent he could not sign it until he got back. You recall the Gerow memorandum in which he states—

The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum

this is Gerow to General Marshall—

you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum that were made.

Now if the changes were made at that time it would not appear probable to me that Marshall would have signed it on the 25th, particularly as the memorandum bears the date of the 27th, and particularly also in view of this memorandum.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I note in the same White House record that on 10:30 a. m. you called General Marshall on the 26th. It is possible that he signed it on the 26th after the changes were made, is that not correct? Does not the telephone call pertain to that?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what that telephone call pertains to. Someone has suggested to me that I had something important that morning and wanted to delay the joint board meeting a little bit, and that that call was for that purpose. Personally I do not recall.

Mr. GEARHART. The same White House record discloses that you called General Marshall at 1:25 p. m. on the 26th. Could it be possible you called with reference to that memorandum to the President, that you had determined with him to send to the Chief Executive?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; it could have been possible.

Mr. GEARHART. It could have been signed on the 26th? It was within the range of possibilities?

Admiral STARK. It was; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the diary of Secretary Stimson shows that at the meeting of the 27th, when General Marshall was out of the city, the memorandum was [*6177*] considered by the War Council, that would seem that it was signed before, instead of after the 27th, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily. I think the best testimony we have on that is from General Marshall himself.

Mr. GEARHART. I have here the testimony of Mr. Stimson which says:

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed.

Now, that is from the diary of Secretary Stimson, and his diary ought to be better evidence, ought it not, than the memory 5 years old of the Chief of Staff.

Do you not think so?

Admiral STARK. Yes; but I see nothing in there to show that General Marshall might have signed it on the 26th. That is a discussion of the draft of the memorandum, is it not?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; presented to the War Council, and discussed by the War Council. Would it be presented to the War Council and discussed by them if it were not assented to by the Chief of Staff already?

Admiral STARK. May I see what you are reading from?

Mr. GEARHART. I am reading from the United States newsprint of the Army report, reading from page 51, half way down the second column.

Admiral STARK. That is this publication (indicating)?

[*6178*] Mr. GEARHART. Page 51, the right-hand column.

Admiral STARK. About half way down the right-hand column?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. About one-third of the way down it says, "Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November, 1941."

I have skipped down about three paragraphs.

Admiral STARK. Yes. As I read it, it says: "I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

That was not a War Council meeting, it was a conversation over the telephone if I have the right paragraph.

Mr. GEARHART. It is the next paragraph:

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, "a draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined and the question of need for further time was discussed."

Admiral STARK. As I read that, the "he" refers not to the President but to Mr. Stimson.

Mr. GEARHART. You then called up the President and talked with him about it?

Admiral STARK. It says:

"I then called up the President [*6179*] and talked with him about it."

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall.

I think it refers to Secretary Stimson, as I read it.

Mr. GEARHART. Perhaps you are right. Do you remember the occasion?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, you remember whether it was the President who took it up with you people or whether it was taken up by Mr. Stimson.

Admiral STARK. It was Mr. Stimson, if I remember.

Mr. GEARHART. Where was the meeting held?

Admiral STARK. I think in Secretary Stimson's Office. It was in Mr. Stimson's office, I recollect.

Going back to your record about my calls with General Marshall, there is a note here on my copy which we obtained that General Marshall was not in, so apparently we did not discuss anything. The message of 12:50 also has an "NM" on it, on the mimeographed sheet, from which I suppose you read.

Mr. GEARHART. What does that mean?

Admiral STARK. It means "No message". I did not get [*6180*] hold of him.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that why you kept on trying?

Admiral STARK. Well, I tried to get him at that time and he was not there. He was there in the morning. Now, as regards the late afternoon message to which you referred, I do not see anything after that, after 12:50, which did not get through to Marshall.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, this is repetition, but when did you first hear of the 10-point message?

Admiral STARK. I may have heard of it on the 28th. It is not clear in my mind. I do not remember when I first heard of the 10-point message. Undoubtedly not later than the 28th. Possibly Mr. Stimson mentioned it. It is possible when he said Mr. Hull had thrown over the modus vivendi and was going to send a note, that I had the substance of it. I knew approximately what the substance of that note was, because, as I understand, those were the points that were going to be taken up during the period which the modus vivendi was designed to cover.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, to refresh your memory, I notice on this same record of White House calls that Secretary Hull called you and got through, it is marked with an "O.K." at 1:15 p. m. on the 26th day of November, 1941. Does that remind you of the fact that Secretary Hull told you what he [*6181*] had done previously that morning at 9 o'clock in reference to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. My remembrance, and my only remembrance, is Mr. Hull's feeling about the note, and sometime during that period I learned that he was throwing over the modus vivendi, and the flat statement that it was now up to the Army and Navy, which, to my mind, pointed clearly to the fact that he had no hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement in the Pacific through further negotiations. That we crystallized in our dispatch of the 27th.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the making of a decision to abandon the modus vivendi and to serve upon the Japanese the 10-point document, that so many people call an ultimatum, was an important event in the minds of all the members of the War Council, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Well, when I learned of it I considered it very important, particularly, as we were playing for time.

Mr. GEARHART. It was so important that I am astonished that Admiral Stark should call you on the 'phone just after he had completed the delivery, to talk with you and not say anything about it.

Admiral STARK. You mean Mr. Hull?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Hull; yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. As I say, he may have told me at that [*6182*] time about it being up to the Army and Navy. Just when I got that, whether it was the 26th or 27th, or I may have inferred it from his

conversation on the 25th, I could not say, but I would again invite attention to the fact that it was on the 26th that he asked the President's permission to proceed on that line. What time the President got that and what time the President O.K.'d I do not know. I doubt that Mr. Hull would have told me he was going to do it prior to getting the President's permission. I think he delivered the note in the late afternoon, somewhere around 1800, as I recall, to the Japs. That can be ascertained from the records.

Mr. GEARHART. Are you sure as to that?

Admiral STARK. Not sure. I say it can be obtained from the records. I have that recollection. It is probably based on some appointment, or something, of Secretary Hull with the Japs.

Mr. GEARHART. But you have no memory of the Secretary mentioning anything to you in his telephone call at 1:25 p. m. concerning what kind of a message he was going to deliver to or had delivered to the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. I did not get the first part of that, Mr. Gearhart. I was looking for something to back up my statement about the late afternoon, and with your permission I would like to state that from the Washington Post of the 27th [*6183*] Washington Post, November 27, page 4, it states, "Then came Hull to see the President. Hull left the White House and returned to the State Department to confer with Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton and Ballantine, his Far East experts." That is the Washington Post, November 27, page 4.

These officials were still with Hull when Kurusu and Nomura arrived at 5 p. m. The note was handed to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6:45 p. m.

Now, that is from the Washington Post, and I assume the State Department can verify it if such is desired.

[*6184*] Mr. GEARHART. What was the hour?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Mr. GEARHART. What was the hour mentioned?

Admiral STARK. It states the note was handed to Kurusu and Nomura at this conference which lasted until 6:45 p. m. It also states the two Japanese diplomats arrived at 5 p. m.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the record shows that at 2:35 p. m. you called Secretary Hull; refreshing your memory, did he say anything about what kind of a document he was planning to deliver to the Japanese later on in the day?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you first hear Secretary Hull quoted as saying that he had decided to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposals at all?

Admiral STARK. That is what I have been trying to reconstruct. The Gerow memorandum shows that we had that in the conference on the morning of the 27th through Mr. Stimson. That is the one definite thing in writing which seems to set that date.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you hear for the first time that Secretary Hull had made the statement, as he put it:

I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of Stimson and Knox and the Army and Navy?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I say, I heard it not later [*6185*] than the 27th and on the 27th. Now, whether Mr. Hull told me that

as his feeling earlier, I don't know, but he couldn't have made the definite statement, I would say—and, of course, Mr. Hull is available—prior to getting permission from the President, which was in his memorandum of the 26th.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you, Admiral Stark, in the light of all these facts and figures and telephone calls that I have called your attention to, is it not a fact that as a consequence of the meetings of the war council of November 25 and of November 26 that you and Marshall were very, very much disturbed because of the anticipated and announced action of Secretary Hull and that you and he rushed to—and did—prepare a memorandum pleading with the President to do something which would make it possible to offset what Mr. Hull was contemplating and to gain time for the military forces of the United States to prepare for the inevitable conflict?

Admiral STARK. Well, the entire picture became serious around the 23d and the 24th, as reflected in my dispatch of the 24th. Whether that memorandum was started on the 25th or the 26th or the 24th I am not sure. But, of course, we were disturbed. That is factual. We were playing for time. That is factual. And the memorandum bears the date of the 27th.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

[*6186*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Admiral STARK. May I now—I see Senator Lucas is here—bring up the point which I started to bring up this morning and noting his absence did not bring up, with reference to yesterday?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may proceed with that.

Admiral STARK. Yesterday Senator Lucas in examining me asked if the damage done to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not largely due to torpedoes, that it was his opinion that it was, and in that I agreed. I was particularly thinking of my old command, which I put in commission as executive officer, and later commanded, the *West Virginia*, whose damage was very extensive from torpedoes, and I think his statement may still stand as correct that the great portion of the damage was caused by torpedoes, although the Department can give factual information on that.

However, not being too sure of my answer I checked up and I want to offer the following, which is taken from item 15 of the Navy Folder which is before the committee, and without reading the entire thing I simply want to show the following in the record, which does show great damage probably done by bombs.

You have this item 15 among your exhibits.

[*6187*] The *Arizona* was attacked by both torpedoes and bombs.

The *California* was attacked by torpedoes and bombs.

The *West Virginia* was attacked—when I say attacked I mean hit—by torpedoes and bombs.

The *Oklahoma* was hit only by torpedoes.

The *Nevada* was hit by torpedoes and bombs.

The *Maryland* was hit by bombs only.

The *Pennsylvania* was hit by bombs only.

The *Tennessee* was hit by bombs only.

The *Helena* was hit by torpedoes only.

The *Honolulu* was damaged by bombs only.

The *Raleigh*, damaged by both torpedoes and bombs.

The *Shaw*, by bomb only.

The *Cassin* and *Downes*, by bomb only.

That refers to the major combatant ships and there is further data with regard to what damage was suffered. I just touched on the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement on that, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, you have now given the opinion to Senator Lucas, from the record there, on the [*6188*] ships. Did the Secretary of the Navy go out to Hawaii after the attack?

Admiral STARK. Very shortly after; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did he bring back a report?

Admiral STARK. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you examine that report with him?

Admiral STARK. The only report that I saw was the one which was made public; and, of course, he told us, in a long conference, a great deal of what happened, particularly items of interest, and of the wonderful behavior of our men, and of their wonderful spirit, et cetera, as he saw them in the hospital wards.

I was asked, and I didn't understand the question, in the previous investigation by the Navy, when I said I saw the report, I believe reference was made to a special report which he made to the President that I did not see.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you never saw the report that went to the President?

Admiral STARK. So far as I know I never saw that report. I don't recall it. I saw the report which was made public; and, of course, from conversations with him I got the picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true that the report that was made public was a different report than the one given to the President?

[*6189*] Admiral STARK. I understood so since, but I have not seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that the Secretary of the Navy did not disclose to you the facts that he disclosed to the President, you being the highest Navy man under him?

Admiral STARK. I don't account for it.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't account for it?

Admiral STARK. I don't. I don't recall any knowledge of it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well——

Admiral STARK. That he had made a special written report to the President, if he did, and I am assuming from your question that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. And you indicated that you knew he had?

Admiral STARK. Well, I indicated to this extent, that when I was asked the question last summer, or a year ago last summer, I should say, if I had seen the report which Colonel Knox made, I replied "Yes," and I gathered later that the report—the report I referred to was that which was published, that is what I understood the question was asked on, and I gained the understanding since that there was another report.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, yesterday you made an answer to Mr. Gearhart that I want to ask you about. You said:

[*6190*] I have spent hours trying to recall what went on, on the 25th, 6th and 7th, as to time. I have discussed it with others. We come to an impasse as to any agreement every time we do it, and every time we start it we waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the details of just when I got that information. I wish I could, but I just can't do it.

Do I understand from that answer that what you are conveying to the committee is that you have sat down with various other officials and tried to arrive at an agreement as to what happened during this period, is that what I understand?

Admiral STARK. As to when it happened. My memory is clear as to certain things which did happen and not clear as to others. But when I try, for example, to fix in my own mind whether Mr. Hull told me about the Chiang Kai-shek memorandum on the 25th or 26th, I can't do it. I have talked the matter over at length on different occasions with Admiral Schuirmann, who was in constant touch with the State Department, and as to what he knew.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not what I am getting at. Do I understand that some of your answers here are because you have agreed with somebody that that is what happened and if you can't agree then you don't give your best answer?

Admiral STARK. No. I have given my best answer. That [*6191*] is not the inference to be drawn at all.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to straighten out on this answer.

Admiral STARK. No; that inference is not what I intended to convey. It is my effort to fix down to a date and a time as to just when I learned, for example, of Mr. Hull's sending the 10-point note, of his conversation about Chiang Kai-Shek, and the material of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Now——

Admiral STARK. But——

Senator FERGUSON. I will have to change the subject, because I was talking about another thing, but you bring up another thing which I will ask you about now, copy of the message transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong, under cover of a letter dated November 25.

Will you look at that and see whether that is the Chiang Kai-shek message that you are talking about?

Admiral STARK. That is the message, or it certainly conveys the material which Mr. Hull talked to me about, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I understand that a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State was sent to the Secretary of War. Do you know whether or not a copy was sent to the Secretary of the Navy, and did it reach you in that manner?

Admiral STARK. It is my recollection, and again you can [*6192*] get factual data, that this message was not only sent to Mr. Hull but to a number of other officials in our Government.

Senator FERGUSON. That is just it. Isn't it true that the Chinese Government not only went to the Secretary of State but they went to other agencies and Mr. Hull was upset about it?

Admiral STARK. Very much upset. I believe this was also made known to people in Congress at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So the substance of that letter not only came to you through Mr. Hull but it came from other sources, did it not?

Admiral STARK. I knew of the substance of it because I can recall Colonel Knox talking about people talking about this on the Hill.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did you have a conversation—I realize how long it has been, I realize that there is much water gone over the dam, as we say, but I want to try and get the substance of some of these conversations because what this committee has to do is to try to get the best information they can so that we will get all the facts, and I hope that you will bear with me on some of these questions.

Admiral STARK. I will do my best to give you all I know and any information that I have that should be of assistance.

Senator FERGUSON. I start out with the assumption, and [*6193*] I take it it is true, that you favor this hearing and you are willing to cooperate.

Admiral STARK. I am delighted that this hearing came before Congress where all parties would have the opportunity to tell you all they know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am assuming that.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this information that came from the Chinese Government in relation to this modus vivendi, it wasn't only given to the Secretary of State, but it was given to other agencies and even came up on the Hill, as we call the Congress; that is true; isn't it?

Admiral STARK. That is my understanding, and confirmed, without any question, by Mr. Hull's statement to me that they were crying appeasement on the Hill, another thing which greatly perturbed him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now—do you want to take a moment to look at that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There is one paragraph here in Mr. Hull's statement which reads——

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the statement of November 29th?

Admiral STARK. No, of November 25:[1]

Subject: Opposition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to modus vivendi.
[*6194*] Participants: Secretary Hull and the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih.

And part of that reads:

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang Kai-Shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indo-China and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indo-China and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-Shek said was an imminent danger—

and so forth.

I remember very clearly how upset Mr. Hull was, of his telling me that even the Hill was crying appeasement, that the Chinese themselves should have supported him, because he was doing this in their behalf, and that apparently they didn't understand it.

Also in a previous dispatch, which I read, he pointed out that the British, he thought, were only half-way supporting it.

[1] Included in Exhibit No. 18.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it your understanding, or was it not your understanding, that to have entered into or to have sent the modus vivendi, or agreed on the modus vivendi, that [*6195*] thereby America would have been sacrificing her principles?

Admiral STARK. No. That is not my opinion. My understanding of the modus vivendi was that it was to insure a period of three months to talk things over and that the material which was in the 10–point note were the items which they were going to talk over and resolve.

Senator FERGUSON. But the modus vivendi would have given an extension of three months for negotiations and would have not, except for that period, let's say, sacrificed the American principles?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I had no idea that Mr. Hull for one second considered sacrificing any principles or walking backward.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the highest Naval authority in the United States?

Admiral STARK. I was.

Senator FERGUSON. You were under the Secretary of the Navy but you were the highest authority?

Admiral STARK. By virtue of my office at that time I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were vitally interested in our diplomatic negotiations, because, as I understand it, you have to have your diplomatic negotiations tied in with your military authorities, because you have got to be able to [*6196*] back up what you do; isn't that the principle?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were vitally interested in this modus vivendi and the diplomatic negotiations; is that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us why the modus vivendi was not sent. You were one of the top officials representing the United States Navy, and, if I might add, before you answer that, this would be a Naval war in the Pacific, would it not?

Admiral STARK. Largely, yes. I always looked on it as largely a naval war.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you would be very vitally interested in this question as to whether or not we had a 3 months period or whether or not we didn't take that period. Will you tell us why the modus vivendi was not sent?

Admiral STARK. May I add there that so was Marshall, because——

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, yes.

Admiral STARK. Because the defense of the Philippines, which was an Army problem, was one of the primary reasons for that extension.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't mean to say that the Military, [*6197*] the Army, was not vitally interested also, but it would have been, to a greater extent, a naval war?

Admiral STARK. Yes; but holding the Philippines was something I took up in the first meeting I ever had in the White House. There had always been a general feeling that we couldn't hold the Philippines, that we would have to abandon them. I was hoping that we would have time to take steps to make them secure. My desire for time was so that the Army could complete a project it had to greatly strengthen the Philippines, and in turn the fleet could support them in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, coming back to my previous question, why did we not use the modus vivendi?

Admiral STARK. Well, I can give you my opinion as to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have the substance of what was said first and then your opinion.

Admiral STARK. I gained the impression from Mr. Hull that the Chiang Kai-shek note so disturbed him that—along with other things which have been read—that he seriously questioned, when he first informed me, the desirability of his going ahead with the modus vivendi. Subsequently he did not go ahead with it. Now—

[*6198*] Senator FERGUSON. What were the other things?

Admiral STARK. The other items were those which have been mentioned, but, as I recall, the British and the Dutch appeared not too strongly with him; they were crying appeasement on the Hill, as he stated to me, with regard to the course that he was taking.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe that is the message that you referred to today and it reads something like this:

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their Governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments were more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and to take the lead in defending the entire area.[1]

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. And then there was his memorandum dated November 29,[2] in which he refers to a conference: Participants, the Secretary of State, Hull, and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. That was the one I was thinking about.

[*6199*] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Will you give me the substance of that?

Admiral STARK (reading):

The British Ambassador called at his request and I soon discovered that he had no special business except to check on the aftermath of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japanese with special reference to the question of the proposed *modus vivendi*. This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the facts are.

There are about four or five pages to this. I do not know whether you want me to go ahead with the rest of it as a refresher or not.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in, is it not?

[*6200*] Mr. MITCHELL. It is in Exhibit 18.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it is in the record.

Admiral STARK. It is in the record, yes, sir. I might just add the next sentence. [Reading:]

I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, appar-

[1] Page 3 of Memorandum of Conversation, dated November 24, 1941, included in Exhibit No. 18.

[2] Included in Exhibit No. 18.

ently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that [*6201*] all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter into with China.

And then it goes on. I think I have read enough to show how Mr. Hull felt about it and which I got the impression from him in talking with him personally.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, all right. Did you feel the same way about it?

Admiral STARK. I felt the same way about the impropriety of flooding all of Washington in the manner in which Mr. Hull stated. I thought they should have gone about it to him with all of their troubles and not gone to the highways and byways.

Senator FERGUSON. But after we are all through, it is apparent that Mr. Hull—or is it apparent—that Mr. Hull followed just what the Chinese wanted?

Admiral STARK. He did. He broke off so far as the modus vivendi is concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[*6202*] Admiral STARK. And he gives extensive reasons there for it. Perhaps he may have agreed with some of Chiang Kai-shek's thoughts that even a leak that we were—and I think it is in that letter—a leak to the effect that the United States was going to let Japan have oil or other materials or ease up on the freezing might be such a blow to their morale as to make it impossible for them to continue. But we had all those things. He talked it over, I assume, with his chief and he came to that conclusion. We were thinking that from the military standpoint to gain time.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Admiral, isn't this true, that when you take what Mr. Hull said about Chiang Kai-shek, it indicated that he was not going to follow that route rather than that he was going to follow what he wanted; it was a criticism of it.

Admiral STARK. It was a criticism of Mr. Hull by the Chinese you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. No; a criticism of the Chinese stand, was it not?

Admiral STARK. By Mr. Hull?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not know if he criticized so much although he may have and did in some respects the Chinese understanding. That, I would say, could have been resolved and [*6203*] set straight between Mr. Hull and the Ambassador, but when it was broadcast, or the impression was gained or at least talked about and

Mr. Hull gained the impression, that even here at the Capitol that he, Mr. Hull, was being guilty of appeasement and that may also have influenced him in the action which he took.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. Do I understand, then, that the opinion that Mr. Hull was appeasing Japan may have had something to do with him throwing out the modus vivendi and putting in the note of the 26th?

Admiral STARK. Whether or not that criticism which was being leveled at him in official Washington had anything to do with his final decision, only Mr. Hull could answer. I do know that it greatly annoyed him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how do you account for this note on the 24th where he fully recognized what he is saying:

> I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

He fully recognized our position in the world when he said that, did he not?

[*6204*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he recognized that and I think that probably from the other governments it is not unusual. It is a rather human weakness to have that sort of an opinion. Every fellow is thinking of himself first and perhaps sometimes from thinking overmuch of himself loses sight of the broader picture. That is what I gather that he means.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that exactly what happened, just what Mr. Hull prophesied would happen, that we would have to defend the whole area and we would have to have the war for the whole area, isn't that what happened?

Admiral STARK. We would have the major role.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. The Chinese had their role and, of course, the British also had their role and there were plans being laid.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that takes me to this: What was our role, what was our plan in case there was an attack upon the British possessions in that area? I am talking right from this memorandum of the 24th here:

> In case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

which would include the British.

Now, what was our plan, what was our role if an attack [*6205*] was made upon the British possessions in the Far East?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what it would have been. It would have been up to Congress in the last analysis, had the President decided that it was time to make a recommendation to Congress. What recommendation he would have made, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to find out what would be your stand? You had to prepare for such an emergency, did you not?

Admiral STARK. We were preparing for it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you could not wait until Congress acted to get at least prepared for such a situation?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did you ever try to find out what our stand would be in that case?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you try to find it out from?

Admiral STARK. I had asked the President.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he tell you?

Admiral STARK. He could not answer the question and I believe that he was sincere in stating that he did not know. You will recall, and I have stated factually—this is not hindsight—in answer to questions of this sort which Admiral Richardson asked me and that I had asked for the answers to [*6206*] those questions and could not get them, and I quote—I believe I stated—that I thought that "there was nobody on God's green earth who could answer them."

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you went to the President and you asked the specific question as to what we would do in that case if an attack was made on the British possessions, in which case I understand that he told you he did not know.

Admiral STARK. He did not answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what did he say or what did he do?

Admiral STARK. Just that he did not know; at least he said that he could not answer it. At one time I believe he said to me, "Don't ask me these questions," because I feel that he could not answer them—I felt that he could not answer them. Now, as to what he would done, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Admiral, how could you prepare for that situation? If you could not get an answer and, as you say, you knew the President could not answer it, how could you prepare for that?

Admiral STARK. I could work on the assumption that the worst might happen and that is what I did. For example——

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you——

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness complete his answer.

[*6207*] Senator FERGUSON. I will let him answer.

Admiral STARK. May I just give you an example? You will recall that on my own initiative, so far as getting the British over here in early 1941, we started hearings here with the British. When I asked them to come over initially I did not ask the President's permission or Colonel Knox. It was more or less—there was some dynamite in the fact that it might be known that we were holding conversations with the British as to what we would do and how we would work with them in case of war.

I was asked the question one day on the Hill before one of the Senate committees, as to whether or not we were holding conversations with the British with regards to participation with them in the war and my answer was that I would like to put two or three questions up to the committee. And the first one was, "Is there not some possibility of the United States being drawn into this war, remote though it may be and regardless of our endeavor to keep out?" They agreed that such a possibility did exist in the world situation at that time.

I then asked, "Suppose that possibility develops, is there any question on which side we would fight? If course there was no question. It would be opposed to the Axis.

I then answered the question and stated, "The answer is in the affirmative" in answering you, but wouldn't I be utter- [*6208*] ly

derelict in my duties if I did not prepare for the contingency so that if and when war did eventuate that there would be ample working plans, so far as possible, to dovetail and coordinate our effort?

The questioning of me on that subject stopped and I never was asked about it during the course of months, during the course of those next couple of months work with the British.

Now, as regards the Far East, we did hold conversations out there in the A-D-B, none of which was approved, and final action, we put it up to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Phillips, the British Commander-in-Chief, to make their own plans as to how to work together if we both got in it. The directions were always against any political commitment. I have Hart's here, his despatch covering the recommendations with regard to that pulling together and I have our answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that at any time you discussed with the President the question as to not what we would do, but preparing for the eventuality that if they did attack the British that you would be prepared for this country to come in?

Admiral STARK. I stated, and he knew with regard to the particular conversations I have just mentioned, I informed him in January, after the committee was here, that I was going ahead with those conversations.

[*6209*] Senator FERGUSON. And what did he say about that?

Admiral STARK. I told him that I would prefer to be panned for not being ready than for being reproved when the time came and I was not ready, and he let it go at that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what did he say? What was the substance of what he said?

Admiral STARK. Well, he did not pan me and after looking——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean after the 7th he did not pan you?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. You mean after the 7th of December or when?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time?

Admiral STARK. After I informed him of the conversations going on. Later on all those conversations, that is, the boil-down and the plans were shown to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then, that on the 7th day of December 1941, you as the head of the Navy had no plan to go into effect if the British were attacked and we were not attacked?

Admiral STARK. If the British were attacked and we were [*6210*] not attacked we had no plans to bring into being.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I understand——

Admiral STARK. I say that we did not get any.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. Then I understand that the Winant note, the message sending the information that they were going to the Kra Peninsula on the 6th and that they would be there in some 14 hours, and another note, the paraphrase of a secret message—this is on page 5507 of this record—received at the War Department at 4:29 December 6th, that is, 4:29 p. m. in the afternoon of December 6th [reading]:

Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west, were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant ships; these were seen at 106°8′ E., 8° N.; this was the first report.

The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers were seen following the same course at 106°20′ E., 7°35′ N.

Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.

Now, I understand, Admiral, that those two messages, then, would not cause us to be alerted in and of themselves because we had no plan if they attacked the British and it was certainly not an attack on any of our possessions?

[*6211*] Admiral STARK. If they had attacked the British and not us I would have taken no action except to continue to be alert against an attack by them, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that that could account for the fact that you were not alerted, your office was not alerted Saturday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday morning up till the time of the attack?

Admiral STARK. I do not understand just what you mean by "not alerted." Our office was operating 24 hours a day.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, having those two messages and no plan for us to take any part, were you alerted for war that afternoon and that morning, Sunday morning the 7th?

Admiral STARK. You mean where, in Washington or in the field?

Senator FERGUSON. No, Washington, right in your office.

Admiral STARK. Yes, we were. We were alerted. We were on duty at all times.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that by being alerted you mean this, that at 10:30 on the day that war was to start that you would get down to your office at 10:30 if you were fully alerted and expecting a war to start?

Admiral STARK. If I had expected the war to start at [*6212*] that time I would have come down. I did not know the war was going to start that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know it was going to start as far as the British was concerned on the 7th?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What about these two messages?

Admiral STARK. Well, this message from Hart to the British——

Senator FERGUSON. And the Winant message.

Admiral Stark. And the Winant message, which is practically the same as the one from Hart, gave the movement of that and we were trying to diagnose where they would hit.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, they were going to cross the Gulf of Siam, were they not?

Admiral STARK. They were heading south, which is in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. And that fleet and that convoy would not attack America's possessions?

Admiral STARK. No, but there might have been another attack on American possessions concurrently.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate such?

Admiral STARK. Did I what, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate such another attack on American possessions?

[*6213*] Admiral STARK. We had mentioned that we could not preclude an attack elsewhere and we had specifically included the Philippines, which was on the flank, as a possibility in that connection

and we had sent previous messages to the effect that they might strike anywhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you figure that when they would strike the British, which would be some time on Sunday—14 hours, in fact, from some time on Saturday noon—did you figure that they would attack American possessions?

Admiral STARK. We figured at that time, in view of the fact that they had destroyed their codes with us and with the Dutch that there certainly was a possibility, even a strong probability—even a probability of their attacking all three of us. That was after the destruction of codes. It certainly was an indication and a rather clear indication of their enemies. They might simply have broken off diplomatic relations with us, we couldn't tell, but the presumption which we instilled into the dispatch was war.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say a strong probability was that they were going to attack us as well as the British?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how do you account, Admiral, for the fact that you could not be reached Saturday night——

Admiral STARK. I would not want to——

[*6214*] Senator FERGUSON. Wait until I finish my question.

Admiral STARK. Pardon me.

Senator FERGUSON. And that you did not get to your office and no one reached you until 10:30 that Sunday morning?

Admiral STARK. I would like to say as regards reaching me Saturday night, that I am still of the opinion that I was home. I am not sure, from the testimony which has been given on that, that I was called that night. There is room for doubt in the testimony that I have read of each of the parties concerned with calling me, that they might have been under the impression that the other had called and I have never been sure that I was called and I will continue to be in doubt unless this committee pins it down, the fact that I was definitely called by someone. It is not plain to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least your own testimony is to the effect that you did not get down to your office until 10:30 that morning or around that time, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. My testimony is to the effect that it would be my recollection, after this lapse of time, that I was in general down there about half-past ten on Sunday morning. Others stated that I was there earlier. That was just a guess on my usual procedure that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, this was of such importance that the President of the United States took from the [*6215*] Supreme Court on leave Justice Roberts, named him as the head of a committee to investigate how this thing happened at Pearl Harbor. Isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you, the head of the Navy, knowing that the President a few days afterwards thought it was of such importance that he named a Supreme Court Justice to do the job, did you make an investigation into your own office, into this office that you had control of here in Washington, as to what was known in Washington and how this thing could have happened?

Admiral STARK. No, I did not. I knew pretty well what had happened and what was coming in and I was then very much engaged in fighting the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you were, but you were also interested in knowing whether or not your office was efficiently equipped and manned in order that it could fight the war in the future, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to leave that and I want to go to this report of the Secretary of the Navy. This is a report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President. The first sentence of it is:

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on [*6216*] December the 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy.

Now, the Army and the Navy would be all-inclusive, would it not, the way he has used it there, and I think a later sentence which I will read to you indicates that the Army and the Navy were completely surprised as far as the attack on Oahu is concerned.

Admiral STARK. That is what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. That is just what it says?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that your understanding?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would not want to make a statement as sweeping as that, particularly with regard to the Army. I know that Marshall was surprised, I know that I was surprised and I believe my principal advisers have testified on the subject.

[*6217*] Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to go to the next sentence:

Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack by both branches of the service. This statement was made to me by both General Short and Admiral Kimmel and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army nor Navy Command on Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preparedness of the American naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is, in the Far East.

Were you of the same opinion?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I thought the attack would take place in the Far East, from the evidence we had.

Senator FERGUSON. You were then of the same opinion?

Admiral STARK. I was of that opinion as regards the most likely place of attack, but I did not preclude an attack elsewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. You were very close, Admiral, to the admiral in charge of plans, were you not—Admiral Turner?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6218*] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that his opinion was that there was a 50–50 chance for an attack on Pearl Harbor at that time?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that 50–50 chance to which he has testified.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the State Department, Mr. Hornbeck, said that if he was a gambling man and was placing odds on the 27th day of November 1941, that it would be 5-to-1 that there would be no attack before the 15th of December?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that he had written such a memorandum?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there disagreement between the Navy and the State Department on that question of whether or not there would be an attack or no attack as far as America was concerned?

Admiral STARK. Well, Mr. Hull stated that he would not be surprised at a surprise attack. I dealt more with him than with Hornbeck. Admiral Schuirmann dealt primarily with Dr. Hornbeck.

Senator FERGUSON. Now reading from this report again:

Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any [*6219*] knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear in Washington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at 1:00 o'clock on Sunday.

Did you ever discuss that matter with Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. Only in the case of hindsight. No one intimated to me that that 1 o'clock message meant an attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not he indicate it in here?

Admiral STARK. He indicates it there but after the event. I can indicate it after the event.

Senator FERGUSON. But it says here "made clear in Washington." It says "Neither Short nor Kimmel at the time of the attack had any knowledge of the plain intimation of some surprise move made clear in Washington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura."

Admiral STARK. It is clear now. To my mind it was not clear then. Colonel Knox never intimated that to me prior to the attack, to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he goes on, and I will read this sentence——

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Are you reading from Knox's report?

[*6220*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I am reading from Knox's report.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that the one he made public; or the one he made to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. It is Secretary Knox's report to the President. That is indicated at the top.

Senator LUCAS. Is this in evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. No. Might I inquire from counsel as to where this paper was obtained from, whether from the Secretary of the Navy's office or the White House?

Mr. MITCHELL. It came from the Navy Department.

Admiral STARK. I never have seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason I want to ask you some questions on the facts contained in it.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire how long we have had this document?

Mr. MITCHELL. I was just going to ask that.

Senator FERGUSON. I have had it a day.

Senator LUCAS. It is not mimeographed and distributed to the members?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the only copy we have.

Senator FERGUSON. So that all will get it, I will ask the admiral to read it into the record. I think it is worth reading, because I want to ask some questions on it. It covers your question about the torpedoes, and that is the [*6221–6222*] reason I started out on it.

Would you read it into the record?

Admiral STARK. Starting at the beginning?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK (reading):

Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is not right, is it? It should be "to me," should it not?

Admiral STARK. It says "by me." I think it probably means " by me."

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is right. If you read the rest of it.

Admiral STARK (continuing):

Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preponderance of the American naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without [*6223*] warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is, in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.

A general warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching [*6224*] the planes on the various fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully guarded against possible subversive action by Japanese agents. This condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air.

The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provisions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did

accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were incurred by the Fleet from submarine attack. One small two-man submarine penetrated into the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, but because it broached in the shallow water it was immediately discovered by the [6225] *Curtis* and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of that vessel and those of the destroyer *Monaghan*. This submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west of Ford Island.

The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, save only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire covering every approach from the air. The Navy morning patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts with enemy craft. At least 90% of Officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition Three', which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.

The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after seven a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she had contacted a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth-charged it. Thus an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by approximately a half-hour. Quite a number of similar incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had [6226] occurred in the recent past and too great credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investigation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Bloch received the report and weighed in his mind the possibility that it might be the start of action, but in view of submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.

The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy.

The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. Reliance therefore of both branches of the service is chiefly upon three Army detector stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion of the day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested and obtained from the Control Officer, to, on 7 December, operate only from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December, the stations were manned from before dawn until seven a. m. when they were closed officially. However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained at his post to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with no thought of enemy approach. At least a half-hour before the attack was made this Officer's Radar indicator [6227] showed a concentration of planes to the northward, about 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should have been reported to Headquarters. The officer there, a Second Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he had been told the *Enterprise* was at sea, and that the planes he had located were probably from that carrier.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I interrupt you, Admiral, just one moment? Our information has been, has it not, and yours was the same, that he thought there were B–17's coming in? Is this the first time you ever heard he thought they were planes from the *Enterprise*?

Admiral STARK. I think he said that, and also waited for a flight from the coast coming in at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In the previous hearing it was said there were three different sources that the planes might come from.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask the Admiral, had you any information as to where they thought the planes were coming from, other than what is in this message?

Admiral STARK. Since that event I knew of the flight from the coast to Oahu, which came in, I believe, during [*6228*] the attack, and I have some recollection, although it is a little hazy, about hearing also that he though there might have been planes from a carrier.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield to a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In General Short's testimony he refers to an affidavit on that that covers three possible places where the planes might have been coming from.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. (Reading):

No report of this discovery of an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the major part of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful air attack into a Japanese disaster.

[*6229*] The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air force on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. I have seen the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces returning to the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports as to various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese carriers did come to the Navy Commander-in-Chief.

The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the attack, took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of confusing and contradictory rumors concerning the direction in which the attacking planes had departed, as well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The Navy regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to the southward as most dependable and scouted at once in that direction. It is now believed that another unit of the Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder bearings on these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was to the southward. A force from the westward moved over from there in an attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon [*6230*] a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the Japanese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they were not contacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to have established contact on 7 December.

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was made and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were in their quarters and the guns were not manned or in position for firing, save only those in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusively of fire from 50-caliber machine guns.

The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field, and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by very light and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speaking, the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, and this fire grew rapidly in intensity.

Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying low, appeared first over the hills surrounding the harbor, and in probably [*6231*] not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor was resisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by so intensive a barrage from the ships that it was driven off without getting the attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last assault.

The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the enemy made the third and final sweep, and in the combat that ensued they estimate eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these eighteen being Japanese planes which found themselves without sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged into the sea. Conversation between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain language, received in Oahu, is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.

The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance lies between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes each, and a maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking force somewhere between [*6232*] one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.

From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese plane which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers, and numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter planes were Model 0–1, equipped with radial engines and built in early 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were any self-sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American radio and other American-buit equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was armed with a Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of explosive and incendiary 20-millimeter ammunition was a material factor in damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo bombers were of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With this in mind, it was found that the armor-piercing bombs employed were 15-inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail [*6233*] vanes.

In actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, American fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. One Army pilot alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots who got in the air returned to the ground confident of their ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in the future.

At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe some VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, most of them were put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of the fields were heavily bombed and many of them completely wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by bombs, some ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of the *Arizona*, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage.

Many of the officers and men of the crews when their ships were set afire were compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number were trapped below decks aboard the [*6234*] *Oklahoma* and the *Utah*, both of which capsized. By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was in progress, twenty-six additional men were rescued alive. Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from the harbor swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of men who were driven overboard from their ships. The rescue of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of the wounded was carried on throughout the engagement by both service people and civilians with the greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond recognition and a large number having been picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after several days in the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still there bodies were being recovered from the water, but all were in a condition which prevented identification. Dispositions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) were adequate and were efficiently carried out.

Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 December, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of a few days. These are the *Maryland*, *Pennsylvania*, and the *Tennessee*. The *Nevada* can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete overhaul. The California can be raised in two and one-half months, and then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific Coast for a year's overhaul. The *West Virginia* can be raised in three months, and will require a year and a half to two years for overhaul. The *Oklahoma*, which was overturned, it is estimated can be raised in four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined now. The *Arizona* is a total wreck, her forward magazine having exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The *Colorado* was on the Pacific coast for overhaul.

There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The *Detroit* put to sea at once and is uninjured. The *New Orleans* and the *San Francisco* are now ready to go to sea. The *Honolulu* will be ready on December 20. The *Helena* was badly damaged and may require a new engine. She will be ready to go to the Pacific Coast for overhaul December 31. The *Raleigh* was flooded throughout her machinery spaces and seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will be ready for the trip to the Pacific Coast for overhaul on January 15.

[*6236*] There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The *Cassin* and the *Downes* were in the same drydock with the *Pennsylvania*. Bombs designed for the *Pennsylvania* hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although both destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved the *Pennsylvania* from any danger. The destroyer *Shaw* was in the floating drydock at the time of the attack. All of this ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off. The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged, and a new section can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed.

The mine layer *Oglala* was lying moored outside the *Helena*, and received the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a total loss. The airplane tender *Curtis*, which was bombed and injured by fire started when a torpedo plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on December 17th. The *Vestal*, one of the ships on the train, which was damaged, will be ready to go to the Pacific coast on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship *Utah*, which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a total loss.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General [*6237*] Short to albi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would have to travel to make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.

There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of apprehension of any attack at all, and [*6238*] neither Army nor Navy were in a position of readiness because of this feeling.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found anywhere in the American possessions, due to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese. The intelligence work done by this fifth column before the attack, provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl

Harbor, exact location of all defenses, gun power and numerous other details. Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that the exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted, and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese possession. It is an interesting fact that the *Utah* at the time of the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier, and she was sunk and is a total loss. The work of the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been approached in this war by the success of a similar group in Norway.

The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they slid into the waters from the *Oklahoma's* deck or were driven overboard by fires on other [*6239*] ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven overboard while the heaviest fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the *Utah*, swept from the deck of the ship as she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers which rescued them and went to sea.

The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was carried on with such superb courage and efficiency as to excite universal admiration, and additional hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought ashore.

The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is imperative. I recommended that the *Solace* should be loaded with these convalescent wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without escort.

The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near Lualualei was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to direct the efforts of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity [*6241*] of the reported landings. His ships were turned away just prior to the launching of a number of torpedoes by waiting submarines, which torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in Admiral Draemel's force.

[*6242*] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed by the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise true of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in the fire fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack.

It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7 December, no enemy airplane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks in which huge quantities of oil are stored. This was one of many indications that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to strengthen our air defenses, particularly in pursuit planes and anti-aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. This anticipation of a renewal of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy Officers in Hawaii. As a matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both services it is hoped for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery which cost the lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their spirits, the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new enemy approach.

SALVAGE OPERATIONS

The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one of the most important pieces of defense [*6242*] work now under way. Its magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all facilities in manpower and material that will further its expeditious progress, including top priorities for material and high speed transportation facilities to and from the mainland and Hawaii.

The Navy is fortunate that Lieutenant Commander Lemuel Curtis, who is an officer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage men in the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He is in full charge of the salvage operations under Commander J. M. Steele, USN, the representative of the Base Force Command. With personnel already available and with certain additions to be immediately provided, adequate organization to carry on this work with maximum speed has been assembled.

I am proposing to send to Pearl H arbor a large force of partially trained men from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to be trained to form part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to be completed next autumn. The most rapid delivery to the job of matériel and men to expedite this salvage work is essential, and I am proposing to arrange for the purchase or charter of the S. S. *Lurline* of the Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel to be utilized primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available for returning to the United States the families of officers and men who should be evacuated [*6243*] because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not needed for the transfer of matériel for the salvage operations can be used to assist in the transportation of food to Hawaii.

Lieutenant Commander Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time required for the salvage operations on the *Nevada*, *California*, *West Virginia*, and *Oklahoma*.

REPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS

The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was discussed with the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl Harbor. A suggestion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard by Continental Repair Yards did not meet with their approval for reasons that were compelling, but the desirability of dispersing part of the Naval work on this Station resulted in the suggestion that the Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small ship repair plants located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a management contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so much of these plants as are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, and the Navy Yard would assign work to [*6244*] them on destroyers, small vessels and yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in case of further possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the various interested parties. With these added facilities, the Navy Yard can adequately handle the work load presently to be imposed upon it.

INSTRUCTIONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS

Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th Naval District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary information and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to permit them to safeguard their commands so far as possible. This included all available information about the two men submarines which might provide a serious menace to the west coast. The Commandant of the Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to pass on all of this information to the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval Districts who could not attend this meeting.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, may I invite particular attention to the following points in my report and draw certain conclusions therefrom:

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.

[*6245*] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until some hours after the attack on that date.

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air attack.

(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer period, was only operated from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m., on December 7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information center by an unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other information from Army Radar showing the

retirement of enemy aircraft to their bases received as such by the Navy until two days after the attack.

(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal objectives, caught them all completely unprepared. It was about four minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their mobile units in position it was [6246] some time before their anti-aircraft fire became effective.

(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during the first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital ships.

(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks resulted in successively less damage.

(8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields and the Naval stations very badly damaged and resulted in the practical immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to come, the loss of 75 percent of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu.

(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired. Individually and collectively the bravery of the defense was superb. In single unit combat the American pursuit planes proved themselves superior to the Japanese and the American personnel in the air demonstrated distinct superiority over the Japanese.

(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was hit by bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangers of the type used on all four stations are [6247] a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for storage purposes in possible attack areas.

(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded has been prompt and efficient. The wounded should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible.

(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in preparation.

(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to be augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and will place the damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible time.

(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs as are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are under consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lesson the concentration of vessels at one harbor.

(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the usefulness and availability of this Naval station must be restudied. Its air defenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special [6248] defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep floats to be moored alongside important combatant units must be developed. Pending these studies and the addition of satisfactory safeguards, no large concentration of Naval vessels can be permitted at Pearl Harbor.

(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail of their plans of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness in executing and pressing home their operations. It should serve as a mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a final victory.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. At this time, we will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[6249] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Are you ready to resume, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

Admiral STARK. May I bring up just one thing, sir, before the testimony resumes?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yesterday on page 6067, lines 13 and 15, in answer to a question from Congressman Murphy, I stated that the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor was 1:57, shortly before 2 o'clock. I believe the official testimony shows the attack began at 7:55 a. m. Pearl Harbor time, Honolulu time, or 1:25 p. m. Washington time.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr Chairman, the record would then have to be corrected by anyone reading it because that would cut down the time between 11:47 and the time of the actual attack.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I interject a request at this time?

Senator FERGUSON. I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. We have been provided with an instrument or document or book, whatever it may be, entitled "Appendix [*6250*] to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations," and in the back of that, or, the final pages of it, appears several pages entitled "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," referring to the Navy Court.

Now, I have been interested for a long time in trying to get the top secret report of the Navy Court of Inquiry. I have had the Army top secret report of the Army Board. Am I to understand that this addendum, which is labeled "Top Secret," which appears in the book identified, is that the so-called top secret report of the Navy Court of Inquiry?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is all of it?

Mr. MITCHELL. As we understand it.

Mr. KEEFE. It is continually referred to in portions of this report and what I want to be certain of is that this that appears following the heading "Addendum to court's finding of facts" is the entire top secret report of the Navy Board of Inquiry.

Mr. MITCHELL. Everything in this book labeled "Top Secret" is the additional material. Not only what you referred to but there are other documents in it that are labeled "Top Secret" and they are the withheld part of the original report.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not referring, of course, to—it [*6251*] starts out with the Hewitt report, this book does, and then it has after the Hewitt Report, as I recall, there follows certain findings and conclusions signed by H. K. Hewitt, ending on page 180.

Then appears the Navy's third endorsement on the Naval Court of Inquiry, and then appears the second endorsement.

Now, this second endorsement and the third endorsement are labeled Top Secret also.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it would be more accurate for me to call your attention to the label on the front page, which I think really describes it. You are right in your statement that the section you refer to is the addendum to the court's finding of facts, but in addition to that in this book it says:

Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative statement of evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

Mr. KEEFE. That says "Report by Admiral H. K. Hewitt."

Mr. MITCHELL. The page I am referring to is the first page just after the cover. That describes what it is. There is some material that wasn't in the original Navy Board report. It says:

Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to tne Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

[*6252*] Mr. KEEFE. What I would like to get clear in my mind is this: Is there one document that I may refer to, that is official and I can put my hands on, which is the Navy Top Secret Report of the Navy Court, disassociated from Admiral Hewitt's findings and disassociated from the endorsement of the Secretary of the Navy and the report of Admiral Gatch, and so on?

That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think my confusion, or our confusion about it, rests on the fact that the naval order of inquiry technically didn't end when the original naval board made its report. The inquiry went on and that included some supplemental inquiries that were made.

I am informed by the Navy here that the part that you referred to, "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts," the only addition that we know of on the original board report, is that.

Mr. KEEFE. I think counsel will readily grasp the significance of the inquiry which I am attempting to make.

Mr. MITCHELL. I certainly do. I realize the propriety of it entirely, sir, and I am trying to give you the exact information.

Mr. KEEFE. Then so I may understand, when the original Navy report of the court of inquiry was released, it [*6253*] was understood that there was some top secret material which was not included in that report and labeled "Top Secret," which was kept out, and that that top secret material is that which is now found in the last pages of this report under the heading of "Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts"?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Navy says that is so, and that is my understanding.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is all of it, there are no other findings or no other statements of a top secret character that were withheld out of the testimony or evidence at the time the Navy Report was first released except that which is contained in this so-called addendum?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, let's be accurate about that. I never speak of the transcript of the evidence as a report, although in a broad sense it may be, but the report and the opinions and findings of a board, just like a court, after they have heard the evidence.

If you are going to treat the narrative statement and call that part of the report—in a broad sense it is—why, then I will have to check against that and see.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, as lawyers, I think we agree on that, Mr. Counsel. But may I also ask, I have seen the testimony and have gone through it, taken by the Navy court, and there was a lot of that testimony that was expurgated [*6254*] and transferred over into a top secret file. Is that top secret file of testimony as well as this top secret finding of facts, is that available?

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you got it, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. They tell me it is in my file. I will have to check it. I will do so right away.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think Senator Ferguson has the only copy of it, of the testimony, the additional testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. That is the expurgated testimony that was taken out of the regular and put into a top secret?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. This is the part taken out of the findings, this is what we strictly call the report, it is in this book.

Now, we have a set of testimony that didn't appear in the published report—that we have one copy of, and I think Senator Ferguson had use of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have it down. I sent my secretary after it.

Mr. KEEFE. I will be glad to come over and have you read it to me, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the other Senators might have a caucus and have it read to them. It seems strange that only one member of the committee can obtain these top secret documents.

[*6255*] Mr. MITCHELL. My own personal recollection is nothing, because this is a thing that I personally have not had to do with. I am relying on other people.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that, but every now and then we run into a document that has been in the possession of some member of the committee or his counsel which we know nothing of. It seems to me, in fairness to the whole committee, that we ought to know something about these secret documents that are withheld and not known about except by someone who gets it first.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is about the way it works because sometimes the requests for the stuff come in and the pressure has been so strong to give it that we don't have time to study it ourselves and hand it around and we have been sniped at a good deal for delay, and we don't make for any more delay than we can help, and then we don't have it, we don't have an opporunity to mimeograph it, or anything of that kind.

Maybe we have been at fault in that. But we have some difficulties.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman——

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me. One question. Has this report been released to the press?

[*6256*] Mr. MITCHELL. This document you have in your hands has not been offered in evidence. We have been holding it here for several days to put in.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it confidential, has it been released to the press?

The CHAIRMAN. Copies of the first two volumes, known as the Narrative Statement, were given to the press a week or 10 days ago, when distributed to the members of the committee. Recently this addendum, the third volume, has come in, and I don't think that has been given to the press—it has been given to them but they are holding it.

Mr. MITCHELL. They are holding it until I offer it.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, I don't want to get into the situation we had here when there was some criticism over the fact that some Army top secret report was passed around to certain people and not others.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose I offer it now and release it to the press and to you.

Mr. KEEFE. I think it ought to be.

Mr. MITCHELL. I offer it now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the three volumes?

Mr. MITCHELL. This is an appendix to the Narrative Statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The other two volumes that were given [*6257*] to the committee as the original Narrative Statement were never made a part of the evidence and never filed as exhibits, they were just distributed to the committee.

Now, if this third agenda, addendum, or appendix, whatever it is, is to be filed as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair that the other two volumes ought to be filed.

Mr. KEEFE. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, on that. This exhibit is in a quite different category than the other two. The other two are a narrative of conclusions and expurgations and everything else. This is supposed to be a complete and accurate statement of existing files and papers. I have no objection to this, but if you are going to offer that narrative in evidence why, I think, that would be another thing.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought this was in addition to the Narrative Statement.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. The Narrative Statement is just the Navy story that they worked up. These, as the Congressman said, are documents themselves, and not the Navy's opinion about them.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no connection then between this and the other volumes?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. That is why we didn't offer the others. This one we expected to offer and I offer it now as [*6258*] exhibit 107.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107.")

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear about the fact that I happened to have this particular testimony, I obtained it a few days ago to read for the examination of Admiral Stark. I have had no requests for its return. It has been here. . All these matters that I have had have been on a special request either by letter or otherwise that I might see them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not correct?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is correct. No special favors have been given you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not complaining about any special favors but it strikes me that when a request is made by a member of the committee that instead of it being simply a personal request it ought to be for the benefit of the whole committee if there is any benefit to accrue to the committee from that request, and that the committee might have the information available to them and not have to go somewhere in order to get it because there is only one copy.

Go ahead, Admiral, and Senator.

[*6259*] Mr. MITCHELL. I only want to say that a great deal of this material requested by individuals turns out to be of no particular value and so I don't make a practice of mimeographing and distributing the answers to all this stuff—any more than I did to the log of the *Boise*.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair appreciates that fully.

Mr. MITCHELL. So we have to use some judgment about it. Whenever we thought a thing was of interest generally we have had it memeographed but sometimes we doubt whether anybody else will be interested. That is how it happened.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. My remarks are not intended to be in any criticism of anybody, especially counsel, but it has occurred two or three times and something has been produced here that some of the members didn't have, although others did.

Go ahead, Admiral, and Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, where did you first get the idea that there was a secret weapon used by the way of torpedoes at Pearl Harbor in the initial attack, when did that first come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall any particular secret weapon. There was nothing revolutionary, I believe, in anything they used.

Senator FERGUSON. In the discussion here a few days ago, [*6260*] as part of your testimony, when you were talking about these torpedo baffles, and as to whether or not we had already equipment to meet such an attack, the words secret weapon were used. They had a torpedo that we knew nothing about and that they were able to launch in 20 or 30 feet of water instead of, as at Taranto, where they had launched it in 60 to 80 feet.

Admiral STARK. That was covered in the letter where they stated no ship could now be considered safe in any depth, that is, any major caliber depth, where there was sufficient room for the run of the torpedo to arm. It was just a progressive step, which I explained in our own experiments we were continually trying to increase the speed of a plane in dropping a torpedo, and also increasing the altitude from which it should be dropped. And the Japs, as shown, had progressed very far in that. And the letter which you read this morning where they spoke about putting some apparatus on the stern of the torpedo, we had already been experimenting with ours, we referred to it as the tail of the torpedo. But I think there was nothing revolutionary except the development had gone further.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, the Navy Department never had any complaint because Admiral Kimmel didn't put in these torpedo nets, because they had neither furnished [*6261*] them to him nor had they furnished the equipment with which he could make them?

Admiral STARK. That is correct. He stated, in the first place, that he thought they were not necessary from the information he had, and which later information showed them desirable, but he had no nets which were easy to handle, or baffles. These we were endeavoring to develop and they had not been developed up to December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear that there had been a so-called secret weapon as far as the torpedoes were concerned?

Admiral STARK. Have you this [indicating document]?

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't, but I have read it, I think.

Admiral STARK. In the Navy Court of Inquiry on this subject—I quote:

> The especially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fall in the category of the so-called secret weapon of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mines are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an

initial advantage which continues until the defenses against them have been perfected.

In other words, it was a development which we were all working on.

[*6262*] Senator FERGUSON. I had in mind yesterday at page 6032, where Senator Lucas said:

Well, the Navy Board of Inquiry called this bomb a secret weapon in the nature of a robot bomb which was unknown to the best professional opinion in America at this time. Do you agree with that statement?

And you answered:

A robot bomb?

Admiral STARK. Well, the answer is, of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mines are examples. I never heard it called a robot bomb.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. You would take, from what Secretary Knox said, instead of it being a new, secret weapon, it was probably a forgotten weapon, when he said:

The torpedo bombs were old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906 equipped with a large vane on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of a torpedo dropped by plane.

Admiral STARK. Well, the Whitehead torpedo, I may say, is an English type of torpedo with a reciprocating action. We abandoned it some years ago and went into turbine torpedoes. The old Whitehead was a good torpedo and they had developed this tail arrangement to assist in having it make a shallow dive. We were experimenting with the same thing. The wings [*6263*] or vanes which you put on the tail detach when it hits water.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. When you quoted the Admiral you said that he said a robot bomb.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't mean to infer that——

Mr. MURPHY. It was a question, and on the next page he didn't agree that it was a secret weapon.

Senator FERGUSON. And he explained that now, that he didn't agree that it was a robot bomb.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I have given you a broad picture from my memory. The Bureau of Ordnance could give you, if you wanted it, real technical data on that. They could give it. But we ourselves were working with detachable vanes to assist us in having the torpedo make a proper entry into the water so as to facilitate its not going so deep.

Senator FERGUSON. That the next sentence was, by the Secretary:

It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapon.

Admiral STARK. Well, that is in line with what I have said. It was along the line of our development.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going back to one of the summaries, where he speaks about a general warning on the 27th and a [*6264*] special warning at midnight on Saturday, did you ever hear of that before?

Admiral STARK. Not until you read it this morning. I don't know what is referred to there.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any idea what they might be referring to?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. That is new to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall when Secretary Knox came back?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him?

Admiral STARK. Well, I saw him as soon as he came back, I reported to him, of course, as soon as he returned.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to go to the conference between the Secretary and the President?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account, if this paper which you read this morning, Secretary Knox's report to the President, was on file in the Navy Department that you, the operating head responsible under the statutes, the rules and regulations, never knew about it?

Admiral STARK. Perhaps one reason is there is very little in that report that he didn't tell a considerable number of us in his office. All that with regard to behavior [*6265*] of personnel, with reference to ships, we discussed it, the salvage matters, and in general I am so familiar with what is in there to almost think that I have seen it, but I think I have not, as set up there, just as it is, I did not see it, to the best of my recollection.

But he discussed practically every detail of it with us.

[*6266*] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any special representatives going out to Hawaii in the summer of 1941 to get information? Did you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. When you say to get information, will you elaborate on that a little bit, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, here is a man named Munson mentioned, a representative from Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Isn't he an Army officer, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know that. "Believed to be a Presidential agent, carrying a letter from OPNAV."

Admiral STARK. OPNAV.

Senator FERGUSON. That is you.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "To open everything to him."

Do you know a man by the name of Curtis B. Munson? I show you this last page and see whether or not it will refresh your memory [handing document to witness]. Could I just have it back?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I do not recall that. If he was told by OPNAV, of which I was head, that everything should be opened to him I probably O. K.'d the letter but I do not recall just what it was. We had a good many people traveling around one place and another.

[*6267*] Senator FERGUSON. Now, if he went out there as a special representative of the Navy or was believed to be a Presidential agent and you approved his, "Open everything to him," and this was during this critical period, did you get a report back from him?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the incident, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, let me try to refresh your memory.

Pertinent extracts from above report:

About that time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from OPNAV to "open everything to him" sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast.

Admiral STARK. Is that Colonel Knox talking?

Senator FERGUSON. No, this is Captain——

Admiral STARK. Zacharias?

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Zacharias talking; Ellis M. Zacharias.

Admiral STARK. He was in Intelligence at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Zacharias is talking.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6268*] Senator FERGUSON. Now, getting back to reading this statement:

After outlining to him my firm convictions that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor on a week end and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated: "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately one way or the other." This envoy arrived in Washington a bout the 2nd of December 1941.

Now, had that ever been called to your attention by this special envoy?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not connect that up at all, the December 2. That may, however, have formed the background for a dispatch which you will recall has been placed in evidence here, which was sent out there to the effect that if Japan attacked it might come by a surprise raid on either a Sunday morning or a holiday. We sent that out there.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Admiral STARK. It was earlier in the year and I have forgotten just what the date was.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is in Exhibit 37.

Mr. MURPHY. The first dispatch in the Navy basic exhibit, I think is what you are looking for.

[*6269*] Admiral STARK. That goes back to April. It was some months previous to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Very well.

Admiral STARK. I will read it if you would like to have it. It is short.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I would like to have you read it.

Admiral STARK. This is from OPNAV. [Reading:]

Action: Com all Nav districts

NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned. They should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know what was the cause of that dispatch? Was it this special representative of the President coming back and telling you about this Intelligence?

Admiral STARK. Could you give me the date of that to see whether there is any hook-up on dates?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I cannot give you the date because the letter that has it in it, the memo is dated about [*6270*] the 17th of March 1942.

Admiral STARK. 1942?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the 17th of March 1942. You may want to read this whole letter, which may refresh your memory. I thought you would only know about part of it.

Admiral STARK. That was after we were in the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but his happened before you were in the war. To make this a little clearer, this was on file in the Navy Department and at the top of this statement I read is this:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1942.—I have read the personal and confidential report of Captain E. M. Zacharias, U. S. N., as a memorandum for Admiral Draemel, dated March 17, 1942, and desire to state that the remarks relating to me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and correct in detail. In addition he suggested that the attack would conform to their historical procedure, that of hitting before the war was declared.

Admiral STARK. Well, our dispatch is of April 1941. This memorandum for Admiral Draemel is dated March 17, 1942. [Reading:]

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted:

[*6271*] My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet, which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an at- [*6272*] tack. From time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack, amazed at unrealistic attitudes, I said, "When are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack." About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opnav to "open everything to him," sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a week-end and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other." This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941.

On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, "Here I am a G–2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack." I advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic [*6273*] air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about." On 28 No-

vember I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac's dispatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked, this is no drill," I turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever known that before?

Admiral STARK. I have no recollection of it at all. [Reading:]

Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted.

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu—one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of intention to attack—I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor [*6274*] 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in." I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally, two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Cincus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lt. Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise Cincus on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

One of the contributing factors to 7 December was [*6275*] the reluctance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition. A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the *Salt Lake City*, I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Officer which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here, he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report [*6276*] or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

Mr. MITCHELL. How much more of that is there? These are Zacharias' personal papers. He is the man who claimed also that he settled and brought peace to Japan. I am wondering how much more there is.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't any desire to have him read it. I thought it would refresh his memory, that is all. Does that refresh your memory?

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to know whether this was written before the event or after the event.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, yes, this is a story of one of those men with great foresight.

Mr. MURPHY. We have him listed as a witness, haven't we?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Some request was made, I don't know from what member, for Zacharias' papers and we hunted around and there was none in the Navy, but I understand that these are papers that he had in his possession that the Navy asked him to produce and then we turned them over to the member of the committee that had asked for them.

[*6277*] Mr. MURPHY. Before the hearings commenced there was a reference to the fact that he had made a speech in Annapolis, and it was after that that he was listed as a witness.

Mr. MITCHELL. He is on the list here.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I will just ask you if that refreshes your memory, I mean after you read it all.

Admiral STARK. No, it does not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I ask you this, inasmuch as it has been read: Who is this man referring to here when he says, "You have two envoys in Washington and when the third arrived on the 2d or 3d of December," who is he talking about and to whom? He speaks about two envoys here and he says that a third has arrived. Who is he talking to?

Senator FERGUSON. He is talking about Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was he talking to? He says "you."

Senator FERGUSON. He was talking to Munson.

Admiral STARK. This memorandum is marked "Personal and confidential memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is evidently reciting a past event there.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He exhibited a good deal of foresight because he starts out predicting what was going to happen and then in March he says it happened. Now, I don't know who he is [*6279*] talking to when he is making that prediction.

Admiral STARK. And signed by Zacharias.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, do you recall whether or not it was that report from Munson that caused you to send the April notes or order?

Admiral STARK. No, sir, I do not. The Munson report was, did you say, dated in March?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't know. I have never seen the Munson report and I don't know as he has ever made a report. Do you know whether he made a report?

Admiral STARK. This is in 1942. I do not recall the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. No, it was before the attack that Munson was out there.

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. It is clear.

Admiral STARK. It is not clear. I remember our sending out the dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why that dispatch was sent?

Admiral STARK. No. To my mind it was one of those things which was brought up in Intelligence as a good thing to send. I was informed of it and I agreed that it was a good thing to send.

[*6279*] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, going to the Intelligence branch here, that was a very important branch, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Very, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was under you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when Admiral Kirk went in?

Admiral STARK. I have got it here somewhere. Kirk came in, as I recall, early in—well, I won't have to rely on my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it in May or June, or was it in April?

Admiral STARK. 1 March.

Senator FERGUSON. 1st of March?

Admiral STARK. 1 March 1941; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know what was the occasion for changing Intelligence officers on the 1st of March 1941?

Admiral STARK. Rear Admiral Walter Anderson had been head of Intelligence, was anxious to go to sea, was due for sea, and went to sea in July 1941 and Captain Jules James was acting as an interim head of Intelligence until Kirk came in in 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that this Intelligence branch was treated in this way, that if a man went in there no matter how good he was, if his time came [*6280*] around for him to go to sea, he was taken out of the Intelligence branch and sent to sea, and a new man put in?

Admiral STARK. Generally speaking, that is true in the Navy. An officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded, I think, at any time, might sacrifice his career, and I have brought up the point that there may come a time when we would just have to keep people in their billets, but the law requires an officer to have so much sea duty before he can be promoted and if he reaches a certain age and has not had that sea duty in the grade he may be and is likely to be held too much ashore and not promoted.

[*6281*] Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, under that rule of the Navy, men were fearful of staying in Intelligence because they would not get promotion?

Admiral STARK. In Intelligence, or any other branch, it might be the Judge Advocate's Office, it might be too much staff duty, it might be too much radio duty, or any other shore duty too long.

Senator FERGUSON. But back at March 1, 1941, things were rather critical in our negotiations, were they not?

Admiral Stark. Yes, 1941 was a critical year, I would say.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why would we change the heads of the Intelligence Branch?

Admiral Stark. Well, we changed them because Anderson went to sea in command of a battleship.

Senator FERGUSON. And the Chief Assistant acting was who?

Admiral STARK. Captain Jules James.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not take that place. A new man came in, Admiral Kirk, is that true?

Admiral STARK. Well, James was there temporarily pending Kirk's arrival.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you had a break there while Anderson was at sea in which a temporary man by the name of [6282] James and then Kirk came in?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Around March 1, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us why Kirk was removed from that department on the 15th of October, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Well, Kirk also went to sea-going command.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it at his request that he left that department?

Admiral STARK. As I recall, he was very very glad to get the job. That does not answer the question exactly. I think he did request a sea-going job, but I could not swear to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we had a very critical period in October. That was just about the time of the change of the Japanese Cabinet, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, it was.

Senator FERGUSON. And the department under your supervision changed at that particular time, the heads of the Intelligence Branch, is that correct?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us who named Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral STARK. He was recommended to me. I knew [6283] Admiral Wilkinson, but not well. But I did know him to be a man with a reputation for outstanding intelligence. I do not mean Intelligence duties, but he was a highly intelligent man.

Now Personnel usually gives a list of those who are available. I undoubtedly discussed that with Nimitz and with Ingersoll, and probably with Intelligence, and Wilkinson could be made available and was entirely acceptable.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with the President?

Admiral STARK. I think not that detail; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not as to who was to go in?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall discussing that with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Unquestionably, because he was greatly interested in the Intelligence Division, and always had been. He took a very strong personal interest in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you understand that it took a special mental attitude for an Intelligence officer?

Admiral STARK. Well, other things being equal, a man who had had Intelligence duty, or who had a flare for it, of course, would be preferable, but there was not any question in anybody's mind in regard to the fitness of [6284] Wilkinson. He had been secretary of the general board, one of his important duties, and I think Wilkinson—I can verify it—had been on one or two of the peace conferences or reduction of navy international conferences. He was considered a highly able man and strongly recommended to me, and was available.

I may state, when I state the Secretary of the Navy was very much interested in Intelligence, none of these moves was made without his personal O. K.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, at the time of the Atlantic Conference, you were called to go to that conference, were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know just when the first order of shooting in the Atlantic was? It was after that, was it not?

Admiral STARK. It was after that; yes, sir. May I state, Senator Ferguson, in that connection, that lest my testimony this morning be misunderstood with regard to the shooting order, the shooting order appeared in the Western Hemispheric Defense Plans. It was in defense that the shooting order was issued, not offense. It was to defend our own communications and our own ships and our own western Atlantic waters. The tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet, some of them, start out under [*6285*] (a)—"Protection against hostile attack United States and flag shipping; insure safety of sea communications; support the defense of United States territory." In other words, it was a defensive order.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that, but I wondered whether this would refresh your memory as to its date. On September 22, you wrote a letter to Admiral Hart, addressed to "Dear Tommy", which was your custom; is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> Now, considerable has happened since I last wrote you. So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The President's speech of September 21, 1941, put the matter squarely before the country. We were ready for it; in fact, our orders have been issued.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So prior to September 21, the orders were actually issued to shoot in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. They were ready for execution.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We were in complete touch with the President on that. Of course, we could not have done anything of that sort except at Presidential direction. These hemispheric defense plans were submitted to him, and he went over [*6286*] them before they were issued. Where we state the President directs, it was his directive; no one but the President I would say could direct us to take the action indicated in those plans.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, though, that congressional approval was not necessary for an overt act. You considered that an overt act, did you not, the shooting?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that you would call an act an overt act if you considered it in self-defense or in defense of carrying out what you might call the congressional will of getting material abroad. I would say the background for it is that if we were making in this country enormous amount of material, if the country approved that, and Congress did approve it, they would expect to see that it got to its destination and not let somebody else go and sink it at his will. So, this was a defensive measure.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to look at your memorandum for the Secretary of State of the 8th of November, the postscript, and that may help you on what you told us this morning about your statement before a congressional meeting.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the postscript on page 3 of that letter of the 8th of October 1941.

Admiral STARK. That was to Hart or to Kimmel?

[*6287*] Senator FERGUSON. No; it is to the Secretary of State. It is the memorandum for the Secretary of State, 8th of October 1941.

Admiral STARK. That is included in the letter to Admiral Hart?

Senator FERGUSON. To Admiral Kimmel, dated October 27. That is the letter to Kimmel on October 27. That is not your letter.

Admiral STARK. The memorandum of the 8th of October?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. The last postscript may clear up something that you said this morning and also what I ask you about now.

Admiral STARK. Do you want me to read that postscript, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it is very short.

Admiral STARK (reading):

I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is good and ready, and it would be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and when he thinks it will pay, and not until then. He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now if he were of a mind to. He had no legitimate excuse in the world except to serve his own ends to invade the countries he has. When he is ready he will strike and not before.

[*6288*] I had forgotten how closely I paraphrased that this morning. It was the same thought.

Senator FERGUSON. But you put that in the memorandum to the Secretary of State?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted or asked for that information, as to what your opinion was on that subject?

Admiral STARK. Well, this memorandum starts out with:

This morning you asked me—

This is to Mr. Hull—

what would be the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of the United States naval-craft escorting all the way across the Atlantic, also as to the disadvantages and advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States.

This was in reply to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you just read the last paragraph? I think it will also clear up something that you testified on.

Admiral STARK (reading).

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country would not let Great Britain fall, and that ultimately, in order to prevent this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above, I have long felt and have often stated, that the sooner we get in the [*6289*] better.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate you had had that opinion for 2 years?

Admiral STARK. I do not know how long.

Senator FERGSON. You said, "I have assumed for the past 2 years."

Admiral STARK. "I have assumed for the past 2 years that our country would not let Great Britain fall, that ultimately, in order to prevent this, we would have to enter the war, and as noted above, I have long felt." I did not say "for 2 years."

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you that feeling?

Admiral STARK. I do not know just how long. I became worried about the situation, feeling we were heading for it certainly in 1941,

and as I stated yesterday in giving a very brief, general picture it often crossed my mind that if we waited too long it might be too late, and we might have a job on our hands to do alone.

Senator FERGUSON. That was shortly after the Atlantic Conference. At the Atlantic Conference were you consulted in any way about the Far East?

Admiral STARK. You mean as to any political decisions?

Senator FERGUSON. No, not political but military.

Admiral STARK. I was not consulted with reference to the [*6290*] Far East. We had no agenda at the Atlantic Conference. For the most part we would have talks with Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, with regard to our positions, as to what we had, and we talked over undoubtedly the ABC conversations. We talked a good deal, as I recall, about aircraft. The British were extremely anxious to get more flying boats in particular, and any other things that we could give them in the way of small craft to help them out in their fight against the submarine. But as to any special plans, or talks or commitments with regard to getting into the Far East or elsewhere, there were none.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted by the President at that time?

Admiral STARK. We got in on very few of the conversations, if any, on the political issue. Ours was almost all matériel, operations, naval matters.

Senator FERGUSON. I was going to ask, were you consulted by the President at that time as to the steps essential for the defense of the whole or any part of the Pacific area?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We had laid out our general plan in ABC–1, as was read into some of the testimony this morning, and that will be shown, if you want to read it, in the final agreement made out there regarding the division of fleets.

[*6291*] Senator FERGUSON. ABC–1 did not include the Pacific, did it?

Admiral STARK. We talked over the whole ocean; the whole world.

Senator FERGUSON. Did ABC–1 include the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. Yes; it did, as I recall very plainly; yes, sir. ABC–1 formed the background for Rainbow 5, which formed the basic plan for WPL–46, and ABC–1 was our broad investigation of the entire effort, should we become involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, when did you first know that we were building landing strips at Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Rabaul, Balikthean, and Singapore?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall our building those strips prior to December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted about that prior to that date?

Admiral STARK. If you can give me some background for that, some letters or something to show for it, maybe it would refresh my memory. I do not recall it at all.

Senator FERGUSON. General Marshall's testimony with relation to furnishing bombs down there, the furnishing of equipment, some landing strips, gas, and oil.

Admiral STARK. That may have been Army landing strips, with which we would not have been particularly concerned.

[*6292*] Senator FERGUSON. You would not be consulted on that?

Admiral STARK. Well, we usually talked about everything, but I do not recall that. I had no particular interest in its prosecution, so far as being able to help is concerned, so probably it did not make any permanent impression on me. I dare say he mentioned it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when the President returned, when were you first advised that he gave a note to the Ambassador of Japan in relation to further movements?

Admiral STARK. That was the note of August 17?

Senator FERGUSON. August 17.

Admiral STARK. My recollection is that in one of our liaison meetings, I think the next day or very shortly thereafter, Mr. Sumner Welles read us that note.

Senator FERGUSON. The next day, you think?

Admiral STARK. Very, very shortly after.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did that message mean to you, instead of reading it again? You know it in substance.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The message was a very sharp message, and like messages of that sort, when nobody knows just what may de-develop from it. We had already frozen their assets. That happened in July, and this was August. They were clearing their shipping in the Atlantic. There was not much more we could do. There were some loopholes left. I [*6293*] say "loopholes," there were places whereby we could give them certain material in exchange for raw silk, and one thing and another. They might have been closed. Diplomatic relations could have been severed. That was about as far, I would say, as we could have gone without consultation with Congress. I do not know what we would do as the result of that note. It was a very briefly worded note.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you think they might do in relation to it?

Admiral STARK. What would I think the Japs might do?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I would not diagnose what the Japanese mind would have thought that note was to mean otherwise than a sort of stop, look, and listen. That is the purpose I suppose it was meant to serve.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it more than stop, look, and listen? Did not it indicate if they went further south we would take action?

Admiral STARK. As I recall the note, we reserve the right to take any action which we thought was necessary in defense of our interest.

Senator FERGUSON. It is at the bottom of the page.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I have it here, if you would like to have me read it. It is on page 714 of "Peace and War." [*6294*] The sharp part of that note I think to which you refer is this:

> Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American Nationals and towards assuring the safety and security of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you prepare to be able to back that up? Did you have a conversation with the President about preparation to back that up?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I was preparing just as fast as I could for any eventuality, and had been since I took office in 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to whether or not Great Britain was to give parallel action along the same line?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. I think we could assume that from what Mr. Churchill said from time to time, and the fact if they went south it was affecting their interests. I did not assume it, but you asked me if I thought it might. [*6295*] I was not in on the issuance of this note and knew of it only afterwards when Mr. Welles gave it to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard that Great Britain did give parallel action?

Admiral STARK. To this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. I want to submit, Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, the evidence up to this point shows definitely there was no parallel action given. The Senator has constantly assumed all through the hearing that parallel action was given.

Senator FERGUSON. I was just trying to ascertain if it was given. If I may get the Hornbeck note——

Admiral STARK. I do not recall——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment until I get this paper.

(Short interruption.)

[*6296*] Senator FERGUSON. I want to read you from Mr. Hornbeck's statement. I had better read the whole paragraph so that I won't be taking out one sentence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it be well to identitfy it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Has this an exhibit number?

Mr. MITCHELL. I couldn't give it to you offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. It was handed to us the other morning with exhibit 95 and exhibit 97, but my copy doesn't seem to have a number on it. It is an instrument by Mr. Hornbeck on the November 27 memoranda.

Admiral STARK. 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Admiral STARK. The Marshall-Stark memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. He says:

> Mr. Hornbeck had over the years frequently advanced the view that the United States and Japan were moving toward an armed collision and that, unless Japan changed her course or was deflected or brought to a standstill by an encounter with some other country, such a collision was bound some day to occur. During the "exploratory conversations" of the year 1941, Mr. Hornbeck took the position that the only "peacful settlement" which Japan was seeking was a settlement on her own terms wherein she [*6297*] might have the assent of the United States to her program of conquest in the Far East.

It is this sentence:

> By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression.

It isn't my language at all. Senator Lucas can raise the question, but it isn't my language. I am trying to get information from the head man, that is, the head of the United States Navy, and I read you that sentence now:

> By August of 1941 the situation had become definitely threatening. Toward the end of that month, the British Government and the American Government served on Japan a strong warning against further extending of her courses of aggression. From then on it was generally recognized that Japan might embark on acts of force against Great Britain or the United States or both. Officers of the Department of State were in constant touch with officers of Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, exchanging factual data and discussing the possibilities of the situation.

Now, it is not mine. I want to know if you ever heard [*6298*] anything to the effect that Great Britain and America had given these warnings.

Admiral STARK. I recall only our own warning of August 17.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge of this?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that you would remember it? That would be an outstanding matter?

Admiral STARK. I think I would if there had been any such note we sent, had it been called to my attention. However, I wouldn't guarantee it.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is no exhibit number attached to it. It may be identified in the record by stating the date and from whom to whom it was written. It was read into the record but not given a number.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is the Hornbeck statement attached to "Problem of Far Eastern Relations," November 27, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. The top document to the Hornbeck memorandum, is it?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I suggest it be given an exhibit number because Mr. Keefe has already put in one Hornbeck memorandum and [*6299*] there are three or four more available to the committee, which will be separate.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the next exhibit number?

Mr. MITCHELL. 108.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be ordered filed as Exhibit 108.

(The document refered to was marked "Exhibit 108.")

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a memorandum entitled, "Special Assistant to the Secretary, November 2, 1944," with the initials, "S. K. H." That is Hornbeck, I suppose. Attached to it is a long memorandum, which was read from, and that also has the initials "S. K. H."

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Mr. MITCHELL. November 2, 1944. The memorandum attached to it is dated February 28, 1944, and they both appear to be signed by Hornbeck. And that which was read, was from his memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. They are both attached to the memorandum of the 27th; is that not correct?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Let's clear this up first.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't find it in the paper here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How can a memorandum in 1944 be attached to a memorandum in 1941?

[*6300*] Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is; there it is.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will straighten that out. On top is a memorandum of November 2, 1944, signed with Hornbeck's initials, stating:

> The memorandum at the bottom of this file, a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations,

and we find that memorandum dated November 27, 1941, "Problem of Far Eastern Relations."

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is that memorandum addressed?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is not addressed to anybody, but it is signed or initialed by "S. K. H."

The CHAIRMAN. Does the paper indicate to whom it is intended to go?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. It is just some memorandum that he had written and was in the file. It is not addressed to anybody. Then it goes on to say:

> For purposes of the record there is now being superimposed a memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, of date February 28, 1944, in which certain pertinent facts are stated and an analysis is made of the contents and true purport of the memorandum of November 27, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a memorandum written by Dr. [*6301*] Hornbeck in 1941 and thereafter a reference made to it by Mr. Drew Pearson, and this memorandum of 1944 is a discussion of the Drew Pearson paper and showing it wasn't justified and showing what he had in mind in 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. Every word in this thing is written by Hornbeck. When he speaks of "Mr. Hornbeck" he is talking about himself.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what makes it difficult to understand.

Mr. MITCHELL. It has been offered in evidence.

Senator LUCAS. Is this an argument between Drew Pearson and Hornbeck?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair doesn't know whether it is an argument or whether it is an agreement.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a dispute.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. The Chair might interject this observation, that the statement in the memorandum of Dr. Hornbeck that parallel recommendations were made by this Government and Great Britain to Japan, would not of itself be evidence that such was done, if such a protest or representation was made by Great Britain, of course the document itself would prove what it contained. We have already had evidence as to the request or suggestion or urgency upon the President to issue a parallel document, [*6302*] but he issued his own warning, if that may be the proper term for it, on August 17, which was not parrallel to what had been urged upon him. Whether Great Britain at the time issued a similar one, or it might be called parallel, could be proved by the document itself, regardless of what Dr. Hornbeck may have said about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the British papers are not subject to our examination, so I take it that it is our duty to present to the committee everything that we have, and particularly those things that come out of the State Department, that would bear upon this.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not protesting against it. It is entirely proper to present it for whatever it is worth. But the mere fact that Dr. Hornbeck said there was a parallel statement, by itself wouldn't necessarily be proof of that fact, without in any way impugning Dr. Hornbeck's credulity or credibility.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not commenting on the weight of this instrument, but it certainly is evidence.

[*6303*] Mr. MURPHY. It is my understanding that the record shows that instead of the British sending a parallel note that Prime Minister Churchill made a speech in the House, in London, which was in effect their answer, or their action, pursuant to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. There is quite a bit of evidence in on this. There is the radio broadcast of Mr. Churchill, which was sent to Mr. Grew, indicating that that was the parallel action, and there is this.

The CHAIRMAN. This has been filed.

Senator FERGUSON. There is the New York Times article.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record, so we will go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you knew Mr. Hornbeck, didn't you?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the political adviser, was he not?

Admiral STARK. He was adviser to Mr. Hull on Far Eastern matters. I believe he was head of the Far Eastern Division.

Senator FERGUSON. You would take for granted that he knew what was going on on these notes and messages, as far as the Far East was concerned?

Admiral STARK. He should have known in detail.

[*6304*] Senator FERGUSON. You had conferred with him and taken his advice and you had given him your advice?

Admiral STARK. I didn't confer with Dr. Hornbeck very often, and when I did it would probably be in the presence of Mr. Hull. Occasionally Mr. Hull would send for me and I might talk to him and several State Department people, but generally I did not take up business with Mr. Hornbeck.

Senator FERGUSON. But you never found that he was mistaken as to what had been done or not done? That is, on these messages and notes?

Admiral STARK. I had no finding one way or the other on that. I saw very little of him. I saw him occasionally, but generally speaking, Admiral Schuirmann dealt with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether your Department disagreed with Mr. Hornbeck as to the possibility or probability of war with Japan?

Admiral STARK. On the assumption that he thought we were heading for it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I also thought so.

Senator FERGUSON. So you agreed with him on that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, on the basis that he thought so; I also thought so. That was agreed.

Senator FERGUSON. In this particular instrument—I [*6305*] think it is this—he said it was 5 to 1 that we would not be at war with Japan by the 15th of December. Were you that strong?

Admiral STARK. No, I didn't make those predictions, as a rule. Those 2 to 1, 3 to 1, or 50–50 chances, or 80 to 20. I believe Mr. Hull, at times, as the percentage went down, of his chances, I often thought he was optimistic, but he should have known better than I, and doubtless did—he was working on it all the time—but I never went into that 5 to 1 business, or this or that.

The other fellow had the initiative and he was going to set the day.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard Mr. Welles say that there was a change from a thousand to one to a million to one?

Admiral STARK. On what?

Senator FERGUSON. That we would stay out.

Admiral STARK. That we would stay out of the war or get in?

Senator FERGUSON. That we would get in; it was a million to one.

Admiral STARK. It was pretty close to getting in after December—after November 27.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the Konoye visit, had you ever been consulted about that?

[*6306*] Admiral STARK. I knew about it. I wasn't consulted as to the advisability of his coming or not coming.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you present in the room when the note of Secretary of War Stimson was read as a memorandum at the bottom of another letter where he said he had agreed he thought it would be a bad thing to have him come, were you there?

Admiral STARK. No; I don't recall that at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted at all as to whether or not you advised to confer with him or not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. That was on a high political level.

Senator FERGUSON. And had you ever talked that over with Mr. Knox, the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall. As to whether he should come or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever prepare any agenda or prepare any ship to have the meeting on?

Admiral STARK. Are you referring to the meeting where they wanted the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I thought—my testimony may be inaccurate—I was thinking of Kurusu's visit. You are talking about the meeting on the high sea?

[*6307*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I was present at some of the meetings when that was discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, you said Konoye.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wrong——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean Kurusu?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean Prince Konoye.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. In other words, I am referring to the proposal to have the Japanese—that he and the President meet somewhere and discuss means of settlement in the Pacific. I had heard that discussed; yes, sir. I don't recall that my opinion was asked, but I was in sympathy and agreement with the stand taken that if the President of the United States left the country to discuss matters of

State with the Prime Minister of Japan, some sort of agenda which offered some chances of success should be set up beforehand, and I believe, without going into any papers on the subject, that that was the stumbling block, that we could get nothing from Japan.

But I would say Mr. Hull would be a far more competent witness on that than I.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you oppose such a meeting?

Admiral STARK. No; I didn't oppose, nor did I approve it. I mean I don't recall having expressed an opinion [*6308*] except that I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished.

[*6309*] Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned in one of your statements here that our fleet was being depleted at Pearl Harbor and that while in its full strength it would be a deterrent, yet in a weakened state it would not be, as far as Japan was concerned. Do you recall that?

Admiral STARK. You mean as regards the numbers in that fleet?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Admiral Kimmel made that statement, and I was quite in agreement with it, that the strength of the fleet, just like the strength of the voice of the United States in international affairs, is almost entirely dependent on its armed force.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, it has been mentioned here, and I want to clear it up, as to what Mr. Churchill said in his speech on the 27th of January 1942 in the House of Commons, and I wanted to ask you some questions on it.

Admiral STARK. This was December——

Senator FERGUSON. January 28, 1942, in the House of Commons.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Churchill speaking:

> On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt, that the United [*6310*] States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been falsified by the events.

Did you hear that discussed at the Atlantic Conference?

Admiral STARK. I did not. I was not present at the conferences between the President and the Prime Minister. Naturally, they were alone much. I remember that speech of the Prime Minister.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the very thing that you were trying to find out from the President, was it not, as to what we would do if Britain alone was attacked?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and I was trying to find it out and just what agreements were made I have no idea. I was surprised when I heard that talk of Mr. Churchill.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am reading further——

Admiral STARK. Because the President could not commit us to going in, and the Prime Minister knew he could not without being backed by Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, could we have gone into a nondeclared war, such as in the Atlantic, where Congress did not sanction it?

Admiral STARK. Not unless we were attacked. In the nondeclared war in the Atlantic, again I invite attention to the [*6311*] fact that it was defensive measures in support of getting material across the Atlantic for which Congress had provided.

Senator FERGUSON. To make it clear, Admiral Stark, why I am asking these questions, this, in my mind, only leads to the one question, of whether or not you believed that they were going to attack Great Britain alone on the 7th, and as to what you were prepared to do, or other people in Washington, or in the Pacific, or anywhere else. That is the only purpose of trying to find out what you knew, whether you knew about this.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether it would cause you to do certain things then or not to do certain things then. [Reading on from Mr. Churchill's speech:]

It fortified our British decision to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts. As time went on, one had greater assurance than if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American fleet.

[*6312*] Now, here is a former Lord of the Admiralty in Britain speaking about our fleet being in the rear and on the flank. Did that ever occur to you prior to the 7th of December, that Japan would not attack Britain alone, or would not attack Britain and the Dutch East Indies, and allow our fleet to be in the Pacific as stated by Churchill?

Admiral STARK. I thought of every angle of that, not as a result of any conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill, but from my own military viewpoint.

May I, the subject of ADB has come up once or twice—may I read you a dispatch, which is not very long, showing the final termination of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I would like to have any evidence you have.

The CHAIRMAN. You may read that into the record.

Admiral STARK. We received a dispatch from Admiral Hart on 7 November 1941:

Are there any instructions regarding ADB–2, which I understand is in the hands of Batavia but not yet received here?

I answered that dispatch on the 11th, his dispatch having been sent on the 7th:

Chief of Naval Operations and British Chief of Naval Staff have agreed ADB–1 and ADB–2 are dead and a complete new [*6313*] approach will be required. Your 050255.

The one I just read.

[In general it will consist of a joint naval operating plan drawn up by you and Commander-in-Chief British Far Eastern Fleet who is now enroute that station and who will probably be directed to visit Manila secretly to establish personal contact with you and with Army high command. This naval plan would be integrated with Dutch naval plans and Army and Air plans to be worked out by the U. S., United Kingdom, and the Netherlands East Indies Commands in the Far Eastern area. Letter now enroute to you by air-mail on this subject. Additional instructions will be sent later.]

[*6314*] In response to that, which I had taken up with Admiral Pound, I informed Hart as noted therein that Admiral Phillips of the Royal Navy would visit him, I received the following from Admiral Hart, which was sent December 7. This is in five parts.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, that was written before any attack was made, was it not?

Admiral STARK. That was written before the attack; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, please make this notation in the record that this document will be found commencing at page 5125 of the record.

Admiral STARK. The first two short dispatches I believe should be put in the record at this time to make it complete. I think these are not exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you give us what they are?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They are short, aren't they?

Admiral STARK. The two short ones.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have just read them, haven't you?

Admiral STARK. I have read them; yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Please give those to the reporter and he will leave those in the transcript and strike out of the [*6315*] transcript your reading of the other documents.

Admiral STARK. I will give him both documents.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Stark, you were familiar though, with the fact that prior to Admiral Hart sending you that message, he sent you Exhibit 40:

Learn from Singapore we have assured British Army support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral STARK. For the reason that we did not have any to give him on that subject and the rumor that he had was false so far as we knew. I had nothing on it.

Senator FERGUSON. But as soon as you received this one that you have just read, referred back to the correct page, you did reply to that?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, doesn't this amount to practically the same thing, Exhibit 40?

Admiral STARK. Will you read that again, please?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Learn from Singapore we have assured British Army support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

That is from Admiral Hart to you.

[*6316*] The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Dated December 6 or 7.

Senator FERGUSON. 7.

Mr. MITCHELL. 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. At 6:45.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that letter show whether Admiral Hart said the fleet had already been attacked?

Mr. MITCHELL. That dispatch was sent 3 or 4 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and that has already been read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a little deceptive, that 6:45.

Mr. MITCHELL. We figured it out that it was about 6 hours before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Just before the attack.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't the reply in the long message that he sent amount to practically the same thing as he was asking about?

Admiral STARK. We had been working for practically a year on this subject of endeavoring to get together out there. We had had two or three conferences which, as I recall, were rejected, certainly the first one which came in, which I think was in April 1941, because it showed commitments and we could not make any commitments and we had sent word that we could [*6317*] not make any.

Now, that dispatch which you read me might assume that Admiral Hart had heard that we had made commitments. We had not. Whether this had any bearing on that I do not recall, but we got from him, "Are there any instructions regarding A–B–D–2," which was the last conference they had? We were taking that up with the Admiralty. Both were rejected and, as I told him, they were dead and then definitely to go ahead and make his own plan in case we became involved in a war, but so far as I know the information that he got that we would go in was not correct. I had never heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you consult the President about your reply to Admiral Hart's message that is on page 5125, volume 29, of our record? That is the one you were reading.

Admiral STARK. Consulted him about this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; about the long one. Before you sent the answer did you confer with the President?

Admiral STARK. With regard to the answer that I sent?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I undoubtedly told him about it because I kept him pretty familiar with all that material.

Senator FERGUSON. And what was the reply given to you by the President, that is the substance of it? Did he agree [*6318*] to it?

Admiral STARK. To this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; your reply to Admiral Hart.

Admiral STARK. Well, it went out, it was O. K.'d. It went into operation and just whether I took that up with him or not I do not definitely recall, but in general I kept him informed of every movement we made of this sort. I have not the distinct remembrance of this dispatch as I have of some of the messages with regard to the Atlantic, but I undoubtedly told him about it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would say that if you did tell him that you undoubtedly received his consent or you would not have sent it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; or received his O. K. that he was satisfied with it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean, his O. K.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me. I would like to have the record show when the answer was sent, the hour or day.

Senator FERGUSON. It was sent 7 in the evening, after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Not after the attack?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; after the attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I wanted to know.

Admiral STARK. Our answer was sent on December 7 at [*6319*] 080121.

The CHAIRMAN. What would that be in the United States?

Admiral STARK. That would be in the United States about 3 o'clock in the morning of December 7. That is when the——

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. No; that could not be because you got his telegram after that.

Admiral STARK. Oh, I was looking at the wrong number up here. The date of that dispatch—I was looking at the top of the page—is 080121. That is 1 o'clock in the morning, 1:21 in the morning Greenwich, which would be 21 hours 21, which would be 9:21 on the evening of the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. In other words, it went out 9 o'clock that evening.

The CHAIRMAN. After the attack.

Admiral STARK. After the attack; yes, sir.

Regarding these conversations and when they started and regarding political commitments, I sent a dispatch to Admiral Hart on February 15, 1941, reading:

Beginning February 22 British and Dutch staff conversations will be held in Singapore.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is already in the record.

[*6320*] Admiral STARK. I would like to bring it up at this point if I may, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

Admiral STARK (reading):

Will be held in Singapore under conditions of the utmost secrecy. You are advised to have your representatives participate in these conversations. He will have the power to agree tentatively to a joint plan of operation of U. S.-English and Dutch forces, but he will not be empowered to make any commitments of a political nature. Agreements must have your and my approval.

I just want to accentuate that question about political commitments, with which we were very careful.

Senator FERGUSON. "Your and my approval." Who is he referring to?

Admiral STARK. Hart's and mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral——

Admiral STARK. Wait, let me check it, will you please? "Must have your and my approval." That is Admiral Hart's and mine to start with an, of course, ultimately it would come back to Congress before we could do anything except in the case of a surprise attack or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you come to Congress on the same kind of a problem in the Atlantic? Did you come to Con- [*6321*] gress or did anyone come to Congress on the same kind of an arrangement in the Atlantic?

Admiral STARK. You mean with regard to making arrangements with the British in case we got into war?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we did not come to Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what is the difference between the Pacific, the ABC in the Pacific and that in the Atlantic.

Admiral STARK. Not so much, sir. In the Atlantic we originally got together and made plans to have them ready, and for which I was responsible, in case we were drawn in. This was a similar thing, to have a plan in case we were drawn in in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. But in the Atlantic with what you call technical war—we won't go over that again—we went in without Congress. Now, what was the difference in the ABCD in the Pacific and the ABC in the Atlatnic?

Admiral STARK. We had no similar problem confronting us in the Pacific with regard to transport of materials.

Senator FERGUSON. Weren't we transporting material to Iceland and we were transporting it to the Philippines? What was the difference?

Admiral STARK. Well, the difference was that we were be- [*6322*] ing attacked in the Atlantic and we had drawn up defense plans against that attack. We had had no attacks against any of our ships in the Pacific subsequent to the *Panay* incident.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is if they had gone in against Britain—you see, we are talking about that—what would have been our arrangement? Were they going to come to Congress about taking the Azores? You were told to get ready with transports and all to take the Azores. Did they come to Congress about the Azores?

Admiral STARK. There was given the order to make a military plan for the Azores. It never was made.

Senator FERGUSON. You got the ships all ready?

Admiral STARK. I got the ships ready and I brought marines around to be prepared to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. But it did not eventuate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have the same problem about sending some of your marines down to Brazil?

Admiral STARK. We sent some of our people down to Brazil.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send any marines?

Admiral STARK. I think we did. We established air stations down there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that there was to be a German attack on Brazil and that you were to get a certain [*6323*] amount of marines ready to go down, or that there had been an attack?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I think not, Senator Ferguson. I recall nothing about a German attack down there.

Senator FERGUSON. When were the reserve marines called out?

Admiral STARK. You mean the marines who were on the retired list or on inactive duty, when were they called?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall just when that was. The Department can furnish you that information.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am not concerned with the Atlantic, only insofar as I am trying to get why there was a distinction between

the Atlantic and the Pacific, that is all; I am not concerned with that.

Admiral STARK. As I see it, sir, our problems were quite different up to the point of war because in the Atlantic we were confronted with the problem of getting supplies through to the British, a problem where sinkings—at one time in 1941 ships were being sunk three times as fast as they were being built and that could only go on until we crossed the curves in the opposite direction. It meant defeat of the British and defeat of the sending of material over there due to German aggression on the high seas. We had no such problem [*6324*] in the Pacific. I do not know whether I get your question right or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you gave me an answer, as you see it, what the distinction was.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know whether this was a fact—and we were interrupted when I was reading Mr. Churchill's speech. There was one other item that I wanted to ask you about, and this is quoting from Mr. Churchill's speech of the 27th of January 1942 in the House of Commons.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all cost to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged.

Did you know that to be a fact?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not. That is his opinion. I do not know whether he knew it to be a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of facts that would permit Mr. Churchill to make that statement?

Admiral STARK. I do not know what his background for it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the message of the 27th you use the word "deployment" and I want to ask you, Admiral, if [*6325*] there is any place in the Navy war plans where the word "deployment" is used or defined?

Admiral STARK. I think it may be used. I do not know that it is defined. A deployment to a naval officer with regard to his forces, with a specific objective in view, I think, has a definite meaning to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you used it in a little different way in the October 16th message.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There you say, "You will take due precaution, including such preparatory deployment." Deployment there is preparatory; and in the one on the 27th it is used "defensive"; "appropriate defensive deployment."

Now, was there any place in any of the war plans where that word was used so that these commanders in the field would know what they were to do under a war plan?

Admiral STARK. Not exactly, no definite set-up as I recall. He would use his judgment as to what this meant, or if in doubt he could ask.

Senator FERGUSON. If I asked you this question, the word "deployment," is it a word of art as far as the Navy is concerned? Do you know what I mean by that?

Admiral STARK. Is it what?

Senator FERGUSON. A word of art. Is it used by the Navy [*6326*] to designate a certain thing?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the definition?

Admiral STARK. Well, deployment in general means a spread. You deploy your forces, you deploy on a scouting line, you may deploy on an attacking line.

Senator FERGUSON. But there is nothing in any war plan that you know of where it was used where he could look and say, "There is what we are to do," or "That is what we are to do"?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I recall the deployment which he made in response to the dispatch of October 16 was a preliminary deployment in line with what war plans called for as one of the first moves in the outlying islands and he did that.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read to you now what you did say before the Roberts Commission, pages 1813 and 1814, to refresh your memory on that:

> What we expected him, Admiral Kimmel, to do was to get more planes and personnel and so on down to Wake and Midway and, if possible, to send his task forces, some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raider, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew all the task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway and were expected to go on [6327] the fifth or sixth up down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port—

meaning you—

> and at that time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to meet in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept them at sea. He had taken those measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe assignment and other measures sad been taken of a similar nature.

Now, do you remember that testimony before Justice Roberts?

Admiral STARK. I recall it now that you read it, in general.

[6328] Senator FERGUSON. Is it true now?

Admiral STARK. I knew about his sending his submarines out and deploying them after the October message. We had one dispatch indicating one of the forces at sea. I do not recall the other. We knew of the general plan, we knew of the forces in port and at sea, and just what he had at sea at that time, or I mean in port at that time. Since then, I haven't any recollection that we knew just what he did have in port.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you had a Navy board where the ships were kept on the board?

Admiral STARK. We had a Navy board, as I explained, but all the general local movements were not kept up to date.

Senator FERGUSON. Would a local movement be a movement from Pearl Harbor to Wake?

Admiral STARK. That would be one within his province, which he initiated.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Would it be a local movement so it would not go on your board?

Admiral STARK. I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your board did show what he had gotten? Did you ever consult your board to find out?

[6329] Admiral STARK. No; I did not consult the board for that particular thing. He sent us a message, or a letter, I have forgotten

which, about one of those movements to which I have testified. I think it was the one which left the 28th, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Now is it not a fair summary of your testimony that, so far as the disposition by Kimmel of the ships of the fleet was concerned, you considered his message was sent in accordance with the directive in your dispatch of November 27?

Admiral STARK. The disposition of ships he had at that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Are you including planes?

Senator FERGUSON. No; just the ships of the fleet.

Admiral STARK. I have stated I did not know what orders he gave to his two task forces, but that movement was in general conformance with the strengthening of the area, and if I had known of it I certainly would have taken no exception to it. It was all right at that time, so far as I was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, do I understand then that we had this very critical situation where you were notifying them of a war warning on the 27th and you were not consulting [*6330*] the board to ascertain exactly what he was doing?

Admiral STARK. The board would not have shown exactly what he was doing.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have got all of those boards downstairs. The Admiral stated yesterday the board did not show the position in and out of port, of Pearl Harbor. I did not bring them up. If you want them we can bring them up.

Admiral STARK. Lieutenant Commander Richmond tells me there is a board showing the picture from the 1st to the 6th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it did show it?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I misunderstood you.

Mr. MITCHELL. I tried to draw out whether he knew the ships were bottled up at Pearl Harbor and I asked him about these boards, and he said the board would not show in detail just the ships in the area, so I dropped it.

I have the boards downstairs, and I will bring them up in the morning.

Admiral STARK. I was going to say the simplest thing to do would be to get the boards and look at them.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have the boards here tomorrow morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. We can bring them up now, if you have time.

[*6331*] The CHAIRMAN. We have only got about 18 minutes more.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, am I not correct in saying that there are two phases which modify the word "deployment" in your dispatch of the 27th? The first phase is defensive, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the second phase is preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL–46?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a fair statement?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this moment.

Now, Admiral, take the task assigned in WPL–46. That involves certain offensive action, does it not, such as raids of the Marshall Islands?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you directed a defensive deployment, but a deployment which was also preparatory to an offensive mission, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, a defensive deployment preparatory—in naval understanding, when you tell someone to do something preparatory, it means that you will bear in mind or get ready for, and be in readiness to execute another plan later on.

[*6332*] In taking a defensive deployment he would protect himself and be ready later on to carry on his other duties under the plan.

Senator FERGUSON. But this language called on him to do two things, that is, one was a defensive deployment and the other one was preparatory to an offensive deployment, isn't that right?

Admiral STARK. The other does not require action in the sense that he has got to take up a position prepared to attack the Marshalls, that is the Eastern Marshalls. He takes a defensive deployment and it will be in keeping with readiness to execute another plan later on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the plans use the word "J-day"?

Admiral STARK. Use what?

Senator FERGUSON. The word "J-day." What was J-day?

Admiral STARK. I think that was something that Kimmel used for Japan day, for war. The order did not say that, and our plan did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had a certain day which would be war, and then so many days plus they were to do certain things in the Marshalls, isn't that correct?

Admiral STARK. That would have been left to his discretion, as to when he would have taken the raids in the Marshalls. It would be his own plan.

[*6333*] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a law passed in Hawaii that designated M-day?

Admiral STARK. A law passed in Hawaii?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; a territorial law that provided for the declaration of M-day.

Admiral STARK. No; I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mobilization day. You do not know about that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Now isn't it true that you did not intend Admiral Kimmel, in taking his deployment, to ignore preparations for the defensive action expected of the Pacific Fleet under the war plan?

Admiral STARK. That would be correct; yes, sir, I would not ignore it. But I think he would also not let that subsequent movement interfere with his primary mission at the time, if he considered that to be the defense of his fleet and what he could do to protect Pearl Harbor, which he must defend to be of further use.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the situation in June 1940, between the United States and Japan as critical as it was in November of 1941?

Admiral STARK. In June 1940?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were the head of Naval Operations in June of 1940?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time an all-out alert was ordered in Hawaii, was it not, that is "Be on the alert against hostile oversea raids"? Do you remember that?

Admiral STARK. That was an alert ordered by the Army. Is that the one you refer to?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one I am referring to, June 17, 1940.

Admiral STARK. My memory on that is very hazy. Apparently we had nothing—the files have been recently searched—to show anything of an unusual character to cause us to alert the fleet at that time, and we have been unable to find it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not Admiral Richardson say that he did receive a message later, that it was a genuine alert and that he was to act accordingly?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; he stated his remembrance of it was, at first, that it was a drill, and later he sent us a message, and we replied to it, stating, "War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Departments. Request [*6335*] you continue cooperation."

But I do not recall, Senator Ferguson, that incident particularly. It left no particular point in my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there was not anything uncertain about it, was there?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. There was not anything uncertain about it? It said to be on the alert against hostile overseas raids, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; but I do not recall that we were concerned particularly with it at that time in the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. I say there was not anything uncertain about it. An officer ought to understand that order, ought he not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; plainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now can you tell us why that or similar language was not used to alert them on the 27th, when there was a danger, as you say?

Admiral STARK. That was a War Department dispatch at that time, and I cannot recall on what specific information it was founded, and certainly we were not perturbed and we were not looking for war at that time, and we have been able to find nothing to justify it.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you give that kind of an alert [*6336*] when you are not looking for war, and you cannot find anything to justify it, and then you get up to the 27th—let me relate some facts to refresh your memory, and that is that on the 5th of November you had a statement that the deadline was placed on the 25th, and then along came the days as they went by and they changed that to be the 29th, and it became certain and definite, and, as you have told us here, the President expected an attack on the 30th, which would be the 29th in Japan.

[*6337*] Admiral STARK. I said he would not be surprised, I believe, had an attack occurred, not that he expected it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am glad that you corrected that.

There is a distinction, you see, between you would not be surprised and you would expect. Now, with all these intercepted messages,

the one to Hitler indicating that they would go to war—when you had that tense situation, why were not the same or similar orders given to be on the alert against hostile overseas raids?

Admiral STARK. I would invite attention to what we did send, and which has been discussed dozens of times, in the messages of the 24th and 27th. I think you have my standpoint on that, and they were my best judgment. I have also stated that while I would have assumed that that would have alerted, and had thought and had intended to fully alert, the people in Hawaii, I was not expecting an overseas raid on Hawaii at that time, having no evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, do the words "deployment" and "alert" mean the same thing in the Navy?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What does "alert" mean?

Admiral STARK. Well, we do not usually use the word "alert" in the Navy the way the Army uses it. We talk about being alerted. I assume that when we send a dispatch that [*6338*] states "This is a war warning and the enemy is expected to attack," that that in itself would alert the people. The language was such, without saying "alert," that it certainly, we thought, would have people ready to intercept and take action against an invading force should it occur.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you do not use the word "alert" in the Navy. Did not they have alert Nos. 1, 2, and 3?

Admiral STARK. We call them condition 1, 2, and 3.

Senator FERGUSON. Condition 1, 2, and 3?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Army uses the "alert"?

Admiral STARK. They use the word "alert."

Mr. MITCHELL. "Condition of readiness" is the term.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had notified Admiral Kimmel to be in condition of readiness No. 1, 2, or 3, what would that mean?

Admiral STARK. One is: General quarters, all out, with us on board ship. That refers to the condition on board ship.

Senator FERGUSON. They were in 3, were they not?

Admiral STARK. I believe he was in 3 at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you would have put him on No. 1 condition, would it have meant the same as deployment?

[*6339*] Admiral STARK. If I had told him to go into condition 1, he probably would have wondered why I was telling him what sort of condition to take on his individual ships. It was not my place to prescribe to him his internal arrangements. It was my place to give him a war warning and the gravity of the picture presented as I could see it, and it was his responsibility to take whatever condition on board ship, or whatever dispositions of the fleet, he thought best to meet it.

Senator FERGUSON. You answered one of Senator Lucas' questions and I want to try and get you to elaborate a little on it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About the oil question, and your attitude toward Japan. Did you not testify before the Navy court, on page 43, question 117, that after the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan in the summer of 1941 you stated that Japan would go somewhere and take it (oil), and that if you were a Jap you would?

Admiral STARK. I think that is correct. You are reading from the record, and I stand back of it. I stated it, and I stated in the State Department, as I recall, that if a complete shut-down was made on the Japanese, throttling her commercial life and her internal life and her essential normal peace life by stopping her from getting oil, that the natural thing for [*6340*] a Jap was to say, "Well, I will go down and take it."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend the White House conference on the 24th of July 1941 with President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, or Under Secretary Mr. Welles, where it was indicated to the Japanese Ambassador that the British, the Dutch and American Governments were about to impose upon Japan an oil embargo?

That is in Foreign Relations, volume 2, on page 527, to refresh your memory.

Admiral STARK. Well, I recall a good many discussions about economic sanctions. I do not recall that particular one. I remember very clearly one meeting in the White House about that period with the Japanese Ambassador, and I think it was Mr. Welles and not Mr. Hull, in which we were struggling to keep the peace in the Pacific, when Nomura stated it was necessary for them to secure themselves regarding certain products in Indochina, food, rice, and the President proposed that, so far as his position could have influenced he would endeavor to see that they got food and their minimum needs, provided they would stop their aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I got this quote from the official record, and I wondered whether that would refresh your memory.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that particular meaning [*6341*] to which you refer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember on that same occasion that the President did tell Japan, that is, through the Ambassador, that should she then attack to get oil by force the Dutch and British would go to war against her? That is on page 527.

Admiral STARK. That the President said, "if"—what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That on that occasion he said to the Japanese Ambassador should she attack to get oil by force the Dutch and British would go to war against her?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that particular statement.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 527.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that particularly.

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, I have here papers that we very recently dug out of the State Department files, a letter of July 22, 1941, by Admiral Stark to Mr. Welles, about the possible effect of an embargo, and attached to it, on July 19, 1941, is Admiral Turner's analysis of the embargo problem which was sent to Mr. Welles, with the notation at the bottom "I concur in general. Is this the kind of picture you wanted? HRS."

Senator FERGUSON. That will help. I will quote from page 527 of Foreign Relations:

The President said that if Japan attempted to [*6342*] seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow of a doubt, resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would

then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result.

Do you remember that?

I do not think you and I have the same volume.

Admiral STARK. I think we have.

Sentor FERGUSON. It is at the bottom of page 527.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. But it undoubtedly took place, being in here.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not shortly after that, in fact in about 48 hours, the embargo did go on?

Admiral STARK. The embargo went on, as I recall, on the 26th. This is the 24th; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, referring to page 531 of that same book, that is the conversation between Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa and Mr. Ballantine, were you informed on that day that the Japanese military attaché told Mr. Ballantine that Japan would have no alternative sooner or later but to go to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies

[*6343*] for oil and other material?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that, but it is in line with the thought I had as to what to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, taking the high-ranking officials in our Government, you said that you thought sanctions such as this oil, and so forth, would bring war on ultimately. Who else agreed with you?

Admiral STARK. Well, according to Peace and War, and which I read into my statement, I think the State Department also agreed with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did General Marshall?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would rather you asked him. My recollection is there was no difference of opinion amongst us with regard to that, and this Peace and War states:

Practically all realistic authorities have been agreed that imposition of substantial economic sanctions or embargoes against any strong country, unless that imposition be backed by a show of superior force, involves serious risk of war. The President and heads of the Army and Navy and Department of State were in constant consultation through this period regarding all the aspects of the diplomatic and military situation.

[*6344*] The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Can counsel show us what those papers are?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not see why I should not hand the paper to the reporter and ask him to transcribe it, and you will all see it in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Let that be done.

Mr. MITCHELL. Put in the record, Mr. Reporter, at this time, and transcribe, the letter of July 22, 1941, from Admiral Stark to Mr. Welles, relating to embargoes, and attach to it the study on the embargo problem, dated July 19, 1941, prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations by Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we will all have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

(The matter referred to follows:)

In reply refer to Initials
and No. Op-10 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 22 July 1941.

DEAR MR. WELLES: The latter part of last week the President asked my reaction to an embargo on a number of commodities to Japan. [*6345*] I expressed the same thought to him which I have expressed to you and to Mr. Hull regarding oil, but as to the subject in general I would be glad to have War Plans Division make a quick study. This study was finished yesterday. I sent it to the President and told his Aide I should also like to send you a copy. The President expressed himself as pleased with it and asked me to send a copy to Mr. Hull, which I have done; and to talk it over with you.

Will you send for me at your convenience?

Sincerely,

H. R. STARK

Honorable SUMNER WELLES,
Under Secretary of State,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

Op–12–djm.

Jul 19 1941.

SECRET

From: The Director, War Plans Division.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Study of the effect of an embargo of trade between the United States and Japan.
Enclosures:
(A) Copy of the following tables:[1]
(1) Exports to Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.
(2) Exports from Hawaii to Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.
[*6346*] (3) Exports from the Philippines to Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.
(B) Copy of the following tables:
(1) Imports from Japan—December 1940 through May 1941.
(2) Imports from Japan to Hawaii—December 1940 through May 1941.
(3) Imports from Japan to the Philippines—December 1940 through May 1941.

1. *Purpose.*—The purpose of this study is to determine the effect that would be produced by the enforcement of an absolute or partial embargo on trade between the United States and Japan. Detailed consideration has not here been given to the trade between Japan and the Philippines.

2. *United States exports to Japan in 1940.*—United States exports to Japan in 1940 were valued at $227,000,000, a decline of $5,000,000 from 1939, and of $13,000,000 from 1938. During the first ten months of 1940 the value of exports advanced, due to higher commodity prices and Japan's increased demand for American products as a result of enforced curtailment of her purchases from Europe. However, sharp recessions in export trade during the last two months of 1940, occasioned in part by the application of export license control to certain products, wiped out earlier gains. In November and December, particularly sharp declines were registered in machine tools, ferro-alloys, and refined copper, while scrap-iron exports were practically negligible.

[*6347*] 3. *Present trends of exports.*—(a) United States exports to Japan during the first five months of 1941 were valued at $47,000,000 as compared with $91,500,000 for the same period of 1940. During the current year trade has declined steadily from $11,336,000 in January to $6,594,000 in May (see Enclosure (A).

(b) The principal factor affecting exports to Japan during the past year has been the progressively restrictive effect of export control measures. The virtual disappearance from the trade in 1941 of iron and steel products and of metal-working machinery, which together accounted for shipments valued at $67,000,000 in 1940, was the direct result of an embargo on shipments of these commodities to Japan. The sharp drop in Japanese purchases of raw cotton during 1940, however, was the result of other influences.

(c) (1) During 1939 Japan purchased American raw cotton valued at $42,500,000, while in 1940 her purchases amounted to only $29,500,000. This drop

[1] The tables referred to were not submitted to the official reporter.

was due to the large quantity of piece goods then on hand in Japan, the relatively high price of American cotton compared to that of India and of Latin America, and shipping requirements for items needed more urgently. In November 1940 American exports of raw cotton were valued at only $157,000; they have risen steadily since then, reaching $881,000 in May 1941.

(2) Declines in luxury items, including automobiles, [6348] are due to a decline in purchasing power in Japan and to Japanese action in placing restrictions on the importation and use of these items, rather than to United States export restrictions.

(d) Petroleum exports during 1940 increased by $9,300,000, or 21%, over the figure for 1939. Exports for the first five months of 1941 were valued at $27,200,000, or 50% of the total for the entire year 1940. This is contrary to the general trend of exports.

(e) Sharp reductions in available ship tonnage has contributed to the fall in exports. Due to withdrawals from trade of additional vessels, future exports to Japan will be even less, regardless of export restrictions.

4. *Imports from Japan.*—(a) Imports from Japan to the United States during 1939 were $161,000,000 and in 1940, $158,000,000. For the first four months of 1941, imports amounted to $40,000,000, a decline of only $8,200,000 from the same period in 1940; this compares with a decline in our exports of $37,300,000. Our exports to Japan exceeded our imports from that country, during the period 1 January to 30 April, 1941, by only about $500,000, much less than usual. One result of the system of export control is thus seen to be the arrival at a balance between exports and imports. This fact permits Japan to pay in kind for all goods sent to her from this country, and a continuation of the [6349] present trend may soon make her our creditor.

(b) The following table shows items of imports valued at more than $1,000,000 during 1940:

Item	*Value of 1940 imports*
Crabmeat	$3,269,000
Tea	3,190,000
Cotton cloth, bleached	2,263,000
Raw silk	105,311,000
Silk fabric, except pile	1,661,000
Hats, bonnets, and hoods	1,143,000
China and porcelain ware	2,423,000
Earthen and stoneware	1,096,000
Total	$120,356,000

These eight items account for 76% of our imports and indicate where curtailment might start if it is decided to take steps to reduce Japan's markets.

5. *Effect of further restrictions on exports.*—(a) The most important fields for exercising further restrictions on exports are petroleum products and raw cotton, which accounted for 74% and 13%, respectively, of the trade in May, 1941.

(b) It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result. Japan doubtless knows [6350] that wells and machinery probably would be destroyed. If then engaged in war in Siberia, the necessary force for southward adventures might not be immediately available. Furthermore, Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months war operations. Export restrictions of oil by the United States should be accompanied by similar restrictions by the British and Dutch.

(c) Restrictions on the export of raw cotton would probably be serious for Japan only if India, Peru, and Brazil should apply the same restrictions. Cotton stocks in Japan are believed to be rather low at present.

(d) It will, of course, be recognized that an embargo on exports will automatically stop imports from Japan.

[6351] (e) An embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course. Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measures against the British and Dutch, she would also include military action against the Philippines, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war. Whether

or not such action will be taken immediately will doubtless depend on Japan's situation at that time with respect to Siberia.

(f) Additional export restrictions would hamper Japan's war effort, but not to a very large extent since present restrictions are accomplishing the same result, except with regard to oil, raw cotton, and wood pulp. Thus, the economic weapon against Japan has largely been lost, and the effect of complete embargo would be not very great from a practical standpoint.

6. *Effect on the United States of a loss of imports from Japan.*—(a) As previously mentioned, exports and imports are approaching a balance. If exports cease, imports will also cease, as Japan would not have the means to continue her purchases. The same effect would be produced if we stopped [*6352*] buying from Japan, but attempted to continue our exports.

(b) In 1940, raw silk formed 69 percent of United States imports from Japan. Silk is processed here. It is used in industry and for certain munitions, particularly powderbags. The armed services have large stocks of raw silk, and could get along without further imports, though silk substitutes are not entirely satisfactory. Doubtless industry could manage without silk, although the lack of it would cause a considerable dislocation of labor now employed in the industry. The effect of stopping the purchase of silk would also have an adverse psychological reaction on the part of Japan, though possibly not so great as would an export embargo.

(c) Stopping other imports from Japan would not cause any great hardship in the United States, although the general effect on industry would be adverse.

7. *Conclusions.*—(a) Present export restrictions, plus reductions of available ship-tonnage for use in Japanese trade have greatly curtailed both exports and imports.

(b) The effect of an embargo would hamper future Japanese war effort, though not immediately, and not decisively.

(c) An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan on Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, [*6353*] and possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific. If war in the Pacific is to be accepted by the United States, actions leading up to it should, if practicable, bo postponed until Japan is engaged in a war in Siberia. It may well be that Japan has decided against an early attack on the British and Dutch, but has decided to occupy Indo-China and to strengthen her position there, also to attack the Russians in Siberia. Should this prove to be the case, it seems probable that the United States could engage in war in the Atlantic, and that Japan would not intervene for the time being, even against the British.

8. *Recommendation.*—That trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time.

R. K. TURNER

(Written in longhand:)
I concur in general.
Is this the kind of picture you wanted

H. R. S.

The CHAIRMAN. The committe will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 5, 1946.)

[6354]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jules M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[6355] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson will resume. Do you want to make a statement, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I have one or two things I would like to bring up.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will proceed.

Admiral STARK. Senator Ferguson yesterday, at page 6326 of the record, called my attention to my testimony before the Roberts commission concerning what I expected Admiral Kimmel to do, and concerning what I knew about his dispositions at the time of the attack. He read to me an extract from my testimony which I believe was taken from pages 1813–1814 of the Roberts commission record. I would like to refer to this again and also refer to my earlier testimony before this committee.

In my testimony before the Roberts commission there appears the following:

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for General McNarney's purpose, all he wants to know is whether you expected him (Admiral Kimmel) to carry out his part of the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, whatever it was.

ADMIRAL STARK. Well, significant as to the state of readiness to be expected at Pearl Harbor were the steps [6356] that he took for other than the Pearl Harbor defense plan. What we expected him to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway and were expected to go on the 5th or 6th day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at

that particular time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. He kept the others at sea. And because he had taken those measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.

In passing, Senator Ferguson, I might point out that this quotation is not transcribed exactly at pages 6326–6327 of volume 34 of the committee record. The differences are minor, but I thought you would want to know that there is a difference.

In my testimony of Wednesday, Mr. Mitchell asked me what [*6357*] I knew about location of ships in the Pacific Fleet. His questions and my answers appear at pages 5727–5728, and read as follows:

Mr. MITCHELL. You had a map in your room somewhere in the Navy Department that showed the precise location of ships in the Pacific Fleet day by day, did you not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did not you have a ship movement division there that kept track of where the fleet was?

Admiral STARK. Not in detail, sir. The ships were in the Hawaiian area, but their departures from Pearl Harbor, for example, to their target practice ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing, to my best knowledge and belief we did not know. I know I did not know it. He was not required to report that. If he wanted to move the fleet to the west coast, for example, he would have not done it without asking our permission, but if he wanted to go 100 miles in this or that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some special maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would not have reported that to us.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not then have a system of keeping track of the daily location of ships or of the fact that ships were or were not in Pearl Harbor?

[*6358*] Admiral STARK. No, sir.

I believe the Senator is interested in clearing up what he considers an inconsistency in these two statements.

In order to clarify the matter, I wish to point out to the committee that in my testimony before the Roberts Commission, which was given on January 19, 1942, I indicated that "* * * we knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea * * *." I must have been referring, apparently, to the carrier force which Admiral Kimmel had sent out on the 28th of November and to the regular task force which we knew generally from his quarterly operating plan was due to be at sea. I could not have referred to the carrier force which Admiral Kimmel sent out on December 5, for I had no information as to its composition and movement.

Specifically, as to the task force which departed from Pearl Harbor on November 28, and which, I later learned, included the *Enterprise*, I stated, at page 5729 of the committee record, that:

* * * But the order to go at that time was his (Admiral Kimmel's) own, and as I recall, we were told, in answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and other things, about the *Enterprise*, I believe it was, which left around the 28th.

Mr. Mitchell then suggested to me that the *Lexington* left December 5. I replied, at page 5730:

Yes. I do not [*6359*] recall, and I recollect of no evidence of his reporting to us about the movement of the *Lexington* which left the 5th.

Mr. Mitchell then inquired:

* * * Did not you know that the movement was taking place right about the time that you were sending these warning messages out there?

I replied:

Not until his message came in in reply to the one in which we asked his advice on the relief—on the movement of certain Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever were informed about the movement of the *Lexington*.

This referred to his (Admiral Kimmel's) dispatch of November 28 stating in part——

Twelve marine fighters leave November 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send other marine planes to Midway later. On December 1 sending 12 patrol planes Midway to Wake and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. * * *

These patrol planes, of course, flew out there under their own power.

I think my statement before the Roberts Commission and my statement before this committee are correct and are essentially consistent.

Then, sir, there was another question raised by Senator Ferguson yesterday as to whether there was any difference between the circumstances surrounding our advance planning with the British in ABC–1—which covered both the Atlantic and the Pacific areas—and our advance planning in the so-called [*6360*] American-British-Dutch conversation concerning the far eastern area.

I am afraid my answers yesterday did not make the matter very clear.

You will note that ABC–1 covered not only our advance planning in case we were drawn into the war in the Atlantic, but also contained our advance planning in case we were drawn into a war in the Pacific. This is shown in annex II and in annex III of ABC–1, which gives considerable detail concerning the responsibility, tasks, and forces in the Atlantic and the Pacific area, including the Far East.

I considered it my duty as Chief of Naval Operations to be ready with plans for coordinating our efforts with the British if we should be drawn into the war in the Atlantic. Having in mind, however, that I was not empowered to commit the United States to any course of action, there was written into the agreement, that is, ABC–1, the following:

* * * The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:
(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom.
(b) The Government of the United States and His [*6361*] Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

This agreement formed the basis for WPL–46, the Navy's basic war plan.

As to whether we obtained the approval of Congress before engaging in so-called overt acts in the Atlantic, I can only say, as I have already said, that the people of the United States, through the Congress, had established their policy of aid to Britain in the Lend-Lease Act passed on March 10, 1941. We considered that the Hemisphere defense plans, calling for the defense of the sea lanes through which any effective aid to Britain must pass, was in accordance with this policy.

There was no difference in the circumstances surrounding our conversations with the British and the Dutch in the Far East. In my dispatch of February 15, 1941, to Admiral Hart, directing him to

have a representative participate in conversations with the British and Dutch at Singapore, I stated, with respect to this representative:

> * * * He will have the power to agree tentativey to a joint plan of operation of U. S., English, and Dutch forces, but he will not be empowered to make any commitments of a political nature. Agreements must have your and my approval. * * * Strategic plans adopted should be completely realistic in nature. Due to the fact that doubt exists as to whether the Congress would declare war [*6362*] in case of Jap aggression against any country but the United States, your representative will express my view that any strategic arrangements of the British and Dutch which depend for their efficacy upon intervention by us would not be sound. * * *

I am sure that Admiral Hart and his representative at the various conversations in the Far East were well aware of my injunction against any political commitments and my caution that all planning must be done subject to the will of Congress, and so far as I know, these restrictions were fully complied with.

There was one other point that I am not sure that I got over to the committee with regard to the difference in the Atlantic, where the hemispheric defense plan was in full operation in defending our commerce and the fact that no such order was issued in the Pacific, except on the Southeast Pacific.

The reason for that is that we were at peace with Japan. Japan had not attacked any of our shipping and it had been unnecessary to call into being any such plan. The hemispheric defense plan was not a war plan in the sense that it involved offensive movements on a broad scale anywhere the enemy might be located. It was a defensive plan for the Western Hemisphere and our shipping.

[*6363*] Now, there was one other item and one which Senator Ferguson asked me to check up and that is as to who Mr. Curtis Munson was and if I could get any further information on him.

On the 23d of October the State Department sent word to us that Mr. Curtis Munson was desired by the President for a mission to study Japanese-American relations on the west coast and in Hawaii. As a result of that request by the State Department on us there was a dispatch sent by OPNAV, released by Admiral Wilkinson on 24 October 1941, which reads as follows:

> On confidential mission Mr. Curtis Munson for President of the United States to determine exact status of Japanese-American relations on West Coast and in Territory of Hawaii. Allow him access to all information on Japanese activities in files of District Intelligence Offices. Mr. Munson now in California.

I did not have time to get further information but I learned just before coming up here that Mr. Munson made either two or three reports, I assume to the President, copies of which reports are in the files of Naval Intelligence and can be produced if the committee desires Admiral Colclough to produce them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would like, Admiral, to now ask counsel to get the entire files on Munson from the White [*6364*] House or the Navy file.[1] You have not seen those files, I take it, Admiral.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; they came in just as I was leaving; they are rather long reports and I did not even read the first word of them.

Senator FERGUSON. I meant at the time that they came in. This was October what? When did he come out there, October——

Admiral STARK. My dispatch was October 24. The request was made on us on the 23d and it was stated at that time he was on the west coast.

[1] Included in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2680 et seq.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not see the reports when they came in in 1941?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall them. I might add that I stated this dispatch was sent by Admiral Wilkinson. I did not state to whom. It was sent to the commandants of the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth districts, which are San Diego, San Francisco, Puget Sound, and Hawaiian districts.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, do I take it then that in this ABCD arrangement that we were speaking about yesterday you felt there was an implied approval of Congress as to what was done in the Atlantic because we had passed the lend-lease bill?

Admiral STARK. I felt so in that it was being done to protect what Congress had provided for and the President also [*6365*] made it very plain to the country I think in his address of early September.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was no difference in the plans in fact. In the Pacific you were going to do the same thing as you had done in the Atlantic if the facts required it?

Admiral STARK. That would be conjecture and I assume that it is a proper conjecture.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, this was a tentative plan. It would go into effect under certain circumstances.

Admiral STARK. Well, now I am not sure which plan you are talking about, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. The one in the Pacific.

Admiral STARK. The broad plan was the Rainbow 5. I thought at first my answer to your question was based on the assumption that you were talking about the hemispheric defense plan. That is the one which has the so-called shooting order in it.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is why we ordered three small boats out to watch for these ships going down to the British possessions, why we sent these airplanes out on December 2d on a specific order out scouting to see this movement to the British possessions, if we did not have a tentative plan which involved a movement against England?

[*6366*] Admiral STARK. We did have a tentative plan, but only based on if and when we got in.

[*6367*] Senator FERGUSON. But if they attacked Britain and not America, why were you concerned with going over there and scouting to see whether they were going to attack Britain and not scouting to see whether or not they were going to attack our own possessions?

Admiral STARK. Our scouting would have given us information as to where they were going, and we were very anxious to get that information, and the dispatch states that that was the purpose of the dispatch—in other words, to find out what was going to happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you——

Admiral STARK. May I go just a little further on that, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I gather—and if I am not correct, you can inform me—that what you are getting at is the possibility, at least, that if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch we might automatically come in.

Senaor FERGUSON. That is exactly what I want to know, whether that was not what was in your mind, and then, going further, that

being true, as Churchill said in his speech, that they would not allow our fleet to remain on their flank, and therefore it should have been anticipated that they would attack at Pearl Harbor. Churchill is the one that raises [*6368*] this question in his speech.

Admiral STARK. Well, now, as regards that being true, I can only reiterate that in my initial orders regarding those plans I stated specifically that no political commitment could be made; that the plans, when they first came out, I rejected. When I read the paragraph from which one might infer that we were going to do certain things if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch, I rejected the plan right there, and what I read this morning further verifies that.

This is all from the record, to which I tried to stick so far as I possibly could.

I also, in my replies to Joe Richardson as to what we would do if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch, I did not know, and I did not think there was anybody on God's green earth that could tell me. That was wide, and it was meant to be wide, and I did not know, and in the dispatch this morning I stated I did not know what the Congress would do.

Now to go one step further with regard to Mr. Churchill's speech, I can only reiterate what I stated yesterday in regard to that, that I do not know his background for that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you cannot make a treaty. No one can make a treaty without the approval of Congress. But you, as the head of the Navy, had a plan that in case [*6369*] certain things happened you would be in a position to move and to defend America.

I am not criticizing the plan.

Admiral STARK. I understand that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know whether that was in your mind, and, therefore, I ask the next question: That being true, did not the high officials in the Navy and Army anticipate an attack upon America?

Admiral STARK. We knew it to be a possibility. Later on we anticipated it, and even almost a year before it happened, in both the Atlantic and Pacific the times were fraught with that possibility, and I endeavored to be prepared for that should it eventuate. It was very much in my mind. It was my job.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, for instance, on page 12 of your memo to the committee you have struck out these words "and by the President." You were saying, "Based on the understanding arrived at in the ABC–1 the Army and Navy developed a joint basic war plan known as Rainbow 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy," and you struck out these words "and by the President."

Now, when you drafted this instrument you believed that the President had approved that plan; is that true?

Mr. MITCHELL. May I interrupt?

[*6370*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you forgotten the exhibit that is in evidence, in which the President expressly refused?

Senator FERGUSON. I have not forgotten that, but I am asking for the opinion of this gentleman.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't forgotten that at all. I want to know, when you put that in there, whether you were of the opinion personally that that had been approved by the President?

Admiral STARK. I was. I had forgotten the later document showing that he had not specifically approved it, but stated if we got in the war, as I recall the document, to then bring it back to him and he would approve it. At least that was my assumption from the memorandum, I believe, from Pa Watson.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you——

Admiral STARK. Just a second further.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Admiral STARK. I took that out because I had no documentary proof of it. I do know the President, except officially, approved of it, although it shows he was not willing to do it officially until we got into the war. Nevertheless, I sent that plan out on April 3. This is also from the record. [*6371*] I think it is in my statement, and in a letter to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have you go to your letter of April 4.

Admiral STARK. Of April 4?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I told Kimmel and told Tommy—Admiral Hart—that I had read to the President my official letter of April 3 and that the President had approved it and knew I was sending it out. Therefore, I think it is safe to say that the President certainly approved of it. He approved my sending it out, although he had not officially approved it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on April 4 you said this in your letter:

I make a two-weeks' inspection trip in the West Indies and our activities in the United States south of Washington and just about as I got back the President shoved off, so I had no close liaison with him until his return this week.

This is the part I want to call your attention to.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I spent over 3 hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some flaws in it as the result of that conference. I may tell you and Hart and [*6372*] King in the strictest confidence—and I mean by that nobody but you and Hart and King—that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That explains the situation because that happened at the time, did it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to the next page of your letter:

I am also enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret——

Admiral STARK. Is this my letter of 4 April?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Will you read the first letter?

Senator FERGUSON. It is the third paragraph down on the second page of that letter:

I am enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it covering the President's talk with Ghormley——

Admiral STARK. Yes; that is Vice Admiral Ghormley——

Senator FERGUSON. "And me yesterday."

Now, what was in that memorandum that was ordered to be burned?

Admiral STARK. I do not specifically recall what was [6373] in that memorandum. There is nothing in it that I would not be glad to have this committee see, if I could put my hands on it.

I went to the White House with Ghormley. I understand that Admiral Ghormley is now in Washington, should you desire to call him. I went to the White House with Admiral Ghormley in order that he might talk to the President and the President to him prior to his going over as our special naval observer in London. We talked about ABC–1, as I recall, at that time, and I particularly pointed out something that I had always stressed, and that is generally with reference to the so-called "plan dog" as our guiding principle and as a simplified WPL–46 regarding the principal enemy.

I also distinctly recall the President's warnings to Ghormley not to, by any possible chance, make any commitments or say or do anything which would lead the British to think that we were going into the war. Nevertheless, he wanted Ghormley to find out all he could with regard to the British thoughts, and he authorized me to let Ghormley sit in over there—two Army officers were sent over at the same time—on conversations with regard to plans in case we got in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you——

Admiral STARK. Just a minute.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir. I want to get as complete [6374] an analysis of that as I can, that secret memorandum that was to be burned. That is the only instrument I find that you mentioned was to be burned or destroyed.

Admiral STARK. In all this correspondence?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. There was one other letter which I wrote, and I think with which the committee is familiar, which I asked to be destroyed as soon as read. The letter turned up in the hearings before the naval court of inquiry and has been given this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there should be a copy of this memorandum in the Navy files, should not there? You would not send the only one over there and have it burned?

Admiral STARK. I do not know that a copy was retained. I have given you my remembrance of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Admiral Ghormley can give you his remembrance of it, and I will ask that a search be made, or if counsel will ask the Department to make the search.

Senator FERGUSON. I will now ask counsel to do that.[1]

Admiral STARK. I do not have it in my personal files.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know, Admiral, where you kept these personal letters when you were active with the Navy.

Admiral STARK. They were kept in the files of the Navy [6375] Department. My secretary kept them.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the file be marked "personal" so when you would leave the letters would go with you?

[1] See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5502, for a memorandum from the Navy Department in this connection.

Admiral STARK. I left them in the Department under lock and key.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose lock?

Admiral STARK. I say under lock and key. They are in the files which I generally kept under lock in the Chief of Naval Operations' office.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not kept by you personally?

Admiral STARK. Not at the time I first went abroad. Later on I got them.

Senator FERGUSON. Later on did you remove them from the Navy files?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I got them to study them.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt they were your personal correspondence?

Admiral STARK. They were, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume when Admiral Kimmel got a personal letter from you it did not remain in the Commander in Chief's files there so that the succeeding Commander in Chief would have access to that file, any more than your successor would have access to yours?

Admiral STARK. I do not know. You may recall when Kimmel [*6376*] relieved Admiral Richardson I wrote him and asked him to read the correspondence which I had had with Admiral Richardson as affording a good background, and that in the court of inquiry in the summer of 1944, when I got my letters together, I also told Admiral Kimmel I had them, and if he would be lacking anything I would be glad to furnish him anything I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I am going to go to some other items which will be rather disconnected, because I do not want to cover anything that has been covered. I want to try to clear up some matters in my own mind at least.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As the Chief of Naval Operations you were responsible for the operation of the Navy, were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And under article 433, that is the act of 30 March 1915, it states that you shall:

> under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operation of the Fleet, and with preparation and readiness of plans for use in war.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You were charged with that statutory duty?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I think some misunderstanding might naturally arise in the minds of those who might read [*6377*] that, to think that I was actually operating the fleet. I believe the committee, after the testimony given, would not be under that impression.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were charged——

Admiral STARK. May I go a little ahead, a little further, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to complete your answer.

Admiral STARK. There was what they call the force employment plan, which was made out usually to cover a year, made out on a yearly basis. It gave broad directives. It showed when ships were going into the navy yard for repair; it showed the areas in which they were to operate; it would show a block when fleet maneuvers were to be held; it showed target practice periods, a general broad outline which the Commanders in Chief afloat and CNO reconciled, and then issued a plan.

Now the details of operation under that plan, that is the operations within an area in which the fleet was to base, that was up to the Commanders in Chief.

Do I make myself plain, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But you were also charged, as a matter of statutory law, with the preparedness and readiness of plans to be used in war.

Admiral STARK. That is quite true, and it was one of [*6378*] the first things that I took up when I went to Washington, and I am responsible for the plans which were drawn up and which I insisted be realistic. We even drew up things as to what we might have and might not have. The plans drawn up here were——

Senator FERGUSON. Who was authorized——

The CHAIRMAN. Let him finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me.

Admiral STARK. The plans drawn up here were realistic. The allocation of forces was based on the forces that we actually had, and the plan was disseminated, I think, on May 26, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you have ordered the fleet to mobilize? Was that your responsibility?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I could. But the fleet was mobilized.

Another thing that I did almost as soon as I became Chief of Naval Operations—I would like to give the committee this background—some of you may remember my coming on the Hill for special appropriations. My experience and my knowledge of previous wars in which we had engaged was that we entered them with a large number of ships in what we might call a reserve, and when I became Chief of Naval Operations we had a large number of ships in reserve, destroyers, submarines, some cargo vessels, some tankers. It was my [*6379*] ambition that if we got caught there would not be a single ship left on the Navy list which would be of use to us which was not ready. I went on that basis immediately, I went to Congress, with the President's permission, to ask for special appropriations for money for getting the large number of destroyers we had into commission, and the submarines and other ships, and Congress granted the funds for that purpose. It was tough on the forces afloat in some respect, because they had to give up enough experienced men to form a nucleus around which we put recruits to get these ships going.

But in December of 1941 we were practically mobilized.

The commander in chief of the Pacific corroborates that in his own war plan when he states that he was virtually mobilized.

Senator FERGUSON. You could do that on your own responsibility, and did it, even without consulting the President?

Admiral STARK. I tried to sell the President on it. I had to go on the Hill, for special appropriations for the destroyers, for example.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember having any discussion with the President in 1941 about mobilizing the fleet for war in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. The President knew that I was working on getting everything we had ready.

[*6380*] Senator FERGUSON. So then you take it it was an understanding between you and the President that you were mobilizing the fleet?

Admiral STARK. Perfectly, and requesting men in that connection.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it your duty——

Admiral STARK. May I add to that also?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. The Congress knew it, because before the committees I went asking for money, it was thoroughly explained what I wanted it for, and it was to get these ships that were tied up in the Philadelphia Navy Yard and San Diego, Puget Sound, San Francisco, and elsewhere. Congress knew why I was asking for that money. I was asking for money for all sorts of purposes, for our shore bases, and I have often stated, and I would like to state publicly here, as I told President Knox——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean Secretary Knox?

Admiral STARK. Secretary Knox. That the work done by Admiral Moreell in getting the bases ready, that Midway might not have been possible, and the great victory that turned the point we had there, had it not been for the work done on those shore bases.

I would like to say also that the dock, the big drydock, [*6381*] in Hawaii, which was available the day after Pearl Harbor, was finished months ahead of time, and I had to come up on the Hill to defend myself against having made contracts which were perhaps not quite according to Hoyle in order to push on the work, as some of you may recall, not only in connection with my endeavor to double the size of the fleet but also to build up the shore bases to support the fleet, and particularly in the Pacific, and not only in the Central Pacific, but in the Aleutians.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, was it your duty as Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate the effect of diplomatic representations upon the countries to whom they were addressed?

Admiral STARK. I was necessarily interested in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it your duty?

Admiral STARK. I would consider it my duty to keep in touch with that so far as I possibly could, and to keep the commanders in the field informed of my evaluation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did I understand you the other day to say that you only read part of the magic?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Ingersoll read part?

Admiral STARK. I suppose it would depend a good deal on how busy he was. He might also have read only the messages which were clipped as of importance.

[*6382*] Senator FERGUSON. Did you read all that were clipped?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were away, what happened?

Admiral STARK. Well, when I was away, the duty would be carried on largely by Admiral Ingersoll, and, of course, the others who were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose duty was it to clip the messages that you would or would not read?

Admiral STARK. That duty was performed in Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Who in Intelligence had the responsibility of clipping, with paper clips, I take it, what you were to read?

Admiral STARK. I think the initial clipping was done by Kramer, and McCollum was our far eastern officer, and he was also very much interested in it. Whether Captain Safford also clipped, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did they clip for you these so-called ship-movement messages?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall specifically about the ship-movement messages. I kept in touch with them generally, with War Plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. He is talking about ship locations.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about these messages in volume 2, in the yellow book.

[*6383*] Admiral STARK. You are referring to the ships at certain points?

Senator FERGUSON. The intercepts, at certain areas.

Admiral STARK. I thought you were talking about the broad problem.

Senator FERGUSON. I was talking about something different.

Admiral STARK. Your question is what?

Senator FERGUSON. Did they clip for you these intercepted ship-movement messages or ship-location messages, as they are known as, the Japanese messages, the military installations and ship movements, and so forth, in exhibit 2?

[*6384*] Admiral STARK. I can only say with regard to the particular messages to which I believe you refer what I said previously. that I do not recall having seen those messages, and to the best of my knowledge and belief I did not see them, but I may have seen them. In any case, it was my over-all responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, which was of the most importance, when Japan was going to strike or where Japan was going to strike, or was there any distinction between those two points?

Admiral STARK. I would say they were both so important as to be No. 1 priority.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get at why the same effort was not put on the translations or deciphering as to where they were going to strike as was put on the diplomatic messages.

Admiral STARK. Senator Ferguson, that gets down into a matter of detail which I think my subordinates could give you much better than I. I can give you my own knowledge of the thing but it is very general. It is not specific and I might be in error.

Senator FERGUSON. After all, you were responsible, under the rules. for the conduct of the officials under you; were you not?

[*6385*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The over-all responsibility was mine; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, without reading some of these ship messages, they have been read, I want to call your attention to some that I think have not been read.

You say it is of equal importance where they were going to strike as when they were going to strike.

The message on page 12 was read to you. I won't read that again. It has been used as indicating a plan of Pearl Harbor, indicating a desire to get a plan of Pearl Harbor exactly, each part of the water, where the ships would be.

I go to the next message which is the 29th of September.

Admiral STARK. That is on page 13; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And there the message reads:

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels.

Indicating exactly what kind of a code will be used to tell where these ships are.

Navy docks in the navy yard (the ten ten pier).
Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island.
Along side in Ford Island: (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.)
Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

We get that on "10–10–41" indicating that the Japanese [*6386*] have a code method of telling Tokyo exactly our plan at Pearl Harbor. Would you say that is true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take the next message. Who was Togo in 1941?

Admiral STARK. Tojo, as I recall, was Prime Minister and Togo was——

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't he Foreign Minister at that time?

Admiral STARK. I think he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. I thought I had them straightened out between Tojo and Togo.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a high official in the Japanese military hierarchy?

Admiral STARK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take the short message, the 15th of November. That is after we get the dead-line message of the 25th. It is not translated until 12–3.

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week.

Now, it is a "in harbor report."

* * * irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

[*6387*] Wouldn't that be of great significance? You have a dead line and here is a message going from a high official in Tokyo to Honolulu—to Togo. They want to get their reports irregular but they want them twice a week. Wouldn't that be very impressive at that time; wouldn't it indicate something? You have a dead line. They want to get these reports twice a week.

Admiral STARK. Well, assuming that that "ships in harbor report" is not just the normal ships in port, which they were giving in ports like San Francisco and Puget Sound and in the Canal, but that it referred to the previous two dispatches, it does not say so, but assuming that it does refer to the previous two dispatches, it would be very important.

Taken of itself, without the background of the other two, I wouldn't consider it so important.

Senator FERGUSON. Take it by itself, take this language:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical.

Not that they want this because they are trading with America and want to know when ships are leaving, but "the relations are most critical and, therefore, we want these twice a week, in the harbor." What could any intelligence officer read in that?

Admiral STARK. It is an important dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that was called to [*6388*] your attention?

Admiral STARK. I do not. Again I say it might have been, but I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 3d of December, when it was translated, this most critical period, this important language, you can't now recall whether that was called to your attention; you say you cannot?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take page 14. This is from Honolulu to Tokyo. It is a message showing that they are using the one on page 12, which much stress has been put on here and many questions asked, they are using those areas and that method.

Area A—A battleship of the *Oklahoma* class entered and one tanker left port.

I want to go down to paragraph 3 and see whether we can analyze that. This is obtained on the 6th. It came in on November 18. That is why I asked you if it was not just as important to ascertain where they were going to attack as when they were going to attack.

Here we had a pilot message on the 6th indicating that a reply to ours of the 26th was going to be received. We had the message over in Berlin that they were going to break relations and anticipated war. We had all of the information. [*6389*] We have coming into the Navy this information.

Admiral STARK. I would like to say in regard to all that information, even if it is reiteration, bear in mind our messages of the 24th and the 27th—the war warning message, with all of its directions.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what they say on the 18th. This is after the deadline has been set:

At ten o'clock a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Relayed to ———.

Now, wouldn't that information indicate that they wanted to get the exact court, where there were no mines, so that if they wanted to use submarines, and later they did use submarines, or tried to use them, wouldn't this indicate to you that they wanted to know exactly where they could travel [*6390*] in our harbor?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; it would, and, of itself, they probably wanted that and got it everywhere they could, just as we did on enemy harbors. If you could find out where the swept channel was it was always important to know.

I don't say that in mitigation of the inference from these dispatches, but I want to point out that that particular information is something that any military naval man would want to know.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing all these other facts, he wouldn't want to know of it just to file in his file, would he?

Admiral STARK. No. It might be useful to him, and it was asked in this case, in the light of hindsight, for a specific purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that specific purpose was to use it for small submarines to come in?

Admiral STARK. I would say, in the light of the knowledge we now have, it may very well have been for that purpose. At that time we didn't know they had the small submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean that our Intelligence was such that we didn't even know that Japan had these small submarines?

Admiral STARK. That is my remembrance, and I might suggest that you ask committee counsel to certify that with [*6390–A*] Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. I certainly want to get that information.

Admiral STARK. To see if we did have any knowledge of them or not.

Senator FERGUSON. We didn't know they had the last four battleships, our Intelligence was such that we didn't know that?

Admiral STARK. My appearance at hearings on the Hill will show how litle knowledge we had of what the Japs had. You will recall a day or so ago my stating that when trains went by certain Japanese navy yards the curtains were pulled down so that people could not see out and also my statement that it was sometime felt we didn't get much inside the 3-mile limit. I have covered that in previous testimony.

[*6391*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. We won't repeat if we can help it. We weren't getting this kind of information in the Japanese harbors, were we?

You say that was probably one of those things that any military agency would get but we weren't getting it because we had no idea of attacking Japan?

Admiral STARK. We undoubtedly had Japanese channels. I cannot recall that we had any swept channels at that time. But if we had been able to get anything of that sort and our people could have picked it up I have no doubt they would have.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in our Intelligence Branch, at least on the 6th, we have this message.

Let's go to the next message. We got that the day before, on the 5th. This is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu. November 18, translated on the 5th. So, we get it Friday.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein.

Not moving vessels. But the following areas—they want to know what ships are anchored in them.

Area N—Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, Honolulu—

"Honolu" is writen up in the margin.

and the areas adjacent there to. Make your investigation with great secrecy.

In other words, don't let America know that you are [*6392*] doing this, but we want to know what ships and we want to know what is in those adjacent areas. We translated that on the 5th.

Let's go to the next. This one comes on November 20. Getting nearer this dead line.

Strictly secret.

This we get on Thursday before.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet.

This is from Tokyo to Honolulu, from Togo, a high official.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Now, "military reservation" would be where the antiaircraft was, wouldn't it? And they wanted comprehensive analysis.

Admiral STARK. I would say it would mean bases anywhere. Where the fleet was located, in the neighborhood of Hawaii. I don't know just why he states "military reservation" there, but I would say they wanted any information they could get.

Senator FERGUSON. But they wanted it comprehensively.

Admiral STARK. They always wanted it comprehensively, whatever it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's go to the next. Here is another message from Tokyo. Here are three messages from Tokyo seeking information on the 5th, 4th, and 6th, immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Here is Tokyo concentrating on [*6393*] getting information.

By the way, this next message is dated November 29, which is the day before the dead line, and it would be the day before the President had indicated that there might be an attack.

Now, here is what they want to know.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Indicating that they want to keep, isn't it true, they want to keep exact information on every ship in our harbor at Pearl Harbor, not moving but in the harbor?

Admiral STARK. That is not unusual. It is my recollection that I sent Admiral Hart a similar message with regard to his scouting, to report not only what he saw but to report daily if he didn't see anything. We get that from the war games also. It is simply to insure that it was sent out properly and got through, by getting a message each day. I think that is the significance of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no rule that this information was not to come over your desk?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. As you understood it, this same information that went to the Secretary of the Navy went to the President?

[*6394*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as the Navy was concerned?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 2 days we get these three messages. In fact, on the 3 days—on 4 days: 12/3, 12/6, 12/5, 12/4, and 12/5—these five messages would normally come across your desk, and they don't strike any responsive chord at all now that you saw them?

Admiral STARK. They would normally come across my desk if they were evaluated as of particular significance and interest. I can only repeat what I have already said, that so far as I know the significance of these messages at that time, among the great mass of information that was coming in, was not realized as we realize it now, laying them out subsequent to the event.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, isn't it true that you had officials that were culling the insignificant from the significant? And here we have had delivered to us just these. I don't know how much came in that may have been considered not significant. But these have been delivered to us and would normally go across your desk. I wonder whether you have ever made an investigation to point out whether they did go across your desk.

Admiral STARK. Well, I wouldn't make an investigation [*6394–A*] on something I didn't know had happened. Occasionally I would go through, if I had time, and I was pressed for time continuously, I might read through the entire file that came in to me—not the entire file that was in the Navy Department—as a check-up. And my aide, Commander Wellborn, who was a very brilliant and able young man, occasionally did that also.

Now, I can see exactly how this looks now. I can only say that to the best of my knowledge and belief, and from anything that I have, it was not so appreciated at that time. I can repeat in more detail what I said originally, but I can't add anything to it.

Senator FERGUSON. But America had placed her safety in officials whose duty it was to evaluate the evidence before them in order that America might be protected; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and I will say further that they were good men, going through these dispatches daily.

Senator FERGUSON. But you told me yesterday that on the 15th of October you changed the Intelligence Branch, had Admiral Wilkinson, who had never had any previous experience in intelligence work; isn't that a fact?

Admiral STARK. That is a fact, but these dispatches came to him after being looked over further down, and it required no particular, I would say, no special previous [*6395*] experience in intelligence to handle something of this sort. Wilkinson is a brilliant man. He is known as such. Just what happened to these dispatches, and what went on where they came in, obviously they came in to Intelligence. They couldn't get out of Intelligence. And I understand you are asking other people to testify on these. I won't add anything to what I have already stated with regard to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Has there ever been any disciplinary action against anyone in the Navy, court martial or otherwise, for either failing to translate these within a reasonable time after, or not getting them to you and not calling your attention to the significance of them?

Admiral STARK. I would say that the only man who has been censored with regard to this and other matters is myself, by the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. But there has not been anyone down the line that was similarly acted upon for neglect of duty?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. These dispatches came to light a couple of years after the event. I say they came to light. That is my understanding. I do not recall having seen them until they were produced. And while it would have been, perhaps, in view of what has happened since, a good thing at the time to have gone through everything, I was busy. We had [*6396*] the war in the Pacific on our hands, and in addition what was going on in the Atlantic, and elsewhere. But I was doubly busy right after the event and during my continued duty in Washington until I went abroad. I was thinking more of handling the job and getting on with the war than I was on possible post mortems at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, the action of the Secretary of the Navy as to you has been very recent, in 1945?

Admiral STARK. The action of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Secretary of the Navy, which you mentioned.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And prior to that you had been decorated, prior to the criticism of the Secretary of the Navy you had been decorated by the President, had you not?

Admiral STARK. I had been, and one of the finest—well, I don't know that I might mention it—but I received a letter from Colonel Knox also when I left, of which I am very proud. Incidentally—well, I won't mention it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were decorated by the President after that?

Admiral STARK. I was, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the decoration?

Admiral STARK. I have a brief of that citation here, [*6397*] and I also have kept in my file, ever since coming up here I have kept it with me, the letter from the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we have those both printed as part of the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read them at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Read them. They are not very long?

Admiral STARK. They are not very long; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Read them now.

Admiral STARK. The other thing which I started to mention bore on my duty abroad, from the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. When the King went back to Norway you were delegated by the President to be his representative at that ceremony, were you not?

Admiral STARK. The President of the United States sent me on a mission to Norway and also Denmark, rather a nice diplomatic mission. It was of no great significance. I haven't mentioned any foreign decorations. I don't imagine you would want to go into that.

Senator FERGUSON. But they were given you——

Admiral STARK. The British gave me one of the highest decorations, as a result of the action by the Chiefs of Staff, that it was within their power to give. The one from Norway, by King Haakon, of whom I had seen considerable in London, [*6398*] was the highest decoration that they could give.

The French also gave me a high decoration in connection with the Normandy invasion.

[*6399*] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, Admiral, go ahead and read it, please.

Admiral STARK. This letter is dated 21 March, from Colonel Knox.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What year, please?

Admiral STARK. 1942. It reads:

I have just signed the order assigning you to your new command in London. You know, of course, that you take with you from me my heartiest best wishes for success in this most responsible post, but I do not want to terminate the relationship which has existed between us for the past two years via a coldly formal letter.

I came to this present task of mine with little besides good intentions, energy, and a desire to serve my country in a very grave crisis. No one in the Navy has been of greater assistance and help to me in my efforts to be a constructive and helpful force in the Navy than you. In every possible official way, you have aided me and supported me. However, this is but a minor part of the story. In a warmly personal way, you have been my friend and counselor

throughout. I can think of scores of times when you have saved me from serious missteps and, in everything that I have attempted, designed to promote efficiency in the Navy, especially in its administra- [6400] tion, you have been a tower of support and strength.

In all of a fairly long and busy life, I have never had a more dependable, constructive, and self-effacing associate. As Chief of Naval Operations, during two and a half of the most critical years in American naval history, you have discharged the duties of your high office with brilliance, single-minded devotion to the Navy and to the country and in a manner which will leave an indelible impression on the naval establishment for many years to come.

You take with you as you leave your post here for the one in London the affectionate regard and the most heart-felt good wishes of the entire establishment. May God go with you and bless you in all that you do. I shall hope to hear from you occasionally in an informal and personal way as well as officially.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK KNOX.

The citation from the President reads:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Gold Star in lieu of the Second Distinguished Service Medal to

ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY

for services set forth in the following:

[6401] CITATION

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States in a duty of great responsibility during his tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 to 1942 when he was charged with the responsibility of building and administering the largest peacetime Navy in the history of this country.

"Due to his exceptional qualities of leadership and his outstanding ability, full reliance was placed upon his advice and counsel by the Secretary of the Navy, by the Congress and by the President of the United States as evidenced by the executive and legislative measures adopted for the Naval Service to effect a high state of training for war and the building of a 'two ocean Navy.'"

Mr. MURPHY. May I have the date of that?

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. The date of it is April 9, 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was your assignment to London?

Admiral STARK. I was in command of the naval forces in Europe, originally less the Mediterranean and north Africa, which theater was added in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. And you stayed on that post how long?

Admiral STARK. I stayed on the post until the war was [6402] over.

Senator FERGUSON. So you completed that assignment until the war was over?

Admiral STARK. I completed that assignment and the items of this sort, as I stated, came from the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean the war in Europe?

Senator FERGUSON. The war in Europe I have in mind, but when did you leave?

Admiral STARK. I left after Japan had surrendered. We had also had VJ-day.

Senator FERGUSON. Thanks for the correction, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral STARK. I had received orders shortly before Japan surrendered but I actually did not leave until the 16th of August.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Chairman, I won't touch on what is

in these messages but I would ask to have printed in the record what is in this yellow book, exhibit 2, here at this place in the record from page 16 to page 29, inclusive. It is to bring to us in the printed record and at one place all of the messages that we have been handed in this book showing ship movements or harbor locations, which were the messages translated after December the 7th, but I think all of them received prior to that date.

[*6403*] The CHAIRMAN. They have not heretofore been printed in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. They have not been printed in our official record, as I understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. They have been introduced in an exhibit but never included in the transcript, in the daily transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. I just do that to call attention to them, because I do not want to review it with the witness——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection the pages indicated will be included in the transcript at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. To complete my sentence—because he had not seen them because they were not translated.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you included in that series the one about Manila, where they want the information about the airplanes and the number of fields.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would be in there, I am sure.

Well, now, Admiral, to move along, did you know——

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me. You see, this Exhibit 2 is divided up into groups relating to Hawaii, Panama Canal, Philippines, and they are all separated, and what the Senator has asked to put in is the messages relating to Hawaii which [*6404*] were intercepted prior to December 7 and not translated until after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have, in addition, this one particular dispatch as to Manila which seems to be more elaborate and in greater detail than the others.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you point it out?

Mr. MURPHY. I will give the stenographer a memorandum as to where it is in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The excerpts from Exhibit No. 2 referred to follow:)

[*6405*] B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 24, 1941.
#234. (Part of 2)
Re your #114.[a]
Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

[*6406*] [a] Not available.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)

From: Honolulu.
To: Tokyo.
November 24, 1941.
#234 (Part 2 of 2).

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicnity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of ———, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

[*6407*] ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
November 28, 1941.
#119 Re your message #243[a].

Secret outside the Department.

Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)

From: Honolulu.
To: Tokyo.
November 28, 1941.
#238.

Military report:

[*6408*] (1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their antiaircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

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[a] Available in code under study.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.
ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12-8-41 (7)

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
#241 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #119*.

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for [*6409*] the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on;

(1) Fuel is plentyfull and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns can not be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

[*6410*]
JD—1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941

#123 (Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE.—This message was received here on December 23.)

ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

From: Honolulu (Kitz)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
#247

Ship report.

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.
3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

26065

JD-1: 7309 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

*JD-1: 7158.
**Available, dated 23 November.

[*6411*] From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

(Military secret)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters:
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:
I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

Meaning		Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie	1
A number of carriers	Preparing to sortie	2
Battle ship divisions	All departed between 1st and 3rd	3
Carriers	Several departed between 1st and 3rd	4
[*6412*]	Several departed between 1st and 3rd	5
Battleship divisions	All departed between 4th and 6th	6
Carriers	Several departed between 4th and 6th	7
Carriers	All departed between 4th and 6th	8

26145

2. Signals.
I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m	1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m	2
" " " 10 and 11 p. m	3
" " " 11 and 12 p. m	4
II.	
Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m	5
" " " 1 and 2 a. m.	6
[*6413*] Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m	7
" " " 3 and 4 a. m	8

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.
If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates 1, 2, 3, or 4.
If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

Times	*Signal*
1900–2000	3
2000–2100	4
2100–2200	5
2200–2300	6
2300–2400	7
0000–0100	8

V. K. G. M. G.*** Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
B. CHIC. Co farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P O box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

[*6414*] 3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium**** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40′ N., longitude 156°19′ W., visible from seaward to the south-

*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile north of Lanikai.
***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
****At latitude 20–42–45 N., longitude 156–20–20 W.

east and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

Time	*Signal*
From 7–8	3 or 6
From 8–9	4 or 7
From 9–10	5 or 8

JD–1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12–11–41 (7)

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
#248

Ship report.

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movements.
26066
JD–1:7310 (Y) Navy Trans. 12–10–41 (2)

[*6415*]
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokio
December 4, 1941
#249

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. ——— ———.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the Brtish Consular Office and received some mail in return.
ARMY 26161 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (2)

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Toyko.
5 December 1941
#252

(1) During Friday morning the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
[*6416*] 8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and ——— were in dock.

*Available, dated 29 November.

26029
JD–1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12–10–41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 6, 1941
#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123[a] the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.
ARMY 26158 JD 7381 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

[a] Not available.

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
#253 Re the last part of your #123.[a]

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but [*6417*] it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa,[b] there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

ARMY 25877 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[*6418*] From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

[*6419*] Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, do you have any knowledge that some time in August they stopped sending Admiral Kimmel what was known as "magic"?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not recall having any knowledge of that or of the fact that those messages had been sent previous to that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it possible that in the Navy Department we did not appreciate or did not recognize the value of air as an offensive weapon over ships in harbor, that this might happen?

Admiral STARK. I think the Navy was very much alive to that. Air power——

Senator FERGUSON. If they were very much alive to it how do you account for it happening?

Admiral STARK. I do not just understand your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say they were very much alive to the weapon. Now, how do you account for that happening then? How did this happen? How did we get surprised?

Admiral STARK. You mean how did what happen, the Japanese——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, how were you surprised then if we were fully cognizant of the ability of air power to destroy a fleet in a harbor?

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[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Admiral STARK. Well, the correspondence shows how air- [6420] minded we had been with regard to a possible attack on Pearl Harbor and in laying plans to prevent it. The question as to why we did not detect it or why we were not making reconnaissance is the question which I imagine you are asking in connection with it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Well, in Washington, as I have stated, that is in the Navy Department, we had intended to convey the critical situation and the possibiltiy of an air attack in the messages which we had sent and we had felt, I had felt that when I sent the message starting out with, "This is a war warning," and in view of what had gone before and the subsequent dispatches with regard to, or without regard to the subsequent dispatches but, certainly, reenforced by subsequent dispatches on the burning of the codes, that those in the field, in the Pacific, both in the Asiatic and in the Central Pacific would have been on the lookout for a surprise attack from any direction.

Senator FERGUSON. In June of 1940 you said in effect, "Look out for an air raid."

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or "Look out for a raid."

Admiral STARK. No; I did not say, "Look out out for a raid."

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; you did not, but the order did.

[6421] Admiral STARK. Sir?

Senator FERGSON. The alert did.

Admiral STARK. Well, I had assumed that they would be on the lookout for it from what I stated as a possibility to be guarded against even though only a possibilty.

Senator FERGUSON. This is very difficult to read but that message was:

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measures after consultation with the Navy and State Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Apparently he is talking about the Herron alert.

Senator FERGUSON. The Herron order.

Admiral STARK. Yes, I get that now. I thought you were talking about the raid which was made.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, yesterday you said that the Navy and State and the Army opposed the embargoes. What department of government or who was for them and how did they come to get that if three departments were against it?

Admiral STARK. With regard to your statement that I opposed them, I pointed out whenever it was brought up to me the seriousness that such an embargo would have or might have on our relations with the Japanese. When you throttle a nation's economic life she has got to do something if she thinks she [6422] can, particularly with regard to oil, which I always stressed. Now, that was a military or a naval man's estimate with regard to it.

There was a political significance also in connection with that which was not within my province, except to say what I thought as regards its implications on the military so that the implication of those could only be—the placing of such could only be by the State Department and I assume with the approval of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, I understand that it is a fair conclusion to say that the political situation outweighed the military and they were put on?

Admiral STARK. All things were considered, must have been considered, our opinions and the political and the decision was made higher up.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever consulted as to whether or not if they were put on and it meant war that we had the military might to defend our action?

Admiral STARK. We discussed all angles of that picture and that picture was thoroughly known by the high authorities in the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What was your opinion in July, that we had the military might to back it up?

Admiral STARK. We had the military might to implement the [*6423*] war plan. When you say to back it up——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is a layman's expression.

Admiral STARK. We knew, as I stated, again quoting from my letter, "It would be a H—— of a war, particularly to start with." I may state my sizing up of that. I think I stated it before Congress. At the first press conference—and I did not hold one except when I had to—in England, which was a very large conference and particularly many of our own correspondents to start out, occasionally, that asked me for my opinion. I stated what I felt at that time, which was what I felt earlier, that in view of the conditions then existing in 1942, the year 1942 would be a very tough year, that we would be on the defensive in the Pacific, seizing an opportunity which might give us a chance for attack, or creating one when we could.

That in 1943 we would be gathering our strength and perhaps a limited offensive, but certainly we would be gathering our strength and beginning to go after the enemy and that in 1944, which I used to state I could hardly wait to come around, we would then be realizing from the legislation and the earlier authorizations and would be able to go all out and that we would win in 1945. That statement was made back in 1942.

Now, I also told Admiral Nomura, and an officer when I was in London pulled a memorandum on me of what I had told him, [*6424*] which happened to be a good guess, that initially with the initiative in their hands and a readiness and a plan they probably would have a considerable initial success but that we would completely break them before we got through. It was inevitable because they could not replace their losses and we could not only replace ours but continue to gain and it was a simple matter of arithmetic.

I said "Therefore, if you attack us you insure the destruction of the Japanese Empire." I am inclined to think that he agreed with me but I could not state so. That was my feeling of the situation. I did not feel that we were then ready to go all out and finish the thing up, I knew we could not, but I felt we were strong enough to hold until we could go all out and win.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, were you one of those in the Navy that felt that we would lose the Philippines if we went to war in the fall of 1941? We have had testimony here by other men that that was true.

Admiral STARK. Well, my hope was to put up a good, stiff fight. I would not say that I would have thought that we could have held them with what we had at that time, and you will recall that I stated

almost in my first meeing in the White House, I can remember it, to the President, with Marshall, recounting the fact—and this goes back to 1939— [*6425*] that always in war plans, which had been going on for many years, we conceded that we would lose the Philippines and that how much easier it would be if we could hold them rather than to lose them and fight to get them back and in the hope that we could strengthen them, which we had not been able to. We did not have the material.

Senator FERGUSON. You did discuss it with the President?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That we would lose them?

Admiral STARK. He was thoroughly familiar with the picture and so was Marshall. I remember in that conversation Marshall recounting what we could do.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was not considering the possibility that we would lose the fleet we had waiting in Pearl Harbor, the Pearl Harbor fleet. Your view was without losing the fleet, so it was much worse when we lost our fleet.

Admiral STARK. It was tougher because of the vessels we lost, and I think perhaps there may be some surprise over the fact that of the 112 vessels in Pearl Harbor as I recall——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you explained that yesterday, how many were lost.

Admiral STARK. That a great number were not touched.

Senator FERGUSON. That leads me to this question. In your letter of November 25, the last page—would [*6426*] counsel show it to the Admiral? The postscript. I will read it because I want to ask you some questions about it:

"I held this up pending"—this is the 25th, just 4 days before the dead line, the last dead line, which they said they meant and they even said what time it would end.

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack.

Now, this is the question I want to ask you:

From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarassing thing that could happen to us.

What were you talking about there?

Admiral STARK. I was thinking that we might lose them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk with the President about that on that day?

Admiral STARK. We had talked with the President—I don't know about that day. Probably. We had talked over that situation many times.

[*6427*] Senator FERGUSON. Now, indicating a change—this is a letter which was modified because it went to him after; at least it reached him after he got the cables.

Admiral STARK. It reached him—I believe I was asked when it reached him and I believe they reached him on 3 December, some 6 days after the message of the 27th and 9 days after the message of the 24th.

Senator FERGUSON. But it says:

I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance in Thailand, Indochina, Burma Road area as the most likely.

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that be misleading to him? You have got possibilities and probabilities and now we come to the words "most likely."

Admiral STARK. Well, I did not think so. I was giving him the evidence I had and which had been given in the dispatch, or which he had. I think it was in the dispatch of the 24th.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not quite clear on this:

From many angles an attack on the Phillipines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us.

Suppose they took Wake, suppose they took Guam or—I mean suppose they attacked Wake? Suppose they attacked at [*6428*] Guam or at Pearl Harbor? That wouldn't be embarrassing to us?

Admiral STARK. Any one of them would have been embarrassing to us. The Philippines was on the flank. To lose the Philippines was costly. The probability of their loss was recognized due to their insufficient state of preparedness. Therefore, if that was correct and we did lose them we knew it was a big fight to get them back; also it left the Japanese flank secure from that attack on the continual support of their movement south.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you disagree with Churchill that the fleet at Hawaii was on the flank also?

Admiral STARK. Well, there is some 4,000 miles or 3,000 miles difference in the flank and with no places to go after you go out there to support you. We had to build a chain of bases up all the way across before we could go out there and we had to build a train which could support the fleet after they got out there. The fleet in Hawaii was not, except for submarine work, and they did wonderful work as you know, was not in position to seriously threaten Japanese communications going south until it was strong enough to go out there itself. Raids occasionally under auspicious circumstances, yes, but not continued pressure.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, wasn't the only deterrent in the Pacific as far as Japan was concerned the fleet at Hawaii?

[*6429*] Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is a fair statement. The United States Fleet, but sitting as a threat on the flank; Hawaii was a long ways away.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, on the 25th of February 1941 you spoke about sending four cruisers, nine destroyers and some carriers to the Philippine Islands by the southern route and let it leak out that they were going out there. I found that in your book. Had you ever discussed that with the President?

Admiral STARK. Yes, and the President backed me up——

Senator FERGUSON. What was that?

Admiral STARK. If I may just finish.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And the President backed me up in my recommendation not to send a detachment to the Philippines. You will recall a day or two ago my reading a memorandum to the President opposing the sending of a detachment to the Philippines and the Pres-

ident accepted that memorandum. The proposal was from the State Department.

I noted that one paper in the press took that memorandum as though I were opposed to the President's desire to send them out there——

Senator FERGUSON. You were opposing the State Department.

Admiral STARK [continuing]. And it stated so. I was giving that to the President backing me up, to back me up in [*6430*] my arguments against those who wanted to send them out there and the President was with me. He was not for it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, why did the State Department want to send this fleet, a part of the fleet, to the Philippines?

Admiral STARK. I think they thought that it might have a further deterrent effect on Japan. That could have been, in my opinion, their only reason for such a request.

[*6431*] Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said about sending a much smaller one so in case you lost the loss would not be so heavy?

Admiral STARK. I think so. We might have sent something light out there. My reaction to all that was: Get them out there. Then you would be divided up still further if attacked at sea, or you might lose what you had, or if you started to pull them back, then there might be an argument against weakness.

Senator FERGUSON. Had not you heard from Grew that there might be war?

Admiral STARK. I quoted a part of Grew's letter in my previous testimony, in my memorandum to the President, and in it Grew agreed with me. You will recall I stated to the President——

Senator FERGUSON. On February 7.

Admiral STARK. That I was obviously quoting that part of Grew's letter which supported me.

Senator FERGUSON. On February 7. Could I ask counsel whether they know whether that is in the white papers, that memo from Grew?

It is as follows: "I have just read a telegram on the 7th of February from the American Embassy at Tokyo which the State Department has furnished. In it appears the following:

[*6432*] Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East, and it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factors which such risk constitutes. The risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities.

Even Grew was notifying the State Department, and were they still insisting on sending this out there even though it meant war?

Admiral STARK. Well, it was at the State Department's request. I was delighted to have it from Grew.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that help you in keeping them from going out there?

Admiral STARK. The President decided not to do it. I am inclined to think he would agree with me even though he had not seen the Grew memorandum. That, however, is conjecture.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, on April 19, 1941, you said:

I wrote about the Australian detachment. The President said, incidentally, "When I open to you that way I do not expect you to quote the President and I know there is nobody who can keep a thing secret better than you can." Just as soon as those ships come back from Australia or New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out.

[6433] You are quoting the President as wanting to send some more out.

I just want to keep them popping up here and there and to keep the Japs guessing. This, of course, is right down the State Department's alley. I might say a lot of State Department suggestions and recommendations are no less than childish. Don't quote me, as I have practically said so in so many words in the presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course, I recognize some merits, if exercised with some discretion, and that is where the Navy has to count on FDR for reserves. So we did have to send ships into Singapore, and we did keep them on a flank, to be in a position to go to work or to retire if something broke.

At that time did not you consider Hawaii the flank?

Admiral STARK. I considered Hawaii more of a central covering position for the United States, the Canal, and the Aleutians. You can look at it as the flank, I have no objection to it. But when I sent ships farther to the westward, much farther, I did not want them to get into what might be called a central hole like the Philippines, but felt if they were well down on the flank away from Japan, where they could retire or perhaps take care of themselves in [6434] case of emergency, that I could see some merit in it, and that is what the President approved. But as to sending them beyond and into Singapore, I always opposed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel has just advised me that he searched widely and has not found the February 7 message.

Mr. MITCHELL. That Grew message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. We asked the State Department for that on the day that Admiral Stark furnished us his statement and they have not reported yet.[1]

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, this was popping you. You were going to have the ships around the various places, and the State Department was very active to have that done. I want to read what you said on the next page:

Now, when the question of popping up everywhere came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President, "How about going north?" He said, "Yes, you can keep any position you like and go anywhere." There was a little method in my madness as to the northern cruise. I thought for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might make them hold back. Incidentally, that northwest cruise may have many good points. It still conforms to the [6435] flank and a detachment on an occasional sortie or in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to make such a cruise yourself of your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you can see what a striking force on the position I gave you and known to the Japs would mean to them in view of their unholy fear of bombing, and a striking detachment would have been right in position for most anything. I had a broad awkward smile when the State Department in effect said, "Please, Mr. President, don't let him do it," or words to that effect. It was a little too much for them.

What did you have in mind there?

Admiral STARK. Well, I had in mind what I produced but, as I stated, it also had some merit, and there was some merit in ships popping up here and there, provided we still maintained them in a position where we could concentrate where necessary, and not isolate them from the rest of the fleet. My recollection of that is that I suggested we might take a carrier, probably accompanied by the usual support of four fast cruisers and destroyers and send them well to the northwest-

[1] The message referred to appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2917 et seq.

ward or that we might send a couple of ships on in advance, or on either flank, and let them start some radio work first one place and then another one a thousand [*6436*] miles to the southward, all in connection with this, and that they would be in a position to withdraw, but at the same time it was in line with keeping the Japs guessing.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this a fair evaluation of this situation about the ships popping up, that the State Department wanted to use the United States Navy in a diplomatic way as a deterrent to Japan, or a threat to Japan? Is that a fair estimate?

Admiral STARK. In supporting diplomacy in a way in which they thought would be effective, and to a degree, as regards exposed positions, I interposed the strongest objections I knew how.

Senator FERGUSON. Were we doing this very thing? Were we using the United States Navy in November or early December as a weapon with our diplomacy, or had we got away from that because of your victory on that point?

Admiral STARK. The fleet was then all in Hawaiian waters, except for one or two cruisers doing escort duty, and which, of course, they have to pick up as soon as war began or beforehand, if it was deemed advisable, and it was, and also for those vessels in the Asiatic Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you last use the Navy for popping up purposes in aid to diplomacy?

Admiral STARK. The best of my recollection is that [*6437*] cruise to Australia was the last and the only move we made of that kind. Well, I would say it was the only one of that kind, unless you would consider the movement of the fleet under secret orders and radio silence when it went out in June, I believe it was, in 1940 for a specific purpose and was kept absent for a week.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, on June 10, 1941, did not you say, in one of those instruments for the Secretary of the Navy, or memo for the Secretary of the Navy, that it was apparent to Japan that the United States Pacific Fleet was no longer strong enough to be a threat? How do you reconcile that with some of the other testimony about our fleet?

Admiral STARK. That would be a threat in the Far East, and which I have mentioned this morning we were not strong enough, nor did we have the facilities in the Far East to keep the fleet there as a threat, as an effective threat, or strong enough to interpose against a southern movement.

Senator FERGUSON. On December 2, 1941, a message went out——

Admiral STARK. What date was that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. December 2. It was from CinCAF to OpNav.

Admiral STARK. That is from Hart to me.

Senator FERGUSON. From Hart to Stark?

[*6438*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Part of it states, "Calling *Isabel* from current Mission," and we got a memorandum yesterday on that same *Isabel.* What mission was she on? That is the ship that the President had directed to be used as one of the men-of-war?

Admiral STARK. We authorized Admiral Hart to use her in connection with reconnaissance as one of the three vessels if he so desired.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. I take it his recalling her from a mission means that he recalled her from where he had her. I do not know just what the disposition was at that time. I do know that he was deployed to some extent. He had sent some ships south. He had certain submarines out looking for whatever they could find, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the same day in the same message, the last line, I want to ask you some questions about that.

Admiral STARK. I might add, I replied to that dispatch and said, "*Isabel* may be replaced by chartered vessels at your discretion."

Senator FERGUSON. The last part states, "When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out [*6439*] more subs." Now, he had the same message at that time that Kimmel had?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was he speaking of, or do you know? He said, "When it is considered called for will increase air patrols"—that is reconnaissance?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. "And send out more subs."

Now, if you had a war warning out, I am wondering what he had in mind there and what he was asking you to do.

Admiral STARK. That meant that when in his judgment further vessels should be sent out he would do so. The record will show what he had out. The Army was scouting over there, and he was scouting over there. He had submarines out. I am not sure just where his destroyers were at that time. He had sent some ships to the southward. He had kept in Manila Bay ready for further scouting, if necessary, or for attack in case we were attacked, a certain number of submarines.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't mind me now, Admiral, for just a moment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask to put in the record this message, because it is not in the record yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one is that?

[*6440*] Senator FERGUSON. The one dated December 2, 1941, from CinCaf for action, OpNav.

[*6441*] It starts out:

My views are as follows: The Jap movement down the Indo-Chinese coast is already defined but it remains to be seen whether aimed against the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, or both. That the British can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran and we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo.

What could he be there talking about? That the British can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

And we should use what have left after guarding against descent on Luzon in watching for one on Borneo. Am recalling Isabel from current mission and sending toward Padaran. She is too short radius to accomplish much and since we have few fast ships her loss would be serious. Therefore have to recommend against carrying out Isabel's movement though it is improbable that can start any chartered craft within two days.

It is improbable, he said. That is the one that the President had ordered, I take it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Am searching for vessels for charter that are suitable but cannot yet estimate time required to [6442] obtain and equip with radio.

Army planes are reconnoitering sector northerly from Luzon and eastward from Sanbernardino. Navy planes northwesterly from Luzon, also covering Balabac Strait and joining up with Dutch to cover Mindanao-Halmahera line, effectiveness is problematical but as great effort as available forces can sustain continuously. Two cruisers, two desdivs—

what is that?

Admiral STARK. Destroyer divisions.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Two desdivs are deployed well south, remainder surface forces on local missions or repairing.

Have five submarines out now, remainder either placed in readiness for defensive missions or held here prepared for offensive tasks. When it is considered called for will increase air patrols and send out more subs.

Now that gave you a definite statement as to what Admiral Hart was doing?

Admiral STARK. That was a very comprehensive picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was not he operating on a plan with the British and Dutch even though the attack would not have been on America?

Admiral STARK. The dispatch shows that he was, to some extent, dovetailing where he was searching. It states there, I believe, that he was covering up to a certain point, and [6443] then the Dutch were covering, and in a previous dispatch you may recall I had told him where the British were searching.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, we can assume that the Japanese knew what we were doing as far as these ships were concerned on December 2, 1941?

Admiral STARK. I think we could not assume that they knew where his submarines were.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of the subs.

Admiral STARK. Outside of the submarines I dare say they had the picture.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And therefore, to all intent and purposes, on the surface it would look as if the British, the Dutch, and the United States had one plan in relation to an attack on the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral STARK. Their searches were made in coordination.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now that being true, was it not also apparent to America that if the Japs were going to attack one it meant war with all?

Admiral STARK. I can only repeat what I have said before, that I did not know, and I do not know now, if Japan had attacked one or two and left us out——

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). That was not my question. My question was from the Japanese viewpoint.

Admiral STARK. What is that, sir?

[6444] Senator FERGUSON. From the Japanese viewpoint of what was going on with this plan, would not it be apparent to the Japanese, in what we were going to do, apparent to the Japanese that if they attacked the British it would mean war with all three?

Admiral STARK. I think that would depend a good deal on how they had sized up the situation, and the opinions of the American people and a political estimate as to what our Congress might do, and I would say that would have been a tall order. I do not know.

[*6445*] Senator FERGUSON. On the 23d of September 1941 you wrote to Kimmel——

Admiral STARK. What date was that?

Senator FERGUSON. The 23d of September 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the second page of that letter you said this:

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East.

Now, that is just what we were doing on the 2d of December 1941, isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and that is what we were planning. We had to know what our possible allies would do if we were to get in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Stark, did it become aware to you in the meetings with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff that Japan's stand was that, if the American-Japanese negotiations fell, the result would be war in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. If the Japanese negotiations fell, there would be war in the Pacific?

[*6446*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. It was likely. We stated, I believe, in one letter it might possibly mean a breaking up of negotiations. After the destruction of codes it looked definitely like Japan would attack all three, and we took no chance even before that, but that she might.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, in December 1941 were we breaking the Jap Navy code?

Admiral STARK. December 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. We were breaking some of their codes, but not all of them. We had broken, as I recall—I would be glad if you would verify this, but one of the codes that we had not broken and which had been assigned to the unit in Hawaii was the Japanese naval code. I think that was not broken at that time. What other codes were not broken, I do not know. We did not break them all.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the movement into the Kra Peninsula a rejection of the note of the 17th of August, or was it a rejection of the note of the 26th of November?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would say it was a rejection of what they knew we were opposed to. It was further military extension by Japan, something to which they knew we were opposed.

[*6446–A*] Senator FERGUSON. Will you refer to your letter of August 28?

Admiral STARK. 1940 or 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I have it.

[*6447*] Senator FERGUSON. You referred in that letter, on the second page of that letters, Admiral, down, "Once again thanks for the

human side of the news," and this is what I want to call your attention to:

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific, about all I can say is that the Japs seems to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them, but just what they are going to do I don't know.

What messages were you referring to, to Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. I think——

Senator FERGUSON. You said you could only intimate to him. What were those messages?

Admiral STARK. I think the message to which I undoubtedly referred there was the message which had been sent by the State Department, as I recall, on 17 August, and to which you have made reference previously.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. This letter——

Senator FERGUSON. Refers to that message?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if the movement on the Kra was a rejection of the note of the 17th of August and also a rejection of the note of the 26th, wasn't the 14-part [*6447–A*] message only a confirmation of that rejection?

Admiral STARK. I thought the 14-part message first set up a confirmation of what they had said before and put it all together and finally stated what, as I testified, we had said in substance some days earlier, namely, that negotiations were broken off.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said at the Atlantic Conference about babying them along for 3 months, or anything to that effect?

Admiral STARK. I never heard of it until it came up in recent months.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember preparing an instrument with the Chief of Staff which provided a line beyond which the Japs were not allowed to go?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me whether you conferred with the President on that before you drew it up?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that we did. He got it, of course, after we had drawn it up.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever acted upon?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it turned down by the President?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall any action with regard to it. He had the information, I know, and I feel that he was [*6448*] endeavoring to and was backing Mr. Hull in his efforts to maintain peace, but as to giving us any clear indication, or any indication of what he would do if they went beyond this line, I have no recollection of his ever having given us any intimation on that.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 24th of November Senator Pepper in a speech at Boston said that a line had been marked in the Pacific, and if the Japs crossed that line, the United States Navy would shoot without a declaration of war. Had you ever heard of that before?

Admiral STARK. You mean before right now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I may have. I would not have given it any weight at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is your memorandum of the 17th—no, of the 5th—where you put down a line, but you say it has never been agreed to. Here is Senator Pepper on the 24th, the same month, saying that a line had been marked in the Pacific and that if the Japs crossed that line the United States Navy, and that is your department, would shoot without a declaration of war.

Was that a fact?

Admiral STARK. If the Senator is available may I suggest you ask him.

[*6449*] Senator FERGUSON. No; I am asking you. As far as you knew, was it a fact?

Admiral STARK. Not so far as I knew; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew of no such line, that if they crossed that your Navy was going to shoot?

Admiral STARK. We had no commitment or any intimation that we would shoot until we were attacked, in which case we would have done it without any orders from anybody, depending on the scale.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know how far we are going into these irresponsible statements that United States Senators previous to Pearl Harbor made. If we get into that, we will never get through.

Senator FERGUSON. I am through with the statement. I merely wanted to find out whether that was a fact, insofar as the admiral knew, and he was in charge of our Navy, and he said it was not a fact.

And I take it for granted, Admiral, that you are the man that would have known?

Admiral STARK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You say that our fleet was on a war basis. You still say that is a fact?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was done without consultation, [*6450*] necessarily, with the President, merely with his assistant?

Admiral STARK. The President knew that I was going to do that; I was getting everything ready as fast as possible, had started in on that in 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think that this particular question has been asked you, Admiral.

What was the cause of the sending of the message of the 24th? What was in your mind when that message was sent, what caused you to send a message?

Admiral STARK. Well, in general, of course, it was the developing seriousness of the situation. We had at that time the first dead-line message. We had the Jap note also as background, of September 20——

Mr. MITCHELL. November 20.

Admiral STARK. November 20. We were getting nowhere and the situation, the gravity of the situation was just generally increasing, and my own feeling was, after talking with Mr. Hull, where I got most of my background, that the chances of favorable conclusions, or favorable outcome of our negotiations, were growing less and less, if

they hadn't already practically disappeared. That background, unquestionably, was influenced by conversations with Mr. Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you got it you even had the change of the date, put over to the 29th, where they [*6451*] stressed the "repeat 29th"?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In your conference at the White House on the 25th, which was the day following, with the President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and General Marshall, was the matter contained in these intercepts that you have been given, about the deadline, discussed?

Admiral STARK. As I said before, Senator Ferguson, I don't recall just what we discussed at that time. I think everyone present had seen those messages, knew about them, and we may have discussed them, but certainly it was common knowledge to us at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, couldn't that have placed the date the President thought might, there was some talk about being an attack by the next Monday, because that would be the very date—

Admiral STARK. Monday would not have been the 29th, would it?

Senator FERGUSON. Monday was the 30th.

Admiral STARK. The 30th.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was our 29th.

Admiral STARK. I don't know just why he made that statement as regards Monday. It may have been a considered statement or it may have just been one of those statements [*6452*] which we all make at times, "Well, I wouldn't be surprised if they attacked by next Monday." I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this discussed, that Japan was a nation that would probably attack before a declaration of war?

Admiral STARK. We all knew that, that was common knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the President left for Warm Springs on the night before he anticipated that there would be an attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He went on the 29th.

Admiral STARK. Yes. I knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. And the conversation was about the attack coming on the 30th. How do you account for that, was there any conversation is what I have in mind.

Admiral STARK. His plan was to go. He did go. He knew that he could be called back if necessary. And, incidentally, Mr. Hull asked me about calling him back and I said I hated to do it but I advised that he come back before his vacation was over. He needed the rest. He had planned it. Wherever he would have been we would have been in constant touch with him by telephone, if necessary, and a trip by plane would have brought him back to Washington very quickly.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, as I get the picture [*6453*] from what you have told us the President was greatly interested in all these moves, all these intercepted messages, they were being delivered to him daily, or hourly, as the case might be, and it was anticipated that the deadline would be on the 30th, and notwithstanding that on the afternoon of the 29th the President went to Warm Springs?

Admiral STARK. He did.

Senaor FERGUSON. Now, did you have any conversation with him about his messages, that would come through your Navy, these intercepted codes, and so forth, while he was at Warm Springs?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having any conversation with him while at Warm Springs?

Senator FERGUSON. To whom——

Admiral STARK. While he was at Warm Springs.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom were the messages delivered while the President was at Warm Springs?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall that detail.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a little more than a detail, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Well, it is a detail; arrangements were made to get the President's mail to him by pouch, usually flown down, locked pouch, or by courier, and they may very well have been sent that way, or to his naval aide, I don't [*6454*] recall it. I don't recall having taken the matter up. Arrangements for his mail were generally made by his aide.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least, you don't recall any conversation about that?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any doubt in your mind that the President knew about the deadline being set on the 29th?

Admiral STARK. None.

Senator FERGUSON. None whatever?

Admiral STARK. None whatever. When I say "none whatever," those messages were being delivered regularly to the White House and I assume that he saw them, and that is what I base my answer on.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Do you know whether you ever had any discussions about these important messages?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. As I stated, we were talking that situation over more or less continuously.

Senator FERGUSON. With all that has been gone over about these various messages, of the 27th and 26th, do you now recall anything that you want to add, that you had conversations about with anyone, as to why you sent one message on the 27th, why you sent another, of a different [*6455–6456*] text, on the 28th?

Admiral STARK. Nothing beyond——

Senator FERGUSON. Or, the 29th.

Mr. MITCHELL. What messages are they?

Admiral STARK. Our messages and Army messages?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, I think I have covered that in my testimony rather fully.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know of any conversations you had with the President or Secretary of War or Navy on that question?

Admiral STARK. Beyond what I have testified to, which is the fact they were familiar with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you ever discussed with the President the message which was intercepted from Tokyo to Berlin on the 30th, it is at page 204 of our exhibit 1?

Admiral STARK. Are you referring to that part of the message which stated:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

[*6457*] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You knew there was a tie-up between Hitler and the Japs and you had this message in your possession on the 1st. It was translated on the 1st. Did you ever discuss that with the President?

Admiral STARK. I may have. The message was undoubtedly sent to him. I had anticipated the effect of that message by having previously stated in a dispatch that it might come within the next few days, that dispatch being of the 27th, and Marshall having stated it might come any time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this called to your attention, that we intercepted parts 1 and 3 of that very vital and important mesage, but we don't have part 2 here—and I want to read you the first line of part 3:

If when you tell them this——

Which would be referring to what was in part 2.

If when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July.

Was there anything said about this missing part of this important message?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not anyone got in touch with the Philippines, where they were intercepting [*6458*] the same kind of messages, to see whether or not part 2, which seemed to be vital in this language, was ever intercepted?

Mr. MITCHELL. What about page 211? They are scattered around.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a different number. I have written to—or asked counsel's office to write and try to locate why they didn't get part 2 and why we don't have it. That is why I am questioning the Admiral.

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it. We probably didn't get everything. There may be gaps here and there all through this.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is a very vital message. There are three places that they are being intercepted and decoded. One is the British. One at the Philippines. One is here. I am wondering whether this wasn't called to your attention or whether you didn't notice in reading these dispatches, whether you didn't notice it and say, "Where is part 2."

It says:

If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you——

Which indicates what was said in number 2.

Admiral STARK. I don't recall it, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall it at all?

[*6459*] Admiral STARK. No, I have no memory with regard to it, but it may be that you can get that from other witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least it didn't strike any chord in your mind?

Admiral STARK. It doesn't now, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And doesn't even now?

Admiral STARK. It does not now. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think that that could be a very significant message—did you ever try to get it from the British?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall the incident. I believe we were exchanging with the British almost continuously. It is my recollection that we had a British Officer right in our group in Corregidor and that we had an officer right in their group in the Singapore area.

[*6460*] Senator FERGUSON. Did we have them in London with them?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall that. We probably—well, I don't recall. You can get that from the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get over your desk, Admiral, admiralty messages?

Admiral STARK. Well, I got over my desk any admiralty messages which were intended for me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am talking about admiralty messages on this question of intercepts. For instance, they wired that about the Kra Peninsula.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I got that.

Senator FERGUSON. Ship movement.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Those messages would come through the same channels through which messages from our own people came, and they would be delivered to me in the same manner.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall ever getting this part 2?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall the thing at all; no, sir. The answer is no.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall part 1 and part 3?

Admiral STARK. I recall the one about the war breaking out. To the best of my remembrance, I saw that at the time. That sort of rang the bell somewhere. But some of this is [*6461*] pretty difficult to separate after the intervening years, as to whether you are thinking in terms of what you are reading now or what you saw then. But I do think that I saw that particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. When you take that with the previous message on the 29th from Berlin to Tokyo, where they hadn't given them any information, then when the deadline comes along we get this important information going right into Berlin, doesn't that impress you that you knew about that?

Admiral STARK. I was greatly impressed when I sent out a message stating it was a war warning and that the Japs were expected to strike in the next few days. I don't know how I could have made it stronger or more unequivocal.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, this all came after you sent the war-warning message.

Admiral STARK. This particular message did. The previous one you referred to did not. It was confirmatory of our evaluation which we had made and sent out.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall where you were when you received the word of the attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you?

Admiral STARK. I was in the office.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose office?

[*6462*] Admiral STARK. My own.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you with the Secretary of the Navy when he received his message?

Admiral STARK. You mean the 1300 message? I was not with him when he received that. I believe he received that very shortly after I did. It was delivered to him in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the attack message.

Admiral STARK. The attack message.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a raid, not a—what do you call it when it is not maneuvers—no drill?

Admiral STARK. This was a raid. With regard to the Secretary's moves at that time, you know that there had been some telephone calls recorded, and I had been asked what they were, and trying to get back in my memory what they were, and I recently saw someone who was going up North, and endeavoring to check back on that, and I have learned this, and with full authority.

Secretary Knox had intended this morning going to Chicago with Mr. O'Keefe, who, I believe, was manager of his paper. His plane was standing by. He stopped in at the State Department. And after that conference, according to Mrs. Knox, who was waiting for him and expecting him to go on, he changed his plan and O'Keefe went on separately. The Secretary went [*6463*] on down to the *Sequoia*, his naval yacht, for lunch, and she remarked they were not ready for them, and not expecting them. My guess would be that he received the dispatch while on the *Sequoia*. He came to the office later and remained in the office, getting home that night about 2 o'clock in the morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the Secretary of the Navy's office between 12 and 12:30 on Sunday?

Admiral STARK. I don't recall, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. To refresh——

Admiral STARK. The clear thing that stands out in my memory is the discussion of the 1300 dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the 1300 dispatch is the 1 o'clock dispatch?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. My memory is extremely clear on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this refresh you memory, that the Secretary of the Navy received that as you and he came out of your office—out of his office? He made a remark about it. I am trying to get the remark, if you remember.

Admiral STARK. I do not remember discussing it with him. As to the time of delivery, the dispatches were delivered, I believe, by Kramer, who is going to be a witness here, and it is my understanding that immediately after bringing the message [*6464*] to my office, about 10:40, as I recall, he went directly to the State Department and delivered the message, delivered Colonel Knox a copy of that message.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now past recess time.

Senator FERGUSON. I can't finish in the next few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[6465] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Dues counsel have anything now?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not just at present.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have anything to present before you proceed?

Admiral STARK. Sir?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything you want to present at this time?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did you know of any diplomatic relations being carried on with Japan along the same questions that we were carrying them on, by the British Empire, by London or by the Netherlands?

Admiral STARK. I gather the question is——

Senator FERGUSON. During the period that we were negotiating.

Admiral STARK. Did I know whether Great Britain or the Netherlands were carrying on?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[6466] Admiral STARK. No, sir, I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no information on that subject?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, when you were moving the vessels around in the Pacific was it called to your attention, or did you ever get any information to the effect that Japan made a protest that our fleet in effect had surrounded one of their task forces or their fleet in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of that in 1940?

Admiral STARK. I never heard of that at any time.

Senator FERGUSON. We had no particular lanes laid out at that time?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That had never been called to your attention, that there was a protest filed?

Admiral STARK. That is correct, it never had. When I state that we had no particular lanes laid out, there were certain areas wherein the fleet exercised.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, as far as our fleet was concerned.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, as far as our local exercise in an area.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it was also true when we were exercising that we had some difficulty with parts of the Jap [6467] fleet getting in there and observing those?

Admiral STARK. We seldom had fleet maneuvers when I was in the fleet on the west coast that some time or other during the maneuvers a Japanese tanker or Japanese fishermen were not present. That goes back a number of years.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So we felt at that time they were even using that means of obtaining information?

Admiral STARK. Always regarding our fleet formations and how we were maneuvering.

Senator FERGUSON. It was no surprise then for us to learn how much in detail they had obtained the information at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the statement made in exhibit 16 by Admiral Schuirmann in relation to the note of August 17?

Admiral STARK. That it was an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I did not know about that or did not recall it until after the discussion of that here before the committee that there was an ultimatum and somebody discussed that. We have had a lot of fun with Admiral Schuirmann about it but I have no recollection of it otherwise.

Senator FERGUSON. In exhibit 45, Admiral, there is one [*6468*] sentence I would like to talk with you about in order to get your explanation of it.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading).

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was assured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

Will you explain that as far as your knowledge was concerned, as to what it was?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I recall, the changes suggested by Colonel Stimson were very minor and also, as I recall, he did not want us to put the President in a position, or recommend in any way that he go back to the Japanese in any way which would walk back anything we had said. My recollection is not too clear. I do not think it amounted to a great deal. The memorandum stands about as it was. If he comes before the committee he can give it himself and I would rather he would. My remembrance is that we did not want to be put in a position of—or, rather, Colonel Stimson did not want to be, of walking back on anything we had done.

Senator FERGUSON. I had felt that there was some doubt [*6469*] that he might appear and that is the reason that you, being a top, high-ranking officer of the Navy and being a party to this instrument, in effect drawing it up, that you would be able to explain that as far as the Navy was concerned.

Admiral STARK. Well, I think that is what it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no better or different recollection than that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it considered that that was part of the diplomatic-political angle that you were not to be concerned with that you were strictly to keep to the military?

Admiral STARK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that explained to you in any way?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we had the right to say anything we wanted to. I think the message speaks for itself. Primarily, and as I recall this message of the 27th so stated, either that or the one of the 5th or both—we were primarily concerned with getting time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand this the same as I understood that Admiral Turner understood, the memo of the 27th was brought about by the British, that they wanted it drafted and that they were after that information? It was to be given to the President so that he could pass upon a question that they wanted in relation to sending out some reconnaissance [*6470*] planes?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall the British prompting having anything to do with this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you recall in one of the diplomatic notes there is evidence that we were to send out three scouting planes?

Admiral STARK. Yes. I do not know about the diplomatic notes. I remember having directed Admiral Hart to do that and stating that the British were—I remember what you are talking about now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And that the British were scouting a certain area and this dovetailed with it. That may have been in response to either a request of theirs or of their stating where they were looking and asking what we were doing and, as a matter of fact, I think I am correct in stating that Admiral Hart was already doing that before we told him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Admiral Turner gave us the information that one of our planes in scouting had gone over Formosa and there was a protest. Did you ever see that protest?

Admiral STARK. I remember his stating it. I had forgotten the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge of that?

[*6471*] Admiral STARK. I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it now.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did have knowledge?

Admiral STARK. I say I had forgotten it. I have knowledge of it now from the statement which has been made.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what was done about the protest? Had you any conversation with the President about it?

Admiral STARK. Not that I recall. I think not. I do not know what was done about the protest, whether it was let go or what not. They were flying over us in spots regularly and we knew it and they knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not one of the things that made the wording "Avoid the first overt act" to be put in the note? I assume that that was after the note was given.

Admiral STARK. That is with respect to the Army note?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I am not sure. I do not recall of the President having directly told us not to put it in the dispatch, certainly we did not put it in, not to commit the first overt act. That, however, I knew to be general policy.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the general policy?

Admiral STARK. General policy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's retirement?

[*6472*] Admiral STARK. Well, I knew that he had retired; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you tell us what you know about it? Were you consulted or conferred with?

Admiral STARK. I was directed.

Senator FERGUSON. Who directed you?

Admiral STARK. It came to me from Colonel Knox regarding the relief of Kimmel; regarding his detachment.

Senator FERGUSON. Yesterday, when you read the memo of Secretary Knox to the President you did not find anything there critical about his removal.

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did Colonel Knox first talk with you about the removal of or detachment of Kimmel?

Admiral STARK. Shortly after he came back and after coming from the White House he directed that Kimmel be relieved. There is a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy to the commander in chief, Pacific, 162105; that would be 16 December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK (reading):

You will very shortly receive dispatch orders detaching you as CINC Pacific and Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet and ordering you report Com. 14 for temporary duty.

[*6473*] Inform Pye.

That is Admiral Pye.

He will be your temporary relief.

That is from the Secretary of the Navy and it bears my initials and also those of Admiral Nimitz, who was Chief of Personnel at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had no conversation with him as to the cause, merely that you were approving or initialing the order doing it?

Admiral STARK. I received my orders regarding Kimmel. I was not consulted beforehand.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say he had any conversation with the President about his removal or his detachment?

Admiral STARK. A commander in chief would not be removed without the President's permission.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, of course, there is a distinction between permission and a directive.

Admiral STARK. I say without his permission or without his O. K.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was on his direction?

Admiral STARK. Well, I know that the Secretary told me to send that dispatch and that the Secretary had been in touch with the President. I never asked the Secretary whether the President directed it initially or whether he did or whether [*6474*] it was Colonel Knox's recommendation to the President and the President so ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. But you took it then that it was on at least the President's order?

Admiral STARK. In effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And how many days would you say that was after Colonel Knox returned from the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. I think it might be best to get the fact on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do not have the information.

Admiral STARK. It was shortly after, I would say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it hours or days or a week?

Admiral STARK. Well, I would say shortly. By "shortly" I mean perhaps in a day or two.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he retired to the coast?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any conversation with him or anyone else about his resignation or retirement?

Admiral STARK. I wrote him, as I recall, with regard to his retirement and I have not seen a copy of that letter. Whether it was official or whether Admiral Kimmel may have a copy of it, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what did you say? What was the substance of the letter you wrote him about his retirement? [*6475*] Now, when you said "official" did you mean whether you were acting as an official or personal?

Admiral STARK. Whether I wrote him an official note from Chief of Operation to Admiral Kimmel or whether it was one of my "Dear Kimmel" letters?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would amount to the same thing about his retirement?

Admiral STARK. It would be notifying him; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you write him?

Admiral STARK. My recollection—and I want to make it plain that this is recollection—is that I discussed the matter from one angle or another, suggested that I was not trying unduly or even to influence him, pointed out that Short had requested retirement and that he might want to parallel that or he might not and asked him to advise me. I wish I could find that correspondence and whether Admiral Kimmel has a copy of it or not I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write that after conference with anyone?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; with the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it on his request that you do it in that way, which was at least a polite suggestion, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Well, he was familiar with it. Whether [*6476*] it was my suggestion or his, I am not certain.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever call anyone at the Mare Navy Yard in relation to it?

Admiral STARK. At where?

Senator FERGUSON. At Mare Island.

Admiral STARK. I think I did talk to Kimmel or to the officer out there at the time with reference to getting some word to him. Kimmel afterwards came to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember what was said in that conversation about asking him to retire?

Admiral STARK. No. I only remember the general subject of retirement and that it was taken up.

Senator FERGUSON. And he did retire on your suggestion then?

Admiral STARK. He retired——

Senator FERGUSON. That is, your suggestion from the Secretary.

Admiral STARK (continuing). On his own volition. We did not force him at all as I remember it. I never knew of a man to put up a manlier, straighter, finer front than did Admiral Kimmel in this entire picture at that time. His whole bearing was exemplary and what I would have expected of him.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I understand that the information or opinion that you had was if he had not retired he [*6477*] would have been removed?

Admiral STARK. If he had not retired I do not know just what action might have been taken.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you a conversation with the Secretary about that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that, when I got it. We did not have to.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that he would do it on the suggestion?

Admiral STARK. He did it. He did do it, I think, after sizing up all the considerations and, as he said, he had only the best interests of the Navy and of the country at heart, I believe almost in those words and what happened to him he was not so concerned with at that time, the war was on, and I believe his own size-up of the situation was that the best thing for him to do at that time was to retire. Now, if I am mistaken in that he can correct it and I would abide by anything that he stated with regard to it.

Senator FERGUSON. And did the Secretary of the Navy say that he had had a conversation with the President or not about his retirement? Was that a matter that only the President could pass on?

Admiral STARK. I imagine that had been discussed with the President because the future of those two officers at that time [*6478*] was on a high level.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you assumed that that was true when you were talking to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. I think Colonel Knox undoubtedly told the President just what we were doing because I had kept Colonel Knox fully informed.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long was that after your letter to him that he retired?

Admiral STARK. That he actually retired?

Senator FERGUSON. That he actually retired?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not remember the date of his retirement, sir. Counsel can also get that from the Navy Department if it is desired.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, one or two questions on the wind message. Did you ever see the message that came from Batavia in relation to the wind message, that had a little different angle to it than ours. Instead of diplomatic relations being broken off it used the word "war."

Admiral STARK. My recollection is very hazy on that entire subject. I heard it discussed so much since then, before the Navy Court of Inquiry and what has been testified to, I know exactly to what you are referring; whether my remembrance is in the light of what I have heard since or before I am not sure. I do not recollect it except as it has come to us later [*6479*] but I may have known it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would be very significant, would it not, that they expected if relations were broken off, it meant war?

Admiral STARK. It was very likely to mean war.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your opinion whether you would have had that message or not?

Admiral STARK. If we broke off relations?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I thought we were heading for it pretty well anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, the message that they sent of 14 parts was more than an ultimatum, was it not? There was no chance to comply with that at all and never was intended.

Admiral STARK. That broke off negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. In other words, you described that the other day as an ultimatum. It was more than that, was it not?

Admiral STARK. I described it as an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. I do not recall, but it was to break off all negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. It was more than an ultimatum because [*6480*] we could not even comply with it if we wanted to. They intended war.

Admiral STARK. The message stands for itself, I think, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did you hear before the President sent this message to the Emperor that he was going to send one? Were you consulted about that?

Admiral STARK. I believe I knew about that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before the evening of the 6th were you informed about that message?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember just when. I knew that there was talk about the President sending the message as one last hope for continuing the peace in the Pacific. I could not say just when I knew about it. I may have known about it shortly after it was conceived, to which I believe Secretary—I do not know whether Secretary Hull has testified as to that date or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any opinions or was any opinion sought by the President from you on that?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall that it was. It was one of those things that might do some good, could do no harm. The issue was pretty well drawn at that time. It was what might be called a last hope. I recall the President's message with regard to the European war before it broke out, and it is [*6481*] one of those things which I believe we have always done.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in relation to that, as I am informed and I will ask you, Did you hear that broadcast on the radio on Saturday evening, that the message had been sent?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a very important matter, wouldn't it?

Admiral STARK. Important that I heard it over the radio?

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; that you did hear it. You say you do not remember hearing it.

Admiral STARK. Well, I do not know that it would have been particularly important if I knew it was going that I happened to hear it over the radio.

[*6482*] Senator FERGUSON. Now you had said in the message of the 27th that diplomatic negotiations had ceased. Now I want to get your opinion on how that would be construed in the field, hearing it on the radio and knowing from press reports that on the 2d or 3d of December the President had made another request from the Japanese, and that was in relation to going into Indochina, or Thailand, I do not have that message here at the present time.

Admiral STARK. I do not know to just what message you refer about the 2d or the 3d.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a message sent on December 2d. In the white book we have quite a number of conversations. In fact we have on page 777 of Foreign Relations one where Mr. Ballantine had an appointment with Mr. Terasaki, and one on December 1 stating "The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that he noted that the President was returning to Washington in advance of his schedule and inquired what the reason for this was," and so forth.

Another note on December 2 handed by the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2, 1941.

Another memorandum of a conversation on December 2, 1941. Another memorandum on December 5 between the Japanese [*6483*] Ambassador and the Department of State, stating, "The German Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department."

Admiral STARK. I remember those, or at least I have seen them within the last few months. I thought you were referring to a message which had been sent out from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. These are messages delivered by Washington, or memoranda of conversations.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now that being true, and Admiral Kimmel not knowing that the message of the 26th had gone, and we were waiting for the reply on that message, and you saying it had practically ceased, and all this information going out from the articles in the newspapers, and the President personally negotiating with the Emperor on the night of the 6th, would not that cause a belief that your former message about "they had ceased" was not exactly true?

Admiral STARK. I think the Commander in Chief knew that I would not make such a flat statement and of such gravity without full consideration, and he would believe that if I said it, and said it to him officially, it was so. I believe that that again backed up by the burning of the codes, and even the burning of the codes in Honolulu, would have outweighed anything else in his mind, or if he were in [*6484*] doubt he could have asked me, and I feel he would have thought that I would have changed my message if there had been any reason to change it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did not your message, when you sent him a copy of the Army message, weaken it?

Admiral STARK. I did not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think so?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading it now, what would you say?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not think so. I think my message stands for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. When was Singapore alerted, to your knowledge?

Admiral STARK. Singapore?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral STARK. By the British?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the British in Singapore.

Admiral STARK. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any knowledge on that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that on the 6th, and right before the 7th, troop ships were sailing out of our west coast at San Francisco?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I probably did know that. I recall [*6485*] we were sending troops out, and I recall the action taken the next day when we were wondering if submarines might not be in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the Roberts report before it was filed?

Admiral STARK. I do not think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you requested to make any changes in it?

Admiral STARK. I beg pardon, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I say were you requested to make some changes in it? Do you have some information that you want to get?

Admiral STARK. This was information on my statement about sailings. I think I have covered that.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recollect seeing the Roberts report before it was filed?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted on it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. What I saw about the Roberts report was the printed report.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing but the printed report, after it was printed?

Admiral STARK. That is all I recall; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have not, I take it, then [*6486*] seen the original Roberts report since?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I have not. This is the document which I saw [indicating], Docket 159, Seventy-seventh Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the printed report. I want to ask you now if you can recall going to the Secretary of the Navy's office at noon prior to the 1300 message that we talked about this morning, the one on attack, and talking with the Secretary for some 30 minutes?

Admiral STARK. No; I have no recollection of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Trying to refresh your memory, and only for that purpose, when you and the Secretary were walking out of the office the message was handed to the Secretary advising him about the attack. Does that refresh your memory?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall anything being discussed with the Secretary of the Navy on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral STARK. No, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you when you first talked with the President on Sunday, the 7th of December 1941?

Admiral STARK. I do not remember when I first talked to him. It is my impression that I did talk to him after I had talked to Pearl Harbor, but I do not remember the times of [*6487*] those calls.

Senator FERGUSON. Now to again refresh your memory, and only that, from the evidence that has appeared in one of the previous hearings——

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of Captain McCullom coming to your office and giving you a message and you indicated that you were going to talk to the White House and lifted up the phone and he left?

Admiral STARK. That was after the attack?

Senator FERGUSON. No; before the attack. Do you recall any conversation with the President prior to the attack?

Admiral STARK. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any with him that day after the attack?

Admiral STARK. I think I did. It would have been the most natural thing in the world and in accordance with my regular procedure of giving him anything of importance, any news of importance which I had, and I had been in touch with the commander of Pearl Harbor as regards what had happened out there. I either would have told him personally or made sure that he would have gotten it through Colonel Knox or his aide. Usually I picked up the phone and without hesitation gave the President everything I had of interest.

[*6488*] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what his remark was to you about the attack when you did discuss it with him, not saying when the time was?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I do not. I do not remember what his expression was at that time when it occurred.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether or not you ever notified CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic Fleet to start shooting German subs?

Admiral STARK. I think I covered that in my statement, about telling them about the order.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no official order?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be in that letter that I read to you this morning, or that you read to me?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall having informed them officially. I believe I sent them copies of the order and told them in a personal letter.[1]

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, is there anything that you want to add on this record or that you want to take from the record as far as any of my questions or any other questions are concerned?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I think of nothing at this time. I will read the record over very carefully. I have not had an opportunity to do it. If there is anything I will write [*6489*] a letter to the committee. I was trying to think during the noon hour if there was anything—thinking of your questions—anything that I could add that would be helpful. I could think of nothing that I could subtract and I cannot think of anything that has not been pretty well covered, as far as I am concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what you want to tell us is that at least you have had a fair hearing, and a complete hearing, that you have had an opportunity to give all your versions and views before this committee?

Admiral STARK. Absolutely; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether the questions were asked or not, you have had that opportunity?

[1] See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2668 et seq., for a letter from Adm. Stark and list of Naval commands receiving Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5.

Admiral STARK. That is correct. If I thought there was anything of any importance, or if I do think of anything which I have left out, I would not hesitate to send it up.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the purpose of my questions to you.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I understand.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. It seems at the time the Senator from Michigan [*6490*] placed in the record a series of messages between certain dates and at certain pages to Pearl Harbor he left out one particular message in exhibit No. 2. I find that the message in regard to the Philippines is not there, but since there has been so much testimony about the bomb plot at Hawaii and some questions particularly by Mr. Gesell that the other messages were mostly ship movements, there has been some testimony by General Marshall to the effect that there were other messages that were not ship-movement messages.

I would like to place in the record at this time reference to the entries in exhibit No. 2 at page 34 which pertains to maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone; at page 36, which speaks of a transfer of an air depot at Panama Canal, about the petroleum supply tanks being camouflaged, about the amount of food supplies there, about the shifting around of the use of the ammunition loading pier.

I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 122, again thinking about taking the maps of the Panama Canal out by plane so they would not be picked up.

Again, I would like to place in the record the message at page 125, and particularly this quotation:

> Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval preparations by enforcing various [*6491*] exercises to meet any eventuality.

And again I quote:

> Evidently the preparations are intended for defense against Japan.

And again:

> Lately the departure of craft from the bay has become infrequent but since the war, those craft which do go out seldom return, even through it be Saturday or Sunday.

I would like also to place in the record the entry at page 123 outlining the preparations which the Russians made in the month of June at Vladivostok.

I would also ask to have placed in the record the entry at page 38 about the inspection for the location of airplane bases and the construction of airports at Panama Canal.

Also the entry at page 39, dated October 18, 1941, where the statement is made, "In order to find out the plans of the Canal Command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th." And again, "going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each."

As well as the entry at page 40 in regard to gun emplace- [6492] ments. The entry at page 51—and I would like to call particular attention to that entry, wherein the following language is used—it was sent on the 22d of November 1941 and not translated until December 25, 1941, but the language is used:

> The United States Government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea.

I would like also to put in the entry at page 52, which speaks of the antiair defenses on Lock No. 1, which is now being used, are being improved. It states:

> Of course, there are anti-air defenses at Lock No. 3. The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Saliona Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene on the Gulf of Fonesca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.
> [6493] Present Army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; Air Force, 5,000. In addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this general total, made up of the families and laborers,

and so on.

I would like also to call your attention to the entries at pages 58, 70, 71, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, and 96 none of which are ship-movement reports but in effect specific inquiries about the Aleutians and Alaska, about the Panama Canal Zone, about the Philippines, as well as the west coast of the United States.

And I would like to call the particular attention of the committee to the master plan for espionage at page 117.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All of those pages are in exhibit 2?

Mr. MURPHY. All in exhibit 2.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be so ordered.

Do you have something, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I understand the committee asked me for the time of transmission by radio to Honolulu of certain of our dispatches, and I have it here. I will give it to counsel. It just gives the time groups.

There is the message of the 24th, with which you are all familiar, in which the time of transmission was 24—2355, and it runs down through from that message of the 27th and those with regard to the codes. I do not know who asked for it, [6494] but counsel informs me that someone did.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for a moment and ask if you obtained the Munson reports yet, or were they delivered to you?

Admiral STARK. I think they have not yet come up. Counsel was going to ask for them.

Senator FERGUSON. At least they have not come to your attention?

Admiral STARK. I will follow it up personally, to make sure that they come through.

Mr. MITCHELL. While we are on it, I will ask the reporter to write into the daily transcript this memorandum that has just been furnished by the admiral, giving the times. These were received by the naval radio station at Honolulu and are expressed in Greenwich civil time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

[6405]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C., 5 Jan 1946.

In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-20-4-blp
Serial 0003003P20
(SC)A17-24(1)
Top Secret
Memorandum for Captain John F. Walsh, USN.
Subj: Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.
Ref: (a) Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark, dtd 3 Jan 46.

1. The following information is submitted in accordance with reference (a). The times given represent time received by Naval Radio Station, Honolulu, T. H., and are expressed in Greenwich Civil Time:

Originator	Date/time group	Month and year	Time of transmission to radio Honolulu
OPNav	242005	November 1941	242355
OPNav	272337	November 1941	280106
OPNav	290110	November 1941	290238
OPNav	031850	December 1941	031956
OPNav	031855	December 1941	031952
OPNav	270038	November 1941	270109
OPNav	270040	November 1941	270568

[6496]

/S/ Joseph R. Redman,
JOSEPH R. REDMAN,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Chief of Naval Communications.

[6497] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, just one short letter. You may recall that in my testimony, when the question came up of dawn at Honolulu, I stated I thought it was at least an hour before the 7:55 time which was reported as the time of the attack, and that I could get something definite on that from the Naval Observatory. I made a request of the Superintendent of the Naval Observatory, and I have his report, which, if you would like to have it, I will read. It will clear up that matter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Admiral STARK (reading):

On December 7, 1941, sunrise at Pearl Harbor occurred at 0627—

that is 6:27—

time of 157°.5 meridian (Zone+10^h 30^m). National twilight began 52 minutes before sunrise, at 0535; and civil twilight 24 minutes before sunrise, at 0603. Civil twilight is conventionally taken to begin in the morning when the sun is still 6° below the horizon, and is intended to cover the somewhat indefinite period during which the natural illumination usually is sufficient for ordinary outdoor operations to be carried on.

That was at 3 minutes after 6:00.

Nautical twilight begins when the sun is 12° below the horizon, a time intermediate [6498] between complete darkness and civil twilight. Actually, the illumination varies greatly according to weather conditions at the time.

The moon was a few days past full (full moon occurred on Dec. 3). The moon rose at 2005—

that is 8:05 p. m.—

on the evening of December 6 and set at 0925 on the morning of December 7 (Zone 10^h 30^m time) at Pearl Harbor.

The times of sunrise, and of moonset, are for the instant when the upper limb appears on the horizon.

That is, you get the round sun, and the upper limb is the tangent to the horizon.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. That is all, yes, sir. I think the important thing in that message is, in addition to the moonlight, that at 6:03, the time of civil twilight, is a period when natural illumination usually is sufficient for ordinary outdoor operations to be carried on.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I would like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that in the narrative there is a statement by the commander of one of the destroyers going into Pearl Harbor that visibility was good between 5 and 6 that morning.

[*6499*] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the admiral one question on that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the mountains make any difference in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I think very little. Of course you would not get the direct sun rays just as the sun comes above the water, but I think that time is all right, and particularly because of the fact that the moonlight out there is frequently brilliant.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, Admiral.

[*6500*] Mr. KEEFE. I assume at this time, Mr. Chairman, that everybody connected with this examination has exhausted every possible question that could be asked of Admiral Stark, and I hesitate to take much of Admiral Stark's time, but I think there are a few things that I think this record ought to show.

Admiral, when were you relieved of your duties as Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. I was relieved in March 1942.

Mr. KEEFE. And was the letter which you read into the record this morning from Secretary Knox dated at that time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were then assigned as commander of the European Fleet?

Admiral STARK. The United States naval forces in Europe; yes, sir.

Later on, the fleet was known over there as a fleet, and I was given additional orders.

I have a short and rather pithy transcript here that I had made up some days ago in case this question should be asked me.

Mr. KEEFE. I haven't any objection, but I would like to shorten this up as much as I can and ask some very simple questions that can be answered rather easily and without going into too much length.

[*6501*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. This is rather short.

Mr. KEEFE. What does it have reference to?

Admiral STARK. My duties in Europe.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral STARK. Upon my detachment as Chief of Naval Operations, I was designated commander, United States naval forces in Eu-

rope with headquarters in London. In 1943, as preparations for the invasion progressed, I was given additional duty by the commander in chief, United States Fleet, as commander, Twelfth Fleet. Also in 1943, I was given additional duty by the Secretary of the Navy as United States Naval Advisor to the European Advisory Commission, an organization in London of representatives of the Big Three Powers, which was charged with making recommendations concerning problems arising out of the war in Europe. In November 1944, I reached the statutory retirement age, but continued in my command. In April 1945, the United States naval forces in the Mediterranean-North African area were added to my command. On 16 August 1945, I was relieved by Admiral Hewitt.

During the preinvasion, invasion, and postinvasion phases of the liberation of France, Belgium, and Holland, and the conquest of Europe, COMNAVEU was at all times the representative of the Navy Department in Europe and in direct control of all matters relating to convoys and shipping, anti- [*6502*] submarine warfare in general, the logistic support of all naval forces in Europe (less Mediterranean) and the screening agency through which all logistic requirements for the United States Army, British Navy, and the navies of governments in exile funneled. COMNAVEU-COM-12 was in administrative control of the submarine and surface forces of the United States Navy which operated with the British Fleet in European waters (less Mediterranean), of the air squadrons which operated with coastal command, RAF, and of the naval forces and shore establishments which were placed under the control of General Eisenhower and the allied naval commander in chief for the invasion of France. As the senior United States naval officer in Europe, COMNAVEU and commander Twelfth Fleet received copies of all orders regarding the operational control of naval forces under the afore-mentioned commands and was in constant touch with their dispositions and requirements. His assistance in bringing about any needed adjustments was constantly sought by submarine, air force, surface force commanders, and commander Task Force 122. Vice Admiral Kirk, United States Navy, was in command of this task force. He was the operational commander of the United States naval task forces engaged in the invasion of Normandy. COMNAVEU was the senior naval adviser to the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, Ambassador to governments in exile, and, in effect, to the commanding general, European theater of operations, General [*6503*] Eisenhower, and subsequently the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Both port organizations and shipping were at all times under the control of COMNAVEU and commander Twelfth Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I assume that the carrying out of the responsibilities incident to that position required the exercise of some superior judgment, did it not?

Admiral STARK. With all due modesty, I may say I thought it did.

Mr. KEEFE. When you were relieved of your command, did you receive any word from General Eisenhower, the supreme allied commander?

Admiral STARK. I received a dispatch from him, which I greatly prize, and prior to that, and after the Normandy invasion, the Army awarded me the Distinguished—Army Distinguished Service Medal.

Mr. KEEFE. What date was that award made, and will you produce the message from General Eisenhower?

Admiral STARK. The message from General Eisenhower reads——

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of it?

Admiral STARK. It is an Army message. In the 17th of August.

Mr. KEEFE. 1945?

Admiral STARK. 1945; yes, sir.

[*6504*] Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Admiral STARK. I read his message:

I have no words to express my appreciation for the great help you have given the Forces under my command over the past three years. Your assistance has been vital and the spirit in which it was rendered has been the acme of generous cooperation.

Good bye and good luck.

(Signed) EISENHOWER.

Mr. KEEFE. When was the citation from the Army by which you received the Distinguished Service Medal?

Admiral STARK. It was initiated and bears the date of July 15, 1944.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, have you that citation?

Admiral STARK. I have it.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you read it into the record, please?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I will eliminate the first part which refers to previous decorations and Army requirements. It starts with:

Recommendation for Award of Distinguished Service Medal. * * *

For Distinguished Service Medal: Admiral Stark, while serving in support of the Army of the United States, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorius service [*6505*] to the Government in a duty of great responsibility.

Admiral Stark, as Commander of the United States Naval Forces in Europe, was charged with the planning and preparation of the United States naval aspects of the launching of the campaign for the liberation of Europe. These plans were coordinated with the United States Army and the Armies of the Allies, as well as the Navies of the other participating countries. From an Army standpoint, the attack on Europe would have been impossible without the complete support of the U. S. Navy.

More than 4,000 naval ships and craft and over 100,000 naval officers and men were used in the V-Day assault. The fact that these ships and men were available is directly attributable to the efforts of Admiral Stark. The successful planning for the needs and employment of these ships and for the officers and men was accomplished through the untiring efforts of Admiral Stark and the close cooperation which he maintained with the appropriate Army commanders and their staffs. Every desire of the Army commanders for naval craft, personnel and matériel was met in a most efficient manner.

The planning for this assault was complete to the smallest detail on the part of the United States Naval [*6506*] Forces and served to make the combined Naval and Ground Forces of the United States an integrated unit.

The efficient planning of Admiral Stark enabled the United States Navy to assemble and maintain—in spite of unfavorable weather—a list of a substantially greater assault force than was first anticipated by the Army commanders. The results so far accomplished in this assault on the Fortress of Europe would have been impossible without the complete and wholehearted support on the part of the Navy.

The service for this award as recommended has been completed, as the original assault has been sucessfully concluded.

And the proposed citation reads:

Admiral Harold Raynsford Stark, Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe, for exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. Admiral Stark was responsible for the planning, preparation and coordination of the United States naval aspects of the launching of the campaign for the liberation of Europe. Through keen foresight and excep-

tional administrative ability, Admiral Stark was able to plan for and meet the necessary personnel and matériel requirements for this enormous operation. Only through his untiring [6507] efforts was the accomplishment of this successful invasion completed. The services rendered by Admiral Stark reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of the United States. Entered Naval Service from Pennsylvania.

(Signed) DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
General, U. S. Army,
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

May I add, of course that would have been impossible for any commander to attain without a wonderful lot of personnel under him.

I might mention, for example, that an initial goal of readiness of the 4,000-odd craft; that is, of a large portion of them, was put at 85 percent readiness, which was higher than any other power had put it. We kept raising that, and in the last visit I made, particularly to the workmen, with their torches and whatnot, at all of the large number of stations we had, my consant plea was for 100 percent, and they all said they would give it. They were working day and night. They practically attained it. The over-all result for all stations being 99 percent plus. And what was accomplished was entirely due to the subordinate commands, which were the finest in the world.

[6508] Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Stark, to get this matter chronologically in one piece, as a result of your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were cited by the President and awarded, as I understood your testimony, a gold star; is that right?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. At the termination of your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were given the letter from the Secretary of the Navy which you have read into the record this morning?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. You then embarked upon service as commander of the naval forces in the European area and as a result of that service rendered during the war you were decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross from the Navy—from the Army?

Admiral STARK. Distinguished Service Medal from the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. Distinguished Service Medal, I should say, from the Army, together with a citation from General Eisenhower and also a personal letter from General Eisenhower, which you have read into the record, when you left that service?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch.

Mr. KEEFE. In addition you were decorated by at least three foreign governments?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[6509] Mr. KEEFE. Now during this period of time between December 7, 1941, and the time of your relief from duty as commander of the United States naval forces in the European area, did you know of any action taken by Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King with respect to your conduct as Chief of Naval Operations prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you first learn that Admiral King had recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that you be relegated to a position not requiring the exercise of superior judgment and to a position, and I quote, "in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors"?

Admiral STARK. I learned that after I returned home and when I was on what has become to be known as terminal leave. In other words, my service had terminated. I am still waiting orders for retirement. I first saw that, as I recall, in the press.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you officially notified by a finding by the Secretary of the Navy that you should be retired under circumstances so that you could never again serve in the Navy in a position that might require the exercise of superior judgment?

Admiral STARK. Not until it was published. I had no previous knowledge of it.

[*6510*] Mr. KEEFE. So upon your return from your service in Europe, after receiving citations from the President of the United States, from the Navy Department, from the War Department, and from at least three foreign governments, you learned for the first time, in the press, that you had been retired under these circumstances which I have just related?

Admiral STARK. That I was to be retired.

Mr. KEEFE. Were to be retired?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you been retired?

Admiral STARK. Not yet, sir. I was placed on 4 months' leave, as is customary. That 4 months was up on December 24, but in view of these hearings I have not yet been retired. My service was over really when I returned home.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it accurate for me to say, as a layman, that during all your service as Chief of Naval Operations you were the opposite number of General Marshall?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. You as Chief of Naval Operations and he as the Chief of General Staff were opposite numbers?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. He having responsibility on the Army side and you on the Navy side?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6511*] Mr. KEEFE. And from your testimony that you have given before this committee I conclude that you feel that as Chief of Naval Operations you did everything which you considered possible and proper for you to do to alert the Navy prior to December 7?

Admiral STARK. I thought so.

Mr. KEEFE. At Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. I thought so; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you say that principally because, as you have reiterated time and again, you sent the message of November 24 and the war warning message of November 27?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; plus the code dispatches.

Mr. KEEFE. Plus the code-burning dispatch that followed on the 3d of December?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and plus the background of many months before.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, plus the background of information relating to the general situation which you knew was in the possession of Admiral Kimmel, our commander on the Navy side at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. What I had sent and the efforts that we had made in preparation.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask you this; it is one of the things that bothers me as a layman: When you sent this order, or [*6512*] this message of November 27, you stated in it, in substance, that Admiral Kimmel was to take certain deployment measures?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You stated that it was a war-warning message?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, specifically what were the deployment measures that you expected Admiral Kimmel to take?

Admiral STARK. A deployment means a spread. A defensive deployment means a spread for defense. And I would take it, and I believe it would be generally accepted, to intercept and guard against surprise. My first thought would have been a conference of Admiral Kimmel with his key people and with the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, will you permit me to interrupt at that point: Admiral Kimmel was in command on the Navy side?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. General Short was in command on the Army side?

Admiral STARK. True.

Mr. KEEFE. You would expect, would you not, that there would be close liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and I have no reason to believe that there was not.

Mr. KEEFE. General Short received his directions from [*6513*] General Marshall?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Kimmel received his from you as Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The evidence in this case shows that you sent your message on the 27th, Marshall likewise sent a message to Short on that day, and asked General Short to report. You recall that, do you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ask or expect Admiral Kimmel to report to you as to measures taken?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not?

Admiral STARK. That was not Navy custom. It was not my practice to ask the people in the field—I gave them a broad directive, expected them to carry out the details. You may recall that Admiral Kimmel asked me not to send him any categorical instructions, in one of his letters, but to give him only broad general objectives. Prefacing that request with the fact that I could not know or be too well informed of the conditions confronting him on the spot. It was not my practice, it never has been, to tell the "how to do," but rather the "what to do."

[*6514*] Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, Admiral, am I to understand from that statement that having sent your message of November 27 you had performed your full and complete duty as Chief of Naval Operations, and having given him this war warning and ordered him to take a defensive deployment, you had no further responsbility in the matter to see that the order which you had given was carried out?

Admiral STARK. I felt that way about it, that it was then up to him.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am not asking how you felt, Admiral. I am asking you whether or not there was, in connection with your responsibilities of Chief of Naval Operations, a responsibility on your part to see that the order which you had given was carried out?

Admiral STARK. No; I did not feel that there was a responsibility on my part to see that the order was carried out. I gave the order and assumed that it would be carried out. I had the right to make that assumption.

Mr. KEEFE. Is there a written order or booklet defining the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations that covers that situation?

Admiral STARK. Not that particular point. I think it is Navy, general Navy custom, for a senior to give a subordinate an order and leave it to the subordinate to carry it out.

[*6515*] Mr. KEEFE. In that respect apparently there was a difference between the Navy and the Army because, as I recall General Marshall's testimony, he felt that it was his responsibility to see to it that his orders were carried out.

Admiral STARK. Well——

Senator LUCAS. The Congressman is wrong about that.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't say that.

[*6516*] Admiral STARK. Well, I do not know just what their practice is. Our practice——

Mr. KEEFE. So far as the Navy is concerned you have stated them to be as just indicated?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, Kimmel was supreme commander out there in the Pacific area and when you gave him an order it was assumed by you that that order would be carried out?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not feel that you were under any responsibility to pursue the matter to see that it was carried out, is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, you expected Kimmel and Short to get together and compare notes to determine what they should do; did you not?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It is to be assumed that they did get together out there after receiving these messages, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Because I believe on the next day, on November 28, you sent what purported to be a copy of the Army message to Admiral Kimmel; did you not?

Admiral STARK. I sent it to him for information; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand, for information.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, supposing these men got together and Short says, "Here is a message from Kimmel, read this over," and Kimmel says, "Here is one we got from Stark," and Short says, "Here is one I just got from G–2, from Miles and I have answered and here is what I have answered to Marshall, that I am alerted against sabotage, liai-

son with the Navy"; you were in constant contact with General Marshall here, were you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You said you were in the closest contact with him——

Admiral STARK. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Day after day during that period of time.

Admiral STARK. Yes; I was; we always were.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, if the Army had paid any attention to Short's reply stating that he was alerted against sabotage only they perhaps would have discussed that with you, would they not?

Admiral STARK. Well, I do not know that they would. That was something between them and their field commander. I [*6518*] may say that the first I learned of the Short dispatch was at the Roberts Commission. I did not know of it before that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral Stark, it certainly must have been of concern to the Navy to know what measures were put into force by the Army because the Army was there to defend the fleet, wasn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; and the Army had——

Mr. KEEFE. Your fleet would have been in bad shape without the protection that should have been afforded by the Army; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; but the outstanding things in the Army message to me was that war might come at any moment and directed Short to make a reconnaissance and I had directed Kimmel to make a defensive deployment. The two hooked up together. Short had the stations on Hawaii, the radar stations as one element for reconnaissance, he had a few planes, not many, but that is where he would have been helped out in his direction for reconnaissance by Kimmel, who had under the Martin-Bellinger agreement assumed responsibility for the so-called offshore reconnaissance with planes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you as Chief of Naval Operations at any time between the 27th of November and the 7th of December did not know of your own knowledge that Kimmel was in fact alerted, did you?

[*6519*] Admiral STARK. No; I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. You simply assumed that he would follow your command?

Admiral STARK. I thought that that message was so outstanding, I had worked for hours over it and particularly the war warning, which was all out, that I thought it would convey what I intended it should convey. I thought it was very plain and it flew all the danger signals.

Mr. KEEFE. The difficulty that I find in my thinking, Admiral Stark, and I want you to help me if you can, I have heard you say repeatedly you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor; you were surprised, the President was surprised, General Marshall was surprised, you were all surprised, you did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and yet you expected Kimmel with less information than you had of the situation, even conceding this order which was given on the war warning, you expected him to be prepared against an attack which none of you thought would take place. Now, it is difficult for me to reconcile those two positions.

Admiral STARK. Well, I reconcile it this way, that I had sent to Kimmel for action a war warning signal containing a directive

and containing what information we had, but the signal was sent to him for action and he was directed to take a deployment and it started out with, "this is a war warning."

[*6520*] A surprise attack on Hawaii was known to be a possibility. I did not expect it, I was surprised that it took place at that time, but we all recognized it to be a possibility and we had worked and pressed for months with regard to drilling for it, if you will recall, training once a week for this thing, we had pressed for weapons to repel it, we had pressed for planes to be there, we had talked about it by letter and by official letter, we had pointed out that war might be preceded by it and here was war at our door and with all that background and with the statement, "This is a war warning" and to take a defensive deployment, we thought that that would put them on a war footing out there so far as any surprise was concerned. It did not but we had expected it would.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, I appreciate your statement exactly but I still am in a fog to a certain extent and am unable to understand your position and see if I can make myself clear.

You say you were surprised that an attack took place, you say you did not expect an attack to take place at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral STARK. At that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Yet you say it was possible for an attack to take place and you had spent your time getting ready to repel that attack but in your warning to Kimmel you called his at- [*6521*] tention to the place where you thought the attack would take place, which was way off thousands of miles away, down in the China Sea, Samoa, and Kra Peninsula, and so on.

Admiral STARK. That is true, but the attack which we envisaged down there, we stated that the makeup, and so forth, of this amphibious expedition, not a raiding force or a carrier force but an amphibious expedition, and the points of that amphibious expedition might be so and so.

There was no question, there had not been in my mind at any time of an amphibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Now, the points mentioned there were in line with what had gone before and that was the information that we had, but one of the things that means a lot, I think, to the average naval officer when he gets a message—that part of the message was information. We could have sent that simply out as a separate dispatch had we so willed, just to him for information, it could have been left out, but when we sent the dispatch to him for action it was with the idea that there was a war warning and that the attack might come in any direction.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, let me understand this. Now, the thing that I cannot understand is this and I hope you will try and make it clear to a layman: Evidently you had a war plan, Rainbow No. 5, which I hold in my hand, this big document. I understood you to say this morning that that was the [*6522*] outgrowth in its final form of your ABCD.

Admiral STARK. ABC–1 was the Basic War Plan for both the Army and Navy, Rainbow 5, and that, if it is the WPL–46, is the Navy plan.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you kindly tell me where in this plan, which I assume was in the possession and within the knowledge of both General

Short and Admiral Kimmel, where is the specific program set out that covers this so-called deployment business preparatory to actual war?

Admiral STARK. You mean as to where any phrase in connection with deployment is used?

Mr. KEEFE. Where can I look in this plan to see what the commander, Kimmel, was to do when you told him to execute a defensive deployment? If there is anything in this war plan, I would like to have you point it out.

Admiral STARK. There is one place where deployment is mentioned. I do not think there is any place in the plan where it would tell him what to do in connection with a defensive deployment. That would be of his initiative to make a defensive deployment which he thought was proper.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in the name of conscience then how am I as a member of this committee to determine whether Admiral Kimmel carried out the order that you gave to him if nobody knows what the order means and what the deployment is to be? [*6523*] Supposing he took one ship and took it out to sea, that would be a deployment, would it not?

Admiral STARK. That would be a partial deployment; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is there anything in the Navy record or in the files or in the war plans that I can point to which says when an order is given to a commander to take a defensive deployment he is to do A, B, C, D, E?

Admiral STARK. I think you will not find that anywhere. From long naval experience a defensive deployment means a spread in defense. That would be my definition of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Would that mean then that he should take his fleet out of Pearl Harbor and spread it out on the ocean, or what does it mean?

Admiral STARK. Well, it would mean, in my opinion, scouting with his planes, it would mean the disposition of other forces such as submarines or light forces or perhaps aircraft in accordance with his best judgment for defense. It was a defensive deployment. Now, he did have, as we now know, certain forces on the sea. He may have considered them as part of a defensive deployment. He can testify as to that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, he had the *Enterprise* out, did he not, with planes in the air?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6524*] Mr. KEEFE. Scouting around. Admiral Newton had the *Lexington* out with a task force, also with planes in the air; and the balance of the fleet, except a destroyer that went out that morning, I guess, was in Pearl Harbor. Now, would you consider the fact that the *Enterprise* was engaged in the specific task of taking planes to Wake and the *Lexington* was engaged in the specific task of taking planes to Midway, as I recall—those would not be defensive deployments, would they, in accordance with your order?

Admiral STARK. If he had been sweeping ahead of him, and, as I recall, he did sweep ahead of him and if he were flying any planes and I dare say they were and scouting around the horizon it might very well be considered part of a defensive deployment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all right. Now, then, assume that he did that. That, then, is at least a partial compliance with your order then, is it not?

Admiral STARK. It very well might be according to what they were doing and what we told them.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we lost a lot of ships in Pearl Harbor and a lot of men. Do you conceive that your order and directive to make a defensive deployment involved the ships that were in the harbor and, if so, how?

Admiral STARK. Well, as I have stated, I left that up [*6525*] to him. It was impossible—not impossible but generally we did not know the ships that were in or what their condition was or just what was out there, but the planes were one of the means which could have been used and how many destroyers he might have had at that time to accompany his battleships if he wanted to put them out, and it is an open question whether or not it would have been best to have them out or have them where they were, provided they were ready, in other respects, to meet this attack.

I would hesitate to state without full knowledge and without being on the spot at the time just what I would have done there at that time. My feeling——

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, with full knowledge as to what he did do——

Admiral STARK. My feeling is that I certainly would have had my planes out, I would have had my radar going, and I would have been using my submarines and perhaps——

Mr. KEEFE. Now, just a moment before you go further, if you will pardon the interruption. You say you certainly would have used your radar. You mean ships' radar?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I mean—and I am glad you picked that up—the Army radar.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, then, let us talk about Kimmel and then we will get to Short after a while. Let us stick [*6526*] right with Kimmel. Certainly his radar would not be any good with the ships located in Pearl Harbor and with these mountains on all sides, would it?

Admiral STARK. Very little, if any.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral, what I am trying to get at, and I wish we would stick right with that point, I want you to tell this committee, if you can, what did Admiral Kimmel fail to do with respect to this order which you gave for him to take a defensive deployment; specifically state what he failed to do.

Admiral STARK. Well, if I may say so, I would rather the committee judge of his failure. My feeling is that if I would have had this job and what we thought when we gave the order, that one of the first things that he would have done would have been to scout continuously with what aircraft he had in the direction which he would have worked out as being the most likely point from which an attack might come.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, did he have these aircraft out?

Admiral STARK. I believe he did not.

Mr. KEEFE. And thus you say he defaulted, because he did not have proper reconnaissance by aircraft; that is number one, is that right?

Admiral STARK. I say what I would have done and he did [*6527*] and it is hindsight. It is hindsight and it is not hindsight. You have asked me to state specifically what I think I would have done and that is what I think I would have done and I assumed

that is what was done. We were assuming that they were scouting with everything they had in the air.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Stark, if I may be so bold as to interrupt. I am just a layman and I think most of the members of the committee are laymen. You gave this Admiral, as Chief of Naval Operations, an order to do a certain thing, to take a defensive deployment. Now, you must have had in your mind as Chief of Naval Operations that that placed the responsibility upon Admiral Kimmel to do some specific thing. Now, your answer to us is that that was in the discretion of Admiral Kimmel, that he could do what he thought was the proper thing to do. I am asking you what did you contemplate you intended him to do when you issued that order to him, that is what I would like to know?

Admiral STARK. Well, the answer to that is, starting out again, if I may, first conference with the Army. We had told Kimmel to take a defensive deployment, we had said that war might come in a few days, we had stated the war warning. Short was told war might come at any minute. He was told to make reconnaissance.

Now, confining myself to what I intended and what I [*6528*] thought Admiral Kimmel would do, I thought that they undoubtedly were considering if an attack did come where it would come from and, of course, I would assume that it would be air and submarine, either or both.

A defense against such an attack, either air or submarine or both, is scouting with planes. Therefore, I would have assumed that he would have scouted with his planes to the best of his ability with what he had. I would have assumed that he would have used his submarines to assist him in that scouting and I would have assumed he would have weighed the rest of the force he had, what he had at sea, what he had in port, as to whether he had the best balance possible also to assist in that scouting. He had fast task forces at sea, which are well adapted to that sort of work, carriers whose planes can cover a wide area, accompanied by defensive units such as we usually have in a fast carrier task force, namely, cruisers and destroyers. Those are the basic things I would have assumed.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, am I to assume or is the committee to assume that in the event that Admiral Kimmel states here on the stand that he considered as the Commander out there that it was the proper thing to do to have this fleet deployed in Pearl Harbor as he had it, that he having exercised that judgment was clearly within his rights and that no [*6529*] criticism can attach to him because he exercised that judgment under the circumstances? Are we to understand that?

Admiral STARK. He was within his rights to exercise his judgment and when you have heard his judgment I assume then you will be in position to weigh what I have said and his judgment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I realize the delicacy of these questions, Admiral Stark, because Admiral Kimmel is your friend and he has been all through.

Admiral STARK. One of the closest and finest I ever had and one of the finest I ever knew.

Mr. KEEFE. Almost as close as a brother to you and because of that I shall not press it any further at this time except that I want

to call your attention to the fact that in this war plan Rainbow No. 5 on page 17 of this photostat that I have it says:

Upon the receipt of the following OpNav dispatch the naval establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war:
Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5.
(b) The date of the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

Admiral STARK. Not until after the attack.

Mr. KEEFE. Then was such a dispatch sent?

[*6530*] Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; at once.

Mr. KEEFE. Then that put in operation the entire Rainbow No. 5 plan?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Upon the sending of that dispatch?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It put it in effect against Japan.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, exactly. Now, then, so prior to the sending of that dispatch, "Execute Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5" these other dispatches did not have reference to anything contained in this War Plan Rainbow No. 5?

Admiral STARK. I believe the dispatch of the 27th directing the defensive deployment stated preparatory to carrying out the tasks herein, being to him for action, further showing, in my opinion, that we were expecting an attack and that this would come in effect.

[*6531*] Mr. KEEFE. All right; now, Admiral, but there is no similar document on the part of the Navy showing what a Navy commander situated as Kimmel was, was to do before the receipt of this "execute" message?

Admiral STARK. Admiral Kimmel's own plan drew up certain things which he contemplated doing, or might consider necessary to do before actual hostilities in his own Pacific plan, which was predicated largely and necessarily on WPL–46.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now I want to ask you a few questions about this 1940 alert.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were Chief of Naval Operations at that time?

Admiral STARK. I was.

Mr. KEEFE. And General Marshall, through Adams, sends a message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, stating:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly.

[*6532*] Acknowledge.

Signed, "Adams."

Now, you were in close liaison with General Marshall at that time, were you not?

Admiral STARK. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not he ever discuss with you, as Chief of Naval Operations, the background and the facts which prompted him to send this alert order on the 17th of June, 1940?

Admiral STARK. I have stated that I do not recall that clearly, and I can only assume that the reason I do not recall it clearly is that I was not impressed, so far as the Navy was concerned, with any particular gravity at that time. That is the reason that I did not initially send Admiral Richardson anything in regard to it, and I must have looked on it, I assume I looked on it largely, as an Army affair.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that is not what I asked you, Admiral Stark, and that is not a direct answer to my question. My question is whether or not you discussed this alert with General Marshall. Now, if you didn't discuss it, or if you do not remember it, that is one thing.

Admiral STARK. That is what I meant to convey. I do not recall that alert.

[*6533*] Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you had some communications with Admiral Richardson in reference to it, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes; there were dispatches exchanged, but the one thing I did recall when I came up here, and which I checked upon later, was that Admiral Richardson had written me and requested, if anything like that occurred again, he would like to be informed beforehand .

Mr. KEEFE. Did you give Richardson any orders for the deployment of the fleet?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. We told him, in response to his question with regard to it, to continue cooperation with the Army. They were already working with the Army on it out there, without any directive from me.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that during this alert Admiral Richardson took the fleet out of Pearl Harbor and went to a secret rendezvous, giving the impression that he was sailing to the Panama Canal, in order to try to stir up the saboteurs of the Canal?

Admiral STARK. I remember that.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you give that order?

Admiral STARK. I remember that very clearly. I think the fact that it happened at this time was a coincidence. I remember very distinctly telling Joe to take the fleet out and to provide for a leak. When it was brought up to me, I said [*6534*] "Yes," and I also recall extending his time 2 days, which I also verified, the time was extended 2 days. We told him to maintain radio silence, to start as theoretically heading southeastward, in case any Japanese ship should see him. It was an exercise at sea, but the primary purpose was that the Canal authorities thought, if war came, that the fleet was going into the Atlantic, and that some of their agents would commit considerable sabotage down there. They were anxious to apprehend these people, and we thought we might precipitate action on their part. So after the Army had provided to catch these people if they did start anything, and to break this thing up, we then agreed and we sent the fleet to sea. But that it happened at the same time as this alert is, in my opinion, just a coincidence.

I have a dispatch here——

Mr. KEEFE. I think it is already in evidence.

Admiral STARK. I think I have covered the thing.

Mr. KEEFE. I offered it in evidence, I think, heretofore.

Admiral STARK. That I do recollect quite clearly, but the other I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Admiral Stark, when General Marshall ordered that alert on the 17th of June 1940, he clearly must have felt that there was some possible breach in the relations with Japan that prompted him to put Hawaii on the [6535] alert?

Admiral STARK. He has so testified, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; he testified, but the reasons for it did not come in until after he left. I sought to get those, and we have them in the record now, the reasons which prompted that alert.

Now, you cannot recall any of the conversations that took place between you and General Marshall which prompted Marshall to order an all-out alert in 1940?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I cannot.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now I would like to ask a question which bothered me, with respect to this Rainbow No. 5, which places the island of Guam in what is called category F.

Admiral STARK. I have the category here.

Mr. KEEFE. Now will you state for the record what category F means?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; we have that, I am sure. This is out of Joint Action, Army and Navy, and refers to degrees of preparation, and they are put in categories of defense A, B, C, D, E, and F.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, take Guam to start with. That is in F. Now give us what category F means.

Admiral STARK. Category F: "Positions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject [6536] to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy."

[6537] Mr. KEEFE. Then, so far as Guam was concerned, at the time this basic war plan was devised it was the considered opinion of both the Army and Navy that it could not be defended and it therefore was placed in category F that required those on the island, through demolition or otherwise, to destroy anything of value to the enemy and to permit it to be taken?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And to surrender?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, is it not?

Admiral STARK. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in what category was Wake placed under this war plan?

Admiral STARK. I will have to look that up under the war plans, sir. I think it is misplaced here.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to get it also for Midway and Samoa.

Admiral STARK. I think it is a safe assumption that Wake may not be specifically mentioned, but it is included in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, and on that assumption the category of defense would be D. I will check the war plans carefully, and if that assumption is inaccurate, I will notify the committtee.

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier was in category D.

[6538] Mr. KEEFE. Then, I will ask to have placed in the record, Mr. Chairman, this document that has been presented to us, to which we may make reference to the record, as to these war plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to find out where it comes from. I have been trying to locate it.

Admiral STARK. The reference I think is given at the top. It is from Joint Action of the Army and Navy.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, in the book, Exhibit 44, we have as item 6, Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Is that what it is?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; it is a book which has been approved by both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that covers joint action. I think it is FTP–145.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean it is not in any of the war plans we have had here at all?

Admiral STARK. No. Here it is. I think the assistant counsel has it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it in effect prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; it has been in effect for a number of years, with several changes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Chapter V out of that book, is it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. This is taken right out of the book.

[6539] Mr. MITCHELL. This is the printed publication of the Public Printing Office, prepared by the Joint Board, and revised by the Joint Board, 1935.

Admiral STARK. If I said FTP–145 I should have said 155.

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not find anything like that on the title page.

Admiral STARK. It is FTP–155.

Mr. MITCHELL. What does FTP stand for?

Admiral STARK. Fleet training publication.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you also give me the information as to Midway?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us settle the question whether this is to be printed at this point in the record, to which I assume there is no objection.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. It can be transcribed in the daily transcript, but I wanted it identified. It says, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter V, Coastal Frontier Defense," but it does not say what volume it comes from.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been identified.

Admiral STARK. It states, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." That might very well be clear enough.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a Public Printing Office publication of 1935.

[6540] The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be printed at this point in the transcript.

(The document referred to follows:)

[6541] *Confidential*

JOINT ACTION OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

CHAPTER V—COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE

SECTION III—CATEGORIES OF DEFENSE AND REQUIREMENTS AND MEANS TO BE PROVIDED

30. *Degree of preparation.*—The degree of preparation in coastal frontier defense and the frontier defense measures to be taken, including the strength of

the forces to be provided, depend upon the enemy and the character of the enemy operations to which coastal frontiers may be subjected in the early stages of a war. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established as listed below. Decisions as to the "category of defense" required for each coastal frontier are included in all joint basic war plans except those for wars of a minor nature. These decisions constitute a directive to the Army and Navy commanders of the joint organization for coastal frontier defense as to the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken. They likewise constitute a directive to the [6542] War and Navy Departments as to the allocation of the means required for this defense. Defensive sea areas will be proclaimed in time of actual or impending war as necessitated by the nature of the war and the probable enemy.

31. *Categories of defense.*

a. *Category A.*—Coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must be provided for political reasons. Under this category, only a sufficient part of the gunfire elements of harbor defense will be manned in the strength required to create a show of preparedness. The strength required will be that considered necessary to repel small naval raids. A nominal offshore patrol will be maintained.

b. *Category B.*—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to minor attacks. Under this category, the harbor defenses will be provided with one manning relief, and a part of the obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain defensive sea areas may be established and a limited offshore patrol may be instituted, with a limited control of shipping entering and leaving harbors.

c. *Category C.*—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack. Under this category, the coastal defense area should be provided, in general, with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet the following enemy naval operations: those incident to con- [6543] trolling the sea; those against shipping; and minor attacks against land areas. The harbor defenses should be fully manned and air support arranged. Longe range air reconnaissance will be provided, if practicable. If sufficient forces are available, outposts will be established outside of harbor defenses along the sensitive areas of the shore line. The inner mine barrages will, in general, be established; a full inshore patrol and complete control of shipping will, as a rule, be instituted; and certain outer mine barrages and defensive sea areas may be established, and a limited offshore patrol instituted.

d. *Category D.*—Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C, will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely [6544] to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force.

e. *Category E.*—Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to major attack. Under this category, in addition to the measures required for Category D, there will be required generally the concentration of the troops necessary to defend the area against a serious attack in force, together with additional naval forces to provide intensive inshore and offshore patrols. Defensive sea areas will be established. Air defense will be provided as in Category D. All or a part of the GHQ air force may be ordered to the threatened area to operate either under direct control of Army GHQ or under that of the Army commander of the theater of operations or frontier.

f. *Category F.*—Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces. Under this category, the employment of existing local forces and local facilities will be confined principally to the demolition of those things it is desirable to prevent falling into the hands of the enemy.

g. *General.*

(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable [6545] initially, local defense plans should provide for the initial employment of such forces of the

Army and the Navy as may be required in addition to those forces which are ordinarily available for the initial defense of the coastal frontier in question, and which can be diverted from the mobilization and concentration of the Army forces, from the United States Fleet, and from other naval forces, during the period of mobilization and concentration, without materially interfering with or seriously delaying the operations to be undertaken in the principal theater of operations.

(2) Under all categories of defense, the Army coastal frontier or Army sector commander is responsible for the antiaircraft defense within the corps area and naval district extending inland from the frontier or sector, such antiaircraft defense to include an aircraft warning service. Cases involving the antiaircraft defense of Army GHQ airdromes and those where one corps area borders on two coastal frontiers, will be specifically covered in appropriate Army strategical plans.

[*6546*] Mr. KEEFE. Can you now state, Admiral, the category in which Midway was placed?

Admiral STARK. That would be in the same category as the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

Mr. KEEFE. And what about Samoa?

Admiral STARK. Samoa would be also in D.

Mr. KEEFE. The same category?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and the capture of Guam by the Japs were improvements on the harbor being made at that time or had they been completed?

Admiral STARK. They had not been completed. Of course, I recall very clearly the legislation with regard to that. I do not know just what their status was at this moment. I had obtained from Congress the appropriation, I believe it was $6,000,000, for certain improvements to the harbor. You recall the first year I lost it by six votes, and the following year it went through almost unanimously, only one vote being opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that I do not recall at the moment.

Mr. KEEFE. With those improvements completed, Guam would still be in Category F, would it not?

Admiral STARK. In the same category, category D. The imporvements were not such as improved the defense of Guam [*6547*] but very little.

Mr. KEEFE. Even with the improvements that were requested and contemplated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the Joint Army and Navy Board, could not be successfully defended due to the power that Japan had in the mandated islands surrounding it, is that right?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral STARK. May I state for the record when I said category D a minute ago that should be F, which Congressman Keefe mentioned.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, just a couple of other questions to make the record clear, Admiral Stark: You have referred repeatedly to the experience which you have had over the period of time that you were Chief of Naval Operations in coming to the Congress for appropriations.

And I would like to make this record crystal clear as to that procedure, which I am sure you are familiar with and which I know many members on this committee are quite familiar with. When the Navy or the Army prepares its annual request for appropriations,

they must first be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, is that not true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the presentation of requests for appropria-
[6548] tions is always first made to the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Budget tells you how much money you can spend?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So far as they are concerned?

Admiral STARK. Yes. That is our guide from then on.

Mr. KEEFE. And that action of the Bureau of the Budget is then translated into the President's budget which he submits to the Congress?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Whether it be his annual budget or supplementary budget?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. It is our guide. When we are through with the Budget and they tell us how much we can have; my own naval experience is we stick within that.

Mr. KEEFE. That same thing holds true for any supplementary estimates. The same procedure is indulged in, is it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. We cannot come up here for supplemental estimates without first getting the permission of the Budget.

Mr. KEEFE. So, when you made the statement about coming up to the Hill for money, asking for appropriations on the Hill, [6549] you had to proceed first and get authority from the Bureau of the Budget and the Bureau of the Budget transmitted your request to the Congress in the form of a budget estimate?

Admiral STARK. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. By the President; isn't that true?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There were times, of course, when I went directly to the President without going through the budget for money, and he would grant it to me.

Mr. KEEFE. And then submit a supplementary estimate to the Congress?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Then, we would inform the Budget.

Mr. KEEFE. Now then, you appeared before the House Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I have, at a great many hearings.

Mr. KEEFE. And also before the Senate Committee?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When you appeared before either the Senate or the House Subcommittees on Appropriations asking for funds, were you not under a direction and injunction from the President not to justify any item that was not contained in the Presidential budget?

Admiral STARK. Well, I knew that I could not do it. Nobody ever had to give me an injunction. I just did not have [6550] to do it, and I did not do it. The Commander in Chief having set for us a limit, we stayed within it.

Mr. KEEFE. So everytime you came to a committee of the Congress you came up to justify and defend the Budget estimate submitted to the Congress by the President?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And that has been the universal practice, has it not, during all the period that you were Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral STARK. Once or twice in response to questions, we went outside, when the question was asked us, initiated by someone on the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if a member of the committee, or the committee itself, saw fit to ask you questions as to whether or not you did request additional funds from the Bureau of the Budget you would answer those questions?

Admiral STARK. If the committee asked me, I would.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Otherwise not?

Admiral STARK. Otherwise, I would not initiate it.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, there has been placed in the record here a statement of the appropriation request made by the Navy and Army to the Bureau of the Budget, the action taken thereon by the Bureau of the Budget, and the action taken thereon by the Congress. You have seen that [*6551*] calculation, have you not?

Admiral STARK. I have seen it; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Now, in both cases, in the case of the Army and Navy, over the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, those figures show that the Congress exceeded the Presidential Budget estimate, do they not, in the matter of appropriations?

Admiral STARK. Which years did you say?

Mr. KEEFE. The total years from 1933, I believe, or 1932. I think those figures start from 1932 and go to 1941, inclusive, excluding the contract authorizations provided for by the Congress and referring to just cash appropriations. Leave out, if you please, the contract authorizations.

Admiral STARK. Well, assuming that the arithmetic here is correct——

Mr. KEEFE. Well, those are my figures, and I think they are correct.

Admiral STARK. They show appropriations requested by the Navy Department $9,434,271,533. Budget estimates submitted to the Congress, $7,428,240,190. Amounts made available by the Congress, appropriations, $7,256,896,276, along with a contract authority for $1,029,038,112. The total of appropriations plus contract authority from Congress was $8,285,934,388 as opposed to I believe to what you want to check it on, a [*6552*] budget of seven-billion-odd dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, don't those figures speak for themselves, and is it necessary to make Admiral Stark add them up again?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I think they speak for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, assuming they are correct.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And nobody has challenged it.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking these questions because of the fact that Admiral Stark himself sort of indicated the difficulty that he had experienced in getting appropriations in order to increase the personnel of the Navy. You made reference to that in your testimony, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That may have been a different item from the ones in these categories of figures. They were more or less sporadic efforts, on your part, as I understand it, to get more men.

Admiral STARK. Well, they were continuous. We finally got authority to ask for what we needed.

Mr. KEEFE. One other question, Admiral Stark, and perhaps you can clear this up. It is minor in character. When Admiral Wilkinson was on the stand, there was placed in [*6553*] evidence a written or printed statement showing his responsibility as Chief of Naval Intelligence. A dispute arose between Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval War Plans, as to whose responsibility it was for certain things. Admiral Wilkinson contended that the written orders or printed orders specifying the duties of the Chief of Naval Intelligence had been changed, the Schedule of Organization, I believe it was called, had been changed by you in verbal instructions to Admiral Kirk, his predecessor, so that when he, Wilkinson, came into the office and tried to ascertain what his duties were he went over this schedule of orders, and so on, that were issued by you as Chief of Naval Operations but was told by Kirk that there were certain things in there that he did not have to do, that were transferred over to Turner, Chief of War Plans, and Turner specifically denied that any other change had taken place, so far as he was concerned, and stated that that schedule of organization was the law, so far as he was concerned, today, and that there never had been any change made, and thus Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner clashed very definitely on that issue.

Now, I want to ask you the simple question whether or not, when a written order was issued by you as Chief of Naval Operations specifying the duties and responsibilities of an office—whether those orders were subject to be changed by verbal communications to the incumbent?

[*6554*] Admiral STARK. Where one or two people were concerned and there was a mistake in understanding, they would naturally go, as provided in the publication, to Admiral Ingersoll, which they did, as I understand, in this instance. And what was referred to, I believe, was that it was War Plans' duty to make up the war plan, including the estimate of the situation. It had to be funneled through one source. It couldn't be sent out from two. Ingersoll spoke to me about it. I was in complete agreement with him. I never felt that there was any real difficulty there. In the first place, these people were working together every day. Intelligence had to give the material, all it had, to War Plans, on which they could base their estimate. I think they continued to do it and continued to evaluate it for that purpose. I know that they did and were continually working together. But the final estimate, which went into the war plan, on that sort of thing, rested with War Plans. And, so far as I know, as a result of that, there was never any gap or hiatus that was created anywhere, or any conflict or any trouble about it. I was surprised when the situation developed the way it did up here.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, I still don't have an answer to my question. Was that written order ever changed verbally in any respect? Admiral Wilkinson claimed it was. Admiral Turner claimed it was.

You are the one who is supposed to [6555] have changed it verbally to Admiral Kirk. All I want to know is, did you change the order verbally or didn't you?

Admiral STARK. Well, I know that when it came to me with Ingersoll's recommendation, and with regard to the getting out of the probable intentions for incorporation into the war plan, that I stated that that was War Plans' duty, but that the material in connection with it would continue to be supplied, as it had been in the past, by Intelligence. I don't——

Mr. KEEFE. Do you mean by that the evaluation of the material was to be the duty of Intelligence who would in turn transmit that to War Plans?

Admiral STARK. They continued to give it, with their evaluation, but the final over-all set-up in the war plan was Turner's.

For example, in the Fortnightly Summaries we got out there were evaluations there being made right along by Intelligence.

I would like to read, in that connection, if I might, three paragraphs in this same publication.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't care for that myself, Admiral. All I want is an answer to a very simple question. If it can't be answered, all right. We have gone all over that with Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner, and they were in complete [6556] disagreement as to the proposition, and Admiral Wilkinson had gone to the trouble to send over and get some statement from Admiral Kirk over in the Mediterranean, as I recall. It was a question as to their respective responsibilities, one claiming that he was complying strictly with the order as written, the other claiming that that order had been changed verbally by you to Admiral Kirk, predecessor to Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral STARK. I remember some of their testimony, and I thought they were nothing like as far apart as might appear. There was one part of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony in particular with regard to the meat of it, and one part of Admiral Turner's testimony, as I studied it, that were very much in line. I never felt there was any real difficulty between them.

Mr. KEEFE. I guess you weren't here in the room then to see the clashes that passed when that incident occurred or you wouldn't think so.

Admiral STARK. I wasn't here.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought they were very much disturbed at each other.

Admiral STARK. I would like to read these three paragraphs, if I may.

Mr. KEEFE. Can't you answer my question, did you or did you not change that order through verbal instructions to [6557] Admiral Kirk?

Admiral STARK. I decided, when it came to me, that the estimate of the situation in War Plans would be made by War Plans, and War Plans would be responsible for it.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that in accordance with the written order?

Admiral STARK. That is where they seem to have a good deal of trouble. In my opinion it is not——

Senator LUCAS. It is not clear.

Admiral STARK. It is not clear and it is not worth while. The written order states:

Secure all classes of pertinent information, especially that affecting disposition and probable intentions.

Wilkinson contined to get all classes of information and he continued to give it to Turner, who, where the main war plan was concerned, finally evaluated it and put it in.

The paragraphs that I mentioned are overriding considerations and I would like to read them to you. This was not given on the sheets that were given you. I would like to have you have them.

Matters which are of paramount interest to any one division shall be handled by that division.

Responsibility for necessary liaison with other interested divisions shall rest with the director of [*6558*] the division having paramount interest, who shall keep other divisions informed of action taken.

The director of each division is responsible, in matters assigned to its cognizance, for necessary liaison and coordination of effort within the Navy Department.

Now, the staff was an integrated staff. It is almost impossible to write up a set of regulations where things dovetail in as closely as they do in an organization such as we have, so as to lay down just what each person will do specifically.

Those paragraphs were meant to cover and get the people together on them, and my feeling is that Turner and Wilkinson always did work together closely and without any trouble on this.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, where these three paragraphs are from?

Admiral STARK. They are from the same pamphlet.

Mr. KEEFE. It is the Operational Order?

Admiral STARK. The Operational Order. It is sort of an overall picture to show that you just can't get down and say, "Well, you stop there, and you stop there," when people are working together and seeing each other all the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my thanks [*6559*] to Admiral Stark for his great patience, he having been here a long time, and I am not going to ask him any further questions.

Admiral STARK. There is one thing that occurred to me this afternoon in Mr. Keefe's questioning. Whether it would be helpful or not, I don't know. I would just like to take a minute or so to glance at the so-called tasks assigned in WPL–46 or in Kimmel's orders.

(Short pause.)

Admiral STARK. This is reading——

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Admiral STARK. From Admiral Kimmel's war plan, which in turn was based on WPL–46.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is not labeled that way officially. Identify it for the record.

Admiral STARK. It is U. S. Pacific Fleet Publication W. P. Pac. 46, promulgated July 25, 1941.

Mr. Keefe was asking about just prior to plans coming in, and I remembered that Admiral Kimmel had covered that, and thought possibly this might be of assistance, and, regarding which, of course, he will have a more intimate knowledge than I have, but I had remembered that he had done that.

Chapter II, page 25, under the heading, "Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions." It is an outline of [6560] tasks.

It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption A2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption A1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

a. PHASE I—Initial tasks, Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE IIA—Initial tasks, Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc.—Succeeding tasks.

Phase I tasks are as follows:

a. Complete mobilizatiton and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.
[6561] g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, at this point:

You are referring to the plan of Admiral Kimmel now, which relates to M-day, are you not?

Admiral STARK. This is phase I, which he designates as "Initial tasks, Japan not in the war."

Mr. KEEFE. But he refers to M-day? You just referred to it.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.

I read this:

Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day.

Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups [6562] as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.

h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

And you might recall that he had already done that. He called it a defensive submarine patrol.

i. Observe, with submarines outside the 3-mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

And you will note that he was strengthening those, some of those places, by sending planes.

k. Continue training operations as practicable.
l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.

That is in his phase known as "Japan not in the war." He has covered there some of the things that have been talked about, and it

occurred to me, when you were asking me questions, that it might be of interest to you to know about that. [*6563*] I assume that he will be able to testify on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel for Admiral Stark wish to ask any questions?

Mr. OBEAR. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel wish to ask further questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two questions.

Senator Lucas, you may go ahead if you have some questions.

Senator LUCAS. No; wou go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stark, Admiral Richardson testified that when he was relieved of command of the Pacific Fleet, he submitted to the Navy Department a list of men whom he recommended from whom the successor be chosen, and he testified that on that list was the name of Admiral Kimmel; is that your recollection?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. There was universal regard for the right caliber of Admiral Kimmel. I think he would have been on anybody's list. He was on mine also.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the appointment of Admiral Kimmel made by you or the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral STARK. That appointment always goes to the President for the final selection or at least the O. K. [*6564*] I remember, when the President mentioned Kimmel, he said, "He has been a White House aide," he remembered him very well.

The CHAIRMAN. A good deal has been said about this word "deployment." It is not a new word in military and naval matters, is it?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been used ever since Hannibal, hasn't it?

Admiral STARK. I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't every Naval Academy graduate, when he goes out, know what it means?

Admiral STARK. He certainly learns what it means before long from war games.

The CHAIRMAN. It is used in the arrangement of ground forces, in military matters, as well as upon the high seas, in regard to ships, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir, it is used; it was used in our war plans. It was incorporated in Kimmel's war plan. I didn't read it this afternoon. That was another thing I thought of. But it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is the arrangement of troops or ships in order to accomplish a definite purpose, whether it is defense or offense?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

[*6565*] The CHAIRMAN. And the word "deployment" as I have read in the history of battles in all our wars, it has ben used in the sense that General So-and-So deployed his forces by putting so many over yonder on the right and so many over on the left, so many in the rear, depending upon the character of battle it was to be, and whether he was to defend his ground or whether he was to make an attack upon the enemy.

Admiral STARK. That is true, and it occurs particularly in our tactical instructions where we deploy for battle.

The CHAIRMAN. Any naval officer of the rank of admiral or vice admiral or rear admiral would know, whether he was instructed to deploy his forces, what that meant, wouldn't he?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; in my opinion he would.

The CHAIRMAN. He might be, of course, expected to use his own judgment as to how he deployed them, but the particular arrangement under which he was to carry out the instructions was within his discretion, was it not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you were asked if it was your duty to see to it that the orders were carried out. When you gave an order to a naval officer in any part of the world, you had the right, under his responsibility, to expect that he would carry it out?

Admiral STARK. That is right.

[*6566*] The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't see that they were carried out, yourself, unless you went out there and did it?

Admiral STARK. Or unless I directed him to report whether or not he had done it.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if he reported that and hadn't done what you ordered him to do, you could reiterate your orders, but if you saw they were actually executed personally, you would have to be on the ground; would you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The details were his.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Navy Department, and you, had confidence in all our officers in all theaters of war, so far as the Navy was concerned, that they knew what orders would mean and how to carry them out?

Admiral STARK. I did; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to the situation in the Atlantic that has been talked about, there was nothing secretive about that at the time; was there?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. About the orders to shoot in defending the shipment of our materials which Congress had authorized, there wasn't any secret about that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. It was wide open.

The CHAIRMAN. The President made speeches; my recollection is that he reported to Congress on it.

[*6566–A*] Admiral STARK. I don't remember about that, but his speech in September was wide open on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyhow, at the time it was going on, the American people knew it, and the President issued public statements and made speeches about it, so that there was nothing secret at all in regard to it?

Admiral STARK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Stark, have you ever had a conversation with Admiral Kimmel since December 7, 1941, about what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not talked to him about it at all in detail.

[*6567*] Senator LUCAS. When you left the service as Chief of Naval Operations you went directly to London?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And there became the Admiral of the American Fleet?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was operating then with the English?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. The operational commanders, of course, were those in immediate command, like Kirk for the Normandy invasion; the forces we had at Scapaflow had their own admiral; we had a man in command of Air Forces.

Senator LUCAS. What was your exact title there?

Admiral STARK. Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe. Later on I was given the additional title of commander of the Twelfth Fleet, of which these other forces would be made a task force under the commander of the Twelfth Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. How long did you remain in that position?

Admiral STARK. I reported there, it was the last day of April in 1942, and I was detached on the 16th of August 1945—something over 3 years.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I take it that in that important position which you held it required that you exercise superior judgment, did it not, from time to time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; I think so. I think the Army [*6568*] citation on that—apparently the Army thought so.

Senator LUCAS. For exercising that superior judgment during those long years you were awarded several citations by different governments and our own?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You said in the early part of your examination that you failed to send Admiral Kimmel any of the ultra or magic codes because it might compromise the source, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Senator Lucas, will you repeat that?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have the wrong man.

Senator LUCAS. I will withdraw the question.

Admiral STARK. I didn't testify to that.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, you realized and appreciated the secrecy of magic as it was being intercepted by our Government?

Admiral STARK. It was a very powerful weapon, or might be one; yes, sir.

[*6569*] Senator LUCAS. And you had a certain group of officers in the Navy here in Washington that knew about the secret code?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you whether or not Admiral Kimmel knew about the secret code at the time?

Admiral STARK. Of our breaking the codes in Washington?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. Senator Lucas, I have asked myself that question. I took it for granted, not that he had them but that he knew that we were breaking them, because I have found out since that messages showing these were being sent out there, and some of the messages that we sent showed where these dispatches were coming from. So, I am under the impression that he did know, but I have never asked

him personally whether he knew. At least, I don't recall it. I would rather that he would clinch that with you.

Senator LUCAS. One other question that intrigues me a little. They have some bearing upon my own judgment and may not be of particular importance here. It is in respect to the Battle of Midway. Who was in command, who was the commander of the Pacific Fleet at that time?

Admiral STARK. That was about 6 months after Pearl Harbor, something like that, and Nimitz was in command.

Senator LUCAS. You were not Chief of Naval Operations?

[*6570*] Admiral STARK. No. King had relieved me by that time, and Nimitz was commander in chief of the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. I was just wondering what kind of an order King gave to Nimitz with respect to the Battle of Midway, if he gave him any order at all.

Admiral STARK. I don't know. I know that King published a paper when he was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet calling attention to the fact that people should not give specific detail to subordinates, but what I said earlier, tell them what to do, not how to do it.

Senator LUCAS. The only reason I asked the question was to try to determine what kind of an order King may have given to Nimitz at that time, to make a comparison with the order you gave to Kimmel and to see whether or not Nimitz carried through the responsibilities and whether the orders were similar and just what responsibility was given to that command at that particular time.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you have any notion about that at all?

Admiral STARK. No, I have nothing, but I do know that in the Normandy invasion, the plans were worked out entirely in Europe and copies simply sent back to the Department. Our relations with the Department at that time were simply in the plea for the material, men, ships, equipment, et cetera, that [*6571*] we needed to implement orders which we had drawn up.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you drew up the orders?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir; the operational people. Kirk, for example, drew up the orders for the actual ships and which came down the line for higher authority.

Senator LUCAS. And the subordinates in the Normandy invasion assumed the responsibility, after they got the command, for either success or failure?

Admiral STARK. The subordinates down the line drew their cue, so to speak, from over-all orders higher up, and they in turn issued their own orders.

Senator LUCAS. Now, one other question with respect to the breaking of the Japanese code. Who, in your immediate naval family, knew that we were breaking the Japanese code at that time?

Admiral STARK. The President knew it. Colonel Knox knew it. Ingersoll, of course, knew it. The radio people, certain ones, knew it. Intelligence and certain people there knew it. War Plans people, I don't know just how many of them, such as Turner, as the head of War Plans, knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject? When you say, "radio" you mean naval radio?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I am speaking about our communications division. Perhaps that would have been a better term to [6572] use. But it was kept rather close. For example, in the morning sessions which we had we were very careful about talking about anything of that sort; or in the big conferences, which we held on Thursday, with all the chiefs of bureaus, matériel bureaus, and so forth, that sort of thing was never mentioned.

Senator LUCAS. Did you give any specific and direct orders to your subordinates that knew about magic with respect to keeping it a secret?

Admiral STARK. I think at that time we had to sign up a paper. I am not sure. I know we have since. For example, Lieutenant Commander Richmond, assisting me here, he has pretty near signed his death warrant, and if he were to give anything out about it, he would be doing that, but it is all out now.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Practically everything that has ever been known about breaking the codes is known now to the world.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Primarily, through this Pearl Harbor hearing.

Admiral STARK. Before that happened, anybody who was let in on that had to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically so long as he lived, or ever to talk about it. And, as a [6573] matter of fact, people coming to Europe, we did it there, too. Not only people coming to Europe, we did it there, too. Not only people coming to Europe, but if anybody came in my office and I started to talk to them about things, regardless of their rank, I would not discuss such things with them because I didn't know whether they knew the codes were being broken or not, and I didn't dare bring up subjects which might be unknown to them, because of that.

Senator LUCAS. Did it ever come to your attention at any time while you were Chief of Naval Operations that there was a leak in any part of your Department with respect to giving away this secret to someone?

Admiral STARK. Not in my Department. There was an incident that occurred, I am not very clear on it, where a reporter, or someone connected with the press in the Pacific, mentioned the breaking of codes, while the war was still on. The Navy Department could give you the details. I recall only the one incident.

Senator LUBAS. Well, there was nothing that ever came to your attention, as I understand it, that would imply that anyone under your immediate control was letting the secret out?

Admiral STARK. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, there have been a lot of questions asked you, Admiral Stark, about the so-called purported agree- [6574] ments that were made between this country and the Dutch and the British.

Admiral STARK. I did not get the first part of that.

Senator LUCAS. I say, a great many questions have been asked you by members of the committee with respect to the so-called agreements that were made between America, the British, and the Dutch.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And some assumptions have been made here from time to time in this committee that there might have been some agreements of some kind. But, if I understand you correctly, insofar as

you know, while you discussed, you and your officers in the Navy discussed, from time to time matters with the British and the Dutch about what should be done in the event that you all got into war, at no time was there any formal agreement drawn up or any commitments made that were approved by the President of the United States?

Admiral STARK. And on which would be predicated a forecast that if Britain or the NEI were attacked we would come in?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I know of no such agreement.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you include the Canadian agreement?

Senator LUCAS. No; I do not include that.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Canadian agreement was a defensive agree-
[6575] ment for defending our own territory. I imagine the President could do that without a declaration of war.

Mr. KEEFE. I ask so that there would not be any question.

Senator LUCAS. I do not include the Canadian agreement. The Dutch didn't have anything to do with the Canadian agreement.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; these ABD are the American, Dutch, British.

[6576] Senator LUCAS. It was a necessary procedure for the Navy to make all plans that it could possibly conceive of for the defensive purposes of this Nation of ours at that time?

Admiral STARK. That is the way I felt about it and that is what I thought.

Senator LUCAS. And you did more or less what the country was doing at that time in view of the passage of lend-lease and other measures to aid England and the Dutch; you were working out or at least you were talking about plans that might come into being in the event that we were drawn in?

Admiral STARK. That is true, and in that connection there is a distinction between the so-called hemispheric defense plans and WPL–46.

Senator LUCAS. I want to direct your attention to exhibit 33, which is the estimates of the military intelligence, and read a paragraph or two from that exhibit with respect to economic sanctions and whether or not you agree or disagree.

Admiral STARK. What page, sir?

Senator LUCAS. It is on page—well, it is the July 25th memorandum that was prepared by General Miles for the Chief of Staff, entitled "Sanctions Against Japan," Exhibit 33. I do this because there has been so much insinuation or, rather, so many questions asked of you about economic sanctions, and I want to read paragraph 9, on page 2, of that letter.

[6577] Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention from the main theater of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands.

And then on the bottom of that:

Recommendation: That this paper be referred to the Joint Board with a view to initiating plans whose execution will place a complete export and import embargo on our trade with Japan.

Then the latter was stricken out and there is a penciled notation which says:

This memo was written prior to receipt of information regarding embargo decision.

In other words, it appears here at that time that the G–2 of the Army was in full accord with the economic-sanction program that was then being discussed by the State Department [*6578*] and I was wondering whether or not you agreed at that particular time with Miles with respect to economic sanctions?

Admiral STARK. Well, in the last analysis under the conditions obtaining in the Government of Japan I felt that the military would control. Nevertheless, I did think that certainly the impositions of economic embargoes, economic sanctions might possibly precipitate hostilities, if not make the time closer when they would occur inasmuch as they might trottle Japanese life. Now, against that had to be balanced an opinion that ultimately we would go to war with them anyway and if we did not impose these they might take it as a sign of weakness, it also might hasten it and it also might have them better equipped if war did come about.

Senator LUCAS. Well, there were two schools of thought on that question at that particular time.

Admiral STARK. Well, there was a balance there and the economic sanctions, as I recall, were imposed after Japan had made her move into Indochina and it may have been just another way of saying, "Keep this up and here is our reply to your going on the rampage."

Senator LUCAS. Well, I would like to call the committee's attention to this same exhibit. From time to time Miles expresses the same opinion as I just read, without reading them. I will turn to the one of December the 5, 1941, [*6579*] in his memorandum to the chief of staff, the latter part of it, in which he says:

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner.

In other words, I merely call attention to the fact that even up to the very last the intelligence chief of the Army was asking and recommending to the Chief of Staff economic sanctions against Japan.

Now, I have placed these matters before you in the record for the purpose of more or less answering some of the questions, at least some of the insinuations that have been placed here in the record that economic sanctions was the thing that more or less drove Japan into this war.

I want to state this for the record while I am discussing economic sanctions: You will recall, Admiral Stark, that there were a great number of people from 1936 to 1941 that were asking that we do apply the embarko on oil and scrap iron and other things, do you not?

Admiral STARK. Among the general public; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And, on the other hand, there was another group of people, big business and small business, that were insisting that we sell to Japan oil and scrap iron and these [*6580*] other things.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. I remember them very well because I expressed myself strongly against the imposition on oil unless we were prepared to fight.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, here are the figures that I want to offer into the record for whatever they are worth:

In 1936 this country sold to Japan—I don't say this country, but the business interests of this country sold to Japan 27,781,999 barrels of crude petroleum, natural gasoline, gasoline, and other petroleum motor fuel in bulk, and so forth, besides millions of pounds of greases and paraffin wax, and so forth.

In 1937 the business interests of this country sold 28,377,381 barrels of the same commodities.

In 1938, 31,354,050 barrels.

In 1939, 28,012,000 barrels.

In 1940, 22,796,748 barrels, and this does not include, and I will not read it, the millions of pounds of lubricating greases and petroleum coke and petroleum jelly and other things that were used in connection with getting ready for war.

In 1941 it fell off to 6,986,517 barrels.

In other words, you have one group of people in this country that was doing everything that they knew how to sell this [*6581*] oil to Japan knowing that they were aggressors at that time and doing what they were doing. On the other hand, you have another group that are attempting to apply economic sanctions for the purpose of stopping the aggression, and right along that line, if I may, I will read this into the record.

Right at that particular time American business firms made shipments of scrap iron to Japan:

In 1936, 1,057,000 tons.

In 1937, 1,900,000 tons.

In 1938, 1,380,000 tons.

In 1939, 2,000,000 tons.

In 1940, 960,000 tons.

So we did pretty well as far as supplying the Japs in those years with oil and scrap iron and I am not so sure but that if we had applied economic sanctions sooner it would have been better for us. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark, I hate to detain you at this late hour but this is my last chance, I suppose, to tender interrogatories to you.

Yesterday when I was examining you I referred to the story which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October of 1942, an article which was written by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson, United States Navy, and which was entitled, [*6582*] "I Fly for Vengeance." At that time my questions were from memory. Today I have had the Congressional Library send me a photostat of that article and with your indulgence I will read the first two paragraphs:

> You would damn well remember Pearl Harbor if you had seen the great naval base ablaze as we of Scouting Squadron 6 saw it from the air, skimming in ahead of our homeward-bound carrier. The shock was especially heavy for us because this was our first knowledge that the Japs had attacked on that morning of December seventh. We came upon it stone cold, each of us looking forward to a long leave that was due him.
>
> It wasn't that we pilots didn't sense the tension that gripped the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere, all the time. Certainly the mission from which we were returning had the flavor of impending action. We had been delivering a batch of twelve Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 211 to Wake Island, where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from

Pearl Harbor on November twenty-eighth under absolute war orders. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the Aircraft Battle Force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in [6583] the sky and bomb anything we saw on the sea In that way, there could be no leak to the Japs.

Now assuming that the then Lieutenant and now Commander Clarence E. Dickinson correctly records in this paragraph the nature of the orders under which he flew, absolute war orders as he calls them, orders which directed him to sink without a trace any Japanese ships that he encountered, to shoot down any Japanese planes he encountered in the air, would you say that those orders did not constitute an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. When you previously questioned me on this I did not have the detail which you give there. I do not know the route they took and I would rather not express an opinion unless I knew more about it. For example, I stated that if I had been on the Island of Oahu and Japanese planes came over I would shoot them down. Kimmel stated and informed me that he had given orders to bomb any submarine which came in that area. I thought it was a perfectly proper order.

Now, if I had been going close by a Japanese mandate and a scouting plane had appeared within reach of my guns I do not know that I would have shot it down unless I had felt that there was pretty good reason to believe that it was going to attack. It is a rather difficult thing to answer but if Bill Halsey felt that it was necessary from where he was going to give those orders I would not differ with him until I knew more about why he issued them.

[6584] Mr. GEARHART. Well, there isn't so much left out of this paragraph that I have read to you. You know from it that the mission was from Hawaii to Wake and from Wake back to Hawaii, do you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. Well, regarding the overt act, anything that he did in self-defense he was authorized to do. The Navy Regulations covered that.

I had invited Kimmel's attention to that when he asked me about shooting orders in the Pacific. I think I put it in my statement. Anyway, it is available to the committee in my correspondence. He told me what he was doing. I agreed with him on every point, as to what he was doing.

But if out on the high seas, out of sight of everything, to take the other extreme, that force had run into a Japanese merchant ship on the horizon and a plane saw her and deliberately bombed her and sank her, I will say it would be an overt act.

If a Japanese submarine had popped up close aboard, I would say it would be self-protection to have sunk that submarine and not an overt act. Between the two is a line of judgment which must be left up to the man in the field.

Mr. GEARHART. But under this order that was issued it would have been the duty of Commander Dickinson and his copilots to have sunk a merchant ship, if it had encountered it on the sea, because they were under absolute orders to keep [6585] their mission secret at all costs. That is an absolute war order, is it?

Admiral STARK. I would say so if it were issued, but I would like to have Halsey's version of that before I would be prepared to accept it.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. But assuming the facts as they are stated here by Clarence E. Dickinson, who has been twice promoted and never recommended for this article or criticized for writing it in all the years since it was published, if these facts are accepted as true, that he, as he said, was "flying on absolute war orders with instructions to keep my mission secret at all cost," "under orders to sink any Japanese ship I encountered on the surface of the seas and to shoot down any Japanese airplanes that I encountered in the air," that is war, isn't it?

Admiral STARK. Well, from the illustration that I have given you of what might be regarded perhaps as an innocent merchant ship on the horizon, not bothering anybody, perhaps even headed home for Japan, why, I just have difficulty in understanding that Halsey would have expected them to sink such a ship.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, Admiral, how could he keep his mission a secret if he allowed a merchant ship to observe him in the air, allow it to radio the information that he had gone [*6586*] by? If he did not sink such a ship, he would certainly not have lived up to the letter of the war orders that had been given to him, would he?

Admiral STARK. He would not have lived up to the orders that he states were given him.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral STARK. He might, however, change the course of his flight so that the merchant ship could not see him. If he had spotted the merchant ship from the air, perhaps 100 miles away, in that case he would not have had to change his course.

Mr. GEARHART. Does the fact that Admiral Halsey gave that order to Commander Dickinson when he had before him your message, "This is a war warning," have any influence on your answer to these questions?

Admiral STARK. No; I have not been thinking of it in that connection, except for the tenseness of the period. I think in all those cases a matter of judgment comes in. If there were no question of being seen, and coming back to the merchant ship example, where a plane might be well up in the air and where a merchant ship might not see the plane because the plane could see her a long ways off, for the plane to go out of his way to sink that merchant ship, I just rather doubt that Halsey intended that to be done.

[*6587*] Mr. GEARHART. That is all right. Let us doubt it, but assuming that Vice Admiral Halsey ordered Lieutenant Dickinson to keep his mission secret at all cost, what would you say then?

Admiral STARK. Then it comes to whether it would have been a secret or not. With all the assumptions that you put in there, and on the merchant ship example which I have given it might be regarded as an overt act.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it follows as a logical conclusion, assuming all that Lieutenant Dickinson says is true, that we were at war in the Pacific on the 28th day of November 1941?

Admiral STARK. No; I would not say so.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then, point out why.

Admiral STARK. Because we were not.

Mr. GEARHART. When we are directing our fleet commanders to sink without a trace we are not at war?

Admiral STARK. Well, you are drawing up a premise here which I do not think holds.

Mr. GEARHART. I am asking you to assume what Lieutenant Dickinson said. Assume that that is true; I am asking you as a naval expert, based upon that assumption, that carries with it the acceptance of the idea that Clarence Dickinson was under orders to sink without a trace any ship that he [*6588*] encountered upon the sea, I want to know whether or not, on that assumption, you will say we were not at war on the 28th day of November 1941 in the Pacific?

Admiral STARK. And you are assuming that he sees the ship and he is sure that ship would have information of him, and that that information of one single plane which he might never see, would disclose——

Mr. GEARHART. You are asking me to pass on the question of whether or not——

Admiral STARK. I am asking you; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You are asking me to pass on the question of whether or not a certain situation constitutes keeping his mission a secret at all costs. Now, you can pass on that same situation. Is he keeping his mission a secret at all costs if he flies by a merchant ship that he might encounter on the sea?

Admiral STARK. What do you consider keeping his mission a secret? If his main body is here [indicating] and off here on the horizon, maybe 100 miles away, is a merchant ship and which the plane can see probably from such a distance and the merchant ship cannot see him, I would say that is not giving the secret away.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, he is under orders to sink that ship, isn't he?

[*6589*] Admiral STARK. May I finish, sir?

You said that his orders are such as to have him go out of his way to sink that ship, and I say in that case it might be regarded as an overt act. Somebody might ultimately have to pass judgment on it. But in my opinion, also, under those conditions, the merchant ship would not discover what Admiral Halsey's mission was.

Mr. GEARHART. That hasn't got anything to do with the question I am propounding to you. If he is under orders to keep his mission secret is he not under orders to sink every ship that he encounters carrying the Japanese flag?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. In the first place, the Jap might not see the plane, and, in the second place, if he did see it what can he gather from it?

Mr. GEARHART. How would Lieutenant Dickinson or any American officer know whether the Jap saw him, or if he saw him plainly on the sea? Would not he, as a reasonable man, have to assume that the ship saw him?

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily; no, sir. But in any case, suppose he did see him, would the short picture of one plane indicate what Halsey's mission was 100 miles away?

Mr. GEARHART. He was flying with the squadron.

Admiral STARK. Well, you are further amplifying it now. Was he deployed on the scouting line?

[*6590*] Mr. GEARHART. That does not make any difference, Admiral.

It does not make any difference at all. The question is: We are officially issuing orders to keep a mission secret at all costs, to sink all ships encountered.

Admiral STARK. Which might——

Mr. GEARHART (interposing). No, no; there is not any "which might" there. There is no question as to whether the Japs saw or not.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be treated with some courtesy here.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you think I am discourteous, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. I have no objection. That is all right.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not need the protection of the gentleman from Illinois?

Admiral STARK. No.

Mr. GEARHART. You have got a pretty good reputation as a fighting man, yourself, haven't you?

Admiral STARK. In some ways.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us not get into an argument on that either.

Mr. GEARHART. I am asking you to assume that the orders issued to Clarence Dickinson were as he says they were. Now, can a man fly on the Pacific under those orders and next be flying under absolute war orders, as he says he was, himself?

[*6951*] Admiral STARK. Congressman Gearhart, I understand that the orders were premised on the fact that the objective was that Halsey's mission should not become known to the Japs.

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral STARK. Well, I submit that one plane—you say there was a squadron, but if they were out searching they would not be bunched, I do not believe. It might be that they were looking for an enemy, and if an enemy came close by, if he had discovered a Japanese force at that time heading eastward, that would have been one thing, but if they were deployed on the scouting line and the ship, way outside of Halsey's force, were to see a Japanese merchant ship—we have gotten into that phase of it, that that would disclose Halsey's intentions, but I do not believe it would, and assuming that, if he were out there for the purpose of protecting the secrecy of Halsey's position, he would not have been required, under the orders, I would say, to sink the ship.

[*6592*] Mr. GEARHART. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky?

Admiral STARK. Anything.

Mr. GEARHART. And bomb anything we saw on the sea. Is there anything equivocal about that?

Admiral STARK. Isn't that, "shoot down anything we saw or bomb anything we saw on the sea which might disclose our mission or threaten it"?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; that is the purport of it.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that Admiral Halsey is going to be here as a witness, wouldn't it be advisable to let him in on this?

Mr. GEARHART. I want a definite answer. I think you can answer the question definitely. Can those orders be issued and not be war orders?

Admiral STARK. Under certain circumstances, yes, sir. If I had been in Halsey's shoes—and he didn't need anybody else's shoes—and he had started on this mission, say a couple of hundred miles, or a hundred miles, from Oahu, and he had met this Japanese task force headed eastward, Bill would have hit it, and so would I, and I believe

anybody else would. Under that circumstance he was justified in it. How far he would have gone, and of which I drew an extreme one way and an extreme the other way, I don't know. Just [6593] whether his orders to shoot down what he saw were further qualified by some reasoning as to position and threat, I don't know.

In other words, I am telling you frankly where I would have shot. You might stretch it. Say they were 400 miles away. I still think I would have let him have it. Supposing he were 800 miles north of Oahu and were headed south. I certainly would have let him have it then. But if I saw a single merchant ship——

Mr. GEARHART. You are not talking about the order. You are talking about what you would have done. You say you expected Admiral Kimmel to do certain things under your very loosely drawn order. Here is a positive order. You are finding ways of avoiding observing it by pointing out fanciful situations which fly in the face of the order to sink everything encountered on the sea and shoot down everything encountered in the air.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I yield, and that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are being asked, Admiral, is, if that article in the Saturday Evening Post is true, and the orders were given, it constituted an overt act which justified an attack on Pearl Harbor. That is what you are being asked.

Mr. GEARHART. I am trying to find the facts. I have no [6594] one to defend, no one to prosecute, and no cause to serve save the truth. Let's have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, as part of the record of Admiral Stark, he has brought in and given to counsel these maps showing the location of the ships——

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Turner.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Turner—but he was also asked about it, whether or not they show the ships, and they are here, from the 1st to the 6th, inclusive, and I would like to have them in evidence as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; they will be marked. What is the next number?

Mr. HANNAFORD. 109.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 109.")

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you any further statement that you would like to make in addition to what you have already stated?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; I can't think of anything that I know that I haven't told you or of anything that I can suggest that hasn't been covered.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you for your very manifest effort to give it all the information within your [6595] knowledge. You have been patient and courteous and you have demeaned yourself before this committee as befits your rank and your record as an admiral of the United States Navy, and we appreciate it.

Admiral STARK. Thank you, sir. I also appreciate the opportunity to come before you all. I was hoping that it would happen, both for Admiral Kimmel and myself, and I am delighted to have the oppor-

tunity; and I also want to thank the committee for its courtesy in every instance.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; good, luck, Admiral.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman——

Admiral STARK. I take it you will not want we again?

The CHAIRMAN. No, not so far as the committee knows.

Senator LUCAS. We might want you here when Admiral Halsey is here to answer that last question.

Admiral STARK. I think Bill can take care of himself.

Senator LUCAS. It is very important.

(The witness was excused temporarily.) [1]

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, we have a great number of documents here that have already been distributed to the committee, and instead of holding the committee, I would like the committee's permission to have Mr. Hannaford dictate certain statements to the stenographer referring to those exhibits and place them in the record. They are not things that you would want to rule against or anything of that kind. [*6596*] They are before the committee members but they are to be put in as formal exhibits, and I thought, with your permission, Mr. Hannaford could dictate that into the daily transcript and you would have the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will go in as part of the daily transcript.

I would like to say to the committee that I possibly might want to have a brief executive session Tuesday in regard to a matter Mr. Richardson might want to bring up.

Mr. HANNAFORD. First, I have two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief United States Fleet, dated November 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941. The committee will recall that exhibit 9 contains the correspondence between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Stark. There are two letters in this exhibit from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark, to which the two letters to which I have just referred are replies. I would, therefore, like to have these two letters of December 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941, inserted in exhibit 9 at the appropriate places.

In Admiral Stark's prepared statement he quoted excerpts of certain letters he had written to Admiral Hart. In order that the records of the committee may be complete, Admiral Stark has requested that the file containing the complete copies of the letters be introduced in evidence as an exhibit. [*6597*] I therefore offer these letters from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart as exhibit 110.

(The letters referred to were marked as "Exhibit No. 110.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. Admiral Stark has asked that the following documents be inserted in the daily transcript of the hearing. They are the following:

First is his letter of June 11, 1941, to the holders of WPL–46.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

[*6598*]

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
WASHINGTON, *June 11, 1941.*

Op–12B–5–McC (SC) A16/EM Serial 063712
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List (attached).
Subject: Order of priority in the preparation of war plans.

[1] Adm. Stark's subsequent testimony appears in Hearings, Part 11.

Reference:

(a) CNO Secret Letter Op–12B–5–McC, (SC) A16/EN, Serial 03112 of January 8, 1941.

(b) Paragraph 3302, WPL–8.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

2. In accordance with the provisions of reference (b), the highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to the plans required by WPL–46. It is directed that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay.

3. WPL–13, WPL–14, WPL–42, and WPL–44, and subordinate plans, are placed in an inactive status. WPL–1 is also placed in an inactive status.

4. The subject matter of subordinate plans prepared in accordance with the directives of WPL–42 and WPL–44 may be used where applicable in the subordinate plans required by WPL–46.

[*6599*] 5. A copy of this letter will be placed in the front of each volume of WPLs–1, 13, 14, 42, and 44, in your custody.

6. The urgency of deliery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

(S) H. R. STARK.

Second, his memorandum of January 9, 1941, to the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, relating to the installations of aircraft-detection equipment.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

[*6600*] Op–12A–4–dro 1/9/41 (SC) H1–16 Ser. 04312
Secret

JANUARY 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject: Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.

1. The Navy Department considers that improvement of the antiaircraft defenses, and particularly of the aircraft detection components of those defenses, in the Hawaiian Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring and summer of 1941 enemy air operations are much more likely to take place in the Hawaiian area and in Alaska than in Puerto Rico, Panama, and the Continental United States.

2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority of permanent installation of the fixed antiaircraft detection equipment being procured by the Navy is as follows: Midway, Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantanamo. It is requested that consideration be given to revising schedules of delivery so as to provide Army installations in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and Sitka before completing installations at Panama and before proceeding with installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United [*6601*] States.

3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 January 1941, in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisions of both services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.

4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that delays are anticipated in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended that the highest priority be given to production of this equipment and supplying the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtaining the necessary priorities.

R. E. INGERSOLL, *Acting*.

Copy to: Op–12, Op–20, Op–23, Op–30.

[*6602*] Mr. HANNAFORD. Third, a memorandum of July 25, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, with reference to WPPac–46, and Admiral Stark's reply thereto, dated September 9, 1941.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

[6603] Op–12B–2–djm (SC)A16/EF12 Serial 098912 D–33956
Secret

SEP 9 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac–46, review and acceptance of.
Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.
2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16/WPPac–46(16)
[6604] Serial 064W
Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *July 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (WPPac–46).
Reference: (a) WPL–46.
Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac–46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for approval.
2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted when completed.
4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as they are developed.
5. This O–1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of prospective op- [6605] erations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risk of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handicapped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine force.
6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and the forces actually available.

(s) H. E. KIMMEL.

Secret

[6606] Mr. HANNAFORD. Yesterday, we offered as Exhibit 107 the unpublished portions of the various Navy Pearl Harbor reports. The findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary of the Navy were not bound in the volume with the other reports. In order that the record may be perfectly clear I suggest that the findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary of the Navy, which is a separate document, be marked as exhibit 107–A.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 107–A.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. Exhibit 8 contains various reports from General MacArthur's headquarters relating to the Japanese plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor. We have received a subsequent report from General MacArthur's headquarters dated December 13, 1945, with reference to this subject. I request that this document be received in evidence as Exhibit 8–D.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 8–D.")

Mr. HANNAFORD. From time to time, the witnesses who have appeared before this committee have submitted memoranda to counsel suggesting corrections in the transcript of their testimony. I have before me a memorandum from Mr. Grew dated December 18, 1945, which is in reply to a memorandum from Mr. Mitchell dated December 1, 1945; a memorandum from Lt. [*6607*] Col. Harmon Duncombe, dated December 21, 1945, prepared on behalf of General Marshall; a memorandum dated December 21, 1945, from Admiral Wilkinson, and three memoranda from General Miles, dated December 12, 1945; and a memorandum from General Gerow dated December 26, 1945; all suggesting changes in the transcript of their testimony.

I request that these memorandum be spread upon the daily transcript.

(The memoranda referred to follow:)

[*6608*]

[Copy]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
December 1, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Grew.

Regarding changes you desire to make in the transcript of your testimony, it will not be possible to allow any changes in the existing transcript in matters of substance—only errors of spelling. Consequently, in order to record your desire to have changes made in your testimony, you should write us a memorandum referring to the pages of the transcript where you want the corrections to be made, and in that memorandum state the words you want stricken out and the words you want substituted. There will be no changes in the existing transcript, but your memorandum requesting those changes will be put in evidence and form a part of the transcript.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

WDM/CBN

[*6609*]

2840 WOODLAND DRIVE,
Washington, D. C., December 18, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

With reference to your memorandum of December 1, 1945, I enclose two papers:

1. List of errors of spelling in the transcript of my testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

2. Corrections in the transcript of my testimony. I do not wish to change my testimony in any respect. Here and there the stenographer appears to have heard my words incorrectly and these corrections are intended merely to give an accurate record of what I actually said before the Committee.

[S] Joseph C. Grew,
JOSEPH C. GREW.[1]

CORRECTIONS IN SPELLING IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

November 26, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1502; line 12: "Kasa" should be altered to "Kase".
Page 1503; line 19: "Gogi" should be altered to "Gogai".

[1] Mr. Grew's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 2, pp. 560–603, 615–773.

[6610] *November 26, 1945 (Afternoon Session)*

Page 1554; line 16: "Chaing" should be altered to "Chiang".
Page 1555; line 9: (same correction)
Page 1556; line 19: (same correction)

November 27, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1648; line 18: "Toyda" should be altered to "Toyoda".

November 27, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1680; line 24: "Chaing" should be altered to "Chiang".
Page 1681; line 20: (same correction)
Page 1751; line 17: (same correction)

November 28, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1839; line 5: "KGI" should be altered to "KGEI".

November 28, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1902; line 23: "Shanghi" should be altered to "Shanghai".
Page 1926; line 8: "Eugene F. Dooman" should be altered to "Eugene H. Dooman".
Page 1929; line 17: "omniescient" should be altered to "omniscient".
Page 1946; line 19: "Hiramuna" should be altered to "Hiranuma".
Page 1947; line 3: (same correction)

[6611] CORRECTIONS IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY. EACH LINE IS GIVEN COMPLETELY AS IT SHOULD PROPERLY READ.

November 26, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1474:
Line 14: Mr. GREW. Joseph Clark Grew.
Page 1497:
Line 6: army went into Manchuria and that inevitably brought the
Line 7: military into a position of control.
Page 1498:
Line 11: of Admiral Yonai, who was a naval officer.
Line 13: in Japan for many years.
Page 1501:
Line 6: telephoned to Mr. Dooman, the Counselor of the Embassy, to stand by.
Page 1502:
Line 7: Togo, the Foreign Minister—and the Minister finally said, "I will present your

November 26, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1523:
Line 13: Mr. GREW. A military and a naval attache and
Page 1528:
Line 6: Mr. GREW. I said that is correct, sir.
[6612] Page 1533:
Line 17: garden, and just chatting about things, and I said:
Page 1538:
Line 8: Mr. GREW. No, sir; it did not.
Page 1539:
Line 15: called their co-prosperity sphere, first economic control, to
Line 17: by the Japanese military was in the way of implementing that
Page 1542:
Line 19: the more difficult their economic position became. They however had
Page 1546:
Line 22: his salt if, in case he felt he couldn't conscientiously carry out that
Line 23: policy, he should remain in office. There can be no question about that.
Page 1557:
Line 10: Mr. GREW. Yes, perfectly.
Page 1562:
Line 20: that they were ostensibly fighting for. I do not say what

Page 1569:
Line 11: Very probably, but I have had no evidence to be able to
[6613] Page 1580:
Line 9: before the Konoye Cabinet fell, Admiral Toyoda, the Foreign Minister,
Line 10: asked me to call and said the Ambassador "was fatigued" and he
Line 14: he could not mention his name to me, but he just wanted me to
Line 15: know he was going to have to send somebody over for the reason he
Line 16: had stated and he hoped I would cooperate in getting plans ready as
quickly as
Line 17: possible. Before he could act the Konoye Cabinet fell and
Line 18: the Tojo Cabinet came in, and in my first interview with the
Line 19: Foreign Minister, he brought up this point at once. He
Line 23: Nomura's reports of the conversations in Washington were always
Page 1581:
Line 14: an American wife, and I had negotiated with him, and I had seen
him
Line 15: in a personal way often. I always regarded him as
[6614] Line 16: pro-American in his outlook and sentiments, and the
Page 1582:
Line 10: him over here—to support and cooperate with Admiral Nomura.
Line 22: conversations did not come to a satisfactory conclusion that

November 27, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1625:
Line 5: absence in 1939 and when I saw the President he said, When
Page 1639:
Line 22: 1. Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, published
in 1943.
Line 25: 2. Foreign Relations of the United States; Japan, 1931–1941.
Page 1640:
Line 3: 3. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan".
Line 20: been misinterpreted by foreign governments, and points of
Page 1649:
Line 4: that record of a conversation with the Foreign Minister.

November 27, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1668:
Line 12: as comment in my diary. I considered that September was one of
Page 1669:
Line 10: Mr. GREW. No, sir, that is a telegram from our then Legation
Line 15: Mr. GREW. Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent in the
Page 1674:
Line 16: It would be short-sighted, however, to deny their existence or
Page 1677:
Line 8: used. Once that conviction is shaken it is possible that
Page 1680:
Line 12: East and from time to time my recommendations as to what
Line 13: policy should be followed in Washington.
Page 1682:
Line 8: into East Asia. They were potentially
Page 1684:
Line 24: "Only insuperable obstacles will prevent the Japanese
Page 1692:
Line 2: Mr. GREW. Yes, as I remember it, we might
Line 3: have. Let me see how that was stated.
Page 1740:
Line 17: Mr. GREW. Senator, I did not go into those stra-
Page 1753:
Line 20: with the responsibility for some of the worst acts of banditry
Page 1757:
Line 18: 29, Senator. I think I had better stick to the record here.

November 28, 1945 (Morning Session)

Page 1802:
Line 8: the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and
Page 1837:
Line 5: Mr. GREW. That would be 14 hours earlier. I understand
Page 1841:
Line 15: Mr. GREW. Fourteen hours earlier. That, in Washington.

November 28, 1945 (Afternoon Session)

Page 1880:
Line 12: ing from Japan in August 1942 submitted a [6617] report to Mr. Hull.
Page 1901:
Line 20: prime minister Hiranuma was also attacked. His throat was cut and
Page 1904:
Line 11: and it is all on the record—I had better read you exactly what
Page 1908:
Line 13: Mr. KEEFE. When did the Konoye Cabinet fall?
Line 14: Mr. GREW. October 16, 1941.
Page 1909:
Line 6: this meeting with the President took place the Konoye Cabinet
Page 1917:
Line 7: a purely technical point; it is a point as to what is meant
Line 17: in it so much as whether further negotiations continued after

November 29, 1945 (Morning Session)

Pag 1994:
Line 18: might have been the Counselor of the Embassy; it might have

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[6618]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 21 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

It is requested that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the testimony of General Marshall.[1]

	Page	Line	Correction
	2766	4	Change "McNary" to "McNair".
	2767	4	Omit "Of".
	2767	18	Change "priority" to "priorities".
	2767	25	Change "point" to "part".
	2769	9	Change "the" to "their".
	2769	10	Change "representation" to "presentation".
	2787	11	Change "Hart" to "Stark".
	2790	6	Change "Squadron" to "Squadrons".
	2790	18	Change "times" to "time".
	2822	6	Change "brough" to "brought".
	2825	14	Change "known" to "not".
	2830	15	Change "eacch" to "each".
	2834	21	Chage "approved" to "approve".
	2836	7	Change "operations" to "operation".
	2850	4	Change "outweight" to "outweigh".
	2868	11	Omit "for", change "operation" to "operational".
	3874	9	Omit "Mr. Mitchell."
[6619]	2874	12	Change "General Marshall" to "Mr. Mitchell".
	2874	13	Change "Mr. Mitchell" to "General Marshall".
	2874	14	Omit "General Marshall".
	2885	20	Change "Aid de Memoirs" to "Aide Memoire".
	2891	12	Change "far" to "for".
	2895	8	After "Japanese", insert "Expedition".
	2896	10	Change "on" to "in".
	2986	18	Change "on" to "at"; capitalize "Joint Board".
	2901	5	Change "sources" to "resources".
	2914		Change page No. from "2194" to "2914".
	2914	16	Change "from 7 to 9" to "before dinner time"
	2918	4	Change "from" to "for".
	2925	11	Change "is" to "was".
	2928	11	Change "officers" to "opposite".
	2929	13	Change "Dean" to "Deane".
	2930	4	Remove comma after "authentic".
	2933	17	Change "officer" to "opposite".
	2933	21	Change "officer" to "opposite".
	2038	7	Change "transportation" to "transmission".

[1] Gen. Marshall's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1049–1358, 1377–1541.

	Page	Line	Correction
[6619]	2939	5	Change "Bundy" to "Bratton".
	2953-A	15	Change "materiel" to "material".
[6620]	2953-A	21	Change "they" to "the".
	2956	25	Change "B-1y's" to "B-17's".
	2960	18	Change "Hawayy" to "Hawaii".
	2973	2	Change "Ferguson" to "Lucas".
	2979	2	Change "to" to "the".
	2989	2	Change "Clark" to "Clarke".
	2994	24	Change "it a matter of record" to "another effort".
	2995	2	Change "telephone" to "telephoned".
	2996	4	After "Mr. Bell", insert "but not".
	2997	12	Change "Vissell" to "Bissell".
	2997	15	Do.
	2997	19	Do.
	2997	22	Do.
	2997	24	Do.
	2998	7	Do.
	2998	13	Do.
	2998	17	Do.
	3003	20	Do.
	3004	2	Do.
	3004	6	Do.
	3009	6	Change "quadron" to "squadron".
	3016	8	Change "measure" to "message".
	3037	14	Change "arrived" to "were away".
[6621]	3056	25	Change "to him" to "to me".
	3061	14	Change "Philipping" to "Philippine".
	3063	3	Change "Backking" to "backing".
	3109	8	After "fact" insert "as far as I recall,". (See p. 3515, line 9.)
	3111	24	Change "ready" to "already".
	3112	24	Change "some" to "someone".
	3113	4	Change "knew the" to "was the only".
	3116	18	Change "there" to "then"; "any" to "it a".
	3132	25	Change "chief of" to "General".
	3145	6	Change "at 7:00 o'clock" to "on the 7th".
	3147	18	Change "suversive" to "subversive".
	3156	14	Change "ythis" to "this".
	3164	10	Change "his" to "my".
	3171	17	Change "hear" to "head".
	3172	3	Change "advise" to "advice".
	3178	21	Change "8:30" to "6:30"; "American" to "A. M.".
	3182	9	Change "presented" to "prevented".
	3189	4	Change "applied" to "implied".
	3194	5	Change "from" to "near".
	3195	20	Change "on" to "all"; "and" to "on".
	3195	25	Change "Hawaii" to "Panama"; "we" to "I".
	3235	13	Change "attack" to "attacked".
[6622]	3253	6	Change "Marshall" to Marshal".
	3256	4	After "Washington" insert "to".
	3260	23	After "that" insert "we".
	3270	11	Change "concerning" to "concerned".
	3276	11	Change "was" to "war".
	3315	25	Change "though" to "thought".
	3316	5	Change "emphazied" to "emphasized".
	3321	4	Change "scope" to "slash".
	3327	15	Change "sent" to "send".
	3344	10	Change "night" to "morning".
	3352	13	Change "C. S. O." to "C. N. O."; "S. O. S." to "C. O. S."
	3352	19	Change "C. S. O." to "C. N. O."; "S. O. S." to "C. O. S."
	3353	6	Change "seee" to "see".
	3359	8	Change "kept on with our" to "felt no fear for".
	3364	15	Change "Winane" to "Winant".
	3364	22	Change "7th" to "6th".
	3371	12	Change "possible" to "possibly".
	3405	17	Change "exchange" to "change".
	3419	11	Change "chance" to "change".
	3427	2	Change "indicate" to "indicative".
	3451	22	Change "somewhere" to "interrupted with something".
[6623]	3453	23	Change "terne" to "tern".
	3455	16	Change "know" to "knowing".
	3472	18	After "message" insert "indicate".
	3472	20	Change "thatm" to "that".
	3473	13	Change "too" to "to".
	3480	4	Change "o" to "do".
	3480	16	Change "Denny" to "Deane".
	3501	6	Change "gto" to "to".
	3506	23	Change "deligated" to "delegated".
	3543	25	After "1941" insert "called".
	3548	11	Change "point" to "joint".
	3555	7	Change "proceedures" to "procedures".
	3558	22	Change "MacArthur" to "Herron".
	3565	14	Before "prompted" insert "that".
	3621		Should be page "3622".
	3622		Should be page "3621".

	Page	Line	Correction
	3627	2	Change "exhause" to "exhaust".
	3640	2	Change "distributed" to "disapproved".
	3652	3	Change "discussion" to "discuss".
	3652-B	4	Change "Decxmber" to "December".
	3662	6	After "Yes, Sir" start a new paragraph and insert "Mr. Keefe", capitalize "And".
	3680	17	Change "thought" to "though".
	3685	18-20	Omit lines "18 to 20".
[6624]	3724	2	Change "siwht" to "with".
	3729	7	Change "makking" to "making".
	3734	8	Change "presumaly" to "presumably".
	3747	6	Change "Simenko" to "Semanko".
	3747	7	Change "Spearman" to "Speaman".
	3754	12	Change "contract" to "contact".
	3766	7	Change "Corp" to "Corps".
	3971	14	Change "Dean" to "Deane".
	3972	25	Change "is" to "was".
	3983	18	Chagne "Short" to "Strong".
	3984	20	After "to" insert "get".
	4032	23	Change "Genera" to "General".
	4040	10	Change "nto" to "to".
	4057	7	Change "hour into" to "out to".
	4060	23	Change "Normany" to "Normandy".
	4071	7	Change "vinal" to "final".
	4073	3	Change "port and" to "important".
	4075	5	Change "Dean" to "Deane".
	4080	24	Change "be" to "me".

(S) HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

[6625]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 21 December 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: In the record of my testimony in the current hearings before the Joint Committee I note a few stenographic errors, due doubtless to my over-rapid replies, which I believe should be corrected in the interest of clarity and accuracy.

Record of December 18

Page 4754:
Line 20. Change "a 55" to "the 5th".
Line 21. Strike out "the translation is inadequate".
Line 22. Change "which" to "each".
Page 4759:
Line 21. Strike out "not".
Page 4766:
Line 17. Change "Marshalls" to "Carolines".
Page 4773:
Line 12. Change "for" to "by".
Line 15. Strike out "and again".
Page 4791:
Line 8. Change "Kirk" to "King".
Page 4800:
Line 1. Change "fleets" to "planes".
Page 4806:
Line 5. Change "fleet" to "field".
Page 4897:
Line 23. Change "not" to "now".
Page 4900:
Line 24. Change "communications" to "intentions".

[6626]

Record of December 19

Page 4947:
Line 21. Change "but not" to "or".
Page 4963:
Line 1. Change "certain" to "the Anglo-Saxon".
Page 4964:
Line 11. Change "it" to "they" and "out of the" to "on".

Page 4986:
Line 14. Change "days" to "years".
Page 4996:
Line 9. Strike out "Admiral Wilkinson".
Page 5018:
Line 4. Change "20th" to "25th".
Page 5019:
Line 3. Change "November" to "September".
Page 5033:
Line 11. Strike out "and".
Line 12. Change "Ingersoll" to "Stark".
Page 5057:
Line 3. Change "and it was an" to "in the".

Also, for clarity, though an emendation and not a stenographic correction, there should be added to Page 5063, line 7, the following: "The fortnightly *summary* of that date, but not the *memorandum* of December 1 discussing the Japanese movements into the South China Sea".

Very truly,

(S) T. S. WILKINSON,[1]
T. S. WILKINSON,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Mr. W. D. MITCHELL,
Counsel to the Joint Committee.

[6627]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D 761, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 12 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 4 December:

	Page	Line	Correction
	2425	13	Insert period after the word "message".
	2425	14	Delete words "so that".
	2425	15	Insert comma after word "message".
	2425	22	Change "this" to "that".
	2425	23	Change "up" to "my attention to".
	2428	21	Insert words "those two" after "except".
	2450	4	Change first "that" to "with".
	2454	7	Change first "it" to "there".
	2481	24	Change "place" to "status".
	2485	15	Change "have" to "had".
	2485	20	Change "it" to "they".
	2486	23	Insert comma after word "read".
	2486	24	Change "over" to "addressed".
	2487	16	Insert comma and the word "as" after "record".
	2488	5	Change "written" to "read".
	2495	20	Change "intercepting" to "decoding".
[6628]	2507	15	Insert comma and the word "then" after "one".
	2507	16	Delete comma after "code".
	2516	6	Insert comma after "checked"; insert "if" after "and".
	2516	7	Change "if" to "then".
	2524	4–5	Change comma after "Japan" to period and delete remainder of sentence.
	2527	14	Insert "that" after the comma.
	2527	15	Change commas around phrase "and I think I can say always" to parentheses.
	2527	16	Insert comma after "messages".
	2536	16	Change "Atlantic" to "Pacific".
	2543	18	Change "concentration" to "control".
	2548	8	Change "would have" to "when it".
	2554	6	Change "from" to "to"; change "at" to "after".
	2574	15	Change period to colon; change "The" to "that the".
	2574	16	Change "indicated" to "indicate".
	2574	17	Change "was" to "be".
	2575	6	Line should read ". . . ABC (not D) agreement . . ."
	2582	12	Insert "not" after "of".

(S) SHERMAN MILES,
Maj. Gen., USA.

[1] Admiral Wilkinson's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1723–1782, 1794–1911.

[6629]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D761, THE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, *D. C., 12 December 1945.*

Memorandum for Mr. GESELL:

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 30 November:

	Page	Line	Correction
	2133	13	Change "the same" to "some".
	2133	17	Change "in" to "with".
	2133	20	Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
	2133	24	Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
	2134	3-4	Change the lines to read "Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, with eight subsections".
	2135	3	Delete the "g" from "bulletings".
	2136	3	Delete the word "controls".
	2136	12	Insert a comma after the second "gauge".
	2136	18	Change the line to read "for maps of all sorts, and we were coordinating—we were the".
	2137	23	Change "for" to "in".
	2137	24	Change "for" to "with".
	2137	25	Change line to read "Army—I mean the next to the last war. I served other times".
[6630]	2146	14	Insert comma after "Staff"; delete "and".
	2146	15	Change line to read "of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of War, were, from then".
	2153	19	Change "by that" to "on".
	2157	12	Change "a" to "the".
	2157	13	Change "twice" to "once".
	2157	22-23	Change lines to read "the Dutch, the Siamese, the British, the Chinese or the Russians".
	2161	3	Change "message" to "messages".
	2161	5	Change line to read "was only one of many. There were more, actually, that indicated an attack".
	2161	6	Change "and" to "or".
	2162	17	Insert "a" after "being".
	2163	13-14	Change lines to read "Many times I have drawn up a maneuver or war game situation on the assumption of a Japanese attack fol-".
	2164	15-16	Change lines to read "General Miles: Many times I have drawn up a maneuver or war game situation under the assumption of an all out".
	2165	19	Delete the word "all".
	2165	23	Change "in" to "or"; change "situations" to "situation".
	2169	11	Change "wild" to "wide"; delete "in".
	2173	9	Insert quotation marks after "efficiency".
[6631]	2173	10	Delete quotation marks after "it".
	2173	13	Insert the word "successfully" after "she".
	2176	6	Insert the word "that" after "learn".
	2182	5	Change line to read "the Commanding General himself had put an alert in his".
	2205	23	Change "Deputy" to "Chief of".
	2205	24	Delete word "General".
	2208	17-18	Consolidate lines and change to read "ference by direction. In other words, I was the one who was raising".
	2209	3	Delete comma after "to".
	2209	5	Delete words "limiting it only".
	2209	6	Delete word "to"; change "against" to "about".
	2210	15	Change "General" to "Colonel".
	2214	19	Substitute "Japanese" for "American".

MR. GESELL'S QUESTION

	2238	4	Change "Staff" to "a division".
	2238	11	Insert "there was also the" after "end".
	2245	8	Change line to read "day that I have counted 56 of those that were deciphered * * *"
	2246	19	Change second "the" to "that it is".
	2246	20	Delete comma following "probable".
	2251	16	Change "and would be a" to "since they were".
[6632]	2251	17	Change line to read "meaningless messages to the person sending them."
	2254	3-4	Change lines to read "could add, however, of course, that we knew the Japanese were following".
	2254	10	Change "there" to "it".
	2258	10	Change "running" to "writing".

General Miles has also requested the following corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony on 3 December:

	Page	Line	Correction
	2314	24	Change line to read "General Miles: The possibility or the probability of".
	2314	25	Delete the word "it".
	2315	22	Delete the words "Now" and "have".
	2315	23	Change line to read "You ask me whether I thought it was a".
	2315	24	Change comma to period after "surprise"; capitalize "w" in "we".
	2315	25	Change line to read "in war with us, might attack Hawaii, and we took action".
	2316	2	Change "This" to "The".
	2316	3	Change "billeted" to "established".
	2316	4	Change line to read "We also followed, I think, the second principle. We".
[6633]	2316	6	Change "he" to "they".
	2316	10	Change "very" to "great".
	2316	11	Change "he" to "they".
	2318	22	Change "Yes" to "No".
	2319	6	Delete words "a mine".
	2320	13	Change "control" to "controlled".
	2323	7	Change "sent" to "seem".
	2323	9	Insert word "by" after "believe".
	2324	8	Delete words "or might not".
	2332	14	Change "waters" to "province".
	2337	18	Change "close" to "closer".
	2338	15	Change "officially" to "generally".
	2367	10	Insert word "was" after "question".
	2367	11	Change "their" to "our".
	2367	14	Change line to read "the risking of this secret by using the two codes. We were".
	2371	22	Change "Brunert" to "Grunert".
	2373	15	Delete words "knew, and".
	2374	24	Change "of the" to "and train".
	2374	25	Change "people" to "the agents"; change "why" to "what".
	2383	18	Insert word "we" after "which".
	2384	21	Change "he is" to "his".
	2384	22	Delete word "good".
[6634]	2384	23	Change "You" to "I".
	2389	17	Delete words "one of".
	2389	18	Change line to read "sole function".
	2390	20	Delete period and add "in our army".
	2391	6	Add "—a" after "that".
	2394	20	Inset "and" after "department".
	2399	4	Change line to read "Marshall's warning message of November 27. Concerning my message of".
	2399	5	Delete words "did" and "and".
	2405	25	Delete "Admiral Turner".
	2408	6	Change "authority" to "authorities".
	2409	7	Change line to read "those codes. But the Japanese could not jump our headquarters".
	2409	24	Change "take" to "attack".
	2419	13	Change comma to period after "citizens"; capitalize "b" in "but".

(S) SHERMAN MILES,
Maj. Gen., USA.

[6635]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D761, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 12, 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.

I request that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the testimony which I gave on November 29:

	Page	Line	Correction
	2065	16	Strike the word "the".
	2066	16	Strike the word "general".
	2067	9	Strike the word "with".
	2067	10	Change "commanders" to "commands".
	2074	23	Change "not" to "now".
	2083	6	Change "nor was G-2" to "nor was Naval Communications".
	2084	11	Change "Hugh" to "Jules".
	2108	9	Change "of" to "or".
	2111	17	Strike the word "few".
	2111	24	Strike the word "it".
	2115	10	Strike the word "preceding".
	2115	11	Change "April" to "August".
	2115	14	Change "battle for the Leyte Gulf" to "battle for Leyte Gulf".
	2116	13	Change the line to read "gagged by the Chief of Staff or was it in any way suggested that I".
[6636]	2125	7	Insert "and" after "economic".
	2127	23	Change the line to read "War Department, the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of War that we".
	2100	14	Change "right" to "light".

(S) SHERMAN MILES,[1]
Maj. Gen., USA.

[6637]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 4D761, THE PENTAGON,
Washington, D. C., 26 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Gesell.

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 5 December:

	Page	Line	Correction
	2603	10	Delete comma.
	2603	22	Delete "of"; substitute comma.
	2641	4	Change "means" to "mission".
	2641	5	Change "means" to "missions".
	2645	19	Change "means of" to "missions, the".
	2668	8	Insert "that" after "conclusion".
	2668	22	Change "earning" to "warning".
	2668	22	Change "that" to "as".
	2669	12	Change "article" to "obstacle".
	2672	2	Change "aircract" to "aircraft".
	2672	5	Change "autmenting" to "augmenting".
	2688	4	Change "there" to "these".
	2691	13	Change "drafing" to "draftine".
	2708	25	Insert "not" after "is" and before "necessarily".
	2709	10	Change "sent" to "send".
6638]	2711	6	Change "Galey" to "Galley".
	2714	24	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
	2714	25	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy"?
	2715	9	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
	2715	12	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
	2725	6	Strike "from".
	2728	25	Strike line (duplicated top of next page).
	2743	2	Insert "I saw" between the words "time" and "the".
	2743	4	Delete "was".

[1] Gen. Miles' testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1360–1375, 1541–1583.

The following corrections should be made in the transcript of my testimony on 14 December:

Page	Line	
4248	3	Change "preciipitate" to "precipitate".
4254	24	Change "Memoirs" to "Memoire".
4262	24	Insert "do not" before "believe".
4271	19	Change "Commanding" to "Command and".
4307	11	Change "Bad Nomen" to "Bad Nauheim".

(S) L. T. GEROW,[1]
Lieut. General.

[*6639*] Mr. HANNAFORD. At pages 4164 and 5038–40 of the transcript Congressman Gearhart requested information concerning any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from December 1 to December 6, 1941. We have received two memoranda from the War Department, dated December 27, 1945, and January 2, 1946, in reply to Congressman Gearhart's request. I request that these memoranda, together with the attachments, be spread upon the daily transcript at this point.

(The memoranda referred to follow:)

[*6640–6641*]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
2 January 1946.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

With reference to Congressman Gearhart's request for information concerning any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December 1941, there is inclosed a further report from the Commanding General in Hawaii.

(S) Harmon Duncombe,
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

1 Incl.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Incoming Clear Message

1 JANUARY 1946.

From: CG USAF MIDPAC Ft Shafter TH.
To: War Department.
Nr: MP 18038.

To the Chief of Staff USA Washn DC Attn Assistant Chief [*6642*] of Staff Operations Div info CINCAFPAC Admin CINCAFPAC Adv MP 18038 MPGCT Richardson.

See following references:

A WCL 30471 DTG 200138Z Dec

B AFMIDPAC radio MP 17177 DTG 220554Z Dec

An intensive and thorough search of all records of this Hqs and Air Corps Hqs on Oahu fail to disclose info requested in reference A).—End.

Note: MP 17177 is MC–IN–62666 (22 Dec 45) OPD
Action: OPD
Info: L & L D
MC–IN–50590 (2 Jan 46)

DTG 010720Z rmw

Unclassified

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[1] Gen. Gerow's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 3, pp. 983–1048; Part 4, pp. 1592–1640 and 1643–1673.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
ROOM 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
27 December 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

At pages 4164 and 5038–40 of the transcript, Congressman Gearhart requested complete information concerning any [*6643*] all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December 1941. A thorough search has disclosed no information in the War Department files concerning such an alert. Inclosed herewith are (1) a 19 December 1945 cable on the subject from the War Department to the Commanding General in Hawaii and (2) a preliminary reply dated 22 December 1945.

(S) Harmon Duncombe,
HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Col., GSC.

Incls. (2).

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Outgoing Clear Message

Operations Division WDGS.
Current Group WAROPDIV 74676.

19 DECEMBER 1945.

COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft. Shafter T H
INFORMATION:
CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I
Number: WCL 30471
From WARSEC

Joint Congressional Committee has requested infor- [*6644*] mation whether orders were issued placing Hickam, Wheeler or any other Army airfield in Hawaiian Department on alert during first week December 1941 and also whether any such alerts were cancelled on or about 6 December. Request immediate thorough investigation of available records and other sources of information relating to any such alerts. If alerts were placed in effect or cancelled, send by cable the text of all such orders and specify by whose authority they were issued. Give details as to nature of alerts and any other pertinent information.—End.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: L & L D
MC–OUT–30471 (Dec 45) DTG 200136Z ls

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Unclassified

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Incoming Clear Message

Urgent

From: CG, Fort Shafter, Honolulu, TH.
To: War Department
Nr: M 17177

22 DECEMBER 1945.

[*6645*] To the Chief of Staff United States Army Washington 25 DC Attention Assistant Chief of Staff Operations Division info Commander in Chief Army

Forces Pacific Admin Commander in Chief Army Fores Pacific Adv. M 17177. Signed Richardson.

See urad WCL 30471 DTG 200138 z December 1945.

Records searched to date have not disclosed information requested in subject radio. All possible sources and records are being canvassed and any pertinent information found will be forwarded immediately.—End.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: L&LD
MC–IN–6266 (22 Dec 45) DTG: 220554Z blw

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Unclassified

[*6646*] Mr. HANNAFORD. At page 5904 of the transcript Senator George requested the number and type of ships attached to the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets on December 7, 1941. This request was repeated by Congressman Gearhart. The information requested appears on page 6 of Exhibit 86, copies of which have been furnished to committee members.

In addition Congressman Gearhart asked for the specific location on December 7, 1941, of the ships in the Pacific Fleet. This information is contained in Exhibit 6, which is the Navy folder of maps, charts, and statements. Item 1 of that exhibit shows the disposition of the Pacific Fleet in graphic form, and item 5 shows the same information in written form. Item 8 shows the disposition of the ships in Pearl Harbor in graphic form, and item 9 shows the disposition of the ships in Pearl Harbor in written form.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., an adjournment was taken until Tuesday, January 15, 1946, at 10 a. m.)

Part 6—January 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946—follows.

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