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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

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PART 15

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 44 THROUGH 87

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1– 399	1– 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401– 982	1059– 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983–1583	2587– 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585–2063	4195– 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065–2492	5461– 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493–2920	6647– 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921–3378	7889– 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379–3927	9108–10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929–4599	10518–12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601–5151	12278–13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153–5560	13709–14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1	23 11–15–45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2	24 11–15–45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3	87 11–16–45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4	142 11–16–45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5	153 11–16–45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.
6	153 11–16–45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7	172 11–17–45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3–B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8	233 11–19–45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8–A	1792 12–18–45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–B	1792 12–18–45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8–C	1792 12–18–45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8–D	2480 1–5–46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11–19–45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11–20–45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11–21–45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11–21–45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11–21–45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11–21–45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11–23–45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11–23–45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16–A	3839 2–6–46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16–B	4341 2–13–46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11–23–45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11–23–45	1084	Documents relating to proposed "*Modus Vivendi*," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11–23–45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11–23–45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11–23–45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11–23–45	1252	(*a*) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (*b*) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 16Ø115; (*c*) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22–A	1694 12–15–45 2065 12–31–45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((*c*) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22–B	1783 12–18–45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22–C	1783 12–18–45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22–D	1783 12–18–45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11–24–45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11–26–45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11–27–45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11–27–45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11–27–45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941", vols. I and II (1943), Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11–27–45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11–28–45	1316	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11–29–45	1326	Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11–29–45	1334	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G–2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33–A	2092 12–31–45	1385	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11–30–45	1389	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11–30–45	1390	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11–30–45	1393	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11–30–45	1395	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11–30–45	1409	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12–4–45	1409	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12–4–45	1412	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (Ø7Ø645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12–5–45	1413	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12–5–45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10–15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12–5–45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12–5–45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12–5–45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12–5–45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12–5–45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3ØØ85Ø"; dispatch 3ØØ85Ø from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12–5–45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48–A	2093 12–31–45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12–6–45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC–1).
50	1053 12–6–45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).

51	1053 12–6–45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC–22).
52	1053 12–6–45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12–6–45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12–6–45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12–6–45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12–6–45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12–6–45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B–17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12–6–45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12–6–45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12–6–45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12–7–45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12–10–45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12–11–45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12–13–45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12–13–45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12–15–45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (Ø61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12–15–45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12–15–45	1689	Log of U. S. S. *Boise* for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12–15–45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12–15–45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12–15–45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12–15–45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12–15–45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).

74	1703 12–15–45	1735	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74–A	2768 1–19–46	1741	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12–15–45	1744	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11–15–45	1754	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12–15–45	1757	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12–17–45	1768	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12–17–45	1770	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12–17–45	1774	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12–17–45	1837	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12–17–45	1864	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP–16).
83	1754 12–17–45	1866	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (Ø31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12–17–45	1867	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12–18–45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12–18–45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12–19–45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12–19–45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP–12)".
89	1938 12–20–45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12–31–45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12–31–45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12–31–45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12–31–45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G–2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12–31–45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12–31–45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12–31–45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12–31–45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12–31–45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12–31–45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12–31–45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12–31–45	2023	Log of U. S. S. *Enterprise* from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12–31–45	2107	Log of U. S. S. *Lexington* from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12–31–45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, *Enterprise* Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12–31–45	2122	"U. S. S. *Lexington* War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12–31–45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12–31–45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1–4–46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107–A	2479 1–5–46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1–4–46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1–5–46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1–5–46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1–15–46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1–15–46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1–16–46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113–A	2807 1–19–46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113–B	2807 1–19–46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113–C	3449 1–31–46	2538	(*a*) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL–41, together with documents which approve same; (*b*) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1–16–46	2568	WPPac–46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac–46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O–1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1–16–46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (*a*) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (*b*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115–A	3449 1–31–46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115–B	3450 1–31–46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45–41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1–16–46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1–16–46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117–A	5015 2–20–46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1–16–46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1–16–46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1–16–46	2721	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (*b*) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (*c*) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1–16–46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1–16–46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

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Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123	2588 1–16–46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123–A	5015 2–20–46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124	2674 1–17–46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125	2678 1–17–46	2801	Log of the *U. S. S. Wright* from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126	2767 1–19–46	2832	(*a*) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (*b*) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (*c*) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127	2768 1–19–46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128	2768 1–19–46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129	2842 1–19–46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130	2879 1–21–46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131	2892 1–21–46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

132	2917 1–21–46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132–A	5137 2–20–46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662–13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (*a*) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (*b*) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (*c*) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (*d*) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1–23–46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1–23–46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1–23–46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27–28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1–23–46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1–23–46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1–23–46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1–23–46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G–2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G–2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1–26–46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1–28–46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1–29–46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142–A	3324 1–29–46	3318	(*a*) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (*b*) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142–B	3674 2–4–46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142–C	3741 2–5–46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142–D	3780 2–5–46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339. 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2–7–47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2–7–46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2–7–46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2–8–46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2–13–46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2–18–46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2–19–46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2–20–46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2–20–46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2–20–46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4–11–46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4–11–46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4–11–46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4–11–46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4–11–46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161–A	5464 5–23–46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4–11–46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162–A	5464 5–23–46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4–11–46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. *Helena* from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4–11–46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4–11–46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5–23–46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5–23–46	3652	(*a*) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (*b*) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (*a*); (*c*) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (*a*); and (*d*) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (*a*) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5–23–46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5–23–46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5–23–46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5–23–46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5–23–46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5–23–46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5–23–46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5–23–46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5–23–46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5–23–46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5–23–46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5–23–46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5–23–46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5–23–46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5–23–46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G–2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5–23–46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the *Utah* by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940–45 production of B–17 4-engine bombers.

EXHIBIT NO. 44

COPIES OF DEFENSE PLANS

Contents

Item
1. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange (1938)
2. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1
3. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5
4. Extracts from War Department Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5
5. Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
6. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
7. Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
8. Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)
9. 5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department
10. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department
11. Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5
12. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 20L–41 (Revised)—Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas
13. Operations Plan No. 1–41. Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval District

[1] EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE (1938)

SECTION I—DIRECTIVE

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE—shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans—ORANGE, all Navy Plans—ORANGE, all Joint Plans—ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

SECTION II—ASSUMPTIONS

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that—

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

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[2]

SECTION IV—MISSIONS

1. *Joint Mission for the Armed Forces.*—To defeat ORANGE by operations against ORANGE armed forces and communications, while conserving the resources of the UNITED STATES and protecting UNITED STATES' territory, sea communications, and interests.

2. *Mission for the Army.*—To defend the Continental UNITED STATES and its overseas possessions; to provide for contingencies which may arise from either foreign intervention or the ultimate exigencies of the Joint Mission, and to support the Navy.

3. *Mission for the Navy.*—To defeat ORANGE forces, interrupt ORANGE sea communications, protect UNITED STATES' sea communications and UNITED STATES' interests abroad, and to support the Army.

SECTION V—JOINT DECISIONS

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2. *COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.*

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b. HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier—(1) *Boundaries.*—The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

[3] (2) *Category of Defense.*—Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

(3) *Missions*—(a) *Joint Mission.*—To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(b) *Mission for the Army.*—To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

(c) *Mission for the Navy.*—To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Armed forces.

(4) *Forces*—(a) *Army Forces.*—The peace garrison, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by initial reinforcements of about 25,000 troops from Continental UNITED STATES. The reinforcements from Continental UNITED STATES will be those so designated in the Concentration Plan of the Army Strategical Plan—ORANGE.

[4] (b) *Naval Forces.*—(i) Naval Local Defense Forces of the 14th Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements to a total of about 7,000 individuals, as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE.

(ii) In time of Peace, the major part of the submarine and Naval air forces based on PEARL HARBOR will be retained in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS whenever the UNITED STATES FLEET is not in the Eastern PACIFIC.

(5) *Joint Plan to be Prepared.* Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

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SECTION VI—SUPPORTING MEASURES

1. *TIME OF EXECUTION.*

M–Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE. M–Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M–Day.

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 1[1]

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SECTION VI—TASKS

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Joint Tasks

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7. *Joint Task*

HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Joint Decisions

a. Boundaries. The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.

b. Category of Defense: Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

c. Army Task: To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

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[1] Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 14 August 1939, verbally by the President 14 October 1939; revised by the Joint Board 10 April 1940.

d. Navy Task: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army Forces.

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f. Joint Plan to be Prepared: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

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[2] SECTION VII—JOINT DECISIONS FOR SUPPORTING MEASURES

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2. *Time of Execution.*—M–Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M–Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M–Day.

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EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5[1]

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SECTION VII—TASKS

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The Pacific Area

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33. *Army Tasks.*

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d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

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35. *Navy Tasks.*

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f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, Samoa and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

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47. *Categories of Defense.*

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Hawaiian Coastal Frontier ..... Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier ..... Category E

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Midway, Johnston, Palmyra ..... Category D
Guam ..... Category E

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[2] SECTION IX.—SUPPORTING MEASURES

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53. *Time of Execution.* M–Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M–Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M–Day.

* * * * * * *

Annex I. Coastal Frontiers

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

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[1] Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and by the Secretary of War, 2 June 1941.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

"33. Joint Organization and command.

"*a.* Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are stated below.

NOTE: The preceding subparagraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 26 *a*, Section 1, of reference (a).

"*b.* A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

[3] "*c.* Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

"*d.* The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

"*e.* Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 *b*."

* * * * * * *

9. Insert in reference (a), the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"*a.* Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

"*b.* Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army."

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[1]

EXTRACTS FROM WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5[1]

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SECTION VII—MISSIONS AND FORCES

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30. *Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.*

a. Extent.

OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

b. Category of Defense: D (as defined in Section III, Chapter V, J. A. A. & N., 1935).

c. Missions.

(1) Joint—Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

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[1] Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.

(2) Army—Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

(3) Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

* * * * * * *

[2] SECTION VIII—GENERAL PROVISIONS AND NAVAL SUPPORTING MEASURES

40. *General Provisions.*

a. How put into effect.

This plan or any portion thereof will be put into effect on orders of the War Department.

b. Chemical Warfare.

All necessary precautions will be made for the use of chemicals from the outbreak of hostilities; but the use of toxic agents is prohibited unless and until authorized by the War Department.

c. Active Air Defense Measures, Continental United States.

(1) *Responsibility*—The Chief of the Army Air Forces, under GHQ, is responsible for so much of the active air defense of the continental United States as includes planning and execution of operations of air, antiaircraft artillery, balloon barrage units and aircraft warning service, except:

(a) Local defense by ground units with their organic weapons against low-flying aircraft;

(b) When the War Department, to meet an actual or threatened invasion, activates a Theater of Operations (or similar command) in the United States or contiguous territory for the combined employment of air forces and ground arms (other than antiaircraft artillery) the commander of the theater (or similar command) will be responsible for all air defense measures in his theater.

(2) *Mission*—The air defense mission is stated in terms of priority of areas vital to national security under varying strategic conditions. Other localities or installations not named are not excluded from defense measures but are of less national importance.

(a) Condition A: No threat to vital installations on the West Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on the Atlantic Coast.

1st Priority: New York-Philadelphia Area.
2d Priority: Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.
3d Priority: Boston-Narragansett Area.

(b) Condition A (1): Same as A except that threat appears to be localized in North Atlantic.

Priorities as in (a) above.

[3] (c) Condition B: No threat against vital installations on the East Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on any part of Pacific Coast.

1st Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.
2d Priority: Puget Sound Area.
3d Priority: San Francisco Area.

(d) Condition B (1): Same as B except that threat appears to be localized in Puget Sound-San Francisco Area.

1st Priority: Puget Sound Area.
2d Priority: San Francisco Area.
3d Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.

(e) Condition B (2): Same as B except that threat appears to be localized in San Francisco-San Diego Area.

1st Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.
2d Priority: San Francisco Area.
3d Priority: Puget Sound Area.

(f) Condition C: Threat to vital installations equally divided between the East and West Coasts.

1st Priority: New York-Philadelphia Area.
2d Priority: Los Angeles-San Diego Area.
3d Priority: Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.
4th Priority: Puget Sound Area.
5th Priority: Boston Area.
6th Priority: San Francisco Area.

(3) *Forces:*

See Sections 1 and 2, Table II, Annex II, Concentration Tables. The Chief of the Army Air Force or subordinates designated by him will exercise command functions over all mobile and fixed Aircraft Warning units in continental United States, and over such other forces as are allocated for air defense except as otherwise indicated in subparagraph (1) above.

(4) The Chief of the Army Air Force will render such assistance and advice as may be practicable to communities, installations, military or naval forces not under his command regarding weaknesses and improvements in the air raid precautions system. For this purpose he is authorized to consult directly with the authorities concerned.

d. Logistics.

For details relative to mobilization, concentration, embarkation, administration, military government of occupied territory, intelligence, organization, training, supply, and evacuation, see Concentration Plan and Annex III—Logistics to this Operations Plan.

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[1] EXTRACTS FROM HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECT, REVISION 1940

SECTION II—BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. *a. Missions.*

(1) *Joint Mission:* To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) *Mission for the Army:* To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces against hostile sympathizers; and to support the naval forces.

(3) *Mission for the Navy:* To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces. (Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan-Orange).

b. Category of Coastal Frontier Defense: Category "D" defense, prescribed by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the employment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general reserve. (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

* * * * * * *

d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

(*a*) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

(*b*) Sabotage.

(*c*) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

(*d*) Air raids, carrier based.

(*e*) Surface ship raids.

(*f*) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.

[2] (2) *Sabotage and Internal Dissension.*

(a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, in event of war, will divide itself as follows:

(1) Loyal to the United States. This group will certainly include some American citizens of Japanese origin.

(2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor, when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair proportion of the aliens and many citizens.

(3) Loyal to Orange (to extent of sabotage and other subversive actions). This group will probably be small, although formidable.

* * * * * * *

5. *a. Basis for Planning.*

(1) *Missions and Conditions.*

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 *b*).

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (see par. 1 *a*).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(*1*) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

(*2*) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

[*3*] (*3*) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation".

(*4*) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

b. Conclusion.—To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacost and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:*

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6).

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.

(b) *To Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:*

The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6.)

[*4*] (c) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:*

In carrying aut the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

* * * * * * *

[*1*]

Headquarters
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

Headquarters
Fourteenth Naval District
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

1. *Responsibility.* This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared, under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. *Basis.* This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. *Method of coordination.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that

in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 *b*.

4. *Planning representatives.* The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G–3) Headquarters Hawaiian department, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, are designated as planning representatives respectfully for the Army and Navy Commanders in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. (Par. 40 *a*, page 61, joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.)

5. *Joint planning committee.* A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Nava' District and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Fontier. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.

[2] SECTION II—DELIMITATION OF AREAS

6. *Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.* "The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu."

It has been determined that the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

7. *Hawaiian Coastal Zone.* The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

8. *Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier plus the areas bounded by the territorial waters of Midway Island, Johnson Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.

9. *Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone.* The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of Midway Island, Johnston Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.

10. *Hawaiian Defensive Sea Areas.* WPL–8, paragraph 2201, defines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first kind—2201.a.1 of WPL–8—is the Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the second kind—2201.a.2. of WPL–8—have been established by executive order for Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe.

(1) *Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.* The Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier includes all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau; Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title—Hawaiian D. S. A.

(2) *Pearl Harbor—Defensive Sea Area.* The Pearl Harbor—Defensive Sea Area comprises: The area of water in Pearl Harbor lying between extreme high water mark and the sea, and in an about the entrance channel to [3] said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Light, and a line bearing west true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse. This area is given the short title—Pearl D. S. A.

(3) *Kaneohe Bay—Defensive Sea Area.* The Kaneohe Bay—Defensive Sea Arear comprises: All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true extending three miles from Kaoio Point, a line bearing northeast true extending four (4) nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given the short title—Kaneohe D. S. A.

(4) *Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Johnston, Midway, and Wake—Defensive Sea Areas.* These defensive sea areas comprise: Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.

11. *Oahu Defensive Coastal Area.* The Defensive Coastal Area for Oahu comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows:

Keahi Point—Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
Puu Kapolei—Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
Kahuku Point, Puuiki Station } Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.

This area is given the short title—Oahu D. C. A.

SECTION III—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION—TASKS AND FORCES

12. *Category of Defense.* Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, Rainbow No. 1.

14. *Tasks.*

a. Joint task. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. Army Task. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. Navy task. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

[4] *a. Army Forces.* The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.

b. Naval Forces. Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.

c. Overseas Reinforcements. (1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

d. Civil Organization. A Civil Organization, under the supervision of Army authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the Territory of Hawaii for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of the Territory of Hawaii in assisting the military and naval forces.

SECTION IV—DECISIONS

16. *General.*

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of Oahu in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

[5] *c.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans

for the Mobilization of man-power and material resources in the Territory of Hawaii and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in accordance with the detailed agreeements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19.

17. *Army.* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of Oahu with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present thereat, Honolulu Harbor, city of Honolulu, and the Schofield Barracks-Wheeler Field-Lualualei area. The increasing importance of the Kaneohe area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18 *a.*), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the Hawaiian Islands.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. *e.*

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

[6] *j.* An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the Hawaiian Islands.

k. Counter-espionage within the Hawaiian Islands.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the Hawaiian Islands.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. *Navy.* The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the Oahu-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the Oahu-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

[7] *l.* In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 *i*, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

SECTION V—MOBILIZATION

19. *Mobilization Plans.*

a. General.

(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the Mainland.

(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-power and material resources of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as of the reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of Oahu, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M–Day operation will be possible.

b. Army Plans. The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.

(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

[8] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.

(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.

(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.

(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the Hawaiian Islands, except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.

(7) Control and care of the civil population of the Hawaiian Islands (civil organization (Par. 15 *d*, above) to assist), in event of martial law.

(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands vital to military effort and civil life, in event of martial law.

(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial law.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements and supplies received on Oahu.

c. Navy Plans. The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for—

(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, material, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.

(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.

(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.

(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.

(6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the Hawaiian Islands for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.

(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and protection of shipping therein.

(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.

(9) Control of all shipping activities in the Hawaiian Islands.

(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in event of martial law.

SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination from time to time:

Allocation of military and civil man-power.

Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.

Allocation of transportation, land and water.

Allocation of signal communications.

Allocation of material and supplies.

Allocation of food supply.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF–41 (JCD–42) supercedes HCF–39 (JCD–13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VIII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. Bloch,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.

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[1] Headquarters
14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Headquarters
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT—1939

28 MARCH 1941.

ANNEX NO. VII, SECTION VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS—JOINT SECURITY MEASURES, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE

I. *General.*

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF–39, (14 ND–JCD–13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. *Joint air operations.*

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make avail-

able without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks; if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

[2] *b.* Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. *Joint Communications*

* * * * * * *

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, The Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense [3] Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. *Joint Antiaircraft Measures.*

8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaaian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commanding Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

9. *Balloon barrages.*—Reports from abroad indicate the successful development and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.

10. *Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.*—When made available by the Naval Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

* * * * * * *

Approved: 2 April 1941.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

[*1*] MARCH 31, 1941.

Comdr. Naval Base
Defense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT ESTIMATE COVERING JOINT ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF SUDDEN HOSTILE ACTION AGANST OAHU OR FLEET UNTS IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA

1. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10–8″ guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small [*2*] carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between

fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for [3] combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. *Possible enemy action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust .

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make [4] a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. *Action open to us:*

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but

can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

[5] 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carriers.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

[6] V. *Decisions:*

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility Squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)* The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carried VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

[7] 1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vesels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.
(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[8] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
2. All types—30 minutes.
3. All types—one hour.
4. All types—two hours.
5. All types—four hours.

The armanent and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A–1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B–1 and B–2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

[9] (f) In order to perfect fundamental communitions by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

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[1] STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

SECTION I—GENERAL

* * * * * * *

5. *Tactical principles.*—* * * The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of Oahu and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

a. Complete organization of the ground

b. Position to be held lightly

c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them

d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. *Security.*—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

* * * * * * *

10. *Antiaircraft defense.*—*a.* Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

* * * * * * *

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and material when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

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[2] SECTION III—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15*f* (8) below.

14. *Alert No. 1.*—*a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At Department Headquarters, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

* * * * * * *

e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

* * * * * * *

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 *g* below.

[3] *g.* The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

* * * * * * *

i. The Station Complements of Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

* * * * * * *

15. *Alert No. 2.—a.* This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At Department Headquarters, only the G–2 and G–3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each Infantry Division will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

* * * * * * *

(6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

[4] (7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm. guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 *e* below.

* * * * * * *

e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.
(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
f. The Hawaiian air force will:
(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
[5] (5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing Two.
(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
g. The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will: Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

* * * * * * *

i. The Department Signal Officer will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.
j. The Interceptor Command will: Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.
[6] (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. Station Complements:
(1) The Fort Shafter Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shafter and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(2) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

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16. *Alert No. 3—a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.
b. At Department Headquarters:
(1) All sections of the forward echelon * * * will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
(2) All sections of the rear echelon * * * will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.
c. Department Troops will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.
d. Each Infantry Division will:
(1) Defend its assigned sector on Oahu.

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

* * * * * * *

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacost armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

* * * * * * *

[7] *e.* The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Detachment Field Artillery will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 16 *1* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On Oahu, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

[8] (10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Intercepter Command.

* * * * * * *

h. The District Commanders of Hawaii, Maui (includes Molokai) and Kauai Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

* * * * * * *

j. The Interceptor Command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. The Department Signal Officer will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. Station Complements.—

(1) The Schofield Barracks Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The Fort Shafter Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shafter and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Field Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

[9] 17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. Material Readiness.—

A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. Degree of operational Readiness.—

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2—All types: 30 Minutes.

3—All types: One hour.

4—All types: Two hours.

5—All types: Four hours.

SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

* * * * * * *

20. *Measures to obtain information.*—

a. Navy.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

* * * * * * *

[10] (d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

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b. Army.

(1) Hawaiian Air Force.

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui; Kauiki Head Light, Maui; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii; Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Nihau; Lahua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loops.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop,

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

* * * * * * *

(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

[*11*] (b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and demage to enemy airplanes.

* * * * * * *

c. All Elements of Hawaiian Department.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

* * * * * * *

SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. *Supply.*

* * * * * * *

e. Class V Supplies:

* * * * * * *

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only ⅓ of the "initial issues" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3", 37 mm. and Machine Gun ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.

[*12*] (7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

* * * * * * *

(Inclosure No. 6)

[13] *Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft) for initial issue, Hawaiian Department*

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	CA	25	140	20	185
	Eng	------	40	------	40
	FA	------	32	8	40
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.)	16	112	32	160
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)	4	28	8	40
	QM	------	40	------	40
	Sig	------	25	------	25
	Others	30	105	15	150
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	Eng	48	80	24	152
	Inf. (Rifle Plat.)	24	162	46	232
	Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)	4	28	8	40
	Ord	------	64	16	80
	Sig	------	40	------	40
	MP	------	48	------	48
	Others	30	105	15	150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	CWS	------	460	120	580
	CA	60	560	60	680
	FA	960	------	240	1,100
	Inf	60	992	120	1,172
	Ord	------	240	60	300
	QM	30	30	20	80
	Others	150	525	75	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4).	Eng	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf	500	3,500	1,000	5,000
	Tanks or Armd. Cars	4,800	------	1,200	6,000
Machine gun, cal. .30, WC (M1917A1).	CA	7,200	------	1,800	9,000
	(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.)	3,600	------	900	4,500
	Eng	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf	675	4,725	2,350	6,750
	Others	600	2,100	300	3,000
Pistol, cal. .45	CWS, CA, Eng., Inf	------	28	------	28
	FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others	------	21	------	21
Submachine gun, cal. .45	Sig. (motorcycles)	------	340	------	340
	Sig (other than motorcycles)	------	350	------	250
	MP	------	440	110	550
	Others	------	240	60	300
[14]					
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA)	CA (AW Bn.)	5,760	------	1,440	7,200
	CA (except AW Bn.)	2,880	------	720	3,600
	Others	2,880	------	720	3,600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB	FA	600	------	150	750
	Inf	960	------	240	1,200
	Tanks or Armd. Cars	1,568	------	392	1,900

[15] Weapon	Arm or Service	No. of rds. per weapon				
		AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Shotgun	All					25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)	Inf					150
Signals, ground (asstd.)	Inf					25
	Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.)					5
	Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.)					30
Lights, Very signal (assorted)	All					24
37mm gun, M1916					240	240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3)	FA	200				200
	Inf	180			20	200
37mm gun, Antiaircraft	CA	180			1,620	1,800
60mm Mortar	Inf				120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar	Inf			(light)	132	150
				(heavy)	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D	All					[1] 459
75mm gun, Antitank	FA					[1] 144
105mm How	FA					[1] 205
155mm How	FA					[1] 117
3" AA mobile	CA	15			285	300
90mm AA mobile	CA	12			238	250
3" AA fixed	CA				300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1	All				100	100
240mm How. M1918	FA				60	60
8" Ry. Gun	CA	85				85
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY						
3" gun, M1903					505	505
6" gun		1,000				1,000
8" gun		350			200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)		335				335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage)		275				275
12" Mortar		300				300
14" gun		280				280
16" gun		250				250

NOTES

Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not avilable in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

[1] Proportions of types (shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

(Inclosure No. 7)

[16] *Unit of fire (other than aircraft)—Hawaiian Department*

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903	30	105	15	----	150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30	150	525	75	----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle)	150	525	75	----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle)	600	----	150	----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917–17A1)	600	2,100	300	----	3,000
Pistol, cal. .45	----	20	----	----	20
Submachine gun, cal. .45	----	160	40	----	200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB	720	----	180	----	900
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries)	1,920	----	480	----	2,400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries)	960	----	240	----	1,200
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)	----	----	----	----	150
Projector, signal ground (assorted)	----	----	----	----	25
Pistol, Very, Mk III	----	----	----	----	24
37mm gun, M1916	----	----	----	120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3	84	----	----	36	120
37mm gun, antiaircraft	60	----	----	540	600
60mm Mortar	----	----	----	400	400
81mm Mortar	----	----	(Light)	234	300
			(Heavy)	66	
3″ Trench Mortar	----	----	----	----	300
75mm Field Gun	----	----	(Super)	36	300
			(Normal)	150	----
			(Reduced)	114	----
75mm gun, antitank	111	----	----	39	150
105mm How	----	----	----	225	225
155mm How. M1918	----	----	----	150	150
3″ AA gun, mobile	15	----	----	285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile	12	----	----	238	250
3″ AA gun, fixed	----	----	----	300	300
155mm gun, M1918 MI	112	----	----	38	150
240mm How. M1918	----	----	----	60	60
8″ Ry Gun	85	----	----	----	85
4″ Chemical Mortar	----	----	----	----	200
4.2″ Chemical Mortar	----	----	----	----	200

Notes

Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution f other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

[17] (Inclosure No. 8)

Load of aircraft ammunition per airplane

Item	Type Airplane						
	Bombers			Pursuit			OBS. (C&D)
	Hv. (B17D)	Med. (B-18)	Lt. (A20A)	(P-40)	(P36A)	(P-26)	1-engine (O-47)
Ctg. AP Cal 30							
Ctg. ball Cal 30	480	1,280	1,920	1,600	400	800	640
Ctg. tr Cal 30	120	320	480	400	100	200	160
Total Cal 30#	600	1,600	2,400	2,000	500	1,000	800
Ctg. AP Cal 50	60			20	10		
Ctg. ball Cal 50	900			300	150		
Ctg. tr Cal 50	240			80	40		
Total Cal 50#	1,200			400	200		
BOMBS							
Bomb frag. 30# and			40			10	
Bomb Demo. 100# or	20	32	12				
Bomb Demo. 300# or	14	14	4				
Bomb Demo. 500-600# or	8	6	2				
Bomb Demo. 1000-1100# or	6	4	1				
Bomb Demo. 2000#	4	2					
PYROTECHNICS							
Bomb Photoflash	[1] 4	[1] 4					[1] 4
Flare M26 [2]	3	3	1				1
Flare M 9	6	6	6				5
Sig. AC Asstd	20	20	20				20
Sig. Drift	10	7					

[1] For Reconnaissance squadrons only.
[2] Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.

[1] OPERATIONS ORDERS

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

PART VI—FIELD ORDER NUMBER 1 NS (NAVAL SECURITY)

Field Orders No.—Ins HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Date)[1] (Hour)[1]

Maps: Topographic, Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (1940 Edition): Terrain Map, Island of Oahu, 1/20,000 (1940 Edition); Island of Oahu 1/180,000 (1939 Edition); Hawaiian Islands, Eastern Part U. S. C&G.S. Chart No. 4102.

1. *a.* (1) For information of the enemy see Current Summaries of Intelligence.

(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers.

[1] Date and hour this Field Order becomes effective will be announced by orders from this headquarters. See also par. 3 *c* (6) (Page *3*).

b. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include:

(1) By the Pacific Fleet:

(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are operating.

(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.

(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit to locate and destroy hostile submarines.

(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and attached units):

[2] (a) Establishment of an inshore patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol at the entrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and daily mine sweeping operation.

(b) The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing Two, attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing to search for and attack hostile surface ships.

(c) Establishment of a harbor control post.

(d) The placing under the tactical control of the Army of certain land based fighter aircraft and Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery units.

2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.

3. *a.* The Hawaiian Division will provide protection for vital installations on Oahu, except those located within Police District No. 1, against acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers, will maintain one infantry battalion with necessary motor transportation in readiness at Schofield Barracks prepared to move on two hours notice, and will maintain normal training activities with the remainder of the command.

b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, supported by such Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery units as may be made available, will defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, paying particular attention to the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field area, and in addition thereto, will—

(1) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

(2) Cooperate with Army and Navy Air Forces in safe guarding friendly aircraft from the fire of antiaircraft artillery troops.

(3) Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor and the Army antiaircraft artillery defense as may be practicable. This coordination will include measures to protect friendly aircraft from the antiaircraft artillery fire of Naval ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(4) Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, disseminate warnings of hostile air attacks by radio broadcast.

(5) Unless specifically authorized, railway guns will not be moved from the home stations of the units manning this armament.

[3] *c.* The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fleet aircraft, will defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, will attack hostile Naval vessels, and in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:

(1) *Offensive Action.* Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels. Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.

(2) *Defensive Action.* Reinforced by shore based fighter aircraft of the Navy made available, defend Oahu against air attack. Provide antiaircraft machine gun defense for airplanes on ground on all fields.

(3) *Reconnaissance.* Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces in securing information of hostile fleet movements.

(4) *Cooperation.* In the preparations for and conduct of joint air operations, close cooperation will be maintained with the commanders of local Navy air units. Close cooperation will also be maintained with the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade to provide for safeguarding Army and Navy aircraft from the fire of friendly antiaircraft artillery.

(5) *Conidtions of Readiness.* Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.

(6) *Hostile Air Attack.* Air operations directed above will be instituted without further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condition of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon Oahu or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and crews thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.

d. The Department Signal Officer, in cooperation with Naval communications personnel will insure that, insofar as equipment available permits, the joint communications described in Section III of Annex No. VII, HCF–39 are in readiness for immediate employment at any time that they may be required.

e. The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Be prepared to initiate such precautionary measures as may be required by the situation to insure protection of vital installations within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, exclusive of those located on garrisoned Army and Navy reservations. These precautionary measures will be limited to the minimum necessary in order to avoid undue alarm and hysteria of the civil population.

[4] (2) Maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to determine any indications of the possibility of sabotage by hostile sympathizers.

f. The Commanding Officers, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, Department Service Command will maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to determine indications of the possibility of sabotage or attacks by hostile sympathizers, take such precautionary steps as may be required by the situation within the means available to them, and when necessary, secure the cooperation of civilian agencies in the guarding of military airfields.

x. (1) All major units of the defense will cooperate with the 14th Naval District and elements of the Pacific Fleet in all spheres of action compatible with their missions, armament, and equipment.

(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under the following conditions:

(a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, torpedoes, mines or other ammunition, has been observed.

(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.

(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.

(3) Instructions will be issued to all sentinel and patrols guarding vital installations requiring that ammunition will be used only after all other measures have been employed, without success.

(4) During periods when elements of the command are alerted under the provisions of this order, normal training will be continued to the extent practicable.

4. *a.* Small arms and artillery ammunition issued to troops initially will not exceed approximately one-half day of fire. Provision will be made for prompt issue of additional quantities of ammunition. Stocks of aircraft ammunition and bombs will be maintained at airfields in accordance with existing policies.

b. Other administrative details normal.

5. Command Posts:

Hawaiian Department: Fort Shafter.
Hawaiian Division: Schofield Barracks.
[5] Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Fort DeRussy.
Hawaiian Air Force: Fort Shafter.
Fourteenth Naval District: Pearl Harbor.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

(S) Philip Hayes
PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
(S) R. C. Throckmorton
R. C. THROCKMORTON,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3.

[6] Distribution:
Distributed as a component part of "Army Operating Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1938"

* * * * * * *

[1] EXTRACTS FROM NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW NO. 5

PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

SECTION 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

* * * * * * *

3233. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the Pacific Area are assigned the following tasks:

(a) *Task.*

Defend the Naval Coastal Frontiers in categories indicated below:

* * * * * * *

Category D. * * *
—The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier

* * * * * * *

APPENDIX I—ANNEX 1. COASTAL FRONTIERS

* * * * * * *

9. Insert in reference (a) (Joint action of the Army and Navy, 1935) the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

"(a) Boundaries.

"The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for its defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman's Reef.

[2] "(b) Commanders.

"Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

"Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3 QL/(13)
Serial 01646

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *October 14, 1941.*

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (REVISED)

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : Pacific Fleet
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference:
(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
(b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2 (13) Serial 01221 of 3 August 1941.
(c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
(d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
(e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L 40 (Revised).
(f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
(g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
(h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.
Enclosure:
(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sector.
(B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

[2] (A) *Continuous Patrol:*

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(*B*) *Intermittent Patrols:*

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol:

(a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (Ready Duty) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°–21′ N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(*C*) *Sortie and Entry:*

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A–1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A."

[3] (4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A–1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.
(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.
(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.
(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B)(1)(b) and (B)(2)(b), above.
(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

(*D*) *Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).
(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.
(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.
(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.
(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C–5, C–7, U–1, M–20, M–21 and M–24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C–5 and C–7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.
[4] (6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.
(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.
(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(*E*) *Ships at Sea:*

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:
(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.
(2) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:
Priority 1—BBs
Priority 2—CVs
Priority 3—CAs
Priority 4—CLs
(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to cooperate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.
(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.
(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness Three on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(h) Maintenance of material condition X-ray, or equivalent to all ships.

[5] (i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(l) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(*F*) *Ships in Port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(*G*) *Defense Against Air Attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

[6] (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Feet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

CONDITION I.—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

CONDITION II.—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

CONDITION III.—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(*a*) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

[7] (*b*) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c) above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(*c*) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(*H*) *Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in Operating Area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A. Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

Ships other than one attacked.

(*b*) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(*c*) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

[8] (*d*) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(*e*) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which

assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(*f*) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(*g*) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(*h*) *Base Force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(*i*) *Patrol Wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(*j*) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(*k*) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(*l*) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(*m*) *Task Force Commander at Sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation [9] and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL

Distribution: (5CM–41)
List II, Case 1: A. X.
EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11–12–13–14, NY8–10,
(A1—Asiatic, A1—Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLEY,
Flag Secretary,

USS Penn.—75—10–15–41—1,000.


PEARL HARBOR MOORING AND BERTHING PLAN
I
II
III
IV

Confidential

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)
(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)
(B) (3)
(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)
(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
(E) (2)
(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

[1] File
C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0164)
Confidential
Operation Plan No. 1-41

HEADQUARTERS,
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 27 February 1941.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Inshore Patrol* (Commander Inshore Patrol)
Destroyer Patrol (2 DD)
Outer—1 DD
Inner—1 DD
Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)
Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)
A/B Boom
Mine Sweepers—Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86) Anchored (Mine Force and Base Force Detail)

(b) *Base Defense Air Force* (Commander Patrol Wing Two) In conjunction with Army.

(c) *Anti Aircraft Defense* (District Marine Officer) In conjunction with Army.

(d) *Harbor Control Post* (District Operations Officer) In conjunction with Army.

1. *Information.* Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No. CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1 CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

[2] (3) A combination of these two—possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HAROR and to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Inshore Patrol.* Maintain a continuous patrol of the Interior Waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan—Annex "A".

(b) *Base Defense Air Force.* Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area.

Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan—Annex "B".

(c) *Anti-Aircraft Defense.* Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.

The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan—Annex "C".

(d) *Harbor Control Post.* Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone circuits separate from dial system, to Army and Navy activities necessary for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction and cooperation with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5 November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan—Annex "D".

[3] (x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the task groups concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements.

4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E".

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

C. C. BLOCH,
Naval Base Defense Officer,
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District).

Annexes:

A. Inshore Patrol Plan
B. Base Defense Air Force Plan
C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan
D. Harbor Control Post Plan
E. Communication Plan.

Distribution-complete with Annexes.

CinCPAC (10)
CG HD (20)
Dist. Marine Officer 14ND
Operations Officer 14ND
Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND
Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL
District Intelligence Officer 14ND
NTS 14ND (10)
CO NAS PHTH (5)
CO SUB BASE PHTH (5)
COMAIRSCOFOR (3)
CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)
COMBATFOR (15)
COMSCOFOR (15)
Combat ships (17)
COMCRUBATFOR (25)
COMAIRBATFOR (50)
COMDESBATFOR (165)
COMIXBATFOR (20)
COMCRUSCOFOR (25)
COMSUBSCOFOR (40)
COMPATWINGTWO (20)
COMBASEFOR (75)
COMDR. 2ND. MAR. AIR CRP (10)
COMDESDIVTWO (05)

[1] File -A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0563)

Confidential

ANNEX "A" REVISED TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN NO. 1–41

Operation Plan I. S. P. No. A–1–41

HEADQUARTERS,
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Outer Harbor Patrol:* Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Eighty, TANEY, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.

(1) *Picket line:* Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol:* C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Eighty, or TANEY.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer:* C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol:* Senior Boat Officer.

(1) *Entrance Channel Patrol:* Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.

(2) *Boom Patrol:* Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol:* Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combase.

(1) *Drydock Channel Patrol:* Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(2) *East Loch Patrol:* Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(3) *Middle Loch Patrol:* Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(4) *West Loch Patrol:* Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.

(d) *A/B Boom:* Lieut. Spear.

Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) *Minecraft:*

(1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Cmdr. C. D. Kine, D–O, USNR REEDBIRD, CONDOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBELL.

(2) YS–86; C. O. Towing Vessel. KEOSANOU, and YT–142 towing vessels detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

[2] 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan, No. 1–41 Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint Coastal Defense Plan)," are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups:

"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortified harbor includes the *Outer Harbor Area*, the *Harbor Channel Area*, and the *Inner Harbor Area*."

"*The OAHU Defensive Coastal Area* (Oahu D. C. A.) comprises all water areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii as follows:—

KEAHI POINT ..... Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI ..... Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION ..... } Tweenty-three thousand (23,000) yards."
KAHUKU POINT ..... }

"*The Outer Harbor Area* is the water area which extends to seaward from the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the range of the habor defense batteries." (OAHU being a small island containing three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONOLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area).

"*The Harbor Channel Area* is the water area which lies between the *Outer Harbor Area* and the *Inner Harbor Area*, and which comprises all the entrance channels to the harbor.

"*The Inner Harbor Area* is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor."

[3] This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships.

3. (a) *Outer Harbor Patrol* maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) *Picket Line* patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency ~~2760~~ 2690 kcs. ~~(2792 in peace time).~~ Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) as ordered. (Details in Addendum I)

(2) *Channel Entrance Patrol* patrol the seaward area within one and one half mile radius of entrance buoys. Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen. Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17–41 (Revised). Report movements of foreign registry ships.

(3) *Ready Duty Destroyer* moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in [4] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness: Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots. (If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).

(b) *Harbor Channel Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:

(1) *Boom Patrol* patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).

(2) *Entrance Channel Patrol* patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).

(c) *Inner Harbor Patrol* maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).

(d) A/B Boom to be maintained and operated at present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

(e) *Minecraft* conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of [5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operation, the senior commanding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority" in plain language, addressed to the Commandant Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District, "Clear" to mean

"The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed."

(2) YS–86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.

(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be stationed at present, due to lack of avilable vessels:

(a) (1) *Picket Line.*

(b) (2) *Entrance Channel Patrol.*

(2) The following task group under Task Organization will be administered by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No. 6–40 of 12 June 1940:

(c) Inn Harbor Patrol

4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1–41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27 February 1941.

5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base defense Communication Plan, Annex E.

Use zone time plus ten and one half.

Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ G. B. Woolley
G. B. Woolley,
Commander, U. S. N. (Ret).,
Commander Inshore Patrol,
Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ J. W. Bays
J. W. Bays,
Aide to Commandant.

Distribution:
Same as Basic Plan.

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[1] C–A16–3/A4–3(5)/ND14(0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ANNEX BAKER TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 1–41 DATED FEBRUARY 27, 1941—NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A–1–41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.
Shore-based VO—VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air.
Combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group* (Senior VF Squadron Commander)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. *Information:*

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL–41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and

attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

[2] *Assumptions:* As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) *Search and Attack Group.* (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) *Air Combat Group.* (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditiions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1–41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1–40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.
Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated:
[Signature illegible]
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

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[1] C–A16–3/4–3(5)/ND14(0348)

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force,
Patrol Wing Two,
Naval Air Station
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADDENDUM 1 TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A–1–41

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. *Summary of the Situation.*

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. *Survey of Opposing Strengths.*

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10–8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU, as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. *Possible Enemy Action.*

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably comopsed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second

attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing condi- [4] tions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. *Action open to us:*

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt despatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. *Decisions:*

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

[6] 2. *Subsidiary decisions.* In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group* (*Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force* (*Commander Patrol Wing TWO*)) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO–VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army Bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group* (Commander Hawaiian Air Force) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. *Search and Attack Group.* Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group.* Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.
(c) Information is received than an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shal be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number frmo the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functioned type available and ready for task.
C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routing operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
2. All types—30 minutes.
3. All types—one hour.
4. All types—two hours.
5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks asigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information curently available to them.

In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A–1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B–1 and B–2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condiiton I, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

Authenticated:

/s/ J. W. HAYES,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

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[1] C–A16–3/A4–3(5)/ND14 (0348)

Confidential

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

ADDENDUM II TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A–1–41—CONDITIONS OF READINESS AND READINESS REPORTS

1. Conditions of readines will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.
2. All types—30 minutes.
3. All types—one hour.
4. All types—two hours.
5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

[2] 3. *Readiness Reports:*

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A–1–41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

Task Organizations:

(a) *Group One:* All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41 to Sector I.

(b) *Group Two:* Those so assigned to Sector II.

(c) *Group Three:* Those so assigned to Sector III.

(d) *Group Four:* Those so assigned to Sector IV.

(e) *Group Five:* All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present.

1. *Information:* See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41, Fourteenth Naval District Operation Plan 1–41 and OCABF–38. Information on special situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the Communication Plan, Annex "E".

2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defence of OAHU: (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) *Groups One to Four, inclusive:* Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41.

(b) *Group Five:* Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade.

4. *Logistics: Group Five:* Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies—normal. Ammunition except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.

5. *Group Five:* Command Post: To be announced later.

H. K. PICKETT,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps.
District Marine Officer.

Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Army,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force,
(Commandant, 14th Naval District).

[1] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0164)

Confidential

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Washington, December 5, 1941.

Operation Plan No. 1-41

ANNEX "D"

Task Organization

(a) Harbor Control Post District Operations Officer.

1. *Information.* As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army Circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Amy observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert" considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operate in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

3. (a) *Harbor Control Post.*

(1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections:

Harbor Control Post to
Hdqtrs. Haw'n Dept. Ft. Shafter
Hdqtrs. HSCAB, Ft. Derussy
Command Post, Ft. Kamehameha
Command Post, Hickam Field
Commander Patrol Wing Two
SOPE (if at dock)
Navy Yard Signal Tower
Navy Yard Power House

(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power [2] House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.

(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the Communication Plan, Annex "E," and be prepared to direct Power House as to Signal to be used (See paragraph 6,000, *Special Signals.*)

(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore Patrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.

(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.

4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time as watch standers are available to the Operations Officer, the necessary officer watch standing duties after working hours, will be carried out by the District and Navy Yard Duty Officer.

(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Control Post:

Condition I: Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.

Condition II: Post manned by Army and Navy watch officers, telephone and teletype operators on watch.

Note: Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.

Condition III: Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District and Yard Duty Officer on call.

[3] 5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 508; after working hours on Honolulu 75143.

(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.

(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations Office), headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.

/s/ H. B. Knowles
H. B. KNOWLES
Commander, U. S. Navy
District Operations Officer

Approved:
/s/ C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH
Naval Base Defense Officer
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District)

Distribution: In accordance with Distribution List of Operating Plan No. 1–41

EXHIBIT NO. 45

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

[Stamped notation:] Nov 28, 1941. Noted—Chief of Staff.
(WBS—handwritten). Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff.
(WBS—handwritten).

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conferenec with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:
Memo. for President, 11–27–41
Memo. for TAG, 11–27–41

EXHIBIT NO. 46

PO 14
325P

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

NOVEMBER 28, 1941

453A M.

From MANILA PI

To GENERAL GEORGE C MARSHALL

SECRET

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1004 NOVEMBER TWENTY EIGHTH

PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR RADIO SIX TWO FOUR AIR RECONNAISSANCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND INTENSIFIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NAVY STOP GROUND SECURITY MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN STOP WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THIS THEATRE OF OPERATIONS EVERYTHING IS IN READINESS FOR THE CONDUCT OF A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE STOP INTIMATE LIAISON AND COOPERATION AND CORDIAL RELATIONS EXIST BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY

MACARTHUR

46 A G O
DEC 3 '41
Received

NOTED - CHIEF OF STAFF

NOTED, WPD

SECRET

Action Copy

O.C.S/18136-118

F.N. 4/28/41

P 9 J RADIOGRAM 0-4-c

605P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 28, 1941

557A M.

From FORT SHAFTER TH

To CHIEF OF STAFF

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 959 NOVEMBER 27TH

REPORT DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD

LIAISON WITH NAVY REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTY SEVENTH

SHORT

Noted H.S.

46 A G O
DEC 3 1941
Received

NOTED, WPD L.S.

FILE NOV 28 1941

Action Copy

REDIFORM-FARD-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC. NIAGARA FALLS N.Y.

P.N. 11/28/41

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE, SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF

DISPOSITION SLIP

Subject of paper: 18136-118 and

To	Tally No. 18136-120	Date
	Office, The Ass't Sec. of War	
	Adm. Ass't S/W	
	A. C. of S., G-1	
	A. C. of S., G-2	
	A. C. of S., G-3	
	A. C. of S., G-4	
(1) (2)	A. C. of S., W. P. D.	11/28
	The Adjutant General	
	Budget & Legislative Planning Branch	
	Statistics Branch	
	Executive for Reserve Affairs	

For—

- ..... Necessary action.
- ..... Preparation of study.
- (1) ..... Note and return. FORWARD
- ..... Remark and recommendation.
- ..... Comment or concurrence.
- ..... Inviting attention to {notation / direction} of Sec. War.
- ..... Draft of reply.
- ..... Direct reply.
- ..... Note and file.
- (2) ..... File.
- ..... Signature.
- ..... D. C. of S.

By direction of D. C. of S.

WAR DEPARTMENT
O. C. of S. Form No. 8


NOV 28 1941
OUT
OUT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF

EXHIBIT NO. 47

[Telegram received]

TK. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).
From: Chungking via N. R.
Dated November 3, 1941
Rec'd 8:48 P. M.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

435, November 3, 5 p. m., (Section One).

Reference my 431 not rec'd in Dept. of November 1, 11 a. m.

Foreign Minister has now sent me copy of Generalissimo's message to President which was telegraphed yesterday to Hu Shih who no doubt will make it available to the Department. I am forwarding copy by airmail unless instructed to repeat it by radio.

The message differs in form but not in substance from that originally summarized to me by Foreign Minister.

It is not yet certain that Japan will undertake the difficult invasion of Yunnan from Indochina but I believe it is certain that in any case large Japanese air forces will operate from that base against the Burma Road within China and against the American or any other volunteer air force when they enter China.

It is true, of course, that a major defeat of a Japanese attack upon Yunnan would have very advantageous effects in restraining Japanese ambitions in the Far East.

If it should be found possible and practicable to send Anglo-American air units into Yunnan they should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air concentrations.

GAUSS.

KLP

[Telegram received]

DES. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).
From: Chungking via N. R.
Dated November 3, 1941
Rec'd 6:45 a. m., 4th.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Priority.
435, November 3, 5 p. m. (Section Two).

Half or token measures would prove disastrous. Maintenance and supply of such an air force in Yunnan would heavily tax facilities of the Burma Road, operation of which would probably need to be under effective military control. Advance depots of supplies would need to be built up at once. Time factor is of utmost importance if as the Generalissimo thinks, Japanese are to move in immediate future.

The successful invasion of Yunnan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese morale and deprive China of supplies for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan's problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(End of Message)

GAUSS.

BB

(Handed me by Mr. Liu XI–4–41, 9:30 a. m. /s/ SKH)

Telegram from Chungking November 2, 1941

(Rec'd from S File—H. E. F.)

Confidential.
Message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt.

"In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr. Winston Churchill:

" 'Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yunnan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming and to cut China's lines of communication with Britain and the United States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of expansion either northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and my right to impress them upon you, for much the future lies in your hands.

" 'Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan's war of aggression on [2] China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.

" 'You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can our army do against another that is strong in the air? A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than four years on the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand's reach. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.

" 'For more than four years now China has kept some five million men in the field and thus immobilizes the [3] man-power of Japan. The implications of this must be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized by yourself and all other friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole might elsewhere. The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the European (?) war may hang upon it.

" 'If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this [4] war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they mean to do, one by one, I am not asking you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, to make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.

" 'You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she is * * * by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon this the fate of democratic cause will [5] turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British and American willingness to cooperate in the defence of Yunnan. If the Japanese

can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the plea that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression.'

"I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America; if the United States would draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation. I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You [6] are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now essential to avoid the errors by which statesmen of Europe allowed Nazi Germany to divide them and to acquire a commanding position, and to prevent Japan from attacking us in succession and separately and thus attaining the stature of a second Nazi Germany in the Far East."

(signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

In reply refer to No. Op–16–F–2 Copy No. 1

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washington, November 1, 1941.

Secret

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 3ØØ85Ø

1. In this dispatch Major McHugh assumes that a Japanese drive from northern Indo-China to cut the Burma Road is imminent. He further states that the only hope of blocking this drive would be active participation in the campaign of all American and British Far Eastern air units which would require foreign (presumably American) seizure and control of means of transportation and air fields in Yunnan province.

2. In a message which the American Ambassador states is now being forwarded to President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek states that the Japanese will launch a drive to cut the Burma Road within 30 days. He takes a somewhat less serious view of the situation than does Major McHugh. Chiang says that he has land forces adequate to defend the road but will need air support. He indicates that he desires aid from British and American air effectives in Singapore and Manila in a voluntary status. He says nothing about foreign control of Chinese air fields and Chinese means of communication.

3. Considering the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Indo-China border and Kunming, it is believed that the *Chinese, if they fight* and are given some air support from Britain and America, can halt this Japanese drive. The Japanese now have less than 100,000 men in Indo-China. How many they can transport there in the next 30 days is problematical, but it is considered that they cannot maintain their present concentrations (which threaten Russia in the North), maintain their present garrisons in China, and at the same time spare more than 200,000 troops for the drive into Yunnan.

4. The real question here is: Will the Chinese fight? In this connection there have been many rumors that Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan Province, has sold out or soon will sell out to Wang Ching-wei. If this happens there is little that Chiang Kai-shek, the British, or the United States can do to save the Burma Road. This rumor, however, lacks confirmation.

5. Chinese character should also be taken into consideration. When aid is promised to them they have a strong tendency to stop fighting themselves, sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major

McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan—in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

(Signed) R. A. BOONE,
For A. H. MCCOLLUM.

Distribution: Original and 1 copy to DNI—Copy No. 1 and 2
CC—Op-16-F—Copy No. 3
Op-10/11—Copy No. 4
Op-12—Copy No. 5
File—Copy No. 6

[Copy]

Secret
From: Alusna, Chungking. Action: OPNAV PRIORITY
Date: 30 October 1941.
Tor Coderoom: 1450.
Decoded by: TIERS.
Paraphrased by: REISS.
300850 CR 0531

Active participation all American British Far East air units would be only hope for blocking invasion Yunnan which Sinos now seek. Supply and protection available fields however very serious task not repeat not presently feasible under existing conditions. Transport over Burma Road still insufficient and lacking coordination. Problem possible of solution only if highest home authorities order immediate action thereby justifying seizure and operating under foreign control of all available transport including civil air. Believe Chiang will support this also that general public reaction would inspire voluntary Sino cooperation. Present indirect methods for timely results totally inadequate.

20 OP File CNO File

Distribution:
16 Action Record Copy 12 13 Bauer File.

Naval Message Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: Addresses Message precedence
From: Alusna Chungking
Released by: OPNAV PPPPPP Astalusna Shanghai
Date: 30 October 1941 CINCPAC PPPPPP
TOR Coderoom: 1433 CINCAF
De/coded by: TIERS COMSOPAT
Paraphrased by: V. TUCKER COM 16TH Nav Dist

Troops arrived daily Haiphong plus steady stream of supplies and materials reported arriving at Formosa and Hainan indicate possible invasion Yunnan. Such operation while difficult would be feasible if executed in force. Chinese contention that it would be turning point in battle for Asia believed correct. Capture of Kunming would completely crush Sino resistance while penetration even to Mengtze would close Burma Road. Foreign attaches here agree minimum requirement is 7 divisions and preferably ten.

Distribution:
16 Action
10/11 12 13 20OP FILE FILE.
[Stamped:] Confidential Top Secret.

OCTOBER 28, 1941.
2:42 P. M.

NPM 5342
Filed 0140

Priority

From: CHUNGKING.
To: FOR AMMISCA.
Number 28. October 28th.

Part 1. Especial attention Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The Generalissimo, who has been absent since our arrival, received me today, accompanied by MacMorland. After exchange of messages and amenities he expressed deep appreciation for the sending of the mission.

In order to get his reaction to the objectives of the mission I outlined my conception of the methods to be employed in making available the assistance afforded by lend lease material and services. I suggested five different military problems to which lend lease material was applicable and regarding which our personnel could collaberate on the solution. These were: 1, the communications problem; 2, the aviation project; 3, the supply of equipment to reorganized army forces; 4, the supply of raw materials; 5, the projects for training in and maintenance of new material.

Part 2. He made a note of these five points and expressed satisfaction with this method of approach, then quickly singled out aviation as the most pressing problem. He stated bluntly that he would like the mission to take over the control and development of his aviation service, disregarding apparently the Chinese air force and referring to Chennault's volunteer force as the only aviation that counted.

He requested with emphasis that a high ranking aviation officer be sent to take over his air force.

[2] I had no opportunity to comment on these points.

Becoming intently earnest he said there was another emergency about which he wished to ask immediate assistance. More follows.

Part 3. The Japanese, he knew, were preparing to attack Kunming from Indo China and cut the Burma Road. He expects the attack by the end of November. By a concentration of his land forces he could resist this attack, he said, but only if he had air support. Then, queried later, he insisted that he had the resources to defeat the Japanese if air assistance were forthcoming. The generalissmo insisted, and rightly, that Chinese resistance would end if Kunming were lost. In his analysis he argued that Kunming was the key to the Pacific, if it fell, China would fall, and the attack on Malay Asia would inevitably follow. War in the Pacific then, was a certainty. If China could hold, peace in the Pacific might be saved. But China must have air support, he repeated. The British should reinforce the American volunteer unit. They must be convinced of the necessity of this course of action. Although not so expressed, it was to be inferred that no other assistance would be forthcoming in time. Not once did he mention American reinforcements of any kind, pleading the critical situation he repeatedly said that only British air support could save China and peace in the Pacific.

Part four. The generalissimo then asked directly that I inform Washington of the threatening situation at once, and urge that the President intercede with London to make available the Singapore air forces to support his defense. Also he requested me personally to appeal to the British commander in chief in Singapore to the same effect. Para. Quoting some announcement of the administration to the effect that a movement [3] southward by Japan would be considered inimical to American interests, he argued that our govt could properly interpret an attack on Kunming in that light. Even worse, since it would be the first item in a more effective movement south if Chinese resistance were eliminated he added that with the Burma Road cut, America's right to trade with China would be infringed.

Part 5. He then pled that the President be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests. This course, he believed, would cause Japan to desist.

In the circumstances, I had no opportunity to turn the interview into channels in which I was authorized to act. I seized one opportunity to point to the critical deficiency of operations on the Burma Road that the success of the defense depended upon improving the traffic there whether or not the British gave all support. I further reminded him that an argument the British might offer for refusing

support would be their inability to supply their air units with the road in its present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.

Part 6. The generalissimo informed me that he had taken up the question of aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large land forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurences of air support if Kunming were attacked, unless British territory were invaded.

I told the generalissimo that I could transmit his request to the Secretary of War.

[4] Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also it is doubtless true that without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in this decisive effort.

Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months. Increments of lend lease aviation matériel contemplated will be too little and too late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.

I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.

MAGRUDER.

EXHIBIT NO. 48

WPD 2917-32 WPD 2917-26-47 396

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects—Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.

3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you. The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4. If The Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

/s/ L. T. Gerow,
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:
Memo. to C/S, fr.
Actg. A. C. of S., WPD.
JB No. 350 (Ser. 678)

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November 17, 1941.

WPD 2917-32

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

I. *Discussion.*

1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of command is now before the Joint Planning Committee.

2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following coastal frontiers:

a. Caribbean.

Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being vested in the Commandant of the 10th Naval District.

b. Panama.

Coordination by unity of command, command being vested in the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the Commandant of the 15th Naval District.

c. Hawaii.

Coordination by unity of command as follows:

(1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.

(2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.

3. The Army section proposes the following, applicable to all coastal frontiers:

a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet or the major portion thereof is operating against comparable hostile forces within the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases within the coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested in the Navy

[2] *b.* In a specific operation, unity of command in coastal frontiers may be transferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested to assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate from bases outside the coastal frontier.

4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity of command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that the Navy section will agree to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation.

5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military operation is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingness to cooperate can eliminate the objections inherent in the committee system of control of military forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted with the successful attack on that Island in which the attacking force presumably was commanded by a single individual.

6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within the Army and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difficulties encountered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination by mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.

7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of the operations. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play the major part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major responsibility may well pass from one service to the other during defensive operations. On the other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations requiring support from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems in which the service having preponderance of responsibility can readily be determined. The time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its nature and extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of responsibility definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating the service in which unity of command should vest. In [3] such operations the preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.

8. A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that, although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services.

II. *Action recommended.*

That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee.

/s/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

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[1] OCS 21278-10

GCM
DECEMBER 20, 1941.

Personal and Confidential

MY DEAR EMMONS: Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him this morning.

You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

General DELOS C. EMMONS,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, T. H.

MY

EXHIBIT NO. 48A

Confidential 2917–32

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, December 5, 1941.

OCS 21278–5

Memorandum for General Gerow:

I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval Section of the Joint Planning Committee. However, I think it is important that a general policy, or what might be called an explanation, should first be decided on, expressed in carefully considered sentences, as to the *application* of unity command.

A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum and you have covered it orally to me, but no where is it presented in a concise form.

[handwritten] G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.

EXHIBIT NO. 49

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

STAFF CONVERSATIONS

[Pencilled notation:]
Approved by Sec Navy 28 May 41
" " " War 2 June 41
Not approved by President

REPORT

WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 27, 1941.

[Pencilled notation:]
For map showing boundaries described in ABC-1 see Copy No. 97 of ABC 1 & 2.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B. U. S. (J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

	No. of pages	Change in effect
Cover Page	i	ORIGINAL
List of Effective Pages	ii	ORIGINAL
Report	title page unnumbered pages 2 to 10 inc.	ORIGINAL
Annex I	pages 1 to 4 inc.	ORIGINAL
Annex II	title page unnumbered pages 2 to 3 inc.	ORIGINAL
Annex III	pages 1 to 32 inc.	ORIGINAL
Annex IV	title page unnumbered pages 2 to 5 inc.	ORIGINAL
Annex V	title page only (unnumbered)	ORIGINAL

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

GENERAL

1. Staff Conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941, between a United States Staff Committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a United Kingdom Delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were associated with the United Kingdom Delegation throughout the course of these conversations, but were not present at joint meetings.

2. The personnel of the United States Staff Committee and of the United Kingdom Delegation comprise the following:

United States Representatives:
Major-General S. D. Embick
Brigadier-General Sherman Miles
Brigadier-General L. T. Gerow
Colonel J. T. McNarney

Rear-Admiral R. L. Ghormley
Rear-Admiral R. K. Turner
Captain A. G. Kirk
Captain DeWitt C. Ramsey
Lt.-Colonel O. T. Pfeiffer

British Representatives:
Rear-Admiral R. M. Bellairs
Rear-Admiral V. H. Danckwerts
Major-General E. L. Morris
Air Vice-Marshal J. C. Slessor
Captain A. W. Clarke

Secretariat:
Lt.-Colonel W. P. Scoboy
Commander L. R. McDowell
Lt.-Colonel A. T. Cornwall-Jones

PURPOSES OF THE STAFF CONFERENCE.

3. The purposes of the Staff Conference, as set out in the instructions to the two representative bodies, were as follows:

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

(b) To coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers.

(c) To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme Military control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations.

APPROVAL OF THE REPORT.

4. The Staff Conference, interpreting the foregoing instructions in the light of the respective national positions of the two Powers, has reached agreements, as set forth in this and annexed documents, concerning Military Cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth and its present Allies should the United States associate itself with them in war against Germany and her Allies. The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom.

confirmation required C/S.

(b) The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Heads of Govts.

5. The Chiefs of Staff will request His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions, the Government of India, and the Governments of Allied Powers to the relevant provisions of the agreements herein recorded. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will similarly request the United States Government to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of the Governments of such other American Powers as may enter the war as associates of the United States.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

COLLABORATION IN PLANNING. 6. The High Command of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

ASSUMPTIONS. 7. The term "Associated Powers" used herein is to be taken as meaning the United States and British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

8. The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In those circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and an Association of the United States, the British Commonwealth and its Allies, including the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account.

9. The Conference assumes that the United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but, for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. It is recognised that the amount and nature of the material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealth will influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war.

THE BROAD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. (OBJECT) 10. The broad strategic objective (object) of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE POLICIES. 11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

SECRET
U.S.Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

(a) United States.

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power.

(b) British Commonwealth.

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) Sea Communications.

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort

GENERAL STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

Strategic Concept

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern Approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

(e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres.

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

(g) United States' land forces will support United States' naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States' land forces will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States' forces.

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will be directed towards achieving, as quickly as possible, superiority of air strength over that of the enemy, particularly in long-range striking forces.

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war.

PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

14. Subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III, and to other agreements made between appropriate authorities to meet special conditions, the following principles will govern the exercise of command of the Military forces of the Associated Powers:

(a) In accordance with plans based on joint strategic policy, each Power will be charged with the strategic direction of all forces of the Associated Powers normally operating in certain areas. The areas are defined initially in Annex II.

(b) As a general rule, the forces of each of the Associated Powers should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.

(c) The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

(d) The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

(e) When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.

(f) United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.

MILITARY MISSIONS. 15. To effect the collaboration outlined in paragraph 6, and to ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these missions, the organization of which is described in Annex I, will be as follows:

(a) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

(b) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

16. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.

SECRET
U.S.Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

17. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces.

18. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary.

INTELLIGENCE. 19. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two Powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations.

ANNEXES. 20. Agreements as to the details of the foregoing and as to technical methods of cooperation are annexed hereto as follows:

I. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY MISSIONS.
II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF MILITARY FORCES.
III. UNITED STATES - BRITISH COMMONWEALTH JOINT BASIC WAR PLAN.
IV. COMMUNICATIONS.
V. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING.

79716 O—46—pt. 15——7

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1941

S. D. Embick,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

Sherman Miles,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.

L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Army.

J. T. McNarney,
Colonel, U. S. Army.

R. L. Ghormley,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

R. K. Turner,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.

A. G. Kirk,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DeWitt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

O. T. Pfeiffer,
Lt.-Colonel, U. S. M. C.

R. M. Bellairs,
Rear-Admiral, Royal Navy.

V. H. Danckwerts,
Rear-Admiral, Royal Navy.

E. L. Morris,
Major-General, British Army.

J. C. Slessor,
Air-Vice Marshal, Royal Air Force.

A. W. Clarke,
Captain, Royal Navy.

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A1)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex I
March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

ANNEX I

ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY MISSIONS

DESIGNATION. 1. In accordance with paragraph 15 of the Main Report, the two Powers will establish the following:

(a) The United States Military Mission in London.

(b) The British Military Mission in Washington.

TIME OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MISSIONS 2. These Military Missions will be established and announced as the duly accredited representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff vis-a-vis the Chiefs of Staff of the other Power, immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war as an Associate of the British Commonwealth.

ORGANIZATION OF MISSIONS. 3. The organization of the missions will be such as to enable them to carry out their functions, as prescribed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Main Report.

ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION IN LONDON. 4. The United States Military Mission in London will consist of two members and a staff. The members will be a flag officer of the United States Navy and a general officer of the United States Army. The staff will be approximately as follows:

(a) The Joint Planning Staff, which will collaborate with the Joint Planning Subcommittee of the War Cabinet, will consist of one naval officer and at least three assistants, one army officer and at least three assistants, and a small secretariat.

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A1)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex I
March 27, 1941

(b) The Naval Staff, which will collaborate with the Admiralty and, as necessary, with the Air Ministry, will consist of the following:

Sections	Officer Personnel
Operations	6
Planning	4
Aviation	4
Intelligence	3
Shipping Control	5
Submarine and Anti-Submarine	2
Communications (Signals)	3
Material	4
Secretariat	3
TOTAL	34

(c) The Army Staff, which will collaborate with the War Office and with the Air Ministry, will consist of the following:

Sections	Officer Personnel
Personal Staff	
Aides	1
General Staff	
Chief of Staff	1
G-1(Personnel)	2
G-2(Intelligence)	3
G-3(Organization, Operations, and Training)	3
G-4(Supply and Evacuation)	3
Special Staff	
Aviation	4
Anti-aircraft	2
Armored Force	1
Artillery	1
Chemical Warfare	1
Engineer	2
Infantry	1
Ordnance	2
Signal (Communications)	2
Medical	2
Adjutant General	1
Judge Advocate	1
Quartermaster	2
TOTAL	35

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A1)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex I
March 27, 1941

ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH MISSION IN WASHINGTON.

5. The British Military Mission in Washington will consist of three members, a staff, and a secretariat. The members will be a flag officer of the British Navy, a general officer of the British Army, and an Air Officer of the Royal Air Force. The staff will consist of the following:

(a) The Joint Planning Staff, which will collaborate with the United States Joint Planning Committee, will consist of one Naval, one Army, and one Air Force officer.

(b) The Naval Staff, which will collaborate with the United States Navy Department, will consist of the following:

Sections	Officer Personnel
Operations)	
Convoy and Trade)	
Protection)	4
Intelligence	2
Signals (Communications)	1
Anti-Submarine Warfare	1
Fleet Air Arm	1
TOTAL	9

(c) The Army Staff, which will collaborate with the United States War Department, will consist of the following:

Sections	Officer Personnel
Intelligence	2
Signals(Communications)	1
Antiaircraft	1
Organization	1
Administration	1
TOTAL	6

(d) The Air Staff, which will collaborate with the United States War Department and with the United States Navy Department, will consist of the following:

S E C R E T
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A1)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex I
March 27, 1941.

Sections	Officer Personnel
Intelligence	2
Signals (Communications)	2
Organization and Administration	1
Training	1
Coastal Command	1
TOTAL	7

(e) The Secretariat will consist of approximately three officers and a suitable number of clerical and typing personnel.

(f) The Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand will be represented on the above staff of the Mission in Washington by their service attaches.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A2)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 2
March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

ANNEX II

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF MILITARY FORCES

UNITED STATES AREAS.

1. Upon entering the war the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas:

(a) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West, except:

(1) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

(2) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States - Canada joint agreements.

(b) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows:

(1) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;

(2) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;

(3) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74° West;

except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States - Canada joint agreements. The United States will afford

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A2)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 2
March 27, 1941

1. (b) (Cont'd)

support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

2. As soon after entering the war as the augmentation of its naval forces in the Atlantic will permit, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in that part of the South Atlantic Ocean south of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West.

THE FAR EAST AREA.

3. Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by the Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

(a) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

(b) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

(c) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British naval Commander in Chief, China. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

(d) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A2)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 2
March 27, 1941

3. (d) (Cont'd)

west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

JOINT LAND OFFENSIVES. 4. Responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theater of operations should be established.

BRITISH COMMON-WEALTH AREAS. 5. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Associated Military forces in all other areas not described in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Annex II.

S E C R E T
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

ANNEX III

UNITED STATES - BRITISH COMMONWEALTH JOINT BASIC WAR PLAN

1. This Annex III is the Joint Basic War Plan Number One of the United States and the British Commonwealth for war against the Axis Powers. The assumptions and strategic considerations on which this plan is based will be found in paragraphs 7 to 13 of the Main Report.

2. This Plan is arranged in the following sections:-

I. UNITED STATES AREAS

(a) Western Atlantic (Paragraphs 7 to 16)

(b) Pacific (Paragraphs 17 to 27)

II. THE FAR EAST AREA AND THE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA

(Paragraphs 28 to 38)

III. BRITISH AREAS

(a) United Kingdom and Home Waters (Paragraphs 39 to 52)

(b) North Atlantic (Paragraphs 53 to 61)

(c) South Atlantic (Paragraphs 62 to 69)

(d) Mediterranean and Middle East (Paragraphs 70 to 76)

(e) India and the East Indies (Paragraphs 77 to 80)

3. Uncertainties exist as to the stability of the strategic situations in various theaters, and as to the time of entry into the war of the United States, Japan,

Copy No. 98 of 125. -1-

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

and the Netherlands East Indies. The strategic deployments, strengths, and tasks of the armed forces of the Associated Powers, as hereinafter listed, must therefore be regarded as subject to final decision in the light of the strategical situation at the time when any of these three Powers enter the war.

4. Certain joint agreements are being drawn up between the United States and Canada regarding the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The Staff Conference assumes that these agreements will conform generally to the agreements set out in this Report.

5. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

6. United States naval and British naval, army, and air strengths are assigned on the basis of estimated probable strengths on April 1, 1941, unless otherwise indicated. Naval auxiliary, coastal, and harbor types, and vessels under extensive repair or refit are omitted. United States Army strengths are those which it is estimated will be available on the dates stated herein. See also Appendix B, "General Note on the Disposition of British Naval Forces".

I. UNITED STATES AREAS

THE WESTERN ATLANTIC

Definition of Area.

7. The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas north of Latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West, except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

Naval Forces

8. Tasks

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

(d) Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

So far as practicable the naval forces in the Western Atlantic will be covered and supported, against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the United Kingdom and the Eastern Atlantic.

9. Initial Naval Forces

United States	British Commonwealth
(a) Ocean Escort (based on Halifax)	
3 Battleships	10 Armed Merchant Cruisers *
2 8" Cruisers	8 Submarines *
2 Destroyers (1850 tons)	2 Destroyers *
7 Destroyers	
4 Minesweepers (destroyer type)	
9 Destroyers (old) (temporarily, pending re-gunning)	

* From existing American and West Indies and Halifax Commands. Submarines also in part from Western Approaches Force.

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

(b) Striking Force
(based on Newport, Bermuda or Trinidad, as required)

2 Aircraft Carriers
2 8" Cruisers — NIL.
4 Destroyers
6 Patrol type Seaplanes (Bermuda)

(c) Southern Patrol Force
(based on Trinidad)

4 6" Cruisers (old) — 1 Sloop (Dutch)

(d) Submarine Force

6 Submarines (old) — NIL.

(e) Fleet Marine Force
(based on United States)

1 Infantry Division (7,500 troops)
1 Defense Battalion (900 troops) — NIL.
1 Aircraft Group (63 airplanes)

(f) Coastal Frontiers:

North Atlantic

12 Patrol type Seaplanes — NIL.

Caribbean

12 Patrol type Seaplanes — NIL.
5 Destroyers (old)

Panama

12 Patrol type Seaplanes — NIL.
4 Destroyers (old)

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

10. It is estimated that by July 1, 1941, the following reenforcements will be available for this area. The date on which units of the Pacific Fleet can be moved to the Atlantic, however, will depend upon the situation in the Pacific.

United States.	British Commonwealth.
(a) Ocean Escort	
3 8" Cruisers (2 from Striking Force in paragraph 9b)	NIL.
6 Destroyers (1850 tons)	
(b) Striking Force.	
4 6" Cruisers	NIL.
(d) Submarine Force.	
3 Submarines (old)	NIL.
(g) Patrol Planes	
12 Patrol type Seaplanes (Assignment indeterminate)	NIL.

Land Forces

11. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with naval and air forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the expansion of enemy military or political power into the Western Hemisphere by denying use to the enemy of land positions in that Hemisphere.

(b) In conjunction with naval and air forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

(c) Relieve, as soon as practicable, British forces in Curacao and Aruba (subject to the agreement of the Netherlands Government in London).

(d) Provide derensive garrisons for bases leased in British territory.

(e) Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany.

12. United States Land Forces

(a) Continental United States

The Army of the United States now in process of organization consisting of:

2 Cavalry Divisions
4 Armored Divisions
27 Infantry Divisions

Appropriate Army, Corps, and GHQ reserve units

The above includes a reinforced Corps of three Infantry Divisions which will normally be maintained as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and the Latin American Republics. A maximum of four Infantry Divisions and two Armored Divisions will be trained and equipped by September 1, 1941.

(b) Overseas Garrisons on April 1, 1941

Panama Canal - 23,000 troops
Puerto Rico - 12,000 troops
Newfoundland - 1,000 troops

13. British Commonwealth Land Forces

(a) Field Army

Now in process of organization in Canada)

1 Armored Division
1 Army Tank Brigade
2 Divisions

(b) Garrisons

Jamaica -- One Canadian Battalion
Bermuda -- One Company
Curacao -- One Battalion
Aruba -- One Battalion, less one Company
Newfoundland -- One Canadian Battalion

Air Forces

14. Tasks

(a) Support the land and naval forces in the defense of the Western Hemisphere and in the support of Latin-American Republics by providing for the air defense of vital installations, by destroying enemy expeditionary forces, and by denying use by the enemy or forces supporting the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases.

(b) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

15. United States Air Forces

(a) Continental United States

The GHQ Air Force now in process of organization in Continental United States, consisting of:

9 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
7 Bombardment Groups, Medium
7 Bombardment Groups, Light
14 Pursuit Groups, Interceptor
3 Pursuit Groups, Fighter
1 Composite Group

This force includes all units which may become available for dispatch to overseas theaters of war.

(b) Overseas Garrisons (now in process of organization)

Panama Canal

2 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Light
2 Pursuit Groups, Interceptor
1 Pursuit Group, Fighter

Puerto Rico

1 Bombardment Group, Heavy
1 Pursuit Group, Interceptor

16. British Commonwealth Air Forces

None except minor forces on the east coast of Canada.

THE PACIFIC

Definition of Area

17. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:

(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.

(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.

(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74 West.

Naval Forces

18. Tasks

(a) Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

79716 O—46—pt. 15——8

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

(e) Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extension of enemy Military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

(f) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

19. Initial United States Naval Forces

(a) Pacific Fleet (based in Hawaii)

8 Battleships
2 Aircraft Carriers
8 8" Cruisers
5 6" Cruisers
3 6" Cruisers (old)
5 Destroyers (1850)
40 Destroyers
5 Minesweepers (Destroyer type)
19 Submarines (3 enroute from Atlantic)
4 Submarines (old)
8 Minelayers (Destroyer type)
1 Minelayer
84 Patrol type Seaplanes

(b) Atlantic Reenforcement

(Available for Pacific operations until transferred, vide paragraph 57)

3 Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

4 8" Cruisers
4 6" Cruisers
6 Destroyers (1850 ton)
8 Destroyers

(c) Southeast Pacific Force (based in Canal Zone)

2 6" Cruisers (old)
4 Destroyers

(d) Fleet Marine Force (based on San Diego)

1 Infantry Division (7500 troops)
1 Defense Battalion (900 troops)
1 Aircraft Group (63 planes)

(e) Coastal Frontiers:

Pacific

9 Destroyers (old)
2 Submarines
24 Patrol type Seaplanes

Hawaii

4 Destroyers (old)

20. There will be no British naval forces in this area other than local naval defense craft on the Canadian seaboard.

21. Estimated United States Naval Reenforcements by July 1, 1941.

(a) Pacific Fleet

1 Battleship
1 Aircraft Carrier
10 Submarines
1 Submarine Minelayer

Land Forces

22. Tasks

In conjunction with the naval and air forces in the area:

(a) Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base.

(b) Defend the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast of the United States and Canada, and Alaska, including Kodiak and Unalaska.

(c) Support Latin-American Republics on the West Coast of South America against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy established in this area.

23. United States Land Forces

(a) Continental United States

Included in paragraph 12(a). One Reinforced Division listed therein is reserved on the Pacific Coast for the support of the Latin-American Republics.

(b) Overseas Garrisons on April 1, 1941

Hawaii, 23,000 troops
Alaska, 3,600 troops

24. British Commonwealth Land Forces

Included in paragraph 13 (a).

Air Forces

25. Tasks

(a) Support the land and naval forces in the defense of Oahu, the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast of the United States, Canada, and Alaska, and in the support of Latin-American Republics on the west coast of South America by providing for the air defense of vital installations, by destroying enemy expeditionary forces, and by denying use by the enemy or forces supporting the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases.

(b) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

26. United States Air Forces

(a) Continental United States

Included in paragraph 15 (a).

(b) Overseas Garrisons (now in process of organization)

Hawaii
2 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Light
1 Pursuit Group, Interceptor
1 Pursuit Group, Fighter

Alaska
1 Composite Group, consisting of:
1 Bombardment Squadron, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Medium
1 Pursuit Squadron, Interceptor

27. British Commonwealth Air Forces

None, except minor forces on the West Coast of Canada.

II. THE FAR EAST AREA AND THE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA

Definition of Far East Area

28. The Far East Area is defined as the area bounded by lines from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the Equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

Definition of Australia and New Zealand Area

29. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The limits of these Stations are defined in Appendix "A".

Special Command Relationships

30. The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area will be the responsibility of the respective Commanders of the Military forces concerned. These Commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

31. In the Far East Area the responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British naval Commander in Chief, China. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.

32. The British naval Commander in Chief, China, is also charged with responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australia and New Zealand Area as defined in paragraph 29.

Naval Forces

33. Tasks in the Far East Area

(a) Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis forces.

(b) Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues).

(c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

S E C R E T
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

(d) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

34. Tasks in the Australia and New Zealand Area

The tasks of the naval forces in the Australia and New Zealand Area are the same as those for the Far East Area.

35. Naval Forces

Far East Area

United States Asiatic Fleet

1	8" Cruiser
1	6" Cruiser (old)
13	Destroyers (old)
11	Submarines
6	Submarines (old)
24	Patrol type Seaplanes

Netherlands Forces

2	6" Cruisers
6	Destroyers
11	Submarines
4	Submarines (old)
27	Patrol type Seaplanes (plus 12*)
2	Sloops

*Crews not as yet trained.

Far East Area and Australia and New Zealand Area

British forces available for operations in those areas and the British reenforcements which may be sent:

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

Types of Ships	British and Dominion Forces	Immediate British Reenforcements	Ultimate British Reenforcements
I.	II.	III.	IV.
Battleships	-	-	5(a)
Battlecruisers	-	1(b)	-
Aircraft Carriers	-	1(b)	-
8" Cruisers	1	1(c)	2(d)
6" Cruisers	3	3(c)	5(d)
6" Cruisers (old)	4	-	4
Armed Merchant Cruisers	3	-	-
Destroyers	-	5(e)	27(e)
Destroyers (old)	5	-	-
Flying-Boats	9	-	-
Sloops	1	-	-

(a) 3 from Halifax Force, one from Force H, one from vessels unallocated.

(b) From Force H, vide paragraph 55.

(c) From Force H and other areas.

(d) Probably from Home Fleet and new construction.

(e) From North Atlantic Command and other unallocated vessels, vide paragraph 55 and Appendix B.

Land and Air Forces

36. Tasks

Far East Area

(a) Defend Hong Kong, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies and such other territories and islands as it may be decided from time to time to occupy as bases.

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41).30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

(b) Hold Malaya, Singapore, and Java against Japanese attack.

(c) Support the naval forces.

Australia and New Zealand Area

(d) In conjunction with naval and air forces, protect British territory and prevent the extension of enemy Military power in this area.

(e) Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers.

37. Strength of Land Forces on April 1, 1941:

Philippines

20,000 troops (includes Organized Philippine Army)

Netherlands East Indies

2 Divisions

Hong Kong

4 Battalions

Malaya

Equivalent of 7 Brigade Groups
Note: One additional Brigade Group will arrive late in April, and a second in May, 1941.

Australia and New Zealand

Field Army
One Division is forming in Australia

Garrison
One New Zealand Brigade at Suva, Fiji Islands

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

38. Strength of Air Forces on April 1, 1941:

Philippines
1 Composite Group consisting of ;
1 Bombardment Squadron
3 Pursuit Squadrons

Netherlands East Indies
9 Bomber Squadrons
2 Fighter Squadrons
1 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron
27 (plus 12) Patrol type Seaplanes
(Also shown in paragraph 35)

Malaya
5 Medium Bomber Squadrons
1 Fighter Bomber Squadron
1 Fighter Squadron
2 Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
1 General Reconnaissance Squadron
1 General Reconnaissance Flying-Boat Squadron

NOTE: A program of reenforcement of British air strength for Malaya, which will bring the total number of aircraft in Malaya to 336 (i.e. 22 squadrons), is being carried out gradually as the situation elsewhere permits.

Australia
6 General Reconnaissance Squadrons
4 General Purpose Squadrons
2 Army Cooperation Squadrons
1 Flying-Boat Squadron

New Zealand
3 General Reconnaissance Squadrons

III. BRITISH AREAS

UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS

Definition of Area

S E C R E T
B.U.S.(J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial C11512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

39. (a) Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the northward of Latitude 43° North.

(b) Land areas bordering on, and islands in, the above ocean area.

Naval Forces

40. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with land and air forces protect the British Isles against invasion.

(b) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

41. British Commonwealth and Allied Naval Forces:

(a) Home Fleet

3	Battleships	
2	Battle Cruisers	
2	Aircraft Carriers	
3	8" Cruisers	)
14	6" Cruisers (including some ships armed with 5.25"guns	) NOTE 1.
2	Anti-Aircraft Cruisers	
2	Other Anti-Aircraft ships	
22	Destroyers	
25	Submarines	

NOTE 1. Would be reduced if reenforcements are sent to the Far East, vide paragraph 35.

(b) Mine Laying Squadron

5 Large Minelayers
4 Destroyers

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

(c) Northern and Western Patrols

8 Ocean Boarding Vessels

(d) Western Approaches Command

1 Anti-Aircraft Cruiser
93 Destroyers
49 Corvettes
9 Sloops
14 Submarines NOTE 2.

NOTE 2. 6 of these are included in the submarines shown as Ocean Escorts in paragraph 9(a).

(e) Other Home Commands and Channel and North Sea Trade Protection

1 6" Cruiser, old (gunnery training)
61 Destroyers
7 Corvettes
10 Sloops
5 Submarines
5 Minelayers

42. Initial Strength of United States Naval Forces

(a) Northwest Escort Force

Task. Escort convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief of the Western Approaches.

9 Destroyers
18 Destroyers (old)
48 Patrol type Seaplanes

(b) Submarines

Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.

9 Submarines (old)

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

43. Estimated United States Naval Reenforcements by July 1, 1941:

(a) Northwest Escort Force

5 Destroyers
9 Destroyers (old) (from Ocean Escort, after completion of regunning).

(b) Submarines

3 Submarines (old)
(Assignment indeterminate)

Land Forces

44. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with naval and air forces, hold the United Kingdom against invasion and defend it against air attack.

(b) Defend Iceland and the Faroes.

(c) Undertake offensive land operations as opportunity offers, in accordance with joint United States - British plans to be agreed upon at a later date.

(d) Hold forces in readiness to occupy the Azores and Cape Verde Islands until such time as this responsibility is assumed by the United States.

45. British Commonwealth and Allied Land Forces:

(a) Field Army

28 Divisions (includes 1 in Iceland and 4 Independent Brigade Groups)
1 Armored Division (plus 4 forming)
1 Army Tank Brigade (plus 2 forming)

(b) Air Defense

Approximately 10 anti-aircraft Divisions.

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

46. United States Land Forces.

When the United States enters the war, it will provide:

(a) 1 Reinforced Division to relieve British forces now charged with the defense of Iceland.

(b) Troops for ground and anti-aircraft defenses for such naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces as may be agreed upon at the time.

(c) Approximately one reinforced regiment (Brigade Group) in the United Kingdom.

Note: None of the above will be available before September 1, 1941.

Air Forces

47. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with land and naval forces, defend the British Isles against air attack and invasion.

(b) In conjunction with naval forces, protect shipping against surface, submarine and air attack.

Note: The execution of Tasks (a) and (b) will involve the devotion of a substantial proportion of the air effort to attack on enemy bases.

(c) Conduct a sustained air offensive against German Military power in all areas within range of the United Kingdom.

48. British Commonwealth and Allied Air Forces

These are of the order of 165 squadrons of all classes.

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

49. United States Air Forces

United States Air Forces of the order of 32 squadrons (Bombardment and Pursuit) with appropriate command echelons, will be available for despatch to the United Kingdom during 1941. Additional units will be provided as resources become available, the number and disposition being determined by the Military situation from time to time. In addition the United States will provide one Pursuit and one Bombardment squadron for the defense of Iceland.

50. Pursuit (fighter) units operating in the British Isles will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon.

51. United States Air Bombardment units will conduct offensive operations primarily against objectives in Germany. Operations to defeat attempted invasion or Blockade will be conducted as demanded by the situation.

52. United States Army Command Relationships

Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.

NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

Definition of Area

53. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:

(a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,
(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,
(c) Western boundary, Longitude 40° West,
(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West,

together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

S E C R E T
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

Naval Forces

54. Tasks

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean.

55. British Commonwealth Naval Forces

Force H (Gibraltar)

1 Battleship
1 Battle Cruiser
1 Aircraft Carrier
1 6" Cruiser
8 Destroyers

Gibraltar and Straits Force

7 Destroyers

56. Initial United States Naval Forces

(a) Submarines

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic.

10 Submarines (old)(Gibraltar)

NOTE: It is estimated that an additional 7 United States submarines (old) can be assigned to Gibraltar by July 1, 1941.

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011312-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3.
March 27, 1941.

57. As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, the following United States naval forces will be assigned the tasks in paragraph 54, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision. It is possible, depending upon the situation in the Far East, that Force H will have left Gibraltar for the Indian Ocean or Far East Area before its relief by United States naval forces.

United States Gibraltar Force

3 Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier
4 8" Cruisers
13 Destroyers
12 Patrol type Seaplanes

NOTE: Upon arrival of this force, the United States submarines shown in paragraph 56 (a) will be assigned to it.

Special Command Relationships

58. Strategic direction of the United States Gibraltar Force will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:

(a) To the British Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean.

(b) To the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic.

59. Subject to the preceding paragraph, the Commander of United States Gibraltar Force will exercise strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers which operate in that area. He will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

79716 O—46—pt. 15——9

S E C R E T
B.U.S.(J) (41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title-ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

Land Forces

60. Task

Hold Gibraltar

NOTE: This will be a British responsibility. The present garrison at Gibraltar is four battalions.

Air Forces

61. Task

Support the land and naval forces.

NOTE: There is at present a British Flying-Boat Squadron at Gibraltar which will be released for employment elsewhere when the United States Gibraltar Force assumes the naval tasks in this area.

SOUTH ATLANTIC

Definition of Area

62. (a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African coast,

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between Longitudes 74° West and 33° East,

together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.

Naval Forces

63. Tasks

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

S E C R E T
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

(c) In conjunction with land and air forces, protect the territories of the Associated Powers.

64. British Commonwealth Forces

1 Aircraft Carrier
1 Seaplane Carrier
5 8" Cruisers
7 6" Cruisers (2 old)
14 Armed Merchant Cruisers
6 Corvettes
6 Sloops

Land Forces

65. Task

In conjunction with naval and air forces, defend British and Allied territory.

66. British Commonwealth Forces

British West African Colonies

Approximately 2 Divisions.

South Africa
Field Army
One Division forming.

67. United States Forces

If the United States Navy regularly uses a base in this area, the United States Army will provide the necessary anti-aircraft units.

Air Forces

68. Tasks

(a) In conjunction with naval forces, protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers.

(b) In conjunction with land forces, protect British and Allied territories.

SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12 (R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

69. On April 1, 1941, it will not have been possible to provide any British air forces to fulfill these tasks. If the United States Navy regularly uses a naval base in this area, the United States Army will provide one pursuit squadron and two light bombardment squadrons there.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

70. The Mediterranean and Middle East Areas comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theaters of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area.

Naval Forces

71. Tasks

(a) Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Conduct offensive operations against Axis sea communications to North Africa and Albania, and against Axis territory and islands.

72. British Commonwealth Naval Forces

3 Battleships
2 Aircraft Carriers
1 8" Cruiser
* 7 6" Cruisers (includes some ships armed with 5.25" guns)
2 Anti-Aircraft Cruisers
23 Destroyers
4 Corvettes
14 Submarines

* One returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.

S E C R E T
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

73. As described in paragraph 58, when operating in the Mediterranean area the Commander of the United States Gibraltar Force will operate under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.

Land and Air Forces

74. Tasks

(a) Hold the naval bases necessary for executing the naval tasks given in paragraph 71.

(b) Defend the British position in North Africa, Kenya and Palestine, and conduct offensive operations against Italian overseas possessions.

(c) Support Turkey and Greece.

(d) Conduct offensive operations against the Axis Powers on the Continent of Europe.

75. In view of the operations at present in progress in this theater of war it is not considered desirable to set out the present dispositions and strengths of British land and air forces in this area.

76. It is not proposed to employ United States land or air forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas in the initial stages.

INDIA AND EAST INDIES

Definition of Area

77. (a) India.

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australia Station.

(c) The islands in the above ocean area.

S E C R E T
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

Naval Forces

78. Tasks

(a) Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

(c) Conduct offensive operations against Axis territory in the Red Sea.

79. British Commonwealth Naval Forces

1 8" Cruiser
* 5 6" Cruisers (4 old)
1 A.A. Cruiser
5 Armed Merchant Cruisers
3 Destroyers
12 Sloops
1 Submarine (ex-Italian)

* One returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.

Land and Air Forces

80. The task of the land and air forces is the defense of India and of the islands in the area. The whole of the Army in India is available for this purpose. Six squadrons of obsolete aircraft are maintained for tribal control.

GENERAL

81. In view of the facts that a considerable number of British Commonwealth naval forces are undergoing repair, and new vessels are continually coming forward from construction, it is not practicable to present here the complete distribution of all naval forces of the British Commonwealth. A Note by the British Delegation on this subject is attached as Appendix B.

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

APPENDIX A

LIMITS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND STATIONS

The Australia Station is bounded on the west by Longitude 80° East south of Latitude 30° South, thence through lines joining the following positions:

	Latitude	Longitude
(a)	30° 00' South	95° 15' East
(b)	13° 00' South	95° 15' East
(c)	13° 00' South	120° 00' East
(d)	11° 00' South	120° 00' East
(e)	Southern point of boundary between Papua and Dutch New Guinea (Latitude 9° 00' South, Longitude 141° 00' East).	
(f)	0° 00'	141° 00' East
(g)	0° 00'	169° 00' East
(h)	1° 00' South	169° 00' East
(i)	1° 00' South	170° 00' East
(j)	32° 00' South	170° 00' East
(k)	32° 00' South	160° 00' East

remainder of Eastern boundary being Longitude 160° East to south of (k).

The New Zealand Station is bounded on the west by Eastern boundary of Australia Station (to position (g)), thence through lines joining:

	Latitude	Longitude
(g)	0° 00'	169° 00' East
(l)	4° 00' North	169° 00' East
(m)	4° 00' North	180° 00'
(n)	30° 00' North	180° 00'
(o)	30° 00' North	150° 00' West
(p)	0° 00'	150° 00' West
(q)	0° 00'	120° 00' West

remainder of Eastern boundary being Longitude 120° West, south of the equator.

S E C R E T
B.U.S. (J)(41) 30
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title -ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941.

APPENDIX B

GENERAL NOTE ON THE DISPOSITION OF BRITISH NAVAL FORCES

1. The foregoing tentative distribution of British Naval units is based on the latest detailed information available to the United Kingdom Delegation and anticipated adjustments to meet the contingency of Japan entering the war.

2. The distribution does not include certain units which were still under long repair in January, or new construction. These are listed below. Their distribution will depend on requirements at the time each comes into service and cannot be predicted with any certainty at present.

3. It is probable that new construction cruisers, and those coming out of repair, would replace cruisers required in the Far East, or augment the latter strength; and some of the destroyers shown as allocated in the further reenforcements to the Far East would have to come from the new construction program.

Units under long repair

1 Battleship (under repair: completion date uncertain)
1 Aircraft Carrier (" " " " ")
4 8" Cruisers (one ready in February; 1 in March; 1 in September; 1 date uncertain).
3 6" Cruisers (one ready in June; others later).
1 Armed Merchant Cruiser (date uncertain).
15 Destroyers (not repaired until April or later).
4 Sloops (" " " " " "

New Construction

1 Battleship (working up. Probably to Home Fleet).
1 Battleship, reconstructed. (working up. Probably to Mediterranean Fleet).

SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March 27, 1941

1	6" Cruiser	)
15	Destroyers	)
32	Corvettes	) Completing before
3	Sloops	) April 1, 1941.
6	Submarines	)
3	Fast Minelayers	)
1	Aircraft Carrier	)
4	6" Cruisers	)
15	Destroyers	) Completing between
30	Corvettes	) April 1, 1941 and
1	Sloop	) July 1, 1941.
8	Submarines	)
1	Fast Minelayer	)

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

ANNEX IV

COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

Note: The United Kingdom Delegation tentatively accepts this Annex IV, subject to technical examination by the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish as soon as possible in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:

(a) A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who will become members of the staff of the United States Military Mission when that Mission is established in London.

(b) Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom.

2. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.

3. The British Authorities will appoint staff members of their Military Mission in Washington as representatives to confer with:

(a) The Communication Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy.

(b) United States Army Signal Corps and United States Army Air Corps.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27, 1941

NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

4. The United States and British Navies will exchange the following, as essential for intercommunication between the United States Navy and the British Navy:

(a) Necessary fundamental instructions on methods and procedure for radio (W/T) for ships and aircraft.

(b) Shore radio (W/T) organization, frequency plan, and instructions for ship (airplane) to shore communications.

(c) Call sign lists for certain shore and operating units.

(d) Recognition system keys and instructions.

(e) Information as to total wave bands covered by certain Navy transmitters and receivers, installed in operating units.

(f) Signal flags and any special visual signalling equipment, when required.

(g) Communication liaison officers to certain important ships and stations, which are to be designated later.

(h) Codes and Ciphers for use when intercommunicating.

(i) Data as to locations and organization of strategic D/F stations.

(j) Merchantship - Navy communication instructions, codes, ciphers, etc.

(k) Weather broadcasts, meteorological information, time signal data, and other special broadcasts.

Note: Some details of the foregoing exchanges have already been completed and others are now in progress.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27, 1941

5. The following principles will be observed relative to intercommunication of United States and British ships:

(a) Ships which customarily operate within the area of strategic responsibility of their own Power will normally use their own communication systems for direct communication with their own ships and shore stations. When beyond visual or sound signalling distance, such ships will normally intercommunicate with ships or shore stations of the other Power via their own principal bases or shore radio (W/T) stations; but when it becomes necessary for such ships to communicate directly with a ship or shore station of the other Power, they will do so via joint frequencies and joint codes assigned for this purpose. When within visual or sound signalling distance, visual and sound intercommunication will be by International Code, or in English text using International Procedure.

(b) Ships which customarily operate within an area of strategic responsibility of the other Power will normally intercommunicate as in 5 (a), unless they usually engage in tactical cooperation with forces of such Power. In such case they will adopt the complete communication systems of the Power having strategic responsibility, and this Power will supply them with details of communications, liaison personnel if necessary, and appropriate codes, ciphers, flags and special apparatus. Decision as to which system to adopt will be made on the merits of each case.

Note: The United States Navy has prepared one hundred sets of British signal flags for use of United States Naval ships which may require them.

(c) In areas of joint strategic responsibility, intercommunication will be via joint frequencies, codes, and procedures if such have been previously agreed upon. In the absence of previous agreement, intercommunication will be through liaison officers or via International Code, as may be most convenient.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27, 1941

5. (Cont'd)

(d) Communications between ships of a convoy, and between the Commander of a convoy and the escort, regardless of nationality, will be via the system now in use for this purpose by the United Kingdom which is based on the employment of International Code and International Procedure.

6. The Associated Communications Committee will prepare the following, which will be made effective by direction of the competent authorities when conditions require:

(a) Joint radio (W/T) frequency plan for intercommunication.

(b) United States Navy - British Navy recognition signals in all systems to be used for aircraft, surface ships (including merchant ships), and submarines, in order to permit safe joint operations, and to effect entrance to defended harbors.

(c) Joint United States Navy - British Navy call signs.

(d) Plan for joint operation of United States Navy and British Navy strategic D/F stations, including joint codes or ciphers, as may be necessary, and with intercommunications preferably by landline or cable, rather than by radio (W/T).

(e) Joint United States Navy - British Navy plan for radio (W/T) transmissions from certain British shore stations in Africa, Australia, etc., to United States ships operating in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean; and for transmissions from United States' stations to British ships operating in the Eastern Atlantic, if necessary.

(f) Plan for cable and, secondarily, radio (W/T) point-to-point communication between certain United States and certain British cable terminals and radio (W/T) shore stations.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27, 1941

6. (Cont'd)

(g) Joint United States Navy - British Navy cryptographic systems.

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS

7. In view of the fact that no United States Army forces, either ground or air, are expected to operate in areas where intercommunication with British forces is necessary prior to September 1, 1941, it has not been considered necessary to define at this stage the detailed arrangements which will be necessary.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12(R-A5)
B.U.S.(J)(41)30
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 5
March 27, 1941

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

ANNEX V

CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

1. British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, (vide Annex II). United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces (vide Annex II).

2. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

3. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States agencies in United States Areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States Areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41)39
Short Title ABC-2

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

AIR COLLABORATION

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

List of Effective Pages	No. of pages 1	Change in effect ORIGINAL
Letter to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy; the Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom; of March 29, 1941.	title page unnumbered page 2	ORIGINAL
Air Policy	title page unnumbered pages 2 to 6 inc.	ORIGINAL

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41) 39
Short Title ABC-2

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

AIR COLLABORATION

March 29, 1941.

To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
The Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy.
The Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom.

Sirs:

1. The joint letter of transmittal forwarding the report of the staff conversations held in Washington between the United States Staff Committee and the United Kingdom Delegation, contains a recommendation as follows:

> "5. The Staff Conference recommends that immediate steps be taken to provide for the following:
>
> (c) Allocation of Military Material
>
> The establishment at the earliest possible moment of a method of procedure which will ensure the allocation of Military Material, both prior to and after the entry of the United States into the war in the manner best suited to meet the demands of the Military situation."

2. The general subject of Air Collaboration, in which the policy pertaining to the supply and distribution of aircraft is an essential factor, is considered of such immediate and vital importance as to deserve special treatment.

3. Accordingly, a subcommittee of the United States Staff Committee and the United Kingdom Delegation was appointed to study this subject and to submit a report. The constitution of this subcommittee was as follows:

J. C. Slessor,
Air Vice Marshal, Royal Air Force.
DeWitt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
J. T. McNarney,
Colonel, U. S. Army.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41)39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

4. The report of this subcommittee is forwarded herewith for consideration.

S. D. Embick,
Major-General, U. S. Army)
R. L. Ghormley,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy.) On behalf of the United States Staff Committee.

R. M. Bellairs,
Rear-Admiral, Royal Navy, on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41) 39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

AIR POLICY

1. The general subject of Air Policy, in which the supply and distribution of aircraft is an essential factor, is considered of such immediate and vital importance as to deserve special treatment.

The Air Subcommittee, accordingly, submits the following report and recommendations.

REQUIREMENTS OF UNITED STATES NAVAL AVIATION

2. United States Naval Aviation is employed in naval tasks. It consists of four categories of combat airplanes: 1st, those considered as integral parts of the combatant ships to which attached, viz., aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers; 2nd, long-range patrol bomber airplanes attached to shore bases or mobile tenders; 3rd, shore-based observation airplanes for the patrol of coastal zones; and 4th, bombers, scouts, and fighters for the use of the Marine Corps. The priority of organization and equipment of these four categories is approximately equal to that accorded to vessels of the United States Fleets.

The current United States Naval Aviation 15,000 airplane expansion program, both for airplanes and shore stations, has been integrated with the expansion of the United States Navy as a whole. Any change in this program will influence the size and character of the naval forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war, and for future national security (See ABC-1 Paragraph 9).

The proposed allocation of United States Naval Aviation Units is set out in Table "A" (limited circulation).

REQUIREMENTS OF UNITED STATES ARMY

3. In conditions under which the British Isles no longer were available as a base for air operations against the Axis Powers, an air force of 54 combat groups, plus the necessary personnel and facilities to undertake an expansion to 100 combat groups, is the minimum strength required by the United States Army for its proportionate effort in achieving the air security of United States interests.

Copy No. 98 of 125.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41)39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

It will, however, in present circumstances, be the policy of the United States to operate a substantial proportion of these forces from advanced bases in the British Isles in the event of United States intervention in the war as an Associate of the British Commonwealth.

The development and proposed allocation of units of the 54 Group program are set out in Table "D" (limited circulation).

REQUIREMENTS BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR FORCES

4. Details of the British Commonwealth air strengths and expansion program, which include requirements for the security of the British Commonwealth and its sea communications are set out in Table "C" (limited circulation).

ALLOCATION OF MATERIAL

5. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, in consultation with the British Military Mission in Washington, will jointly advise the President on the allocation of air equipment among the United States Navy, the United States Army, and the air forces of the British Commonwealth in accordance with the requirements of the Military situation.

The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee will be kept informed as to the progress of the aviation expansion programs of the British Commonwealth and United States. The United States Military Mission in London and the British Military Mission in Washington will be furnished with all pertinent information by the appropriate Military authorities.

6. The rate of expansion of the air combat forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth largely depends upon the ability of the two nations to provide adequate air material. All programs of aircraft construction will be accelerated as rapidly as circumstances permit. Deliveries of material to the United States Navy, to the United States Army, and to the air forces of the British Commonwealth will be conditioned by the ability of those organizations to absorb material usefully, either for the equipment of operating units, or for reserves of such magnitude as may be agreed upon, according to Military circumstances. The broad policy with respect to the provisions of equipment should be as set out in the following paragraphs.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S. (J)(41)39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

7. (a) United States Naval Aviation and Army Air Corps.

In principle, the United States programs for the equipment and maintenance of existing and new units and training establishments, should be based on total United States Production less:

(i) Allocations to the British Commonwealth as outlined in subsequent paragraphs, and

(ii) Allocations to other nations that may be authorized.

(b) British Air Forces.

In principle, the British Commonwealth programs for the equipment and maintenance of existing and new units and training establishments should be based on:

(i) The output from production in the British Commonwealth,

(ii) The output of the approved British 14,375 and 12,000 airplane programs from United States industry.

(iii) The allocation of a continuing output from United States capacity now existing or approved, in such numbers as the Military situation may require and circumstances may permit.

8. In addition, allocation of output from new capacity for the production of Military aircraft beyond that envisaged in paragraph 7, should, in principle and subject to periodical review, be based on the following:

(a) Until such time as the United States may enter the war, the entire output from such new capacity should be made available for release to the British.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41)39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

(b) If the United States enters the war, thereafter the output from such new capacity should be divided among the Associated Powers as the Military situation may require and circumstances may permit. For planning purposes the United Kingdom should assume that such capacity will be divided on approximately a 50/50 basis between the United States and the British Commonwealth.

UNITED STATES NAVAL AVIATION

9. The United States should expand its Naval Aviation, in the four categories listed in paragraph 2, on the plan of the 15,000 plane program. This program is expected to reach maturity concurrently with the completion of the authorized shipbuilding program in the fiscal year 1946. A pilot training program has been initiated which contemplates an ultimate yearly output of 6720 naval aviators. This program is coordinated with the expansion of the Navy as a whole.

The 15,000 plane program envisages an operating strength of combatant airplanes as follows:

Observation-Scouting	854
Fighting	1,272
Scout-Bombing	1,662
Torpedo Bombing	588
Bombing	52
Patrol Bombing	1,540
	5,968

Excess primary training capacity will exist at various United States Naval Reserve Aviation Bases during fiscal year 1942 which, if British instructing personnel are available, could be applied to British needs.

UNITED STATES ARMY AVIATION

10. Subject to the principles set out in the foregoing paragraphs, and so long as the United States does not enter the war, the United States should agree to defer completing the aircraft equipment of the 54 Combat Group program of the United States Army except as set out in detail in Table "B", provided any additional aircraft, thus made available, contribute directly to the effectuation of the policy stated in paragraphs 11 and 13 (h) of the Main Report.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41)39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

11. The United States Army should proceed with the initiation of its planned Second Aviation Objective (the 100 Group program referred to in paragraph 4) to include total training facilities for 30,000 pilots and 100,000 technicians per year, on the basis of a planned first line strength of:

Class	Airplanes
Heavy Bombardment	1,520
Medium Bombardment	1,059
Light Bombardment	770
Pursuit (Interceptor)	2,500
Pursuit (Fighter)	525
Observation, Liaison and Photo	806
Transport	469
Amphibian	150
TOTAL	7,799

The time schedule for the completion of this program will periodically be adjusted to conform with deliveries of combat aircraft to the United States made in accordance with paragraph 10 or necessitated by wastage in combat units. Excess training capacity resulting therefrom will be made available for the training of British personnel.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR FORCES

12. The United Kingdom is now developing the program outlined in Table "C". The rate of development will depend in the main on the rate at which aircraft and trained pilots become available. The allocation of resources as between the different strategic Commands in the United Kingdom and as between the United Kingdom and overseas theaters of war will be determined in accordance with the requirements of the strategic situation from time to time, and, if the United States enters the war, in accordance with the joint war plans of the Associated Powers.

SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(41)39
March 29, 1941
Short Title ABC-2

It is the British intention to build up their offensive power as rapidly as possible.

J. C. Slessor,
Air Vice Marshal, Royal Air Force.

DeWitt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

J. T. McNarney,
Colonel, U. S. Army.

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AMERICAN-DUTCH-BRITISH

CONVERSATIONS

SINGAPORE, APRIL, 1941

(Short Title—"A.D.B")

REPORT

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
China Station,
27th April, 1941.

MOST SECRET.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,

SINGAPORE.

21st to 27th April 1941.

(Short Title: "A.D.B.")

	Page
LIST OF CONTENTS	1
DISTRIBUTION LIST	2
LIST OF DELEGATES	3
SIGNATURE SHEET	5
INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE	6
REPORT:	
I - Object	7
II - Summary of Situation	8
III - Necessity for collective action	13
IV - Action open to Associated Powers	14
V - Command	15
VI - Plan for employment of Naval Forces ..	17
VII - Plan for employment of Land and Air Forces	23
VIII - Liaison and Communications	27
APPENDICES:	
I - Appendix to Naval Plan - Initial Dispositions and Functions of Naval Forces	29
II - Appendix to Air Plan - System of Air Reinforcement	32
III - List of Liaison Officers and Observers	33
IV - Copy of telegraphic summary of Report (Not included)	34

SINGAPORE.
27th April 1941.

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AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,

APRIL 1941.

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29 - 31.	Commander-in-Chief, Far East.	
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44 - 51.	New Zealand.	
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56 - 57.	East Indies.	
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62.		
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AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

DELEGATES.

United States of America.

Captain W.R. Purnell, U.S.N.	Chief of Staff, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.
Colonel A.C. McBride, U.S.A.	Asst. Chief of Staff U.S. Military Forces Philippines.
Captain A.M.R. Allen, U.S.N.	U.S. Naval Observer, Singapore.
Lt. Colonel F.G. Brink, U.S.A.	U.S. Military Observer Singapore.

Netherlands East Indies.

Major-General H. ter Poorten	Chief of General Staff.
Captain J.J.A. van Staveren, R.N.N	Chief of Naval Staff.
Captain D.C. Buurman van Vreeden	General Staff.
Lt. Cdr. H.C.W. Moorman, R.N.N.	Naval Staff.
Captain L.G.L. van der Kun, R.N.N.	Naval Liaison Officer Singapore.
Major J.M.J. Wegner.	Military Liaison Officer, Singapore.

General Headquarters, Far East.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C. (Secretary General).	Commander in Chief, Far East.
Group Captain L. Darvall, M.C., Royal Air Force.	

Commander in Chief, China and Staff.

Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, K.C.B., D.S.O.	Commander in Chief, China.
Commodore F.E.P. Hutton, R.N.	Chief of Staff.
Paymaster Captain D.H. Doig, R.N. (Secretary to Conference)	Secretary to Commander in Chief China.

Australia.

Admiral Sir Ragnar M. Colvin, K.B.E., C.B.	First Naval Member.
Paymaster Captain J.B. Foley, O.B.E., R.A.N.	Secretary to First Naval Member.
Commander R.F. Nichols, R.N.	Naval Staff.
Group Captain F.M. Bladin, R.A.A.F.	Air Staff.
Colonel H.G. Rourke, M.C.	General Staff, Australian Imperial Force, Malaya.
Commander V.E. Kennedy, R.A.N.	Australian Naval Liaison Officer, Batavia.

(Contd.).....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 4.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL, 1941.

DELEGATES.....continued

New Zealand.

Commodore W.E. Parry, C.B., R.N.	Chief of Naval Staff.
Air Commodore H.W.L. Saunders, M.C., D.F.C., M.M., R.A.F.	Chief of Air Staff.
Colonel A.E. Conway, C.B.E.	New Zealand Staff Corps.

India.

Major General G.N. Molesworth.	Deputy Chief of General Staff (representing Defence Department).

East Indies Station.

Commodore A.G.B. Wilson, D.S.O., M.V.O., R.N.	Chief of Staff.

(Contd.).....

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

REPORT.

SIGNED at Singapore this twenty-seventh day of April 1941

(Sd.) W.R. Purnell

CAPTAIN, U.S.N.
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET.

(Sd.) V. Staveren.

CAPTAIN, R.N.N.,
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF,
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

(Sd.) H. ter Poorten.

MAJOR-GENERAL,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

(Sd.) R.M. Colvin.

ADMIRAL,
FIRST NAVAL MEMBER,
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH NAVAL BOARD.

(Sd.) W.E. Parry.

COMMODORE,
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, NEW ZEALAND.

(Sd.) G.N. Molesworth.

MAJOR-GENERAL,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, INDIA.

(Sd.) A.G.B. Wilson.

COMMODORE,
CHIEF OF STAFF, EAST INDIES STATION.

(Sd.) G. Layton.

VICE-ADMIRAL,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHINA STATION.

(Sd.) R. Brooke-Popham.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, FAR EAST.

MOST SECRET.

A.D.B.
Page 6.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.

INTRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE.

1. Introduction.

The following conditions apply:-

(a) State of war between Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand, and British Empire with its present Allies and the United States of America (referred to herein as the Associated Powers) on the other.

(b) No political commitment is implied.

(c) Any agreement is subject to ratification by Government concerned.

Terms of Reference.

2. To prepare plan for conduct of military operations in Far East on basis of report of Washington conversations.

3. Particular points for agreement are:-

(a) Plan for employment and disposition of forces in whole area Indian Ocean, Pacific and Australian and New Zealand waters before and after arrival of Far East Fleet, as agreed in Washington conversations, and summarised in Admiralty Telegram 1848 of 4th April.

(b) Details of arrangements for co-operation, e.g. communications, exchange of Liaison Officers, etc.

MOST SECRET.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.

I - OBJECT.

4. Our object is to defeat Germany and her allies, and hence in the Far East to maintain the position of the Associated Powers against Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long-term economic pressure against Japan until we are in a position to take the offensive.

Our most important interests in the Far East are:-

(a) The security of sea communications

and

(b) The security of Singapore.

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can be operated from Luzon, expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East are out-flanked.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 8.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION.

5. The war situation is that obtaining on the 20th April, 1941.

6. The Associated Powers are convinced that any action against one is of vital importance for the others.

7. JAPAN's object is assumed to be to obtain complete political and economic domination of South East Asia and the islands in the Far East Area in order to secure control for herself of the sources of vital war supplies.

8. Knowledge by Japan that aggression by her against one of the Associated Powers would immediately lead to united resistance by all might prevent war.

9. In spite of the signing of a Non-Aggression Pact between Russia and Japan, it is considered that the Japanese will not feel relieved of responsibility for maintaining considerable forces in the North to guard against the possibility of a change of policy by Russia. The signing of a Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia has not led to the growth of mutual trust between these countries.

10. The influence of China is likely to be considerable. The Russians declare that they are not reducing their military support to China. Nothing could give Chinese resistance more encouragement than if the Associated Powers went to war with Japan.

Considerable progress has already been made in organising British assistance to China. A scheme for the operation of Air Forces and Guerillas controlled and advised by the British is already well advanced in the planning stage.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO JAPAN.

11. To achieve her object Japan must assume the offensive; she can launch attacks against any of the following:-

(a) The Philippines and/or Hong Kong.

(b) Malaya, direct or via Thailand.

(c) Burma, via Thailand and Indo-China.

(d) Borneo or the Northern line of Netherlands East Indies.

(e) Sea communications in all areas, (including the establishment of advanced bases).

/ (contd.).....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 9.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

12. Attacks on :-

(a) The Southern line of Netherlands East Indies (Java - Sumatra) and

(b) Australia and New Zealand

are ruled out as initial operations.

Attack on the Philippines and/or Hong Kong.

13. This would eliminate a serious threat to the flank of further Japanese expeditions to the Southward. All the other possible lines of attack would be hampered by an active United States naval and air base at Manila.

It would also be the nearest objective to Japan and so easiest to cover as regards air support and lines of communications. If successful, the attack would provide useful bases from which further expeditions could be launched.

The disadvantage to the Japanese of an attack on the Philippines is that the economic resources of the islands are of comparatively little value for war purposes, so that it would be primarily a strategical move towards Japan's main object.

An attack on the Philippines might well be combined with an attack on Hong Kong on similar principles.

Attack on Malaya.

14. An attack on Malaya via Thailand would have to be made in two stages :-

(a) Political domination which would give some indication of intention;

(b) Military occupation which would take time and would provide an opportunity of forestalling action in the Kra Isthmus.

On the other hand, attack by direct landing on the East coast of the Malay Peninsula could be undertaken without preliminary warning, but requires a greater degree of control of the sea and air communications.

15. It must be obvious to Japan that the forces available for the defence of Malaya have been greatly reinforced during the last six months, and an attack on them is becoming a much more formidable proposition than it was in October, even taking into account only the British forces available on the spot. Either line of attack, if undertaken before the reduction of Hong Kong and Manila, involves a long and precarious line of communications.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 10

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

Attack on Burma.

16. Attack on Burma only becomes a possibility after occupation of Indo-China and Thailand and prior indication of Japanese intention would be available. Even after occupation of Thailand the routes to Burma are so poor that they severely limit the size of forces available to attack Burma. The great advantage to Japan would be the cutting of communications between Burma and China, which would have a disastrous effect upon Chinese resistance. It would also cut the air route between India and Malaya except for long range aircraft.

The principal threat to Burma and Eastern India would be of air bombardment on oil refineries and docks at Rangoon and possibly on vulnerable points in Eastern India (Digboi, Calcutta, Tatanagar).

Although the immediate economic gains to Japan of an occupation of Burma would be negligible, ? the denial of Burma's resources to us would be serious.

Attack on Borneo or the Northern Line of Netherlands East Indies.

17. Although Manila and Hong Kong are on the flanks of the line of communications of Japan, an attack launched from an advanced base such as Kamranh Bay or Pelew on Borneo would facilitate the subsequent reduction of the Philippines, provide a base for air attack on Singapore, and assist further Southward advance. It might also establish control of vital sources of oil supplies. An attack on other points in the Northern line of the Netherlands East Indies would provide useful subsidiary bases for further expeditions.

The possibility of attack on the oil fields by landing operations in conjunction with parachute troops cannot be overlooked and is being provided against.

Attack on Sea Communications.

18. Attack on sea communications will certainly form part of any Japanese plan of action and may constitute a most serious threat to the war effort of the Associated Powers. In spite of the influence of the United States Pacific Fleet, Japan's local naval superiority in the Eastern Theatre (paragraph 34) places her in a position to devote a limited number of cruisers and submarines, in addition to a considerable number of armed merchant raiders, to attack on sea communications in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Though the distances involved are considerable, they present no greater difficulties than those confronting Germany in operating raiders in the same areas. The problem for the Japanese is closely connected with the use of isolated harbours

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

fuelling bases, and also with the passage of Japanese ships through the straits and narrows of the Netherlands East Indies.

19. The Associated Powers must therefore be prepared for a greatly increased and sustained scale of attack on their sea communications in the Eastern Theatre, including attack by armed merchant raiders and a limited number of cruisers and submarines, operating singly or in company. This will be concerted with attacks by German raiders.

20. Active operations by the United States Pacific Fleet against Japanese bases in the Marshall and Caroline Islands may have the effect of considerably reducing the scale of attack on sea communications in the Southern Pacific, at least as regards warships.

REMARKS ON POSSIBLE JAPANESE COURSES OF ACTION.

21. Until the forces, particularly submarine and air, maintained in the Philippines, are eliminated, Japan would be taking great risks in launching an attack either West of them on Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, or East of them on the Netherlands East Indies or Australia and New Zealand.

22. The question whether Japan is in a position to launch two or more sea-borne attacks simultaneously is influenced by the following factors :-

(a) Japan not established in South Indo-China and Bangkok area.

(b) Japan established in South Indo-China and Bangkok area.

23. Under the conditions of 22(a) all Japanese forces attacking Malaya must be moved by sea. The Japanese can never afford to ignore the needs of home defence against the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets. While maintaining in Home waters a force slightly inferior to the U.S.A. Fleets she can just provide sufficient covering and escort forces to protect her first expedition against small scale raids by surface craft and submarines. For the passage of subsequent expeditions the same warships could be used but escorts of supply ships would be additional commitments. In consequence, simultaneous attacks on more than one of the objectives described in paragraph 11 can only be undertaken if the Japanese accept great risks.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 12

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL, 1941.

II - SUMMARY OF SITUATION (contd.)

24. Under the conditions of 22(b), the risks attendant on simultaneous attacks on any two of these would be reduced.

25. If it is clear to Japan that the united forces of the British Empire, the United States and the Dutch would meet aggression on her part, her immediate intervention in the war is unlikely. The only situation which would be likely to appeal to her as offering outstanding chances would be such a deterioration in our position in Europe that it appeared probable that all United States and British effort would have to be concentrated in that theatre for a considerable time. On the other hand, such is the national psychology of the Japanese that acts of hysteria which might lead to the plunging of Japan into war must be faced. It is for this reason in particular that it is necessary for combined plans to be made by the Associated Powers to meet threats to their interests which may occur at very short notice.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 13.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.

III - NECESSITY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION.

26. Our collective military strength can only be developed fully if our Governments agree to act together, should any of them judge that the Japanese have taken action which necessitated active military counter-action. It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counter-action would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorise such action:-

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war". It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognised that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the West of 100° East or to the South of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

27. The Conference recommends that steps should be taken to evolve a satisfactory procedure to ensure immediate decision to take counter-measures. This applies particularly to 26 (c) above.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 14

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

IV - ACTION OPEN TO THE ASSOCIATED POWERS.

28. To ensure that we are not diverted from the major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, our main strategy in the Far East at the present time must be defensive. There, are, however, certain measures open to us which will assist greatly in the defence of our interests in the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

29. It is important to organise air operations against Japanese occupied territory and against Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the most direct and one which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operation submarine and air forces from Luzon, referred to in para. 21 above there is even greater value from the offensive point of view in holding this island. It is therefore recommended that the defences of Luzon should be strengthened and that every effort should be made to maintain a bombing force in the island in addition to building up a similar force in China.

30. Other positive activities which may be undertaken are as follows:-

(a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid and provision of equipment.

(b) Operation of Guerillas in China.

(c) Organisation of subversive activities in Japan.

31. So far as economic pressure is concerned, the entry of the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies into a war against Japan would automatically restrict Japanese trade to that with the coast of Asia. Since China will be in the war against her, and our submarine and air forces should be able to interfere considerably with trade from Thailand and Indo-China, a very large measure of economic blockade would thus be forced upon Japan from the outset.

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AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 1941.

V - COMMAND.

32. The following arrangements are subject to the right of any of the Governments of the Associated Powers or British Dominions to withdraw or withold its forces, provided that prior information of such an intention is passed to the Strategic Commander concerned.

33. The United States will undertake responsibility for strategic direction of its own and British Forces in the Pacific area, together with Islands therein contained and adjacent continental land areas. The Pacific Area is defined as area North of 30° North and West of 140° East: North of Equator and East of 140° East; South of Equator and East of 180° to South American coast and 74° West. The United States will support British Naval Forces in regions South of Equator as far West as 155° East. The Far Eastern Area is defined as area from coast of China in 30° North, East to 140° East, thence South to Equator, thence East to 141° East, thence South to boundary between British and Dutch New Guinea on South coast thence Westward to 11° South, 120° East, thence South to 13° South, thence West to 92° East, thence North to 20° North, thence to boundary between India and Burma.

34. For the purposes of this report the term "Eastern Theatre" is used to indicate the whole Sea area included in the East Indies, China, Australia and New Zealand British naval stations except parts included in the Pacific Area as defined in the preceding paragraph.

NAVAL FORCES.

35. In order to attain greater flexibility and economy in the employment of naval forces in the Eastern Theatre, it is recommended that the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, should exercise unified strategical direction over all naval forces, excluding those employed solely on local defence, or operating under Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.

This direction would include movements of warships from any part of the area to that point where the Commander-in-Chief, China, considers they can best be employed.

In exercising this direction the Commander-in-Chief, China, must be fully acquainted with the operations being carried out from day to day in all areas concerned; and he will decide which of the regional operations must be modified in order to deal with a more dangerous situation elsewhere.

While the Commander-in-Chief, China, will thus direct the dispositions of naval forces throughout the area and the general plan for their employment, the Commander-in-Chief of each station would retain full operational command of forces within that station.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 16.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

V - COMMAND (contd.)

In order to work out operational plans and to exercise this strategic direction, the immediate establishment at Singapore of a combined staff including representatives from Dominions and Associated Powers is recommended.

LAND FORCES.

36. In the particular circumstances the primary task of the land forces has been decided to be the defence of the naval and air bases and the denial of potential naval and air bases to the enemy. There is little possibility of strategic offensive action by land forces and a localised strategic policy is therefore already established for the land forces. They will continue to be controlled by the authorities of the territories in which they are stationed except as where otherwise mutually arranged, e.g. TIMOR.

AIR FORCES.

37. Air forces have the power to concentrate provided the decision can be made quickly, the orders issued rapidly, and the necessary bases and facilities are available throughout the area. Unless one central authority with power to direct concentrations is established in advance the great strategic advantages of this power to concentrate rapidly to meet particular situations in different areas cannot be obtained.

38. In effect such central control would only be exercised over those portions of the air forces of the Associated Powers which can from time to time be made available for concentration in the area that is at any time most important to the common interest. The central controlling authority would be empowered to decide the time and area for the concentration, direct the moves to take place, and indicate the main task of the forces. The operational control of the forces thus concentrated would be exercised by the Commander of the Power in whose operational area the concentration was effected.

39. It is recommended that the authority empowered to exercise this strategical direction of air forces in the FAR EAST should be the Commander-in-Chief, FAR EAST, with General Headquarters at SINGAPORE.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET

A.D.B.
Page 17.

ANGLO - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES.

Definition of Phase I and Phase II.

40. Phase I is regarded as existing from the outbreak of hostilities with Japan until the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet in the Eastern Theatre.

Phase II refers to operations subsequent to this.

OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS DURING PHASE I.

41. The basic principle of the strategy of the Associated Powers is that the Atlantic and Europe are the decisive theatre of war. It follows that the forces employed in other theatres must be reduced to a minimum so as not to impair our main effort in the decisive theatre.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to allot large forces to other theatres, and such forces should be used whenever possible, to inflict the maximum loss on our enemies.

The chief example of this is the United States Pacific Fleet, which it is essential to maintain in strength at least equal to the Japanese fleet, in order to hold our position in the Pacific and to act offensively against Japanese forces and bases in order to counter the certain Japanese offensive against the position of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre.

The remaining naval forces of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre are so weak that they will inevitably find themselves very largely occupied with the local defence of bases and the protection of vital sea communications. Nevertheless, whenever and wherever they can, they should assume the offensive against Japanese naval forces and sea communications.

United States Pacific Fleet.

42. As stated in the Report of the Washington Conversations, the United States Pacific Fleet at Hawaii will operate offensively against the Japanese Mandated Islands and against Japanese sea communications in the Pacific. The support to be afforded to British forces south of the equator between 155 °East and 180° cannot be defined until further information is received from the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as to his intentions.

As the United States Pacific Fleet is responsibl for operations, including the protection of sea communications, to the Eastward of 180°, it will be necessary for Australia and New Zealand to co-operate direct with the Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet.

(Contd.).....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 18.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES..contd.

United States Asiatic Fleet.

43. Based on Manila initially. Should movements of Japanese naval and air forces become threatening, it is proposed to despatch the submarine, destroyer and large patrol plane tenders and the tankers to Singapore before the commencement of hostilities. If hostilities start before these auxiliaries are safely disposed, the combatant vessels will escort them. It is estimated that Japan's most probable course of action will be to :-

(?)

(a) contain the Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay with the object of destroying it by air and torpedo attacks and failing in this, to

(b) locate the fleet at the earliest possible moment and endeavour to destroy it by air, submarine or surface vessel attacks.

44. The submarine, naval air and Philippine local defence forces will be employed in support of the Army in its defence of Luzon, conducting reconnaissance and such offensive operations against Japanese sea communications and naval forces as are consistent with that mission. Hong Kong will be available as a base for these operations.

45. The cruisers with attached aviation units and destroyers will, when ordered by C in C Asiatic Fleet, proceed towards Singapore reporting to Commander in Chief China, to operate under his strategic direction.

46. Upon the "Ultimate Defence Area" (which includes Corregidor at the entrance to Manila Bay) becoming untenable, all remaining naval and naval air forces retaining combat value will, when released by Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, retire southward passing under the strategic direction of Commander in Chief China.

British Naval Forces.

47. Apart from the local defence of bases, British naval forces will be employed on the defence of our vital sea communications, and the attack on Japanese sea communications. It is clear that the forces available are quite inadequate for the introduction of general convoy system and that evasive routeing or sailings under cover must therefore form the main defence for trade.

Dutch Naval Forces.

48. These will be employed primarily for the defence of the Netherlands East Indies and of the narrow passages between the islands.

(Contd.).....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 19.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES...cont.

Dutch Naval Forces. (Cont.)

49. One cruiser, two destroyers and two submarines will be available initially to operate under British control.

Submarine Operations.

50. Co-ordinated direction of the operations of allied submarines is of great importance since these working in conjunction with our air forces, constitute our most powerful weapon for attacking Japanese seaborne forces.

51. United States submarines, so long as they operate in defence of the Philippines, will operate under the orders of Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Upon being released by Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, they will pass under the control of Commander in Chief, China, who will be responsible for co-ordinating their operations with those of the Dutch submarines.

52. The Dutch submarines will principally operate under the orders of Commander in Chief, Netherlands East Indies, for defence of the channels through the Netherlands East Indies to the Indian Ocean and to meet any enemy action in Netherlands East Indies waters, but as described in para. 49, two initially, and possibly others at a later stage, will be allotted to general tasks at the direction of the Commander in Chief, China. These Dutch submarines will operate in the South China Sea south of the line joining Cape Padaran and Kudat, all United States submarines keeping north of this line until both forces operate under Commander in Chief, China.

DEFENCE OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.

53. The security of the following must be ensured:-

(a) Reinforcements and supplies to our forces in Middle East.
(b) Reinforcements and supplies to our forces in the Eastern Theatre.
(c) Conveyance of vital supplies between the United Kingdom, U.S.A., Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand.
(d) Empire Air Training Scheme to Canada and U.K.
(e) Empire Air Training Scheme to South Africa.
(f) Troop movements to Ambon and Koepang.
(g) Troop movements to Pacific Islands.

(Contd.)...

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 20.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES....cont.

DEFENCE OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS....cont.

54. The above entails protection to the following routes :-

(a) Cape to Aden, Indian Ports, Colombo and Malaya.
(b) Australia to Colombo, Indian Ports and Aden.
(c) Australia and New Zealand to Singapore via Sunda Strait.
(d) Australia and New Zealand to Cape.
(e) Australia and New Zealand to West Coast of America.
(f) Indian Ports to Aden.
(g) Persian Gulf to Aden.
(h) Persian Gulf to Indian Ports and Colombo.
(i) Darwin to Netherlands East Indies.
(j) N.E.I. to the Philippines.
(k) Coastal trade.

55. Methods of protection may be summarised as follows:-

(a) Convoy.
(b) Cover.
(c) Patrol of focal and terminal areas by surface vessels and aircraft.
(d) Routeing of shipping, either evasive or coast-wise. The latter, when feasible, requires :-

(i) Seaward cover by surface ships including A/S vessels.
(ii) Air cover and availability of air striking forces.
(iii) Protective minefields.

Convoy.

56. The volume of trade passing along the routes denoted in paragraph 54, the great distances involved and the number of warships available render impossible the adoption of a universal convoy system throughout the whole Eastern Theatre. We should therefore be prepared to provide escorted convoys as necessary to meet the following requirements :-

(a) important troop movements (capital ship escort for the more important).
(b) supply ships between Colombo (and Indian ports) and Malaya.
(c) supply ships from Australia to Singapore and Netherlands East Indies.
(d) shipping between America, Australia and New Zealand while in the Tasman area.

(Contd.)....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 21.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES...cont.

The Commander in Chief of the Stations concerned will continue to arrange convoy escorts as hitherto, with the Commander in Chief, China, acting where necessary as the co-ordinating authority.

Routeing:

57. Routeing of independent sailings should be conducted on the following general lines :-

(a) Shipping in the Indian Ocean, with the exception of that to and from Australia should be routed as far to the North as is feasible. No shipping to pass South of the Seychelles Group or at more than 100 miles South of Ceylon.
(b) Wherever feasible, all shipping to be routed close inshore.
(c) Australia to Aden shipping to be routed via Durban.
(d) All shipping on Indian and Pacific Ocean routes to be evasively routed.

Protective Minefields.

58. It is not yet possible to consider the provision of protective minefields for inshore routeing in any area of the Eastern Theatre.

Disposition of Naval and Air Forces.

59. Naval Forces and air forces detailed primarily for defence of sea communications should be disposed with the following principles in view :-

(a) prevention of the passage of enemy forces through the Netherlands East Indies.
(b) cover of focal and terminal areas by both surface and air forces.
(c) provision of escorts for convoys as in paragraph 56, without unduly affecting (a) and (b) above.
(d) rapid concentration of forces employed in (b) above to deal with any attack on a particular section of a trade route.

60. A table giving the intended initial dispositions and functions of the naval forces of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre, based on the foregoing principles, is attached as Appendix I, but it should be understood that offensive operations by the United States Pacific Fleet may so contain Japanese forces that it may be possible to release both naval and air forces allocated for trade protection for opher operations.

(Contd.).....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 22.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VI - PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES..cont.

DEFENCE OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.....cont.

PHASE II.

61. In Phase II with the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet the balance of strength of naval forces in the Eastern Theatre will be altered considerably against Japan, and taking the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a whole, Japan would probably be in a position of inferiority.

62. The immediate object of the British Far Eastern Fleet is to operate from Singapore. While alone it is inferior to the Japanese Main Fleet, its strength should be sufficient to enable the Associated Powers to seize the initiative, launch powerful counter-attacks against such Japanese forces as may have established their position in territories of Associated Powers, and intensify the attack on Japanese forces, territories and sea communications.

63. In the unlikely event of it proving impossible for the British Fleet to operate from Singapore, it will operate from bases in the Indian Ocean with the object of securing our vital sea communications in the Indian Ocean and Australian and New Zealand areas, disputing any further advance by the enemy to the southward or westward, and if possible, relieving pressure on Malaya by operations in the Malacca Straits and against any enemy activities on the West coast of Malaya.

64. So many developments must precede the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet that it is not profitable to examine in greater detail the operations that would then be possible.

(Contd.).....

MOST SECRET.

A.D.B.
Page 23.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES.

65. The only land frontiers in the area to be guarded are those of Burma and Malaya.

66. The northern frontier of Malaya is strategically weak, and attack across it becomes possible after Japanese occupation of Southern Thailand, either by moving down the Isthmus, or after a landing.

67. In Java, Sumatra, the West coast of Malaya, Luzon, and Celebes, land communications are well developed. In all other areas, such communications are almost entirely absent and could only be improvised with great difficulty. Movement is chiefly coastwise by ship or by means of native boats up the rivers.

68. Except therefore in Burma and Northern Malaya, any enemy land forces moving to attack our territory must be sea-borne. This involves seizure of bases from which to operate naval and air forces and from which to advance to the objective, except that if the Philippines are attacked only advanced air bases will be required. Adequate air support is an essential requirement for a combined operation.

69. The most suitable objectives for enemy attack are the sea and air bases on which the defence mainly rests. The policy should therefore be to organise the defence system to give the greatest possible security to these bases. This, together with the denial of potential air and naval bases to enemy occupation, will be the primary task of the land forces. We can thus fully employ the mobility of air forces both independently and in co-operation with naval submarine and surface forces, to effect concentrations against any naval forces or sea-borne expeditions during their approach and landing, to discover and destroy enemy air forces and to operate dispersed for the protection of sea communications.

70. The method adopted to implement the policy set out in paragraph 69 above, is to establish protected air bases along the line Burma - Malaya - Borneo - Philippines - New Guinea - Solomons - New Hebrides - Fiji - Tonga. This line of bases is supported by a second line from Sumatra through the Netherlands East Indies and the East coast of Australia to New Zealand. At present the numbers of aircraft and land forces available are below what is considered to be the safe minimum required, but to some extent the power to concentrate air forces quickly makes up for lack of numbers. The move of land forces, in the circumstances, is much more difficult.

71. The Associated Powers undertake responsibility for air operations, including reconnaissance, in the following spheres:-

(a) U.S.A.
(1) Pacific area as defined in paragraph 33.
Note. The extent of the United States support to

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MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 24.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES. (contd.)

the British air forces in areas (d) and (e) cannot be defined until further information is received from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as to his intentions.

(ii) Philippine Islands including the Sulu Sea area and bounded on the West by a line joining Kudat to Cape Padaran. On the South it is bounded by a line joining Kudat to Sangi Island, and thence to 4° North 140° East.

(b) N.E.I. On the West: 92° East. On the North: the line of the equator from 92° East to 113° East, thence North-East to the frontier of Sarawak and from thence following the frontier to the sea. The boundary continues N.E. along the coast of British North Borneo to Kudat, thence East to Sangi Island and thence to 4° North, 140° East. On the South: a line drawn along 13° South from 92° East to 120° East, thence just excluding the Islands of Roti, Seman, Timor and Molu to Cape Valsche, continuing along the South shore of Dutch New Guinea to its boundary in 141° East, thence North.

(c) British. The area northward and westward of the Dutch sphere.

(d) Australia. The area southward and eastward of the Dutch sphere as far East as the western boundary of the New Zealand Naval Station and the northern reconnaissance line from New Guinea - New Hebrides (Sandwich Island).

(e) New Zealand. The area of the New Zealand Naval Station, excluding the Pacific area, and the northern reconnaissance line from New Hebrides (Sandwich Island)-Fiji - Tonga.

AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKING FORCES IN THE PRECAUTIONARY STAGE.

72. On the introduction of the "precautionary stage", air reconnaissance will be intensified throughout the whole of the Eastern Theatre and co-ordinated with naval reconnaissance. Air striking forces will be prepared to attack raiders, naval forces or expeditions.

73. To enable concentrations to take place to deal with major operations in specially important localities, certain air base areas are prepared to receive and operate reinforcements from other areas. Such areas are Burma, Southern Malaya, West and East Borneo, South Celebes, Ambon, Timor, Luzon in the Philippine Islands, and the Australian and New Zealand areas. It is important that the aerodromes concerned should be adequately supplied with fuel, bombs

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MOST SECRET.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES (contd.)

and S.A.A. for the use of reinforcing squadrons, reasonably secured against air and land attack and with good signal communications.

74. As a basis for planning it can be assumed that the forces available for reinforcing will be as follows:-

From Malaya	4 (B) Squadrons.
From Netherlands East Indies	3 (B), 1 (F) Squadrons.
From Philippines (in event of evacuation only)	All available.
From Australia	Up to possible 2 (B) Squadrons for the Ambon - Timor area.

Flying boats are very short in the whole area. It is impracticable to lay down now from which area or in what numbers they might be spared for reinforcement, but it is important that the mobility of flying boats shall be exploited to the full to make good the deficiency in numbers.

75. The maintenance of a secure air route, adequately supplied with fuel, permitting reinforcement via India through Burma, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies to Australia, with a branch to Luzon, is of great importance.

76. The Conference recommends that it should be a definite object of the Associated Powers to build up the capacity to operate aircraft offensively against Japan to the maximum extent in their power with due regard to the main object, which is the defeat of Germany and Italy.

77. Plans will be prepared and co-ordinated for air bombardment of targets on the Japanese lines of sea communications in the South China Sea and Pelew areas, and objectives in China, Formosa and the Pelew Islands. It may be possible also to attack targets in Japan from air bases to be established in China.

OTHER OPERATIONS.

78. (a) Support to Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid, provision of equipment and establishment of military and air missions. A British nucleus Mission is already established, and a United States Mission possible combined with the British Mission would be of considerable value, and it is recommended that preparations to establish it should now be made.

(b) The operating of Chinese Guerilla Forces armed, equipped and directed by the Associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organise such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organise similar guerilla forces.

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MOST SECRET.

A.D.B.
Page 26.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES (contd.)

(c) The organisation of subversive activities, sabotage and corruption in Japan and Japanese occupied territories. Activities of this kind are already being organised by the British Government. It is recommended that the United States Government should also undertake such activities and co-ordinate them closely with those of the British.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 27.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VIII - LIAISON, COMMUNICATIONS.

LIAISON.

79. Arrangements for the exchange of liaison officers and observers are already well under way and the Conference does not recommend any special extension of these. It is recommended, however, that the Liaison Officers and Observers of the Dominions and Associated Powers at Singapore should be instructed that, on the outbreak of hostilities they will be available for duty on the Combined Staff of the C-in-C., Far East or C-in-C., China.

80. A list of the present Liaison Officers and Observers is appended for reference as Appendix III.

COMMUNICATIONS.

The following is a summary of the present situation :-

81. Point-to-point W/T (Radio) Services.

(a) Singapore, Batavia and Australian W/T Stations communicate direct by W/T at routine times daily.

(b) Arrangements have been made for Cavite to Join in, making a four cornered W/T point-to-point service (Singapore - Batavia - Cavite - Australia). Up to the present Cavite has not taken part. It is considered desirable that permission should be given by the United States Naval Authorities for Cavite to open up direct W/T communication with stations named, as soon as possible.

(c) No arrangements have been made for a point-to-point service between Australia, New Zealand and Honolulu. It is now considered that such a point-to-point service is required and should be arranged directly by the parties concerned.

82. Communications to and from 'Associated' Ships.

(a) The normal method is for ships to pass their messages to their own shore bases, the latter forwarding relevant messages (via the services in 81 above) to other Commanders-in-Chief.

(b) Ships can, if desired, pass messages direct to 'Associated' shore stations.

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 28.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

VIII - LIAISON, COMMUNICATIONS.(contd.)

83. Communications between 'Associated' ships in an operation.

A means is provided whereby, at a certain stage of an operation, Associated ships may be ordered to set watch on a common wave to allow direct communication between them.

CODES AND CYPHERS.

84. The following are in force now or will be distributed and brought into force when available :-

(a) A cypher for use between Flag Officers afloat and ashore and Senior Officers Commanding Ports, etc. (Dutch ENIGMA at present in use, with very limited distribution. A British cypher is being distributed now and will be brought into force about the end of May 1941).

(b) A cypher for use between all ships and shore authorities (in production in England now).

(c) A code (with low degree of security) for use between all ships and shore authorities. It also contains Self Evident Code for use between ships and aircraft. (Distributed and ready to be brought into force now).

(d) A code for use between ground stations and aircraft or ships and aircraft (in production in Far East now).

(e) A book of Call Signs (in course of distribution now).

(f) Recognition signals for use between ships, aircraft and signal stations at defended ports (distributed and ready to be brought into force now).

85. In addition to the above the following books are distributed and in force in the Far East for use between British and Dutch ships and aircraft :-

(a) Code as in 84(c).
(b) Call signs as in 84(e)
(c) Recognition signals as in 84(f).

CONFERENCE OF SIGNAL OFFICERS.

86. A further conference of Communication Officers will be required and will probably be convened by Commander-in-Chief, China, about the end of May.

/ (contd.) ....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 29.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

APPENDIX I.

LIST OF INITIAL DISPOSITIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF NAVAL FORCES.

SHIP	BASE	FUNCTION
(a) British Commonwealth Forces - East Indies Station.		
GLASGOW RANCHI CARTHAGE KANIMBLA	Durban	Cover to shipping from Cape Area through Mozambique Channel.
SHROPSHIRE ENTERPRIESE HERMES (or EAGLE) 4 HUNTS (if available)	Seychelles Mombasa	Cover to shipping from N. end Mazambique Channel towards Maldives area. Reconnaissance over Saya de Malha area. Escort of troop and supply convoys as required.
1 Cruiser 2 A/S Sloops	Maldives	Cover to shipping to westward of Maldives to Ceylon. Escort of troop and supply convoys in this area as necessary.
EMERALD COLOMBO EAGLE (if available) 2 A/S Sloops	Colombo	Cover to shipping in Ceylon area and to eastward. Escort of troop and supply convoys to and from Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea as requisite.
CERES CAPETOWN	Trincomalee Madras. Calcutta	Cover of shipping in Bay of Bengal. Escort of troop and supply convoys from Indian ports as requisite in conjunction with China cruisers operating from Penang area.
CALEDON HECTOR ANTENOR	Bombay	Cover of shipping in Arabian Sea. Escort of troop and supply convoys Bombay-Aden, Bombay - Colombo as requisite.
RENOWN ARK ROYAL 5 destroyers (Force "H")	Trincomalee	General cover to route Seychelles to Aden. Escort of troop convoys Fremantle - Colombo and onward as necessary. Escort or cover of troop convoys in Bay of Bengal as requisite. Destroyers A/S protection of Force H in terminal areas.

/ (cont) ....

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 30.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

APPENDIX I.(cont).

SHIP	BASE	FUNCTION
(a) British Commonwealth Forces - East Indies Station (continued)		
SEABELLE FALMOUTH 3 R.I.N. Sloops.	Bahrein Basra Khor Kuwai	Protection of shipping in Persian Gulf. Patrol of Straits of Ormuz.
3 Sloops	Aden Suez	Protection of shipping in Red Sea. Patrol and convoy cover in Perim Strait.
(b) British Commonwealth Forces - China Station.		
DAUNTLESS DURBAN DANAE	Singapore and Penang	Protection of shipping in Malacca Straits and to westward.
(c) British Commonwealth Forces - Australian Station.		
AUSTRALIA CANBERRA	Operating in and from S.W. Pacific.	Act as Hunting Force in Indian Ocean or SW Pacific. Escort of troop convoys to Middle East as far as Fremantle. Escort of supplies Fremantle to Malaya.
2 6-inch cruisers.	Operating in S.W. Pacific.	Act as Hunting Force in S.W. Pacific. Escort trans-Tasman convoys. Escort troop convoys to Tulagi and Vila. Provide cover for supplies to islands in S.W. Pacific.
1 6-inch cruiser.	Operate in N. Australian waters.	Escort troop convoys to Ambon and Koepang. Escort reinforcements to Singapore. (Then to be at disposition of C-in-C China).
Note: Cruisers in the Tasman Sea will provide a degree of cover for the east coast trade.		
ADELAIDE @ MANOORA WESTRALIA	Melbourne	Escort westbound shipping from Melbourne and Adelaide to Fremantle and/or point of dispersal for independent routeing.
@ ADELAIDE - effectiveness considered to be that of an A.M.C. only.		

/ (contd.) .....

MOST SECRET.

...D.B.
Page 31.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

APPENDIX I.(cont).

SHIP	BASE	FUNCTION
(d) British Commonwealth Forces - New Zealand Station.		
ACHILLES LEANDER MONOWAI	Auckland	(1) Escort of troop convoy. (2) Protection of eastbound shipping (N.Z. - Panama) within focal area. (3) Protection of N.Z.-Fiji-Vancouver convoys, in focal area. (4) Troop movements in Pacific Islands. (5) General defence of territory and shipping on New Zealand Station.
(e) Dutch Naval Forces in Netherlands East Indies.		
JAVA 2 destroyers	Sourabaya	Under orders of Commander-in-Chief, China. Escort of important convoys.
DE RUYTER TROMP 4 destroyers 6 submarines	Sourabaya	Defence of straits and passages in N.E.I., and general action against enemy forces in N.E.I. waters.
3 submarines	Sourabaya	Local defence of Sourabaya.
2 submarines	As requisite	Available for offensive action in S.China Sea south of line Cape Padaran-Kudat under C-in-C., China.
(f) United States Asiatic Fleet.		
HOUSTON MARBLEHEAD 13 destroyers (1200-ton class)	Singapore	Under orders of Commander-in-Chief, China. (1) To attack enemy naval forces and sea communications. (2) To escort important convoys.
17 submarines	Manila	Under orders of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. (1) Defence of Philippines. (2) Attack on enemy naval forces and sea communications.

MOST SECRET.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.

APPENDIX II.

SYSTEM OF AIR REINFORCEMENT.

It is intended that the system of air reinforcement shall conform to the following general principles :-

(a) If any reinforcing squadrons are ordered to proceed to the Philippines in the event of the main attack falling on those islands, they will be found from the Netherlands East Indies squadrons mentioned in paragraph 74. Such squadrons will be replaced in the Netherlands East Indies from Malaya.

(b) If the main attack falls on the Netherlands East Indies the Malayan squadrons will proceed to Borneo; initially 2 to Sinkawang II, and 2 to Samarinda II.

(c) If the main attack falls on Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies (B) and (F) squadrons will proceed to Malaya.

(d) If the circumstances occur when the evacuation of air forces from LUZON is required the United States (F) and (B) Squadrons will proceed to Samarinda II in Borneo, initially for operations under control of the Dutch Command. The Flying Boats will proceed to Singapore for operations under the control of the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station.

(e) The Australian (B) Squadrons will be prepared to operate as a striking force from Ambon as soon as possible after war breaks out. When not required for striking force duties, they will be based on Darwin for reconnaissance and striking duties in the Darwin - Timor areas. Australian land force detachments will proceed to Ambon and Timor to reinforce the Dutch garrison at Ambon and to take over military control of Dutch Timor.

MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 33.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS, APRIL 1941.

APPENDIX III.

LIST OF LIAISON OFFICERS AND OBSERVERS.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.

British Observers	U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA	Commander C.R.L. Parry, R.N.
	U.S.S. BOISE	Lieutenant Commdr. C.C.Martell, R.N.
	U.S.S. STERRETT	Lieutenant Commdr. Hon.D.C.Cairns,R.N.

MANILA.

Dutch Observer.	Commander H.D. Lindner, R.N.N.

BATAVIA.

British Naval Liaison Officer	Commander J.B. Heath, R.N.
British Air Liaison Officer	Squadron Leader Watkins, R.A.F.
Australia Naval Liaison Officer	Commander V.E. Kennedy, R.A.N.
Australia Air Liaison Officer	Wing Commander Thomas, R.A.A.F.

SINGAPORE.

United States of America Naval Observer	Captain A.M.R. Allen, U.S.N.
United States of America Army Observer	Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Brink, U.S.A.
Dutch Naval Liaison Officer	Captain L.G.L. Van der Kun.
Dutch Military Liaison Officer	Major J.M.J. Wegner.
New Zealand Liaison Officers	Group Captain L. Darvall, [illegible] R.A.F..
	Commander E.K.H. St. Aubyn, D.S.C., R.N.

AUSTRALIA.

United States Naval Attache	Commander L.D. Causey, U.S.N.
United States Naval Observer (Darwin)	Commander M. Collins, U.S.N.
Dutch Naval Liaison Officer	Commander G.B. Salm, R.N.N.
New Zealand Liaison Officer	Group Captain T. Wilkes, R.N.Z.A.F.

NEW ZEALAND.

United States Naval Observer	Commander Olding, U.S.N.

COLOMBO.

United States Naval Observer	Commander H.M. Lammers, U.S.N.

EXHIBIT NO. 51

THE JOINT BOARD,
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE,
Washington, August 12, 1941.

J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)
Secret
From: The Joint Planning Committee,
To: The Joint Board.
Subject: Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title—ABC–22).
Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July 1941) with permanent Joint Board on Defense letter of transmittal, dated: Montreal, 30th July, 1941.

The subject plan, which was prepared in collaboration with the War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments, is transmitted herewith with recommendation that it be approved.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.
(Signed) C. J. Moore
C. J. MOORE,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717) Secret

CANADA—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

Office of the Secretary
East Block Parliament Buildings
Ottawa

MONTREAL, *30th July, 1941.*

To: The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
The Chief of Staff, United States Army
The Chief of Naval Staff, Canada
The Chief of the General Staff, Canada
The Chief of the Air Staff, Canada

There is submitted herewith a copy of Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (short title ABC–22) prepared by the Service members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

(Sgd) S. D. Embick
S. D. EMBICK,
Major-General, U. S. Army.
(Sgd) H. W. Hill
H. W. HILL,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
(Sgd) Forrest Sherman
FORREST SHERMAN,
Commander, U. S. Navy.
(Sgd) Clayton Bissell
CLAYTON BISSELL,
Lieut.-Colonel, U. S. Army.
(Sgd) F. L. Houghton
F. L. HOUGHTON,
Captain, R. C. N.
(Sgd) Maurice Pope
M. A. POPE,
Brigadier.
(Sgd) A. A. L. Cuffe
A. A. L. CUFFE,
Air Commodore, R. C. A. F.

SECRET

U. S. Registered Copy No. 34

[*1*] J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)

This Draft includes corrections made up to 28 July 1941.

JOINT CANADIAN-UNITED STATES BASIC DEFENSE PLAN NO. 2

(Short Title ABC–22)

SECTION 1—PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN

1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their concurrence. The report, which bears the short title "ABC–1", includes a United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.

2. ABC–1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States for common action in war under the concepts of ABC–1 will conform generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Commonwealth be associated in a war against Germany and her allies.

3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action by Canadian and United States Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with:

(a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;

(b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones;

(c) the defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland, (which includes Labrador) and the northern portion of the United States.

4. The coastal zones are the whole area of the navigable waters adjacent to the seacoast and extend seaward to include the coastwise sea lanes and focal points of shipping approaching and departing from the coast.

[2]

SECTION II—SPECIAL PROVISIONS

5. Except as otherwise provided herein, the assumptions, concept and other provisions of ABC–1, where applicable, shall form a part of this plan.

6. Coordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual cooperation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. These tasks may be assigned in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plans, or by agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned, the United States Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such.

7. In effecting mutual cooperation, as provided in paragraph 6, the forces of one nation will, to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the other nation.

8. Each nation shall retain the strategic direction and command of its own forces, except as hereinafter provided.

9. A unified command may, if circumstances so require, be established over United States and Canadian forces operation in any area or areas, or for particular United States and Canadian forces operating for a common purpose:

(a) when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or

(b) when the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation required the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate establishment of unity of command in cases of emergency.

10. Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination. In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval [3] forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Ocean, nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land areas, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.

11. The assignment of an area to one nation shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

12. For all matters requiring common action, each nation will require its commanders in all echelons and services, on their own initiative, to establish liaison with and cooperate with appropriate commanders of the other nation. The principal commanders of Canadian and United States forces who will cooperate under this plan are as follows:

Canada	*United States*
Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force (RCN)	Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, (USN)
Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast (RCN)	Task Force Commanders, United States Atlantic Fleet (USN)
Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command (RCAF)	Commander North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier (USN)
General Officer Commanding in Chief, Atlantic Command (CA)	Commanding General Northeast Defense Command (USA)
Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command (RCAF)	Commanding General, GHQ

Canada	*United States*
Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast (RCN)	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (USN)
Air Officer Commanding Western Air Command (RCAF)	Task Force Commanders, United States Pacific Fleet (USN)
	Commander Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier (USN)
General Officer Commanding in Chief Pacific Command (CA)	Commanding General Western Defense Command (USA)
Air Officer Commanding Western Air Command (RCAF)	

13. Under the provisions of ABC–1 the United States will assume responsibility for the control and protection of Associated Overseas shipping in the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas. Pending the establishment of effective United States agencies the British Naval Control Service Organization will, in accordance with ABC–1, continue in the exercise of its present functions.

14. Within the coastal zones of Canada and the United States, responsibility for routing and protection of shipping is allocated as follows:

[4] (a) Canada will be responsible for routing and protecting coastwise and independently routed overseas shipping within the coastal zones of Canada and Newfoundland.

(b) The United States will be responsible for routing and protecting Associated overseas shipping except as provided in sub-paragraph (a).

(c) The routing of shipping passing from the coastal zone of one nation into the coastal zone of the other, will be effected in the Atlantic by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, and the United States Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier; and in the Pacific by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, and the United States Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

15. Each nation will provide within its own territory certain base facilities for use by the other nation. These facilities are listed in Annex II. So far as practicable, each nation will make available its own bases, harbors, and repair facilities, for use by the forces of the other.

16. To facilitate common decision and action, Canada and the United States will establish in Washington and Ottawa, respectively, officers of all Services who will be charged with the duty of representing their own Chiefs of Staff, vis-à-vis the appropriate Chief of Staff of the other nation. They will also arrange to assign liaison officers where needed for effectuating direct cooperation between Commanders of forces in the field.

17. This plan will be placed in effect by the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States when so directed by the Canadian and United States Governments.

SECTION III—JOINT TASK OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

18. Protect the sea communications of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and defend the territory of Canada, Newfoundland, and the United States, including Alaska, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and the United States.

SECTION IV—TASKS

[5] 19. The tasks set forth in this section are those which will be undertaken jointly by the armed forces of Canada and the United States, should the latter enter the war. These joint tasks are:

JOINT TASK ONE: PROTECT ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC AREAS.

JOINT TASK TWO: DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND AND PROTECT ASSOCIATED SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

JOINT TASK THREE: DEFEND EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONES.

JOINT TASK FOUR: DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

JOINT TASK FIVE: DEFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHWESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE COASTAL ZONES.

20 *Joint Task One:* PROTECT ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC AREAS.

Canadian Tasks

All Services—Support the United States Navy in the execution of this joint task.

United States Tasks

Army—Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect overseas shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as may be appropriate, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

21. *Joint Task Two:* DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND AND PROTECT ASSOCIATED SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Canadian Tasks

Army—Defend Newfoundland, in cooperation with other Canadian and United States Services. Cooperate in the defense of United States bases in Newfoundland.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the coastal zone. Provide the naval defense of St. John's and Botwood. Support the defense of Newfoundland.

[6] Cooperate with the Royal Canadian Air Force in denying Hudson Strait to enemy forces. Assist the United States Navy in initial movements of United States forces from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.

Air Force—Defend Newfoundland in cooperation with other Canadian and United States Services. Cooperate in the defense of United States bases in Newfoundland.

United States Tasks

Army—Defend Newfoundland in cooperation with Canadian and other United States Services. Defend United States bases. Support associated naval operations.

Navy—Support the defense of Newfoundland and its coastal zone. Patrol Placentia Bay. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of United States forces in Newfoundland.

22. *Joint Task Three:* DEFEND EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Canadian Tasks

Army—Defend the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspe Peninsula.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the Canadian Coastal Zone. Provide the naval defense of the harbors of Gaspe, Halifax, Sydney, Shelburne, and Saint John, N. B.

Air Force—Defend Eastern Canada. Support Associated naval operation.

United States Tasks

Army—Defend the northeastern portion of the United States. Support Associated naval operations. Support the defense of the Maritime provinces and the Gaspe Peninsula.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the United States Coastal Zone. Support the defense of the northeastern portion of the United States. Support the defense of Eastern Canada and its Coastal zone.

23. *Joint Task Four:* DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Canadian Tasks

Navy—Protect sea communications in the Canadian coastal zone. Assist the United States Navy in the initial [7] movements of United States forces between the United States and Alaska.

Air Force—Support the defense of Alaska. Support Associated naval operations.

United States Tasks

Army—Deny the use by the enemy of sea and land bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. Defend United States military and naval bases and installations in Alaska. Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect shipping in the United States coastal zone. Support the defense of Alaska. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of United States forces in Alaska.

24. *Joint Task Five*—DEFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHWESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS IN THE COASTAL ZONES.

Canadian Tasks

Army—Defend Western Canada. Cooperate with the United States Army in the defense of the Straits of Juan de Fuca—Puget Sound Area.

Navy—Provide the naval defenses of Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver and Prince Rupert. Protect sea communications in the Canadian coastal zone.

Air Force—Defend Western Canada. Support military and naval operation, particularly in the straits of Juan de Fuca—Puget Sound Area.

United States Tasks

Army—Defend the northwestern portion of the United States. Support the defense of Western Canada. Cooperate with Canadian forces in the defense of the Straits of Juan de Fuca—Puget Sound Area. Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the United States coastal zone. Support the defense of the northwestern portion of the United States. Support the defense of Western Canada and its coastal zone.

[8]

SECTION V

25. The forces estimated to be available for the operations required by this plan are indicated in Annex I—*Military Forces.*

SECTION VI

26. The facilities to be provided by the two governments concerned for the joint execution of this plan are indicated in Annex II—*Facilities to be Provided by Canada and the United States.*

SECTION VII

27. The general communication principles outlined in Annex IV of ABC–1 shall serve as a guide for this plan, subject to such additional instructions as may be issued from time to time by the Chiefs of Staff concerned.

[9]

ANNEX I—MILITARY FORCES

In view of the uncertainties which exist as to the stability of the strategic situations in various theatres, and as to the date on which the United States may enter the war, the strengths of forces listed below must be regarded as subject to change in the light of the strategic situation which may exist when the plan is placed in effect. The forces now estimated to be initially available for the operations required by this plan as of 15 July, 1941, are:

(A) ATLANTIC

Ocean Escorts United States Atlantic Fleet

6 Battleships
5 8″ Cruisers
54 Destroyers
4 Mine Sweepers (destroyer type)
54 Patrol Planes

North Atlantic Naval Coastal Force (U. S. N.)

5 Eagle Boats
3 Gunboats
4 Patrol Yachts
18 Patrol Planes

Newfoundland Force (R. C. N.) (Allocated to operate with Ocean Escorts, U. S. Atlantic Fleet)
5 Destroyers
15 Corvettes

Atlantic Coast Command (R. C. N.)
8 Destroyers
28 Corvettes
4 Mine Sweepers
4 Magnetic Mine Sweepers
11 Armed A/S Yachts

Eastern Air Command (R. C. A. F.)
Headquarters
Maritimes
Three Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Partly Operational)
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Not Fully Equipped)
One Fighter Squadron (Partly Operational)
One General Reconnaissance School Squadron (Partly Operational)
One Operational Training Reconnaissance and Bombing Squadron (Partly Operational)
Three Coast Artillery Cooperation Detachments

[10] *Newfoundland*
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron

Newfoundland Base Command (U. S. A.)
Force Headquarters
One Regiment Infantry (Less two battalions)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., 37 mm Gun (Reinforced)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., 90 mm Gun (Reinforced)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., M. G. (Reinforced)
One Battery Coast Artillery, 8" RR.
One Battery Coast Artillery 155 mm Gun (Reinforced)
One Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy)
One Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor)
Service Troops
Total Force, 5400

Northeast Defense Command (U. S. A.)
Headquarters First Army
One Army Corps (Three Divisions)
One Division
Harbor Defense Units
4 Regiments Infantry
1 Battalion Field Artillery (Pack)
Service Troops
Total, 130,000
Antiaircraft Artillery and pursuit aviation units may be assigned as warranted by the category of defense.

Atlantic Command, Canadian Army

Atlantic Command Headquarters	65
Maritimes	10,508
Three Fortress Headquarters	
Five Infantry Battalions	
Two M. G. Battalions	
Four A. A. Batteries	
Four G/L Batteries	
Harbor Defense Units	
Service Troops	
Newfoundland	2,911
Headquarters	
Two Infantry Battalions	
One A. A. M. G. Battery	
Two Heavy Batteries (CA)	
Service Troops	
General Reserve	
One Infantry Division (less units overseas)	
Total Force	34,630

[11] (B) PACIFIC

Naval Local Defense Force, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, (U. S. N.)
5 Destroyers
1 Eagle Boat
1 Gunboat
2 Submarines
12 Patrol Planes

Pacific Coast Command (R. C. N.)
1 Armed Merchant Cruiser
1 Corvette
2 Armed A/S Yachts

Western Air Command (R. C. A. F.)
Headquarters
Three Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons (Not Fully Equipped)
One Operational Training Reconnaissance Squadron
One Coast Artillery Cooperation Detachment

Pacific Command, Canadian Army
Pacific Command Haedquarters 45
Puget Sound Area 4,180
Victoria—Esquimalt Fortress Headquarters
Headquarters Vancouver Defenses
Two Infantry Battalions and Six Platoons
One A. A. Battery
Two Search Light Batteries
Coast Defenses
Service Troops
Prince Rupert 1,222
Headquarters Prince Rupert Defenses
One Infantry Battalion
One Search Light Battery
One Heavy Battery
General Reserve 3,717
One Infantry Brigade
One Infantry Battalion
Total Force 9,164

Western Defense Command (U. S. A.)
Headquarters Fourth Army
One Army Corps (Two Divisions)
One Army Corps (One Division)
Harbor Defense Units
1 Cavalry Brigade
[12] 1 Cavalry Regiment
5 Field Artillery Battalions (75 mm Gun)
1 Infantry Regiment
2 Antitank Battalions
Service Troops
Total, 100,000.

Antiaircraft artillery and pursuit aviation units may be assigned as warranted by the category of defense

Alaska Defense Command (U. S. A.)
3 Regiments and 3 Companies of Infantry
1 Light Tank Company
1 Composite Battalion and 1 Battery, Field Artillery
3 Regiments and 4 Batteries of Antiairrcaft Artillery
2 Battalions and 2 Batteries of Harbor Defense, Coast Artillery
1 Squadron each of pursuit, bombardment medium, bombardment heavy, and transport aviation
1 Air Base Group
Service Troops
Total, 24,000.

[13] ANNEX II—FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED BY CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

In order to provide for the joint execution of the tasks contained in this plan, the two governments concerned have agreed to provide facilities as follows, primarily for use by the military forces of either or both nations;

By Canada

At the Newfoundland Airport, facilities for the operation of a composite group (73 planes) of United States Army aircraft, and storage for 1,500,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

In the Botwood-Lewisporte area, storage for 1,000,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

In the Botwood area, shore facilities permitting the operation of one squadron of United States Navy Patrol planes.

Land plane staging facilities at Sydney, Nova Scotia, including radio facilities.

A fighter aerodrome in the vicinity of St. Johns, N. F.

Defenses for the ports of St. Johns, Botwood, and for other points as required.

Expansion of the aircraft operating facilities in the Maritime Provinces to include provisions for the early operation by the United States of one squadron and the ultimate operation of four squadrons of naval patrol planes (48 planes).

Staging facilities for aircraft en route between Alaska and the continental United States.

Airdromes on the north end of Vancouver Island and at Uceleulet.

Additional coast defenses at Christopher Point, B. C.

By United States

At Argentina, a defended base for the operation of two squadrons of patrol planes (24 planes), including storage for 110,000 barrels of fuel oil and 1,800,000 gallons of aviation gasoline.

[*14*] Staging facilities at Stephenville for short range aircraft between Sydney and the Newfoundland Airport; these to include radio facilities.

Improvement of the Newfoundland railway and an increase in rolling stock of 5 locomotives and 100 cars to meet United States requirements.

Development of airways and other transportation facilities leading into Eastern Canada.

Army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks.

Land aviation facilities at Ketchikan, Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage, Bethel, Nome, Boundary and Big Delta.

Naval air stations at Sitka, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor and their defenses.

Airways between Ketchikan and Kodiak, and between Nome and Boundary.

Readjustment of coast defenses in Juan de Fuca Straits to coordinate with Canadian fixed defenses at Esquimalt.

Aircraft operating facilities at Seattle, Whidby Island, Tongue Point, Aberdeen, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia and Spokane County.

EXHIBIT NO. 52

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN

WAR DEPARTMENT AND GENERAL HERRON

CONCERNING 1940 ALERT

Communications between War Department and General Herron concerning 1940 Alert

Date	From	To	Subject	Page[1]
17 June 40	AG	Herron	Ordering immediate alert	1
17 June 40	Herron	AG	Acknowledging alert order	2
17 June 40	Herron	Marshall	Reporting action under alert	3
18 June 40	Herron	AG	Requesting funds	4
19 June 40	AG	Herron	Authorizing modification of alert	5
19 June 40	Herron	AG	Acknowledging authorization	6
19 June 40	Herron	Marshall	Reporting continuance of air precautions	7
21 June 40	Herron	Marshall	Reporting Navy not put on alert	8
22 June 40	Marshall	Herron	Ordering modified alert continued	9
24 June 40	Herron	Marshall	Reviewing alert developments	10
[26 June 40	Marshall	Strong	Requesting draft of explanation for field on why alert called.	11]
[27 June 40	Strong	Marshall	Submitting draft; recommending not be sent	12]
			[Unused draft	13]

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

Communications between War Department and General Herron concerning 1940 Alert—Continued

Date	From	To	Subject	Page[1]
1 July 40	Herron	Marshall	Alert status end two weeks	14
8 July 40	Herron	Marshall	Alert status end three weeks	15
10 July 40	Marshall	Herron	Re transportation wear	16
15 July 40	Herron	Marshall	Alert status start fifth week	17
16 July 40	Marshall	Herron	Authorizing partial relaxation of alert	18
21 Aug 40	Herron	Marshall	Alert status end two months	19
28 Aug 40	Marshall	Herron	Inquiry on effects of alert	20
6 Sept 40	Herron	Marshall	Reply on effects of alert	21
15 Oct 40	Herron	Memo	Reporting Navy resumption outer air patrol	22

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[*1*] Sent June 17, 1940 Number 428. WE.

Secret

June 17, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

ADAMS.

[*2*] LW

127WVY

Received at the War Department, June 17, 1940, 6:29 P. M.

From: Honolulu,
To: The Adjutant General.
Secret
Honolulu Number 1843. June 17th.

Receipt acknowledged your radiogram 428.

HERRON.

[*3*] Received at the War Department, June 18, 1940, 4322, 737 A. M.

W 2
1140 P
From: Hawaii
To: General George C. Marshall
Secret
Number 1. June 17th.

All antiaircraft observations and security of detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installations. Some local interest in ammunition issues but no excitement. Navy inshore and offshore air patrols in operation.

HERRON.

Initialed "G. C. M."

[*4*] Received at the War Department, June 19th, 1940, 12:11 A. M.

46-WTJ
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 1848 June 18th. 426PM. Priority.
Secret

Following funds urgently required for local procurement of services and supplies in connection with your radio 428 seventeenth; U S and S A, three thousand dollars; S F E, eighty eight thousand five hundred dollars broken down as follows: Engineer construction materials, forty eight thousand dollars; rental of motor vehicles and construction equipment, twenty five thousand dollars; wages, two

thousand dollars; transportation of equipment and supplies two thousand five hundred dollars; Medical and Hospital treatment, one thousand dollars; Miscellaneous, ten thousand dollars.

HERRON.

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[5] Secret

Number 434. Sent 6–1940—MWW.

JUNE 19, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Concerning your 1848, June 18 period You are authorized to modify gradually measures ordered in our 428 but adequate guards on a semipermanent basis will be maintained at all critical points period guard detachments may be rotated at your discretion period In view of above resubmit your request for funds with concise explanation as to their application under each appropriation subhead period every effort should be made to avoid publicity and to place maintenance of alert as modified herein on strictly a training basis period Acknowledge.

ADAMS.

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[6] Secret

Received at the War Department, June 20, 1940, 113 A. M.
37 WTJ
From: Hawaii
To: The Adjutant General
Number 1849. June 19th.
Acknowledge receipt your 434 of 19th.

HERRON.

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[7]

Received at the War Department, June 20, 1940, 8: 00 A. M.
W 1
From: Honolulu,
To: Chief of Staff.
Secret
Honolulu Number 2. June 19th.
Yours of 19th acknowledged. Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will be continued with easing in other lines. Local publicity on maneuvers favorable and not excited.

HERRON.

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[8]

Received at the War Department, June 21, 1940, 8: 47 P. M.
W–27.
From: Fort Shafter, T. H.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Number 3, June 21st. Filed 2: 00 PM
Secret
In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

HERRON.

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[9]

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:
Subject: Defense Precautions.
No. 1. Sent 6–22–40 BFS
The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram, in the Chief of Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:
"Reurad 3 June twenty-first. In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue

your Alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

MARSHALL."

GEO. V. STRONG,
/s/ Gen. Strong
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

ml

[*10*] JUNE 24, 1940.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

This is to report that the Hawaiian portion of your domain is quiet this morning. I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air, and the antiaircraft men roll out of their blankets at the first grey light at the sound of the claxon and stand to their guns. The Infantry at Walter Dillinghams bathing beach on the North shore were standing by their guns and looking out to sea.

I have been highly gratified by the promptness and precision with which the planes get off the ground every morning promptly at 4:30. It is further encouraging to see the discipline and quiet efficiency among the ground crews. It is my belief that the Air Corps here comes on well.

A week ago today I gave the command for a surprise alert, which went off smoothly and efficiently. In view of the disturbing state of the world I thought that the command might as well get accustomed to having live ammunition, but did not realize how much this would excite the post war portion of the Army. However, they are all quieted down now, as is the city, which buzzed for a couple of days. Some of the young people thought that M day had come and two or three young couples that had intended to get married this month hustled around and did it at once just as in 1918!

We really worked the young men for the first few days but have now eased up so that not more than 25% of any command is on actual reconnaissance or observation at any one time.

Our officer strength ebbs fast and we rapidly approach the day when we will have but one officer per battery or company. However, with our "maneuver officers" for combat and the expected Thomason Act officers to carry the administrative portion, I will have no complaint. It is, of course, unorthodox to contemplate using Thomason Act officers for administrative duties but the proportion of that is heavy and the few remaining [*10A*] regular officers must be released to train their companies.

Under existing War Department Directives but little use can be made of local Reserve Officers without obvious racial discrimination. I am still convinced that the discreet employment of a few orientals will have a tremendous effect upon the mass and will rally much of the disaffected to our side. I may soon ask to have War Department Directives entailing racial discrimination set aside insofar as they apply to Hawaii.

In planning the M day organization of a police force to relieve the command from guarding our hundred miles of cables we have found that the project makes a great hit with the Plantation Managers, although they would be asked to supply the personnel. It seems that the desirability of an increased police force in war has been a good deal on the minds of some of the managers.

I have turned over nearly everything in the office to the Chief of Staff and am spending my time with the troops, which is one of the things that I learned from Charles Pelow Summerall and the First Division!

Your crack that "yesterday we had time but no money and that today we have money but no time" is good and has made a great hit in particular with the civilians.

With warmest regards and best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,

/s/ C. D. Herron
C. D. HERRON.

Please pardon typographical error—the mail closes too soon to have this rewritten. [Handwritten]

[11] Confidential

JUNE 26, 1940.

Memorandum for General Strong:

It seems to me I should write to both Van Voorhis and Herron something of what led up to our emergency radios of the other day; that is, if you think we can trust to Air Mail for such a confidential message. Personally, I think it is reasonably safe.

Will you have somebody make a rough draft of what I should say.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL, *Chief of Staff.*

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[12] Secret

JUNE 27, 1940

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Defense Precautions.

1. Reference to your memorandum of June 26, with reference to writing General Van Voorhis and General Herron in regard to the background for our emergency radios; I am inclined to think that developments of the last 10 days, as reflected in the press, have given both all the background necessary.

2. Another point to be considered is that air mail may be tampered with, any reference in the matter covered in your secret code might jeopardize that code.

3. However, if you think that you should write them, I suggest that the communication go by registered mail. Drafts of suggested remarks herewith.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls.
2 drafts:
1 for Gen. Van Voorhis.
1 for Gen. Herron.

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[13] Secret

MY DEAR HERRON: You have no doubt wondered as to the alert instructions sent to you on the 17th. Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii.

Presumably such a raid would be in the interests of Germany and Italy, to force the United States to pull the Fleet back to Hawaii.

Whether the information or deductions were correct I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were, by discouraging any overt act.

In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The world situation is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the "all-clear" signal.

Best of luck.

Sincerely yours,

G. C. M.

Not used

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[14] Received at the War Department, July 1, 1940, 5:45 P. M.

W–15.

From: Honolulu, T. H.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Honolulu Number 4. July 1st. Filed 10:35 AM

Secret

Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally no ill effects on command except cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Fords Island.

HERRON.

[15] Received at the War Department, July 8, 1940, 9:42 P. M.

W–26.

From: Honolulu, T. H.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Number 5, July 8th. Filed 2:05 PM.
Secret

Three weeks of Alert completed today with no unfavorable reaction on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. No developments in local situation.

HERRON.

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[16] *Secret*

No. 2. Sent July 10, 1940. BFS. July 10, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:
Subject: Defense Precautions.

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram in the Chief of Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Your 5, July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear on motor transportation by putting present Alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction on convenience or morale of personnel? If this meets your approval submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary type. As to your shortage of transportation it is expected that 1½-ton types will be delivered by October 1 and other types by December 1, 1940. These vehicles will be placed at ports of embarkation and shipped as rapidly thereafter as transport space permits.

"MARSHALL.

/s/ Gen. STRONG
GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

ml

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[17] Received at the War Department, July 15, 1940, 5:47 P. M.

W 14

From: Honolulu,
To: Chief of Staff.

Secret

Honolulu Number 6. July 15th.

Alert entering 5th week. As now conducted is without undue strain on personnel or materiel including motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol.

HERRON.

Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:
Subject: Defense Precautions.
No. 3. Sent July 16, 1940. BFS

The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram, in the Chief of Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Your Number 6, July 15. You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax Alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness and second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an Alert basis on short notice.

"MARSHALL."

/s/ Gen. Strong,
GEO. V. STRONG,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

[19] AUGUST 21, 1940.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: You will be interested to hear that the evacuation of Ford Island proceeds on schedule and that we will be completely out on the agreed date. Our shops are about set up in hangers and we can get by until the new Hickam shops are finished, although that time is several months off.

In addition, we seem about to complete satisfactorily our local joint agreement with the Navy. In the original agreement concluded last winter, there were necessarily some gaps—matters, such as the allocation of local man power, upon which we could not then pin the Navy Down.

Admiral Bloch, who commands the 14th Naval District, is a fine, upstanding officer, always amenable to reason and never narrow-minded or stupid. However, he is a tough guy who plays his cards closely and shamelessly picks up his opponents tricks, if the latter does not protect himself. But that kind of a game serves its purpose of dividing up the chips before the joint is raided, and suits me as well as any other kind. I think the Army has lost none of its garments to date, except Bishop's Point. Ford Island ought to belong to the Navy.

Richardson is the salt of the earth and I am devoted to him.

The Reserve Officers begin to come in and to date we have 38. They are alright and an infinite help.

We have an allotment of funds for the Supersonic Warning Service and hope to be ready to go the day the instruments arrive, although it will be no childs play to do the preliminary work on these mountain tops. If the system works, it will be a major addition to our strength.

[19A] The Alert has now been on two months. The only present measurable loss is in the weathering of the hundreds of miles of field wire in place, largely for anti-aircraft purposes, but that is probably worth while.

I trust that you keep well and do not allow them to drain away in any day strength that you cannot regain before the next dawn. However acute things be now, it is not yet war!

Best wishes!

Yours as ever,

/s/ Herron
C. D. HERRON.

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[20] Confidential

WASHINGTON, D. C., *August 28, 1940.*

DEAR HERRON: I have appreciated very much your letters and notes keeping me generally advised of the situation.

As to "the alert", what is your frank reaction? Do you think it is imposing too heavy a tax to continue on the present basis? In Panama the condition is much more different. We have had to give them about $300,000 to construct temporary shelters for the numerous antiaircraft stations in the high hills. The rainy season makes life under these circumstances very difficult, but I do not feel that we can expose ourselves to the risks of a sudden lunge from some unexpected quarter. It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be catastrophic.

Let me have your frank opinion.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL.

General C. D. HERRON,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

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[21] Confidential

KILAUIA MILITARY CAMP,
Hawaii, T. H., 6 Sept. 40.

DEAR GEORGE: Your note of August 28th has just reached me here, where I have come to collect my wits and obtain a little perspective. Wish you could do the same!

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that now that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolutely secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much. As things now are, I feel that you need not have this place on your mind at all. The position of this place on the Army priority lists is still all right, for our essentials can still be quickly supplied when the necessity arises. You know what they and War Plans can refresh your mind.

Am flying back early tomorrow morning to greet Mr. Knox.

Best wishes!

C. D. HERRON.

[All of above hand written.]

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[22] Confidential

OCTOBER 15, 1940.

Secret

The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit planes in the air at dawn.

We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will be observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that precautions must increase.

C. D. H.

EXHIBIT NO. 53

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL SHORT

Date	From	To	Subject	Page [1]
7 Feb	Marshall	Short	Advise to Short on assumption of command	1
19 Feb	Short	Marshall	Plans for Hawaiian Department	4
5 Mar	Marshall	Short	Urging air defense preparations	10
6 Mar	Short	Marshall	Expediting of AWS project requested	11
13 Mar	Marshall	Short	Short's coordination with Navy approved	13
15 Mar	Bryden (Marshall absent).	Short	Need for clearance with Interior on AWS sites	14
15 Mar	Short	Marshall	Report on measures for defense from air attack	15
28 Mar	Marshall	Short	Hawaiian defense needs	18
14 Apr	Short	Marshall	Strong points & new airfield; forwarding Army-Navy air defense plans.	19
1 May	Short	Marshall	Requesting funds for airfield construction	21
2 May	Short	Marsnall	Amplifying request	23
5 May	Marshall	Short	Acknowledging receipt of air defense plans forwarded 14 April.	25
15 May	Short	Emmons (to Marshall).	Statement on projects of interest to Hawaiian Department.	26
29 May	Short	Marshall	Reporting recent maneuvers	35
3 July	Marshall	Short	Recreation camp	37
11 July	Short	Marshall	Site for new airfield	38
25 July	Short	Marshall	Army-Navy mutual use of airfields; plans for Army-Navy air exercise.	39
19 Aug	Marshall	Short	Choice of airfield site	40
10 Oct	Marshall	Short	Missions of air units under Short's tentative SOP	42
14 Oct	Short	Marshall	Same	43
28 Oct	Marshall	Short	Same	44

NOTE.—Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 18 were classified Secret. Items 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 were classified Confidential.

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1] FEBRUARY 7, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications for command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy.

I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday,—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and [2] very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40–B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40–B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles,

carriers 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortres planes for Hawaii.

[3] I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited material we have, for Alaska, for Panama, and, *most confidentially* for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel, I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped.] (Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

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[4] FEB. 19, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

Since assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

(1) Cooperation with the Navy.

(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.

(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.

(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.

(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.

(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.

(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.

(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and aircraft. These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.

[5] *Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.* Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual asignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:

Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T–O 4–11.

One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (mobile) (less searchlight battery) T. O. 4–15.

Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Antiaircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel, [6] both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery materiel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4–31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This

shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary for the defense of the island.

There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of [7] repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.

Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

Cooperation with the Navy. Joint letter, HHD, 14th Naval District, 14 February, 1941, subject: "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," copy attached, Inclosure No. 1.

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.

Dispersion and protection of aircraft. Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.

Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55, copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.

[8] Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.

North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662/7, 19 February 1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.

Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights.

a. Beach Defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 January 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineers Status Report, Revision, 1940." 1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: "Reference Par. 1 *c*, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action

is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails. Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.

Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 600.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached):

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.
3. Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.
5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 14.
6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclosure No. 15.
7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.
8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.
9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.

[9] *Increase in number of Engineer Troops.* Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.

Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

19 Incls:[1]

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[10] MARCH 5, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

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[1] Omitted.

[*11*] Via "Clipper" Air Mail

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and has communicated this concern to the Navy Department; as you know, the Secretary of War has advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be received in this department some time in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter. I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within thirty days after receipt of the equipment.

All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941 just received from The Adjutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and a paraphrase of my reply are inclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant General's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not yet been appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain restrictions regarding construction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, the completion of this station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important in the warning net; its commanding location gives it greater coverage than any of the others, and its early completion is vital. I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

[*12*] Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

2 Incls: [1]
Radio 3 Mar 1941
Paraphrase

[*13*] MARCH 13, 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

Since the Navy development in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming responsibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available.

The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, matériel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating

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[1] Omitted.

projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

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[14] MAR. 15, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The matters referred to in your secret letter dated March 6, 1941, and the inclosures thereto, have been given careful study.

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public lands. It is not believed that it would be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through official channels.

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest cooperation.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Signed) WM. BRYDEN.
In the absence of the Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
1 Chief of Staff.

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[15] 15 MARCH 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense from air attack.

DISPERSION AND PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better. Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island. On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius.

The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the arrival

of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly congested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at Wheeler Field.

[*16*] Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Incidentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually at some distance from the air field.

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only 4½ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

The shortage of personnel is much more serious than that of equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4–11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO 4–15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 19th.

COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, commanding the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air Station. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the past [*17*] month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find out anything that is wrong with the plan.

WEST COAST DEFENSE

If the situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our

air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel that it would be wise to send him also as he would be able to get all the details. If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officers I would like to send their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.

I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this subject.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

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[18] MAR 28 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing the air defense situation in your department.

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes will be included in estimates.

A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available.

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service matériel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3" antiaircraft guns, December, 1941; one hundred and fifteen 37 mm antiaircraft guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR No. 268, April, 1941; five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May 1941.

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft garrison so as to provide full strength units for the armament available within your department. Additional Coast Artillery reinforcements probably will be held in the United States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute.

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Due to various reasons that exercise has been postponed till Fall, as you may know.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Distribution:
1 Copy for the Chief of Staff

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[19] APRIL 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On April 12th I sent a radio to the War Department requesting that I be authorized to make leases of 230 separate parcels of land, none of which exceed 5 acres on island of Oahu, totaling approximately 467 acres and asking for $10,000.00 to cover the rental. The purpose in leasing this land is to begin the construction of strongpoints at all places where they are not located in cane fields and pineapple fields. The greater part of the other land is rock so the construction of the strongpoints requires the use of explosives and takes a great amount of time. One company strongpoint on the West Coast is now in the process of being constructed and the troops have been working most of the time for seven months. The strongpoint lacks considerably of being completed. I feel that it is essential to get these under way at once rather than taking several months to get the exact metes and bounds and get the approval of the War Department on each separate lease before starting work. At the best I do not believe they can all be completed before September. Any field fortifications to be constructed in cane fields and pineapple fields will be very simple as the nature of the soil is such that the construction can be carried on without the use of explosives. I am enclosing a copy of the radio sent.

We have completed the reconnaissance and estimates for the new air field. We had some difficulty in meeting all the technical requirements as I was insistent that it should be located somewhere in the interior where it could not be picked up so easily at night, could not be shelled from ships and would not require a special guard. We have located a place that seems to meet all requirements and is exceptionally well located from a tactical point of view. I am enclosing a copy of the letter of transmittal. The complete document is being sent forward to the Adjutant General by this same mail. With the great increase in the number of pursuit planes I feel that it is essential to push this construction as rapidly as possible.

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

[*20*] 2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Forces, to implement the above agreement.

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.

Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will interest you.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Walter C. Short.
WALTER C. SHORT.

[*21*] MAY 2, 1941. 4:39 AM.

From: Honolulu.
To: General George C. Marshall.
Honolulu No. 2755. May 1st.

Hawaiian Department has submitted estimates for construction of airports for the Hawaiian Air Force as follows: Island of Oahu, Kipapa $4,940,000.00, Bellows Field $2,543,000.00. Island of Kauai, Barking Sands $1,772,000.00. Island of Hawaii, Morse Field $1,688,000.00, Hilo airport $670,000.00, Parker Ranch $1,993,000.00, Total $13,606,000.00. Additional estimates will be submitted for airports as follows: Island of Oahu, Haleiwa $450,000.00. Island of Kauai, Burns Field $640,000.00. Island of Molokai, Homestead Field $400,000.00. Island of Lanai $1,990,000.00, total $3,480,000.00. It is recommended that provision be made in the current 1942 appropriation bill for the inclusion of these items at a total estimated cost of $17,860,000.00.

In addition request that amount of $10,000,000.00 be included in estimates for use in this Department on projects which can not be completely anticipated at this time. This fund should be available without waiting for future congressional action for projects under construction but lacking sufficient funds to complete, and upon [*22*] approval for those projects now under study but not yet approved including fortifications, bombproofs, housing, military roads and other structures. Understand fiscal year 42 appropriation bill now before Senate and recommend inclusion of these general amounts before bill passed and sent to conference. Clipper letter follows.

SHORT.

[23]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: This letter is being written to amplify the requests made in my radiogram of 1 May to you for inclusion of funds in the Fiscal year 1942 estimates now before Congress.

I believe that the two requests made in this radiogram are both necessary to solve the problem existing in this department. The development of adequate airfields for the rapidly expanding Hawaiian Air Force is essential. An effort has been made to develop these fields through use of troop labor and WPA, but this is entirely too slow and uncertain. The projects which have been and are being submitted at a total estimated cost of $17,086,000 will provide satisfactory operating conditions. Copies of the project letters already submitted are enclosed for ready reference. Our request for the inclusion of $10,000,000 in these estimates is intended to establish a source of funds which can be drawn upon to finance necessary projects as the need for them occurs. With the rapidly changing situation it is impossible to anticipate all our needs and submit detailed projects for consideration. In addition to this difficulty there have been several instances in the past six months where projects have been submitted and approved by the War Department as desirable and necessary but construction work could not be initiated due to a lack of funds. I think that the situation has progressed to such a point that we can no longer afford the delay in time which has heretofore been required to secure appropriations by Congress after the projects have been approved. I can foresee several requirements this coming year which must be met. Among these are housing for the increases in the garrison, increased storage needs, work on roads, fortifications, gasoline storage (both aviation and motor vehicle), and other requirements. As stated, all of the details cannot be anticipated at this time but some source of funds should be available for their construction without having to wait for congressional action.

If these funds could be secured it would give us an equal opportunity with the Navy. The Navy is apparently getting an allotment of funds without the necessity of submitting detailed projects and as a result they have been able to accumulate required materials and almost corner the local labor market. There has already developed a shipping shortage between the mainland and the islands and the situation in regard to shipping in the present war makes it highly probable that many of the ships now plying between here and the coast may be transferred to trans-Atlantic service and this will make the situation serious. I think it is extremely important that funds be made available without delay for the procurement and shipment to these islands of the materials required in our construction program.

[24] At the time my radio was sent I understood that this appropriation bill was still pending before the Senate and speed in obtaining your consideration of these recommendations was important.

Very sincerely,

/S/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

7 Incls:[1]
Letters:

1. Bellows Field (Pusuit and Bombardment)
2. Kipapa Field (Pursuit)
3. Barking Sands Field (Bombardment)
4. Morse Field (Bombardment)
5. Hilo Airport (Bombardment)
6. Parker Ranch (Bombardment)
7. Homestead Field, Molokai (Pursuit)

Letters being submitted later:

1. Burns Field, Kauai (Bombardment)
2. Lanai (Pursuit and Bombardment)
3. Haleiwa, Oahu (Pursuit)

[1] Omitted.

[25] MAY 5, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time.

I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awhile. Last week the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through the successive sessions of four hours each, which involved answering a barrage of questions on all matters great and small.

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 15 May 1941.

In reply refer to:

Pencilled notation of WPD Action

HR. 4545, to provide for Public Works including schools, now pending in Senate.

S. 1313, a bill to provide educational means, now being studied by G–1 preparatory to submitting WD report thereon.

Information furnished by 1st Ind. (5–3–41) to AG 000.73 (4–16–41) M–B.

Activated by G3/45351 (5–29–41). G–1 states no action taken re assignment by Brig. Gen. for AA Brig.

Under study by G–3.

Memorandum for Lieutenant General D. C. Emmons, U. S. A.[1] to Gen. Marshall

The following projects are of vital interest to the Hawaiian Department:

G–1

1. *a.* No action has been taken by the U. S. Commissioner of Education to provide school buildings and facilities for approximately 3,000 children of service personnel and defense workers (Army and Navy combined). Most of the Army children belong to personnel on duty at Air Fields.

b. The Territory of Hawaii has appropriated $121,294.00 to pay teachers.

G–2

Letter 326.2 (G–2) from Hawaiian Dept to The Adjutant General, dated 16 April 1941, subject: Censorship, Hawaiian Department. Requested information concerning current policy of the War Department regarding Army operation, control and coordination of publicity, propaganda and censorship in this Department, particularly the censorship of mail and local telephone service in case of war in the Pacific area.

G–3

1. Authorization for activation of 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Hq. Battery, and Intelligence Battery, and assignment of Brigadier General to command.

2. Authorization for reorganization of troops in Hawaiian Department:

a. Formation of two triangular divisions.

b. Creation of Air Defense Command.

[1] The words "to General Marshall" are handwritten in the original.

5th Ind (AG 580, 12–12–40) dated 5–10–41 rec'd WPD 5–28–41. Under study.

Information governing the distribution of controlled items and estimated future delivery dates have been furnished. 100% of requirements for 37mm (AA and AT) guns by May 1942. 60% AP Shot (AT)—Nov. 1941. 60% HE Shell (AA) March 1942.

AG 565.4 (2–11–41) Mar. 27, 1941 informed that funds for 1 barge for Pearl Harbor would be included in next estimate.

AG 561.11 Haw Dept (3–13–41) Apr 26, 1941 approved request for 2 ocean-going barges and 1 ocean-going tug. QMG taking action to procure.

Not rec'd in TAG (6–11–41)

Activation of Tow Target Det. authorized May 29, effective July 1, 1941. (AG 320.2, 5–22–41)

4th Ind (4–18–40) to AG 472.2 (2–10–40) M–WPD. 105mm not available for issue to Haw Dept. Will be issued, when available, in accordance with established priorities.

Action taken by 3d Ind 4–18–41 to AG 600.12 (1–4–41)

AG 600.12 (5–17–41) Under study G–3

3. Provision of facilities for Army bombers, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Canton Islands, and provision for trans-Pacific movements of bombers, if such action is contemplated by the War Department. All installations to be constructed, maintained and defended by Navy.

4. Need for 37mm ammunition and matériel (antiaircraft and anti-tank). (No ammunition and only 20 out of 120 guns now on hand.)

5. Need for more water transportation to outlying islands.

6. Troops and matériel for defense of Kaneohe Air Station. Plans now in preparation (due in Department Headquarters 1 June).

7. Formation of 5th Target Squadron so as to relieve load on tactical units. Increased demands due to doubling antiaircraft garrison will interfere greatly with tactical training of Air Force units.

8. Provision of 105mm howitzers for light regiments of 11th Field Artillery Brigade.

G–4

Quartermaster Projects:

Letter to The Adjutant General, 4 January 1941, which requested $312,500 for warehousing in Hawaiian Department.

Approved by radio 5–22–41 (AG 600.12) 34th Engineer Camp Mobilization Housing---------- $276,000.00

804th Co., requested 13 May 1941, Scho. Bks---------- 34,000.00

Action by radio 4–25–41 AG 672 (4–14–41)
Action by 3d Ind (6–11–41) AG 671.1 (6–5–41)
Approved 3d Ind (5–6–41) AG 673.1 (2–13–41)
Action by 3d Ind (5–6–41) AG 673.1 (2–13–41)
Latest action—by 3d Ind (9–25–30) WD to HAW Dept AG 412.34 (9–23–39)

Auth. by radio May 20 #AG 600.12 (4–28–41)
Action by 5th Ind (5–10–41) #AG 600.12 (3–3–41)
Auth by QMG May 23 (QM 634 C–EP)
AG 614 (Haw Dept) (5–16–41) to Ch/AC by 5th Ind (6–5–41) Under Study

Under study Ch/AC AG 600.12 (4–8–41).
Action rec. in Memo Ch/Staff (AC #50) (5–28–41).
AG 600.12 (5–2–41). Action rec. in Memo Ch/Staff (AC #51) (5–28–41).

AG 580 (5–22–41) to Ch/AC (5–27–41) Under study.

Memo to Ch/Staff
WPD 2550–22 (6–10–41)

Sewage Disposal, Scho. Bks	130,000.00
Water Distribution System, Fort Kamehameha	23,000.00
Dry Battery Storage, Fort Shafter	3,500.00
Rehabilitation of Transformer Station, Cho. Bks	54,000.00
Water Lime for Water Softener, Laundry, Fort Armstrong	1,700.00
G. M. Warehousing, Fort Armstrong	92,000.00
Q. M. Warehousing & Utilities, Schofield Barracks	164,000.00
Two Fire Stations, Schofield Barracks	28,000.00
Survey Bombing Range & Landing Field, Lanai	1,800.00

Engineer

Important projects which have been submitted to the War Department and on which no reply has been received to date:

a. Airfields:

Location	*Date*	*Funds*	*Remarks*
Bellows Field, Oahu	5 Apr 1941	$2,542,900	118 Off. 1049 E. M.
Kipapa Field, Oahu	14 Apr 1941	4,938,950	15th Pur. Sqn.
Hilo Airport, Hawaii	2 May 1941	670,140	1 Bomb. Sqn.
Homestead Field, Molokai	2 May 1941	407,600	1 Pur. Sqn.
Morse Field, Hawaii	2 May 1941	1,687,530	2 Bomb. Sqns.
Barking Sands, Kauai	2 May 1941	1,772,220	2 Bomb. Sqns.
Parker Ranch, Hawaii	2 May 1941	1,992,600	1 Bomb. Sqn.
Lanai Airport	(1)	1,990,000	1 Pur. Sqn.
Burns, Field, Kauai	(1)	640,000	1 Hv. Rcn. Sqn.
Haleiwa, Oahu	(1)	450,000	

[1] Projects will be ready for mailing this week.

The above projects were summarized in radio and letter to General Marshall 2 May 1941 (AG 600.12 (6–10–41)). The radio also included request for a blanket allotment of $10,000,000 to cover immediate needs of this department for fortifications, bombproofs, and other construction.

Information furnished by: 9th Ind (1–25–41) AG 662.1 (10–7–40) 5th Ind (4–2–41) AG 662.1 (2–6–41) 4th Ind (4–3–41) AG 662.1 (2–4–41) 1st Ind (4–17–41) AG 662.1 (2–4–41) 1st Ind (5–12–41) AG 662.1 (2–4–41) 4th Ind (5–22–41) AG 662.1 (2–4–41) 5th Ind (5–9–41) AG 611 (11–8–40) 4th Ind (6– –41) AG 662.1 (4–14–41) Copy of 3d Ind (5–15–41) AG 633.5 (4–17–41) will be sent to Haw Dept (G–4 – Capt Horton). Advised by 6th Ind (5–12–41) AG 662.1 (2–5–41) re funds for QM gas storage.

5th Ind (5–9–41) to AG 611 Haw (11–8–40) informed of status of funds. $50,000 for roads and $300,000 for RR in FY 1942 (SCD). $900,000 for roads in FY 1943. Will be allotted when available.

By 1st Ind (4–16–41) to AG 600.12 (3–17–41) the WD requested justification of additional funds. No reply to date but $613,000 tentatively included in FY 1943 Est. to complete project.

AG 600.12 (4–4–41) Under study—G–4

Action, based on approved Memo Ch/Staff (WPD 4483 (5–13–41), taken by 4th Ind (5–31–41) to AG 600.12 (2–9–41)

b. Bombproof Construction.

(1) The various bombproof projects which were submitted to the War Department in February have been answered either directly or indirectly but no definite statement has been received as to the funds which will be available for the construction of the approved projects. General Marshall has stated that funds in the amount of $3,000,000.00 have been tentatively set up for the bombproofing requirements in this department but what proportion, if any, of this money is ear-marked for the casemating of the major caliber seacoast batteries is not known.

c. Roads and Trails.

(1) The last revision of the military roads and trails program was returned to the War Department by 4th Indorsement dated 4 April 1941 requesting immediate release of funds in the amount of $1,249,620 for the construction of necessary roads, trails and railroads. Information has been received that $300,000 is included in 1942 estimates for the construction of the railroad items of the program but there has been no release of or information on funds for the remainder of the items.

d. Ammunition Storage.

(1) Final estimates for the magazine construction at Schofield Barracks were submitted to the War Department 17 March 1941 with a request for funds in the amount of $1,203,900. Last War Department advice has been that $937,000 has been included in the 1942 estimates for Schofield Barracks and Aliamanu magazines. This amount is inadequate by approximately $600,000 ($267,000 for Schofield Barracks and $335,000 for Aliamanu).

(2) Hickam Field. Letter submitted 4 April 1941 requested funds in the amount of $148,600 to complete igloo magazine construction at Hickam Field for the storage of bombs.

e. Bunkering for airplanes.

(1) Letter submitted 19 February requested funds in the amount of $1,565,600 for the construction of bunkers for the pursuit and bombardment planes at Wheeler and Hickam Fields respectively.

Action by 4th Ind (6–9–41) AG 600.12 (4–5–41)

Action by 4th Ind (5–20–41) to AG 600.12 (4–5–41)

Action by 4th Ind (6–6–41) to AG 600.12 (3–22–41)

No record of request.

Priority on cable delivery has been given Haw. Dept. Cable will be sent as rapidly as procured. Signal Officer, Haw. Dept, being so notified. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

f. Mobilization Housing.

(1) Letter submitted 5 April 1941 requested funds in the amount of $250,000 for the purchase of kitchen equipment for the approved mobilization housing program at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

(2) Letter submitted 5 April 1941 requesting funds in the amount of $170,000 for the construction of the Headquarters Building for the Hawaiian Air Force.

(3) Letter submitted 22 March 1941 requesting funds in the amount of $113,500 for the construction of 5 warehouses and 1 theatre at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

(4) In addition to the foregoing, the District Engineer is submitting this data to this headquarters his final estimate for the additional funds required to complete the present authorized mobilization construction program at Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields. The additional funds required are $1,256,647, and should be asked for immediately.

Signal

1. *Cable.* All cable for Command and Fire Control Cable System Projects now on hand will be installed by 31 July, 1941, with the exception of that for Project SCD–1120, Maili to Station "U". 100 pair cable for projects SCD–1115, 1116, 1117, 1119 and 200 pair cable for Project SCD–1118 will not be shipped until after 1 September, 1941. Shipment of conduit and part of 100 pair lead covered cable for Project SCD–1126 has been promised for 1 July 1941. This will permit the installation of the conduit and manhole system on SCD–1126 between 1 July and the arrival of cable for the other projects. However, this work will not be sufficient to keep our trained crews working during that period. Shortage of labor and higher wages in other governmental departments and in contract work will result in our men going to other work if forced to lay off due to lack of cable. All possible steps should be taken to advance the delivery date of part of the 100 or 200 pair cable now on order so that our construction force can be kept intact.

Issue automatic. CG Haw Dept being so informed. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

Signal Off., Haw Dept. being furnished information requested. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

Project requires Congressional approval. $306,300 included in Req. Est FY 1942 eliminated by Bureau of Budget. Hem now in Tent. Est FY 1943. Ch/SO asking for earlier consideration. CG Haw Dept will be informed. (Ch/SO—Maj Lanahan)

2. *Teletype Machines.* The Hawaiian Air Force has a dire need for more teletype machines. Information is requested as to whether the teletype equipment now authorized on the TBA for aviation units in this Department will be issued automatically or whether requisitions should be submitted. A tabulation based on the aviation unit now stationed in Hawaiian Department indicates that the following are authorized on TBA:

Perforators	32
Model 15 WX	6
Model 15 Standard	18
Model 19	16
Reperforator	32
Switchboard Teletype 6 Line	20

It is noted in TBA that the peacetime allotment of the last item is by rental only. If this is to be issued automatically, information is requested in what quantities and at what intervals it will be shipped.

3. *Schofield Barracks Telephone Exchange.*

Present condition of this telephone exchange is such that it is impossible to give good communications. A new telephone exchange is absolutely essential. A project for this purpose is in Washington at the present time. Information is desired as to when this project will be approved and whether it would be possible to place this exchange in a bombproof shelter to provide adequate protection at all times so that it will work for both administrative and tactical purposes. Authority to bombproof Hut Y, which is adjacent to the Schofield Telephone Exchange has been received and the work is to start in the near future. Hut Y is so designed that at a later date the new Schofield Exchange could be placed adjacent to it and bombproofed, without any additional changes to Hut Y other than cutting through of two doors. In the project for the Schofield Barracks Exchange, $40,000.00 was requested for a new building. That amount with an additional $25,000.00 would provide a building underground and properly bombproofed. The combination of these two units in bombproof shelter is considered highly desirable.

See para. *e* below.

Action by radio (6–9–41)

Officers being procured by WD and Corps Areas as rapidly as possible.

No record of request. Xth Sig Bn eliminated from authorized War Reinforcements on recommendation CG Haw Dept (AG 320.2, 11–4–40).

See remark para. *d* above.

4. *Data re urgent personnel needs for Signal Corps.*

a. Signal Bn T/O 11–15, 1 Nov 1940, comprising Hq. Co—construction and operations Companies.

b. Two (2) sections of Signal Depot Company, T/O 11–107, 11/1/40, (1 Section—Repair—1 Section—Storage and Issue.)

c. Commissioned personnel for Hawaiian Air Force. Signal Corps activities on duty with Hawaiian Air Force are short 10 Reserve officers. Radio to TAG transmitted a week or ten days ago requesting they be furnished prior to June.

d. Short 14 Reserve officers for Signal Corps activities *other than those with A. C.* Request has been submitted to War Department requesting them.

e. Action now being initiated requesting authority to activate the following units and to increase the 9th Signal Service Co. from 230 men to 320.

1 Signal Bn.
1 Signal Depot Co. (2 Sections only)

The most urgent commissioned personnel problem at present is to bring the HAF Signal Corps officers up to full strrength of 20. They are urgently in need of at least 5 Captains to command their Company units, consisting of:

307 Sig. Co. Air Wing—W. F.
324 Sig. Co. Air Wing—H. F.
328 Sig. Co. AWN H. F.
53 Sig Mtc Co.

The enlisted men and units, etc., are urgently required and are essential to facilitate the installation-operation and maintenance of wire and radio communications systems and the Command and Fire Control cable system, and to take care of the additional abnormal load placed on all Signal Corps activities due to current emergency.

Food.

1. At the present time the only War Department project in which this Department is primarily interested is the effort being made through the Governor's committee (Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball) in Washington for the purchase by the Emergency Procurement Management of Supplies of essential food such as:

Letter S/W to Mr. Chester C. Davis, Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense, April 10, 1941, endorsed plan for stockpile of foodstuffs in Haw Dept. (WPD 3915–12, 4–10–41)

Rice,
Wheat flour and products,
Canned Milk
Fats and Oils,

and their shipment without delay as emergency food supplies to Hawaii. At the present time it appears that Mr. Warner has been successful in making arrangements for the purchase of two million dollars worth of this food through the office of the Emergency Procurement Management. The thing which is holding up the project is the lack of storage warehouses here.

The War Department is apparently ready to certify that this storage is necessary as an emergency defense measure if any private interests here will undertake to put up the necessary warehouses under a plan to amortize the entire cost of the warehouses in five years.

At present the Hawaiian Pineapple Company is considering the project but apparently is holding back on final arrangements because the Government will retain an equity in the property equal to the rent paid. Until this obstacle can be overcome the project is still in the aid (air).

2. It is believe that the War Department recognizes the storage of emergency food supplies here as of paramount importance. It is only necessary that the various governmental agencies concerned in the project be kept informed from time to time of the War Department's interest in the subject.

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

AG 600.12 (5–15–41) Under Study—G-4

Also to be added to Engineer List, Project for Anti-Sabotage Protection submitted by letter 15 May requesting funds in the amount of $240,000 for installation of protective fences and other guards against sabotage.

No record of request.

None available at present.

Rec'd—W. P. D. May 27, 1941

Facilities for bathing, cooking; toilet facilities, mess halls, etc., for camps for convalescents and evacuation for women and children to be developed at regimental recreation camps in time of peace, so that they may be maintained for future use: $100,000.

(In handwriting) 90 mm AA guns are necessary for defense of Pearl Harbor.

[34A]

A. ARMY

Morse Field: 1 paved runway 3,400′ long, 300′ wide, Gasoline storage 450,000 gallons, construction for 2 bombardment squadrons, total estimated cost $1,687,530.00.

Bellows Field, Oahu:
1 runway 300′ wide, 3,400′ long.
1 runway 500′ long, 300′ wide.
Buildings, 4
1 night bombardment squadron
1 observation squadron
1 pursuit squadron
Gasoline storage, aqua system, 600,000 gallons.
Cast, $2,542,900.00

New Pursuit Field: 3 runways each 5000′ long, paved width 200′, gasoline storage of 900,000 gal. aqua system, housing facilities for 1 pursuit group, cost if land is leased $4,668 950.00, if land is purchased $4,938,950.00

Parker Ranch, Hawaii: 3 runways 5000′ long, 200′ wide, gasoline storage for 300,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment group, estimated cost $1,992,600.00

Lanai Airport: 2 runways each 5000′ long, paved width 300′, gasoline storage 200,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost $1,990,000.00

Barking Sands: 2 runways 5000′ long, 200′ wide, housing and facilities for 2 bombardment squadrons, gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons, estimated cost $1,772,220.00

B. Following fields to be improved by Civil Aeronautics Authority. Army construction necessary for housing and other facilities

Molokai: 1 runway 31000′ long, 200′ wide; 1 runway 4200′ long, 200′ wide, gasoline storage 350,000 gallons, buildings and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost $407 600.00

Hilo Airport: 3 runways each 200′ wide respectively 3000′, 4000′ and 4500′ long, gasoline storage for 450 000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment squadron, estimated cost $670.140.00

Burn Field: 2 runways 200′ wide, 3200 and 2600 feet long, storage for 200,000 gallons gasoline, housing and facilities for 1 heavy reconnaissance squadron, estimated cost $640,000.00

C. ARMY

Haleiwa Airport: Flying condition to be improved as follows: Construction 1 runway 4000′ by 300′, installation of 100,000 gallons gasoline storage, no housing facilities except for small permanent detachment, estimated cost $450 000.00.

Housing for 1 company of National Guard to be provided at all airports except Hilo where 2 companies will be housed and excepting Haleiwa where none will be built.

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[35]

MAY 29, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I know that you will not have time to look over a detailed acount of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like to have a birds eye view of what we did and the purpose back of it.

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one days fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands

and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force and Antiaircraft, than we had during any previous exercise.

Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to complete the issue.

The second phase consisted of the completion of our plans and the organization of the ground, including the construction of Field Fortifications. Naturally this work should have been completed before any warning of enemy landing was received. However, it would have been impossible to actually construct field fortifications until we got authority for the leasing of the ground. Cost of leasing of the ground is going to be extremely low. The whole command dug diligently upon them day and night. We accomplished a very great deal and I believe shall be able to complete all necessary field fortifications soon after July 1st. Fifty-five bunkers for pursuit planes were actually constructed at Wheeler Field. To my mind the construction of the field fortifications are extremely important since our plans are so intimately tied in with the organization of the ground. My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following:

1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.
2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.
3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.

[*36*] 4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.

5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counterattack.

We have received enough of our new transportation so that with proper planning I am convinced that we can move all of our reserves. With the completion of our field fortifications we shall make small changes in our plan so as to make more reserves available.

Third phase, the maneuver proper—Repelling of a Serious Attack. The situation was based on the theory that a serious enemy attack against Oahu would be possible only under the following conditions:

Our fleet would be either absent or very greatly inferior.

Our air force would be destroyed or very greatly inferior.

Five enemy landings were made. The Navy furnished ships to simulate enemy transports and enemy naval ships. They did not make actual landings as the Marines were not available at that time. The 27th Infantry was employed to represent the enemy, being sent to landing places by train and motors. Landings were made at widely dispersed places on the island. The situation was developed so that our forces were rather widely dispersed in driving off the four minor landings and had to be moved rapidly for a general counterattack when the main enemy threat developed. The situation was built up by the destruction of our large guns so that the Harbor Defense troops in the later phase of the exercise manned 3" and 6" secondary armament which are not normally manned on account of the lack of personnel. In the final phase the Harbor Defense troops were required to take over one sector of beach defense to release Infantry for the main attack. Likewise air personnel which were available through almost complete destruction of our planes were used for anti-sabotage work and finally to take over a short sector of beach defense. 155-mm guns and Antiaircraft batteries were moved from their usual positions and missions and acted as Army artillery in support of the main attack.

I feel that we put across the necessity for organization of the ground and for mobility. Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our air defense command, the construction of division, wing and air defense C. P.'s. which have been authorized, and probably for the completion of the 13 weeks training of the selectees which will be called on July 1st.

I am sending under separate cover a few photographs of field fortifications.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[37]

JULY 3, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: I have examined the proposal outlined in your letter of June 7th concerning the establishment of a training camp in the Koolaus Mountains which could be used as a convalescent and recreational center, and possibly as an evacuation area.

With funds at hand or in sight we are having difficulty in satisfying requirements for troops less fortunately situated with respect to recreational and training facilities. The proximity of the mountains to Schofield Barracks and the ideal recreational facilities of the beaches on Oahu place your project relatively in priority. Consequently, I believe that favorable consideration of your request must be declined.

The official communication is being returned to your headquarters through regular channels.

Faithfully yours,

[stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

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[38]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
July 11, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On April 14th I submitted a letter recommending the establishment of a new air field between Kipapa and Waikakalua gulches on the Island of Oahu. This field is more important to us than any of the other fields recommended as they were on outlying islands. This field was selected after a very thorough search of the whole island on the part of the Air Corps. General Martin considers it the only suitable place on the Island of Oahu. I agree with him fully. On July 4th I received a wire from the War Department stating that this site for the field was not approved and recommending the reconsideration of Kahuku Point. On July 7th I replied to the wire stating that I considered Kahuku Point impossible from a tactical point of view owing to the fact that it had practically no protection from Harbor Defenses and would be subject to raids by small landing parties. This data I forwarded to the Adjutant General a complete study of all air fields considered, with a map showing existing Army and Navy Fields, as well as those considered and discarded. I am enclosing copies of all the correspondence, as well as a copy of the map, in order that it may be immediately available to you. I consider it important that we get a decision on this matter at the earliest practical moment since General Martin tells me that planes for the 15th Group may arrive at almost any time.

I am afraid that someone in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps who has been out here is considering Kahuku Point purely from the point of view of technical flying and is giving no consideration whatsoever to its tactical location. I would not bother you with this unless I felt that it was a matter of prime imporance.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

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[39]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
25 July 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Continuing our cooperation with the Navy I have arranged with Admiral Kimmel to have all Navy air fields on Hawaii and outlying islands extended wherever possible so as to provide for landing of B–17s. With very few exceptions this is going to be practicable.

I am enclosing copies of Admiral Kimmel's instructions on this matter and also copies of our orders and Naval orders to effect the use of Navy fields by Army planes and Army fields by Navy planes. The matter is a little more simple from the point of view of the Army than the Navy inasmuch as we can use their bombs but our bombs cannot be used by the Navy without an additional attachment.

We are now experimenting to see if we can manufacture locally such an attachment. When the fields are completed at Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston I think it will perhaps be a good idea to send a squadron of B–17s to each island. I am sure that we can arrange with Admiral Kimmel for the stationing of destroyers to guarantee the safety of the flight.

Tomorrow we are carrying out an attack exercise with tanks, infantry and artillery, supported by thirty-four Navy Dive Bombers. It is the first time I have had an opportunity to see the use of dive bombers directly in support of ground troops and I think this is perhaps true of all the officers here. I am giving an opportunity to as great a number of officers as possible to see this exercise.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

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[40] 8–19–41

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Your letter of July 11, has been received recommending the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for the 15th Pursuit Group. The advantages and disadvantages of each site have been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the Kahuku Point Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field sufficiently to result in my decision to establish the base on Kahuku Point.

The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision:

a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field—Kipapa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups in an area subject to the same adverse weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions. Selection of the Kahuku Point site places one group in a location where relatively favorable weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area.

b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield Barracks—Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present conditions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traffic in the interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably aggravate this situation.

I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and [41] accordingly, will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. I hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may have previously established to any part of the area involved.

With best personal regards,

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

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[42] OCTOBER 10, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific pur-

pose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

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[43]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
October 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised.

Very sincerely

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

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[44]

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and [45] have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situation.

Faithfully yours,

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

EXHIBIT NO. 54

FEBRUARY 19, 1941.

NOTES ON GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING, 10:00 A. M., FEBRUARY 19, 1941

Present:
General G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. Wm. Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. R. C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
Chief of Infantry, General Lynch
Chief of Cavalry, General Herr
Chief of Field Artillery, General Danford
Chief of Coast Artillery, General Green
Chief of Air Corps, General Brett
Chief of Engineer, General Kingman
Chief Signal Officer, General Mauborgne
The Adjutant General, General Adms
The Inspector General, General Peterson
The Judge Advocate General, General Gullion
The Surgeon General, General Magee
The Chief of Finance, General Loughry
Chief of Ordnance, General Wesson
The Quartermaster General, General Gregory
Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Gen. Baker
Chief of Chaplains, Colonel Arnold
Reserve Affairs, General Hester
Exec. for Under Sec. of War, Gen. Burns
GHQ—(Col. Hyssong represented Gen. McNair)
Chief of National Guard Bureau, Gen. Williams
A. C. of S., G–1, Gen. Shedd
A. C. of S., G–2, Col. Smith (Act'g)
A. C. of S., G–3, Col. Twaddle (Act'g)
A. C. of S., G–4, Col. Meyer (Act'g)
A. C. of S., WPD, Col. Anderson (Act'g)
Colonel Orlando Ward, Secretary, General Staff.

Subject: Defense Objectives (Revised Feb. 13, 1941)

* * * * * * *

To give you a further view of the special circumstances, we have been pressed by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at Manila. They have added one or two major vessels, old large cruisers, I believe. Some time back they added some modern submarines but there was not an AA gun to defend the Cavite anchorage. Not one. And that put Admiral Hart out there in a very embarrassing, if not careless, position, particularly as the Japanese were coming in with a new plane of remarkable speed, 360 mps and climbing ability and heavy gun armament, 6 guns, two of which are 20 mm. The planes out there are well under 300 (mi. per hour).

We have a very archaic plan in the Philippines at the present moment, and I have described the AA situation to Admiral Hart. Under those conditions we have abstracted 18 guns, gotten them out of organizations (very quietly) in order to get them out to the Philippines. That is no complete defense. It is only a very small fraction but it is something. It has the effect of boosting morale and of preventing the Japanese planes from just being contemptuous in their approach. Just as we got it arranged, the Navy wanted equipment for some battalions to go to Wake, Midway and another island where they have to have AA. They took 16 of the guns and left us with 2. We have no more deliveries until July, so all we can send out are 4 unless we take them away from troops, but that is a dilemma.

Out in Hawaii the Fleet is anchored but they have to be prepared against any surprise attack. I don't say any probable attack but they have to be prepared against a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes. Our whole Navy power in general is concentrated there; they can't cruise for next six months.

We are pretty well off in AA 3" guns out there; we are not so well off in the .50 caliber.

But when it came to planes, we only had 36, of which 19 could cruise 292 miles an hour, with only four guns, two .50's and two .30's. With the new Japanese

plane you can see the situation there. So we arranged to send 31 more P36's to reinforce the 16. (Supposed to have 180.) The carrier is to come back on March 15 and then for the first time we give them the most modern plane—the P–40D, with six guns, two of which are .50 caliber speed 360 miles, leak-proof tanks and armore; not as rapid to climb as the Japanese plane. 50 of those will go on the 15th on the carrier from San Diego to Honolulu to safeguard the Fleet.

* * * * * * *

General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in priorities; these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the situation is such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in Hawaii, that you are going to have change priorities and get some aircraft warning units mobilized.

Gen. Marshall said we are on that right now.

Gen. Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole question on aircraft warning and also with reference to priorities and where we are going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with the Alaskan aircraft warning service.

Gen. Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards on the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protection of the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite embarrassed. When the next planes come out over and above the .50 mm. planes, it is a question of where they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands. That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practically dictate where those planes should go until we reach a certain degree of security." We haven't any modern medium bombers. They are just beginning to come off the line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision, for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for the protection of our shores. "I don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to be solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate situation.

EXHIBIT NO. 55

CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT 10:00 A. M., TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1941

Present: Chief of Staff, General Emmons, General Arnold, General Brett, General Spaatz, General Gerow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, Colonel Twaddle.

CHIEF OF STAFF: In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability, but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P–36 ships there. The Curtis plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes to March 10th; the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama—no modern planes. I understand that the P–40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water.

Consequently, our original allocation will be changed by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum with reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes, to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program. We are concerned with the reduction of the assignment to the GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started a proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of a problem.

Colonel ANDERSON. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows: *First priority:* to the Philippine Islands—one interceptor squadron, one medium bomber squadron. To Alaska—one composite group. To Hawaii and Panama—sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico—one pursuit group and two bomber groups. *Second priority:* The equipment for an emergency force to South and Central America—three groups of heavy or medium bombers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups of intercept. *Third priority:* Remainder of the GHQ, minimum training requirements for the remainder of the 54 group program. We will complete training requirements before January 1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter pursuit in July 1942; heavy bombers in April 1942; medium bombers in December 1941; light bombers in April 1942.

CHIEF OF STAFF. What do you think about this, Emmons?

General EMMONS. We have little means to accomplish our plans in GHQ Air Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25 group program and we won't get the shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the P–36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane strength is the B–18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P–40s we now have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B–17s, also 4 P39s and 5 A–20A. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air.

General ARNOLD. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 1941; the 54 group by April 1942.

General EMMONS. With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it would be a mistake to send new planes over-seas until the defects inherent with new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P–40Bs to go to Hawaii, probably won't make much difference except with the engine.

General BRETT. The engine is improving all the time. The P–40D has a new engine.

CHIEF OF STAFF. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?

General EMMONS. It functions very well.

General ARNOLD. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have to manufacture parts in the depots—we used to do it before.

General BRETT. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect, in a measure, the production of spare parts.

General EMMONS. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the allocation, I don't know what to say. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii has a peculiar situation—pursuit is of little value at night, at which time—due to phosforesence in the water—primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long range bombers and not send pursuit, but bombers.

Conference adjourned.

[1]

EXHIBIT NO. 56

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, D. C., May 13, 1941.

AG 600.12 (2-19-41)
WPD 4483
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, recommends (Tab A) that $1,565,600 be allotted his department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of dispersed protective bunkers for 263 pursuit ships and 95 bombers at Wheeler and Hickam Fields. The Chief of Engineers concurs (Tab B) in the principle of providing such protection and recommends an initial allotment of $1,000,000 with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more fully determined.

2. The Chief of the Air Corps urges (Tab C) the construction of similar protective bunkers, to include gas proofing and bombproof shelters for crews, for 170 pursuit ships and 83 bombers, these being the total number of airplanes presently visualized as an attainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time. The gas proofing visualized consists of an impregnated covering provided with collective protector units to keep out gas. He states that such revetments should be located at the "battle stations" of airplanes dispersed at present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. He recommends that $1,955,000 for the construction of gas proof revetments in the Hawaiian Islands be included in estimates now being prepared pending receipt and approval of estimates revised to include gas proofing for 253 airplanes.

3. War Plans Division believes:

a. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from carrier based aviation is not serious. On the other hand, the relatively small sum required per airplane to provide protection against bomb attack is undoubtedly justified in any locality where heavy air attacks are envisaged.

b. That gas attacks against air fields in the Hawaiian Islands are not probable and, if encountered, reasonable protection can be secured through the medium of impregnated clothing and gas masks. Accordingly, the gas proofing of revetments as proposed by the Chief of the Air Corps is not concurred in.

c. That the construction of splinter-proof shelters within the walls of the revetment for the protection of crews against splinters will be relatively inexpensive and should be a standard item of construction where revetments are to be built. Bombproof shelters for individuals in battle positions are not believed justified.

II. ACTION RECOMMENDED

1. That the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70 four engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit airplanes be approved.

2. That the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, be directed to submit revised estimates covering the construction of these revetments incorporating splinter-proof shelters for the plane crews.

3. That the Chief of the Air Corps be authorized to include funds in the amount of $1,358,000 for this purpose in the next estimates to be prepared, subject to correction in amount on receipt of revised estimates from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

4. That, if approved, these papers be returned to War Plans Division for further necessary action.

III. CONCURRENCE

A. C. of S., G–4 ( ) In 5/13/41 Out 5/16/41

/s/ Harry J. Malony
HARRY J. MALONY,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incls
AG 600.12 (2–19–41) w/3 inds. and 2 incls (as listed on 3d Ind.)
Memo, 4–29–41, to ACofS., WPD from C/AC.
MAY 21 1941
Approved
By order of the Secretary of War

R. C. MOORE,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
(Sgd) W. T. Sexton
by W. T. SEXTON,
Maj., G. S. C., Asst. Sec. W. D. G. S.

NOTED—Deputy Chief of Staff W. T. S.

EXHIBIT NO. 57

MAY 19, 1941.

CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, MAY 19, 1941

Present:
The Secretary of War—Mr. Stimson,
The Under Secretary of War—Judge Patterson,
The Assistant Secretary of War—Mr. McCloy,
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air—Mr. Lovett,
The Chief of Staff—General Marshall,
The Deputy Chiefs of Staff—General Bryden; General Moore; General Arnold,
The Secretary, General Staff—Colonel Ward.

* * * * * * *

Subject: Martinique.

General MARSHALL: In the light of statements made in the Sunday papers with reference to Dakar and Martinique, I had the plans checked immediately. The plan provides for 2,800 Marines, with the necessary landing equipment to make the initial landing, followed by the 1st Division. The Marines have the necessary landing equipment for their troops. They will be opposed by 4,000 to 5,000, 50% effective, troops. About 50 officers of the Martinique garrison will fight, including the Admiral. The G–3 of the force is very pro-American. The French cruiser in Martinique is a first class cruiser ship with a top speed of 40 knots.

The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good condition, and was informed that she was.

General Marshall indicated that it would take about ten days for the Navy to get boats for the 1st Division. He further indicated that it was primarily a Naval mission, but that Army Air should participate, both for the help it could give and the experience it would gain. He indicated that the B–18's in Puerto Rico would be staged at St. Croix. Puerto Rico is almost 400 miles from Martinique.

General Marshall then indicated that there were now in the United States 14 B–17's of the most modern type which he thought should not be sent out of the country in view of the current situation. These had been withheld from the Hawaiian Department contingent.

The Secretary of War asked if this would affect the impregnability of Hawaii.

General Marshall said that it would not. He further said that we need some B–17's (but not of the most modern type) in Panama, and that he is recommending that 9 be sent there. This matter is under consideration.

General ARNOLD. There are now available 50 B–17's without leak-proof tanks and without armor.

General MARSHALL. High bombing is possible in the Caribbean area, due to weather conditions, and these ships without leak-proof tanks could be effectively used there.

EXHIBIT NO. 58

CONTENTS

1. List taken from President Roosevelt's appointment book specifying his engagements with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, for period October 1 to December 7, 1941.
2. Telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators' notes available.
3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.
4. List showing the President's appointments Saturday, December 6, 1941.
5. List showing the President's appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR AND NAVY, GENERAL MARSHALL AND ADMIRAL STARK—OCTOBER 1ST TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

1941

October 7th—1 P. M. (lunch)	Admiral Stark and Harry Hopkins.
October 7th—2.15 P. M.	Secretary Knox.
October 9th—2.30 P. M.	The Secretary of War, General Marshall, General Lewis B. Hershey and Dr. Leonard G. Rowntree.
October 14th—3.40 P. M.	The Secretary of State.
October 16th—12 noon	The Secretary of State.
October 16th—2 P. M.	The Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, General George C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark and Hon. Harry Hopkins.
October 21st—10 A. M.	Secretary Hull, The Vice President, Senator Alben W. Barkley, Senator Tom Connally, Speaker Rayburn and Congressman John W. McCormack.
October 22nd—2 P. M.	The Secretary of the Navy.
October 29th—3 P. M.	Secretary Hull.
October 31st—1.15 P. M.	Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.
November 6th—11.15 A. M.	The Secretary of War.
November 7th—12 noon	The Secretary of War.
November 10th—12 noon	Secretary Hull and French Ambassador.
November 13th—11.45 A. M.	Secretary Hull.
November 15th—11.30 A. M.	The Secretary of War, General Robert C. Richardson.
November 15th—12.15 P. M.	Director Harold Smith, General Marshall, General Brown, Mr. Blandford.
November 17th—11 A. M.	Secretary Hull, The Japanese Ambassador, Hon. Saburo Kurusu.

[2]

November 24th 4 15 P. M.	The Secretary of the Navy.
November 25th 12.15 P. M.	The Secretary of State, The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, General George C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark.
November 27th 2.20 P. M.	Secretary Hull.
November 27th 2.30 P. M.	Secretary Hull, Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), Hon. Saburo Kurusu.
November 27th 3.45 P. M.	Admiral Ernest J. King.
November 28th 12 noon	The Secretary of State, The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
December 1st 11.45 A. M.	Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark.
December 2nd 12 noon	The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, The Under Secretary of State.
December 4th 2.15 P. M.	The Secretary of the Navy.
December 4th 3.30 P. M.	The Secretary of State.
December 5th 1 P. M.	Secretary Hull (Lunch).
December 5th 2 P. M.	Cabinet.
December 7th 3 P. M.	Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Hon. Harry Hopkins, General George C. Marshall, Secretary Hull.

TELEPHONE CALLS MADE FROM OUTSIDE THROUGH WHITE HOUSE SWITCHBOARD ON 12/6/41 AND 12/7/41 AS COMPILED FROM OPERATOR'S NOTES AVAILABLE

Dec. 6

920a Mr. Stettinius cld Mr. McCloy—OK.
925a Secy Knox cld Sumner Welles—OK.
930a Secy Knox cld Jesse Jones—in NYC—nm.
931a Secy Knox cld PMG—OK.
955a Secy Stimson cld AG—lwc—ok 1000a
1030a Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson—OK.
1030a Mr. Stettinius cld James Roosevelt—OK.
1047a Secy Knox cld Secy Hull—lwc—OK 1050a
1045a Secy Knox cld Bob Hinckley—OK.
1100a James Forrestal cld Secy Knox—OK.
1138a. Mr. Stettinius cld Mr. Forrestal—OK.
1150a Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—OK.
1201p Secy Hull cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1201p Wayne Coy cld Dir. Smith—lwc—of 1225p
1205p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
1258p Secy Stimson cld Secy Hull—lwc—OK 1259p.
100p Ed. Stettinius cld Dean Acheson—OK.
105p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
109p Ad'm Stark cld Secy Hull—OK.
333p Wayne Coy cld AG—lwc—OK 338p.
830p Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson—OK.
845p Secy Knox cld Secy Hull—OK.
847p Secy Knox cld Secy Stimson—OK.
850p Secy Navy cld Oprns WD—OK.

Dec. 7.

1044a Secy Knox cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1140a Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1130a Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1136a Secy Knox cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
1210p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
1229p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
119p Secy Knox cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
201p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
205p Ad'm Stark cld Secy Hull—busy—OK 215p
210p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
250p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.
305p Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
310p Capt. Beardall cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
315p Secy Stimson cld Secy McCloy—OK.
335p VP from NY talked Sen. Hill and Sen. McNary—OK.
445p Secy Hull cld Ad'm Stark—OK.
600p Secy Knox cld J. E. Hoover—talked to Tamm OK.
635p James Forrestal cld Jesse Jones—OK.
845p Ad'm Stark cld Gen. Marshall—OK.

DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE SATURDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 6, 1941 AT EIGHT O'CLOCK

The President and Mrs. Roosevelt.
Mrs. Breckenridge Long.
Vice Adm. Sir Wilfred & Lady French, Friends of Gladys Hopwood (Wolyche Whitmore). Sir Wilfred sent here from England on business in connection with Navy Dockyard.
Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship.
Brig. Gen. & Mrs. Shelley U. Marietta, Walter Reed Hospital.
Hon. and Mrs. Norman S. Case, Member, Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick B. Adams, Sr., Friends and house guests.
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick B. Adams, Jr., Friends and house guests.

Miss Laura Adams, Friend and house guest.
Maj. and Mrs. Clifford Blitch, Walter Reed Hospital, Medical Corps.
Mrs. Grenville T. Emmet, Friend
Mr. Raymond H. Geist, Chief of Division of Commercial Affairs, Department of State.
Mrs. Charles Hamlin, Friend and house guest.
Hon. Nan Wood Honeyman, Former member of Congress.
Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Le Blanc, Artist.
Lt. Comdr. Garrison Norton, Friend of Hon. Frederic A. Delano.
Mr. and Mrs. Conyers Read. He is head of British Empire Division under Colonel Donovan.
Capt. and Mrs. James Roosevelt.
Mr. and Mrs. Charles P. Taft.
Mr. and Mrs. Charles Warren, Friends.
Capt. Chester Hammond, White House Aide.
Lieut. Wilkie A. Rambo, White House Aide.

THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1941

10 A. M.: Justice Wm. O. Douglas.
11:15 A. M.: Director Harold Smith.

THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1941

12.30 P. M.—The Chinese Ambassador.
3.05 P. M.—The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. Harry Hopkins.
Captain John Beardall.
Secretary Marvin McIntyre.
Secretary Early.
Miss Grace Tully.
3.20 P. M.—Gen. George Marshall.
The Secretary of State.
7.00 P. M.—The Solicitor General.
8.40 P. M.—The Vice President and entire Cabinet.
9.45 P. M.—The Vice President.
Senator Alben W. Barkley.
Senator Charles McNary.
Senator Connally.
Senator Warren Austin.
Senator Hiram Johnson.
Speaker Rayburn.
Congr. Jere Cooper.
Congr. Joe Martin.
Congr. Sol Bloom.
Congr. Charles Eaton.
10.45 P. M.—Under Secretary Sumner Welles.
12.00 P. M.—Mr. Ed Murrow.
Col. William Donovan.

EXHIBIT NO. 59

"Modern Planes have completely changed the situation as to defensibility" AIDE MEMOIRE

Defense of Hawaii

(came to file 5/3/41)

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense. Without air superiority this is an impossible task.

Air Defense. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit.

Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

* Due to make a mass flight from mainland to Hawaii May 20th. A number of this type of plane could be dispatched immediately if the situation grew critical.

EXHIBIT NO. 60

[1] SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ground Forces.

1. *Basic Considerations.*

a. National Policy.

Defense of Western Hemisphere.
Preservation of war effort of Britain, Russia and associated powers.
Curb of Japanese aggression.
Eventual defeat of Germany.

b. Requirements.

Germany cannot be defeated by supply of munitions to friendly powers, and air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be required.

(1) *Western Hemisphere Security.*

Provide minimum garrisons necessary to hold outlying bases in event of sudden collapse of United Kingdom.

Prepare task forces for prompt employment against Atlantic islands and Natal region of Brazil.

(2) *Western Pacific Theater.*

Rush build-up of air power to Philippines, together with small increases in modern ground army equipment and personnel to restrain Japan from advance into Malayasia or Eastern Siberia.

(3) *European Theater.*

Prepare security forces for air and naval bases in the British Isles and Ireland.

Prepare task forces to secure, when opportunity offers, additional bases encircling Germany. Britain is reaching limit of usable man power. We must supplement her forces.

Prepare framework for forces eventually to defeat Germany. Time is required to organize, train and equip these.

(In handwriting on Margin:)

[2] 2. *Immediate Requirements.*

As long as Britain stands and her Fleet remains intact.

a. ATLANTIC BASES.

1,500 total this fall — (1) *Greenland.* Authorized 2,500; Now there only construction troops and local guards. Base for staging aircraft to Britain and patrol base for North Atlantic. Secure defense of bases and cryolite mines essential. Forces must be dispatched earliest moment.

4,500 total this fall — (2) *Newfoundland.* Authorized 5,500; now there 2,500. Naval and air bases for protection of Great Circle Route, and to assist Canadians in defense of Newfoundland. Dispatch of approximately 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these must be equipped and available in United States.

2,000 total this fall — (3) *Bermuda.* Authorized 4,000; now there 800. Air and naval base. Contribute to defense of Atlantic Seaboard. Dispatch of about 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these forces must be available in United States.

350 total this fall — (4) *Jamaica.* Authorized 876; now there 14. Essential staging field. Ground forces of 350 men required for protection United States installations. Dispatch of remainder can be deferred.

Leave — (5) *Puerto Rico.* Authorized and present garrison 21,000. Advanced air and naval base. New naval base under development. Covers approaches to Panama Canal. From military point of view, reduction in garrison by demobilization of Puerto Rican National Guard is feasible. Demobilzation would have adverse political reaction and serious economic repercussions.

12,000 total this fall

(6) *Trinidad.* Authorized 16,000; now there 1,800. Naval anchorage. Major air base for protection Southeast approaches to Caribbean. Jumping off point for prompt movement into South America. Ground forces required for protection and mobile reserve for prompt movement. Dispatch of about 4,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but this remainder must be immediately available in United States.

O. K.

(7) *British Guiana, St. Lucia, Antigua.* Authorized and presents 350 men each. Essential air and naval bases and staging fields.

O. K.

(8) *Panama.* Authorized and present 33,000. Ground forces essential to protect locks and utilities, and for ship guards and small reserve for use in South and Central America. Air defense demands continuous alert, necessitating forces occupying over 300 scattered positions. Ground forces cannot be safely reduced.

O. K.

b. PACIFIC BASES.

(1) *Alaska.* Authorized 24,000; now there 16,000. Air and naval bases covering Great Circle Route to Far East. Isolated. [3] Poor communications. Great distances. Fleet in Pacific reduces threat. Authorized garrison essential to reasonable security.

O. K.
Leave as is.

(2) *Hawaii.* Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installations (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded, requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in United States to give Fleet freedom of action.

12,000 additional

(3) *Philippines.* Present garrison or enroute 31,000 (12,000 native troops). Critical situation. Japan wavering. Strong air and naval forces on her flank may deter her or wean her from Axis. If Japan moves, forces in position to assist Associated Powers. No reduction possible, on the contrary reinforcements of about 12,000 troops, including air complements, in prospect. Philippine Army in process of organization 80,000 by January 1, 1942.

c. TASK FORCES.

(1) Organized forces for overseas expeditions. Two forces especially trained for landing attacks. Complete equipment and ammunition reserves necessary.

O. K.

(a) *East Coast Task Force with amphibious training.* One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. Possible use; Azores, Cape Verdes, Martinique.

Out but O. K. as an Emergency Task Force

(b) *West Coast Task Force with amphibious training.* One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. For use in Pacific or west coast South or Central America. Available for use in Atlantic.

O. K.

(c) *Relief Forces.* For Azores, Cape Verdes, one division (reinforced) 27,000 men. After taking Azores, Cape Verdes, specially trained amphibious task force should be relieved and quickly reconstituted for additional operations.

O. K.

(d) *Expeditionary Force.* Reinforced Corps (3 divisions foot; two divisions armored; reinforcing units)—154,000. For use as required; Brazil, Africa, Philippines, England, Middle East. Essential to security Western Hemisphere, for exploiting success of task forces and for carrying out commitments of ABC–1.

O. K.

(e) *Iceland Force.* One division (reinforced) 28,000 men. 5,000 now in Iceland. Remainder to relieve Marines and British in spring of 1942.

d. REMAINDER OF ARMY.

(1) *Ground Forces:*

(a) GHQ Reserve (4 armored, 2 cavalry divisions, antiaircraft) _ 115,000

(b) Two field armies (20 infantry divisions) _____ 465,000

[4] *Air Forces.*

(a) Combat	60,000
(b) Maintenance	40,000
(c) Schools	150,000

(3) *Additional personnel.*

(a) Harbor Defenses	45,000
(b) Administrative overhead	125,000
(c) Trainees not assigned to units and instructors	150,000
Total	1,150,000

(4) The Ground and Air Combat Forces are essential:

(a) For reinforcement of expeditionary forces—always unpredictable and to meet the unexpected.

(b) To permit rapid expansion.

(c) For training of new units and reserves.

(5) Armored Forces included are difficult to train. Approximately 9 months required. Large number of specialists. Cannot be readily created by conversion of other forces. Any operations against Axis will require high percentage of armored forces. First two armored divisions about 90% equipped, with 95% proposed by April 1, 1942. Second two divisions recently organized, about 45% equipped. Equipment for third two divisions 20% or less. By spring of 1942, four armored divisions will be 85% or better equipped and trained. The remaining two cannot be ready for operations before the late summer of 1942. No reduction in armored units should be made..

3. *Effect on Defense Aid of reducing Ground Forces.*

a. Policy of Defense Aid should be based on:

(1) Task forces equipped 100%.

(2) Overseas forces equipped 100%.

(3) Remaining Army Forces equipped 50%.

b. Task forces require 100% equipment for combat. Any reduction in strength will reduce Tasks which can be undertaken.

c. A reduction of 25% in the personnel of overseas departments would have no effect on antiaircraft material and combat vehicles and only minor effect on infantry and artillery matériel. Similer reduction in strength of Base Forces would not materially increase the amounts of Defense Aid releases. Excluding the Philippines, the saving in shipping would amount to some 32,000 tons anually.

d. Reduction of equipment of Remaining Army Forces below 50% is impossible without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of new units. Additional Defense Aid matériel from this source can be obtained only by reduction in number of units.

[5] *e.* Summarizing, no appreciable increase in Defense Aid items desired by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of Remainder of Army.

4. *Future Requirements.*

By 1943, Nazis may dominate Europe from Urals to Iberian Peninsula and from Scandinavia to North Africa. Germany's war machine may comprise 400 divisions. Collapse of Russia, England, offensive tactics by Japan and belligerent attitude in Latin America are possibilities. We must prepare to meet these eventualities.

Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step is the only practical way of wearing down here war potential by military and economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and annihilate the German military machine. Forces deemed necessary at this time to accomplish role of ground units in supreme effort to defeat Germany comprise five field armies of about 215 divisions (infantry foot, armored, motorized, airborne, mountain and cavalry). If the United States remains committed to the policy of defeating Germany, making an all-out effort mandatory, then we must build toward these forces as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the initiative we must have forces available for employment at the time and place of our own choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our present forces may result in fatal delay. Time is required for the training of forces in the technique of modern war. We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and

we should push on with unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes of policy are seldom justified in prolonged efforts, and are devastating to organized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to shift our national objectives by the reduction of our army at the present time, might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give the Russian and British governments, would be far outweighed by the positive indications it would give to the German government, that they need not fear an eventual onslaught of ground forces.

5. *Conclusions.*

No appreciable increase in items of equipment especially needed by the British (AA guns, armored vehicles and ships) will result from any reduction of Army ground forces, which can be justified by the present international situation.

Chief of Staff.

Confidential

Proposed United States deliveries of light tanks, M3, October 1, 1941, to completion of contracts

NOTE: No English Contracts Scheduled

Months	Total productions	Allocations to—	
		Other Nations	United States
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
October	290	183	107
November	300	180	120
December	310	180	130
January	330	100	230
February	360	110	250
March	400	300	100
April	400	300	100
May	400	300	100
June	400	300	100
Sub total	3,190	1,953	1,237
July	400	300	100
August	400	300	100
September	400	300	100
October	130	98	32
Totals	4,520	2,951	1,569

EXHIBIT NO. 61



WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF A. C. OF S., WPD

12/7/41 ..... CHG
Date Initials

December 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Carribean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

MARSHALL

Notice O.C.S.
12/7/41 [illegible]

L. T. GERON,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Code messages sent out [illegible]

Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41, by Code Room, WDMC:
12.08' #733 to CG, USAFFE, Manila, P.I.;
12.17' #529 to CG, Haw. Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH.
12.00' #519 to CG, Crbn. Def. Cmnd., Quarry Heights, CZ.
12.11' # 16 to CG, Fourth Army, Pres. of San Fco., Cal.
ehb - 1705.

[illegible] JAN - 3 1942

SECRET

[illegible] 1-10-42

EXHIBIT NO. 62

THE JOINT BOARD
Washington

S E C R E T

MINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

The weekly meeting of The Joint Board scheduled for November 26, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building, at 11:35 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding;
General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff;
Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U.S.N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations;
Major General William Bryden, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air;
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S.N., Director, War Plans Division, Office Naval Operations;
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U.S.A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;
Captain D. C. Ramsey, U.S.N., Bureau of Aeronautics, in the absence of Rear Admiral J. H. Towers.
Colonel W. P. Scobey, U.S.A., Secretary.

The presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of November 19, would stand approved unless there were objections. There were no objections and the minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 724 - Priority of A-1-a for Medium Tanks.

Serial 718 - Construction of Airdromes in the Aleutian Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula.

Action of the Board on the two serials was as follows:

Serial 724 - Priority of A-1-a for Medium Tanks. Following a discussion of the Joint Planning Committee report during which the Navy members announced their agreement to eliminate consideration of the four-engine bomber program in order to expedite action on the tank program, motion was made and seconded that the serial be approved. Motion was adopted without objection.

Serial 718 - Construction of Airdromes in the Aleutian Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula. In the course of the discussion of this subject the Army members agreed with Admiral Stark that the work proposed in the recommendations made in the Joint Planning Committee report should not be pushed at the expense of other defense construction projects in more vital areas. It was moved and seconded that the serial be approved. Without objection the serial was approved.

The Board having disposed of the agenda proceeded to a discussion of professional topics.

SECRET

Admiral Stark raised the matter of United States military requirements in Brazil and read a dispatch from Admiral Beauregard, the United States Naval Attache in Rio de Janeiro, outling the difficulties encountered in obtaining Brazilian authority to base Navy patrol planes in Natal and Macsio for protecting our shipping. The attitude of the Brazilian Government, as reported by Admiral Beauregard, if to oppose further military development in Brazil by the United States. General Marshall recounted his experience during his recent visit to Brazil. At that time the Brazilian military chiefs favored U. S. military assistance in Brazil. Since that time there had been a marked change in their attitude and now collaboration with the United States had been supplanted by opposition. The responsibility for this reversal in relationship was attributed largely to Nazi efforts, and should the democracies suffer further reverses, continued and further opposition to the United States in Brazil might be expected. No Joint Board action was taken on this subject, but Admiral Stark requested that the Army postpone further requests to base troops or planes in Brazil until the Navy is fully established there.

Admiral stark wanted to know if any material had been forwarded by the Army to Chiang Kai Shek by airplane or if any such request had been received. His query was based upon a request made by Mr. Currie for the use of one Navy patrol plane to fly certain critical items of equipment from Manila to Singapore or Rangoon. General Arnold knew of no materials being forwarded by airplane except some spares for pursuit airplanes which had become necessary because of damage to airplanes already delivered to China.

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and photographic flights over the United States islands in the Western Pacific. It was felt that in view of recent developments indicating reinforcements and activity in the construction of defense installations in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, efforts should be made on the part of the United States to photograph the more important of these islands. General Arnold announced that two planes were already enroute from Dayton to the Philippines with photographic equipment and with instructions to photograph Truk, Jaluit, and such other important Japanese islands as required. With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced that the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands in the Far East and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired so that instructions could be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions.

The Board next discussed the stationing of Army pursuit aviation on islands of Midway and Wake. The Army is willing to locate a squadron of twenty-five airplanes on each of the islands. The Navy members announced their agreement. In connection with the operation General Marshall proposed: 1st, that a Navy airplane carrier be used to transport the Army pursuit units from Hawaii to their destinations; 2nd, that

the Navy cooperate in the movement of Army air units to the Philippines by furnishing air and sea protection at Midway and Wake Islands, utilizing patrol planes and such other Navy facilities as available. Speaking for the Board Admiral Stark directed that Admiral Turner and General Gerow get together and make necessary arrangements for the movement.

In a discussion on the development of an airplane route across the Pacific further eastward, the Navy raised the question as to the extent of Army plans for the development of Christmas Island as one of the landing fields on this route. It was the Navy's belief that developments contemplated by the Army should be made on Palmyra rather than Christmas Island, because the sovereignty of Christmas Island, being in dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom, would be claimed by the British following the war. Explaining the reason for the developments on Christmas Island, General Arnold pointed out that in the early considerations for the development of an interior southern air route, the Naval Commandant of the 14th district, Hawaiian Islands, had given General Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, information that the Palmyra developments could not be completed until August of 1942. A reconnaissance made by Army engineers indicated that construction of landing field facilities on Christmas Island could be expedited and the minimum development for flight operations could be completed by January 15, 1942. Considering the necessity for early completion of the field the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had secured transportation facilities and operating equipment and moved into Christmas Island, and now construction was well under way. So that the Navy members might have the full picture of Army action, General Gerow read the message sent to the War Department by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. General Arnold stated that Canton and Christmas Islands were to be staging fields, and the permanent installations would be kept at a minimum. Following this explanation Admiral Stark stated that, whereas the Navy considered Palmyra more desirable than Christmas, nevertheless the Navy would not now offer further objections to the development and completion of the Christmas Island project.

There being no further business before the Board, adjournment was taken at 12:45 p.m.

W. P. SCOBEY,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary.

EXHIBIT NO. 63

(This Exhibit comprises the Top Secret Report and Top Secret Memoranda of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Investigation and will be found printed as a part of Joint Congressional Committee Exhibit No. 157. See Table of Contents.)

EXHIBIT NO. 64

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Memorandum from General H. H. Arnold for Chief of Staff recommending change in proposed "Standing Operating Procedure" of Hawaiian Department dated 14 July 1941.
2. Memorandum from Col. R. H. Dunlop inviting constructive criticism of the proposed "Standing Operating Procedure," Hawaiian Department.
3. "Standing Operating Procedure," Hawaiian Department (tentative) dated 14 July 1941.

OCS 19741-62

RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the attached letter of instructions covering "Standing Operating Procedure" of the Hawaiian Department dated July 14, 1941.

2. This memorandum provides, Page 4 Paragraph 14 d. (8) and (9) as follows:

"(8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four (4) companies totaling five hundred (500) men, to assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary, see Paragraph 14 g. (2) below;

"(9) Defend Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks;"

3. I strongly recommend that these provisions be rescinded for the following reasons:

a. The Air Force units in order to carry out their missions must have 100% effective mechanic and maintenance strength.

b. Air Force enlisted men have been trained for particular purposes, and in most cases it has taken over a year to train them for these specialized jobs.

c. In general, it may be said that these provisions are "putting the cart before the horse." The ground troops should provide protection for the air bases rather than the air units provide protection for the ground bases.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Incl:
Restricted cy "Headquarters Hawaiian Department" dated 7-14-41, mimeographed book, subj, "Standing Operating Procedure."

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

14 July 1941

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure.

To: All Officers.

1. Attention is directed to the Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, attached.

2. Constructive criticism is invited. All suggestions will be submitted to the Office of A. C. of S., G-3, this headquarters, on or before 15 August 1941.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Tentative SOP-HD

RESTRICTED

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

14 July 1941

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
(Tentative)

SECTION I GENERAL

Par.	Subject	Page
1	Purpose	1
2	Unit Procedures	1
3	Short Title	1
4	Department Headquarters	1
5	Tactical Principles	1
6	Security	1
7	Liaison	1
8	Orders	2
9	Movement	2
10	Antiaircraft Defense	2
11	Sentries	3
12	Guides	3

SECTION II ALERTS

13	Alerts	3
14	Alert No. 1	3
15	Alert No. 2	5
16	Alert No. 3	5

SECTION III
ARMY AND NAVY COOPERATION

17	Air Forces	7

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE

18	Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure	8
19	Essential Elements of Enemy Information	8
20	Measures to Obtain Information	11
21	Measures for Handling	11
22	Reports and Distribution	11
23	Department G-2	11
24	G-2 Forms	12

SECTION V ADMINISTRATION

25	Supply	12
26	Evacuation	12
27	Traffic	13
28	Motor Transportation	13

RESTRICTED

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
(Tentative)

14 July 1941

SECTION I

General

1. Purpose. The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 205, FM 100-5, "Tentative, Field Service Regulations, Operations."

2. Unit Procedures. Conforming to the Department Procedure, subordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operation Procedures.

3. Short Title. "SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. Department Headquarters: Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:

a. Forward Echelon:

Commanding General and Aides.
General Staff (less G-1 and G-5).
Engineer Officer.
Signal Officer.
Chemical Officer.
Ordnance Officer.
Surgeon.
Headquarters Commandant.
Provost Marshal.

b. Rear Echelon:

G-1
G-5
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. Tactical Principles. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of Oahu and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

a. Complete organization of the ground;
b. Position to be held lightly;
c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them;
d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. Security. Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

7. Liaison. a. Officers: During operations, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

Hawaiian Division(s).
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
Hawaiian Air Force.

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86th Observation Squadron.
Department Reserve. (If and when established).

b. Responsibility: Liaison responsibility is from left to right.

8. Orders. a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Division(s), the Air Force, the Coast Artillery Brigade and all attached troops.

b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c below) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order but this will be confirmed later in writing.

c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

d. To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. Movement. a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in the trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

b. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. In general, trucks will move directly from one concealed position to another concealed position. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed.

c. All truck movements in daylight will be by truck infiltration, the distance between vehicles being not greater than 600 yards nor less than 300 yards. The maximum speed authorized by law will be maintained during daylight hours. When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (par. 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized.

d. Truck movements at night will be in convoy with blue lights. The distance between vehicles will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of commercial traffic.

e. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. Antiaircraft Defense. a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

c. On marches, all weapons suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

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Warning: To maintain air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

Concealment: To adopt necessary measures to defeat both visual reconnaissance and aerial photography through proper choice of position, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage either when halted or when in movement.

Dispersion: To reduce vulnerability to air attack and observa tion by dispersion and increased speed of movement.

Reports: To report to the next higher headquarters without delay each action with hostile aircraft

11. Sentries. Double sentries will be placed at all important installations and an adequate alarm system will be established.

12. Guides. In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

SECTION II

Alerts

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack, see paragraph 17 below.

14. Alert No. 1.

a. Alert No. 1 requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less detachments) attached 298th Infantry, will:

(1) Defend Oahu;

(2) Be responsible for all military traffic regulations except in the area AIEA JUNCTION - NUUANU PALI - MAKAPUU HEAD.

c. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, attached Det. 11th F. A., will:

(1) Oppose enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire;

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament;

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels;

(4) Support the Hawaiian Division(s);

(5) Provide method for protection of friendly aircraft from friendly antiaircraft fire;

(6) Coordinate all antiaircraft and seacoast intelligence agencies;

(7) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

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79716 O—46—pt. 15——17

RESTRICTED

d. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft;

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed;

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces, see par. 17 b. below;

(4) On Oahu, defend all air fields against sabotage, air and ground attacks;

(5) Arm all planes;

(6) Prepare bombers for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and disperse on fields;

(7) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers;

(8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four (4) companies totaling five hundred (500) men, to assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary, see par. 14 g. (2) below;

(9) Defend Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks;

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions;

(11) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders, see par. 14 f. below.

e. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

(1) A Food Administration.

(2) A Labor Procurement Service.

f. The District Commanders of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments stationed within the districts, will defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

g. The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Cooperate with the Auxiliary Police for the protection of all vital installations within Police District No. 1, exclusive of those on Army and Navy reservations;

(2) Inform Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, reference details of provisional battalion, see par. 14. d. (8) above;

(3) Regulate military traffic within area AIEA JUNCTION - NUUANU PALI - MAKAPUU HEAD, see par. 14. b. (2) above;

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

h. The Air Defense Command, when activated, will:

(1) Assume command of all air and antiaircraft defense forces on Oahu.

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15. Alert No. 2.

a. Alert No. 2 is applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1, but does require the availability at all times of fifty percent (50%) of all troops either in garrison or in the field and the guarding of important installations.

b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less detachments) attached 298th Infantry, will:

(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50%) of all troops;

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice;

(3) Protect all vital installations and regulate traffic as provided in paragraphs 16 b. (3) and (4), Alert No. 3;

(4) Place all 240mm howitzers in position, establish necessary guards, and place ammunition at positions, if directed.

c. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will:

(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50%) of all troops;

(2) Be prepared to put fifty percent (50%) of the armament into action without delay;

(3) Protect all vital installations as provided in paragraphs 16 c.(1),(2) & (3), Alert No. 3;

(4) Place the fire control units in position.

d. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50%) of all troops;

(2) Be prepared to place one (1) squadron of each group in operation without delay.

(3) Protect all vital installations on air fields and bases;

(4) Be prepared to furnish the provisional battalion, see par. 14. d. (8) above.

e. The District Commanders will:

Assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

f. The Department Provost Marshal will:

Be prepared to assume his responsibilities without delay under Alert No. 1.

g. The Air Defense Command, when activated, will:

Assume command of all air and antiaircraft defense forces on Oahu.

16. Alert No. 3.

a. Alert No. 3 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no particular threat from without.

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b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less dets), attached 298th Infantry, will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders including sabotage except in Police District No. 1;

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice;

(3) Protect all vital installations, except in Police District No. 1 and on garrisoned Army and Navy reservations, as follows:

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1;

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2;
Water supply for Schofield Barracks;
Radio station at PUU MANANAHUA;
Telephone Exchange at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAILUA, LAIE and KANEOHE;

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, KAILUA, PUULOA, WAIPIO, PEARL CITY and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO - WAHIAWA - SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station - BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3;

(4) Regulate traffic except in Police District No. 1.

(5) Release the 11th Tank Company to the Department Provost Marshal;

(6) Be prepared to assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

c. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense;

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the Brigade;

(3) Protect the Territorial dump and radio beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

d. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on air fields and bases;

(2) Release the provisional battalion to Department Provost Marshal, see paragraph 14. d. (8) above.

e. The District Commanders will:

(1) Assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

f. The Department Provost Marshal will:

(1) Be responsible for the protection of all vital instal-

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lations within Police District No. 1, exclusive of those on Army and Navy reservations;

(2) Inform Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, when he desires the provisional battalion, see paragraph 14. d. (8), and Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, when the 11th Tank Company is desired.

(3) Regulate military traffic within Police District No. 1.

SECTION III

ARMY AND NAVY COOPERATION

17. a. Air Forces. In case of hostile attack all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness pass to Army control, and all Army bombers in condition of readiness "A" pass to Navy control and the bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, supported by all available Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery, will defend Oahu, and:

(1) Provide personnel to cooperate with the Navy in the operation of the Harbor Control Post.

(2) Provide method of protection of friendly aircraft from friendly antiaircraft fire.

(3) Disseminate warning by radio broadcast of the AAAIS.

c. The Department Signal Officer will insure that joint communications are in readiness for immediate employment. Special arrangements will be made to transmit to the Navy information from the A.W.S.

d. Conditions of readiness.

(1) Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

(2) Material Readiness.

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

(3) Degree of Operational Readiness.

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types - four minutes. Types other than fighters - fifteen minutes.
2. All types - 30 minutes.
3. All types - one hour.
4. All types - two hours.
5. All types - four hours.

SECTION IV

INTELLIGENCE

18. The intelligence standing operating procedure indicated below is applicable generally to all Alerts.

19. Essential Elements of Enemy Information:

a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASE, PEARL HARBOR, KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the United States without occupation? If so, will his air attacks be accomplished by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASE, PEARL HARBOR, KANEOHE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establishing bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

20. Measures to Obtain Information:

a. NAVY.

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

(b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and PEARL HARBORS.

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

b. ARMY.

(1) Hawaiian Air Force.

(a) Observe water area corresponding generally to the

"Defensive Sea Area" for the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. Report location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to air craft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) 86th Observation Squadron.

(a) Observe water area corresponding generally to the "Defensive Sea Area" for the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction, and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(3) Aircraft Warning Service.

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel to Air Defense Command, when, activated, thence by Intelligence Loop.

(4) Hawaiian Division.

(a) Report location, number, type, and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report enemy fron lines and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

RESTRICTED

(c) Report location of own front lines. Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence loop.

(g) Report time, place, kinds, and method of employment of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(5) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formations.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by either hostile aircraft and vessels or by the seacoast artillery and and antiaircraft, giving location of naval vessels or aircraft, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, damage inflicted on hostile capital ships and transports.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and compostion of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEOHE BAY.

(g) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(h) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage due to use of chemical agents.

(i) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(j) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) Hawaii District Commander, report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction, and area of attack or observation;

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment;

(c) Location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group;

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units;

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important;

(f) Time, place, kinds, and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) Kauai District Commander.

Same as Hawaii District Commander above.

RESTRICTED

(8) Maui District Commander.

Same as Hawaii District Commander above.

(9) Department Signal Office.

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND NAVY.

Report assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

x. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Transmission of G-2 Information.

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions.

21. MEASURES FOR HANDLING.

a. Prisoners: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. Documents and Captured Material.

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Division(s), with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious means.

c. Maps. Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. The DEPARTMENT G-2 will:

a. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable The Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(1) Furnishing the Provost Marshal with all information gained through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

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(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

b. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

c. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

24. G-2 Forms:

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Report, see Inclosure No. 5.

SECTION V

ADMINISTRATION

25. SUPPLY.

a. Classes I, II, III and IV, see Pars. 75-77, FM 100-10. The existing system of supply for items of Class I, II, III and IV will be continued during all Alerts, except that a standard menu ration will be initiated for Alert No. 1.

b. Class V (Ammunition)

(1) Supply points remain unchanged. Dumps and ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

(2) Credits of an "Initial Issue" and of one "Unit" of fire are automatically placed at the disposal of all units whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "Initial Issue" and in a "Unit" of fire are shown in Inclosure Nos. 6 and 7, herewith.

(3) When Alert No. 1 or No. 2 is ordered, unless ammunition has already been drawn, all units will draw their "Initial Issue". Wherever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority:

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3" and 37-mm ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition - all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery ammunition, less AA.

(4) When Alert No. 3 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "Initial Issue" will be drawn.

26. EVACUATION.

a. Casualties: No change in present procedure.

b. Salvage: No change in present procedure.

c. Prisoners of War.

(1) Collecting Points - Schofield Barracks, Fort Shafter, Fort Ruger, Kaneohe Bay. To be established and operated by Department

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Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshal(s), Hawaiian Division(s).

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures - Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. TRAFFIC. Present regulations and procedure will continue in effect.

28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

a. When Alert No. 1 is put into effect, all attached motor transportation is automatically released to parent organization.

b. Motor pools will be established by the Hawaiian Division(s) and the Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. These pools will consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

c. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

d. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Hawaiian Division(s) and the Separate Coast Artillery Brigade as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position, see par 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves, the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Actg. Asst. C. of S., G-3.

7 Inclosures.



INCLOSURE NO. 1
Revised July 7, 1941


INCLOSURE NO. 2
LEGEND
4 POLICE DISTRICTS
45 RAILROAD BRIDGES
34 HIGHWAY BRIDGES
ELECTRIC LINE POWER HOUSE TO SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 22 MILES
ESSENTIAL TELEPHONE SWITCHBOARDS (OUTSIDE MONOLULU)
REVISED APRIL 1, 1941
KANEOHE BAY
ISLAND OF OAHU
REPRODUCED BY THE DEPT. ENGINEER MAP REPRODUCTION PLANT

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Inclosure No. 2

RAILROAD BRIDGES

Number	Location	TYPE		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Concrete	6.0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu	Concrete pile	Timber	5.0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.3'	208'
10	0.2 mi. W of Aiea	Concrete pile	Timber	4.5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	3.5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalauao	Concrete pile	Timber	4.0'	112'
14	Waiau Station	Timber pile	Timber	3.5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau	Timber pile	Timber	1.5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	2.0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau	Concrete pile	Timber	6.0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	5.6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City	Concrete pile	Timber	3.0'	16'
20	Waipahu	Timber Trestle	Timber	6.5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.3'	96'
42	1.0 Mi. N of Nanakuli	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	7.0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	12.0'	96'
47	0.5 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waianae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waianae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Waialua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0'	448'
78	Kaiiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	96'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0'	80'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	75'
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	128'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23.5'	98'
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11.0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	20.0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30.0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75.0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115.0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107.0'	448'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55.0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13.0'	112'

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79716 O—46—pt. 15——18

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Inclosure No. 2

HIGHWAY BRIDGES

Priority 1

Number:	Location:	Coordinates:
52	Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream	01.95 - 84.12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream	98.25 - 82.99
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96.46 - 95.68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96.37 - 96.75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa	87.98 - 07.98
74	Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea	92.82 - 13.52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch	95.27 - 98.92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kmukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks	93.72 - 96.96

Priority II

Number:	Location:	Coordinates:
13	Kam Highway over at Waialua	87.78 - 06.33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)	32.45 - 70.22
5	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86.06 - 04.57
6	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86.12 - 05.76
7	Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa	86.52 - 06.20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon	11.76 - 76.55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay	14.34 - 03.25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	97.79 - 95.34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O.R. & L. RR at Waipahu	98.56 - 82.46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea	06.82 - 80.30
109	Kam Highway at Heeia fish pond	21.04 - 89.11



RESTRICTED

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Title
Place
Date and hour

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Naval Oporations.-Movements (by fleet or groups).
   b. Enemy land oporations.
      (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
      (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
      (3) Sabotage.
      (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.
   a. Enemy capabilities.-An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.
   b. (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the forogoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
      (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

Chief of section.

INCLOSURE NO. 4

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)

PERIODIC REPORTS

Issuing unit
Place
Date and hour of issue

No.____
Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).-Location and nature.
b. Defensive organization. - Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
c. Units in contact.- Composition of units, with identifications if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
d. Artillery.- Location and calibers.
e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.- Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.
f. Supply and evacuation establishments.- Location and nature.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. General summary - action of enemy forces as a whole.
b. Operations of component elements.
(1) Enemy Naval Operations.- Movements (by fleet or groups).
(2) Enemy Land Operations.
(a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).
(b) Operations of Land Components.
1. Antiaircraft artillery.
2. Antitank units.
3. Armored forces.
4. Artillery.
5. Aviation, combat.
6. Aviation, observation.
7. Cavalry.
8. Chemical warfare.
9. Engineers.
10. Infantry.
11. Tanks.
12. Administrative elements.
c. Sabotage.
d. Miscellaneous.- Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in b above.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
b. Morale.
c. Supply and equipment.
d. Terrain not under our control.
e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.- A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

AC of S, G-2.

INCLOSURE NO. 5

R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON FOR INITIAL ISSUE
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

WEAPON	No. of rds. per Weapon			
	AP	BALL	TRACER	TOTAL
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903	10	100	10	120
Rifle, U.S., cal. .30, M1	25	250	25	300
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 (all)	40	320	40	400
Machine gun, cal. .30, ground (M1917)	500	4000	500	5000
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle)	150	1200	150	1500
Machine gun, cal. .30 AA (M1917)	250	2000	250	2500
Machine gun, cal. .30, AC	600	2400	600	3600
Machine gun, cal. .30 (Tank or Armd. Car)	4800		1200	6000
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA) (AW Bn)	2880	2880	1440	7200
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA) (other than Automatic Weapons Bn)	1440	1440	720	3600
Machine gun, cal. .50, Aircraft	120	840	240	1200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB (ground)	960		240	1200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB (Tank or Armd. Car)	1568		392	1900
Pistol, cal. .45		21		21
Shotgun, riot type				25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)				150
Signals, ground (assorted) or				25
Lights, Very signal (assorted)				24

		HE	AP	SHRAP	
37 mm gun, M1916 (Inf.)		200			200
37 mm gun, Antitank (Note 1.)		100	100		200
37 mm gun, Antiaircraft (Note 1.)		1620	180		1800
60 mm Mortar (Note 1.)		120			120
81 mm Mortar	(Light)	120			150
	(Heavy)	30			
3" Trench Mortar					150
75 mm gun (Note 2.)					300
155 mm Howitzer, M1918		122		28	150
3" AA Gun, Mobile		300			300
3" AA Gun, fixed		300			300
155 mm Gun, M1918 M1		100			100
240 mm How. M1918		60			60
8" Ry Gun			85		85
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY					
3" gun, M1903		505			505
6" gun			1000		1000
8" gun		200	350		550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)			267		267
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage)			272		272
12" Mortar			300		300
14" Gun			279		279
16" Gun			250		250

Note 1. - No service ammunition for this weapon on hand in Hawaiian Department at present.

Note 2. - Proportion of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) to be as shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

INCLOSURE NO. 6

RESTRICTED

EXHIBIT NO. 65

[Copy]

[1] SECRET

Op–12–VED
(SC)A16–1/RF13–13
Serial 075112

Secret JULY 3, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

To: The Special Naval Observer, London. The Special Army Observer, London.

Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941. (Short title "A. D. B.")

References: (a) United States—British Staff Conversations, ABC–1.

1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with reference (a).

2. The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the governments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agreements.

(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC–1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC–1, form the basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report [2] Under ABC–1, the United States proposed to commit its Naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to British naval strategic direction only for employment in the Far Eastern Area. The United States has not agreed, and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

(c) There is apparent a failure by the Delegates to appreciate the great strategic importance of holding the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly Sumatra and Java, and preventing enemy use of _____ and Loubok Straits. It will be impossible to hold Singapore if these Dutch Islands are captured by Japan.

(d) At British insistance during the ABC conversations the following was inserted in paragraph 11 (b) of the Report:

> "A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."

In other exchanges during the ABC conversations the British Delegates emphasized repeatedly their view that the retention of the general line of the Malay Barrier was vital to the continued security of the United Kingdom itself. Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff note in Appendix 1 of the ADB Report that, of forty-eight British naval vessels available in the "Eastern Theater," only three British vessels are to operate in the vicinity of the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor to offensive operations designed to close the passages of the Barrier to the passage of Japanese raiders. All British naval forces are assigned to escort and patrol work, most of them at great distances from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital." It may be pointed out that the naval defense of this position is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States

and [3] Dutch forces. Even the British Force II would not be placed in a position to operate offensively. It would only be during Phase II, which contemplates sending a strong British Fleet to the Far East, that British naval forces would be employed in a manner which might support the defense of the Malay Barrier. Since the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far East is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British position in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to withdraw their agreement to permit the United States Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that Area.

(e) The ABD Report contravenes the agreement set forth in paragraph 14 (f) of the reference. The Chief of Naval Operations cannot agree to permit aviation forces of the United States Navy to operate for other than naval purposes, or to be placed under other than naval command. It is particularly important, in the case of a naval force of inferior strength, to have available naval aviation units which are well trained in naval operations.

(f) After conclusion of the ABC conversations the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advised the British Chiefs of Staff of their desire that, as soon as practicable, delegates be assembled in Singapore for the purpose of drawing up a practical operating plan for the Far East Area in accordance with the ABC agreements. Their view was that a plan should be gotten ready for immediate use in case of eventualities. The report of ADB conversations cannot be considered as a practical operating plan. In it, proposed United States operations in the Philippines are clearly outlined. Dutch plans are fairly definite. British plans may be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in Appendix 1. There is no strategic operating plan set forth for operations in common by the three Powers involved. The ADB Report cannot take the place of such a plan, and the opinion is entertained that, until such a plan is drawn up, the cooperative effort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area will be largely ineffective.

[4] 3. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff can see no particular advantage in establishing the "Eastern Theater," and appointing a new British Commander termed the "Commander in Chief, FAR EASTERN FLEET." It is suggested that the same purposes could be served by giving appropriate authority to the British Commander in Chief, China, and have that officer, familiar with the general situation, continue to exercise direction even after the arrival on that station of additional British naval forces. It is agreed that there is no objection to giving this officer general strategic control of the various British naval stations in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, but the establishment of an officer in a superior echelon, in command of all is considered of questionable value. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are disposed to discuss this matter further, if so requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but question the present utility of such discussion, in view of the length of time before it would be practicable to establish such an office.

4. Details of the subject report which either vary from ABC–1, or appear to be unacceptable for other reasons, are indicated below. The numbers referred to are the paragraph numbers of the report.

3 (a): The operating plan should be confined to the plan for the Far East Area, rather than for the "Eastern Theater."

4: This paragraph does not give sufficient emphasis to the security of the Dutch position, nor to the necessity for the greatest possible degree of offensive operations. Attention in this connection is invited to the naval tasks set forth in paragraph 35, Annex 3, ABC–1. It is not agreed that Japanese expeditions against the Netherlands East Indies can be outflanked from Luzon if such expeditions go south via the protected line of the Pelews. This latter remark applies also to paragraph 13.

13: As indicated in previous correspondence, the usefulness of Hong Kong depends on its ability to contain Japanese blockade forces, as that base is unlikely to be usable for naval base purposes.

17: The opinion is held that, if the Pelews line of southward movement is taken by the Japanese, the early capture of Borneo and the northern line of the Dutch Islands is essential to a serious Japanese attempt against Java.

[5] 29: With respect to strengthening the defenses of Luzon, the conference apparently failed to give appropriate importance to paragraph 13 (d) of reference (a). Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas, the United States is not now able to provide any considerable additional reenforcement to the Philippines. Under present world conditions it is not considered possible to hope

to launch a strong offensive from the Philippines. The United States is taking steps to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines through improving the quality of native troops, and by providing additional modern material.

32: This subject was discussed during the ABC conversations, and decision reached to forego inclusion of it in the report, as the right is sovereign. Reference to it should be omitted from the ADB Report.

35: (last subparagraph)—The establishment of a combined staff, (presumably for all Services and all Powers), in Singapore is not considered advisable, there being no agreement, nor possibility of agreement, for a single commander of all of the military forces of the Associated Powers. Appropriate liaison should, of course, be established. Existing liaison for the purposes indicated is considered adequate, so far as the United States is concerned.

38 and 39: These paragraphs cannot be accepted as to United States naval aircraft, for the reason given previously.

41: This paragraph should be omitted as it has already been covered by reference (a). It differs in certain respects from that reference. The United States does not agree that the United States Pacific Fleet must under all circumstances be equal in strength to the Japanese Fleet.

42: The matter of cooperation in the Tasman Sea between the United States Pacific Fleet and the British Naval Forces has been clarified in other correspondence.

45 and 46: This is not in accord with ABC–1, which requires that the Associated Powers, except in an emergency, will exercise command over their own forces. United States Naval Forces would not be "released" to British operation, in the sense in which paragraph 46 is construed, but would be assigned appropriate strategic tasks, derived from those listed in ABC–1, under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief, China.

47: As previously indicated, the small part which is proposed for British Naval Forces in the Far East Area is not acceptable. This and succeeding paragraphs should be clarified.

[6] 53, 54 and 55: Since this plan should apply particularly to the Far East Area, the details listed in these three paragraphs cover too wide a scope.

57: This paragraph seems rather indefinite.

61, 62, 63, and 64: It is suggested that reference to Phase II might be omitted from the present consideration, since plans as to operations in that Phase must necessarily be highly speculative at this time.

Appendix II: United States naval aircraft should be listed under the United States Asiatic Fleet. Subparagraph (d) is not acceptable as regards United States naval aviation.

5. If further conferences are to be held in Singapore for drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers, it is suggested that the conference would have its work simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been agreed upon in advance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, you will inform the British Chiefs of Staff that, after they have had sufficient opportunity to give further study to this matter, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will be pleased to entertain suggestions which they may have to offer with respect to such an agenda.

(Sgd.) H. R. STARK,
Chief of Naval Operations.

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

JUL 25 1941.
Out OCS

Copy to:
Cincaf To CNO for dispatch
Cincpac To CNO for dispatch
Room 2055

Serial #261
Comdg. Gen., Philippine Dept. Reg. No. 900051, 7–26–41
British Jt. Staff Mission in Washington

2 Copies to C. N. O.—Rm. 2055
1 Carbn cy accompanied original to S. P. O. B. (checked him)
7–26–41 acw–rlc

EXHIBIT NO. 66

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER — ADDRESSEES — MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FROM CINCAF

RELEASED BY

DATE DEC 6, 1941.

TOP COVERDOM

DECODED BY CURTIS

PARAPHRASED BY ROBINSON

INFORMATION FOR ACTION

OPNAV

CINCPAC
COM 16
COM 14

PRIORITY PPP
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

PRIORITY PPP
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

061255 CR 0151

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

REPORT BY CINC CHINA "25 SHIP CONVOY WITH ESCORT OF 6 CRUISERS AND 10 DD'S LAT 08-00 N, [redacted] 106-00 EAST AT 0316 GMT TODAY. CONVOY OF 10 SHIPS WITH TWO CRUISERS AND 10 DESTROYERS 07-40 NORTH, 106-20 EAST TWO HOURS LATER. ALL ON COUR SE WEST. THREE ADDITIONAL SHIPS 07-51 NORTH 105 EAST AT 0442, COURSE 310. THIS INDICATES ALL FORCES WILL MAKE FOR [redacted] KONTRON"

SIGHTED BY MV SCOUTING FORCE ANCHORED CAMRANH BAY - 30 SHIPS AND ONE LARGE CRUISER.

ACTION: 38W.....

RECORD COPIES 12....13....16....38....38S....NAVAIDE....FILE...

CNO.....P1A FILE..... 20 OP.....

SECRET

BAD

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

TOP SECRET



In reply refer to initials and No.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUL 24 1943
Department of State

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

December 6, 1941.

Memorandum for State Department.

Following report has been received from the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet dated December 6th:

British Commander in Chief China reports a twenty five ship convoy escorted by 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers in Lat. 08 - 00 N. Long. 106 - 00 East at 0316 Greenwich time today. A convoy of ten ships with two cruisers and 10 destroyers were in Lat. 07 - 40 North Long. 106 - 20 East two hours later. All on course west. Three additional ships in Lat. 07 - 51 North Long 105 - 00 East at 0442 course 310°. This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron in Lat. 10 - 01 N. Long 104 East.

Commander in Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart's Scouting Force has sighted 30 ships and one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay.

R. E. Schuirmann.
R. E. Schuirmann,
by direction.

894.30/128-1/2

894.30

Confidential File

FILED
JUN 28 1943

Reproduction of this material in any form is not authorized except by specific approval of the Secretary of the Navy.

EXHIBIT NO. 67

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
17 August 1941
(Purple)

#708 (Probably an error for #706)

This afternoon, in spite of the fact that it was Sunday, I called, at his personal request, on the President, who had just returned to Washington this morning. (Secretary Hull was also present). Upon our arrival, he read two papers, the contents of which is being sent to you as my message #707* (the gist of which was that if Japan makes further aggression through the use of force of arms, the United States will take any and all necessary steps immediately to protect the interests of the United States and of United States citizens), and my message #708** (the gist of which is that in connection with Japan's proposal to conduct a meeting of leaders of the two countries, the United States would like to be advised of the aims of the Japanese Government).

After reading them, he requested me to relay the contents to my home government. He added that the two papers were not to be considered as oral statements, but were to be given the status of only reference material. As such, he said, he had had the State Department prepare them. I accepted the papers on condition that they would be for only my information.

I am sending you the gist of our talks and the opinions expressed in subsequent messages.

*JD-1: 4672.

**JD-1: _____.

21225

JD-1: 4671 (D) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (3)

From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
17 August 1941 (English text, enciphered in Purple)
(Purple)

#707(In 2 parts, complete).

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the governments of Great Britain, of the Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indo-China should be available to all powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indo China. Notwithstanding these efforts, the government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposal of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indo-China with its military, air and naval forces.

The government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries.

This government's patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

Such being the case, this government now finds it necessary to say to the government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a

21226 JD-1: 4672 (continued) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (2)

policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

21226

JD-1: 4672 Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To : Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) (English text, enciphered in Purple)
(Purple)
17 August, 1941

#708 Part 1 of 8 (Strictly Confidential)

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on 8 August during a conversation with the Secretary of State, whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoye and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is also made to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on 16 August, that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

Part 2 of 8*

Part 3 of 8

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indo-China. Subsequently, On July 20 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indo-China and pointed out that the government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indo-China or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the south Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

Part 4 of 8

The government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the

2133 JD-1: 4696 (continued) Navy Trans. 8-21-41 (2)

opinion of this government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed.

Part 5 of 8*

Part 6 of 8

If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this government and this government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirm that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character.

Part 7 of 8

In those areas where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for

21334

JD-1: (continued) Navy Trans. 8-21-41 (2)

the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

Part 8 of 8

The government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two governments, it would be helpful to both governments, before entering a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

*Parts 2 and 5 not available.

21334

JD-1: Nagy Trans. 8-21-41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura).
To : Tokyo.
17 August 1941
(Purple) (English text, enciphered in Purple)

#708

Part 2 of 8

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up the suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

Part 5 of 8

The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principles of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conductive to the maintenance of peace.

21335

JD-1: Navy Trans. 8-22-41 (X)

4713

EXHIBIT NO. 68

1053

Page

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Tuesday (Day) 25 (Date) November (Month) 1941.

ZONE DESCRIPTION - 11

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming in company with Task Group 15.4, on course 267°T and pgc, 255°psc, at speed 13.8 knots, (142 rpm). Boilers #5, #6, and #7 in use. Ship darkened and in Material Condition Baker. Condition of Readiness Three set thoughout the ship. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 142.1.

P. G. DIXMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before, on course 267°T and pgc, at 13.8 knots. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 141.3.

W. C. BUTLER, JR.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

6 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0640 Unset Material Condition Baker above third deck. 0715 Sighted plane bearing 013°T. Position of convoy: Latitude: 20° 00' 00" N.; Longitude: 168° 07' 00" E. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 142.6.

R. K. SAWYER,
Ensign, D-V(G), U.S.N.R.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0815 Mustered crew at quarters; absentees, none. 0913 Set Material Condition Baker. 0930 Sounded General Quarters for damage control drill. 0951 Set Material Condition Afirm. 1037 Unset Material Condition Afirm. 1040 Secured from General Quarters. 1042 Set Condition of Readiness III. 1159 Position of convoy by latitude and longitude indicator: Latitude: 19° 58' 00" N.; Longitude: 167° 11' 00" E. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 143.2.

W. C. THOMAS, JR.,
Ensign, D-V(G), U.S.N.R.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1256 Changed course to 267°T. 1300 Changed speed to 13.8 knots, 143 revolutions per minute. 1440 On signal from S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT changed course to 256°T. 1511 Shifted steering control to steering aft. 1544 Shifted steering control to navigation bridge. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 144.6.

A. C. FOX,
Ensign, G-V(G), U.S.N.R.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1645 Set Material Condition Baker. 1716 Darkened ship. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 142.8.

J. K. BOAL,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 141.9.

E. C. KRAUS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 141.6.

P. G. DIXMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Approved:
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward L. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Navigator.

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Navy Dept. Bur. No. 1056

Page

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP (Name) BOISE (Identification Number) CA47

DAY'S PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Wednesday 26 Novembere 41.

ZONE DESCRIPTION -11 S. E. ROBINSON, Capt., U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hours	"All Hands" Exercises (Drills)	BY AREA: Nautical Miles	BY AREA: Tenths	BY LOG: Nautical Miles	BY LOG: Tenths	Courses (P. C.) Gyro X. Mag ___ (Indicate which)	WIND: Direction	WIND: Force K'TS	BAROMETER: Reading at Noon	BAROMETER: Reading at Noon Corrected	TEMPERATURES: Sea	TEMPERATURES: Air	TEMPERATURES: Wet Bulb	Weather at Noon	CLOUDS: Form	CLOUDS: Movement From—	CLOUDS: Amount	Visibility	SEA: Direction	SEA: Height in Feet
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M.																				
1	143.0	14	0	13	0	256	ENE	18	29:88		78	73	81	bc	cu	NE	4	10	4	NE
2	142.3	13	9	13	.3	256	ENE	16	29:88		77	73	81	bc	st cu	NE	5	10	4	NE
3	141.4	13	8	13	2	256	ENE	15	29:88		76	73	81	c	cu nb	NE	8	8	4	NE
4	141.3	13	9	12	7	256	NE	19	29:88		76	73	81	c	st cu	NE	8	7	4	NE
5	141.7	13	9	12	6	256	NExE	19	29:90		78	73	81	bc	st cu	NE	3	7	4	NE
6	141.9	13	9	13	8	256	NExE	16	29:90		78	74	81	bc	cu	NE	3	25	4	NE
7	141.9	13	9	13	2	256	NExE	20	29:93		79	73	81	bc	cu	NE	6	35	4	NE
8	141.9	13	9	13	5	256	NExE	20	29:94		79	74	81	bc	cu	NE	3	35	4	NE
9	141.8	13	9	13	4	256	NE	20	29:95		79	74	81	bc	cu	NE	4	35	4	NE
10	141.9	13	9	13	5	256	NE	20	29:96		79	75	81	bc	cu nb	NE	4	35	4	NE
11	142.0	13	9	13	5	256	NExE	20	29:84		79	75	81	bc	cu	NE	5	35	4	NE
12	141.9	13	9	13	5	256	NExE	18	29:92		79	75	81	bc	cu	NE	3	35	4	NE

1 Latitude 18° 58' 00" N.
2 Longitude 162° 17' 00" E.

1 Latitude 18° 45' 00" N.
2 Longitude 161° 21' 00" E.

1 Latitude 18° 18' 00" N.
2 Longitude 159° 27' 00" E.

Current: Set 235°, Drift 0.5°

Gyrocompass in Use
Error 0.2° W.

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation

Fuel: Received None; Expended 23,720; On hand 482,295

Water: Distilled 20,190; Received None; Expended 17,315; On hand 137,174

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft.

Magnetic Temperatures:
Maximum 88 @ 8 P.M.
Minimum 73 @ 4 A.M.

Normal.

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Steering casual.	Fire drill.
2	ty drill.	Fire and rescue
3	School for re-	drill.
4	pair parties.	Steering casual ty
5	AA Condition II	drill.
6	gun drill.	Instruction in
7	Main & AA loading,	firing 45 cal.
8	nightsatting,	pistol for
9	control, track-	gunnermins.
10	ing drill.	Veneral lecture
Visual	gunnaing	for 2nd division.
drill.		Divisional in-
Ammunition supply		struction in
drill for turret		Naval terms,
III.		definitions and
AA gun crews in-		naval etiquette.
struction in first		Condition
aid, rifle and		Baker.
pistol.		
Lookout instruction.		
Spotting drill.		

P.M.																				
13	141.9	13	9	13	4	256	ENE	17	29:90		80	75	81	bc	cu	NE	4	35	4	NE
14	142.0	13	9	13	4	256	NExE	18	29:88		80	75	81	bc	cu nb	NE	5	35	4	NE
15	142.0	13	9	13	4	256	NExE	19	29:87		79	75	81	bc	cu nb	NE	4	35	4	NE
16	142.1	13	9	13	4	256	NExE	22	29:88		80	75	81	c	cu nb	NE	6	25	5	ENE
17	141.8	13	8	13	4	256	NExE	23	29:89		80	75	81	cc	cu nb	NE	7	25	5	ENE
18	142.0	13	9	13	4	256	NE	23	29:90		78	74	81	cc	cu nb	NE	7	25	6	NE
19	141.8	13	9	13	5	256	NExE	24	29:90		78	74	82	cc	cu nb	NE	7	10	5	NE
20	141.9	13	9	13	3	256	NExE	22	29:92		79	74	82	cc	cu nb	NE	10	7	4	NE
21	141.9	13	9	13	6	256	NE	22	29:92		80	75	82	cc	cu nb	NE	9	6	4	NE
22	142.1	13	9	13	3	256	NE	22	29:92		80	75	82	cc	cu nb	NE	9	6	4	NE
23	142.1	13	9	13	5	256	NE	22	29:92		79	74	82	cc	cu nb	NE	9	6	4	NE
24	141.4	13	0	13	4	256	ENE	20	29:91		80	75	82	bc	cunb	NE	4	7	4	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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

N. Nav. 49
(Mar. 1939)

Page 1055

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Wednesday (Day) 26 (Date) November (Month), 1941.

ZONE DESCRIPTION -11

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming on course 256°T and pgc, 246°psc, in company with Task Force 15.4. Steaming on boilers #5, #6, and #7, at speed 13.8 knots, 143 rpm, (standard speed 15 knots). Ship darkened, in Material Condition Baker and in Condition of Readiness III. Average steam 426.6. Average rpm. 142.4.

D H Adams
D. H. ADAMS,
Lieutenant (jg), D-V(G), U.S.N.R.

4 to 6.

Steaming as before. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 141.8.

F. G. Dierman
F. G. DIERMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

6 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0623 Sighted ship; Unset Material Condition Baker above the third deck. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 141.9.

T D Morris
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0815 Mustered crew at quarters; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal. Average steam 420. Average rpm. 141.9.

L. A. Collins Jr.
L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1435 Exercised crew at fire drill. 1437 First stream of water. 1443 Secured from fire drill. 1446 Called away fire and rescue party. 1455 Secured from general drills. 1528 Steering aft took steering control. 1537 Navigation bridge took steering control. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 142.

A C Fox
A. C. FOX,
Ensign, C-V(S), U.S.N.R.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1712 Set Material Condition Baker above the third deck. 1742 Darkened ship. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 141.9.

T D Morris
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before on course 256°T and pgc, at 13.6 knots. Average steam 422.5. Average rpm. 141.8.

W C Butler Jr
W. C. BUTLER, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Average steam 421. Average rpm. 141.8.

D S Edwards Jr
D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Approved: S. B. Robinson
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

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1057

Page

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Thursday 27 November 1941.
(Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION -11 A - 10

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming on course 256°T and psc, 244°psc, at 13.8 knots, 142 rpm, acting as escort to a convoy consisting of S.S.CAPE FALCONSTONER, PRESIDENT GRANT, DONA NATI, JOHN LYKES and AMERICAN LEADER. BOISE 2300 to 3300 yards ahead of S.S.PRESIDENT GRANT, convoy guide. Boilers #5, #6 and #7 in use. Ship darkened, in Condition III and Material Condition Baker. Average steam 422.5. Average rpm. 139.4.

A. T. NATHANAY,
Lieutenant, (jg), U.S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. Average steam 422.5. Average rpm. 141.7.

D. H. ADAMS,
Lieutenant (jg), D-V(G), U.S.N.R.

6 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0644 Lighted ship. 0700 Unset Condition Baker above third deck. Average steam 421.6. Average rpm. 141.6.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0800 Set clocks back one hour to zone (-)10 time. 0815 Mustered crew at quarters; absentees, none. 0848 A Deck Court, Lt. W.S. RODIMON, USN, met in the cases of TESTI, F.L., Sea2c, USNR, and HANLEY, H.F., Sea2c, USN. 0905 A Deck Court, Lt.W.S. RODIMON, USN, adjourned. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 140.5.

W. G. THOMAS, Jr.,
Ensign, D-V(G), U. S. N. R.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1335 Changed course to 249°T and psc, 234°psc, and 241°psc. Average steam 427.5. Average rpm. 139.1.

T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1647 Set Condition Baker. 1707 Darkened ship. Average steam 422.5. Average rpm. 141.6.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1840 Sighted darkened ship, bearing 240°T, estimated range 18000 yards. Went to General Quarters. 1845 Set Material Condition Affirm. 1851 Challenged ship. Received no reply. 1852 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1854 Changed speed to 14 knots. 1900 Changed course to 254°T and psc. 1903 Changed course to 259°T and psc. Strange ship changed course to left and increased speed. 1915 Changed course to 249°T and psc. 1923 Lighted off boilers #3 and #4. 1927 Lost contact with strange ship. 1930 Unset Material Condition Affirm. 1931 Secured from General quarters. Set Condition of Readiness Two. 1937 Changed course to 249°T and psc. 1945 Cut in boilers #3 and #4 on main steam line and cut out at 1950. Average steam 411.5. Average rpm. 143.1.

F. D. [illegible]
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. 2115 Resumed course 249°T and psc. 2253 Sighted darkened ship bearing 208°T, distant 13000 yards; went to battle stations. On various courses intersecting between convoy and darkened ship. 2300 Passed darkened ship steam to

Approved:
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N. Navigator

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N. Nav. 26 Page 1059

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. BOISE Date 27 November 1941.

20 to 24. (Continued).

port, distant about 8000 yards, on course about 060°T. 2304 Cut in boilers #3 and #4 on main steam line. 2317 Secured from General Quarters. Set Material Condition Baker. On various courses resuming position ahead of convoy. 2330 Resumed course 249°T and pgc, in station ahead of convoy. Average steam 428.3. Average rpm. 141.6.

C. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Approved: H. B. Robinson.
H. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

16—30. (This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)



No. Navy 1058

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE (Name) CL47 (Identification Number)

PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO -- Thursday 27 November 1941. (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION -11 S. B. ROBINSON, Capt., U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Zone Description (Plus or Minus)	BY RUNS. Distance Miles	Time	BY LOG. Distance Miles	Time	Course (P. C.) Gyro. X. Mag. (Deviation used)	WIND Direction	KTS. Force (Beaufort Scale)	BAROMETER Height of Mercury	Reduction to Sea Level	TEMPERATURE Dry Bulb	Wet Bulb	Weather, Sea Disturbance	CLOUDS Form	Amount Tenths	VISIBILITY	SEA Character	Direction
A.M.																		
1		140.4	13 7	13 4	256		NExE	22	29:91		80	74	82	bc	cu nb	NE	4	4	4	NE
2		136.4	13 3	13 0	256		NExE	21	29:90		80	73	82	ltc	cu nb	NE	3	3	4	NE
3		139.4	13 6	13 1	256		ENE	20	29:90		79	73	80	bc	cu nb	NE	3	3	4	NE
4		141.9	13 8	13 6	256		ENE	20	29:90		80	75	82	ha	cu nb	NE	4	6	4	ENE
5		141.9	13 8	13 4	256		NExE	23	29:90		80	73	82	ha	cu nb	NE	5	6	4	ENE
6		141.6	13 8	13 5	256		NExE	21	29:92		80	73	82	ha	cu	NE	4	15	4	ENE
7		141.9	13 8	13 2	256		NExE	21	29:92		80	75	82	ha	cu	NE	5	30	4	ENE
8		142.0	13 9	13 4	256		NExE	21	29:93		80	75	82	ha	cu	NE	3	35	4	NE
8 30		142.0	13 9	13 6	256		NExE	21	29:95		80	74	82	ha	cu	NE	3	35	4	NE
9		140.8	13 8	13 0	256		NExE	21	29:96		81	74	82	ha	cu	NE	3	35	4	NE
10		140.0	13 7	13 2	256		NE	22	29:92		81	75	82	ha	cu	NE	3	40	4	NE
11		140.0	13 7	13 5	256		NExE	18	29:92		81	73	82	ha	cu	NE	3	40	4	NE
12		140.0	13 7	13 3	256		NExE	19	29:88		81	73	82	ha	cu nb	NE	5	25	4	NE
P.M.																				
13		139.1	13 6	13 3	256		NExE	19	29:87		81	73	82	haz	cu	NE	5	18	4	E
14		135.4	13 2	13 0	249		NExE	18	29:85		81	74	82	haz	cu	NE	5	18	4	E
15		141.0	13 8	13 7	249		NExE	19	29:84		81	73	82	haz	cu	NE	5	18	4	E
16		140.9	13 8	13 5	249		NExE	19	29:84		81	73	82	haz	cu	NE	5	18	4	E
17		141.8	13 8	13 4	249		ExN	18	29:84		81	73	82	haz	cu	NE	5	15	4	E
18		142.0	13 9	13 0	249		NExE	17	29:87		81	73	82	ha	cu	NE	5	15	4	E
19		145.2	14 3	14 3	249		NExE	16	29:87		80	73	82	ha	cu	NE	3	15	4	ExN
20		141.0	13 9	13 4	246		NExE	16	29:88		80	73	82	ha	st cu	NNE	3	15	4	ExN
21		140.8	13 8	13 1	249		NExE	18	29:88		81	72	82	ha	cu	NW	4	15	4	NE
22		141.0	13 8	13 6	249		ENE	17	29:88		81	72	82	ha	st cu	NNW	7	15	4	NNE
23		142.2	14 0	13 9	239		NExE	16	29:86		81	73	82	ha	cu nb	NW	7	30	4	NE
24		142.8	14 0	13 9	249		NE	12	29:87		81	74	82	ha	cu nb		4	NE	4	NE

BY OBSERVATION.

Noon	Latitude 17° 34' 00" N.	
	Longitude 156° 23' 00" E.	
Noon	Latitude 17° 20' 00" N.	
	Longitude 155° 25' 00" E.	
8 A.M.	Latitude 16° 40' 00" N.	
	Longitude 153° 37' 00" E.	

Current { Set ... Drift ...

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error ...

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No. ...
S. H. ...
Error ...
Variation ...
Deviation ...

Fuel { Received None; Expended 23,463; On hand 488,838

Water { Distilled 21,530; Received None; Expended 26,238; On hand 192,466

RECORD LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd ...
Draft aft. ...

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd ...
Draft aft. ...

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES:
Maximum 90
Minimum 72

Normal.

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Steering casualty drill.	Veneral Instruction for "S" and "F" divisions. Division Instruction in fire main and fire fighting equipment. Condition Baker. General Quarters. Condition Afira. Condition IT Watches.
2		
3	Instruction for Repair Parties.	
4		
5	Gun drill in AA battery, loading, sightsetting, control, and tracking drill. Procedure school for signalmen. Ammunition supply drill for turret III. Instruction for AA gun crews in 1st aid, rifle and pistol. Instruction for gun crews in rifle and pistol.	
6		
7	Division III	
8	Watch. Main &	Steering casualty
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

Page 1061

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Friday 28 November 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION -10

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming on course 249°T and psc, 240° per psc at 13.8 knots, 141 rpm, acting as escort to a convoy consisting of S.S. CAPE FAIRWEATHER, PRESIDENT GRANT, DONA NATI, JOHN LYKES, and AMERICAN LEADER. Range 3200 to 3300 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT, convoy guide. Convoy in line divisions. Boilers #5,#6,#7 in use. Ships darkened, in material condition Baker, in Condition of Readiness II. Average steam 430. Average rpm 140.9.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant, (jg), U.S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0605 Lighted ship; set Modified Condition Baker; secured from Condition of Readiness II; set Condition of Readiness III. Average steam 427.5. Average rpm 140.7.

E. S. EDWARDS,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0805 Changed speed to 12 knots. 0832 Changed speed to 13.8 knots. 1400 25 November, 1941, the Captain held mast and assigned the following punishments: COKER, J.R., Sea2c, Unseamanlike conduct, throwing lighted cigarette on linoleum deck; 4 hours extra duty. GOGO, J.M., MAtt2c, (1) having another man's clothing in his possession; (2) marking another man's clothing with his name; 5 days solitary confinement. KIEFER, J.W., Sea3c, smoking during general quarters; 5 days restriction. FRASER, B.F., MM2c, allowing a man to smoke during general quarters; 5 days restriction. HANLY, F.P., Sea2c, asleep on lookout watch at 0100 11/25/41; Deck Court. TESTY, F.L., Sea2c, asleepon lookout watch at 0100, 11/25/41; Deck Court. 1055 Cut in boiler #8. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; Conditions normal. Average steam 486.7. Average rpm 137.9.

T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1300 Commanding officer conducted inspection of lower decks. 1500 Various courses and speeds launching two aircraft for reconnaissance; Lt. (jg) BOAL, U.S.N., in charge. Average Steam 426.8. Average rpm 151.8.

L. A. COLLINS,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

16 to 20.

Steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. 1614 Secured from flight quarters, having recovered two aircraft. On Various courses resuming position ahead of convoy. 1641 Resumed course 249°T and speed 13.8 knots. 1703 Set Material Condition BAKER. 1719 Lighted off boilers #3 and #4. 1733 Darkened ship. 1743 Sighted ship bearing 325°T, hull down. Changed course to 260°T, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 Cut in boilers #5 and #4 on main steam line. 1752 Set Condition AFIRM. On various courses at various speeds keeping between ship sighted at 1743 and convoy. Ship appeared to be H.I.J.N.S. "ATAGO" type, steaming darkened at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. 1900 Ship turned to course about 090°T. 1804 On various courses closing convoy. 1835 Unset Condition AFIRM. 1920 On various courses in rear of convoy, having lost Japanese cruiser bearing 077°T. Average steam 431.2. Average rpm 138.5.

E. S. EDWARDS,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm 139.4.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant, (jg), U.S. Navy.

Approved:
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander,
U.S.N., Navigator.

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Navy Dept. Form 1062

Page

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE (Name) CL 47 (Construction Number)

AT PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. TO Friday 28 Nov. 1941 (Day) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION +10 S. R. ROBINSON, Capt. U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Log Distance Since Noon	BY RUNS Nautical Miles	BY RUNS Knots	BY LOG Nautical Miles	BY LOG Knots	Course (P. C.) Gyro X Mag. Compass wkwk	WIND Direction	WIND Force	BAROMETER Height of Mercury	BAROMETER Reduction to Sea Level	TEMPERATURE Air	TEMPERATURE Sea	TEMPERATURE Water at Surface	Weather, Sea Reports	CLOUDS Form	CLOUDS Motion From—	CLOUDS Amount	Visibility	SEA Condition	SEA Period
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A.M.																				
1	140.8	13	8	13	2	249	WxS	17	29:89		81	74	82	bc	cu nb	NE	4	11	1	NE
2	140.9	12	8	13	5	249	NE	16	29:85		81	74	82	c	cu nb	NE	6	5	1	NE
3	140.9	12	8	13	6	249	ENE	15	29:85		80	75	80	bp	cu nb	NE	8	5	1	NE
4	141.5	13	8	13	4	249	NExE	16	29:84		81	72	82	bc	cu nb	NE	3	5	2	NE
5	140.9	13	8	13	6	249	NExE	18	29:84		81	72	82	bc	cu nb	NE	3	10	4	NE
6	141.0	13	8	13	4	249	ENE	17	29:85		81	73	82	c	st cu	NE	7	25	4	NNE
7	141.0	13	8	13	2	249	NExE	20	29:86		81	73	82	c	cu nb	NE	6	30	4	NE
8	140.0	13	7	13	5	249	ENE	17	29:89		82	76	82	bc	st cu	NE	5	30	4	ENE
9	130.2	12	8	12	6	242	NExE	23	29:90		82	76	82	c	st nb	NE	7	30	4	ENE
10	141.8	13	8	13	5	249	NExE	17	29:88		81	76	82	c	cu nb	NE	8	30	4	ENE
11	140.5	13	8	13	2	249	ENE	17	29:86		83	77	82	c	cu nb	NE	8	30	4	ENE
12	138.9	13	5	13	3	249	ENE	19	29:83		83	75	82	c	cu nb	NE	6	35	4	ENE

Latitude 15° 39' 00"N
Longitude 150° 51' 00"W

Latitude 15° 22' 00"N
Longitude 149° 56' 00"E

Latitude 14° 45' 00"N
Longitude 148° 17' 00"E

Current: Set / Drift

GYROCOMPASS IN USE
Error +.05N

STANDARD MAG. COMPASS
Compass No.
S. H.
Error
Variation
Deviation

FUEL
Received None
Expended 24,765
On hand 404,047

WATER
Distilled 24,030
Received 2,635
Expended 27,036
On hand 126,829

BEFORE LEAVING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

AFTER ENTERING PORT
Draft for'd
Draft aft

MAGAZINE TEMPERATURES
Maximum 80°#5RB.
Minimum 75°A524M

Normal

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Steering casual-	Lower decks ins-
2	ity drill.	pection.
3	Gun drills for	Catapulted 2 Planes
4	AA Battery.	for reconnaissance;
5	Condition III	Boat recovery.
6	Watch.	Condition BAKER.
7	Field Day.	General quarters.
8		Condition Affirm.
9		

P.M.																				
13	138.9	13	6	13	3	249	ENE	18	29:80		83	76	82	bc	cu nb	NE	3	35	4	ENE
14	140.0	13	8	13	4	249	ExN	20	29:80		85	77	82	bc	st cu	NE	5	35	4	ENE
15	142.5	13	9	13	8	249	E	19	29:87		85	77	82	bc	st cu	NE	6	30	4	ENE
16	134.8	12	9	12	0	249	E	20	29:79		84	77	82	bc	cu nb	NE	5	25	4	ENE
17	142.7	14	0	13	9	249	E	19	29:80		85	77	82	bcr	st cu	NE	4	25	4	ENE
18	128.0	12	3	12	9	249	ExE	18	29:81		82	78	82	bc	st cu	NE	4	35	4	ENE
19	142.4	14	0	13	1	240	E	19	29:82		82	76	82	bc	cu st	NE	3	35	4	ENE
20	144.0	14	2	13	8	248	E	17	29:83		82	76	82	bc	ci st	NE	4	11	4	NE
21	140.2	13	8	13	5	249	NExE	18	29:84		82	77	82	bc	ci st	NE	4	10	4	NE
22	139.0	13	7	13	5	249	E	16	29:85		82	77	82	bc	cu	NE	6	8	4	NE
23	139.2	13	7	13	0	249	E	17	29:84		82	76	82	bcp	cu	NE	4	8	4	NE
24	136.3	13	6	13	8	249	ExN	17	29:83		82	75	82	cp	cu nt	NE	4	8	4	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly).

N. Nav. 48 (Mar 1938)

Page 1063

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Saturday 29 November 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION -10

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming darkened under boilers #5, #6, and #7, on course 249°T and pgo, 241°psc, enroute West from Pearl Harbor, T.H., acting as escort for convoy comprising the following ships: PRESIDENT GRANT (convoy commander), CAPE FAIRWEATHER, DONNA MACE, AMERICAN LEADER, and JOHN LYKES. Maintaining station on the port quarter of the American Leader, distant 7-800 yards, on the port quarter of the convoy. Standard speed 15 knots, steaming at 13.6 knots. Ship in Material Condition Baker and Condition of Readiness II. 0358 Sighted ship bearing 005°T on opposite parallel course. Average steam 431.2. Average rpm. 137.8.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0628 Lighted ship, unset Material Condition Baker above the third deck and set Condition of Readiness III. 0649 Sighted Rota Island bearing 295°T, distant 28 miles. 0715 Proceeded to take station 2300 to 3300 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT. Average steam 427.6. Average rpm. 145.6.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0815 Mustered crew at quarters; absentees, none. 0823 Sighted Island of Guam on port bow bearing 250°T, distance 30 miles. 0843 Changed course to 274°T. 0940 Sighted Rotudian Point Lighthouse bearing 235°T. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 431.2. Average rpm. 142.

C. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1527 Catapulted two planes, Lt.(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., USN, in charge. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 147.3.

A. C. FOX,
Ensign, O-V(S), U.S.N.R.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1633 On various courses at various speeds recovering two aircraft. 1648 Recovered two aircraft, Cast Method. 1630 On various courses at various speeds taking station ahead of convoy. 1712 Steaming on course 274°T and pgo, speed 13.9 knots. 1726 Set Material Condition Baker. 1756 Darkened ship. Average steam 433. Average rpm. 148.1.

T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Went to General Quarters. 1810 Secured from General Quarters and set Condition II. 2000 Set Modern back to zone (-)9 time. Average steam 433.3. Average rpm. 137.2.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Approved:
S. H. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

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Page 1064

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE (Name) CL47 (Identification Number)

Date Passage Pearl Harbor, T.H. (Dep.) TO (Dest.) Saturday 29 November 41. (Date)

ZONE DESCRIPTION -10 S. D. ROBINSON, (Name) Capt., U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Zone Description	By Revs. Number Miles	By Revs. Times	By Log Number Miles	By Log Times	Course (P.C.) Gyro. Mag. Compass	Wind Direction	Wind Force (Beaufort Scale)	Barometer Reading at 32°	Barometer Reading Reduced to Sea Level	Temperature Air	Temperature Sea (Injection)	Temperature Wet Bulb	Weather and Remarks	Clouds Form	Clouds Movement From	Clouds Amount	Clouds Height	Sea Condition	Sea Swell Direction
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1	139.6	13	6	13	7	249	ENE	16	29:82		82	75	83	c	cu nb	SW	9	10	4	ENE
2	139.4	13	4	13	2	249	ENE	16	29:81		82	75	83	c	cu nb	SW	8	10	4	ENE
3	135.1	13	0	13	0	249	ENE	10	29:80		82	75	83	cu	cu nb	SW	9	10	4	ENE
4	139.2	13	8	13	4	249	SE	12	29:81		79	75	83	odr	cu nb			10	2	4 NE
5	142.0	14	0	13	3	249	ESE	14	29:81		78	75	82	odr	cu nb			10	5	4 NE
6	141.9	14	0	13	9	249	ESE	16	29:82		78	75	83	c	cu nb	SW	9	10	4	NE
7	144.5	14	2	14	0	249	NE	16	29:84		78	74	83	c	cu nb	SW	7	45	4	NE
8	145.0	15	0	14	7	249	ENE	19	29:83		80	76	83	c	cu nb	SW	7	45	4	NE
9	150.9	14	7	14	4	274	ENE	17	29:86		82	76	83	bc	a cu	SW	5	40	4	NNE
10	139.0	13	6	13	3	274	ESE	15	29:86		80	77	83	bc	a cu	SW	2	40	4	NE
11	139.0	13	6	13	2	274	ENE	13	29:84		82	76	83	bc	ci cu	SW	1	40	3	
12	139.1	13	6	13	5	274	ENE	14	29:82		82	76	83	bc	cu	ENE	3	45	1	NExE

BY OBSERVATION.

8 A.M.	Latitude	13° 44' 00" N.
	Longitude	145° 32' 30" E.
Noon	Latitude	13° 51' 30" N.
	Longitude	144° 32' 00" E.
-10	Latitude	14° 04' 00" N.
	Longitude	142° 35' 00" E.

Current: Set ____ Drift ____

Gyrocompass in Use — Error 0.9° W.

Standard Mag. Compass — Compass No. ____ S. H. ____ Error ____ Variation ____ Deviation ____

Fuel: Received None; Expended 28,471; On hand 328,476

Water: Distilled 28,570; Received None; Expended 28,103; On hand 128,298

Before Leaving Port — Draft for'd ____ Draft aft ____

After Entering Port — Draft for'd ____ Draft aft ____

Magazine Temperatures: Maximum 90° @ 8 P.M. Minimum 79° @ 5 A.M.

Normal.

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Drills	Morning	Afternoon
1	Steering and sounding	Launched 2 planes for sighting; Fast recovery. Condition Baker. General Quarters. Condition II.
2	ty drill.	
3	Condition II.	
4	Condition III.	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

13	144.0	14	1	13	9	274	ENE	14	29:79		82	73	83	bc	cu	ENE	4	45	1	NExE
14	145.0	14	2	13	4	274	ENE	12	29:78		82	76	83	bc	cu	ENE	4	45	1	NExE
15	150.1	14	7	14	1	274	ENE	17	29:78		82	76	83	bc	cu	ENE	4	45	1	NExE
16	158.7	15	0	14	5	274	ENE	13	29:78		82	75	83	bc	cu	ENE	2	45	1	NExE
17	165.8	16	0	15	3	274	ENE	13	29:80		82	78	83	bc	cu	ENE	2	30	4	NExE
18	135.4	12	0	12	4	274	NE	14	29:82		82	75	83	bc	cu	NE	2	30	4	NE
19	139.2	13	5	13	3	274	NE	18	29:83		82	75	83	bc	cu	NE	4	10	4	NE
20	136.6	13	5	13	3	274	ENE	16	29:85		82	77	83	bc	ci cu	NE	3	12	4	NE
21	139.0	13	6	13	2	274	ENE	19	29:85		81	77	83	bc	cu	ENE	2	7	4	NE
22	139.0	13	6	13	3	274	ENE	16	29:85		82	76	83	bc	cu	NE	2	10	2	NE
23	139.9	13	6	13	3	274	ENE	16	29:85		82	76	83	bc	cu	ENE	3	15	2	NE
24	139.3	13	9	13	0	274	NE	17	29:85		82	79	83	bc	cu	NE	2	16	2	NE

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUMMARIZED

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

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

Page 1066

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE (Name) CL47 (Identification Number)

SEC. PASSAGE Pearl Harbor, T.H. to (Date) Sunday 30 November 41.

ZONE DESCRIPTION -9 S. B. ROBINSON, Capt., U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Watch	Date (Ship's Civil Date) & Hour (Zone Time)	Dist. Last 24 Hours (Noon to Noon)	Engines Revs. Average	Engines Revs. Total	Course (P. C.) Gyro / Mag. (Standard Compass)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Reading at Hour	Barometer Tendency last 3 Hours	Temperature Dry Bulb	Temperature Wet Bulb	Temperature Sea	Weather, Sea Disturbance	Clouds Form	Clouds Amount	Clouds Character	Sea Direction	Sea Force
	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	17	18	19	20
A.M.																		
1	140.0	13	8	13	5	274	NE	17	29:84		81	77	83	hc	cu		3	12	1	NE
2	139.9	13	9	13	4	274	E	16	29:83		81	77	84	hc	cu		NE	3	12	1	NE
3	140.0	13	8	13	5	274	NE	14	29:82		81	77	84	hc	cu		NE	3	15	1	NE
4	139.1	13	6	13	9	274	ENE	13	29:81		81	77	83	hc	st cu		NE	2	8	2	NE
5	139.0	13	6	13	4	274	ENE	13	29:81		81	77	83	aq	cu nb		NE	7	8	2	NE
6	139.0	13	6	13	4	274	ENE	13	29:84		81	77	83	aq	cu nb		NE	7	18	2	ENE
7	139.1	13	6	13	3	274	ENE	12	29:85		81	77	83	a	cu nb		NE	6	35	2	ENE
8	139.0	13	6	13	5	274	ENE	12	29:87		81	77	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	35	2	ENE
9	138.9	13	6	13	3	274	ENE	11	29:87		81	77	83	hc	cu nb		NE	5	35	2	ENE
10	140.8	13	8	13	6	268	ENE	17	29:86		82	78	83	hc	cu		NE	5	45	2	ENE
11	140.4	13	7	13	8	268	ENE	16	29:86		82	78	83	a	cu		NE	7	45	2	ENE
12	139.9	13	7	13	1	268	ENE	15	29:83		82	77	83	a	cu nb		NE	6	45	3	ENE
P.M.																					
13	149.9	14	6	14	8	268	ENE	12	29:81		81	78	83	a	cu nb		NE	7	40	2	NE
14	149.8	14	6	14	8	268	ENE	12	29:81		81	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	5	45	2	NE
15	149.9	14	6	14	6	268	ENE	11	29:80		82	78	83	hc	cu		NE	5	45	2	NE
16	159.5	15	7	14	3	268	ENE	14	29:82		83	78	83	c	cu nb		NE	7	50	2	NE
17	148.8	14	0	13	0	268	ENE	15	29:82		84	78	84	c	cu nb		NE	8	55	2	NE
18	138.7	13	6	13	3	268	ENE	16	29:84		83	77	83	a	cu nb		NE	6	13	2	NE
19	139.1	13	6	13	3	268	ENE	18	29:84		82	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	10	2	NE
20	139.8	13	7	13	3	268	NE	18	29:87		82	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	11	1	NE
21	140.1	14	0	13	4	268	ENE	18	29:88		82	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	11	1	NE
22	140.0	14	0	13	5	268	NE	17	29:89		82	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	11	1	NE
23	139.0	14	9	13	8	268	NE	16	29:89		82	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	10	1	NE
24	139.0	13	6	13	8	269	NE	15	29.88		82	78	83	hc	cu nb		NE	4	15	1	NE

g/ Latitude 14° 04' 30" N.
g/ Longitude 139° 23' 00" E.

g/ Latitude 14° 11' 30" N.
g/ Longitude 138° 23' 00" E.

g/ Latitude 14° 12' 00" N.
g/ Longitude 136° 23' 30" E.

Current: Set
Drift

Chronometers in Use
Error 0.30 W.

Standard Mag. Compass
Compass No.
S. H
Error
Variation
Deviation

Fuel: Received None
Expended 25,690
On hand 352,886

Water: Distilled 30,570
Received None
Expended 23,810
On hand 132,052

Before Leaving Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

After Entering Port
Draft for'd
Draft aft

Magazine Temperature:
Maximum 90 @ 2 P.M.
Minimum 77 AS24M.

Normal.

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1	Condition III.	General Quarters
2	Steering casual-	Condition Baker.
3	ty drill.	Condition II.
4		Catapulted 2
5		planes for
6		scouting: Cast
7		recovery.
8		
9		

Submerged Run Data—Submarines

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

1065

Page

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Sunday 30 November 1941.
(Ship) (Date) (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION -9

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming on course 274°T and pgc, 268° psc, standard speed 15 knots, steaming at 13.8 knots, 139 rpm, acting as escort to a convoy consisting of S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, USA MTL.CMD FAIRWEATHER, JOHN LYKES, and AMERICAN LEADER. BOISE 2000 to 3000 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT, convoy guide. Boilers #5, #6, #7 and #8 in use. Ship darkened, in Material Condition Baker, Condition of Readiness II. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 139.7.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0549 Lighted ship, unset Condition Baker above third deck. 0607 Set Condition III. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 138.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0805 Held quarters for muster and physical drill; absentees, none. 0936 Changed course to 268°T and pgc, 264°psc, and 260° pstc, upon signal from the PRESIDENT GRANT. 1130 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 140.

A. C. FOX,
Ensign, C-V(G), U.S.N.R.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1200 Changed speed to 16 knots, 150 rpm. 1453 On various courses and speeds while catapulting two planes for scouting. 1502 Catapulted two planes, Lt(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., USN, in charge. 1508 Secured from flight quarters and returned to base course, 268°T and pgc, at 16 knots speed. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 152.2.

T. C. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1612 Steamed various courses at various speeds recovering two aircraft, Cast Method. 1630 Set Material Condition Baker. 1700 Went to General Quarters. 1704 Took station 2000 - 2500 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT and set course 268°T and pgc, 260°psc at 13.8 knots, 139 rpm. 1706 Secured from General Quarters, set Condition II. 1722 Darkened ship. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 140.9.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.4.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.5.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Approved:
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander,

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

N. Nav. 91. (Aug 1936)

LOG BOOK

MAR 10 1942

OF THE

U. S. S. BOISE

CL47 Rate,

COMMANDED BY

S. B. ROBINSON, Captain, U. S. Navy,

Attached to Cruiser Division Nine Division,
Commander Cruisers Battle Force Squadron,
United States Pacific Fleet Fleet,

Commencing December 1, 1941,

at Sea, Latitude: 14° 12' 00" North; Longitude: 136° 23' 30" East.,

and ending December 31, 1941,

at Sea, Latitude: 7° 24' 00" South; Longitude: 114° 42' 00" East.

1937

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)

N. Nav. 48
(Mar. 1938)

1067

Page

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Monday 1 December 1941.

ZONE DESCRIPTION -9

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming darkened on course 268°T, 262°psc, standard speed 15 knots, steaming at speed 13.8 knots; boilers #5, #6, #7, and 8 in use, acting as escort to convoy composed of PRESIDENT GRANT, DONA NATI, CAPE FAIRWEATHER, JOHN LYKES, and AMERICAN LEADER; PRESIDENT GRANT convoy guide. In Material Condition Baker, Condition of Readiness for Action II. Convoy Commander in PRESIDENT GRANT. Keeping station 2500 yards ahead of convoy. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

4 to 6.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

6 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0614 Unset Condition Baker above 3rd deck. 0700 Tested siren and whistle. Average steam 431.6. Average rpm. 138.

A. C. FOX,
Ensign, C-V(S), U.S.N.R.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0810 Quarters for muster and physical drill; no absentees. 1030 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 431.6. Average rpm. 139.3.

T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1202 Changed speed to 15 knots to take station 5 miles ahead of convoy. 1454 Changed course to 315°T. 1458 Catapulted two aircraft for scouting, Lt.(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., USN, in charge. Changed course to 268°T. Average steam 426.1. Average rpm. 149.8.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1615 Changed course to 275°T to take station 5 miles ahead of convoy. 1652 Recovered two aircraft, Lt.(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., USN, senior pilot. 1713 Set Material Condition Baker. 1716 Resumed base course 259°T, speed 13.8 knots, standard speed 15 knots, boilers #5, #6, #7, and #8 in use, in station 2500 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT, convoy guide. 1744 Darkened ship. 1745 Set Condition of Readiness II. Average steam 427.5. Average rpm. 148.9.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.7.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 138.2.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Approved: S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

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Page 10[illegible]

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.A.S. [illegible] Date 2 December 19 41.

16 to 18. (Continued).

PRESIDENT GRANT, IOWA (BB), CAPE FAIRWEATHER, JOHN LYKES, AMERICAN LEADER. 1731 Sighted Batog Light, Samar Island, P.I., bearing 230.6°T, distance 19 miles. Average steam 422.2. Average rpm. 130.8.

L. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Let fires die under boiler #7. 1835 Changed course to 240° T, speed 11 knots, forming 1000 yards astern of convoy column. 1842 Steadied 1000 yards astern of convoy column on course 259°T, speed 13.8 knots. 1951 Passed Batog Island light abeam to port, distant 13 miles. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 126.9.

C. C. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. Captain on the bridge. 2045 Batog Light on quarter, bearing 124°T, distant 16.5 miles. 2105 Changed speed to 2/3 standard speed, 10 knots. 2119 Changed speed to 13.6 knots. 2125 Sighted San Bernadino Light bearing 262°T, distant 21 miles. 2145 Cut in DeGaussing gear on course 259°T. 2145 Batog Light dipped, bearing 107°T. 2237 Changed course to 257°T. 2240 Changed course to 255°T. 2245 Changed course to 250°T. 2250 Sighted Casul Light bearing 216°T, distant 19 miles; changed course to 245°T. 2252 Changed course to 240°T. 2253 Changed speed to 10 knots. 2255 Changed course to 230°T. 2258 Changed course to 220°T. 2304 Changed course to 215°T. Set DeGaussing gear on course 212°T. 2315 Changed course to 220°T. 2320 Changed speed to 13.2 knots. 2325 Changed course to 230°T. 2333 Changed course to 212½°T. 2340 Changed course to 215°T. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 127.6.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

Approved: S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. N., Navigator.

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

UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible]

ZONE DESCRIPTION [illegible]

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming on course 259°T and pgc, 250°psc, at 15.8 knots, [illegible] Standard speed 15 knots, acting as escort to a convoy consisting of S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, GAPE FAIRWEATHER, DONA MATI, JOHN LYKES, AMERICAN LEADER. BOILER 2000 to 3000 yards ahead of PRESIDENT GRANT, convoy guide. Convoy in line of divisions. Boilers #7, #6, #7 and #8 in use. Ship darkened, in Material Condition Baker and Condition of Readiness II. Average steam 428.1. Average 137.6.

A. T. [illegible]
A. T. [illegible],
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

4 to 6.

Steaming as before. Average steam 426.3. Average rpm. 138.3.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

6 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0635 Lighted ship. Unset Material Condition Baker above the third deck. 0655 Secured from Condition of Readiness II and set Condition of Readiness III, Watch I. 0730 Changed course to 256°T and pgc, 247°psgc, 255°psc. Average steam 427.5. Average rpm. 138.0.

T. D. MORRIS,
T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0800 Held quarters for muster, absentees, none. 0900 Set clocks back one (1) hour to zone (-18 time. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. 0950 Changed speed to 16.7 knots. 1015 Changed course to 240°T. 1016 Changed speed to 21 knots. 1020 Catapulted 2 aircraft, Lt.(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., USN, in charge. 1021 Changed course to 256°T. Changed speed to 19 knots. 1055 Changed speed to 15 knots. 1110 Changed course to 270°T. 1120 Flight quarters, prepared to recover 2 aircraft, Cast Method. 1125 Various courses and speeds recovering aircraft. 1135 Aircraft 9-CH-6 capsized. All engines stopped. Aircraft capsized while clear of stern. 1140 All engines backing full. 1143 Lowered starboard motor whaleboat. 1144 to 1205 Various maneuvers and engine speeds to recover personnel and aircraft. 1200 Lying to. Average steam 433. Average rpm. 133.1.

A. C. FOX,
A. C. FOX,
Ensign, C-V(S), U.S.N.R.

12 to 16.

Lying to. 12 16 Recovered capsized aircraft. 1245 Steaming at full speed, 20 knots, to take position on convoy. 1324 Changed course to 259°T. 1435 Steaming at various courses and speeds. 1445 Catapulted two aircraft for scouting, Lt.(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., in charge. 1447 Changed speed to 15 knots, resumed base course 259°T. 1515 Shifted main engines to cruising combination. Average steam 425.3. Average rpm. 141.2.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1600 Changed speed to 14 knots, 140 rpm. 1604 Sighted Samar Island bearing 231°T, distance 40 miles. 1611 Changed speed to standard, 15 knots. 1615 Sighted smoke signal bearing 258°T, distance six miles. 1620 At 1430 this date ZOMBOLA, G.W., Sea2c, cut his leg on loose wire while sitting on box of potatoes, receiving laceration 3 inches in length on calf of right leg. Edges approximated with six sutures and patient placed on sick list by McAULIFFE, G.S., HAlc, USN. 1622 On various courses at various speeds recovering two aircraft, Dog Method. 1630 Set Material Condition Baker. Recovered two aircraft, Dog Method. 1635 On various courses at various speeds taking position with convoy. Lighted fires under boilers #1 and #2. 1700 Set Condition of Readiness II, Watch II. 1710 Darkened ship. 1717 Boilers #1 and #2 cut in on main steam line. 1730 GAPE FAIRWEATHER, JOHN LYKES, AMERICAN LEADER maneuvered to form column, order of vessels:

Approved: S. B. Robinson
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. Navy.

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N. Nav.-48 (Mar. 1937)

Page 1073

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Wednesday (Day) 3 (Date) December, 1941. (Month)

ZONE DESCRIPTION -8

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming darkened in Condition of Readiness for Action II, and Material Condition Baker; on various courses at 12 knots, 125 rpm, standard speed 15 knots, entering San Bernadino strait, P.I., with convoy consisting of S.S. AMERICAN LEADER, PRESIDENT GRANT, CAPE FAIRWEATHER, DONA NATI and JOHN LYKES. Acting as convoy escort. Boilers #1, #2, #5, #6, and #8 in use. 0015 Changed course to 214°T, changed speed to 14 knots. 0016 Sighted Calantos Island light bearing 235°T. 0045 Passed through tide rips. 0058 Passed Capul Island light abeam to port, distant 2.1 miles. 0106 Sighted darkened ship bearing 228°T, distant 6 miles. 0108 Changed course to 230°T. 0110 Changed course to 260°T. 0112 Changed course to 270°T. 0117 Passed Calantos Island light abeam to starboard distant 2.6 miles. 0129 Changed course to 301°T. 0200 Sighted Bogatao light bearing 327°T. 0215 Sighted Bulen light bearing 353.5° T. 0218 Sighted darkened sailboat bearing 326.7°T. 0242 Sighted San Miguel light bearing 291°T. 0252 Secured boilers #1 and #2. 0307 Sighted ship bearing 290°T. 0310 Lighted off boilers #1 and #2. 0310 Changed course to 301°T, increased speed to 20 knots. 0320 Changed speed to 15 knots, 151 rpm. 0325 Challenged strange ship on port beam. Ship's name: CORVILLE. 0325 Changed speed to 14 knots. 0330 Changed course to 270°T. 0342 Changed course to 250°T. Sighted Bugui Point light bearing 245.7°T. 0346 Changed course to 240°T. 0347 Passed San Miguel light abeam to port, distant 3 miles. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 143.2.

E. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0424 Changed course to 242°T. 0436 Changed course to 280°T. 0445 Cut out DeGaussing gear. 0510 Passed Bugui light abeam to port, distant 5 miles. 0536 Changed course to 293°T. 0537 Let fires die out under boilers #1 and #2. 0545 Secured Condition II; set Condition III. 0556 Unset Material Condition Baker above third deck. 0654 Changed course to 285°T. 0700 Changed standard speed to 12 knots, steaming at 10 knots, 84 rpm. 0716 Changed course to 290°T and pgc, 293°psc. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 139.

A. T. NATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before on course 290°T and pgc, 286°psc at 2/3 standard speed, 8.6 knots, standing up Sibuyan Sea. 0817 Netherlands S.S. TAMBU passed abeam to port on opposite course, distant 4 miles. 0830 Published Deck Court in the case of TESTI, Vernon L., #660-01-00, Sea2c, V-3, USNR, tried November 27, 1941; offense: sleeping upon his watch; sentence: to be confined for a period of fifteen (15) days, and to lose $9.00 per month of his pay for a period of 2 months, total loss of pay, $18.00. Approved by convening authority November 29, 1941. 0900 Published Deck Court in the case of MANLY, Philip F., #202-80-94, Sea2c, USN, tried November 27, 1941; offense: sleeping upon his watch; sentence: to be confined for a period of twenty (20) days, and to lose $12.00 per month of his pay for a period of 2 months, total loss of pay, $24.00. Approved by convening authority November 29, 1941. 1001 Changed course to 287°T. 1025 Changed course to 290°T. 1103 Tugbungan Point broad on port bow, distance 7.7 miles. 1141 Tugbungan Point abeam to port, distance 6.7 miles. Average steam 433.9. Average rpm. 86.7.

W. C. BUTLER, Jr.
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1305 Sighted Beltasar Island light bearing 311°T, distance 8 miles. 1340 Sighted Dumali Point light bearing 261°T, distance 16 miles. 1352 Beltasar Island light abeam to starboard, distance 3 miles. 1402 Changed course to 289°T and pgc. 1405 Changed course to 300°T and pgc. 1416 Changed course to 302°T and pgc, 305°psc. 1508 Dumali Point light abeam to port, distance 10 miles. Average steam 428. Average rpm. 79.7.

F. C. DIERMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

Approved:
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Navigator.

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ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. BOISE Date 3 December 1941.

16 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1600 Changed course to 208°T., 209°patsc, 203°psc. 1648 Sighted Malabrigo Point Light bearing 318°T. 1653 Changed course to 303°T., 298°patsc, 306° psc. 1655 Set Material Condition Baker. 1700 Set Condition of Readiness Two, Watch Two. 1750 Changed course to 301°T., 296°patsc, 304°psc. 1804 Sighted Salcorceo Light bearing 331°T. 1850 Changed course to 270°T., 263°patsc, 261°psc. 1902 Cut in boilers #1 and #2 on main steam line. 1909 Sighted Celeran light bearing 198°T., distant 5 miles. 1915 Changed course to 272°T., 265°patsc, 263°psc. 1920 Celeran Light abeam to port, distant 4½ miles. 1940 Sighted two darkened ships bearing 120°T., distant 6 miles. 1945 Sighted ship bearing 282°T. Average steam 428. Average rpm. 74.1.

J. K. BOAL,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before, on various courses. 2019 Sighted tug towing a barge bearing 231°T., distant 6 miles. 2100 Changed course to 315°T., increased speed to 9 knots. 2102 Passed Escorceo Point light abeam to port, distant 2.3 miles. 2125 Changed speed to 7 knots. 2141 Sighted ship bearing 300°T., distant 8 miles. 2200 Turned on navigation lights. 2207 Secured fires under boilers #1 and #2. 2211 Turned off running lights. 2212 Sighted Santiago Point light bearing 307.7°T. 2213 Passed steamer abeam to starboard, distant 1700 yards. 2223 Sighted submarine bearing 301° T. 2239 Turned on navigation lights. 2240 Turned off running lights. 2235 Challenged submarine on starboard bow. 2302 Submarine passed abeam to starboard, distant 1.5 miles. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 78.0.

G. E. MARCUS, Jr.,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Approved: S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward E. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N. R., Navigator.

N. Nav. 42
Oct. 1920

Page 107

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Thursday (Day) 4 (Date) December (Month) 19

ZONE DESCRIPTION -8

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming on course 300°T and pgc, 303°psc at 2/3 standard speed, 74 rpm, standard speed 12 knots, acting as escort to a convoy consisting of S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, DONA MATI, CAPE FAIRWEATHER, JOHN LYKES, AMERICAL LEADER. Boilers #5, #6, and #7 in use. Ship darkened, in Condition II, Material Condition Baker. 0030 With Santiago light abeam to starboard, distant 3.3 miles changed course to 316°T. 0050 Sighted Fortune Island light bearing 341°T, distant 19 miles. 0129 Sighted Corregidor Island light bearing 003°T, distant 34 miles. 0130 Changed course to 000°T, pgc and psc. 0214 Changed course to 338°T and pgc, 339.3°psc. 0320 Sighted Caballo light bearing 021°T, distant 21 miles. 0326 Passed Fortune Island light abeam to starboard 1.5 miles. 0339 Changed course to 000°T, pgc and psc. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 76.9.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0410 Changed speed to six knots. 0420 Changed speed to 5½ knots. 0428 Changed speed to 5 knots. 0512 Changed course to 040°T and pgc, 037° psc. 0518 Changed speed to 4 knots. 0522 On various courses and at various speeds off Corrigidor Island during entrance of the convoy into guarded channel. 0618 Secured from Condition of Readiness II; set Condition of Readiness III in the anti-aircraft battery. Set Modified Material Condition Baker. 0716 Changed course to 040°T. 0727 Lighted off boilers #1 and #2. 0730 Changed course to 043°T. On various courses at various speeds standing up toward Corregidor Island. 0736 Cut in boilers #1 and #2 on main steam line. 0755 Stopped. Awaiting pilot from TULSA. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 54.9.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before, approaching Manila Bay entrance channel. 0810 Pilot came aboard. Steaming at various courses and speeds passing through channel in mined entrance area. 0852 Completed passage through mined area. Changed course to 090° T and pgc. Changed speed to 10 knots. 0858 Changed course to 067°T and pgc. 0900 All engines stopped. 0925 Dropped pilot. 0927 Changed course to 072°T and pgc. Changed speed to 13 knots. 0935 Changed speed to 5 knots. 0940 Changed speed to 17 knots. Changed course to 063°T and pgc. 1001 San Nicholas light abeam to starboard, distance 3 miles. 1030 Steaming at various courses and speeds approaching anchorage. 1114 Anchored in berth A-2, Manila Harbor, P.I., in 28 feet of water with 45 fathoms of chain out to the starboard anchor. Boiler #2 in use for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: various units of Asiatic Fleet. Commander Yangtze Patrol, Senior Officer Present Afloat. 1123 Secured main engines. 1125 Secured degaussing cable. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 92.8.

F. G. DIERMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

12 to 16.

Anchored as before. 1339 PECOS stood in and anchored. 1440 RIMORIN, G., OC3c, left the ship on 4 days leave. 1600 BANGDONG, E., OS2c, left ship on 4 days leave. In accordance with orders of the commanding officer, the following named men left the ship on temporary duty as shore patrol in Manila, P.I.: LOCKHART, T.L., CFC; MAZUR, S.F., EM1c; GANGWISH, F.F., MM2c; ROSS, H.B., GM2c; LAKE, W.R., Cox.; GREEN, A.R., GM3c; KRTEK, R.B., GM3c.

J. J. POWELL,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

16 to 20.

Anchored as before. 1700 DeJESUS, R., OC1c, left the ship on 4 days leave. 1730 WHIPPORWILL stood in and anchored.

R. J. PROSEUS,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Anchored as before.

F. G. DIERMAN,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

Approved: S. B. Robinson
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander,

U.S.N., Navigator

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N. Nav. 42
(Mar. 1938)

Page 1073

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Friday (Day) 5 (Date) December (Month) 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION -8

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Anchored in berth A-2, in 5 fathoms of water in Manila, P.I., with 45 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor. Boiler #2 in use for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of the Asiatic Fleet. Commander Yangtze Patrol, Senior Officer Present Afloat. 0315 Following named men returned aboard from temporary duty as shore patrol in Manila, P.I.: LOCKHART, T.L., CFC; MAZUR, S.F., EM1c; GANGWISH, E.F., MM2c; ROSS, H.B., GM2c, LAKE, W.R., Cox; KRTLN, R.B., GM3c.

D. D. Howell
D. D. HOWELL,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Anchored as before. 0630 GREEN, A.R., GM3c, returned aboard from temporary duty with Manila shore patrol. 0720 The following named men left the ship on four days leave: REMO, Fidel, OS3c, and MAGGAY, Claro, OS1c. 0755 The following men returned aboard absent over leave since 0700, this date, and were made prisoners at large by order of the commanding officer: POSEY, R.B., SK3c; HOUCK, T.E., MM2c; EAGLE, R.S., FC3c.

R. J. Proseus
R. J. PROSEUS,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Anchored as before. 0800 Mustered crew on stations. Absentee: GARWOOD, J.A., MM1c, absent over leave since 0700, this date. 0830 GARWOOD, J.A., MM1c, returned aboard, having been absent over leave since 0700, this date. Made a prisoner at large by order of the commanding officer. 0832 TRINITY underway. 1000 Pursuant to orders of commanding officer, this date, KINSEY, C.C., CBM, #262-19-91, USN, was transferred to 16th Naval District for assignment to duty. Records and accounts accompanied man. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal.

F. E. Wheeler
F. E. Wheeler, Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

12 to 16.

Anchored as before. 1330 In accordance with orders of the commanding officer, dated December 5, 1941, the following named men left the ship for further transfer to Asiatic station: THOMPSON, G.S., #316-34-52, EM2c; KINCAID, C.E., #346-15-13, CEM. Records and accounts accompanied men. 1330 In accordance with orders of commanding officer, the following named men were transferred to the HOLLAND for assignment by Commander Submarine Asiatic Fleet: WEBSTER, S.C., #300-04-22, EM3c, in charge; MCNEECE, L.A., #337-35-66, SF3c; WILKES, R.A., #262-56-91, GM3c; CHAPMAN, L.F., #382-20-90, S3c; GISHIN, E.H., #342-26-73, F2c; KIRSHMAN, G., #382-48-61, F2c, REITER, W.L., #376-33-43, F3c. Records and accounts accompanied men. 1330 in accordance with orders of the commanding officer, the following named men were transferred to the LANGLEY for further transfer to Commander Patrol Wing 10: TAYLOR, L., #342-19-95, SK3c; CORNISH, R.J., #337-22-75, Sea1c; HOLDER, R., #295-64-72, Sea1c; EVANS, N.E., #337-36-96, Sea1c; HANSEN, D.P., #410-62-20, Sea2c; BARNES, D.L., #223-90-44, F2c; ALLEN, K., #212-60-79, F2c. 1330 Hoisted out two aircraft, Lt.(jg) G.E. MARCUS, Jr., U.S.N., in charge. 1355 Sent divers over starboard side, aft; Chief Carpenter H.C. THOMAS, in charge. 1456 HOMER stood in. 1500 Completed diving operatings, having cleaned and inspected starboard propellers. 1515 Hoisted in aircraft. 1542 SCULPIN stood in. 1542 SAURY and SARGO stood in. 1555 WHIPPORWILL stood in.

D. S. Edwards
D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

16 to 20.

Anchored as before. 1800 Shore patrol left the ship. 1830 MARTENS, W.J.H., #316-12-00, CM1c, USN reported for transportation to and transfer to a U.S. Naval Hospital in the United States.

G. E. Marcus Jr.
G. E. MARCUS, Jr.,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Anchored as before. 2130 JARRATT, J.A., Sea2c, was returned aboard under arrest

Approved: S. B. Robinson
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

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N. Nav. 46 Page 1031

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. BOISE Date 5 December 1941.

20 to 24. (Continued).

by shore patrol, report to follow.

L. A. Collins Jr.
L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

Approved: S B Robinson.
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

Navy Dept. 42 (Mar. 1939)

Page 11.

UNITED STATES SHIP BOISE Saturday 6 December 1941.

ZONE DESCRIPTION -8

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Anchored in berth A-2, Manila Bay, Manila, P.I., in 38 feet of water with 45fathoms of chain out to starboard anchor. Boiler #2 in use for auxiliary purposes. Senior Officer Present Afloat, Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet, in U.S.S. HOLLAND. Ships present: Asiatic Fleet less detached units. 0130 MADDAY, C., #497-80-50, OSlc, returned to ship, on recall. BUTRELL, J.F., (U.S.S. SEARFISH), treated for cuts on ring and forefinger; cause, unknown. Wound on forefinger approximated with two sutures. Dressing applied. Treated by WARNER, R.E., PhM3c. 0800 ELLARD, Ray., Pvt., USMC, treated for lacerated index finger; cut finger with knife while making for liberty boat. Dressing applied; treated by WARNER, R.E., PhM3c. 0345 In accordance with commanding officer's orders, dated December 5, 1941, the following men returned from temporary shore patrol duty in Manila, P.I.: BURNS, A.L., CWT, USNR; DUNKEL, A.D., GMlc, USN; COX, F., GMSc, USN, RANOVIC, A.N., Cox., USN; O'DONNELL, W.C., Cox., USN; and SOMEN, W.T., EM3c, USN.

O.H. Adams

O. H. ADAMS,
Lieutenant (jg), D-V(G), U.S.N.R.

4 to 8.

Anchored as before. 0500 Lighted off boilers #1, #3, and #6. 0550 Made preparations for getting underway. 0550 Cut in boilers #1, #2, #5, and #6. 0600 BRANTON, F., GMSc, USN returned from shore patrol duty in Manila, P.I. 0615 Stationed special sea detail. 0620 Tested main engines. 0630 Commenced heaving short. 0637 Underway on various courses at various speeds to go alongside PECOS. 0717 Moored port side to alongside PECOS. 0740 Commenced fueling ship. DeJESUS, R., OClc, returned from 2 days leave. TURNER, N.R., MMlc, returned under report and was confined to the brig. 0745 Secured boilers #5 and #6.

P. H. Edwards, Jr.

P. H. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Moored as before, portside to U.S.S. PECOS. Absentee at quarters for muster: RANDONG, E., OSSc, recalled from leave, but not returned. 0820 REYO, Fidel, OSSc, returned aboard from two days leave on time. 0930 Provisioning lighter #29A came alongside to starboard. 0937 RIVOVIN, G., OSSc, returned aboard from two days leave on time. 0940 Provisioning lighter YF#30 shoved off from alongside. 0944 Captain left the ship. 0950 CEBU and LEYTE, Phillipine troop ships stood in. 1000 TAZ, Phillipine steamer, stood in. 1003 U.S.S. POPE stood out. 1030 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. 1045 Received the following from San Miguel Brewery: 30 gallons ice cream for general mess; inspected as to quality by Lt.(jg) J.A. O'DONNELL, (MC), USNR, and as to quantity by Ensign W.R. GRIFFIN, SC-V(S), USNR. 1050 Provision lighter left ship. 1055 Lighted fires under #5 and #6 boilers for boosting purposes. 1102 Captain returned aboard. 1115 stationed special sea detail. 1116 Closed all watertight doors. 1120 Cut in #5 and #6 boilers on main steam line. 1120 Tested main engines. 1131 Lighted fires under #8 boiler. 1133 Let go all lines, having received 351, 666 gallons of fuel oil at 60°F. 1145 Set course 278°T. 1146 Changed course to 250°T, 230°psc, 240 pstgc. 1153 Cut in #8 boiler on main steam line. 1155 Changed course to 255°T. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 183.3.

G. E. Marcus, Jr.

G. E. MARCUS, JR.,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1205 Set Modified Material Condition Baker. 1206 Changed course to 250°T. 1212 Changed course to 252°T. 1236 Rigs San Nicholas Shoal Light abeam to port, distant 2.75 miles, changed course to 247°T. 1254 Changed course to 245°T. 1255 Changed course to 249°T. 1255 Sighted Corrigidor Island Lighthouse bearing 233°T. 1258 Changed speed to 2/3 standard speed. 1345 By order of the commanding officer, WERNER, N.R., MMlc, was released from confinement. 1259 Changed course to 249°T. 1323 Changed course to 270°T. 1332 Changed course to 240°T. 1343 Changed speed to standard speed 15 knots, 150 rpm. Changed course to 181°T. 1355 Changed course to 185°T. 1356 With Caballo Lighthouse bearing 076.5°T, distant 4.6 miles, El Fraile Lighthouse bearing 330°T, distant 8 miles, La Monja Lighthouse bearing 340°T, distant 2 miles, took departure for Cebu, P.I. 1358 Changed course to

Approved:

S. B. Robinson

S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:

Edward S. Pearce

Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Navigator.

Page 1089

ADDITIONAL SHEET

U. S. S. BOISE Date 6 December 19 41.

12 to 16. (Continued).

220°T and pgc and increased speed to full speed, 20 knots, 220 rpm. 1359 Cut in DeGaussing gear. 1400 Set Condition III in the anti-aircraft battery. 1408 Changed course to 180°T and pgc. 1423 Changed course to 174°T and pgc, 173°psc. 1434 Lighted fires under boilers #1 and #2. 1437 Cut boilers #1 and #2 in on main steam line. 1449 Passed Fortune Island Lighthouse abeam to sthd, distant 1.6 miles. 1505 Sighted Santiago Lighthouse bearing 147°T. 1522 Changed course to 140°T and pgc, 141°psc. 1535 Changed course to 145°T. 1536 Changed course to 157°T. 1543 Changed course to 124°T and pgc. Average steam 428.7. Average rpm. 177.7.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1631 Changed course to 110°T. 1635 Secured DeGaussing gear. 1636 Changed course to 090°T. 1640 Sighted Malbrigo Light bearing 090°T. 1644 Sighted Escorceo Light bearing 136°T. 1655 Set Meterial Condition Baker. 1715 Changed course to 133°T. 1717 Changed speed to 15 knots. 1720 Changed speed to 20 knots. 1726 Darkened ship. 1755 Turned on dim masthead and side lights. Average steam 425. Average rpm. 208.9.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Set Condition of Readiness for Action II. Slowed to 2/3 standard speed, 10 knots. 105 rpm. 1805 Changed course to 128°T and pgc. 1807 Secured boilers #1 and #2. 1820 Sighted Dumali Light bearing 140.5°T. 1824 Sighted Tres Reyes Island Light bearing 104°T. 1840 Changed course to 131°T and pgc. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 104.5.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. 2020 Changed course to 174°T, pgc and pgs. 2040 Passed Dumali Light abeam to starboard, distant 3.0 miles. Average steam 432.8. Average rpm. 104.7.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U. S. Navy.

Approved: S. B. Robinson.
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined: Edward S. Pearce
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets)

N. Nav. 48
(Mar. 1926)

Page 10

UNITED STATES SHIP [illegible] Sunday 7 (DAY) December (MONTH) 19 41

ZONE DESCRIPTION + 8

REMARKS

0 to 4.

Steaming independently, darkened, under boilers #5, #6 and #8, headed south from Manila, P.I. at 2/3 standered speed 10 knots, 105 rpm, on course 174°T and 175°pgc. In Material Condition Baker and Condition of Readiness for Action II. 0305 Sighted Manigium Light bearing 179°T. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 104.9.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

4 to 8.

Steaming as before. 0400 Changed course to 166°T and pgc, 169°pstgc, 167°psc. 0513 Passed Manigium Light abeam, distant 1.6 miles. 0516 Changed course to 135°T, 142°pstgc, 137°psc. 0540 Changed course to 164°T, 167°pstgc, 165°psc. 0600 Set Condition of Readiness Three. Unset Material Condition Baker above the third deck. 0605 Shifted steering control to after steering station. 0610 Shifted steering control to the bridge. 0630 Sighted ship bearing 172°T, distance 11 miles. 0643 Changed course to 174°T and pgc, 175°pstgc, 175°psc. 0655 Changed course to 164°T and pgc, 167°pstgc, 165°psc. 0704 Changed course to 174°T and pgc, 175°pstgc, 175°psc. Average steam 435. Average rpm. 104.9.

J. F. BOAL,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

8 to 12.

Steaming as before. 0915 Mustered crew at quarters; absentee: FANDOWI, E., OS2c, recalled from leave but failed to return. 1012 Tubigan Point Light sighted bearing 139°T. 1027 Changed course to 180°T and pgc, 179°psc, 180°pstgc. 1044 Passed Tubigan Point Light abeam, distant 5.1 miles. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples. Conditions normal. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 104.9.

T. D. MORRIS,
Ensign, D-V(P), U.S.N.R.

12 to 16.

Steaming as before. 1200 Sighted Nogas Point Light bearing 150°T. 1230 Changed course to 148°T and pgc, 150°psc and 152°pstgc. 1253 Nogas Point Light abeam, distance 2 3/4 miles; sounding 280 fathoms. Average steam 430.5. Average rpm. 105.0.

L. A. COLLINS, Jr.,
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

16 to 18.

Steaming as before. 1617 Changed course to 100°T, 099°psc. 1647 Changed course to 132°T, 134°psc. Changed speed to 7.5 knots. 1659 Set Material Condition Baker. 1729 Darkened ship, dimmed running lights. 1748 Changed course to 162°T, 165° pstgc. Average steam 440. Average rpm. 80.9.

A. C. FOX,
Ensign, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.

18 to 20.

Steaming as before. 1800 Set Condition II. Average steam 430. Average rpm. 60.

A. T. HATHAWAY,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S. Navy.

20 to 24.

Steaming as before. 2033 Turned off navigation lights. Average steam 432.5. Average rpm. 60.

D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

Approved:
S. B. ROBINSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N. Navigator.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)

LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U. S. S. BOISE (CL47), commanded by S. B. ROBINSON, Captain, U. S. N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date of reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death, from 1 December, 1941, to 31 December, 1941.

NAME.	RANK.	DATE OF REPORTING FOR DUTY.	DETACHED. Date.	DUTIES.
S. B. ROBINSON	Captain, USN	8/28/40		Commanding Officer.
L. J. MORAN	Commander, USN	6/3/40		Executive Officer.
E. S. PEARCE	Lieut.Comdr. USN	3/4/40		Navigator.
F. V. HELL	Lieut.Comdr. USN	3/6/41		D.C. Officer. First Lieutenant.
J. R. CLARK	Lieut.Comdr. USN	10/3/40		Engineer Officer.
J. J. LAFFAN	Lieut.Comdr. USN	1/2/41		Gunnery Officer.
W. S. RODMON	Lieut. USN	8/12/38		Asst.F.C. Officer.
W. C. BUTLER, Jr.,	Lieut. USN	9/21/39		W & D.
R. K. SMITH	Lieut. USN	9/23/39		Asst.Eng. Officer.
D. S. EDWARDS, Jr.	Lieut. USN	12/19/40		W & D.
J. M. LEE	Lieut. USN	8/12/38		Comm. Officer. Ship's Secretary.
A. T. HATHAWAY	Lieut.(jg) USN	5/18/40		W & D.
G. E. MARCUS, Jr.	Lieut.(jg) USN	6/22/40		Sen.Avia. W & D.
J. K. BOAL	Lieut.(jg) USN	9/26/41		W & JD.
D. H. ADAMS	Lieut.(jg) USNR D-V(G)	10/30/40		W & D.
F. B. DIEHMAN	Lieut.(jg) USN	8/12/38		W & D. Asst.D.C.Officer.
A. G. FOX	Ens.D-V(S), USNR	9/19/41		JW & JD.
*W. E. KUNTZ	Ensign, USN	6/24/39		Eng. W & D.
H. S. MOREDOCK	Ensign, USN	6/24/39		Eng.Inst.
F. N. RUSSELL	Ensign, USN	6/24/39		W & D. Rdo.Officer.
F. R. WOLLENBERG	Ens.A-V(N), USNR	7/14/40		JW & JD.
T. D. MORRIS	Ens.D-V(P), USNR	11/20/40		W & D.
S. A. FORTER	Ensign, USN	6/11/40		W & D.
*G. K. DETERDING, Jr.	Ensign, USN	6/11/40		Eng.W & D.
I. G. PETERS	Ensign, USN	7/2/40		W & JD.
J. D. HOWELL	Ensign, USN	6/10/40		W & JD.
R. J. PROSEUS	Ensign, USN	6/11/40		W & D.
J. L. STARNES, Jr.	Ens.D-V(G), USNR	12/7/40		Asst. Navigator. JW & JD.
J. A. STEINMETZ	Ens.D-V(G), USNR	12/7/40		Sig. JW & JD.
W. G. THATCHER	Ens.D-V(G), USNR	12/7/40		JW & JD.
W. G. THOMAS, Jr.	Ens.D-V(G), USNR	12/7/40		JW & JD.

Examined and found to be correct.

Edward S. Pearce,
Lieutenant Commander, USN, Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 68 consists of a map reflecting the Disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 Dec. 1941 together with typewritten table reflecting the position of the U. S. S. Boise at the times indicated. These items will be found reproduced as Item No. 25 in EXHIBITS - ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

VESSEL	OCTOBER 1941					NOVEMBER 1941					DECEMBER 1941				
	1	5	12	19	26	1	5	12	19	26	1	5	12	19	26
MARYLAND (BB)				(19 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 31)											
TENNESSEE (BB)										(29	A.M.I.-D.C.P. 12)				
PENNSYLVANIA (BB)								(11 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 21)							
SARATOGA (CV)								(11 M.I.-B.I.S. 14)							(21 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 30)
OKLAHOMA (BB)													(6 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 17)		
HONOLULU (CL)						(1	.M.I. Inspection by ComCruBatFor			30)					
ST. LOUIS (CL)						(1	.M.I. Inspection by ComCruBatFor			30)					
HELENA (CL)											(1	.M.I. Inspection by ComCruBatFor			31)
PHOENIX (CL)											(1	.M.I. Inspection by ComCruBatFor			31)
NORTHAMPTON (CA)									(18 M.I.					17)	
CHESTER (CA)		M.I.			20)								(11 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 12)		
PENSACOLA (CA)		M.I.			20)										
				(14 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 15)											
LOUISVILLE (CA)								(12 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 13)							
INDIANAPOLIS (CA)				(16 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 17)											
MINNEAPOLIS (CA)															(18 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 19)
ASTORIA (CA)								(13 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 14)							
SAN FRANCISCO (CA)	1	.M.I.	12)												
HOPKINS (DMS)			(11	.M.I.	12)										
PERRY (DMS)										(26	.M.I.	4)			
TREVER (DMS)										(26	.M.I.	4)			
WASMUTH (DMS)										(26	.M.I.	4)			
ZANE (DMS)										(26	.M.I.	4)			
SOUTHARD (DMS)			(11	.M.I.	22)										
LONG (DMS)			(11	.M.I.	22)										
CHANDLER (DMS)			(11	.M.I.	22)										
HOVEY (DMS)			(11	.M.I.	22)										
LAMBERTON (DMS)						(2	.M.I.	16)							
BOGGS (DMS)						(2	.M.I.	16)							
HULBERT				(16 A.M.I.	26)										
CURTIS				(16 A.M.I.	26)										
McFARLAND															
SWAN		(6	A.M.I.	16)										(17 A.M.I.	31)
TANGIER		Schedule to be submitted upon reporting													
TEAL												(5 A.M.I. 8)			

KEY TO SYMBOLS:

A.M.I. - Annual Military Inspection
D.C.P. - Damage Control Practice
B.I.S. - Board of Inspection Survey
M.I. - Material Inspection

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT NO. 70

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Fe

August 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a draft telegram to the Embassy at London containing a proposed message from you to the British Prime Minister. If you approve of the draft I will arrange to have the message transmitted.

C H

NK

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Charge to

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

Department of State

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. SC

Washington,

August 18, 1941

8P

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (ENGLAND).

3208

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR CHURCHILL.

QUOTE With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far East, upon my return to Washington I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had on August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resumption of the informal conversations which the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest which had led to the cessation of those conversations.

On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the

711.94/2182A FS/WHA

Confidential File

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Sent by operator _____ M. _____ 19__ _____

13



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Department of State

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PARTAIR
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of State in regard to the resumption of conversations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Government has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to readjust its position and embark upon a peaceful program this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and that before undertaking the resumption of those conversations we felt that it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and plans.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had told him to his Government. [redacted]

Roosevelt UNQUOTE

Hull

FE:UWH:FEE FE

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Sent by telegraph ... 19

EXHIBIT NO. 71

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Department of State

Gray

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X NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE X
PARTAIR
"Gray" PLAIN

Washington,

August 25, 1941

8 pm

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA) AND NAVAL RADIO.

535

~~Having in mind the restrictions which govern the Japanese press there is repeated here~~ There follows for your information extract from the Associated Press text from London of Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of August 24: ~~as recorded by the New York Times:~~

QUOTE But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as it if were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it SUBQUOTE the Chinese incident. END SUBQUOTE Now, they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort

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-2- *Washington,*

will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States. UNQUOTE

Hull

740.0011 EW 1939/14364A.

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PA/H

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2

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Department of State

Washington, SC
August 1, 1941.

Noon
Priority

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

[redacted] Confidential to the Ambassador.

Reference my 451, August 1, 1941
1923 94

One. After the Japanese Ambassador had delivered his Government's message in regard to the bombing incident at Chungking and I had expressed appreciation, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that we have heard from authoritative sources that the Japanese are bringing or are about to bring pressure on the Government of Thailand similar to that which they have recently exerted against the French Government and the Indochina authorities; that we, of course, regard such reports with very serious apprehension; and that, speaking under instructions from the President, I wished to state that the proposal which the President made recently in relation to Japan's contemplated procedure in and regarding Indochina would also extend to and cover any such contemplated procedure in and regarding Thailand. I requested that the Ambassador immediately inform his Government of this. The Ambassador replied that he would do so.

Two.

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19__

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740.0011 P.W./3724

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

August 1, 1941.

-2-

Two. The President and I desire that you at the earliest possible moment inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the above.

Acting

PA/H:SKR:EGT

FE

AUG 1 1941

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

1—3462 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Tokyo

Dated August 2, 1941

Rec'd 7:47 a.m.

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

SECRETARY OF STATE
AUG 5 - 1941
NOTED

RUSH.

1153, August 2, 3 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Department's 452, August 1, noon.

One. In the absence from the Foreign Office today of the Foreign Minister, who is leaving tonight to worship at the Ise Shrines, Counselor called this afternoon on the Acting Vice Minister and communicated to him the substance of the first paragraph of the Department's telegram under reference, at the same time conveying my request that the information be transmitted promptly to the Minister. Mr. Yamamoto replied that a report along precisely similar lines had already been received from Ambassador Nomura, but that he would immediately inform the Minister of the information received through us.

Confidential File

FILED
AUG 12 1941

TRB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

FROM Tokyo

Dated August 2, 1941

Rec'd 7:48 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1153, August 2, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Two. In reply to my request for an interview with the Foreign Minister on Monday afternoon after his return from Ise, Mr. Yamamoto said that he would of course arrange for the interview if I desired to communicate further views or information with regard to the American Government's proposition, but that if the purpose of the interview were to receive some indication of the Japanese Government's considered views with regard to the proposition he believed that the interview might be usefully deferred for a few days. He said that the proposition was being carefully studied by the Japanese Government with every desire to find a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of the preceding sentence had already been sent to Ambassador Nomura.

GREW

HPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

Radio Bulletin No. 186 August 6, 1941.

NOTE: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference. Questioned again today whether any credence could be placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had said yesterday morning.

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper's mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that he had heard a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff-Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent people who come to this country.

A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related to the Pacific area.

Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.

Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have especial application to Thailand and the present situation.

A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also made some demands upon the Ecuadorans, and he asked whether we were going to do anything about that. The Secretary said that we had nothing on that subject except what appeared in the newspapers. He added that he had not heard from Ecuador nor from our representatives.

A correspondent asked whether there had been some indications that Thailand had been offered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a part. The Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that area lately and said that we were observing all of these as closely as possible.

A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Netherlands Indies paper that there was no question that the United States was behind the Netherlands Indies but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indications of a weakening of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary said that he had nothing new on that subject.

To

To a question of whether the United States had had any change in relations with Finland, the Secretary said that there had been nothing especially new on that recently.

Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that he had not yet heard from him.

A correspondent asked whether there was any development on the question of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there was nothing especially new. He said that we had not had any communications yet from any of the persons who were refugees if we might call them that or from our consuls. He added that at the same time we are giving every attention to the whole problem.

A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group, including several Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last night to Congress (see below) to put a stop to the step-by-step projection of the United States toward an undeclared war and he asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull said that he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-Lease Bill in which he sought to state the issues confronting us in the international situation.

Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a translation of a letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from the Minister of Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Señora de Morínigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Señora de Morínigo and their son. The letter said that the general health of the child has improved notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21).

Chile. Señorita Magdalena Petit, distinguished authoress and musician from Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11 on an invitation extended by the Department of State to visit the United States.

Max W. Thornburg. The Department has announced the appointment of Max W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act as consultant to the State Department on international petroleum matters. Mr. Thornburg has been assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

CONGRESS

Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property Requisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as passed by the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out the differences. (See Radio Bulletin No. 173 of July 22)

Highway Defense Program. The Senate today over-rode by 57 to 19 the President's veto of the $320,000,000 highway defense bill.

The measure will now go to the House for consideration (See Radio Bulletin No. 185 of July 5).

DEFENSE

Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six additional section bases for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key West, Fla.; Mobile, Ala.; Corpus Christi, Tex.; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; Monterey, Calif., and Neah Bay, Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department said that additional section bases would also be established in Alaska.

Airplane Deliveries. The OPM reported that its Director General Knudsen, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to inspect East Coast Airplane factories with a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy and the British.

Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Adminstrator Jones announced that the Defense Plant Corp., at the request of the Navy Department, had authorized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C. to construct and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing $3,100,000, to be used for naval equipment production.

The Defense Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agreement with Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Niagara Falls Airport

* * * * * * *

EXHIBIT NO. 73

DRAFT TELEGRAM

October 16, 1941.
(Draft no. 2)

His Imperial Majesty

Hirohito,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a narrower concept than I had anticipated. The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which

would be clear manifestations of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that there be a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that such a meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE:MMH:HES

tentative draft which was discarded upon receipt of a draft from the White House.

DRAFT TELEGRAM

October 16, 1941.

His Imperial Majesty

Hirohito,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed through news reports that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation to you. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a more narrow concept than I had anticipated (than that conveyed by the Premier's message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2

suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concept and endeavor through re-examination of that concept to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifestations(of the lofty concepts) of our original concepts and thus might be expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest that Your Imperial Majesty signify approval of a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek, the Premier of China, in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE:MMH:HES

78

October 16, 1941

DRAFT OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN -- SUPERSEDED BY A LATER DRAFT DATED OCTOBER 17, 1941.

THIS DRAFT WAS NOT USED.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State
SECRETARY OF STATE
NOTED

October 16, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed action. Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not at this time be sent.

A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel that we should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese operations in China.

FA/H:SKH:BGT

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering

considering armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned.

EXHIBIT NO. 74

TELEGRAM SENT

AC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

October 6, 1940
2 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA)

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA)
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA)
AMERICAN CONSUL, HONG KONG

381.

The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in widespread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultural, and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely affected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Department to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude toward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with reference to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indochina quietly repeat quietly inform American citizens in their respective districts of the substance of the

preceding

preceding sentence and suggest withdrawals insofar as is practicable from the areas in question to the United States. This applies especially in regard to women and children and to men whose continued presence in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indochina is not repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed. There should be pointed out to American citizens the advisability of their taking advantage of transportation facilities while such facilities are available, as it goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such facilities will remain available indefinitely.

In order that this instruction be not repeat not misconstrued in any quarter, it is desired that effort be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that endeavor be made to preclude the reading into it of sensational implications.

The Department would appreciate receiving from you and from Peiping, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other interested offices an estimate of the number of Americans who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo should instruct consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping should instruct those in China.

The Department will expect shortly to issue further instructions embodying various administrative considerations.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Saigon.

FE:GA:HES FE PA/H S HULL

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1941 FEB 11 PM 5 56

Washington, February 11, 1941 7 p. m.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

100

URGENT.

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. Br

390.1115A/4300

Department's 381, October 6, 2 p.m., withdrawal of American citizens.

It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct American consulates in Japanese territory to renew, immediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any sensational publicity, to American citizens, especially women and children and men whose continued presence in Japan is not highly essential, this Government's suggestions that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should explain to American inquirers that this Government is making no repeat no assumption that a situation of acute physical danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this Government, in the light of obvious trends in the Far Eastern situation, desires to reduce the risks to which American nationals and their interests are exposed by virtue of uncertainties and, through the process of withdrawal of unessential personnel, to improve its position in relation to problems which may at any time be presented

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Washington,

of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons who are not in position to withdraw, those interests which cannot be abandoned, and those principles and those rights to which it is the duty of the American Government to give all appropriate support at all times. This instruction and the advice to be given under it is not repeat not meant to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary precautionary measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary hardships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those whom you address shall realize that there are real risks, that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this advice is being given in the interest both of the safety and convenience of the American nationals addressed and in the interest of national security.

The Department is sending similar instructions to Peiping, Hong Kong, and Indochina.

The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such transportation facilities as may be currently available.

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Department of State NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

November 19, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA).

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).
AMERICAN CONSUL, HONG KONG.

765

Reference Department's 100, February 11, 7 p.m. and previous telegrams in regard to withdrawal of American citizens.

The Department desires that the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hong Kong. Tokyo please repeat to all consular

390.1115A/537A

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Sent by operator ..... *M.*, ..., *19*....

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offices in the Japanese Empire and to Dairen. Peiping please repeat to all consular offices in Japanese-occupied areas of China, and in Manchuria. Hong Kong please repeat to Saigon and Hanoi.

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Sent by operator ..... *M.*, ..., *19*.....

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EXHIBIT NO. 74A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 4, 1941

PA/H--~~Mr.~~-Hornbeek: No objection. Do not clearly perceive a need. SKH

~~Le---Mr.~~-Haekworth: No objection. GWH

SD Mr. Green: It would appear highly desirable to take such a step immediately. J.C.G.

A-L Mr. Long: I agree. L.

U Mr. Welles: I agree. SW(?)

S Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called on an officer of this Division this afternoon and stated that the British Ambassador in Tokyo had raised the question whether endeavor should not be made to effect an arrangement with the Japanese Government under which, in the event of British-Japanese hostilities, British and Japanese officials and nationals in the territory of the other would be withdrawn or exchanged. Mr. Hayter did not know whether the British Ambassador in Tokyo had in mind an arrangement designed also to be effective as regards Manchuria and Japanese-occupied areas of China. Mr. Hayter stated that the British Foreign Office, before acting in the matter, desired that the British Embassy discuss it with the Department with a view to learning our views.

Although it is possible that the Japanese Government would not be willing to enter into such an arrangement, especially with regard to Manchuria and occupied areas of China, it is believed that, for the sake of the personal safety

safety of American officials and other American nationals, it would be advisable for this Government as well as the British to attempt to make such arrangement. Such attempt might, at this time, be advisable also in that it would be definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firmness of the American position in the present crisis and would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government the seriousness with which we view the present situation.

It is our opinion that, if endeavor is made to effect such an arrangement, earnest effort should be made to have included within its scope both the occupied areas in China and Manchuria. It seems to us that there is a fair possibility that American officials and other nationals in Japan would, in case of hostilities between Japan and this country, would receive reasonably correct treatment (although such treatment in the case of nationals placed in concentration camps would naturally, because of the lower standard of living in Japan, involve much more physical discomfort than would be the case in this country). On the other hand it is likely that our officials in Manchuria, who have no official status vis-á-vis the "Manchukuo" regime, and our nationals there as well as our officials and nationals in occupied areas of China, might receive extremely harsh treatment especially as the Japanese military authorities in control of those areas are to be classed

in

in general among the extremists and are in general anti-American.

The proposed agreement would seem necessarily to envisage assent on the part of this Government to the withdrawal from United States territory of a number of Japanese subjects many times as great as the number of American nationals in territory controlled or occupied by Japan.

The officer of this Division on whom Mr. Hayter called informed Mr. Hayter that the matter would be brought to the attention of the high officers of the Department and that the British Embassy would be informed as soon as it was possible to reach a conclusion. It is suggested that, if it is decided that endeavor will be made to effect the suggested arrangement, the American approach to the Japanese Government be made independently of the British. M.M.H.

As the making of such an approach would be interpreted by the American public as a definite indication that this Government ~~is~~/expects war between Japan and the United States, the Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the advisability of this Government's making such an approach at this time. M.M.H.

FE:Atcheson:ALM/MJF

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Washington,

November 26, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

783

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE COUNSELOR ONLY.

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents-- an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram.

711.94/2479A

PS/WHA

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Washington,

November 26, 1941

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

SC

dwf Counselor

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ~~COUNSELOR AND~~ AMBASSADOR ONLY.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at my request November 26.

I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement substantially as follows:

It is believed that some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which we have been discussing for the past several months in informal and exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settlement of problems of the entire Pacific area. Included among those principles are the principles of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation to improve world conditions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent and solve controversies, inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal affairs of other nations and the principle of equality. Mention is made of the proposals of the Japanese Government received on November 20 and recent statements of the Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue

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these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating a propitious atmosphere.

This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to provide full opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of a broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals of November 20 in some ways conflict with the fundamental principles to which each Government has committed itself and would not be likely to further our ultimate objectives. It is suggested that further efforts toward resolving divergences of views on the practical application of those principles be made. There is therefore offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one practical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there thus may be expedited progress toward a meeting of minds.

The draft proposal for a broad-gauge settlement was substantially as follows:

The first section contained a draft mutual declaration

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in which there was embodied an affirmation by both Governments that their national policies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace throughout the Pacific area, that both Governments are without territorial designs, that both have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressively military force and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to certain fundamental principles. (There are then listed the four principles which are mentioned above in the oral statement.)

Both Governments agree to practically/apply and actively support five economic principles in a program to eliminate and to prevent recurrent political instability, economic collapse and to provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a) the establishment of international financial institutions and arrangements designed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of all nations and to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of all nations; (b) non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c) non-discriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition

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of expressions of extreme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of international economic cooperation; (e) full protection of consuming countries' and populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten steps to be taken:

1. Both Governments to exert their influence to bring about other governments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and economic principles set forth.

2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States.

3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already concluded by either with any third power or powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental purpose--establishment and preservation of peace in the entire Pacific.

4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement among the Netherland, Thai, American, British,

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Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling for pledges on the part of each Government to respect Indochina's territorial integrity and should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon immediate consultation with regard to that threat; ~~in order that measures necessary and advisable to meet that threat may be taken~~. such agreement to provide also that each signatory ~~~~ould not repeat not accept or seek preferential economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all signatories equality of treatment in those matters.

5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all police, air, naval and military forces.

6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritorial rights in China and rights and interests in and with regard to concessions, international settlements and rights under the Boxer Protocol; both Governments to seek to obtain from other governments, including the British, an agreement to give up all similar rights in China.

7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward conclusion of an American-Japanese trade agreement on the

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Department of State

-6- *Washington,*

basis of mutual reductions of tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list, and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.

8. Both Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's funds.

9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate stabilization plan, each allocating one-half of the funds adequate for that purpose.

10. Both Governments not repeat not to support--economically, politically, militarily--any government or regime in China except the National Government located temporarily at Chungking.

An account of the conversation will be sent you in a later telegram.

Hull
(CH)

FE:MWS:MBW FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.,* _____ *19* _____

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect { Full rate / Day letter / Night letter }
Charge Department: Full rate / Day letter / Night letter
Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN
"SC"

Washington, November 27, 1941

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE COUNSELOR ONLY.

Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p.m.

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as Japan had to deal with a domestic political situation this Government also had its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the documents he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the documents.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrangement suggested in the documents which he had just received. He mentioned Japan's bitter experience with international

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

711.94/24798 (SUPPL)

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Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PARTAIR
PLAIN

organizations as the basis for his objection to the proposed multilateral non-aggression pacts. He added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington treaties and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's rights. He said that if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government he did not see the possibility of any agreement and added that he did not see how the Japanese Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support from regimes or governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these questions.

Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely to throw up its hands at our proposal and as the document was marked tentative and without commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally before sending it to the Japanese Government.

The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to study the documents before further discussion. The Secretary said that with the public having lost its perspective it was necessary to present a complete picture of our position. He mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil question and

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19___, _____

3—1409 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect { Full rate / Day letter / Night letter }

Charge Department: Full rate / Day letter / Night letter

Charge to $

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTAIR
PLAIN

-3- *Washington,*

reminded the Japanese of the great injury being done to us by Japan's immobilizing large forces of democratic countries in territories near Indochina and indicated that should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of Indochina and to our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on Japan's difficulty in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei and observed that the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion.

The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not possible and whether they could see the President.

The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vivendi and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a modus vivendi was because of the attitude of other powers, he added that he had done his best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for November 27).

FE:MWS:HNS/HES

FE PA/H Hull

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ *M.*, _____ *19*__

1—1402 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

EXHIBIT NO. 76

[Translation of Document 1881–PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel]

[1]

Notes Fueh 20/41

NOTES REGARDING THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FUEHRER AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OF THE M.NISTER OF STATE MEISSNER IN BERLIN ON THE 4TH OF APRIL, 1941

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal CASPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscope and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would [2] conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally ranks high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany

would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His organization went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignity of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it my Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could ad- [3] vance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment. to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Empror, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

BERLIN, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1881–PS

4 APRIL 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881–PS.

ERNST COHN,
Pfc.
33925738.

EXHIBIT NO. 77

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m.

Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern correspondent for the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steele is an experienced and able observer the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department.

(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria after an absence of four months I noticed many striking changes. Japan is moving toward totalitarianism at a faster pace than at any time since the commencement of the China hostilities. The Yonai Government which was a neatly balanced arrangement of pro-Anglo-American and pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime based on the expectation and hope of an early German victory over Great Britain.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

SMYTH

EMB

894.00/951

F/FG

MG

This te[illegible] **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 11:59 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

This (*) has made no secret of its intentions to profit in every possible way from that victory, if it comes. Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, businessmen and liberals were still acting as a brake against precipitate acts of aggression and opportunism, but these elements have been momentarily submerged under the current wave of pro-Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone frankly and starkly "realistic".

Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satisfied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous the Germans will be in the

Page 2, No. 300 from Peiping, Section two.

in the final reckoning.

I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the Japanese as active allies in the European conflict or whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplomatic alignment which would give the Japanese a free but independent hand against the British in the Far East.

(END SECTION TWO)

(*) Apparent omission. SMYTH

EMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 1:45 a.m. Sep. 1

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

In any case German newspaper men told me that the most important factors in any possible arrangement between Germany and Japan would be: (one) definite assurances concerning the future German stake in the China market which Germany regards as of great importance; (two) some satisfactory solution of the East Indies and other South Sea problems in which Germany has a deep interest especially economically; and (three) utilization of the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States constantly worried and preoccupied with Pacific problems so that Germany would have a freer hand in Europe.

Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are pro-Japanese at heart and some are doubtful of the extent to which the Japanese could help them. Most of them however, recognize that at ~~worst~~ WORST the Japanese would have a certain nuisance value and Germany would therefore like to make ~~them~~ ALLIES OF them. The Germans foresee of course that

Japan's

Page 2 No. 300, from Peiping (Section Three)

Japan's exclusionist policy in the Orient will be applied to all white people including themselves in the long run if and when Japan becomes strong enough to enforce it.

(END SECTION THREE)

SMYTH

EMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MN. PEIPING VIA N.R.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Dated August 31, 1940

FROM

Rec'd 5:30 a.m. September 1

Secretary of State

Washington

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR.)

I believe that a considerable part of the Japanese army including War Minister Tojo is in favor of a closer alignment with Germany. They are being stalled off for the moment by other pro-Axis but cautious elements in the Government who wish to be sure that they are on the winning side. The reasons why Japan is hesitant to plunge boldly forward on her policy of southward expansion are in order of importance: (one) she wants to be sure which way the war in Europe will go; (two) she wants to be sure that the United States has no intention of taking up arms against her; (three) she wants to be sure of at least a temporary respite along the Soviet Manchurian frontier which is the Achilles Heel of the Japanese Empire; and (four) failure to wind up the China incident.

Meanwhile as Japan struggles to make up her mind she may be expected to continue the nibbling policy she has pursued ever since the Manchurian outbreak. She has learned

-0- tel # 500, August 31, from Peiping

learned from experience that aggression by easy stages is the easier way. She has discovered that many little bites add up to the same thing as one big one and that the victims seem to make much less noise about it.

(END OF SECTION FOUR)

SMYTH

END

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:50 a.m. Sept. 1

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 8 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In view of Japan's extremely difficult position I believe that she is in no position at the present time to wage a successful war alone against the United States or Russia although with allies her position would of course change. I feel sure, however, that the majority in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a conflict with the United States. I might add that on my recent visit to the United States I was struck with the number of people who mistakenly believe that any strong show of strength by the United States would automatically plunge the United States into war. The trouble is that the Japanese know we feel this way and are making the most of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces. Actually I believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting us except as a last resort; in the face of this attitude I believe that firmness is the soundest and safest

American

Page 2 No. 300 from Peiping Section Five.

American Naval policy. The risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States. Of course if Great Britain is defeated then we can expect the Japanese to become more belligerent.

(END SECTION FIVE)

SMYTH

EMB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:45 a.m. Sept. 1

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

The Japanese appear to be so confident of a German victory and are so hopeful that such a victory would permit them to realize their ambitions in Asia that it appears quite useless for the United States at the present time to suggest any halfway measures of appeasement or friendship. In fact the reception that has been accorded such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows that the tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weakness. No form of appeasement short of American recognition of the Japanese created new order in the Far East would satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is obviously pointless to attempt to reason with the Japanese until the course of events in Europe becomes clear. If Great Britain holds out against Germany contrary to present Japanese expectations Japan will then have to reconsider her whole policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely by expediency. (End Summary)

(END

Page 2, No. 300 from Peiping(Section Six.)

(END OF MESSAGE).

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai.

Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

SMYTH

EMB

EXHIBIT NO. 78

DESPATCHES ON KRA PENINSULA ALERT

Despatches on KRA Peninsula alert (1941)

Date	From	Action	Page [1]
28 Nov	COM14	OPNAV	1
30 Nov	OPNAV	CINCAF	2
30 Nov	CINCAF	OPNAV	3
1 Dec	CINCAF	OPNAV	4
2 Dec	CINCAF	OPNAV	5
2 Dec	CINCAF	OPNAV	6
2 Dec	CINCAF	CXM CINC CHINA	7
3 Dec	CINCAF	OPNAV	8
4 Dec	CINCAF	OPNAV	9

[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[*1*] Top Secret

28 November 1941
From: Com 14
Action: Opnav
Info:
28Ø24Ø

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla.

[*2*] Top Secret

3Ø November 1941
From: Opnav
Action: Cincaf
Info: Cincpac
3ØØ419

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch X Instruct planes to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British air forces will search arc 18Ø miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur X British mission here informed X

[*3*] Top Secret

3Ø November 1941
From: Cincaf
Action: Opnav
Info:
3Ø1135

Only 1 small cruiser and 1 auxiliary were disclosed by todays reconnaissance in position approximately 14–ØØ north 11Ø–ØØ east.

[4] Top Secret

1 December 1941
From: Cincaf
Action: Opnav
Info: Cinc China
Ø1114Ø

Results of today's reconnaissance negative even including the close vicinity Camranh Bay: Reference Opnav's dispatch 3Ø17Ø9.

---

[5] Top Secret

2 December 1941
From: Cincaf
Action: Opnav
Info: Cincpac
Ø2Ø73Ø

Bearing Ø7Ø from Saigon distant 18Ø miles 3 type 1–61 submarines in cruising formation headed south 15 knots. 21 transports anchored Camranh Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

Comment: This is in position Lat 11–5Ø N Long 1Ø9–29E, 69Ø miles from Manila. /s/ EW

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[6] Top Secret

2 December 1941
From: Cincaf
Action: Opnav
Info: Cincpac
Ø2Ø345

Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed 1Ø course south at Ø23Ø Greenwich Lat 13–1Ø N, Long 11Ø–ØØ East.

---

[7] Top Secret

2 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: C X M
CINC CHINA
INFO: OPNAV
Ø21636
No results of significance today's reconnaissance other than as reported before. The 9 subs were line abreast 5 miles spacing. Ships in Camranh are mostly large, several probably cargo only. Our planes have been sighted on Indo-China coast three successive days have discontinued search for the present of that locality.

---

[8] Top Secret

3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
Ø314ØØ
No results from reconnaissance today.

---

[9] Top Secret

4 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
Ø41315
Negative results from Dec. 4th reconnaissance.

EXHIBIT NO. 79

DESPATCHES

ON

DUTCH ALERT

Despatches on Dutch alert (1941)

Date	From	Action	Page
21 Nov	OPNAV	CINCPAC, CINCAF	1
22 Nov	CINCPAC	OPNAV	2
22 Nov	SPENAVO, LONDON	OPNAV	3
23 Nov	CNO	SPENAVO	4
23 Nov	CINCAF	OPNAV	5
24 Nov	OPNAV	SPENAVO, LONDON	6
25 Nov	CINCAF	OPNAV	7
3 Dec	SPENAVO, LONDON	OPNAV	8
4 Dec	SPENAVO, LONDON	OPNAV	10
5 Dec	CNO	SPENAVO, LONDON	12

NOTE.—Despatch from Dutch Legation is in exhibit 21.

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[1] Top Secret

21 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINC AF CINC PAC
Info:
211833

Have been informed by Dutch Legation that they have received a despatch as fllows quote according to information received by the Governor General of The Netherlands East Indies a Japanese expeditionary force has arrived in the vicinity of Palau X should this force comma strong enough to form a threat for The Netherlands Indies or Portuguese Timor comma move beyond a line between the following points Davao Waigea Equator the Governor General will regard this as an act of aggression and will under those circumstances consider the hostilities opened and act accordingly unquote inform Army authorities of foregoing X request any information you may have concerning development of this Japanese threat against the Dutch East Indies and your evaluation of foregoing information

---

[2] Top Secret

22 November 1941
From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
Info:
22Ø315

Have no info which substantiates your 211833 other than your 211755. Indications are 4th Fleet may move Palao. Third Base force there increasing traffic evaluation Dutch report rating "B"

---

[3] Top Secret

22 November 1941
From: Spenavo London
Action: OPNAV
Info:
221122

By Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister for Marine in the Dutch Government in England and CINC of all Dutch naval forces, I have been asked informally to present the following to you and request your informal reply. Dutch Government has received reports to the effect that Japan is concentrating an expeditionary force in Palau. Dutch state it is difficult to ascertain veracity of this information but they consider that this point does not absolve them from considering

what should be done by the Dutch in case this reported concentration leads to an expedition crossing the Davao-Waigeo line or the Equator east of that line (see PARA 26ADB April 1941). Dutch Government are inclined to consider that any such expedition could only be regarded as a direct menace to Netherlands East Indies and thereby as a non direct threat to the territories and interest of the United States and Great Britain and that therefore it would have to be immediately countered by force. Dutch state that before definitely making up their minds in this respect, they would like to have the views of our C. N. O. The possibility of an individual Japanese commander acting against the intentions of the Japanese Government should be taken into account and also the fact that in case of that nature, the Japanese Government has the tendency to back up the commander in question considering that otherwise the Japanese would lose face. Dutch have received information that 4,ØØØ laborers have left Japan for Palau.
I suggested the possibility of confusion between the movement of laborers with the reported movements of expeditionary force.
Biddle requests this be passed to State for information.

---

[4] Top Secret

23 November 1941
From: CNO
Action: SPENAVO
Info:
222Ø4Ø

Your 221122 introduces political questions upon which the CNO is not in a position to offer advice but you may express my views concerning the importance of the Pelews for the defense of the mandates and for offensive operations against either the Philippines or Nei. OPNAV questions accuracy of information concerning an expeditionary force near the Pelews but is aware that land and air forces and facilities there are in process of expansion. CINCPAC and CINCAF are checking on recent Japanese movements. Will advise you further.

---

[5] Top Secret

23 November 1941
From: CINCAF
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC
221150

No information here supporting Dutch report in your 211833. We have not detected presence in mandates of any men of war other than those normally assigned Fourth Fleet and although all units of latter have not been positively identified since 1 November it is probable that they are all in mandates but no concentration these units is apparent. There may have been an increase in number of transports and marus but this is hard to establish with certainty. The concentration of marus in Saipan area which has been apparent since about 2Ø October and numbers between 35 and 4Ø continues. CINCFOURTH is at Saipan and AIRON 24 may be. Traffic association between units combined fleet and mandates mentioned in COM 16 Ø916 of 27 October continues. One BATDIV and two carriers may be preparing to proceed mandates but no such movement has been detected. We continue to watch closely.

---

[6] Top Secret

24 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: SPENAVO London
Info:
25Ø1ØØ

CNO advises as follows after studying special reports from CINCAF CINCPAC and Guam on the subject of my 222Ø4Ø;—you are at liberty to disclose the info to Vice Admiral Furstner and the British CNS. None of these special reports show any info supporting the Dutch report. Unquestionably activity in the mandates has increased both as regards warships and merchant types. A con-

siderable number of garrisons are being strengthened. CINC Fourth Fleet is in Saipan and some units of fleet plus merchant types are fairly well distributed throughout the mandates. Air force submarine and patrol craft activity is increasing but as a general proposition Japanese emphasis is chiefly on the Truk and Jaluit areas. The CNO does not believe that any large Japanese aggressive force is now prepared for any immediate move from the region under discussion but he is concerned over southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to Formosa and also apparent preparations in China Formosa and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some chracter. There are no clear indications at present as to the direction or strength of such a movement and the situation should be carefully watched.

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[1] Top secret

25 NOVEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: CINCPAC
25Ø623

Shipping Adviser Batavia informs that Dutch report concerning Palau originated with Army in Timor. Portuguese Timor was named as objective of the alleged expeditionary force. Info was classified as very doubtful and has had no confirmation.

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[8] Top Secret

3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: SPENAVO LONDON
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
Ø31411

Part 1 of 2: I have kept Admty informed regarding my 221122 and your 222Ø4Ø as Admty has discussed same subject with Dutch authorities. Further suggested to Admty that it might now be necessary for Dutch authorities to declare area south and west of Davao-Maigeo-Equator line to be dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against suspicious vessels crossing from north and east. Admty informed declaration from naval point of view would constitute useful defense measure. Essential for political reasons that one should be declared in as unprovocative form as possible and should further be represented as a defense one rather than dangerous one. Admty informed Furstner they also doubt accuracy of this info. In view Dutch proposal involved matters of high policy, it was recommended Dutch take question up with Foreign Office thru Dutch Foreign Minister. When Foreign Minister visited Eden, his proposal went beyond that of Furstner as it invited joint declaration of defense.

(See page two)

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[9] Top Secret

3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: SPENAVO LONDON
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
Ø31411

(Page Two)

One by A or B Powers. After consulting Admty Eden replied to Dutch Foreign Minister as follows; A. That during the continuance of the present negotiations between Japan and the US in Washington, it was undesirable that any declaration should be made unless there was the plainest evidence that Japanese were prepairing an expedition against Netherlands territory. The State Department would be particularly likely to be influenced by this consideration. Part Two follows.

[*10*] Top Secret

4 December 1941
From: SPENAVO LONDON
Action: OPNAV
Info:
Ø31413 (Part Two Baker)

That it therefore seemed better to make no declaration at all until there was evidence more definite than was at present available of concentrations of Japanese forces constituting a threat to Netherlands territory. (C). His Majesty's Government recognise the military value that the declaration of a defense zone would have if definite evidence of such concentrations was obtained but that they consider the declaration would be less provocative to Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to a unilateral declaration by the Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (D). That in similar circumstances His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the Japanese concentrations on the northern border of Indochina began to constitute a threat to Malaya. The declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory was plainly a measure only [*11*] of defense and was at the time accepted as such by Japan without serious criticism. (E). Mr. Eden therefore suggested that if a declaration proved necessary the Netherlands Government should declare that a certain military and naval defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davaowaigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter this zone must notify the Netherlands naval authorities of their intention and call at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous to that made by His Majestry's Government off Johore and would not be likely to increase existing tension. Winant and Biddle informed. Please inform State.

[*12*] Top Secret

5 December 1941
From: CNO
Action: Spenavo London
Info:
Ø4223Ø

While CNO agrees with you that November reports of a Japanese concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of an attack by the Japanese from that region against the Philippines or Nei cannot be ruled out. This replies to your Ø31411 and gives CNO views as to the military aspects of the Dutch project to declare areas south and west Davao dash Waigo dash equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch forces might attack suspicious vessels entering from north and east. Were this area declared dangerous to shipping the prohibition would apply to all merchant shipping of whatever nationality and to naval vessels of the United States and United Kingdom as well as to those of Japan. Large amounts of shipping traverse this general area and it is questionable if Dutch could set up promptly a naval control system that would obviate excessive delays of shipping most important to the United States and particularly shipping carrying United States naval and army reenforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between west coast of United States and the far east area is now routed via Torres Strait. If NEI declares this large area closed it would be quite a different matter from the British closure of the Jahore area which is a very small one. Japan would be free to close Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and all the western portion of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. Were the United States to acquiesce in the Dutch declaration it would have few grounds for objecting to a Japanese declaration of the same character. At present United States defense aid is going to Russia via the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan, and the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands East Indies are executing extensive reconnaissance measures in all directions considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and reconnaissance measures ought to continue and CNO is convinced a declaration by the Dutch closing the area in question would be most prejudicial to naval and military interests of the three powers. If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked. Communicate these views to the admiralty and the Dutch naval command in London.

EXHIBIT NO. 80

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 83
Serial No. 25

December 1, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

T S Wilkinson

T. S. Wilkinson
Captain, U. S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

3

299 (22 pages-illus.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial No. 25.
December 1, 1941

Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations

A. The Diplomatic Situation

1. Japan

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

2. Germany

Members of the German Armament Commission in Casablanca are now authorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air Force, Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupation of Morocco.

There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these two countries with materials which eventually can be turned against those who have supplied them.

Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequences." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.

According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.

CONFIDENTIAL

4

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3. Italy

The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by the French is now the subject of conversations being held by a French delegation which arrived recently in Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign exchange. These negotiations are not expected to meet with particular success.

The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome in October apparently was motivated by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr. Funk threatened to raise the price of coal shipments to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the yearly exports of coal to Italy from the twelve million tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million tons. Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached two-thirds of the Italian national requirements. This was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting heating this winter.

4. France

France moved a step closer to the "new order" in Europe on November 18 when Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-collaborationist elements within the Vichy government, announced the "retirement" of General Maxime Weygand as delegate-general and military commander of French North Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Premier Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juin, until June of this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later commander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand as military commander in North Africa. The military command of French West Africa goes to General Jean Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice Admiral Fenard was named permanent Secretary General of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the Germans may be announced following the meeting of Petain and Darlan with Reichsmarshal Goering which is scheduled for the near future. There are indications that this meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier Mussolini.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany, meanwhile, is reported to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from $8,000,000 to $6,000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.

France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret (Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General Staff) to inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air. Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing under his National Defense Ministry all services under the Franco-German armistice formerly administered by the War and Foreign Ministries.

Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the United States Department of State announced that trade with North Africa would be suspended and that Franco-American relations were to be studied in the light of the new developments. At the same time American lend-lease aid was extended to the Free French of General Charles de Gaulle.

On November 26, General Catroux (Free French Commander in Syria) proclaimed the independence of Lebanon and the termination of the mandate in the name of France. The new government will be headed by President Alfred Macache.

France is understood to have protested to the Japanese government over the size of the mission, numbering 350 political and economic experts, accompanying Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China.

Despite rumors of capitulation, the situation in French Somaliland remains uncharged. The Paris radio announced on November 21 that the colony could not hold out longer than four to six weeks under the continued British blockade.

6

CONFIDENTIAL

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5. Latin America

Mexico

President Roosevelt has nominated the present Ambassador to Cuba, George S. Messersmith, to succeed Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. The new British Ambassador to Mexico, Charles Bateman, is expected to arrive in mid-December, which is about the same time that Messersmith probably will take up his new duties.

The State Department announced an agreement has been reached with Mexico providing: (1) The settling of a final fair price for American properties taken over in 1933, through experts or through further diplomatic negotiations. Mexico tendered $9,000,000 in advance as a token payment. (2) General and agrarian claims comprised, Mexico to pay $40,000,000 in full settlement. Mexico has already paid $3,000,000 on these claims and will pay $3,000,000 upon exchange of ratifications of the conventions covering them. The remaining $34,000,000 is payable at the rate of $2,500,000 annually. (3) A reciprocal trade agreement to be negotiated at once. (4) The United States will provide a $40,000,000 stabilization fund to maintain the peso at its present rate. (5) The United States will purchase up to 6,000,000 ounces of newly-mined Mexican silver monthly.

The Export-Import Bank has established a $30,000,000 credit for the development of roads and highways. The credit will be available in yearly increments up to $10,000,000 over a three year period. The Mexican Government guarantees payment unconditionally; and additional security is provided, in the form of highway bonds, payable from the Federal gasoline tax.

Costa Rica

President Calderon has repeated his offer of landing fields, air and naval bases to the United States, as free measures of hemispheric defense.

El Salvador

Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Marino has been replaced by pro-Ally Colonel Monterrosa.

-4-

CONFIDENTIAL 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Panama

Little progress is noted in the new government of Panama towards consolidation of its gains. The second designate to the presidency is named Minister to Washington; the third designate, Anibal Rios, is in Colombia, and will be arrested if he returns to Panama, where a number of his supporters have been jailed. Key positions still are occupied by Arlaristas, although there is a cordial disposition to cooperate with the United States. The extreme nationalistic laws passed by Arias are not repealed, but already their application is lapsing. The government is unlikely to do anything that will frighten off U. S. tourist or business dollars.

Argentina

There are many indications that a secret understanding as to the joint defense of the Straits of Magellan has been established between Argentina and Chile. The recent death of the President of Chile probably will reopen discussions on defense in that area. There have been expressions of annoyance on the part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions between the United States and countries adjacent to the Argentine, and over the U.S. lend-lease aid promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The view is held that the Argentine is an interested party to all such discussions and dispositions.

A new political party, of Fascist character, called Patria has been launched in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Fresco. Observers note a new student's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a coalition of radical nationalist groups.

German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and an intensification of the Taborda Committee activities may be expected.

While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in

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politics, seems firmly in control of the Army. In the Senate, the nationalists and the Democratic factions have reached an impasse. A coalition of nationalist - or totalitarian - factions, under a strong leader, probably would mean the overthrow of the present government.

Brazil

During the period under review there have been some alarming reports from various sources in Brazil, forecasting trouble between Vargas and the explosive elements in his government. To date, however, nothing serious has occurred. Brazil is meeting, with some hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere defense, and cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops to Surinam by sending a military mission to Paramaribo, and strengthening her border forces in that area. Currently, General Goes is denouncing U. S. aims as imperialistic in South America, and his good faith in staff discussions should be accepted with grave reservations.

Chile

The sudden death of Presnt Aguirre Cerda, from a bronchial affection, has caused considerable unrest in Chile, and responsive uneasiness in that country's neighbors. Don Tinto, as he was affectionately called, because of the red wine for which his vineyards were famous, headed the only popular front government, but was generally regarded as a friend to Democracy. He has preserved for some years an uneasy equilibrium between highly antagonistic and immoderate factions. His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator. Most observers believe that the government will remain stable during the sixty-day period before the election of a new President.

Colombia

The Colombian Senate has rejected the U. S. Black List of Axis firms in the Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that, in a matter of such mutual interest to the American Republics, all their governments should have been consulted.

The Colombian press condemns articles on the country by Benjamin Welles and John Gunther, terming them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not realized

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in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-America press is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S. literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American accord.

Bolivia

A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in La Paz.

Ecuador

The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.

Peru

Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resentment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.

In Lima, the Aprista Party announces the possibility of the resignation of President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation. General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorean war, is a strong Presidential possibility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the office by unconstitutional means. Ureta is pro-U.S. and anti-Axis.

General

The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised; almost literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would have a happy effect at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

10

19

CONFIDENTIAL

Trends

Military and Naval

Mexico. The naval budget for 1942 has been set at 35,000,000 pesos, or about $8,000,000. This is twice the 1941 budget.

South America. Nothing to add to summary of November 15.

Economic.

The period under review has been characterized by numerous complaints in the press of the American Republics, and in reports from various local sources, over the growing dearth of materials essential to the support of industries. Deprived of European export markets, the American Republics look to the United States for a variety of heavy materials, neither produced nor manufactured south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacles are: The matter of priorities, and the availability of shipping. Here, as in the lend-lease military and naval material, the patience of the Latin-Americas is about exhausted, and their confidence in U. S. good faith is deteriorating. Few Latin Americans appreciate the magnitude now of the demands upon U. S. industry. Aids to Britain, to Russia, and to China, and confusion in U. S. production, are widely advertised. Opponents to U.S. and to Pan American policies are alert to take advantage of current circumstances. As a measure for the future, no less than for immediate benefit, the allotment to Latin American trade of certain priorities, however limited, and of shipping, appears urgently desirable.

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B. The Japanese Military Situation

Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continues. Japanese army strength now in Indo-China is believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking province, and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China.

Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated that there are about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Burma Road. In position, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men, including China's only mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported during the period in north Honan, south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, near Shanghai and near Canton.

CONFIDENTIAL

12

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CONFIDENTIAL

B. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Strength

It has been estimated that Germany now may have 300 divisions. Of these, 28 divisions are unidentified. Of the identified divisions 72 are probably unfitted and not yet ready for field duty. This would leave 200 divisions ready for active service at the present time.

Distribution

The 272 identified divisions are distributed as follows:

Location	Number of Divisions
Russian Front	Total 168 (including 20 motorized, 19 armored, 2 cavalry, and 2 mountain divs.)
Northern Group	31
Central Group	86
Southern Group	51
Italy and Libya	3 (including 2 armored)
Balkans and Hungary	14 (including 1 mountain)
Poland and East Prussia	10
Finland	7 (including 1 motorized and 3 mountain)
Germany and Austria	33
Holland, Belgium and France	27
Norway	8
Denmark	2

Operations

(Note: Eastern Front only; See ITALY for Libyan Campaign)

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Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have been resumed.

Finnish Sector - There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk, Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector - The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank engaged in the siege of Leningrad.

Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.

The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.

Central Sector - German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Mozhaisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report great German pressure.

South-Central Sector - Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in the reports that Yefremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh, have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.

-11-

CONFIDENTIAL

14

299

CONFIDENTIAL

Donetz Basin Sector - The Russians claim deep advances in a counter-attack on the "Donetz Plateau", but fail to mention the recapture of any important industrial centers. Axis reports have emphasized gradual progress along a broad front, but have been vague as to details.

Rostov apparently has been captured, although the Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit of retiring Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported from Berlin.

Crimean Sector - According to reports, all of the Crimea except Sevastopol is now in German hands. The defeat of Russian forces in the central Crimea, the breaking of strong defense positions across the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of Kerch and of the western shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.

Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and apparently has lost its value as a base for the Red Black Sea Fleet.

Personalities

General Kurt von Briesen was killed in action on the eastern front on November 20, 1941.

2. Naval

Distribution

Ship Name	Type	Date	Location
TIRPITZ	BB	November 9	Kiel
SCHARNHORST	BB	November 21	Brest
GNEISENAU	BB	November 21	Brest
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	OBB	November 9	Hamburg
SCHLESIEN	OBB	October 7	Central Baltic

CONFIDENTIAL

Ship Name	Type	Date	Location
(Continued)			
GRAF ZEPPELIN	CV	Prior Nov. 16	Departed Stettin
ADMIRAL SCHEER	CA	November 19	Swinemuende
LUETZOW	CA	November 9	Kiel
SEYDLITZ	CA	October 12	Bremen
PRINZ EUGEN	CA	November 21	Brest
ADMIRAL HIPPER	CA	November 5	Off Sassnitz
NUERNBERG)	CL	(	One of these
)		(November 5	two ships off
LEIPZIG)	CL	(	Sassnitz
KOELN	CL	September 29	Gdynia
EMDEN	CL	November 9	Kiel
4 Units	DD	September 24	Northern Norway
5-7 Units	DD	September 24	In the Baltic
1 Unit	DD	September 24	Bergen
3 Units	DD	September 24	North Sea ports
2 Units	DD	October 24	Cherbourg
Remaining Units	DD	-	Unknown
150 Units (estimated)	SS		Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports

Operations

A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.

British October shipping tonnage losses were less than 75% of the September, 1941, losses.

CONFIDENTIAL

16

299

CONFIDENTIAL

HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two or more German submarines just east of Gibraltar on November 13, 1941. It is not certain whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast bases, or from newly established bases in the Mediterranean.

In the light of available information, it appears practically certain that all Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans for use as bases for offensive operations. The naval forces at Axis disposal in this sea are still very inferior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea naval operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time as the Red Black Sea Fleet either will have been destroyed or otherwise neutralized.

It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reenforced by five small submarines brought down the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.

A shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping may be indicated by the recent sinking of a 1200-ton Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis land forces and was sunk by a mine in the Black Sea.

H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and sank a converted German commerce raider on November 22 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider, believed to have been the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion thirteen minutes following the commencement of the engagement.

According to belated evidence, it is not fairly certain that the German 6,000-ton light cruiser KOELN was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.

Personalities

Lt. Reschke and Lt. Guggenberger were in command of the two German submarines credited with the sinking of the ARK ROYAL. Reschke entered the Navy in 1929 and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer had been previously mentioned in connection with submarine operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

17

297

CONFIDENTIAL

Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported sunk by H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915 and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

3. Air

Strength and Disposition

According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force in Russia is as follows:

	Leningrad	Moscow	South of Kharkov-Kiev	Finland & North Norway
Long range bombers	90	200	240	40
Bomber reconnaissance	30	30	45	10
Dive bombers	0	90	60-75	30
Single-engine fighters	30	180	130	30
Two-engine fighters	30	35	0	10
Totals	180	535	475-490	120

Grand Total - 1310-1325

A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 single-engine fighters from the Russian front to Central Germany for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported from several sources.

In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive in Cyrenaica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

	Bombers	Dive Bombers	Fighters	Recon-naissance	Coastal
Cyrenaica	30	70	75	5	-
Sicily	10	-	-	-	-
Crete	-	20	10	-	-
South Greece	60	-	-	20	25

Total - 325

This represented a slight decrease in German air strength in the Mediterranean from the last previously reported figures.

Operations

West - Reconnaissance continues to be the chief German aerial activity in this theater, operations being carried out over the British Isles and over the sea approaches. A small number of bombers were regularly in action, and activity of mine-laying planes was reported occasionally.

Russian Front - According to German claims, the German Air Force has been very active on the Eastern Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed regularly during the past two weeks. The northern part of the city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the Germans report. German bombers also are said to have paid particular attention to railroad communications; namely, the yards near Moscow and the Murmansk railroad at and north of Vologda.

The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.

Up to November 1, German sources claim that 83,000,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights had been carried to the front by German air transport.

On November 21, the Germans claimed further that, to that date, 15,877 Russian planes had been destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

19

299

CONFIDENTIAL

Mediterranean - German activity in this theater has been limited largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in Libya have recently vainly requested reenforcements of troop-carrying planes.

Personalities

During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret weapon. Lt. Col. Koelders was killed when a transport plane in which he was a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 22. Moelders was returning to the front after attending Udet's funeral.

CONFIDENTIAL

F. The Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Libya

At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the British launched their long-awaited offensive against the Italian and German forces in the Libyan Desert. The British have been preparing for this drive for many months, and a steady stream of materiel has been flowing to the Middle East. For the first time British forces are meeting the Germans with ample equipment and air superiority.

The main spearhead of the attack began south of Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from the coast at Sollum, and branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidi el Rezegh. At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Armored Division apparently was badly mauled by the British. At El Rezegh, Imperial forces captured the airfield, including planes and personnel. Further south an Imperial Motorized Force, starting from Giarabub, raced across the desert to Gialo Oasis and captured the Italian outpost of El Augila.

Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between German and British armored forces, ensued at El Rezegh where both sides lost heavily in mechanized equipment. To date the fighting is still fluid, and no decision has been reached. However, the British are now in possession of Rezegh; Gambut and Sidi Omar Nuovo (the main supply bases of the German armored forces) have been captured, and the Tobruk garrison has made a juncture with the main Imperial forces at Ed Duda.

East Africa

Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians in Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate within the next few weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are entrenched on a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they have been cut off from supplies for the past seven months. British forces are closing in now and are only seven miles from Gondar.

(Note: Since the preparation of this report, the fall of Gondar has been announced.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Russian Front

Italian ground lines of communication are being obstructed on the Russian Front and air transport is being used to supply the troops. Italian difficulties are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation facilities and the refusal of the Germans to repair the railroads in that sector. As a result, Italian forces in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit whatever local resources are available.

2. Naval

The Italian Navy is demonstrating its inability to protect convoys to Africa. In the attack on an Italian convoy November 8 by the British, the two Italian 8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British 6-inch gun cruisers during the entire action. Seven of the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained German troops. Again on November 21/22 a British submarine attacked another Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of November 22 the convoy was again attacked by British aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which hits were claimed on another cruiser and several merchant ships.

German submarines are basing now in the Mediterranean. Reports indicate that the principal German submarine base in the Mediterranean is located at Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for persons of Italian nationality. A German submarine base also is being established on the West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate seven submarines.

3. Air

On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the Italian Air Force when General Rino Corso Fougier succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as Under-Secretary for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo indicated that he had failed to protect Italian cities from British air attacks because his interest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was believed that General Fougier, who is a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of

CONFIDENTIAL

the sinking of the big convoy on November 8 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Pricolo resigned.

General Fougier is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He was a protege and satellite of the late General Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

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Copy No. 83
Serial No. 21.

November 15, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

T. S. Wilkinson

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Captain, U. S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

31E

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial No. 24.
November 15, 1941

Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations

A. The Diplomatic Situation

1. Japan

The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese relations over-shadowed all other developments in the Far East during the period.

Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, is flying to Washington with compromise Japanese proposals. No one apparently expects his mission to succeed, the envoy himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that the United States will not budge from her position. Prime Minister Churchill warned that if war breaks out between Japan and America, Britain will declare war on Japan "within the hour." The United States is preparing to withdraw the marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at Britain and the United States.

Japan protested to Panama against treatment of Japanese subjects in Panamanian territory. Panama rejected the protest. Japan also protested to Russia against floating mines in the sea of Japan which sank a Japanese passenger vessel in Korean waters.

Russia and Japan reached agreement on demarcation of the Mongolia-Manchukuo border in the Lake Buir Nor area.

2. Germany

In accordance with tradition, Hitler returned with prominent members of his Party to the Buergerbraeukeller in Munich on November 8, 1941, to celebrate the 18th anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch. In his speech, Hitler declared that he had ordered the German Navy to fire on American ships only after being attacked. Orders have been issued, however, to torpedo any ships carrying war materials to Britain.

In a recent magazine article, Dr. Goebbels tells the German people that it is comparatively unimportant when the war will end and all-important how it will end. The article is calculated to steel the nation to endure further hardships and to be prepared for a continuation

CONFIDENTIAL

294

45E

CONFIDENTIAL

of military effort for an indefinite period. The New York Times calls the article "a rare concession of the possibility of defeat."

It has been reported that eighty per cent of the Iranians are pro-Axis and would welcome German intervention as a means of securing liberation from Russian and British control.

Karl Schnurre, Minister in the German Foreign Office, returned to Stockholm early in November. His return was followed by a report that Sweden had acceded to the wishes of the Reich and would not permit ten Norwegian vessels in Swedish ports to be returned to Norwegian owners.

Germany is pressing Bulgaria to assume police duties in Serbia and thus release the two or three German divisions engaged in putting down the Serbian uprisings.

Construction of a new highway and railroad line between Hamburg and Copenhagen, via the Islands of Fehmern and Laaland, has been commenced. This new line will shorten the distance between Copenhagen and Hamburg by more than eighty kilometers and will reduce travel time materially between the two cities.

3. Italy

The Brazilian Foreign Office announced on November 7th that the proposal for the purchase of Italian ships in Brazilian ports had been accepted by Italy. Eight ships are involved in the transaction for which Italy will receive a non-negotiable credit in the Bank of Brazil, which, when the war ends, will be liquidated, no transfer of funds being involved. The CONTE GRANDE, 23,861 tons, and three other Italian vessels, which have not discharged their original cargoes, were not included in the proposal.

On October 31st, the Yugoslav vessel TOMISLAV, which has been at Shanghai since April, was boarded and seized by a company of Italian Marines. The master and crew members were threatened with pistols and forced to abandon the ship and their personal effects. This is the second incident involving the vessel, the first occurring last April when the Italians seized the ship, claiming it had been

41E

CONFIDENTIAL

purchased by Lloyd Triestino. This attempt failed, however, when the Japanese intervened. Since the second seizure, the Italians have been busy removing the last vestiges of Yugoslav ownership and the funnell is being repainted with the colors of Lloyd Triestino. In connection with the reported purchase of the vessel by Italian interests, a Japanese naval spokesman stated that under the Chinese Maritime code, the transfer of the vessel would not be valid unless it was duly registered with the Chinese Government.

Because of the intolerable conditions existing in Croatia, the Duke of Spoleto (King Aimone of Croatia) has abdicated the throne of that country.

4. France

The reprisal executions of Frenchmen, followed by Marshal Petain's appeal to the people, appear to have had the desired result, the only recent act of terrorism being the suspected sabotage of an Orleans passenger train in a Paris station. Little progress has been made in Franco-German collaboration, however, and it is reported that Adolph Hitler has become dissatisfied with what he characterizes as the "ambiguous" attitude of the Vichy government. It is thought that under renewed German pressure France must agree both to military and naval collaboration in French Africa and to the early retirement of General Weygand from his North African command. This latter demand has the support of Admiral Darlan and Minister of the Interior Pucheu. Petain, attempting to gain time, sent General Huntziger, Minister of War, to Africa to make a survey of local opinion, but it is felt that the Marshal must yield eventually and agree to Weygand's recall. De Leuss, personal representative of Weygand in Vichy, already has been removed from his post.

(Note: General Huntziger was killed in a plane crash on November 12, 1941, while returning to Vichy from this mission to Africa.)

Indications point to an increase of German activity in Tunisia. Two reputedly Rumanian engineers have been in that colony making surveys of the general terrain, highways, bridges, etc., and the French Resident General, Admiral Esteva, has gone to Vichy for consultations.

CONFIDENTIAL

42E

CONFIDENTIAL

The Vichy Government has announced that French Somaliland officials had agreed to negotiate with the British regarding the use of the port of Djibuti and the railroad linking the port to Addis Ababa. However, Colonial Secretary Admiral Platon, after a hurried trip to Djibuti, stated that the harbor works and railroad would be blown up before the port was surrendered to the British.

Diplomatic relations have been completed by the United States with Great Britain for sending a $1,000,000 Red Cross cargo of milk, clothing and medicines to unoccupied France. Arrangements still must be completed with Germany and Italy for safe conduct of the vessel.

The Vichy government has protested to London against the capture of a convoy of five French merchant vessels en route from Madagascar to France. The British action was believed based on the possibility that the vessels carried tin and rubber from French Indo-China destined for the Nazis. Vichy, however, denies that there was contraband aboard. The 4,578-ton freighter SENNEVILLE was reported damaged by Royal Air Force planes on November 3, while in Tunisian territorial waters.

It has been reported that the BB RICHELIEU is now looked upon as one of the fixed defenses of Dakar and that there is no intention of having it undergo trial runs.

5. Latin America

Mexico

The Mexican Government apparently is attempting to take advantage of the desire to eliminate all existing differences between the United States and Mexico quickly, in order to force acceptance of a settlement on the oil companies. Various high officials of the Mexican Government have issued thinly-veiled threats to the oil companies to agree to the negotiated settlement, "or else."

Reports have been received of several Supreme Court decisions which indicate a conservative trend. One decision held that an expropriation of property was in violation of constitutional guarantees in that no payment

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

was made of "prompt and fair compensation." This is considered as another indication of government trend away from the leftist policy of the Cardenas administration, as the Supreme Court usually reflects the views of the administration, its decisions being in effect dictated by the executive.

Conservatism is gradually replacing the former communistic policies in the Department of Education, under the new Minister, Bejar Vasquez.

Acceptance of policies regarded as desirable by the United States is apparently greatly impeded by the presence in high governmental posts of officials under Axis influence or motivated by Anti-American sentiments.

Four hundred additional Spanish refugees from Casablanca, Morocco, among them Alcala Zamora, ex-President of Republican Spain, are expected in Vera Cruz.

Sinarquismo and Accion Nacional, two fascist organizations attaining significant strength and numbers, which are apparently under Nazi influence exerted both directly and through the Falange and Spanish-dominated members of the Catholic clergy, constitute a potential danger to internal order in Mexico and to Mexican-United States relations. If recent information that such figures as ex-President Portes Gil and Abelardo Rodriguez, and many other influential Mexicans, are working behind the scenes in these organizations, proves correct, the danger is even more serious than had previously been thought.

Guatemala

German propaganda has effectively used Guatemalan economic problems arising from blacklisting of German coffee producers to produce friction between President Ubico and the American Legation. A campaign to discredit the American Military Mission, and have it replaced by a Spanish Mission has been started, but little success has been noted.

Costa Rica

Under discussion, according to a recent report, is legislation to permit the registry under Costa Rican flag of American merchant vessels. Little opposition has

CONFIDENTIAL

21F

44E

CONFIDENTIAL

appeared, and sentiment trends toward permitting the arming of such vessels. Foreign Minister Echandi of Costa Rica, only pro-German cabinet member, went to Panama, apparently to secure permission of that country for ex-President Arnulfo Arias to live in Costa Rica.

Panama

Arnulfo Arias is now in Mexico City. It is reported that he has been offered refuge in Canada, provided that he stays for a minimum of three months. It is doubted that he will accept this offer, as most of his feminine contacts appear to be in Latin America, a factor which has radically influenced his movements hitherto.

The new government in Panama is still somewhat under the control of the national revolutionary party organized by Arnulfo Arias, and contains a number of high officials friendly to Arias, which inspires some doubts as to continuous satisfactory cooperation from the new regime.

Anibal Rios proposes to return to Panama to assert his claim as third designate to the Panamanian presidency.

Colombia

A committee of the Colombian Legislature published on November 9 a report on the American Black List and specified that the report itself should be brought to the attention of the foreign officers of the other American Republics. The report is said to have asserted that the United States Government criticized the Black List in the World War as being in violation of the law of nations, and implied that bribery and espionage by foreign service officials were involved in the compilation of the Black List and that the lists themselves are based on acquisitive ambitions.

Ecuador

Ecuador has agreed to allow American naval vessels to operate from her waters, but has not publicized the agreement, merely stating that patrols by United States vessels in Ecuadorean waters had been authorized.

298

45E

CONFIDENTIAL

Chile

The President of Chile requested leave of absence due to illness, and designated Jeronimo Mendez, head of the Radical Party, as Acting Vice President to administer the executive powers in his absence. The Radical Party is the largest element in the Popular Front Government which elected Aguirre Cerda to power. Upon first receiving news of the change it was feared that the Popular Front would be broken up by secession of the Communists, or that the new Vice President would swing so far to the right as to side with the Nazi Conservatives, inasmuch as his Radical Party is the middle of the road element and farther to the right than any other part of the Popular Front which supports the present government. However, as the Communist press has registered approval of the change and recommends increased watchfulness against the Rightist conspiracies of the Nazis, while Conservative members of the legislature have attacked the Acting President, it is believed that the Popular Front will remain intact and Acting President Mendez will not favor the Nazi-dominated Conservatives. Therefore, it would appear that the change would result in greater unity of the forces opposed to Nazism.

Peru

Dr. Rafael Larco Herrera, Vice President of Peru, arrived by plane from Rio in Buenos Aires on November 11. It seems significant that he has visited on his current trip the three countries which offered their good offices to re-establish peace between Peru and Ecuador. It is reported that he intends to remain several days in Buenos Aires and confer with Acting President Castillo, the Foreign Minister, and other prominent officials. Vice President Larco provides a democratic window-dressing for Peru to cover up the "behind the scenes" totalitarian methods employed against Ecuador. It appears reasonable to suppose that by his current visit to the three countries offering to mediate in the dispute, that he is trying to discover what fate lies in store for Peru in case mediation is forced upon her. Mexico was probably the first country to suggest that steps be taken against Peru due to her invasion of Ecuadorean territory. It is interesting to recollect that Mexico dispatched her Minister to Panama on a swing around the circle of South American capitals immediately after the expropriation of the oil fields, probably in order to ascertain what would be the result if consultation were invoked against Mexico.

CONFIDENTIAL

298

46E

CONFIDENTIAL

Indications are not lacking that now, as then, consultation of the other American nations would result in severe criticism of the "aggressor" nation.

Argentina

Brazilian Foreign Minister Aranha arrived in Buenos Aires by plane from Rio November 11. Recurrent rumors have been heard that Brazil has been successful in efforts to draw closer to herself her immediate neighbors in a net work of alliances that might be used to exert pressure on Argentina. Argentine official circles do not appear disturbed, however, but say they are fully informed as to what Brazil is doing and see no reason for alarm.

Argentine naval circles are disturbed by fears that the elevation of Dr. Mendez to the Acting Presidency in Chile will obstruct joint Argentine-Chilean defense of the Straits of Magellan.

Paraguay

Paraguay has recently had several small naval vessels operating in combined maneuvers with the Argentina fleet, and Argentina has offered to send a naval mission to Paraguay. The offer is still under consideration, with good prospects of being accepted.

Brazil

Foreign Minister Aranha was quoted on November 11 at Porto Alegre as saying that Brazil would not remain neutral if another American nation entered the war. He said, according to the newspaper, "We are, and wish to be, Pan Americanists. We follow the American way. We go along with America's fortunes." Despite these public declarations, he is opposed to the placement of certain Brazilian firms on the Black List and has forbidden temporarily the publication of the latest edition of the Black List in Brazil. He is also at odds with Pan American Airways, probably due to what he considers lack of cooperation in furnishing transportation when desired for his family and for his present trip to Chile. News reports from Chile state that he was received most enthusiastically upon his arrival there.

CONFIDENTIAL

298

47E

CONFIDENTIAL

Current action of the Brazilian Government in facilitating use of Brazilian airports by American planes and by reinforcing garrisons in northern Brazil, indicate that President Vargas has decided definitely to throw his influence to Pan American cooperation. The opposition may become desperate, however, and cause open disorders as a result.

Trends

Military and Naval

There is a marked trend towards military and naval cooperation by the southern countries of South America for mutual defense of their territories. This is exemplified by the joint maneuvers of the Paraguayan and Argentine navies and the plans for joint Argentine-Chilean defense of the Straits of Magellan.

Economic

The economic trend is towards increased interchange of commodities between South American countries in an effort to supply the necessities and dispose of surplusses amongst themselves. There appears to be much hope for considerable success in this direction as, surprisingly enough, in normal times the tendency was to export and obtain manufactured articles in return from Europe, but little commerce was conducted among themselves. Now it has been found that many of the articles formerly obtained from Europe can be obtained from neighboring South American countries which produce them. When projected improvements in communications between South American countries are completed, still further economic interchange will become possible.

Totalitarian Penetration

Arnulfo Arias, ex-President of Panama, while in Managua manifested a strong desire to get in communication with a German General in Argentina. This would indicate that Arias also had been involved in contacts with Germans in Argentina, as had the Honduran exiles, to whom Ambassador von Thermann had promised assistance in the contemplated revolt against the present government of Honduras. Fernando Gomez Ayau, Guatemalan police official lent to Panama as Chief of Arias' secret police, has been mentioned in connection with a project to secure arms for the Honduran exiles. It now appears that Arias may have been aware of this and a party to the plot, though the possibility exists that he had requested German aid against the U.S. in Panama.

468

CONFIDENTIAL

B. The Japanese Military Situation

Reports of Japanese strength in Indo-China ranged from 43,500 to 120,000. It is believed that actually there are about 60,000 Japanese troops in Indo-China, which number is being increased slowly. China fears an attack on Yunnan, and Thailand fears attack. Both governments are attempting to obtain British-U.S. military (particularly air) support. It does not appear that Japan is yet strong enough in Indo-China to attack Yunnan or even Thailand.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

The Combined Fleet remains in home waters, nearly in full force in the Inland Sea. The only large combatant vessels believed immobilized are the HARUNA (BB) and TAKAO (CA). The Fleet aircraft units, which were sent to southern Formosa about two weeks ago, have been returned to home waters. Thus no major units are now off their regular stations.

With troop transports and cargo vessels continuously moving down to Indo-China ports small naval craft are providing escort. There is, however, no indication of any large naval concentration at present in any area.

Naval aircraft in Indo-China are being augmented. These aircraft are being drawn not only from Hainan and China coast bases, but probably also from units normally shore-based in Japan. Accurate numbers are not available.

A naval guard ship is now stationed in the Tsugaru Straits which challenges all maritime traffic passing through the straits.

The IZUMO, a converted aircraft carrier, originally laid down as a passenger liner of 27,000 gross tons, was launched in Kobe on October 30. New construction in general running slow due to lack of materials but evidence is becoming stronger that one battleship will be completed very soon.

An increasing number of merchant vessels are being requisitioned by the Navy since the disruption of Japan's overseas trade. It is believed that all merchant tankers are being armed with two guns each.

D. The Chinese Military Situation

Japanese troops evacuated Changchow, Honan, which city they recently captured. Skirmishing occurred at scattered points in north China and Suiyuan, along the Yangtse, near Shanghai, and near Canton.

49E

CONFIDENTIAL

The Soviet government has informed Chungking that no more Russian war materials can be shipped to China.

E. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Strength

No new information regarding the strength of the German Army has been received since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Distribution

No new information regarding the over-all distribution of the German Army has been received since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Operations

There has been no decisive change in the relative positions of the opposing armies along the Russian front. The Russians apparently have held their lines with success practically everywhere, except in the Crimea.

Finnish Sector - To date all Finnish-German attempts to reach the Murmansk-Leningrad Railway in the Murmansk and Kandalaksha sectors have been frustrated. West of Murmansk the Germans were again driven back to the Litsa River. A renewed Finnish-German thrust is rumored to have gotten underway, aiming to cut this rail line at, or below, Kandalaksha. There are, as yet, no definite indications as to the progress of this effort.

Due to their failures in northern Finland, the Germans are now reported to have detailed a group of their army officers to take instruction in winter and forest warfare at the (Finnish) Linsey Military School.

Except for a limited advance up along the Murmansk Railway to a point approximately 90 miles north of Petrozavodsk, operations in Eastern Karelia were practically at a standstill. Off the western shore of the Karelian Isthmus, the Finns were reported to have recaptured Koivisto Island fortress and other small islands in the Gulf of Finland. Hangoe is still under siege.

CONFIDENTIAL

298

50E

CONFIDENTIAL

North-Central Sector - The siege of Leningrad continues. Both Russians and Germans claim to have repelled one another's attacks. A reliable source reports famine conditions inside Leningrad. A move to cut off a Soviet route of supply to the city (via the Vologda Railway to Lake Ladoga, and via this lake to the city) was undertaken by the Germans. Moving eastward from their bridgeheads across the Volkhov River, German forces were reported to have seized the rail junction of Tichvin last week (about 100 miles ESE of Leningrad. The Soviets partially confirmed this move when they claimed to have stopped German attacks 25 miles south of Tichvin.

Central Sector - The basic situation around Moscow appears to have remained unchanged during the past two to three weeks. After considerable fighting, the front appears to have been stabilized in the Kalinin area. At Volokolamsk successive Russian counter-attacks are said (by the Soviets) to have resulted in the encircling of German forces of considerable size. From Mozhaisk, through Naro-Fominsk, Maloyaroslavetz and Serpukhov, to the region about Tula, heavy fighting apparently has failed to make much of an impression on the Soviet defenses. The Germans denied a report that their forces had captured Tula.

Southern Sector - Little detailed information on operations along the front from Orel to Rostov has been received. While minor territorial gains may have been made by the Germans and their Allies, no further cities or areas of prime importance are known to have been lost by the Russians. It is quite possible, however, that the Germans have been busy preparing another major offensive, designed to carry them to the Don, or perhaps lower Volga Rivers.

Crimean Sector - Considerable gains were made by the German force invading the Crimea. Simferopol, Theodosia and Yalta have fallen, and the defending Red Land forces split and driven back in the directions of Sevastopol and Kerch. The Red Black Sea Fleet was forced to abandon its Sevastopol operating base. Severe fighting is now in progress on the Kerch Peninsula, and on the outskirts of Sevastopol.

South-East - Full load German Army trucks have been reported moving into Bulgaria. This may indicate ammunition and equipment for a possible German Caucasus thrust to be launched from Bulgarian shores. According to the latest reports, three German divisions are now reported stationed in Bulgaria.

CONFIDENTIAL

298

SIE

CONFIDENTIAL

The total mobilized strength of the Bulgarian Army now is reported to have reached 270,000 men, including 6,000 now in process of mobilization. Two Nazi SS Divisions, hitherto assigned to the forces of occupation in Yugoslavia, are now reported being relieved by Bulgarian Army units. It is not known where the two SS Divisions are to be sent.

South - An unconfirmed report states that the Germans are organizing four light armored and 10 motorized divisions for tropical service. Another report claims that 150,000 young German Army recruits are being trained and acclimated for tropical service in the Bordeaux-Hendaye area.

A reliable source reports the transit of German colonial forces to Italy, estimated at 8 divisions. A recent unconfirmed report from supposedly reliable sources claims that German forces in North Africa have been increased from 40,000 to 70,000 men. Light tank units are also said to have been moved into Greece by way of Yugoslavia, for eventual transportation by plane to Libya.

2. Naval

Distribution

Ship Name	Type	Date	Location
TIRPTIZ	BB	November 9	Kiel
SCHARNHORST	BB	October 27	Brest
GNEISENAU	BB	October 27	Brest
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	OBB	November 9	Hamburg
SCHLESIEN	OBB	October 7	Central Baltic
GRAF ZEPPELIN	CV	October 12	Stettin
ADMIRAL SCHEER	CA	November 7	Swinemuende
LUETZOW	CA	November 9	Kiel
SEYDLITZ	CA	October 12	Bremen
PRINZ EUGEN	CA	October 27	Brest

295

52E

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMIRAL HIPPER	CA	November 5	Off Sassnitz
NUERNBERG	CL	November 5)	One of these two off Sassnitz; location of other unknown.
LEIPZIG	CL	November 5)	
KOELN	CL	September 29	Gdynia
EMDEN	CL	November 9	Kiel
4 Units	DD	September 24	Northern Norway
1 Unit	DD	September 24	Bergen
5-7 Units	DD	September 24	In the Baltic
3 Units	DD	September 24	North Sea ports
2 Units	DD	October 24	Cherbourg
Remaining Units	DD	-	Unknown
150 Units (estimated)	SS	Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atlantic ports.	

Operations

Two German submarines are now reported to be operating in the Aegean. German naval off-shore patrols in Greek waters are said to have been increased.

On November 4, some 1,100 German naval seamen were reported stationed at Naples. Hotel Bopendile on Ponpyazza Baccadileone, Rome, is now German submarine headquarters, which will control German submarines now entering the Mediterranean.

3. Air

Strength and Disposition

No further information regarding German over-all plane strength and production has been received since distribution of the last Fortnightly Summary.

A reliable report just received puts Nazi air strength in the Mediterranean, on October 21, at:

CONFIDENTIAL

298

53E

CONFIDENTIAL

	Bombers	Dive Bombers	Fighters	Reconnaissance	Coastal Aircraft
Cyrenaica	30	70	80	10	-
S. Greece	80	-	-	25	-
Crete	-	20	10	-	25
Sicily	-	-	10	-	-

The total number of German planes available in the Mediterranean area is estimated at 380.

Operations

West - No substantial change in German air operations has been noted since distribution of the last Fortnightly Summary.

Eastern Front - There is reason to infer that the Nazis may be getting ready to curtail operations along the Moscow section of the front during the winter.

A shortage of gasoline at forward stations of German fighter commands is holding up fighter operations around Rostov. These forward stations are supplied by air transport.

The strength of German close support forces has been kept up well. Replacements have been made available to these units, several of which have gone into action above their normal strength.

Though Nazi losses in the war with Russia as regards most equipment and material have not been overly severe, this does not apply to the loss of German aircraft which has been serious.

From German sources come the following claims of air action:

(1) Finns sank Russian troops ship and hit PT in the Gulf of Finland.

(2) Raids on the Caucasus area.

(3) During week ending November 9: 1 warship sunk
17 transports sunk
2 warships damaged
29 merchantmen damaged

-15-

CONFIDENTIAL

298

546

CONFIDENTIAL

Mediterranean - No information of a change in the basic air situation has been received since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Personalities - Germany's No. 1 flyer, Lieutenant Colonel Moelders, until recently in Russia, has been sent to Greece and Crete to assume charge of large scale operations against the Suez Canal, Alexandria and the British Mediterranean Fleet, according to a recent report.

The Flying Corps of Lieutenant General Pflugbeil is reported taking part in the offensive in the Crimea.

CONFIDENTIAL

298

556

CONFIDENTIAL

F. Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Libya

No unusual military operations have taken place in the Western Desert area. Patrol activities continue and there are indications that the Axis have increased substantially their forces in recent weeks.

East Africa

British forces in Abyssinia have encountered some opposition from native forces who have been harrassing their line of communications along the Sardo-Dessie road. Lately the natives shifted to the northwest toward Alomato and communications have been reestablished.

Recently three Italian battalions were moved out of the Gorgora-Ceiga sector west of Gondar, eastward to the line of Meldiba-Deva.

Russian Front

Four Black Shirt battalions entrained at Rome on November 3 for the Russian front. These were specially selected men who have recently undergone a period of special training in Italy so that their technical-military efficiency is at present considered high. The force wears the insignia "M" and are known as the "Mussolini Battalions". The greater part of them are veterans of the Italian campaigns in East Africa, Spain and Greece.

The many reports of 1,000,000 men, 350,000 men, 25 divisions, etc., being sent to Russia, can be boiled down to the 4 divisions already at the Front, the above token Black Shirt force and the 4 divisions earmarked, which may or may not actually leave.

2. Naval

On the night of November 8/9, an Italian convoy, consisting of ten merchant ships and an escort of 2 10,000-ton, 8-inch gun, TRENTO class cruisers and 4 destroyers, was attacked by a British naval force of

CONFIDENTIAL

295

56E

CONFIDENTIAL

two light cruisers and two destroyers. In the ensuing action, nine Italian merchant ships were sunk, a tanker left burning and abandoned, and two Italian destroyers were sunk. On the following night, a British submarine sank one destroyer and damaged another, east of Messina.

The badly damaged Italian battleship CAVOUR is now in the water off the Eastern Drydock Arsenal of Lloyd Triestino at Trieste. The 10,000-ton cruiser BOLZANO, which was damaged seriously in August, is now undergoing repairs at Genoa. The battleships VITTORIO and VITTORIO VENETO are still at Naples and the DORIA and DUILIO are at Taranto. The light cruiser EUGENIO DI SAVOIA is at La Spezia undergoing overhaul. Of the twenty-three submarines which were basing recently at Bordeaux, only six are left, the balance having returned to Italy.

3. Air

The latest disposition of the Italian Air Force is as follows:

Type	Libya	Aegean	Balkans	Sardinia	Total
Fighters	230	40	110	60	440
Bombers	60	16	25	50	151
Torpedo Bombers	10				10
Bomber Reconnaissance	50	40		20	110
Dive Bombers	20				20
Reconnaissance	30		80	10	120
Transport	25				25
TOTAL	425	96	215	140	876*

* Serviceability 60%

CONFIDENTIAL

298

57E

Exhibit No. Op-16-F

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

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Copy No. 83
Serial No. 23.

November 1, 1941

FORTNIGHTLY SUMMARY OF CURRENT NATIONAL SITUATIONS

(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publication due to its wide dissemination by mail.)

Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of the CONFIDENTIAL channels through which it is transmitted to the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.

T. S. Wilkinson
Captain, U. S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

297 (24 pages 16 Ca. 4)

588

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial No. 23
November 1, 1941

Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations

A. The Diplomatic Situation

1. Japan

Prince Konoye's Cabinet resigned on October 16. Lieutenant-General Tojo, Konoye's Minister of War, formed a new cabinet in which he holds the posts of Premier, Minister of War, and Minister of Home Affairs. He also reshuffled the membership of the powerful Cabinet Advisory Council to ensure that this body would cooperate with the government. Tojo has thus concentrated enormous powers in his own hands, far more than any Premier of modern times. He is jingoistic and anti-foreign, particularly anti-Russian. He has strong pro-Axis leanings.

Tojo stated that Japan would seek settlement of the China incident, strengthen her ties with the Axis, and continue her policy of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. An early Japanese attack upon Siberia is predicted by many observers, a drive against Thailand by others. Still others think an advance into Yunnan to cut the Burma Road is imminent. However, General Tojo announced that Japan-United States conversations will continue. This, together with the fact that a special five-day session of the Diet has been called for November 15, makes it appear probable that Japan will not launch any new attacks at least until after mid-November.

2. Germany

Since the beginning of the Russian Campaign, there have been indications of growing unrest among the civilian population in Germany - particularly along the Baltic littoral. At Danzig, military forces had to be called upon to assist the police in restoring order. Workmen are reported to have thrown pieces of iron at the soldiers, who thereupon fired into the crowd. It must not be assumed, however, that unrest has reached serious proportions. Blind faith in Hitler is still widespread, and signs of internal dissensions are, as yet, only slight. Incidents like the Danzig affair are isolated and should not be considered indicative of a general trend.

CONFIDENTIAL

297

59E

79716 O—46—pt. 15——27

CONFIDENTIAL

Coincident with the fall of the Japanese Cabinet of Premier Prince Konoye, Germany announced three important assignments to the Far East. Heinrich von Stahmer, specialist in Far Eastern and Asiatic affairs, was appointed Minister to the "Government in China" in Nanking, on October 15, 1941. Fritz Wiedemann, former German Consul at San Francisco, was appointed Consul General to Tsingtao on October 16, 1941. Tsingtao is the former German colony of Kiao-chau. Dr. Ernst Wendler, former German minister to Bolivia, whose removal from this office was requested by the Bolivian authorities in July, 1941, was appointed Minister to Thailand on October 16, 1941.

The Russian Campaign has created an oil situation in Germany more serious than any which has existed since September, 1939. Industrial plants have had their quotas cut sixty per cent in many instances. Many individual consumers have been cut off entirely.

Since the beginning of the Russian Campaign, Germany has had to investigate the possibility of another route if she is to continue to receive rubber from the Far East. It is reported that arrangements with the French authorities have been made for rubber shipments from Saigon to Valparaiso, thence by land to Buenos Aires, and from there to Portugal or Casablanca.

Because of the inadequacy of leather supplies from other sources, Germany has been attempting to run the blockade from Brazilian ports with German and Italian ships loaded with heavy hides.

Germany and Spain have signed a labor agreement whereby Spain will send 100,000 workers to Germany, but will accept no German workers in return. Germany had asked for an "exchange" of some 200,000 men.

The majority of Russian prisoners are employed by the Todt Organization on reconstruction in German-occupied Russia. About 20,000 Russian prisoners are employed in agriculture.

Dr. Karl Clodius, after concluding the German-Turkish trade agreement, went almost immediately to Rome, where he conferred with the German Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Walther Funk, and the Italian Minister of Exchange.

CONFIDENTIAL

97

60E

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Italy

A series of important conversations began in Rome on October 19 between Dr. Walther Funk, Germany's Minister of Economics and Raffaelo Riccardi, the Italian Minister of Exchange. The outcome of these conversations was that Germany not only made important concessions to Italy on the price and delivery of coal, but Dr. Funk took the occasion to paint a glowing picture of Italy's place in the post-war order. Italy is to have undisputed control of the Mediterranean - provided, of course, she furnishes in advance the men and labor Germany is demanding. Another one of the aims of the discussion was to provide a rearrangement of clearings to embrace not only Italy's trade with Germany, but that between Italy and the Balkans, as well as southern European countries.

Shortly after the discussions with the German delegation, Riccardi left for Bucharest to negotiate a new Italo--Rumanian commercial accord. A large Italian delegation is soon to follow, in order to complete the details.

Also, discussions are being carried on at the Nazi headquarters in Russia between Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italy's Foreign Minister, and Hitler and the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. The purpose of this meeting is somewhat obscure, but it is believed that plans are being made for a new diplomatic move aimed at Turkey.

A treaty fixing the borders between Croatia and Montenegro was signed in Zagreb October 27 by Italian and Croat officials. The new border starts from the zone of Dobricevo, northern limit of the border, and follows roughly the ancient borders of 1914 between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Montenegro and Serbia, reaching Mount Kliunack-Glava, which is the point where the borders between Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia meet.

The exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el Husseimi, has arrived in Rome, after escaping the British in Iran. As a result, Italy is provided with a great propaganda weapon, which may be used to turn the Moslem world against the British and Jews. The Grand Mufti fled from Palestine to Syria in 1937, when the British attempted to arrest him for Arab terrorist activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

297

61E

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From Syria, the Mufti went to Iraq when the French were about to seize him, and in Baghdad he directed the Iraqi revolt, which the British had to put down last May. After the British occupation of Iraq, the Grand Mufti sought shelter in Iran, from where he mysteriously disappeared when the British and Russians entered Teheran.

4. France

The termination of one year since the Montoire meeting of Adolph Hitler and Marshal Petain, at which the foundation for Franco-German collaboration was laid, finds France moving slowly into the Axis orbit. Economic collaboration is well under way, and political collaboration is expected to follow under renewed Nazi pressure. With a slowing up of German military operations in Russia during the winter, new developments are expected in the negotiations between France and Germany which may determine whether this policy is to survive. A strong effort is being made to return Pierre Laval to a position in the French government, in order to remove existing obstacles to collaboration.

While a state of war exists between France and Germany, normal diplomatic relations cannot be restored. However, an agreement has been reached for establishing, on a reciprocal basis, Nazi consulates in the French unoccupied zone and French consulates in the Reich. Krug von Nidda has been named German representative to Vichy and Georges Scapini, present Vichy negotiator concerning war prisoners, is expected to be the French envoy to Berlin.

In reprisal for the assassination of two German military authorities in France, 100 French hostages have been executed, bringing to 198 the total to date. The execution of an additional 100 hostages, sentenced to be shot unless the assassins of the German officers were found, has been postponed indefinitely.

Contrary to rumor, Gaston Henri-Haye will remain as French Ambassador to Washington, his appointment having been extended in July for another six months. The renewals for six months of the missions of Ambassadors Francois Pietri to Madrid and Leon Berard to the Vatican have been announced also.

General Gamelin, ex-Premiers Daladier, Blum and Reynaud, and former Minister Mandel have been ordered

-4-

CONFIDENTIAL

297

62E

CONFIDENTIAL

confined in the Pyrenees fortress of Pourtalet by Marshal Petain under the charge of having failed in official duties and engaged France in the war unprepared. This sentence is independent of the proceedings of the Supreme Court at Riom, which is attempting to fix responsibility for the French defeat.

French Fleet

No recent movements have been reported among units of the Vichy fleet. The disposition of the vessels is as follows:-

Toulon	BB STRASBOURG, OBB PROVENCE, CVS COMMANDANT TESTE, 4 CA's, 3 CL's, 18 DL's, 17 DD's, 23 SS's, and 14 PG's.
North Africa	BB DUNKERQUE (damaged), 1 DL, 4 DD's and 10 SS's.
Casablanca	BB JEAN BART (77% completed), 2 CL's, 2 DL's, 6 DD's, 12 SS's, and 6 PG's.
Dakar	BB RICHELIEU (Damaged), 2 CL's, 4 DL's, 1 DD, 10 SS's, and 4 PG's.
Madagascar -	3 SS's and 1 PG.
West Indies -	CV BEARN, 2 CL's, 1 PG, and 1 XCL.
Indo-China -	1 CL, 12 PG's and PR's.
Unreported -	1 SS and 1 PG.

French Colonies

North Africa

Germany is bringing strong pressure upon the Vichy Government for the ouster of General Weygand as French pro-Consul for Africa and his replacement by General Henri Dentz, who directed the French defense of Syria. Weygand, upon his recent return from Vichy, declared that the government of France has made no decision on changing the present status of France's African possessions and that no conces-

297

U3E

CONFIDENTIAL

sions have been granted the Axis for the use of air and naval bases in Africa. In accordance with the agreement between Vichy and Berlin, German consulates will be established in Algiers and Morocco, and an agreement between Darlan and Germany authorizes two Nazi "cultural missions," each consisting of about ten members, to Morocco and Algeria.

French Somaliland

According to a Vichy announcement of October 24, two "Anglo-de Gaullist" light columns of 300 men invaded French Somaliland, crossing the border from Eritrea. Two days later it was announced that the troops had been withdrawn. No British or Free French comment has been made.

Syria

It was announced in London on October 28 that Great Britain formally recognized the independence of the Syrian Republic.

CONFIDENTIAL

77

64E

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Latin America

Mexico

Relations have been renewed between Mexico and Great Britain. The British Minister to Mexico will be Charles Harold Bateman, Chancellor of the British Embassy at Cairo since 1937. The Mexican Minister to London will be Alfonso de Rosenzweig Diaz, now Minister to Venezuela.

Mexico and Colombia raised their respective legations to embassies "through the desire to tighten and make more cordial the relations between the two countries."

Guatemala

On Monday, October 20, a report emanating from Berlin, but first heard in Guatemala over station KGEI of San Francisco, stated the United States had delivered an ultimatum to Guatemala as follows: Withdrawal of German Minister Reinebeck; rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany; insistence that the United States would not purchase a single grain of produced coffee; and a demand that the firms on the United States proclaimed blacklist be forced out of business. The news was widely re-broadcast throughout Central American with many variations as to the terms of the alleged ultimatum.

A variation heard from a Costa Rican station was that German coffee was banned from the United States markets, and that the United States demanded that German banking firms in Guatemala be closed. On Tuesday, October 21, the Guatemalan Government officially denied that it had received any ultimatum from the United States Government. Reliable informants in Guatemala reported that the ultimatum news originated in Guatemala and that Foreign Minister Carlos Salazar and the President's German valet, Ibarguen, had collaborated with the German Legation on the subject. The German Legation has ordered certain prominent firms to discharge their employees by the end of November, indicating pressure being exerted by the United States Government as a reason for this action.

CONFIDENTIAL

297

GSE

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Honduras

Messages intercepted in Honduras indicate that Liberal revolutionary plots still are being hatched, but the plans discovered appear so impracticable that little serious effect is expected if attempts are made in the near future to put them into effect.

Panama

The new Government of Panama has revoked the decree of the former Arnulfo Arias administration, which forbade the arming of Panamanian merchant vessels. Although the tension has not subsided entirely, the new Government is clarifying and improving its position daily. Ex-President Arias still is at Managua in Nicaragua, from whence his departure is made difficult by the Nicaraguan Government's requirement that he have a valid passport, visaed by Panama and by the country of destination, before he is allowed to leave. Thus far he has no passport whatever.

Colombia

The Congressional debates concerning former War Minister Castro Martini's sale of a Colombian transport, believed worth $200,000, for a mere $50,000, subsided, although the opposition press continued to campaign against the Foreign Minister. The House is now presided over by an anti-Lopez Liberal, but election of Senate leaders has been delayed as a protest against coalition between anti-Lopez Liberals and Conservatives.

Peru

Rumors are current in Peru that that country will seek Japanese help if the United States, Argentina or Brazil attempts to restrain Peru in her struggle with Ecuador. Peru purchased Japanese munitions during her Letitia dispute with Colombia, as no other country would sell them to her, and Japanese munitions were sent to Peru in small quantities in the spring of this year.

Chile

Chilean Foreign Minister Rossetti, who was previously somewhat luke-warm towards Pan American cooperation, on October 22, made a strong speech in favor of continental defense and opposition to the Nazis. On October 31 he stated that the war situation makes common defense

-8-

CONFIDENTIAL

297

66E

CONFIDENTIAL

absolutely necessary, and that Chile could cooperate by a military alliance between Chile and the United States and by participation in the general continental defense plan. He also stated that an attempt will be made to work out an agreement between Chile and Argentina regarding the fortification and defense of the Magellan area.

Argentina

Responsible government leaders state that Argentina is seeking to work out details with Brazil for defense in the Atlantic, and with Chile for the defense of the Magellan area.

Paraguay

Two Paraguayan minesweepers recently joined the Argentine fleet in maneuvers, the first time in the history of South America in which the war ships of two countries have engaged in joint maneuvers.

Brazil

The Brazilian Army has taken over the inactive AIR FRANCE facilities in northern Brazil, notably at Recife, which will prevent any possibility that the Italian LATI or German CONDOR lines might use them.

President Vargas and the Brazilian Minister of War, General Dutra, apparently have decided to throw in their lot with the democracies. They have issued instructions that various groups of younger army officers be impressed with the urgent need for the closest Brazilian-American cooperation. Apparently a marked turn for the better is in progress among Brazilian Army leaders in their feeling toward the United States, although many continue to express their disappointment at the delay encountered in securing much needed military materiel ordered from the U. S.

Venezuela

Two important treaties have been completed between Colombia and Venezuela. One settles an old boundary dispute, and the other provides for a non-aggression, conciliation and arbitration pact between the two countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

277

67E

CONFIDENTIAL

Cuba

The Cuban House of Representatives has enacted a resolution to send a protest to Hitler against the killing of hostages in France and is considering requesting all the Latin American countries to take similar action.

Trends

Military and Naval

Argentina is reported to be contemplating sending a Military and Naval Mission to the United States to discuss her part in the hemisphere defense and acquisition of needed material.

Economic

Efforts are being exerted by Germans in Guatemala and Costa Rica with some success through their sympathizers in those governments, to avoid the full effect of the application of the United States Blacklist to German economic interests in the countries concerned.

Federal Loan administrator Jesse Jones has announced that the Export-Import Bank has agreed to lend Mexico $30,000,000 for national highway developments, at the rate of $10,000,000 per year.

A free commerce treaty has been signed between Guatemala and El Salvador which should be of mutual advantage to those countries, as each imports certain products which the other exports.

Totalitarian Penetration

The situation, as far as can be estimated by surface indications, continues to improve through Latin America. This is particularly gratifying in view of the continued successes of the Nazis in Russia. Hitherto such outstanding German successes have been visible throughout Latin America in the shape of immediate softening of the local Governments' attitudes toward Nazi activities. It is felt that the different nations of Latin America now may consider themselves committed to such an extent against Axis activities that any further appeasement would be extremely awkward. When and if such a position is reached,

CONFIDENTIAL

68E

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it is believed that the Latin American nations will proceed in a much more efficacious and expeditious manner to rid themselves of Axis activities than anything that they have manifested hitherto. Apparently Brazil already definitely considers herself in that position. It is believed that the majority of the other countries do, with the possible exceptions of Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Peru. Mexico still continues a delicate balancing act on the fence, while she distributes favors equally both to the Democratic and Nazi-Fascist sides, despite her lip service to democracy. Guatemala and Costa Rica, in view of their acknowledged weaknesses, may feel constrained not to offend the Axis too deeply thus far. Peru, while continuing to conduct her relations with Ecuador in the best totalitarian manner, has her Vice President in the United States stirring up a smoke-screen of democracy.

B. The Japanese Military Situation

The Japanese forces in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia, disposed for attack upon Russia, are reliably reported to have been increased to 684,000. At the same time reinforcements are arriving in Indo-China and it is believed that the garrison in that colony is to be increased from 50,000 to approximately 100,000 men. A large new air base is being established in northern Indo-China. The Japanese force at Canton is also being strengthened. The small Japanese garrison at Sharps Peak near Foochow has been withdrawn. A minor clash near the Siberian-Manchukuo border, in which both sides suffered casualties, was reported by the Russians but denied by the Japanese.

C. The Japanese Naval Situation

The Japanese Navy now, according to the Navy Department's spokesman, is ready for any immediate eventuality. Mobilization plans have been carried out including not only changes in commands but the increase of ships' crews to full war complements.

The Combined Fleet has remained in home waters on normal stations except that a few units possibly including one capital ship have moved over to stations on the Japan Sea. Fleet aircraft units, however, in considerable strength have moved down to Southern Formosa. The Third Fleet, normally stationed on the China Coast, continues to remain in home waters. Other fleets are on normal stations. Although troop transports and cargo ships have been taking troops and supplies to ports in Indo-China, these vessels have not been accompanied by naval escorts.

CONFIDENTIAL

297

67E

CONFIDENTIAL

D. The Chinese Military Situation

On October 13, after three days of indecisive street fighting, the Chinese attackers withdrew from Ichang. Since that time nothing but sporadic skirmishing has been reported in this area. Skirmishing also occurred in southern Shansi, in north Honan and near Canton.

Russia has notified Chungking that she is unable to continue shipments of war supplies to China.

297

70E

CONFIDENTIAL

E. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Strength

No new information regarding the strength of the German Army has been received since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Distribution

According to a reliable source, the distribution of the German Army on October 8, 1941, was estimated to be as follows:

Location	Total Number of Divisions	Including (Mechanized)	(Motorized)
Russia Northern Group - 31 Central " 77 Southern " 59	167	(19)	(21)
Finland	8		(1)
Poland/East Prussia	10		
Balkans	14		
Italy - Libya	3	(2)	
Holland-France-Belgium	30		
Norway	7		
Denmark	2		
Germany and Austria (exclusive of E. Prussia)	19		(2)

The Tank Army, commanded by Colonel-General Hoeppner, has been transferred from the Northern to the Central Group of German Armies on the Russian Front.

Operations

Eastern Front - The second half of October saw the large German offensive slowed down by strong local

CONFIDENTIAL

297 71E

CONFIDENTIAL

Russian opposition and inclement weather.

Finnish Sector - Following the capture of Petrozavodsk, on Lake Onega, Finnish forces have been advancing northward along the Leningrad-Murmansk Railway. A Finnish column operating eastward out of Central Finland has joined forces with the column pushing north from Petrozavodsk at a point near the northwest tip of Lake Onega. The Finns are waiting for full winter weather, prior to resuming a vigorous offensive.

The Finns are reported contemplating cessation of offensive operations upon reaching and securing the following line:

White Sea to Lake Onega
Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga
Lake Ladoga - Karelian Isthmus - Gulf of Finland

A partial demobilization of the Finnish Army is to be carried out, as dwindling Russian resistance releases more and more Finnish military man power.

The Finns have apparently assumed a defensive attitude on the Karelian Isthmus facing Leningrad, at the Soviet-held island fortress of Koivisto and at Hangoe.

North-Central Sector - Dagoe, last Russian stronghold in the Baltic Islands, was taken by the Germans a week ago. Siege operations continued at Leningrad, with no apparent change in the local situation. The beleaguered Russians still obtain some supplies and reenforcements by water via Lake Ladoga. The Germans are reported to have established and enlarged a bridgehead across the Volkhov River, while a German division, farther east, crossed the Svir River and advanced some 20 miles to the southward. These German operations may be designed to eliminate the remaining Russian-held shore line on Lake Ladoga. Strong Russian positions still exist in the Valdai Hills sector. It now appears that the Germans have made no progress eastward from the line: Lake Ilmen - Seliger Lake.

Central Sector - The Germans officially claimed to have eliminated the bulk of Marshal Timoshenko's Group of Field Armies in the double-encirclement battles of Vyazma and Bryansk. The Soviets denied

CONFIDENTIAL

297

72E

CONFIDENTIAL

these claims and maintain that the main strength of these armies fell back to new positions closer to Moscow. The northern flank of the German force advancing along the Moscow-Smolensk highway branched north from Vyazma, took Rzhev, and drove on to Kalinin, where it was apparently stopped by Russian counter-attacks. Near Mozhaisk, west of Moscow, the principal German advance was halted, fighting spreading northward to Volokolamsk and southward to Maloyaroslavetz. German forces, coming by way of Bryansk, captured Orel and Kaluga, and pushed up towards Moscow as far as Naro-Fominsk. Severe Russian resistance and inclement weather, which bogged down mechanized equipment and supply trains, slowed down and stopped the Germans. With freezing weather hardening the ground, however, the Germans may regain a great deal of their mobility.

Southern Sector - The German advance into the Donetz industrial area has been relatively slow. Severe local Russian opposition and inclement weather are believed largely responsible. During the past two weeks, the Germans took Kursk, Belgorod, Kharkov, Kramatorsk, Stalino and Taganrog. Rostov is threatened; severe fighting is reported 20 miles west of that town.

In a battle beginning October 18, the Germans officially declare to have broken through two Soviet defense lines just south of the Perekop Isthmus, taking 15,000 prisoners. Farther west, Odessa fell to a siege by German and Rumanian forces. The Russians claimed to have successfully evacuated the garrison and most industrial equipment.

Troop Units

German SS Panzer troops in tropical uniforms were recently seen for the first time in the streets of Berlin. Inasmuch as these militarized Nazi Party troops are selected carefully and trained as special assault units, these new SS formations may be an indication of contemplated offensive operations somewhere in the lower latitudes - either North Africa, the Near East, or perhaps West Africa.

Army Personalities

General of Aviators Danckelmann, successor to General von Schroeder as Military Commander in Serbia,

297 136

CONFIDENTIAL

is reported to be in command of three German Divisions in Yugoslavia. These forces are being employed to put down the rebellion.

2. Naval

Distribution

Ship Name	Type	Date	Location
TIRPITZ	BB	September 29	Danzig Bay
SCHARNHORST	BB	October 13	Brest
GNEISENAU	BB	October 13	Brest
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	OBB	Prior Oct. 17	Departed Kiel
SCHLESIEN	OBB	October 7	Central Baltic
GRAF ZEPPELIN	CV	October 12	Stettin
ADMIRAL SCHEER	CA	Prior Oct. 24	Departed Hamburg
LUETZOW	CA	October 17	Kiel
SEYDLITZ	CA	October 12	Bremen
PRINZ EUGEN	CA	October 13	Brest
ADMIRAL HIPPER	CA	October 17	Kiel
NUERNBERG	CL	September 29	Gdynia
LEIPZIG	CL	October 20	Off coast N. of Kiel
KOELN	CL	September 29	Gdynia
EMDEN	CL	October 20	Kiel
4 Units	DD	September 24	Northern Norway
1 Unit	DD	September 24	Bergen
5-7 Units	DD	September 24	In the Baltic
3 Units	DD	September 24	North Sea ports
2 Units	DD	October 24	Cherbourg
Remaining Units	DD	-	Unknown
150 Units (estimated)	SS	Operating out of German, Norwegian and French Atl. ports	

297

74E

CONFIDENTIAL

Operations

A German official communique on October 21, 1941, announced the conclusion of operations in the Baltic and along the Estonian littoral. Sea forces under the command of General Admiral Carls are credited with contributing decisively to the conquest of the Baltic Islands. Units of the fleet transported troops and broke up mine fields, and naval personnel participated in operations on land.

Grand Admiral Raeder has not given whole-hearted approval to the all-out submarine campaign advocated by Vice Admiral Doenitz, Commander of German U-boats. Admiral Raeder is believed to have recommended that Germany concentrate her naval efforts in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean and reduce her scale of operations in the Atlantic.

Approximately 20 submarines have been operating recently west of longitude 30 and between latitudes 50 and 56. Some submarines have been operating as far west as longitude 53. Five or six submarines continue to patrol the water in the vicinity of the Azores and of the Canary Islands. One submarine is known to have been operating recently in the approaches to the White Sea.

Personnel

The presence of Lieutenant-Commanders "under instruction" on German U-boats indicates that the German Navy is reaching out into the older brackets for U-boat officer material. At the same time it appears that younger officers, even from classes as recent as those of 1935 and 1936, are also filling command positions in the U-boat service. At the beginning of the war, the most successful U-boat commanders came from the 1930 and the 1931 classes. Many of these have been lost to the service through death, capture or physical disability. There is evidence that there is also a lack of trained U-boat ratings.

Personalities

General Admiral Carls is the third ranking officer in the German Navy. While the BISMARCK was on her last

CONFIDENTIAL

297

75E

79716 O—46—pt. 15——28

CONFIDENTIAL

cruise, Admiral Carls, as Commander-in-Chief "Gruppe West", directed the course of the BISMARCK from shore.

3. Air

Strength and Disposition

German air forces were reliably reported disposed as follows on October 1:

Western Fr.	Russian Fr.	Mediterranean	Central Ger.	Total
1032	2545	380	583	4540

More than half of all Nazi planes in Russia are said to be concentrated in the drive on Moscow.

Estimated total air strength and monthly plane production remains as shown in the last Fortnightly Summary - 2900 planes of all types and 2200 monthly production.

Operations

West - There has been no substantial change as regards German air operations over the British Isles and in the Western approaches since the last Fortnightly Summary.

Eastern Front - German reports make the following claims regarding air activity during the last fortnight:

(1) hits on Murmansk railway;

(2) troops short of supplies in Kalinin area provisioned by air;

(3) much of Colonel General Keller's air fleet, formerly employed in the Latvia-Estonia-Lake Peipus section, liberated for action elsewhere;

(4) sank 30,000 tons of Russian shipping in the evacuation of Odessa.

CONFIDENTIAL

297

76E

CONFIDENTIAL

Lediterranean - Until recently General Geissler maintained air headquafters in Sicily for operations in the vicinity of Lalta. The bulk of his planes have now been transferred to Greece, where he will direct Nazi air activity throughout the Lediterranean.

German air forces have been relieved of the air defense of Bardia by the Italians.

Personalities

The former German Air Attache in London, General of Aviator Wenninger, is now on the staff of Field Larshal von Sperrle, Commander of Air Fleet No. 3, which is operating against the British Isles and shipping in the Atlantic.

277

774

CONFIDENTIAL

F. Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations

1. Military

Libya

Recently the Germans augmented their forces in the Western Desert by one armored and one infantry division, which brings their total strength to:

2 Armored Divisions (15th and 21st)
1 Motorized (5th)
1 Infantry

The Italian forces in Libya total 11 full divisions, plus 4 divisions which are being reconstituted from four divisions destroyed by the British last winter.

East Africa

The Italians still are continuing the fight in the Gondar area of Ethiopia, where their strength is now estimated to be: 15,000 men; 12,000 rifles; 57 guns.

Eastern Front

The German High Command gave Italian troops a share of the credit for the capture of Stalino in the Donetz Basin. The Italian forces are now operating about forty miles west of Rostov on Don.

Occupied Territory

There is every indication that a real war is underway in Serbia. Nearly all railroad operations have ceased because of the activities of saboteurs and a number of trains have been derailed or blown up. Between forty to fifty thousand armed soldiers are conducting guerrilla activities from the hills of Montenegro and Herzegovina against Italian and German occupational forces. These guerrilla bands are receiving the cooperation of the rural population to the extent that almost the entire occupied territory is in a state of insurgency. To control the situation, the Italians have been forced to send a total of at least 25 divisions and possibly as many as 30 divisions to this theater. However, there are reports to the effect that Italian soldiers are selling their weapons and military supplies, deserting and entering into conspiracies with the inhabitants of this area.

297

CONFIDENTIAL

78E

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In the occupied territory, the Italian forces are distributed as follows:

Croatia and Lubiana	3 divisions
Albania and Montenegro	8 divisions
Dalmatia	4 divisions
Greece and Aegean Islands	10 divisions

2. Naval

Several losses have been sustained by the Italian Navy during the past fortnight. On October 5 an Italian submarine was sunk by a British destroyer when two or three Italian submarines attempted an attack on an English convoy in the Atlantic. Two small destroyers were sunk by mines in the Central Mediterranean about the middle of October and an auxiliary armament cruiser, the CITTA di GENOA was sunk off Naples by a British submarine.

The present estimated strength of the Italian Navy is as follows:

Battleships:	2	LITTORIOS
	3	CAVOURS
Cruisers:	4	8" gun cruisers (1 badly damaged)
	11	6" gun cruisers
	2	light cruisers (old, efficiency very low)
Destroyers:	91	
Submarines:	72	

At the start of the war Italy had 121 submarines and her war plans were based on the fact that the striking effort of this large submarine force would assist her surface forces in rapidly gaining control of the entire Mediterranean. This was the biggest submarine force in Europe and was made up mostly of new types. Immediately after Italy joined the war her submarine losses grew to considerable and disastrous proportions. To date Italy has lost approximately forty-nine submarines. However, Italy is constructing undersurface craft (believed to be a small type) at the rate of two per month and it is possible that about twenty of these have been built since the war began. Some reports state that building equals losses but that the personnel problem hinders effective additions to the submarine force.

CONFIDENTIAL

297

79E

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Air

Contrary to the general belief, there is no evidence that the morale and fighting spirit of Italian pilots is poor. On the other hand, there is ample proof that in actual combat the Italians are outclassed frequently by the superiority of British pilots and aircraft. The Italian Air Force has been hampered by inadequate training and outmoded planes.

The estimated strength and disposition of the Italian Air Force is as follows:

Libya	
Central & East Sector	302
Western Sector	159
Saharan Sector	50
Balkans	188
Aegean	104
Sardinia	130

Italy suffered its worst air raid of the war on October 21 when the British attacked Naples for 5 1/2 hours. Extensive damage was inflicted on the electric power center which has paralyzed train service. Entire streets of buildings were destroyed by fire, the industrial section around the suburb of San Giovanni a Teduccio was razed and fuel oil tanks near Granali were hit. In spite of the tremendous damage there were very few civilian casualties as the raid was confined entirely to military objectives.

297

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EXHIBIT NO. 81



O. N. I. No. 107

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR the Director
Assistant Director

Subject: Burning of Secret and Confidential Codes and Ciphers by Japanese Embassy.

I was informed from a reliable source last evening that the Japanese have destroyed by burning their confidential and secret codes and ciphers.

It is probable that the Japanese Embassy has retained one copy of one secret or confidential code for emergency use.

Respectfully,

Maxwell C. Davis

Confidential

MSD-7BE + F-2 undisp

286

Op-16

SECRET December 5, 1941

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: O.N.I. estimates of Japanese forces in Indo-China, and adjacent areas.

25,000 men in Tonkin Province (North)
80,000 men in Southern Indo-China
105,000 men.....TOTAL

90 planes near Hanoi (North)
160 planes Southern Indo-China
250 planes.....TOTAL

NAVAL FORCES

At Camranh Bay or vicinity	1 Heavy Cruiser 1 Converted Seaplane Tender 9 Submarines 21 Transports or supply vessels.
At Saigon	2 Destroyers
Indo-China Coast	1 Light Cruiser 1 Minelayer
In the general Hainan-Formosa area	1 Heavy Cruiser 3 Light Cruisers 24 Destroyers 10 Submarines 3 Aircraft Tenders 1 Submarine Tender 1 Minelayer 27 (approx.) transports or supply vessels.

In supporting distance are:

On Hainan 30,000 men and 200 planes.
On Formosa 45,000 men and 100 planes.

A 2

Copy No. 7

In reply to No.
Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1941.

Memorandum for the Director

1. Attached hereto is a resume of the outstanding military, naval and political moves made by Japan during the past two months. No effort is made to draw conclusions in each instance but a view of the general situation would indicate that the principal preparatory effort has been directed by the Japanese looking towards, first: an eventual control or occupation of Thailand followed almost immediately by an attack against British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore.

A.H. McCollum.

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24

Memorandum for the Director

December 1, 1941.

ARMY PREPARATIONS

Starting about 1 October and continuing until about the middle of November the Japanese shipped out of the port of Shanghai alone a large quantity of military supplies. Vessels carrying this equipment were seen headed South or Southwest. The equipment consisted of all sorts of military stores and equipment, a large number of landing boats being particularly noted. Other especially noteworthy items consisted of a considerable number of tanks and trucks, quite a few of which were camouflaged green; considerable railroad equipment, particularly locomotives and rolling stock. While a few troops were taken out at this time these ships principally carried equipment. Starting about 15 November the character of the shipments underwent a marked change. From 15 to 21 November large transports took out of Shanghai alone some 24,000 fully equipped veteran troops, while an additional 30,000 were reported as being withdrawn from North China reputedly destined for Formosa. From 21 to 26 November 20,000 troops were landed at Saigon and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops already there were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves and docks at Haiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with Japanese transports unloading supplies and men. It is estimated that the following Japanese troops are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action.

(a) South and Central Indo-China	70,000
(b) Northern Indo-China	25,000

The landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and more distant Formosa.

NAVAL PREPARATIONS

Starting about 1 October and continuing through November extensive naval preparations have been made. The following are the high points of this preparation.

(a) All possible ships have been recalled to Japan for a quick docking and repair check up that has now been completed.

(b) Some additional naval aircraft strength has been sent to the Japanese Mandate Island area.

(c) An air and surface patrol was established on a line between the Marshall Islands and the Gilberts. Guam was placed under air and submarine observation.

(d) The CinC 2nd Fleet organized two task groups, both rather loosely knit organizations; group No. 1 to operate in the South China Area and group No. 2 to operate in the Mandate Islands area. This organ-

25

ization is about finished and the CinC of the 2nd Fleet expects to be in Southern Formosa by 3 or 4 December.

(e) The CinC of the Combined Air Force has just completed an inspection of all outlying naval air groups, particularly those in the Mandates, South China and Formosa.

(f) Many merchant vessels have recently been taken over by the Navy and at least three of these have been equipped as antiaircraft ships.

POLITICAL PREPARATIONS - 1 October - 30 Nov.

Japanese residents particularly women and children have been evacuated from

(a) British India and Singapore
(b) Netherlands East Indies
(c) Philippine Islands
(d) Hongkong
(e) Australia
(f) Many Japanese residents have recently withdrawn from the United States, Canada and South America.

Preparations have been made to shift the center of the War Intelligence and Espionage net covering the Americas from Washington to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Japanese Embassy at Rio de Janeiro has been equipped with short wave radio transmitter.

Great stress has been laid on establishment of espionage net in Thailand and Singapore as follows:

(a) Japanese consulate at Singora is manned by 4 Army Intelligence Officers.

(b) A consulate has been established at the northern railhead of Chiengmai.

(c) Army communication personnel and equipment is present at Singora, Bangkok and Chiengmai.

(d) Four Army and Navy officers under assumed names have been sent to the Embassy at Bangkok. The Ambassador has received instructions not to interfere in the work of these men.

(e) A chain of drug stores manned by intelligence agents is in process of establishment.

(f) Japanese Army doctors under assumed names are in the hospital at Bangkok.

(g) At the end of November 60,000 Bahts were sent in gold to the Ambassador at Bangkok with instructions to hold it for emergency intelligence use.

(h) At least two sabotage agents have been sent into Singapore.

-2-

26

In French Indo-China the Japanese military has taken over many police functions. Many Chinese and Annamese are being summarily arrested. At the end of November Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa queried his government as to whether he and his staff should take over the governmental functions of French Indo-China or continue to function through the front of the French Government General.

The Consul General at Shanghai has informed his government that all preparations are complete for taking over all physical property in China belonging to British, Americans and other enemy nationals.

The Army General Staff sent urgent requests for information for U.S. and Dutch troop and plane strengths and dispositions in the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies.

Special Ambassador Kurusu sent to the United States to conduct negotiations with the United States.

Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

November 1, 1941

Memorandum for the Director

SUBJECT: Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 30850

1. In this dispatch Major McHugh assumes that a Japanese drive from northern Indo-China to cut the Burma Road is imminent. He further states that the only hope of blocking this drive would be active participation in the campaign of all American and British Far Eastern air units which would require foreign (presumably American) seizure and control of means of transportation and air fields in Yunnan province.

2. In a message which the American Ambassador states is now being forwarded to President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek states that the Japanese will launch a drive to cut the Burma Road within 30 days. He takes a somewhat less serious view of the situation than does Major McHugh. Chiang says that he has land forces adequate to defend the road but will need air support. He indicates that he desires aid from British and American air effectives in Singapore and Manila in a voluntary status. He says nothing about foreign control of Chinese air fields and Chinese means of communication.

3. Considering the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Indo China border and Kunming, it is believed that the Chinese, if they fight and are given some air support from Britain and America, can halt this Japanese drive. The Japanese now have less than 100,000 men in Indo-China. How many they can transport there in the next 30 days is problematical, but it is considered that they cannot maintain their present concentrations (which threaten Russia in the North), maintain their present garrisons in China, and at the same time spare more than 200,000 troops for the drive into Yunnan.

4. The real question here is: Will the Chinese fight? In this connection there have been many rumors that Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan Province has sold out or soon will sell out to Wang Ching-wei. If this happens there is little that Chiang Kai-shek, the British, or the United States can do to save the Burma Road. This rumor, however, lacks confirmation.

5. Chinese character should also be taken into consideration. When aid is promised to them they have a strong tendency to stop fighting themselves sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan - in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

A. H. McCollum

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28

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Copy No. 5 of 5 Copies

Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Summary of the Far Eastern Situation.

1. The ultra-nationalistic element of Japan has seized control of the Government and is prepared to push collaboration with the Axis powers and the opposition to the democracies to the ultimate extent.

2. At the present time Japan has about 684,000 troops in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia in a position to attack Siberia. There is every evidence that due to the recent weakening of Russian forces the Japanese have the position and strength to attack Siberia. The Japanese armies in China are bogged down and a stalemate has resulted with neither side capable of obtaining a decision.

3. Economically food is not a problem for Japan but in order to supply her war industries which are essential for her present war effort Japan must have access to over-seas markets or must open up an over-land supply route to Europe through Russia. Failing in either of these two alternatives, she must face a situation in which she will see her total war effort gradually decline which must eventually result in her eviction from the Asiatic continent and her decline as a world power.

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29

In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1941

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Political Situation - Japan

With the advent of the Tojo Cabinet Japan swings back to closer Axis ties under the aegis of the jingoistic military clique. Although Tojo's Cabinet retains a balance between the comparatively conservative Navy members and the more radical Army there are remaining a number of old wheel horse politicians. The report that General Tojo is filling the Home Ministry and War Portfolios in addition to the Premiership indicates clearly however that the Army intends to take the reins of the Government, and such being the case, the intimation is clear that positive action detrimental to United States' interests may be expected.

2. The Economic Situation - Japan

The basic weakness in Japan's economic situation is her lack of raw materials to feed her war industries. She depends on overseas imports for 65% to 100% of her supplies of nickel, cotton, rubber, molybdenum, aluminum, lead, mercury, oil, tin, mica, iron; this dependence is partly offset by stockpiles, particularly oil, molybdenum and aluminum, but existing stocks of other items are not sufficient to meet current requirements for more than six months. A basic restriction on expansion of Japan's industries is the lack of machine tools, precision instruments, refinery installations, and workmen skilled in producing and installing these items. The living standards of Japan's industrial and agricultural workers reflect the condition of Japan's foreign trade, particularly the export of silk and the import of industrial raw materials. The steady decline of foreign trade has caused the living standards of the entire nation to deteriorate. On the other hand, Japan is 97% self-sufficient in basic food items; in recent weeks, however, the government has completed elaborate plans for increased restriction of food consumption and for admixture of substitute and synthetic foods and drinks; plans have been made also for nationwide distribution of 150,000,000 pieces of canned goods and for distributed storage of rice, biscuits, canned fish, and vegetables. In brief, Japan is not prepared to feed her war industries for a period exceeding six months if a blockade closes her main overseas routes; she is prepared, however, to provide for an indefinite period staple food supplies.

30

259

3. The Military Situation - Japan

There are reliably reported to be 684,000 Japanese troops in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia. These forces are disposed for an attack upon Siberia. Russian strength east of the Baikal Lake is believed inferior to these Japanese concentrations.

There are slightly over half a million Japanese troops in China Proper. Three limited objective Japanese offensives have been carried out or attempted in China during the last month. Japanese planes continue an intensive bombing of points in unoccupied China. Japan shows no indication of giving up any important points in China or relaxing her efforts to crush the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

There are roughly fifty thousand Japanese troops in Indo-China. These units are not disposed for an attack on Thailand. It is reported, however, that Japan plans to double this force in the near future and some of these reenforcements may have already arrived at Haiphong.

The dry season in Thailand begins in November and lasts until April. Japan launched her 1904 war against Russia on February 1 and attacked Manchoukuo in late September. The Nipponese seem to prefer winter campaigns in this area. Thus, both to the north and south, weather conditions are favorable to military operations. In Japan Proper, training of reserves continues. The maximum of Japanese manpower is being placed on a war footing.

4. The Naval Situation - Japan

The naval forces of Japan may now be considered to be fully mobilized for imminent action. All forces not urgently required in the Mandates and the Asiatic continent have been called back to home waters and during a period of recent marked inactivity extensive personnel changes have been carried out and mobilization plans probably completed.

5. The Military Situation - China

Chiang Kai-shek has at least one million men under arms. There are almost half as many guerrillas back of the Japanese lines. China's army lacks almost everything except manpower and small arms. It has practically no offensive striking power, but possesses considerable defensive strength. For almost three years the Sino-Japanese war has been a stalemate broken only by occasional limited Japanese offensives designed to break up Chinese concentrations close to Japanese lines. The stalemate is likely to continue for a long time because:

(1) Japan cannot annihilate the Chinese army.
(2) The Chinese cannot drive the Japanese back.
(3) No mutually satisfactory basis for peace has been suggested.

U.S. help to China on the scale now planned will greatly raise Chinese morale and make more effective China's war of attrition. The possibility of a Chinese offensive actually recapturing territory strongly held is, however, still far distant.

-2-

2-4

6. French, Indo-China

Vichy and the Colonial Government are beginning to resist Japanese demands. It is not believed that they will be successful in these efforts, and Indo-China may be considered virtually under Japanese domination.

7. Thailand

The Thai Government is resisting Japanese pressure and will probably fight if the Japanese invade the country. They have an army of about 70,000, backed by some 200,000 reserves. Their air force and navy are negligible. However with British help they could give the Japanese a lot of trouble. At least it is believed that the conquest of Thailand, aided by the British, would develop into a major military campaign. It is not believed that Japan has the strength to carry on major campaigns in the north and the south simultaneously.

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Op-16-F
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32

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

September 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL TURNER

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation.

JAPANESE ARMY

An analysis of all available reports indicates that there are in Manchoukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia about 500,000 Japanese troops. Movement of Japanese units from Japan and China to these territories continues. Within the territories feverish movements of men and supplies, designed to place forces in position to attack Russia, have been proceeding since shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-German hostilities. Recent relaxation of restrictions, permitting some railroad travel by civilians, leads to the belief that military preparations are nearing completion. Russian strength east of Lake Baikal is believed to be less than these Japanese concentrations.

In Indo-China there are roughly 50,000 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese are strengthening their positions here and working on long range plans to occupy the region permanently, but they are not ready to attack Thailand, nor are they making sound logistic preparations for such an attack. The forthcoming Japanese maneuvers near the Thai border are believed more of a political than a military gesture.

Half a million Japanese troops remain in China proper. Japan is at present conducting three sizable offensives against Chiang Kai-shek's men and during the last two months has greatly intensified her bombing raids. It is plain, therefore, that Japan intends neither to give up any important points in China nor to relax her efforts to destroy Chiang's regime.

Training of reserves continues in Japan. The maximum of Japanese man power is being placed on a war footing.

The Japanese Army is, in brief:-

1. Ready, or nearly ready, to strike at Russia.
2. Continuing the campaign in China.
3. Not in position for a southward drive.
4. Preparing for a maximum effort.

JAPANESE NAVY

Recent dispositions of the Japanese naval forces afloat have shown a marked transfer of interest from the South, in waters off China and Indo-China, to home waters. The entire Third Fleet has been withdrawn from blockade duty off the China coast back to home ports. With the exception of certain minor operations of light craft in the Japan Sea and more recent submarine operations off the southern coasts of Japan, the Combined Home Fleet has been inactive, undergoing extensive personnel changes. This personnel reorganization which is not normal for this time of year, may be interpreted to mean that preparations are being made for an emergency

(6 [illegible]) 33

requiring employment of all naval forces. Remaining in China waters and off Indo-China now are only the regularly stationed 1st (Central), 2nd (South) and 3rd (North) Expeditionary Fleets, augmented by the so-called Special Expeditionary Fleet consisting principally of auxiliaries servicing the occupation forces in Indo-China.

Naval shipbuilding remains shrouded in secrecy, but it has been reasonably well established that two (2) new carriers have been or are being commissioned, one light cruiser has recently been added to the forces afloat, and within the past year five destroyers and at least one submarine have been completed. Lack of materials has in the recent past retarded the building program and is undoubtedly an increasing handicap. One new battleship may be nearing completion, but there is no conclusive evidence to this effect.

CHINA

Counting provincial forces and Reds, Chiang has at least one million men under arms. There are almost half as many guerrillas back of the Japanese lines. China's army lacks almost everything except man power and small arms. It has practically no offensive striking power but possesses considerable defensive strength. Unless the Japanese greatly increase their forces, they will not be able either to drive to Kunming and cut the Burma Road or to capture Chungking. It is doubtful if they could capture Chungking in any event. Chinese skill in guerrilla operations and attrition warfare is such that Japan cannot measurably reduce her present garrison in China without shortening her lines and giving up territory.

For almost three years the Sino-Japanese war has been a stalemate, broken only by occasional limited Japanese offensives designed to break up Chinese concentrations close to Japanese lines. These offensives succeed, but the concentrations always reform. The Japanese are at present engaged in such an offensive in the Wutai Mountain district of Shansi, - their 20th drive in this area.

The stalemate is likely to continue for a long time because:

1. The Japanese cannot annihilate the Chinese armies.
2. The Chinese cannot drive the Japanese back.
3. No mutually satisfactory basis for peace has been suggested.

U.S. help to China on the scale now planned will greatly raise Chinese morale and make more effective China's war of attrition. A Chinese offensive actually recapturing territory strongly held is, however, still far distant.

FAR EAST POLITICAL-MILITARY-ECONOMIC SITUATION

All phases of Japanese economy have been or are rapidly being placed on a totalitarian war footing. The Japanese army and navy are preparing for supreme emergencies. By taking virtual control of the army the Emperor may be either (a) insuring cooperation of the army with the foreign policy of the government or (b) taking the final step to prepare the nation for a totalitarian military effort. By getting rid of Matsuoka, initiating negotiations with the U.S., and appointing two conservatives, Yamada and Toyoda, as head of the army and foreign service respectively, Nippon is inclining away from the Axis and towards the democracies. Japan acquired Indo-China partly as a result of joining the Axis and the Axis nations have recognized Manchukuo and Nanking. Tokyo may reason that the Axis has nothing more to give her and can now be dropped.

34

What Japan will do depends on a number of factors, chief of which are:

1. Progress of fighting on the Russo-German front. If Russia collapses Japan would be strongly tempted to take Saghalien and the Maritime Provinces. Germany's successes in the Ukraine have strengthened the pro-Axis groups in Japan.

2. Japan's economic situation. She must get basic war materials, including oil, iron ore, scrap iron and cotton. Her most immediate serious shortage, rubber, has been alleviated by her conquest of Indo-China. It is believed that Japan's reserve stocks of other materials will permit her to sit on the fence between the Axis and the Democracies for several months.

3. The progress of her U.S. negotiations. It is not believed that Japan will agree to withdraw her forces from China on a fixed date, or from Indo-China at all.

4. The progress of the naval war in the Atlantic. The President's "shooting order" committed strong units of the American fleet to operations in the Atlantic. This delighted the Japanese who would like to see the entire U.S. fleet committed there. If in future we are compelled to transfer additional vessels to the Atlantic we may anticipate that each such transfer will be followed by a stiffening of Japan's attitude towards us.

5. Weather Conditions. Japan started her campaign against Manchukuo in September and her 1904 war against Russia in February. In spite of some obvious disadvantages the Japanese seem to prefer winter campaigns in this area, probably because the frozen ground makes widespread operations possible.

In Thailand the dry season lasts from November to April, the wet season from May to October.

Thus both to the north and south winter campaigns are feasible.

The undersigned believes that Japan will:

1. Continue the negotiations with the U.S., but not yield on any points which she considers would endanger the "East Asia co-prosperity sphere".

2. Watch closely the Russo-German fighting and the naval warfare in the Atlantic.

3. If Russia collapses, attack Siberia.

4. If the bulk of the U.S. fleet is withdrawn to the Atlantic, strike south. She does not expect this development but could quickly exploit it.

5. If Russia is still resisting strongly by December, wait, at least until late next spring, before taking any decisive action.

R.A. Boone.

Distribution:
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File - Copy No. 4

35

(Memo attached from Capt. Kirk for CAPTAIN BEATTY)

"This has been held up to await events.

I urge it be signed as we (ONI) need time now, to get all set in advance of trouble.....a.g.k."

(In a.g.k.'s handwriting)

254

36

(A-4)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

July 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Director

SUBJECT: Possibility of Early Aggressive Action by Japan.

1. The Commandant of the 3rd Naval District reports that a reliable informant close to Japanese industrial interests has stated that these interests expect Japan to make an aggressive move against Russia on July 20th. Too much credence should not be placed in this report as in the past the Japanese industrial and business community in New York has not proved to be a very reliable barometer of Japanese government action. Nevertheless the following factors would seem to indicate that some sort of action probably distasteful to the United States may be planned, namely:

(a) Since about June 25th there has been an absence of sailings from Japan of merchant vessels bound for United States East coast and gulf ports and if this trend continues, in about two weeks there will be no Japanese merchant ships in the Atlantic.

(b) Simultaneous recognition by the Axis powers of the Japanese-sponsored Wang Ching-wei government of China may have been procured by Japan's promise to take aggressive action against the non-Axis powers.

(c) The announcement today that the Japanese government had decided on its policy in regard to the Russo-German war, coupled with the fact that publication of any policy whatsoever or comment on any such policy has been deferred, suggest the possibility that the policy may be other than the often publicized southward advance policy.

(d) Japan has for many years coveted the pre-Amur provinces of Siberian Russia, both as a security measure and for the natural resources of these areas.

2. The present disposition of the Japanese armed forces would seem to preclude the possibility of any sudden thrust against Russia. Their disposition and composition appear to be such that if any sudden aggressive action at all is planned, such action would be in the direction of further minor action against the South China coast or possibly directed towards seizure of additional bases in French Indo-China. Nevertheless the naval forces in particular may be re-Oriented in a very short interval of time and the situation is such that the possibility of Japanese action against Russia, though still considered unlikely, cannot be ruled out entirely.

CC -Op-16-F
Op-10/11
Op-12
Op-38W

A. H. McCollum.

284

37


CNO 6
ACNO 9 4/17/41.
Op-12
For info & return.
The significance
of these moves
ought not to be
overlooked.
My view is that
Japan will strike,
and soon.
38

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

April 17, 1941

Memorandum for the Director

SUBJECT: British-Japanese Crisis.

1. On April 16, 1941, the Domei (Japanese) News Agency reported from Bangkok that repeated attacks by British troops on Thai territory along the Thailand-Malaya frontier caused the Thai government to lodge a protest with British authorities. Domei said the protest was announced by the Thai Foreign Ministry, and added that no further details regarding these attacks were given.

2. For some months past the Japanese have been concentrating troops at Formosa, Hainan Island and Kyushu. There has been a gradual shortening of lines in Central China, and movement of troops from this area to Formosa and Hainan Island. There has been also a gradual reduction of Japanese troops in North China, which were in some instances replaced by Manchukuo levees. Within the last two weeks some 8,000 Japanese troops, 3,500 of whom had received special instruction in jungle warfare, left Indo-China for unannounced destinations. During about the same period, some 11,000 fresh troops from Japan arrived in Central China, and 11,000 veterans left Central China for Formosa. The Japanese Fleet is in home waters. A strong force is near the Palau Islands. It is probable that in case of a drive on Singapore, a strong flanking force would be maintained in the Palau Island area.

3. A report from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, states that there are persistent rumors in Tokyo that Japan plans an early attack on Singapore. Although the Japanese deny this, credence is lent the story by the above facts, and by the severe blows suffered by Britain in the Balkans. Britain's merchant tonnage is suffering so heavily that the question of American convoys is coming prominently to the fore. Some move to keep the American Fleet in the Pacific and thus prevent the diversion of any American strength from the Pacific to convoy duty in the Atlantic would seem logical for the Axis to make at this time.

4. When to all this is added Japan's new position with regard to Russia, whereby she apparently has a Russian guarantee of non-interference in case of a southward drive, it may be that the Domei article is the

282 (2 pp + short note by Rich)

39

Op-16-F-2

-2-

April 17, 1941

beginning of a Japanese drive on Singapore. Newspaper attacks have often preceded Japanese military attacks, and newspaper attacks invariably precede the military attacks of her Axis partners.

A.H. McCollum

The Japanese fleets have been reorganized, also.

CC - Op-16-1
Op-16-F

I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-China. See my memo of 7-6-5th

282 RK1 40

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-7

CONFIDENTIAL

April 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM for the Director

Evacuation of Japanese Nationals from Panama

The Commandant Eleventh Naval District (DIO) in a report of April 4, 1941, to ONI states as follows:

"The Los Angeles Japanese press under a Tokyo dateline of April 5, 1941, states that a large number of the colony of 800 Japanese have been forced to evacuate Panama due to that Republic's discriminatory laws against Japan. The Japanese Government is reported to be viewing the Panama Republic's attitude with great concern and is considering counter-measures.

"The item further states that it is apparent that the United States is behind the Panama Republic's anti-Japanese policy in an effort to hit at the Axis nations. The item also bitterly mentions anti-Japanese actions of the governments of Peru and Brazil, stating that the Japanese Government has attempted to keep the facts secret and avoid outbursts of public opinion in Japan."

Japanese Armed Merchant Men

Recent unconfirmed reports indicate that the Japanese Government is arming some of its best merchant ships with four to six inch guns. Specifically mentioned are the YAWATA MARU, NITTA MARU and HEIAN MARU.

The Commandants, Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts, have been requested to inspect these ships upon arrival in their respective ports to ascertain the facts and report.

Japanese Oil Shipments from West Coast Ports

Commandant Eleventh Naval District (DIO) reported on April 9 that the Japanese are now purchasing quantities of petroleum products in drums and 5 gallon tins and shipping same on cargo vessels to Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

253 (211) 41

- 2 -

Op-16-B-7 April 17, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL The Japanese Government has ordered all Japanese tankers to load oil hereafter at West Coast ports foregoing trips to Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico ports.

W. B. Phillips,
Captain, U.S. Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

383

42

Office of Chief of Naval Operations

Op-16-F

SECRET

Situation Briefs
Serial No. 1

February 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF WAR PLANS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Briefs on:

(a) Japanese Missions to Berlin, Rome (Europe)

(b) Japanese Observation of United States Naval Movements

(c) German Submarines and Raiders in the Pacific

H. D. Bode
By Direction

Copy to:
Lt.Comdr. A. H. McCollum

Copy 2 of 7.

43

Japanese Commissions to Berlin and Rome

1. Under date of December 21, 1940, the U.S. Naval Attache at Tokyo reported that the Japanese Government had officially announced that the political, military and economic commissions provided for in the Axis pact would begin to function in the near future. At the same time the Japanese Government announced the appointment of General Hiroshi Oshima as Ambassador to Berlin. It will be recollected that General Oshima was formerly Ambassador to Berlin and had been removed from his post shortly prior to the commencement of the European war in the summer of 1939 for being entirely too pro-German. He is undoubtedly as pro-German as he ever was and his appointment to Berlin has been widely interpreted in Japan as a vindication of General Oshima's action in urging a pro-German policy on Japan.

2. Pursuant to the Axis agreement the Japanese Foreign Minister on February 7, 1941 advised Berlin and Rome concerning the composition of the Japanese members of the political, economic and military commissions provided for in the Axis pact. The Japanese members of these commissions are as follows:

In Berlin

Political - Ambassador Oshima

Economic - Minister Matsushima
Counselor Kase
Commercial Advisor Nagai

Military - Major General Sakanishi
Vice Admiral Nomura

In Rome

Political - Ambassador Horikiri

Economic - Counselor Ando

Military - Colonel Shimizu
Rear-Admiral Abe.

In Tokyo

Political - Foreign Minister Matsuoka

Economic - Vice Foreign Minister Ohashi
Commerce Bureau Chief - Mizuno

Military - Major General Mito
Rear-Admiral Oka.

44

3. The U.S. Naval Attache at Tokyo on December 22, 1940 reported that Lieutenant General Tomoyuld Yamashita, Chief of the Japanese Army Air Corps, was proceeding to Berlin, together with a corps of experts for the purpose of making a comprehensive study of "Blitzkreig" tactics and latest aviation technical developments. General Yamashita is said to have been accompanied by a large staff of technical experts and they departed from Japan on December 22, 1940 and proceeded to Berlin, Germany via Russia. It is reported that later on this Japanese military aviation mission intends to proceed to Rome.

4. The Japanese naval transport Asaka departed from Japan on January 16th bound for Lisbon, Portugal, transited the Panama Canal on February 7th and had on board a large Japanese naval mission to Berlin. The mission was headed by three Rear-Admirals, two of them specialists in technical naval engineering matters, while the other flag officer is a specialist in naval aviation matters. Most of the other officers comprising the mission appear to be experts on various technical, engineering and aviation matters. From this the presumption follows that the naval mission is largely technical in character and is designed to obtain information concerning German technical developments.

45

Japanese Observation of United States Naval Movements

1. Japanese consulates throughout the United States and its possessions have been instructed to make dispatch reports concerning U.S. naval movements. The Japanese Consuls along the West coast and at Honolulu have been particularly active in making these reports and Japanese naval officers are stationed at Seattle and at Los Angeles to assist the consuls in compiling these reports.

2. In June of 1940, the U.S. Naval Attache at Tokyo reported that Japanese submarines were said to maintain an observation patrol in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands and that the submarines were supplied from time to time by making contact with Japanese naval tankers at sea. The tracks of Japanese naval tankers moving between Japan and the West coast of the United States were plotted and it was found that most of them passed through a point just to the northward of the Hawaiian Islands and in this same area the tankers seemed to make very slow progress for a day or two leading to the presumption that it was in this general locality that contact was made between the observing submarines and their supply ships. This area was searched on several occasions and no contact with Japanese submarines was made. Repeated reports have been received, usually of a vague nature, that Japanese submarines have been seen operating off the West Coast of the United States, at various localities off the coast of Central America, and as far south as the Galapagos Islands. In several instances it has been possible to make a fairly comprehensive investigation of these reports and in these instances they have been found to be wholly without foundation. An analysis of the various reports concerning the operation of Japanese submarines in close proximity to the coasts of the Americas and the Hawaiian Islands leads to the conclusion that these reports are of doubtful reliability.

3. British Intelligence at Singapore reports that Japanese merchant ships are stationed at 1200 mile intervals across the Pacific Ocean all the way from New Zealand to Lower California, that these ships make periodic reports to Tokyo on a frequency of 8400 kilocycles. At our request the various radio calls used by the alleged Japanese station ships were furnished and it was determined that all of these radio calls were ones used by the naval transport ASUKA while she was en route from Yokosuka to the Panama Canal zone.

46

German Submarine and Raider Situation in the Pacific

1. In the late summer of 1940 reports were received that the Japanese were turning over submarines to the Germans for use by the latter in attacking British commerce in the Pacific. These rumors have been carefully sifted and to date no evidence has been developed indicating that the Japanese have supplied the Germans with submarines. Furthermore, no sinkings or attacks by German submarines have been reported in the Pacific.

2. German raiders have been reported in the Pacific and there is a strong presumption that three such raiders are being supplied from Japanese sources. Latest reports indicate that these raiders were operating from bases in the Japanese Mandate Islands and attacking shipping to the southward of this general area. Several authenticated captures have been made and so far none of these raiders have been eliminated. At least one captured vessel, the Norwegian tanker Ole Jacob, in charge of a German Prize crew, made port at Kobe, Japan and sailed the next day after transferring prisoners to the German merchant ship Scharnhorst which has been in Kobe Harbor since the outbreak of the war. The evidence so far indicates that Japan is willing to furnish supplies to German raiders operating in the Pacific but this action has been taken with great circumspection and has been carefully concealed. No raider sinkings or captures in the Pacific have been noted during the past month.

3. Since early in 1940, there have been recurrent rumors, emanating (so it eventually appeared) from the same or parallel source, that Germans were transporting fabricated submarine parts to Vladivostok for erection at that port; that German officers were proceeding via Trans-Siberian to man German submarines at Vladivostok; that German officers were proceeding to Vladivostok to instruct Russians in submarine warfare and in the operation of submarines; and, finally, that German nucleus crews, consisting of warrant and petty officers, were being sent to Vladivostok for manning submarines, presumably either German-fabricated, Russian or Japanese. At the time of the receipt of these various reports and rumors, there was no evidence to either substantiate or definitely contradict any of them, except that two reports (one proceeding from British and another from another source considered by the Consulate at

47

Tsingtao to have been reliable) when finally investigated, were found to be without substance.

4. There has been no evidence, either direct or indicative, of German submarine activity, either erection of submarines or training of crews by German officers, at Vladivostok or at any other port in the Siberian maritime provinces.

48

EXHIBIT NO. 82

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (OP 16)

16–1. *Duties:*

(a) *The Foreign Intelligence Branch will:*

(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.

(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.

(3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attaches.

(4) Maintain liaison with Naval Missions.

(5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attaches accredited to the United States.

(6) Maintain liaison with other Government Departments for the exchange of foreign information.

(b) *The Domestic Intelligence Branch will:*

(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information pertaining to naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to potential enemy, enemy agents and sympathizers.

(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.

(3) Maintain liaison with and cooperate with other Government Departments, particularly with the Military Intelligence Division of the Army and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice in the collection and dissemination of such information as will assist in the protection of the Naval Establishment against espionage and subversive activities.

(4) Except as otherwise specifically provided for, prepare security letters, instructions on policy, rules, regulations and instructions on Naval information to assist the Naval Establishment and interested Government agencies in safeguarding the general security of Naval classified matter.

(5) Regulate the visits of foreign Nationals to the United States Naval Establishment and to commercial concerns engaged in production for the Navy.

(6) Maintain liaison with those Government agencies charged with the control of travelers, ships and shipping with a view to assisting them in preventing the travel of persons engaged in activities inimical to Naval interest; the movement of ships and shipping harmful to Navy interests; and sabotage of shipping of value to the Navy.

(7) Maintain cognizance of the general Naval interest in safe and unobstructed building and production for the Naval Establishment and prepare pertinent directives and advisory matter in connection therewith.

(c) *The Public Relations Branch will:*

(1) Prepare and present to the Public in cooperation with Bureaus and other offices of the Navy Departments, pertinent information not incompatible with military secrecy, regarding the United States Navy.

(2) Maintain for the Press representatives, a point of contact with the Navy Department.

(3) Act on inquiries for information concerning naval matter received from the public and the press.

(d) *The Censorship Branch will:*

(1) Provide detailed plans and personnel for the censorship of the international radio and cable communications of the general public.

(2) When national censorship is established, and until the Administrator of Public Relations takes office, conduct censorship of the international radio and cable communications of the general public through the agency of the Joint Army-Navy Public Relations Committee.

(3) Prepare regulations for Naval Censorship of personal communications originating within the Naval Establishment.

(e) *The Historical Branch will:*

(1) Administer the Navy Department Library and Archives.

(2) Select, index and file the most important Naval records in such manner that they will be available for reference and printing.

(3) Receive, record, classify and distribute as necessary photographs of current or potential strategic or historical interest.

(4) Prepare for issue to the Naval Establishment necessary instructions covering the preparation and disposal of War Diaries.

(f) *The Administration Branch will:*

(1) Handle matters of administration for the Division of Naval Intelligence.

(2) In conjunction with the Bureau of Navigation and with the Naval Reserve Policy Division procure, administer and train Naval Reserve Officers, Class I–V(S).

16–2. The Intelligence Division has membership on the following Committees:

Joint Board Sub-committee on Rules concerning Press Releases.

Joint Board Sub-committee on Special Joint Army and Navy Public Relations.

EXHIBIT NO. 83

NAVAL MESSAGE — NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER 3998 — ADDRESSEES — MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FROM OPNAV — CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, COM 16 — PRIORITY X

RELEASED BY T.S. Wilkinson — ROUTINE

DATE December 3, 1941 — DEFERRED

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

TOR CODEROOM — PRIORITY

DECODED BY — ROUTINE

PARAPHRASED BY — DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG X SINGAPORE X BATAVIA X MANILA X WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS X ~~FROM POSSESSING INFEN THAT CHANGE PLANS EARLY ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA~~

Op-16-F

SECRET

SEE ART 76(4) NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

38B

EXHIBIT NO. 84

(Handwritten note:) Telephone conversation of Dec. 3, 1941 between a citizen in Honolulu (Japanese) & a military or naval officer in Tokio. Translated & available to Military intel. Hawaii, Dec. 5, 1944.

IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amused.

(J) Has there been any increase in . . . ? . . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

[4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US–Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US–Japan question?

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US–Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

*(J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune", that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

[7] (H) About fifty thousand.
(J) How about the second generation Japanese?
(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.
(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?
(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.
(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?
(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.
(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?
(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.
(J) Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.
(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.
(H) Wait a moment please?
(J) Off phone.

EXHIBIT NO. 85

PH(3)

SECRET

Op-16-F-2

November 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations.

(Note: See Op-16-F-2 ONI Serial #54-41, dated October 30, 1941 for the new organization of the Japanese Fleet).

FLEETS		LOCATIONS	
First Fleet		In Kure-Saeki area	(1)
BB - NAGATO		In Kure-Saeki area	(1)
BB - MUTSU		" " " "	"
BB - YAMASHIRO		At Yokosuka	
BB - FUSO		In Kure-Saeki area	(1)
BB - ISE		" " " "	"
BB - HYUGA		" " " "	"
BB - HIYEI		" " " "	"
BB - KONGO		At Maizuru	
BB - KIRISHIMA		In Kure-Saeki area	(1)
BB - HARUNA		Undergoing repairs	(2)
	10 BB		
	4 CA	In Kure Saeki area	(3)
	2 CL	" " " "	("
	27 DD	" " " "	"
Second Fleet		In Kure-Saeki area	
	12 CA	In Kure-Saeki area	(3)
	1 CA	In Yokosuka	(4)
	2 CL	In Kure-Saeki area	(3)
	28 DD	" " " "	"
Third Fleet		Near Maizuru or Sasebo	
	1 CL	Near Maizuru	
	4 CM	" "	
	12 AM	" "	
	12 PC	" "	
	1 CL	Near Sasebo	
	12 DD	" "	
	1 AS	" "	
	6 SS	" "	
	2 CM	" "	
	6 XPG	" "	
	46 AP or AK	" "	

66 (4-44)

ID

FILE

FLEETS

		LOCATION
Fourth Fleet		Mandated Islands
	4 CL	In Truk-Ponape area
	8 DD	" " " "
	1 AS	" " " "
	3 SS	" " " "
	8 XPG	" " " "
	8 AP or AK	" " " "
	2 CM	Near Saipan
	1 DD	" "
	3 XPG	" "
	11 AP or AK	" "
	4 SS	" Palao
	4 XPG	" "
	17 AP or AK	" "
	1 Survey Ship	" Jaluit
	1 AS	" "
	4 XAM	" "
	3 PC	" "
	1 AP or AK	" "
	1 CM	In home waters
	7 SS	Near Sasebo
	2 SS	Near Maizuru
Fifth Fleet		
	1 CL	Maizuru (6)
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)		
Sixth Fleet		In Home waters
	4 CL	" " "
	2 AS	" " "
	1 AP	" " "
	42 SS	" " "
Carrier Fleet		S. Kyushu - Takao
CV - AKAGI		S. Kyushu
CV - KAGA		"
CV - SORYU		" (?)
CV - HIRYU		"
CV- HOSHO		"
CV - KORYU		" (?)
CV - KASUGA		" (?)
CV - RYUJO		Takao area
CV - ZUIKAKU		" "
CV - SHOKAKU		" "
	4 DD	" "
	11 DD	S. Kyushu

-2-

66 2D

SECRET

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Combined Air Force		
	4 AV	Kure-Saeki area
	1 AV	Takao
	1 XAV	"
	1 XAV	Gulf of Tongkong
	1 XAV	Near Sasebo
Combined Fleet Train		Scattered
	4 AO	In Kure-Saeki area
	2 AO	Maizuru
	1 AO	Takao (8)
	1 AO	Near Yap (9)
	1 AC	" "
	1 AF	Kure-Saeki area
	2 AR	" " "
	1 Ice Breaker	Saghalien
	1 Target Ship	Kure-Saeki area
Japanese Naval Forces in China		
	1 OCA	Left Chefoo October 3 rd
	1 PG	Shanghai
	3 DD	"
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet		
	4 PG	Between Wuhu and Ichang
	10 PB	" " " "
	1 AP	" " " "
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CA	Sasebo
	1 CL	Canton-Hongkong area
	4 TB	" " " (10)
	1 PG	" " "
	2 AM	" " " (10)
	13 Misc.	" " "
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 OCA	Tsingtao
	1 DD	"
	8 TB	"
	1 AF	"
Southern Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CL	French Indo-China coast
	1 CM	" " " "

SECRE

NOTES:

(1) The Combined Fleet has been located somewhat more exactly than before, in the Kure-Saeki area. This includes the western portion of the Inland Sea, between the western parts of Honshu and Shikoku, and the northern part of Kyushu.

(2) Earlier in the year, the HARUNA was reported undergoing major repairs. Since the HARUNA has not been specifically mentioned among the active battleships for some time, it is believed that the ship is still undergoing repairs.

(3) It is believed that the various cruisers and destroyers in the Combined Fleet, which were formerly divided between Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, have now rejoined the main body of the Fleet in the Kure-Saeki area.

(4) The TAKAO (CA) is in dry-dock at Yokosuka.

(6) The Fifth Fleet has its flag in a light cruiser at Maizuru, but nothing else is known about the force as yet. It is possibly the nucleus of a Japan Sea Fleet.

(7) No new information concerning the location of individual submarines is at hand, so that the detailed survey given last week no longer holds good. However, certain units of the submarine fleet have been active in the Chichijima-Marcus-Saipan area, south and southeast of Honshu.

(8) The SATA has moved from Canton to Takao.

(9) The SHIRETOKO, previously reported in Jaluit, has moved near Yap.

(10) The detached torpedo boats and mine sweepers in the South China Fleet are believed to have rejoined the main force in the Hongkong area.

Distribution: CNO - Copy No. 1
DNI - Copy No. 2
Op-12 - Copy No. 3
Op-38W - Copy No. 4
Op-16-F - Copy No. 5

SECRET

66 4D

Op-16-F-2

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
First Fleet		In Kure-Saeki area
BB - NAGATO		In Kure-Saeki area
BB - MUTSU		" " "
BB - YAMASHIRO		At Yokosuka
BB - FUSO		In Kure-Saeki area
BB - ISE		" " "
BB - HYUGA		" " "
BB - HIYEI		" " "
BB - KONGO		At Maizuru
BB --HARUNA		In Kure-Saeki area
		Undergoing repairs
	10 BB	
	4 CA	In Kure-Saeki area
	2 CL	" " "
	27 DD	" " "
Second Fleet		In Kure-Saeki area
	12 CA	In Kure-Saeki area
	1 CA	In Yokosuka
	2 CL	In Kure-Saeki area
	29 DD	" " "
Third Fleet		Near Maizuru or Sasebo
	1 CL	Near Maizuru
	4 CM	" "
	12 AM	" "
	12 PC	" "
	1 CL	Near Sasebo
	12 DD	" "
	1 AS	" "
	6 SS	" "
	2 CM	" "
	6 XPG	" "
	46 AP or AK	" "

67 (41.)

5D

SECRET

FLEETS		LOCATION
Fourth Fleet		Mandated Islands
	4 CL	In Truk-Ponape area
	8 DD	" " " "
	1 AS	" " " "
	3 SS	" " " "
	6 XPG	" " " "
	8 AP or AK	" " " "
	2 CM	Near Saipan
	1 DD	" "
	3 XPG	" "
	11 AP or AK	" "
	4 SS	" Palao
	4 XPG	" "
	17 AP or AK	" "
	1 Survey Ship	" Jaluit
	1 AS	" "
	4 XAM	" "
	3 PC	" "
	1 AP or AK	" "
	1 CM	In Home Waters
	7 SS	Near Sasebo
	2 SS	Near Maizuru
Fifth Fleet		
	1 CL	Maizuru
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)		
Sixth Fleet		
	4 CL	In Home Waters
	2 AS	" " "
	1 AP	" " "
	42 SS	" " "
Carrier Fleet		S. Kyushu - Takao
CV - AKAGI		S. Kyushu
CV - KAGA		"
CV - SORYU		"
CV - HIRYU		"
CV - HOSHO		"
CV - KORYU		"
CV - KASUGA		"
CV - RYUJO		Takao area
CV - ZUIKAKU		Kure-Sasebo area (1)
CV - SHOKAKU		Takao area (?)
	4 DD	" "
	11 DD	S. Kyushu

67

6D

SECRET

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Combined Air Force		
	4 AV	Kure-Saeki area
	1 AV	Sasebo-Kure area (1)
	2 XAV	Sasebo-Kure area (2)
	1 XAV	Saigon-Camranh Bay area (3)
Combined Fleet Train		Scattered
	4 AO	In Kure-Saeki area
	2 AO	Maizuru
	1 AO	Takao
	1 AO	Near Yap
	1 AC	" "
	1 AF	Kure-Saeki area
	2 AR	" " "
	1 Ice Breaker	Saghalien
	1 Target Ship	Kure-Saeki area
Japanese Naval Forces in China.		
	1 OCA	Left Chefoo October 3rd.
	1 PC	Shanghai
	3 DD	"
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet		"
	4 PC	Between Wuhu and Ichang
	10 PR	" " " "
	1 AP	" " " "
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CA	Sasebo
	1 CA	Canton-Hongkong area
	4 TB	" " "
	1 PC	" " "
	2 AM	" " "
	13 Misc.	" " "
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 OCA	Tsingtao
	1 DD	"
	8 TB	"
	1 AP	"
Southern Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CL	French Indo-China coast
	1 CM	" " " "

67

SECRET

7D

SECRE

NOTES:

The fleets have remained in the same operating areas as previously reported. Several minor changes in the position of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders have been observed:

(1) The ZUIKAKU (CV) and the NOTORO (AV) have moved from the Formosan straits to the Dure-Sasebo area.

(2) Two auxiliary seaplane tenders are now in the Sasebo-Kure area. One of these was formerly in the Gulf of Tongking.

(3) The KENJO MARU (XAV) has moved south from Takao to the Saigon-Camranh Bay area.

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67

8D

PH(3)

SECRET

Op-16-F-2

November 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations.

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
First Fleet		In Kure-Saeki area
BB - NAGATO		In Kure- Saeki area
BB - MUTSU		" " " "
BB - YAMASHIRO		At Yokosuka
BB - FUSO		In Kure-Saeki area
BB - ISE		" " " "
BB - HYUGA		" " " "
BB - HIYEI		" " " "
BB - KONGO		At Maizuru
BB - KIRISHIMA		In Kure-Saeki area
BB - HARUNA		Undergoing repairs at Sasebo
	10 BB	
	4 CA	In Kure-Saeki area
	2 CL	" " " "
	27 DD	" " " "
Second Fleet		In Kure-Saeki area
	11 CA	In Kure-Saeki area
	2 CA	In Yokosuka (1)
	1 CL	In Kure-Saeki area
	1 CL	In Yokosuka area (2)
	28 DD	In Kure-Saeki area
Third Fleet		Near Maizuru, Sasebo, and Bako (3)
	1 CL	Near Maizuru
	4 CM	" "
	12 AM	" "
	12 PC	" "
	1 CL	Sailed Amoy Nov. 4th (3)
	2 DD	Near Sasebo (4)
	1 AS	" "
	6 SS	" "
	2 CM	" "
	6 XPG	" "
	46 AP or AK	" "
	3 DD	" Maizuru (4)
	7 DD	" Bako-Takeo (4)

SECRET 68 (444)

9D

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Fourth Fleet		Mandated Islands
	4 CL	In Truk-Jonaje area
	3 DD	" " " " (5)
	1 AS	" " " "
	3 SS	" " " "
	8 XPG	" " " "
	8 AP or AK	" " " "
	4 DD	Near Saipan (5)
	2 CM	" "
	1 DD	" "
	3 XPG	" "
	11 AP or AK	" "
	4 SC	" Palao
	4 XPG	" "
	17 AP or AK	" "
	1 Survey Ship	" Juliet
	1 AC	" "
	4 XAK	" "
	3 PC	" "
	1 AP or AK	" "
	1 CM	In home waters
	3 DD	Near Sasebo
	7 SC	" "
	2 SS	Near Maizuru
Fifth Fleet		
	1 CL	Yokosuka (6)
(The Composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)		
Sixth Fleet		
	2 CL	Kure (7)
	2 CL	Sasebo (7)
	1 AS	Kure (7)
	1 AC	In Home Waters (7)
	1 AP	Yokosuka (7)
	7 S	Yokosuka (7)
	15 SC	Kure (7)
	22 S	In Home Waters
Carrier Fleet		S. Kyushu Takao
CV - AKAGI		S. Kyushu
CV - KAGA		"
CV - SORYU		"
CV - HIRYU		"
CV - HOSHO		"
CV - KONGO		"
CV - RAIZUGA		"
CV - RYUJO		Kure (6)
CV - [illegible]		Kure-Sasebo area
CV - SHOKAKU		Takao area (7)
	5 DD	
	11 DD	S. Kyushu

-2-

10D

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Combined Air Force		
	4 AV	Kure-Saeki area
	1 AV	Sasebo-Kure area
	2 XAV	Sasebo-Kure area
	1 XAV	Saigon-Camranh Bay area
Combined Fleet Train		Scattered
	4 AC	In Kure-Saeki area
	1 AC	Maizuru
	1 AC	Takao
	1 AC	Near Yap
	1 AC	" "
	1 AF	Kure-Saeki area
	2 AR	" " "
	1 Ice Breaker	Saghalien
	1 Target Ship	Kure-Saeki area
Japanese Naval Forces in China		
	1 OCA	Left Chafoo October 3rd
	1 PG	Shanghai
	3 DD	"
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet		
	4 PG	Between Wuhu and Ichang
	10 PR	" " " "
	1 AP	" " " "
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CA	Sasebo
	1 CL	Foochow (?)
	4 TB	Canton-Hongkong area
	1 PG	" " "
	2 AM	" " "
	13 Misc.	" " "
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 OCA	Tsingtao
	1 DD	"
	8 TB	"
	1 AP	"
Southern Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CL	French Indo-China coast
	1 CM	" " " "

NOTES:

(1) The CHOKAI (CA) is in Yokosuka. The TAKAO is still in drydock at Yokosuka.
(2) The NAKA (CL), Flagship of Desron 4, is at yokosuka. The destroyers in Desron 4 are still in the Kure-Saeki area.
(3) The NATORI, Flagship of Desron 5, sailed Amoy November 4th.
(4) Ten of the 12 destroyers in Desron 5, formerly at Sasebo, have been shifted - 3 to Maizuru, and 7 to Sako.
(5) Three of the 8 destroyers in Desron 6, formerly in the Truk-Ponape area, have moved to Sasebo; and 2 to Saipan.
(6) The flagship of the Fifth Fleet, an unidentified CL, has moved from Maizuru to Yokosuka.
(7) Many of the units of the 6th Fleet have been located more exactly.
(8) The RYUJO has returned to Kure from Taiwan.
(9) The ISUZU (CL), temporary flagship of the 2nd (or South) China Expeditionary Fleet, has moved from Hongkong to Foochow.

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68

12D

SECRET

Op-16-F-2

November 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
First Fleet		Home Waters
BB - NAGATO		Near Kure (1)
BB - MUTSU		" "
BB - YAMASHIRO		At Yokosuka
BB - FUSO		Near Kure
BB - ISE		" "
BB - HYUGA		" "
BB - HIYEI		Near Sasebo (2)
BB - KONGO		Near Maizuru
BB - KIRISHIMA		Near Kure
BB - HARUNA		" "
	10 BB	
	3 CA	Near Kure (1)
	1 CA	Near Sasebo (4)
	2 CL	Near Kure (1)
	27 DD	" "
Second Fleet		In Home Waters
	11 CA	Near Kure
	1 CA	In Yokosuka (5)
	1 CA	Near Sasebo (6)
	1 CL	Near Kure
	1 CL	Near Yokosuka
	13 DD	Near Yokosuka(7)
	15 DD	Near Kure (7)
Third Fleet		Sasebo and Bako area
	1 CL	Near Sasebo (8)
	5 CM	" " (8)
	12 AM	" " (8)
	12 PC	" " (8)
	4 DD	" " (8)
	1 AS	" "
	6 SS	" "
	6 XPG	" "
	46 AP or AK	" "
	1 CL	Bias Bay (8)
	7 DD	Near Bako
	1 CM	" "
	1 DD	Near Maizuru

69 (4/1)

13D

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Fourth Fleet		Mandated Islands
	4 CL	In Truk-Ponape area
	3 DD	" " " "
	1 AS	" " " "
	9 SS	" " " " (9)
	8 XPG	" " " "
	16 AP or AK	" " " "
	2 DD	Near Saipan (9)
	1 SS	Near Saipan (9)
	1 survey ship	Near Saipan (9)
	3 XPG	" "
	17 AP or AK	" "
	4 SS	" Palao
	4 XPG	" "
	30 AP or AK	" " (9)
	1 AS	" Jaluit
	4 XAM	" "
	3 PC	" "
	13 AP or AK	" "
	1 CM	In Yokosuka
	3 DD	Near Sasebo (8)
	1 SS	At Maizuru (9)
	1 SS	At Kure (9)
Fifth Fleet		
	1 CL	Chichijima (10)
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)		
Sixth Fleet		
	2 CL	Near Kure
	2 CL	" Sasebo
	1 AS	" Kure
	1 AS	Sasebo
	1 AP	Yokosuka
	7 SS	Yokosuka
	12 SS	Kure
	23 SS	In Sasebo and other Home waters
Carrier Fleet		
CV - AKAGI		S. Kyushu
CV - KAGA		"
CV - SORYU		Kure (11)
CV - HIRYU		" (11)
CV - HOSHO		" (11)
CV - KORYU		S. Kyushu
CV - KASUGA		"
CV - RYUJO		Kure
CV - ZUIKAKU		Kure
CV - SHOKAKU		Kure (11)
	10 DD	S. Kyushu and Kure
	5 DD	Yokosuka (11)

64 -2- 14D

SECRET

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Combined Air Force		
	4 AV	Near Kure
	1 AV	Truk (12)
	2 XAV	Near Sasebo
	1 XAV	Saigon-Camranh Bay Area
Combined Fleet Train		
	2 AO	Near Yokosuka (13)
	2 AO	Near Kure
	1 AO	Near Sasebo (13)
	1 AO	Near Maizuru
	1 AO	Near Saipan
	1 AO	Near Yap
	1 AC	Near Saipan (13)
	1 AF	Near Yokosuka (13)
	2 AR	Near Kure
	1 Ice Breaker-	Saghalien
	1 Target Ship	Sasebo
Japanese Naval Forces in China		
	1 OCA	Shanghai (14)
	1 PG	Shanghai
	3 DD	"
	7 AK or AP	(15)
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet		
	4 PG	Between Wuhu and Ichang
	10 PR	" " " "
	1 AP or AK	" " " "
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CA	Sasebo
	1 CL	Foochow
	4 TB	Canton-Hongkong area
	1 PG	" " "
	2 AM	" " "
	13 Misc.	" " "
About	30 Ap or AK	South China coast (15)
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 OCA	Tsingtao
	1 DD	"
	1 TB	"
	1 AP	Tsingtao
Southern Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CL	French Indo-China coast
	1 CM	" " " "

69 - 3 -

SECRET

15D

CECRET

(1) The Kure area includes the whole Inland Sea area, together with the Saeki area, which controls the straits between Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku.
(2) The HIYEI (BB) has moved to Sasebo from the Kure area.
(3) The HARUNA (BB), formerly undergoing repairs at Sasebo, has rejoined the fleet as flagship of Batdiv 3.
(4) The FURUTAKA(CA) is at Sasebo, separated from the other CA of the division which are near Kure.
(5) The TAKAO (CA) has left the drydock at Yokosuka, and rejoined 2nd Fleet units near Kure.
(6) The SUZUYA(CA) shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo area.
(7) The 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 2nd Fleet have been reported near Yokosuka. The other 15 are still near Kure.
(8) The Third Fleet has reduced the number of its units near Maizuru, and increased the number in the Formosan Straits. The NATORI, which sailed from Amoy on Nov. 4th, is now at anchor in Bias Bay.
(9) The Fourth Fleet has been augmented by the addition of 8 divisions of ex-merchantment (about 32 ships(. Increased activity has been noticed among other units of the Fourth Fleet, but except for the shift of 6 submarines to Truk, the total number of fighting ships in the Mandates has not been increased.
(10) The Fifth Fleet has moved from Yokosuka to Chichijima, with certain portions possibly near Marcus Island.
(11) The aircraft carriers SORYU, HIRYU, and HOSHO have moved from South Kyushu to the Kure area. The SHOKAKU has moved from Takao to Kure. The plane guard destroyers have shifted slightly.
(12) The KAMOI (AV) is near Truk.
(13) The Combined Fleet Train has made a number of minor shifts.
(14) The IZUMO is assumed to be in Shanghai.
(15) Ten transports left Shanghai between the 14th and 17th, with troops, supplied and landing boats; seven transports are still there. In addition, 17 transports, southbound, were sighted between Hongkong and Shanghai between the 10th and 14th. Over the week end, 18 transports sailed up the Pearl River, and 12 downstream.

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160

N. S. I. 96—1940

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 65 (Start new series each year, i.e. 1-40, 2-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. 901-200 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-2, ONI (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person) at Washington, D.C. Date Nov. 26, 1941

Reference (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) Evaluation Rating "A" (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan (Nation reported on) Navy (Main title as per index guide) Organization (Subtitles) Fleets (Make separate report for each title)

Brief—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following information has been submitted by the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

Since the latter part of October, the Commander-in-Chief of the SECOND Fleet has been forming a Task Force consisting of:

SECOND Fleet,
THIRD Fleet, (Including First and Second Base Forces, and First Defense Division),
Destroyer Squadron THREE,
Submarine Squadron FIVE,
Combined Air Force,
Air Squadron SEVEN,
and possibly vessels of the THIRD Battleship Division in the FIRST Fleet.

Third Fleet units are believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

It appears that the SEVENTH Cruiser Division, and the THIRD Destroyer Squadron are an advance unit, and may be enroute South China.

The Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that some of it has already moved on to Hainan Island.

It seems that the SECOND Base Force is transporting equipment of the Air Force to Taiwan.

Radio calls for the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and the Naval Stations at Sama, Bako, and Takao appear also in headings of dispatches concerning this Task Force.

The Resident Naval Officer Palao, and the THIRD Base Force at Palao have communicated extensively with the Commander-in-Chief of the SECOND FLEET.

218

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Nav.	Ord.	T. & D.	C. & R.	Eng.	S. & A.	M. & S.	Aero.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sca. For.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Sparon.	Com. Atron.	P. A. T. U.
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"It is thought that a strong force of submarines and air groups are in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This force includes the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier, and probably one-third of the submarine fleet (By Note:- This may mean one-third of the fleet submarines.)

The 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit evaluates the foregoing information to indicate that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task force may operate from the Marshalls and Palau.

Comment by F-2:

The forces given in this report may be enumerated as follows:

TASK FORCE
Commander - (CINC 2nd Fleet)

1st Fleet units	2nd Fleet	3rd Fleet
1 CL	13 CA	2 CL
15 DD	2 CL	12 DD
4 BB (possible)	28 DD	1 AS
		9 SS
Combined Air Force	6th Fleet units	6 CM
5 AV	1 CL	12 AM
2 XAV	7 SS	12 PC
32 Air Groups		6 XPG

Summary of above

4 BB (possible)
13 CA
6 CL
55 DD
5 AV
2 XAV
1 AS
16 SS
6 CM
12 AM
12 PC
6 XPG
32 Air Groups

CONCENTRATION IN MANDATES

4th Fleet	Airon 24	Carrier Div
4 CL	1 AV	2 CV
8 DD	1 XAV	
1 AS		
12 SS		

Plus miscellaneous craft including converted merchant vessels

6th Fleet units
About 14 SS

18D

SECRET

SUMMARY

2 CV
1 AV
1 XAV
4 CL
8 DD
26 SS
1 AS
Miscellaneous craft.

CinCPac, CinCAF and Com 16 have been notified direct by Com 14.

Although the importance of this report cannot be minimized it does conflict with a recent report from CinCAF to the effect that all Japanese Naval forces were in normal distribution.

Forwarded by: H. Bell
Commander, U.S.N.

190

N. N. 2. 98-1940

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 66 (Start new series each year, i.e. 1-40, 2-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. 901-200 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-2, ONI (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person) at Washington, DC. Date Nov. 27, 1941

Reference (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) Evaluation Rating "A" (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan (Nation reported on) Navy (Main title as per index guide) Organization (Subtitles) Fleets (Make separate report for each title)

Notes.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated, include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following information has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit in comment on the report of the 14th Naval District given in Op-16-F-2, Serial # 65 dated Nov. 26, 1941.

During the past few days traffic analysis has shown that the CinC 2nd Fleet was directing units of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Fleets and a submarine force comprising a loosely knit task force which appears to be divided into two groups.

In order to clarify the situation units which are expected to operate in the South China area are referred to as Task Group # 1, units which may be expected to operate in the Mandates, Task Group # 2.

The composition of Task Group # 1 is estimated as follows:

Crudiv 7
Airron 6
Defense Div 1
Desron 3
Subron 6

Task Group # 2 as follows:

Crudiv 5
Cardiv 3
RYUJO and 1 Merchantman
Desrons 2 and 4
Subron 5
Desdiv 23
1st Base Force of 3rd Fleet
3rd " " at Palau
5th " " at Saipan
Miscellaneous unidentified units

Although Crudiv 6 and Batdiv 3 are possibly included in Task Groups # 1 and # 2, respectively, their status cannot be accurately determined at present.

The status of those units of the 3rd Fleet not mentioned above, including Desron 5, is doubtful but it may be assumed that they will take station in the Straits of Formosa or further south.

There are slight indications today that Desron 3, Crudiv 7 and Subron 6 are in Takao area.

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Combined Air Force units from the Japanese Empire are located at Pakhoi, Hoihow, Saigon, Takao and other bases in Formosa and the China Coast. (Pakhoi is on the China Coast in the Gulf of Tonking. Hoihow is the principal port in northern Hainan. Saigon is in southern French Indo-China, Takao is on the southwestern coast of Formosa)

There is no confirmation of the presence of carriers and a submarine force in the Mandates.

Our best indications are that all known 1st and 2nd Fleet carriers are still in the Sasebo-Kure area, and that the CinC Combined Fleet is in the NAGATO, CinC 1st Fleet in the HYUGA, and CinC 2nd Fleet in the ATAGO in the Kure area, the CinC 3rd Fleet in the ASHIGARA in the Sasebo area, CinC 5th in the Bonin Islands area, Commander Submarine Force in the KASHIMA in the Yokosuka area although this last is believed unreliable.

The South China Fleet seems to have been strengthened by units from Central or North China, probably torpedo boats.

The Southern Expeditionary Fleet is apparently being reinforced by one Base Force unit.

Directives to this task force, if it is such, are directed to individual units and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede the formation of task forces used in area operations.

The CinC 2nd, 3rd and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.

Traffic from the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the CinCs of all fleets appears normal.

The evaluation of the above is considered reliable.

Comment

The forces enumerated in this report are summarized as follows:

TASK FORCE

Task Group # 1 — South China area
Crudiv 7 - 4 CA
Airron 6 - 3 XAV
Defense Div 1-Miscellaneous small craft
Desron 3 - 1 CL, 15 DD
Subron 6 - 1 CL, 6 SS
Crudiv 6 - 4 CA (possible)

Task Group # 2 — mandate area
Crudiv 5 - 3 CA
Cardiv 3 - 2 CV, 4 DD
1 CV, 1 XCV or XAV
Desrons 2 & 4 - 2 CL, 24 DD
Subron 5 - 1 CL, 6 SS
Desdiv 23 - 4 DD
1st Base Force - 3 CM, 12 AM, 12 PC, one ex-merchantman
3rd " " - 4 SS, 4 XPG, 6 ex-merchantmen
5th " " - 2 CM, 3 XPG, miscellaneous small craft.
Batdiv 3 - 4 BB (possible)

(214)

21D

SUMMARY OF TYPES IN TASK FORCE

4 BB (possible only)
3 CV
11 CA
5 CL
47 DD
16 SS
5 CM
4 XAV
12 AM
12 PC
7 XPG
7 ex-merchantmen
Miscellaneous small craft.

Although there are variations in the strengths estimated by Com 14 and Com 16 the principal confliction of opinion seems to be in the actual locations of carriers. In general Com 16's estimate appears to place units of the task force in not as advanced position as did Com 14.

The fact that CinC, 2nd Fleet remains in home waters and the composition and reported locations of the task groups indicate individual assignments rather than concerted operations, at least for the present.

This report transmitted on November 26th by Com 16 was addressed for action to Opnav, CinCPac, Com 14, CinC AF.

Forwarded by C. Matts
4. Comdr., USN

-3-

22D

N. N. L. 90—1942

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F-2 0018

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 68
(Start new series each year. 1 to 1 at 2 am)

Monograph Index Guide No. 907-700
(To correspond with [illegible] index. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make a separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-2, ONI at Washington,D.C. Date November 29, 1941
(Ship, fleet, sta., district, office, station, or person)

Reference
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. If applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence Evaluation Rating "A"
(As official, personal observation, information, press, conversation with ..... when new words ...)

Subject Japan Navy Operations Movements
(Name reported on) (Mail title as per index guide) (Subject) (Make separate report for each title)

Basis. (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include as pertinent facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following information has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit commenting on Astalusna, Shanghai dispatch 270830:

The ISUZU (CL) was in the Formosan Straits Sunday, November 23rd. The sub tender and four submarines are probably Subron 6 and the NAGOYA MARU as tender. The last sentence is believed to refer to the SENDAI and two destroyer divisions. There is no comment on other items.

The following additional information has been received. NITTA MARU is sailing from Yokosuka to Takao on the 29th with military supplies. Two senior construction officers and 4,000 men whose status is not known have been ordered to the Mandates.

An unidentified ship, believed to be a light cruiser, appears to have relieved the KASHII (CL) as flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet. This ship is now in Camranh Bay in the Saigon area.

Comment: The above dispatch has been sent for action also to CinC Pacific and Com 14.

Forwarded by [illegible]
Major, U.S.M.C.

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	✓			✓					✓	

Nav.	Ord.	Y. & D.	C. & R.	Eng.	S. & A.	M. & S.	Aero.	U.S.M.C.	C. in C. U.S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sea. For.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Sparron	Com. Aircon.	F. A. T. U.

Attached at	Op-10/11	Op-12	Op-13	Op-14	Op-20	Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-30	Op-31	State	Com. Intern.	Maritime Com.
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A-2 0019

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 70 (Start new series each year, i. e. 1 to 10, 2 to 20)

Monograph Index Guide No. 907-100 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-2, ONI. at Washington, D.C. Date November 29, 1941 (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference Op-16-F-2 Serial # 66 of November 27, 1941 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence (As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with identity when practicable, etc.) Evaluation Rating "A" (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan (Nation reported on) Navy (Main title as per index guide) Operations (Sub-title) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated, include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

The following encrypted addresses have been noted in the past two days traffic:

"Commander First Patrol Force"	Headquarters apparently in Yokosuka or Palao.
"Fifth Air Battalion"	At Takao
"French Indo-China Billeting Detachment"	In Saigon Area.
"Third Fleet Headquarters"	Probably at Yokosuka.
"Commander Airborne Troops"	Location undetermined.

Commander-in-Chief THIRD fleet shifted flag from the ASHIGARA (CA) to the NAGARA (CL); Commander-in-Chief Southern Expeditionary Fleet shifted flag from the KASHII (CL) to a unit tentatively identified as the CHOKAI(CA).

New arrivals in the Takao Area that may be placed in Task Group # 1 of the Task Force mentioned in reference report: Destroyer Squadron FOUR, Air Squadron SEVEN, and one command that appears to be a Submarine Squadron. The HIYEI (BB) and KONGO (BB) now appear definitely associated with these units in First Section but no movement noted by them.

The Commander-in-Chief SECOND Fleet indicates he will shift communications from the Kure Communication Zone at 0400,29th; from the Sasebo Communication Zone at 0000, 1st; and enter the Bako Communication Zone at 0000, 2nd, thus implying a move from Japan proper to the South.

Comment:

Since the CinC, 2nd Fleet is the Commander of Task Force moving southward his movements as given in the last paragraph are of the greatest importance. There is no known definite delineation of the Communication Zones mentioned.

Desron 4, consisting of 1 CL and 12 DD was in 2nd Fleet. Airon 7 consists of three (3) modern new AV. It is a unit of the Combined Air Force previously operating with the 1st Fleet.

HIYEI (BB) and KONGO (BB) are in Batdiv 3 which in the reference report were given as possibly a part of Task Group # 2. This has now been

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Navy	Ord.	F.B.I.	C.A.A.	Treas.	N.E.A.	M.I.C.	Army	U.S.M.C.	C. in C. U.S.	Coast Bat. For.	Corps Area For.	C. in C. A.F.	Coast Guard	Coast Guard	F.R.U.
Remarks:		Op-10	Op-12	Op-13	Op-14	Op-16	Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-30	Op-32	State	Treas.	Navy Dept.
Cmd. Gen. Staff	Aide to Pres.	Army M.P.										Return to Room No.		

24D

changed to Task Group # 1 indicating movement to waters off S.E. Asia rather than the Mandates.

Forwarded by A.H. McCollum,
Comdr., USN.

221

25D

SECRET

Op-16-F-2

December 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Japanese Fleet Locations.

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
First Fleet		Home Waters
BB - NAGATO		Near Kure
BB - MUTSU		" "
BB - YAMASHIRO		At Yokosuka
BB - FUSO		Near Kure
BB - ISE		" "
BB - HYUGA		" "
BB - HIYEI		Near Sasebo
BB - KONGO		Near Maizuru
BB - KIRISHIMA		Near Kure
BB - HARUNA		" "
	10 BB	
	3 CA	Near Kure
	1 CA	Near Sasebo
	1 CL	Near Kure (1)
	1 CL	Near Sasebo (1)
	27 DD	Near Kure
Second Fleet		In Home Waters
	10 CA	Near Kure (2)
	2 CA	Near Sasebo (2)
	1 CA	Off Camranh Bay (3)
	1 CL	Near Kure
	1 CL	Near Bako (4)
	4 DD	Near Yokosuka (4)
	12 DD	Near Kure (4)
Third Fleet		Sasebo and Bako area
	1 CL	Near Sasebo
	5 CM	" "
	12 AM	" "
	12 PC	" "
	4 DD	" "
	1 AS	" "
	6 SS	" "
	6 XPG	" "
	46 AP or AK	" "
	1 CL	Bias Bay
	1 CM	Near Bako
	1 DD	Near Maizuru

70 (4-44) 26D SECRET

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Fourth Fleet	-	Mandated Islands
	4 CL	In Truk-Ponape area
	3 DD	" " " "
	1 AS	" " " "
	9 SS	" " " "
	8 XPG	" " " "
	16 AP or AK	" " " "
	2 DD	Near Saipan
	1 SS	" "
	1 Survey Ship	" "
	3 XPG	" "
	17 AP or AK	" "
	4 SS	" Palao
	4 XPG	" "
	30 AP or AK	" "
	1 AS	" Jaluit
	4 XAM	" "
	3 PC	" "
	13 AP or AK	" "
	11CM	In Yokosuka
	3 DD	Near Sasebo
	1 SS	At Maizuru
	1 SS	At Kure
Fifth Fleet		
	1 CL	Chichijima
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)		
Sixth Fleet		
	2 CL	Near Kure
	2 CL	Near Sasebo
	1 AS	Near Kure
	1 AS	Sasebo
	1 AF (XAS)	Bako (5)
	4 SS	Bako (5)
	5 SS	Yokosuka (5)
	12 SS	Kure
	21 SS	In Sasebo and other Home waters(5)
Carrier Fleet		
CV - AKAGI		S. Kyushu
CV - KAGA		" "
CV - SORYU		Kure
CV - HIRYU		"
CV - HOSHO		"
CV - KORYU		S. Kyushu
CV - KASUGA		"
CV - RYUJO		Kure
CV - ZUIKAKU		"
CV - SHOKAKU		"
	10 DD	S. Kyushu and Kure
		Yokosuka

10 27D

SECRET

FLEETS		LOCATIONS
Combined Air Force		
	3 AV	Near Bako (6)
	1 AV	Near Kure (6)
	1 AV	Truk
	2 XAV	Near Sasebo
	1 XAV	Saigon-Camranh Bay area
Combined Fleet Train		
	2 AO	Near Yokosuka
	2 AO	Near Kure
	1 AO	Near Sasebo
	1 AO	Near Maizuru
	1 AO	Near Saipan
	1 AO	Near Yap
	1 AC	Near Saipan
	1 AF	Near Yokosuka
	2 AR	Near Kure
	1 Ice Breaker -	Sakhalien
	1 Target Ship	Sasebo
Japanese Naval Forces in China		
	1 OCA	Shanghai
	1 PG	Shanghai
	3 DD	"
	7 AK or AP	"
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet		
	4 PG	Between Kuhu and Ichang
	10 PR	" " " "
	1 AP or AK	" " " "
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CA	Sasebo
	1 CL	Foochow
	4 TB	Canton-Hongkong area
	1 PG	" " "
	2 AM	" " "
	13 Misc.	" " "
about	30 AP or AK	South China coast
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 OCA	Tsingtao
	1 DD	"
	4 TB	" (7)
	4 TB	Canton-Hongkong area (7)
	1 AP	Tsingtao
Southern Expeditionary Fleet		
	1 CL	French Indo-China coast
	1 CM	" " " "

70 -3- 28D

SECRET

NOTES:

(1)(CL) SENDAI moved from Kure to Sasebo
(2) The ATAGO (CA), Flagship of the 2nd Fleet, has moved from Kure to Sasebo. Further southward movements are expected.
(3) The CHOKAI (CA) has probably become flagship of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, off Indo-China.
(4) Desron 4, consisting of the NAKA (CL) and 12 DD have moved to Bako
(5) The NAGOYA MARU and the 4 Minelaying SS of Subron 6 (I-121 - 124) are now near Bako.
(6) Airron 7 has moved from Kure to Bako.
(7) At least one division of Torpedo Boats have moved to South China.

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70 -4-

29D

N. N. L. 90—1940

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 71 (Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. 907-100 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-2, ONI at Washington, DC. Date Dec. 1, 1941
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence Evaluation Rating "A"
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan NAVY Operations
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Basis:—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated. Include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

The following arrived in Takao during the past two days:

Commander Destroyer Squadron FIVE in NATORI
NAKA to join Destroyer Squadron FOUR
Unidentified units of Number Two Base Force
CHOGEI which is considered to be tender for two divisions of submarines.

All of the above units are now under the command of Commander-in-Chief, THIRD Fleet.

Commander-in-Chief SECOND Fleet in ATAGO shifted from Kure to Sasebo Communication Zone, apparently enroute South China waters.

All ORANGE service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, 1 December 1941.

CINCAF, CINCPAC and COM FOURTEEN have received the above information.

Comment:

The movements reported above are still of small units. All of Desrons 4 and 5 are now given as located at Takao. Subdivs 9 and 13 have already been reported at Takao.

Although the CinC, 2nd Fleet is in command of the entire task force, the organization of the subordinate commanders has not yet been clarified. Apparently CinC 3rd Fleet commands a major subdivision.

Forwarded by [illegible]
Commander, U.S.N.

(322)

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✓	✓		✓	✓					✓	

Mess.	Cin.C.	I. & D.	C. & P.	Log.	S. S. A.	Pl. & S.	Aero.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Ber. Pac.	Com. Sec. Pac.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Appeals	Com. Atlan.	F. A. T. U.
Attached		✓ Op-16-11	✓ Op-12	Op-13	Op-15	Op-20		✓ Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-25	✓ Op-26	State	Com. Inform.	Strategic Com.

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30D

N. N. I. 26—940

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C-2 0021

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 72-41 (Start new series each year. See par. 3 a (2), page 3 of O.P.N.A.V.I.)

Monograph Index Guide No. 907-100 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-2, ONI (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person) at Washington, DC Date December 3, 1941

Reference (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Radio Intelligence (An official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) Evaluation RATING "A" (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan (Nation reported on) Navy (Main title as per Index guide) Operations (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Basis—(Here enter useful summary of report, containing substance maximally stated. Include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

Commanders-in-Chief, SECOND and THIRD Fleet plus Commander Southern Expeditionary Force are in the Takao Area.

Broadcasts to fleet units are now being sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition to Tokyo Radio.

The Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes.

CINCAF, CINCPAC and COM FOURTEEN have received the above information.

Comment: The assembling of units in the Takao area is beginning to indicate a concentration in this area.

Forwarded by [signature]
Comdr., USN.

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Nav.	Ord.	T. E. D.	C. A. F.	Eng.	S. & A.	M. & C.	Aero	C. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Sta. For.	Com. Sea. For.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Eastern	Com. Asiatic	F. A. T. U.
Attached		Op-1 ✓	Op-11	Op-13	Op-14	Op-16	Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-30	Op-32	State	Communications	Maritime Com.
Coast Guard	Army War Plans	Aide to Pres.											Return to Room No.		

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EXHIBIT NO. 86

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, May 1, 1941.

	AXIS				
	GERMANY	ITALY	VICHY FRANCE	OTHER *AUGMENTATIONS	TOTALS
Battleships	6 (a)	6 (b)	5 (g)	-	17
Aircraft Carriers	-	-	1 (h)	-	1
Heavy Cruisers	4	4 (c)	4	-	12
Light Cruisers	4	11 (d)	9 (i)	2 (k)	26
Destroyers	15 (est.)	84 (e)	52 (j)	9 (l)	160
Submarines	150 (est.)	77 (f)	56	9 (m)	294

(a) Includes 2 overage battleships, SCHLESIEN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
(b) Includes damaged DUILIO and CAVOUR, heavily damaged, resting on bottom.
(c) Includes damaged BOLZANO.
(d) Includes 5 ineffective light cruisers.
(e) Includes 2 ineffective destroyers.
(f) Includes 3 ineffective submarines.
(g) Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships.
(h) Interned in Martinique.
(i) Includes 2 interned in Martinique.
(j) Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers.
(k) Includes Yugoslavian DALMACIA and Dutch GELDERLAND.
(l) Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers.
(m) Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 6 Dutch submarines.

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, May 1, 1941.

ALLIED

	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	FREE FRANCE	OTHER AUGMENTATIONS	TOTALS
Battleships	6	16(a)(b)	3(g)	-	25
Aircraft Carriers	3	7(c)(d)	-	-	10
Heavy Cruisers	5	13(e)	3(h)	1(k)	22
Light Cruisers	6	30(f)	1(h)	2(l)	41
Destroyers	85	191(f)	12(i)	11(m)	299
Submarines	53	85(f)	8(j)	15(n)	141

(a) Includes 3 battle cruisers.
(b) Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair.
(c) Includes 1 escort carrier.
(d) Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair.
(e) Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair.
(f) Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time.
(g) Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
(h) Interned at Alexandria.
(i) Includes 4 incomplete and 3 interned at Alexandria.
(j) Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
(k) Includes Greek GEORGIOS AVEROV.
(l) Includes Dutch HEEMSKERCK and SUMATRA.
(m) Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
(n) Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, PACIFIC OCEAN, as of May 1, 1941.

AXIS

	JAPAN	VICHY FRANCE	TOTALS
Battleships	10	-	10
Aircraft Carriers	7	-	7
Heavy Cruisers	18	-	18
Light Cruisers	17	1	18
Destroyers	100	-	100
Submarines	68	2	70

ALLIES

	UNITED STATES Pacific	UNITED STATES Asiatic	GREAT BRITAIN	DUTCH	TOTALS
Battleships	9	-	1	-	10
Aircraft Carriers	3	-	1	-	4
Heavy Cruisers	12	1	4(a)	-	17
Light Cruisers	9	2	13(b)	3	27
Destroyers	67	13	6(b)	7	93
Submarines	27	28	-(c)	15	70

(a) Includes 1 unit damaged and under repair.
(b) Estimated, no accurate figures available.
(c) Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.

3

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NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, December 7, 1941.

	AXIS				
	GERMANY	ITALY	VICHY FRANCE	OTHER AUGMENTATIONS	TOTALS
Battleships	5(a)	6(b)	5(g)	-	16
Aircraft Carriers	-	-	1(h)	-	1
Heavy Cruisers	4	4(c)	4	-	12
Light Cruisers	4	12(d)	9(i)	2(k)	27
Destroyers	20(est.)	77(e)	53(j)	9(l)	159
Submarines	155(est.)	67(f)	60	9(m)	291

(a) Includes 2 overage battleships SCHLESIEN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
(b) Includes CAVOUR heavily damaged but afloat.
(c) Includes damaged BOLZANO and GORIZIA.
(d) Includes damaged D'AOSTA, DUCA D'ABRUZZI, and MONTECUCCOLI.
(e) Includes 34 damaged destroyers.
(f) Includes 26 damaged submarines.
(g) Includes 3 damaged or incomplete battleships.
(h) Interned at Martinique.
(i) Includes 2 interned at Martinique.
(j) Includes 7 damaged or incomplete.
(k) Includes Yugoslavian DALMACIA and Dutch GELDERLAND.
(l) Includes 1 Greek, 5 Norwegian, and 3 Yugoslavian destroyers.
(m) Includes 6 Dutch, and 3 Yugoslavian submarines.

4

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, December 7, 1941.

ALLIED

	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	FREE FRANCE	OTHER AUGMENTATIONS	TOTALS
Battleships	6(a)	12(e)(f)	3(k)	-	21
Aircraft Carriers	4(b)(c)	8(g)(h)	-	-	12
Heavy Cruisers	5	12(i)	3(l)	1(o)	21
Light Cruisers	8(d)	28(j)	1(l)	2(p)	39
Destroyers	92	225(j)	11(m)	11(q)	339
Submarines	56	80(j)	8(n)	15(r)	161

(a) Does not include NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON both on trials.
(b) Does not include HORNET on trials.
(c) Includes LONG ISLAND (Escort Carrier).
(d) JUNEAU, ATLANTA, SAN DIEGO and SAN JUAN carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or commissioned and are not included.
(e) Includes 1 battle cruiser.
(f) Includes one damaged battleship under repair.
(g) Includes 2 Escort Carriers.
(h) Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair.
(i) Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair.
(j) Estimated. No accurate figures available.
(k) Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
(l) Interned at Alexandria.
(m) Includes 4 incomplete, 2 interned and 1 repairing.
(n) Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
(o) Includes Greek GEORGIOS AVEROV.
(p) Includes Dutch HEEMSKERCK and SUMATRA.
(q) Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
(r) Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.

5

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, PACIFIC OCEAN, as of December 7, 1941.

AXIS

	JAPAN	VICHY FRANCE	TOTALS
Battleships	10	-	10
Aircraft Carriers	9	-	9
Heavy Cruisers	18	-	18
Light Cruisers	17	1	18
Destroyers	103	-	103
Submarines	74	1	75

ALLIES

	UNITED STATES Pacific	UNITED STATES Asiatic	GREAT BRITAIN	FREE FRANCE	DUTCH	TOTALS
Battleships	9	-	4(e)(f)	-	-	13
Aircraft Carriers	3	-	1(g)	-	-	4
Heavy Cruisers	12	1	4	-	-	17
Light Cruisers	10(a)	1	17(h)	-	3	31
Destroyers	54(b)(c)	13	13(h)	1	7	88
Submarines	25(d)	28	-(i)	-	15	68

(a) Includes BOISE which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
(b) Includes 4 destroyers assigned 14th Naval District.
(c) Does not include destroyers assigned other West Coast Naval Districts.
(d) Status of two submarines not clear.
(e) Includes 1 battle cruiser.
(f) Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair.
(g) This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair.
(h) Estimated, no accurate figures available.
(i) Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.

6

EXHIBIT NO. 87

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Room 4D757
The Pentagon

18 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

Inclosed is a memorandum prepared by General Strong on the subject "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June 1940".

Harmon Duncombe
HARMON DUNCOMBE
Lt. Col., GSC

Incl.



15 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

SUBJECT: Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June 1940

1. In connection with your testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack you were asked repeatedly for the reasons which prompted you to alert the Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June 1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division at that time, I was responsible for advising the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the story (in case it is not self-evident to the Committee from a review of contemporaneous historical events) if I summarize the situation leading to the alert which I recommended and you approved.

2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and early June of 1940 gave us cause for gravest concern. The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany had a good chance of acquiring the French fleet intact. Russia appeared to be cooperating with the Axis; on 12 June she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she demanded a change of government in Esthonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolia border, and the inference was that these two had composed their differences with a view to negotiating a neutrality pact. The Japanese navy would then be free for any adventure. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu, apparently for further aggressive action.

3. You may remember a conference held in your office at 0830 on 17 June 1940 at which I was present, along with General Andrews and General Moore. We believed at that time that German control of the French fleet would create a very serious situation in the South Atlantic. Should Great Britain fall, a hostile move toward South America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a desperate need for troops in Brazil and Uruguay, General Andrews and I recommended at this meeting that the National Guard be ordered into Federal Service. That was our frame of mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference you directed us to consider the questions which had been raised.

4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the most immediate threat to be a raid or major sabotage effort which would effectively close the Panama Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed; certain specific evidence is mentioned below. In the event of a raid, a diver-

sionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, on 17 June 1940 I recommended placing these two Departments on an alert status. The documents directly bearing on my decision do not tell the story nearly so well as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities and American weakness at that time when the collapse of France was imminent and the fall of Britain by no means impossible. However, I cite and summarize below a few significant papers which reflect those times and give some indication of what was in our minds during those late spring days of 1940.

a. State Department 793, 94119/640, dated 25 May 1940. Mr. Grew discusses "a flurry of official activity" in Tokyo. Although he sees no reason to expect an attack on the Netherlands East Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an attack "would presumably be guarded with the utmost secrecy." (This, to our minds, did not exclude, but rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of attack or raids elsewhere.)

b. State Department 711.94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that "a complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted." He cites the opinion of Japanese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and expresses his own belief that Japan "may be tempted to resort to desperate courses."

c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/165, dated 10 June 1940. The Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the Panama Canal when the United States "declares mobilization."

d. War Department WPD 3730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquer, revealed to an American petty officer on 1 May 1940 at Eureka, California, some specific and detailed plans to blow up the Panama Canal if our entry into the war "became imminent."

e. War Department WPD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter prepared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama Department, was informed that "the background of the instructions (for the alert of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in the public press", and that "the increasing tension and uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come." (This letter remained unsent on

my recommendation, largely because I considered the reasons for the alert to be obvious, as indeed they were.)

5. I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize the situation as of 17 June 1940 than to point out that the factors which guided my decision to recommend alerting these overseas bases were essentially those which made it necessary for the President of the United States to issue his Proclamation of 27 June 1940 (F. R. Doc. 40-2639), which extended the scope of the national emergency proclaimed 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority in regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal.

Incls (w/orig only)
As listed in par 4 above (cys)
F.R.Doc.40-2639 (cy)

GEO. V. STRONG
Major General, USA (Retired)



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAP
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (B)

TOKYO
Dated May 25, 1940
Rec'd 10:03 a.m.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAY 27 1940 Department of State

COPIES IN PARAPHRASE SENT TO G.N.I. AND M.I.D. IN CONFIDENCE

Secretary of State

Washington

376, May 25, 7 p.m. (GRAY)

The following series of events has led to uneasy speculation in foreign circles here:

(One) Yesterday General Kaiso, Minister of Overseas Affairs, called on the Prime Minister just before the cabinet meeting and is reported in the press as having discussed "a vital issue" and as having made "an important recommendation to the Premier in connection with the settlement of the China affair".

(Two) Last night the spokesman of the Foreign Office delivered the radio address reported in our 375, May 25, 6 a.m.

(Three) This morning the Navy Minister called on the Prime Minister at 9:17. The Prime Minister went to the Emperor at 10 o'clock and after the audience called on Yuasa, Lord Privy Seal. (END GRAY)

(Four) CONFIDENTIAL. Whatever step if any is presaged by this flurry of official activity there appears to be good reason to believe that it envisages a descent on the

Netherlands

793.94119/840

MILD JUN 4 1940



PAP -2- 375, May 25, " p.m. from Tokyo

Netherlands East Indies, preparations for which would presumably be guarded with the utmost secrecy. We shall, however, watch the situation closely and report whatever significant evidence may emerge from the current welter of speculation.

GREW

GW

(CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

A telegram (no. 378) of May 23, 1940, 7 p.m., from the American Embassy at Tokyo reads substantially as follows:

The following series of events has led to uneasy speculation in foreign circles in Tokyo:

On May 24 General Reina, Minister of Overseas Affairs, called on the Prime Minister just before the cabinet meeting and is reported in the press as having discussed "a vital issue" and as having made "an important recommendation to the Premier in connection with the settlement of the China affair".

On the evening of May 24 the spokesman of the Foreign Office delivered the radio address reported in Tokyo's 378, May 23.

On the morning of May 25 the Navy Minister called on the Prime Minister at 9:17. The Prime Minister went to the Emperor at 10 o'clock and after the audience called on Yuzen, Lord Privy Seal.

In view this sudden excursion in official circles [illegible] any [illegible], there seems to be no real ground for thinking that such excursion contemplates an excursion when the Netherlands Crown Indies, preparations for which would be treated with the greatest secrecy, it is assumed.

[illegible]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

To FE (MMH) for action

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) Tel. to Tokyo

FROM Tokyo

Dated June 3, 1940

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

File B

SECRETARY OF STATE 1940 NOTED

400, June 3, noon. (SECTION ONE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 172, May 30, 2 p.m. 1517a

One. I am most grateful for your telegram under reference not only as a directive but as confirmation of my own views with regard to the potential consequences of the tragedy unfolding in Europe. With special reference to the last two paragraphs of your telegram, I have conceived it to be one of my principal duties to assist in the procuring of a reversal of Japanese policies and objectives in China and an adherence by Japan to principles and policies to which the United States and Great Britain are committed. I have never held the opinion that such reversal of Japanese policies could be procured only at the cost of modification of American opposition to the use of force by Japan in achieving her objectives in China. I have reported by several telegrams sent during the last two months that there was growing skepticism of the "New Order in East Asia" conceived in terms of exclusive rights and monopolies in China, which tended to

confirm

711.94/1518

Confidential File F/N

-2- #400, June 3, noon, (SECTION ONE) from Tokyo.

confirm my belief that popular disillusionment in the China adventure combined with the additional strength of those elements in this country who believe in law and order and who realize that Japan's economic well-being is unalterably bound up with economic and therefore political cooperation with the United States and the British Empire would in time make possible the desired reversal of Japanese policies. If conditions in Europe had remained as they were during the first six months of the war there is no (repeat no) substantial reason to doubt that the movement in the direction desired by us would have accelerated. The position today is that the field here has been left to the Germans who are exploiting their military successes with a view to aggravating relations between the United States and Japan. A complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted.

(END SECTION ONE)

XLP GREW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

FROM TOKYO

Dated June 3, 1940

Received 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

400, June 3, noon (SECTION TWO)

Two. I venture respectfully to hope that this telegram may have your special attention because I regard its substance and conclusion as of prime importance. My analysis of the situation is as follows.

Three. Japan is at present in a state of political turmoil of unusual intensity. Dominating elements are united in the desire to bring about an early settlement of the hostilities in China but they are radically separated with regard to the nature of the settlement and the means to bring it about. While these various schools of thought cannot be grouped in clear cut categories, each enjoys support from considerable elements in the country including elements in the army and each manifests certain basic trends progressively receiving attention which are roughly characterized in the ensuing paragraphs.

Four. One school of thought advocates an understanding with Soviet Russia for the partition of China on Polish lines. It is reported that Russia made some such

EDA - 2 - #400, June 3, noon from Tokyo

such proposal to Japan last autumn and that Japan turned it down. Informants have told us that Russia has recently renewed the proposal, desiring a free hand to cope with eventualities in Europe, including the Balkans and the possibility of eventually having to fight the Germans for control of the Baku oil fields, and that a Japanese colonel has already arrived in Moscow to negotiate. Informants look for fruition of this scheme by autumn and they maintain that the desire to settle the China conflict is so pressing that even this solution would be welcomed by the Japanese public as a whole. Some supporters of this thesis furthermore advocate seizure of the Netherlands East Indies before a German victory in Europe would give Germany a similar opportunity. They realize that economic reprisals by the United States would have to be faced but they maintain that no country has ever been destroyed by embargoes and that Japan would find a way out. They discount the possibility of war with the United States and believe that in any case the Japanese fleet has nothing to fear from the use of force. This faction, which expects to bring about the overthrow of the present Japanese Cabinet before autumn, is made up largely of members of the reactionary societies and younger officers in the army and is

2891

supported



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

TOKYO

Dated June 3, 1940

Rec'd 12:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

400, June 3, noon (SECTION THREE)

Five. A second school of thought, which is fundamentally pro-German, has been given increased prestige by the recent German successes in Europe. The movement for close relations with Germany is being assiduously furthered by the German citizens in Tokyo whose main efforts are directed at strengthening anti-American sentiment through constant propaganda, especially among the military. The character of such propaganda indicates that the German thesis is that if such relations between the United States and Japan are directed and maintained in increasingly dangerous channels, the United States will be less prone to enter the European war against Germany. They aim to bring about a situation where the entry of the United States into the war against Germany would ensure a similar clash with Japan. The pro-German elements in Japan, especially those who foresee a German victory in Europe, argue that Japan can expect nothing from Great Britain or France and that

-2- #400, June 8, noon (SIC HERE) from Tokyo

that the policy of the United States towards Japan is of so intransigent and rigid a nature that good relations between those two countries are impossible. This faction is believed to be largely supported by military elements but may well become broadened and strengthened in the event of continued German successes in Europe.

Six. Finally there is the school of thought that recognizes the fundamental fact that Japan has more to gain from good relations and cooperation with the democracies than with the totalitarian powers. They clearly perceive the reasoning of those who advocate a self-sufficient economic bloc between China and Manchukuo and they realize that the reconstruction of China cannot succeed without the cooperation of the great commercial powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain. This faction includes most of the business world and influential men both within the government and out of it, including some of the higher military officers. Some of them realize that the Wang Ching Wei regime cannot succeed and they are quietly working toward a reasonable peace with Chiang Kai Shek in order to provide a bridge for readjustment of relations with the countries with which Japan's economic destiny

-3- #400, June 3, noon (SEC THREE) from Tokyo

destiny lies, namely the United States and the British Empire. Representatives of this school of thought have pointed out to us that at present the democracies seem disinclined even to raise a finger to strengthen the hands of the forces in Japan which are striving for a return to moderate courses. They inquire whether, in the event of the conclusion with Chiang Kai Shek of a peace considered satisfactory by the American and British Government, they could be assured thereafter of economic assistance in assuring Japan's normal supplies of raw materials as well as of much needed credits from the United States.

(END SECTION THREE)

GREW

DDM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

J

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Tokyo

Dated June , 1940

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

440, June 5, noon. (SECTION FOUR)

what they feel to be necessary for the success of this movement toward the sort of peace that would be satisfactory to the United States and Great Britain is the creation of a feeling of assurance that in such an event Japan could depend on a restoration of the old relations of friendship with the United States and the countries of the British Empire. These elements stress frankly, not as a threat but as an (?) fact, that unless such a feeling of future assurance can replace the present widespread susceptibility that Japan has nothing to hope from the United States and Great Britain in the way of economic and financial cooperative assistance, the present Cabinet will fall during the next few months and may be replaced with a Cabinet of strong military and pro-German tendencies with disastrous results for Japan. Speculative reports of the impending fall of the Cabinet are being heard more frequently and from increasingly credible sources.

Seven. It has recently come to my attention that the

-2- 400, June 2, noon (SECTION FOUR) from Tokyo.

the Foreign Minister in conversation with an informant said to him that the American Ambassador had told the Minister that there could be no possibility of an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan as long as the conflict in China continued. I have never presented the situation to the Minister in those words or in that form and it is obvious that he has drawn the logical implications from the observations which I have from time to time made to Mr. Arita and to his predecessors as duly reported to the Department. But the Minister's remark to my informant, who authorizes me to quote him to Mr. Arita, seems logically to open the way to a further approach to the Minister with a view to clarifying the attitude of the United States, either under instructions or as conveying my own thoughts. If you approve of my seeking such an interview I should like to present our attitude orally along the lines of your 175, May 30, 2 p.m., with special regard to paragraph four thereof, and then to endeavor to sum up the situation as follows: (END SECTION FOUR)

GREW

EPD

[illegible]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM Tokyo
Dated June 3, 1940
Rec'd 10:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

100, June 3, noon. (SECTION FIVE)

Eight. My thought would be to say official was correct in attributing to me the view that the relations between our two countries cannot be expected to improve so long as there is a continuance of the multifarious interferences with American rights and interests in China including inter-alia the bombings of American property the indignities to which American citizens are repeatedly subjected and the penalizing of American commercial and financial rights and interests through monopolistic and other measures at the hands of Japanese authorities in China and also so long as the Japanese in China continue to endeavor to achieve various positive underlying national objectives by the use of force. On the other hand the United States desires and would welcome an early return to mutually good and helpful relations with Japan; that now more than ever the present state of world affairs dictates the mutual importance of the building up of such relations; that as soon as concrete evidence emerges that

Japan

1009

-2- #400, June 3, noon (SECTION FIVE) from Tokyo.

Japan genuinely desires and genuinely intends to relinquish force as an instrument of national policy and to direct its policy and efforts toward achieving its objectives by peaceful and legal methods and means, involving a discontinuance of past and current interferences with American rights and interests in China, the United States for its part will be disposed to view such a re-orientation of policy and efforts with sympathy and with the hope that the effectiveness of such a movement will in due course open the way to a new era in American Japanese relations in which the future will hold out possibilities of helpful economic and financial cooperation. What I have chiefly in mind is to convey to the Minister and to others with whom I may have occasion to talk, without any commitments whatsoever, the thought that a new and mutually helpful era in American-Japanese relations is by no means impossible and that in my own belief the time is ripe for a positive move by Japan in that direction. I am not without hope that the striking of such a note in the midst of current Japanese perplexity might conceivably create an important influence on Government thought at this crucial moment.

Mine. Please instruct, and provided that the foregoing thoughts are approved advise me of any further comment which you feel could properly and helpfully be

made



-3- #40, June , noon (SECTION FIVE) from Tokyo.

made in such a suggested interview, apart from your previous instructions which I constantly retain in mind for use when occasion offers. (END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

DOM:HPD



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JT
This telegram was sent in Naval Code and must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM: OPNAV

FROM Rec'd June 10, 1940

6:37 p.m.

INFO: STATE DEPARTMENT

ACTION COMELEVEN. PASSED BY COMELEVEN TO COMFIFTEEN AND OPNAV FOR INFO

PRIORITY.

10 June, 1940. For Captain E.M. Zacharias from T-one. S.S. SANTA MARIA former S.S. WARWICK UNION OIL sailed 6 June for Balboa with Brazilian crew. Urgent brought to Pedro by ARGENTINA MARU. Brazilian crew learned from Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in Panama Canal when United States of America declares mobilization.

NPL

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS Department of State

DIVISION OF ... 1940 ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U - LIAISON OFFICE ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE

811.812 PROTECTION/165 US/LR

FILED Confidential File

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

FROM COMMANDER LOS ANGELES SECTION COAST GUARD

June 10, 1940

Rec'd 8:33 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: COM 11

INFO: OPNAV
SECSTATE

RESTRICTED PRIORITY

For Captain E. M. Zacharias from T-one. S.S. SANTA MARIA former S.S. WARWICK Union Oil sailed 6 June for Balboa with Brazilian crew. Crew brought to Pedro by ARGENTINA MARU. Brazilian crew learned from Japanese crew of ARGENTINA MARU all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in Panama Canal when U.S.A. declares mobilization.

HPD

F.W. 811F.812 PROTECTION/165

June 17, 1940

Notes of conference in office of Chief of Staff, 8:30 A.M., June 17, 1940.

SUBJECT: Defense Problems.

PRESENT: General Marshall
General Strong
General Andrews
General Moore

The Chief of Staff remarked that in going over the various possibilities it seems that we may suddenly find Japan and Russia appear as a team operating to hold our ships in the Pacific. If the French navy goes to Germany and Italy, we will have a very serious situation in the South Atlantic. Germany may rush the South American situation to a head in a few weeks.

Are we not forced into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is, purely defensive action in the Pacific, with a main effort on the Atlantic side. There is the possibility of raids with resultant public reaction. The main effort may be south of Trinidad, with any action north thereof purely on the basis of a diversion to prevent our sending material to south America. This seems to indicate that we are reaching a point where we should mobilize the National Guard.

General Strong stated that the Navy reports that they have a definite information that the French fleet has already been turned over to and incorporated in the British fleet. (NOTE: Later information from the Navy Department indicates that this is questionable.) If this is so, and if the next move of the Germans, possibly through Ireland, results in the capitulation of Great Britain proper, the combined Atlantic fleets may move to the western hemisphere. In this case, they must operate from our ports as there are no others adequate. From this point WPD and the Navy disagree on action. WPD believes in defensive operations only in the

17

Pacific and concentrating everything in this hemisphere.

The Chief of Staff commented that if the British and French fleets come here the Navy point of view is OK; if not, it is all wrong. We have to be prepared to meet the worst situation that may develop, that is, if we do not have the Allied fleet in the Atlantic.

Thinking out loud, should not Hawaii have some big bombers. We have 56. It is possible that opponents in the Pacific would be four-fifths of the way to Hawaii before we knew that they had moved. Would five or ten flying fortresses at Hawaii alter this picture?

General Andrews stated that this small number would be overwhelmed by hostile pursuit. We are weak in pursuit and any small force would be destroyed. He believes we should not split our forces but should send more or none. He also believes that if we could get our reserves of ammunition, bombs, etc. to Hawaii, we could put big planes there in three days if necessary. The Chief of Staff remarked that three days might be fatal. General Strong thinks we would have less than 24 hours notice.

We have a combined Army and Navy Air force of 476 combat planes in Hawaii. Japan at present can hardly bring more than 400 because of the small size and number of her carriers. Merchant ships can be converted for launching planes, but the planes cannot land again on the ship.

In response to a question regarding the use of the 3d Division in Alaska, General Strong thought this premature. A landing field is being put in at Kodiak.

Both General Andrews and General Strong recommend ordering the National Guard into Federal service. General Strong anticipates a desperate need within 60 days for troops in South America, (Brazil and Uruguay.) The Chief of Staff thought that although we cannot at once send expeditions, we might be able to guarantee to some of the South

American governments the occupation and holding of certain key ports.

With respect to further equipment for the Allies as per the President's statement, we have scraped the bottom so far as the Army is concerned.

General Andrews wishes to motorize the 4th Division. He wants an air-ground team in training, preferably at Fort Benning.

The Chief of Staff directed consideration of all questions raised during this conference by the heads of staff Divisions present.

W.B.S.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo

Dated June 17, 1940

Rec'd 8:05 a. m.

6/17
Shown to
Dd & MID
KCK

BSK
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone. (B)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1455, June 17, 6 p. m.

Confidential reports have been coming to us from various sources of considerable concentration of Japanese military forces in Hainan, Formosa and Kyushu but these reports are not subject to confirmation. Soviet and British attaches here are speculating with regard to a possible Japanese invasion of French Indo-China in the event of the capitulation of France in Europe.

GREW

WSB

793.94/15954

F/FG

C O P Y

COPY

(Pencilled: fr 3730 Panama)

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander, San Francisco District.
To: Commandant.

Subject: Sabotage, Panam Canal, alleged method to be used by Germans.

Inclosures: (1) Sketch.

1. Lieutenant Commander S. B. Johnson, upon an inspection by him of the Hunboldt Bay Lifeboat Station on 1 May, 1940, was informed by Chief Boatswain (1) Churchill that a personal friend of Churchill's in the town of Eureka, California, had met a German who had been drinking. Churchill's friend was invited to have a drink with the German, who bragged about a plan to blow up the Panama Canal if the United States' entry into the war became imminent. Churchill's friend plied the German with drinks and appeared to drink with him but in fact spilled his drinks. The German did not identify himself other than that he had been in the country one year. The German said that a small vessel would be fitted out, with mines secured to the vessel's bottom, detachable from inside the ship. The mines would be operated by a timing device set in motion, apparently, when detached from the ship. To prevent an obvious change in the water line of the vessel when the bombs were released, special tanks were to be fitted inside the vessel to take in water in a location and weight to counteract the effect of dropping the load of mines.

2. Two sketches were made by the American to describe the method by which mines were attached and tanks distributed in the vessel. These two sketches are on the tracing, inclosure (1).

Signed: Stanley V. Parker,
Typed: Stanley V. Parker.

Copy:

FBI,
ONI, 12th Naval District.
G-2, 9th Corps Area Hq.

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My dear Van Voorhis:

The special* instructions recently* sent you ~~some 10 days ago~~ were based on information which we had here and upon consultations between the State, War and Navy Departments. The background of the instructions has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in the public press. I only want to add that the increasing tension and uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come.

I trust that the instructions in question did not cause you people to lose too much sleep.

Best of luck

Sincerely yours,

G. C. M.

(Pencilled: Not used)

* Pencilled notations

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14 Fr
"Armed guards on public
vessels transiting
Panama Canal"
THE PRESIDENT 4415-1
6-27-40 Panama)

CONTROL OF VESSELS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

[1]

WHEREAS, A proclamation issued by me on September 8, 1939, proclaimed that a national emergency existed in connection with and to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations, and that specific directions and authorizations would be given from time to time for carrying out these two purposes,

WHEREAS, The continuation of the conditions set forth in said proclamation of September 8, 1939, now calls for additional measures within the limits of peace-time authorizations,

WHEREAS, Under and by virtue of section 1 of title II of the Act of Congress approved June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 220 (U.S.C. title 50, sec. 191), it is provided as follows:

"SECTION 1. Whenever the President by proclamation or Executive order declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened war, insurrection, or invasion, or disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, may inspect such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if necessary in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States, may take, by and with the consent of the President, for such purposes, full possession and control of such vessel and remove therefrom, the officers and crew thereof and all other persons not specially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof.

"Within the territory and waters of the Canal Zone the Governor of the Panama Canal, with the approval of the President, shall exercise all the powers conferred by this section on the Secretary of the Treasury."

AND, WHEREAS, It is essential, in order to carry into effect the provisions of said Act, which are quoted herein, that the powers conferred

[1] 4 F.R. 3851.

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therein upon the President, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the Panama Canal be at this time exercised, or available for exercise, with respect to foreign and domestic vessels.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of the said Act of Congress quoted herein, do hereby declare the continuation of the conditions set forth in my proclamation of September 8, 1939, and the existence of a national emergency by reason of threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States.

AND, I therefore consent to the exercise, with respect to foreign and domestic vessels, by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the Panama Canal, of all the powers conferred by the provisions of said Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 27th day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty and of the Independence of the United States of America, the one hundred and sixty-fourth.

(SEAL)

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

By the President:

CORDELL HULL

Secretary of State.

(No. 2412)

(F. R. Doc. 40-2639; Filed, June 28, 1940; 10:05 a.m.)

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