[Senate Hearing 119-506]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-506
U.S. LEADERSHIP AT THE WORLD
RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 2027:
STRATEGY AND CHALLENGES AHEAD OF
SHANGHAI
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND MEDIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2026
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-385 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chair BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico, Ranking
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska GARY PETERS, Michigan
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TED BUDD, North Carolina JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
JOHN CURTIS, Utah JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio ANDY KIM, New Jersey
TIM SHEEHY, Montana LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 17, 2026................................... 1
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 34
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 37
Statement of Senator Moreno...................................... 39
Witnesses
Ambassador (Ret.) Grace Koh, Vice President of Government
Relations at Ciena and former Head of U.S. Delegation to the
World Radiocommunication Conference 2019....................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Ambassador (Ret.) Stephen A. Lang, Senior Advisor, Crest Hill
Advisors LLC and former U.S. Coordinator for International
Communications and Information Policy.......................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Dr. James A. Lewis, Distinguished Fellow, Center for European
Policy Analysis................................................ 20
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Michael Calabrese, Director of Wireless Future and Senior Advisor
of Technology and Democracy, New America....................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Appendix
Letter dated March 17, 2026 to Hon. Ted Cruz, Hon. Maria
Cantwell, Hon. Deb Fischer and Hon. Ben Ray Lujan from Hon.
Cory Gardner, President and CEO, NCTA--The Internet &
Television Association......................................... 45
Response to written questions submitted to Ambassador (ret.)
Grace Koh by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 46
Hon. Cynthia Lummis.......................................... 49
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 49
Response to written questions submitted to Ambassador (ret.)
Stephan A. Lang by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 53
Hon. Cynthia Lummis.......................................... 53
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 54
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 55
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. James A. Lewis by:
Hon. Ted Cruz................................................ 56
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 56
Response to written questions submitted to Michael Calabrese by:
Hon. Cynthia Lummis.......................................... 58
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 59
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 61
U.S. LEADERSHIP AT THE WORLD
RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 2027:
STRATEGY AND CHALLENGES AHEAD OF
SHANGHAI
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2026
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Media,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Deb Fischer,
Chair of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Fischer, Blackburn, Moreno, Lujan, and
Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. I call the hearing to order. Welcome
everyone and thank you for being here today to discuss the
United States' preparation for the 2027 World
Radiocommunication Conference.
The World Radiocommunication Conference convened by the
International Telecommunication Union every four years is one
of the most consequential global foras into spectrum policy.
The decisions made at these conferences shape the international
rules governing how radio frequency spectrum is allocated and
shared around the world. Those decisions have far-reaching
implications for United States economic competitiveness,
national security, scientific research, and the continued
leadership of the United States in wireless and satellite
technologies.
Next year's conference will be hosted in Shanghai, and the
Chinese Communist Party will certainly be prepared to advance
positions meant to undermine the United States' leadership. The
United States must enter these negotiations with a strong
position. This requires a tightly coordinated interagency
process.
This process, which is led by NTIA, begins with Federal
agencies providing technical input and operational perspectives
on each agenda item under consideration for WRC-27.
The United States' final position should reflect the full
range of national spectrum interests. Among agencies, the
Department of Defense plays a particularly significant role.
DOD is the largest Federal user of radio frequency spectrum
within the Federal Government, and many of its most critical
capabilities, including satellite communication, raiders--
radars--I had a dog named Raider--radars and missile warning
systems, depend on reliable and interference-free spectrum
assets.
As the WRC agenda looks to address space-related services
and satellite operations, the intersection between
international spectrum policy and national security becomes
even more pronounced. National security missions cannot simply
be engineered around certain commercial spectrum priorities.
This is exactly why Congress exempted 7.4 to 8.4 gigahertz band
from FCC auction authority last year, in addition to the lower
three band.
Other Federal agencies also contribute essential expertise
to the interagency process, NASA and NOAA depend on spectrum
for scientific satellites and weather monitoring systems that
are crucial for forecasting and climate observation. The FAA
relies on spectrum for aviation safety and navigation systems
that support the integrity of the global aviation network.
Each of these missions must be carefully considered as the
United States evaluates proposed regulatory changes at the
international level, where they will inevitably impact the
domestic use of America's airways. The challenge and the
responsibility of the interagency process is to reconcile these
diverse needs and translate them into a cohesive position that
advances American innovation and resilience. This unified
position will allow the United States to engage effectively
with regional partners, build coalitions with allied nations,
and advocate confidently for outcomes that protect the United
States' interests.
Those interests are substantial. The regulatory frameworks
adopted at the conference will influence how the next
generation of satellite constellations operate, influence the
coexistence of emerging communications services, and influence
how spectrum policy supports both economic growth and national
security.
That is why preparation for WRC-27 is not a short-term
exercise. Today's committee hearing examines how best to
support the interagency in the coming months. We all share the
goal of advancing U.S. leadership in spectrum and in space.
Thank you and I look forward to your testimonies.
And now I recognize my friend, Ranking Member Lujan, for
your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Chair Fischer, thank you so very much for
calling this hearing. And to all of our witnesses, thank you
for being available today to discuss how the United States will
be preparing for the International Telecommunications Union's
World Radiocommunication Conference at the end of 2027.
Now, the United States has long been the world's leader in
communications technology, developing advanced networks and
devices used by billions of people that have been critical in
shaping the modern digital economy. We must not take that
leadership role for granted. That is why we must take a hard
look at the role the United States will play at the WRC-27
being held in Shanghai, China.
Now, hosting the conference gives China a clear homefield
advantage in a forum that carries enormous geopolitical weight.
China understands that international standard bodies are
strategic areas where economics and geopolitical powers can be
built for decades. Congress has already acted to protect our
own infrastructure from China, providing $4.98 billion for the
Secure and Trusted Communications Network Reimbursement program
known as Rip and Replace to help small and rural providers
remove equipment from Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE.
The People's Republic of China has made it a national
priority to suppress United States' dominance in the
technologies that will define global connectivity. This would
threaten our national security, which is why our engagement in
the United States at the WRC-27 matters. Success requires a
clearly executed strategy, coordination and accountability
across our government, active partnership with the private
sector, and most critically, strong coalitions with our allies.
As we are learning in the time that we are speaking, that
matters.
That is why I am deeply concerned that the Trump
administration has been careless and outright reckless in its
approach to our global relationships. While the President has
touted this as an America First agenda, the execution is doing
real damage to our alliances and to Americans at home. Over the
last few months, the administration has cut tens of billions in
global aid, conducted illegal military strikes across multiple
regions, including in Nigeria and Iran, and imposed tariffs
that hurt small businesses and families.
If we continue on this path, the logical conclusion is
self-imposed isolation to our own detriment. Congress must
ensure that the Trump administration, the FCC, NTIA, and the
State Department are fully coordinating and accountable in
their preparation for the WRC 2027. The United States must
engage in the lead-up to the Conference with clarity and
purpose. The outcome of WRC 2027 is not predetermined, but what
we know for certain is that it will shape the future of global
spectrum policy.
The United States must advance a unified strategy to
promote U.S. innovation in space and wireless technologies and
protect our national defense interests. If we fail to act, we
will arrive in Shanghai divided and unprepared, handing our
competitors a strategic advantage. This should not be a
partisan issue. What matters now is whether we will step into
our role as leaders in communication technology or willingly
cede that ground to China.
We are fortunate to have an expert panel with us today, and
I look forward to a productive conversation. And again, I thank
you all for being here.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Lujan.
I would like to now introduce our witnesses for today.
Our first witness is Ambassador Grace Koh, former Head of
the U.S. Delegation to the 2019 World Radiocommunication
Conference. In this role, she managed interagency discussions
to develop United States' positions and oversaw negotiations at
the conference. Ambassador Koh currently serves as Vice
President of Government Affairs at Ciena.
Our second witness is Ambassador Stephen Lang, former U.S.
Coordinator for International Communications and Information
Policy. In this capacity, he led the United States delegations
to several international conferences, including the 2023 World
Radiocommunication Conference. Ambassador Lang currently serves
as a Senior Advisor at Crest Hill Advisors.
Our third witness is Dr. James Lewis, a distinguished
Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. His current
work focuses on strengthening American foreign policy and
examining how innovation shapes global competition.
And our final witness is Mr. Michael Calabrese. Am I saying
that correctly? I am sorry. Mr. Michael Calabrese, Director of
Wireless Future and Senior Advisor of Technology and Democracy
at New America.
With that, Ambassador Koh, you are recognized for five
minutes to give your opening statement. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR (RET.) GRACE KOH,
VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AT CIENA
AND FORMER HEAD OF U.S. DELEGATION TO THE WORLD
RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE 2019
Ambassador Koh. Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
U.S. leadership at the World Radiocommunications Conference
2027.
My name is Grace Koh. I am Vice President of Government
Relations at Ciena, and I did have the privilege of serving as
U.S. Ambassador and head of delegation to WRC-19. I am here in
my personal capacity. My employer has no significant stake in
the outcomes of WRC-27.
So I will make two points. Why consensus is essential at
the WRC, and why it is so hard to achieve, and why we must
prepare early, given the added risks of holding WRC-27 in
Shanghai. The World Radiocommunication Conference is among the
most technically complex treaty negotiations in the world.
Nearly 200 administrations participate, and the outcomes set
global rules for spectrum use and satellite operations.
These outcomes are almost always reached by consensus. A
vote is widely viewed as a failure, not just as a matter of
tradition, but because the system cannot work without broad
buy-in. Spectrum rules only matter if countries implement them.
And signals cross borders, satellites operate globally, if
rules were adopted by a narrow margin, dissenting countries
would have little incentive to comply, driving more
interference and less predictability for everyone.
Consensus produces durable rules, but it is hard, and the
work starts years before the conference begins. In the United
States, WRC preparation pulls together Federal agencies,
engineers, and private-sector stakeholders with competing
priorities. Carriers want capacity for mobile networks.
Satellite operators want globally harmonized rules for new
systems. Federal agencies must protect missions tied to
national security, aviation safety, and weather.
And reconciling those interests takes time. Technical
studies, policy tradeoffs, and hard negotiation. Parties test
limits and hold positions. Progress requires persistence,
credible analysis, and practical compromises, and it also
requires making hard calls.
But this work strengthens the U.S. position. By the time we
arrive with a proposal, the toughest objections have been
surfaced and addressed. We show up with a position that is
technically credible and resilient at the negotiating table. At
the conference, negotiators must turn those different proposals
into operating rules for 4 weeks--in 4 weeks. That is why the
final days can run late into the night, but consensus is
usually reached because everyone understands the alternative,
the possibility of no rules and more interference.
For WRC-27, the takeaway is simple. Start early. Consensus
takes sustained work with U.S. stakeholders and with other
delegations, and we cannot afford a delay. Here is why.
Shanghai adds a real operational and political risk, including
the fact that this host government has interests that diverge
sharply from ours. We should assume that devices,
communications may be monitored, and that raises significant
cybersecurity risks for a delegation that depends on laptops,
phones, and shared technical documents.
We should also plan for constrained connectivity. Common
U.S. collaboration tools may not work reliably. Delegations may
have limited access to remote technical support, so key experts
need to be on the ground to respond to late-breaking proposals.
Export controls may further limit discussions, and state media
may try to shape the narrative.
The response is preparation and discipline. Resolve
sensitive policy issues earlier, not in Shanghai. Train the
delegation early. Name the delegation head early. Staff the
delegation to cover parallel sessions and train the team
throughout the cycle. Issue clear guidance on cybersecurity
communications and export compliance, and at the conference,
enforce tight information handling practices.
The State Department will also need to intensify its
engagement with ITU leadership to protect a transparent, rules-
based conference, and plan now with like-minded partners for
contingencies, like unexpected political disruptions. Early
decisions also let U.S. negotiators build support and shape
regional priorities--positions before WRC-27. That requires a
full-strength leadership at both the NTIA and the FCC.
In WRC-19, NTIA did not have a confirmed administrator, in
WRC-23, the FCC Spectrum Auction Authority had lapsed.
Thankfully, Congress has restored the FCC's Auction Authority
and confirmed an NTIA administrator. Going forward, both
agencies should be fully expected to represent Federal and
private-sector equities.
We enter the WRC-27 cycle with major strengths: world-class
technical expertise, a transparent preparation process, and
strong government industry collaboration. If we start early and
plan rigorously for the Shanghai environment, we will be well-
positioned to shape global spectrum policy in ways that advance
our innovation, growth, and national security.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Koh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Grace Koh, Vice President of Government Relations
at Ciena and former Ambassador and Head of U.S. Delegation to the World
Radiocommunication Conference 2019
Introduction
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) plays a central
role in the global governance of radiofrequency spectrum and satellite
orbits--resources that follow the laws of physics rather than the
jurisdictional boundaries of national governments. Wireless
communications, satellite services, aviation systems, weather
satellites, and many other technologies depend on international
coordination to operate reliably across borders. The ITU's World
Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs) are the principal international
forum for negotiating the regulatory framework that governs these uses.
I had the privilege of serving as the United States Ambassador and
Head of Delegation to the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference
(WRC-19) in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. In that role, I led the U.S.
delegation in negotiations on a broad range of issues affecting the
future of wireless communications, satellite services, and scientific
systems.\1\ My testimony explains why the ITU and WRC matter to the
United States, how the United States prepares for these negotiations,
how decisions are reached in practice, and what the U.S. government can
do now to ensure strong U.S. leadership at WRC-27.
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\1\ Today, I work for Ciena, a leading developer and manufacturer
of optical networking equipment, critical to fiber deployments,
submarine cables, and data center connectivity. Ciena does not
participate in the World Radiocommunication Conference preparation or
negotiations, nor does Ciena have a significant stake in the outcomes
of WRC-27. I am testifying solely in my personal capacity as the former
U.S. Ambassador and Head of Delegation to WRC-19, and my remarks are my
own.
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The decisions made at World Radiocommunication Conferences have
long-lasting consequences. The Radio Regulations negotiated at these
conferences establish the international rules governing spectrum use
and satellite operations, often shaping communications markets and
technology development for decades.\2\ As wireless technologies
continue to evolve and satellite constellations expand, the outcomes of
these conferences increasingly affect U.S. economic competitiveness,
national security interests, and scientific capabilities.
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\2\ Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union art.
4, Apr. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 331 (``ITU Constitution); see also S.
Treaty Doc. No. 104-34 (1996) (transmitting the ITU instruments to the
Senate); 47 C.F.R. Sec. 2.100 (2024). Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin.,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Manual of Regulations and Procedures for
Federal Radio Frequency Management ch. 4 (Jan. 2023 rev. ed.), at
https://www.ntia.gov/page/manual-regulations-and-procedures-federal-
radio-frequency-management.
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Preparing for a WRC is therefore a complex national undertaking
requiring extensive technical analysis, diplomatic engagement, and
coordination across Federal agencies and the private sector. The United
States has historically maintained a strong and transparent preparation
process that allows government and industry experts to work together to
develop national positions for international negotiations. One of the
central lessons from recent conference cycles, however, is that
successful outcomes depend heavily on beginning that work early and
resolving key issues well before the conference begins. This requires
the Administration to prioritize the work of preparation.
This testimony explains why the ITU and the World
Radiocommunication Conference matter to the United States, describes
how the United States prepares for a WRC, explains how these
conferences operate in practice, and offers recommendations for
ensuring that the United States is fully prepared to advance its
interests at WRC-27, which is scheduled to be held in Shanghai, China.
The ITU and the World Radiocommunication Conference: Why They Matter to
the United States
Because radio signals cross national borders and satellites operate
globally, international coordination is necessary to ensure that
communications systems can function without harmful interference.
Countries retain sovereignty over domestic spectrum decisions, but no
country can fully realize the value of spectrum and satellite
communications without agreed international rules. The principal forum
for this coordination is the International Telecommunication Union.
The ITU provides the international framework through which nations
coordinate the use of radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbital
resources.\3\ For a country such as the United States, whose economy,
national security, and technological leadership depend heavily on
reliable access to spectrum, the ITU is an essential institution.
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\3\ See note 2 supra.
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At the center of the ITU's radiocommunication work are the Radio
Regulations, the international treaty instrument governing the
allocation and use of spectrum globally.\4\ These regulations create
the framework that allows communications systems to operate predictably
across national boundaries. From satellite communications and mobile
broadband networks to aviation safety systems and maritime navigation
services, internationally coordinated spectrum use is fundamental to
the modern global economy.
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\4\ Radio Regulations, ITU (2020 ed.), https://www.itu.int/pub/R-
REG-RR/en.
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Participation in the ITU allows the United States to lead in
shaping that framework. Through the ITU's study groups, working
parties, and World Radiocommunication Conferences, countries negotiate
how spectrum will be used internationally and under what technical
conditions. These decisions affect the development of new technologies,
the availability of spectrum for commercial and governmental services,
and the ability of satellite systems to operate globally. As a result,
the ITU's work has a direct impact on the competitiveness of U.S.
industries and the effectiveness of U.S. government operations.
Although the ITU provides the framework for international
coordination, each nation retains full sovereignty over its spectrum
resources.\5\ In the United States, spectrum management
responsibilities are established by Congress and divided primarily
between the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which manages
spectrum used by commercial and non-federal entities, and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), within the
Department of Commerce, which manages spectrum used by Federal
agencies.\6\ These institutions implement international commitments
through domestic regulatory processes.
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\5\ ITU Constitution art. 44, 2, Apr. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S.
331.
\6\ Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 151, 301, 305
(2018); National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Organization Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 901-902 (2018); 47 U.S.C.
Sec. 305 (2018). Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal
Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (Aug. 2, 2022), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-385867A1.pdf; 47 U.S.C. Sec. 922 (2018).
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That constitutional and statutory structure also explains how the
United States participates in the treaty framework of the Radio
Regulations. When a World Radiocommunication Conference concludes,
member states sign the Final Acts incorporating the revisions adopted
during the conference. The United States signs those Final Acts,
typically with carefully considered reservations or declarations, to
ensure that implementation remains consistent with U.S. law and
preserves the statutory authorities of U.S. regulatory agencies. In
practice, the United States has long supported the substance of the
Radio Regulations while ensuring that its international commitments
remain compatible with domestic law.
The ITU matters to the United States for several reasons.
First, it matters for economic growth and innovation.\7\ The United
States is home to many of the world's leading telecommunications
companies, satellite operators, equipment manufacturers, and technology
innovators. Harmonized spectrum allocations developed through the ITU
allow these companies to build technologies and services for global
markets. Satellite operators have always recognized the critical role
that ITU regulations play in the deployment of their services. The ITU
governs orbital slot allocations and interference protections necessary
to the operation of satellite services. More recently, mobile
communications service operators have sought to harmonize bands at the
ITU for next generation mobile telecommunications services. When bands
are aligned internationally, manufacturers benefit from economies of
scale, deployment costs fall, and new services can be introduced more
quickly.
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\7\ See, e.g., Meredith Attwell Baker, #RestoreAuctionAuthority
with a Spectrum Pipeline, CTIA BLOG (Mar. 8, 2024), https://
www.ctia.org/news/restoreauctionauthority-with-a-spectrum-pipeline
(stating that the U.S. wireless industry supports 4.5 million jobs and
contributes $825 billion to the economy each year); see also BryceTech,
State of the Satellite Industry Report: 2025 Executive Summary
(Satellite Industry Ass'n, May 13, 2025), https://sia.org/wp-content/
uploads/2025/05/SSIR25-2025-SSIR-FY2024-1-Pager-Exec-Summary-1.pdf
(indicating that In 2024, the satellite industry accounted for $293
billion--71 percent of the $415 billion global space economy).
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Second, the ITU matters for national security and government
operations. Many U.S. government systems--including military
communications, intelligence platforms, weather satellites, aviation
systems, and other critical capabilities--depend on spectrum that must
be coordinated internationally. Active engagement in the ITU helps
ensure that these systems can operate without harmful interference and
that international decisions preserve the flexibility Federal agencies
need to carry out their missions.\8\
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\8\ See ITU Constitution, art. 45; see also ITU Constitution, art.
48 (explicitly recognizing the sovereignty of military and national
defense systems).
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Third, the ITU matters for public safety and critical
infrastructure. Aviation communications, maritime navigation, weather
monitoring, and emergency communications all depend on internationally
coordinated spectrum allocations. Aircraft and ships move routinely
across borders, and weather and Earth-observation satellites provide
global coverage. International coordination through the ITU helps
ensure that these safety-of-life and infrastructure-related systems
operate reliably.
U.S. engagement with the ITU has remained broadly supportive across
recent administrations, even as the geopolitical environment has
evolved. During President Trump's first administration, U.S. policy
toward multilateral institutions emphasized ensuring that international
organizations advanced U.S. interests. Even so, the United States
remained actively engaged in ITU radiocommunication work, recognizing
that global spectrum coordination is essential to both government
operations and the success of American technology companies. During
that period, the United States strongly supported Doreen Bogdan-
Martin's successful campaign for election as Director of the ITU
Telecommunication Development Bureau, making her the first woman
elected to a top ITU leadership post.\9\
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\9\ Press Release, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Statement of
Assistant Secretary Redl on Doreen Bogdan-Martin's Election as Director
of the ITU's Telecommunication Development Bureau (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2018/statement-assistant-
secretary-redl-doreen-bogdan-martins-election-director-itu-s.
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The Biden administration placed renewed emphasis on coalition-
building and international technology governance. That approach was
reflected in the successful campaign to elect Doreen Bogdan-Martin as
Secretary-General of the ITU in 2022, making her the first woman to
lead the organization.\10\ The United States worked with a broad
coalition of partner countries to support her candidacy, reflecting a
shared commitment to a technically grounded and transparent
international telecommunications framework.
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\10\ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the
Spokesperson, U.S. Support for ITU Secretary General Candidacy of
Doreen Bogdan-Martin (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.state.gov/u-s-
support-for-itu-secretary-general-candidacy-of-doreen-bogdan-martin/.
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The current Trump administration has continued to support active
U.S. engagement and U.S. leadership within the ITU, including support
for Bogdan-Martin's bid for re-election.\11\ That continuity reflects a
bipartisan recognition that the ITU remains important to protecting
U.S. technological leadership, supporting open and competitive
communications markets, and ensuring that international communications
policies remain consistent with U.S. economic and security interests.
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\11\ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the
Spokesperson, U.S. Support for the Re-Election of Doreen Bogdan-Martin
as ITU Secretary-General (June 20, 2025), https://www.state.gov/
releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/u-s-support-for-the-re-
election-of-doreen-bogdan-martin-as-itu-secretary-general.
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The strategic importance of the ITU has grown as communications
technologies have become more central to economic growth, national
security, and digital infrastructure. Demand for spectrum continues to
increase as wireless systems, satellite constellations, and data-
intensive applications expand. At the same time, competition within the
ITU has intensified. China has increased its engagement in ITU
activities, including through technical participation, leadership
roles, and efforts to shape international telecommunications standards
and spectrum policies. These efforts reflect a broader strategy to
influence global technology governance.\12\
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\12\ China's campaign to engage on the global stage and lead the
innovation agenda shows clearly at the ITU. In 2014, China supported
the candidacy of Zhao Houlin for ITU Secretary-General, which came
after years of service in ITU leadership. Under Zhao's tenure, the ITU
Secretary-General's office consistently lent rhetorical legitimacy to
Chinese digital policy priorities. See, e.g., Chen Meng, ITU Secretary-
General: ICT a Foundation for Development Under Belt and Road
Initiative, People's Daily Online (May 23, 2017), http://en.people.cn/
n3/2017/0523/c90000-9219335.html ('' `[ICT networks] are essential to
future prosperity. The Belt and Road Initiative recognizes this
critical role played by ICTs as a foundation for development,' Zhao
stressed. He added that ITU and China are working together to implement
ICT projects, which will enable growth and innovation across many
industries.'') (Chinese state media). See also Council on Foreign
Relations, China's Approach to Global Governance, https://www.cfr.org/
china-global-governance (last visited Mar. 7, 2026); Philip Lott, How
China Became the Standard Maker, 9DashLine (Oct. 26, 2022), https://
www.9dashline.com/article/how-china-became-the-standard-maker; Most
Important UN Agency You Have Never Heard Of, CSIS (2021), https://
www.csis.org/analysis/international-telecommunication-union-most-
important-un-agency-you-have-never-heard; Elsa B. Kania & John
Costello, The Fight over the Fate of the Internet, UC San Diego China
Focus (Apr. 21, 2021), https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2021/04/21/the-
fight-over-the-fate-of-the-internet-the-economic-political-and-
security-costs-of-chinas-digital-standards-strategy/; Steve Lang, The
Path to Victory in Shanghai at the World Radiocommunication Conference,
Broadband Breakfast (Oct. 22, 2025), https://broadbandbreakfast.com/
steve-lang-the-path-to-victory-in-shanghai-at-the-world-
radiocommunication-conference/; Tech. Policy Inst., International
Spectrum Leadership: Key Takeaways (Mar. 20, 2025), https://
techpolicyinsti
tute.org/publications/broadband/spectrum/international-spectrum-
leadership-key-takeaways/.
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For that reason, sustained U.S. leadership in the ITU remains
essential. Active participation in study groups, working parties, and
World Radiocommunication Conferences allows the United States to shape
the technical and regulatory foundations of global communications
networks. It also allows the United States to work with allies and
partners to promote spectrum policies that support innovation,
interoperability, and efficient spectrum use.
The ITU's most consequential decisions regarding international
spectrum use are made at the World Radiocommunication Conference. At
these conferences, member states negotiate updates to the Radio
Regulations and determine how spectrum will be allocated or regulated
to support existing and emerging services. Those decisions directly
affect U.S. commercial, scientific, and governmental interests. For
that reason, the WRC is one of the most important international forums
shaping the future of communications policy.
Key Issues at WRC-27
At WRC-27, administrations will confront a series of spectrum and
satellite regulatory decisions that will shape the next decade of
global communications.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Int'l Telecomm. Union, Resolution 813 (WRC-23), Agenda for the
2027 World Radiocommunication Conference, in Final Acts of the World
Radiocommunication Conference (Dubai, 2023).
Spectrum for Future Mobile Networks (6G). WRC-27 will
consider identifying additional spectrum for International
Mobile Telecommunications (IMT), the global framework used for
5G and future 6G systems. Decisions on mid-band spectrum--
particularly in the 4-8 GHz range--will influence whether the
United States and its allies can maintain leadership in next-
generation wireless technologies while ensuring continued
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access for critical government and satellite systems.
Regulatory Framework for Large Satellite Constellations.
With thousands of satellites now being deployed in low Earth
orbit by U.S. companies such as SpaceX, Amazon, and others,
WRC-27 will examine rules governing how non-geostationary
satellite systems share spectrum and coordinate with other
space services. These decisions could significantly affect the
growth of the emerging global satellite broadband industry.
Direct-to-Device Satellite Communications. The conference
will consider regulatory frameworks that enable satellites to
communicate directly with consumer devices such as smartphones.
This technology has the potential to extend connectivity to
rural areas and provide critical communications during
disasters, but it raises complex spectrum-sharing questions
between terrestrial and satellite networks.
Protection of Weather and Earth-Observation Satellites.
Certain frequency bands used by passive sensing satellites are
essential for weather forecasting, climate monitoring, and
national security. The United States has historically played a
leading role in protecting these bands at WRC conferences to
ensure that commercial spectrum use does not degrade the data
used by meteorologists and defense agencies.
Spectrum for Aviation, Maritime, and Global Connectivity.
WRC-27 will examine additional spectrum for satellite
communications used by aircraft and ships, including systems
that provide in-flight connectivity and maritime broadband.
These systems are increasingly important for global
transportation safety and economic activity.
Lunar Communications and the Expansion of Space Activity.
For the first time, the conference will study spectrum
allocations that could support communications between
spacecraft operating in lunar orbit and on the lunar surface.
As both government and commercial lunar missions accelerate,
these decisions could help shape the regulatory framework for
communications beyond Earth orbit.
Interference Risks from Mega-Constellations and Spectrum
Sharing. The rapid growth of satellite constellations raises
new technical challenges related to interference management,
spectrum sharing, and coordination between space systems and
terrestrial services. Addressing these challenges will be
critical to maintaining reliable communications and protecting
scientific systems such as radio astronomy.
As in previous conferences, these discussions will require
balancing the economic benefits of expanded mobile broadband capacity
against the need to protect other critical services--aviation and
maritime safety systems relied upon by U.S. airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, and global shipping operators; and passive sensing bands
essential to weather forecasting and climate monitoring conducted by
NOAA and NASA. These decisions also bear directly not only on U.S.
economic and technological leadership but also on U.S. national
security and the defense industrial base, affecting military
communications, space and intelligence systems, secure aviation and
maritime operations, and the ability of U.S. defense and aerospace
suppliers to operate and deploy globally under predictable
international spectrum rules.
How the United States Prepares for a World Radiocommunication
Conference
A defining feature of the U.S. preparation process for World
Radiocommunication Conferences is its high degree of transparency and
stakeholder participation. Unlike systems in which spectrum policy is
developed largely within a government ministry, the U.S. approach
incorporates extensive participation from Federal agencies, private-
sector stakeholders, technical experts, and research institutions. Much
of the preparatory work occurs in open forums where participants
contribute technical studies, regulatory proposals, and operational
perspectives. For example, meetings of the FCC's WRC Advisory Committee
are generally open, and many of the documents developed through the
process are publicly available. This openness allows the United States
to draw on the technical depth of its communications industry, research
institutions, and engineering community, producing sophisticated
technical contributions that often strengthen the credibility of U.S.
proposals abroad.
That openness also makes the process more complex. Stakeholders
often have sharply different priorities. Wireless carriers may seek
additional spectrum for advanced mobile systems, satellite operators
may seek globally harmonized allocations for broadband constellations,
and Federal agencies may require continued protection for military
systems, aviation services, weather satellites, or scientific sensors.
The scientific community may emphasize the importance of protecting
passive sensing bands from harmful interference. Reconciling those
competing interests into coherent U.S. positions is one of the central
challenges of preparing for a WRC.
WRC Preparation Timeline
Preparation for a WRC begins soon after the conclusion of the
previous conference and unfolds over several years. The agenda for each
WRC is set by the preceding WRC. Once the agenda for the next
conference has been adopted, the ITU Radiocommunication Sector begins
conducting technical studies on the new agenda items. During this
period, U.S. experts from both government and industry participate in
ITU study groups and working parties to help develop the methods and
analyses that will later inform regulatory decisions.
Roughly three years before the conference, the domestic preparation
process becomes more formalized. The FCC establishes the WRC Advisory
Committee (WAC), which organizes stakeholders into working groups
around the conference agenda items. In parallel, Federal agencies
intensify their internal and interagency analysis through NTIA-led
processes. During this stage, stakeholders conduct detailed studies of
compatibility, interference, sharing feasibility, and operational
requirements. These technical analyses frequently form the basis of
preliminary U.S. views and proposals.
The preparatory process culminates in the Conference Preparatory
Meeting (CPM), held at the ITU several months before the WRC. The CPM
compiles the technical and regulatory options developed during the
study cycle and effectively sets the parameters for negotiation at the
Conference itself. Success at the CPM is shaped not only by domestic
preparation, but by sustained engagement in regional organizations and
bilateral discussions well in advance of that meeting. The three
meetings held by Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL) to
plan regional strategies for the WRC are critical milestones in the
preparatory process, as they can determine whether U.S. proposals enter
the CPM and the WRC with regional backing.
Two to three years before the conference, the United States also
begins to focus more intensively on international coordination. U.S.
officials participate in regional preparatory meetings and bilateral
consultations with other administrations to build support for U.S.
positions, understand where other countries are heading, and identify
where compromise may be possible.
During the final year before the conference, U.S. negotiating
positions are refined, the delegation is assembled, and the
Administration names a Head of the U.S. Delegation. The Head of the
U.S. Delegation is granted the status of a U.S. Ambassador for six
months during this period and is accorded full powers to conduct
negotiations at the WRC and sign the treaty on behalf of the United
States. Diplomatic engagement intensifies as administrations seek to
narrow disputes before formal negotiations begin. Input on U.S.
proposals and positions are closed to input from the general public and
is limited to the members of the U.S. delegation.
Coordination of Federal Government Viewpoints
Within the Federal government, preparation for a WRC is coordinated
through NTIA, which manages spectrum policy for Federal agencies and
chairs the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). The IRAC is
a long-standing interagency body composed of representatives from
departments and agencies that rely on radio systems to carry out their
missions. The IRAC advises NTIA in assigning frequencies to U.S.
government operations and developing policies, technical criteria, and
procedures for spectrum allocation.\14\
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\14\ See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-04-1028,
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee: IRAC Representatives
Effectively Coordinate Federal Spectrum (2004); 47 U.S.C. Sec. 305.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IRAC's Radiocommunication Conference Subcommittee (RCS) serves
as the principal Federal forum for examining the implications of
specific WRC agenda items. Agencies submit detailed engineering studies
and operational assessments addressing how proposed regulatory changes
could affect Federal systems. These analyses commonly evaluate spectrum
sharing, interference risks, and protection criteria for sensitive
operations, including military systems, aviation services, Earth-
observation satellites, and passive sensing bands used for weather
forecasting and scientific research.
Because Federal agencies operate a wide range of systems with very
different missions, the discussions within the RCS can be highly
complex and, at times, contentious. The Department of Defense may
depend on a band for mission-critical operations while commercial
stakeholders seek greater access to that same spectrum for terrestrial
or satellite services. Agencies such as NOAA and NASA may require
strong protections for passive bands even as pressure grows to expand
active services nearby. These are not merely bureaucratic
disagreements; they reflect legitimate mission needs and the practical
difficulty of accommodating them in a finite spectrum environment.
In parallel with the Federal interagency process, the FCC gathers
private-sector input through the WAC.\15\ The WAC is a Federal advisory
committee composed of representatives from wireless carriers, satellite
operators, equipment manufacturers, technology companies, engineering
organizations, and trade associations. It conducts much of its work
through working groups organized around specific agenda items. Those
groups develop technical analyses and draft proposed positions on
matters such as mobile broadband allocations, satellite regulatory
frameworks, access for emerging technologies, and protection of
scientific and safety-of-life services. The private sector process can
be as contentious as the intra-governmental process, as the uses of
spectrum have proliferated over time and more businesses view access to
spectrum as vital to their operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See Federal Advisory Committee, World Radiocommunication
Conference Advisory Committee, 90 Fed. Reg. 59,825 (Dec. 22, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical studies are essential to World Radiocommunication
Conference preparation, but they are not, by themselves, the basis for
decisionmaking. Engineering analyses help define what is technically
feasible and where interference risks or sharing constraints arise, but
the resolution of U.S. positions ultimately reflects public policy
priorities established by Congress, the Administration, national
security authorities, and many other stakeholders. Those priorities--
economic growth, national security, public safety, scientific
integrity, and global competitiveness--guide how technical options are
weighed and which tradeoffs are acceptable. The task of WRC preparation
is therefore not to identify a single ``correct'' technical outcome,
but to use technical evidence to determine how best to advance the
Nation's stated objectives while making the most efficient use of an
increasingly scarce and contested resource.
One of the defining strengths of the U.S. process is the diversity
of interests engaged in the formation of U.S. positions and proposals.
The WAC develops proposals and analyses reflecting commercial and
technical perspectives. The IRAC and RCS evaluate how those proposals
may affect Federal systems and missions. Through coordination among
NTIA, the FCC, and the Department of State, these views are ultimately
reconciled and integrated into U.S. preliminary views, formal
proposals, and negotiating positions.
That process can be difficult, but it also produces an important
benefit: by the time the United States reaches a final position, many
of the most serious objections have already been surfaced and worked
through domestically. A U.S. position that has survived that process is
often stronger internationally because it has already been tested
against a wide range of technical and operational concerns.
Department of State plays a critical role in bringing these
domestic negotiations to as close to resolution as possible during the
last year to year and half of preparation. Further, the WRC is
ultimately an international treaty conference, which is the remit of
the State Department.\16\ In addition to coordinating the final
position of the United States during the final year of preparation, the
Department of State prepares the delegation for negotiations,
determines the strategy and fallback positions, and designates
spokespersons who can effectively convey U.S. positions to persuasive
effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2651a(a) (vesting authority in the
Secretary of State to carry out the foreign relations of the United
States); Delegation of Authority No. 480, 86 Fed. Reg. 70,885 (Dec. 13,
2021) (delegating authority to designate United States representatives
to international conferences and meetings convened by international
organizations); see also Federal Communications Commission, World
Radiocommunication Conference (WRC), https://www.fcc.gov/wrc (noting
that the Executive Branch, led by the Department of State, heads the
U.S. delegation to WRC).
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Domestic preparation, however, is only one part of the process.
Because decisions at a WRC are negotiated among nearly 200
administrations, successful outcomes depend heavily on international
coalition building before the conference begins. U.S. officials
participate actively in regional preparatory processes, especially
through CITEL, where countries of the Americas develop common
approaches for upcoming conferences. The Department of State also
conducts bilateral consultations with administrations in other regions
to exchange views, advance U.S. priorities, and identify areas where
compromise may be possible. Those efforts are often decisive in shaping
the conference environment before the first day of the WRC.
How a World Radiocommunication Conference Operates in Practice
A World Radiocommunication Conference is one of the most complex
and technically demanding treaty negotiations conducted under the
auspices of the ITU. Nearly 200 national administrations participate,
along with representatives from international organizations, technical
bodies, and industry stakeholders. The conference typically lasts four
weeks, and the result is a set of revisions to the Radio Regulations
that have been debated for the previous four years.
At the beginning of the conference, participating administrations
elect the conference leadership. The chairman is traditionally
nominated by the host country and formally elected in the opening
plenary.\17\ The chairman plays a central role in guiding the work of
the conference, maintaining momentum, and helping administrations find
paths toward compromise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The election at the conference is a formality. The Chair of
the WRC is typically well vetted and socialized with the conference
members by the time the conference begins.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supporting the chairman is the Steering Committee, which helps
coordinate the work of the various committees and manage the overall
conduct of the conference. The vice chairs of the conference who make
up the Steering Committee typically come from the leadership of the
major regional telecommunications organizations: CITEL, Asia-Pacific
Telecommunity (APT), the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), the African
Telecommunications Union (ATU), the Arab Spectrum Management Group
(ASMG), and the Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications
(RCC, representing central Asian countries). The Vice Chairs matter
because they influence how negotiations are organized, how disputes are
escalated, and how compromises are developed.
The substantive work of the conference is carried out through a
system of committees, working groups, and ad hoc drafting groups. The
Plenary, which includes all participating administrations, elects
leadership, receives committee reports, and ultimately adopts the final
revisions to the Radio Regulations. Other committees address
credentials, budget and administration, detailed technical and
regulatory negotiations, and editorial matters.
The substantive negotiations occur in committees and working groups
addressing specific agenda items. Those groups review the technical
studies developed during the preparatory cycle, debate competing
regulatory proposals, and attempt to reconcile the needs of different
services. The negotiations are often highly technical, and national
delegations typically rely on engineers and subject-matter experts to
lead them.
Each administration sends a national delegation composed of
government officials, engineers, policy experts, and technical
advisors. The United States delegation to WRC-19, for example, included
representatives from the FCC, NTIA, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA, the Federal Aviation Administration,
the National Science Foundation, and other agencies, along with
private-sector advisors who provided specialized technical expertise.
In the working sessions, government delegates serve as the official
spokespersons for the United States; their responsibilities are to
monitor the progress of the agenda items, ensure that the U.S.
interests are considered appropriately, and coordinate with the U.S.
delegation and regional organizations. Private-sector participants
provide advice, technical support, and operational insight. The size of
the U.S. delegation reflects the importance of many of the WRC agenda
items to U.S. national security and economic interests as well as the
U.S. capacity to address many of these intensely technical questions.
Insufficient representation on a key agenda item risks undermining U.S.
leadership in negotiations.\18\
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\18\ At WRC-19, the U.S. delegation included 167 participants drawn
from multiple Federal agencies and from the private sector, reflecting
the wide range of spectrum users and technologies affected by the
conference. WRC-19 may have been the first WRC, where the Chinese
delegation (183) outnumbered the U.S. delegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although negotiations formally occur among individual
administrations, much of the real diplomatic activity at a WRC occurs
through regional coordination groups. Regional organizations arrive
with pre-conference proposals or common positions and continue
coordinating strategy throughout the meeting. Because these groups may
represent dozens of administrations, their collective views can
significantly influence the direction and outcome of negotiations. For
that reason, coalition building among regions--and not simply among
individual countries--is essential to success.
Consistent with long-standing ITU practice, WRCs do not typically
resolve issues through formal votes.\19\ Outcomes are reached by
consensus, and a vote is usually treated as an indication that the
preparatory and diplomatic process has broken down. The deepest
incentive for compromise is that the alternative--no agreement--
distributes costs widely while concentrating them unpredictably. At the
WRC, the physical reality of interference, the treaty status of
outcomes, the infrequency of conferences, and the complexity of cross-
agenda linkage combine to make consensus the dominant strategy for most
participants most of the time, even when the substantive terms fall
short of any party's ideal. As a result, administrations devote
significant effort to compromise and coalition-building, because
durable international spectrum rules depend on broadly supported
outcomes rather than narrow majorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC), Int'l
Telecomm. Union, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/conferences/wrc/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2026) (describing World
Radiocommunication Conferences as treaty-level negotiations conducted
under ITU constitutional procedures, with outcomes reflected in
negotiated revisions to the Radio Regulations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Striving for consensus means that the pace of a WRC can be
extremely demanding. People, companies, and governments must make hard
choices to walk away from the negotiating table with what they need if
not what they wanted. Working groups meet throughout the day and often
into the evening. During the final week, negotiations frequently
continue late into the night as administrations attempt to close
remaining gaps. Informal consultations organized by committee chairs or
working group leaders can become especially important during this
stage. These smaller drafting groups often allow for more candid
exchanges and more rapid movement toward compromise than formal
sessions permit.
Leadership quality can strongly affect outcomes. Effective chairs
help structure discussions, manage procedure fairly, identify the real
points of disagreement, and develop pathways to compromise. Weak
leadership can delay discussions, create confusion, or force unresolved
issues upward too late in the conference. In some instances, poor
management of a working group can lead to last-minute scrambles that
could have been avoided with more disciplined chairing. As such, active
involvement from the United States in selecting the leadership for the
conference committees contributes to success.
As unresolved issues accumulate, they are gradually elevated
through the conference structure. Matters that cannot be resolved in a
working group may be taken up by committee leadership, and especially
difficult questions may eventually require attention from the
conference chairman and the Steering Committee. This escalation process
contributes to the accelerating tempo of the final days of the
conference.
An important but often overlooked part of the conference structure
is the Editorial Committee, which is responsible for finalizing the
treaty text that will amend the Radio Regulations. Because the Radio
Regulations are issued in the six official languages of the United
Nations, the Editorial Committee must ensure that the language adopted
by the conference is reflected accurately and consistently across all
official versions. That responsibility requires not only linguistic
precision but also a deep understanding of the underlying technical and
regulatory concepts. Members of the Editorial Committee must therefore
possess a high degree of technical competence and professional
integrity. Their role is not to reopen compromises, but to ensure that
the conference's negotiated outcome is faithfully captured. The United
States regularly offers a delegate for the Editorial Committee.
The resolution of the WRC agenda alone is enough to generate
substantial friction as the conference moves toward resolution of these
questions. To complicate matters further, geopolitical issues can
occasionally surface on the margins as well. At WRC-19, for example, a
number of administrations circulated a declaration supporting greater
participation of women in telecommunications and spectrum policy. Many
delegations supported the objective, but the initiative also prompted
discussion about whether broader policy declarations should be
associated with a conference whose formal mandate is technical in
nature. The declaration ultimately remained a voluntary statement
rather than becoming part of the treaty outcome.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See World Radiocommunication Conference 2019 (WRC-19),
Declaration on Promoting Gender Equality, Equity and Parity in the ITU
Radiocommunication Sector, in Final Acts of the World
Radiocommunication Conference (Sharm el-Sheikh, 2019) (Int'l Telecomm.
Union 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions related to Palestinian participation and status have also
surfaced periodically at WRCs and ITU Plenipotentiary meetings. These
issues can create serious legal and diplomatic difficulties for some
administrations, including the United States, if handled incautiously.
In practice, such disputes are often managed through quiet diplomacy
involving the United States, the host country, and moderate Arab
administrations that have a strong interest in preventing political
disputes from derailing the conference's technical work. The result is
typically a compromise that acknowledges Palestinian concerns while
allowing the conference to proceed without jeopardizing the
participation of key administrations.\21\ However, preparation for this
particular issue often requires the State Department to engage with the
Palestinian and Israeli governments during the periods between ITU
conferences to mitigate disruption at the conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See, e.g., Res. 12 (Rev. WRC-19), Assistance and Support to
Palestine, in Final Acts of the World Radiocommunication Conference
(Sharm el-Sheikh, 2019) (Int'l Telecomm. Union 2020).
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Challenges and Recommendations for WRC-27 in Shanghai
The challenges of preparing for WRC-27 will be even more difficult,
simply due to the mounting pace of technological change and the scale
of the negotiations. As a result, the most important overarching lesson
from recent conference cycles is the need to start earlier, align U.S.
positions sooner, and resolve the most difficult issues well before the
conference convenes. Earlier alignment strengthens the ability of U.S.
negotiators to build international support, shape regional outcomes,
and manage the increasingly complex diplomatic environment surrounding
international telecommunications policy.
One challenge arises from the diversity of U.S. spectrum
stakeholders; the resolution of these interests can be difficult and
protracted. Reconciling these interests into unified U.S. positions
requires sustained coordination among experienced officials at NTIA,
the FCC, the Department of State, and numerous other agencies and
stakeholders. Just as importantly, the debate between NTIA, FCC, and
the Department of State must occur on equal footing to ensure that
private sector and governmental equities are evaluated legitimately.
The FCC's loss of auction authority during the WRC-23 cycle also
weakened an important component of its domestic spectrum policy
toolkit, at a time when private-sector interests were pressing for
clear U.S. leadership on spectrum issues.\22\ Fortunately, this has
been remedied.\23\ During preparation for WRC-19, NTIA operated for a
period under an Acting Administrator, which may have limited its
ability to fully leverage the Department of Commerce's institutional
weight in negotiations. These key agencies should have full authority
during these negotiations to ensure full, timely resolution of U.S.
positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See Patricia Moloney Figliola & Jill C. Gallagher, The Federal
Communications Commission's Spectrum Auction Authority: History and
Options for Reinstatement, Cong. Research Serv., No. R47578 (Sept. 12,
2023) (noting expiration of FCC auction authority on Mar. 9, 2023); see
also ``Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comment on Ways to
Facilitate Access to Spectrum in Light of Ongoing Lapse of Auction
Authority,'' 39 FCC Rcd 2143 (2024).
\23\ See One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21,
Sec. 43101, 139 Stat. 72 (2025) (amending 47 U.S.C. Sec. 309(j)).
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These disagreements are not unusual. Experienced negotiators
sometimes hold high-value issues until late in the process to preserve
bargaining leverage. But the risks of delay have become more serious in
this geopolitical environment. When U.S. proposals are finalized late
in the study cycle, the United States has fewer opportunities to
socialize those positions internationally, build support within
regional organizations, and shape the negotiating environment before
key meetings occur.
For WRC-27, that problem is compounded by the operating environment
in Shanghai, where the United States should assume that some issues
will be harder to resolve safely and candidly once the conference is
underway. The United States should therefore seek to finalize most
major proposals well before the Conference Preparatory Meeting and the
final regional preparatory meetings. Earlier resolution will improve
coalition building and reduce the risk of hasty decisions in Shanghai
with unintended consequences.
A second challenge concerns the availability of experienced
negotiators and technical experts. As noted earlier, spokespersons are
critical to the success of the U.S. argument in shaping the outcome of
a WRC resolution. Recent conferences have shown that it can be
difficult to field enough seasoned spokespersons when multiple
negotiations are occurring simultaneously. The skills needed to conduct
technical studies are not identical to the skills needed to negotiate
effectively in a multilateral treaty setting. Federal agencies should
therefore identify and develop future spokespersons earlier in the
cycle and provide training on conference procedure, negotiation
strategy, and delegation coordination.
A third challenge is the logistics of managing a large U.S.
delegation in an environment where surveillance must be assumed. A WRC
delegation typically includes several hundred participants representing
Federal agencies, private-sector advisors, and technical experts. That
breadth is one of the strengths of the U.S. system, but it also creates
management challenges. Leadership must ensure that information flows
efficiently, that negotiators across committees understand broader
delegation strategy, and that sensitive issues are elevated promptly.
These challenges will be even greater in Shanghai, where operational
discipline among both government and private-sector delegates will be
especially important. Delegation leadership should strengthen
structured reporting mechanisms, hold focused issue meetings, and
ensure that decision-making channels are clear well before the
conference begins. Security training for the delegation should begin
quickly after the delegation is formed.
Administrative and logistical preparation also deserves more
attention than it sometimes receives. Accreditation, travel
coordination, security planning, document handling, and conference
logistics must be managed early and carefully. Delays in delegation
formation or accreditation can impede training, complicate security
preparations, and reduce opportunities to build internal delegation
cohesion before the conference. Administrative planning should
therefore begin early in the cycle, with clear timelines and
accountability for accreditation, travel, communications support, and
other logistics.
International coalition building will remain indispensable. Because
WRC decisions are negotiated among nearly 200 administrations,
technical merit alone is not sufficient for success. Regional
organizations play a central role in shaping the conference
environment, and for the United States, CITEL remains a particularly
important platform for developing support in the Americas. At WRC-19,
engagement with key partners such as Canada, Brazil, and Mexico was
instrumental in advancing U.S. priorities. Looking toward WRC-27, early
and sustained engagement will also be important in Africa, among Arab
administrations, and within Asia-Pacific processes. The United States
should intensify diplomatic outreach early in the study cycle and use
both bilateral and regional channels to build support well before the
conference opens.
Although WRCs are primarily technical conferences, the broader
geopolitical environment can affect them. Political disputes unrelated
to spectrum policy can consume diplomatic attention and complicate
negotiations. The Department of State should therefore begin early
integration into the preparation process, not only to manage diplomatic
outreach but also to anticipate and contain political issues before
they disrupt progress on the technical agenda.
As discussed above, the decision to hold WRC-27 in Shanghai
introduces an additional set of operational and security challenges
that require early attention. The bottom line is that State Department
must begin logistical preparation early in the year, perhaps even
before the delegation is formed. To do so, State Department will
require strong political support to ensure that it has the resources
and clarity of mandate to act.
First, the United States should work with the ITU Secretariat and
other relevant actors to ensure that the conference is conducted in a
fair, transparent, and open manner consistent with long-standing ITU
practice. The host country plays an important role in conference
logistics, communications infrastructure, and administrative
arrangements. Early engagement will be important to ensure that
delegations have reliable access to facilities, documents, and
communications, and that conference procedures are administered
evenhandedly.
Beyond these institutional considerations, the operating
environment in Shanghai presents practical risks for the U.S.
delegation. Internet access may be inconsistent or restricted, and
commonly used collaboration platforms--such as Slack, Google Workspace,
and certain Microsoft applications--may be unavailable or unreliable.
Because WRC negotiations require constant communication with experts in
Washington and elsewhere, reliable connectivity is essential. The State
Department should work with conference organizers and the U.S. post in
Shanghai to ensure that delegates have the tools and support necessary
to maintain effective communications.
Delegation members should also assume that electronic
communications and personal devices will be monitored. WRC delegations
rely heavily on laptops, mobile devices, and shared technical documents
to coordinate strategy and consult with outside experts. Protecting
sensitive communications and information will therefore require careful
planning and disciplined execution. The U.S. Consulate in Shanghai will
be an important resource in this regard. Coordination with the
Consulate can help ensure that delegation leadership has access to
secure communications when necessary and appropriate locations for
sensitive discussions away from the conference venue.
Other risks should also be anticipated. State-affiliated media may
seek to frame conference developments in ways that support the host
government's broader messaging. Delegation members should therefore
exercise caution in public statements and media interactions. Protocol
issues may arise during official events and bilateral meetings hosted
by the organizing government, requiring clear guidance to ensure that
participation remains consistent with U.S. diplomatic practice.
The location of the conference also raises export control and
compliance concerns. U.S. export controls explicitly treat China as a
heightened-risk destination for advanced and dual-use technologies,
particularly in telecommunications, AI, semiconductors, and space
systems. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the
International Trade Administration (ITA) both emphasize that China's
military-civil fusion strategy complicates end-use and end-user risk
assessments, creating elevated compliance risk for U.S. persons and
companies.\24\ Many U.S. delegates will represent companies or
organizations involved in advanced communications technologies.
Technical discussions at the conference may touch on sensitive matters,
and delegation members must remain mindful of export control
obligations. Pre-conference guidance should therefore address not only
cybersecurity and travel security, but also device management,
information handling, export compliance, and official protocol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep't of Com., China--U.S. Export
Controls, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/china-us-
export-controls (last published Sept. 25, 2025). Importantly, export
control risk is not limited to physical shipments. The Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) cover exports, re exports, transfers,
and releases of controlled technology, including intangible transfers
such as technical discussions or access to controlled data while
abroad. See also 15 C.F.R. Sec. 734.13(a)(2), (b) (2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These risks reinforce the importance of forming the U.S. delegation
early and beginning training well in advance of the conference.
Delegates should receive briefings on cyber hygiene, travel security,
communications discipline, export compliance, and host-country
operating risks. This is especially important for agenda items
involving national security concerns, where resolving U.S. positions
earlier in the cycle will reduce the need for sensitive deliberations
once the delegation is on the ground in Shanghai.
Finally, delegation leadership must establish and enforce clear
expectations regarding discipline and operational security. The
effectiveness of the U.S. delegation depends on its members acting in a
coordinated and responsible manner. Delegates should understand that
adherence to security guidance and delegation protocol is not optional.
Leadership should be prepared to enforce those expectations, including
sending individuals home if their actions place the security of the
delegation or the effectiveness of the U.S. negotiating position at
risk.
Conclusion
The World Radiocommunication Conference is one of the most
consequential international forums shaping the future of wireless
communications, satellite services, and scientific systems. The
decisions made at these conferences influence global spectrum policy
for decades and directly affect U.S. technological leadership, national
security capabilities, and scientific interests.
The United States enters the WRC-27 cycle with important
advantages: a transparent and inclusive preparation process, world-
class technical expertise, and a tradition of close collaboration
between government and industry. To capitalize on those strengths,
however, the United States must act to:
Resolve major U.S. positions earlier in the preparation
cycle.
Authorize and fund early logistical and security preparation
for the Shanghai conference.
Identify and train U.S. spokespersons earlier.
Intensify coalition-building before the CPM and final
regional meetings.
Maintain strong delegation discipline and operational
security.
Congress can play a key role in empowering the State Department to
prepare early for logistical challenges and supporting the Department's
authority to ensure discipline within the delegation.
If the United States does so, it will be well positioned to
continue leading in the development of global spectrum policy and to
ensure that the international regulatory framework supports innovation,
economic growth, scientific progress, and critical government missions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Ambassador. You were right on
point there with your five minutes. Thank you.
Ambassador Lang, welcome. You are now recognized for five
minutes.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR (RET.) STEPHEN A. LANG,
SENIOR ADVISOR, CREST HILL ADVISORS LLC AND
FORMER U.S. COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION POLICY
Ambassador Lang. Thank you, Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and
members of the Subcommittee. I am honored and grateful for the
opportunity to share my perspectives on this important topic. I
had the honor of leading our delegation to the 2023 World
Radiocommunication Conference and recently retired from the
State Department after a 30-year career serving under five
presidents.
I am honored to testify today on my own behalf based on
those experiences and should note that I am not testifying on
behalf of clients of Crest Hill Advisors.
The World Radiocommunication Conference may be the most
consequential international negotiation that most people have
never heard of. At the WRC, ITU members negotiate updates to
the International Radio Regulations, a treaty-level instrument
that allocates and harmonizes radio frequency spectrum to
enable new services, prevent interference, and promote
interoperability. As you know, spectrum is a finite resource.
And with the rapid advancement of evermore data-intensive
technologies and accelerating growth of mobile and wireless
devices, it is increasingly precious to an ever-growing number
of industries, government agencies, scientists, and consumers.
Radio frequency spectrum harmonization through the WRC has
allowed industries ranging from mobile phones to Wi-Fi to
achieve global economies of scale, driving billions of dollars
in investment. It ensures our military that its radar and
communication systems can operate reliably and without
interference. And increasingly, the WRC is critical to
unlocking the space economy, from new satellite technologies,
to a human presence on the moon.
Like other multilateral bodies, the ITU and WRC are flawed,
but there is no other mechanism that can realistically open
global markets to wireless services. Private companies can join
the ITU as sector members and participate in the WRC, an
unusual feature for a U.N. organization that has worked to our
advantage.
The stakes are high. China is aggressively promoting its
approach to digital technology around the world, an approach
that uses technology to restrict speech and repress dissent. It
has targeted the ITU as a venue for expanding its global
technology reach. That is why it was a significant blow to U.S.
interests when the ITU Council voted to accept China's offer to
host WRC-27 in Shanghai. A Chinese official will now be the
presumptive Chair of the Conference, and information security
will be a serious concern.
But these potential obstacles must not deter us. They
should drive the United States to recommit to winning at the
WRC. China's offer to host in the first place was motivated by
the successful U.S. effort in 2022 to replace the Chinese
Secretary General of the ITU with Doreen Bogdan-Martin, a
uniquely qualified American citizen and former Department of
Commerce official. China's offer to host the WRC was aimed at
reasserting its influence.
With advanced preparation and planning, effective
leadership, and a high-level commitment to success, the United
States can achieve all of its objectives at WRC-27. I believe
there are four critical steps that the U.S. Government must
take to win.
First, keep the pressure on China. China won the vote to
host by a narrow margin of only 25 votes of the 48 ITU Council
members, and its legitimacy as host is already in question. We
must continue to hold China accountable and press like-minded
partners to do the same while urging the ITU to do so in its
negotiations of the host country agreement.
Second, accelerate U.S. preparations. The U.S. delegation
in the past has too often been disadvantaged by delays in
developing U.S. positions. Senior leadership of U.S. agencies,
including the FCC, and Departments of Commerce, Defense, and
State, need to commit with White House support to developing
U.S. positions as quickly as possible.
Third, build coalitions early. We cannot win this contest
without friends and allies who share our priorities and are
committed to standing up to opposition. The earlier we start
building coalitions through persistent, high-level diplomatic
engagement, the more successful we will be.
And finally, identify leadership now and build the right
team. I understand that the administration has been working to
identify the head of delegation for WRC-27, and I hope we will
see an announcement soon. The sooner that happens, the better.
It will also be critical to make sure that he or she has
the right team in place and is fully resourced to engage
diplomatically on a global scale. The ITU is far from perfect,
and the WRC process is frustrating and difficult. However, with
a high-level commitment to action now, the United States can
emerge from WRC-27 stronger and more competitive in the global
tech race.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lang follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador (ret.) Stephan A. Lang, Senior
Advisor, Crest Hill Advisors LLC, and Former U.S. Coordinator for
International Communications and Information Policy
Thank you, Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of the
subcommittee. I am honored and grateful for the opportunity to share my
perspectives on this important topic--U.S. Leadership at the World
Radiocommunication Conference 2027: Strategy and Challenges Ahead of
Shanghai. I had the honor of leading our delegation to the 2023 World
Radiocommunication Conference in Dubai while I served as deputy
assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital
Policy. I recently retired from the State Department after a 30-year
career serving under five Presidents and currently work as a senior
advisor with Crest Hill Advisors LLC. Today, I am testifying on my own
behalf based on my experience leading the WRC-23 delegation and working
as a Foreign Service officer and not on behalf of any clients of Crest
Hill Advisors.
The World Radiocommunication Conference may be the most
consequential international negotiation that most people have never
heard of. The conference takes place under the auspices of the
International Telecommunication Union, or ITU, usually at four-year
intervals. At the WRC, ITU members negotiate updates to the
international Radio Regulations, a treaty-level instrument that
allocates and harmonizes radiofrequency spectrum to enable new
services, prevent interference, and promote interoperability. As you
know, spectrum is a finite resource, and with the rapid advancement of
ever more data-intensive technologies and the accelerating growth of
mobile and wireless devices it is increasingly precious to a growing
number of industries, government agencies, scientists, and consumers.
Radiofrequency spectrum harmonization through the WRC has allowed
industries ranging from mobile phones to Wi-Fi to achieve global
economies of scale driving billions in investment. It ensures
militaries that their radar and other systems can operate reliably and
without interference. It enables our devices to connect to local
networks when we travel. It makes sure that aircraft and ships have
continuous communications and functioning navigation wherever they go.
And increasingly, the WRC and its work are critical to unlocking the
space economy, from new satellite technologies to a human presence on
the Moon.
Like other multilateral bodies, the ITU and WRC are flawed. The
bureaucracy has grown bloated over the years; politics occasionally
bleeds into technical conversations; and adversaries, like Iran and
Cuba, have equal seats at the table. But there is no other mechanism
that can realistically open global markets to wireless services on the
ground, at sea, in the air, and in space. Private companies can join
the ITU as sector members and participate in the WRC, an unusual
feature for a UN organization that has worked to the advantage of the
United States.
The stakes are high at the ITU. China is aggressively promoting its
approach to digital technology around the world--an approach that uses
technology to restrict speech, control assembly, and repress dissent.
China's technological advancement is a direct threat, not only to our
national security and economic prosperity, but also to our democratic
values. It has targeted the ITU as a venue for expanding its global
technology reach.
That's why it was a significant blow to U.S. interests when the ITU
Council, the organization's governing body, voted to accept China's
offer to host WRC-27 in Shanghai, despite the aggressive U.S.-led
diplomat campaign to prevent such an outcome. A Chinese official will
now be the presumptive chair of the conference, and information
security for the delegations attending will be a serious concern.
But these potential obstacles must not deter us. They should drive
the United States to recommit to winning at the WRC. China's offer to
host in the first place was motivated by the successful U.S. effort in
2022 to replace the Chinese Secretary General of the ITU with Doreen
Bogdan Martin, a uniquely qualified American citizen and former
Department of Commerce official. Offering to host the WRC was an
attempt by China to reassert its influence.
These challenges are not insurmountable. With advanced preparation
and planning, effective leadership, and a high-level commitment to
success, the United States can achieve all of its objectives at WRC-27.
I believe there are four critical steps that the U.S. government
must take to win:
1. Keep the Pressure on China: China won the vote to host by a
narrow margin with only 25 votes of the 48 ITU Council members,
and its legitimacy as host is already in question. We must
continue to hold China accountable and urge likeminded partners
to do the same. We can do this directly with Chinese leadership
in bilateral conversations while urging the ITU to do the same
in its negotiation of the host-country agreement with Beijing.
This should include demanding mitigating measures to address
information security concerns as well as securing commitments
to impartial management of the conference. We must then work
with partners to make sure China fulfills those commitments
before and during the conference.
2. Accelerate U.S. Preparations: The WRC process continues
throughout the four years between conferences. The U.S.
delegation in the past has too often been disadvantaged by
delays in developing U.S. positions through complicated
internal negotiations. Senior leadership of U.S. agencies,
including the Federal Communications Commission and the
Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State, needs to commit,
with White House support, to developing U.S. positions as a
quickly as possible. Industry should cooperate in this effort.
Even when positions are not fully finalized, identifying top
priority issues early in order to be able to begin engagement
with our foreign partners will be essential.
3. Build Coalitions Early: We cannot win this contest without
friends and allies who share our priorities and are committed
to standing up to opposition. The earlier we start building
coalitions through persistent, high-level diplomatic
engagement, the more successful we will be. This includes
locking in support from our most closely aligned partners while
also working hard to win over as many middle ground countries
as possible. We must think creatively as well and explore new
ideas for engagement. This could include a U.S.-hosted spectrum
summit to build support among allies and countries on the fence
in the months ahead of the conference.
4. Identify Leadership Now and Build the Right Team: I understand
that the administration has been working hard to identify the
right person to lead our delegation to WRC-27, and I hope we'll
see a formal announcement soon. The sooner that happens the
better. It will also be essential to make sure that he or she
has the right team in place that is fully funded to engage
diplomatically on a global basis. The conference is a
complicated and sprawling event with multiple committee and
working party meetings taking place simultaneously. It will be
critical to have an adequately sized U.S. government contingent
with the right skill sets at the conference to cover all of
these competing events.
The ITU is far from perfect, and the WRC process can be frustrating
and difficult. However, the United States has achieved much in
reshaping the institution through Bogdan Martin's leadership and our
own persistent and strategic engagement to make it fit for purpose and
a venue where the United States can win. Now is the time to double
down. With a high-level commitment to action now, the United States can
emerge from WRC-27 stronger and more competitive in the global tech
race.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Ambassador.
Next, we have Dr. Lewis. Welcome, and you are recognized
for your opening comments.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES A. LEWIS, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, CENTER
FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS
Dr. Lewis. Thank you, and I thank the Committee for the
opportunity to testify.
My testimony will discuss four issues: The environment in
Shanghai, issues for LEO constellations and 6G, and process
goals for the WRC. We have entered an era of ubiquitous global
connectivity. The economic opportunities and the security
implications are immense. The suppliers of ubiquitous
connectivity will gain strategic advantage, and this is perhaps
the subtext that drives the work. It is also a central part of
competition with China. China recognizes the importance of
technological leadership. It was, as you heard, narrowly able
to win the WRC Chair, and will use this to shape the conference
and strengthen its influence at the ITU.
Negotiating in China poses unique security challenges.
Chinese espionage efforts can circumvent most defenses. Any
unencrypted communication is subject to interception.
Technologies that allow for surveillance without the device
owner's cooperation or knowledge suggest that even physically
securing a device is insufficient. The U.S. can help reduce
this risk by ensuring that all delegations are aware, and by
suggesting possible means to counter it.
The outcome of the work will be shaped in part by the state
of international relations 18 months from now. The WRC's
negotiating terrain will be difficult, but not impossible. One
important point to make is that the U.S. can insist on
equitable and transparent processes, and emphasize the need for
the Chinese Chair to play by the rules and respect consensus.
Sovereignty and competition in space are defining issues.
China and other nations suffer from Starlink envy, fearing that
U.S. commercial dominance will crowd them out of low-Earth
orbit. In response, China submitted filings in late 2025 for
roughly 2,003 satellites to challenge the U.S. They do not
actually have the satellites in orbit, but they filed the
claim.
Another issue will be how to regulate satellite providers
as they increasingly compete with terrestrial providers. One
controversial proposal suggests requiring national approval for
satellite operations. This is an effort to shut off Starlink
and a response to events in the Ukraine. Finding a way to
accommodate sovereignty concerns without putting U.S. companies
at a disadvantage is one of the challenges for the WRC.
Spectrum allocations, I do not need to tell you, spectrum
allocations are always contentious. This will be the last WRC--
people say 6G will appear in 2030, and if that is true, this
will be the last WRC before it is deployed, 6G spectrum
disputes it will be similar to the issues seen previously over
5G spectrum. Chief among these, not the only, but chief, is
that the U.S. Government occupies spectrum that other countries
see as commercial. China will likely try and force the U.S. to
defend these national allocations.
The administration is moving quickly and is working to
appoint the U.S. head of delegation. This is a valuable first
step. A head of delegation with support from the administration
and Congress can ensure consistency in the U.S. position and in
the U.S. delegation. The next step is to reach consensus on
U.S. WRC positions. WRC-27 will require nimble negotiating
skills and a willingness to work with allies and partners to
achieve the best outcome.
With that, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lewis follows:]
Dr. James A. Lewis, Distinguished Fellow,
Center for European Policy Analysis
I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify. My
testimony will discuss four issues: the political environment for the
World Radiocommunications Conference, known as WRC-27: the substantive
issues of LEO satellite constellations. and 6G, and procedural goals
for the WRC negotiations.
The WRC is held every four years to review and revise the
International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) Radio Regulations and
harmonize international and satellite use of radio-frequency spectrum
to prevent interference. By reaching a consensus on these rules, the
ITU ensures that global communications systems operate efficiently.
We have entered an era of ubiquitous global connectivity.
Ubiquitous global connectivity means that there will soon be no place
on Earth not covered by at least one network. It means an environment
of involuntary transparency, ubiquitous knowledge, and perhaps
ubiquitous surveillance.
These overlapping networks will be created by mobile
telecommunications, terrestrial and undersea fiber optic cables, and
satellites, all interconnected in ways that provide access to the
Internet and digital services. The economic opportunities and the
security implications are immense. The suppliers of this ubiquitous
connectivity will have strategic advantage and commercial, political,
and military outcomes will favor them more than others.
Pursuit of the strategic advantage that technology provides is a
central part of the competition with China. This competition frames the
upcoming WRC. China recognizes that economic strength and technological
leadership are fundamental to national security. This is why it is
seeking to dominate technology in the twenty-first century. As part of
this strategy, China was able to narrowly win the WRC Chair.
The International Environment
WRC-27 is particularly vital because its agenda will look at
crucial topics for global connectivity and technological leadership.
These are space-based services, 6G standards, and satellite
regulations--areas where U.S.-China competition is most intense.
Winning the WRC chair was an effort by Beijing to regain influence in
the ITU. China will manage the conference and can influence the flow of
information and informal networking among participants.
The outcome of the WRC will be shaped in part by the status of
international relations when it begins 18 months from now and the
outcome of the Iran intervention. This will be a challenging
negotiating environment. The WRC's negotiating terrain will be
difficult for the US, but not impossible.
The WRC is ultimately more likely to concentrate on technical
issues rather than political issues.
This helps the U.S. But in thinking about the WRC and preparation
for it, there are a few larger political issues that deserve
consideration. These involve the upcoming Plenipotentiary Meeting,
where the reelection of Doreen Bogden as ITU Secretary General is
crucial for American interests. On a related note, the election of
Jennifer Warren to the Radio Regulation Board (RRB) is also in the U.S.
interest.
China as Host
Negotiating in China poses unique security challenges. China owns
the networks upon which delegates will communicate both with other
delegations and with their home countries, China has an immense and
powerful cyber intelligence effort that will circumvent most defensive
efforts. and any unencrypted communication will likely be subject to
interception. China has put a huge effort into managing surveillance
data, so the volume of traffic will not be a challenge. This espionage
program poses unique problems for all delegations in that the
negotiations could easily be compromised to China's advantage.
Shanghai will not be a secure environment, and the Chinese have
developed very sophisticated techniques to monitor communications
within China, largely because of their paranoia about their own
population. It will be very difficult to communicate without some
degree of Chinese surveillance. Technologies similar to those developed
by NSO group and others for implanting surveillance software without
the device owners cooperation or knowledge suggest that even physically
securing a phone, laptop, or tablet, will not be sufficient to
safeguard a device.
The U.S. can reduce this risk by first ensuring that all
delegations are aware, and by suggesting ways to counter it. There are
a few commercially available encryption technologies, such as Signal,
that might improve security Others encryption technologies are likely
compromised. An awareness of a heightened security challenge in the
Shanghai environment will be useful for all delegations to bear in
mind. This is a problem, but it can be managed.
Maintain Equitable and Transparent WRC Processes
One important point for the preparations for WRC negotiations is
the ability to emphasize the need to remain subject to the usual WRC
decision-making processes, such as consensus rules rather than voting.
The WRC operates on the principle of consensus. Unlike many
international bodies that default to simple majority voting, the ITU's
culture is rooted in finding a ``common denominator'' to ensure global
interoperability of radio services and satellite orbits. While Article
28 of the ITU Convention allows for voting, if necessary, it is treated
as a last resort. A vote is generally seen as a failure because it can
lead to cross-border interference and fragmented global markets.
China and others would prefer voting because, frankly, they
probably have a narrow majority, and they would get outcomes favorable
to them. The requirement to get consensus forces greater compromise by
all parties. Proposals to rely on voting are a standard UN negotiating
ploy by Russia and China. To some extent, the procedural issues that
are coming up in the WRC resemble conventional Chinese and Russian
negotiating tactics in the UN and other multilateral fora. They may
seek a decision making process based on voting rather than consensus,
since they have the votes, can influence developing nations, and press
on issues that put the U.S. in a difficult spot, such as seeking to
reassign spectrum now assigned to national security purposes. The U.S.
has successfully dealt with these in the past and should be able to do
it again at WRC-27 by insisting equitable and transparent consensus
processes, and it is in the U.S. interest to emphasize the need for the
Chinese Chair to play by the rules. This is a case that needs to be
made early and often with other countries.
The Administration has taken a valuable first step by appointing
the U.S. Head of Delegation to the WRC. The next step is to reach
consensus on the U.S. WRC positions on substantive issues as early as
possible. We have 18 months, but if we could do that in a year or less,
that would be a significant improvement. The earlier the U.S. can begin
to work with other nations develop common positions, the better. In the
interim, the U.S. can use the time to meet with other nations to
advocate support for strong WRC processes. Finally, some have raised
the issue of delegation discipline. A strong head of delegation with
support from the Administration and Congress can hold delegates
accountable if they do not support the U.S. position, and deviating
from that is unacceptable.
LEO Constellations
Sovereignty and competition in space will be a defining issue for
WRC-27. The assumption of a borderless sky, where commercial efforts
defined global networks, is being challenged. The sector has entered a
new phase in which states have begun to assert what amounts to orbital
sovereignty. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) has changed from a sparsely
populated domain to a dense layer of critical infrastructure with
profound political consequences.
China's push for a PRC-aligned space ecosystem is driven by a
desire to avoid dependence on Western infrastructure, particularly as
satellite networks become embedded in military systems. Many countries,
and in particular, China suffer from what we could call Starlink envy.
They are worried that the Starlink system will crowd them out of space.
This worry afflicts more than China. It is a concern among developing
countries as well. Finding a way to accommodate their sovereignty
concerns without putting U.S. companies at a disadvantage will be one
of the challenges for WRC preparation. A bad outcome at the WRC could
result in a fragmented global space architecture where critical ground-
segment is aligned with Chinese technical standards and security
protocols.
China is flooding the ITU with applications for LEO satellites,
with an unprecedented number of filings), seeks to redefine orbital
governance as a domain of state-supported critical infrastructure
rather than commercial activity. A pivotal moment occurred in December
2025, when China submitted filings for satellite constellations
totaling roughly 203,000 spacecraft. This is intended to challenge and
constrain the first-mover advantage held Starlink.
There is a potential dispute over whether satellite providers
should be subject to the same licensing as terrestrial carriers as less
regulated satellite operators offer telecommunication services in
competition with terrestrial providers governed by national
regulations, A controversial agenda item involves regulatory measures
to limit satellite operations to those that are nationally authorized.
This is a direct response by nations wanting the power to shut off
satellite Internet (like Starlink).
Spectrum for 6G
The 6G spectrum disputes spectrum allocation issues are in many
ways similar to the issues seen in the last WRC over 5G spectrum. Chief
among these is that the Department of War occupies spectrum that other
countries will see as commercial and China will use this as a way to
put the U.S. in a difficult position, forcing it to defend its national
security allocations against the commercial desires of other countries.
The most contentious issues revolve around midband spectrum, where
Europe and parts of Asia are leaning toward allocating this for
licensed mobile (IMT/6G) while major American companies want to obtain
license-exempt access to support Wi-Fi. There are also the usual
difficult disputes over astronomy, navigation, and moving existing
government, military, and fixed-satellite services. These are issues
that can be worked out in preparatory discussions to define the U.S.
position.
The ubiquitous connectivity that 6G and 5G provides is central to
twenty-first century national security and economic success. The WRC-27
6G discussions over spectrum allocation are in many ways similar to the
issues seen in the last WRC over 5G for the US. These are that the
Department of defense occupies spectrum that other countries will see
as commercial and China will use this as a way to put the U.S. in a
difficult position, forcing it to defend its national security
allocations against the commercial desires of other countries.
However, the same kind of negotiating strategies that worked the
last time to achieve acceptable outcomes for the U.S. will work again
when it comes to spectrum allocation for 6G The U.S. can benefit from
the move to rely more on software rather than hardware in telecom
infrastructure Progress in the development of dynamic spectrum sharing
technologies will allow national security and commercial uses to inter
operate safely and manage interference in ways that reduce the spectrum
allocation burden. These and other changes in telecom technology (such
as use of Open-RAN) are likely to help the US. The good news is the
bands identified in the [One Big Beautiful Bill Act are also under
consideration for global harmonization at WRC 27.
Adequate radio frequency spectrum for commercially licensed use--
particularly the mid-band spectrum that is ideal for high-capacity,
wide-area deployments--are central to national security. This licensed
spectrum, will constitute the backbone for future use. Presently, the
United States has a significant shortage of licensed mid-band spectrum
allocated to 5G when compared to China and other countries, and China
is projected to further widen that disparity in the coming years.
Some of the issues that spectrum allocation will pose at the WRC
may be addressed by an emphasis on the potential for dynamic spectrum
sharing to allow for a greater interoperability less interference and
the colocation of spectrum for both U.S. defense requirements and by
commercial concerns.
Conclusion
The WRC cycle is four years long (2023-2027). We are now in the
transition to a serious phase of preparation. The technical studies are
being concluded and the U.S. must soon finalize its positions to
advocate effectively at regional bodies, like CITEL in the Americas,
before the final conference in 2027. The earlier the better for this
advocacy, which means the earlier the better for agreement on a U.S.
position.
The U.S. has advantages, but it could be easy to lose them and WRC
27 will require nimble negotiating skills as well as being able to
demonstrate American technological superiority and a willingness to
work with allies and partners to achieve the best outcome.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Dr. Lewis.
Next, we have Mr. Calabrese. Welcome, and you are
recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CALABRESE, DIRECTOR OF
WIRELESS FUTURE AND SENIOR ADVISOR OF TECHNOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY,
NEW AMERICA
Mr. Calabrese. Thank you, Chairman Fischer. I direct the
Wireless Future Program at New America, a nonprofit policy
institute here in Washington. Decisions at WRC-27 concerning
the allocation of spectrum for licensed cellular, Wi-Fi, and
satellite services will have a substantial impact on the global
competitiveness of leading U.S. industries. The ITU's
harmonization of spectrum drives global economies of scale for
equipment and consumer products.
ITU rules also determine whether our Nation's dominant low-
Earth orbit, or LEO satellite providers, will have the spectrum
and global market access they need to scale up lower costs and
innovate both at home and worldwide. It is therefore crucial
that the U.S. quickly finalize unified positions on priority
issues, select a senior official as head of the delegation far
sooner than in the past, and begin consulting widely with
allies to build coalitions early.
To succeed in Shanghai, we will need to overcome several
key challenges. The first is to develop clear, unified U.S.
positions as soon as possible so that the State Department can
first submit them for consideration by CITEL, the group of
nations in our own ITU Region 2. There are also important
issues that are not formal agenda items. The most salient are
the ITU rules that govern spectrum sharing between traditional
geostationary satellites, or GSOs, and the increasingly
prevalent LEO constellations launched by SpaceX, Amazon, and
others.
As the Space Bureau has acknowledged, the ITU's 25-year-old
sharing rules are overprotective, needlessly reducing LEO
satellite power, capacity, and operational performance. It
remains possible to modernize satellite spectrum sharing rules
at WRC-27, but this will require a focused U.S. effort.
A second challenge is the appointment of a senior official
to lead preparations. Regardless of the short-term nature of
the formal appointment, the U.S. should have that future
delegation head on board at least 12 to 18 months prior to the
conference.
A third challenge is the imperative to build coalitions in
support of U.S. priorities. This must focus initially on
consensus among the nations in our own Region 2 through the
CITEL process.
A fourth key challenge is developing and managing
priorities. The U.S. must resist making concessions,
particularly early, on one set of issues if it undermines
another vital industry or interest. An example is the global
market for telecom equipment. The U.S. dominates the world
market for enterprise Wi-Fi equipment and services. In
contrast, for cellular equipment, China's Huawei controls a
larger share of the global market than Europe's Nokia and
Ericsson combined, while the U.S. has no significant share.
Not surprisingly, China is using the WRC process to push
more nations to allocate the upper 6 GHz spectrum for licensed
cellular, spectrum the U.S. allocated for unlicensed and Wi-Fi
use in 2020. This effort undermines 6 GHz as a global superband
for next-generation Wi-Fi. Agenda Item 1.7 proposes to change
the allocation of 7.1 to 8.4 GHz to International Mobile, or
IMT, for regions 2 and 3 only. This would restrict the
flexibility of member nations to use portions of these bands to
expand Wi-Fi capacity.
Mobile industry representatives on the FCC's WRC Advisory
Committee support this change, despite the fact that the One
Big Beautiful Bill specifically excluded 7.4 to 8.4 GHz from
reallocation to IMT to protect national security operations.
As Chairman Fischer mentioned at the outset, we believe the
U.S. position should oppose a change to IMT that U.S. law
prohibited just nine months ago. Moreover, the results of
NTIA's ongoing studies of the lower-7 GHz band will be
available later this year, making a position now other than no
change premature at best.
Finally, it is notable that 80 percent of the entire WRC
agenda is focused on space-based and LEO satellite issues. My
written testimony describes three agenda items that should be
U.S. priorities because of their potential impact on our world-
leading LEO satellite industry.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calabrese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Calabrese, Director, Wireless Future and
Senior Advisor on Technology and Democracy, New America
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Lujan, and members of
the Subcommittee. My name is Michael Calabrese. I direct the Wireless
Future program at New America, a nonprofit policy institute based here
in Washington, D.C., where I focus primarily on both terrestrial and
satellite spectrum policy. I have also served, from 2009 to 2024, on
the Department of Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee
(CSMAC). At New America, I've worked for over two decades to develop
and advocate for policies to promote ubiquitous, seamless and more
affordable wireless broadband connectivity, as well as more efficient
spectrum use with a focus on expanding unlicensed access, closing
digital divides, and promoting competition and innovation in ways that
benefit consumers and the U.S. economy more broadly.
Thank you for inviting me to participate in this important hearing.
When it comes to preparing consensus positions, priorities and
coalition-building for U.S. participation at the World
Radiocommunication Conference late next year (WRC-27), high-level
Administration leadership and Congressional oversight cannot come early
enough. While the ITU's quadrennial WRC process is flawed in many
respects--and will be especially challenging with China hosting WRC-27
in Shanghai--it is more vital than ever that the U.S. do everything it
can to influence the outcome on the most important issues impacting our
leading industries and economy.
As communications and connectivity is increasingly wireless,
decisions at WRC-27 concerning the global harmonization of spectrum
frequency bands for licensed use (IMT), unlicensed or Wi-Fi, satellite
and other services has a large and growing impact on the global
competitiveness of leading U.S. industries. ITU decisions on the global
harmonization of spectrum frequencies often drive global economies of
scale for telecom equipment and consumer products (e.g., smartphones
and Wi-Fi routers). They will also determine whether America's emerging
and currently dominant low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite providers will
have the global market access they need to scale up, lower costs, and
innovate new services for consumers both at home and worldwide.
Spectrum sharing and interference rules adopted by the ITU can also be
crucial, particularly for satellite services, since virtually all
satellite spectrum is shared.
Spectrum has been called the ``oil of the information age'' for
good reason: Wireless data and communication is rapidly becoming an
input for almost every other product and service in our economy. The
critical role of spectrum access and interoperability will soon become
far more vital as artificial intelligence and distributed cloud
computing are integrated into most personal devices and business
operations, from smart phones and industrial IoT, to smart homes and
fully automated vehicles. Access to sufficient spectrum with the right
propagation characteristics will be key to processing data from smart
devices, factories and sensors in real-time.
A balanced ITU spectrum policy favorable to U.S. values can further
enhance the benefits of this wireless world by facilitating global and
interoperable markets for truly ubiquitous and seamless connectivity.
The integration of varied wireless networks (cellular, Wi-Fi,
satellite) to create ubiquitous, seamless and interoperable networks
can allow users to access and automatically switch to the best
available connections anywhere and everywhere they go. Of course, while
the U.S.-dominated Wi-Fi industry is central to this future indoors,
satellite will close the gaps outdoors in places where cellular signals
are absent or weak--and as a burgeoning industry, LEO satellite has
attracted particular attention at the ITU. Indeed, it is striking and
important to note that more than 80 percent of the WRC-27 agenda items
directly or indirectly impact emerging and U.S.-led LEO satellite
operators. And unlike cellular services, which can acquire exclusive-
use licenses for what is inherently a domestic market, under ITU rules
(and U.S. law) virtually all satellite spectrum is shared globally--and
for LEO constellations, global spectrum harmonization, power levels and
market access is critical to achieving economies of scale.
In short, the U.S. should strive to shape the global spectrum
allocations and rules governing market access and interference
avoidance to benefit major U.S. industries as well as to promote
democratic conceptions of communications policy. The alternative would
be to cede the playing field to adversaries pushing entirely different,
self-interested and undemocratic agendas. This will make an all-out
U.S. effort to prevail on key agenda items both more important and more
challenging in Shanghai, where the PRC will have home-field advantages.
Our delegation is very likely to be smaller and more difficult to
coordinate given the likelihood of intense surveillance. The more
worrisome, though less obvious advantage is that the host country is
the presumptive chair of the Conference. And in the recent past, the
host nation and chair (e.g., the UAE at WRC-23 in Dubai) has been able
to manipulate the process in some important respects. For example, the
American delegation at WRC-23 found itself frozen out of some key final
negotiating sessions at the end of the Conference--as final decisions
were made--in part because the Conference chair decided that only the
nations designated to represent one of the ITU's three regions should
be able to participate.
Overcoming Key Challenges to U.S. Success
To effectively shape the outcomes on agenda items most important to
leading American industries and interests, it is especially important
that the U.S. quickly finalize unified positions on priority issues,
select a senior official as head of the delegation far sooner than we
have in the past, and begin consulting widely with allies to build a
coalition in support, starting in our own ITU Region 2 (the Americas).
1. The Path to Early, Unified U.S. Positions
First, developing clear positions sufficiently far in advance is
more challenging for the U.S. than most other nations. One reason is
that we engage in a two-track consultative process with a wide variety
of both governmental and industry stakeholders. On one track, NTIA
coordinates Federal agency recommendations through a subcommittee of
its Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). The Radio
Conference Subcommittee conveys its views and recommendations, once
approved by the IRAC, to the FCC.\1\ On a separate and parallel track,
the FCC has appointed a WRC Advisory Committee (WAC) of more than 40
private industry representatives to develop its own set of preliminary
views and recommendations.\2\ The FCC and NTIA must reconcile
differences in their positions through their WRC coordinators, after
which the positions are sent as draft U.S. preliminary views and
proposals to the Department of State.
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\1\ See NTIA, Radio Conference Subcommittee, https://www.ntia.gov/
page/radio-conference-subcommittee-rcs.
\2\ See FCC, WRC-27, https://www.fcc.gov/wrc-27.
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The State Department ultimately submits approved documents to CITEL
PCC.II (the convening entity for the participating nations in ITU
Region 2) or directly to the ITU depending on the timing. While this
process is moving along, the WAC has reported out diverging ``non-
consensus'' positions on several agenda items. The FCC puts these non-
consensus views out for public notice and comment. It did this recently
for five items that included agenda Item 1.7, concerning whether large
swaths of the 7 and 8 GHz bands (7.125--8.4 GHz) should be allocated
only for ``IMT'' (terrestrial cellular) or more generally for
terrestrial ``Mobile'' (allowing individual countries to decide if a
portion could be authorized for Wi-Fi or shared IMT/Wi-Fi).
The path to consensus within both the FCC's WAC and the NTIA's
IRAC, followed by a reconciliation and final decision that includes the
State Department, is a long and arduous process that has occasionally
come too late for U.S. positions to be adopted as a regional position
at CITEL. In short, while the U.S. has an admirably inclusive
consultative process, we are at a disadvantage unless it now
accelerates and yields final positions on the established agenda items
that can jumpstart diplomacy and coalition building within CITEL and
beyond.
At the same time, there are issues that are not formal agenda items
yet that remain in play and of major importance to U.S. interests. The
most salient example are the ITU rules that govern spectrum sharing
between the traditional geostationary satellites (GSOs) and the
increasingly prevalent LEO and other non-geostationary satellites
(NGSOs). Under rules adopted more than 25 years ago, prior to
commercialized LEO constellations, the ITU adopted strict power limits
(``equivalent power flux density,'' or EPFD, limits) on the amount of
interference NGSO satellites can impose on GSOs. However, as the FCC
stated last year in its pending proposal to relax the EPFD limits, the
ITU's metrics are very over-protective, wasting spectrum and needlessly
reducing LEO satellite power, capacity and operational performance.\3\
Studies show that modernizing these limits premised on avoiding
unacceptable interference could yield enormous increases in LEO
downlink capacity available to a given geographic area, which could
alleviate data capacity shortages that limit the scale of LEO services
today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Federal Communications Commission, Modernizing Spectrum Sharing
for Satellite Broadband, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, SB Docket No.
25-157, at para. 11 (rel. April 29, 2025).
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Due to opposition by GSO interests at WRC-23, modernizing the EPFD
limits did not make it onto the formal agenda for WRC-27. Instead, an
ITU-R study group was tasked with conducting studies on whether and how
the currently very restrictive EPFD limits can be modified to enhance
NGSO capacity and performance while still protecting GSOs from harmful
interference.\4\ Under a standing agenda item, these results can result
in a recommendation to adopt at least incremental changes. The studies
that have already been conducted indicate that the current framework is
technically obsolete and overprotects GSO satellites past what is
necessary to the detriment of LEO satellites' operations, which is
similar to the conclusion the FCC has come to domestically. The U.S.
should prioritize this issue and submit it to CITEL with the goal of
developing a regional proposal to be voted on at WRC-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ This obligation has fallen on ITU working party 4A, which
covers efficient orbit and spectrum utilization for satellite services
for the ITU. See https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/study-groups/rsg4/rwp4A/
Pages/default.aspx.
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2. Appointing Senior Delegation Leadership Further in Advance
A second challenge that can be met more readily is the timely
appointment of a senior U.S. official to lead the U.S. preparations and
the ultimate delegation for WRC-27. In 2023, current FCC Commissioner
Anna Gomez's appointment was announced roughly 9 months before the
Conference. Her predecessor's appointment was announced with an even
shorter lead time to WRC-19. Indeed, the U.S. has a history of
appointing delegation heads--who receive the rank of ambassador--less
than a year before the Conference. This limited runway hampers
appointees' ability to fully understand the technical issues and to
build relationships and coalitions, across first our own ITU Region 2
and then globally for the Conference itself. And because the agenda for
WRC-27 is laden with novel LEO satellite issues, this challenge will be
heightened for WRC-27 if the delegation head does not have prior
satellite spectrum expertise.
While the State Department is constrained by the short-term nature
of the appointment, the Administration can still decide who will be
occupying the role and bring them on board (whether at State or NTIA)
at least 12 to 18 months prior to the Conference. This advance notice
could enable the candidate to begin strengthening their understanding
of the issues, attending CITEL meetings, coalition-building, and even
socializing U.S. positions as they emerge. The longer runway would
leave the U.S. on much stronger footing by the time of the Conference.
In this respect, it is a hopeful sign that the Administration appointed
Adam Cassidy to be Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital
Policy earlier this month.
3. Focusing Early on Coalition Building at CITEL and Then Globally
A third and related challenge for the U.S. is the imperative to
build coalitions in support of U.S. priority positions in the current
international environment. This process needs to begin in the Inter-
American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL) process, as we engage
with the other nations in ITU Region 2 (the Americas and Greenland).\5\
The outcomes of the WRC process often vary substantially by region, and
it is also far more difficult for the U.S. to sustain a position at the
Conference unless it has already been endorsed through Region 2's CITEL
process during the year prior to WRC itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Organization of American States, Inter-American
Telecommunication Commission (CITEL), https://www.oas.org/ext/en/main/
oas/our-structure/agencies-and-entities/citel/About.
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Recent international developments could make this more difficult.
Ultimately, the ITU process can be as much about larger political
alignments and grievances as it is about good telecommunications
policy. The 11 emerging market countries that comprise the BRICS
group--Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and five newer
members--appear to be coordinating economic and diplomatic efforts more
than they were just a few years ago. In addition, the current
Administration's widespread imposition of tariffs, as well as both
actual and threatened military interventions in both our own region and
more widely, are likely to create additional obstacles to persuading
many countries to publicly support U.S. interests on issues such as
space-based services.
4. Setting and Managing Priorities That Do Not Concede Any Key U.S.
Interests
A fourth key challenge is developing and managing priorities for a
nation with multiple world-leading industries and interests that can be
substantially impacted, for better or for worse, by most of the
outcomes of WRC-27. The U.S. must be extremely resistant to making
concessions to gain votes on one set of issues if it undermines another
important U.S. industry or interest. This is most evident for LEO
satellite and other space-based services, where the U.S. is the
dominant player by far. China and even the European Union have little
self-interest in helping the U.S. accelerate changes to satellite
spectrum policy that will widen the U.S. lead before their own national
champions are in a position to compete. And as we saw at WRC-23, too
many developing nations seem inclined to give more weight to the
interests of incumbent GSO operators providing current services rather
than to the far greater advances in connectivity possible by optimizing
spectrum access and sharing for new LEO systems.
Telecommunications equipment is another industry with a sharp
dichotomy. The U.S. dominates the world market for enterprise Wi-Fi
equipment and services. Cisco and HPE Aruba had a 55 percent market
share in 2024, while China's Huawei is third with a 9 percent share. In
contrast, for mobile cellular equipment, Huawei's global market share
(31 percent in 2024) is more than Europe's Nokia and Ericsson combined,
while the U.S. has no significant part of that market. It is not
surprising, therefore, that China's agenda for upper 6 GHz is to use
WRC-27 as an opportunity for countries to exempt themselves from the
current and flexible ``Mobile'' allocation decided in 2023 and instead
pledge allegiance to spectrum for IMT (which excludes Wi-Fi) via
footnote modifications to the international regulations. If China is
successful in recruiting more nations to jump into IMT footnotes, the
outcome is an expanded and lucrative market for their national
champions (Huawei and ZTE).
At the same time, China is the only major nation in the world that
has not allocated even the lower 6 GHz for Wi-Fi. Not only is Wi-Fi a
U.S.-dominated industry, but it's a type of decentralized communication
technology that is far more difficult for an authoritarian regime to
surveil and censor. We believe the U.S. should not take or accept any
position that undermines a harmonized--and hence larger--global market
for Wi-Fi equipment and services.
This tension between Wi-Fi and terrestrial mobile interests has
clearly surfaced in the FCC's WAC. Agenda Item 1.7 proposes to
potentially change the ITU's allocation of the upper mid-band spectrum
between 7.125 and 8 GHz to ``International Mobile Telecommunications''
(IMT) for Regions 2 and 3. The significance is that adopting an IMT
rather than a ``MOBILE'' allocation (which includes Wi-Fi) would work
to restrict the flexibility of member nations to use these higher-
frequency bands to meet their future needs for more Wi-Fi capacity. In
the U.S. and Canada, for example, the unlicensed 6 GHz band that is
fueling next generation Wi-Fi 7 and 8 with very wide contiguous
channels currently extends to 7.125 GHz. The sub-bands immediately
above this, including possibly some 7 GHz military spectrum, could work
well for Wi-Fi on at least a low-power, indoor-only (LPI) basis. But
even if the FCC were to authorize this, an IMT identification at the
ITU would undermine the potential global markets for the dominant U.S.
enterprise Wi-Fi companies noted just above.
Despite all this, the FCC's WAC reported three ``non-consensus''
views to the FCC that diverged precisely along industry lines, with
mobile industry representatives supporting a changed allocation to IMT
and representatives from technology, cable and other companies
supporting No Change. This disagreement is counterproductive and at
best premature. In the U.S., last July's One Big Beautiful Bill Act
specifically excluded the entire 1,000 megahertz between 7.4 and 8.4
GHz from consideration for reallocation or assignment for IMT to
protect national security operations. Item 1.7 does not propose this
same allocation for Region 1 (Europe, Africa, Middle East, northern
Asia), since at WRC-23, this region excluded 7.25--7.75 GHz. And,
consistent with the OBBBA, NATO reportedly now supports excluding 7.75
up to 8.4 GHz from IMT as well while European regulators would impose
conditions that would protect incumbent operations. In Region 3 (the
rest of Asia and Pacific nations), China is likewise opposed to
allocating 7.25--8.4 GHz for IMT.
As a default, the U.S. position should oppose a change to IMT that
U.S. law (OBBBA) prohibited just 9 months ago. Moreover, the OBBBA
designated 7.25--7.4 GHz as one of three bands that NTIA is studying
this year for potential reallocation to IMT by auction. In December, in
his ``Winning the 6G Race'' executive order, President Trump extended
that study down to 7.125 GHz. Since the results of these studies will
be available before the end of this year, we agree with the leading
U.S. technology companies that early IMT identification is premature
and unnecessary for the moment.
WRC-27 Is an Opportunity for the U.S. To Boost Its Lead in LEO
Satellite Services
The WRC-27 agenda is unusual for its heavy emphasis on satellite-
specific issues. This represents an opportunity for the United States
to play a leading role in influencing global policy that shapes the
trajectory of this emerging and rapidly growing industry. Indeed, the
ITU is playing catch-up on several key satellite policy issues that the
U.S. has already addressed, or is in the process of addressing,
domestically. A strong and consistent U.S. focus on these agenda items
is imperative to both advance our current leadership on innovative
satellite services as well as to not cede ground to adversaries and
competitors hoping to shape the regulatory landscape to slow down or
undermine U.S. dominance. Maintaining a strong and active showing in
the process can help the U.S. achieve its optimal outcomes in some of
these key issue areas. Three of the key agenda items include:
Agenda Item 1.3 proposes an additional thousand megahertz of
satellite spectrum (51.4--52.4 GHz) to support NGSO earth station
gateways that provide Internet backhaul for fixed satellite broadband
and other services. Today's rapidly growing demand for LEO satellite
services is putting pressure on the limited availability of spectrum
and the earth station gateways that serve as backhaul. The FCC has
already proposed to make this spectrum available for earth stations
domestically in its recent Spectrum Abundance Proceeding.\6\
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\6\ See Federal Communications Commission, Satellite Spectrum
Abundance, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, SB Docket No. 25-180 (rel. May 27, 2025),
Agenda Item 1.5, initiated by Russia and supported by Iran, has
attracted controversy for suggesting the need for new regulatory
measures to preclude all satellite transmissions over countries and
territories in which they are not authorized. However, under current
ITU rules, satellite operators cannot offer commercial services without
a market access authorization from a nation's regulator (e.g., FCC).
While satellite operators should ensure they are not communicating with
unlicensed terminals, crafting new regulations requiring satellites to
turn off all transmissions every time they fly over, or where their
beams overlap, an unauthorized country is impractical and would hamper
their ability to serve areas in neighboring countries where they do
have authorization. Domestic regulators are better situated to address
unauthorized use of satellite equipment. More broadly, the United
States has long maintained the view that the ITU should not become an
instrument for enforcing censorship or for helping authoritarian
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
regimes control communication.
Agenda Item 1.14 supports the need to allocate additional Mobile
Satellite Service (MSS) spectrum to facilitate satellite direct-to-
device services, or D2D, by which satellites can directly enable 3G and
even 4G levels of connectivity on consumer handsets, vehicles and
enterprise IoT networks in any location regardless of terrestrial
mobile coverage. It is the more consequential sibling of Item 1.13,
which effectively proposes to adopt globally the same framework the FCC
approved in 2024 to authorize D2D mobile services to operate, in
partnership with terrestrial mobile carriers, where there is no mobile
coverage in specified terrestrial mobile bands.\7\ Item 1.14, in
contrast, opens the door to additional, and potentially globally-
harmonized, MSS spectrum that can be used by satellite providers on a
significantly less constrained basis to innovate and provide more
commercially available direct-to-device mobile connectivity to
consumers. The current partnership between U.S.-based Globalstar and
Apple to allow texting between new iPhones anywhere on Earth is an
example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Federal Communications Commission, Supplemental Coverage
from Space, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
GN Docket No. 23-65 (rel. March 15, 2024).
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Thank you for this opportunity to share our views with the
Committee on the critical preparations necessary for successful U.S.
participation at the ITU's World Radiocommunication Conference 2027.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
We will start our first round of questioning now, and I
will begin five minutes for questions.
First, thank you for all your testimonies. I want to
emphasize the point that the United States' influence work at
WRC depends on the strength of the interagency coordination.
Ambassador Koh, what happens when other countries perceive
that the United States has not fully aligned its domestic
stakeholders before these negotiations begin?
AmbassadorKoh. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman. I
can speak personally from experience when I was able to--when I
had the honor of representing the delegation. But when people
do perceive that the U.S. Government is not aligned, the
positions and proposals that the U.S. offers at regional
conferences are not taken seriously, and not considered for
adoption by other administrations, readily.
This can be countered to some degree by very frank
discussions and negotiations between seasoned negotiators who
can discuss with each other where things are going and where
things are laid out. That is the beauty and use of having
seasoned professionals at these negotiations. But at the same
time, the truth is that the position is not settled, and other
delegations can make hay with that where they will. The best
course of action, obviously, is to have a seasoned leader
pushing those positions into place at the interagency
domestically. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Can you tell me, do you know if other
nations have their teams together already?
Ambassador Koh. Madam, the other teams do not have the same
spectrum regulatory structure that the United States does. As
every young telecommunications attorney knows, allocation of
spectrum policy is divided between the NTIA and the FCC with
Federal spectrum responsibility at the NTIA, and private
spectrum responsibility at the FCC.
The two have always been a bit at odds with each other
given the value of spectrum resources. As such, I did point out
in my testimony that the discussion between the two entities
can be fierce, must occur among equals in order to be able to
bring the best positions to light, and when the resolution does
come, and it does, because the alternative is worse, when it
does come, our positions are stronger and more resilient as a
result.
Senator Fischer. As we look at the priorities of Federal
agencies, the head of WRC-27, we know that national security
space operations rely on that 7.4 to 8.4 GHz band, and that is
why that band, as was mentioned, it was specifically excluded
from the FCC's current Auction Authority in statute last year.
Ambassador Koh, can you tell me, has the United States ever
gone into a World Radiocommunication Conference and advocated
for a position that directly contradicts its own domestic law,
yes or no?
Ambassador Koh. No, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. And what would that mean for American
leadership globally and our credibility if that would happen?
Ambassador Koh. I think that that is self-explanatory,
madam, that it would undermine our own positions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Dr. Lewis, when DOD's spectrum
needs, such as protecting certain radar bands or high-priority
military satellite communications, when they diverge from the
global harmonization proposals, how should the delegation, how
should our delegation balance those tensions while at the
conference?
Dr. Lewis. Thank you for the question. So far, the U.S. has
been successful in defending its national allocations, and in
some ways, IT rules permit that in a way. We are such a big
country, we can get away with it. There is a first-mover
disadvantage for the U.S., which is we develop spectrum
applications for government purposes, for defense decades
before other countries, and their positions now diverge. One of
the options that has come up in the past is the potential for
spectrum sharing. This is something that every administration,
since the Bush administration, has been working on, and every
year it gets a little better, so perhaps there is a technical
solution. But at the moment, it is in our interest to defend
the national allocations from--and China will try to exploit
that. it is an obvious target. But we can probably successfully
defend it.
Senator Fischer. I hope so. That day has not come yet, to
have that technology present for the spectrum sharing. I
support that, and I support as we continue to look at research
and be able to accomplish that goal. Thank you.
Senator Lujan, you are recognized.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Chair Fischer. Now, this question
will be for each of the witnesses. In your testimony, you all
clearly laid out the important role the United States played in
previous world radio conferences, a treaty-level international
forum every four years. However, President Trump just this past
January, through a recent memorandum, announced that the United
States is withdrawing from a long list of international
organizations, conventions, and treaties that are, and I quote,
``Contrary to the interests of the United States''.
This is in addition to the United States withdrawing from
the World Health Organization at the start of this
administration. My concern is this, that the administration
will not have the discipline necessary to be impactful in
Shanghai in WRC-27. So the question I have for each of you,
Ambassador Koh, what are the consequences if the United States
withdraws from the World Radio Conference?
Ambassador Koh. Thank you, Senator Lujan, for the question.
This is a concern that I have long tracked. International
coordination on spectrum and satellite operations are not
really a policy choice, it is a science. Spectrum does not
respect borders and satellite operations impact large swaths of
the Earth as they orbit. Without international coordination,
wireless networks, and satellite systems, aviation
communications, weather satellites, they cannot work. So we
really do not have a choice. Our national security systems
depend heavily on our ability to maintain interference-free
operations.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Ambassador Lang?
Ambassador Lang. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
think it is an important one. And I fully agree with everything
that Ambassador Koh has said, and would also add that we would
be ceding the field to China and that it would be able to take
advantage of that to promote its approaches to spectrum
allocation, which would give its firms a clear advantage in
markets around the world and provide them enormous economies of
scale in production.
Senator Lujan. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Lewis.
Dr. Lewis. Well, to be a little contrarian, there was some
deadwood in the international system that probably needed to be
cleared out. And certainly there was bloat, particularly at the
U.N. I actually got a phone call last week about an agreement
that I negotiated is now on the chopping block. So it is a bit
shocking when you see one of your own children at risk, but it
does make some sense. We have 18 months to work this out. Over
the long term, nations will vote their national interests.
And if we play our cards right, most countries will realize
their national interest does not lie with China. So that is a
shot, that is a difficult question, but I think we can do it.
And I conclude by saying America First does not necessarily
mean America alone. So you are right to emphasize the
importance of partners in these negotiations.
Senator Lujan. So, Dr. Lewis, if I can read into your
response, it is not a good idea that the United States would
withdraw from WRC-27?
Dr. Lewis. Definitely not a good idea with that.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. Mr. Calabrese?
Mr. Calabrese. Yes, I mean, on the one hand, there is no
question that multilateral organizations like the WRC and the
ITU can be very frustrating. At the same time, we should be
very motivated to engage here because, you know, as was said,
spectrum knows no borders. Global harmonization of spectrum
policy is in the interest of the U.S. probably more than any
other country because of economies of scale for some of our
largest industries.
As I mentioned, because 80 percent of the agenda is
concerning satellite issues, we are leading the world on that,
and the rest of the world is just, they are just lying in wait
to some degree to trip us up, to slow us down while they
subsidize their national champions in the sky who are running
so many years behind us. So we have to be there, at a minimum,
to defend ourselves, and hopefully to push things further
ahead.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Lang, why is it important for the White
House to nominate a WRC Ambassador early in the process?
Ambassador Lang. I am sorry for?
Senator Lujan. Yes.
Ambassador Lang. Yes, we need leadership in place to
oversee the development of our positions, to make sure that we
have unity in our delegation and that we are able, I think most
importantly, to begin diplomatic engagement around the world to
build global support for our priorities.
Senator Lujan. And Ambassador Koh, same question?
Ambassador Koh. I absolutely agree with Ambassador Lang on
the need to bring somebody in early. There is something about
having that leader that actually forces the delegation to start
paying attention and start realizing that things are nearing
the end, and they need to actually compromise. This person also
does need to be a little bit practiced at cracking heads.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. Ambassador Koh, can you
provide your top recommendation for this administration for
WRC-27?
Ambassador Koh. I think it is all in prepare early,
especially because this is in Shanghai. We need to be
logistically ready. We need to be diplomatically ready.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that, Ambassador Lang.
Ambassador Lang. Yes, I think accelerating our preparation
process, making sure that we have our positions in place, and
unified support for them, as quickly as we can, and then begin
that diplomatic engagement.
Senator Lujan. Dr. Lewis.
Dr. Lewis. Same thing, early preparation, early appointment
of a strong leader.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Calabrese.
Mr. Calabrese. Yes, very much the same. Early positions,
especially into the regional process, which proved to be very
important last time, whether we had support from our, you know,
ITU Region 2 or not. And even if this Ambassadorial position is
6 months, the person should be on, like I said, at least 12 to
18 months ahead, driving not only preparations, but
establishing these relationships, you know, in the Americas and
then globally.
Senator Lujan. Appreciate that. And Chair Fischer, thank
you for your thoughtfulness in calling this hearing. I look
forward to the follow up from this as well going forward.
Thank you for your time, to everybody.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Lujan. As we wait for
more committee--oh, Senator Blackburn is coming in. Senator,
would you like us to ask a question before you sit? Are you
ready to go?
Senator Blackburn. Yes.
Senator Fischer. OK. OK, welcome, Senator Blackburn, you
are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And as Ms.
Koh, and many on this panel know, I am never short on questions
on this topic because I do think that it is vitally important.
Ambassador Lang, I want to come to you first because I
think you know, I was very concerned last time around, Ms.
Gomez's departure and just kind of throwing sticks to the wind,
if you will, as we were getting ready for the WRC. And I
thought it was bad timing and a very poor choice and left our
Nation in a disadvantaged position. So you stepped in, took
over, had that short runway.
So I want you to talk for a moment about your experience
and the challenges that you had by having to truncate that
preparation for the WRC? And then follow that with why it is
important to go in ready for the fight?
Ambassador Lang. Thank you very much for the question. And
thank you for your support for this process and for your
attention to this important topic. I really do appreciate that.
And it was certainly a challenge stepping in after Anna Gomez
had to step down after her confirmation as FCC Commissioner.
And my recommendations for 2027 reflect some of the challenges
that we had during that experience.
We weren't able to develop our positions for 2023 as
quickly as I would have liked. I was, unfortunately, unable to
fully participate in a robust series of diplomatic engagements
in the months preceding the conference, because I was going to
be away----
Senator Blackburn. OK, I want to jump in right there. Ms.
Koh, I want to ask you to step in. You talked in your response
to the Chairwoman earlier about seasoned negotiators. So I want
you to weigh in on what he just said about that preparation and
that continuum that is so necessary for that?
Ambassador Koh. Thank you, Senator Blackburn, for the
question. It was a tough situation that Ambassador Lang was put
into, but he had been aware and had been involved in the
discussions beforehand. It is not the same as being first. This
by no means was the ideal situation for the leader of the WRC
delegation for the United States.
Fortunately for us, the State Department does offer a
seasoned rank--a seasoned bench of negotiators and people who
are willing and able to step into those shoes, but they do have
to be activated with the right leadership, with the political
support above, and with really good staff beneath to be able to
use and deploy within the delegation.
Senator Blackburn. And then Ambassador Lang, coming back to
you, what kind of challenge did having to do this truncated
process actually put you in as you got to the WRC?
Ambassador Lang. Well, I think one of the greatest
challenges was, I had not been able to attend many of the
preparatory meetings leading up to the conference, especially
the final year before the conference. There is a series of
regional meetings all around the world to prepare positions
regionally, like our CITEL process in the Americas. I was not
able to attend those series of meetings, and unfortunately
hadn't fully developed all the relationships that I would have
liked to have had leading into the conference. I had a shorter
runway and needed to do a lot of that on the ground.
Senator Blackburn. So it is important to realize this is
not a one-and-done prep meeting, this is something that depends
on the U.S. having a solidified front, a strong position, and a
well-seasoned team who realizes that it is imperative we put
our interests first, correct?
Ambassador Lang. That is correct.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Dr. Lewis, I want to come to
you. We have got China as the host for this and I think that
this is something that is going to present some unique
situations and problems. We all know that China is, primarily,
a surveillance state, and they make--they do not try to hide
that. And I have supported the development of technology
through the Open Technology Fund for years. I think this is
important. I think Ms. Koh probably remembers those days in the
House when I fought furiously to be certain that we were doing
this.
And of course, we have seen that pay dividends as we have
looked at the situation in Iran. But as we look at the
situation in China with the surveillance state mentality that
we have, give a brief assessment of what you think the security
threat is to our delegation as they go into the WRC?
Dr. Lewis. Thank you, Senator. The last time I was in
China, I was a little annoyed because they weren't following me
anymore. And I thought, gee, I must not be important. And when
I got back, a friend told me, they are not following you
because they do not need to. Their surveillance is ubiquitous.
it is digital, it is electronic. So the environment you go into
in Shanghai will be one of complete coverage by the Chinese
State.
And I think a lot of the smaller nations may have trouble
understanding that. One of the technologies that is most
interesting to me and that rises objections is, you do not need
to cooperate for them to tap your phone. You can have software
implanted on your phone, even if it is not on, that would let
it become a communications device for the Chinese State.
So this is, as my colleagues have said, a serious obstacle
for the U.S. moving forward because China is probably a peer
when it comes to communications intelligence now, a peer with
the U.S.
Senator Blackburn. OK, so how do we mitigate that?
Dr. Lewis. One way is to--thank you, one way is to ensure
that all the delegations, certainly the friendly delegations,
know that you can't overestimate how much people are aware of
this threat. And I do that routinely. We live with it. It is
not clear that every delegation feels that way. There are some
technologies, as you have said, that allow you to communicate
more securely, not necessarily the mass market technologies,
but certainly some of the things that you can buy on the
market, and encouraging people early to think about that level
of security.
Finally, there will need to be an attention to how you
meet, where you meet, who you meet with to take this way. So
there are steps we can take to manage the risk. But again, and
I think one of the themes of this hearing is it needs to be
done early so that people are prepared.
Senator Blackburn. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, for letting me go way, way over.
Senator Fischer. We are happy you are here, Senator. Thank
you.
I think we can begin a second round of questions, and when
we are joined by members, we will slot them in. I understand
there are some on their way.
Ambassador Lang, I have a question for you. Moving forward,
what principles should guide U.S. policy when commercial demand
for spectrum intersects with bands that support critical
national security or scientific missions? How do you balance
that out? Because the United States, obviously, is advancing
very quickly in technology. We have these bands set up already.
How do you deal with that at an international conference?
Ambassador Lang. Well, thank you for the question. I do not
think there is an easy answer. It is always a tradeoff. I would
note that I believe that having spectrum available for
commercial use is also important to our national security, that
we need a strong innovative--a strong environment for technical
innovation in the United States that is fueled by spectrum in
order to be competitive globally, and that it contributes
directly to our national security.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. And Ambassador Koh, at past
conferences, you mentioned negotiations, and tradeoffs, and the
importance of firming up the position within the United States'
delegation before we get there. How does that support our
national security or scientific missions when you have those
competing interests? How do you rate the tradeoffs?
Ambassador Koh. Rating the tradeoffs is a very difficult
question. And thank you for raising this important topic,
Senator. One of the things that I would constantly say during
my time as head of delegation was that we have to do it all. It
is not an option to do one or the other, but we have to figure
out how to have both important weather satellites and weather-
sensing services in addition to allocating spectrum for
advanced telecommunications. The possibilities are there when
we look at technical studies that allow us to understand the
parameters to which these services can operate.
Spectrum has always been shared. It has always been shared,
and it is going to continue to be a shared resource. The
problem is, do you get everything that you want out of your
service because you were able to get all of the technical
resources--technical parameters that you would like, or will
you be able to operate part of your service?
There has to be an acceptance of limitations regardless,
because there are different competing priorities. That is why
the technical studies are not the end of it. It is also the
political priorities and the public policy priorities that the
administration brings to bear, and that is why seasoned
leadership, practiced political eye is necessary in these
discussions. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Senator Lujan, is it OK if we call on Senator Rosen?
Senator Lujan. OK.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator Rosen, you are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chair Fischer, Ranking
Member Lujan. This is such an important issue, it is
fundamental to our national security and to our leadership in
technology as a whole; and I want to thank all of the witnesses
for being here, again for having this hearing.
You know, because advocating for harmonized global spectrum
standards is essential for protecting American investments,
protecting investments specifically in trusted technology like
Wi-Fi, which our adversaries, we know, seek to undermine us. So
I am going to ask each of you, I will start with Ambassador Koh
first, about the risk of failure here, the risk of failure.
So think about this for a second. I want you to think about
some context, the upcoming World Radio Conference. What are the
stakes? What happens if we, the United States, fails to protect
the 6 GHz band and other key bands we are invested in? And so
what would that mean for American leadership in telecom?
Because we want to be the world leader.
So Ambassador Koh, we will start with you. And I only have
5 minutes, so you can each maybe--I know it is a very long
answer, but maybe you can give some perspective.
Ambassador Koh. Thank you, Senator, and that is an
important question, particularly as it is one of the biggest
issues that faces WRC-27. Obviously, the economic impacts will
be significant as we have become quite dependent and
interested--and committed to the use of Wi-Fi and expanding the
use of Wi-Fi in the United States, and have put our regulatory
efforts behind creating that ecosystem. In addition, I guess I
might leave it to others to speak to the reservation process as
well.
Senator Rosen. OK.
Ambassador Koh. Because I do not want to take up all of the
time, but happy to come back to you at another point.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. The stakes are really high, we
have to succeed, so just wanted to start off a little bit on
that, and give a top line.
Ambassador Lang. Well, thank you, Senator. I would
emphasize that this is an important arena for competition with
China. That China is aggressively promoting its approach to
technology in the ITU and the WRC and wants to see a global
harmonization that reflects its own domestic allocations. That
would give its companies a huge advantage in the international
marketplace, one that would set us back in terms of our
national security, our own innovation environment, our economic
prosperity. And I actually think it is a potential threat to
our democratic values as well.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Dr. Lewis.
Dr. Lewis. Thank you, Senator. We have learned from the
experience in Ukraine, in Venezuela, and now Iran, of the
importance of spectrum. And one of the interesting things to me
is, first, electronic warfare has come out of the closet and is
now crucial. Electronic warfare is electromagnetic spectrum.
Second, what we have seen is a blend of commercial and
military technologies, and that has been one of the sources of
U.S. success. The Chinese know that, the Russians know that,
and so they will be trying to exploit that. The outcome of the
work will immediately affect our national security and our
economic competitiveness. So it is a much more high-profile
event than might be judged from its press appearances.
Senator Rosen. Yes.
Mr. Calabrese. Yes, Senator, the stakes are high on the
issue that you mentioned. We know that China will be making an
effort to get more countries to opt for an allocation of IMT,
which precludes Wi-Fi in the upper 6 GHz band. This is one of
those issues I mentioned in my oral statement that are not on
the formal agenda, it is not a formal item, but should be a
priority for the U.S., which is to work against China's effort
to get more and more countries to jump aboard those footnotes
to designate IMT in the upper six, because on one hand, they
want to undermine U.S. Wi-Fi, which we lead the world by far in
equipment, enterprise equipment and chips, and at the same
time, they are the only major economy that has not even adopted
the lower 6 for Wi-Fi.
Senator Rosen. Let me get a last quick question in to you
then, Mr. Calabrese. The United States develops its WRC
positions through multiagency process, FCC, NTIA, State
Department, other Federal agency, industry, other stakeholders.
How well is the current interagency process functioning as the
U.S. prepares for WRC-27, and what can we do to be sure
agencies--to help, be sure that they are coordinating
effectively?
Mr. Calabrese. Yes, we have a greater challenge because we
have this dual-track consultative process, as you mentioned. I
mean, it seems to be going well, except for the fact that there
are these non-consensus positions on things that do not make
sense to me to be non-consensus.
You know, as Chairman Fischer mentioned earlier, about 7.4
to 8.4 for IMT, when in fact that was prohibited by the One Big
Beautiful Act. Similarly, we need to make it more clear on
defending Wi-Fi allocation up to at least 7125.
Senator Rosen. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Calabrese. So anyway, the process is going apace, but
it needs to accelerate and become unified.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, if there are things we can
do to help, now please let us know. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Hopefully,
current statute will be a basis from which the delegation can
come together and achieve that consensus before they attend the
conference, so thank you for that.
Senator Moreno, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNIE MORENO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Moreno. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I will start with you, Dr. Lewis. What are your thoughts
on, just generally speaking, getting out of the weeds a little
bit, on China and how they are doing with telecommunications
infrastructure, spyware, et cetera?
Dr. Lewis. Thank you for the question. it is an important
one. One of the problems we have is that very often we tend to
overestimate China's capabilities. When I speak to Chinese
friends, I kid them that a grown-up power doesn't need to float
a balloon if they are going to do spying, but we also can
underestimate their ability to improve rapidly. So for a
conference occurring in Shanghai on Chinese networks, owned and
controlled by the Chinese Government, the risk is immeasurable.
Senator Moreno. Well, and for example, when you travel to
China, would you take your personal cell phone with you, or
would you have a different phone that you would use just to go
there?
Dr. Lewis. On one of my trips, the Chinese complained that
I never brought my phone, so they gave me a Chinese phone, and
that is what I take.
Senator Moreno. Well, my point, if I were traveling to
China, or any of my colleagues were traveling to China, would
it surprise you that the advice from the Military liaisons is
not to bring our government phones, not to bring our personal
phones?
Dr. Lewis. So a friend who works for an intelligence agency
thought he would test your theory, this was some years ago, and
see how many times his phone was probed between when he got off
the airplane and when he got to his hotel. He did not have to
do the full test because it was probed four times in the
walkway between the plane and the terminal. So any device going
to China will be subject to some kind of intrusive activity.
Senator Moreno. And then, shifting to the world that I hold
near and dear to my heart, which is the auto industry, a lot of
automobiles, people do not realize how much cars have really
transitioned into really portable telecommunications devices,
connected vehicles, et cetera, with cameras and things like
that. What are your thoughts on where these Chinese car
manufacturers are doing and why it is so important to keep them
out of the U.S. market?
Dr. Lewis. One indication of what is going on, Senator, is
that the Chinese have banned Teslas from military and
government installations. That is because as cars become more
and more digital, as they become autonomous, as they are loaded
with sensors, and many of them have wireless connectivity, the
car is now a collection device. The Chinese know that. I am not
sure everyone here does.
Senator Moreno. Right. And I am hoping my colleagues on
this committee will support my efforts later this month and
maybe next month, to make certain that we do not allow the
threat of Chinese automobiles to enter the U.S. market for the
reasons that you just stated. And I think you are pretty
familiar, I am sure the rest of you are, with what has happened
in other markets with Chinese-made automobiles, where the
market share has gone from basically zero to 30, 40 percent and
climbing. Are you familiar with that? What are your thoughts?
Dr. Lewis. The Chinese subsidize in a different fashion
from the way we would use government subsidies, but it has
created rampant competition in China that leads to vicious
price cutting and an effort to find global markets. So the term
``dumping'' occurs. China itself makes enough cars to supply
the entire world. You do not need Germany, you do not need
Japan, you do not need the U.S. or Korea. And so they have to
find a home for those cars to pay off the debts.
Senator Moreno. And this is extraordinarily predatory. And
I will start with you, Ambassador Koh. From the conversation
you just heard, anything that you would want to add or
subtract?
Ambassador Koh. Actually, thank you for the question,
Senator. This is exactly what China needs to do. This is not--
for the Chinese Government, this is existential, you do need to
have a fully functioning economy with significant exports. So
this is not going to change. The behavior of the Chinese
economy will not change. It is on, I think, the United States
and other like-minded countries to be able to contain the
economic aggression that is coming from the country.
Senator Moreno. So if you look at our auto industry--I know
this is not the topic. I will land the plane, I promise,
Chairperson, on bringing this back to the topic at hand. But
four American auto companies lost $60 billion chasing electric
vehicle mandates, $60 billion. That has already made our
industry less competitive than the Chinese, who didn't lose $60
billion, who actually got massive, probably 2-, 3-, 4-X that
subsidies from the government. I guess my question to all of
you would be, and where this ties in, is why on earth would we
have a conference in China when they are an obvious bad actor?
I mean, it would be like the hens having a conference at the
wolf's den. Seems like a really, really bad idea. Thoughts in
my last few seconds here?
Dr. Lewis. You don't always win, Senator. And this was one
where the Chinese, it was exceptionally close, as Steve said.
Out of 48 votes, the Chinese got 25. That means they won by one
vote, right? So it was very close, and we just didn't make it.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Moreno.
Senator Lujan, you are recognized.
Senator Lujan. Thank you. And I appreciate that last
question from my colleague. I will answer the question. The
United States got rolled. This vote happened under President
Trump's first term. Whoever the President was when 2027
happened, this is what happened. I do not mean to point fingers
at the current President, Bernie.
But every article that I read about this says that the
Chinese conspired with the Rwandans. This is normally a
consensus vote by ITU, and you all tell me if I am wrong about
this, and at the last minute, the Rwandans withdrew, opened the
door for the Chinese to roll in. They got the bid. I would
stand by, the United States got rolled, and this is something,
colleagues, for us to look for the next one, to be ready,
whoever the President is, so that the United States is not in
this posture, in this position again, and I have concerns about
that.
Now, there was a question earlier that was a little
critical of the previous President. I do not think it was at
you, Ambassador Lang, but the question that the Biden
administration, that this maybe could have gone better, maybe
on the planning side. But let me ask you this. The United
States in WRC-23, was the United States able to beat back
China's attempt to repurpose the 6 GHz band?
Ambassador Lang. Well, thank you for the question, Senator.
I believe that we had important successes in 2023 in preserving
the 6 GHz band for unlicensed use.
Senator Lujan. What about expanding connectivity? The
United States did OK there?
Ambassador Lang. I think we did. I think we had successes
both on the unlicensed side with the 6 GHz and also----
Senator Lujan. What about unlocking the space economy?
Ambassador Lang. Yes, I think we had some important
achievements in 2023 with regard to various satellite
communications.
Senator Lujan. I think Elon Musk should be thankful to you,
and so should Jeff Bezos, because without the work you did, we
wouldn't have SpaceX, and we wouldn't have Amazon launching
satellites today, because of the great work that you and the
United States did in that space.
And last, what about protecting spectrum used for national
security? Did you do OK there?
Ambassador Lang. I think we did. We were able to make sure
we preserved some critical protections even as we identified
additional spectrum for various other telecommunications uses.
Senator Lujan. And the proof will be what happens after
this one. I hope that the list is longer than the one that I
just read coming out of WRC-27. Now, what I will say from the
critical nature of that question is planning is important and
this should have been done much better under the Biden
administration on the planning side.
And I certainly hope that the Trump administration is
taking note to all of your testimony today, and also what we
learned that could have gone better in preparation of 2023,
because to me it just feels like we are lacking a little bit.
And I certainly hope that the thoughtfulness again of our
Chair, of Senator Fischer, calling this hearing is just a
reminder: Hey everybody, time to get to work. Roll up your
sleeves and let us get at this as well.
So I very much appreciate the time for the second round of
questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Lujan.
If I can close the hearing, unless one of our colleagues
tries to get in here under the wire, but if I could just close
the hearing and ask each of you, you know, we have talked about
this during the hearing, how important it is for the delegation
to work together, to work with our allies, to be able to have a
strong leader. If we can just go down the panel here and you
tell me what we need to see in the background of a strong
leader, besides ``cracking heads'', what we need to see in
their background and what you would hope to see in our
delegation that is chosen for this very, very important work?
Ambassador?
Ambassador Koh. Thank you, Chairwoman. I would hope to see
a willingness to--I think what I would like to see is
discretion and a willingness to see past the surface arguments.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Ambassador Lang.
Ambassador Lang. Thank you very much for the question. For
the head of delegation, I think we need somebody who
understands how the telecommunications industry works, and how
radio frequency spectrum works, appreciates the important
strategic consequences of this event and is a great negotiator.
And he or she will need a team that is fully equipped across
the U.S. interagency, with strong experts, with good
negotiation skills. They will need to be aggressive and
persistent in inserting themselves into every conversation of
the WRC.
They will also need to be good diplomats. And I think they
will also need, as a group, the resources to engage globally on
a diplomatic--diplomatically on a global scale. That is going
to take significant funding for travel. And then there are
other creative tools that we should be thinking about for
engagement, things like we have heard suggestions of a spectrum
summit hosted in the United States in advance of the
conference. I think that would be a great idea.
We should be looking at opportunities like providing
training for other delegations' members in advance of the
conference. So a strong diplomatic strategy leading up to the
conference I think is absolutely critical.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Dr. Lewis.
Dr. Lewis. Thank you, Senator, for your question. Thank
you. When you are taught negotiating skills, they always tell
you that you are engaged in two simultaneous negotiations, one
with the other side and one with the people back home. And so a
negotiator will need to have the authority, the discipline, the
skill to make sure that the American delegation sticks to
consensus positions.
It is exceptionally damaging if other agencies go off the
reservation and say things that are contrary. A second part of
that is that multilateral negotiations are a different art. You
need people who have some knowledge of how multilateral
negotiations work that need not be international. I was talking
in preparation for this with people that said the skills that
you bring to the legislative process, you need a similar set of
skills, the ability to sense positions, cut deals, identify
things.
So you need basically a negotiator who has both the
domestic skills and the international skills. They can be
learned. I am less worried about the technical side. We are not
technical experts. But the ability to forge that deal, forge
that agreement with other countries is essential.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Calabrese.
Mr. Calabrese. The early public identification of a leader
with all the experience that Steve--Ambassador Lang outlined,
but I would add, who puts a particular focus on building
relationships, diplomatic relationships early, starting next
month at CITEL with the Americas, you know, with these other
countries engaging in their perspective. We were, I think,
surprised in some cases last time around Mexico, Brazil, and
others. And China is going to be trying to pull more of those
tricks. And so I think very early engagement and relationship
building in those places, particularly to anticipate where the
Chinese might have backdoor influence.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of
the witnesses for their testimony here today. Thank you.
Senators will have until the close of business on March 24
to submit questions for the record. The witnesses will have
until the close of business on April 7 to respond to those
questions.
This concludes today's hearing and the Committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
NCTA--The Internet & Television Association
Washington, DC, March 17, 2026
Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chair,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate.
Hon. Deb Fischer,
Chair,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Media,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate.
Hon. Ben Ray Lujan,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Media,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate.
Re: Hearing on U.S. Leadership at the World Radiocommunication
Conference 2027 (WRC-27): Strategy and Challenges Ahead of
Shanghai
Dear Committee Chair Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, Subcommittee Chair
Fischer, Ranking Member Lujan, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Decisions made at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC)
shape the global market for a wide range of communications
technologies, from satellite services to Wi-Fi to commercial mobile
services. Ensuring that the marketplace remains flexible and open to
innovation will require a whole-of-government approach, as well as
consistent engagement with both industry and our international partners
and allies. In support of that engagement, NCTA recommends that
Congress and the Administration (1) prioritize WRC-27 advocacy that
reinforces U.S. technological leadership and captures all aspects of
our telecommunications marketplace, (2) invest in robust public-and
private-sector participation in the WRC-27 preparation process, and (3)
work to ensure the conditions necessary for full and secure stakeholder
participation in Shanghai.
A well-coordinated campaign to promote U.S. priorities has never
been more important. Other nations, particularly the People's Republic
of China, are investing significantly in attempts to dominate
international standards, proliferate untrustworthy technologies, and
lock U.S. companies out of key international markets. Sustained and
robust U.S. engagement will help ensure that international spectrum
policies reflect principles of open markets, free speech, technical
rigor, and innovation-driven growth--not authoritarian values. That
engagement should be focused on three pillars.
First, Congress and the Administration should prioritize efforts
that maximize our Nation's leadership and competitive advantage,
especially with regard to unlicensed and shared spectrum technologies.
For decades, Americans have benefited from a spectrum policy framework
that encourages innovation, promotes investment, and supports an ``all
of the above'' wireless ecosystem. That environment has helped make
shared and unlicensed spectrum critical economic drivers and consistent
sources of U.S. wireless leadership and competitive advantage. Much of
the technology ecosystem supporting Wi-Fi and related platforms--
including chipsets, networking equipment, software, and services--has
been developed by American companies and continues to support high-
skilled jobs, research, and manufacturing in the United States. Wi-Fi,
in turn, supports a large and growing U.S. innovation ecosystem that
drives investment, high-skilled employment, and global leadership in
networking equipment, semiconductor design, and connectivity services.
As NTIA Administrator Arielle Roth put it, when it comes to unlicensed
technologies, ``[n]o one does it better,'' than the United States,
``and the world knows it.''
Second, NCTA recommends that Administration leaders promote
sustained participation by U.S. government and private-sector experts
to ensure that the conference's decisions are informed by the
experience of the world's most dynamic communications ecosystem. NCTA
recognizes that WRC preparation is a multi-year process that, when done
right, requires significant investments of time and resources. Making
that long-term commitment may be particularly challenging when
Congress, under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, has also charged the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) with strict
timeline benchmarks for allocating our Nation's spectrum airwaves.
Congress can support this work by stating clearly that investments in
WRC preparation support a wide range of priorities for the economy,
national security, and innovation.
Third, NCTA urges the Administration to help remove obstacles to
broad public-and private-sector participation in Shanghai. The U.S.
approach is strengthened by our Nation's commitment to a transparent,
collaborative partnership between the public and private sectors.
Alongside government experts, participation by American private-sector
leaders has consistently advanced technically sound and forward-looking
proposals that reflect the cutting edge of technology. Industry
partners also help government negotiators fully understand the
commercial consequences of each proposal and serve as force multipliers
in formal negotiations and informal engagements around the world. A
significant American presence at preparatory events and on the ground
at WRC-27 is essential.
Without careful planning, the location of the conference in
Shanghai could deter some stakeholders from undertaking this important
work. Potential participants have raised concerns about data security,
safety, privacy, and rule-of-law protections. The U.S. government can
promote participation by encouraging the International
Telecommunication Union to ensure the host country offers protections
and conditions consistent with international norms. These should
include guarantees of timely entry and exit for registered delegates;
access to consular services; secure communications capabilities at the
conference site, including reliable encrypted Wi-Fi connectivity;
appropriate privacy safeguards in meeting spaces and lodgings; and
assurances that all registered participants may freely conduct official
conference business consistent with the rules of the conference.
In short, maintaining leadership at WRC-27 will help ensure that
international spectrum frameworks continue to support innovation,
investment, and the development of advanced communications technologies
that benefit consumers and businesses both domestically and around the
world.
We thank you for your leadership on this issue and for holding such
an important hearing regarding America's continued emphasis of our
technology and innovation on the global stage. Our nation faces a
critical moment in Shanghai in 2027. Your attention to the upcoming
conference will further drive key stakeholder involvement in the
process, helping the U.S. meet this pivotal moment in the global
competition for technology leadership.
Respectfully,
Hon. Cory Gardner,
President and CEO,
NCTA--The Internet & Television Association
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Ambassador (ret.) Grace Koh
Question 1. The International Telecommunication Union's World
Radiocommunication Conference 2027 (WRC-27) will be an inflection point
for the technologies that will define the next generation. If the
United States fails to lead, China will set many of the global rules
for 6G and satellite systems that underpin AI and quantum-related
communications. How does the restoration of the FCC's auction authority
and the 800 MHz spectrum pipeline included in the Working Families Tax
Cut Act help the U.S. delegation leading up to WRC-27?
Answer. The restoration of the FCC's auction authority and the
establishment of an 800 MHz spectrum pipeline materially strengthen the
United States' position as it prepares for WRC-27, both substantively
and diplomatically.
First, restoring the FCC's auction authority reinforces U.S.
credibility in international spectrum discussions. At the World
Radiocommunication Conference, other administrations assess not only
the technical merits of U.S. proposals, but also whether the United
States has the ability to implement those policies domestically. The
lapse in auction authority during the previous cycle created
uncertainty about the United States' capacity to act. Its restoration
signals that the United States once again has a full complement of
spectrum policy tools, which strengthens the persuasiveness of U.S.
positions in international negotiations.
Second, the 800 MHz pipeline provides a clear and forward-looking
framework for identifying spectrum resources to support next-generation
technologies. WRC-27 will address spectrum for future mobile networks,
including 6G, as well as satellite services that underpin emerging
applications in AI and advanced communications. When the United States
can point to a defined pipeline of candidate bands for study and
potential deployment, it demonstrates seriousness of purpose and
provides a concrete foundation for engaging with international partners
on harmonized approaches. That clarity is critical, because globally
aligned spectrum bands enable economies of scale, reduce deployment
costs, and accelerate the development of new technologies.
Third, these measures enhance the United States' ability to engage
in early and effective coalition-building. Outcomes at WRCs are shaped
well before the conference convenes, through regional organizations and
sustained bilateral engagement. A credible domestic spectrum strategy
allows the United States to socialize its proposals earlier in the
preparatory cycle, build support among like-minded countries, and shape
the technical and regulatory options that ultimately come before the
conference.
Finally, in the context of strategic competition, these actions
position the United States to lead with affirmative proposals rather
than respond to the initiatives of others. China approaches spectrum
policy as part of a coordinated national strategy and works actively to
build international support for its preferred approaches. The most
effective U.S. response is to present well-developed, technically
grounded proposals backed by clear domestic policy direction and
implementation capability.
Taken together, restoring auction authority and establishing a
robust spectrum pipeline strengthen U.S. credibility, improve the
ability to build international consensus, and position the United
States to shape the global spectrum framework in a manner that supports
American technological leadership, economic competitiveness, and
national security interests at WRC-27.
Question 2. In the past, U.S. delegations have sometimes been seen
as divided, which weakens our influence, especially when individual
delegates or U.S. companies advocate positions that conflict with the
U.S. position. How should the delegation leader maintain a unified U.S.
position among the delegation, and what should the leader do if a U.S.
delegate or company representative works behind the scenes with a
foreign delegation to advocate against or undermine the U.S. position?
a. Should such delegates be ejected and sent home? Please explain.
Answer. A unified U.S. position is essential to advancing American
interests at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC). The
delegation leader plays a central role in ensuring that unity is
established early, maintained throughout the conference, and enforced
when necessary.
First, unity is best achieved through preparation and process. The
delegation leader should ensure that all participants, government
officials and private-sector advisors alike, are fully aligned with the
officially adopted U.S. positions prior to the conference. This
includes clear communication of objectives, thorough interagency
coordination, and reaffirmation that all delegates serve under a single
national position, not individual or commercial interests. The
longstanding U.S. preparatory process, which incorporates input from
industry while ultimately producing consensus government positions, is
designed to support precisely this outcome.
Second, the delegation leader must reinforce expectations of
conduct. All delegates should understand that participation in the U.S.
delegation carries an obligation to advocate for and defend the agreed
U.S. position in all formal and informal settings. This includes
bilateral discussions, regional group meetings, and behind-the-scenes
negotiations that are often decisive at WRCs. Clear guidance at the
outset helps ensure consistency in messaging and strategy. At WRC-27,
where the strategic stakes are high and global competition is
pronounced, the margin for error will be smaller, and even limited
deviations from agreed positions can be amplified in ways that
undermine U.S. objectives.
If a U.S. delegate or company representative acts contrary to the
U.S. position, particularly by coordinating with foreign delegations to
undermine it, the delegation leader should respond promptly and
proportionately. Initial steps should include direct engagement to
understand the circumstances and to reiterate the expectation of
alignment with U.S. policy. In many cases, such issues can be resolved
through clarification and reinforcement of roles.
However, if the conduct is deliberate and persists, stronger
measures are warranted. The integrity and credibility of the U.S.
delegation must take precedence. The delegation leader has the
authority to limit that individual's participation in delegation
activities, restrict access to internal coordination, or remove them
from the delegation entirely.
Ejection should be available as a last resort. In most cases,
maintaining unity through clear expectations, active management, and
corrective engagement will be sufficient. However, where a delegate's
actions materially undermine the U.S. position or negotiating strategy
(and especially where those actions involve coordination with foreign
interests against U.S. objectives) removal from the delegation is
appropriate.
The key principle is that participation in a U.S. delegation is a
privilege contingent on advancing the national interest. At WRC-27,
where competitive dynamics may magnify the impact of internal
divisions, the delegation leader must be prepared to act decisively
when that standard is not met.
Question 3. The Working Families Tax Cut Act directs the
administration to make 500 MHz of Federal spectrum available for
commercial use. How could decisions made at the WRC affect whether
these bands are realistically made available for commercial deployment?
a. If the U.S. does not secure favorable mid-band spectrum
identifications in the lower 7GHz range and in the 4GHz band at WRC-27,
what alternative spectrum bands could support U.S. 6G deployment, and
what would be the likely consequences for U.S. national security and
economic competitiveness?
Answer. Decisions at WRC-27 could materially affect whether the 500
MHz of Federal spectrum identified pursuant to the Working Families Tax
Cut Act is ultimately usable for timely and economically viable
commercial deployment. Many of the bands under active study in the
United States, particularly in the 4 GHz and lower 7 GHz range, overlap
directly with bands under consideration internationally at WRC-27.
Favorable outcomes at the conference, including internationally
harmonized identifications for IMT with workable technical rules, would
significantly improve the likelihood that these bands can be cleared,
standardized, and supported by a robust global equipment ecosystem.
Conversely, if WRC-27 results in no identification, fragmented regional
outcomes, or overly restrictive sharing conditions, the United States
could still move forward domestically, but doing so would likely be
slower, more costly, and less globally aligned.
With respect to the likelihood of success at WRC-27, it is
meaningful but not assured. Many administrations recognize that the 7
GHz range is well suited for 6G, which creates momentum for some form
of IMT identification. At the same time, the band supports significant
incumbent federal, satellite, and scientific operations, and the
outcome will depend on whether ongoing studies demonstrate that those
systems can be adequately protected. Accordingly, the United States
should approach WRC-27 not as a binary question of whether 7 GHz will
be used for next-generation wireless, but as a negotiation over the
terms of that use. Specifically, success for the United States will
hinge on whether any identification preserves U.S. flexibility,
protects critical incumbent missions, and enables commercially viable
deployment.
If the United States does not secure favorable mid-band outcomes in
the lower 7 GHz and 4 GHz ranges, alternative bands could partially
support 6G deployment, including additional spectrum in the 3 GHz
range, the Upper C-band, and other mid-band frequencies currently under
study by NTIA and the FCC. However, these alternatives would likely be
less optimal than globally harmonized allocations in the 4 GHz and 7
GHz ranges. Reliance on a more fragmented mix of bands would increase
network deployment costs, complicate equipment development, reduce
economies of scale, and delay the pace of innovation.
The consequences for U.S. national security and economic
competitiveness would be significant. Spectrum leadership shapes not
only commercial wireless performance, but also the security,
resilience, and interoperability of critical communications
infrastructure. If the United States is unable to align domestic
spectrum availability with globally harmonized bands, it risks ceding
influence over the development of the 6G ecosystem, including
standards, supply chains, and deployment timelines. That, in turn,
could place the United States and its allies in a more reactive
position, with fewer strategic options and increased dependence on
decisions shaped by foreign competitors.
For these reasons, WRC-27 should be viewed as a critical complement
to domestic spectrum policy. The Working Families Tax Cut Act
establishes an important pipeline, but the ultimate strategic and
economic value of that pipeline will depend in significant part on
achieving outcomes at WRC-27 that support globally harmonized,
commercially viable spectrum for next-generation wireless systems.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Cynthia Lummis to
Ambassador (ret.) Grace Koh
Question 1. The last ITU-related meeting held in Shanghai saw the
U.S. limit its participation to a handful of government representatives
with no private sector delegates. The U.S. private sector delegation
has historically been one of America's greatest assets at the WRC,
providing real-time technical expertise and industry intelligence
during negotiations. What specific operational security measures should
the U.S. government put in place for WRC-27 in Shanghai, and how will
those measures impact private sector and expert participation?
Answer. Robust private sector participation is a hallmark of the
American approach to the World Radiocommunication Conference and one of
our greatest comparative advantages. U.S. companies and technical
experts bring real-time engineering expertise, operational insight, and
market-driven perspectives that materially strengthen the quality and
credibility of U.S. positions. Preserving that model is essential to
U.S. leadership at WRC-27.
At the same time, the operating environment in Shanghai will
require a more disciplined and security-conscious approach to
participation. The appropriate response is not to limit private sector
involvement, but to enable it through a layered set of operational
security measures that mitigate risk while preserving effectiveness.
First, all delegation members (government and private sector alike)
should receive mandatory, tailored counterintelligence and
cybersecurity briefings in advance of travel. These briefings should
provide practical guidance on surveillance risks, social engineering,
and protection of sensitive technical and business information. Second,
the delegation should adopt a ``clean device'' model, under which
participants use government-furnished or pre-approved devices with
minimal data and rely on secure, encrypted communications channels
designated for conference use. Personal devices should be avoided for
official activities.
Third, clear protocols should govern the handling of sensitive or
pre-decisional information. This includes disciplined internal
coordination, limits on informal discussions of negotiating positions,
and appropriate compartmentalization where necessary. The delegation
should also establish secure, routine coordination mechanisms--such as
daily briefings and designated communication channels--to reduce
reliance on ad hoc or unsecured exchanges. Physical security practices,
including awareness of surveillance in hotels and meeting spaces and
adherence to badge and access controls, should also be emphasized.
These measures will introduce some additional burden for private
sector participants, including training requirements, compliance
obligations, and potential costs associated with secure devices and
communications. In some cases, companies may be more selective about
who they send. However, with early planning, clear guidance, and
appropriate government support, these impacts can be managed.
Importantly, a well-defined security framework should enable
private sector participation. By giving companies and experts the tools
and confidence to operate effectively in a higher-risk environment, the
United States can preserve the core strength of its delegation. Given
the stakes at WRC-27 and the narrower margin for error in Shanghai, the
goal should be to protect our people and information while continuing
to field the full complement of private sector expertise that has long
distinguished and strengthened the American approach.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Ambassador (ret.) Grace Koh
U.S. Expertise and Resources. International coordination is
essential to set regulations that permit technological innovation
without risk of spectrum interference. These global negotiations are
very technical, so we need to make sure that the best engineers are
working on these issues.
Yet, instability in employment at the Federal level has led to many
staffers with institutional and technical knowledge leaving the Federal
workforce. That brain drain sets us at a disadvantage. We need to keep
subject-matter experts in the U.S. delegation.
Question 1. Ms. Koh, what should we be doing now as negotiations
are ongoing to ensure that the right experts are in those
conversations?
Answer. Technical expertise is the foundation of effective
participation in these negotiations. The United States has historically
had an advantage because of the depth of its engineering talent and the
strength of its public-private collaboration. Preserving and
strengthening that advantage requires both immediate action ahead of
WRC-27 and a longer-term strategy to rebuild and sustain the expert
pipeline.
In the near term, as preparations for WRC-27 are already underway,
the United States should focus on ensuring that its most experienced
experts are fully engaged and supported. That starts with prioritizing
retention and continuity within the Federal workforce, particularly at
NTIA, the FCC, and other agencies central to spectrum policy, so that
institutional knowledge is not lost at a critical moment. It also means
fully leveraging the U.S. model by integrating private sector and
academic experts early and consistently into the preparatory process.
These experts provide real-time technical analysis, strengthen the
evidentiary basis for U.S. proposals, and are often instrumental in
engaging with international counterparts.
In addition, the United States should intensify its technical
preparation now, advancing well-developed positions, conducting
rigorous studies, preparing responses to objections, and ensuring
alignment across government and industry. The U.S. delegation must
arrive in Shanghai with both the expertise and the data needed to lead.
Just as importantly, U.S. experts play a central role in building
international consensus ahead of the conference; sustained technical
engagement with allies and partners will be critical to countering
well-organized efforts by competitors like China.
Over the longer term, the United States needs a more durable
strategy to cultivate and retain spectrum expertise for future
conferences. That includes investing in the Federal workforce through
stable funding, competitive career paths, and incentives that allow
agencies to attract and retain highly specialized engineers. It also
means building a stronger pipeline of talent by expanding fellowship
programs, interagency details, and opportunities for early-and mid-
career experts to gain experience in international spectrum
negotiations.
At the same time, we should continue to strengthen the U.S. multi-
stakeholder model by institutionalizing collaboration with industry,
academia, and standards bodies, ensuring that expertise is continuously
refreshed and integrated into policymaking. Finally, sustained
leadership in multilateral forums will require not just technical
excellence, but long-term engagement with allies to align spectrum
strategies well before formal negotiations begin.
Taken together, these near-term and long-term steps will help
ensure that the United States continues to bring the best technical
expertise to the table and translate that expertise into leadership at
WRC-27 and beyond.
Concerns About China. By a single vote, China won the right to host
the WRC in 2027 in Shanghai. That means not only will a Chinese
official chair the conference, but it will literally be on their turf.
As our witnesses have stated, the U.S. delegation can expect to be
surveilled. We also know that China's priorities--particularly its push
for international spectrum and satellite rules--are aimed at hindering
American leadership.
Combatting China's home-court advantage requires more preparation
and coordination than ever before. Given the challenges to negotiating
with partners on the ground, we need to build a strong coalition well
ahead of the conference.
Question 1. How does hosting the conference in Shanghai give China
an advantage on policy outcomes?
Answer. Hosting WRC-27 in Shanghai provides China with both
structural and practical advantages that can shape outcomes,
particularly at the margins.
At a structural level, the host country plays an important role in
setting the tone and tempo of the conference. The conference chair,
likely a Chinese official, will exercise influence over how discussions
are managed, how consensus is assessed, and how contentious issues are
sequenced. While ITU processes are rules-based, these procedural levers
can matter in close negotiations, especially where outcomes depend on
informal consensus rather than formal votes.
In addition, there is a longstanding norm within international
forums of affording a degree of deference to the host country.
Delegations are generally reluctant to create the appearance of a
disorderly or contentious conference, particularly in the host's
capital. As a result, there can be subtle pressure to avoid public
disagreements or procedural challenges that might be perceived as
undermining the host's stewardship. That dynamic can advantage the host
country in shaping how and when difficult issues are resolved.
At a practical level, the location itself creates asymmetries.
China will have significantly greater ease in mobilizing a large, well-
coordinated delegation with deep bench strength across technical and
policy issues. By contrast, other delegations may face logistical,
security, and administrative constraints that limit participation or
constrain real-time coordination. Concerns about surveillance and
operational security may also inhibit open discussion among U.S. and
allied delegates, particularly in informal settings where much of the
negotiation typically occurs.
Finally, hosting creates opportunities for sustained engagement
with other delegations outside formal sessions. The host nation can
leverage proximity, access, and diplomatic engagement to reinforce its
positions and build support, especially among countries that may
already be aligned with its proposals.
Taken together, these factors do not predetermine outcomes, but
they do create a meaningful ``home-field advantage'' that underscores
the importance of preparation, coalition-building, and disciplined
execution by the United States and its partners.
Question 2. What can the United States and our allies do now to
prepare for Shanghai?
Answer. To mitigate these challenges, the United States and its
allies should focus on early, sustained, and coordinated preparation
across several fronts.
First, coalition-building must begin well in advance of the
conference. The United States should deepen engagement with like-minded
partners, e.g., Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia, Canada, and key
emerging markets, to align on priority bands and technical positions.
Regional organizations such as CITEL, CEPT, and APT preparatory
processes will be critical venues for building consensus and
identifying areas of compromise before arriving in Shanghai.
Second, the United States should lead with strong, technically
rigorous proposals. Success at the WRC depends heavily on the
credibility of underlying engineering studies. Investing now in ITU-R
study group participation, compatibility analyses, and data-driven
advocacy will help ensure that U.S. positions are persuasive and
resilient in negotiation.
Third, the U.S. delegation should be fully resourced and tightly
coordinated. That includes integrating Federal experts with private
sector engineers, ensuring continuity across preparatory meetings, and
establishing clear lines of authority and messaging discipline within
the delegation.
Fourth, the United States and its partners should plan for
operational and security challenges associated with the venue. This
includes establishing protocols for secure communications, protecting
sensitive information, and enabling effective coordination among allies
despite a constrained environment.
Fifth, the State Department should engage proactively with ITU
leadership and the Radiocommunication Bureau--and rally like-minded
countries to do the same--to reinforce shared expectations for a
transparent, rules-based conference. Coordinated diplomatic engagement
can help ensure that conference procedures are applied consistently,
that all delegations have fair access to the process, and that any
concerns regarding host-nation conduct are addressed promptly. A
unified message from multiple countries will carry greater weight in
reinforcing norms of neutrality, openness, and procedural integrity.
Finally, sustained diplomatic engagement more broadly will be
essential. Many countries will arrive at WRC-27 without fixed
positions. Proactive outreach, both bilaterally and through
multilateral forums, can help shape those positions in advance,
reducing the likelihood that key decisions are made under pressure in
the final days of the conference.
In short, the best way to counter a host-nation advantage is to
arrive in Shanghai with a unified coalition, well-developed technical
positions, and a disciplined, well-prepared delegation, while also
working collectively with allies to ensure that the conference itself
is conducted in a fair, transparent, and rules-based manner.
U.S. Candidates for ITU Leadership. Strong leadership at the
International Telecommunication Union also puts the United States at an
advantage globally. We are fortunate that Doreen Bogdan-Martin, an
American, has represented the U.S. as Secretary-General of the ITU
since 2022. ITU member states will hold an election for Secretary-
General at their plenipotentiary this November. I support Secretary-
General Bogdan-Martin's reelection this fall.
Another American, Jennifer Warren, is nominated to serve on the
Radio Regulations Board. We should do what we can to support both
candidates because American leadership in these institutions matters.
Question 1. How important is it for Americans to be engaged with
and hold positions within the ITU?
Answer. American engagement and leadership within the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) are critically important to advancing
U.S. national, economic, and security interests. The ITU plays a
central role in shaping the global regulatory framework for spectrum
use, satellite operations, and telecommunications standards. These
decisions directly affect the competitiveness of U.S. industries and
the integrity of our communications infrastructure.
The United States is fortunate to be able to sponsor highly
qualified and respected candidates such as Secretary-General Doreen
Bogdan-Martin and Jennifer Warren for service in these roles. Their
expertise, credibility, and commitment to transparent, consensus-based
processes reflect the best of the U.S. approach to international
telecommunications governance.
When Americans hold senior leadership positions within the ITU, it
strengthens the United States' ability to promote open, market-
oriented, and technically grounded approaches to spectrum management
and global connectivity. U.S. leaders help ensure that international
decisions support innovation, competition, and secure, interoperable
networks--principles that have long underpinned the success of the
global communications ecosystem.
At the same time, sustained American leadership helps reinforce
alignment with allies and partners and supports effective coalition-
building ahead of key negotiations such as the World Radiocommunication
Conference. Conversely, any absence of strong, credible leadership in
these roles can create opportunities for other actors to exert greater
influence over international telecommunications policies, potentially
advancing approaches that diverge from the open, market-based
principles the United States and its partners support.
For these reasons, continued U.S. engagement and support for
qualified American candidates in ITU leadership positions remain
essential to maintaining U.S. influence in global telecommunications
governance.
Spectrum Leadership. The United States dedicated the 6 gigahertz
band to unlicensed wireless--including the next-generation of Wi-Fi--in
2020. Since that time, we have seen faster speeds and the emergence of
a whole new wireless ecosystem, driven by companies right here in the
U.S. and our allies.
In WRC-23, the U.S. and our allies successfully beat back Chinese
attempts to force the whole world to reallocate this band to licensed
high-power spectrum, which would benefit Huawei with the largest
installed base of equipment in the 6 gigahertz band. But we know that
China will make another run at redesignating the 6 gigahertz band for
high-power licensed use.
Question 1. What will it mean for U.S. leadership if China is
successful in moving the 6 gigahertz band to high-power licensed use?
Answer. If China were successful in redesignating the 6 GHz band
for high-power licensed use, it would represent a significant setback
for U.S. spectrum leadership, innovation, and global competitiveness.
The United States made a deliberate, forward-looking decision in 2020
to dedicate the band to unlicensed use, catalyzing a new generation of
Wi-Fi technologies (including Wi-Fi 6E and Wi-Fi 7) and enabling a
broad ecosystem of devices, applications, and services. That decision
has already produced tangible economic and consumer benefits, e.g.,
faster speeds, lower latency, and expanded capacity for everything from
telework and telehealth to advanced manufacturing and education.
A shift to high-power licensed use would undermine that momentum in
several ways. First, it would devalue the investments already made by
U.S. companies and innovators in the unlicensed ecosystem. Second, it
would tilt the global equipment market toward incumbent vendors with
large installed cellular infrastructure bases, particularly Chinese
firms such as Huawei, thereby distorting competition and disadvantaging
trusted suppliers. Third, it would fragment the global spectrum
environment, increasing costs for manufacturers and slowing the
development of interoperable technologies.
More broadly, such an outcome would signal a retreat from the U.S.-
led model of open, innovation-friendly spectrum policy. The success of
the 6 GHz decision has reinforced U.S. credibility with allies and
partners; reversing course internationally would weaken that coalition
and embolden efforts to shift future bands toward more centralized,
state-driven allocation models. In short, preserving the current
approach to 6 GHz is essential not only for Wi-Fi leadership, but for
maintaining the broader U.S. advantage in wireless innovation.
Question 2. Are there other bands you are concerned about where an
adverse decision could hinder the U.S.'s ability to innovate?
Answer. There are several additional bands under consideration for
WRC-27 where adverse decisions could meaningfully constrain U.S.
innovation and competitiveness if not carefully managed.
First, the upper mid-band spectrum--particularly in the 3.5-4.2 GHz
and 4.4-4.9 GHz ranges--will be critical for next-generation wireless
services, including 5G evolution and future 6G systems. If
international decisions limit flexibility or prioritize uses that
diverge from U.S. allocations, it could complicate efforts to make
these bands available domestically and reduce economies of scale for
U.S. technologies.
Second, the lower 7 GHz band (7.125-8.4 GHz) is emerging as a key
area of contention. This band offers a rare opportunity to harmonize
spectrum for a mix of licensed and unlicensed uses that could support
both advanced mobile networks and next-generation Wi-Fi. However,
competing proposals, particularly those favoring exclusive high-power
licensed use, risk foreclosing the balanced approach that has driven
U.S. innovation to date.
Third, satellite-related bands, including those considered for non-
geostationary orbit (NGSO) systems, will be central to the future of
global connectivity. Decisions that impose overly restrictive sharing
conditions or favor certain national champions could limit the growth
of U.S.-based satellite operators and the broader space economy.
Finally, there are ongoing efforts by some countries to expand
regulatory frameworks that could constrain unlicensed use more broadly.
Any shift away from flexible, low-barrier access to spectrum would
disproportionately impact the innovation ecosystem that has thrived in
the United States.
Taken together, these issues underscore the importance of sustained
U.S. leadership and coalition-building going into WRC-27. The stakes
extend beyond any single band; they will shape whether the global
spectrum environment continues to support the open, competitive, and
innovation-driven model that has long benefited the United States and
its partners.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Ambassador (ret.) Stephan A. Lang
Question 1. In the past, U.S. delegations have sometimes been seen
as divided, which weakens our influence, especially when individual
delegates or U.S. companies advocate positions that conflict with the
U.S. position. How should the delegation leader maintain a unified U.S.
position among the delegation, and what should the leader do if a U.S.
delegate or company representative works behind the scenes with a
foreign delegation to advocate against or undermine the U.S. position?
a. Should such delegates be ejected and sent home? Please explain.
Answer. Delegation discipline must be a priority for the head of
delegation. Clear and frequent communication with delegation members is
critical to making sure they fully understand U.S. positions and the
expectations for their behavior. I also believe that the United States
should not allow representatives of the private sector to be on the
U.S. delegation if their employer is actively opposing U.S. positions
either directly or as part of another delegation. More generally, a
member of the U.S. delegation should be removed from the delegation if
their presence begins to undermine U.S. positions.
Question 2. The Working Families Tax Cut Act directs the
administration to make 500 MHz of Federal spectrum available for
commercial use. How could decisions made at the WRC affect whether
these bands are realistically made available for commercial deployment?
a. If the U.S. does not secure favorable mid-band spectrum
identifications in the lower 7GHz range and in the 4GHz band at WRC-27,
what alternative spectrum bands could support U.S. 6G deployment, and
what would be the likely consequences for U.S. national security and
economic competitiveness?
Answer. Licensed and unlicensed spectrum are both critical to U.S.
national security, economic prosperity, and technological
competitiveness. A pipeline of spectrum for 6G in the United States is
essential to ensure the United States continues to lead in the
deployment of advanced wireless communications. The FCC and NTIA must
work together and prioritize identifying this pipeline as quickly as
possible so that it can be harmonized internationally. It seems that
the 4 GHz and 7 GHz bands are the most likely candidates and focusing
on these bands will help take international pressure off the 6 GHz
band, which the United States has decided should be used for unlicensed
services.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Cynthia Lummis to
Ambassador (ret.) Stephan A. Lang
Question. The U.S. two-track consultative process has produced non-
consensus positions on several agenda items, including Agenda Item 1.7
concerning spectrum between 7.125 and 8.4 GHz. Meanwhile, the inter-
American regional process at CITEL requires finalized U.S. positions
well in advance of the conference. In your experience coordinating U.S.
international communications policy, what is the realistic deadline by
which the FCC-NTIA reconciliation process must be completed for the
U.S. to have its positions adopted as regional positions at CITEL?
Answer. I would assess that the U.S. delegation should have its
positions finalized no later than spring 2027 to be able to win the
support of five additional CITEL member states, the minimum required
support, in time for the final CITEL meeting for approval of Inter-
American Proposals. But sooner would be much better.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Ambassador (ret.) Stephan A. Lang
U.S. Expertise and Resources. International coordination is
essential to set regulations that permit technological innovation
without risk of spectrum interference. These global negotiations are
very technical, so we need to make sure that the best engineers are
working on these issues.
Yet, instability in employment at the Federal level has led to many
staffers with institutional and technical knowledge leaving the Federal
workforce. That brain drain sets us at a disadvantage. We need to keep
subject-matter experts in the U.S. delegation.
Question 1. Mr. Lang, how important is it that the U.S. delegation
to WRC-27 include technical subject-matter experts?
Answer. It is critical that the U.S. delegation include a
sufficient number of technical subject-matter experts. And it is
important that those experts be both from Federal agencies and the
private sector.
Question 2. Are you worried that U.S. Companies and government
agencies will send fewer people because the meeting is in China?
Answer. U.S. companies who plan to send employees to WRC-27 will
have additional concerns based on the conference's location in
Shanghai. It is therefore important for the State Department working
with other government agencies and in coordination with the ITU and
likeminded partners to secure commitments from China to address those
concerns. U.S. agencies should also prepare to implement unilateral
mitigating measures that can help allay the concerns. I believe that
U.S. agencies are already working to take these steps.
Concerns About China. By a single vote, China won the right to host
the WRC in 2027 in Shanghai. That means not only will a Chinese
official chair the conference, but it will literally be on their turf.
As our witnesses have stated, the U.S. delegation can expect to be
surveilled.
We also know that China's priorities--particularly its push for
international spectrum and satellite rules--are aimed at hindering
American leadership.
Combatting China's home-court advantage requires even more
preparation and coordination than ever before. Given the challenges to
negotiating with partners on the ground, we need to build a strong
coalition well ahead of the conference.
Question 1. How does hosting the conference in Shanghai give China
an advantage on policy outcomes?
Answer. As host of the conference, it is expected that a Chinese
official will be the conference chair. Although any chair is expected
to oversee the conference in a fair and unbiased manner, he or she has
significant influence over some elements of the process.
Question 2. What can the United States and our allies do now to
prepare for Shanghai?
Answer. The United States working with allies and ITU leadership
needs to convey clear expectations to the Chinese government of
unbiased management of the conference proceedings. During the
conference itself, U.S. leadership and the entire delegation should be
prepared to monitor the process closely and raise any concerns
immediately with the chair and ITU leadership together with likeminded
partners. In addition, the U.S. government should act quickly to decide
what positions it is going to take on key issues and work to advance
those positions with like-minded governments well in advance of the
conference. Quickly appointing the U.S. head of delegation is also
crucial.
U.S. Candidates for ITU Leadership. Strong leadership at the
International Telecommunication Union also puts the United States at an
advantage globally. We are fortunate that Doreen Bogdan-Martin, an
American, has represented the U.S. as Secretary-General of the ITU
since 2022. ITU member states will hold an election for Secretary-
General at their plenipotentiary this November. I support Secretary-
General Bogdan-Martin's reelection this fall.
Another American, Jennifer Warren, is nominated to serve on the
Radio Regulations Board. We should do what we can to support both
candidates because American leadership in these institutions matters.
Question 1. How important is it for Americans to be engaged with
and hold positions within the ITU?
Answer. U.S. leadership in the ITU is crucial to U.S. technological
competitiveness, economic prosperity, and national security. Secretary
General Bogdan Martin has made important progress in increasing the
transparency of ITU, improving its fiscal health, and making its
management more efficient after eight years of leadership by a Chinese
national. She has helped to keep the organization focused on its
mandate and core competencies. Another term will help her further
deepen these reforms.
The United States has not been represented on the Radio Regulations
Board (RRB) for the last eight years. This is a gap that should be
corrected as quickly as possible. Jennifer Warren is highly qualified
and respected among ITU members. She will make a strong addition to the
RRB. We should also prioritize U.S. re-election as a member of the ITU
Council.
Spectrum Leadership. The United States dedicated the 6 gigahertz
band to unlicensed wireless--including the next-generation of Wi-Fi--in
2020. Since that time, we have seen faster speeds and the emergence of
a whole new wireless ecosystem, driven by companies right here in the
U.S. and our allies.
In WRC-23, the U.S. and our allies successfully beat back Chinese
attempts to force the whole world to reallocate this band to licensed
high-power spectrum, which would benefit Huawei with the largest
installed base of equipment in the 6 gigahertz band. But we know that
China will make another run at redesignating the 6 gigahertz band for
high-power licensed use.
Question 1. What will it mean for U.S. leadership if China is
successful in moving the 6 gigahertz band to high-power licensed use?
Answer. Licensed and unlicensed spectrum are both critical to U.S.
national security, economic prosperity, and technological
competitiveness. The United States has allocated the 6GHz band for
unlicensed use and advocated for that use at WRC-23. It would be unwise
and probably impossible to change that position now. We should instead
focus on identifying other bands, such as the 4GHz and 7GHz bands, for
licensed use, which will reduce international pressure for licensed use
in the 6GHz band as China has advocated. Chinese success in promoting
its approach would be harmful to U.S. industry and technological
leadership.
Question 2. Are there other bands you are concerned about where an
adverse decision could hinder the U.S.'s ability to innovate?
Answer. U.S. agencies are currently working hard to develop U.S.
positions and priorities for WRC-27. I believe that process will be
successful in identifying the bands that should be top concerns for
U.S. interests. But those decisions need to be made quickly. Delay
simply sidelines us.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Ambassador (ret.) Stephan A. Lang
Advancing our priorities at the World Radio Conference in 2027 will
require both a well-funded and expert-led U.S. delegation and a
comprehensive diplomatic strategy to engage our allies and partners.
Question 1. Where is the U.S. government in assembling the team to
lead the U.S. delegation at the conference, and what additional
resources are needed to ensure the U.S. delegation is ready for the
Conference next year?
Answer. I am unable to confirm details of the U.S. government's
effort to assemble its leadership team for the WRC-27 delegation.
However, it should select and announce the head of delegation as soon
as possible and hire or reassign personnel to fill any vacancies on the
interagency team soon. They will need resources to make sure there is a
sufficient U.S. government presence in the delegation in Shanghai and
to fund travel for diplomatic engagement ahead of the conference. I
also recommend that the United States host a spectrum summit to engage
global partners in advance of the conference. That event should be well
resourced to succeed.
Question 2. What should the U.S. diplomatic strategy to prepare for
the conference entail?
Answer. The U.S. diplomatic strategy for WRC-27 should include
global engagement through our embassies overseas, U.S. delegation
leadership participation in all WRC regional preparatory meetings, and
bilateral visits by delegation leadership to key partner countries. The
United States should also consider hosting a global spectrum summit
event in the United States for foreign partners in advance of the WRC.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to
Dr. James A. Lewis
Question 1. Satellite services will be a big part of the agenda at
WRC-27, and they are also a major driver of the U.S. space economy. To
support the FCC's proposed satellite licensing reforms, this Committee
passed the Satellite and Telecommunications (SAT) Streamlining Act,
which would modernize and speed up the FCC's process by setting clear
deadlines for decisions and providing needed clarity for applicants and
commercial satellite investment.
Will these regulatory improvements--that provide a timely and
transparent licensing regime at home--give U.S. negotiators stronger
standing to push for international rules at WRC that both protect
critical satellite spectrum users and allow new satellite services to
deploy quickly?
Answer. China wants to present its state-directed, licensed model
as the most efficient way to manage 6G and satellite interference. The
domestic regulatory improvements proposed in the Satellite and
Telecommunications (SAT) Streamlining Act should strengthen the U.S.
position at the WRC. Streamlining domestic regulations can create
leverage. The SAT Act requires the FCC to define clear technical
qualifications and interference standards, U.S. negotiators can present
these data-driven standards at WRC to prevent foreign competitors from
asserting vague interference concerns as a tool to block U.S.
commercial interests.
The SAT Act also directs FCC, NTIA, and State Department to work
together to reduce foreign barriers. At WRC-27, where much of the
agenda is expected to be space-related, this can strengthen a defense
against efforts by competitors to impose restrictive global
regulations. It could undercut U.S. arguments on efficiency if the
domestic regulatory process is seen as a bottleneck.
Having clear technical standards are invaluable in WRC
negotiations. Adversaries can use technical uncertainty as a diplomatic
tactic and argue that new U.S. satellite constellations might interfere
with their telecom services. By having the FCC codify precise
interference criteria, U.S. negotiators gain an advantage. If the FCC
sets a clear standard for how a 1,000-satellite constellation must
coordinate with existing geostationary (GSO) satellites, other nations
(especially ``swing voters'' in the Global South) are more likely to
adopt those same standards.
Question 2. In the past, U.S. delegations have sometimes been seen
as divided, which weakens our influence, especially when individual
delegates or U.S. companies advocate positions that conflict with the
U.S. position. How should the delegation leader maintain a unified U.S.
position among the delegation, and what should the leader do if a U.S.
delegate or company representative works behind the scenes with a
foreign delegation to advocate against or undermine the U.S. position?
a. Should such delegates be ejected and sent home? Please explain.
Answer. While U.S. delegations have sometimes been divided (as in
WRC-19) and weakened U.S. influence, there appear to be fewer
substantive dispute facing the U.S. for WRC27. Delegation management
should be left to the head of del (the WRC Ambassador) and his position
can be reinforced by the committee signaling strong support for unity
behind the agreed positions before negotiations start. Participating on
the WRC delegation is not a right but a privilege and coming on board
entail accepting the need to support all agreed U.S. positions or
leave. The key is to strengthen and support the U.S. WRC Ambassador.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Dr. James A. Lewis
International Cooperation. We have heard from our witnesses that
preparation is critical to secure the U.S. policy position going into
WRC-27. We know that China and Russia will be prepared. So we must work
with our allies to build coalitions to advance shared priorities.
Yet foreign policy decisions from the current administration have
distanced us from our allied partners, not brought them closer. And
that's putting China at an advantage.
Earlier this month, a Politico poll of our closest allies showed
that people in these countries see more trust and dependability with
China than the U.S. under President Trump. A majority of respondents
from Canada, Germany, France, and the U.K. agreed with the statement
that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has
become harder to depend on. And more troubling is that respondents from
these nations believe that China has the most advanced technology--not
the U.S.
This should be a wake-up call. The U.S. relationship with our
allies has soured, and this administration should work to repair them
so that we continue the United States' leadership on technology.
Question 1. Mr. Lewis, how are the Trump Administration's foreign
policies shaping U.S. preparations for WRC-27?
Answer. The U.S. would not win any popularity contests at the
moment, but fortunately, the WRC is a long way off. When it begins,
three issues will shape the global reception for the U.S. at the WRC.
First, if there is an acceptable outcome to the Iran conflict, which
currently is unpopular in many countries, the U.S. position will
improve. If the conflict ends in a timely and tolerable manner, its
effect will be limited. It is not like Iran has a lot of friends.
Second, China remains unpopular because of a lack of trust in many
countries in its technology and intentions. While Chinese technology
can be as good as western technology and is often cheaper, countries
realize that this lower price comes with a cost. Third, we can rely on
countries to vote based on self-interest, so if the U.S. can create a
compelling case for its spectrum positions that serves both its
interests and those of other countries, it should be able to overcome
the difficulties created by foreign policy and win support for its
proposals.
Concerns About China. By a single vote, China won the right to host
the WRC in 2027 in Shanghai. That means not only will a Chinese
official chair the conference, but it will literally be on their turf.
As our witnesses have stated, the U.S. delegation can expect to be
surveilled.
We also know that China's priorities--particularly its push for
international spectrum and satellite rules--are aimed at hindering
American leadership.
Combatting China's home-court advantage requires even more
preparation and coordination than ever before. Given the challenges to
negotiating with partners on the ground, we need to build a strong
coalition well ahead of the conference.
Question 1. How does hosting the conference in Shanghai give China
an advantage on policy outcomes?
Answer. Hosting the WRC in Shanghai gives China an advantage in
being able to manage the agenda and to chair meetings. The Chair wields
significant influence in structuring the work, appointment of the
Chairs of the Working Groups and Sub-Working Groups. These ``leads''
are critical because they facilitate the consensus required to move an
item back up to the Plenary, and eh creation of Ad Hoc Groups. China
also gains an intelligence advantage as delegations will be more
vulnerable to technical collection and other intelligence activities in
Shanghai, given China's pervasive surveillance. Chairing the WRC does
not guarantee success for China, but it certainly gives it an edge.
Question 2. What can the United States and our allies do now to
prepare for Shanghai?
Answer. The timely adoption by the U.S. government of U.S.
positions is crucial. The lens through which the U.S. should look at
its positions in the WRC is to come up with positions that addresses
both licensed and unlicensed spectrum in ways that will be appealing to
potential partners. U.S. spectrum allocations are themselves unique in
the amount of spectrum allocated to government use and to unlicensed
spectrum. This need not be an insurmountable obstacle. The decisions on
allocations in PL 119-21and NSPM-8 helps address this, and developing a
package that combines proposals for both licensed and unlicensed
spectrum designed to balance protecting U.S. interests with winning
global support would help counter China.
Spectrum Leadership. The United States dedicated the 6 gigahertz
band to unlicensed wireless--including the next-generation of Wi-Fi--in
2020. Since that time, we have seen faster speeds and the emergence of
a whole new wireless ecosystem, driven by companies right here in the
U.S. and our allies.
In WRC-23, the U.S. and our allies successfully beat back Chinese
attempts to force the whole world to reallocate this band to licensed
high-power spectrum, which would benefit Huawei with the largest
installed base of equipment in the 6 gigahertz band. But we know that
China will make another run at redesignating the 6 gigahertz band for
high-power licensed use.
Question 1. What will it mean for U.S. leadership if China is
successful in moving the 6 gigahertz band to high-power licensed use?
Answer. If China is successful in moving the 6 gigahertz band to
high-power licensed use, it would gain commercial and technological
advantage. By designating this spectrum for 5G and 6G mobile
infrastructure, China aims to establish a global standard that favors
its state-directed, centralized telecommunications model, which
prioritizes licensed cellular infrastructure.
The 6 GHz band contiguous bandwidth allows for higher speeds while
maintaining superior propagation characteristics. These frequencies
provide a balance of data throughput and signal reliability and are
vital for the millisecond-level responsiveness required in robotics and
smart manufacturing. A favorable regulatory framework would allow China
to shape the hardware and software protocols for autonomous systems.
Question 2. Are there other bands you are concerned about where an
adverse decision could hinder the U.S.'s ability to innovate?
Answer. Beyond the 6 GHz band, the 7-8 GHz range (7.125-8.4 GHz)
represents the next frontier for 6G leadership. China and other nations
want this for high-power licensed mobile services, while the U.S.
currently utilizes these frequencies for Federal systems, including
military radar and satellite operations. A decision at WRC-27 that
favors a global International Mobile Telecommunications (licensed
mobile) framework could create a dilemma for the U.S.: either undergo
an expensive and disruptive ``clearing'' of Federal users or risk
international isolation where American 6G hardware is incompatible with
global markets.
Additionally, the ability to innovate in autonomous systems and
``Physical AI'' using the mid-band (4.4-4.8 GHz) and higher-frequency
(15 GHz) ranges could be affected. These bands are vital for the high-
capacity, low-latency links required for smart manufacturing and
robotics. U.S. leadership in space-based connectivity could also face a
challenge in satellite-to-device bands (694 MHz--2.7 GHz). While
American companies like SpaceX currently lead in direct-to-cell
technology, adversaries at WRC-27 may push for restrictive interference
rules designed to protect geostationary satellites. Such regulations
could limit capacity for U.S. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations,
hindering the ability of American firms to scale their networks, harm
commercial competitiveness and weaken Western telecommunications and
defense networks.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Cynthia Lummis to
Michael Calabrese
1. Agenda Items 1.13 and 1.14 address satellite direct-to-device
(D2D) services, with 1.13 proposing to adopt globally the framework the
FCC approved in 2024, and 1.14 opening the door to additional globally
harmonized Mobile Satellite Service spectrum for less constrained D2D
operations. The U.S. has a clear first-mover advantage in D2D
technology and related regulatory framework.
Question. What is the United States doing to successfully create a
globally harmonized D2D framework?
Answer. The U.S. leads the world by far in D2D deployment and
innovation thanks to both forward-looking regulation by the FCC and our
world-leading Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite industry. The U.S. should
certainly support these two Agenda items, both because more ubiquitous
connectivity for smartphones is very beneficial for consumers, but also
because America's world-leading LEO satellite operators (Starlink and
soon Amazon Leo) will have a natural commercial advantage in global
markets as this innovation in ubiquitous connectivity surges.
Agenda Item 1.13 at WRC-27 proposes to adopt globally the same
basic Supplemental Communications from Space (SCS) framework the FCC
approved in 2024 to authorize D2D mobile services to operate, in
partnership with terrestrial mobile carriers, where there is no mobile
coverage in specified terrestrial mobile bands. This form of D2D
connectivity from satellites to consumer smartphones and other devices
is very constrained, since it relies entirely on exclusively licensed
cellular bands and limited to areas where the terrestrial licensees are
not providing service. One caveat, though, is that the U.S. should
oppose efforts by some terrestrial mobile interests to impose an overly
strict protection threshold (-6 dBm I/N) that would require huge keep-
out zones around national borders. This would virtually exclude D2D
service where nations share many borders, such as in Central America,
West Africa and East Asia. It could also create big coverage gaps all
along our borders with Canada and Mexico.
Agenda Item 1.14 is, in our view, the more consequential item since
it would potentially designate more globally-allocated Mobile Satellite
Service (MSS) spectrum for D2D services that are unconstrained by the
need to protect co-channel terrestrial mobile operations, or to work
exclusively with a single mobile carrier. It opens the door to
potentially globally-harmonized, MSS spectrum that can be used by
satellite providers on a significantly less constrained basis to
innovate and provide more commercially available direct-to-device
mobile connectivity to consumers. The partnership between U.S.-based
Globalstar and Apple that enables texting between new iPhones anywhere
on Earth is an example. Another more robust example is the Direct to
Cell service that SpaceX reportedly has in mind--trademarked Starlink
Mobile--initially using the 65 megahertz of mostly global MSS spectrum
purchased from EchoStar late last year. Allocating more lower mid-band
spectrum for MSS is a pro-innovation and pro-consumer position that the
U.S. should prioritize at WRC-27.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Michael Calabrese
International Cooperation. We have heard from our witnesses that
preparation is critical to secure the U.S. policy position going into
WRC-27. We know that China and Russia will be prepared. So we must work
with our allies to build coalitions to advance shared priorities.
Yet foreign policy decisions from the current administration have
distanced us from our allied partners, not brought them closer. And
that's putting China at an advantage.
Earlier this month, a Politico poll of our closest allies showed
that people in these countries see more trust and dependability with
China than the U.S. under President Trump. A majority of respondents
from Canada, Germany, France, and the U.K. agreed with the statement
that any attempts to get closer to China are because the U.S. has
become harder to depend on. And more troubling is that respondents from
these nations believe that China has the most advanced technology--not
the U.S.
This should be a wake-up call. The U.S. relationship with our
allies has soured, and this administration should work to repair them
so that we continue the United States' leadership on technology.
Question 1. Mr. Calabrese, what are the consequences to U.S.
spectrum policy if we do not go into WRC-27 with a strong coalition?
Answer. The ITU process can be as much about larger political
alignments and grievances as it is about good telecommunications
policy. It is essential that the U.S. build early and solid coalitions
in support of our priority agenda items, first within CITEL (Region 2)
and then more broadly.
Unfortunately, recent developments are creating a far more daunting
diplomatic playing field. The 11 emerging market countries that
comprise the BRICS group appear to be coordinating economic and
diplomatic efforts more closely than just a few years ago. In addition,
the current Administration's widespread imposition of tariffs, the
impact of the current U.S./Israeli attacks in the Middle East, as well
as both actual and threatened military interventions in our own region
and more widely, are likely to create additional obstacles to
persuading many countries to publicly support U.S. interests on issues
such as space-based services.
Without strong coalitions, the specific impact on spectrum policy
will negatively impact both world-leading U.S. companies and our
economy more broadly with respect to Wi-Fi and Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
satellites in particular.
Concerning satellite policy, at least 80 percent of the current
agenda for WRC-27 will impact LEO satellite operations, a rapidly
growing industry that will be dominated by U.S. companies for the
foreseeable future. Many nations, including traditional allies, have a
perceived self-interest in slowing down American LEO satellite
companies such as SpaceX and Amazon LEO. Many nations also continue to
prioritize protecting incumbent GSO operators and services that they
perceive as threatened by U.S. proposals to increase the relative
spectrum access and power levels authorized for the rapidly
proliferating constellations in LEO. While the FCC can continue on its
current path to modernize satellite rules over U.S. skies, because
satellite spectrum is allocated globally--and profitable LEO satellite
services often depend on global revenue and performance--the U.S. must
make it a priority to achieve globally harmonized changes in satellite
policy that accommodate the rapid growth and technological improvements
in LEO satellite coverage, capacity and performance.
Concerning Wi-Fi, a technology the U.S. invented and an industry
American companies dominate (particularly for enterprise Wi-Fi), China
is clearly attempting to undermine larger and harmonized markets for
next generation Wi-Fi 6E, 7 and 8. This was evident at WRC-23, where
China tried but failed to have the upper 6 GHz band identified globally
for IMT--a band the U.S., Canada and most Region 2 nations had already
authorized for unlicensed use and Wi-Fi.
At WRC-27, as I explained in my written testimony, Item 1.7 seeks
to foreclose the expansion of spectrum access for next generation Wi-Fi
in the 7 GHz band immediately above the top of our current unlicensed 6
GHz band. This item would identify the entire 7.125-8.4 GHz frequency
range to IMT, which excludes Wi-Fi, in the Americas and in Asia (Region
3), while making no change in Region 1 (Europe, Middle East and
Africa). This change would not only be contrary to U.S. law--the OBBBA
last July specifically excluded IMT from 7.4-8.4 GHz for national
security reasons--but it also seeks to block countries in Region 2 and
3 from allocating a portion of the 7 GHz band for unlicensed and Wi-Fi
use. That is in China's interest, promoting its dominant (and
subsidized) mobile cellular equipment makers, but it harms the U.S.-led
Wi-Fi industry. It also potentially harms U.S. consumers if it manages
to further fragment future markets for Wi-Fi access points, chips,
routers and other inputs.
Concerns About China. By a single vote, China won the right to host
the WRC in 2027 in Shanghai. That means not only will a Chinese
official chair the conference, but it will literally be on their turf.
As our witnesses have stated, the U.S. delegation can expect to be
surveilled. We also know that China's priorities--particularly its push
for international spectrum and satellite rules--are aimed at hindering
American leadership.
Combatting China's home-court advantage requires even more
preparation and coordination than ever before. Given the challenges to
negotiating with partners on the ground, we need to build a strong
coalition well ahead of the conference.
Question 1. How does hosting the conference in Shanghai give China
an advantage on policy outcomes?
Answer. By tradition, the country hosting a WRC serves as its
chair. The chair can effectively control the floor, the agenda
sequencing, the recognition of delegations to speak, as well as
influence what procedural motions succeed and decisions about whether
``consensus'' has been reached. Since the WRC operates primarily by
consensus rather than formal votes, these can amount to substantial and
ultimately substantive advantages. Exacerbating all of this, as
discussed the hearing, is that surveillance will be endemic both within
the conference venue and even in the hotels and social settings.
Question 2. What can the United States and our allies do now to
prepare for Shanghai?
Answer. The ITU negotiates an agreement with the host country that
governs facilities, security, communications infrastructure, and
support services. The U.S. and its allies should agree on restrictions
and mitigations--particularly concerning secure communication,
surveillance and cybersecurity--that could potentially mitigate
expected threats. Early and continued pressure on every aspect of the
host-country agreement should be pursued in tandem with our willing
allies both in CITEL and more broadly. Finally, as a consensus among
the witnesses emphasized, strong delegation leadership should be
appointed as soon as possible and begin high-level diplomatic
engagement. A U.S.-hosted spectrum summit is one other preparatory
measure that should be considered as a means of accelerating U.S.
coalition building.
Spectrum Leadership. The United States dedicated the 6 gigahertz
band to unlicensed wireless--including the next-generation of Wi-Fi--in
2020. Since that time, we have seen faster speeds and the emergence of
a whole new wireless ecosystem, driven by companies right here in the
U.S. and our allies.
In WRC-23, the U.S. and our allies successfully beat back Chinese
attempts to force the whole world to reallocate this band to licensed
high-power spectrum, which would benefit Huawei with the largest
installed base of equipment in the 6 gigahertz band. But we know that
China will make another run at redesignating the 6 gigahertz band for
high-power licensed use.
Question 1. What will it mean for U.S. leadership if China is
successful in moving the 6 gigahertz band to high-power licensed use?
Answer. We should expect to China to double down on its ongoing
efforts to undermine global harmonization of Wi-Fi in the upper 6 GHz.
The U.S., Canada and most of Region 2 has allocated 1,200 megahertz up
to 7.125 GHz for unlicensed shared use. But with much of the world
undecided about using 6.425 to 7.125 GHz for Wi-Fi, for IMT, or for a
combination of the two, WRC-27 is an opportunity for China to lobby
more nations to exempt themselves from the current and flexible
``MOBILE'' allocation decided in 2023. China will push more countries
to opt for IMT (which excludes Wi-Fi) via footnote modifications to the
international regulations. If more nations jump into IMT footnotes, the
outcome will be expanded markets for China's globally-dominant cellular
equipment makers (Huawei and ZTE) and diminished markets for U.S.
companies that dominate enterprise Wi-Fi (Cisco, HPE) and chips
(Broadcom, Qualcomm).
Question 2. Are there other bands you are concerned about where an
adverse decision could hinder the U.S.'s ability to innovate?
Answer. Yes. In addition to Agenda Item 1.7, concerning the Chinese
effort to foreclose Wi-Fi from 7 GHz band above 7.125 GHz in Regions 2
and 3 (discussed above), there will be important decisions concerning
spectrum access and coexistence rules for LEO satellite operations that
are vital to our world-leading and rapidly growing satellite and space
industries.
One of these is Agenda Item 1.14, which supports allocating
additional Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) spectrum to facilitate
satellite direct-to-device services, or D2D, by which LEO satellites
can directly enable 3G and even 4G levels of connectivity on consumer
handsets, vehicles and enterprise IoT networks in any location
regardless of terrestrial mobile coverage. Another is Agenda Item 1.3,
which proposes an additional thousand megahertz of satellite spectrum
(51.4--52.4 GHz) to support NGSO earth station gateways that provide
Internet backhaul for fixed satellite broadband and other services.
The most important satellite spectrum issue for the U.S. is not
even on the formal agenda yet, but it could be and should be. This
concerns the ITU rules that govern spectrum sharing between the
traditional geostationary satellites (GSOs) and the increasingly
prevalent LEO and other non-geostationary satellites (NGSOs). Outdated
ITU sharing rules include strict power limits (``equivalent power flux
density,'' or EPFD, limits) that needlessly reduce LEO satellite power,
capacity and operational performance. At its April 30 meeting, the FCC
is scheduled to vote on an Order overhauling this antiquated GSO/NGSO
sharing framework that will apply only over U.S. skies and not
globally. Under a standing WRC agenda item, the results of coexistence
studies authorized at WRC-23 could lead to a recommendation to adopt at
least incremental changes. The U.S. should prioritize this issue and
submit it to CITEL with the goal of developing a regional proposal to
be voted on at WRC-27 that is as similar as possible to the FCC's new
sharing framework.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Michael Calabrese
1. While each country maintains the right to govern its own
telecommunications policy, they must coordinate with surrounding
countries to prevent signal interference at borders. In Minnesota we
are very familiar with working with our Canadian neighbors on border
issues, and spectrum is no exception.
Question. What has historically been included in agreements the
U.S. has had with border countries with respect to telecommunications
signals, and why are these agreements so important?
Answer. One purpose of the ITU and the treaty-level decisions made
at its quadrennial World Radio Conference is to adopt rules that
harmonize spectrum allocations, promote coexistence, and minimize
cross-border interference. On top of that baseline, individual nations,
such as the U.S. and Canada, can then more readily engage in bilateral
consultations that go considerably further in addressing the practical
realities of geography, population density, and other factors. The
Canada-United States Spectrum Management Arrangement is the principal
instrument governing U.S.-Canada spectrum coordination, evolving
through ongoing consultations and negotiations since the 1960s.
The agreements typically incorporate the technical parameters
needed to minimize cross-border interference, including: power limits
and antenna orientation requirements, propagation models and
interference calculation methodologies, TV and radio channel allotment
plans, satellite earth station coordination, geographic and out of band
emission limits for mobile and fixed wireless operators, as well as
coordination procedures and timelines to resolve and, if necessary,
escalate disputes.
Optimizing coexistence and avoiding harmful interference between
U.S. and Canadian operations is important not just for commercial
wireless services, but for public safety (e.g., first responders), for
national security, and for mutually promoting technological advances
and innovation. Minnesota shares a border with Manitoba and Ontario,
where U.S./Canada coexistence includes FM radio coordination (both
states and provinces have stations near the border), cellular and LTE/
5G coordination in multiple bands, public safety interoperability for
cross-border emergency response, and agricultural and transportation
uses of GPS, MSS and other satellite services.
A recent very important example of the generally collegial and
successful coordination between the U.S. and Canada is Wi-Fi: Canada's
commercial spectrum regulator (ISED) quickly followed the FCC when it
allocated the full 1,200 megahertz of spectrum between 5.925 and 7.125
GHz for unlicensed sharing and Wi-Fi.
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