[Senate Hearing 119-429]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-429
ARMS CONTROL AND TRANSFORMING
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2026
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-909 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Suzanne Wrasse, Staff Director
Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho.................... 1
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator from New Hampshire............ 3
Witness
DiNanno, Hon. Thomas G., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Thomas G. DiNanno by Senator Cory A. Booker............... 30
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Thomas G. DiNanno by Senator Brian Schatz................. 33
(iii)
ARMS CONTROL AND TRANSFORMING
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2026
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,
Barrasso, Cruz, Scott, Cornyn, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley,
Van Hollen, and Rosen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
The Chairman. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
will come to order. This morning we have an interesting agenda,
and before we do we want to welcome all our guests, the public.
We are glad to have you always. We do have a zero-tolerance
policy for interruptions or attempts to communicate. But other
than that we are glad to have you, glad to have you here, and
glad to have everybody's participation.
I am going to give an opening statement and then yield to
the ranking member who will do so, and then we will hear from
our witness, and after that we will open it up to a round of
questions.
Mr. Under Secretary, thank you so much for being here today
to discuss an incredibly important issue, and that is arms
control. A timely issue given the President's actions in Iran
to address a near-nuclear-capable adversary which one could
argue is indeed arms control.
The military action in the Middle East has highlighted what
the United States must do to protect the American people from
the imminent threat of an adversary and the danger of nuclear
weapons in the wrong hands. As we all know, having nuclear
weapons in the wrong hands is very, very dangerous for the
entire planet.
President Trump is rightly taking care of the Iranian
nuclear capabilities, but as you know, Iran is not the only
country of concern.
We are now, for the first time, in a multipolar nuclear
landscape. It is a landscape where the U.S. is facing two
nuclear near-peer competitors in Russia and China, in addition
to rogue States with nuclear ambitions, which are a very, very
concerning problem.
As you have rightly noted before, we are at an inflection
point, and a changing landscape requires a change in policy.
The expiration of the New START Treaty with Russia was not
just a symbolic milestone. By the way I supported that and
urged the President to terminate. It was the recognition that
we have more than one nuclear threat to the American people,
and nuclear agreements of days gone by no longer meet the needs
of our Nation. If our adversaries are building nuclear
stockpiles, we unfortunately must do so as well.
I know you agree that any future agreement must be
verifiable, enforceable, and inclusive of developing nuclear
powers. A treaty with only Russia will not protect American
interests.
But building this kind of broad nuclear agreement will not
be easy. Russia is a serial treaty violator, and that is
putting it kindly. It has failed to uphold its end of virtually
every treaty that it has signed.
And China too is violating its treaty obligations under the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has the fastest-
growing nuclear arsenal of any nuclear-armed State. This is a
dangerous time, but fortunately we have an Administration that
is up to the task.
President Trump has stated clearly that future arms control
must address both Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals.
And Secretary Rubio has laid out three foundations for any
new arms control agreements that, I think, are spot on and
worth noting here, as are most things Secretary Rubio does.
First, arms control can no longer be a bilateral issue
between the United States and Russia. It must include China to
be even remotely effective.
Second, we will not accept terms that harm the United
States or ignore nations who do not follow through on
agreements in the pursuit of a future agreement. It is
pointless. Listen up, Russia.
And third, we will always negotiate from a position of
strength. We are the United States of America, and we will act
like it.
We need a credible, modernized nuclear program that deters
our enemies from ever trying to intimidate us with their own
nuclear weapons. But we need to do this while ``pursuing all
avenues to fulfill the President's genuine desire for a world
with fewer of these awful weapons,'' as the Secretary has
noted.
Early in this Administration, President Trump directed a
landmark transformation of the State Department to reduce
bureaucracy and structural inefficiencies that got in the way
of effective foreign policy. The organization you lead is now
able to align arms control, security assistance, emerging
threats, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics policies all
under one roof to support America's national interests.
As the inaugural Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, I hope that you will use this
opportunity to provide this committee with an update on the
reorganization and the state of our nuclear programs and
negotiations, as much as can be done in an open setting.
Thank you for your service and that of your family.
And I will now turn it over to the ranking member, Senator
Shaheen. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome Under
Secretary DiNanno. Now that I know about your history, I will
consider you an honorary Granite stater. So, we are delighted
to welcome you to the hearing today.
Last Thursday, almost 3 weeks into this war against Iran,
the administration pushed through more than $16 billion in arms
sales to the Middle East, and they did that by using emergency
authority to bypass normal congressional review. What we know
is that our Gulf partners are burning through interceptors at a
staggering rate, using in a day what the United States produces
in a year. We met with a number of our Gulf partners last week
and heard that they are concerned about the availability of
munitions.
This is an emergency with respect to our munitions and
weapons, I believe. And I think it is one driven by a lack of
planning and a clear strategy. The United States is running
through munitions as well here at home. In some cases, we have
only about a quarter of the interceptors we need. I have been
in briefings, and it is still not clear what the end goal of
the war in Iran is. Without a clear end goal, we are making
real tradeoffs about where our resources go.
We have seen these tradeoffs are already showing up in
Ukraine, where it continues to adapt and is currently advancing
against Russian forces. But U.S. support has become less
predictable, and allies are increasingly stepping in to
purchase or backfill American-made arms.
According to Ukrainian officials, over 80 percent of their
strikes are now carried out by drones. The battlefield is
moving toward autonomous systems and drone swarms. In fact,
Senator Kaine and I just were in a hearing that was classified,
but is going to become open, but it was about how we are
developing some of those developmental munitions, which are
what we have been seeing in Ukraine, and among our adversaries
in Iran, from Russia, from China. But unfortunately, the
support that we have in the U.S. is not keeping pace.
And it does not stop with Ukraine. The broader security
environment is becoming more dangerous. Russia is expanding and
modernizing its nuclear capabilities. As we know, the Chairman
alluded to the New START Treaty that has been suspended and
that ends inspections and provides increasing uncertainty.
Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, moving
them closer to NATO and raising the risks. And we are hearing
from a number of our NATO partners who are very concerned that
within the next 5 years Russia intends to advance on a NATO
country. It is also testing new underwater nuclear systems that
are harder to track and control.
At the same time, China is also rapidly expanding its
nuclear capabilities. It is constructing more than 300 new
missile silos, and it is growing its arsenal with little
transparency and outside any arms control framework.
And at the same time, the arms control framework that has
helped manage these risks is breaking down. Talks on future
arms control arrangements have stalled.
There is broad agreement that a multilateral approach that
includes Russia and China is best. But, as we know, that is not
viable right now. And China has consistently opposed joining
such negotiations. In practice, that gives China an effective
veto over progress that we could make with Russia and on other
fronts. Waiting for perfect conditions while things are moving
in the wrong direction is not a plan.
Mr. DiNanno, the Bureau of Arms Control and International
Security has gone through a major reorganization that was
supposed to bring clarity and focus. I hope we will hear this
morning how you are approaching this and what is guiding your
decisions.
I look forward to hearing your perspective. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now, Mr.
DiNanno, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS G. DINANNO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. DiNanno. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify before you today. I am honored to be the first
Under Secretary appointed to lead what is known as the new and
expanded ``T'' family since the State Department was
reorganized in July 2025.
The reorganization consolidated the Department's
international security functions, expanding the ``T'' family
from three to five bureaus, and assigned three offices to our
broad portfolio. I serve as the Senior Advisor to the President
and Secretary of State for U.S. policies on nonproliferation,
arms control, and international security. Our team works on
critical national security matters, ranging from preventing the
proliferations of weapons of mass destruction to countering
terrorism and international narcotics to approving arms sales
and security assistance to U.S. partners and allies worldwide.
When I was before you as a nominee, almost a year ago, I
committed to seeking verifiable and enforceable arms control
agreements that enhance America's national security. I have
used each day of my first months as the Under Secretary to
advance that very goal.
Perhaps less publicly known than other State Department
roles are the vast responsibilities that fall under the Office
of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security. We oversee nuclear, chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons issues, export controls, sanctions
enforcement, and treaty verification. We drive interagency
policy processes, coordinate closely with the War Department
and other Federal agencies, and represent the United States in
bilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings, including the
critical trilateral AUKUS arrangement.
``T'' family personnel largely consist of civil service
experts. Our staff possess deep knowledge, and technical
competencies that are relevant to a vast range of international
security concerns. We leverage our inhouse expertise of
technologists, like seismologists, nuclear physicists, counter-
drone experts, and aviation experts, to fulfill an extensive
array of ``T'' family responsibilities. We also negotiate,
implement, and rigorously verify an array of international arms
control and disarmament agreements on behalf of the Secretary
of State and President Trump.
One such treaty at the top of many minds is New START,
which expired last month. The Treaty was ineffective and only
constrained the United States, allowing Russia to build and
maintain a vast theater-ranged nuclear arsenal. New START was a
bilateral treaty that had no impact on the nuclear weapons
programs in China or any other States. New START no longer
served the national interest of the United States, and its
expiration opened up a new era for us to pursue President
Trump's vision for an improved and modernized agreement.
Although the work of our team may often be invisible to the
public, our wide-ranging responsibilities are essential to
keeping Americans safe at home and abroad. I will share just a
couple of quick examples with you.
In January, members of our Emerging Threats Bureau traveled
to Antarctica to inspect foreign research stations and to
verify the absence of any military activity associated with the
Antarctic Treaty system. Our Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement operates a high-value rewards program that
offers financial incentives and information, bringing major
criminals, corrupt officials, and transnational criminal
networks to justice.
The Counterterrorism Bureau supports Secretary Rubio's
designations of foreign terrorist organizations, including
terrorist actors and cartels, like the Muslim Brotherhood and
Tren de Aragua. Since January, when President Trump took
office, the Counterterrorism Bureau has designated nearly 30
foreign terrorist organizations, including 15 narcoterrorist
cartels.
Another significant ``T'' family office is our Political-
Military Affairs Bureau that has recently cut regulations,
streamlined approval processes, and the number of restricted
government-to-government transfers by over a third, as a part
of the administration's priority to jumpstart the U.S.
industrial base and remove outdated regulations.
Similarly, our AUKUS partnership helps strengthen both U.S.
security and prosperity by securing significant Australian
investments to uplift our submarine industrial base in an
important arrangement with the United Kingdom and Australia.
We work day in and day out to make America safer, more
prosperous, and more secure, by modernizing arms control,
countering adversaries, and protecting America's technological
and military advantages, and we will continue to deliver
measurable results to the American people.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DiNanno follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas G. DiNanno
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members
of this committee--thank you for inviting me to testify before you
today. It is a pleasure to be back in front of this committee, and an
honor to be appearing for the first time as the confirmed Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
When I was before you as the nominee almost a year ago, I committed
to you that as Under Secretary, I would seek verifiable and enforceable
arms control agreements that enhance American national security.
Without those two components of an arms control arrangement--or the
political will to address noncompliance--we are only pursuing the
illusion of security. I committed to advancing agreements that
prioritize U.S. national security, strengthen those that don't, and
reassess our participation in any agreement that constrains the United
States or our interests. Sitting before you today, I can attest that I
am keeping up with my commitments.
Last month, New START expired. That may have been concerning for
some of you, and welcome news to others. The fact of the matter is: the
Treaty was always destined to expire. There was no mechanism within the
Treaty that would have allowed for its extension--the Biden
administration enacted its full extension provision in 2021. But even
if extension was an available option, I still would have come before
you to discuss why New START was no longer in the national interest.
As I stated in my remarks in Geneva last month, New START was a
vestige of a security environment totally disconnected from the
realities of today. Some might even argue that it was already largely
obsolete even when it entered into force back in 2010. Why? Because two
of its greatest flaws--though certainly not its only two--were that it
failed to capture Russia's non-strategic, or theater-range,
capabilities and it failed to account for China's nuclear weapons
program at all. Even when New START was being negotiated, the United
States was at a significant disadvantage with respect to Russia's
theater-range systems; indeed, an intolerable disadvantage. I know some
of you here raised those very concerns when advice and consent for New
START was being debated.
Chairman Risch, I know you understood this challenge and that's why
you introduced an amendment that would have acknowledged the
interrelationship between non-strategic and strategic offensive arms
and that ``the disparity between the Parties' arsenals could undermine
predictability and stability.'' Opponents of your language argued that
New START set the stage for limits on Russia's tactical nuclear
weapons. That argument did not hold up well, as we have seen. But
perhaps New START's expiration now sets the stage to address these
capabilities through clear-eyed talks and negotiations.
Most critically, China used the opportunity of legally binding
U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenal constraints to begin expanding its own
nuclear arsenal at a historic, unprecedented pace. In other words, New
START's inadequacies were compounded by the emergence of a third, near-
peer nuclear rival whose ascendance was enabled by the Treaty itself.
Arms control is only one part of my portfolio, expanded as it was by
this summer's Department re-organization.
Introduction
I have the honor of being the first confirmed Under Secretary for
Arms Control and International Security overseeing the new ``T'' Under
Secretariat, which was reorganized in July 2025 to implement Secretary
Rubio's vision for efficient international security affairs focused on
core national security issues and President Trump's America First
foreign policy. This new portfolio expands what is internally called
the ``T'' Family with two additional bureaus, now totaling five under
my purview, plus three offices. The ``T'' Family reorganization was
designed to unite the State Department's primary security assistance
and security diplomacy functions. It is my goal and challenge to steer
the integration and collaboration of bureau missions, abolish
fragmented efforts, and stimulate innovative approaches to address
multi-dimensional security challenges. This realignment has
strengthened the Department's international security functions. We have
made much progress since this summer's re-organization and will
continue to integrate our operations in the coming months and years.
Whereas the ``T'' Family previously consisted of three bureaus--the
Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS), the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), and the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs (PM), we now have five bureaus: a long
overdue merger of the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus into
the newly established Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
(ACN); the realignment of the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) and the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
into the ``T'' Family; the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as well
as the newly established Bureau of Emerging Threats (ET). There is also
the Office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor, a unified T Family Executive
Office, and a centralized Outreach office focused on congressional,
media, and public relations functions.
While the Department's reorganization was an expansive endeavor, I
believe the new ``T'' Family was one of its most impactful and
strategic transformations. All told, I now oversee ten programs, and
with the support of Congress expect to program almost $9 billion of FY
2025 foreign assistance funding. Including diplomatic engagement
funding, this comes to a combined annual budget of $9.1 billion.
Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Under Secretary Rubio's leadership, the State Department has become
leaner and more efficient, but also better aligned and suited to meet
the challenges of today. In my address to the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva last month, one of my central themes on arms control applies
to what this Administration has sought from its State Department
reorganization. That is the theme of being ``fit for purpose.''
The old State Department was dated and static--designed to address
diplomacy and national security, but sclerotic and slow moving and thus
unable to best address the challenges of today's security environment.
One of the most relevant and important undertakings of the
reorganization was the merger of the ADS and ISN bureaus. It is often
said that disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same
coin. In the old Department, these two bureaus were often at odds with
each other. Today, these functions are integrated, aligned, and
complementary under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Yeaw.
ACN leads the charge in implementing several of President Trump's
executive orders to advance U.S. leadership in nuclear energy, American
airspace security, and drone technology. The bureau makes America more
secure by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
their delivery systems, and destabilizing advanced conventional weapons
and related technologies. ACN protects both our national security and
American industry through robust export controls, expanding the
peaceful use of U.S. nuclear technology with the highest safety,
security and nonproliferation standards, and encouraging international
partners to do more to address malign proliferation threats.
The bureau also spearheads diplomatic efforts to increase global
stability, reduce unintentional escalation, strengthen the enforcement
of international bans on chemical and biological weapons, and implement
the President's call to achieve a better agreement on nuclear arms
control through strategic stability dialogues. The President has been
incredibly clear and consistent on his ultimate objective of a world
with fewer nuclear weapons. The New START treaty was not fit for
purpose for today's security environment and was fundamentally flawed--
particularly as it allowed China's unconstrained, rapid, and opaque
nuclear buildup. ACN will play an important role in the future of
nuclear arms control. Likewise, the President made a clarion call to
action on the biological weapons convention (BWC) during his speech at
the UN in September: in addition to seeking to end the development of
biological weapons, the President called for strengthening the
enforcement of the BWC. Our team in ACN has been working diligently in
the Department and with other agencies to bring these efforts to bear.
In just over six months since the merger, ACN has already achieved
some key successes. We have entered into force one 123 agreement on
civil-nuclear cooperation while completing negotiations with five
additional partners, directly in support of Executive Order 14299. The
bureau has also secured signature of five nuclear cooperation MOUs and
two intergovernmental agreements to advance cooperation with those
partners on civil nuclear power programs. Not only does this help us
ensure that these countries will adhere to our strict standards for
safety, security, and nonproliferation, but the commercial deals these
agreements allow will be lucrative for U.S. nuclear industries and
American workers.
ACN has also helped strengthen and speed up how the United States
vets visas to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive U.S.
technologies. In 2025, such visa denials increased by over 100
percent--mainly for Chinese nationals. We've also issued over 100
demarches to interdict shipments that would aid malign actors in
producing illicit missiles; prevented diversion of hundreds of millions
of dollars of technology and dual-use goods to adversaries; protected
U.S. technology and defense investments from predatory foreign
acquisition--particularly by China; and helped partner countries
establish foreign direct investment screening that aligns with U.S.
national security interests to create a safer environment for American
investment abroad. ACN also worked with our PM bureau to reform
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) licensing policy to make these
regulations easier for U.S. industry to compete globally, while at the
same time, more difficult for adversaries to elude our nonproliferation
objectives.
We are also in the process of engaging with other nuclear weapon
states to advance the President's call for multilateral strategic
stability and arms control. We have already made significant progress
and have garnered widespread praise and support from other countries
for our sound and seminal approach to nuclear arms control. No one can
say that the United States has not made an effort to realize a world
with fewer nuclear weapons and to honor our Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, or NPT, obligation to negotiate in good faith. We need active
and willing partners, and we will continue to use the levers and tools
at our disposal to achieve the President's objective.
As we pursue arms control, we are also strengthening deterrence.
ACN is helping secure Indo-Pacific and European partners' commitment to
increased burdensharing and coordination to strengthen extended
deterrence and deter aggression. It cannot be lost on our allies--or
our adversaries--that the United States will remain committed to our
extended deterrence partners. ACN also is diligently addressing threats
from chemical and biological weapons. We continue seeking ways to
strengthen the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
uphold the norm against chemical weapons use. We aim to help the
organization maintain its credibility while also advancing the mission
to destroy any remnant of the Assad-era chemical weapons program. We
are leading the charge on strengthening enforcement of the BWC and
trying to make the President's vision of an AI verification system for
the treaty a reality--not sometime in the distant future, but in the
very near term. As I said in my nomination hearing: for these arms
control treaties and agreements to be effective, they must be
verifiable and enforceable.
Bureau of Counterterrorism
Secretary Rubio's decision to include the Bureau of Counter
Terrorism in the T family helps the Department break down bureaucratic
silos and prioritize efficient and rapid response to threats. The T
Family can now integrate counterterrorism with related security
functions to coordinate responses to modern threats like terrorism,
proliferation, transnational crime, and malign technology use.
CT delivers security for Americans at home and abroad using the
appropriately expanded tools provided by President Trump's executive
orders. In implementing E.O. 14157 on designating cartels as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and Specially Designated Global
Terrorists (SDGT), for example, CT has contributed to the Department's
designation of 15 new organizations, including Cartel de los Soles,
Tren de Aragua, and Clan del Golfo. These designations enhance the U.S.
government's ability to protect Americans by disrupting cartel
financing, restricting their travel, and enhancing partner law
enforcement's suite of tools. CT also implements the E.O. 14161,
"Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other
National Security and Public Safety Threats,'' to ensure that known and
suspected terrorists are added to the U.S. Terrorist Watchlist and to
share this information with select foreign governments to prevent
attacks before they occur. Broadly speaking, CT urges countries to use
all tools available to deter terrorist groups, such as through
watchlisting and working with law enforcement to detect and deter
material support or terrorist travel.
By leading the Department's efforts to designate Iranian proxies--
including Ansarallah (Houthis) and Iran-aligned militia groups in
Iraq--as FTOs, CT has isolated dangerous actors and strengthened the
maximum pressure campaign against Iran. CT also works with partners to
share information on the activities of these organizations; its
diplomatic outreach has helped secure the EU and Australia's
designations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
globalizing U.S. efforts to deny the IRGC the resources it needs to
operate. CT has leveraged these designations to galvanize additional
political action against Iranian-sponsored threats. It does this, for
example, through Iran-focused technical exchanges with European, Latin
American, and East Asian partners in the Countering Transnational
Terrorism Forum. CT has also trained partners on maritime screening and
interdiction efforts in the Red Sea, countering the Iran threat while
shifting the burden to other concerned partners.
CT's work countering violence and destabilization from terrorists
extends far beyond Iran into all areas of the globe, for example
designating the Lebanese and Sudanese chapters of the Muslim
Brotherhood as FTOs and SDGTs in line with Executive Order 14362. CT
also is leading international engagement on what our partners describe
as a rise in far-left terrorism and extremism and has designated four
Antifa-aligned groups in line with the National Security Presidential
Memorandum 7. As I mentioned on this issue in Budapest last year, we
must stop this destructive cancer before it metastasizes.
To further counter terrorist threats, CT ensures partners and
allies carry their share of the global security burden through new,
highly focused initiatives empowering foreign partners to stop
terrorist travel, disrupt attacks, and protect U.S. citizens and
interests. CT carefully oversees counterterrorism programs to train
foreign law enforcement organizations to disrupt terrorist recruitment,
attacks, transit routes, and apprehensions.
Emerging Threats
U.S. adversaries are developing and deploying advanced technologies
in new and disruptive ways that threaten core American interests.
Previously, the State Department did not anticipate or respond to how
adversaries could weaponize technological changes to undermine U.S.
national security. The Bureau of Emerging Threats (ET) was created to
close this gap and ensure the Department meets the demands of a 21st
century security environment, in line with Secretary Rubio's calls for
the Department to act at the speed of relevance. ET proactively
identifies and addresses emerging threats at the nexus of technology
and national security, leveraging diplomatic tools and interagency
capabilities to counter adversary use of new technologies including in
cyberspace, outer space, and undersea, as well as malicious uses of
artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing.
ET's remit is unbounded in terms of domain, extending from the
entire tech stack to underseas to cyberspace to outer space. On space
security, ET leads diplomatic efforts to mitigate adversarial
weaponization and exploitation of space assets. This includes
countering China's use of space-enabling infrastructure in third
countries--such as in the Western Hemisphere--to provide Beijing with a
security advantage over the United States. ET's work in this domain was
demonstrated by the recent inspection of China's Zhongshan station in
Antarctica to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty, the first
U.S. inspection of Zhongshan since 2012. ET also advances the
administration's priorities under Executive Order 14369, ``Ensuring
American Space Superiority,'' by encouraging allies and partners to
invest in space security and shoulder their fair share of the
collective burden.
On cybersecurity, ET leads the Department's efforts, alongside the
Cyber and Digital Policy Bureau, to protect the United States against
national security threats in cyberspace. In support of the President's
new Cyber Strategy for America, the Bureau employs a proactive posture
in a whole-of-government effort to disrupt, deny, and degrade adversary
cyber aggression using our diplomatic toolkit and the full suite of
U.S. government capabilities. ET also leads the Department in
mitigating AI-related threats to national security--including promoting
American AI security as the international gold standard and imposing
costs on adversaries who engage in malicious behavior with AI systems.
In the undersea domain, ET uses diplomatic tools to disrupt, deter,
and impose costs on adversary threats to critical undersea
infrastructure like subsea cables and pipelines.
Through these and other efforts, ET keeps U.S. foreign policy at
pace with technological change. It shifts the Department from a
reactive posture against adversarial ``Sputnik moments,'' to an
anticipatory, strategic approach toward maintaining and advancing U.S.
global power.
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INL leads the Department's counternarcotics and anti-crime law
enforcement efforts, which are top priorities for President Trump and
Secretary Rubio. Through targeted security assistance, rewards and visa
restrictions, and diplomatic engagement, INL delivers results that
advance the America First agenda by degrading narco-terrorist
organizations, disrupting drugs and crime harming American communities,
and expanding U.S. strategic advantage and access in regions vital to
U.S. national security.
INL enables U.S. and foreign law enforcement to dismantle cartels
by depriving them of illicit proceeds, targeting their operations and
leadership, and facilitating the arrest, prosecution, and extradition
of key members and facilitators. One of INL's most successful tools is
its support to 61 vetted units, where U.S. law enforcement agencies
partner with foreign law enforcement units on operations and
investigations with a U.S. nexus. Over the past year, these INL-
supported vetted units resulted in the prosecution of 22 cartel
operatives in Mexico and the arrest of FTO leaders across the Western
Hemisphere.
INL protects Americans by countering the most significant drug and
crime threats--disrupting U.S.-bound flows of illicit fentanyl,
methamphetamine, and cocaine as well as cyber-enabled crime and
predatory schemes defrauding Americans of billions of dollars annually.
In 2025, INL helicopters in Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru
facilitated the eradication of 44,456 hectares of coca--approximately
two-and-a-half times the size of Washington, D.C.; the seizure of 401
metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base; the destruction of 3,250 drug
laboratories; the incineration of 207 metric tons of precursor
chemicals; the law enforcement missions that resulted in the capture or
neutralization of more than 200 narco-terrorists; and the destruction
of illegal mining equipment responsible for tens of millions of dollars
in annual FTO and transnational criminal organization revenues.
INL ensures the United States is the security partner of choice by
strengthening the border and maritime security of key partners,
enhancing foreign law enforcement cyber capabilities, and providing
trusted U.S. technologies to replace untrusted Chinese-origin
alternatives. For example, in 2025, INL enabled Vietnamese maritime law
enforcement agencies to triple patrols in their exclusive economic zone
in the South China Sea in response to Chinese grey zone activity.
Political-Military Affairs
The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) serves as the
principal link between the Department of State and the Department of
War, advancing U.S. national security objectives through diplomacy,
defense trade, and security assistance. PM advances an America First
foreign policy by safeguarding the homeland and preserving the United
States' technological advantage through rigorous enforcement of export
and acquisition controls, as well as defending U.S. technology from
exploitation, diversion, or misuse. PM leverages security assistance to
enable partners to defend against shared threats and shoulder more of
the operational burden-sharing.
The bureau's work drives American prosperity by cutting
regulations, streamlining acquisitions, and fast-tracking key cases.
This ensures the United States remains a global leader in the national
security innovation base, in line with Executive Orders 14265 and
14268. One of the most consequential reforms in the past year has been
overhauling the list of items restricted to government-to-government
transfers. After a thorough review, PM reduced this list by nearly a
third, from over 125 items to 87, and narrowed controls to only the
most sensitive sub-systems. We also updated our export policy for
advanced Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or UAS, now treating requests for
advanced UAS similarly to manned fighter aircraft to reflect
technological advances and the needs of our partners. These changes
ensure our partners get the capabilities they need to advance our
mutual security objectives while protecting sensitive U.S.
technologies.
PM also co-leads on ``Establishing an America First Arms Transfer
Strategy'' under Executive Order 14383 to align U.S. arms transfers
with national security priorities and revitalize America's defense
industrial base. Supporting over one million American jobs, this work
links national security to economic growth and preserves the
competitive advantages of the defense sector.
Beyond managing arms transfers, PM builds strong security
partnerships and supports peacekeeping operations, aligning U.S.
foreign policy and military strategies to promote global stability and
protect American interests. Following a thorough review of U.S.
security assistance under Executive Order 14169, PM has reprioritized
key programs--including Foreign Military Funding, International
Military Education and Training (IMET), Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining and Related Programs--Conventional Weapons
Destruction (NADRCWD), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)--to advance
the President's America First foreign policy agenda.
AUKUS
The FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act created the Office
of the AUKUS Senior Advisor to lead robust diplomatic, security, and
defense cooperation among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The reorganization has allowed the AUKUS Senior Advisor to
streamline regulatory processes across T bureaus and collaborate more
seamlessly with the T Family. This has allowed the office to more
effectively remove boundaries and red tape to rapidly deliver
capabilities for the warfighter and wins for U.S. business. For
example, the office has worked with the PM bureau to authorize a
blanket Foreign Military Sales Third Party Transfer for the UK and
Australia, expanding the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) exemption's practical use.
AUKUS has gained new momentum under President Trump's leadership
and implementation is progressing rapidly, thereby strengthening the
trilateral partnership as we move ``full steam ahead.'' Last year, the
partnership achieved significant milestones: Australia enabled a U.S.
submarine to receive unexpected repairs before participating in an
exercise, two U.S. submarines conducted maintenance visits in Perth,
and the United Kingdom began its historic first foreign maintenance in
Perth just last month and is increasing its presence in the
IndoPacific.
AUKUS directly supports America's national strategic interests by
strengthening allied deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and enhancing
burden sharing. The office advances several Executive Orders by
supporting the restoration of the U.S. maritime industrial base (E.O.
14269), the modernization of defense innovation (E.O. 14265), and the
improvement of the foreign defense sales system (E.O. 14268). For
example, Australia has transferred $2 billion to uplift our submarine
industrial base, and Australian sailors are now serving on U.S.
submarines and training at U.S. shipyards through Foreign Military
Sales. The Office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor remains steadfast in its
commitment to advancing U.S. leadership, strengthening our alliances,
and ensuring a secure and prosperous future for America and our
partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
The T Family's reorganization and ongoing work directly advance the
National Security Strategy by taking an America First approach to
international security and arms control. We are advancing the
Strategy's call for peace through strength by modernizing our arms
control and nonproliferation efforts, countering adversaries' malign
activities, and ensuring that American technological and military
advantages are protected and expanded. T Family's integrated approach
reflects the Strategy's emphasis on streamlining government and
directing every element of national power on core U.S. interests. The T
Family is delivering measurable results by protecting the homeland,
supporting U.S. industry and innovation, and prioritizing U.S. security
interests worldwide.
As we continue integrating into the new T Family, we will identify
additional ways we can collaborate with other bureaus to align mission
sets and priorities, making the Department more efficient and effective
in implementing the Secretary's vision for a safer, more secure, and
more prosperous America. We will provide strategic and targeted foreign
security assistance that puts U.S. interests first. We will leverage
U.S. leadership to advance our priorities while shifting some of the
costs of these programs from the U.S. taxpayer to our international
partners and will promote reforms in international organizations that
have for too long taken U.S. contributions for granted. We will protect
American technological superiority, economic competitiveness, and
national security. And we will bring about an arms control renaissance
that strengthens and modernizes the international arms control
architecture to ensure it is fit for today's--and the future's--
security environment.
The Chairman. Well, thank you so much. We certainly
appreciate your expertise here and great background on this. I
agree with virtually everything you said, with one exception,
and that is that you said that the New START Treaty did not
restrain any country on the planet. I would disagree with that.
It restrained us. We were the only ones that kept our word
under that agreement, and as we know Russia was just totally
loose under that.
Let me ask this. Obviously, China is a big question mark
here. I do not think anybody would think that they are going to
negotiate until they get peer status with us. Once they develop
and produce enough nuclear material and arsenal, I think at
that point they may be interested in talking. What is your view
on that? Do you think when they get to peer status with us they
will indeed want to sit down and talk?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman. I agree
with you. The New START Treaty only constrained the United
States.
Regarding the Chinese, I think first of all it is important
to point out their international obligation under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Article VI, to engage in disarmament
discussions, and they have refused to do that. We continue to
press them on that.
Regarding the growth of their stockpile, as you said in
your opening statement, we no longer view this as a bilateral
problem. Even the New START number of 1,550 Russian strategic
systems, combined with what is approaching 1,000 warheads, that
2,500 is already an asymmetry between the New START limit that
the United States would be at, under 1,550.
So their incentive to engage with us, No. 1, it is their
obligation, and No. 2, we have to work very closely with the
War Department to understand that we are going to vigorously
compete and modernize our deterrent to try to roll back the
Chinese stockpile.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that. I guess I look a
little further down the road even than that, and that is that I
do not lay awake at night worrying about Russia using a nuclear
weapon, nor for that matter China. Both of them are matured
societies, far enough to know that it is world destruction when
someone presses the button for the first time. What I worry
about are the rogue countries, or even non-State actors, that
have an ambition to get a nuclear weapon and use it. And, of
course, once one is used, who knows what that is going to set
off.
So let's assume, for a minute, the best, and that is that
once China gets to the point where it feels it can sit down and
negotiate and reach a reasonable agreement, and Russia comes to
the table, and the three of us get to a point where we have an
agreement we can live with, what do you think that the
possibilities are or the likelihood that the three of us
together will then look to the other countries that have
nuclear weapons and say, ``Look, the three of us are going to
help police the entire planet's arsenal of nuclear weapons.''
Do you think that is a reasonable possibility to look forward
to in the future?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question. I think it is
certainly a possibility. I mean, I think it is important today
to point out that we do participate in the P5, which is all the
nuclear-weapon States--U.K., France, China, Russia, and the
United States. I think the P5 can be an effective tool. I think
it needs to be more effective and take on some of the
challenges that we have laid out.
And I also think the point that you raise about real
nuclear potential proliferation risks continue. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group, for example, was formulated in 1974, the
Australia Group, MTCR, our existing non-proliferation regimes
are antiquated. They need to be modernized. And I think we have
to recognize that across all nuclear-weapon States. I think
this is also an issue we will discuss at length at the NPT
Review Conference next month. But these are all issues very
much in my mind, and I look forward to working through some of
these issues with you.
The Chairman. I appreciate that. And I guess one of the
reasons that I think as I think is the recent experience we had
where war broke out between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-
armed countries. One of those, Pakistan, the nuclear weapons
are not even controlled by the government. They are controlled
by the military, and that is an absolute recipe for disaster.
Something has got to be done about this. I mean, as I say,
we look over the fence, we look at Russia, we look at China,
but those are not nearly as big a threat, I think, to the
planet as are the rogue actors. Your thoughts?
Mr. DiNanno. Regarding India and Pakistan, look, there are
a lot of issues. Our approach, as we laid out, as the President
laid out, is broadly multilateral. It is an evolution from the
trilateral approach of the prior Trump administration. And
certainly, we would welcome discussions with both India and
Pakistan. There are safety and reliability issues. There is
lots for us to talk about, again, outside of the non-
proliferation framework. So I think it is important we engage
both countries, to your point, sir.
The Chairman. Well, I agree with that, and the President
agrees with that. You noticed when that war broke out both he
and the Secretary waded into that really, really quickly, and
were instrumental in bringing that to an end very quickly. And
they recognize the dangers that countries like this have, that
possess nuclear weapons, particularly if two of them get into
it with each other.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
certainly agree with you that the threat, the more alarming
threat, is probably from non-State actors and from countries
that have not been part of a previous controlled regime around
nuclear weapons. And I certainly agree with you, Mr. DiNanno,
that we need a new way to think about it.
But we had a hearing here in December, where our witnesses,
they had some disagreement, but I think there was general
appreciation for the fact that if China is not willing to join
discussions and Russia is, why would we not go ahead and start
engaging with Russia, because they have more nuclear weapons
right now than China does. What we have heard from some sources
is that China does not intend to engage in nuclear talks until
it is on parity on nuclear weapons with the United States.
So it seems to me that there would be some benefits as we
are looking at upgrading the nuclear non-proliferation
guidelines to going ahead and engaging with some of those
countries that pose a concern for the United States. How do you
answer that?
Mr. DiNanno. We have not put any limits on our multilateral
approach. It does not shut off any bilateral engagements that
might lead to this multilateral approach.
Senator Shaheen. Are we engaging, however, in those?
Because there is a difference between saying, yes, if somebody
wants to come and approach us, we are happy to engage, and are
being proactive about how we engage with other countries.
Mr. DiNanno. Oh yes, ma'am. Again, as I mentioned earlier,
our engagement in the P5 is ongoing. Again, that is always a
challenge. But I think, like some of our other regimes, it
needs additional attention and additional caregiving. And
again, the Russians and the Chinese as well as the U.K. and
France are all involved in these discussions, so that would be
a multilateral venue. And again, we have not shut off any
channel that would exist for bilateral engagement. Again, I
think it is important that we keep all of our options open, and
I think the President's policy has clearly done that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. While I appreciate that the
threat of nuclear weapons is a concern that has much greater
ramifications, the reality we are seeing right now, whether it
is in the war in Ukraine, in Iran, and other parts of the world
where conflict is existing, is that warfare is changing and
that the weapons are changing, and that the bigger threat right
now may not be those nuclear weapons. It may be the other
weapons that are being used.
We really pushed our European allies to step up on their
own defense and on Ukraine, and they have. Right now they spend
more than we do supporting Ukraine, and they are spending that
money on American weapons. Are we in a position where we can
actually deliver the weapons that they are buying from us?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question, Senator. I think it
is an important one, and I think it really shows why the
reorganization of the State Department and putting all the
bureaus that do international security together makes sense.
Because I think in relation to our Political-Military Bureau
and the work that we are doing to modernize our defense
industrial base, we have released two executive orders. We work
very closely with the War Department. As part of the most
recent executive order had announced that it wanted an
executive council to stand up between the Commerce Department,
the State Department, and the War Department, and that meeting
took place within a month. That is unheard of bureaucratic
speed, I can tell you.
Senator Shaheen. That does not make me feel better.
The Chairman. That is not a very high bar.
Senator Shaheen. No.
Mr. DiNanno. The commitments to modernizing our defense
industrial base could not be stronger. I heard it loud and
clear during my confirmation process. The State Department's
role here is to make sure that our regulatory approach does not
constrain our allies and partners, that the demand signal from
every part of the government, from this committee, from my
leadership, was to move faster and to provide more capability.
I think our recent America First Arms Transfer Strategy is
a really good iteration on that, that for our partners and
allies around the world it might not always require our most
exquisite platform, require an F-35, it might not require a
Patriot system. But there are other systems that are certainly
good enough, that complement existing U.S. posture in the
region, and that can send a demand signal to industry to stand
up other capabilities.
So again, the State Department piece of this is to open up
the aperture, take on a little more risk, and move faster. It
really is dwarfed by the reforms they are making in the War
Department, and Under Secretary Duffey and his team are making
drastic reforms. We work very closely with them. I am on a call
with them weekly, driving change, driving integration.
So it is a priority for us, and again, I think it is not
going to happen overnight, and it is not going to be easy or
painless. I think we need to work together, the administration
and the Congress. There may be some legislative relief we may
need along the way here. But it is an absolute national
security imperative, not only for the security of the United
States but as well as our partners and allies. And I think this
is what you are seeing play out.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McCormick.
Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member,
and Mr. DiNanno, thank you for being here.
You know, we are in the middle, obviously, of this active
conflict with Iran, and Iran has a record of global menace and
nuclear proliferation that is well established. But it is worth
discussing now, I think, how we will monitor and evaluate
Iran's nuclear, drone, and missile capabilities following the
conclusion of the military campaign.
The recent launch of an Iranian missile on Diego Garcia now
puts European capitals within direct range of the regime's
missiles. In addition, the DIA concluded even prior to
Operation Epic Fury that Iran had developed space-launched
vehicles they could use to develop a military-viable ICBM by
2035, should Tehran decide to do so.
So first question to you is how are you engaging with our
NATO allies to update their threat assessments and perceptions
regarding Iran, the missile threat, and what arms control
regimes are viable to constrain Iran's ability to threaten
Europe?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question, Senator. On the first
question, I just got back from Europe last week, having
extensive meetings with the British and the French. I had
multiple engagements with other NATO allies, the Germans, the
Danish, the Dutch, the Polish, you name it. We are actively
involved.
I was telling the staff earlier, this is really the bulk of
my time and my job is to engage foreign partners. Certainly
NATO is a huge part to that. And we need to be, again,
extremely clear on our support to NATO. I think the President
has been, and we need to continue to double down on that.
The second part of your question, I have given this a lot
of thought. I am very troubled when I look across our non-
proliferation regimes. They are all antiquated. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group was formed in 1974. The MTCR in 1987. The
Australia Group, which address chemical and biological threats,
in 1985. This is my entire adult life. So we are trying to
shove 2026, 2030, next-generation problem set into an old
business model.
I am currently chairing a group inside the State Department
on how to modernize, for example, the MTCR. I am personally
overseeing that because it is a regime where we have to be
extremely concerned that we are not constraining our allies and
partners more than we are the adversary. And I think there are
hard questions to ask.
So I look forward to working with you and your team on
soliciting ideas. I do not want to predetermine the outcome of
that engagement. There may very well be elements, and I am sure
there will be, that we need to maintain. But it absolutely
needs to be modernized.
Senator McCormick. Thank you. Yes, I agree with that. Also
according to the Director of National Intelligence 2026 Annual
Threat Assessment, Russia is developing anti-satellite nuclear
weapons, which the intelligence community describes as the
greatest single threat to the world's space architecture.
So, Under Secretary, how should the United States respond
to the expanding threat of outer space weapons, challenges by
peer and near-peer adversaries, and which arms control
approaches, along with risk reduction measures, offer the most
promise given the expiration of the New START Treaty?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question, Senator. Again, very
important question. Specifically to the Russian outer space
system, I do not want to go into too much detail here in an
open forum, but what I can say is that any deployment of that
system would be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, directly
focused on the arms control piece of it. The Russian exotic
systems are getting crazy, even for the Russians. So I think
the President's approach, and again, to the ranking member's
earlier question about how there are bilateral as well as other
multilateral ways to get at the problem, the answer is yes.
That is obviously a system that diplomatically we would
pressure aggressively, pressure the Russians, and I am sure it
will come up in our P5 engagement, which is imminent.
So again, I do not want to talk too much more about the
Russian capability in open forum, but certainly the exotic
systems, the underwater system, the Poseidon, the Burevestnik,
which is their nuclear-powered cruise missile, these are all
systems that fall outside of New START, to your point, that we
need to have a direct conversation with the Russians, and I am
sure we will.
Senator McCormick. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield my remaining 10 seconds.
The Chairman. We will gladly accept that, Senator.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
holding this hearing. Just for the audience, the Senate uses a
lot of acronyms. So we will talk about NATO and AUKUS and CDC.
So ``T'' family, what is the ``T'' family at the State
Department and what does it stand for? The T does not mean
anything. It just historically has been called the ``T''
family. The functions within it are very important functions,
and I am glad that the Chair has called this hearing so that we
can explore.
Secretary DiNanno, you, in your opening comments, talked a
little bit about a priority that is important to me and many on
the committee, which is the AUKUS framework. This was a
framework announced by President Biden. It has been worked on
and supported in a bipartisan way by this committee. President
Trump had a very productive meeting with the Australian PM last
October about AUKUS, critical minerals, other issues. He came
out of that meeting saying full steam ahead on AUKUS.
The NDAA that we did in Fiscal Year 2024 created the Office
of the AUKUS Senior Advisor in the State Department as a
primary integrator of the partnership. The senior advisors
intended to streamline regulatory barriers to enable us to have
this framework be all that it can be between the U.S.,
Australia, and the U.K.
So how are you attempting to empower that senior advisor
position to develop and cement the AUKUS partnership?
Mr. DiNanno. First, to your very important first point on
``T'', the first Under Secretary's name was Tom.
[Laughter.]
Mr. DiNanno. If it is not, that is my name, so it is good
for me.
Senator Kaine. I think that is classified information.
Mr. DiNanno. And there is a State Department Historian that
I actually work with, who is terrific, that I am going to ask
that question.
Thanks for the AUKUS question. It is very important. No. 1,
the AUKUS coordinator reports directly to me, so I see him
every day. He is extremely experienced. His team is small but
extremely knowledgeable on some of the details, the regulatory
pieces that need to fall into place here.
Another data point that I think is important is just
yesterday I met with the Australian coordinator, and last week
I was in the U.K. meeting with the U.K. coordinator. The U.K.
coordinator felt that we really talk a lot about Australia. We
have the U.K. piece here too, as well. So we had an extremely
productive discussion about the type of capabilities,
understanding the geography, of course, and their footprint in
NATO offers a little different flavor than, say, the Australia
team.
So we have made some positive steps forward in AUKUS. I
think, obviously, one is the MTCR. We look at UAVs now, Tier 1
UAVs as a manned aircraft instead of MTCR controlled. So that
is a good start.
However, when you get into the actual agreement, some of
the provisos that would be attached, I mean, it's like a
fishing knot: The more you pull it apart, the more you figure
out the more problems there are. So that is going to happen
here--sort of looking at AUKUS as a bit of a canary in the coal
mine on this regulatory reform, kind of pulling apart the knot
here, we will take them one at a time.
I mentioned earlier, again, we are going through an MTCR
review. I do not want to predetermine the outcomes. I will be
happy when that is done to come back and talk to you about it.
But I believe we will probably need some regulatory relief and
legislative relief. So I would like to work with you and the
committee on it.
The War Department has moved very smartly on this. We are
anxiously awaiting some announcements on Pillar II. And another
point here is the Excluded Technologies List. It is the other
sort of 800-pound gorilla here. It needs to be a lot smaller.
Senator Kaine. Well, I like the progress. I just went to
Australia in February. We did 37 events in 4 cities in 7 days,
35 of which were AUKUS related, to really kick the tires to see
what the Aussies are doing by way of investment. We had hard
questions for them; they had hard questions for us. It was a
really good dialog.
One of the areas, just to put two on your radar screen,
that continues to be important is the implementation of the
ITAR reforms. And you were right to point out in your answer
that we have got to get it right here because we may want to do
similar partnerships with other allies. And to the extent that
we figure out how to do ITAR reform right for AUKUS it will
also make it easier to decide how to apply that with other
allies.
Mr. DiNanno. One hundred percent, I concur.
Senator Kaine. And then on Pillar II, everybody is talking
about what is marquee project, what is a signature project. It
could be anything, but sometimes it makes it hard to focus on.
Excited to hear that there may be some announcements
forthcoming that will give it some focus.
Mr. DiNanno. We are getting closer.
Senator Kaine. I appreciate that.
I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. There is nothing to yield back, Senator.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cornyn, you occupy the far end of the dais there,
and that is the result of the idiosyncrasies of the arcane
committee system here in the Senate. But I do not think there
is anyone on this committee that has got a longer history of
dealing with this subject or more seniority than you do. I
appreciate hearing your thoughts on this.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Present company
accepted between you and the ranking member.
Mr. Secretary, you certainly have an expansive portfolio. I
do not know how you do it, but thank you for doing it. Senator
Shaheen talked about the rapid rate which we are using various
munitions and counter-drone technology, counter-missile
technology in the Middle East in the conflict with Iran. I know
we all are concerned about our defense industrial base, but it
also takes money to buy these munitions and this materiel.
The President is allegedly going to request $400 billion in
emergency supplemental for the Department of War, presumably to
replenish a lot of this. Can you talk a little bit about the
necessity of that, whether it is $200 billion or some other
figure, whatever the figure is, the necessity of Congress
funding the effort to replenish these munitions and develop our
industrial base where it should be?
Mr. DiNanno. Senator, thanks for the question. First of
all, I do the job because I have hundreds of dedicated State
Department civil and foreign service officers that work for me.
They are a really special group, and they work really hard.
Specific to your question, the specific supplemental I
probably cannot speak to. I have not been part of those
discussions. But I think broader, on modernizing the defense
industrial base, to some of the points I was making earlier,
the Foreign Military Sale reform has to be a priority.
Uniquely, it has to be a partnership between the Federal
Government, both the administration and the Congress, our
allies and partners, as well as industry.
I think, again, this is a little bit outside of my purview
at the State Department. The War Department has really leaned
forward on this and is looking toward some extremely unique
arrangements with industry on how to give some certainty to
their investments. So I would defer the questions on those,
what those look like, what those private sector and government
arrangements look like, to bring more capabilities faster.
Again, the State Department piece here is the regulatory piece.
I do not want to downplay it because it is important, and
it can get in the way. Again, the demand signal that I have
gotten, again, from across the committee to my leadership, is
to open up the aperture and make more capabilities available.
And again, the War Department and the administration are doing
some extremely creative financing to bring more capabilities to
our forces and to our partners and allies.
I am not sure that answers your question directly on the
supplement, but I do not want to get that wrong.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. I just want to make the point
that we are going to have to come up with the money to pay for
it, Congress is, one way or the other.
The New START Treaty, I agree with the comments that you
and others have made that Russia cheats, but also the
President's determination to somehow bring China into those
negotiations for any new arms control treaties in the future.
What is it going to take to get China engaged, in your view?
Mr. DiNanno. It is a great question, sir. Thank you. I
think the President's broad view, and he has been extremely
forward leaning on this, is he wants to see fewer nuclear
weapons in the world, and that is a good place to start. Again,
the problem with New START, again, not to repeat what we have
already talked about, is that it only covered part of the
Russian stockpile and none of the Chinese stockpile.
So I think there are two points to make here. Arms control
and non-proliferation are one side of the coin. The other side
of the coin, of course, is the War Department and the vigorous
modernization effort, which is ongoing, that will bring new
capabilities across the spectrum. I think 150 B-21s will get
the Chinese attention. I think hundreds of LRSO will get their
attention. Admiral Correll testified in front of the House
Armed Services Committee, I think last week, and went through
exactly what that modernization looks like.
I don't think anybody wants an arms race. I know the
President does not. He has been very clear, he wants to see
fewer nuclear weapons. But if the Chinese continue this
breakout--and again, they are approaching parity, then this
isn't a 2040 problem. It is very much becoming a 2030 problem--
that we will compete vigorously across the spectrum of
modernizing our nuclear forces.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, will you indulge one more
question?
The Chairman. The Chairman is most generous. Feel free.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the
enriched uranium in Iran. Where is it? How big a concern is it
to you? And what is your opinion about Iran's determination to
continue developing a capacity to develop a nuclear weapon?
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, before you answer that
question, is that answerable in the setting we are in?
Mr. DiNanno. I can lay out some thoughts on it.
The Chairman. He asked for a specific location. I have
been in an intel briefing on this and my sense is that there
is----
Senator Cornyn. I will withdraw that part of the question.
The Chairman. OK. That will make it easier. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Certainly.
Mr. DiNanno. Look, I think the administration's Iran policy
was clear, and it did not start 3 weeks ago. President Trump
issued NSPM-2 14 months ago, laid out a policy that Iran's
nuclear program and their nuclear-capable missiles pose an
existential threat to the United States, and that Iran can
never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. That
was the U.S. policy 14 months ago, and it remains the U.S.
policy today.
Again, to the Chairman's point on the uranium stockpiles,
that active theater of operation will be with the War
Department, and Central Command would be the folks to talk to
directly about that. What we do at the State Department and
inside the ``T'' family bureaus, we would support the IAEA.
That engagement resides under me. But any of that would
probably be after the cessation of hostilities. But I do not
want to get out in front of, again, what is happening in the
region there. That is the purview of the War Department.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Under Secretary DiNanno. I appreciated our earlier discussion
on a number of these questions.
I wanted to ask primarily about the arrangements with Saudi
Arabia. You mentioned in your testimony that five 123
Agreements have been struck. I believe that is Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Hungary, South Korea, and Armenia?
Mr. DiNanno. [Inaudible.]
Senator Merkley. In your testimony you say that you have
negotiated five 123 Agreements. I am assuming one of those is
the Saudi Arabia agreement?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes. So the Saudi Arabia agreement has not
been signed by the President yet. As you know, once the
President signs it, if he signs it, that would be due to
Congress.
Senator Merkley. Was that one of the five that you were
referring to in your testimony, where you were talking about
five different 123 Agreements?
Mr. DiNanno. So the administration has laid out a goal of
signing 20 123 Agreements.
Senator Merkley. I know that. I do not want to take a lot
of time on this. I am just asking if Saudi Arabia is one of the
five that you referred to in your testimony.
Mr. DiNanno. I believe so.
Senator Merkley. OK. So it has not been signed, so that
probably answers my next question, which is the associated
Bilateral Safeguards Agreement probably has not been completed
with Saudi Arabia, as well?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes. Again, once the agreement is signed I am
happy to talk through those details. But until the President
actually signs it----
Senator Merkley. My understanding has been, and I am
referring to your November 24th report to Congress, you note
Saudi Arabia's reservations about the additional protocol. And
the three things that normally comprise the gold standard are
the additional protocol that allows inspection of all nuclear
sites, including ones that we are not directly involved in. And
also no reprocessing and no enrichment.
Of those three things, do you think that any of those three
might be included in the agreement with Saudi Arabia--no
processing, no enrichment, and the inspection of all civilian
nuclear sites, includes ones that are not directly our
companies, if you will?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question, Senator. Look, again,
once the agreement is actually signed we can go through some of
the details. Until it is signed, I do not want to go through
the details. But what I can tell you is I think we will have a
solid--and compliant with the Atomic Energy Act--non-
proliferation approach, again, if this gets signed by the
President. Whether it meets some of those data points or gold
standard, again, it is pre-decisional for us to talk about
that. Once it is signed and delivered I am happy to come back
and answer all those questions.
Senator Merkley. OK. I will just express my concerns. I
know you have already heard from me, but I will express them
again here. And that is all the public reports are that none of
those three things will be covered by the agreement with Saudi
Arabia, and if they are not covered with Saudi Arabia--so they
are able to reprocess or able to enrich, we cannot inspect
sites, IAEA cannot inspect, and we cannot inspect sites that
are other nuclear sites--it seems to me the perfect setup for a
potential proliferation. And also that once that standard is
set, other nations find it very hard to agree to standards that
Saudi Arabia has not agreed to.
As you and I discussed, you have, in the Islamic world, a
major Shiite superpower, Iran. You have a major Sunni
superpower, Saudi Arabia. And anything that Saudi Arabia gets
in terms of not covering enrichment, not covering reprocessing,
not covering the additional civilian nuclear sites for
inspections, it makes it very hard for anyone else to ever
agree to those.
I know you are saying there will be strong standards, but I
guess count me concerned.
Mr. DiNanno. If I could just respond quickly. Saudi Arabia
is determined to develop a civilian nuclear program. I think
the approach that we have, in the non-proliferation
requirements inside Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which
we will meet, and I am confident that we will have an extremely
defensible non-proliferation program. And it is most important
that that non-proliferation program is run by an American
company and an American program as opposed to a Russian or
Chinese program.
So again, I understand exactly what you are referring to.
Again, I am happy to come back if we get the agreement signed
and walk through some of those details. But I am supremely
confident that we will have a non-proliferation footprint,
again, should it get signed, that would more than meet the
minimum standards in the Atomic Energy Act.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
DiNanno, good to see you. And I just want to underscore the
concerns raised by Senator Merkley regarding reports that the
administration is talking about going into a nuclear
cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia without the gold
standard 123 standards. That, of course, is what we required of
the UAE and other recent countries. And if we are really
concerned about non-proliferation, it seems we should have the
strongest standards.
You know, the Chairman mentioned, during his opening
comments, the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, and of
course, you have non-proliferation in your portfolio. You are
familiar with DNI Tulsi Gabbard's recent testimony before the
Senate Intelligence Committee, right? Are you aware that the
DNI testified, just recently----
Mr. DiNanno. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen [continuing]. Before the Senate
Intelligence Committee, and in her testimony she said, and I am
quoting, ``As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer''--of
course, that was the operation that took place last year--``As
a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear
enrichment program was obliterated.'' Do you contest that
finding that was presented by the DNI?
Mr. DiNanno. Sir, I am not in a position to revisit her
testimony or the President's decision.
Senator Van Hollen. I am asking you about, right now, a
comment that the DNI made. Are you privy to--you have non-
proliferation in your portfolio. I would think that you are
following this issue closely. Are you?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, I am happy to talk about the role that
the bureaus that I oversee play in non-proliferation in regards
to Iran. But again----
Senator Van Hollen. Well, do you agree with her statement--
this was public testimony, and I am quoting again, ``There have
been no efforts since then to try to rebuild their enrichment
capability,'' unquote. Do you disagree with that statement from
the DNI?
Mr. DiNanno. The intelligence community's job is to inform
policymakers. I am a consumer of intelligence. I am not a maker
of intelligence in that sense. And----
Senator Van Hollen. Right. So, OK.
Mr. DiNanno. You are provided, I believe, the intelligence
community's view to the policymaker. President Trump is the
policymaker.
Senator Van Hollen. I understand that. That sort of goes
without saying, but go ahead and say it. Joe Kent, who, as you
know, resigned in protest, said that ``all 18 of America's
intelligence agencies agreed that Iran had no capacity to
develop a nuclear bomb.'' As you say, you are a consumer of
intelligence. Have you seen anything to dispute that statement?
Mr. DiNanno. I do not want to respond to what one
individual's--I have not seen----
Senator Van Hollen. I am asking you about the intelligence
community's assessment, which DNI Gabbard testified publicly
about.
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir. I am responding to your comment
about the individual that you mentioned. I have not seen his
comments. I do not follow his comments. And----
Senator Van Hollen. Well, you did not want to respond to my
question about DNI Gabbard either.
Yes, I ask this because President Trump said, on March 4th,
``if we didn't hit them within 2 weeks they would have a
nuclear weapon,'' which is manifestly untrue, based on all the
testimony we have seen from the intelligence community.
Let me turn to another issue. You are responsible for
ensuring that U.S. arms transfers are consistent with the Trump
administration's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, right?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. All right. And that policy requires
that you consider the risk that a proposed arms transfer may
contribute to violations of international humanitarian law,
right?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. All right. Were you involved in
assessing that risk in connection with the administration's
recent decision to invoke emergency powers to bypass
congressional review and transfer over 20,000 bombs to the
Netanyahu government?
Mr. DiNanno. In response to the administration's emergency
declaration, if there is ever a circumstance that is an
emergency, this would be it.
Senator Van Hollen. Mr. DiNanno----
Mr. DiNanno. Let me just finish.
Senator Van Hollen [continuing]. Not responsive----
Mr. DiNanno. No, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. I did not ask you whether it was an
emergency. I asked you----
Mr. DiNanno. Like I said----
Senator Van Hollen [continuing]. I asked whether you
complied----
Mr. DiNanno. I will finish my answer.
Senator Van Hollen [continuing]. With that policy?
Mr. DiNanno. If you let me finish, I am happy to answer
your question, sir. That being said, I sat before the committee
during my confirmation process and committed to working with
the committee to follow the law. The law does allow for the
emergency exemption. That is why we used it.
Senator Van Hollen. I am not asking you about----
Mr. DiNanno. I understand that, but I think the context is
important, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. I know because I submitted a question
for the record and you said you would comply with CAT policy.
So now I am asking you whether you were involved in reviewing
the transfer of 20,000 bombs to the Netanyahu government, with
respect to compliance with the CAT policy.
Mr. DiNanno. Any foreign military sale that we do would
fall underneath the Conventional Arms Transfer policy.
Senator Van Hollen. Did you personally review that
assessment?
Mr. DiNanno. Again, Senator, the emergency declaration----
Senator Van Hollen. No, not the emergency declaration. Did
you review the assessment regarding whether or not that
transfer of 20,000 bombs complied with the CAT policy?
Mr. DiNanno. Everything that we do complies with the law.
Senator Van Hollen. Were you personally involved in that
review?
Mr. DiNanno. I was involved with the transfer, and anything
that we would do would be consistent with our CAT policy, which
is compliant with the law.
Senator Van Hollen. So I am going to take it as a no, that
you did not personally review whether or not that transfer
complied with CAT policy. Did you personally review that?
Mr. DiNanno. You can take it any way you want.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, did you?
Mr. DiNanno. I have already told you I was involved with
the policy. I oversee the Political-Military Bureau.
Senator Van Hollen. OK. Did you personally review----
Mr. DiNanno. I review hundreds of arms sales. I signed
hundreds of them. The emergency declaration, again, it was
consistent with the law, and most importantly, I think it is
important for the committee that we lay out we are not trying
to establish a new norm, that we will continue to address on a
case-by-case basis, look at emergencies if they exist, just
like the Biden administration did in 2023.
Senator Van Hollen. I will finish----
Mr. DiNanno. Use the same authority----
Senator Van Hollen. I am not----
Mr. DiNanno. Sir, let me finish my comment.
Senator Van Hollen. I am not asking you about the emergency
order.
Mr. DiNanno. I know. I am trying to address your concern.
Senator Van Hollen. No you are actually not.
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Van Hollen. Are you concerned that Israeli Defense
Minister Katz said, with respect to Lebanon, that they were
going to use the ``rafah'' model in Gaza? Does that concern
you?
Mr. DiNanno. I am not familiar with that comment.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. It is a matter of public record.
Could you take a look at it and get back to me----
Mr. DiNanno. I would be happy to.
Senator Van Hollen [continuing]. And let me know if that
concerns you?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir. I am happy to look at it.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Last week, NVIDIA said that it had been licensed for many
customers in China for its advanced AI chip, the H200, and had
received purchase orders from ``many companies,'' in quotes. On
January 13th, the Department of Commerce rule governing the
H200 license process, which the State Department plays a role
in as a reviewing agency, contains various end-use
certification requirements.
For instance, the exporter must certify the chips will not
be used for military, intelligence, or weapons of mass
destruction. However, given Beijing's military-civil fusion,
that seems difficult, if not impossible, to certify. Currently,
Communist China is so computer-constrained that it continues to
resort to smuggling U.S. AI chips and distilling from U.S.
models just to remain competitive. As evidence of this, on
Thursday the Justice Department charged three people with
diverting $2.5 billion worth of servers with NVIDIA AI chips to
Communist China.
Under Secretary DiNanno, is it your understanding that
Communist China is pursuing a civil-military fusion strategy,
whereby it has eliminated any barriers between its commercial
and defense sectors to develop the most technologically
advanced military in the world?
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you, Senator, for the question. So the
State Department role and the bureaus that I oversee
specifically in regards to export control enforcement, we had
direction from the President to support this chip sale to
China, with the caveat, and an important caveat, that we would
only do so by establishing--I am trying to remember the
President's exact phrasing on this--strong national security.
And that is exactly what the Non-Proliferation Bureau that
reports to me does. I cannot talk about the specific licenses
per se, but we have reviewed, and continue to review, to apply
the highest standards, to look at all the intelligence and all
the derogatory information that we may find and push that into
the decision process. Ultimately--I am sorry, sir.
Senator Ricketts. Well, I was going to say, because I am
talking about the China civil-military fusion. You have heard
of that term before, right?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir.
Senator Ricketts. All right. And I have not asked you about
a specific license yet, so let's talk about it at a high level.
How would you be able to certify that a technology that may
have dual-use--like, I don't know, say, a high-end AI chips--
would be able to be used for only one purpose versus going into
some of the other things that, again, the license has to
prescribe. So it cannot go into weapons of mass destruction or
intelligence or something like that. How can you possibly
certify that if they have got this military-civil fusion?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes. So the review process is extensive. It is
informed by the best intelligence that we have available from
the intelligence community. And all off that, any derogatory
information would go into sort of our decision process, whether
or not we would recommend approval or not. Ultimately, your
concern is noted, and I think it is important. But looking at
each individual entity with an extremely high bar, again, the
bar that the President himself set, and that is the bar that we
implement, that I oversee and implement, is that high national
security standard. And part of that would be to address the
diversion risk.
Senator Ricketts. OK. So the ability to design and produce
an advanced AI chip lies at the heart of our technology
competition with Communist China. Currently, Communist China
cannot manufacture these chips without U.S. and allies'
semiconductor manufacturing equipment, or SME. As a result,
export controls on SME represent one of our most significant
points of leverage with Beijing. At present, U.S. companies are
barred from selling certain SME to Communist China.
For the past several years we have prioritized diplomacy
with allies, to convince them to match our same level of
controls. However, our allies' controls are still not as
stringent, and foreign companies are able to continue filling
orders for critical tools to Communist China and providing
support. This misalignment uplifts Chinese shipmaking
capabilities, helps Communist China maintain existing advanced
allied tools, and shifts markets away from American firms. And
given that AI is dual-use and contributes to enhanced
capabilities for the PLA, posing a serious national security
threat, do you agree that ensuring our allies have fully
aligned their export controls on SME to ours is critical for
national security?
Mr. DiNanno. Senator, thanks for the question. We have
extremely active diplomacy with our allies. We have programs of
information-sharing engagement, the Non-Proliferation Bureau,
which I oversee, actively seeks out and trains, attempting to
raise the standards of potential weak spots or potential
partners that we felt that we needed to raise their standards.
So not only do we actively engage with, again, I would
characterize it as traditional allies, but it is very important
that we raise the standards across the board, that across the
countries that might be involved in that supply chain. And we
have active programming that does that.
Senator Ricketts. Well, this issue is why I am planning to
introduce the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on
Hardware, or MATCH, Act, to harmonize export controls on SMEs
to Communist China with our allies. The MATCH Act will ensure
that if an adversary cannot build a tool themselves, they will
not be able to buy it from the U.S. or our partners. I hope
that my colleagues will join me in this effort so that the
United States and not Communist China can lead the world in AI.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, because I know you have
been very active in this area, and it is of absolutely critical
concern, not only what we sell to them but also what our
allies, such as the Netherlands, sell to them. That is
absolutely critical, too. Thank you. Thank you for your work in
that regard.
With that, Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Shaheen, for today's hearing, and thank you, Mr. DiNanno, for
joining us today.
I want to go and talk about Nevada a little bit, because
the Nevada National Security Site, the NNSS, was ground zero
for the vast majority of the United States explosive nuclear
testing from 1951 to 1992, during which there were 100
atmospheric tests and 828 underground tests conducted. Nevada's
downwind communities suffered from these exposures, and they
are still waiting for justice and compensation.
Today the NNSS plays a critical role in certifying the
liability, safety, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile,
but without--without, I am going to emphasize that, I could say
it 100 times--without the need for explosive testing. So you
can imagine my surprise when President Trump and others, such
as Assistant Secretary Yeaw, suggested that the U.S. should
resume explosive nuclear testing.
Mr. DiNanno, what is the State Department's position on
explosive nuclear testing, and if President Trump were to order
a nuclear test, how do you expect Russia or China to respond?
What about other countries with nuclear weapons? And how would
we manage the inevitable damage that this is going to cause to
your efforts to pursue multilateral arms control and risk
reduction measures?
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you, Senator. Let me start by saying the
President has laid out a view that I elaborated on, and
Assistant Secretary Yeaw elaborated upon, where the President
instructed the War Department and the Energy Department to test
on an equal basis with our adversaries. The backdrop of that is
important to understand, that both the Russians and the Chinese
are testing at yield.
Senator Rosen. And I can tell you that in our U1a Complex
[renamed: Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical
Experimentation (PULSE)] and the radiographic things that we
have there and the new kinds of technology we have, we have
adequately, without explosive testing, ensured the capabilities
of our nuclear stockpile.
Mr. DiNanno. So thank you, Senator. Look, a couple of
points to make. No. 1, we are still assessing. We have made no
decision specifically on how or what any testing program would
look like, so that is pre-decisional. If the administration
comes to that decision I would be happy to come back and talk
to you.
Senator Rosen. You better come back and talk to me, because
the people of Nevada and the people of Utah and the people all
around you think what happens in Nevada, with an explosive
test, stays in Nevada?
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Rosen. Because it sure doesn't.
Mr. DiNanno. I think you are referring to any potential
atmospheric testing.
Senator Rosen. They cratered the ground in Nevada----
Mr. DiNanno. Ma'am----
Senator Rosen [continuing]. And let me tell you, there is
groundwater--it does not go away.
Mr. DiNanno. Let me answer your concern if I could. I have
not been in any discussions where open atmospheric testing has
been under consideration. The testing, any testing, is under
consideration. It is currently pre-decisional. But the
President has laid out, and I think it is important to
understand, that the United States----
Senator Rosen. Well, it is important to understand that he
better come talk to us in Nevada if he is planning to do that.
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Rosen. Because the people in Nevada have a stake in
that.
Mr. DiNanno. I understand.
Senator Rosen. The people of Utah have a stake in that. And
I will look at everybody, Idaho, right above us, Texas. The
wind, everything goes around this country. Trust me.
Mr. DiNanno. I understand that, ma'am, and I appreciate
your concern.
Senator Rosen. I will move on to something else.
Mr. DiNanno. Hold on. I want to address that. I think it is
important. You are talking about the wind. There is no
discussion that I have been a part of that any atmospheric
testing would take place. Again, the Chinese and Russian
programs are underground. They are at yields that I cannot talk
too much about in this open hearing. But, for example, the
Chinese underground testing program would be in the hundreds of
tons. No discussion, again, that I have been part of, would in
any way talk about winds or downrange. I have heard nothing to
that effect.
Senator Rosen. Well, you would understand my----
Mr. DiNanno. Of course I would. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Rosen [continuing]. Concern about the need for a
visual----
Mr. DiNanno. Of course.
Senator Rosen [continuing]. The sight of the ground
cratering in. And we have made millions and billions of dollars
of investments in radiographic and other technology, using
math, using physics, using science, to be sure that we ensure
the integrity of our nuclear arsenal. We have been very
specific in that. And I am glad to take you down there if you
have not been to see what they are doing and how they are doing
it, before you enter into more of these discussions.
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, ma'am. I would happily go there. I know
what they do there. And again, I think it is extremely
important to understand that the Russian and Chinese systems,
the Russians and Chinese are testing at yield. That creates an
intolerable disadvantage for the United States by not testing.
And again, I have heard no discussion of any sort of
atmospheric testing whatsoever.
Senator Rosen. Well, I tend to disagree with you, but I
yield. Thank you.
Senator Ricketts [presiding]. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find it troubling
that the United Kingdom is prepared to transfer the Chagos
Archipelago to Mauritius, a deal that is straightforwardly
dangerous to U.S. interests. Mauritius is closely aligned to
Beijing, and the transfer gives China leverage over one of our
most strategic military assets, significantly impacting our
ability to operate from Diego Garcia.
I have argued that giving the Chagos Archipelago to
Mauritius is in direct violation of the United Kingdom's treaty
commitments to the United States, where the United Kingdom
agreed to keep the base under British control and out of
foreign control. President Trump has been pressing back very
hard against this deal for months.
Yet there are serious concerns that elements within the
State Department continue to support it, even as Iran targets
Diego Garcia with ballistic missiles. Public reporting
indicates that support for this agreement originated within the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau, and that State doubled down
in a February statement, announcing a PM delegation to
Mauritius.
So let me ask you directly. Do you support the Chagos
Island deal between the United Kingdom and Mauritius?
Mr. DiNanno. Thanks for the question, Senator. I think the
President has been pretty clear, and obviously I follow the
President's policy lead, specific to Diego Garcia the most
important thing that we have, and we have to have, and I agree
with your assessment on the potential concerns with the
Chinese, as well. But the preservation of Diego Garcia as a
forward operating base for the U.S. military, again, slightly
outside of my purview, is without question the priority of the
administration and of the State Department.
Senator Cruz. So I agree with you that the President has
been quite clear, but I would like to get you explicitly on the
record with a yes or no answer. Do you support the Chagos
Island deal between the United Kingdom and Mauritius?
Mr. DiNanno. Again, I am unclear as to the current state of
the negotiation between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. What
I support is that the United States have the ability to use
Diego Garcia. And again, your reference to elements inside the
State Department, I do not know where those elements are. The
Political-Military Bureau answers to me. I answer to Secretary
Rubio and, of course, to the President. So we would be
completely aligned with the President and the Secretary's
guidance on that.
Senator Cruz. Well, let me help you out, because there
appears to be some real tension. On February 18th, President
Trump issued the following on Truth Social: ``I have been
telling Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom that
leases are no good when it comes to countries, and that he is
making a big mistake by entering a 100-year lease with whoever
it is that is claiming right, title, and interest to Diego
Garcia, strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Our
relationship with the United Kingdom is a strong and powerful
one, and it has been for many years. But Prime Minister Starmer
is losing control of this important island by claims of
entities never known of before. In our opinion, they are
fictitious in nature.'' And just to resolve any ambiguity, the
Truth Social ends with, in all caps, ``DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO
GARCIA!"
Is there any ambiguity in what the President said on
February 18th?
Mr. DiNanno. No, sir. There is not.
Senator Cruz. OK. So then why did the P-M Bureau announce a
delegation to Mauritius and signal its support for the deal?
And the official statement says, and I quote, ``The U.S.
supports the decision of the U.K. to proceed with its agreement
with Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago.'' How do you
reconcile that statement from State with the President's
statement on the same topic?
Mr. DiNanno. Well, I do not think any delegation actually
went, most importantly, because the President sets the policy,
and we implement the President's policy.
Senator Cruz. Well, I would ask you to figure out who the
hell wrote that statement that the U.S. supports this deal, and
why they are putting out statements from the Department of
State that are directly contrary to the position of the
President of the United States, who is charged with the
responsibility of making that decision.
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, and just one other statement. I think I
would agree, certainly, that the U.K. would be the partner of
choice there. And there is no daylight between me or anybody at
the State Department and the President.
Senator Cruz. Well, I am very glad to hear it, because as
we have seen with the recent targeting of Diego Garcia by Iran,
this base is critically important for protecting American
national security interests. And if the United Kingdom is to
compromise that base, that would: (a) harm our national
security interest, and (b) be in direct violation of a binding
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Mr. DiNanno. Yes, sir.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cruz. I
suspect, and I could be wrong, but I suspect that the White
House has already figured out who authorized that text that
went out. I would be interested in hearing that.
Senator Cruz. And if they have not, I hope this questioning
will accelerate that process.
The Chairman. I expect that will help.
Thank you so much for appearing here today. I think this
was an incredibly important hearing, and I appreciate a good
airing of these issues. Obviously, it is ongoing, and it is
going to be something that is going to be around for a long
time. We look forward to working with you as we go forward on
all of these, so thanks so much.
For the information of the members of the committee, the
record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow,
March 25th. And if we get any questions I would ask you to
respond to them as quickly as possible.
Again, with the thanks of the committee, we appreciate it.
This committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Thomas G. DiNanno by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. What is the current status of U.S. foreign assistance
programs managed by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) following the January 2025 foreign assistance review?
Answer. INL is actively programming the funds appropriated by
Congress to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, disrupt
drugs and crime harming American communities, and expand U.S. advantage
and access in strategically vital regions by diminishing the influence
of our adversaries.
Question. What is the current status of U.S. foreign assistance
programs managed by the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) following the
January 2025 foreign assistance review?
Answer. CT foreign assistance programs work to make America safer,
including by training and equipping foreign civilian law enforcement
entities to address terrorism posing the most serious threats to the
United States.
Question. Following the January 2025 announced foreign assistance
review, what categories of programs at INL and CT continued versus
those that were paused or ended as a result of the review?
Answer. INL continues to focus programming on dismantling
transnational criminal organizations, disrupting drugs and crime
harming American communities, and expanding U.S. advantage and access
as the security partner of choice in strategically vital regions. The
Department reviewed nearly 1,400 INL projects and terminated more than
400 that were ineffective, wasteful, and did not deliver results for
the American people, including programs focused on foreign public
health and rehabilitation, diversity and inclusion in foreign security
forces, access to justice and legal awareness for foreign populations,
and humanitarian-oriented prison and corrections support.
CT is focused on advancing the administration's counterterrorism
objectives to counter terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland and
citizens by: 1) enabling foreign countries to stop terrorist travel
from abroad, effectively pushing U.S. borders further afield; 2)
countering Iran and its proxies; 3) enabling foreign countries to
investigate, prosecute, and share intelligence on known or suspected
terrorists, including working with U.S. law enforcement; and 4)
enabling foreign countries to interdict and disrupt terrorist safe
havens and attacks, including those targeting U.S. citizens,
facilities, and interests.
Question. What is the total amount of appropriated funding that did
not get obligated as a result of INL and CT programs that were
terminated?
Answer. INL obligated all FY 2024 funding for approved programs,
except for $65 million that was rescinded to comply with the
requirements of the FY 2025 Full Year Continuing Resolution. CT
obligated all FY 2024 funds for approved programs. No funding went
unobligated due to the termination of INL or CT programs.
Question. What prior-year balances remain for INL and CT programs?
Answer. As of March 2026, CT's unobligated balance totals $289
million in FY 2025 funds and INL's unobligated balance totals $1.3
billion in FY 2025 funds. CT and INL intend to notify and obligate all
FY 2025 funding by September 30, 2026.
Question. How does the administration intend to use these remaining
balances?
Answer. INL and CT plan to continue programming funds aligned with
the administration's goals to make America safer, stronger, and more
prosperous through support to the priorities listed in the answer to a
previous question.
Question. Do you plan to engage Russia and China through separate
bilateral negotiations or a trilateral framework?
Answer. As I testified, the United States will not rule out
bilateral engagements that help facilitate and lead to multilateral
strategic stability and arms control. As Secretary Rubio stated on
February 6, future arms control must address the nuclear arsenals of
not just Russia but also China.
Question. What are the current barriers to engage with China and
Russia on nuclear agreements?
Answer. Russia in recent years and China historically have not been
willing partners. The United States is providing both countries an
opportunity to work with us on fulfilling the President's goal to
reduce global nuclear threats. If they opt not to engage, the United
States will not stand idly by. The United States will maintain a
robust, credible, and modernized deterrent to ensure our security,
preserve peace and stability, and negotiate from a position of
strength.
Question. How are the T bureaus staffed and postured compared with
the period prior to the reorganization?
Answer. The T Family bureaus and offices have a mixture of Civil
Service, Foreign Service, military detailees, and contractor personnel.
This is similar to the mix prior to the reorganization. Overall T
Family is now larger in scope and posture than it was before the
reorganization.
Question. How many Civil Servant and Foreign Service positions are
currently vacant across the T bureaus?
Answer. The T Bureaus and Offices have 142 Civil Service vacancies,
and 35 Foreign Service vacancies.
Question. What offices in the T family currently have more
personnel and resources than before the reorganization effort?
Answer. Given numerous changes within the T Family due to merged or
reorganized offices, the following offices are currently larger than
before the reorganization: PM's Office of Security Assistance, CT's
Office of Counterterrorism Coordination and Office of Military
Coordination and Crisis Response, and ACN's Office of Chemical and
Biological Convention Affairs and Office of Strategic Stability and
Extended Deterrence Affairs. No T Family units have more financial
resources than before the reorganization.
Question. Which offices in the T family currently have fewer
personnel and resources than prior to reorganization efforts?
Answer. Given numerous changes within the T Family due to merged or
reorganized offices and the Reduction in Force, the following offices
are currently smaller than before the reorganization: ACN's Office of
Export Controls and Border Security and Office of the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund, PM's Immediate Office of the Assistant Secretary,
and INL's Office of the Assistant Secretary, Office of Aviation and
Cross-Border Programs, Office of Europe and Asia, Office of Security
Assistance and Operations, and Office of Results and Criminal
Deterrence. All T Family units have fewer financial resources than
before the reorganization.
Question. The Congressional Notification states that approximately
115 full-time equivalent and contractor positions will be filled. Can
you provide the staffing breakdown by civil servants, Foreign Service
officers, and contractors?
Answer. Department leadership has approved ET to begin hiring to
reach its authorized strength of 115 FTEs and contractors. This will
allow the Bureau to recruit and acquire the necessary talent and
expertise, including in cutting-edge technologies, to fulfill ET's
mission. Of those 115, we plan for 74 to be Civil Service Employees, 34
to be Foreign Service Officers, three to be Schedule C appointees, and
four to be contractors. ET will also host non-FTEs--including
interagency detailees, U.S. Military advisors, Fellows, and interagency
personnel agreements--to advance specific counter-thread priorities for
the Bureau.
Question. Given the increasing use of AI-generated content and
disinformation campaigns, will the Emerging Threats Bureau actively
counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation?
Answer. Adversaries are misusing advancements in AI capabilities to
produce and disseminate highly convincing deepfake audio, video, or
imagery that could have serious consequences for national security. ET,
in coordination with other relevant bureaus such as R, is responsible
for diplomatic efforts to mitigate malicious uses of AI, which may take
the form of AI-generated synthetic media and deep fakes that contribute
to foreign state and non-state propaganda.
Question. What cyber issue sets will the Emerging Threats Bureau
cover, and how do they align with the goals of the March 2026 White
House National Cyber Strategy?
Answer. Consistent with President Trump's Cyber Strategy for
America, the Bureau of Emerging Threats uses diplomatic tools and
interagency capabilities to shape adversary behavior on cyber issues,
including by imposing costs and consequences to diminish state and non-
state adversaries' abilities to threaten U.S. national security
interests and military advantage.
ET advises Department leadership and coordinates with America's
allies and others to respond to significant cyber incidents by
preparing diplomatic responses, enhancing information sharing, and
bolstering partners' cyber capacity to defend shared interests and
secure critical infrastructure.
Question. The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP)
advances U.S. leadership in critical and emerging technologies,
including AI, with a focus on innovation and economic growth. Will
there be overlap between the work of ET and CDP?
Answer. ET anticipates and addresses how technological changes
could be weaponized to undermine U.S. national security. ET leads
cybersecurity policy efforts, shapes adversary behavior in cyberspace
through diplomacy, aligns cyber operation campaign plans with U.S.
foreign policy objectives, and builds partner capacity to prevent,
disrupt, and respond to cyber incidents. On AI, ET focuses on
mitigating threats to the American AI stack and from the malicious
misuse of AI.
CDP focuses on system-level resilience, not specific threat
disruption and response. CDP leads diplomatic efforts to shape global
digital rules and standards, enables U.S. technological and economic
leadership by expanding global adoption of U.S. technology, and builds
resilient digital conditions internationally. On AI, CDP focuses on
exporting the American AI stack.
Question. If so, how will ET coordinate with CDP to reduce
redundancies and reconcile potentially competing missions?
Answer. Both CDP and ET operate with clear, non-duplicative, and
complementary mandates tailored to their respective missions. ET and
CDP have coordinated and will continue to coordinate closely on a
variety of matters in both cyberspace and AI.
Question. In response to increased threats from North Korea, some
in South Korea have advocated for an independent nuclear arsenal rather
than relying on the United States--how is the U.S. working with South
Korea to address its security concerns within the existing alliance
framework without undermining global nonproliferation efforts?
Answer. The United States continues to work to prevent additional
states from acquiring nuclear weapons. In November 2025, President
Trump reaffirmed the U.S. pledge to provide extended deterrence to the
Republic of Korea, leveraging the full range of U.S. capabilities,
including nuclear. President Trump and President Lee committed to
strengthening cooperation through consultation mechanisms including the
Nuclear Consultative Group.
Question. How do the relocation of U.S. missile defense assets from
South Korea to the Middle East and other regional adjustments affect
U.S.-South Korea security cooperation and the broader alliance
framework?
Answer. The United States and South Korea are committed to ensuring
our forces are prepared to respond to any contingency. The U.S
commitment to extended deterrence is ironclad, and the United States
and South Korea combined defense posture is strong. United States
Forces Korea remains focused on maintaining a strong, ready, and
combat-credible force posture on the Korean Peninsula. With the support
of the United States, South Korea has pledged to accelerate efforts to
strengthen its military capabilities necessary to lead a combined
conventional defense against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The United States remains firmly committed to the defense of South
Korea.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Thomas G. DiNanno by Senator Brian Schatz
North Korea continues to significantly advance its range of
nuclear weapons capabilities, threatening the United States,
key U.S. allies and partners, and regional stability, despite
longstanding efforts to prevent North Korea from developing
such capabilities:
Question. Although the United States should desire a North Korea
with no nuclear weapons capabilities, given the aforementioned North
Korean developments, what role can Congress play in supporting the
adoption and implementation of a risk reduction approach in U.S.
strategy towards North Korea that no longer focuses on North Korean
denuclearization, but rather on mitigating tangible threats to U.S.
interests?
Answer. President Trump is committed to the complete
denuclearization of North Korea to address the threat that North
Korea's nuclear weapons program poses to America, our allies, and the
broader region. The United States works closely with our Republic of
Korea ally to maintain military de-confliction efforts on the Peninsula
that reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation and misperception.
Question. In FY 2025, the United States transferred $104.38B of
defense articles and services and security cooperation activities under
the Foreign Military Sales system. Recent conduct by Israel in Gaza,
Lebanon, and Iran has raised concerns by the human rights community.
Given the scale of U.S. arms transfers and ongoing concerns about the
use of U.S.-provided weapons by partner countries, how is the
Department ensuring compliance with U.S. legal and human rights
standards?
Answer. The Department reviews all arms transfer requests on a
case-by-case basis in accordance with the considerations established in
the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy, as well as all statutory
requirements under the Arms Export Control Act and Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961. In accordance with the CAT Policy, the Department accounts
for human rights and international humanitarian law considerations,
among others, when making arms transfer decisions. Our approach
balances security cooperation and national security objectives with
responsible use.
Question. On February 6, 2026, EO 14383 established the America
First Arms Transfer Strategy as a tool of U.S. foreign policy and to
expand defense production. The State Department has not provided
detailed guidance on how it plans to implement this strategy. How will
the America First Arms Transfer Strategy shape oversight compliance
with U.S. legal and human rights standards?
Answer. The Department will continue to review all proposed arms
transfers on a case-by-case basis in line with the Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy, which accounts for human rights and international
humanitarian law considerations, along with other national security and
foreign policy factors. The America First Arms Transfer Strategy
focuses on leveraging arms transfers to bolster defense production in
the United States and builds upon other Administration efforts to
reform the foreign defense sales system. The strategy does not change
these substantive standards regarding human rights and proper end-use
monitoring.
Question. Section 7035(a)(5) of the National Security, Department
of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 legally
mandates that not less than $2.5 million shall be allocated for the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to ``increase staffing and
resources to enable the robust oversight of United States security
assistance programs, including implementation of United States
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and related statutory requirements.''
How will you ensure that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
utilizes this funding consistent with the legal requirement and clear
Congressional intent?
Answer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will allocate
these funds to support implementation of the Conventional Arms
Transfers Policy consistent with statutory and legal requirements, as
well as congressional intent. Once we receive and consolidate the
funds, we will ensure there is proper and transparent oversight.
Question. Please detail the specific oversight staffing and
resourcing investments that will be made with these funds, the
anticipated timeline for these enhanced oversight capacities to come
online, and how these enhanced capacities will be integrated into
existing oversight mechanisms at the Department.
Answer. Once we receive and consolidate the funds, the PM Bureau
will be in a better position to detail specifics and timelines. We will
ensure these enhanced capacities will be integrated into appropriate
oversight mechanisms at the Department. The Department is committed to
proper and transparent oversight.
The President only partially designated the emergency funding
provided in Public Law 119-4. As pointed out by Senate
Appropriations Committee Chair Collins, this partial
designation was unlawful. In practice, this unlawful partial
designation means that none of the FY 25 SFOPS emergency
funding has been made available to the State Department,
including $275 million in the Foreign Military Financing
account that could be used to provide support to the
Philippines, Ukraine, or other key partners.
Question. If this emergency funding is made available, how would it
be prioritized by the State Department?
Answer. The statute governing emergency designations requires
concurrence by both Congress and the President for funding to receive
an adjustment to discretionary spending limits. The President retains
discretion in making those designations. Where funding is not
designated by the President, it does not receive a cap adjustment and
is therefore subject to applicable budget enforcement constraints. This
reflects longstanding practice in the implementation of section 251 of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The
Department is not currently considering the use of emergency funds
appropriated for the FMF account in FY 2025.
Question. Please provide a list of recipients and amounts.
Answer. The Department is not currently considering the use of
emergency funds appropriated for the FMF account in FY 2025.
__________
[all]