

**ARMS CONTROL AND TRANSFORMING
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 24, 2026

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



Available via <http://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2026

63-909 PDF

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TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 2026

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick, Barrasso, Cruz, Scott, Cornyn, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Van Hollen, and Rosen.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO**

The CHAIRMAN. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. This morning we have an interesting agenda, and before we do we want to welcome all our guests, the public. We are glad to have you always. We do have a zero-tolerance policy for interruptions or attempts to communicate. But other than that we are glad to have you, glad to have you here, and glad to have everybody's participation.

I am going to give an opening statement and then yield to the ranking member who will do so, and then we will hear from our witness, and after that we will open it up to a round of questions.

Mr. Under Secretary, thank you so much for being here today to discuss an incredibly important issue, and that is arms control. A timely issue given the President's actions in Iran to address a near-nuclear-capable adversary which one could argue is indeed arms control.

The military action in the Middle East has highlighted what the United States must do to protect the American people from the imminent threat of an adversary and the danger of nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. As we all know, having nuclear weapons in the wrong hands is very, very dangerous for the entire planet.

President Trump is rightly taking care of the Iranian nuclear capabilities, but as you know, Iran is not the only country of concern.

We are now, for the first time, in a multipolar nuclear landscape. It is a landscape where the U.S. is facing two nuclear near-peer competitors in Russia and China, in addition to rogue States with nuclear ambitions, which are a very, very concerning problem.

As you have rightly noted before, we are at an inflection point, and a changing landscape requires a change in policy.

The expiration of the New START Treaty with Russia was not just a symbolic milestone. By the way I supported that and urged the President to terminate. It was the recognition that we have more than one nuclear threat to the American people, and nuclear agreements of days gone by no longer meet the needs of our Nation. If our adversaries are building nuclear stockpiles, we unfortunately must do so as well.

I know you agree that any future agreement must be verifiable, enforceable, and inclusive of developing nuclear powers. A treaty with only Russia will not protect American interests.

But building this kind of broad nuclear agreement will not be easy. Russia is a serial treaty violator, and that is putting it kindly. It has failed to uphold its end of virtually every treaty that it has signed.

And China too is violating its treaty obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal of any nuclear-armed State. This is a dangerous time, but fortunately we have an Administration that is up to the task.

President Trump has stated clearly that future arms control must address both Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals.

And Secretary Rubio has laid out three foundations for any new arms control agreements that, I think, are spot on and worth noting here, as are most things Secretary Rubio does.

First, arms control can no longer be a bilateral issue between the United States and Russia. It must include China to be even remotely effective.

Second, we will not accept terms that harm the United States or ignore nations who do not follow through on agreements in the pursuit of a future agreement. It is pointless. Listen up, Russia.

And third, we will always negotiate from a position of strength. We are the United States of America, and we will act like it.

We need a credible, modernized nuclear program that deters our enemies from ever trying to intimidate us with their own nuclear weapons. But we need to do this while “pursuing all avenues to fulfill the President’s genuine desire for a world with fewer of these awful weapons,” as the Secretary has noted.

Early in this Administration, President Trump directed a landmark transformation of the State Department to reduce bureaucracy and structural inefficiencies that got in the way of effective foreign policy. The organization you lead is now able to align arms control, security assistance, emerging threats, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics policies all under one roof to support America’s national interests.

As the inaugural Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, I hope that you will use this opportunity to provide this committee with an update on the reorganization and the state of our nuclear programs and negotiations, as much as can be done in an open setting.

Thank you for your service and that of your family.

And I will now turn it over to the ranking member, Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE**

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome Under Secretary DiNanno. Now that I know about your history, I will consider you an honorary Granite stater. So, we are delighted to welcome you to the hearing today.

Last Thursday, almost 3 weeks into this war against Iran, the administration pushed through more than \$16 billion in arms sales to the Middle East, and they did that by using emergency authority to bypass normal congressional review. What we know is that our Gulf partners are burning through interceptors at a staggering rate, using in a day what the United States produces in a year. We met with a number of our Gulf partners last week and heard that they are concerned about the availability of munitions.

This is an emergency with respect to our munitions and weapons, I believe. And I think it is one driven by a lack of planning and a clear strategy. The United States is running through munitions as well here at home. In some cases, we have only about a quarter of the interceptors we need. I have been in briefings, and it is still not clear what the end goal of the war in Iran is. Without a clear end goal, we are making real tradeoffs about where our resources go.

We have seen these tradeoffs are already showing up in Ukraine, where it continues to adapt and is currently advancing against Russian forces. But U.S. support has become less predictable, and allies are increasingly stepping in to purchase or backfill American-made arms.

According to Ukrainian officials, over 80 percent of their strikes are now carried out by drones. The battlefield is moving toward autonomous systems and drone swarms. In fact, Senator Kaine and I just were in a hearing that was classified, but is going to become open, but it was about how we are developing some of those developmental munitions, which are what we have been seeing in Ukraine, and among our adversaries in Iran, from Russia, from China. But unfortunately, the support that we have in the U.S. is not keeping pace.

And it does not stop with Ukraine. The broader security environment is becoming more dangerous. Russia is expanding and modernizing its nuclear capabilities. As we know, the Chairman alluded to the New START Treaty that has been suspended and that ends inspections and provides increasing uncertainty. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, moving them closer to NATO and raising the risks. And we are hearing from a number of our NATO partners who are very concerned that within the next 5 years Russia intends to advance on a NATO country. It is also testing new underwater nuclear systems that are harder to track and control.

At the same time, China is also rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities. It is constructing more than 300 new missile silos, and it is growing its arsenal with little transparency and outside any arms control framework.

And at the same time, the arms control framework that has helped manage these risks is breaking down. Talks on future arms control arrangements have stalled.

There is broad agreement that a multilateral approach that includes Russia and China is best. But, as we know, that is not viable right now. And China has consistently opposed joining such negotiations. In practice, that gives China an effective veto over progress that we could make with Russia and on other fronts. Waiting for perfect conditions while things are moving in the wrong direction is not a plan.

Mr. DiNanno, the Bureau of Arms Control and International Security has gone through a major reorganization that was supposed to bring clarity and focus. I hope we will hear this morning how you are approaching this and what is guiding your decisions.

I look forward to hearing your perspective. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Now, Mr. DiNanno, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS G. DINANNO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. DiNANNO. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I am honored to be the first Under Secretary appointed to lead what is known as the new and expanded “T” family since the State Department was reorganized in July 2025.

The reorganization consolidated the Department’s international security functions, expanding the “T” family from three to five bureaus, and assigned three offices to our broad portfolio. I serve as the Senior Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for U.S. policies on nonproliferation, arms control, and international security. Our team works on critical national security matters, ranging from preventing the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction to countering terrorism and international narcotics to approving arms sales and security assistance to U.S. partners and allies worldwide.

When I was before you as a nominee, almost a year ago, I committed to seeking verifiable and enforceable arms control agreements that enhance America’s national security. I have used each day of my first months as the Under Secretary to advance that very goal.

Perhaps less publicly known than other State Department roles are the vast responsibilities that fall under the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. We oversee nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons issues, export controls, sanctions enforcement, and treaty verification. We drive interagency policy processes, coordinate closely with the War Department and other Federal agencies, and represent the United States in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings, including the critical trilateral AUKUS arrangement.

“T” family personnel largely consist of civil service experts. Our staff possess deep knowledge, and technical competencies that are relevant to a vast range of international security concerns. We leverage our inhouse expertise of technologists, like seismologists, nuclear physicists, counter-drone experts, and aviation experts, to fulfill an extensive array of “T” family responsibilities. We also ne-

gotiate, implement, and rigorously verify an array of international arms control and disarmament agreements on behalf of the Secretary of State and President Trump.

One such treaty at the top of many minds is New START, which expired last month. The Treaty was ineffective and only constrained the United States, allowing Russia to build and maintain a vast theater-ranged nuclear arsenal. New START was a bilateral treaty that had no impact on the nuclear weapons programs in China or any other States. New START no longer served the national interest of the United States, and its expiration opened up a new era for us to pursue President Trump's vision for an improved and modernized agreement.

Although the work of our team may often be invisible to the public, our wide-ranging responsibilities are essential to keeping Americans safe at home and abroad. I will share just a couple of quick examples with you.

In January, members of our Emerging Threats Bureau traveled to Antarctica to inspect foreign research stations and to verify the absence of any military activity associated with the Antarctic Treaty system. Our Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement operates a high-value rewards program that offers financial incentives and information, bringing major criminals, corrupt officials, and transnational criminal networks to justice.

The Counterterrorism Bureau supports Secretary Rubio's designations of foreign terrorist organizations, including terrorist actors and cartels, like the Muslim Brotherhood and Tren de Aragua. Since January, when President Trump took office, the Counterterrorism Bureau has designated nearly 30 foreign terrorist organizations, including 15 narcoterrorist cartels.

Another significant "T" family office is our Political-Military Affairs Bureau that has recently cut regulations, streamlined approval processes, and the number of restricted government-to-government transfers by over a third, as a part of the administration's priority to jumpstart the U.S. industrial base and remove outdated regulations.

Similarly, our AUKUS partnership helps strengthen both U.S. security and prosperity by securing significant Australian investments to uplift our submarine industrial base in an important arrangement with the United Kingdom and Australia.

We work day in and day out to make America safer, more prosperous, and more secure, by modernizing arms control, countering adversaries, and protecting America's technological and military advantages, and we will continue to deliver measurable results to the American people.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. DiNanno follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS G. DINANNO

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members of this committee—thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. It is a pleasure to be back in front of this committee, and an honor to be appearing for the first time as the confirmed Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

When I was before you as the nominee almost a year ago, I committed to you that as Under Secretary, I would seek verifiable and enforceable arms control agree-

ments that enhance American national security. Without those two components of an arms control arrangement—or the political will to address noncompliance—we are only pursuing the illusion of security. I committed to advancing agreements that prioritize U.S. national security, strengthen those that don't, and reassess our participation in any agreement that constrains the United States or our interests. Sitting before you today, I can attest that I am keeping up with my commitments.

Last month, New START expired. That may have been concerning for some of you, and welcome news to others. The fact of the matter is: the Treaty was always destined to expire. There was no mechanism within the Treaty that would have allowed for its extension—the Biden administration enacted its full extension provision in 2021. But even if extension was an available option, I still would have come before you to discuss why New START was no longer in the national interest.

As I stated in my remarks in Geneva last month, New START was a vestige of a security environment totally disconnected from the realities of today. Some might even argue that it was already largely obsolete even when it entered into force back in 2010. Why? Because two of its greatest flaws—though certainly not its only two—were that it failed to capture Russia's non-strategic, or theater-range, capabilities and it failed to account for China's nuclear weapons program at all. Even when New START was being negotiated, the United States was at a significant disadvantage with respect to Russia's theater-range systems; indeed, an intolerable disadvantage. I know some of you here raised those very concerns when advice and consent for New START was being debated.

Chairman Risch, I know you understood this challenge and that's why you introduced an amendment that would have acknowledged the interrelationship between non-strategic and strategic offensive arms and that "the disparity between the Parties' arsenals could undermine predictability and stability." Opponents of your language argued that New START set the stage for limits on Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. That argument did not hold up well, as we have seen. But perhaps New START's expiration now sets the stage to address these capabilities through clear-eyed talks and negotiations.

Most critically, China used the opportunity of legally binding U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenal constraints to begin expanding its own nuclear arsenal at a historic, unprecedented pace. In other words, New START's inadequacies were compounded by the emergence of a third, near-peer nuclear rival whose ascendance was enabled by the Treaty itself. Arms control is only one part of my portfolio, expanded as it was by this summer's Department re-organization.

Introduction

I have the honor of being the first confirmed Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security overseeing the new "T" Under Secretariat, which was reorganized in July 2025 to implement Secretary Rubio's vision for efficient international security affairs focused on core national security issues and President Trump's America First foreign policy. This new portfolio expands what is internally called the "T" Family with two additional bureaus, now totaling five under my purview, plus three offices. The "T" Family reorganization was designed to unite the State Department's primary security assistance and security diplomacy functions. It is my goal and challenge to steer the integration and collaboration of bureau missions, abolish fragmented efforts, and stimulate innovative approaches to address multi-dimensional security challenges. This realignment has strengthened the Department's international security functions. We have made much progress since this summer's re-organization and will continue to integrate our operations in the coming months and years.

Whereas the "T" Family previously consisted of three bureaus—the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS), the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), we now have five bureaus: a long overdue merger of the arms control and nonproliferation bureaus into the newly established Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (ACN); the realignment of the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) into the "T" Family; the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as well as the newly established Bureau of Emerging Threats (ET). There is also the Office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor, a unified T Family Executive Office, and a centralized Outreach office focused on congressional, media, and public relations functions.

While the Department's reorganization was an expansive endeavor, I believe the new "T" Family was one of its most impactful and strategic transformations. All told, I now oversee ten programs, and with the support of Congress expect to program almost \$9 billion of FY 2025 foreign assistance funding. Including diplomatic engagement funding, this comes to a combined annual budget of \$9.1 billion.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Under Secretary Rubio's leadership, the State Department has become leaner and more efficient, but also better aligned and suited to meet the challenges of today. In my address to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last month, one of my central themes on arms control applies to what this Administration has sought from its State Department reorganization. That is the theme of being "fit for purpose."

The old State Department was dated and static—designed to address diplomacy and national security, but sclerotic and slow moving and thus unable to best address the challenges of today's security environment. One of the most relevant and important undertakings of the reorganization was the merger of the ADS and ISN bureaus. It is often said that disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same coin. In the old Department, these two bureaus were often at odds with each other. Today, these functions are integrated, aligned, and complementary under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Yeaw.

ACN leads the charge in implementing several of President Trump's executive orders to advance U.S. leadership in nuclear energy, American airspace security, and drone technology. The bureau makes America more secure by preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and destabilizing advanced conventional weapons and related technologies. ACN protects both our national security and American industry through robust export controls, expanding the peaceful use of U.S. nuclear technology with the highest safety, security and non-proliferation standards, and encouraging international partners to do more to address malign proliferation threats.

The bureau also spearheads diplomatic efforts to increase global stability, reduce unintentional escalation, strengthen the enforcement of international bans on chemical and biological weapons, and implement the President's call to achieve a better agreement on nuclear arms control through strategic stability dialogues. The President has been incredibly clear and consistent on his ultimate objective of a world with fewer nuclear weapons. The New START treaty was not fit for purpose for today's security environment and was fundamentally flawed—particularly as it allowed China's unconstrained, rapid, and opaque nuclear buildup. ACN will play an important role in the future of nuclear arms control. Likewise, the President made a clarion call to action on the biological weapons convention (BWC) during his speech at the UN in September: in addition to seeking to end the development of biological weapons, the President called for strengthening the enforcement of the BWC. Our team in ACN has been working diligently in the Department and with other agencies to bring these efforts to bear.

In just over six months since the merger, ACN has already achieved some key successes. We have entered into force one 123 agreement on civil-nuclear cooperation while completing negotiations with five additional partners, directly in support of Executive Order 14299. The bureau has also secured signature of five nuclear cooperation MOUs and two intergovernmental agreements to advance cooperation with those partners on civil nuclear power programs. Not only does this help us ensure that these countries will adhere to our strict standards for safety, security, and nonproliferation, but the commercial deals these agreements allow will be lucrative for U.S. nuclear industries and American workers.

ACN has also helped strengthen and speed up how the United States vets visas to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive U.S. technologies. In 2025, such visa denials increased by over 100 percent—mainly for Chinese nationals. We've also issued over 100 demarches to interdict shipments that would aid malign actors in producing illicit missiles; prevented diversion of hundreds of millions of dollars of technology and dual-use goods to adversaries; protected U.S. technology and defense investments from predatory foreign acquisition—particularly by China; and helped partner countries establish foreign direct investment screening that aligns with U.S. national security interests to create a safer environment for American investment abroad. ACN also worked with our PM bureau to reform unmanned aerial systems (UAS) licensing policy to make these regulations easier for U.S. industry to compete globally, while at the same time, more difficult for adversaries to elude our non-proliferation objectives.

We are also in the process of engaging with other nuclear weapon states to advance the President's call for multilateral strategic stability and arms control. We have already made significant progress and have garnered widespread praise and support from other countries for our sound and seminal approach to nuclear arms control. No one can say that the United States has not made an effort to realize a world with fewer nuclear weapons and to honor our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, obligation to negotiate in good faith. We need active and willing partners, and we will continue to use the levers and tools at our disposal to achieve the President's objective.

As we pursue arms control, we are also strengthening deterrence. ACN is helping secure Indo-Pacific and European partners' commitment to increased burdensharing and coordination to strengthen extended deterrence and deter aggression. It cannot be lost on our allies—or our adversaries—that the United States will remain committed to our extended deterrence partners. ACN also is diligently addressing threats from chemical and biological weapons. We continue seeking ways to strengthen the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and uphold the norm against chemical weapons use. We aim to help the organization maintain its credibility while also advancing the mission to destroy any remnant of the Assad-era chemical weapons program. We are leading the charge on strengthening enforcement of the BWC and trying to make the President's vision of an AI verification system for the treaty a reality—not sometime in the distant future, but in the very near term. As I said in my nomination hearing: for these arms control treaties and agreements to be effective, they must be verifiable and enforceable.

Bureau of Counterterrorism

Secretary Rubio's decision to include the Bureau of Counter Terrorism in the T family helps the Department break down bureaucratic silos and prioritize efficient and rapid response to threats. The T Family can now integrate counterterrorism with related security functions to coordinate responses to modern threats like terrorism, proliferation, transnational crime, and malign technology use.

CT delivers security for Americans at home and abroad using the appropriately expanded tools provided by President Trump's executive orders. In implementing E.O. 14157 on designating cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), for example, CT has contributed to the Department's designation of 15 new organizations, including Cartel de los Soles, Tren de Aragua, and Clan del Golfo. These designations enhance the U.S. government's ability to protect Americans by disrupting cartel financing, restricting their travel, and enhancing partner law enforcement's suite of tools. CT also implements the E.O. 14161, "Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats," to ensure that known and suspected terrorists are added to the U.S. Terrorist Watchlist and to share this information with select foreign governments to prevent attacks before they occur. Broadly speaking, CT urges countries to use all tools available to deter terrorist groups, such as through watchlisting and working with law enforcement to detect and deter material support or terrorist travel.

By leading the Department's efforts to designate Iranian proxies—including Ansarallah (Houthis) and Iran-aligned militia groups in Iraq—as FTOs, CT has isolated dangerous actors and strengthened the maximum pressure campaign against Iran. CT also works with partners to share information on the activities of these organizations; its diplomatic outreach has helped secure the EU and Australia's designations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), globalizing U.S. efforts to deny the IRGC the resources it needs to operate. CT has leveraged these designations to galvanize additional political action against Iranian-sponsored threats. It does this, for example, through Iran-focused technical exchanges with European, Latin American, and East Asian partners in the Countering Transnational Terrorism Forum. CT has also trained partners on maritime screening and interdiction efforts in the Red Sea, countering the Iran threat while shifting the burden to other concerned partners.

CT's work countering violence and destabilization from terrorists extends far beyond Iran into all areas of the globe, for example designating the Lebanese and Sudanese chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as FTOs and SDGTs in line with Executive Order 14362. CT also is leading international engagement on what our partners describe as a rise in far-left terrorism and extremism and has designated four Antifa-aligned groups in line with the National Security Presidential Memorandum 7. As I mentioned on this issue in Budapest last year, we must stop this destructive cancer before it metastasizes.

To further counter terrorist threats, CT ensures partners and allies carry their share of the global security burden through new, highly focused initiatives empowering foreign partners to stop terrorist travel, disrupt attacks, and protect U.S. citizens and interests. CT carefully oversees counterterrorism programs to train foreign law enforcement organizations to disrupt terrorist recruitment, attacks, transit routes, and apprehensions.

Emerging Threats

U.S. adversaries are developing and deploying advanced technologies in new and disruptive ways that threaten core American interests. Previously, the State Department did not anticipate or respond to how adversaries could weaponize technological

changes to undermine U.S. national security. The Bureau of Emerging Threats (ET) was created to close this gap and ensure the Department meets the demands of a 21st century security environment, in line with Secretary Rubio's calls for the Department to act at the speed of relevance. ET proactively identifies and addresses emerging threats at the nexus of technology and national security, leveraging diplomatic tools and interagency capabilities to counter adversary use of new technologies including in cyberspace, outer space, and undersea, as well as malicious uses of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing.

ET's remit is unbounded in terms of domain, extending from the entire tech stack to underseas to cyberspace to outer space. On space security, ET leads diplomatic efforts to mitigate adversarial weaponization and exploitation of space assets. This includes countering China's use of space-enabling infrastructure in third countries—such as in the Western Hemisphere—to provide Beijing with a security advantage over the United States. ET's work in this domain was demonstrated by the recent inspection of China's Zhongshan station in Antarctica to verify compliance with the Antarctic Treaty, the first U.S. inspection of Zhongshan since 2012. ET also advances the administration's priorities under Executive Order 14369, "Ensuring American Space Superiority," by encouraging allies and partners to invest in space security and shoulder their fair share of the collective burden.

On cybersecurity, ET leads the Department's efforts, alongside the Cyber and Digital Policy Bureau, to protect the United States against national security threats in cyberspace. In support of the President's new Cyber Strategy for America, the Bureau employs a proactive posture in a whole-of-government effort to disrupt, deny, and degrade adversary cyber aggression using our diplomatic toolkit and the full suite of U.S. government capabilities. ET also leads the Department in mitigating AI-related threats to national security—including promoting American AI security as the international gold standard and imposing costs on adversaries who engage in malicious behavior with AI systems.

In the undersea domain, ET uses diplomatic tools to disrupt, deter, and impose costs on adversary threats to critical undersea infrastructure like subsea cables and pipelines.

Through these and other efforts, ET keeps U.S. foreign policy at pace with technological change. It shifts the Department from a reactive posture against adversarial "Sputnik moments," to an anticipatory, strategic approach toward maintaining and advancing U.S. global power.

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

INL leads the Department's counternarcotics and anti-crime law enforcement efforts, which are top priorities for President Trump and Secretary Rubio. Through targeted security assistance, rewards and visa restrictions, and diplomatic engagement, INL delivers results that advance the America First agenda by degrading narco-terrorist organizations, disrupting drugs and crime harming American communities, and expanding U.S. strategic advantage and access in regions vital to U.S. national security.

INL enables U.S. and foreign law enforcement to dismantle cartels by depriving them of illicit proceeds, targeting their operations and leadership, and facilitating the arrest, prosecution, and extradition of key members and facilitators. One of INL's most successful tools is its support to 61 vetted units, where U.S. law enforcement agencies partner with foreign law enforcement units on operations and investigations with a U.S. nexus. Over the past year, these INL-supported vetted units resulted in the prosecution of 22 cartel operatives in Mexico and the arrest of FTO leaders across the Western Hemisphere.

INL protects Americans by countering the most significant drug and crime threats—disrupting U.S.-bound flows of illicit fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine as well as cyber-enabled crime and predatory schemes defrauding Americans of billions of dollars annually. In 2025, INL helicopters in Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru facilitated the eradication of 44,456 hectares of coca—approximately two-and-a-half times the size of Washington, D.C.; the seizure of 401 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base; the destruction of 3,250 drug laboratories; the incineration of 207 metric tons of precursor chemicals; the law enforcement missions that resulted in the capture or neutralization of more than 200 narco-terrorists; and the destruction of illegal mining equipment responsible for tens of millions of dollars in annual FTO and transnational criminal organization revenues.

INL ensures the United States is the security partner of choice by strengthening the border and maritime security of key partners, enhancing foreign law enforcement cyber capabilities, and providing trusted U.S. technologies to replace untrusted Chinese-origin alternatives. For example, in 2025, INL enabled Viet-

nameese maritime law enforcement agencies to triple patrols in their exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea in response to Chinese grey zone activity.

Political-Military Affairs

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) serves as the principal link between the Department of State and the Department of War, advancing U.S. national security objectives through diplomacy, defense trade, and security assistance. PM advances an America First foreign policy by safeguarding the homeland and preserving the United States' technological advantage through rigorous enforcement of export and acquisition controls, as well as defending U.S. technology from exploitation, diversion, or misuse. PM leverages security assistance to enable partners to defend against shared threats and shoulder more of the operational burden-sharing.

The bureau's work drives American prosperity by cutting regulations, streamlining acquisitions, and fast-tracking key cases. This ensures the United States remains a global leader in the national security innovation base, in line with Executive Orders 14265 and 14268. One of the most consequential reforms in the past year has been overhauling the list of items restricted to government-to-government transfers. After a thorough review, PM reduced this list by nearly a third, from over 125 items to 87, and narrowed controls to only the most sensitive sub-systems. We also updated our export policy for advanced Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or UAS, now treating requests for advanced UAS similarly to manned fighter aircraft to reflect technological advances and the needs of our partners. These changes ensure our partners get the capabilities they need to advance our mutual security objectives while protecting sensitive U.S. technologies.

PM also co-leads on "Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy" under Executive Order 14383 to align U.S. arms transfers with national security priorities and revitalize America's defense industrial base. Supporting over one million American jobs, this work links national security to economic growth and preserves the competitive advantages of the defense sector.

Beyond managing arms transfers, PM builds strong security partnerships and supports peacekeeping operations, aligning U.S. foreign policy and military strategies to promote global stability and protect American interests. Following a thorough review of U.S. security assistance under Executive Order 14169, PM has reprioritized key programs—including Foreign Military Funding, International Military Education and Training (IMET), Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs—Conventional Weapons Destruction (NADRCWD), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)—to advance the President's America First foreign policy agenda.

AUKUS

The FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act created the Office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor to lead robust diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The reorganization has allowed the AUKUS Senior Advisor to streamline regulatory processes across T bureaus and collaborate more seamlessly with the T Family. This has allowed the office to more effectively remove boundaries and red tape to rapidly deliver capabilities for the warfighter and wins for U.S. business. For example, the office has worked with the PM bureau to authorize a blanket Foreign Military Sales Third Party Transfer for the UK and Australia, expanding the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemption's practical use.

AUKUS has gained new momentum under President Trump's leadership and implementation is progressing rapidly, thereby strengthening the trilateral partnership as we move "full steam ahead." Last year, the partnership achieved significant milestones: Australia enabled a U.S. submarine to receive unexpected repairs before participating in an exercise, two U.S. submarines conducted maintenance visits in Perth, and the United Kingdom began its historic first foreign maintenance in Perth just last month and is increasing its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS directly supports America's national strategic interests by strengthening allied deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and enhancing burden sharing. The office advances several Executive Orders by supporting the restoration of the U.S. maritime industrial base (E.O. 14269), the modernization of defense innovation (E.O. 14265), and the improvement of the foreign defense sales system (E.O. 14268). For example, Australia has transferred \$2 billion to uplift our submarine industrial base, and Australian sailors are now serving on U.S. submarines and training at U.S. shipyards through Foreign Military Sales. The Office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing U.S. leadership, strengthening our alliances, and ensuring a secure and prosperous future for America and our partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

The T Family's reorganization and ongoing work directly advance the National Security Strategy by taking an America First approach to international security and arms control. We are advancing the Strategy's call for peace through strength by modernizing our arms control and nonproliferation efforts, countering adversaries' malign activities, and ensuring that American technological and military advantages are protected and expanded. T Family's integrated approach reflects the Strategy's emphasis on streamlining government and directing every element of national power on core U.S. interests. The T Family is delivering measurable results by protecting the homeland, supporting U.S. industry and innovation, and prioritizing U.S. security interests worldwide.

As we continue integrating into the new T Family, we will identify additional ways we can collaborate with other bureaus to align mission sets and priorities, making the Department more efficient and effective in implementing the Secretary's vision for a safer, more secure, and more prosperous America. We will provide strategic and targeted foreign security assistance that puts U.S. interests first. We will leverage U.S. leadership to advance our priorities while shifting some of the costs of these programs from the U.S. taxpayer to our international partners and will promote reforms in international organizations that have for too long taken U.S. contributions for granted. We will protect American technological superiority, economic competitiveness, and national security. And we will bring about an arms control renaissance that strengthens and modernizes the international arms control architecture to ensure it is fit for today's—and the future's—security environment.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you so much. We certainly appreciate your expertise here and great background on this. I agree with virtually everything you said, with one exception, and that is that you said that the New START Treaty did not restrain any country on the planet. I would disagree with that. It restrained us. We were the only ones that kept our word under that agreement, and as we know Russia was just totally loose under that.

Let me ask this. Obviously, China is a big question mark here. I do not think anybody would think that they are going to negotiate until they get peer status with us. Once they develop and produce enough nuclear material and arsenal, I think at that point they may be interested in talking. What is your view on that? Do you think when they get to peer status with us they will indeed want to sit down and talk?

Mr. DINANNO. Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you. The New START Treaty only constrained the United States.

Regarding the Chinese, I think first of all it is important to point out their international obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI, to engage in disarmament discussions, and they have refused to do that. We continue to press them on that.

Regarding the growth of their stockpile, as you said in your opening statement, we no longer view this as a bilateral problem. Even the New START number of 1,550 Russian strategic systems, combined with what is approaching 1,000 warheads, that 2,500 is already an asymmetry between the New START limit that the United States would be at, under 1,550.

So their incentive to engage with us, No. 1, it is their obligation, and No. 2, we have to work very closely with the War Department to understand that we are going to vigorously compete and modernize our deterrent to try to roll back the Chinese stockpile.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that. I guess I look a little further down the road even than that, and that is that I do not lay awake at night worrying about Russia using a nuclear weapon, nor for that matter China. Both of them are matured societies, far

enough to know that it is world destruction when someone presses the button for the first time. What I worry about are the rogue countries, or even non-State actors, that have an ambition to get a nuclear weapon and use it. And, of course, once one is used, who knows what that is going to set off.

So let's assume, for a minute, the best, and that is that once China gets to the point where it feels it can sit down and negotiate and reach a reasonable agreement, and Russia comes to the table, and the three of us get to a point where we have an agreement we can live with, what do you think that the possibilities are or the likelihood that the three of us together will then look to the other countries that have nuclear weapons and say, "Look, the three of us are going to help police the entire planet's arsenal of nuclear weapons." Do you think that is a reasonable possibility to look forward to in the future?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thanks for the question. I think it is certainly a possibility. I mean, I think it is important today to point out that we do participate in the P5, which is all the nuclear-weapon States—U.K., France, China, Russia, and the United States. I think the P5 can be an effective tool. I think it needs to be more effective and take on some of the challenges that we have laid out.

And I also think the point that you raise about real nuclear potential proliferation risks continue. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, for example, was formulated in 1974, the Australia Group, MTCR, our existing non-proliferation regimes are antiquated. They need to be modernized. And I think we have to recognize that across all nuclear-weapon States. I think this is also an issue we will discuss at length at the NPT Review Conference next month. But these are all issues very much in my mind, and I look forward to working through some of these issues with you.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. And I guess one of the reasons that I think as I think is the recent experience we had where war broke out between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed countries. One of those, Pakistan, the nuclear weapons are not even controlled by the government. They are controlled by the military, and that is an absolute recipe for disaster.

Something has got to be done about this. I mean, as I say, we look over the fence, we look at Russia, we look at China, but those are not nearly as big a threat, I think, to the planet as are the rogue actors. Your thoughts?

Mr. DiNANNO. Regarding India and Pakistan, look, there are a lot of issues. Our approach, as we laid out, as the President laid out, is broadly multilateral. It is an evolution from the trilateral approach of the prior Trump administration. And certainly, we would welcome discussions with both India and Pakistan. There are safety and reliability issues. There is lots for us to talk about, again, outside of the non-proliferation framework. So I think it is important we engage both countries, to your point, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I agree with that, and the President agrees with that. You noticed when that war broke out both he and the Secretary waded into that really, really quickly, and were instrumental in bringing that to an end very quickly. And they recognize the dangers that countries like this have, that possess nuclear weapons, particularly if two of them get into it with each other.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly agree with you that the threat, the more alarming threat, is probably from non-State actors and from countries that have not been part of a previous controlled regime around nuclear weapons. And I certainly agree with you, Mr. DiNanno, that we need a new way to think about it.

But we had a hearing here in December, where our witnesses, they had some disagreement, but I think there was general appreciation for the fact that if China is not willing to join discussions and Russia is, why would we not go ahead and start engaging with Russia, because they have more nuclear weapons right now than China does. What we have heard from some sources is that China does not intend to engage in nuclear talks until it is on parity on nuclear weapons with the United States.

So it seems to me that there would be some benefits as we are looking at upgrading the nuclear non-proliferation guidelines to going ahead and engaging with some of those countries that pose a concern for the United States. How do you answer that?

Mr. DiNANNO. We have not put any limits on our multilateral approach. It does not shut off any bilateral engagements that might lead to this multilateral approach.

Senator SHAHEEN. Are we engaging, however, in those? Because there is a difference between saying, yes, if somebody wants to come and approach us, we are happy to engage, and are being proactive about how we engage with other countries.

Mr. DiNANNO. Oh yes, ma'am. Again, as I mentioned earlier, our engagement in the P5 is ongoing. Again, that is always a challenge. But I think, like some of our other regimes, it needs additional attention and additional caregiving. And again, the Russians and the Chinese as well as the U.K. and France are all involved in these discussions, so that would be a multilateral venue. And again, we have not shut off any channel that would exist for bilateral engagement. Again, I think it is important that we keep all of our options open, and I think the President's policy has clearly done that.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. While I appreciate that the threat of nuclear weapons is a concern that has much greater ramifications, the reality we are seeing right now, whether it is in the war in Ukraine, in Iran, and other parts of the world where conflict is existing, is that warfare is changing and that the weapons are changing, and that the bigger threat right now may not be those nuclear weapons. It may be the other weapons that are being used.

We really pushed our European allies to step up on their own defense and on Ukraine, and they have. Right now they spend more than we do supporting Ukraine, and they are spending that money on American weapons. Are we in a position where we can actually deliver the weapons that they are buying from us?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thanks for the question, Senator. I think it is an important one, and I think it really shows why the reorganization of the State Department and putting all the bureaus that do international security together makes sense. Because I think in relation to our Political-Military Bureau and the work that we are doing to modernize our defense industrial base, we have released two executive orders. We work very closely with the War Department. As

part of the most recent executive order had announced that it wanted an executive council to stand up between the Commerce Department, the State Department, and the War Department, and that meeting took place within a month. That is unheard of bureaucratic speed, I can tell you.

Senator SHAHEEN. That does not make me feel better.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not a very high bar.

Senator SHAHEEN. No.

Mr. DiNANNO. The commitments to modernizing our defense industrial base could not be stronger. I heard it loud and clear during my confirmation process. The State Department's role here is to make sure that our regulatory approach does not constrain our allies and partners, that the demand signal from every part of the government, from this committee, from my leadership, was to move faster and to provide more capability.

I think our recent America First Arms Transfer Strategy is a really good iteration on that, that for our partners and allies around the world it might not always require our most exquisite platform, require an F-35, it might not require a Patriot system. But there are other systems that are certainly good enough, that complement existing U.S. posture in the region, and that can send a demand signal to industry to stand up other capabilities.

So again, the State Department piece of this is to open up the aperture, take on a little more risk, and move faster. It really is dwarfed by the reforms they are making in the War Department, and Under Secretary Duffey and his team are making drastic reforms. We work very closely with them. I am on a call with them weekly, driving change, driving integration.

So it is a priority for us, and again, I think it is not going to happen overnight, and it is not going to be easy or painless. I think we need to work together, the administration and the Congress. There may be some legislative relief we may need along the way here. But it is an absolute national security imperative, not only for the security of the United States but as well as our partners and allies. And I think this is what you are seeing play out.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCormick.

Senator MCCORMICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and Mr. DiNanno, thank you for being here.

You know, we are in the middle, obviously, of this active conflict with Iran, and Iran has a record of global menace and nuclear proliferation that is well established. But it is worth discussing now, I think, how we will monitor and evaluate Iran's nuclear, drone, and missile capabilities following the conclusion of the military campaign.

The recent launch of an Iranian missile on Diego Garcia now puts European capitals within direct range of the regime's missiles. In addition, the DIA concluded even prior to Operation Epic Fury that Iran had developed space-launched vehicles they could use to develop a military-viable ICBM by 2035, should Tehran decide to do so.

So first question to you is how are you engaging with our NATO allies to update their threat assessments and perceptions regarding

Iran, the missile threat, and what arms control regimes are viable to constrain Iran's ability to threaten Europe?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thanks for the question, Senator. On the first question, I just got back from Europe last week, having extensive meetings with the British and the French. I had multiple engagements with other NATO allies, the Germans, the Danish, the Dutch, the Polish, you name it. We are actively involved.

I was telling the staff earlier, this is really the bulk of my time and my job is to engage foreign partners. Certainly NATO is a huge part to that. And we need to be, again, extremely clear on our support to NATO. I think the President has been, and we need to continue to double down on that.

The second part of your question, I have given this a lot of thought. I am very troubled when I look across our non-proliferation regimes. They are all antiquated. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed in 1974. The MTCR in 1987. The Australia Group, which address chemical and biological threats, in 1985. This is my entire adult life. So we are trying to shove 2026, 2030, next-generation problem set into an old business model.

I am currently chairing a group inside the State Department on how to modernize, for example, the MTCR. I am personally overseeing that because it is a regime where we have to be extremely concerned that we are not constraining our allies and partners more than we are the adversary. And I think there are hard questions to ask.

So I look forward to working with you and your team on soliciting ideas. I do not want to predetermine the outcome of that engagement. There may very well be elements, and I am sure there will be, that we need to maintain. But it absolutely needs to be modernized.

Senator McCORMICK. Thank you. Yes, I agree with that. Also according to the Director of National Intelligence 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, Russia is developing anti-satellite nuclear weapons, which the intelligence community describes as the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture.

So, Under Secretary, how should the United States respond to the expanding threat of outer space weapons, challenges by peer and near-peer adversaries, and which arms control approaches, along with risk reduction measures, offer the most promise given the expiration of the New START Treaty?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thanks for the question, Senator. Again, very important question. Specifically to the Russian outer space system, I do not want to go into too much detail here in an open forum, but what I can say is that any deployment of that system would be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, directly focused on the arms control piece of it. The Russian exotic systems are getting crazy, even for the Russians. So I think the President's approach, and again, to the ranking member's earlier question about how there are bilateral as well as other multilateral ways to get at the problem, the answer is yes. That is obviously a system that diplomatically we would pressure aggressively, pressure the Russians, and I am sure it will come up in our P5 engagement, which is imminent.

So again, I do not want to talk too much more about the Russian capability in open forum, but certainly the exotic systems, the underwater system, the Poseidon, the Burevestnik, which is their nuclear-powered cruise missile, these are all systems that fall outside of New START, to your point, that we need to have a direct conversation with the Russians, and I am sure we will.

Senator MCCORMICK. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield my remaining 10 seconds.

The CHAIRMAN. We will gladly accept that, Senator.

Senator KAINE.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding this hearing. Just for the audience, the Senate uses a lot of acronyms. So we will talk about NATO and AUKUS and CDC. So “T” family, what is the “T” family at the State Department and what does it stand for? The T does not mean anything. It just historically has been called the “T” family. The functions within it are very important functions, and I am glad that the Chair has called this hearing so that we can explore.

Secretary DiNanno, you, in your opening comments, talked a little bit about a priority that is important to me and many on the committee, which is the AUKUS framework. This was a framework announced by President Biden. It has been worked on and supported in a bipartisan way by this committee. President Trump had a very productive meeting with the Australian PM last October about AUKUS, critical minerals, other issues. He came out of that meeting saying full steam ahead on AUKUS.

The NDAA that we did in Fiscal Year 2024 created the Office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor in the State Department as a primary integrator of the partnership. The senior advisors intended to streamline regulatory barriers to enable us to have this framework be all that it can be between the U.S., Australia, and the U.K.

So how are you attempting to empower that senior advisor position to develop and cement the AUKUS partnership?

Mr. DiNANNO. First, to your very important first point on “T”, the first Under Secretary’s name was Tom.

[Laughter.]

Mr. DiNANNO. If it is not, that is my name, so it is good for me.

Senator KAINE. I think that is classified information.

Mr. DiNANNO. And there is a State Department Historian that I actually work with, who is terrific, that I am going to ask that question.

Thanks for the AUKUS question. It is very important. No. 1, the AUKUS coordinator reports directly to me, so I see him every day. He is extremely experienced. His team is small but extremely knowledgeable on some of the details, the regulatory pieces that need to fall into place here.

Another data point that I think is important is just yesterday I met with the Australian coordinator, and last week I was in the U.K. meeting with the U.K. coordinator. The U.K. coordinator felt that we really talk a lot about Australia. We have the U.K. piece here too, as well. So we had an extremely productive discussion about the type of capabilities, understanding the geography, of course, and their footprint in NATO offers a little different flavor than, say, the Australia team.

So we have made some positive steps forward in AUKUS. I think, obviously, one is the MTCR. We look at UAVs now, Tier 1 UAVs as a manned aircraft instead of MTCR controlled. So that is a good start.

However, when you get into the actual agreement, some of the provisos that would be attached, I mean, it's like a fishing knot: The more you pull it apart, the more you figure out the more problems there are. So that is going to happen here—sort of looking at AUKUS as a bit of a canary in the coal mine on this regulatory reform, kind of pulling apart the knot here, we will take them one at a time.

I mentioned earlier, again, we are going through an MTCR review. I do not want to predetermine the outcomes. I will be happy when that is done to come back and talk to you about it. But I believe we will probably need some regulatory relief and legislative relief. So I would like to work with you and the committee on it.

The War Department has moved very smartly on this. We are anxiously awaiting some announcements on Pillar II. And another point here is the Excluded Technologies List. It is the other sort of 800-pound gorilla here. It needs to be a lot smaller.

Senator Kaine. Well, I like the progress. I just went to Australia in February. We did 37 events in 4 cities in 7 days, 35 of which were AUKUS related, to really kick the tires to see what the Aussies are doing by way of investment. We had hard questions for them; they had hard questions for us. It was a really good dialog.

One of the areas, just to put two on your radar screen, that continues to be important is the implementation of the ITAR reforms. And you were right to point out in your answer that we have got to get it right here because we may want to do similar partnerships with other allies. And to the extent that we figure out how to do ITAR reform right for AUKUS it will also make it easier to decide how to apply that with other allies.

Mr. DiNanno. One hundred percent, I concur.

Senator Kaine. And then on Pillar II, everybody is talking about what is marquee project, what is a signature project. It could be anything, but sometimes it makes it hard to focus on. Excited to hear that there may be some announcements forthcoming that will give it some focus.

Mr. DiNanno. We are getting closer.

Senator Kaine. I appreciate that.

I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. There is nothing to yield back, Senator. Thank you very much.

Senator Cornyn, you occupy the far end of the dais there, and that is the result of the idiosyncrasies of the arcane committee system here in the Senate. But I do not think there is anyone on this committee that has got a longer history of dealing with this subject or more seniority than you do. I appreciate hearing your thoughts on this.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Present company accepted between you and the ranking member.

Mr. Secretary, you certainly have an expansive portfolio. I do not know how you do it, but thank you for doing it. Senator Shaheen talked about the rapid rate which we are using various munitions

and counter-drone technology, counter-missile technology in the Middle East in the conflict with Iran. I know we all are concerned about our defense industrial base, but it also takes money to buy these munitions and this materiel.

The President is allegedly going to request \$400 billion in emergency supplemental for the Department of War, presumably to replenish a lot of this. Can you talk a little bit about the necessity of that, whether it is \$200 billion or some other figure, whatever the figure is, the necessity of Congress funding the effort to replenish these munitions and develop our industrial base where it should be?

Mr. DiNANNO. Senator, thanks for the question. First of all, I do the job because I have hundreds of dedicated State Department civil and foreign service officers that work for me. They are a really special group, and they work really hard.

Specific to your question, the specific supplemental I probably cannot speak to. I have not been part of those discussions. But I think broader, on modernizing the defense industrial base, to some of the points I was making earlier, the Foreign Military Sale reform has to be a priority. Uniquely, it has to be a partnership between the Federal Government, both the administration and the Congress, our allies and partners, as well as industry.

I think, again, this is a little bit outside of my purview at the State Department. The War Department has really leaned forward on this and is looking toward some extremely unique arrangements with industry on how to give some certainty to their investments. So I would defer the questions on those, what those look like, what those private sector and government arrangements look like, to bring more capabilities faster. Again, the State Department piece here is the regulatory piece.

I do not want to downplay it because it is important, and it can get in the way. Again, the demand signal that I have gotten, again, from across the committee to my leadership, is to open up the aperture and make more capabilities available. And again, the War Department and the administration are doing some extremely creative financing to bring more capabilities to our forces and to our partners and allies.

I am not sure that answers your question directly on the supplement, but I do not want to get that wrong.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. I just want to make the point that we are going to have to come up with the money to pay for it, Congress is, one way or the other.

The New START Treaty, I agree with the comments that you and others have made that Russia cheats, but also the President's determination to somehow bring China into those negotiations for any new arms control treaties in the future. What is it going to take to get China engaged, in your view?

Mr. DiNANNO. It is a great question, sir. Thank you. I think the President's broad view, and he has been extremely forward leaning on this, is he wants to see fewer nuclear weapons in the world, and that is a good place to start. Again, the problem with New START, again, not to repeat what we have already talked about, is that it only covered part of the Russian stockpile and none of the Chinese stockpile.

So I think there are two points to make here. Arms control and non-proliferation are one side of the coin. The other side of the coin, of course, is the War Department and the vigorous modernization effort, which is ongoing, that will bring new capabilities across the spectrum. I think 150 B-21s will get the Chinese attention. I think hundreds of LRSO will get their attention. Admiral Correll testified in front of the House Armed Services Committee, I think last week, and went through exactly what that modernization looks like.

I don't think anybody wants an arms race. I know the President does not. He has been very clear, he wants to see fewer nuclear weapons. But if the Chinese continue this breakout—and again, they are approaching parity, then this isn't a 2040 problem. It is very much becoming a 2030 problem—that we will compete vigorously across the spectrum of modernizing our nuclear forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, will you indulge one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman is most generous. Feel free.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the enriched uranium in Iran. Where is it? How big a concern is it to you? And what is your opinion about Iran's determination to continue developing a capacity to develop a nuclear weapon?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before you answer that question, is that answerable in the setting we are in?

Mr. DiNANNO. I can lay out some thoughts on it.

The CHAIRMAN. He asked for a specific location. I have been in an intel briefing on this and my sense is that there is—

Senator CORNYN. I will withdraw that part of the question.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. That will make it easier. Thank you.

Senator CORNYN. Certainly.

Mr. DiNANNO. Look, I think the administration's Iran policy was clear, and it did not start 3 weeks ago. President Trump issued NSPM-2 14 months ago, laid out a policy that Iran's nuclear program and their nuclear-capable missiles pose an existential threat to the United States, and that Iran can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. That was the U.S. policy 14 months ago, and it remains the U.S. policy today.

Again, to the Chairman's point on the uranium stockpiles, that active theater of operation will be with the War Department, and Central Command would be the folks to talk to directly about that. What we do at the State Department and inside the "T" family bureaus, we would support the IAEA. That engagement resides under me. But any of that would probably be after the cessation of hostilities. But I do not want to get out in front of, again, what is happening in the region there. That is the purview of the War Department.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Under Secretary DiNanno. I appreciated our earlier discussion on a number of these questions.

I wanted to ask primarily about the arrangements with Saudi Arabia. You mentioned in your testimony that five 123 Agreements have been struck. I believe that is Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Hungary, South Korea, and Armenia?

Mr. DiNANNO. [Inaudible.]

Senator MERKLEY. In your testimony you say that you have negotiated five 123 Agreements. I am assuming one of those is the Saudi Arabia agreement?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes. So the Saudi Arabia agreement has not been signed by the President yet. As you know, once the President signs it, if he signs it, that would be due to Congress.

Senator MERKLEY. Was that one of the five that you were referring to in your testimony, where you were talking about five different 123 Agreements?

Mr. DiNANNO. So the administration has laid out a goal of signing 20 123 Agreements.

Senator MERKLEY. I know that. I do not want to take a lot of time on this. I am just asking if Saudi Arabia is one of the five that you referred to in your testimony.

Mr. DiNANNO. I believe so.

Senator MERKLEY. OK. So it has not been signed, so that probably answers my next question, which is the associated Bilateral Safeguards Agreement probably has not been completed with Saudi Arabia, as well?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes. Again, once the agreement is signed I am happy to talk through those details. But until the President actually signs it—

Senator MERKLEY. My understanding has been, and I am referring to your November 24th report to Congress, you note Saudi Arabia's reservations about the additional protocol. And the three things that normally comprise the gold standard are the additional protocol that allows inspection of all nuclear sites, including ones that we are not directly involved in. And also no reprocessing and no enrichment.

Of those three things, do you think that any of those three might be included in the agreement with Saudi Arabia—no processing, no enrichment, and the inspection of all civilian nuclear sites, includes ones that are not directly our companies, if you will?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thanks for the question, Senator. Look, again, once the agreement is actually signed we can go through some of the details. Until it is signed, I do not want to go through the details. But what I can tell you is I think we will have a solid—and compliant with the Atomic Energy Act—non-proliferation approach, again, if this gets signed by the President. Whether it meets some of those data points or gold standard, again, it is pre-decisional for us to talk about that. Once it is signed and delivered I am happy to come back and answer all those questions.

Senator MERKLEY. OK. I will just express my concerns. I know you have already heard from me, but I will express them again here. And that is all the public reports are that none of those three things will be covered by the agreement with Saudi Arabia, and if they are not covered with Saudi Arabia—so they are able to reprocess or able to enrich, we cannot inspect sites, IAEA cannot inspect, and we cannot inspect sites that are other nuclear sites—it seems

to me the perfect setup for a potential proliferation. And also that once that standard is set, other nations find it very hard to agree to standards that Saudi Arabia has not agreed to.

As you and I discussed, you have, in the Islamic world, a major Shiite superpower, Iran. You have a major Sunni superpower, Saudi Arabia. And anything that Saudi Arabia gets in terms of not covering enrichment, not covering reprocessing, not covering the additional civilian nuclear sites for inspections, it makes it very hard for anyone else to ever agree to those.

I know you are saying there will be strong standards, but I guess count me concerned.

Mr. DiNANNO. If I could just respond quickly. Saudi Arabia is determined to develop a civilian nuclear program. I think the approach that we have, in the non-proliferation requirements inside Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which we will meet, and I am confident that we will have an extremely defensible non-proliferation program. And it is most important that that non-proliferation program is run by an American company and an American program as opposed to a Russian or Chinese program.

So again, I understand exactly what you are referring to. Again, I am happy to come back if we get the agreement signed and walk through some of those details. But I am supremely confident that we will have a non-proliferation footprint, again, should it get signed, that would more than meet the minimum standards in the Atomic Energy Act.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Hollen.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary DiNanno, good to see you. And I just want to underscore the concerns raised by Senator Merkley regarding reports that the administration is talking about going into a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia without the gold standard 123 standards. That, of course, is what we required of the UAE and other recent countries. And if we are really concerned about non-proliferation, it seems we should have the strongest standards.

You know, the Chairman mentioned, during his opening comments, the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, and of course, you have non-proliferation in your portfolio. You are familiar with DNI Tulsi Gabbard's recent testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, right? Are you aware that the DNI testified, just recently—

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes.

Senator VAN HOLLEN [continuing]. Before the Senate Intelligence Committee, and in her testimony she said, and I am quoting, "As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer"—of course, that was the operation that took place last year—"As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear enrichment program was obliterated." Do you contest that finding that was presented by the DNI?

Mr. DiNANNO. Sir, I am not in a position to revisit her testimony or the President's decision.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I am asking you about, right now, a comment that the DNI made. Are you privy to—you have non-proliferation in your portfolio. I would think that you are following this issue closely. Are you?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, I am happy to talk about the role that the bureaus that I oversee play in non-proliferation in regards to Iran. But again——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Well, do you agree with her statement—this was public testimony, and I am quoting again, “There have been no efforts since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability,” unquote. Do you disagree with that statement from the DNI?

Mr. DiNANNO. The intelligence community’s job is to inform policymakers. I am a consumer of intelligence. I am not a maker of intelligence in that sense. And——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Right. So, OK.

Mr. DiNANNO. You are provided, I believe, the intelligence community’s view to the policymaker. President Trump is the policymaker.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I understand that. That sort of goes without saying, but go ahead and say it. Joe Kent, who, as you know, resigned in protest, said that “all 18 of America’s intelligence agencies agreed that Iran had no capacity to develop a nuclear bomb.” As you say, you are a consumer of intelligence. Have you seen anything to dispute that statement?

Mr. DiNANNO. I do not want to respond to what one individual’s—I have not seen——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I am asking you about the intelligence community’s assessment, which DNI Gabbard testified publicly about.

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir. I am responding to your comment about the individual that you mentioned. I have not seen his comments. I do not follow his comments. And——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Well, you did not want to respond to my question about DNI Gabbard either.

Yes, I ask this because President Trump said, on March 4th, “if we didn’t hit them within 2 weeks they would have a nuclear weapon,” which is manifestly untrue, based on all the testimony we have seen from the intelligence community.

Let me turn to another issue. You are responsible for ensuring that U.S. arms transfers are consistent with the Trump administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, right?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. All right. And that policy requires that you consider the risk that a proposed arms transfer may contribute to violations of international humanitarian law, right?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. All right. Were you involved in assessing that risk in connection with the administration’s recent decision to invoke emergency powers to bypass congressional review and transfer over 20,000 bombs to the Netanyahu government?

Mr. DiNANNO. In response to the administration’s emergency declaration, if there is ever a circumstance that is an emergency, this would be it.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Mr. DiNanno——

Mr. DiNANNO. Let me just finish.

Senator VAN HOLLEN [continuing]. Not responsive——

Mr. DiNANNO. No, sir.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I did not ask you whether it was an emergency. I asked you——

Mr. DiNANNO. Like I said——

Senator VAN HOLLEN [continuing]. I asked whether you complied——

Mr. DiNANNO. I will finish my answer.

Senator VAN HOLLEN [continuing]. With that policy?

Mr. DiNANNO. If you let me finish, I am happy to answer your question, sir. That being said, I sat before the committee during my confirmation process and committed to working with the committee to follow the law. The law does allow for the emergency exemption. That is why we used it.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I am not asking you about——

Mr. DiNANNO. I understand that, but I think the context is important, sir.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I know because I submitted a question for the record and you said you would comply with CAT policy. So now I am asking you whether you were involved in reviewing the transfer of 20,000 bombs to the Netanyahu government, with respect to compliance with the CAT policy.

Mr. DiNANNO. Any foreign military sale that we do would fall underneath the Conventional Arms Transfer policy.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Did you personally review that assessment?

Mr. DiNANNO. Again, Senator, the emergency declaration——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. No, not the emergency declaration. Did you review the assessment regarding whether or not that transfer of 20,000 bombs complied with the CAT policy?

Mr. DiNANNO. Everything that we do complies with the law.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Were you personally involved in that review?

Mr. DiNANNO. I was involved with the transfer, and anything that we would do would be consistent with our CAT policy, which is compliant with the law.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. So I am going to take it as a no, that you did not personally review whether or not that transfer complied with CAT policy. Did you personally review that?

Mr. DiNANNO. You can take it any way you want.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Well, did you?

Mr. DiNANNO. I have already told you I was involved with the policy. I oversee the Political-Military Bureau.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. OK. Did you personally review——

Mr. DiNANNO. I review hundreds of arms sales. I signed hundreds of them. The emergency declaration, again, it was consistent with the law, and most importantly, I think it is important for the committee that we lay out we are not trying to establish a new norm, that we will continue to address on a case-by-case basis, look at emergencies if they exist, just like the Biden administration did in 2023.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I will finish——

Mr. DiNANNO. Use the same authority——

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I am not——

Mr. DiNANNO. Sir, let me finish my comment.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I am not asking you about the emergency order.

Mr. DiNANNO. I know. I am trying to address your concern.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. No you are actually not.

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir, I am.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Are you concerned that Israeli Defense Minister Katz said, with respect to Lebanon, that they were going to use the “rafah” model in Gaza? Does that concern you?

Mr. DiNANNO. I am not familiar with that comment.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Right. It is a matter of public record. Could you take a look at it and get back to me—

Mr. DiNANNO. I would be happy to.

Senator VAN HOLLEN [continuing]. And let me know if that concerns you?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir. I am happy to look at it.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ricketts.

Senator RICKETTS. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Last week, NVIDIA said that it had been licensed for many customers in China for its advanced AI chip, the H200, and had received purchase orders from “many companies,” in quotes. On January 13th, the Department of Commerce rule governing the H200 license process, which the State Department plays a role in as a reviewing agency, contains various end-use certification requirements.

For instance, the exporter must certify the chips will not be used for military, intelligence, or weapons of mass destruction. However, given Beijing’s military-civil fusion, that seems difficult, if not impossible, to certify. Currently, Communist China is so computer-constrained that it continues to resort to smuggling U.S. AI chips and distilling from U.S. models just to remain competitive. As evidence of this, on Thursday the Justice Department charged three people with diverting \$2.5 billion worth of servers with NVIDIA AI chips to Communist China.

Under Secretary DiNanno, is it your understanding that Communist China is pursuing a civil-military fusion strategy, whereby it has eliminated any barriers between its commercial and defense sectors to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thank you, Senator, for the question. So the State Department role and the bureaus that I oversee specifically in regards to export control enforcement, we had direction from the President to support this chip sale to China, with the caveat, and an important caveat, that we would only do so by establishing—I am trying to remember the President’s exact phrasing on this—strong national security. And that is exactly what the Non-Proliferation Bureau that reports to me does. I cannot talk about the specific licenses per se, but we have reviewed, and continue to review, to apply the highest standards, to look at all the intelligence and all the derogatory information that we may find and push that into the decision process. Ultimately—I am sorry, sir.

Senator RICKETTS. Well, I was going to say, because I am talking about the China civil-military fusion. You have heard of that term before, right?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir.

Senator RICKETTS. All right. And I have not asked you about a specific license yet, so let's talk about it at a high level. How would you be able to certify that a technology that may have dual-use—like, I don't know, say, a high-end AI chips—would be able to be used for only one purpose versus going into some of the other things that, again, the license has to prescribe. So it cannot go into weapons of mass destruction or intelligence or something like that. How can you possibly certify that if they have got this military-civil fusion?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes. So the review process is extensive. It is informed by the best intelligence that we have available from the intelligence community. And all off that, any derogatory information would go into sort of our decision process, whether or not we would recommend approval or not. Ultimately, your concern is noted, and I think it is important. But looking at each individual entity with an extremely high bar, again, the bar that the President himself set, and that is the bar that we implement, that I oversee and implement, is that high national security standard. And part of that would be to address the diversion risk.

Senator RICKETTS. OK. So the ability to design and produce an advanced AI chip lies at the heart of our technology competition with Communist China. Currently, Communist China cannot manufacture these chips without U.S. and allies' semiconductor manufacturing equipment, or SME. As a result, export controls on SME represent one of our most significant points of leverage with Beijing. At present, U.S. companies are barred from selling certain SME to Communist China.

For the past several years we have prioritized diplomacy with allies, to convince them to match our same level of controls. However, our allies' controls are still not as stringent, and foreign companies are able to continue filling orders for critical tools to Communist China and providing support. This misalignment uplifts Chinese shipmaking capabilities, helps Communist China maintain existing advanced allied tools, and shifts markets away from American firms. And given that AI is dual-use and contributes to enhanced capabilities for the PLA, posing a serious national security threat, do you agree that ensuring our allies have fully aligned their export controls on SME to ours is critical for national security?

Mr. DiNANNO. Senator, thanks for the question. We have extremely active diplomacy with our allies. We have programs of information-sharing engagement, the Non-Proliferation Bureau, which I oversee, actively seeks out and trains, attempting to raise the standards of potential weak spots or potential partners that we felt that we needed to raise their standards. So not only do we actively engage with, again, I would characterize it as traditional allies, but it is very important that we raise the standards across the board, that across the countries that might be involved in that supply chain. And we have active programming that does that.

Senator RICKETTS. Well, this issue is why I am planning to introduce the Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware, or MATCH, Act, to harmonize export controls on SMEs to Communist China with our allies. The MATCH Act will ensure that if an adversary cannot build a tool themselves, they will not

be able to buy it from the U.S. or our partners. I hope that my colleagues will join me in this effort so that the United States and not Communist China can lead the world in AI.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, because I know you have been very active in this area, and it is of absolutely critical concern, not only what we sell to them but also what our allies, such as the Netherlands, sell to them. That is absolutely critical, too. Thank you. Thank you for your work in that regard.

With that, Senator Rosen.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, for today's hearing, and thank you, Mr. DiNanno, for joining us today.

I want to go and talk about Nevada a little bit, because the Nevada National Security Site, the NNSS, was ground zero for the vast majority of the United States explosive nuclear testing from 1951 to 1992, during which there were 100 atmospheric tests and 828 underground tests conducted. Nevada's downwind communities suffered from these exposures, and they are still waiting for justice and compensation.

Today the NNSS plays a critical role in certifying the liability, safety, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile, but without—without, I am going to emphasize that, I could say it 100 times—without the need for explosive testing. So you can imagine my surprise when President Trump and others, such as Assistant Secretary Yeaw, suggested that the U.S. should resume explosive nuclear testing.

Mr. DiNanno, what is the State Department's position on explosive nuclear testing, and if President Trump were to order a nuclear test, how do you expect Russia or China to respond? What about other countries with nuclear weapons? And how would we manage the inevitable damage that this is going to cause to your efforts to pursue multilateral arms control and risk reduction measures?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thank you, Senator. Let me start by saying the President has laid out a view that I elaborated on, and Assistant Secretary Yeaw elaborated upon, where the President instructed the War Department and the Energy Department to test on an equal basis with our adversaries. The backdrop of that is important to understand, that both the Russians and the Chinese are testing at yield.

Senator ROSEN. And I can tell you that in our U1a Complex [*renamed: Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation (PULSE)*] and the radiographic things that we have there and the new kinds of technology we have, we have adequately, without explosive testing, ensured the capabilities of our nuclear stockpile.

Mr. DiNANNO. So thank you, Senator. Look, a couple of points to make. No. 1, we are still assessing. We have made no decision specifically on how or what any testing program would look like, so that is pre-decisional. If the administration comes to that decision I would be happy to come back and talk to you.

Senator ROSEN. You better come back and talk to me, because the people of Nevada and the people of Utah and the people all

around you think what happens in Nevada, with an explosive test, stays in Nevada?

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, ma'am.

Senator ROSEN. Because it sure doesn't.

Mr. DiNANNO. I think you are referring to any potential atmospheric testing.

Senator ROSEN. They cratered the ground in Nevada——

Mr. DiNANNO. Ma'am——

Senator ROSEN [continuing]. And let me tell you, there is groundwater—it does not go away.

Mr. DiNANNO. Let me answer your concern if I could. I have not been in any discussions where open atmospheric testing has been under consideration. The testing, any testing, is under consideration. It is currently pre-decisional. But the President has laid out, and I think it is important to understand, that the United States——

Senator ROSEN. Well, it is important to understand that he better come talk to us in Nevada if he is planning to do that.

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, ma'am.

Senator ROSEN. Because the people in Nevada have a stake in that.

Mr. DiNANNO. I understand.

Senator ROSEN. The people of Utah have a stake in that. And I will look at everybody, Idaho, right above us, Texas. The wind, everything goes around this country. Trust me.

Mr. DiNANNO. I understand that, ma'am, and I appreciate your concern.

Senator ROSEN. I will move on to something else.

Mr. DiNANNO. Hold on. I want to address that. I think it is important. You are talking about the wind. There is no discussion that I have been a part of that any atmospheric testing would take place. Again, the Chinese and Russian programs are underground. They are at yields that I cannot talk too much about in this open hearing. But, for example, the Chinese underground testing program would be in the hundreds of tons. No discussion, again, that I have been part of, would in any way talk about winds or downrange. I have heard nothing to that effect.

Senator ROSEN. Well, you would understand my——

Mr. DiNANNO. Of course I would. Yes, ma'am.

Senator ROSEN [continuing]. Concern about the need for a visual——

Mr. DiNANNO. Of course.

Senator ROSEN [continuing]. The sight of the ground cratering in. And we have made millions and billions of dollars of investments in radiographic and other technology, using math, using physics, using science, to be sure that we ensure the integrity of our nuclear arsenal. We have been very specific in that. And I am glad to take you down there if you have not been to see what they are doing and how they are doing it, before you enter into more of these discussions.

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, ma'am. I would happily go there. I know what they do there. And again, I think it is extremely important to understand that the Russian and Chinese systems, the Russians and Chinese are testing at yield. That creates an intolerable dis-

advantage for the United States by not testing. And again, I have heard no discussion of any sort of atmospheric testing whatsoever.

Senator ROSEN. Well, I tend to disagree with you, but I yield. Thank you.

Senator RICKETTS [presiding]. Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find it troubling that the United Kingdom is prepared to transfer the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius, a deal that is straightforwardly dangerous to U.S. interests. Mauritius is closely aligned to Beijing, and the transfer gives China leverage over one of our most strategic military assets, significantly impacting our ability to operate from Diego Garcia.

I have argued that giving the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius is in direct violation of the United Kingdom's treaty commitments to the United States, where the United Kingdom agreed to keep the base under British control and out of foreign control. President Trump has been pressing back very hard against this deal for months.

Yet there are serious concerns that elements within the State Department continue to support it, even as Iran targets Diego Garcia with ballistic missiles. Public reporting indicates that support for this agreement originated within the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, and that State doubled down in a February statement, announcing a PM delegation to Mauritius.

So let me ask you directly. Do you support the Chagos Island deal between the United Kingdom and Mauritius?

Mr. DiNANNO. Thanks for the question, Senator. I think the President has been pretty clear, and obviously I follow the President's policy lead, specific to Diego Garcia the most important thing that we have, and we have to have, and I agree with your assessment on the potential concerns with the Chinese, as well. But the preservation of Diego Garcia as a forward operating base for the U.S. military, again, slightly outside of my purview, is without question the priority of the administration and of the State Department.

Senator CRUZ. So I agree with you that the President has been quite clear, but I would like to get you explicitly on the record with a yes or no answer. Do you support the Chagos Island deal between the United Kingdom and Mauritius?

Mr. DiNANNO. Again, I am unclear as to the current state of the negotiation between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. What I support is that the United States have the ability to use Diego Garcia. And again, your reference to elements inside the State Department, I do not know where those elements are. The Political-Military Bureau answers to me. I answer to Secretary Rubio and, of course, to the President. So we would be completely aligned with the President and the Secretary's guidance on that.

Senator CRUZ. Well, let me help you out, because there appears to be some real tension. On February 18th, President Trump issued the following on Truth Social: "I have been telling Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom that leases are no good when it comes to countries, and that he is making a big mistake by entering a 100-year lease with whoever it is that is claiming right, title, and interest to Diego Garcia, strategically located in the In-

dian Ocean. Our relationship with the United Kingdom is a strong and powerful one, and it has been for many years. But Prime Minister Starmer is losing control of this important island by claims of entities never known of before. In our opinion, they are fictitious in nature." And just to resolve any ambiguity, the Truth Social ends with, in all caps, "DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA!"

Is there any ambiguity in what the President said on February 18th?

Mr. DiNANNO. No, sir. There is not.

Senator CRUZ. OK. So then why did the P-M Bureau announce a delegation to Mauritius and signal its support for the deal? And the official statement says, and I quote, "The U.S. supports the decision of the U.K. to proceed with its agreement with Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago." How do you reconcile that statement from State with the President's statement on the same topic?

Mr. DiNANNO. Well, I do not think any delegation actually went, most importantly, because the President sets the policy, and we implement the President's policy.

Senator CRUZ. Well, I would ask you to figure out who the hell wrote that statement that the U.S. supports this deal, and why they are putting out statements from the Department of State that are directly contrary to the position of the President of the United States, who is charged with the responsibility of making that decision.

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, and just one other statement. I think I would agree, certainly, that the U.K. would be the partner of choice there. And there is no daylight between me or anybody at the State Department and the President.

Senator CRUZ. Well, I am very glad to hear it, because as we have seen with the recent targeting of Diego Garcia by Iran, this base is critically important for protecting American national security interests. And if the United Kingdom is to compromise that base, that would: (a) harm our national security interest, and (b) be in direct violation of a binding treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. DiNANNO. Yes, sir.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cruz. I suspect, and I could be wrong, but I suspect that the White House has already figured out who authorized that text that went out. I would be interested in hearing that.

Senator CRUZ. And if they have not, I hope this questioning will accelerate that process.

The CHAIRMAN. I expect that will help.

Thank you so much for appearing here today. I think this was an incredibly important hearing, and I appreciate a good airing of these issues. Obviously, it is ongoing, and it is going to be something that is going to be around for a long time. We look forward to working with you as we go forward on all of these, so thanks so much.

For the information of the members of the committee, the record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow, March 25th.

And if we get any questions I would ask you to respond to them as quickly as possible.

Again, with the thanks of the committee, we appreciate it. This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO HON. THOMAS G. DiNANNO BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Question. What is the current status of U.S. foreign assistance programs managed by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) following the January 2025 foreign assistance review?

Answer. INL is actively programming the funds appropriated by Congress to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, disrupt drugs and crime harming American communities, and expand U.S. advantage and access in strategically vital regions by diminishing the influence of our adversaries.

Question. What is the current status of U.S. foreign assistance programs managed by the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) following the January 2025 foreign assistance review?

Answer. CT foreign assistance programs work to make America safer, including by training and equipping foreign civilian law enforcement entities to address terrorism posing the most serious threats to the United States.

Question. Following the January 2025 announced foreign assistance review, what categories of programs at INL and CT continued versus those that were paused or ended as a result of the review?

Answer. INL continues to focus programming on dismantling transnational criminal organizations, disrupting drugs and crime harming American communities, and expanding U.S. advantage and access as the security partner of choice in strategically vital regions. The Department reviewed nearly 1,400 INL projects and terminated more than 400 that were ineffective, wasteful, and did not deliver results for the American people, including programs focused on foreign public health and rehabilitation, diversity and inclusion in foreign security forces, access to justice and legal awareness for foreign populations, and humanitarian-oriented prison and corrections support.

CT is focused on advancing the administration's counterterrorism objectives to counter terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland and citizens by: 1) enabling foreign countries to stop terrorist travel from abroad, effectively pushing U.S. borders further afield; 2) countering Iran and its proxies; 3) enabling foreign countries to investigate, prosecute, and share intelligence on known or suspected terrorists, including working with U.S. law enforcement; and 4) enabling foreign countries to interdict and disrupt terrorist safe havens and attacks, including those targeting U.S. citizens, facilities, and interests.

Question. What is the total amount of appropriated funding that did not get obligated as a result of INL and CT programs that were terminated?

Answer. INL obligated all FY 2024 funding for approved programs, except for \$65 million that was rescinded to comply with the requirements of the FY 2025 Full Year Continuing Resolution. CT obligated all FY 2024 funds for approved programs. No funding went unobligated due to the termination of INL or CT programs.

Question. What prior-year balances remain for INL and CT programs?

Answer. As of March 2026, CT's unobligated balance totals \$289 million in FY 2025 funds and INL's unobligated balance totals \$1.3 billion in FY 2025 funds. CT and INL intend to notify and obligate all FY 2025 funding by September 30, 2026.

Question. How does the administration intend to use these remaining balances?

Answer. INL and CT plan to continue programming funds aligned with the administration's goals to make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous through support to the priorities listed in the answer to a previous question.

Question. Do you plan to engage Russia and China through separate bilateral negotiations or a trilateral framework?

Answer. As I testified, the United States will not rule out bilateral engagements that help facilitate and lead to multilateral strategic stability and arms control. As Secretary Rubio stated on February 6, future arms control must address the nuclear arsenals of not just Russia but also China.

Question. What are the current barriers to engage with China and Russia on nuclear agreements?

Answer. Russia in recent years and China historically have not been willing partners. The United States is providing both countries an opportunity to work with us on fulfilling the President's goal to reduce global nuclear threats. If they opt not to engage, the United States will not stand idly by. The United States will maintain a robust, credible, and modernized deterrent to ensure our security, preserve peace and stability, and negotiate from a position of strength.

Question. How are the T bureaus staffed and postured compared with the period prior to the reorganization?

Answer. The T Family bureaus and offices have a mixture of Civil Service, Foreign Service, military detailees, and contractor personnel. This is similar to the mix prior to the reorganization. Overall T Family is now larger in scope and posture than it was before the reorganization.

Question. How many Civil Servant and Foreign Service positions are currently vacant across the T bureaus?

Answer. The T Bureaus and Offices have 142 Civil Service vacancies, and 35 Foreign Service vacancies.

Question. What offices in the T family currently have more personnel and resources than before the reorganization effort?

Answer. Given numerous changes within the T Family due to merged or reorganized offices, the following offices are currently larger than before the reorganization: PM's Office of Security Assistance, CT's Office of Counterterrorism Coordination and Office of Military Coordination and Crisis Response, and ACN's Office of Chemical and Biological Convention Affairs and Office of Strategic Stability and Extended Deterrence Affairs. No T Family units have more financial resources than before the reorganization.

Question. Which offices in the T family currently have fewer personnel and resources than prior to reorganization efforts?

Answer. Given numerous changes within the T Family due to merged or reorganized offices and the Reduction in Force, the following offices are currently smaller than before the reorganization: ACN's Office of Export Controls and Border Security and Office of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, PM's Immediate Office of the Assistant Secretary, and INL's Office of the Assistant Secretary, Office of Aviation and Cross-Border Programs, Office of Europe and Asia, Office of Security Assistance and Operations, and Office of Results and Criminal Deterrence. All T Family units have fewer financial resources than before the reorganization.

Question. The Congressional Notification states that approximately 115 full-time equivalent and contractor positions will be filled. Can you provide the staffing breakdown by civil servants, Foreign Service officers, and contractors?

Answer. Department leadership has approved ET to begin hiring to reach its authorized strength of 115 FTEs and contractors. This will allow the Bureau to recruit and acquire the necessary talent and expertise, including in cutting-edge technologies, to fulfill ET's mission. Of those 115, we plan for 74 to be Civil Service Employees, 34 to be Foreign Service Officers, three to be Schedule C appointees, and four to be contractors. ET will also host non-FTEs—including interagency detailees, U.S. Military advisors, Fellows, and interagency personnel agreements—to advance specific counter-threat priorities for the Bureau.

Question. Given the increasing use of AI-generated content and disinformation campaigns, will the Emerging Threats Bureau actively counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation?

Answer. Adversaries are misusing advancements in AI capabilities to produce and disseminate highly convincing deepfake audio, video, or imagery that could have serious consequences for national security. ET, in coordination with other relevant bureaus such as R, is responsible for diplomatic efforts to mitigate malicious uses of

AI, which may take the form of AI-generated synthetic media and deep fakes that contribute to foreign state and non-state propaganda.

Question. What cyber issue sets will the Emerging Threats Bureau cover, and how do they align with the goals of the March 2026 White House National Cyber Strategy?

Answer. Consistent with President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, the Bureau of Emerging Threats uses diplomatic tools and interagency capabilities to shape adversary behavior on cyber issues, including by imposing costs and consequences to diminish state and non-state adversaries’ abilities to threaten U.S. national security interests and military advantage.

ET advises Department leadership and coordinates with America’s allies and others to respond to significant cyber incidents by preparing diplomatic responses, enhancing information sharing, and bolstering partners’ cyber capacity to defend shared interests and secure critical infrastructure.

Question. The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP) advances U.S. leadership in critical and emerging technologies, including AI, with a focus on innovation and economic growth. Will there be overlap between the work of ET and CDP?

Answer. ET anticipates and addresses how technological changes could be weaponized to undermine U.S. national security. ET leads cybersecurity policy efforts, shapes adversary behavior in cyberspace through diplomacy, aligns cyber operation campaign plans with U.S. foreign policy objectives, and builds partner capacity to prevent, disrupt, and respond to cyber incidents. On AI, ET focuses on mitigating threats to the American AI stack and from the malicious misuse of AI.

CDP focuses on system-level resilience, not specific threat disruption and response. CDP leads diplomatic efforts to shape global digital rules and standards, enables U.S. technological and economic leadership by expanding global adoption of U.S. technology, and builds resilient digital conditions internationally. On AI, CDP focuses on exporting the American AI stack.

Question. If so, how will ET coordinate with CDP to reduce redundancies and reconcile potentially competing missions?

Answer. Both CDP and ET operate with clear, non-duplicative, and complementary mandates tailored to their respective missions. ET and CDP have coordinated and will continue to coordinate closely on a variety of matters in both cyberspace and AI.

Question. In response to increased threats from North Korea, some in South Korea have advocated for an independent nuclear arsenal rather than relying on the United States—how is the U.S. working with South Korea to address its security concerns within the existing alliance framework without undermining global non-proliferation efforts?

Answer. The United States continues to work to prevent additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons. In November 2025, President Trump reaffirmed the U.S. pledge to provide extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea, leveraging the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear. President Trump and President Lee committed to strengthening cooperation through consultation mechanisms including the Nuclear Consultative Group.

Question. How do the relocation of U.S. missile defense assets from South Korea to the Middle East and other regional adjustments affect U.S.-South Korea security cooperation and the broader alliance framework?

Answer. The United States and South Korea are committed to ensuring our forces are prepared to respond to any contingency. The U.S. commitment to extended deterrence is ironclad, and the United States and South Korea combined defense posture is strong. United States Forces Korea remains focused on maintaining a strong, ready, and combat-credible force posture on the Korean Peninsula. With the support of the United States, South Korea has pledged to accelerate efforts to strengthen its military capabilities necessary to lead a combined conventional defense against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United States remains firmly committed to the defense of South Korea.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
TO HON. THOMAS G. DiNANNO BY SENATOR BRIAN SCHATZ

North Korea continues to significantly advance its range of nuclear weapons capabilities, threatening the United States, key U.S. allies and partners, and regional stability, despite longstanding efforts to prevent North Korea from developing such capabilities:

Question. Although the United States should desire a North Korea with no nuclear weapons capabilities, given the aforementioned North Korean developments, what role can Congress play in supporting the adoption and implementation of a risk reduction approach in U.S. strategy towards North Korea that no longer focuses on North Korean denuclearization, but rather on mitigating tangible threats to U.S. interests?

Answer. President Trump is committed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea to address the threat that North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses to America, our allies, and the broader region. The United States works closely with our Republic of Korea ally to maintain military de-confliction efforts on the Peninsula that reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation and misperception.

Question. In FY 2025, the United States transferred \$104.38B of defense articles and services and security cooperation activities under the Foreign Military Sales system. Recent conduct by Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran has raised concerns by the human rights community. Given the scale of U.S. arms transfers and ongoing concerns about the use of U.S.-provided weapons by partner countries, how is the Department ensuring compliance with U.S. legal and human rights standards?

Answer. The Department reviews all arms transfer requests on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the considerations established in the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy, as well as all statutory requirements under the Arms Export Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In accordance with the CAT Policy, the Department accounts for human rights and international humanitarian law considerations, among others, when making arms transfer decisions. Our approach balances security cooperation and national security objectives with responsible use.

Question. On February 6, 2026, EO 14383 established the America First Arms Transfer Strategy as a tool of U.S. foreign policy and to expand defense production. The State Department has not provided detailed guidance on how it plans to implement this strategy. How will the America First Arms Transfer Strategy shape oversight compliance with U.S. legal and human rights standards?

Answer. The Department will continue to review all proposed arms transfers on a case-by-case basis in line with the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, which accounts for human rights and international humanitarian law considerations, along with other national security and foreign policy factors. The America First Arms Transfer Strategy focuses on leveraging arms transfers to bolster defense production in the United States and builds upon other Administration efforts to reform the foreign defense sales system. The strategy does not change these substantive standards regarding human rights and proper end-use monitoring.

Question. Section 7035(a)(5) of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 legally mandates that not less than \$2.5 million shall be allocated for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to "increase staffing and resources to enable the robust oversight of United States security assistance programs, including implementation of United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and related statutory requirements." How will you ensure that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs utilizes this funding consistent with the legal requirement and clear Congressional intent?

Answer. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will allocate these funds to support implementation of the Conventional Arms Transfers Policy consistent with statutory and legal requirements, as well as congressional intent. Once we receive and consolidate the funds, we will ensure there is proper and transparent oversight.

Question. Please detail the specific oversight staffing and resourcing investments that will be made with these funds, the anticipated timeline for these enhanced oversight capacities to come online, and how these enhanced capacities will be integrated into existing oversight mechanisms at the Department.

Answer. Once we receive and consolidate the funds, the PM Bureau will be in a better position to detail specifics and timelines. We will ensure these enhanced capacities will be integrated into appropriate oversight mechanisms at the Department. The Department is committed to proper and transparent oversight.

The President only partially designated the emergency funding provided in Public Law 119-4. As pointed out by Senate Appropriations Committee Chair Collins, this partial designation was unlawful. In practice, this unlawful partial designation means that none of the FY25 SFOPS emergency funding has been made available to the State Department, including \$275 million in the Foreign Military Financing account that could be used to provide support to the Philippines, Ukraine, or other key partners.

Question. If this emergency funding is made available, how would it be prioritized by the State Department?

Answer. The statute governing emergency designations requires concurrence by both Congress and the President for funding to receive an adjustment to discretionary spending limits. The President retains discretion in making those designations. Where funding is not designated by the President, it does not receive a cap adjustment and is therefore subject to applicable budget enforcement constraints. This reflects longstanding practice in the implementation of section 251 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The Department is not currently considering the use of emergency funds appropriated for the FMF account in FY 2025.

Question. Please provide a list of recipients and amounts.

Answer. The Department is not currently considering the use of emergency funds appropriated for the FMF account in FY 2025.

