[Senate Hearing 119-355]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-355
NOMINATIONS OF: VICE ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON, USAF, TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: // www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-382 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_____________
july 22, 2025
Page
Nominations of: Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN, to be Admiral 1
and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and
Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF, to be General
and Commander, United States Africa Command.
Members Statements
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 2
Witness Statements
Bradley, Vice Admiral Frank M., USN, to be Admiral and Commander, 4
United States Special Operations Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 41
Questions for the Record....................................... 58
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 79
Biographical Sketch............................................ 80
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 83
Signature Page................................................. 86
Anderson, Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M., USAF, to be General and 7
Commander, United States Africa Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 86
Questions for the Record....................................... 104
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 124
Biographical Sketch............................................ 125
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 128
Signature Page................................................. 131
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
NOMINATIONS OF: VICE ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON, USAF, TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2025
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger
Wicker (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Budd,
Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Kaine, King, Warren, Rosen, and Kelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Chairman Wicker. This hearing will come to order. The
Committee meets today to consider the nominations of Vice
Admiral Mitch Bradley to be Commander of the United States
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and Lieutenant General
Dagvin Anderson to be Commander, United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM). I welcome our witnesses and their families, and I
thank them for their continued willingness to serve our Nation.
If confirmed, Admiral Bradley will assume command at a time
when Special Operations Command, SOCOM, faces a formidable
challenge. SOCOM is being asked to build a force capable of
combatting the advanced militaries of China and Russia while
simultaneously remaining fully engaged in the fight against
violent Islamic terrorism. At the same time, special operators
must be ready to respond at a moment's notice as our Nation's
premier crisis response force.
It is clear to me that the role and importance of SOCOM is
greater today than at any time since its establishment four
decades ago. However, SOCOM's budget does not reflect this
reality. Its budget has remained flat since 2019. Adjusted for
inflation, that amounts to roughly a 14 percent cut in
purchasing power. To amplify that point, SOCOM identifies $757
million in unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2026.
We want to ensure that SOCOM is fully resourced to meet the
demands placed on it. Admiral Bradley should tell us how he
plans to meet those demands and how we can help.
If confirmed, General Anderson will confront a growing
array of threats on the African continent. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) views Africa as a critical link in Xi
Jinping's unprecedented global military expansion, and
continues to purchase new bases for the People's Liberation
Army (PLA).
Vladimir Putin remains fully engaged in his destabilizing
campaign to trade security assistance for access to Africa's
abundant natural resources. This is one of Mr. Putin's ways to
fund his malign activities around the world. All the while,
Islamic violent extremist groups aligned with ISIS and al Qaeda
remain an enduring threat in Africa.
Despite the growing complexity and scale of threats on the
continent, AFRICOM remains under-resourced in both manpower and
in critical capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. I look forward to General Anderson's assessment
of Africa's importance to our national security, as well as his
description of what AFRICOM's strategy should be to counter the
growing threat posed by China, Russia, and other adversaries
across the continent. I am particularly interested in how
General Anderson plans to use America's economic tools,
including the Office of Strategic Capital, to combat Chinese
influence.
If confirmed, our nominees will confront a global security
environment that is defined by emboldened, aggressive dictators
in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. They view this fight
as a global fight, unconstrained by geographic boundaries and
the traditional forms of warfare. This axis of aggressors
blends conventional military power with asymmetric tactics,
including economic warfare, disinformation, and the use of
proxy networks to undermine America's security interests. The
witnesses before us today will play a key role in the
Department of Defense's (DOD's) efforts to combat these
challenges, and I look forward to hearing them address these
and many other concerns during today's hearing.
With that I turn to my friend and colleague, Ranking Member
Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
Bradley and General Anderson, welcome, and congratulations on
your nominations. I want to thank you for stepping forward to
continue your long careers of service. I would also like to
extend my appreciation to your families who were with you every
step of the way and will continue to serve alongside you.
Admiral Bradley, you have been nominated to lead the United
States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, at a time of
important transformation. Because of the efforts and sacrifices
of the Special Operations community over the past 2 decades,
the threat from ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], al
Qaeda, and other violent extremist groups has been greatly
diminished. Now America's national security interests are
challenged by the aggressive and often coordinated ambitions of
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Our Special Operations Forces, or SOF, are not only needed
to maintain pressure on violent extremist groups that threaten
our Homeland, they are also key to addressing the challenges
posed by these adversarial nations. As the recently released
SOF Operating Concept proposes, quote, ``Joint SOF capabilities
will help deter conflict by changing our competitors' political
calculations, denying achievement, or imposing costs that
outweigh potential benefits.'' This concept is ambitious and
will require close partnership with the military services and
other elements of the interagency, especially the intelligence
community, and with our network of allies and partners around
the world.
Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, I expect your experience
commanding Special Operators and SEALs around the world will
serve you extremely well. Today I would ask that you share how
you would plan to lead the Special Operations community to
adjust to the rapid pace of change on the battlefield and how
lessons learned from Ukraine, Gaza, the Red Sea, Syria, and
elsewhere can inform the tactics and modernization efforts of
SOCOM. Additionally, I am interested in how you would leverage
unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, space, cyber
information operations, and other capabilities in SOCOM
missions.
Finally, as a combatant command with service-like
responsibilities, SOCOM needs and deserves a senior civilian to
provide service secretary-like oversight and advocacy for our
Special Operations forces. Congress has sought to empower the
Assistant Secretary of Defense of Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict to fulfill that mandate. Admiral Bradley, if
confirmed, I ask for your support as the Department continues
to work to fully implement those reforms.
General Anderson, you have been nominated to lead United
States Africa Command, or AFRICOM. In Africa, our adversaries
are focused on building trade relationships while seizing
influence from us. China's military ambitions on the continent
are no secret, from their growing presence in Djibouti to the
more than 100 seaports that have been constructed, financed, or
operated by Chinese-owned enterprises, and include service
dual-use for future military contingencies.
Russia has also expanded its military engagement in Africa.
It is investing heavily in disinformation campaigns across the
continent to spread anti-Western movements, undermine
democracy, and promote Russian-backed authoritarian leaders,
especially in West Africa.
General Anderson, given these challenges, AFRICOM must
continue to explore new methods to maintain United States
security interests in the region. Our forces continue to train
and advise partner militaries, but we are asked to do so with
fewer resources and troops going forward. I want to ask you to
share your views on the current security situation, the best
approach to establish and maintain close partnerships with
partner nations, and how we can seek to engage a whole-of-
government effort to address the political and economic
instability in Africa.
Indeed, stability is essential for any successful nation.
For decades, we have relied upon our State Department diplomats
and the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to
develop deep, lasting relationships in Africa that can outlast
China and Russia's coercion. The outgoing AFRICOM Commander,
General Langley, described our competitive advantage against
Russia as, quote, ``not just building military and security
capacity. The story needs to be told about the successes of
USAID and State Department, collectively, for all of our
operations, activities, and investments.'' I am deeply
concerned that our soft power leadership in Africa has been
significantly undermined over the past several months.
General Anderson, I would like to know your perspective on
the importance of diplomacy and development tools to achieve
our national security objectives in Africa and how you would
work to ensure our competitors do not capitalize on the
dismantling of USAID in the region.
Thank you both for your service and willingness to lead and
sharing your time. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Reed.
Now Admiral Bradley, you may make your opening statement, and
feel free to introduce any friends and relatives you have with
you, supporting you today.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Bradley. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman
Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the
Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today as the
President's nominee to be the next Commander of the United
States Special Operations Command. I am grateful to the
President, to the Secretary of Defense, and to Chairman Caine
for their trust and confidence in me for this important
nomination.
I would like to recognize and thank the current SOCOM
command team first, General Bryan Fenton and CSM Shane Shorter,
and their families, for their leadership of the SOCOM force and
families these past 3 years.
I am privileged to be alongside my teammate Lieutenant
General Dag Anderson, a longtime friend and Colleague, and if
we are confirmed, I very much look forward to teaming with him
again in our new capacities.
I would like to recognize my family that are here with me
today. They have been critical to my service and to our Nation
and without whom I can't imagine being here today.
My best friend and wife of 34 years, Katie, is here with
me. The grounding rod and conscience of our family, she has
weathered the storms of this career, mentoring young SOF
families, rearing our four children, and keeping me humble and
centered. She grew up in an Army family, daughter to an
infantry officer who served in Vietnam before joining me in the
Navy, and has moved households 27 times in her life, a
testament to resilience if there ever was one.
Our children and their families are here with me as well.
Mary Katherine and husband Ralph, scientists and parents to our
first granddaughter, Rosemary Louise; our oldest son, Henry, an
FBI special agent, and his wife Brianna, also an FBI employee--
we seem to be making interagency cooperation a bit of family
business here--our son, Lieutenant Frank Bradley, a fellow
SEAL, and his wife Kiley, a public servant in Hawaii; and our
youngest son, James, a data scientist working in the national
industrial base on autonomous underwater systems.
I come from a small ranching community in southwest Texas,
where I learned the foundations of meritocracy at an early age.
I am the son of a World War II veteran, an Army Air Corps
Master Sergeant, who worked on P-38s from Operation TORCH in
North Africa to the final assault on Berlin. After the war, my
father ranched and served as the Justice of the Peace, an
elected judge, in our small Texas community. I learned a deep
appreciation for our democracy and the judicial system watching
him dispense judgment in our community. His example of service
and the allure of adventure are what drew me to the United
States Naval Academy and the SEAL community, and I have had
ample opportunity for both in my 37 years since leaving
Eldorado, Texas.
My mother was the compassionate influence. As much of a
rancher as any man in our family, she and my grandmother were
the matriarchs who would weave discipline with love in
appropriate measure. Their influence looms large in everything
I do.
Finally, I must thank my siblings and the countless
coaches, professors, and pastors who have shaped me both on and
off the field. Special Operations is the ultimate team sport,
where to win is to live, and to lose often means someone you
care for does not. As such, I am grateful to be a member of the
most precise and lethal fighting force the world has ever
known.
On a strategic landscape where adversaries and competitors
challenge the rules-based international order, your SOF provide
the agility, precision, and nuance needed to confront and
disrupt these threats in competition. But should the need
arise, we are also ready to integrate into the joint force to
respond to crisis and engage in high-end conflict, where the
precise delivery of violence will be critical to shaping
success on the battlefield.
To this Committee and your predecessors I say thank you.
SOCOM's existence reflects the strong bipartisan commitment in
Congress to ensure the United States leads the world in Special
Operations, and that commitment has paid off.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD SO/LIC, with
my fellow combatant commanders, service leadership, the
Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and this Committee to
sustain and strengthen the force, to man, train, equip, and
care for our SOF warriors and their families. I will provide
the Secretary of Defense and the President candid and clear
military advice, and I will remain fully transparent with this
Committee, ensuring that you have the information necessary to
continue your critical constitutional oversight of our national
defense.
I thank you for your service to our country. I look forward
to answering your questions and engaging with you on the
important work ahead.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Bradley follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley
opening statement
Good morning, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before
you today as the President's nominee to be the next commander of the
United States Special Operations Command.
I am grateful to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their trust and confidence in me for
this nomination.
I'd like to recognize and thank the current SOCOM Command Team,
General Bryan Fenton and Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter and their
families, for their leadership of the SOCOM force and families these
past 3 years.
I am privileged to be alongside my teammate Lieutenant General Dag
Anderson--a longtime friend and colleague; and if we are confirmed, I
look forward to teaming with him again in our new capacities.
I'd like to recognize the members of my family, who have been
critical to my service to our Nation and without whom I can't imagine
being here.
My best friend and wife of 34 years--Katie. The grounding rod and
conscience of our family, she has weathered the storms of this career
mentoring young SOF families, rearing our children, and keeping me
humble and centered. She grew up in an Army family, daughter to an
infantry officer who served in Vietnam before joining me in the Navy,
and has moved households 27 times--a testament to resilience if there
ever was one.
Our children and their families are here with me as well. Mary
Katherine and husband Ralph--scientists and parents of our first
granddaughter, Rosemary Louise. Our son--Henry, an FBI Special Agent
and his wife Brianna, also an FBI employee . . . we seem to be making
interagency cooperation a family business. Our son, Lieutenant Frank
Bradley--a fellow SEAL, and his wife Kiley, a public servant in Hawaii.
And our youngest son, James--a data scientist working in the National
Industrial Base on autonomous underwater systems.
I come from a small ranching community in southwest Texas, where I
learned the foundations of meritocracy at an early age. I am the son of
a WWII veteran, an Army Air Corps Master Sergeant who worked on P-38s
from Operation TORCH in North Africa to the final assault on Berlin.
After the war, my father ranched and served as the Justice of the
Peace--an elected judge--in our small community. I learned a deep
appreciation for our democracy and the judicial system watching him
dispense judgment in our community. His example of service and the
allure of adventure are what drew me to the United States Naval Academy
and the SEAL Community . . . I have had ample opportunity for both in
my 37 years since leaving Eldorado, TX.
My mother was the compassionate influence. As much of a rancher as
any man in our family, she and my grandmother were the matriarchs who
would weave discipline with love in appropriate measure. Their
influence looms large in everything I do.
Finally, I must thank my siblings and the countless coaches,
professors, and pastors who have shaped me both on and off the field.
Special Operations is the ultimate team sport--where to win is to live,
and to lose often means someone you care for does not.
As such, I am grateful to be a member of the most precise and
lethal fighting force the world has ever known.
On a strategic landscape where adversaries and competitors
challenge the rules-based international order, SOF provide the agility,
precision, and nuance needed to confront and disrupt these threats in
competition. Should the need arise, we are also ready to integrate into
the joint force to respond to crisis and engage in high-end conflict,
where the precise delivery of violence will be critical to shaping
success on the battlefield.
To this committee and your predecessors, thank you. SOCOM's
existence reflects the strong bipartisan commitment in Congress to
ensure the U.S. leads the world in special operations--and that
commitment has paid off.
If confirmed, I'll work closely with the ASD SO/LIC, my fellow
Combatant Commanders, Service leadership, the Chairman, the Secretary
of Defense, and this committee to sustain and strengthen the force--to
man, train, equip, and care for our SOF warriors and their families.
I will provide the SECDEF and President candid and clear military
advice, and I will remain fully transparent with this Committee--
ensuring that you have the information necessary to continue your
critical constitutional oversight of our national defense.
Thank you for your service to our country. I look forward to
answering your questions and engaging with you on the important work
ahead.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Admiral. General
Anderson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON, USAF, TO
BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General Anderson. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished Committee Members, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you this morning. It is truly a humbling
honor.
I am honored by the President's trust and confidence in
nominating me to serve as the Commander of United States Africa
Command, and I am grateful for the support of the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would
also like to recognize General Langley's 40 years of
distinguished service and the strong leadership, and the team
that he and Sergeant Major Mike Woods forged.
I am joined today by my wife of 26 years, Liz, a native of
the great State of Maine. Her unwavering support and sacrifice
have been instrumental to my service and the success of the
mission. Liz is the heart of our family, and despite nine
schools in six states and three countries she is the reason we
have two strong and talented daughters: Hala, who is watching
from Paris today, and Lilja, who is here with us.
My commitment to service is rooted in the values instilled
in me by my family. My grandmother, a nurse, served her
community well into her 80's. My grandfathers, one a sailor in
World War I and the other a Marine in World War II, were
ordinary people who answered the call during extraordinary
times.
My mother, Roberta, a special education teacher, and my
father, Charles, a police officer, modeled public service,
selflessness, and integrity. These values have guided me
through 33 years of military service. My parents are watching
from my hometown of Ypsilanti, Michigan, the home of Rosie the
Riveter and Willow Run, where, at the age of 17, I learned to
fly alongside these symbols of American ingenuity and
resilience.
It is an honor to sit beside Vice Admiral Mitch Bradley, a
Special Operations teammate and one of the finest leaders and
warfighters I have served with. If confirmed, I concur with
Admiral Bradley that it is truly a team sport, and look forward
to collaborating closely with him, and all the combatant
commanders, to confront the complex emerging challenges of
today.
My career has followed a non-traditional path, with seven
joint assignments across four commands, ranging from
conventional warfighting exercises in the Indo-Pacific, to
conducting special operations in the Middle East and Africa,
and from global mobility to stateside training.
My experiences abroad have shaped my career. I had the
privilege of studying in the Czech Republic, where I witnessed
an outpouring of support for America after 9/11. Almost 23
years later, I had the honor to speak at the 80th anniversary
of the liberation of Plze. by Patton's Third Army. Thousands
gathered, waving Czech and American flags, a powerful reminder
of our shared values and enduring ties.
While I have flown several aircraft, the missions flying
the U-28, a modest single-engine prop, were among my most
rewarding. In under 2 years, a team of operators, engineers,
and acquisitions experts turned an urgent need into a mission-
ready, highly capable surveillance platform, a testament to
empowered innovation meeting battlefield requirements.
As the Commander of Special Operations Command Africa, I
witnessed how Africa, strategically positioned between the
Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, is increasingly at the convergence
of great-power rivalry and terrorism. China is expanding its
approach from a focus on economic influence to greater military
and information operations. Russia's actions are frequently
destabilizing and run counter to United States interests.
Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces,
posing a direct threat to our safety and security.
During my time at Special Operations Command Africa, an
American citizen was taken hostage in Niger. Within 96 hours,
we located him, coordinated with multiple African partners and
European allies, and Joint Special Operations Command executed
the rescue. The speed and success of that mission underscored
the seamless integration of the joint force and the importance
of strong relationships. When we called in the middle of the
night, our partners answered.
If confirmed, I look forward to building on that success
and those relationships. I will keep this Committee informed, I
will be a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars, and I will
lead by example to advance U.S. interests and counter adversary
threats.
Thank you for your unwavering support of the men and women
of the U.S. Military and thank you for this opportunity. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Anderson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Committee
Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this
morning.
I am honored by the President's trust and confidence in nominating
me to serve as Commander, US AFRICA COMMAND, and I am grateful for the
support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. I'd also like to recognize General Langley's 40 years
of distinguished service and the strong leadership team he and Sergeant
Major Mike Woods forged.
I am joined today by my wife of 26 years, Liz, a native of the
great State of Maine. Her unwavering support and sacrifice have been
instrumental to my service and the success of the mission. Liz is the
heart of our family and despite nine schools in six states and three
countries, she is the reason we have two strong and talented daughters:
Hala, who is watching from Paris, and Lilja, who is here today.
My commitment to service is rooted in the values instilled in me by
my family. My grandmother, a nurse, served her community well into her
80's. My grandfathers, one a sailor in WWI and the other a marine in
WWII, were ordinary people who answered the call during extraordinary
times.
My mother, Roberta, a special education teacher, and my father,
Charles, a police officer, modeled public service, selflessness, and
integrity. These values have guided me through 33 years of military
service. My parents are watching from my hometown of Ypsilanti,
Michigan, the home of Rosie the Riveter and Willow Run--where, at the
age of 17, I learned to fly alongside these symbols of American
ingenuity and resilience.
It is an honor to sit beside VADM Mitch Bradley, a Special
Operations teammate and one of the finest leaders and warfighters I've
served with. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating closely with
him--and the other combatant commanders--to confront emerging
challenges.
My career has followed a non-traditional path, with seven joint
assignments across four commands--ranging from exercising conventional
warfighting in the Indo-Pacific, to conducting special operations in
the Middle East and Africa, and from global mobility to stateside
training.
My experiences abroad have shaped my career. I had the privilege of
studying in the Czech Republic, where I witnessed an outpouring of
support for America after 9/11. Almost 23 years later, I had the honor
of returning to speak at the 80th anniversary of the liberation of
Plzen by Patton's Third Army. Thousands gathered, waving Czech and
American flags--a powerful reminder of our shared values and enduring
ties.
While I've flown several aircraft, the missions flying the U-28, a
modest single-engine prop, were among my most rewarding. In under 2
years, a team of operators, engineers, and acquisitions experts turned
an urgent need into a mission-ready, highly capable surveillance
aircraft--a testament to empowered innovation meeting battlefield
requirements.
As the Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), I
witnessed how Africa--strategically positioned between the Atlantic and
Indo-Pacific--is increasingly at the convergence of great-power rivalry
and terrorism. China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic
influence to greater military and information operations. Russia's
actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to United States
interests. Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces,
posing a direct threat to our safety and security.
During my time at SOCAF, an American citizen was taken hostage in
Niger. Within 96 hours, we located him, coordinated with multiple
African partners and European allies, and executed the rescue. The
speed and success of that mission underscored the seamless integration
of the Joint Force and the importance of strong relationships. When we
called in the middle of the night, our partners answered.
If confirmed, I look forward to building on that success and those
relationships. I will keep this Committee informed, I will be a
responsible steward of taxpayer dollars, and I will lead by example to
advance U.S. interests and counter adversary threats.
Thank you for your unwavering support of the men and women of the
U.S. Military and thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, General Anderson, and
thank you both for being with us. It is now time for me to ask
some standard questions that we ask of all military nominees.
To exercise it legislative and oversight responsibilities,
it is important that this Committee and other appropriate
committees of the Congress be able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information. So if you
will just answer yes or no. You can answer simultaneously. And
we will be watching.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Bradley. Yes, Senator.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Okay. Just a yes or a no is fine. Do you
agree when asked to give your personal views even if those
views differ from the administration in power?
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Bradley. No.
General Anderson. No.
Chairman Wicker. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requests for communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon requests before this Committee?
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with that committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. And thus ends our standard questions. Let
me ask one that has become somewhat standard, and we have
gotten encouraging responses from all of our witnesses.
Much of the funding in the defense reconciliation bill, the
Big Beautiful Bill, as the President calls it, is unspecific
and will technically be at the discretion of the Department of
Defense, though this Committee will write recommendations for
them. We do that because of the rules.
A quick yes-or-no answer from each of you. Do you commit to
follow the Congress' spending recommendations in defense
reconciliation, unequivocally? Admiral Bradley.
Admiral Bradley. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. General Anderson?
General Anderson. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. And Admiral Bradley, you, in particular,
will be receiving quite a sum of money for SOCOM priorities,
and we want to work together to make sure it is used for the
most pressing needs. So I thank you for your answers there.
General Anderson, you talked about the activities of China
and Africa. You talked about the activities of Russia under
their dictator, Vladimir Putin. Why do they do this? Are they
helping Africa out of the goodness of their hearts?
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate the concern. I see
that from my time at SOCAFRICA and my time on the Joint Staff
that there is growing activity from both China and Russia on
the continent. Both of those nations see their futures running
through the continent and as key to their strategy.
I think we can look at several of the things that have been
done that have not necessarily been good for the people of
Africa. I think they are aware of that. I think when we can
highlight that it helps them understand the risks of dealing
with China and Russia, whether that be debt diplomacy from
China or the corrosive effects of the Africa Corps, previously
known as Wagner, in those societies.
Chairman Wicker. Well, okay, and so when we have programs
such as PEPFAR or USAID, we would like to feel that that really
helps the people there. But we have a strategic security
purpose in doing that ourselves, do we not?
General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Okay, and what is that?
General Anderson. Senator, these programs are important as
long as they provide for the security and prosperity of our
Nation. I think as we target those in key areas they can help
build stability in key regions.
Chairman Wicker. If we abandoned the playing field in that
regard, what would be the response in Moscow or Beijing? I
think they would be celebrating, would they not?
General Anderson. Well, Senator, I know that if there are
opportunities, they will seize them.
Chairman Wicker. Yes. Now, on SOCOM, let me just say, the
SOCOM budget has been inadequate. There has been a 35 percent
increase in combatant command requests for SOCOM support over
the last 3 years. In the last decade, there has been a 200
percent increase in crisis response missions executed by SOCOM.
Fourteen percent budget cut, though, in SOCOM, as I pointed out
in my opening statement, since 2019, when adjusted for
inflation, and in raw numbers, 4,000 troops cut from SOCOM, and
$757 million in unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2026.
Now Admiral, the reconciliation bill included $1.64 billion
to support SOCOM's readiness and modernization priorities. Do
you agree with me that SOCOM's budget is inadequate to meet
growing global demands?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, as you have described it, I have
heard General Fenton make a compelling case with the same
statistics and believe those to be true.
Chairman Wicker. Let me just point out to, and make sure
you agree. Reconciliation was always meant to be additive to,
not a replacement for the core budget, absent real growth in
SOCOM's future budget requests. Your command will face
significant resourcing challenges. Is that correct?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, we will absolutely use the
resources that are provided to us, with ruthless prioritization
to go down through the tasks that are given to us. Inevitably,
though, with the current operations commitment that exists,
that will mean that we will have to mortgage some of our
modernization initiatives to be able to pay for that readiness
to sustain those current operations.
Chairman Wicker. Well, listen. We will not be able to be
generous with either of you, but we do want to hear what you
really, really need. We are going to be depending on the two of
you and your teams to let us know that, because if something
goes wrong and you did not have the capacity to cover it, then
they should not look to you if this body has not provided you
with the resources.
So thank you very much. Senator Reed, you are recognized.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. When
General Fenton delivered the posture statement last year he
said, and I quote, ``Our interagency efforts also have included
close cooperation with the Department of State and U.S. Agency
for International Development. With the implementation of the
Global Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa fundamentally
focused on preventing crises in failed states before they can
occur.''
Similarly, AFRICOM Commander, General Langley, testified,
``U.S. investment focused on stabilization, conflict prevention
and peace-building, democracy, governance, economic growth, and
public health attack the roots of terrorism and tyranny more
than bullets and air strikes ever will.''
For both of you gentlemen, why are such efforts in our
vital national security interests and not just humanitarian
good deeds, and what do we risk by walking away from these
investments? Admiral Bradley?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. In my 34 years I have
had the opportunity on many continents to work closely with our
humanitarian, our AID, our diplomats, and I have seen the
executors, even at the non-governmental organization level,
provide important capability for the U.S. I also recognize,
however, that there are many priorities, as we just talked
about, and the prioritization of the budget across those is a
difficult thing to balance and to manage.
I pledge, and I believe, that throughout time we have
always worked as an integrated interagency to be able to bring
the multiple levers of influence and power that the U.S. needs
to achieve its policy objectives, and if confirmed, I would
pledge to continue that.
Senator Reed. General Anderson, and particularly in Africa.
General Anderson. Yes, Senator. From my time at SOCAFRICA,
much like Admiral Bradley, I worked extensively with State
Department, USAID, and NGO's across the continent to meet
requirements. Africa is very much an economy of force theater
so we have to maximize the limited resources we have. So going
forward we will look at where we can find those opportunities,
whether it is with State Department and the aid that they can
provide, bringing and working with the non-governmental
organizations--we have worked closely with several in Africa--
also looking at opportunities with the Office of Strategic
Capital or private equity as private firms may be able to
invest and help in some of these areas, as well.
I think one of the things that AFRICOM is positioned well
to do is to convene people to have these discussions,
understanding we provide the military aspect of it, we can
provide a venue to bring folks together to look at the security
implications of these investments.
Senator Reed. Given the current situation, in which the
State Department is being hollowed out and that USAID is being
effectively abolished, have you lost a valuable strategic tool?
General Anderson. Senator, I understand that is still under
review for the foreign assistance and that much of that is
being transferred to State, so if I am confirmed I would have
to assess what is available and how we can best use that for
our national interests.
Senator Reed. Admiral Bradley, the same question. Are you
losing a very valuable tool?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I am very confident that however
the distribution of those tasks and those efforts are made, we
will continue to work with them closely to make sure we bring
the best combination of those levers and tools to bear.
Senator Reed. Admiral Bradley, what are your modernization
priorities for SOCOM?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. As we look to the
future, the conflicts that SOCOM might be called to participate
in, I have had the opportunity this last 3 years to participate
in General Fenton's leadership team as a member of the Board of
Directors. We focused, as you have seen and in his testimony,
on how to penetrate and power project in contested
environments. We see that through the lessons learned on the
battlefields of Ukraine, even into the Red Sea, and certainly
as we contemplate what a future fight against China might look
like. So contested environments and being able to arrive with
the element of surprise are a critical component.
A second priority, though, is also the ability to operate
within the ubiquitous technical surveillance environment that
is evolving around us today. It provides certainly challenges
to our ability to again arrive with that element of surprise,
but also opportunities, and here, the partnership with
CYBERCOM, with SPACECOM, and with your Special Operators is
particularly important. So those strategic partnership and
relationships and modernization of that partnership I think is
critical.
Senator Reed. Finally, General Anderson, if I may, you have
had valuable experience on the ground already as commander of
Special Operations in AFRICOM. With respect to Somalia, do you
think a continuous presence is essential?
General Anderson. I am sorry, Senator. I missed--where?
Senator Reed. In Somalia.
General Anderson. In Somalia. Senator, as you know, we have
had presence there for quite some time. We have seen some
limited success there in training their forces. The Danab force
is a capable counterterrorism force. I do believe that that
area is volatile. Al-Shabaab has shown the desire and will to
attack the United States and the United States' interests. They
are increasing cooperation with the Houthis. So I think it is
in our interests to have some level of engagement in that
region. Whether that is with the Federal Government or the
member states, I think that is something I would have to
assess, if confirmed.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, to both of you and to both of your families, as
well, for your many years of service and sacrifice.
Countering China has been, and will continue to be, an
important mission for both SOCOM and AFRICOM. The Indo-Pacific
region, one of the most strategically vital and geographically
expansive regions in the world, we have SOCOM, and SOCOM must
be able to rapidly engage where the need is paramount over an
immense expanse of land, sea, and air space.
Admiral Bradley, as the United States military prepares for
a potential war with China, what do you envision Special
Operations Forces, what kind of role will they be playing in
the Indo-Pacific, and how will you be able to balance that with
other SOF responsibilities?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. I believe that the
role that SOF has played over its history has been founded on a
critical value proposition that will be very relevant, even
more relevant against China, and that is our ability to build
strong relationships, to partner and to build capacity,
essentially to be a force multiplier across a strong alliance,
and to strengthen that alliance by doing such.
In fact, the credibility we have generated over these last
two-plus decades in the counterterrorism fight give us great
ability to be able to help sustain and extrapolate that
credibility into the Indo-Pacific, where building partnerships
with our allies will be very critical. That will allow us
placement and access to then help develop enhanced
understanding of our adversaries' actions that might be against
us. Then if deterrence fails and we cascade to crisis or
conflict, it will give us the ability to leverage that
placement and access for the delivery of irregular kinetic and
non-kinetic effects.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Anderson, we talked a
little bit yesterday about the growing influence of China on
the continent, and talked about that influence that they have
and the threats that they are posing. What do you think are the
greatest areas of threats that you are going to have to focus
on if you are confirmed?
General Anderson. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate the
discussion that we had on this. I think China does pose a
significant threat to United States interests on the continent.
We have seen how they have used the Belt and Road Initiative to
be a primarily economic focus in the past. We are seeing them
expand into more information operations on the continent, for
providing the communist propaganda to the continent. We are
also seeing them engage in more military-to-military
engagements, which is concerning.
We are also looking at some of the infrastructure they are
looking to development, and ports that could become dual use
are of concern, especially if they have something on the
Atlantic. Atlantic base of sea-based Chinese ships would
greatly complicate our security picture writ large.
So working across Africa I think to identify where China is
not working in everyone's interests is important, and I think
also engaging in the information domain to highlight some of
these malign activities is important.
Senator Fischer. We also spoke a little bit about losing
some of our Nation partners who have been a great help to us on
the continent. We talked about looking at National Guard and
the partnerships that they have in various countries, and not
just in Africa but also around the world.
Just briefly, could you kind of hit on the importance of
developing those or using those partnerships as tools to help
develop good relationships?
General Anderson. Absolutely, Senator. I think the State
Partnership Program is one of the best programs we have within
our Department. It establishes long-term relationships, it
allows engagement, and builds capability and readiness for our
forces as well as theirs.
I think what you brought up is an interesting point,
especially Nebraska, who has partners on the continent, but
also with the Czech Republic, as there are opportunities that
the State Partnership Program can bring these partners together
and help burden share some of the effort, so that we can use
the expertise--the Czech's bring great expertise and
capabilities--to help train our African partners. Combined with
the State Partnership Program, I think there are some
opportunities there, without a doubt.
Senator Fischer. Admiral Bradley, short question, Mr.
Chairman, please. What is your view on the importance of the
space domain with regards to Special Operations Forces, and how
would you leverage that new command? If you would take that for
a question for the record, the Chairman is anxious to gavel me
out.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I will.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Chairman Wicker. Very, very fine question, Senator Fischer,
which is going to require a lengthy response on the record.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to
both of you for your nominations. I just noticed, in looking at
your bios, you both have had, in your professional careers,
some significant experience in programs kind of with
international partners. So Admiral Bradley, your posting to the
Italian equivalent of their sort of SEALs, the Incursori, and
General Anderson, your reception of the Olmsted scholarship.
Talk about how in each instance this was important to your
professional development.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. I think I was most
surprised and rewarded with being able to see the world through
the eyes of a different culture, and as close even as the
Italian culture is to America, in fact, many immigrants, a
large portion of the country here. But they could still see the
same event in a decidedly different way.
I believe that experience both deepened my family's
closeness and appreciation for the rest of the world but also
helped to deepen my own empathy, to be able to understand the
way other people might see things.
Senator Kaine. So you clearly conveyed a benefit to these
Italian allies by being posted there, but also received a
benefit in return that has helped you in the leader you are
today.
General Anderson, tell us about the Olmsted program.
General Anderson. Yes, Senator, it was, in hindsight, a
transformative program to be able to study abroad and to be
immersed in the culture. Like I said in the opening statement,
when I was there after 9/11 you could not walk through any town
square without seeing a memorial to the United States and to
the Americans that were lost.
As a matter of fact, when I walked to school that morning,
on September 12th, there was a status of Tomas Garrigue
Masaryk, the first President of the Czech Republic. On that
square you could not walk through it because it was covered
with flowers and candles, and across the chest of the statue
was, in Czech, a banner that said, ``We stand with you for
democracy.'' It was a pretty powerful reminder of what those
relations mean and what the American way of life and our values
stand for to many people.
Senator Kaine. This was a number of years ago, at a time
when it probably would have been hard to imagine a land war in
Europe. But the relationship the United States has had with the
Czech Republic, including in the current conflict in Ukraine,
has been a very important one.
We also have a lot of programs where we bring military
leaders from other nations to the United States to participate
in programs at the Naval War College and the Army War College
and others. If you benefited from the experiences in the Czech
Republic and in Italy, I believe, from my own observation,
these programs are also pretty important to building
relationships with foreign military leaders who come to the
United States. Do you share that view?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do.
Senator Kaine. The reason I ask the question--I was
interested in the commonality in your resumes in this way--is I
am very, very worried about the budget that the Administration
has submitted, and the recissions package we voted on is
dramatically undercutting these exchange programs. I have not
yet seen the effect in the DOD, but in the recission package
that we passed last week, it was very nonspecific about
details. But you can tell a little bit from how these
recissions will be used from looking at the Administration's
submitted budget.
The Administration's submitted budget for 2026 basically
eliminates a lot of funding that goes into this. The Bureau of
Education and Cultural Affairs in the State Department, which
handles these programs for diplomates, the recommendation is
that it be cut by 93 percent, and many of the RIFs that were
done a couple of Fridays ago in the State Department, laying
off people who do this work. This is the Fulbright Program, and
this is other exchange programs. These programs that the U.S.
has funded have educated more than 600 current or former heads
of other nations. They have come to the United States and
gained experience here. Eighty-eight Nobel Prize winners are
alumni of these exchanges, and the Administration proposes to
cut the budget by 93 percent. I am very worried about that.
Let me ask one other question. How important is it, in your
work in AFRICOM or Special Forces, going forward, that the U.S.
be a strong competitor in the information domain?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I will start there. It is
critical. In the competition, in the information domain, truth
is the high ground. We in the United States have a history of
leveraging the truth, telling the truth, and I think that is
powerful.
Senator Kaine. General Anderson?
General Anderson. Senator, I think it is absolutely
critical across the continent, and I agree with Admiral
Bradley. The fact that we have a credible news source and that
we tell the truth is a very powerful information operation.
Senator Kaine. The Administration's proposed budget for
2026 slashes the U.S. Agency for Global Media's budget by 82
percent. The Voice of America, the Middle East Broadcasting
Network, VOA Persian, all of these are being dramatically
reduced, and I think many of the RIFs that happened at the
State Department are in that space.
Mr. Chair, I would conclude, I would like to just introduce
in the record an article from the Washington Institute of Near
East Policy, ``Here's How State Department Cuts Would Impede
U.S. Policy,'' dated July 3, 2025.
Chairman Wicker. Is there objection? Without objection, so
ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, welcome. Congratulations. Thank
you for your continued service. Thanks to your families for
their service and sacrifice, as well.
Admiral Bradley, Special Forces were targeted for
reductions in forces and funding in recent years by the past
administration. Could you explain what it takes to turn a
conventional soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, into a Special
Operator? How many years does it take to build that kind of
expertise and ability?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. First, I have to say
we have the benefit of being able to draw from the best and the
brightest across the great population of the United States. Our
services do the principal recruiting, and we have the
opportunity to be able to draw from within those recruits.
But Special Operations provides a very valuable recruiting
tool for those services, as well. Once a candidate assesses
into a service and has the initiative to want to volunteer to
come to one of our selection assessments programs, a rigorous
process, both of their resume, of their psychological
resilience, of their physical capabilities begins, followed by
some amount of training and really grit determination. On the
back side of that, that may take anywhere up to a year,
depending upon the program. Then additional advanced training
will continue. Then finally, the operator or the member will be
assigned to an operational unit where, frankly, another amount
of apprentice to master a progression begins.
So for a fully up and around operator to reach leadership
status it is not uncommon for that to take 6 or 7 years.
Senator Cotton. So if Special Operations Forces were to
face cuts, you do not just lose capability. You lose a lot of
time, as well. That is correct?
Admiral Bradley. It does take time to build that operator.
Yes, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Versus, say, just for the sake of
comparison, the Army can send someone from the first day of
basic training through infantry training to an infantry platoon
in maybe 6 months. Obviously, they are brand new privates just
out of training, about 6 months versus many years. I think we
should be mindful of that contrast.
What is your assessment on how drones are changing the
modern battlefield? Every day there are new reports of new
developments in drone warfare in Ukraine. We saw a couple of
months ago Ukraine launched audacious attacks from inside of
Russia with pre-positioned drones. It appears that Israel may
have done something similar inside of Iran. I know you have
probably given this a lot of thought in your current job and
looking ahead to your future job.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do not think it is unfair to
call this a revolution in military affairs. The changing,
accelerating pace of technology, the ubiquitous information
environment, and the advent of man-machine teamed autonomy on
the battlefields of the world today are absolutely changing the
character of warfare in our very eyes.
Within Special Operations, and I believe the initiatives,
frankly, that you have initiated here with the FORGED Act, the
SPEED Act across the way, and the President and the Secretary's
initiatives to drive innovation within the Department are
critical to allowing us to use the innovative spirit of our
operators, to be able to capture those problems and
opportunities we see on the battlefield and turn them into new
man-machine teamed approaches.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. General Anderson, given your
current role and also the threat of drone attacks from
terrorist groups and your future role, what are your thoughts
on this question?
General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that. It is
transforming the battlefield. We are at a critical inflection
point in history, much like the Industrial Age matured in the
early 20th century, the Digital Age maturing now. As Admiral
Bradley mentioned, it is not just the drones we see today. It
is what does it mean when we have autonomy and AI behind those
drones, and we have swarm attacks. That is not necessarily
science fiction. That is in the future.
So we have to take this very seriously, not just taking on
the drone operations but also what do we do to counter them and
defend against them. This is a grave concern for me as I look
at the African continent, as there are vulnerabilities out
there for our forces. But it is also a vulnerability for our
partners, as well.
Senator Cotton. I guess I should say this, not just
potential terrorist groups. It is also potential insurgencies,
uprisings, clashes of the kind that we see with more frequency
in Africa, as well.
Okay, thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to
welcome both of you, congratulate you on your nominations, and
acknowledge Liz in the audience, a resident of Maine, as you
noted, General Anderson, proud graduate of the University of
Maine. I hope, Liz, you will convey to your family in Maine
that you saw me working. I appreciate you being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I have a statement from our brother, Jim
Inhofe, on the AFRICOM legislation from 2008, when it was first
adopted, and I would like unanimous consent to enter it into
the record of this hearing.
Chairman Wicker. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator King. As all of us know, Senator Inhofe was a great
champion of our interests in Africa, probably the greatest in
the Senate. I noted in his statement, again from 2008, ``My
resolution recognizes the strategic importance of the African
continent and encourages the Department of Defense, the State
Department, and USAID to work cooperatively together with our
African allies to bring hope to the continent.''
We sort of have been talking around this today. We just
made one of the greatest geopolitical mistakes in my lifetime
in the last several weeks by essentially abolishing USAID. I do
not expect either of you to answer questions directly about
that because it could jeopardize your appointment. But there is
just no question.
The term ``soft power'' is kind of unfortunate, because the
emphasis is on soft, but it is power, and as both of you have
testified, communications is important, relationships with the
countries' stabilization, anti-terrorism, developing good
relationships, the PEPFAR program, the malaria program,
education programs, democracy promotion programs are essential
to our ability to compete with the Chinese and the Russians in
the African continent.
In talking to some friends who have been deployed there,
their view was that we just made an enormous gift, particularly
to the Chinese. As the Chairman suggested in his opening
statement and questions, there is no question in my mind that
our recent actions in essentially dismantling and abolishing
AID has met with celebration and approbation in Russia and
China.
General Anderson, one of the things that concerns me, and
it relates somewhat to the AID question but more generally, is
the rise of terrorism. You mentioned September 11th. That was
19 people, and my concern is with our so-called pivot to the
Indo-Pacific we are taking our eye off the terrorism ball.
Could you share with us the thoughts about the status of al
Qaeda and ISIS in Africa and what we should be watching out for
and being concerned of?
General Anderson. Yes, Senator. I appreciate that concern,
and if confirmed, I will definitely make this a priority to
assess, as it has been 4 years since I was at SOCAFRICA.
With that said, though, we have seen the terrorist groups
move much of their operations into the ungoverned spaces of
Africa, both ISIS and al Qaeda. We are seeing ISIS active in
Somalia, as well as in West Africa, ISIS West Africa. AQIM and
their affiliate, JNIM, are also very active in the Sahel, both
with intent to attack U.S. interests. Whether or not they have
that capability is not clear.
So to your point, one of the greatest concerns we have is
having enough resources and enough relationships to be able to
understand how these threats are progressing. So we have the
adequate amount of indicators and warnings and we know what the
threat to the United States could be, so we could take action.
The access is also critical with our partners to understand
what is happening with these threats, and I would also say what
is happening with some of the other powers there and how they
may be working with them or maybe not acting in our interests,
so that we can understand what the threat landscape is on the
continent.
Senator King. Well, I think one of the new duties of your
job, as you take this on, since State Department and USAID is
essentially retreating, you are going to have diplomatic duty,
whether you signed up for that or not. But you are going to
have to build relationships, not necessarily strictly military,
but with the local governments and the local leadership. Do you
see that as a priority?
General Anderson. Senator, where we prioritize those areas
we have the best return on our investment. I think it is
important to build those relationships. I think it is important
to look at creative ways, as we go forward. One of the greatest
powers the United States brings is our economy. That is largely
done through private investment. So finding opportunities in
the continent as it continues to expand and grow in population
I think is an opportunity. Then working with NGO's to identify
some of these. I have worked with several in the past that have
been very productive, and engaging some of those areas that you
are talking about, that we help them understand the environment
and then they are able to execute the actual engagements.
Senator King. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I will
have a question for the record for Admiral Bradley about brain
health and the protecting of our troops from traumatic brain
injury. I will followup on the record. Thank you very much,
gentlemen.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you for your interest in that,
Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, first
of all, thank you for your service to our country. To your
families also, I just want to say thank you, because you
sacrificed a lot, as well, and we most certainly recognize
that, and we appreciate what you do to help both of these
gentlemen be successful in their careers.
Gentlemen, I have heard from, at least now from 29 senior
Department officials, including every service chief and eight
combatant commanders, that vacating the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz and 7.7
to 8 GHz bands of the spectrum would have negative consequences
for our warfighting capabilities. Being forced to share these
bands with commercial interests in a non-optimal way would have
the same impact.
Admiral Bradley, does the Special Operations Force have
capabilities operating on the 3.1 to 3.45 band and the 7 and 8
bands of spectrum, which would be used in a conflict with
China?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. I have to say that I
am not intimately aware of all of the systems across SOCOM. I
can speak to my personal experience in these last 3 years. I do
agree that both directly, some of our systems operated in those
bands that we rely upon for critical tactical capability, but
also indirectly the service systems that operate on those bands
are very important for us as we integrate with the Joint Force.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. would those capabilities be
negatively impacted if DOD were forced to share those bands?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I believe they would.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Anderson, same question.
Does AFRICOM make use of capabilities which reside on our make
use of those bands of the spectrum?
General Anderson. Senator, Africa being a remote location,
we depend upon satellite communications that use some of those
bands, as well as the air and missile defense systems that are
on the continent.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Admiral Bradley, your
predecessor testified earlier this year that SOCOM makes up 3
percent of DOD's forces and less than 2 percent of the budget,
all while missions have increased by over 170 percent compared
to the last decade. Is it fair to say that if we are going to
continue to ask more of SOCOM, more resources will be needed to
enable those increased missions?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. As I have watched
General Fenton make the compelling case about that exact
equation you described, I think that is a conclusion that comes
out. An alternative is we just do less, we do fewer missions.
We have to say no more times.
Senator Rounds. You are the tip of the spear. It seems to
me that we should be doing everything possible to make sure
that those young men and women have the best and capable
technologies and weapon systems available to them.
General Anderson, how do you assess AFRICOM's role in
countering Chinese and Russian influence in Africa,
particularly in regions where entities such as the Wagner Group
or the PRC-affiliated commercial ventures are exploiting
governance or security gaps? What strategies do you believe are
most effective in addressing these challenges?
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate that question. I
think that is a critical area, how do we counter what these
powers are doing on the continent when they run counter to U.S.
interests. One of the areas, when I was at SOCAFRICA, that was
useful was engaging with the partners and explaining to them
what those risks were when they were working with these
partners, especially when Wagner was trying to expand into the
Sahel. While they have gotten a foothold there, we were able to
explain to them the risks that that would entail, the corrosive
nature of those engagements, the lack of human rights that
those nations bring. That was helpful in buffering. It also
helped in some of the other Coastal West Africa states, as
well.
As far as China, I would say it is similar, engaging and
countering some of the malign influence operations that are out
there. We saw, across the Sahel, counter-Western, counter-
French, counter-United States propaganda take hold, and that
then turns the populations against our interests.
Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there is a
combination of hard power, military power, but there is also
the desire to have not just that stick but the ability to offer
other capabilities, as well? Can you give me some examples of
what we would call soft power that might be available or be
very helpful to you, based upon our current situations in
Africa?
General Anderson. Yes, Senator. Across the breadth of what
our Nation brings is important, whether that is called hard
power or soft power, its influence and how could we engage
constructively with them. Can we encourage investment? Can we
open sources to critical minerals? Can we partner with the
nations that are in our interest that also benefit them, as
well? Those are opportunities, as well, that are slightly
outside the military lane, but I do believe we have the
opportunity to convene some of the right folks to have these
types of discussions. Then, again, engagement and building
trust and partnership is critical, as we found in the past.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
gentlemen, both for being here today and your continued service
to our great United States. Your families, as well. We
appreciate their selfless service and sacrifice on your behalf,
as well.
General Anderson, we will start with you, and we will
continue to buildupon what Senator Rounds was discussing.
History has shown that when America reduces her presence, our
adversaries are quickly seeking to fill the void. So sustained
U.S. leadership is essential to deterring those threats and
preserving stability. This is something we talked about in my
office, that I firmly believe that presence is power,
especially when it comes to the forward posture of our American
servicemembers.
General Anderson, can you speak to why continued American
leadership around the globe is essential, and in your
particular case in Africa, why it is essential that we maintain
a presence and how it is in America's best interests.
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate the question, and I
agree that that engagement is absolutely vital. Having that
access and that engagement and building of trust makes a
difference in times of crisis or in times of need. When we call
in the middle of the night, we want our partners to answer, and
we want them to help.
At the same time, it needs to be in our mutual interests.
One thing I have found, as you talked about, in SOCAFRICA is
that we could often bring parties together that normally would
not. We could bring some of the European partners together with
the African partners and create a dialog. And sometimes just
that American presence as a trusted partner opened that door to
be more effective.
I would also say, as you mentioned, small investments and
small teams go a long way on the continent in working with our
African partners. As an example, I was the first general
officer to go back to Cote D'Ivoire after 19 years. The very
first person who met me was the chief of the army, and the
first thing he told me was he thanked me for the training that
the Special Forces team had given him as a captain, 19 years
before. He said it was the best training he ever had, and he
was very excited that we were able to restore relationship,
because it was the best training he had received, and he was
looking forward to that for his army.
It did not take a persistent presence. It took some
episodic engagements and continued investment in that partner.
What I have found in Africa is many of those partners that we
work with are incredibly good partners. They are not looking
for a handout. They are looking for helping hand, and if we can
help them build that capacity they are willing to try to stand
on their own.
Senator Ernst. That is amazing, and thank you for
reaffirming what I have always believed, as well, is that
relationships matter, and our friends will never forget that.
Neither will our enemies. So we will continue on. We could talk
more about China's presence. I think a number of our colleagues
have covered down on that, so we will go ahead and turn to
SOCOM.
Admiral Bradley, thank you so much for your continued
leadership within the organization. We have already talked a
little bit about the fact that SOCOM, you have earned the
reputation that the command can do more with less. I have heard
SOCOM commander after SOCOM commander come in front of the
Committee and State it really does not matter, we will salute
smartly and move out and execute our mission.
But we are reaching a point where, as you have very clearly
stated today, that if you do not continue to see growth,
especially just for inflation, within the department, that you
will have to do less. You will have to dig in deeper and make
the necessary cuts.
So we are in an era of heightened threats and expanding
mission demands. I believe that do-more-with-less mindset can
no longer be sustainable. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do, and, in fact, we have
adopted the term ``less with less'' to ensure we apply the
ruthless prioritization to achieve the highest priority of
those missions.
Senator Ernst. Mm-hmm, and given the increasingly complex
threat environment, we need to be able to strengthen SOCOM's
capacity to deter our near-peer adversaries. So that does
require us moving beyond a stagnant budget. So if confirmed,
Admiral Bradley, then what is the vision for SOCOM and how do
you do that ruthless prioritization?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. If confirmed, our
priorities are the priorities of the Department--defend the
Homeland, ensure that we deter China, and ensure that our force
multiplication of an already strong alliance is strengthened
even further.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much, and again
to your families, thank you for your sacrifice, as well. Thank
you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst.
Senator Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually,
Admiral, I am glad that you ended that way, because that, those
sort of prioritizations of America, which is defend the
Homeland and really this pivot to the Indo-Pacific has been
absent in a lot of the questions that have been asked. A lot of
the questions that have been asked, I feel like I have been
teleported into the Foreign Relations Committee.
I want to ask you, since it was brought up--I had no plan
to talk about this--I am going to just read off a few things: a
half a million dollars for electric buses in Rwanda, $3.3
million for civic engagement in Zimbabwe, $300,000 to hold a
private parade in Lesotho, and almost $900,000 for electrical
reforms and voter education in Kenya, $1.2 million for an
Afrobarometer public opinion survey, $116,000 for media
strengthening activity in Liberia, $800 for promoting vegan
food in Zambia, African hide camping and tours to create
adventure camps for backpackers, graphic design training in
Nigeria.
Do you think these are in the best interest of the United
States of America, given the scarcity that we have?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I know there are a lot of
priorities that have to be balance through the budget process.
Senator Schmitt. I know that, and I appreciate your story.
You were very willing to opine about other things that were
sort of policy matters, in my view. These are policy matters,
and I think that when we do this stuff, it totally undermines
the desire to have real soft power. Like I am not disputing the
idea that soft power exists. My contention is that all of this
nonsense that continues to be defended, in many ways, inhibits
the ability to do exactly what you are articulating, which is
there are smart things to do that are not just about blowing
things up and killing people. But that has been crowded out
with a mission creep in this wandering foreign policy that just
believes that we can just do all of this do-gooding stuff
around the world.
Getting back to what you said at the end of your last
statement, which is, ``Defend the Homeland and understand that
our chief threat is in China,'' that is what I wanted to ask
you questions about, and I am going to. But I cannot let this
go without it being responded to.
Like we are moving away from this stuff, whether people
like it or not. Like the American people do not support it. We
have an Administration that wants to move away from this stuff,
and I applaud it. I might be in the minority on this Committee.
I do not really know. I do not really care, because I think
that is in the best interest of the United States, and we can
have a robust debate about it.
But I do want to ask you, because we are in this great
powers competition, how does SOCOM assess the right balance
between sort of the counterterrorism mission that has existed
for a long time, and is not necessarily going away, versus this
kind of direct action, and especially as it relates to
irregular deterrence and China's gray zone activity that is
happening in the South China Sea and places where our allies
are really--a real threat. We are not talking about electric
buses in Rwanda. We are talking about, you know, communist
China here.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. Having had the
opportunity to be a part of our counterterrorism operations
since 9/11, I have seen us achieve some great successes to
diminish the threat against the Homeland. The credibility that
has come from that gives us a very powerful entree with the
alliance members in the Indo-Pacific. All of our national
defense strategies since 2018, the INDSG all illuminate the
importance of that alliance. I believe that force
multiplication effort is a critical capability.
As you know, General Fenton is the coordinating authority
for counter-VEO, as well, within the Department of Defense, and
so still maintains a principal responsibility to be able to
oversee and advise the Secretary on the approach for
counterterrorism.
The most acute of those threats, those VEOs with external
operations, aspiration, and capability, are the top priority
threats that we, as a whole, integrated interagency, orient our
priorities against. I believe, in many cases, and one instance
in particular, the case in the Philippines is a great example--
--
Senator Schmitt. I was going to ask you about that, yes.
Admiral Bradley.--where our work with the Filipinos over
the last two decades has allowed them to be able to keep that
terrorist threat at bay, and frankly, allowed us to weather a
very difficult diplomatic season with a particular leader
there, and now come out an even stronger ally.
Senator Schmitt. I agree. I think that is a great example,
which completes sort of like the last question I have, in
limited time. Do you feel like our other really important
allies in that region, say Australia and Japan, are prepared or
sufficiently ready to work alongside us the way that the
Philippines has?
Admiral Bradley. Sir, I absolutely believe the Australians
are, and I believe our other allies are working to come to that
place, as well.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Thank you. Good luck.
Congratulations.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to both of you on your nominations.
So the American military is built to defeat our enemies,
not to create more of them, and that is why Republican and
Democratic administrations have worked to reduce risks to
innocent civilians as part of military options. In fact, the
last Trump administration issued DOD first instruction to
establish policies to mitigate civilian harm after concerns
grew about civilian casualties in the campaign against ISIS.
Now, one of the tools that commanders now have in the
toolkit is working with Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response
advisors, from refining war games to real attack planning in
the Middle East and Africa operations, and more.
Vice Admiral Bradley, your predecessor at Special
Operations Command recently said that these experts, quote,
``assisted commanders and their staffs in mitigating civilian
harm without compromising lethality.'' What's more, their
knowledge, quote, ``enhanced precision, preserving legitimacy,
and enabling mission success.''
So Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to keeping civilian harm prevention experts at SOCOM to
advise you and your team?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, first, just to resonate, it is
not only an obligation to adhere to the law of armed conflict
to protect civilians, it is critical to our success and
competition to represent our values. I believe that every
uniformed, every civilian, and every contractor that is
employed or in oversight of the use of lethal force has a
critical obligation to be able to do that, and I do commit to
keeping that as a focus for our command, if confirmed.
Senator Warren. Thank you. That is a strong answer, and I
appreciate it.
Other tools in the toolkit here are the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan and DOD's Policy
Instruction on Civilian Harm, which outlines DOD's plans and
policies to reduce civilian harm risks. AFRICOM has made
progress in implementing these policies, including through
training allies and partners on how to reduce risks to innocent
civilians. We are serving as a model that our other partners
are now beginning to adopt. In May, the Nigerian Air Force
announced its own Civilian Harm Prevention Plan. These are
efforts that save innocent lives.
Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are confirmed, will you
carry forward these efforts to integrate civilian harm
mitigation planning into AFRICOM operations and train allies in
the region to help them do the same?
General Anderson. Senator, to echo Vice Admiral Bradley's
importance of this, this is a critically important show of our
values. It is also important that we maintain the laws of armed
conflict, and when we engage with our partners that we help
them education and that we model this. This has been something
that, when I was at Special Operations Command Africa, we did.
We worked with partners, and when we saw things or heard of
things that were credible, we encouraged them to investigate
and to look into this, and then we gave them assistance, as
needed, in order for them to conduct their own investigations.
So I will continue, if confirmed, to take that on at AFRICOM.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I want to hit one other
point here, because we also need to reduce harm to our own
Special Operators. I have worked with Senator Ernst and others
on this Committee for years to address high levels of brain
injury caused by blast overpressure. Exposed servicemembers
have reported debilitating systems, from seizures to depression
to suicidality. Now preliminary research is showing high rates
of heart disease, chronic pain, hypertension, even links to
brain cancer and neurogenerative diseases. Clearly, we have a
lot more we need to learn.
So let me ask, Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, you will
oversee tens of thousands of Special Operations personnel. Do
you support DOD partnering with outside experts to study the
long-term effects of blast overpressure?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do. I have seen great benefit
from our partnership with academic and other organizations that
are studying this problem critically. Our number one SOF truth
is that people are more important than hardware, and the
critical part of those people is the intellectual capacity. Of
course, that is jeopardized by these brain health issues. We
see them as a critical contract with our operators and our
operators' families to ensure that we keep them sustainable.
Senator Warren. Oh, I appreciate that very, very much. If
you are confirmed, I will be calling on you to help us with
that. There is language in both the House and the Senate NDAA
that would help us get this study, and there are lots of
organizations like Home Base Massachusetts who have the
expertise to help us get these answers. We owe this to our
servicemembers.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator
Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
Thanks to both of you. Thank you for what you have done for our
country over your careers, you and your families. What a
sacrifice it has been. But you have done an outstanding job.
Admiral, I think for far too long we have had our eyes on
other things and not on our hemisphere, whether it is illegal
migrants, drugs, or both. So what is Special Operations
community doing to assist the militaries and governments in our
hemisphere, like Panama, to combat narcoterrorists?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, in my current capacity I am not
privy to all of the activities that SOCOM is engaged in in the
Southern Hemisphere. But in listening and watching General
Fenton and his leadership over these last 3 years, I know that
the partnerships that our teams have been engaging in and
developing remain critical to being able to help them build
capacity, to be able to defend themselves, but also to provide
security locally, which, of course, helps to prevent and secure
our southern border, as well.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. I am sure you are up on the point
of the Darien Gap and the problems it has caused over the
years, and relationship with our Special Ops down in that area,
training people. That will probably be in your forte going
forward. What are your thoughts about cooperation activities
with Latin America, as going into this job?
Admiral Bradley. Yes, sir. I think, as the counterterrorism
fight informs us, it is far better to find the root of the
problem well away from our borders than it is to have to defend
them internal to the United States. So if confirmed, making it
a priority to provide assistance to all of our combatant
commanders as far forward as possible and with those partnered
forces to help them to be able to secure their own territory.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, and we have problems all over the
world, but if we do not watch our back door then we are going
to have really problems within our country, which we already
have.
General, I think we need to be reinforcing our military
presence in AFRICOM. Unfortunately, under the previous
administration we seemed like we were doing just the opposite.
In Niger--you and I talked about this in a meeting in my
office--the vacuum that was caused there. China, Russia, Iran
were all too happy to fill the things that we were doing there.
What is your assessment of our withdrawal from Air Base 201
and have we learned from these lessons, and your thoughts about
maybe the future there.
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate that question, and
there was significant investment that went into that air base.
It was in a key area for us to be able to monitor the threat,
so the loss of that is one that we will have to find creative
ways to continue to get the indicators and warnings of what the
terrorists are doing in this area.
I think we also have to understand that there is some
volatility across the continent, so how do we make smart
investments with the partners that we can continue to sustain.
I will say that the relationships that we built in Niger with
the military over several decades are still there. When the
time is right, I believe there will be an opportunity, but that
time will have to be determined, and if confirmed, I will look
at what that is.
Senator Tuberville. Yes. After your confirmation, I guess
by telling the Committee, and people even watching at home, why
do we need to have presence in Africa? What are your thoughts?
General Anderson. Africa is key to any strategy. It is just
on strategic terrain, just the waterways that it forms between
the Straits or Gibraltar all the way down through the Suez
Canal and the Red Sea. It is critical minerals and resources
that are on the continent that we need for the future economy.
Both China and Russia see their strategies going through the
continent, and they are going to engage there.
So we can cede that ground or we can compete in that
ground, and I think we have a very powerful tool to compete
with. As Admiral Bradley mentioned, nobody brings more
credibility to the counterterrorism fight than the U.S. As a
matter of fact, when we rescued that hostage in Niger, the next
morning there was an influential blogger that posted, ``The
Americans came like the lion in the night. They killed their
enemies and rescued their own.'' No other nation on Earth could
do that, and that is a powerful symbol across the continent and
around the world of what our military and what the United
States is capable of. I do think that some level of engagement
in Africa does matter. I agree it is an economy of force, but a
small investment goes a long way, so that we do not have
strategic surprise that then distracts the United States from
focusing on the rising threats in the Pacific and other areas.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Tuberville, and well
said, General Anderson. Senator Sheehy.
Senator Sheehy. Thank you, Chairman. General, I want to
thank you for what you just said there, because we have been
hearing a lot today about how pulling back investment in
certain programs in Africa is going to end the world and cede
the entire dominance to China. The reality is what you just
said is what the real power projection is. When we can display
to the world that we are going to protect our interests and our
people ruthlessly, no matter what, that is what the real power
projection of the U.S. Military is about. The SOF stuff is
absolutely important. Being able to project economic power and
stability is important. But nothing will ever supersede what
you just said, so thanks for saying that.
Thanks to both of you and your families for what you have
done for this country and continue to do.
Admiral, over to you. We are facing a very challenging
naval atmosphere against China. They are building ships faster
than we can, 230 times faster than we do, as a matter of fact.
So if we should face a maritime conflict, our most asymmetric
advantage is going to be our undersea Special Operations
capability, how we can project that power, manned and unmanned.
Would you take a moment here and just explain to me your
commitment to that program and how we are going to make sure it
remains dominant?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you, and thanks for your
service in that community, as well. I believe, from my time
serving in our undersea community, that the partnership between
Special Operations and the Navy in this regard is singular in
the world in its sophistication. The ability to arrive with the
element of surprise is unparalleled through this approach. It
gives us advantage, asymmetric advantage, not just in
warfighting but also in the ability, in competition and in
crisis.
The Special Operations community has a unique and growing
and deepening relationship with the United States Navy in this
regard, and if confirmed, I would very much look forward to
advancing that and continuing to maintain that asymmetry.
Senator Sheehy. Thank you, and for both of you a similar
question. The last time we fought a war in INDOPACOM we had
about 5,000 seaplanes that were a critical part of our
logistical and tactical network across the region, from moving
insurgents, to supplies, to logistics, to rescuing ships' crew
and downed airmen in areas that, at the time, were out of
range.
Right now we have precisely zero planes that can land, or
any aircraft that can land on water in the entire U.S.
Military. General, with your background in non-standard
aviation, as I do too--I used to fly seaplanes and PC-12s like
you--this is a capability that as we are entering a new era of
great power competition I believe we need to reinvest in it,
and SOCOM would be the tip of that spear.
I recently worked with INDOPACOM to try to reinvigorate the
ability for them to access this capability. Would either of you
care to comment on what you think amphibious aviation could
mean for our ability to project power all over the world?
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate the question. I do
think there are several types of new technologies, emerging
technologies, that we need to invest in that allow different
types of logistics and different types of support. Seaplanes
could be part of that. I think unmanned systems,
semisubmersibles, but a plethora of capabilities that allow us
to operate in a contested environment, with a combination of
manned and unmanned systems is critical. In the Indo-Pacific,
there is a lot of water across that area, so having the ability
to operate in those areas, and to be able to resupply small
islands I think will be very important to a potential Pacific
fight.
Senator Sheehy. Yes. I would say on an AO that in some
cases is over 90 percent water, having the entire AO be a
runway seems like a pretty good idea.
I was recently in Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt. I went over there
for a reason. We also served many years in the Middle East. But
Africa is now going to have 2.5 billion people, become the most
populous continent in the world here, potentially, in the next
decade. It is very possible that the 21st century could be an
African century, and as that 2.5 billion people plug into the
global economy, as they become global citizens, active on the
internet, as they become banked, as they become crypto
citizens, we are going to have to reckon with the great power
competition that is happening there.
As I look at some of our engagement across the Horn of
Africa, and through all of Africa really, what do you see that
your biggest challenge is going to be? What do your first 90,
120 days look like, as you try to grapple with the fact that we
have a massive geopolitical battlefield emerging?
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate those comments, and
I agree that Africa is growing rapidly. There is a large youth
population. That youth can either be challenged to contribute
to the global economy or they could become terrorists or other
nefarious actions.
What I would say to that is that the first thing I would
look at is do we have the right access and placement in order
to have the indicators and warnings to prevent that strategic
surprise. To your point earlier, I think it is a combination of
hard power and soft power, as you put it. But having the
relationships and the trust to have the access, when needed, in
order to project power, to be able to counter terrorism, to be
able to respond to a crisis somewhere on the continent, and
then also to understand what other powers are doing.
So my first few days, if confirmed, would be focused on
assessing that, and do we have the right posture and footprint,
and what can we do to maximize the indicators and warnings.
Senator Sheehy. Thank you. I am out of time, but I would
also encourage you to take a look at Camp Simba and upgrades
required there. It is a key point of power projection for us in
that region. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sheehy. Let me ask both
of you, with regard to the first set of questions Senator
Sheehy brought up about seaplanes, that sort of capacity. Is
there anything on the horizon in that regard?
General Anderson. Senator, there are a few out there that
are being developed. I know DARPA is working on a project.
There are some other companies that are looking at seaplanes
and unmanned seaplanes, as well.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, across Special Operations there
have been experiments with that kind of capability.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator
Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Bradley,
General Anderson, thank you for being here and for continuing
to volunteer to serve our Nation.
SOCOM and AFRICOM both leverage economies of force
principles, so applying limited resources for having an
outsized impact. This requires some careful planning and using
the right assets against the right problem.
Within this economy of force principle, how important are
interagency partnership, like the Department of State, for
SOCOM and AFRICOM's campaign plan?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I will start. Across the Special
Operations community our partnership with the integrated
interagency, also our law enforcement, Federal and, frankly,
even our local law enforcement partnerships have been critical
to us over these last 25 years. I see that as nothing but
growing in the future. If confirmed as the SOCOM Commander, the
relationships that we have inside our integrated interagency,
cultivating those and sustaining them I think would have to be
a top priority. I can tell you that today the State of those
relationships, from my current experience, is, frankly, a high-
water mark certainly of my 34 years, and I suspect even longer
than that.
Senator Kelly. General, do you share that view?
General Anderson. Senator, I agree that we have very
limited resources, and so we have to partner across all
government agencies to maximize those resources and to find
where we can complement each other. We provide the military
piece of that, but to Admiral Bradley's point, my entire career
with Special Operations has been working with multiple
different agencies in order to maximize that, whether that is
the FBI and using legal authorities in different parts of the
world, working with our intelligence community, or with State
Department and others to make sure we leverage the full
authorities and capabilities of our Nation.
Senator Kelly. One of my big concerns here is the impact
that the cuts to USAID within the State Department is going to
have on our ability to build some trust with partner nations.
That is a concern of mine. I am not going to put you on the
spot here on that topic, but I think it is something that I
hope the two of you think about.
Admiral Bradley, China and Russia currently waging some
irregular warfare campaigns against us and our allies in a lot
of different places. PRC is using violence to impose their will
in the Philippines in the Second Thomas Shoal, and Russia has a
long history of using irregular warfare, most recently in
Ukraine. Leveraging your most recent experience as the
Commander of JSOC, how does the United States effectively wage
irregular warfare to compete and win with Russia and China in
the gray zones?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. In my last 3 years I
have had the opportunity to be a member of the SOCOM Board of
Directors and really watch our theater of Special Operations
commands who are responsible for operations from the joint SOF
community inside those areas. I can tell you that our principal
advantage that the SOF value proposition brings is
understanding, and enhanced understanding, of those insidious
actions, which are really preying on our alliance structure.
Being able to illuminate that predatory activity gives our
diplomats and our whole-of-government and our allies power to
be able to stand against it and be resilient to it. That, in
turn, strengthens our alliance and deepens our credibility when
we want to partnership and build capacity there.
Senator Kelly. Great. Well, thank you, and finally, in my
last minute here, General Anderson, I traveled, and it has been
about a year and a half now, in the Sahel, and part of Africa
where Wagner is pretty active, especially on social media, to
exploit coups in Western Africa, commit human rights abuses.
When the Russians gain a foothold in these countries they use a
significant amount of disinformation to intimidate the local
population, stifling opposing views, while they claim to
provide security.
So General, how does Russia's social media activity impact
security and stability in AFRICOM?
General Anderson. Senator, I think that is one of Russia's
greatest weapons that they are employing across the continent.
One of the things they use quite often is disinformation. They
play on historic grievances, historic colonial issues, fears of
sovereignty, and they play that up into an anti-democratic,
anti-Western that then has impacts to U.S. support.
I believe that the Russian influence in the information
operations was critical in turning populations against the
French in the Sahel. I think it is very much not in our
interest with what the Russians are doing in the information
domain.
Senator Kelly. Not only in Africa but, if I could just take
a couple more seconds, do you feel like we are losing this
information warfare with the Russians, Chinese, Iranians?
General Anderson. Senator, I refer to what we discussed
earlier. The truth is incredibly powerful. We have that still.
We are still a very credible source of information. We need to
leverage that. I think we need to be more aggressive about that
in this domain. But I would not say we are necessarily losing
it. But if we do not engage, we risk losing it.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Admiral Bradley,
General Anderson, congratulations. First off, thanks for your
service. Thanks to your family for being here. Thank you for
their sacrifice while you have served. You both are going to do
an outstanding job.
number one, do you believe that the government of China has
decided to be our adversary?
General Anderson. Senator, I do.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I concur.
Senator Scott. So this Committee has put a lot of effort
into getting rid of Chinese drones, in the military and in our
country, and we have made a lot of progress. As you know, we
are seeing drone warfare increase around the world. We have
watched what happened in Ukraine. We have watched what has
happened in the Red Sea. We have watched what the Houthis have
been doing to shoot down ships.
So do you believe drone technology is going to be important
in warfare, going forward?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do.
General Anderson. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Scott. So do you think it is really important to
make sure that we do not have, you know, Chinese products in
our military, such as drones?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I know that there are nefarious
aspects to Chinese products that come out. We must be careful
not to include any of those.
General Anderson. Senator, I would agree that we need to
make sure that we do not open back doors or other
vulnerabilities. We need to understand what products we are
using.
Senator Scott. So whether it is Chinese drones, computers,
printers, drugs, products like garlic that is grown in raw
sewage, do you think it is important that we make sure none of
that--none of that--is used by our military, or never dependent
on any of it?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do resonate with those
thoughts, and though I cannot speak to all the details,
certainly we must be cautious of anything that comes from China
that would be part of our kill chain or part of a military
chain of production.
General Anderson. Yes, Senator. I think that is something
that we need to assess is where are those critical
vulnerabilities, where do we need to ensure we have alternate
supply chains as we look at the future.
Senator Scott. How about drugs? Do you think we ought to be
buying Chinese drugs for our service men, service women?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I have to say I cannot speak to
the details of our drug production chain. Sorry.
General Anderson. Senator, I am not familiar with the
details of that either.
Senator Scott. Off the top of your head, so you think we
ought to have Chinese drug in our bodies, should anybody be
relying on them when we go to war? Do you think they might hold
them back?
General Anderson. Senator, that could be a risk, any time
we become dependent on a sole source. I have full faith in the
American system, and I would prefer American-made medicines.
Senator Scott. I was encouraged to see Secretary Hegseth
announce last week that he was removing CCP cloud services out
of the DOD, which was added, unfortunately, during the Obama
era initiative.
So last question. Do you think it is really important that
we continue to do everything we can to get all Chinese
products, all Chinese apps, everything, drones, computers,
printers, drugs, everything, as much as we can, out of our
supply chain for our military?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do agree with that.
General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I agree we should eliminate
as many vulnerabilities as we possibly can.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking
Member Reed for holding this hearing. I want to thank our
nominees and your families, of course, for your service--it
takes a whole family when you give a lifetime of service--and,
of course, your willingness to continue to serve, and
congratulations on your nominations.
I want to go right into the Houthis and their relations
with al-Shabaab, because the Iranian-backed Houthis are
diversifying their military capabilities and leveraging
regional conflicts to expand their influence. U.S. intelligence
reports indicate that the Houthis are working to provide
weapons to al-Shabaab. This development is incredibly
concerning, as al-Shabaab could utilize more sophisticated
Houthi weapons to target United States equities in the Horn of
Africa, such as our base in Djibouti.
So to both General and Admiral, please, to the extent that
you are able in this open setting, can you share more about the
growing partnership between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, the
risk that it poses, not only to the United States equities but
personnel in the region, global shipping in the Red Sea, the
Gulf of Aden? How are we going to address this challenge?
Since you are closest, Admiral, I am going to start with
you.
Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. The Houthi militia and
Iranian-supported renegade element inside Yemen has been a
destabilizing force in the southern Arabian Peninsula and
across the Horn for some time, and continues to act
belligerently. Any connection that they might make as an
outreach to a violent extremist organization, like al-Shabaab,
an al Qaeda affiliate, definitely bears close concern and,
frankly, interdiction. The potential for them to partner is
what we would see with grave concern.
If confirmed as the SOCOM Commander, I would have the
responsibility as a coordinating authority for an advisor to
the Secretary on counter-ciolent extremist organizations, and a
combination of those two actors would be a serious measure.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. General?
General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that question.
As having been the Commander of Special Operations Command
Africa, I am well aware that the al Qaeda affiliate, that al-
Shabaab is, is fully intent, has full intent to attack United
States interests in the United States Homeland, if they can
build the capability. The concern is that cooperation now
across the Red Sea with the Houthis, who are backed by the
Iranians, and what that could mean, and give them the
capability, not just have the will but now the capability, to
attack the United States or United States interests in a more
robust way.
Again, the Houthis and al-Shabaab operate in critical
terrain for the United States and for global shipping, and so
the means for them to disrupt that and have impact on our
interests is significant.
Senator Rosen. So we need to do everything we can to stop
that partnership.
I want to move on to talking about ISR strategy in the
Sahel. We know that Senator Kelly was talking about the Sahel a
little bit, but I want to go a little bit further, because
since our withdrawal from the two air bases in Niger last year,
at the behest of the host nation, our ability to conduct ISR
within the Sahel, throughout the African continent, has been
severely degraded. This also hurts other activities, as well.
So to both of you, can you speak to the challenges of our
withdrawal from Niger, the loss of the ISR, what is poses to
countering this violent extremism in the region, these
partnerships between the Houthis, al-Shabaab, and other things,
any other groups, and what are the latest updates to
establishing ISR basing elsewhere in Africa?
General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate that question, and
we did use the ISR coming out of Niger extensively. The loss of
that does make it more difficult. There is never enough ISR to
meet global demand, as I understand, and that Africa, as an
economy of force theater, will have limited assets available. I
think it is important that we balance the exquisite high-end
ISR capabilities where most needed, and then look at investing
in other capabilities, whether it be emerging technologies that
can allow some surveillance, partnering with key partners in
the area, having intel-sharing agreements so that we can gain
understanding from them on the ground. I think those are all
critical areas as we look at balancing the ISR demand across
the continent. As to where they could be in the future, if
confirmed, I would look into that. I am not privy to those
plans right now.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Admiral?
Admiral Bradley. Senator, just quickly, the evolving,
ubiquitous information environment provides us an opportunity
here, the space-SOF-cyber triad, an opportunity to be able to
leverage what we call horizontal ISR, to be able to leverage
more and more information available publicly, that people are
freely giving through their use of social media.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
for being here. I enjoyed our meetings last week in the office.
Congrats on your nominations, and thank you for your service
and your sacrifice and that of your families, as well.
Admiral Bradley, in our conversation last week, and I have
said it publicly in this room many times, before this hearing,
we need more and not fewer Special Operations Forces. A large
reason is because of their ability to help train our foreign
partners. You highlighted in your Advance Policy Questions that
SOF are uniquely suited for building partner capacity in
contested and sensitive areas.
So how is SOCOM building partner capacity, particularly in
the Indo-Pacific, and what is the Joint Force getting in return
for those efforts?
Admiral Bradley. Senator Budd, thank you. I very much
appreciated the time to visit with you, and thank you for your
great support for all of our bases, my current headquarters
there in the great State of North Carolina.
Sir, I think the example that best illustrates the essence
is the Philippines, where over a period of 20 years our--well,
for over 100 years, our strong societal relationship with the
Philippine society has been strong. But just within these last
20, our ability to help train, advise, assist the Philippines
to counter the terrorism threat in their country has deepened
that relationship and, in fact, helped us to withstand a very
troubled period, diplomatically, during the Duterte regime.
Now, on the back side, we have an even stronger alliance with
the Philippines, which will be critical as we look at any
action of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
I certainly would not want to speak for Admiral Paparo to
talk about the overall region and where this fits relative to
his other priorities, but I know from a SOF perspective our
contribution to partnerships throughout the region are
important, and we really bring that credibility from the
counterterrorism fight to help leaven and deepen those.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much. General Anderson, I want
to read you a quote from DOD's 2024 Annual Report to Congress
on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC. I will
tee it up with this, and I will ask you a question about it. It
says, ``Some of PRC's Belt and Road Initiative projects could
create potential military advantages such as PLA access to
select foreign ports, to preposition necessary logistics to
sustain naval deployments in water such as distant as the
Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean.''
So here is my concern. I am concerned about the PRC's
access to ports and the potential military advantage that this
could give them. So alongside Senator Kelly and Scott, I
introduce the Strategic Ports Reporting Act. It is a bill to
require monitoring of the PRC's access to foreign ports.
So if confirmed, do you commit to looking into the PRC's
access to foreign ports in your area of responsibility?
General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will look into
that, definitely.
Senator Budd. Thank you, and would you be willing to share
with us some of your concerns in that area, particularly with
PRC access to foreign ports?
General Anderson. Senator, I think as we have seen across
the Indian Ocean and into the African AOR and to the Atlantic
and even the Mediterranean, China is investing in ports
globally. I think that should be concerning to us. I think it
should be concerning to us not only that they could potentially
use those as dual-use military ports but what access could they
deny U.S. Forces or U.S. commerce as necessary in time of
conflict.
So I think this is an absolutely critical area that we need
to understand, the vulnerabilities that may be posed by this.
It does not mean that we do not believe in free commerce and
economics, but at the same time we need to understand our
national security interest and what this may entail.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much. A question about the
North Carolina National Guard. In particular, we have State
partners in the AFRICOM AOR. It is Malawi, Zambia, and
Botswana. So General, how do you view the future of the State
Partnership Program and its ability to strengthen regional
stability in Africa?
General Anderson. Senator, I think the State Partnership
Program is one of the greatest programs we have within the
Department. It builds long-term relationships. The nice thing
about the National Guard and the partner nation is those same
people will see each other decade after decade, and that builds
a really powerful relationship that I know we can buildupon. As
a matter of fact, it was the California National Guard that we
called upon to get the first information in Ukraine, because
they had long-standing relationships with that State
Partnership Program there. The same thing can happen in Africa,
where a small investment can have a great return for us in the
future.
Senator Budd. Thank you both. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Further questions? We are told
that Senator Shaheen is on her way.
Senator King. I can fill a little time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. There is a vote going on also. But yes,
the gentleman is recognized.
Senator King. I was struck by the Admiral's comment that
they had moved 27 times in their career. My first job was
moving furniture for Allied Van Lines in this area. Most of our
customers were military families, and I will never forget a
military spouse saying, ``In terms of damage to the furniture,
seven moves equals a fire.'' So congratulations on surviving
multiple fires.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Bradley. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Senator King, I am a veteran myself, and I
only served 4 years Active Duty. It seems to me that those
people who have made 20 moves have been able to throw away a
lot of things that my children and grandchildren may have to
deal with, since I have not moved now in over 30 years.
We think, within 10 seconds, Senator Shaheen will
materialize. There is a vote going on, and we are trying to do
our best.
[Pause.]
Chairman Wicker. I do not believe we will be able to go on
with our hearing, so I want to thank our witnesses for their
testimony. There will be an opportunity for questions on the
record. So I would remind members, or I would inform members,
that questions for the record will be due to the Committee by 5
p.m. today.
With that we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Vice Admiral Frank M.
Bradley, USN by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?
Answer. As a Unified Combatant Command with service-like
responsibilities, USSOCOM is a strategic headquarters with
responsibilities to organize, train, and equip four service components
(Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air
Force Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command), the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and
seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). In that role, in
accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. Section 167, the Commander of USSOCOM
is responsible as a force provider to the other supported Combatant
Commands to provide ready forces to meet operational requirements and
contingency war plans. As directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, and in accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. Section 164, the
Commander USSOCOM conducts operations globally.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. It has been an honor to serve within the special operations
community since 1992, when I completed Basic Underwater Demolition
School and became a U.S. Navy SEAL. Since then, I have been privileged
to both serve and command at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels, including multiple Naval special warfare units, joint task
forces, Special Operations Command Central, and for the last 3 years as
the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). I have
worked counternarcotics missions across South and Central America,
served in our undersea forces, and deployed to Afghanistan soon after
the September 11th attack. Later, I shaped counterterrorism strategy in
the Joint Staff's Strategy, Plans and Policy directorate (J5), and
worked as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph
Dunford's executive officer (XO). I also served as a liaison officer to
the Italian equivalent of the U.S. Navy SEALs. These experiences taught
me the value our special operators bring in deterring adversaries,
strengthening relationships with allies and partners, and disrupting
terrorist threats to the homeland.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, USSOCOM?
Answer. Yes--absolutely. Under the leadership of General Fenton and
Command Sergeant Major Shorter, USSOCOM is maximizing its comparative
advantages, preserving crisis response capability, and modernizing
toward modern warfare and the threat of China. If I am confirmed, I
will seek to provide continuity and acceleration rather than course
correction. To that end, I would humbly and actively seek the advice
and counsel of the USSOCOM and Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) teams, the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and other DOD leaders,
interagency partners, and our combat-experienced special operators.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Commander of USSOCOM to the following offices:
The Secretary of Defense
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the USSOCOM Commander's next
superior in the operational chain of command. If confirmed, I will look
to the Secretary for guidance and resources to train, equip, and employ
Special Operations Forces (SOF) to advance enduring U.S. national
interests. The USSOCOM Commander owes the Secretary his best military
advice on all aspects of special operations matters linked to national
security objectives.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
Answer. The Chairman is the senior military advisor to the
President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. He
may also consult with Congress, as required. His role is essential to
communicating SOF capabilities and requirements to the President and
the Secretary of Defense. Coordinating USSOCOM activities with the
Chairman enables the Chairman to fulfill his responsibilities to the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and to senior policymakers.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the
Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of
national security and defense policy. The USD(P) develops, coordinates,
and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of Department policy,
including matters related to special operations activities. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the USD(P) to ensure USSOCOM
activities support Department policies.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence &
Security
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I&S))
is the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
USD(I&S) exercises authority, direction, and control on behalf of the
Secretary of Defense over all intelligence and security organizations
within the Department of Defense (DoD), including the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and the intelligence
components of the Combatant Commands and military Services. USD(I&S) is
also dual hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and reports to the DNI
in this capacity. USD(I&S) is the Department's principal interface with
the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence
Community and represents the Department on intelligence and sensitive
activities at the National Security Council. If confirmed, I will work
closely with USD(I&S) to coordinate USSOCOM matters related to
intelligence, intelligence-related activities, and security.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Sustainment
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD(A&S)) serves as the DOD Senior Procurement Executive
(SPE) and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) responsible for all
matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including system
design, development, procurement of goods and services, sustainment of
systems, and providing Department-wide policy. Per Title 10 U.S.C.
Section 167, the USSOCOM Special Operations Acquisition Executive
(SOAE) derives authority to conduct acquisition from the DAE. If
confirmed, I will ensure USSOCOM acquisition activities, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), are executed by
the SOAE under the authorities delegated to the Command by the DAE. In
addition, I will ensure that the Command is effectively implementing
policies and procedures for logistics, maintenance, material readiness,
and sustainment support to the warfighter.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is responsible for overseeing the research, engineering, and
technology development activities across the DOD enterprise, and is
mandated with driving the key technologies (cyber, space, unmanned
systems, machine learning/artificial intelligence, directed energy,
hypersonics) to ensure technological superiority for the DOD. If
confirmed, in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will ensure USSOCOM
science and technology research activities and funding are
complementary to and aligned with Department research policy,
processes, and priorities. In addition, we will assist in the
initiation and implementation of acquisition pathways that embrace
agile practices that innovate, develop, exploit, and reduce barriers of
entry for commercial technologies and non-traditional defense partners.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SOLIC))
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is the Principal Staff Assistant and civilian
advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on special
operations and low intensity conflict matters. The principal duty of
the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall oversight of DOD special operations
activities. The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section
922 codified the administrative position of the ASD(SO/LIC) formally in
the chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the
Commander, USSOCOM to exercise of authority, direction, and control
with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and
support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and organization of SOF,
resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. If confirmed, I will
work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure our forces are organized
effectively, highly trained, and well-equipped to conduct global
special operations.
Question. The Service Secretaries
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act granted the USSOCOM Commander
authority over the Service components assigned to him, but this
relationship requires close coordination with the Service Secretaries,
to respect and preserve each Service Secretary's legal
responsibilities. Close coordination between the USSOCOM Commander and
each of the Service Secretaries is also essential to gaining and
maintaining the Services' support of SOF as an integral part of the
Joint force.
Question. The Service Chiefs
Answer. In cooperation with the Service Chiefs, the USSOCOM
Commander will ensure the preparedness of his forces to execute his
assigned missions. The Service Chiefs play a critical role in the
development, promotion, and assignment of SOF senior officers and
enlisted personnel. The Service Chiefs are also a source of experience
and judgment that every Combatant Commander may call upon. If
confirmed, I will continue an open dialog and cooperative partnership
with the Service Chiefs.
Question. The other combatant commanders
Answer. Successive USSOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere
of teamwork and trust in their relationships with fellow Combatant
Commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the years
as trans-regional threats have taken hold and certainly since USSOCOM
has been responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations
against terrorist networks. If confirmed, I will continue to work
closely and collaborate with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve
our common objectives. I will be committed to providing the Combatant
Commanders trained and ready SOF to support national and theater
security objectives.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander of USSOCOM?
Answer. The next USSOCOM Commander must continually evaluate and
balance SOF readiness and employment with SOF modernization to preserve
and advance our vital interests and those of our allies and partners--
in a resource constrained environment. SOF must continue to enable the
Joint Force and provide strategic leaders with options that span the
continuum from competition to crisis and conflict, and across the
spectrum of attribution.
USSOCOM must preserve and protect the Department's crisis response
capability and continue to serve as the Department's Coordinating
Authority for Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (C-VEO). All
of this allows the Services and other Combatant Commands to maintain
focus on the pacing threat while building warfighting advantage. At the
same time, USSOCOM must invest in modernizing for the future of
campaigning in contested and denied areas, with China as the pacing
threat.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we are always ready for
our no-fail missions--crisis response and keeping the homeland safe
from another major terrorist attack. I would also continue to invest in
SOF's irregular warfare capabilities, by maintaining close ties with
U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command; enhancing the ongoing work
of the Joint Task Force-Strategic Reconnaissance and Enabling Command;
and enabling joint campaigning as a partner with the Combatant Commands
and other USG agencies. If confirmed, I would also fully leverage
USSOCOM's flexible acquisition authorities--in close coordination with
ASD(SO/LIC)--to continue accelerating USSOCOM's modernization campaign,
against the Chinese pacing threat. These acquisition and modernization
efforts enable SOF to capitalize on our Nation's innovation advantage,
and to extend the reach and lethality of the Joint Force. I would also
buildupon SOF's proud history of strengthening the resilience and
resistance ability of partners and allies, in conjunction with the
other Combatant Commands and the interagency. Additionally, I would
maximize usage of the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF)
program to ensure the readiness and resilience of our special operators
and their families.
Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned
during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Department of
Defense?
Answer. Our purpose is our mission. Ultimately, we must answer our
Nation's call to provide for a common defense. Our most important
warfighting system is our people--we must man, train, equip, and
sustain our world-class special operators for success in both the
physical and virtual domains. SOF win by maintaining readiness and
modernization--readiness to fight and win in combat; assure allies;
illuminate peer adversary predation; and provide placement and access
options for the Joint Force.
The pace of technological advancement is accelerating and changing
the character of warfare in a way that demands we transform to remain
as decisive in the future as the past 25 years. SOF transform by
modernizing and leveraging our Nation's technological advantage. This
includes expanding SOF's capabilities in contested environments by
leveraging rapid acquisition to integrate state-of-the-market and
state-of-the-art capabilities into operational plans and coupling
cutting-edge capabilities with our world-class people using man-machine
teaming.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish in
terms of issues that must be addressed by the Commander of USSOCOM?
Answer. I believe that USSOCOM should align its strategic
priorities directly to those in the Interim National Defense Strategic
Guidance (INDSG) and new strategic guidance as it is published. The
first defense priority is defending the homeland. Here, SOF provide
unique value in its Crisis Response and Countering Violent Extremist
Organizations with the intent and capability of attacking the homeland
and defending the territorial integrity of the United States from State
and non-State threats. I also recognize we have the mission to insure
against strategic distractions such as the rapid expansion of ISIS that
destabilized an entire region and that might divert resources from the
pacing threat.
The next priority is deterring China. The INDSG offers a laser
focus on deterring China--while simultaneously defending the U.S. Our
longstanding ability to build relationships and increase the capacity
of allies and partners is critical to strengthening our alliances
maintaining U.S. global influence and ensuring deterrence. SOF have a
unique role in building resistance and resilience in allies and
partners. These relationships provide access and placement for enhanced
understanding of adversary threats. They also provide warfighter
advantage for the delivery of asymmetric and irregular kinetic and non-
kinetic effects; holding adversary systems at risk around the world;
and extending the reach, lethality, and maneuver space of the Joint
Force.
civilian oversight of ussocom
Question. Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017, as amended, included modifications to the roles and
responsibilities of the ASD (SOLIC) as well as the relationship between
the ASD (SOLIC) and the Commander of USSOCOM in order for the ASD
(SOLIC) to more effectively fulfill its ``service secretary-like''
responsibilities to provide civilian oversight of and advocacy within
DOD for USSOCOM's service-like requirements.
What is your view of the role of the ASD (SOLIC) in promoting
civilian control over the military?
Answer. Civilian control over the military is a foundational
element of our constitutional democracy. To that end, ASD(SO/LIC)
assists in interpreting DOD policy guidance for SOF equities and
provides administrative oversight to USSOCOM. Per Section 922 of the
2017 National Defense Authorization Act codifying ASD(SO/LIC)'s roles
and responsibilities in 10 U.S.C., ASD(SO/LIC) exercises authority,
direction, and control over administrative matters relating to
organizing, training, and equipping of SOF. ASD(SO/LIC) assists the
Department in the development and supervision of policy, program
planning and execution, and provides oversight for USSOCOM. His role
also gives the SOF enterprise a stronger position to connect
operational needs with Title 10 solutions.
Question. What is your understanding of the organizational and
administrative relationship between the ASD (SOLIC) and the Commander
of USSOCOM?
Answer. Section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA codified ASD(SO/
LIC) in the chain of command for special operations-peculiar
administration and support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and
organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel.
Section 922 specifically did not impact the Combatant Command's
operational relationship between the Combatant Commander and the
Secretary of Defense. ASD(SO/LIC) fulfills an important Secretary-like
role in the coordination and relationship with the legislative branch
and complements USSOCOM's long-standing Service-like role. ASD(SO/LIC)
plays a critical role in senior level forums like the Special
Operations Policy Oversight Counsel (SOPOC), providing Service
Secretary-like advocacy for issues affecting SOF. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) as he provides civilian oversight and
advocacy for SOF within DOD.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD (SOLIC)
in:
(1) The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget
request;
Answer. As codified in DOD Directive 5111.10, ASD(SO/LIC) performs
a budgetary role and responsibility like those of the Secretaries of
the Military Departments. In close partnership with Headquarters,
USSOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC), provides overall supervision of the preparation
and justification of special operations programs and budget for Major
Force Program-11 to include review and approval of the USSOCOM annual
budget request prior to submission to Congress. Further, ASD(SO/LIC)
partners closely with USSOCOM during budget rollout activities and
coordinates on all answers to congressional requests for information.
Question. (2) Approving programs of record and the acquisition of
special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM;
Answer. ASD(SOLIC) is a full partner in the development and
approval of two key processes for USSOCOM that define our programs of
record: the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board
(SOCREB) and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The SOCREB is
USSOCOM's requirements validation board that approves all special
operations-peculiar requirements and lays the foundation for the
Special Operations Acquisition Executive to establish Programs of
Record. The POM determines the resources we will apply to these
programs of record.
Question. (3) Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters
and service components;
Answer. Section 922 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA directs ASD(SO/
LIC) to exercise authority, direction, and control of all special
operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the
organization, training, and equipping of SOF. This includes the
organization of all USSOCOM elements.
Question. (4) Ensuring the readiness of special operations forces
(SOF); and
Answer. Since the Section 922 amendment, USSOCOM has maintained a
quarterly readiness brief with the ASD and the ASD(SO/LIC) staff to
facilitate oversight of special operations readiness issues and discuss
areas that warrant advocacy from the ASD(SO/LIC) office. The USSOCOM
staff maintains regular contact with the ASD(SO/LIC) staff for actions
that require attention between quarterly briefs.
Question. (5) Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and
accountability of SOF.
Answer. The SOF enterprise is a meritocracy built on a foundation
of ethical leadership, professionalism, and accountability. The SOF
meritocracy is strong--the battlefield successes and competitive
advantages our professionals have attained continue to grow. However,
we must acknowledge we are human, and we make mistakes. A culture of
meritocracy must also ensure accountability for those mistakes. We must
learn from them and demonstrate that unacceptable behavior will not be
tolerated. Leadership is the key to preventing and deterring poor
behavior. Treating every teammate with dignity and respect is
foundational to any culture, especially a meritocracy. Every individual
must be given the opportunity to achieve success based on their own
talents and contributions. Sustaining and cultivating a culture that
reinforces dignity, respect, and accountability is vital to this. If
confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to continue to ensure
SOF maintain a meritocratic culture, built on a foundation of
professionalism and accountability, empowering the innovative spirit to
ensure readiness and mission accomplishment.
strategic environment and the role of special operations forces
Question. What is your assessment of the current strategic
environment, including your assessment of the critical and enduring
threats to the national security of the United States and its allies
and partners?
Answer. I believe the current strategic environment is
characterized by danger, opportunity, and accelerating change. In light
of this, the INDSG directs a strategy of peace through strength, and
prioritizes homeland defense and deterring Chinese aggression in the
Indo-Pacific, while empowering U.S. allies and partners to address
other enduring threats. At the same time, the character of warfare is
changing rapidly, with an increasing role for unmanned systems,
artificial intelligence, man-machine teaming, and virtual domain
sensing--with battlefield success rewarding those who can integrate
these elements and shorten the cycle of innovation, experimentation,
testing, and fielding. I judge that U.S. allies and partners are
critical to mitigating the enduring threats to our national security
identified in the INDSG, and that relationships--including those forged
and strengthened by SOF--are essential to the cooperative threat
reduction and burden sharing envisioned by our strategic guidance.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of SOF in
addressing these threats and challenges?
Answer. In my view, the evolving operational environment and the
emphasis on strategic competition across the Joint Force requires
continual reassessment of SOF's operations and activities across the
spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. SOF must maintain its
core, no-fail missions of crisis response and counterterrorism, while
integrating with conventional forces, interagency partners, and
partners and allies to deter State adversaries to prevent large scale
conflict. USSOCOM has been a proactive participant in the Joint Force's
development of warfighting and competition concepts, and the lessons we
are learning have driven assessment and modernization efforts within
the SOF enterprise. If confirmed, I intend to continue USSOCOM's
modernization to ensure SOF can continue to deliver asymmetric
strategic effects for the Joint Force in competition and conflict while
globally responding to crisis in any operational environment.
Question. How do you intend to balance the competing requirements
of countering violent extremist organizations, crisis response, and
efforts to counter China and Russia?
Answer. In my view, USSOCOM must balance sustainable
counterterrorism, focusing on threats to the homeland and our no-fail
Crisis Response mission, with precision access and global networks to
support campaigning. There is shared interest among our partners and
allies in countering terrorism, and I judge there are opportunities for
effective collaboration and increased burden sharing. If confirmed, I
will use the INDSG and additional strategic documents as a guide and
prioritize the limited available resources for counterterrorism toward
the most dangerous threats--specifically those with the demonstrated
intent and capability to conduct external operations (EXOPs) attacks
against the homeland--while also focusing USSOCOM's modernization and
acquisition programs toward contested environments and China.
Question. Do you believe SOF are appropriately organized and sized
to meet global requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the organization and size of
SOF in light of the global requirements laid out in the INDSG and other
strategic guidance, the rapidly evolving strategic environment, and the
changing character of war and will make any recommendations for change
through the Department and in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC).
special operations missions
Question. Do you believe the special operations activities
identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and
appropriate?
Answer. The ten special operations activities specified in USC
Title 10, Section 167 are sufficient to meet the requirements of the
evolving global security environment and the implementation of the NDS.
The tenth specified authority in particular--to perform ``Such other
activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of
Defense''-provides adequate flexibility to meet INDSG requirements.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. At this time, I am not prepared to advocate for changes in
current USSOCOM missions. If confirmed, and using the INDSG as the
foundation, I will review the range of SOF missions and recommend any
necessary changes in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and the
Department.
evolving operating environment
Question. The operating environment facing SOF has evolved
significantly over the last two decades, as adversary capabilities in
areas such as area access/area denial, ubiquitous technical
surveillance, and rapid advances in unmanned systems.
What do you view as the most pressing challenges that special
operation forces will face on the battlefield currently and over the
next 10 years?
Answer. This is the most complex and dynamic security environment
I've seen in 34 years of service. The character of war is changing
faster than ever. SOF face pressing battlefield challenges requiring
adaptability and innovation. Technological advancements provide State
and non-State actors with commercially available tools to confront us
across the virtual and physical domains. Our adversaries' innovation
cycles are days to weeks, not months to years. Our adversaries are
leveraging asymmetric capabilities, such as using inexpensive, one-way
drones to threaten U.S. forces, bases, and our allies and partners. We
are also seeing the threats from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
State proxies, and violent extremist organizations converge globally.
In addition, our competitors seek to undermine U.S. global influence,
competing with us, and our allies and partners, to expand their own
partnerships and influence in critical regions such as Africa, South
America, the Middle East, and Asia.
Question. What will be your priorities in addressing these
challenges?
Answer. As proven by the increased demand for SOF by Combatant
Commanders over the last several years, addressing these challenges
will continue to require more from SOF. The operating environment will
only become more and more complex, requiring unrelenting modernization
for the most dangerous crises or conflicts we may face. We must balance
the need to maintain SOF operational readiness to meet increasing
global demand, with the imperative to modernize SOF to ensure we are as
decisive in the future as we have been in the last 25 years.
Additionally, SOF's decades-long relationships with allies and
partners, and corresponding global placement and access, will continue
to be critical to maintaining U.S. global influence, enhancing
understanding, increasing burden-sharing, and enabling rapid response
to crises. If confirmed, I will conduct a robust analysis against
current and future challenges, and develop plans to ensure SOF remain a
capable, ready, and resilient force.
combating terrorism
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda,
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other violent extremist
organizations, to the U.S. homeland, and western interests, more
broadly? Which group or groups, in your view, currently present the
greatest threat to the United States?
Answer. I believe ISIS, its senior leadership, and its affiliates
including ISIS-Khorasan and ISIS-Somalia pose the greatest terrorist
threat to the United States. Al Qaeda senior leadership, al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, and Al Shabaab also present a terrorist threat
to the United States Homeland and United States interests abroad.
Although our CT operations, combined with allied and local partner
efforts, reduced the threat of sophisticated, large-scale attacks on
the Homeland, the underlying causes that produce extremist ideologies
persist. Although degraded, ISIS and al Qaeda retain operational
networks across the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia, and
continue to pose a threat to our regional interests.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to fulfill USSOCOM's
assigned responsibilities for synchronizing global operations against
terrorist networks?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fulfill the USSOCOM responsibilities
by coordinating with Combatant Commands and across the DOD and
interagency, to plan, assess, and make recommendations to the Chairman
and Secretary regarding C-VEO campaigning. Under current strategic
guidance, SOF resources are focused on disrupting and degrading only
the most dangerous VEOs (those demonstrating intent and capability to
attack the U.S. homeland), while allocating fewer resources toward
disrupting and monitoring VEOs which present a regional and/or local
threat to U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage and
seek burden sharing opportunities with like-minded partners and allies.
In my experience, a wide-ranging partnership among U.S. and coalition
military, interagency and law enforcement capabilities and authorities
is key to addressing global, trans-regional VEO threats.
Question. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy
and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?
Answer. In my experience, USSOCOM plays a pivotal role in
supporting U.S. counterterrorism strategy. In my view, current
strategic guidance is appropriate, and periodic reviews and risk
assessments help refine priorities for addressing global VEO threats.
Informed by this guidance and the evolving environment, USSOCOM helps
focus SOF resources on monitoring and disrupting only the most
dangerous VEOs, while allocating fewer resources to VEOs which present
a regional or local threat to U.S. interests. In recent years, USSOCOM
has recommended, approved, and implemented modest but highly impactful
adjustments that have reduced risk of external operations attacks at a
sustainable level of investment, consistent with U.S. counterterrorism
strategy. If confirmed, I will work to sustain and improve this
valuable process, which begins with tactical-level feedback from the
special operators and intelligence professionals working our most
challenging counterterrorism problems. USSOCOM also supports U.S.
counterterrorism strategy by working with and leveraging like-minded
partners to address the threat and mitigate the risk against less
capable regional VEOs--this allows U.S. SOF to focus on the more
capable, transregional VEO threats.
countering weapons of mass destruction (cwmd)
Question. Under the Unified Campaign Plan, USSOCOM is tasked with
coordinating DOD's efforts on CWMDs.
Answer. Correct, the 2023 Unified Command Plan, with change #2 (dtd
23 MAY 2025) states, ``Commander, USSOCOM is responsible for planning
of DOD CWMD efforts in support of other Combatant Commands, DOD
priorities, and, as directed, other U.S. Government agencies.
Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities
under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's
efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. As the Department of Defense CWMD Coordinating Authority,
USSOCOM is currently responsible for coordinating and planning DOD CWMD
efforts in support of other Combatant Commands, DOD priorities, and as
directed, other USG agencies; integrating DOD plans, in coordination
with other Combatant Commands, against adversaries and networks that
possess, seek or facilitate WMD; in support of Combatant Commands,
executing global operations against adversaries and networks that
possess or seek WMD.
Question. In your assessment are there any resources, authorities,
or organizational changes needed to better execute USSOCOM's CWMD
mission?
If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic review of USSOCOM's CWMD
capabilities, and its role as CWMD Coordinating Authority. If changes
are needed, I will make appropriate recommendations via the Chairman to
the Secretary of Defense on resources, authorities, and organization as
required to address current and emerging CWMD threats.
10 u.s.c. 127e operations
Question. Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes
the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
facilitating military operations by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. I believe that 127e remains one of the most relevant tools
for our forces countering terrorism overseas. It continues to provide
outsized effects in return for a relatively small investment of U.S.
training and resourcing of select foreign forces. 127e is the essence
of burden-sharing; our ability to enable and leverage the access and
local-area knowledge of select indigenous regular and irregular forces
is critical to mission success, especially in remote or politically
sensitive areas where a large U.S. military footprint is neither
desirable nor feasible.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
127e proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are
complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government counterterrorism
efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that proposals for the use of
127e authority are aligned with INDSG priorities and focused on
combatant command strategic objectives accomplished by U.S. SOF
operations within the scope of Secretary of Defense-granted operational
authority. 127e will not be used to build capacity; rather, it has and
will continue to serve as a mechanism to facilitate burden-sharing with
foreign allies, partners, and surrogates, as a component of our broader
counterterrorism strategy. Proposals must be fully coordinated with the
interagency with a well-defined end-State and off-ramp plan that
considers the Combatant Command, U.S. Country Team, and Department of
State long-term relationships with partner nations. 127e-resourced
tactical maneuver forces must be fully vetted to ensure integrity of
the force and mitigate the risk of human rights violations.
irregular warfare
Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as
irregular warfare and ``gray zone operations.''
What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
adversaries in this domain of warfare?
Answer. The threat to U.S. interests posed by adversaries employing
irregular techniques and hybrid warfare strategies includes peer and
near-peer competitor nations, whose actions could drain U.S. resources
and those of our allies and partners. In my judgment, adversary nations
and their proxies are increasing the frequency and severity of their
gray zone operations. By their nature, these operations fall below the
level of war and provide attractive and inexpensive options for our
adversaries, in part because it increases the difficulty of identifying
perpetrators, understanding red lines, and identifying the thresholds
at which adversaries would intensify or escalate violence. They also
provide the means for a militarily inferior force to coerce advantage
through a more limited and insidious approach that falls between
traditional diplomacy and our conventional military deterrence
approaches.
Question. What should be the guiding principles of the Department
of Defense's strategy to counter these threats?
Answer. The INDSG provides clear guidance to focus Department of
Defense strategy on U.S. homeland defense and deterring Chinese
aggression in the Indo-Pacific, while empowering allies and partners
against other threats with more limited support from the U.S.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of irregular
warfare in supporting Department of Defense strategy and operations?
What role should SOF have in executing such a strategy?
Answer. Irregular Warfare (IW) activities support the DOD's
strategic and operational priorities, including competing against and
deterring China and Russia; combating non-State actors such as al-
Qaida, ISIS, and state-backed proxies like the Houthis; assisting
allies and partners against State and non-State actors; and preparing
for large-scale combat.
SOF have been executing IW operations and activities for more than
80 years. SOF's operations in support of broader USG deterrence efforts
help undermine adversaries' confidence; alter their decisionmaking
calculus; and provide Combatant Commanders opportunities and
advantages--to prevent conflict. With decades of combat experience and
credibility, SOF's long-term relationships with allies and partners
improve interoperability, while also ensuring broad access, placement,
and influence across the globe. This provides the Joint Force with
expanded situational awareness and increases options in competition,
crisis, and conflict. Small, persistent, globally deployed SOF teams,
working alongside regular and irregular forces, strengthen partner
capacity, counter adversary malign activity, and promote regional
stability.
Question. Do you believe that SOF have the appropriate authorities
and capabilities to operate effectively in this domain of warfare?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I appreciate Congress's efforts to provide the DOD and
USSOCOM with the tools needed to fight and win. In my experience, one
of our most important tools is the array of fiscal authorities that we
can apply to enable foreign forces that support our operations. To
build our military advantage in a changing operational environment, we
must adapt and innovate our authorities and capabilities to provide
flexibility and operational agility. If confirmed, I intend to assess
current authorities in close coordination with the USSOCOM staff and
components, as well as ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.
Section 127d of title 10, United States Code, authorizes the
provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to
regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
facilitating irregular warfare operations by U.S. SOF.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. I am grateful to Congress for codifying the former 1202
authority into title 10. The ability to enable and leverage the access
and local area knowledge of select foreign forces allows U.S. SOF to
achieve specific effects in direct support of ongoing priority
Combatant Command irregular warfare operations. This enables outsized
returns from a relatively small investment in our efforts to impose
costs upon malign actors and enhance resiliency of frontline allies. As
a resourcing tool, 127d is the mechanism that sets conditions for
current and future burden-sharing with partners and surrogate forces.
If confirmed, I would work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to provide Congress
with the transparency necessary to build the necessary trust and
confidence that this authority is being appropriately implemented to
maintain our military advantage.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
section 127d proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are
complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government irregular warfare
efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that proposals for the use of
127d are aligned with INDSG priorities, consistent with congressional
intent, within the scope of Secretary of Defense-granted operational
authority and fully coordinated and synchronized with interagency
partners. Proposals must include detailed counterintelligence plans to
mitigate risk and ensure integrity of the enabled force, with defined
control measures to mitigate risk of inadvertent escalation. Proposals
must also include well-defined milestones and end State, with
consideration for eventual off-ramp, executed in concert with the
Combatant Command and the Department of State.
information operations
Question. In your view, are the Department and the broader
interagency appropriately organized to compete with State and non-State
adversaries in the information environment? If not, what
recommendations would you make?
Answer. If confirmed, I would like to examine this issue in greater
detail and assess how USSOCOM and our other capabilities can contribute
to a broader USG effort by integrating and coordinating efforts both
within DOD and the Interagency. The DOD has conducted analysis of force
structure, authorities, and standing capabilities to meet our Nation's
requirements to compete in the information environment. This has
resulted in several initiatives across the Joint Staff, the Services,
and at USSOCOM. I believe SOF are well-positioned both to support
Combatant Commanders and to help synchronize the Department's messaging
across the Department and interagency.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department and,
specifically, SOF in the broader information operations and strategic
communications efforts of the U.S. Government?
Answer. I understand that the Department's role in the broader USG
information operations effort is typically to support the designated
lead agencies for strategic communications. In most cases,
communication efforts take place outside declared areas of hostility
with the Department of State as the designated lead. In a broader
sense, DOD is emphasizing throughout the force that every operation,
action, and investment planned has an accompanying informational
component which together contribute to strategic campaigning. Every
action we take conveys the principle of Peace through Strength.
As directed in the Unified Command Plan and Title 10 USC Section
167, USSOCOM is the Department's SOF Joint Force Provider with the
responsibility to provide combat ready SOF, including Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) forces. The UCP also specifies that the USSOCOM
Commander's ``responsibilities include integrating and coordinating DOD
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) capabilities, and when
directed, executing MISO in support of Combatant Commands.'' Working
primarily through the Theater Special Operations Commands, USSOCOM
provides military information support operations capabilities and
exercises its coordinating authority role to support achievement of
supported Combatant Commanders' objectives. Outside of areas of
hostilities, PSYOP forces conduct military information support
operations in close coordination with Department of State and other
interagency personnel to support the achievement of U.S. Government
information objectives, consistent with Department of State mission
strategic plans.
Question. Do you believe that USSOCOM's military information
support capabilities can be more effectively utilized? If so, are there
doctrinal, organizational, training, or authority modifications that
you believe could make military information support capabilities more
effective?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USSOCOM, supported Combatant
Commands, and interagency partners to review the agility and
effectiveness of USSOCOM's military information support capabilities.
In my current position, I have witnessed the increasing importance of
these capabilities--and other related capabilities in the virtual
domain, such as cyber and horizontal ISR--and judge these capabilities
to be critical enablers in our current and future operations. I firmly
believe that USSOCOM's innovation in this arena--and its fruitful
partnership with USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM in particular--should be
reinforced and accelerated. If confirmed, I will remain a strong
partner to other Combatant Commands--such as USINDOPACOM--that are
integrating information environment operations into their theater
campaign plans.
Question. Are there additional military capabilities that should be
developed by the Department to more effectively compete in the
information environment?
Answer. At this time, I am not prepared to advocate for the
development of additional military capabilities in this area. If
confirmed, I will coordinate employment of these capabilities closely
with Department, Combatant Command, and interagency stakeholders. As
with many other military capabilities, it is essential that these
effects are employed with speed, agility, appropriate discipline, and
consistent with the relevant law.
intelligence operations
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by SOF different from those carried out by others in the intelligence
community?
Answer. In my experience, SOF principally conduct intelligence-
related activities, in support of the warfighter and the Department--to
achieve national security objectives. However, SOF do not do this
alone; they integrate, coordinate, and deconflict these activities with
partners in the Intelligence Community and interagency, often setting
conditions for potential DOD operations in support of deterrence,
crisis response, and conflict. SOF's unique capabilities, access, and
placement enables enhanced understanding, and extends the operational
reach and collection capabilities of the Joint Force and intelligence
community.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence
activities carried out by SOF are properly coordinated with activities
carried out by the intelligence community?
Answer. If confirmed, and in coordination with OUSD(I&S), I will
direct USSOCOM to adhere to Intelligence Community and DOD directives
for coordination of intelligence collection and intelligence-related
activities. I will also ensure that USSOCOM works closely with our
intelligence community partners to share best practices, particularly
those tied to counterintelligence and force protection, as required by
the increasing adversary use of technical surveillance. USSOCOM will
also continue to leverage its SOF liaison network and Intelligence
Community senior representatives and liaison officers to collaborate,
coordinate, and leverage intelligence expertise to support operations.
Theater Special Operations Commands and SOF Joint Task Forces will
continue to conduct coordination with Country Teams and the
Intelligence Community to deconflict activities, share information,
leverage available capabilities, and enable operations.
crisis response capabilities
Question. What is your understanding of the demand for and
associated costs of USSOCOM's crisis response capabilities over the
last decade?
Answer. Employed at the direction of the President and Secretary of
Defense, USSOCOM's crisis response forces eliminate threats to the
homeland, rescue American citizens, and protect our diplomats, all at a
moment's notice. These urgent missions lack predictability in terms of
timing, duration, and total cost. In the past three-and-a-half years,
the frequency of these Presidentially directed missions has increased
by over 200 percent. During this same time, composite strategic airlift
costs increased over 76 percent. Adequate funding for crisis response
and National Command Authority-directed missions is critical to ensure
critical readiness exercises and modernization efforts are not
sacrificed to resource the increased frequency, duration and cost of
crisis response.
Question. What implications, in your view, does a significant
increase in the demand for USSOCOM's crisis response capabilities over
the last decade have for the readiness and resourcing of the force?
Answer. Crisis response operations are inherently unpredictable and
vary year-to-year in number, timing, duration, and total cost. In
particular, the last 2 years have seen some of the most complex and
longest crisis response operations in U.S. history. The increased
demand for SOF to respond to crises, and the duration and cost of those
operations, have impacted SOF's ability to modernize for the future.
Crisis response is no-fail mission for SOF. We must balance SOF
readiness for immediate crisis response requirements, with the need to
modernize the force to be able successfully execute the crisis response
in contested environments.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to USSOCOM's
crisis response posture, capabilities, and employment?
Answer. USSOCOM provides the most capable crisis response force in
the world. To sustain this, we must continue to modernize our crisis
response capabilities, focused on the potential requirement to execute
crisis response operations in environments either directly or
indirectly contested by China or other State and/or state-supported
proxies. Advanced autonomous and remotely controlled unmanned systems,
man-machine teaming, counter-unmanned systems capabilities, and virtual
domain sensing and effects will be critical to future crisis response
operations. If confirmed, I will continue to accelerate USSOCOM's
modernization program--including those capabilities required for crisis
response, and in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)--with China as the
pacing threat.
ussocom acquisition authorities
Question. Section 167(e)(4) of title 10, U.S. Code, assigns to the
Commander, USSOCOM the authority to develop and acquire special
operations-peculiar equipment, and to acquire special operations-
peculiar material, supplies, and services. The Commander, USSOCOM is
advised and assisted in these matters by a command acquisition
executive.
What technology areas and capabilities do you believe should be
prioritized to enable SOF to most effectively support the objectives of
the NDS?
Answer. The increasing pace of technological advancement demands
SOF modernize rapidly to outpace our adversaries through the
unrelenting development and integration of cutting-edge technologies.
This includes harnessing the power of man-machine teaming and fusing
all-domain capabilities to achieve decisive advantages. The pervasive
technical surveillance environment presents both unique challenges and
unprecedented opportunities. Recognizing this, I am committed to
strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the combined
strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF's operational
effectiveness in support of national security objectives. My vision
encompasses integrating technological advancements across all domains--
physical and virtual--including surface and subsurface maritime
platforms; autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned systems; next-
generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; stand-off
precision effects; and modernized mission command systems. If
confirmed, I will leverage the INDSG and other strategic documents to
guide a comprehensive review of USSOCOM's priorities and capabilities
and make recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) aimed at ensuring SOF remain at
the forefront of military innovation and preparedness.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating
a determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel,
supplies, or services is ``special operations-peculiar''?
Answer. The SOF enterprise relies on Service-common investments in
foundational capabilities such as personnel, infrastructure, mobility
platforms, and weapons systems. However, SOF provide the Nation unique
capabilities, and therefore, require specialized capabilities. This may
involve modifications of Service-common systems or developing entirely
unique SOF capabilities. SOF should continue to look for opportunities
to enhance or build from Joint Force solutions wherever possible. I
also believe SOF should be viewed as the vanguard for innovation and
will work with the Services to develop capabilities with transition to
the joint force at the forefront of our development. If confirmed, I
will partner with ASD(SO/LIC) to validate SOF capabilities through our
established process SOF Capability Integration and Development System
(SOFCIDS). Any capability deemed non-special operations-peculiar will
be transitioned to the appropriate Service sponsor--in collaboration
with the Joint Staff and leveraging the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) framework.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to improve each
of the three aspects of the special operations-peculiar acquisition
process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring SOF remain a vanguard
for agility across the Department and I will assess current USSOCOM
requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes to identify what
improvements may be required. I recognize the critical need to respond
to adversary innovation cycles with speed and precision. It will be
important to reduce capability fielding and employment timelines by
empowering leaders to make risk-informed capability development
decisions and enabling rapidly fielded capabilities against emerging
threats. Openness with industry will foster strategic partnerships,
competition, and innovation. Allowing companies insight into SOF
requirements will unlock the ingenuity of the American industrial base
and drive development of critical cutting-edge technologies.
If confirmed, I will also assess USSOCOM's business systems and
processes, and look to modernize them, as required. I will continue to
make strides toward achieving a clean audit to earn your full trust and
confidence in the management and expenditure of the resources entrusted
to USSOCOM. I will continually seek to enhance transparency throughout
the requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic,
technically achievable, and prioritized?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a Commander-driven prioritization
process, ensuring that precious MFP-11 resources are allocated to
programs that are demonstrably relevant, realistic, and aligned with
addressing the current and most dangerous future threats. I will look
to divest of obsolete programs, freeing up resources for modernization.
In my experience, special operator-identified capability gaps combined
with agile authorities, and iterative experimentation and modernization
exercises are invaluable to the successful development and fielding of
special operations-peculiar capabilities. To sustain this advantage, we
must cultivate a battlefield test lab environment with realistic and
technically achievable requirements. If confirmed, I commit to equip
our operators with the best tools possible while remaining good
stewards of the resources entrusted to USSOCOM.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that special operations
capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research,
development, and acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe a strong partnership with the Department is
critical for success in this area. If confirmed, I will prioritize
maintaining a close partnership with USD(A&S), USD(R&E), the Strategic
Capabilities Office (SCO), and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). I
will also continue the practice of co-chairing the Acquisition Summit,
fostering collaboration between SOF acquisition efforts and those of
the Services and key DOD leaders. This synergy will enable SOF to
leverage its unique ability to be both a first mover on emerging
technologies and an early adopter of innovations developed across the
Department. The USSOCOM enterprise's ongoing partnerships with the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and SCO exemplifies
this approach, increasing collaboration on defining SOF requirements
and serving as a transition partner for their groundbreaking
technologies. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring transparency and
interoperability by integrating USSOCOM developmental efforts and
capabilities into the broader DOD and Joint Force to maximize our
collective impact.
ethics and accountability
Question. What are your views on the current culture of ethics and
accountability in SOF?
Answer. In my view, the SOF enterprise is a meritocracy built on a
foundation of ethical leadership, professionalism, and accountability.
A meritocratic culture must also ensure accountability for mistakes. We
must learn from them and demonstrate that unacceptable behavior will
not be tolerated. Strong, ethical leadership is the key to preventing
and deterring poor behavior. Sustaining and cultivating a culture that
reinforces dignity, respect, and accountability is vital to this. If
confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to continue to ensure
SOF maintain a meritocratic culture, built on a foundation of
professionalism and accountability, empowering the innovative spirit to
ensure readiness and mission accomplishment.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to foster a
culture of ethics and accountability in SOF?
Answer. If confirmed, I am fully committed to fostering an
enduring, meritocratic culture underpinned by ethical leadership and
accountability across the USSOCOM enterprise. I will work closely with
ASD(SO/LIC) and subordinate commanders to promote this culture within
SOF, and to make professionalism and accountability pillars of SOF
leadership, training, and assessment programs at all echelons.
Question. What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment
play in decisions relating to misconduct by SOF?
Answer. As a general matter, mission accomplishment does not excuse
criminal or corrosive behaviors. Accountability is fundamental to
ensuring good order and discipline in any formation, and SOF commanders
at all levels have a responsibility to uphold standards. In making
decisions relating to misconduct, leaders must evaluate each case on
its own merits.
health of special operations forces
Question. What is your assessment of the health and readiness of
SOF?
Answer. U.S. SOF are the most capable special operations forces in
the world. This is an achievement that would not be possible without a
strong foundation of health and readiness. To maintain this, if
confirmed, I will ensure the USSOCOM force continues to have access to
the range of services provided by the command's Preservation of the
Force and Families (POTFF) program.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing
the stress on SOF?
Answer. If confirmed, first and foremost, I will continue the
efforts of my predecessors with respect to POTFF. We ask people to do
difficult things, and this produces stress--we owe our teammates
resources to help with stress. The SOF enterprise knows from hard
learned lessons the importance of managing operational tempo and giving
our warriors the resources and opportunities to reset and strengthen
their minds, bodies, and spirits. If confirmed, my priorities will
include closely monitoring the health and well-being of the force
through screening and data, initiatives that cultivate an empathetic
culture of self and buddy care, sustaining POTFF resources, and
investing in innovations to improve the physical, psychological, and
cognitive performance of SOF.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address
suicides in SOF?
Answer. Even one suicide in our formation is one too many. With the
cessation of large-scale combat operations, suicide is now the leading
cause of deaths among our service members. Suicide is preventable.
Prevention requires involved leaders, peers, and subordinates; constant
vigilance; the willingness to ask incisive questions; and access to
mental healthcare and spiritual guidance. If confirmed, I will assess,
and enhance as required, routine screening and resources for mental
health, cognitive impairment, and interpersonal relationship problems--
and to increase continuity of care between caregivers. The cultural
measures we take--to increase empathy and decrease the stigma of asking
for help--also have a tremendous positive impact. In my current
command, I am proud to report nearly 50 percent of personnel have
visited and used mental health services, a high rate unprecedented in
my career, and not always for acute care but to increase resilience and
performance.
Question. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM's Preservation
of the Force and Families program?
Answer. The POTFF program is a powerful capability for the USSOCOM
enterprise, augmenting Service-provided efforts. We must continue to
care for our people--particularly those who have been injured on the
battlefield--and their families. Having benefited from the POTFF
program as a Commander, I understand and appreciate the value of having
embedded, multidisciplinary teams within our formations. The POTFF
construct provides top-quality physical and psychological care to our
members, and the spiritual and family services enhance the
belongingness and interpersonal relationships of our members and their
families. I understand that in FY24 some 89 percent of SOF members were
served by the POTFF program, and that USSOCOM's data showed positive
results in physical performance and reduced severity of injuries,
better mental health access, improved cognitive functioning and deeper
family and community connections.
recruiting and retention
Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in
the USSOCOM community?
Answer. In my current role, I have limited visibility on USSOCOM's
recruiting and retention challenges, but if confirmed, I will examine
this issue closely, in partnership with the Services. I anticipate one
of the biggest challenges to retention in the SOF community is
competition from the civilian workforce. To mitigate this, SOF rely on
Service compensation policies as a significant contributor to retain
the best and most qualified members. Continued support of compensation
policies can only serve to sustain our already positive retention
rates. However, service members assessed into SOF have already
demonstrated their propensity to serve and are some of the most
innovative and adaptive problem solvers in the world. We improve
retention and our collective capability by providing SOF service
members with a purposeful mission and venues that empower their
innovative nature--from training ranges at home to our most
sophisticated adversaries at the forward edge of the battlefield.
Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the
recruiting and retention goals of each of the services' SOF?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment with the
USSOCOM team and Services to better understand recruiting and retention
issues. Recruiting new service members falls under the purview of each
of the Services, and it is evident that they are taking the recruiting
challenge seriously. I fully support and applaud the actions that all
the Services are taking to ensure that we appeal to today's youth, from
compensation and benefit reviews that bolster both recruiting and
retention, to studying the factors that disqualify young Americans from
serving--such as physical, medical, and educational requirements. I am
confident the Services are making positive progress on these
challenges, with beneficial downstream effects on SOF's overall
readiness and manning.
capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
Question. What is your assessment of the mix of responsibilities
assigned to general purpose and SOF, particularly with respect to
security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?
Answer. Both SOF and GPF have important and complementary roles in
Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Security Force Assistance (SFA)
missions; and both have demonstrated their ability to conduct these
missions across the globe. It is likely that both SOF and GPF will
continue to prove vital to the Department's approach to campaigning. In
general, SOF is designed for, and best utilized, as small teams in
contested or politically sensitive areas to achieve low-cost, high-
return results with partner nations. Because SOF is a high demand, low
density force, it is often necessary to use GPF for SFA and BPC
missions at larger scale. In my experience, GPF are most effective when
specially trained to deliver conventional capabilities to foreign
military forces--and in environments where U.S. presence is acceptable
to the host-country government. Both GPF and SOF are utilized in the
conduct of security cooperation for BPC under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 333 and
other Chapter 16 security cooperation authorities.
special operations enabling capabilities
Question. In your view, how should the responsibility for providing
enabling capabilities for special operations missions be divided
between USSOCOM and the services?
Answer. In my 34-years of experience within the SOF community, the
5th SOF Truth, ``most special operations require non-SOF support,'' has
proven accurate. USSOCOM and SOF units depend on the Services in a wide
variety of ways, from administrative needs including recruiting,
personnel, and logistics, to operational needs such as Service-common
equipment and training. In return, SOF serve as a vanguard for the
Services, integrating unique capabilities into operational plans and
creating military options that conventional forces cannot readily
provide. The symbiotic relationship between SOF and the Services is a
critical variable in the success or failure of both special and
conventional operations. This dynamic also highlights the importance of
ASD(SO/LIC) providing oversight and advocacy in a role comparable to
that of a service secretary. If confirmed, I pledge to partner with the
Services--in close collaboration with ASD(SO/LIC)--to bring outsized
return-on-investment and value to the Services and the Joint Force.
Question. How would you ensure that the enabler requirements of SOF
are appropriately communicated to, and receive support, from the
services?
Answer. The Joint Staff Global Force Management Process provides
the appropriate means to communicate special operations requirements
for Service support and allows DOD leadership to consider the strategic
risk associated with the allocation of forces. If confirmed, I would
also leverage the Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council--in
cooperation with ASD(SO/LIC)--to address any support concerns with the
Services.
Question. Do you believe USSOCOM and the services are maintaining
adequate enabling capabilities to support special operations missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess this topic in greater detail
and provide transparency and recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the
Department. USSOCOM and the Services are adjusting their structure and
focus to align with strategic guidance, with downstream effects on SOF
enabling capabilities.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between SOF, general purpose forces,
and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a
significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this
collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and
elsewhere, and what lessons, in your view, are applicable to efforts
against China and Russia?
Answer. In my view, the most important lesson learned from recent
decades of combat in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere is the importance
of relationships--within DOD, with other U.S. departments and agencies,
and with foreign allies and partners. Whether fighting insurgents,
conducting counterterrorism operations, competing against and deterring
China and Russia, combating non-State actors, assisting allies and
partners, or preparing for large scale combat, special operations is
most often a team sport. With decades of combat experience and
credibility, SOF's long-term relationships are directly applicable to
efforts against China and Russia. These relationships are foundational
to SOF's ability to provide the Joint Force with placement and access,
enhanced understanding, and increased options in competition, crisis,
and conflict.
supported combatant command
Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by
the President or Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM may operate as a
supported combatant command.
In your view, under what circumstances should USSOCOM conduct
operations as a supported combatant command?
Answer. In my view, USSOCOM's primary role is to provide trained
and ready SOF to Combatant Commanders with physical areas of
responsibility to execute operations in support of their respective
theater objectives. By exception, and if directed by the Secretary and
President, USSOCOM could be designated as the supported combatant
command, particularly when crisis response operations are trans-
regional and dynamic, or when exquisite sensitive capabilities may be
employed. However, this has not been the historical norm.
Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force
structure changes, if any, are required in order for USSOCOM to more
effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command
responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, and using the INDSG and other strategic
guidance as a guide, I will conduct a holistic review of the SOF
enterprise resource, organization, and force structure, and make
appropriate adjustments and recommendations to the Department in close
coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and the Services.
theater special operations commands
Question. Based on your professional military experience, how would
you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations
component to a geographic combatant command in providing responsive
special operations planning and capabilities in support of the
combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?
Answer. As a former commander of Special Operations Command Central
(SOCCENT), I know firsthand the crucial role our TSOC's play in support
of Combatant Commands' campaign plans. TSOCs are the primary theater
SOF organization responsible for planning, executing, and controlling
theater special operations in support of their respective Combatant
Commands. Similarly, TSOC Commanders also serve as the senior SOF
representative on Combatant Command staffs responsible for advising
Combatant Commanders on the best use of SOF in support of theater
campaign plans and any other emergent theater operational or training
requirements.
civilian casualties
Question. In your view, what are the primary challenges for the
combatant commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to
allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military
operations?
Answer. Minimizing civilian harm is one of the core purposes of the
Law of Armed Conflict, and crucial for maintaining local support,
strengthening partnership, and denying adversaries exploitable
propaganda. Civilian casualties are never routine--every civilian death
is a tragedy, and we will always take feasible precautions to mitigate
CIVCAS--and every time we fail, we will examine where and how we failed
and adjust our processes to mitigate civilian casualties to the best of
our ability. In my experience, the mitigation, investigation, and
reporting of civilian casualties have been improved through measures
such as the use of training, technology (weaponeering and modeling),
refined processes, and dedicated personnel and funding. If confirmed, I
will prioritize the minimization of civilian harm, and I will provide
feedback and recommendations on the associated challenges to the
Department, in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and supported
Combatant Commands.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure civilian casualty
allegations are adequately and promptly investigated by USSOCOM?
Answer. USSOCOM actively works with supported Combatant Commands to
ensure all CIVCAS incidents and allegations are promptly investigated
and reported. USSOCOM has subject matter experts who are involved in
responding to all allegations of civilian harm in accordance with
Department of Defense policy, and in identifying potential trends of
issues specific to SOF. If confirmed, and when USSOCOM forces are
operating under another Combatant Command's operational authority, I
will emphasize full cooperation with that command's processes to ensure
we are taking all appropriate action to investigate and resolve
civilian harm allegations.
Question. Do you believe credible civilian casualty incidents
should be independently investigated by personnel who are sufficiently
removed from the unit or chain of command associated with the incident?
Please be specific in your response.
Answer. The Civilian Harm Assessment Cells (CHAC) at Combatant
Commands are organized to ensure that they are not part of the
targeting process, to maintain a degree of separation that enables an
impartial review of civilian harm allegations. At the same time, these
CHAC personnel, by working as part of the staff, maintain real-time
awareness of operations, policies, battle rhythm, battle damage
assessments, civilian damage estimates, and have access to all relevant
information regarding military operations, including classified
material that requires special access. In my judgment, this ensures the
CHACs are well-positioned to evaluate all civilian harm allegations
thoroughly and in a timely manner, while maintaining their
impartiality. This model provides commanders with maximum flexibility
and discretion to assign and oversee incidents of civilian harm and
results in more relevant investigations as the personnel understand the
organization, policy, and processes involved, and have the expertise to
make relevant recommendations to create institutional change.
Additionally, partnerships with civilian non-governmental organizations
can provide important access to information on civil context in and
around battlefields.
Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's obligation to
report civilian casualty incidents to Congress?
Answer. USSOCOM forces conduct combat operations under the
operational authority of a combatant commander with a physical area of
responsibility. USSOCOM provides required inputs to Congress via
Combatant Commanders with physical areas of responsibility and the
Joint Staff. This report is submitted annually by USD(P). These reports
include specific operational details, such as the date, location, and
the number of civilian deaths and/or injuries that occurred, among
other relevant details.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
to provide ex gratia payments when civilian casualties or other
civilian harm result from unilateral or partnered U.S. military
operations?
Answer. Ex gratia is an expression of condolence or sympathy with
the aim to maintain good relationships with the local community. There
are many factors to consider when making the decision to use ex gratia
funds including the extent of harm, local culture, local economic
situation, the ability to confirm the identity of the affected
individuals, and the command's ability to communicate with them. There
are also the considerations that an ex-gratia payment could put those
individuals in danger, or that the payments could be diverted to
support terrorist activities. There are cases when ex gratia payments
are appropriate due to damage or destruction of property, or injury or
death due to U.S. military operations. In my view, while ex gratia is a
means to maintain positive relationships with affected communities, it
must be weighed against potential risks to the recipients and/or future
operations.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records (including documents and
electronic communications) and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
communications) and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
naval special warfare detachment kodiak
1. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, President Trump recently
said, ``We will ensure Alaska gets even more defense investment as we
fully rebuild our military, especially as Russia and China are making
menacing moves in the Pacific.'' As you know, Alaska offers some of the
most challenging and realistic training environments in the world,
especially for cold-weather and maritime operations. Naval Special
Warfare Detachment Kodiak has played a vital role for decades in
preparing our SEALs for missions in Arctic conditions--an area of the
world that is increasingly relevant given the strategic competition in
the High North. How does SOCOM view the importance of Kodiak in
sustaining the readiness of our Naval Special Warfare units?
Vice Admiral Bradley. While I cannot speak for USSOCOM's view writ
large, I believe Naval Special Warfare Detachment Kodiak provides
critical training to enable NSW personnel to operate in extreme, cold-
weather maritime environments.
2. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, are there plans to
expand or modernize Naval Special Warfare Detachment Kodiak's
capabilities as the Arctic becomes a more contested environment?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my current position, I am not aware if
there are plans to expand Naval Special Warfare Detachment Kodiak. If
confirmed, I will review this, as well as SOF's other artic-focused
training capabilities.
8(a) contracting
3. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, the Small Business Act
(SBA) 8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a contract vehicle
through which sole source and set aside contracts can be awarded to
small businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations, Community
Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian
organizations. These corporations are tied to political relationships,
not racial classifications. They also are some of our most efficient
contractors, earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System (CPARS) marks. Last, many of these small businesses
employ veterans at rates far exceeding the national average, allowing
our Nation's finest to continue to service after they take off the
uniform. Will you commit to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a)
contracting for the Department of Defense?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
4. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, I recently toured an SBA
8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to
the Federal customer in terms of cost and efficiency while delivering
mission-critical solutions that increase our national security and
warfighting readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best ``bang for the
buck'' for taxpayers, giving contracting officers additional
flexibility while also maximizing efficiency by reducing red tape. Do
you see the value in increasing efficiency in flexibility brought from
initiatives such as the 8(a) program?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I believe we must use every tool available to
leverage the incredible power of the U.S. industrial base to support
warfighting readiness, innovation, and modernization. This absolutely
includes small business and any legally available mechanism that allows
acceleration and delivery of mission critical services and capabilities
should be leveraged.
5. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, rapid response
capabilities are essential to enable our warfighters to win on the
battlefield. At the same time, our defense contractors must rapidly
respond to the needs of our military to make the U.S. Military more
lethal. Flexible and efficient contracting through the SBA 8(a) program
is one trusted way to do this, but many of these small businesses do
not have the past performance that other traditional vendors may boast.
How does SOCOM evaluate their operational performance in program awards
and procurement planning?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I am aware that the DOD has a partnership
agreement with the Small Business Administration that allows flexible
and efficient contracting through the 8(a) program. From my current
position, I do not have insight on how SOCOM evaluates operational
performance in program awards and procurement planning, but if
confirmed I will do an assessment of this important function.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
mq-9 availability
6. Senator Cramer. Vice Admiral Bradley, I've heard from both the
Special Operations community and from our own 119th Air National Guard
unit in North Dakota that the MQ-9 is doing critical work for
conventional and special operations around the world. But attrition is
taking its toll on the MQ-9 fleet, and it doesn't look like the Air
Force has an immediate plan to replace the fleet with existing or
future capabilities. Can you briefly explain the importance of the MQ-
9's capabilities to the Special Operations mission?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my experience, MQ-9s have been, and will
continue to be, a critical and enduring platform in SOF's airborne ISR
(A-ISR) toolkit. SOF require an array of complementary physical and
virtual ISR capabilities for permissive, contested, and denied
environments to identify and locate targets, characterize adversary
activities, and provide overwatch of our forces during operations. This
includes A-ISR. My assessment is that we will continue to need MQ-9s,
which we can apply to a range of SOF missions. We must balance our ISR
portfolio with other capabilities, in order to protect essential
platforms like the MQ-9 that our enemies seek to destroy/defeat through
kinetic and non-kinetic (jamming) means. As MQ-9s are primarily used in
more permissive environments, we must also modernize our A-ISR
platforms for operations in contested airspace.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
background
7. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, as part of my
responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions
within the Department of Defense, I will be asking the same two
questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I
serve:?'Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
8. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever faced
discipline, or entered into a settlement related to this kind of
conduct?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
great power competition
9. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, as United States Special
Operations Forces pivot to address threats beyond counterterrorism--
particularly from great power competitors like China and Russia--U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) must adapt its structure, mission
set, and technology investments. SOCOM has a unique role to play in
irregular warfare, strategic influence, and information operations that
can disrupt or deter adversaries operating below the threshold of armed
conflict. In this context, the ability of SOCOM to counter malign
influence and support resistance networks in contested environments has
become increasingly important. How would you assess SOCOM's current
readiness to deter or disrupt Chinese and Russian irregular influence
campaigns in regions like the Pacific Islands, Africa, or Eastern
Europe?
Vice Admiral Bradley. While I don't have complete visibility of the
readiness of the entire USSOCOM enterprise in my current position, I
can say that SOF are successfully conducting critical deterrence and
shaping activities today across the globe, including in the Indo-
Pacific, Africa, Central and South America, and Europe. On any given
day, more than 6,000 SOF are deployed to over 80 countries supporting
over 30 named operations and other Combatant Command requirements.
10. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, what role should SOCOM
play in shaping strategic influence operations and countering hybrid
threats that fall outside traditional kinetic engagements?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Drawing upon decades of combat-experience and
credibility, SOF provide tailorable, asymmetric options while creating
dilemmas for our adversaries. With a range of kinetic and non-kinetic
options to deter aggression and counter coercion, SOF leverage unique
authorities to collaborate and operate with allies and partners--our
greatest strategic advantage for tackling shared challenges. This also
helps bolster our global influence and counter attempts by our
adversaries to undermine our alliances and partnerships. SOF have a
unique role in building resistance and resilience, and our long-term
partnerships also provide SOF incredible placement and access across
the globe, enhancing our understanding of adversary activities.
11. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, how are you prioritizing
investments in emerging technologies--such as artificial intelligence
(AI), unmanned systems, and cyber tools--to give our operators a
decisive edge in irregular and information warfare?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The increasing pace of technological
advancement demands SOF modernize rapidly to outpace our adversaries
through the unrelenting development and integration of cutting-edge
technologies. This includes harnessing the power of man-machine teaming
and fusing all-domain capabilities to achieve decisive advantages. The
pervasive technical surveillance environment presents both unique
challenges and unprecedented opportunities. Recognizing this, I am
committed to strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the
combined strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF's
operational effectiveness in support of national security objectives.
My vision encompasses integrating technological advancements across all
domains--physical and virtual--including surface and subsurface
maritime platforms; autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned
systems; next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; stand-off precision effects; and modernized mission
command systems. If confirmed, I will leverage the INDSG and other
strategic documents to guide a comprehensive review and prioritization
of USSOCOM's priorities and capabilities and make recommendations to
ASD(SO/LIC) aimed at ensuring SOF remain at the forefront of military
innovation and preparedness.
civilian harm prevention and mitigation for special operations command
12. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, General Bryan Fenton,
current SOCOM Commander, when asked during posture hearing whether the
Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CPCOE) has been an asset to
SOCOM operations: ``I think certainly.
[ . . . ] We absolutely, as your SOCOM team, always aim to do the
mission . . . and then protect noncombatants and civilians as part of
who we are and what we stand for. And I think to your point, that sends
a very--that sends a very powerful message across the globe that we're
there to eliminate or disrupt a bad actor yet at the same time protect
innocents and vulnerable and noncombatants. That's a very different
signal from a nation. And that's what your SOCOM team works to do every
day.'' Do you agree with General Fenton's comments on CPCOE and
protecting noncombatants?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I absolutely agree. While SOF are laser-
focused on mission accomplishment, ensuring we do everything we can to
protect noncombatants and civilians from harm represents our values as
a Nation, and is critical to our success in competition.
13. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, if so, how will you
continue SOCOM's mitigation and prevention of civilian harm?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my experience, the mitigation,
investigation, and reporting of civilian casualties have been improved
through measures such as the use of training, technology (weaponeering
and modeling), refined processes, and dedicated personnel and funding.
If confirmed, I will prioritize the minimization of civilian harm, and
I will provide feedback and recommendations on the associated
challenges to the Department, in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)
and supported Combatant Commands.
14. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, what do you
understand to be your roles and responsibilities regarding civilian
harm mitigation and response?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I understand my role and
responsibilities regarding the mitigation of civilian harm and
mitigation response as provided in Under Department of Defense
Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17 and the Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response Action Plan. My role would be to continue to apply resources
and leverage our staff to identify the risks of our military operations
to civilians and make every effort to minimize harmful effects while
achieving our military objectives. I would also work with Combatant
Commands on investigating reports of civilian harm resulting from SOF
operations and responding accordingly when civilian harm does occur.
15. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, furthermore, do you agree
that preventing and responding to civilian harm is a critical
responsibility of the U.S. Military and makes the United States more
effective?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I agree. We have a moral and strategic
obligation to avoid civilian casualties and investigate allegations
thereof. This is at the heart of who we are as a Military and a Nation.
scaling innovative capabilities
16. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, it's broadly agreed that
the Department of Defense needs more rapid procurement and acquisition
authorities. However, SOCOM is unique in how it rapidly acquires and
fields cutting-edge technologies for special forces around the world.
If confirmed, what specific procurement or innovation practices are you
most interested in expanding or institutionalizing within SOCOM?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring SOF remain
a vanguard for innovation and agility and will assess current USSOCOM
procurement and innovation practices in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)
and the Department. I recognize the critical need to respond to
adversary innovation cycles with speed and precision and reduce
capability fielding and employment timelines. I believe openness with
industry will foster strategic partnerships, competition, and
innovation. Allowing companies insight into SOF requirements will
unlock the ingenuity of the American industrial base and drive
development of critical cutting-edge technologies. SOF's ability to
rapidly test, evaluate, and make combat-informed judgments on a
product's viability for its intended function is key to informing the
iterative nature of product development.
17. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would you build on
SOCOM's existing authorities and innovative processes?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I appreciate Congress's efforts to provide
the DOD and USSOCOM with the tools needed to fight and win. In my
experience, one of our most important tools is the array of fiscal
authorities that we can apply to enable foreign forces that support our
operations. To build our military advantage in a changing operational
environment, we must adapt and innovate our authorities and
capabilities to provide flexibility and operational agility. If
confirmed, I intend to assess current authorities in close coordination
with the USSOCOM staff and Components, ASD(SO/LIC), and the Department.
18. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, rapid acquisition often
increases risk. How do you propose measuring and managing risk without
eroding accountability?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will assess and strengthen
internal controls, managing cost schedule and performance risk
throughout our acquisition programs, ensuring accountability and
stewardship of resources.
19. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, how would
you advocate within the broader Department of Defense to scale SOCOM's
agile acquisition practices across other commands?
Vice Admiral Bradley. USSOCOM's unique alignment of flexible budget
authorities, mission command, and capability-based programming have
been instrumental in SOF's ability to address critical and emergent
requirements--specifically unmanned systems development and capacity. I
commit to ensuring SOF remain a vanguard for innovation and agility and
commit to working with the Services to develop capabilities with
transition to the joint force at the forefront of our development. If
confirmed, I will commit to assess these authorities and provide
recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
counter-unmanned aircraft systems capabilities
20. Senator Kaine. Vice Admiral Bradley, in your advance policy
questions (APQ) you cited the threat that one-way drones pose to U.S.
Forces, bases, and allies and partners as one of ``the most pressing
challenges'' facing special operations forces over the next 10 years.
What role does SOCOM have to play in counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(c-UAS) operations?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The ability to counter threats from unmanned
systems, of all types, from both static and dynamic positions, is a
critical capability for SOF--and will only become more important with
the constant advances in commercial unmanned and autonomous
technologies. The ability to rapidly innovate to solve hard problems is
a hallmark of SOF, and if confirmed, I will ensure USSOCOM continues to
work closely with the rest of the Department, and international
partners and allies to advance our c-UAS capabilities for fixed site,
mobile, and expeditionary scenarios.
21. Senator Kaine. Vice Admiral Bradley, how is SOCOM integrating
with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) (as synchronizer) and the Army
(as executive agent) to develop c-UAS technology?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my current position, I do not have
complete visibility on how SOCOM is integrating with NORTHCOM on c-UAS
technologies. If confirmed, I will review SOCOM's efforts in this
critical capability area.
22. Senator Kaine. Vice Admiral Bradley, what are our biggest
technology gaps?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The increasing pace of technological
advancement demands SOF modernize rapidly to outpace our adversaries
through the unrelenting development and integration of cutting-edge
technologies. My vision encompasses integrating technological
advancements and man-machine teaming across all domains--physical and
virtual--including surface and subsurface maritime platforms;
autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned systems; next-generation
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; stand-off precision
effects; and modernized mission command systems. I am committed to
strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the combined
strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF's operational
effectiveness in support of national security objectives.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
23. Senator King. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support the
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)?
Vice Admiral Bradley. U.S. Forces currently follow UNCLOS as a
matter of customary international law. As to the policy decision of
whether UNCLOS should be ratified, I defer to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
brain health
24. Senator King. Vice Admiral Bradley, Special Operations Command
leads the Department with regards to blast overpressure testing.
Special operators are a high-risk population when it comes to brain
health including blast overpressure and brain health, what specific
plans do you have to keep this a priority?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Our people are the most important resource.
SOF's lethality and readiness is an obligation to defend the Nation, as
is our commitment to safe training while still maintaining critical
combat skills. USSOCOM has been a leader in brain health and continues
to lead efforts with respect scientific research and advances. As we
gain more fidelity on the impacts of the range of traumatic brain
injuries, USSOCOM is also taking steps to identify better mitigation
and protection measures, as well as improving treatment and care for
our impacted service members. In partnership with Massachusetts General
Hospital and Harvard Medical School, USSOCOM concluded The Repeated
Exposure to Blast (ReBlast) Study, the most comprehensive work of this
kind to date. If confirmed, I will remain committed to prioritizing
brain health, and I will ensure USSOCOM continues to align with, lead,
and inform the Department of Defense.
25. Senator King. Vice Admiral Bradley, how can the Congress be
helpful to you to support brain health for special operators?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Congress and this committee have been very
supportive of fiscal resources in support of SOF and brain health
initiatives. I ask for your continued commitment and support to SOF,
the Department, and our families to better understand brain health
issues and develop solutions to mitigate and treat them.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
ethics
26. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit not to seek any employment with or compensation from a
defense contractor, including through serving on a board, as a
consultant, or as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I intend to focus on the job at
hand. I have no intentions of seeking such employment. I commit to
following applicable statutes, policies, and regulations regarding
post-government employment and conflicts of interest.
27. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit not to engage in any lobbying activities, including
unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the
guise of consulting or advising, focused on DOD or any of its
components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I intend to focus on the job at
hand. I have no intentions of engaging in such activities. I commit to
following applicable statutes, policies, and regulations regarding
post-government employment and conflicts of interest.
28. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit not to
seek employment, board membership with, or any other form of
compensation from a company that you regulated or otherwise interacted
with while in government, for at least 4 years after leaving office?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I intend to focus on the job at
hand. I have no intentions of seeking such employment. I commit to
following applicable statutes, policies, and regulations regarding
post-government employment and conflicts of interest.
29. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, during your nomination
process, did anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other
closely related entity approach you about your loyalty to President
Trump?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
30. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you were approached
about your loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or
other similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that
pledge or oath.
Vice Admiral Bradley. I was not approached about my loyalty to
President Trump.
31. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you were approached
about your loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal
representations of loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
Vice Admiral Bradley. I was not approached about loyalty to
President Trump.
32. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, in November 2024, the New
York Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top
adviser to President Trump, allegedly requested payment from
prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
positions within the administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
33. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you did discuss the
possibility of joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr.
Epshteyn seek payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a
position within the administration?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I have never spoken to Mr. Epshteyn.
34. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, at any time, did lawyers
for President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
describe the information that they provided you (including copies of
documents), what was discussed during any calls, and any other
information pertaining to this interaction.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
35. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, were you in contact with
Mr. Elon Musk at any time during your nomination process? If so, please
describe the nature of those contacts.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
36. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, was Mr. Musk present or
involved in any interviews you did related to your nomination? If so,
please describe the nature of his involvement.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
37. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, was Mr. Musk involved in
any way with your nomination, including but not limited to directly or
indirectly contacting Senators regarding their position on your
nomination?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
38. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, who was in the room or
participated in any of your interviews regarding your nomination?
Vice Admiral Bradley. During my interview with President Trump for
the position, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the potential nominees for USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and
USCENTCOM, and a notetaker were also present.
During my office calls with SASC members and staff, my current
Commander's Action Group (CAG) Director and a representative from the
Joint Staff Legislative Affairs were present in the room.
39. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you own any stock or
hold any other interest in any defense industry contractors, will you
divest it to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do not hold any stock or hold any interest
in any defense industry contractors.
40. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what do you consider the
role of the press in a democracy?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I am a firm believer in the U.S. Constitution
and the First Amendment which provides for freedom of the press. This
is the cornerstone of our democracy. The press helps hold the
government accountable by exercising the right of all Americans to
freedom of speech through their reporting without censorship.
41. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit not to
retaliate, including by denying access to government officials or
facilities, against news outlets or individual journalists who publish
articles that are critical of you, your office, your agency, or the
Trump administration?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I commit to not retaliate or deny access
to news outlets or journalists if they publish articles critical of me,
my office, my agency, or the administration.
42. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever been
accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
environment for another individual in a personal or professional
capacity? Provide a list of all instances in which you have been
accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
environment for an individual and the behavior of which you were
accused.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
43. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you requested, or
has anyone requested on your behalf, that any other person or third
party sign a nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-disparagement, or
similar agreement regarding your conduct in a personal or professional
capacity?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
44. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you voluntarily
release any individual from any such agreements before this committee
votes on your nomination?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do not have any such agreement in place.
45. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever paid or
promised to pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your behalf,
an individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality, non-
disparagement, or similar agreement?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
46. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if the answer to the
previous question was yes, how much was promised, how much was paid,
and what were the circumstances?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do not have any such agreement in place.
47. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, were you at any time, or
are you currently, contacted by or under investigation or review by any
inspector general or any inspector general's office for any reason?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
48. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of the Hatch Act?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The Hatch Act is a law that restricts the
partisan political activity of civilian executive branch employees of
the Federal Government. While it does not apply to members of the Armed
Forces, there are Department of Defense Policies that similarly
restrict partisan political activities for Active Duty servicemembers.
49. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what disciplinary actions
are appropriate for violations of the Hatch Act?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The penalty structure for violations of the
Hatch Act by Federal employees includes removal from Federal service,
reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not
to exceed 5 years, suspension, reprimand, or a civil penalty. The
nature of the violation, rank/position of the employee, and other
extenuating or mitigating circumstances should drive the appropriate
disciplinary action in any given case.
50. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
family currently or ever been a member, founder, or investor of the
``Executive Branch'' social club? Please provide their name and role
related to the club.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
51. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
family ever visited the club or attended an event at the club?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
52. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if a member of your
family has ever visited the club or attended an event at the club,
please provide the date, circumstances of the visit, and the event.
Vice Admiral Bradley. Neither I nor any members of my family have
visited the club or attended an event at the club.
53. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you had any meetings
at the club? If so, what were these meetings about and with whom?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
54. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
family had any meetings at the club? If so, which family member(s),
what were these meetings about, and with whom were these meetings?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
55. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you encouraged
anyone to join the club or promoted the club in any other way? If so,
in what ways did you promote the club?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
56. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
family encouraged anyone to join the club or promoted the club in any
other way? If so, which family member(s) and in what ways did they
promote the club?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
congressional oversight and transparency
57. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of the role of the Department of Defense Inspector
General and service Inspectors General?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The DOD Inspector General acts as the
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in matters regarding DOD
fraud, waste, and abuse. The DOD OIG combats fraud, waste and abuse by
conducting audits, investigations and evaluations. In addition, the IG
ensures the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress are fully informed
of problems in the Department.
The Military Services Inspectors General provide oversight and
assistance through inspections, investigations, and evaluations within
the DOD. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force each
maintain their own IG office, focusing on their respective branches and
investigating matters affecting them. These Service IGs operate under
similar principles of independence and objectivity, ensuring
transparency and accountability within the armed forces.
58. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you ensure your
staff complies with any Inspector General deadlines established for
requested communications, documents, and witnesses, and that staff will
be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.
59. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are not able to
comply with any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you
notify the Republican and Democratic members of this committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.
60. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from any
individual, including the President?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
61. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what actions would you
take if you were given an illegal order from any individual, including
the President?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I would first seek clarification on the
order, as I do not anticipate that I would receive an illegal order. I
would then seek advice and counsel from the Chairman and my legal
advisor. If I ultimately determine that the order is an illegal order,
I would not follow the order.
62. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
voluntarily provide a deposition if you are requested by Congress to
provide one?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
63. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
voluntarily testify in front of Congress if you are requested by
Congress to do so?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
64. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
testify or provide a deposition in front of Congress if you are issued
a subpoena to do so?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
65. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
providing information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are
requested to do so?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In accordance with all applicable laws and
regulations, I will provide information or documents voluntarily to
Congress if requested to do so.
66. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you provide
information or documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to do
so?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In accordance with all applicable laws and
regulations, I will provide information or documents to Congress if
issued a subpoena.
67. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
following current precedent for responding to information requests,
briefings, and other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees and their minority members?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
68. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, will you
commit to posting your official calendar monthly?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I commit to conducting a
security review to ensure OPSEC before I publicly release any
information.
69. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you think the Federal
Government has an overclassification problem? If so, please provide
examples of overclassification you have encountered.
Vice Admiral Bradley. While there is always room for improvement in
our classification processes and procedures, the Joint Force regularly
writes for release and utilizes classification markings at the lowest
classification levels to ensure dissemination to the widest audience in
a timely manner.
70. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, do you
think your department should pursue strategic technology to support
automated declassification?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I believe there are great opportunities to
leverage advancing technologies such as artificial intelligence and
machine learning to assist in both the classification and
declassification of information. However, I believe there will still
need to be a human in the loop to confirm the accuracy of
classification recommendations made by any machine, especially before
officially declassifying information.
project 2025
71. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you discussed
Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the
Trump transition team, or other members of the Trump administration? If
so, please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with
whom you discussed it.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
72. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you discussed
Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Heritage
Foundation? If so, please explain what you discussed, when you
discussed it, and with whom you discussed it.
Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
foreign influence
73. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you received any
payment from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
government within the past 5 years?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No, I have not.
74. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you communicated
with any foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
government within the past 5 years?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, as a part of my official duties.
75. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, please disclose any
communications or payments you have had with representatives of any
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years and describe the nature of the communication.
Vice Admiral Bradley. In the course of my official duties over the
past 5 years, I have had various contacts with, but no payments to,
foreign governments and entities controlled by foreign governments. I
am happy to answer specific lines of inquiry on this topic, in a
closed/classified setting, as appropriate.
impoundment control act
76. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you believe the
Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to block the disbursement
of funds appropriated by Congress?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I am aware of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 detailing procedures available to allow
Congress to consider Presidential proposals to delay or rescind budget
authority expeditiously. However, I defer questions regarding the legal
authorities of the Secretary of Defense to OSD.
77. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of the Impoundment Control Act?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I am aware of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 detailing procedures available to allow
Congress to consider Presidential proposals to delay or rescind budget
authority expeditiously.
78. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
complying with the Impoundment Control Act?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
79. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
notifying the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the
majority and minority, if you are asked not to comply with the
Impoundment Control Act or not to expend the money that Congress
appropriates or authorizes?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
80. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of the requirements for Federal agencies to obligate
funding that Congress authorizes and appropriates, in accordance with
the time period that Congress deems it to do so?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I understand the Anti-Deficiency Act requires
Federal agencies to obligate dollars for the purposes appropriated, in
the year apportioned, and within our allocated budget. I understand
funds cannot be expended in advance of or in excess of an
appropriation.
81. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
expending the money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
82. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
following and implementing every provision of the annual National
Defense Authorization Act passed into law?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
83. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you became aware of a
potential violation of the Antideficiency Act, Impoundment Control Act,
or other appropriations laws, what steps would you take?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I commit to comply with and prevent
violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, Impoundment Control Act, and
other appropriations laws by ensuring proper internal controls are in
place to ensure all appropriated dollars are responsibly and accurately
expended for the purposes appropriated, in the year apportioned, and
within our allocated budget. I will promptly and thoroughly investigate
and report any potential violations.
civilian harm
84. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you agree that one
difference between the United States and its potential adversaries is
the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human
life and liberty at home and abroad?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
85. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Title 10 U.S.C. 184 establishes the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence (CP CoE) as a specialized military
organization that serves as the Department of Defense's primary
institution for advancing civilian protection capabilities. The CPCoE
operates as a hub and facilitator of Department-wide analysis,
learning, and strategic approaches to civilian harm mitigation and
response during military operations.
86. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, the U.S. Military has
spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate
civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including through the
development of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first
Trump administration, which I commend. These efforts received
bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the
U.S. Military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. If
confirmed, will you commit to continued leadership on civilian harm
issues?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.
87. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
what do you understand to be your role and responsibilities regarding
civilian harm mitigation and response?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed I understand my role and
responsibilities regarding the mitigation of civilian harm and
mitigation response as provided in Under Department of Defense
Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17 and the Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response Action Plan. My role would be to continue to apply resources
and leverage our staff to identify the risks of our military operations
to civilians and make every effort to minimize harmful effects while
achieving our military objectives. I would also work with Combatant
Commands on investigating reports of civilian harm resulting from SOF
operations and responding accordingly when civilian harm does occur.
88. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what do you understand to
be the importance of mitigating civilian harm in military operations?
Vice Admiral Bradley. While SOF forces are laser-focused on mission
accomplishment, ensuring we do everything we can to protect
noncombatants and civilians from harm represents our values as a
Nation, and is critical to our success in competition. Furthermore, we
have a moral and strategic obligation to avoid civilian casualties and
investigate allegations thereof. This is at the heart of who we are as
a Military and a Nation.
89. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what value can advisors
with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response provide to
commanders?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Civilian harm mitigation and response
advisors provide commanders with crucial data on the civilian
environment, tailored mitigation advice, and enhanced understanding of
the impact of operations on civilians, preserving the commander's vital
decision space.
90. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have SOCOM and
AFRICOM, respectively, benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of
Excellence?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The CPCoE provides reach-back support should
our team require it and has provided training for our CHMR personnel.
Additionally, CPCoE has provided coordination across the Department.
91. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have SOCOM and
AFRICOM, respectively, supported and implemented the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The CHMR-AP formed the basis for SOCOM's
approach to CHMR and resulted in a range of policies and operational
processes designed to reduce the risk to civilians prior to conducting
U.S. Military operations. During my time in the SOF enterprise, I have
seen firsthand that SOCOM has been focused on incorporating CHMR
principles into planning, training, and exercises.
92. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what have been the
benefits for SOCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, in supporting and
implementing Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response efforts and the
CHMR-AP?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Supporting and implementing CHMR efforts has
promoted consistency and efficiency in operations by standardizing
processes across SOF. The standards developed following CHMR-AP
implementation govern lethal activities by enhancing precision,
repeatability, and accountability.
93. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you believe that our
troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of civilian
deaths from U.S. Military operations or U.S.-led military operations
increases?
Vice Admiral Bradley. While I cannot correlate specific incidents
of civilian casualties with instances of retribution against troops, I
believe terrorist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS exploit galvanizing
events to inspire supporters worldwide.
94. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how does preventing and
mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. National Security?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Minimizing civilian harm is one of the core
purposes of the Law of Armed Conflict, and is crucial for maintaining
local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries
exploitable propaganda.
95. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, does having civilian-harm
prevention personnel build trust and relationships with local civil
society groups help commanders to collect useful intelligence
information?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Civilian harm mitigation and response
advisors provide commanders with crucial data on the civilian
environment and enhanced understanding of the impact of operations on
civilians, preserving the commander's vital decision space.
96. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, in what ways do you see
civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM and
AFRICOM's missions and the effectiveness of their operations,
respectively?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Civilian harm mitigation is crucial for
maintaining local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying
adversaries exploitable propaganda.
97. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian Protection
Center of Excellence?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will continue to follow all
the Department's policies and instructions regarding civilian harm
mitigation, to include supporting the Civilian Protection Center of
Excellence.
98. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how will you prevent and
mitigate civilian harm?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my experience, the mitigation,
investigation, and reporting of civilian casualties have been improved
through measures such as the use of training, technology (weaponeering
and modeling), refined processes, and dedicated personnel and funding.
If confirmed, I will prioritize the minimization of civilian harm, and
I will provide feedback and recommendations on the associated
challenges to the Department, in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)
and supported Combatant Commands.
99. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
these roles, will you commit to working with civil society and
interviewing civilian witnesses during civilian harm investigations?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, when USSOCOM forces are
operating under another combatant command's operational authority, I
will emphasize full cooperation with that combatant command's
processes, to include working with civil society and interviewing
civilian witnesses, to ensure we are taking all appropriate action to
investigate and resolve civilian harm allegations.
100. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
these roles, how do you plan to work with civil society to reduce
civilian harm in military operations?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will leverage the tools
available at my disposal--including working with civil society through
combatant commands when appropriate--to ensure mission success while
mitigating civilian harm.
101. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
these roles, will you commit to supporting thorough investigations of
allegations of civilian harm, including by partners and allies?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will continue to follow all
the Department's policies and instructions regarding civilian harm
mitigation, to include policies on investigating allegations of
civilian harm. Learning from instances of civilian harm helps us
improve our processes and mitigate future instances of civilian harm.
102. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would a potential
high-intensity conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary that
purposefully embeds itself in densely populated operational
environments impact targeting capabilities, precision, and risks to
servicemembers?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In general, purposely using humans as shields
is a Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) violation. Nevertheless, despite
adversaries' actions, U.S. Forces maintain an obligation to apply LOAC
to all operations, including the principles of distinction and
proportionality. As such, to counter an adversary embedded in densely
populated operation environments, it is critical that SOF have range of
options available, to include precision weapons, AI, and non-kinetic
tools.
103. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would current
technology, capabilities, planning, and rules of engagement, including
efforts to prevent and mitigate civilian harm, help to mitigate such
impacts from the previous question?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Technology, planning, and tailored rules of
engagement are tools that can be utilized to ensure mission completion
against adversaries in densely populated areas while mitigating
civilian harm. If confirmed, I will strive to keep USSOCOM's
capabilities and forces agile to anticipate and respond to evolving
adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures.
104. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
these roles, will you commit to sharing all findings of each
investigation of civilian harm with Congress, including the members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee within 15 days of the
investigation's completion?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In accordance with all applicable laws,
policies, and regulations, I will work through the combatant commands,
Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide
investigations of civilian harm to Congress.
105. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes. I will follow all Department policies
and instructions regarding civilian harm mitigation.
106. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian Harm
Mitigation Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes. I will follow all Department policies
and instructions regarding civilian harm mitigation.
protecting classified information and federal records
107. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of the need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Preserving the element of surprise through
operational security is paramount. Operational security measures should
always be implemented and adhered to in order to not unnecessarily put
the lives of our service members at risk and jeopardizing mission
success.
108. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what are the national
security risks of improperly disclosing classified information?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The national security risks of improperly
disclosing classified information depend on the information disclosed,
but all classified information should be handled properly and only
discussed in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) or
shared on approved networks for that classification level.
109. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what would you do if you
learned an official had improperly disclosed classified information?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If I witnessed an official improperly
disclosing classified information, I would redirect them to the
appropriate channels for sharing the information and ensure that the
incident was reported to the applicable security manager.
110. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of Government officials' duties under the Federal Records
Act?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The Federal Records Act is the legal
framework that maintains transparency and accountability for our
government by requiring each Federal agency, to include those within
the Department of Defense, to properly maintain all recorded
information to include electronic records. Government officials are
required to abide by their organization's records management program.
111. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, should classified
information be shared on unclassified commercial systems?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No, classified information should not be
shared on unclassified commercial systems.
112. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, is it damaging to
servicemembers' confidence in the chain of command if the pilots flying
a mission find out that the official who ordered them to perform that
mission shared sensitive information that could have made it more
likely that the mission would fail or they would be killed?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I believe that it could potentially be
damaging to a servicemember's confidence in the chain of command if
information that put their mission or safety at risk was improperly
shared.
113. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you had information
about the status of specific targets, weapons being used, and timing
for imminent U.S. strikes against an adversary, under what
circumstances would you feel comfortable receiving or sharing that
information on an unclassified commercial application like Signal?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I would not feel comfortable sharing
classified information on an unclassified commercial application.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
114. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you believe that
servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
any other concern that they wish to raise?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, all servicemembers, civilians, grantees
and contractors should feel protected from retaliation and empowered to
come forward about any concern they wish to raise.
115. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what do you consider to
be the purpose of Federal whistleblower protection laws?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Federal whistleblower protection laws protect
Federal employees and uniformed servicemembers who come forward with
claims about agency wrongdoing from reprisal through adverse personnel
actions or other threats.
116. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever retaliated
against any individual for coming forward about an illegal order,
sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other
concern that they wish to raise?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No, I have not.
117. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please specify how
you will do so.
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes. I will adhere to the mandates of the
Federal whistleblower protection laws. I will not levy any adverse
actions or condone retaliation against whistleblowers related to their
coming forward to expose violations, mismanagement, or other
allegations.
118. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to preventing retaliation against any individual for
coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or harassment,
negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish to raise?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I commit to preventing retaliation
against any individual for coming forward about an illegal order,
sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other
concern they wish to raise.
119. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you consider it to be
retaliation to demote an individual, prevent the promotion or
advancement of an individual, remove an individual from the military or
their role, or take other adverse actions related to personnel
decisions for an individual, in response to that individual engaging in
protected activity?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do consider it to be retaliation if an
individual faces adverse personnel actions in response to their
engaging in a protected activity.
120. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you consider it to be
retaliation to encourage another person(s) to demote an individual,
prevent the promotion or advancement of an individual, remove an
individual from the military or their role, or take other adverse
actions related to personnel decisions for an individual, in response
to that individual engaging in protected activity?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do consider it to be retaliation to
encourage someone else to levy adverse personnel actions against an
individual in response to their engaging in a protected activity.
data privacy
121. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of your obligations to protect sensitive servicemember,
contractor, and civilian employee information from unauthorized
disclosure and from foreign governments?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Protecting sensitive and personally
identifiable information for servicemembers, contractors, and civilian
employees is a legal requirement. Everyone within the Department of
Defense has the responsibility for safeguarding and properly handling
sensitive information and preventing unauthorized disclosure.
122. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what are the risks of
any failure to protect sensitive servicemember, contractor, and
civilian employee information from unauthorized disclosure and from
foreign governments?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The failure to protect sensitive
servicemember, contractor, or civilian employee information from
unauthorized disclosure and from foreign governments could potentially
put them or their families at risk of being targeted by an adversary or
nefarious actor looking to exploit them or put national security at
risk.
123. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
understanding of the Protecting Americans' Data from Foreign
Adversaries Act?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The act protects American's personally
identifiable information (PII) by prohibiting data brokers from selling
or transferring that information to foreign adversaries to include
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
124. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you oppose private
entities such as DOD contractors and data brokers selling servicemember
data to China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea
and entities controlled by those countries?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.
125. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, would you support any
contracts for the sale or transfer of servicemember data including a
prohibition on reselling or transferring servicemember data to China,
Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea and entities
controlled by those countries?
Vice Admiral Bradley. No, I would not.
126. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, a 2023 Duke University
study found that data brokers with datasets about Active Duty
servicemembers were willing to sell to buyers in Asia for as little as
12 cents per record. Do you think selling service member data in
foreign countries creates a national security risk?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do.
127. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, would you support
stronger enforcement of existing protections for U.S. and servicemember
data?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I would.
blast overpressure
128. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to protecting servicemembers from blast overpressure
and increasing their options for seeking care after being exposed?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.
129. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
what steps will you take to protect servicemembers from blast
overpressure and increase their options for seeking care after being
exposed?
Vice Admiral Bradley. USSOCOM has been a leader in brain health and
continues to lead efforts with respect scientific research and
advances. As we gain more fidelity on the impacts of the range of
traumatic brain injuries, including blast overpressure, USSOCOM is also
taking steps to identify better mitigation and protection measures, as
well as improving treatment and care for our impacted service members.
In partnership with Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical
School, USSOCOM concluded The Repeated Exposure to Blast (ReBlast)
Study, the most comprehensive work of this kind to date. If confirmed,
I will remain committed to prioritizing brain health, and I will ensure
USSOCOM continues to align with, lead, and inform the Department of
Defense.
130. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you plan to work
with the Department of Veterans Affairs to make sure that
servicemembers, veterans, and their families are aware of the risks of
blast overpressure and traumatic brain injury?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Historically, military medical research and
experience have benefited the civilian healthcare community, academia,
and industry partners. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring USSOCOM's
understanding of these risks, risk mitigation tools, and treatment
options, are shared with the Department of Veterans Affairs.
131. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support
establishing logs for soldiers on blast overpressure exposure and
traumatic brain injury (TBI)?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do. USSOCOM is currently exploring the
use of sensors and wearable technology to monitor blast exposure in
real-time, enabling cognitive monitoring.
132. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support requiring
neurocognitive assessments of soldiers annually, before they begin
training to establish a baseline, and before they leave the military to
determine when their change in cognitive health over time?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do.
133. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
how will you address the links between blast overpressure exposure and
increased risks of suicide?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The first SOF truth is ``humans are more
important than hardware.'' Protecting the health of the special
operations force is paramount. There is much we still do not know about
the impact of blast overpressure on our brains, but USSOCOM, alongside
the DOD, is committed to finding solutions and protecting our people
now. If confirmed, I commit to continue studying the impacts so we can
diagnose, treat, and institute better preventative measures to protect
our service members.
134. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what steps would you
take to improve suicide prevention efforts, including investing in peer
support programs, crisis intervention, and community-based mental
health initiatives?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Losing even one service member to suicide is
one too many and compels us to reflect on what signs we may have
missed. I commit to ensuring service members have the support, tools,
and resources necessary for mental fitness and health while being
afforded appropriate confidentiality. We must eliminate the stigma of
seeking help. As we go to the physical gym to strengthen our bodies, we
must leverage the full range mental health tools available to us to
strengthen our minds. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
broad range of programs that emphasize and aid mental wellness.
135. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed, what steps would
you take to ensure that servicemembers and their families are aware of
the potential increased risks of suicide after exposure to blast
overpressure?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Protecting the health and well-being of our
SOF and their families is paramount to ensuring SOF's readiness, now
and in the future. We must educate our service members and their
families about the risks associated with any traumatic brain injury and
provide resources to help them address the impacts. If confirmed, I
commit to ensuring these critical education initiatives and response
resources are available.
136. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
what resources and support will you provide for families of special
operators so that they can understand the risks of blast overpressure
and recognize if their loved one may be experiencing symptoms as a
result of this exposure?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Family and community support are essential
for recovery. The well-being of our service members is closely linked
to their support networks, which is why SOCOM provides resources and
programs to assist families, including counseling, education and
support groups. Additionally, the Preservation of the Force and Family
(POTFF), provides a robust mental health programs that include regular
screenings, access to mental health professionals, and peer support
networks. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring these critical resources
remain available to our force and families and will constantly seek to
improve them.
137. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, it appears that U.S.
Army Green Beret Master Sgt. Matthew Livelsberger, who died by suicide
in a cybertruck explosion on January 1, 2025, may have had a history of
traumatic brain injury. What do you understand to be the consequences
and long-term effects of blast overpressure exposure and brain injury
on servicemembers?
Vice Admiral Bradley. While I'm not intimately familiar with MSG
Matthew Livelsberger's medical history, any potential connection to
traumatic brain injury continues to highlight the urgent need to
understand the consequences and long-term effects of blast overpressure
exposure and other brain injuries on service members to find solutions
now. Prevention is critical, which is why SOF are continually looking
for ways to improve protective equipment and exploring wearable
technology to monitor blast exposure in real time.
138. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support
addressing the risks of blast overpressure to service members through
the swift implementation of sections 721 through section 725 of the
Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I support all efforts to address the risks of
blast overpressure to service members and am grateful to Congress for
their emphasis on this critical issue. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Department as they implement the comprehensive brain
health initiatives outlined in the FY25 NDAA.
139. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, which occupational
specialties do you understand to be at the highest risk for blast
overpressure exposure?
Vice Admiral Bradley. SOF operate as a team of teams, so while our
breachers and explosive ordinance disposal teams are clearly the
highest risk, I believe all team members in proximity to a blast are at
risk. It is critical that we do not exclude portions of our SOF
formation from cognitive assessment, monitoring, and protection measure
for traumatic brain injuries.
140. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support making
blast overpressure training mandatory for all troops?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
141. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have special
operators benefited from working with community partners to treat
servicemembers who have been exposed to blast overpressure or suffered
brain injuries?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Our SOF service members benefit greatly from
programs like the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICOE) and
Home Base--which provide our service members with vital brain health
care. In partnership with Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard
Medical School, USSOCOM also concluded The Repeated Exposure to Blast
(ReBlast) Study, the most comprehensive work of this kind to date. If
confirmed, I will remain committed to prioritizing service members'
brain health and I will ensure USSOCOM continues to align with
community partners, the military health system, and the Department of
Defense.
142. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed, do
you commit to working with community partners to treat servicemembers
who have been exposed to blast overpressure or suffered brain injuries?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
143. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, since 2019 Home Base has
partnered with SOCOM to provide comprehensive TBI and poly trauma
evaluations to over 750 operators through its Comprehensive Brain
Health and Trauma Program--or ``ComBHaT.'' Ninety-three percent of
SOCOM servicemembers who have attended ComBHaT have returned to duty
after attending. General Bryan Fenton, current Commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command, has stated that ``This high return-to-duty
rate demonstrates the effectiveness of ComBHaT, and the value of
partnership with community organizations like Home Base in supporting
the health and readiness of our operators.'' Do you support continuing
this partnership with the ComBHaT program and Home Base if you are
confirmed?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I am committed to ensuring service members
have access to as many resources as possible when it comes to brain
health. While I am not intimately familiar with the specifics of
ComBHaT program, if confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
the benefits it provides our special operators.
144. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have special
operators benefited from the ComBHaT Program at Home Base?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I am not intimately familiar with the
specifics of ComBHaT program, but if confirmed, I look forward to
learning about all the program has done in support of our SOF warriors.
145. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, why is it important to
mitigate the risks of blast overpressure for special operators?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Our people are SOF's competitive and
comparative advantage--this is, first and foremost, because of their
incredible cognitive capabilities. We must continue to ensure SOF's
physical, psychological and cognitive readiness. Understanding the
impacts of all traumatic brain injuries and developing / advancing
mitigation and protection measures are critical to ensuring SOF remain
ready for current and future challenges.
146. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, why is it important to
ensure special operators have access to quality care after exposure to
blast overpressure?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Understanding the impacts of all traumatic
brain injuries, including blast overpressure, and advancing care and
treatment for those injuries is critical to ensuring SOF remain ready
for current and future challenges.
147. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, over the past several
years, this Committee has supported efforts to better understand the
links between blast exposure, brain injuries, and declining health. The
Home Base program partners with SOCOM to provide TBI and poly trauma
evaluations to operators. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the
focus on TBI remains at the forefront of SOCOM's efforts to ensure
readiness and longevity of the force?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Without our people and their families, we
cannot accomplish our missions. If confirmed, I will remain committed
to continue SOCOM's efforts to trailblaze for DOD and partner with
other agencies to ensure the readiness and longevity of the force when
it comes to brain health.
148. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, SOCOM currently partners
with the Home Base Program to provide operators with TBI and poly
trauma evaluations and care plans to help mitigate TBI related issues.
This program is a prime example of how SOCOM can leverage best-in-class
researchers and innovators to ensure longevity of the force and
readiness. If you are confirmed, will you continue to work with Home
Base and ensure SOCOM stays at the forefront of innovation?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.
149. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, research suggests
exposure to repeated blasts can cause microscopic brain injuries that
lead to profound challenges like mood swings, insomnia, substance
abuse, panic attacks and suicide. At Home Base, researchers are working
on HealthSpan--with early findings showing that repeated blast injury
and TBI, along with other exposures from a SOF career, correlate to
advanced aging and fewer years healthy and free of disease. Will you
commit to support efforts to better understand and mitigate TBI-related
chronic conditions, and ensure SOF personnel remain the Command's
priority?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.
150. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would Special
Operators benefit from working with outside experts on a longitudinal
study to better understand the long-term effects from blast
overpressure?
Vice Admiral Bradley. There is much to learn about the cognitive
impacts on the brain from blast overpressure exposure. Cognitive
monitoring and longitudinal studies are critical to assess and track
exposures and impacts over time. I am committed to advancing the
research in this area, including working with outside experts who are
deeply invested in the study of brain health.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
impact of cuts to foreign aid
151. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have you seen
U.S. diplomatic and economic tools--such as development aid and State
Department engagement--play a decisive role in either deterring
conflict or shaping escalation outcomes?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my 34 years of service, I've had the
opportunity to work closely with U.S. diplomatic and development
professionals on many continents. I have seen firsthand the benefits
they bring in helping to deter conflict--through the application of
American statecraft and economic development power. These efforts
helped increase stability in critical regions, directly supporting U.S.
National Security. If confirmed, I pledge to continue to work closely
with our interagency partners to ensure we are maximizing the use of
the resources available to meet U.S. policy objectives.
152. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you perceive
U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) role in forging and
maintaining partnerships, given the aforementioned gaps in our
interagency toolkit resulting from cuts to aid and diplomatic presence?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Drawing upon decades of combat-experience and
coalition credibility, an important part of SOF's value proposition is
our ability to build and maintain strong relationships with partners
and allies. If confirmed, I pledge to continue to work closely with
interagency and international partners, and NGO's, as appropriate, to
ensure we are maximizing the use of all the resources available to meet
U.S. policy objectives.
interagency cooperation
153. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how has your
experience as a commander been made easier when you have support from
the interagency--such as expert negotiators and other tools like
economic aid and civic-institution-building--to maintain positive
bilateral relations that facilitate your military missions?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Special operations are most often a team
sport. Our interagency partners are critical members of that team, and
I have benefited greatly from their expertise and teamwork over the
course of my career. The efforts of our diplomats, law enforcement
officials, economic and development advisors, treasury officials,
intelligence community partners, and more, are critical--whether
fighting insurgents, conducting CT operations, competing against and
deterring China and Russia, combating non-State actors, assisting
allies and partners, or preparing for large scale combat. Building the
strong, enduring relationships with partners and allies which are
essential to most of our military missions--is best achieved by
leveraging all elements of our national power.
future war
154. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, how
will you work with U.S. Transportation Command and other stakeholders
to navigate complex and contested logistical challenges in your
commands?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
USTRANSCOM and the rest of the DOD logistics enterprise to tackle these
critical challenges. From my perspective, the US advantage is in our
ability to surge combat power rapidly to deliver effects on the enemy--
no one does that better than USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM. SOF has the
advantage of tactical networks that strategic commands such as
USTRANSCOM do not. Through a close partnership, USSOCOM could leverage
these networks to provide vital information to USTRANSCOM by setting
the stage in a contested environment where the DOD may have to ``fight
to the fight''.
155. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, what
concrete ideas would you bring into your roles to drive innovation in
contested logistics and implement solutions that enable more agile
force posture and sustainment?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
USSOCOM team, and the DOD logistics enterprise, to identify ways to
drive innovation for contested logistics, and develop and implement
sustainment solutions to ensure SOF can remain agile. Two such examples
are:
1. Establishing energy independence through self-sufficient power
grids. Such grids enable warfighters to establish C2 and basing nodes
anywhere in the word free from dependency on traditional logistics
supply lines and contracted solutions.
2. Autonomous resupply over land, sea, and air able to achieve
large standoff to avoid enemy A2AD threats, while delivering
substantial payload to objectives. These systems enable flexible,
responsive resupply of warfighters across the conflict continuum.
Autonomous systems also present the opportunity to create an unmanned
system of systems allowing one pilot to orchestrate a multitude of
systems across the battlespace providing commanders more capability
with the same manning.
156. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, how
would you work with our international partners to combat complex and
contested logistical challenges and test the concepts that we will need
for future warfare?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
SOF's robust network of international partners and allies, 30 of which
are represented at the USSOCOM headquarters on these challenges. This
knowledge becomes critical in bridging gaps U.S. Forces would face in
contested environments where the tyranny of distance is multiplied. SOF
are the leaders in fostering these relationships. Additionally, our
international relationships provide another perspective on the same
contested environment challenges that we grapple with globally. By
gathering a multi-national consortium, we can address these problems
collectively and multiply the possible solutions.
u.s. special operations command posture
157. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, what
would your top priorities be for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the
Indo-Pacific theater?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed I will consult with Commander,
USINDOPACOM, and Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)
to assess what SOF's priorities should be in the Indo-Pacific.
158. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you assess the
role of SOF in countering PRC gray zone activities in areas like the
South China Sea or the first island chains?
Vice Admiral Bradley. Drawing upon decades of combat-experience and
credibility, SOF provide tailorable, asymmetric options while creating
dilemmas for the Communist Chinese. With a range of options to deter
aggression and counter coercion, SOF leverage unique authorities to
collaborate and operate with allies and partners--our greatest
strategic advantage for tackling shared challenges. This helps assure
and bolster our global relationships and helps counter the predatory
approach of the Chinese against our alliances and partnerships.
Deterrence is a function of influence, and SOF contribute to deterring
China with the influence generated by our enduring engagements with
partner and allied forces. These relationships also provide SOF
incredible placement and access, enhancing our understanding of Chinese
activities in the Indo-Pacific, but also places like Africa and South
America. Additionally, SOF have a unique role in building resistance
and resilience. If deterrence fails, SOF's speed and agility to project
force offer warfighting advantages in crisis and conflict--to deliver
precision effects with the element of surprise, and to establish small
but meaningful levers of dominance.
159. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, which Indo-Pacific
nations do you view as the most promising for new SOF partnerships?
Vice Admiral Bradley. In my current position, I do not have in-
depth understanding of all the nations in this critical region, to be
able to identify those most promising for new partnerships. If
confirmed, I would consult with Commander, USINDOPACOM, and Commander,
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) to identify these
opportunities.
160. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, for the nations with
whom we already maintain partnerships, what specific steps would you
take to expand those relationships, if confirmed?
Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed I will consult with Commander,
USINDOPACOM, and Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)
to identify the appropriate steps to expand our current relationships
in the Indo-Pacific.
161. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you see SOCOM
aligning with the Trump administration's prioritization shift to the
Indo-Pacific, as reportedly outlined in the interim National Defense
Strategy?
Vice Admiral Bradley. From my perspective in my current position as
a USSOCOM Subunified Commander, USSOCOM has been steadily shifting
focus to the Indo-Pacific over the last several years. SOF deployed
continuously to the Indo-Pacific region throughout the last 20+ years
of the CT-focused fight, maintaining our placement and access in the
region, and paving the way for greater SOF presence and partnerships
over the last few years.
162. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how can SOCOM
continue to maintain credible forward presence in all geographic
commands without overextending?
Vice Admiral Bradley. As General Fenton has spoken about, the
global demand for SOF increased by 35 percent in just the last 2 years.
If confirmed, I will ruthlessly prioritize the allocation of SOF,
aligned with DOD's priorities defined in the INDSG and future guidance
documents, as appropriate.
163. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, given SOCOM's track
record of pioneering some of our military's most adaptive solutions in
austere environments, how do you plan to expand or accelerate that role
to benefit the joint force?
Vice Admiral Bradley. The ability to rapidly adapt and innovate to
address changes to the operating environment is a hallmark of our SOF
operators. They have been, and will continue to be, pathfinders for the
Department in identifying, leveraging, and integrating new technologies
to support operations. If confirmed, I will continue the great work
USSOCOM is already doing to rapidly develop and field new capabilities
to SOF, and transition them, as appropriate to the broader Joint Force.
ethics
164. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, would you follow an
illegal, unlawful or immoral order?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I would not.
165. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, do you
commit that your deliberations and decisions will only be communicated
through official, secure channels and any decisions properly documented
for both oversight and institutional memory?
Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
______
[The nomination reference of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley,
USN follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley,
USN, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Vice Admiral
Frank M. Bradley, USN in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on July 29, 2025,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2025.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Dagvin
R.M. Anderson, USAF by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing
with answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)?
Answer. Under section 164 of title 10, United States Code,
Combatant Commanders are responsible to the President and the Secretary
of Defense for the performance of assigned missions within their
respective areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I would command U.S.
Armed Forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by
the President and ensure USAFRICOM has ready and postured forces to
execute directed national defense missions, respond to military
contingencies, and deter conflict. I would provide authoritative
directions to subordinate commands and forces to carry out the missions
assigned to USAFRICOM, identify and request any additional required
support, engage the interagency, allies, and partners.
I would execute these duties informed by the National Security
Strategy (NSS), the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance
(INDSG), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), National Military Strategy
(NMS), and other plans.
Question. What qualifications, qualities, and characteristics would
you bring to the position of Commander, AFRICOM, if confirmed?
Answer. Throughout my assignments across the last 33 years of
service to this Nation, I have been consistently humbled by, and
inspired to lead and serve alongside, the talented men and women of our
Armed Forces and our civilian teammates, who make it possible for us to
achieve our mission.
Since commissioning in 1992, I have been fortunate to command at
every level below Combatant Command which gives me a wide breadth of
experience across conventional and Special Operations missions. From
commanding the Joint Task Force during Operation Octave Quartz, leading
Air Force Special Operations units from Squadron to Wing, serving as
the Deputy Director of Operations at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM), or as the Joint Staff Director of Force Development, my
path has been non-traditional and gives me a unique perspective.
Specific to Africa, my previous experience as the Commander of Special
Operations Command--Africa (SOCAF), provides me with insight into the
threats to our Homeland, our interests, and our forces, but also the
opportunities across the African continent to advance U.S. interests.
Additionally, my time as the Deputy for Operations in USINDOPACOM
and my current role as the Director for Joint Force Development informs
my understanding of the changing character of war and how the future
Joint Force needs to change to counter the growing threat from China.
I possess the joint qualifications required by sections 661 and
664(d) of title 10, United States Code. Specifically, I have completed
seven joint tours at various echelons, most notably as Director for
Joint Force Development, the Pentagon; Vice Director, Joint Staff
Operations, the Pentagon; Commander, SOCAF; and Deputy Director for
Operations, USINDOPACOM.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. Key actions I would need to take include assessing the
theater operating environment, securing partner and allied engagement
to solve shared problems, and clearly communicating the risks and
requirements relevant to our national security and defense strategies.
If confirmed, I will learn from the USAFRICOM staff about the current
intelligence assessments, ongoing efforts and campaigns, and the
associated approaches of components, the interagency, and allies and
partners.
Africa is truly the world's crossroads--throughout its history, its
location between the Atlantic and Pacific, and now in terms of its
rising populations and economies. It is also of vital and growing
importance to the world--and to U.S. interests. The continent is one of
the world's most dynamic. As it rapidly changes, I will need to
constantly reevaluate the significant opportunities but also the
substantial risks Africa offers. Ungoverned African spaces host global
terrorist organizations with growing reach and ill intent. China and
Russia seek their own advantages at the expense of African nations and
the United States.
If confirmed, I will buildupon the successes of the Commanders and
teams who came before while taking steps to ensure USAFRICOM's plans
are adjusted, as necessary, to any strategic guidance that encompasses
coordinated equities across the U.S. Government.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
civilian control of the military?
Answer. These provisions enhance civilian control of the military.
In essence, ensuring that all lawful orders are passed from the
President to Combatant Commanders through the Secretary of Defense and/
or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures that policy
direction flows through individuals that have been nominated by the
Administration and confirmed by the Senators on the Armed Services
Committee elected to represent their constituents.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. Military Forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
established under title 10, United States Code?
Answer. I understand that national command authority over U.S.
Forces is always retained by the President. This includes authority and
responsibility for, as consistent with law, the organization,
direction, coordination, control, and employment of U.S. Forces. To the
extent practicable, operational command and control should remain under
the chain of command established through title 10 of the United States
Code. That said, I also understand that there are historical cases in
which U.S. Forces have operated in multinational forces, and there may
be such cases in the future. Generally, national command was often
retained through political negotiations or U.S.-led NATO roles. These
historical cases have formed the bedrock of our doctrine on
Multinational Operations. In my role as the Joint Staff J-7, I led and
supervised the review and development of this doctrine and am
comfortable in its application.
Nations operating in an alliance or coalition should always seek to
achieve and maintain unity of effort with all missions, tasks,
responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all
involved--as that is a pre-requisite to achieving mission success in an
allied, coalition, or partnered operation.
relationships
Question. The law and traditional practice establish important
relationships between the Commander, AFRICOM, and other senior
officials of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, AFRICOM, to each of
the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense
Answer. My understanding is that the relationship with the
Secretary of Defense is informed by title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 113,
162(b), and 164(b). Unless otherwise directed by the President, the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of USAFRICOM. If
confirmed, I would be directly responsible to the Secretary for the
preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the
command. I would be responsible for interpreting and implementing
defense strategic guidance within the bounds of USAFRICOM's area of
responsibility (AOR), with careful consideration of application of the
Nation's resources.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. My understanding is that the relationship with the Under
Secretaries of Defense is informed by title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 133-137.
These appointees are principal staff assistants and advisors to the
Secretary on all matters that pertain to their specific portfolios.
They serve as valuable counsel to the Secretary, and to the Combatant
Commanders, and are an integral part of the overall decisionmaking
process within the Department.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs.
Answer. My understanding is that the relationship with the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense, including for International Security
Affairs, is based on their roles and responsibilities as specified by
title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 138. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ASD (ISA)) is the principal advisor to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of
Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of
Departmental interest that relate to the nations and international
organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, their governments
and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation
programs and foreign military sales programs within these regions. If
confirmed, I would ensure that the staff of USAFRICOM continues to
maintain positive and proactive relationships with the ASD (ISA), given
the need to establish more effective ways to collaborate with our
allies and partners for burden sharing in Africa.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. As the former Commander of Special Operations Command--
Africa, I'm familiar with the work of the ASD for Special Operations
(SO) and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Per title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 138(b)(2), the ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to
the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity
conflict matters and (after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary) is the
principal special operations and low intensity conflict official within
the senior management of the Department. The ASD (SO/LIC) oversees and
advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the
Department to ensure these capabilities are properly employed in
accordance with Administration priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure
we maintain coordination with this office on policy issues related to
special operations capabilities and resourcing, given the propensity
for special operations forces to operate on the African continent.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. The Chairman's roles are delineated by title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 151-3 and Sec. 163. The Chairman is the principal military adviser
to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland
Security Council (HSC), and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out
his functions, duties, and responsibilities the Chairman shall consult
with and seek the advice of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified
Combatant Commands and the Service Chiefs, as necessary. The Chairman
transmits communications between the National Command Authority and the
Commander of USAFRICOM and oversees the activities of the same, as
directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is a key conduit
between Combatant Commanders as well as the Service Chiefs.
The Vice Chairman's roles are specified by title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 151 and Sec. 154. As a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Vice Chairman is a military adviser to the President, NSC,
HSC, and Secretary of Defense who may provide advice after first
informing the Secretary and the Chairman. When there is a vacancy in
the office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the
Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of
the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or
disability ceases. The Vice Chairman serves on several councils and
boards whose decisions affect USAFRICOM, including the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, the
Defense Advisory Working Group, and the Senior Readiness Oversight
Council. Regular communication between Combatant Commanders and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is key to ensure these
boards and councils make informed choices on matters affecting the
command. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman informed on significant
issues regarding the command's area of operations, provide advice
regarding the USAFRICOM mission and theater as appropriate, and
communicate directly with the Chairman and Vice Chairman on a regular
basis.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service
Chiefs.
Answer. The roles of the Service Secretaries are clearly delineated
in title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 7013, 8013, and 9013. Generally, they are
responsible for, and have the authority necessary to, the conduct of
all affairs for their respective Departments. These affairs include the
functions of organizing, supplying, equipping, training, administering,
and maintaining their forces. They exercise administrative control
through the Service Component Commands assigned to USAFRICOM.
Duties of the Service Chiefs are covered in title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 7033 (Chief of Staff of the Army), Sec. 8033 (Chief of Naval
Operations), Sec. 8043 (Commandant of the Marine Corps), Sec. 9033
(Chief of Staff of the Air Force), Sec. 9082 (Chief of Space
Operations), and Sec. 10502 (Chief of the National Guard Bureau).
Additionally, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their roles and
responsibilities are further defined in title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 151.
The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the readiness of their
Service branch. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Service
Chiefs can also serve as advisers to the President, NSC, HSC and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I would rely on the Service Chiefs
to provide properly trained and equipped forces to accomplish the
mission.
Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
Answer. The responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) are defined in title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 167. The Commander, USSOCOM is responsible for the administration
and support of special operations forces assigned or attached to
USAFRICOM. Unless directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
however, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted
under the command of the Combatant Commander in whose geographic area
the activity or mission is to be conducted. If confirmed, I would
maintain an exceptionally close relationship with the Commander,
USSOCOM, on issues of mutual interest. SOCAF serves as a Theater
Special Operations Command and is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM
under the operational control of USAFRICOM. As a former SOCAF
commander, I look forward to maintaining the close relationship between
USAFRICOM and USSOCOM.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Duties of the other combatant commanders are defined in
title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 164, the Unified Command Plan, and other
Departmental guidance and directives. While each Combatant Commander
may be assigned a specific geographic area or functional
responsibility, it is imperative that they all work together. Today's
strategic operating environment is characterized by global threats that
cannot be addressed solely in one theater. Additionally, each combatant
commander is vying for the same resources from the Military
Departments. Collaboration and consultation between commanders are
critical to assisting the Chairman in ensuring all operations are
integrated globally to execute the NMS.
USAFRICOM has close relationships with several other Combatant
Commanders, namely the Commanders of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM),
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and USSOCOM. Shared boundaries
between USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM require close coordination as
military operations in one AOR have systemic impacts on the other
areas. The Commander, USAFRICOM has an especially close relationship
with the Commander of USEUCOM as they share four component commands
(USAREUR/AF, NAVEUR/AF, MARFOREUR/AF, SPACEEUR/AF), as well as forces
and assets. Additionally, as the Combatant Commander for special
operations forces operating in Africa under the control of USAFRICOM,
close collaboration is necessary with USSOCOM. If confirmed, I pledge
to continue to maintain the great relationships that have been formed
before me.
Question. The U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the AFRICOM area of
responsibility (AOR).
Answer. My understanding of the roles and responsibilities of U.S.
Chiefs of Mission is informed by title 22, U.S. Code Sec. 3927. Upon
presenting their credentials to the host government, Chiefs of Mission
are recognized as the principal diplomatic representative of the U.S.
Government. Serving as the official representative of the U.S.
President, they have the task of carrying out overarching U.S. foreign
policy goals and strategic objectives in their country of assignment.
The Chiefs of Mission have full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch
employees in a given country, except those employees under the command
of a U.S. area military commander. If confirmed, recognizing their
scope of authority, I will ensure USAFRICOM's partner engagement
complements the Ambassadors' priorities as directed by the President
and Secretary of State.
Question. The U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches (SDO/
DATT) in the AFRICOM AOR.
Answer. The roles and responsibilities of the SDO/DATT are defined
in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5205.75, ``DoD Operations at
U.S. Embassies.'' Unified DOD representation in U.S. embassies is
critical to the accomplishment of national security objectives. The
SDO/DATT is the Chief of Mission's principal advisor on defense issues
and the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned
to a U.S. diplomatic mission. All DOD elements under Chief of Mission
authority are under the coordination authority of the SDO/DATT, except
for the Marine Security Guard Detachment and naval support units. While
they do not work directly for USAFRICOM, they represent the Command's
perspective on a Country Team. There is a supervisory relationship
between the Commander, USAFRICOM and the SDO/DATT. This relationship
ensures they maintain close coordination on all matters as the
Command's senior representative. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
staff at USAFRICOM continues to maintain positive relationships with
the SDOs/DATTs within the AOR.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, the most significant challenges I will face
as USAFRICOM Commander include maintaining awareness and understanding
of the growing threat, monitoring and countering terrorists that
threaten the Homeland, countering expanding Chinese malign activity.
aggression. ISIS, centered in Somalia, has demonstrated the capability
and intent for external operations to threaten the Homeland, while al-
Shabaab threatens our forces in East Africa. West Africa, meanwhile, is
becoming a growing hotbed of terrorism as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-
Muslmin (JNIM) and ISIS-WA expand their control over large swaths of
the Sahel and destabilize the region.
Concurrently, China's military and economic influence over the
continent continues to grow as Beijing continues to exploit Africa as a
source of power. China is expanding beyond traditional economic
activity with increasing military engagement and information
activities. If confirmed, I will direct USAFRICOM resources to defend
the Homeland, counter China, and prepare for crises--to include
enabling joint force freedom of maneuver during a conflict. I will also
direct aggressive engagement with partners as the ability to rapidly
respond to crisis requires effective relationships to gain and maintain
the required access.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAFRICOM's priorities
remain centered on achieving the goals of the INDSG, and the
forthcoming NDS and the NMS. Secretary Hegseth has given USAFRICOM two
overarching priorities: prevent terrorist groups in Africa from
exporting threats to the United States and to deter Chinese military
advances across the continent. I will continue to place pressure on
terrorists with the intent and capability to threaten the Homeland and
work to improve indications and warnings of emerging threats.
Additionally, I will task assigned forces to take actions that
undermine any Chinese malign intent throughout the continent. Key to
this effort will be to work with willing and capable allies and
partners, where feasible and mutually beneficial. Any security
cooperation should be tailored and time-bound based on demonstrated
partner will and capacity with the goal to build partner independence
to operate against mutual security threats.
Africa is a theater where threats, opportunities, adversaries,
partners, and allies converge. The challenges in Africa go beyond just
terrorism and require a nuanced approach that spans multiple agencies.
While working on these priorities, I will also seek ways to balance
investment between United States Forces, African and other partners,
and allies on shared objectives throughout the theater. I know that
USAFRICOM and its forces are not the right tool to solve all these
problems alone. I will prioritize working with the whole-of-government,
international institutions, and our global network of partners and
allies to advance U.S. interests.
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. Beyond the identified major challenges, I would also seek
to create opportunities for U.S. advantage. While Africa has many
challenges including terrorism, political instability, and malign
foreign actors, it also shows great promise. This promise will create
extraordinary opportunities for our Nation but realizing it will take
time and investment to find. As China and Russia both focus their
strategies on Africa, I want to ensure the U.S. realizes these
opportunities first.
Additionally, many African nations are susceptible to instability
to threats and other unforeseen challenges to governance--sometimes
with little to no notice. The responsibility to safeguard American
lives, property, and interests at U.S. Military installations and
diplomatic facilities across the continent factor into my crisis
response priority. Force protection remains a key and critical concern
of mine, and I understand my responsibility to protect the
servicemembers assigned to African-based operating locations. I
understand my role in identifying, communicating, and integrating
capabilities across all domains to protect the force from potential
threats. I will also coordinate with fellow Combatant Commanders to
close seams that adversaries would exploit. I acknowledge my mandate to
support the Department of State in safeguarding our embassies and the
people assigned to them--especially the 14 high threat embassies in
theater.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your
Command's efforts on each of these priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize my efforts to understand
the situation on the continent as quickly as possible, specifically
related to our counterterrorism efforts against ISIS and al-Shabaab. I
will also work to better distinguish CCP military objectives in Africa,
where I will seek ways to prevent further military encroachment that
disrupts U.S. access and relationships. This will involve visiting the
AOR and meeting with key U.S. Ambassadors, my counterparts from our
allies and partners, and senior military and diplomatic officials from
our multilateral security institutions who share our security
objectives. I would also seek guidance from USD(P) and partner with
USINDOPACOM to see where we can deepen mutual efforts to counter
Chinese malign objectives in Africa.
I will obtain assessments from subordinate Service Component
Commanders and discuss regional issues with African Ministers of
Defense and Chiefs of Defense. These efforts will inform USAFRICOM's
priorities as we receive a new NDS and update our own guiding
documents. I will carefully review command priorities to maximize
scarce resources for greatest effect.
national defense strategy
Question. What is your understanding of the 2025 Interim National
Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG) and its implications for the AFRICOM
AOR?
Answer. My understanding of United States strategic objectives in
Africa is informed by the INDSG through the Secretary of Defense. The
United States strategic objectives in Africa are to defend America
forward by preventing terrorists from coordinating attacks on the
Homeland from the continent and contribute to deterrence against CCP
aggression. The implications for the USAFRICOM AOR are a ruthless
prioritization of terror organizations that are looking to attack the
Homeland. Additionally, it calls for a more targeted focus on CCP
military activity and the impact it has on our objectives. Finally, the
INDSG calls for a deliberate effort to shift activities over time to
our allies and partners.
Question. What is your understanding of United States strategic
objectives in Africa and what role do you believe AFRICOM should play
in supporting these objectives?
Answer. My understanding of United States strategic objectives in
Africa is informed by the INDSG through the Secretary of Defense. The
U.S. strategic objectives in Africa are to defend America forward by
preventing terrorists from coordinating attacks on the Homeland from
the continent and contribute to deterrence against CCP aggression.
USAFRICOM accomplishes these objectives by building partner operational
independence through tailored and high-impact security cooperation with
African partners, exposing CCP and Russian malign influence that is
counter to our interests, and retaining access for contingency
operations.
Question. In your view, what does ``great power competition'' look
like in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. USAFRICOM's priorities are to defend the U.S. Homeland from
terrorist threats and to deter CCP global military ambitions on the
African continent in alignment with the 2025 INDSG. As the Department
of Defense balances resources to the Pacific, USAFRICOM's greatest
challenge will be to undermine China's expanding military goals across
Africa while preventing strategic surprise from an attack on the United
States Homeland by external threats. Additionally, USAFRICOM would need
to consider the effect of Russia's destabilizing activity on the
continent and how it impacts United States interests and military
requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with the interagency to
undermine China's military activities in key areas and apply
USAFRICOM's modest resources for a high return on investment.
Question. Are United States policies and programs, as applicable to
Africa, appropriate to ensure the United States can succeed in great
power competition in the AFRICOM AOR? Are there additional measures we
should be considering? What do you perceive as the areas of highest
risk?
Answer. As China is the Department of Defense pacing threat,
USAFRICOM would need to balance countering China with preventing
attacks on the United States Homeland by Africa-based terrorists'
organizations. Terrorist attacks would create strategic surprise and
serve as a strategic distraction from countering China's global malign
ambitions. Specific to Africa, USAFRICOM would look to counter any
additional CCP military basing in Africa--especially on the West coast.
To accomplish both, USAFRICOM would need to detect the indications and
warnings provided by sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) and partner and allied information, access, and
placement.
Question. Do you believe the Command's resources and authorities
are aligned in a manner consistent with U.S. strategic objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review the Command's current
assigned tasks and missions, resources, and authorities considering
their alignment to Defense guidance and U.S. strategic objectives. From
this review, I will provide an assessment on any additional
requirements or residual risk to the Secretary and Chairman.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance or expedite
the implementation of the U.S. strategic objectives in AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will update the theater strategy, campaign
plan, and campaign order as appropriate to align with the forthcoming
NDS and support of overarching U.S. foreign policy goals. In alignment
with the current guidance in the INDSG, I will engage with African,
European, and interagency partners to maximize our combined efforts and
achieve United States advantage.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to balance the
requirements for increased emphasis on great power competition with
China and Russia with countering violent extremism in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure USAFRICOM has a balanced
approach between countering violent extremist organizations with the
intent to attack the Homeland and competing with China and Russia.
Successfully executing both efforts requires increased partners and
allies' capability and engagement to actively take the lead on regional
terror threats. This shift will allow limited U.S. resources to be
focused on threats to the U.S. Homeland and countering China.
china
Question. What is your assessment of China's strategic objectives
in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. China views Africa as critical to its future and central to
its strategy. China seeks to build diplomatic influence and supremacy
in the information, military, and economic spheres to achieve regional
hegemony. The CCP seeks to secure access to markets and resources in
Africa to decrease its reliance on supply chains and financial systems
led by the United States and Western allies and promote China as leader
of the so-called ``Global South.'' Frequent senior leader engagement
with African leaders, political parties, and militaries serves
Beijing's strategic objective to build international support for its
global leadership at the expense of the United States. The CCP has
increased People's Liberation Army (PLA) engagements across the
continent, offering professional military education, military equipment
donations and sales, and training and exercises to African militaries
to deepen strategic access and influence.
Question. In what ways, if any, do their strategic objectives
conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? In what ways, if any, do they
align with those of the U.S.?
Answer. The strategic objectives of the CCP in Africa aim to ensure
continued CCP rule, domestic economic growth, and regional hegemony
despite Beijing's narrative of championing the Global South. Beijing
uses all instruments of national power with little regard to the rule
of law, stable and open international system, democratic governance,
and multilateral institutions. CCP State and non-State entities lack
fair and transparent practices, which has challenged African
governments to achieve favorable terms and has undermined debt
restructuring efforts.
In comparison, the strategic objectives of the United States and
our Western allies include promoting a favorable distribution of power
to ensure equal and fair access to the global commons. We are concerned
that expanding PLA security presence in Africa could restrict freedom
of navigation and global commerce through strategic sea lines of
communication. While the CCP searches for clients and customers, the
United States seeks partners and allies. This reality puts our two
nations' long-term strategic objectives at direct odds.
Question. In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with
African militaries had on those militaries and on United States
security interests?
Answer. The CCP has likely marginally improved some African
militaries through delivering military equipment sales on a quicker and
cheaper basis than the U.S. The opportunity to seemingly more rapidly
modernize their military forces entices African partners to purchase
CCP equipment, but these purchases frequently do not address the
underlying military need, are of low-quality, and lack robust training
and maintenance support. The prevalence of Chinese military equipment
can complicate U.S. security assistance and interoperability. The CCP
contributes up to 2,000 personnel to United Nations peacekeeping
operations, but Beijing's deployments are tailored toward its security
interests, including gaining overseas operational experience for its
military personnel.
Question. Are United States policies and the associated
authorities--as applicable to Africa--sufficient to counter China's
influence, where needed, or are additional measures required? What role
should AFRICOM play in this regard?
Answer. The second most important task the Secretary of Defense has
given USAFRICOM is to deny CCP encroachment on United States interests
in Africa, after countering terrorist threats to the Homeland. If
confirmed, I will thoroughly review USAFRICOM's policies and
authorities to determine if the Command is sufficiently postured to
counter China's malign activities in Africa. I will seek to work with
partners and allies to expose and hold the CCP accountable for its
activities in Africa and determine ways to strengthen African
institutional capacity to withstand those efforts to undermine
international norms.
Question. Do you foresee China's growing energy and resource
demands affecting security developments in Africa?
Answer. Yes. Beijing has agreements with at least 45 African
countries to extract natural resources, including critical minerals. It
continues to acquire new mines and expand production and investment in
strategic minerals to reduce critical dependencies on the West. China's
dominance in this sector, from extraction to processing, is resulting
in strangleholds over global bauxite, cobalt, iron ore, lithium, and
tantalum supply chains.
CCP private security companies are playing an increasingly pivotal
role in securing economic investments in Africa. While Beijing
typically avoids investing in countries deemed unsafe or incapable of
protecting its citizens or interests, Africa is a continent with a
rapidly shifting threat environment. Increased presence of these and
other CCP-affiliated groups or state-owned enterprises could pose a
challenge to U.S. access and influence in the region.
russia
Question. What is your assessment of Russia's strategic objectives
in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. Across all theaters, Russia seeks to systematically counter
Western interests and bolster its influence through military/
intelligence cooperation, arms sales, and energy partnerships. Moscow
sees Africa as a vehicle necessary for its own success centered on
developing the partnerships necessary for its vision of a multipolar
world, while also presenting an opportunity for Russia to extract
natural resources, weaken the West's dominance of global governance,
and recognize economic opportunities for Russian companies,
particularly those closed off to Western markets because of sanctions.
Question. In what ways, if any, do their strategic objectives
conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? In what ways, if any, do they
align with those of the United States?
Answer. Russia intends to undermine Western influence and access
wherever possible. USAFRICOM assists allies in combatting violent
extremists to protect United States and Western interests. In contrast,
Russia's assistance is focused on gaining influence to serve Moscow's
needs and its business interests. Russia's strategic objectives do not
align with those of the United States.
Russia seeks to pressure NATO's southern flank through its
activities in North Africa, but its influence there remains unlikely to
threaten the alliance in the near future, especially while Moscow is
focused on the war in Ukraine.
Russia presents its limited efforts in humanitarian and economic
aid, infrastructure development, and security assistance, including
counterterrorism, as broadly consistent with objectives shared by the
United States and Western partners; however, Moscow views these
activities primarily as tools to compete with Western influence. In
pursuit of these goals, Kremlin-linked groups such as the private
military company Wagner Group have been implicated in practices--
including human rights abuses and illicit mining--that are counter to
United States and Western values.
Question. In your opinion, what effect has Russia's engagement with
African militaries had on those militaries and on United States
security interests?
Answer. Russia provides extensive arms sales and limited training
to African militaries, specifically to former Soviet partners. Moscow
is the largest exporter of weapons systems to Africa, though this
support has faced constraints due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Russia
is historically a leading supplier of military equipment--to include
small arms and heavier weapons such as armor and artillery, as well as
air defense systems, fighter aircraft, and naval vessels--to select
African militaries. These systems increase host nation lethality, but
several of these systems are difficult to sustain and decrease
interoperability with Western military norms and systems. Russia's lack
of robust end-user agreements and support for authoritarian regimes
undermines United States objectives in Africa and fosters human rights
abuses by host nations.
Question. Do you view Russia's activities on the continent of
Africa as a threat or challenge to United States national security
interests? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Russia's current activities challenge United States
national security interests in the USAFRICOM AOR. Russian military and
security advisers currently do not pose a direct military threat to
United States personnel, but Russian deployments and influence
organizations severely limit USAFRICOM's placement and access
throughout the region, inhibiting campaign effectiveness. Russia's
pursuit of a permanent military presence and the deployment of Russian
military and paramilitary personnel across Africa undermines democratic
norms, destabilizes vulnerable security environments, disrupts U.N.
missions, and threatens United States and Western progress.
Additionally, Russia's pervasive propaganda, guised as information
operations, seeks to actively undermine United States influence and
highlight anti-western narratives throughout Africa. These propaganda
efforts are as much an impediment to United States Government access as
its military operations. Ultimately, Russia's operations, activities,
and investments complicate future United States Military and economic
access and heighten the risk to United States national security
interests in Africa.
Question. Are United States policies, associated authorities, and
resources--as applicable to Africa--sufficient to counter Russia's
influence, where needed, or are additional measures required? What role
should AFRICOM play in this regard?
Answer. Based on my prior experience at SOCAF, the current
authorities extended to USAFRICOM appear sufficient, though a
comprehensive review upon confirmation would definitively assess their
adequacy considering updated strategic guidance and priorities.
USAFRICOM's role is to continue interagency collaboration, integrating
with Defense plans, and to work with partners and allies to expose and
hold Russia accountable for its activities in Africa. USAFRICOM's
future role in countering Russian influence and propaganda will require
nuanced adjustments focused on military-to-military relationships with
African partners and information operations.
Question. In your view, is the interagency effectively unified in
implementing a strategy to compete with Russia in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of
interagency integration and the appropriate role for USAFRICOM. An
interagency approach is critical to effectively counter Russian
influence across the continent. Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, which
include disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, political
interference, and security partnerships, demand a coordinated response
that transcends purely military solutions. Our success hinges on
leveraging the diverse expertise of agencies focused on diplomacy,
intelligence, cybersecurity, economic policy, law enforcement,
development assistance, and public diplomacy to ensure a comprehensive
and impactful strategy. USAFRICOM has played a vital supporting role in
this effort, enabling diplomatic and development initiatives that
support U.S. interests.
availability of forces
Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
required to compete for forces in the global force management process.
What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
Campaign Plan and other requirements in the AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the current posture and force
allocation to ensure the command has the necessary forces to accomplish
the tasked mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the challenges and risks to
U.S. security interests, if any, resulting from the lack of assigned
forces to AFRICOM?
Answer. Predictable, postured, and ready forces and resources are
essential to the successful execution of any mission. Based on my
previous experience as the SOCAF commander, rotational forces increase
the complexity and lose some momentum with partners due to turnover.
Effective partnering is based on relationships, which can be difficult
to maintain in a rotational construct. If confirmed, I would assess how
to optimize the force allocated to USAFRICOM against the assigned tasks
and mission to maximize effectiveness.
Question. What is your assessment of the utility of the assignment
of the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade to AFRICOM?
Answer. From my time as the SOCAF commander, the Security Force
Assistance Brigade has conducted training throughout the African
continent, advanced partner capacity, and developed relationships
demonstrating the United States as the partner of choice. These
deployments significantly contributed to USAFRICOM's Theater Campaign
Plan, providing multiple teams capable of conducting military-to-
military engagements.
theater special operations command
Question. Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF) is under the
operational control of AFRICOM and employs United States Special
Operations Forces (SOF) to conduct operations, exercises, and theater
security cooperation activities.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of
SOCAF in supporting AFRICOM's Theater Campaign Plan and associated
requirements?
Answer. Based on my experience as a previous SOCAF commander, SOCAF
plays an important role in executing USAFRICOM's Campaign plan as
operationalized through the USAFRICOM Campaign Order. SOCAF provides
SOF expertise dedicated to the security challenges and operational
environment unique to the USAFRICOM AOR. SOCAF supports USAFRICOM
across the competition continuum, leading the theater counter terrorism
campaign, overseeing the integration of SOF capabilities, and advising
the Combatant Commander, Service component commanders, and others on
the proper employment of SOF.in executing USAFRICOM's Campaign plan as
operationalized through the USAFRICOM Campaign Order. SOCAF provides
SOF expertise dedicated to the security challenges and operational
environment unique to the USAFRICOM AOR. SOCAF supports USAFRICOM
across the competition continuum, leading the theater counter terrorism
campaign, overseeing the integration of SOF capabilities, and advising
the Combatant Commander, Service component commanders, and others on
the proper employment of SOF.
Question. Based on your professional military experience, how would
you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations
component for a geographic combatant command in supporting the
combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?
Answer. A dedicated special operations component allows for
singularity of focus with economy of force, development of long-term
relationships, and theater-specific operational approaches. USAFRICOM
requires dedicated SOF support to effectively counter malign
competitors in addressing the complexities of strategic competition,
disrupt terrorist threats, and maintain relationships with key allies
and partners through its niche skills and capabilities that are not
present in other elements of the joint force. This also facilitates
greater integration of planning efforts amongst all components and the
USAFRICOM staff.
SOF offers low cost for the high return on investment to shape
conditions for to counter terrorist attacks on the Homeland, counter
adversary exploitation of the resources and people of Africa and create
United States advantage. U.S. SOF are the premier training partner for
our African partners and enable them to continue the fight against
extremists. Their quality shows through exercises like FLINTLOCK and
the example they set through Joint Combined Exchange Training events
throughout the continent.
Question. What special operations capabilities are in highest
demand by AFRICOM?
Answer. From my previous experience as the SOCAF commander and in
my current capacity, I believe the Special Operations capabilities that
are in the highest demand in USAFRICOM are the expert training and
advising of counter terrorist forces as well as the ISR capabilities to
assist partner forces in counterterrorism operations. Personnel
recovery, search and rescue, and casualty evacuation assets are also in
extremely high demand.
Question. Which countries in the AFRICOM AOR do you believe have
the greatest need for engagement with SOF?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine all USAFRICOM's
requirements to include those for the unique capabilities of SOF. I
will encourage engagement that is driven by analysis, yet flexible
enough to be adapted to the dynamic environment in the USAFRICOM AOR. I
would consider the feasibility of future partnerships based on the
partner nation's will and capacity to absorb and operationalize U.S.
engagement. enough to be adapted to the dynamic environment in the
USAFRICOM AOR. I would consider the feasibility of future partnerships
based on the partner nation's will and capacity to absorb and
operationalize U.S. engagement.
violent extremist organizations (veos) in africa
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism
strategy as it relates to the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. Countering terrorist threats in Africa with the capability
of affecting the United States Homeland is the number one priority
given to USAFRICOM by the Secretary of Defense. I understand that the
National Strategy for Counterterrorism outlines a comprehensive
approach to combating terrorism by leveraging all elements of national
power and collaborating with international partners. In the USAFRICOM
AOR, and in alignment with the INDSG, assigned and allocated forces
focus their efforts on countering the most pressing threats to the U.S.
Homeland. Separately, remaining limited resources are used to help
African partners to independently address regionally focused terror
threats.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the
threat posed by violent extremist organizations?
Answer. My view on this varies by region, and the situation has
evolved since my time as the Commander of SOCAF. For example, in North
Africa, groups like JNIM are expanding south to pose a significant
threat to the Sahel and increasingly Coastal West Africa. In the East,
counterterrorism operations against ISIS-Somalia have garnered some
success at halting external operations plots targeting the West and
United States Homeland and paused the group's ability to freely move
additional forces to Somalia, many of whom possess technical expertise.
A reduction in pressure against ISIS-Somalia without increasing
counterterrorism burden sharing with allies and partners, will likely
undo hard-won gains made by partner ground operations and U.S. air
strikes.
Also in Somalia, al-Shabaab has retaken nearly all the territory
the group lost in the 2022 Somali National Army (SNA) offensive, while
continuing to collaborate with the Huthis, directly threatening the
security of United States Forces in the region. While United States and
partner CT efforts likely have slowed the pace of the group's offensive
and immediate threat to Mogadishu, the Huthi-al-Shabaab relationship
constitutes a serious threat to United States Force protection in the
USAFRICOM AOR.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
or associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the
underlying causes of extremism be a component of our counterterrorism
strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to assess our
counterterrorism operations, activities, and investments to ensure they
align to the priorities of the INDSG. I welcome the opportunity to work
with the Department to further refine our strategy, in conjunction with
USSOCOM, USCENTCOM, and the interagency, to ensure a global approach to
deterring terrorist threats to the Homeland.
Question. Within the AFRICOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. USAFRCIOM's number one counter terrorism priority is
countering those organizations that pose the highest threat to the
United States Homeland and United States personnel. Terrorists continue
to expand and adapt to locations that allow greater freedom to
maneuver. They are seeking to shift recruiting, financial and weapons
transactions, and planning for external operations to locations in
Western Africa. We must continue to adapt to these threats to minimize
risks to American citizens at home and abroad.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations operating
in Africa, to nations in the AFRICOM AOR, the United States Homeland,
and broader western interests?
Answer. The global center of terrorism has shifted from the
USCENTCOM AOR to the USAFRICOM AOR. While al Qaeda and ISIS have
suffered setbacks outside Africa, their affiliates on the continent
have expanded in tempo and lethality to pose an increased threat to
African partners and other United States and Western interests on the
continent. Africa-based al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates aspire to attack
the United States Homeland.
In East Africa, Al-Shabaab--al Qaeda's largest, wealthiest, and
most lethal global affiliate--is the main organization that threatens
United States and partner interests. Additionally, they have publicly
advocated for attacks against United States targets, including lone-
actor attacks against the United States. ISIS-Somalia is expanding and
continues to aspire to attack the United States Homeland and foreign
deployed U.S. personnel and facilities abroad. In West Africa, JNIM has
emerged as one of al Qaeda's most capable and deadly affiliates and has
increased the frequency and lethality of its attacks in Burkina Faso,
Mali, and Niger. It also has positioned itself to effectively threaten
West African littoral states including Benin and Togo.
Question. Which VEOs do you find most concerning, and why?
Answer. As ISIS and al Qaeda shift from the Middle East to Africa,
both have the intent to attack the United States and our Homeland.
Africa's ungoverned spaces provide them the opportunity to plan where
they are difficult to find. I am concerned about our ability to detect
the indications and warnings of an attack on our Homeland that would
create strategic surprise and distraction from our focus on China. If
confirmed, addressing this concern will be a priority.opportunity to
plan where they are difficult to find. I am concerned about our ability
to detect the indications and warnings of an attack on our Homeland
that would create strategic surprise and distraction from our focus on
China. If confirmed, addressing this concern will be a priority.
somalia
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States National Security interests in Somalia?
Answer. The critical United States interest in Somalia is
preventing terrorists from using Somalia as a safe haven to threaten
the United States Homeland and United States persons and facilities in
East Africa. United States national security interests in Somalia
remain focused on our commitment to our allies and partners in
coordinating and addressing the shared security threat presented by al-
Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy for Somalia?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
assessment of United States strategy in Somalia. I would consider how
USAFRICOM can enable Somalia and other allies and partners to
effectively contribute to countering shared threats.
Question. What role should AFRICOM play in supporting that
strategy?
Answer. Given al-Shabab's continued resilience within Somalia,
USAFRICOM should continue to play two key roles in Somalia. First, it
should continue to plan, enable, coordinate, and facilitate ongoing
kinetic actions to disrupt Somali terror networks. Second it should
identify opportunities to burden share while also supporting our
network of allies and partners on the ground.
Question. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of United States
efforts to counter Al Shabab and ISIS to date?
Answer. Al-Shabaab's manpower has swelled in the past few years,
increasing the resources needed to counter the group's capabilities and
influence. Over the past 6 months, USAFRICOM's air support to Somali
National Army (SNA) operations has mitigated the immediate threat to
Mogadishu, but al-Shabaab still controls substantial territory, has
increased their attacks in Mogadishu, and has been able to increase the
group's overall capability. If confirmed, I will assess our persistent
presence that the President has approved to ensure it provides an
adequate force to work with our interagency partners and international
allies and partners to degrade and disrupt al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
Question. What is your assessment of the prospect for long-term
stability in Somalia?
Answer. I believe that long-term stability in Somalia will require
the establishment of inclusive, representative, and accountable
governance at all levels. Having previously grappled with this
challenging problem as the Commander of SOCAF, I know what a challenge
long-term stability in Somalia is. Creating stability there is beyond
the scope of the military alone to solve.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of United
States efforts to build the capacity of the Somali National Army to
date and what should the objectives of such efforts be in the near-,
mid-, and long-term?
Answer. As the SOCAF commander, we saw moderate success with the
Danab as a component of the SNA. I would need to reassess our progress
to date and determine what appropriate timeline objectives should be. I
would also look to engage other regional allies and partners to
determine their level of interest and investment to determine what
limited role the U.S. would play in concert with other contributors.
lake chad basin and the sahel
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States national security interests in the Lake Chad Basin? The Sahel?
Answer. JNIM is now one of the most active and lethal terrorist
groups in the world and poses a direct threat to the governments in the
Lake Chad Basin, Sahel, and coastal West Africa regions. The ungoverned
spaces in Northern Mali and the Sahel pose a challenge to detect
indications and warnings for an attack on the United States Homeland.
Additionally, China and Russia seek to exploit instability in the
region to achieve their own strategic ends.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy to address threats in the Lake Chad Basin and across
the Sahel?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to do a thorough assessment
of United States strategy for the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. If
confirmed, I will advocate for where possible United States and African
partner engagement to advance an African-led regional counter-terrorism
strategy.
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
supporting that strategy?
Answer. I believe that USAFRICOM supports partner efforts to
counter threats emanating from Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa and does
so through bilateral and multilateral United States security force
assistance to our partners in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure
USAFRICOM coordinates closely with the interagency to meet our Nation's
objectives in the region.force assistance to our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will ensure USAFRICOM coordinates closely with
the interagency to meet our Nation's objectives in the region.
Question. Do you view the problem sets in the Lake Chad Basin and
the Sahel to be the same? If not, how do they differ and how should we
account for that in our strategies?
Answer. No, I do not. However, a more detailed assessment will be
necessary for my full understanding of the relationships between these
problems. The Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel problem sets differ in the
nuances of grievances between terrorist organizations and nation states
and long histories of ethnic tension. They are separated geographically
and ideologically.
Question. What is your assessment of the efforts of governments in
the region to combat VEOs, as well as other regional security and
governance challenges?
Answer. My assessment on this topic is informed by my time as the
Commander of SOCAF. Security and political challenges continue to
undermine stability in the Sahel. Mali and Burkina Faso remain the
epicenter of instability and a haven for many terrorist groups to stage
and launch attacks across the region. Governments are willing to combat
terrorists. Yet, these countries are among the world's poorest, face
severe resource constraints, and have relatively limited military
capability.
Similarly, in the Lake Chad Region, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger,
and Nigeria are largely willing to confront terrorists operating out of
Nigeria and do so through unilateral operations and the five-nation
Multinational Joint Task Force. Multiple competing national security
priorities in each of the Lake Chad Region nations have prevented them
from focusing adequate resources to counterterrorism operations, which
has allowed terrorists freedom to operate.
Question. What do you view as the most pressing impediments to
regional efforts to address security and governance challenges?
Answer. Regional efforts to improve security and governance are
often interrupted by urgent internal crises, whether they be caused by
terrorist organizations, military coups, natural and man-made
disasters, or displaced populations. These events redirect the state's
attention and limited resources and distract from capacity and
institution-building endeavors. Weak and hollow State institutions
struggle to reorganize and grow while confronting constant challenges
and limited resources. One of the most pressing impediments to regional
efforts, however, is corruption. Sudden crises also hinder progress on
security and governance challenges by requiring time and resources at
the expense of capacity building work.
Question. In your view, what measures should the United States
incorporate into current and future military-to-military engagements to
help avoid violence by regional police and the militaries of other
nations against civilians during operations?
Answer. I believe that the United States should continue to press
for partner compliance with long established international norms and
not hesitate to restrict security forces from receiving assistance when
there is credible evidence of gross violation of human rights by
security forces. Consistent application of these standards as a basis
for access to the benefits accrued from military-to-military
engagements with the United States will further legitimize these norms,
reinforce the concept of the rule of law, and act as a deterrent to
violators.
north africa
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States national security interests in North Africa?
Answer. United States interests are directly tied to maintaining
stability in North Africa by preventing malign foreign and non-State
actors from expanding their presence. The United States can do so by
leveraging two of our most capable African partner nations, Morocco and
Tunisia, who are able to serve as security exporters, most notably when
it comes to training other African nations. The United States should
also strive to reorient Algeria away from its historic dependence on
Russia, and to prevent Libya from serving as an access point for
Russian malign actions and expansion. Unchanged for 225 years, the
United States's desired objectives for North Africa are stable,
western-oriented nations that ensure access to critical sea lines of
communication through the Mediterranean.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy for North Africa?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
assessment. I do know that the United States continues to support
Morocco and Tunisia, and continues to encourage them to take the lead
in training other African partner nations. Both nations demonstrated
this willingness during my time at SOCAF by serving as the first
African training leads during exercise FLINTLOCK. NATO is another
important ally in addressing the challenges of North Africa as
terrorism and immigration challenge their southern flank.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy for Libya?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
assessment of the United States strategy for Libya. I do know the
United States continues to pursue a diplomatic and political
reunification process.
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
supporting the United States strategy for North Africa broadly and
Libya specifically?
Answer. I believe that USAFRICOM primarily works to facilitate
military engagement and training opportunities for North African
partner nations, encouraging them to assume a primary role for African
security challenges. A priority for USAFRICOM is to guarantee United
States overflight through North Africa to the remainder of the
continent, and to maintain access to critical sea lines of
communication. USAFRICOM coordinates these efforts with partners such
as Turkiye, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and NATO to synchronize
and layer our activities. For Libya specifically, USAFRICOM strives to
facilitate military engagement and training opportunities between both
Libyan sides to encourage the formation of an integrated military force
capable of conducting independent counterterrorism operations with the
oversight of a unified government.
Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges and
opportunities with regards to the AFRICOM interests and objectives in
North Africa?
Answer. Libya remains a key challenge in North Africa. I would
continue to seek opportunities to engage with Libya and despite the
political instability and other challenges to focus on countering
terrorism that could affect the United States Homeland. Additionally, I
would continue to engage with Morocco and Tunisia to leverage their
partnerships and leadership in our various exercises and security
cooperation with other African partners.
central and southern africa
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States National Security interests in central and southern Africa?
Answer. Our national security interests in Central and Southern
Africa extend beyond counterterrorism to include strategic competition
with China and Russia, transnational threats such as trafficking and
piracy, global health security, and commercial access to natural
resources. Instability in the region can directly impact U.S. security,
while the economic and political trajectory of these nations is
increasingly important to U.S. investments.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy for central and southern Africa?
Answer. The U.S. strategy prioritizes partnership with African
nations to promote security and economic opportunity and respond to
crises. Key pillars include counterterrorism focused on root causes,
investment in sustainable development where interests align, security
sector reform to support operationally independent partners, and
countering malign influence. African leadership and ownership are
central to this approach, emphasizing a collaborative rather than
prescriptive model.
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
supporting the U.S. strategy?
Answer. USAFRICOM protects the United States Homeland from external
threats to prevent strategic surprise, counters malign actors such as
China, and maintains a ready and responsive crisis response force.
USAFRICOM provides extraordinary value for a very modest investment to
advance U.S. interests, by maintaining access and placement to detect
indications and warnings and find opportunities to gain advantage.
USAFRICOM does this in close partnership with African nations, allies,
and the interagency.
Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges and
opportunities with regards to the AFRICOM interests and objectives in
central and southern Africa?
Answer. Key challenges in central and southern Africa include
expanding terrorist groups, increased Chinese investment in military
exercises and engagement, and integrating into whole of government
approaches across the region. USAFRICOM is limited in its resources and
infrastructure focused on this region--especially in the lack of a
contingency location for crisis response. Southern Africa presents a
variety of opportunities where nations have approached the United
States for engagement.
building partner capacity and security assistance
Question. In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the AFRICOM AOR through
defense security cooperation activities or other means?
Answer. I believe that USAFRICOM's building partner capacity (BPC)
efforts should focus on partners that are directly supporting
USAFRICOM's efforts to combat threats to the Homeland and advance
United States interests. BPC efforts should also support advancing
partners to the point where they can train, conduct, and sustain their
own operations against shared threats in a manner that supports U.S.
strategic interests, and regional security. USAFRICOM can also use BPC
programs to counter China as it works to expand its influence across
the continent. If confirmed, my aim will be to make sure we are a
valued security partner throughout the continent by supporting
partners' efforts to field sustainable, accountable security forces
that possess the capability and capacity to address their own security
needs.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate balance between
efforts to build partnership capacity at the tactical and operational
levels and at the institutional and ministerial levels?
Answer. Any assessment of the appropriate balance begins with a
nation's commitment to some shared U.S. interest. Engagement with
nations should be based on our assessment of feasibility--including
both a nation's will and their capacity to absorb and operationalize
U.S. engagement. Then, we would balance building partnership capacity
at both the national and operational levels as appropriate for that
nation. Building only one would be ineffective without the other.
Efforts to build partner capacity must be very select, judicious, and
balanced to ensure a partner nation's ability to maintain a
comprehensive defense approach conducive to U.S. strategic interests.
Question. Do you believe the ability of a partner nation to sustain
U.S.-provided equipment and capabilities should be a key factor in
determining the level and type of assistance to be provided?
Answer. I do. Providing unsupportable aid ultimately undermines our
relationships and creates vulnerabilities malign State actors are
likely to exploit.
Question. How would you characterize the importance of adherence to
human rights as an objective of AFRICOM security cooperation programs
and activities?
Answer. Adherence to human rights underpins USAFRICOM's
relationships with our partners and allies, and, ultimately, increases
our mission effectiveness to advance U.S. interests. Support for human
rights is the cornerstone of an effective military. Security
cooperation improves partner nations' ability to mitigate civilian
casualties and enhances operational effectiveness by maintaining
government legitimacy and differentiating from adversaries who violate
human rights. If confirmed, I will ensure every engagement with a
partner nation, regardless of topic or objective, is an opportunity to
emphasize the core values of human rights and a professional military.
Question. When credible allegations of violence against civilians
by partner nation security forces arise, what should the U.S. response
be?
Answer. Allegations of violations of human rights, the rule of law,
or law of armed conflict undermine governance and should be fully and
transparently investigated. If reports are deemed credible, we will
call on our partners to hold perpetrators accountable via legitimate
judicial processes in addition to internal disciplinary actions.
Incidents of civilian harm by partner nation security forces should
also inform the planning, design, and execution of security cooperation
activities and programs. If confirmed, I will support full and
transparent investigations into credible allegations of civilian
casualties, and violations of the law of armed conflict.
crisis response capabilities
Question. What is your understanding of the crisis response
capabilities available to AFRICOM?
Answer. My experience as Commander of SOCAF provides direct insight
into the critical role of USAFRICOM's crisis response capabilities.
Properly equipped, postured, and ready forces are essential for
protecting U.S. personnel, property, and interests during crises.
USAFRICOM possesses limited organic crisis response forces. Their
missions include reinforcing embassy security and facilitating
military-assisted departures of Department of State-designated
personnel. Furthermore, subject to the Secretary of Defense's approval,
additional crisis response assets from the United States, Europe, and
the Middle East can supplement USAFRICOM's resources.
Question. Do you believe that the availability of crisis response
capabilities and the mechanism for obtaining and deploying those
capabilities are both appropriate and adequate to meet crisis response
requirements in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. Africa's vast size and overall lack of an integrated
logistics infrastructure make the movement, employment, and sustainment
of military forces exceedingly difficult. Many locations suffer from
unstable and delicate security conditions. On any given day, a crisis
could arise that requires USAFRICOM to commit military forces either to
augment the security of a U.S. facility or to evacuate personnel.
Allocation of assets to crisis response in Africa will be balanced
against global requirements in line with security and defense
strategies. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment to determine if
additional capabilities or contingency locations are necessary given
the current and future risks and mission requirements. I will also
examine how to best develop access with partners to enhance USAFRICOM's
ability to respond to crises.
Question. In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be
taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and
personnel by terrorist organizations and other threats throughout
AFRICOM?
Answer. The Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service is
the lead agency for embassy protection supported by Marine Security
Guard Detachments, and Marine Security Augmentation Units as needed. If
confirmed, I will review the current authorities and resources
available to support the Department of State to reduce the risk of
attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and personnel. Key factors of
that assessment would consider available military response forces, ISR
and associated collection for indications and warnings, the posturing
of forward coordinating elements, and regular information sharing and
coordination with agencies, allies and partners.
civilian casualties
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure civilian casualty
allegations are adequately and promptly investigated by AFRICOM?
Answer. I understand that USAFRICOM has a long-standing process to
assess or investigate allegations of civilian casualties. I also
understand that staff sections review allegations of civilian
casualties in a holistic fashion, considering all the information
available. This includes classified information to assess the
allegation and, as necessary, determine whether a further assessment or
investigation is necessary. To the extent permissible by law and
policy, and except as necessary to ensure operational security,
USAFRICOM publishes the results of these assessments. If confirmed, I
intend to continue to implement and refine that process consistent with
Department policy and law.
Question. Do you believe credible civilian casualty incidents
should be independently investigated by personnel who are sufficiently
removed from the unit or chain of command associated with the incident?
Please be specific in your response.
Answer. I believe that to be useful and fair, any assessment must
be impartial. I understand that USAFRICOM's current civilian harm
assessment process ensures an appropriate level of separation or
distance between the unit and/or chain of command involved in a
potential allegation and the unit that is conducting the assessment.
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's current policies
with respect to public transparency, and if confirmed, what policies
would you seek to establish in this regard?
Answer. I understand that USAFRICOM publishes press releases after
any kinetic strike taken by units under its commander and, since 2020,
has publicly reported information on its assessment of allegations of
civilian casualties. If confirmed, I will continue to support
transparency through the release of information in accordance with law
and policy while protecting operational security.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
to provide ex gratia payments when civilian casualties or other
civilian harm result from U.S. unilateral or partnered military
operations?
Answer. I understand that, consistent with law, ex gratia payments
may be an appropriate response for damage to civilian property or the
personal injury or death of a civilian that is incident to the use of
force by U.S. Armed Forces, a coalition that includes the United
States, a military organization supporting the United States, or a
military organization supporting the United States or such coalition. I
believe that the decision to offer such payments should be made
consistent with law and implementing Department guidance, on an
individual and case-by-case basis, considering factors such as whether
the relevant facts can be verified and any potential risks to both U.S.
personnel and the intended recipients, including any risk that such
funding could be exploited by malign actors.United States or such
coalition. I believe that the decision to offer such payments should be
made consistent with law and implementing Department guidance, on an
individual and case-by-case basis, considering factors such as whether
the relevant facts can be verified and any potential risks to both U.S.
personnel and the intended recipients, including any risk that such
funding could be exploited by malign actors.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
Question. Demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years,
largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting
capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the geographic
combatant commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being
met.
What is your understanding of the support AFRICOM is currently
receiving to respond to its ISR requirements?
Answer. ISR availability remains a challenge not only for USAFRICOM
given its lack of organic assets, but also to all other Combatant
Commands given the high global demand for ISR. The need for ISR in the
USAFRICOM AOR remains high to maintain indications and warnings of
attacks on the Homeland and to characterize malign State actor activity
on the continent.
Question. Do you believe the threats emanating from the AFRICOM AOR
warrant additional resources from within DOD? If so, how do you intend
to advocate for additional ISR and other enabling assets, if confirmed?
Answer. Threats emanating from Africa are likely to distract from
our strategic focus and give our adversaries the advantage if not
checked--both from terrorists and State actors such as China. While
additional resourcing is a question of policy, I will assess the
current risk and advocate for the required resources as appropriate to
achieve the national security and defense strategies. I will also
engage allies and partners to continue developing the relationships
that mitigate potential shortfalls and enhance our domain and threat
awareness.
maritime security
Question. What is your assessment of AFRICOM's ongoing maritime
security initiatives?
Answer. My perspective from my current capacity is that USAFRICOM
has been expanding the maritime capabilities of partners through a mix
of security cooperation efforts and exercises. USAFRICOM appears to be
prioritizing its maritime security efforts appropriately given current
security challenges, which I intend to reassess, if confirmed, given
the evolving circumstances of our security interests in North, West,
and East Africa.
Question. Very few African countries have the capacity to project
naval forces beyond their coastal waters. As a result, the economic
exclusion zones of many coastal African countries are exploited by a
variety of international actors.
Answer. I agree and see this topic as an opportunity to engage
African partners and encourage them to hold malign actors, such as
China, accountable.
Question. What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanded U.S.
engagement on maritime security in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess opportunities to expand U.S.
Military, interagency, partner, and allied engagement on maritime
security across the USAFRICOM AOR. The AOR's expansive maritime domain
holds both significant challenges and strategic opportunities that
demand a robust and collaborative approach. I envision enhanced
coordination with our European allies and other non-traditional
partners to advance shared national security objectives, from
strengthening security in NATO's southern flank to combating illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
Through focused maritime exercises, security cooperation training,
information sharing, and bilateral law enforcement engagements,
USAFRICOM can empower partners to operate independently, detect and
expose malign activity, and achieve these vital shared goals. Moreover,
I will coordinate with adjacent Combatant Commands to maximize regional
outcomes. A critical area for disruption involves United States-
designated drug cartels whose involvement in West Africa's drug supply
chain poses a threat to the United States Homeland.
quality-of-life challenges in africom
Question. What unique quality-of-life challenges affect service
members, civilians, and their families assigned to the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. From my experience, the USAFRICOM AOR presents unique
challenges to Service members, civilians and their families assigned on
the African continent. These challenges include access to medical care,
access to education, local environmental concerns impacting health,
adequate religious/spiritual fitness resources, isolation from serving
in remote locations, high operational tempo, local crime, language
barriers, and potential armed conflict exposure. If confirmed, I will
assess the extent to which those serving forward have the necessary
resources and support to fulfill their mental, physical, and spiritual
needs to execute the mission.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these theater-wide
challenges to help improve the quality-of-life and retention of these
personnel and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will complete a thorough assessment of the
current initiatives USAFRICOM employs to address quality of life and
retention. In addition, I will assess subordinate command climates
through site visits, surveys, and feedback. Leveraging my experience as
the Commander of SOCAF, I will refine and promote quality of life
initiatives for personnel deployed within Africa based on eligibility,
threat environment, and mission requirements. I would ensure that
forward-deployed personnel are provided a clear mission, defined
objectives, necessary resources, and appropriate capabilities required
for mission success.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
`rwanda
1. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Anderson, Rwanda is a capable
and reliable United States partner on the African Continent,
particularly in the areas of peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and
regional stability. For example, Rwanda's deployment in northern
Mozambique to combat the ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
affiliate in Mozambique has been a vital contribution to restoring
security in Cabo Delgado and protecting critical energy infrastructure.
Given United States Africa Command's (AFRICOM) increasing focus on
strategic partnerships and burden-sharing in counterterrorism efforts,
can you commit to strengthening United States coordination and support
for Rwanda's operations in Mozambique, and more broadly, to deepening
AFRICOM's engagement with Rwanda as a trusted partner in promoting
security and stability across the region?
Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I commit to support the
priorities identified in national strategic guidance, to include
continuing partnerships with capable and willing African nations to
degrade and defeat terrorist organizations who pose a threat to the
United States Homeland.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
8(a) contracting
2. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, the Small
Business Act (SBA) 8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a
contract vehicle through which sole source and set aside contracts can
be awarded to small businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations,
Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian
organizations. These corporations are tied to political relationships,
not racial classifications. They also are some of our most efficient
contractors, earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System (CPARS) marks. Last, many of these small businesses
employ veterans at rates far exceeding the national average, allowing
our Nation's finest to continue to service after they take off the
uniform. Will you commit to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a)
contracting for the Department of Defense?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with you to ensure our defense industrial base is
more agile and flexible so that our warfighters have the most advanced
and capable equipment to meet our national security priorities.
3. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, I recently toured
an SBA 8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a)
brings to the Federal customer in terms of cost and efficiency while
delivering mission-critical solutions that increase our national
security and warfighting readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best
``bang for the buck'' for taxpayers, giving contracting officers
additional flexibility while also maximizing efficiency by reducing red
tape. Do you see the value in increasing efficiency in flexibility
brought from initiatives such as the 8(a) program?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. As I committed in my
testimony to the Committee, I will be a responsible steward of taxpayer
dollars. I see significant value in increasing warfighting readiness
through enhanced efficiency. If confirmed, I will prioritize efficiency
as well as low-cost solutions to address the greatest threats to U.S.
national security in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
morocco
4. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, 2 years ago, this
Committee, at my request, asked for a briefing on the options to
establish a forward deployed AFRICOM headquarters in AFRICOM. In
response, I understand that DOD has assessed that AFRICOM's current
location in Stuttgart provides key efficiencies and logistical benefits
it requires. Still, Africa is a long way from Stuttgart. Given
Morocco's status as a longstanding and valuable United States security
partner--and the vast range of potential contingencies in Africa--if
not as a subordinate command of AFRICOM, how can we leverage our
partnership with Morocco to more effectively advance AFRICOM's security
objective on the Continent?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, USAFRICOM's security
objectives on the Continent are focused on undermining China's malign
activities while simultaneously defending the United States Homeland
from terrorist attack. It's my understanding that USAFRICOM continues
this critical partnership with Morrocco to ensure we can focus our
efforts on these objectives.
5. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, how do you assess
the threat posed by Iran and its proxies on the African Continent,
specifically in North Africa and the Sahel?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, Iran and its proxies pose a
growing threat to stability across Africa, exploiting existing
vulnerabilities and seeking to expand their influence. Looking across
the Continent, I am most concerned about the Iranian and Iranian proxy
threat in East Africa, where the Iran-backed Huthis pose a force
protection threat to United States personnel in Djibouti and Somalia,
as well as to maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. If
confirmed, I can assure you that USAFRICOM will continue to monitor
their activities and work with partners to counter their malign
influence through intelligence sharing, capacity building, and
coordinated security efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
somalia
6. Senator Budd. Lieutenant General Anderson, in 2022, the
Department of Defense deployed hundreds of Special Operations Forces to
Somalia to counter Al-Shabab. After 3 years of operations, I'd like to
know your assessment of the fight and what you think AFRICOM needs to
accomplish the mission?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I am not fully informed on
the details of the current United States strategy in Somalia. I am
aware that al-Shabaab has demonstrated resilience and, as al Qaeda's
largest, wealthiest, and most lethal global affiliate, is the main
organization that threatens United States and partner interests.
Additionally, they have publicly advocated for attacks against U.S.
targets, including lone-actor attacks against the United States.
I am concerned by al-Shabaab's continued collaboration with the
Huthis, which also directly threatens the security of United States
Forces in the region. While United States and partner counterterrorism
efforts likely have slowed the pace of the group's offensive and the
immediate threat to Mogadishu, the Huthi-al-Shabaab relationship
constitutes a serious threat to United States Force protection in the
USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
I understand that to successfully counter al-Shabaab, all
stakeholders and the government of Somalia need to act with a singular,
unified objective. The United States, along with our allies and
partners, must deliver a strong message to Somali leadership that
counterterrorism is the international priority in Somalia. If
confirmed, you have my assurances that I will assess our persistent
presence to ensure it provides an adequate force to enable Somalia and
other partners to effectively contribute to countering shared threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
background
7. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, as part of my
responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions
within the Department of Defense, I will be asking the same two
questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I
serve:?'Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
8. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever faced
discipline, or entered into a settlement related to this kind of
conduct?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
posture/budget reductions
9. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, AFRICOM operates
under persistent resource constraints compared to other geographic
combatant commands, despite the Continent's growing strategic
importance. Budget limitations, combined with recent discussions about
restructuring or even merging AFRICOM with United States European
Command (EUCOM), risk sending the wrong message to our African partners
and ceding influence to China, Russia, and other malign actors. Any
reduction in posture or personnel would likely diminish the command's
ability to respond to crises and maintain long-standing security
relationships. What risks do you see in the current review of AFRICOM's
posture, particularly if it results in budget or force reductions?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as the former Commander of
Special Operations Command--Africa, I witnessed first-hand the ability
of USAFRICOM component units accomplishing their missions with limited
resources, leveraging both innovation and strong partnerships. We have
opportunities to seek capable partnerships on the African Continent,
enabled by our allies and partners, to address regional security
concerns and allow our command elements to focus on the most pressing
national interests. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing that
same effort to maximize resources by working with allies and partners
toward shared security goals.
10. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would such a
decision affect our ability to counter violent extremist organizations
and support regional stability efforts in places like Somalia, the
Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, violent extremist threats
emanating from Africa are likely to distract from our strategic focus
and give our adversaries--both terrorists and State actors such as
China--advantage if not sufficiently checked. While additional
resourcing is a question of policy, I will assess the current risk and
advocate for the required resources as appropriate to achieve the
national security objectives. I will also engage allies and partners to
continue developing relationships that mitigate potential shortfalls
and enhance domain and threat awareness.
11. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, in your view, what
resources or authorities are most urgently needed to maintain or grow
AFRICOM's impact given the strategic competition playing out across the
Continent?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, our Nation's greatest pacing
threat is China. Beijing sees Africa as an important theater to secure
international support for its policies, strategic resources for its
economy and defense industrial base, and operational experience in
military power projection. As we look at China beyond the next 3 years,
we must consider Africa as a major source of China's long-term
capability to sustain a globally protracted conflict. If confirmed, I
will work with the Department to identify resources and authorities
needed for USAFRICOM to support United States National Security
objectives and constrain China's efforts to achieve hegemony in the
Indo-Pacific and beyond.
foreign aid
12. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, I am very
concerned about how this Administration's mass firing of State
Department employees, cuts to foreign aid, and the dismantling of U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) affect our standing with
allies and partners in the Region. How does ending foreign assistance
programs and other regional aid efforts impact AFRICOM's security
cooperation missions and the command's relationship with partners in
the region??
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, in alignment to national
security and defense priorities, I am committed to defending the U.S.
Homeland and countering China's malign activities on the Continent. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the interagency, allies, and
partners, to ensure that USAFRICOM's limited resources are maximized to
responsibly execute and enable African partners to be more independent
and ensure our shared strategic objectives are achieved.
13. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your best
military advice on the potential risk of the United States ceding
influence in the region by abandoning our allies, partners, and foreign
aid commitments??
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, one of the greatest tools we
have in defeating terrorist activity and undermining malign Chinese
activities is enhanced engagement and collaboration with strong African
partners and other allies. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
the work currently underway at USAFRICOM to engage with key African
partners and enable their ability to operate independently.
14. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, I am reminded of
former Defense Secretary James Mattis' comment: ``If you don't fund the
State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.'' Do you
agree with that statement??
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the State Department is
essential to interagency efforts in Africa that further United States
and partner shared interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Department of State and other interagency members as I did as
Commander, SOCAF, to ensure that the United States Homeland is safe
from terrorist attacks and United States security interests are
advanced on the African Continent.
china and russia in africa
15. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, China has
dramatically expanded its presence in Africa through the Belt and Road
Initiative, dual-use port investments, and a permanent military base in
Djibouti. Russia, meanwhile, is deploying private military companies to
support autocratic regimes and secure access to critical minerals.
These efforts often come at the expense of good governance,
transparency, and civilian safety. AFRICOM plays a crucial role in
helping African partners resist coercion and maintain sovereignty but
faces growing competition in both the security and diplomatic domains.
How do you assess the evolving security risks posed by China's military
and commercial expansion in East Africa, and how is AFRICOM postured to
respond?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, China's approach to security
and economic engagement allows Beijing to expand its influence and
normalize its military presence through its base in Djibouti, the
continuous presence of Chinese warships assigned to the Naval Escort
Task Force, and extensive Chinese economic investment. I am very
concerned about the China's growing efforts, not just in East Africa,
but across Africa. Attempts to entrench Chinese influence with African
Governments and militaries poses challenges to United States
relationships. If confirmed, I will assess USAFRICOM's efforts to
undermine China's military ambitions and work closely with the
Department of Defense and the interagency to address risks to United
States national security because of those activities.
16. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, what role is
Russia's paramilitary presence--especially in Central and West Africa--
playing in destabilizing partner governments or disrupting United
States interests?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as I stated in my testimony,
Russia is a destabilizing force whose actions often run counter to
United States interests. Russia's deployments in multiple African
nations and use of persistent information operation campaigns undermine
USAFRICOM and Western military support and relationships. Russia uses
its presence to bolster and protect transitional and fragile regimes--
many with highly objectionable practices toward local populations--to
derive geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. This also
disrupts United States and Allied military access to countries in
Central and West Africa that are key terrain for countering ISIS and al
Qaeda terrorist groups that could pose a threat to the United States
Homeland. If confirmed, I will work with allies to address the
destabilizing propaganda that Russia uses to further its malign goals
of instability across the Continent.
17. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, how can AFRICOM
better coordinate with the Department of State and international
partners to provide a viable, values-based alternative to Chinese and
Russian engagement?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, USAFRICOM must remain in
close coordination with the Departments of State, Commerce, and
Homeland Security, as well as other elements of the interagency, to
ensure that we achieve U.S. national security objectives and advance
U.S. national interests. USAFRICOM must also work with African
partners, traditional allies, other global partners, and multinational
organizations with shared security objectives to enable a broader
approach to safeguard national interests.
One of the greatest powers the United States brings is our economic
power, largely through private investment. I believe this approach has
the potential to offer additional opportunities across the USAFRICOM
area of responsibility, particularly as the populations of Africa grow.
In my prior role at SOCAF, we were successful in partnering with non-
governmental organizations and elements of civil society to identify
other opportunities to demonstrate the value proposition and power of
U.S. partnerships.
If confirmed, I look forward to further developing both internal
and external relationships to provide viable, credible alternatives to
Chinese and Russian malign efforts that exploit African partner
nations.
civilian harm prevention and mitigation
18. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, the U.S. Military
has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and
mitigate civilian harm from its operations without sacrificing
lethality, consistent with both U.S. values and strategic goals,
including through the development of the Department of Defense (DOD)
Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first Trump administration and
the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP).
Congress also mandated the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence to
provide support to warfighters across the force, and combatant commands
have onboarded expert staff to support civilian harm mitigation and
response. As you know, these efforts received bipartisan support from
Congress and grew out of a recognition that warfighters needed better
tools and trustworthy systems to prevent civilian harm in today's wars
and in the future. Do you agree that preventing and responding to
civilian harm is a critical responsibility of the U.S. Military and
makes the United States more effective?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
19. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, what
do you understand to be your roles and responsibilities regarding
civilian harm mitigation and response?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, it is my understanding that
Combatant Commanders regularly ensure that Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response (CHMR) considerations are integrated into all phases of
planning and execution, including operational planning, intelligence
preparation of the environment, and targeting processes. If confirmed,
I will work with the Department to ensure compliance in accordance with
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5840.01.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
unmanned systems
20. Senator Kaine. Lieutenant General Anderson, the events at
Langley Air Force Base (AFB) 18 months ago, and Operation Spider's Web
last month, both underscore the role that unmanned systems currently
play in modern warfare. How do you assess the threat from unmanned
systems to U.S. interests in AFRICOM?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, threat actors operating in
and within reach of U.S. interests in the USAFRICOM area of
responsibility have benefited greatly from the proliferation of
inexpensive, advanced unmanned system technology. Their access to this
technology and ability to integrate these capabilities into more
complex and lethal attacks present a high risk to U.S. forces,
operations, and interests in Africa. As I did as Director, Joint Force
Development, I will continue to prioritize innovative ways to increase
capabilities with respect to unmanned technologies in line with the
Secretary's imperative to achieve drone dominance. I will also seek
solutions to help African and other partner nations build their
capacity and capability related to UAS opportunities and threats.
21. Senator Kaine. Lieutenant General Anderson, what are our
capability gaps?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed and after
completing my initial assessment, I welcome the opportunity to have a
conversation on this subject in a secure setting.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
22. Senator King. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you support the
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I understand that the United
States considers the vast majority of UNCLOS to be reflective of
customary international law, and I support the continued leadership of
the United States in promoting international norms that advance
American interests in the freedom of the seas and safe navigation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
ethics
23. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit not to seek any employment with or
compensation from a defense contractor, including through serving on a
board, as a consultant, or as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving
DOD?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I will abide by U.S. law and
all ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions pertaining to post-
government employment.
24. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit not to engage in any lobbying activities,
including unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying
under the guise of consulting or advising, focused on DOD or any of its
components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Lieutenant General Anderson. I will abide by U.S. law and all
ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions pertaining to post-
government employment.
25. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit
not to seek employment, board membership with, or any other form of
compensation from a company that you regulated or otherwise interacted
with while in government, for at least 4 years after leaving office?
Lieutenant General Anderson. I will abide by U.S. law and all
ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions pertaining to post-
government employment.
26. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, during your
nomination process, did anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team,
or other closely related entity approach you about your loyalty to
President Trump?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
27. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you were
approached about your loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a
loyalty pledge or other similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of
the text of that pledge or oath.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
28. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you were
approached about your loyalty to President Trump, did you make any
verbal representations of loyalty? If so, please describe this
representation.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
29. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, in November 2024,
the New York Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn,
a top adviser to President Trump, allegedly requested payment from
prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
positions within the administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
30. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you did discuss
the possibility of joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did
Mr. Epshteyn seek payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a
position within the administration?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
31. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, at any time, did
lawyers for President Trump or members of President Trump's team
approach you regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If
so, please describe the information that they provided you (including
copies of documents), what was discussed during any calls, and any
other information pertaining to this interaction.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
32. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, were you in
contact with Mr. Elon Musk at any time during your nomination process?
If so, please describe the nature of those contacts.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
33. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, was Mr. Musk
present or involved in any interviews you did related to your
nomination? If so, please describe the nature of his involvement.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
34. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, was Mr. Musk
involved in any way with your nomination, including but not limited to
directly or indirectly contacting Senators regarding their position on
your nomination?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
35. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, who was in the
room or participated in any of your interviews regarding your
nomination?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, during my nomination process
I interviewed with the Secretary of Defense and the President. In my
courtesy calls with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
was accompanied by an aide from the Joint Staff.
36. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you own any
stock or hold any other interest in any defense industry contractors,
will you divest it to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of
interest?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
37. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you
consider the role of the press in a democracy?
Lieutenant General Anderson. The press is vital to our Nation and
democratic governance, and to the military's civic duties and civil
engagement. DOD doctrine recognizes this importance, emphasizing a
responsibility to proactively engage with the media while balancing
operational security with the public's right to information.
38. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit
not to retaliate, including by denying access to government officials
or facilities, against news outlets or individual journalists who
publish articles that are critical of you, your office, your agency, or
the Trump administration?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
39. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever been
accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
environment for another individual in a personal or professional
capacity? Provide a list of all instances in which you have been
accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
environment for an individual and the behavior of which you were
accused.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
40. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you
requested, or has anyone requested on your behalf, that any other
person or third party sign a nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-
disparagement, or similar agreement regarding your conduct in a
personal or professional capacity?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
41. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you
voluntarily release any individual from any such agreements before this
committee votes on your nomination?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I have no such agreements.
42. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever paid
or promised to pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your
behalf, an individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality,
non-disparagement, or similar agreement?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
43. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if the answer to
the previous question was yes, how much was promised, how much was
paid, and what were the circumstances?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I have no such arrangements.
44. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, were you at any
time, or are you currently, contacted by or under investigation or
review by any inspector general or any inspector general's office for
any reason?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
45. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of the Hatch Act?
Lieutenant General Anderson. As I understand it, the Hatch Act is
applicable to civilian Federal employees and generally restricts them
from engaging in partisan political activities while on duty, in a
Federal facility, or using Federal property. Military personnel are
subject to DOD Instruction (DODI) 1344.10, which governs military
engagement with political activities.
46. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what disciplinary
actions are appropriate for violations of the Hatch Act?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Potential penalties for violations of
the Hatch Act are detailed in law and include the possibility of
disciplinary actions, including suspension, removal from Federal
employment, or assessment of civil penalties. I believe that
appropriate disciplinary action should be consistent with law and, as
provided for by law, made on a case-by-case basis after considering all
lawful factors.
47. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
your family currently or ever been a member, founder, or investor of
the ``Executive Branch'' social club? Please provide their name and
role related to the club.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
48. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
your family ever visited the club or attended an event at the club?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
49. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if a member of
your family has ever visited the club or attended an event at the club,
please provide the date, circumstances of the visit, and the event.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
50. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you had any
meetings at the club? If so, what were these meetings about and with
whom?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
51. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
your family had any meetings at the club? If so, which family
member(s), what were these meetings about, and with whom were these
meetings?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
52. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you
encouraged anyone to join the club or promoted the club in any other
way? If so, in what ways did you promote the club?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
53. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
your family encouraged anyone to join the club or promoted the club in
any other way? If so, which family member(s) and in what ways did they
promote the club?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
congressional oversight and transparency
54. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of the role of the Department of Defense Inspector
General and service Inspectors General?
Lieutenant General Anderson. It's my understanding that the DOD
Inspector General (IG) serves as an independent watchdog and objective
oversight body within the Department of Defense. Their primary role is
to detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in DOD programs and
operations, promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Each
military service also has its own Inspector General focused on
readiness, standards, and addressing servicemember complaints within
their branch. Together, they uphold ethical conduct, improve
efficiency, and provide a trusted channel for reporting concerns. This
dual structure creates a system of checks and balances, ensuring the
integrity of the DOD workforce and operations.
55. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you ensure
your staff complies with any Inspector General deadlines established
for requested communications, documents, and witnesses, and that staff
will be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
56. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are not
able to comply with any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will
you notify the Republican and Democratic members of this committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
57. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from
any individual, including the President?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
58. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what actions would
you take if you were given an illegal order from any individual,
including the President?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I do not anticipate that I
will receive an unlawful order. I swore an oath to support and defend
the constitution of the United States 33 years ago. I have reaffirmed
this oath eight times and will continue to adhere to it as long as I'm
able to serve.
59. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
voluntarily provide a deposition if you are requested by Congress to
provide one?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
60. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
voluntarily testify in front of Congress if you are requested by
Congress to do so?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
61. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
testify or provide a deposition in front of Congress if you are issued
a subpoena to do so?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
62. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
providing information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are
requested to do so?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
63. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you provide
information or documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to do
so?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
64. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
following current precedent for responding to information requests,
briefings, and other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees and their minority members?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
65. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, will
you commit to posting your official calendar monthly?
Lieutenant General Anderson. I will comply with DOD guidance
related to operational security and force protection.
66. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you think the
Federal Government has an overclassification problem? If so, please
provide examples of overclassification you have encountered.
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I can only speak to my
experience with the Department of Defense (DoD). Due to the complex
nature and multiple factors involved in the classification process, DOD
does face challenges with overclassification. While enterprise
solutions and training can help to address specific shortfalls, the
classification process seeks to strike a balance between required
access to capabilities, tools, and information to execute a mission and
protecting those elements--to the greatest extent possible--from
compromise by adversaries. If confirmed, I will seek to encourage a
``write for release'' environment and support efforts to limit
overclassification.
67. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, do
you think your department should pursue strategic technology to support
automated declassification?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, based on my experience as a
military leader at multiple echelons, the Department possesses a vital
need to declassify or sanitize classified information in an
operationally timely manner to enhance interoperability and support
transparency. I believe there is great potential for emerging
technologies to enhance the efficiency, accuracy, and cost-
effectiveness of declassifying government records.
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are at the
forefront of these innovations. Challenges will remain in achieving a
balance of transparency with risk to national security, as well as
ensuring the responsible and ethical implementation of AI for this
application. If confirmed, I will support classification and
declassification tools authorized and promulgated by the Department and
Joint Staff.
project 2025
68. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you discussed
Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the
Trump transition team, or other members of the Trump administration? If
so, please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with
whom you discussed it.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
69. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you discussed
Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Heritage
Foundation? If so, please explain what you discussed, when you
discussed it, and with whom you discussed it.
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
foreign influence
70. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you received
any payment from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
government within the past 5 years?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
71. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you
communicated with any foreign government or entity controlled by a
foreign government within the past 5 years?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator, throughout my 33 years
of service, I was required to interact regularly with military and
other representatives of foreign governments.
72. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, please disclose
any communications or payments you have had with representatives of any
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years and describe the nature of the communication.
Lieutenant General Anderson. My engagement with representatives of
foreign governments is consistent with existing U.S. law and those
ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions applicable to a serving
Officer in the U.S. Military.
impoundment control act
73. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you believe the
Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to block the disbursement
of funds appropriated by Congress?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, it's my understanding that
the President must obligate funds appropriated by Congress, unless
otherwise authorized by Congress to withhold them. I would defer any
specific questions related to legal authorities to my colleagues in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
74. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of the Impoundment Control Act?
Lieutenant General Anderson. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974
codified the limits of Presidential discretion with respect to either
withholding or delaying the spending of funds appropriated by Congress
and established legal processes by which impoundment can be executed.
75. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
complying with the Impoundment Control Act?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
76. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
notifying the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the
majority and minority, if you are asked not to comply with the
Impoundment Control Act or not to expend the money that Congress
appropriates or authorizes?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
77. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of the requirements for Federal agencies to obligate
funding that Congress authorizes and appropriates, in accordance with
the time period that Congress deems it to do so?
Lieutenant General Anderson. It's my understanding that in Federal
budgeting, an obligation of funds represents a legal commitment by a
Federal agency to use funds for the purposes appropriated, in the year
apportioned, and may not be expended in advance of or in excess of an
enacted appropriation.
78. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
expending the money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
79. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
following and implementing every provision of the annual National
Defense Authorization Act passed into law?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator, without reservation, I
will follow U.S. law and defend the U.S. Constitution in accordance
with my Oath of Office.
80. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you became
aware of a potential violation of the Antideficiency Act, Impoundment
Control Act, or other appropriations laws, what steps would you take?
Lieutenant General Anderson. In the event of a violation, I will
comply with the legal reporting requirements. I will promptly and
thoroughly investigate and report such violations, taking remedial
actions to prevent future violations.
civilian harm
81. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you agree that
one difference between the United States and its potential adversaries
is the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human
life and liberty at home and abroad?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
82. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, my understanding is that this
law established the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence to
institutionalize and advance knowledge, practices, and tools for
preventing, mitigating, and responding to civilian harm.
83. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, the U.S. Military
has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and
mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including through
the development of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first
Trump administration, which I commend. These efforts received
bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the
U.S. Military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. If
confirmed, will you commit to continued leadership on civilian harm
issues?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I do. In my 33 years of
experience, the U.S. Military takes extreme care to avoid civilian harm
and are more transparent than any other military in the world.
84. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, what do you understand to be your role and responsibilities
regarding civilian harm mitigation and response?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, my understanding is that
Combatant Commanders ensure that civilian harm considerations are
integrated into all phases of planning and execution, including
operational planning, intelligence preparation of the environment, and
targeting processes. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to
ensure compliance in accordance with Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 5840.01.
85. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you
understand to be the importance of mitigating civilian harm in military
operations?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Civilian harm mitigation and response
efforts support Department missions by enhancing operational
effectiveness, strengthening partnerships, and reducing the risk of
unintended consequences, such as the loss of human life.
86. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what value can
advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response
provide to commanders?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I would defer to those with
dedicated experience in this field to offer more substantive insights
into the potential impact of military operations on civilians. Based on
my experience as Commander, SOCAF, I can personally attest to the value
of that expertise.
87. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how have SOCOM and
AFRICOM, respectively, benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of
Excellence?
Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to assess the specific benefits.
88. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how have SOCOM and
AFRICOM, respectively, supported and implemented the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will work
with my staff to assess how the Command has implemented the Civilian
Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan.
89. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what have been the
benefits for SOCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, in supporting and
implementing Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response efforts and the
CHMR-AP?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will work
with my staff to assess how the Command has implemented the Civilian
Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan and what specific benefits
have come from those actions.
90. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you believe
that our troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of
civilian deaths from U.S. Military operations or U.S.-led military
operations increases?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as a former commander at
other echelons, I believe civilian deaths can be a factor in military
operations.
91. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how does
preventing and mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. national
security?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the U.S. Military should
minimize civilian casualties in warfare as a matter of moral obligation
and strategic imperative. As DOD continues to incorporate civilian harm
and mitigation and associated response efforts into planning and
operations, we strengthen our standing among allies and partners,
separating ourselves from adversaries.
92. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, does having
civilian-harm prevention personnel build trust and relationships with
local civil society groups help commanders to collect useful
intelligence information?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, it can, Senator.
93. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, in what ways do
you see civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM
and AFRICOM's missions and the effectiveness of their operations,
respectively?
Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I look forward to
continuing the current efforts of integrating civilian harm and
mitigation and response efforts into operations and plans at USAFRICOM.
94. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I commit to
working with the Department to ensure I comply with all legal and
policy directives to ensure our national security objectives are met.
95. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how will you
prevent and mitigate civilian harm?
Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I will continue to
ensure that civilian harm and mitigation and response considerations
are integrated into all phases of planning and execution, including
operational planning, intelligence preparation of the environment, and
targeting processes.
96. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed for these roles, will you commit to working with civil
society and interviewing civilian witnesses during civilian harm
investigations?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
97. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed for these roles, how do you plan to work with civil society
to reduce civilian harm in military operations?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will continue
to ensure that civilian harm and mitigation and response considerations
are integrated into all phases of planning and execution, including
operational planning, intelligence preparation of the environment, and
targeting processes.
98. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed for these roles, will you commit to supporting thorough
investigations of allegations of civilian harm, including by partners
and allies?
Lieutenant General Anderson. I commit to working with the
Department to ensure I comply with all legal and policy requirements
associated with civilian harm.
99. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would a
potential high-intensity conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary
that purposefully embeds itself in densely populated operational
environments impact targeting capabilities, precision, and risks to
servicemembers?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, based on my experience, a
peer adversary embedded within dense urban environments significantly
degrades our targeting capabilities and increases risks to U.S.
servicemembers. Precision targeting is compromised by the difficulty in
distinguishing combatants from civilians, increasing the potential for
collateral damage. To mitigate this, we must prioritize refining our
rules of engagement, enhancing intelligence gathering, and adapting our
tactics to minimize civilian harm and maintain mission legitimacy.
100. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would current
technology, capabilities, planning, and rules of engagement, including
efforts to prevent and mitigate civilian harm, help to mitigate such
impacts from the previous question?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, our advanced ISR, precision
munitions, and specialized units, coupled with rigorous planning and
rules of engagement designed to prevent civilian harm, provide a strong
foundation for mitigating the impacts of the situation described above.
Our deliberate targeting process and civilian harm mitigation
frameworks prioritize minimizing collateral damage and ensuring
compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.
101. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed for these roles, will you commit to sharing all findings of
each investigation of civilian harm with Congress, including the
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee within 15 days of the
investigation's completion?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will continue
to support transparency through the release of information in
accordance with existing U.S. law and policy, while protecting
operational security.
102. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian
Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I commit
to working with the Department to ensure I comply with all legal and
policy requirements associated with Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response.
103. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian
Harm Mitigation Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I commit
to working with the Department to ensure I comply with all legal and
policy requirements associated with Civilian Harm Mitigation and
Response.
protecting classified information and federal records
104. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of the need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, operational security (OPSEC)
is paramount to mission success and the safety of our personnel.
Failure to protect OPSEC can result in the compromise of sensitive
information, data, or capabilities, which may provide advantage to U.S.
adversaries as they seek to exploit vulnerabilities.
105. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what are the
national security risks of improperly disclosing classified
information?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the disclosure of classified
information can have far-reaching and detrimental consequences for
national security. Such disclosure can provide adversaries with
critical insights into our capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
intentions, potentially impacting ongoing operations, compromising
relationships with allies and partners, and eroding public trust.
106. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what would you do
if you learned an official had improperly disclosed classified
information?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I would follow DOD guidance
and report the incident in accordance with DOD Directive 5210.50.
107. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of Government officials' duties under the Federal Records
Act?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, it is my understanding that
the Federal Records Act is the primary law governing the management of
records created by U.S. Federal agencies. It establishes a framework
for the creation, maintenance, and disposition of Federal records,
ensuring the preservation of documents relevant to government
activities and decisions.
108. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, should classified
information be shared on unclassified commercial systems?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Classified information should be
communicated on an appropriately classified system.
109. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, is it damaging to
servicemembers' confidence in the chain of command if the pilots flying
a mission find out that the official who ordered them to perform that
mission shared sensitive information that could have made it more
likely that the mission would fail, or they would be killed?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I wouldn't want to speculate
or generalize. We should always preserve the element of surprise and
never put our warfighters in harm's way.
110. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you had
information about the status of specific targets, weapons being used,
and timing for imminent United States strikes against an adversary,
under what circumstances would you feel comfortable receiving or
sharing that information on an unclassified commercial application like
Signal?
Lieutenant General Anderson. As I have throughout my career, I will
continue to communicate classified information through the appropriate
channels.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
111. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you believe
that servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
any other concern that they wish to raise?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. I understand that
Federal law provides whistleblower protections to specific individuals,
and I firmly believe that servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and
contractors should be protected from retaliation for any protected
activity.
112. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you
consider to be the purpose of Federal whistleblower protection laws?
Lieutenant General Anderson. ework to insulate those who make
protected communications or engage in other protected activity from
retaliation or reprisal for their actions. The legal framework is
intended to encourage those persons to report potential wrongdoing so
it can be appropriately investigated and, as warranted, addressed.
113. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever
retaliated against any individual for coming forward about an illegal
order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any
other concern that they wish to raise?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
114. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please
specify how you will do so.
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I will
comply with Federal whistleblower protection laws and will not take any
adverse actions or condone retaliation against whistleblowers who
engage in protected activities.
115. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
confirmed, will you commit to preventing retaliation against any
individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or
harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish
to raise?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
116. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you consider
it to be retaliation to demote an individual, prevent the promotion or
advancement of an individual, remove an individual from the military or
their role, or take other adverse actions related to personnel
decisions for an individual, in response to that individual engaging in
protected activity?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
117. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you consider
it to be retaliation to encourage another person(s) to demote an
individual, prevent the promotion or advancement of an individual,
remove an individual from the military or their role, or take other
adverse actions related to personnel decisions for an individual, in
response to that individual engaging in protected activity?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
data privacy
118. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of your obligations to protect sensitive servicemember,
contractor, and civilian employee information from unauthorized
disclosure and from foreign governments?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, all personnel, regardless of
component or status, must diligently safeguard personally identifiable
information from compromise, including from foreign governments and
their agents. This requires strict adherence to established policies
regarding data handling, storage and transmission, and destruction, as
well as a constant awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities.
Personnel complete annual training to ensure adherence to policies and
procedures.
119. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what are the
risks of any failure to protect sensitive servicemember, contractor,
and civilian employee information from unauthorized disclosure and from
foreign governments?
Lieutenant General Anderson. ncial exploitation, and physical harm
to individuals and their families. Operationally, compromised data can
reveal critical vulnerabilities, enabling adversaries to target
personnel, disrupt operations, and undermine strategic objectives.
Maintaining robust security measures is therefore not merely a
compliance requirement, but an imperative for safeguarding our people,
protecting our mission, and preserving national security.
120. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
understanding of the Protecting Americans' Data from Foreign
Adversaries Act?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the Act generally prohibits
data brokers from selling, licensing, or transferring personally
identifiable sensitive data to certain foreign adversary countries or
to any entity controlled by those foreign adversary countries. I take
the safeguarding of personally identifiable information seriously and
will continue to abide by U.S. law and all DOD policies and guidance.
121. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you oppose
private entities such as DOD contractors and data brokers selling
servicemember data to China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and
North Korea and entities controlled by those countries?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
122. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, would you support
any contracts for the sale or transfer of servicemember data including
a prohibition on reselling or transferring servicemember data to China,
Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea and entities
controlled by those countries?
Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
123. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, a 2023 Duke
University study found that data brokers with datasets about Active
Duty servicemembers were willing to sell to buyers in Asia for as
little as 12 cents per record. Do you think selling service member data
in foreign countries creates a national security risk?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
124. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, would you support
stronger enforcement of existing protections for U.S. and servicemember
data?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
interagency cooperation
125. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how has your
experience as a commander been made easier when you have support from
the interagency--such as expert negotiators and other tools like
economic aid and civic-institution-building--to maintain positive
bilateral relations that facilitate your military missions?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, during my career I have
worked with the interagency to achieve national security objectives.
Going forward, I believe that support from the interagency will be
critical to ensure we can maintain close relationships with allies and
partners who are willing and capable of meeting shared security
objectives. If confirmed, I anticipate building on these partnerships
to achieve the security priorities set forth in national strategic
guidance.
future war
126. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
will you work with U.S. Transportation Command and other stakeholders
to navigate complex and contested logistical challenges in your
commands?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the presence of terrorists,
malign State actors, maritime chokepoints, vast geography, austere
environmental conditions, and insufficient infrastructure represent
many of the logistical challenges within the area of responsibility. It
is essential for USAFRICOM to synchronize and collaborate with
USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other key logistics
support agencies. If confirmed, I will ensure the Command continues to
work with these partners to develop a resilient, robust array of
methods, modes, and means to deploy and distribute personnel,
equipment, and supplies.
127. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed,
what concrete ideas would you bring into your roles to drive innovation
in contested logistics and implement solutions that enable more agile
force posture and sustainment?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I am a strong proponent of
leveraging the latest concepts and technology to overcome the
significant logistical challenges to the Joint Force. Ideas such as
additive manufacturing, autonomous drone delivery of essential
supplies, and simulation-enabled wargaming to identify optimal
logistics methods, among others, offer the potential not only for
greater efficiency in our logistics operations but also for possible
cost savings once implemented. These same concepts and technologies can
also enable greater agility in our ability to support new or emergent
posture requirements. Together, such innovations can reduce our
dependency on vulnerable or time-consuming transoceanic supply lines.
If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to adopt and adapt emerging
technologies to address USAFRICOM's most pressing logistical
challenges.
128. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
would you work with our international partners to combat complex and
contested logistical challenges and test the concepts that we will need
for future warfare?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the USAFRICOM area of
responsibility includes partner nations with significant logistical
support capabilities and infrastructure that we leverage for access,
basing, and overflight needed for daily mission success, as well as
crisis and contingency response. Key to leveraging these capabilities
is investing the necessary time and resources to establish and maintain
relationships with select governments and their militaries, including
incorporating them into logistics-focused exercises. In addition,
USAFRICOM must continue to leverage the logistics-sharing arrangements
we have with several of our NATO allies, especially for airlift
delivery.
129. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, in your
experience as the Director for Joint Force Development for the Joint
Staff, how has the Joint Staff incorporated lessons from engagements
with partners in Africa into the Joint Warfighting Concept and the
Joint Concept for Contested Logistics, particularly around agile and
resilient logistics, assured joint power projection, and sustainment
for distributed operations?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the Joint Warfighting Concept
(JWC) aims to address how the Joint Force will overcome future military
challenges, including those posed in a highly contested environment by
sophisticated adversaries. The JWC emphasizes agility, speed, and the
ability to execute multi-domain operations to achieve objectives and
maintain strategic advantage. A key element of the JWC is the Joint
Concept for Contested Logistics (JCL), which seeks to provide the Joint
Force with concepts of operations (CONOPs) for planning, executing, and
enabling the movement and support of military forces in austere and
wide-ranging operating environments.
The JWC and JLC have global application for the Joint Force, but
the specific emphasis on contested and globally integrated logistics is
particularly relevant to the USAFRICOM area of responsibility and our
ability to conduct operations on--and from--the African continent. The
sheer size of Africa, when combined with population growth, harsh
environments, austere conditions, lack of infrastructure, and the
presence of malign actors and terrorist organizations, creates
multifaceted logistical challenges. The JWC and JLC present solutions
for navigating complex environments by building agility and resilience,
fostering strong partnerships, and leveraging emerging technology to
bridge infrastructure gaps. The implementation of the JWC and
adaptation of logistics strategies are vital for the United States to
maintain a strategic presence in Africa to ensure power projection and
to defend the Homeland from external threats.
united states africa command posture
130. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, press reports
indicate that the Trump administration is considering plans to combine
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) under United States European
Command. If confirmed, do you commit to consulting with this committee
before recommending or implementing any change to these two commands?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as a matter of policy, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with revisions to the
Unified Campaign Plan. I believe that there needs to be an entity
focused entirely on the African continent, whether that takes the form
of a sub-unified or unified command. If confirmed, I can offer my
assessment of risk to mission and the potential impact to United States
strategic interests. If asked, I will provide military advice through
my Chain of Command.
131. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what threats do
Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) pose to United States
Forces in Africa?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as I testified before the
Committee, China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic
influence to include military and information operations, while
Russia's actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to United
States interests.
132. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
will you work to deter PRC and Russian influence and activities that
undermine democracy and exacerbate conflicts on the Continent?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will work to
ensure that malign activity and regional instability are addressed by
engaging with those allies and partners with shared interests. If
confirmed, I will also work with the interagency to prioritize those
activities that directly address threats to the United States national
security interests and counter China's strategy on the African
Continent.
133. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, the PRC continues
to pursue control of key port and other dual-use infrastructure as part
of its Belt and Road Initiative across Africa that could also support
their future military operations. What do you believe is the most
productive way AFRICOM and the United States Military can or should
check the PRC's expanding military and economic footprint in Africa?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, China's military and economic
influence over the continent continues to grow as Beijing continues to
exploit Africa as a source of industrial and financial power. China is
expanding beyond traditional economic activity with increasing military
engagement and information activities, with a clear intent to undermine
Western influence and access wherever possible. If confirmed, USAFRICOM
will support interagency efforts to disrupt Beijing's military efforts
and malign activities in African.
134. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would AFRICOM
manage relationships with partners who do not want to have to choose
between the United States and any other security partner, including the
PRC and Russia?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I believe a moderate
investment can yield out-sized returns in the USAFRICOM area of
responsibility. If confirmed, I will pursue focused relationships
through operations, activities, and investments that achieve
warfighting advantage and support U.S. security interests. African
partners are sovereign nations, free to make their own security and
economic decisions in accordance with their national interests. As
China and Russia's malign activities are exposed over time, African
partners will pursue those relationships that best serve their
interests. Through prioritized and targeted engagement, the United
States must present ourselves as a valuable partner to African nations,
specifically those with the will and capacity to address shared threats
on the Continent.
135. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
will you promote maritime security in Africa?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will assess
opportunities to expand U.S. Military, interagency, partner, and allied
engagement on maritime security across the USAFRICOM area of
responsibility. Africa's expansive maritime domain holds both
significant challenges and strategic opportunities that demand a robust
and collaborative approach. I will pursue enhanced coordination with
our European allies and other non-traditional partners to advance
shared national security objectives, from strengthening security in
NATO's southern flank to combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
Lieutenant General Anderson. Through focused maritime exercises,
security cooperation training, information sharing, and bilateral law
enforcement engagements, USAFRICOM can empower partners to operate
independently, detect and expose malign activity, and achieve vital
shared goals. Moreover, I will coordinate with adjacent Combatant
Commands to maximize regional outcomes and safeguard U.S. national
security interests.
136. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how can AFRICOM
support or complement United States efforts to secure sea lines of
communication?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, U.S.-led naval exercises
present the greatest opportunities to demonstrate freedom of navigation
in key sea lines of communication, both military and commercial. These
annual exercises, conducted by USAFRICOM's assigned naval forces,
demonstrate U.S. capabilities and send the message to malign actors
that the United States is ready to defend freedom of navigation and
global commerce. Additionally, if confirmed, I will continue to work
with our NATO allies to find additional opportunities for maritime
cooperation, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Red Seas.
137. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
will you ensure effective intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance coverage in Africa to combat destabilizing, violent
extremist activity from non-State actors?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as you know, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is a high-demand/low-density
asset. Its availability remains a challenge not only for USAFRICOM but
for all other Combatant Commands.
As an economy of force theater, I understand USAFRICOM will have
limited ISR assets while the need for ISR coverage remains high. If
confirmed, I will assess the current risk and advocate for the required
resources to safeguard U.S. national security interests. To maintain
timely and relevant indications and warnings, I will also seek to
balance the requirement for exquisite, airborne ISR with other cost-
effective means to enhance domain and threat awareness. There are
suitable emerging technologies we can look to leverage. I would also
engage allies and our African partners to strengthen relationships, to
include exploring the potential for enhanced intelligence-sharing
agreements.
138. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
would you assess and adapt AFRICOM's posture following recent U.S.
troop withdrawals in countries like Niger?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as I discussed in my
testimony, the United States used Niger extensively to support ISR
activities. We invested significant resources, particularly at the air
base, which was a key foothold for us to monitor regional threats. As a
result, we'll have to find creative ways to ensure we have timely,
reliable indicators and warnings to counter terrorist threats to the
U.S. Homeland and advance U.S. security interests.
You have my assurance that, if confirmed, I will assess USAFRICOM's
current posture so we can achieve the objectives identified by national
strategic guidance.
139. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
will you leverage security cooperation, diplomatic engagements, and
other tools to build long-term strategic relationships across Africa?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I believe that a modest
investment of resources in Africa can yield an outsized return where
U.S. security interests are concerned. If confirmed, I will ensure that
USAFRICOM strategy is aligned to the U.S. national security priorities
identified in national strategic guidance. I will also engage with
allies and African partners by leveraging security cooperation and
capacity-building activities, and exercises to better enable our
African partners to address regional challenges.
140. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would you
continue to ensure that these efforts remain consistent with U.S.
commitments to democratic governance, civilian oversight, and human
rights?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, these commitments are
critical to the standing of the U.S. Military across the globe. If
confirmed, I will work with the Department to ensure USAFRICOM
activities are conducted in accordance with those U.S. law and
policies.
141. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, can you describe
your priorities for burden-sharing and security capacity-building in
Africa, should you be confirmed?
Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I commit to support the
priorities identified in national strategic guidance, to include
continuing partnerships with capable and willing African nations to
degrade and defeat terrorist organizations who pose a threat to the
United States Homeland.
142. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, which countries
would you prioritize and deprioritize?
Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I will assess the
current strategy to ensure that all USAFRICOM activities, operations,
and investments align to United States national security objectives,
including decisions on the prioritization of African partner nations.
143. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what areas of
cooperation would you emphasize or de-emphasize, and why?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, my focus at
USAFRICOM will be to: (1) counter terrorism to protect the U.S.
Homeland and prevent strategic surprise; (2) counter adversary
strategies on the Continent, and (3) ensure Joint Force readiness to
respond to crisis. I look forward to working with both allies and
partners to enhance their capacity to execute against shared security
objectives and enable our African partners to address regional security
challenges independently.
144. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you see
as the role of our partners in Africa in developing and fielding
innovative new technologies for use in security?
Lieutenant General Anderson. USAFRICOM continuously looks for
opportunities to work with our African partners--whether it be through
combined military exercises, individual technology demonstrations, or
establishing relationships to further research that is mutually
beneficial. Many of our African partners also have strong military-
affiliated research and development facilities and innovation
ecosystems. The ingenuity of our African partners will be critical as
USAFRICOM continues to evolve its military technological edge in
coordination with allies and partners.
145. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
do you anticipate AFRICOM to align with the Trump administration's
prioritization shift to the Indo-Pacific, as reportedly outlined in the
interim National Defense Strategy?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, my understanding is that
USAFRICOM staff and components are already operating with a theater
strategy and campaign plan in support of U.S. national security
objectives. If confirmed, I will assess the strategy and ensure that
all USAFRICOM activities, operations, and investments align to national
strategic guidance.
ethics
146. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, would you follow
an illegal, unlawful or immoral order?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I do not anticipate that I
will receive an unlawful order. I swore an oath to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States 33 years ago. I have reaffirmed
this oath eight times and will continue to adhere to it as long as I'm
able to serve.
147. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, do
you commit that your deliberations and decisions will only be
communicated through official, secure channels and any decisions
properly documented for both oversight and institutional memory?
Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M.
Anderson, USAF follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M.
Anderson, USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson,
USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on July 29,
2025, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2025.]
[all]