    [Senate Hearing 119-355]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-355

     NOMINATIONS OF: VICE ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
           COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND
             LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON, USAF, TO BE
             GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 22, 2025

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available via: http: // www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    63-382 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2026

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska		     JACK REED, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas		     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	     KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    JONI ERNST, Iowa		     RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska		     MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota	     TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, Florida		     ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama	     ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TED BUDD, North Carolina	     TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri		     JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JIM BANKS, Indiana		     MARK KELLY, Arizona
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan

                      John P. Keast, Staff Director
                 Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                   (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

                              _____________

                              july 22, 2025

                                                                       Page

    Nominations of: Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN, to be Admiral     1
      and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and
      Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF, to be General
      and Commander, United States Africa Command.

                               Members Statements

    Wicker, Senator Roger F..........................................     1

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Bradley, Vice Admiral Frank M., USN, to be Admiral and Commander,     4
      United States Special Operations Command.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    41

      Questions for the Record.......................................    58

      Nomination Reference and Report................................    79

      Biographical Sketch............................................    80

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    83

      Signature Page.................................................    86

    Anderson, Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M., USAF, to be General and     7
      Commander, United States Africa Command.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    86

      Questions for the Record.......................................   104

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   124

      Biographical Sketch............................................   125

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   128

      Signature Page.................................................   131

                                     (iii)

                  This hearing is printed to include all available
                    information
                    requested or required to be inserted for the
                    record.

                                      (iv)

     NOMINATIONS OF: VICE ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
           COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND
             LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON, USAF, TO BE
             GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2025

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger
    Wicker (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Budd,
    Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
    Kaine, King, Warren, Rosen, and Kelly.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

        Chairman Wicker. This hearing will come to order. The
    Committee meets today to consider the nominations of Vice
    Admiral Mitch Bradley to be Commander of the United States
    Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and Lieutenant General
    Dagvin Anderson to be Commander, United States Africa Command
    (AFRICOM). I welcome our witnesses and their families, and I
    thank them for their continued willingness to serve our Nation.
        If confirmed, Admiral Bradley will assume command at a time
    when Special Operations Command, SOCOM, faces a formidable
    challenge. SOCOM is being asked to build a force capable of
    combatting the advanced militaries of China and Russia while
    simultaneously remaining fully engaged in the fight against
    violent Islamic terrorism. At the same time, special operators
    must be ready to respond at a moment's notice as our Nation's
    premier crisis response force.
        It is clear to me that the role and importance of SOCOM is
    greater today than at any time since its establishment four
    decades ago. However, SOCOM's budget does not reflect this
    reality. Its budget has remained flat since 2019. Adjusted for
    inflation, that amounts to roughly a 14 percent cut in
    purchasing power. To amplify that point, SOCOM identifies $757
    million in unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2026.
        We want to ensure that SOCOM is fully resourced to meet the
    demands placed on it. Admiral Bradley should tell us how he
    plans to meet those demands and how we can help.
        If confirmed, General Anderson will confront a growing
    array of threats on the African continent. The Chinese
    Communist Party (CCP) views Africa as a critical link in Xi
    Jinping's unprecedented global military expansion, and
    continues to purchase new bases for the People's Liberation
    Army (PLA).
        Vladimir Putin remains fully engaged in his destabilizing
    campaign to trade security assistance for access to Africa's
    abundant natural resources. This is one of Mr. Putin's ways to
    fund his malign activities around the world. All the while,
    Islamic violent extremist groups aligned with ISIS and al Qaeda
    remain an enduring threat in Africa.
        Despite the growing complexity and scale of threats on the
    continent, AFRICOM remains under-resourced in both manpower and
    in critical capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance. I look forward to General Anderson's assessment
    of Africa's importance to our national security, as well as his
    description of what AFRICOM's strategy should be to counter the
    growing threat posed by China, Russia, and other adversaries
    across the continent. I am particularly interested in how
    General Anderson plans to use America's economic tools,
    including the Office of Strategic Capital, to combat Chinese
    influence.
        If confirmed, our nominees will confront a global security
    environment that is defined by emboldened, aggressive dictators
    in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. They view this fight
    as a global fight, unconstrained by geographic boundaries and
    the traditional forms of warfare. This axis of aggressors
    blends conventional military power with asymmetric tactics,
    including economic warfare, disinformation, and the use of
    proxy networks to undermine America's security interests. The
    witnesses before us today will play a key role in the
    Department of Defense's (DOD's) efforts to combat these
    challenges, and I look forward to hearing them address these
    and many other concerns during today's hearing.
        With that I turn to my friend and colleague, Ranking Member
    Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral
    Bradley and General Anderson, welcome, and congratulations on
    your nominations. I want to thank you for stepping forward to
    continue your long careers of service. I would also like to
    extend my appreciation to your families who were with you every
    step of the way and will continue to serve alongside you.
        Admiral Bradley, you have been nominated to lead the United
    States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, at a time of
    important transformation. Because of the efforts and sacrifices
    of the Special Operations community over the past 2 decades,
    the threat from ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], al
    Qaeda, and other violent extremist groups has been greatly
    diminished. Now America's national security interests are
    challenged by the aggressive and often coordinated ambitions of
    China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
        Our Special Operations Forces, or SOF, are not only needed
    to maintain pressure on violent extremist groups that threaten
    our Homeland, they are also key to addressing the challenges
    posed by these adversarial nations. As the recently released
    SOF Operating Concept proposes, quote, ``Joint SOF capabilities
    will help deter conflict by changing our competitors' political
    calculations, denying achievement, or imposing costs that
    outweigh potential benefits.'' This concept is ambitious and
    will require close partnership with the military services and
    other elements of the interagency, especially the intelligence
    community, and with our network of allies and partners around
    the world.
        Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, I expect your experience
    commanding Special Operators and SEALs around the world will
    serve you extremely well. Today I would ask that you share how
    you would plan to lead the Special Operations community to
    adjust to the rapid pace of change on the battlefield and how
    lessons learned from Ukraine, Gaza, the Red Sea, Syria, and
    elsewhere can inform the tactics and modernization efforts of
    SOCOM. Additionally, I am interested in how you would leverage
    unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, space, cyber
    information operations, and other capabilities in SOCOM
    missions.
        Finally, as a combatant command with service-like
    responsibilities, SOCOM needs and deserves a senior civilian to
    provide service secretary-like oversight and advocacy for our
    Special Operations forces. Congress has sought to empower the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense of Special Operations and Low-
    Intensity Conflict to fulfill that mandate. Admiral Bradley, if
    confirmed, I ask for your support as the Department continues
    to work to fully implement those reforms.
        General Anderson, you have been nominated to lead United
    States Africa Command, or AFRICOM. In Africa, our adversaries
    are focused on building trade relationships while seizing
    influence from us. China's military ambitions on the continent
    are no secret, from their growing presence in Djibouti to the
    more than 100 seaports that have been constructed, financed, or
    operated by Chinese-owned enterprises, and include service
    dual-use for future military contingencies.
        Russia has also expanded its military engagement in Africa.
    It is investing heavily in disinformation campaigns across the
    continent to spread anti-Western movements, undermine
    democracy, and promote Russian-backed authoritarian leaders,
    especially in West Africa.
        General Anderson, given these challenges, AFRICOM must
    continue to explore new methods to maintain United States
    security interests in the region. Our forces continue to train
    and advise partner militaries, but we are asked to do so with
    fewer resources and troops going forward. I want to ask you to
    share your views on the current security situation, the best
    approach to establish and maintain close partnerships with
    partner nations, and how we can seek to engage a whole-of-
    government effort to address the political and economic
    instability in Africa.
        Indeed, stability is essential for any successful nation.
    For decades, we have relied upon our State Department diplomats
    and the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to
    develop deep, lasting relationships in Africa that can outlast
    China and Russia's coercion. The outgoing AFRICOM Commander,
    General Langley, described our competitive advantage against
    Russia as, quote, ``not just building military and security
    capacity. The story needs to be told about the successes of
    USAID and State Department, collectively, for all of our
    operations, activities, and investments.'' I am deeply
    concerned that our soft power leadership in Africa has been
    significantly undermined over the past several months.
        General Anderson, I would like to know your perspective on
    the importance of diplomacy and development tools to achieve
    our national security objectives in Africa and how you would
    work to ensure our competitors do not capitalize on the
    dismantling of USAID in the region.
        Thank you both for your service and willingness to lead and
    sharing your time. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Reed.
    Now Admiral Bradley, you may make your opening statement, and
    feel free to introduce any friends and relatives you have with
    you, supporting you today.

    STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL
        AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral Bradley. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman
    Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the
    Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today as the
    President's nominee to be the next Commander of the United
    States Special Operations Command. I am grateful to the
    President, to the Secretary of Defense, and to Chairman Caine
    for their trust and confidence in me for this important
    nomination.
        I would like to recognize and thank the current SOCOM
    command team first, General Bryan Fenton and CSM Shane Shorter,
    and their families, for their leadership of the SOCOM force and
    families these past 3 years.
        I am privileged to be alongside my teammate Lieutenant
    General Dag Anderson, a longtime friend and Colleague, and if
    we are confirmed, I very much look forward to teaming with him
    again in our new capacities.
        I would like to recognize my family that are here with me
    today. They have been critical to my service and to our Nation
    and without whom I can't imagine being here today.
        My best friend and wife of 34 years, Katie, is here with
    me. The grounding rod and conscience of our family, she has
    weathered the storms of this career, mentoring young SOF
    families, rearing our four children, and keeping me humble and
    centered. She grew up in an Army family, daughter to an
    infantry officer who served in Vietnam before joining me in the
    Navy, and has moved households 27 times in her life, a
    testament to resilience if there ever was one.
        Our children and their families are here with me as well.
    Mary Katherine and husband Ralph, scientists and parents to our
    first granddaughter, Rosemary Louise; our oldest son, Henry, an
    FBI special agent, and his wife Brianna, also an FBI employee--
    we seem to be making interagency cooperation a bit of family
    business here--our son, Lieutenant Frank Bradley, a fellow
    SEAL, and his wife Kiley, a public servant in Hawaii; and our
    youngest son, James, a data scientist working in the national
    industrial base on autonomous underwater systems.
        I come from a small ranching community in southwest Texas,
    where I learned the foundations of meritocracy at an early age.
    I am the son of a World War II veteran, an Army Air Corps
    Master Sergeant, who worked on P-38s from Operation TORCH in
    North Africa to the final assault on Berlin. After the war, my
    father ranched and served as the Justice of the Peace, an
    elected judge, in our small Texas community. I learned a deep
    appreciation for our democracy and the judicial system watching
    him dispense judgment in our community. His example of service
    and the allure of adventure are what drew me to the United
    States Naval Academy and the SEAL community, and I have had
    ample opportunity for both in my 37 years since leaving
    Eldorado, Texas.
        My mother was the compassionate influence. As much of a
    rancher as any man in our family, she and my grandmother were
    the matriarchs who would weave discipline with love in
    appropriate measure. Their influence looms large in everything
    I do.
        Finally, I must thank my siblings and the countless
    coaches, professors, and pastors who have shaped me both on and
    off the field. Special Operations is the ultimate team sport,
    where to win is to live, and to lose often means someone you
    care for does not. As such, I am grateful to be a member of the
    most precise and lethal fighting force the world has ever
    known.
        On a strategic landscape where adversaries and competitors
    challenge the rules-based international order, your SOF provide
    the agility, precision, and nuance needed to confront and
    disrupt these threats in competition. But should the need
    arise, we are also ready to integrate into the joint force to
    respond to crisis and engage in high-end conflict, where the
    precise delivery of violence will be critical to shaping
    success on the battlefield.
        To this Committee and your predecessors I say thank you.
    SOCOM's existence reflects the strong bipartisan commitment in
    Congress to ensure the United States leads the world in Special
    Operations, and that commitment has paid off.
        If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD SO/LIC, with
    my fellow combatant commanders, service leadership, the
    Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and this Committee to
    sustain and strengthen the force, to man, train, equip, and
    care for our SOF warriors and their families. I will provide
    the Secretary of Defense and the President candid and clear
    military advice, and I will remain fully transparent with this
    Committee, ensuring that you have the information necessary to
    continue your critical constitutional oversight of our national
    defense.
        I thank you for your service to our country. I look forward
    to answering your questions and engaging with you on the
    important work ahead.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Bradley follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley
                               opening statement
        Good morning, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before
    you today as the President's nominee to be the next commander of the
    United States Special Operations Command.
        I am grateful to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their trust and confidence in me for
    this nomination.
        I'd like to recognize and thank the current SOCOM Command Team,
    General Bryan Fenton and Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter and their
    families, for their leadership of the SOCOM force and families these
    past 3 years.
        I am privileged to be alongside my teammate Lieutenant General Dag
    Anderson--a longtime friend and colleague; and if we are confirmed, I
    look forward to teaming with him again in our new capacities.
        I'd like to recognize the members of my family, who have been
    critical to my service to our Nation and without whom I can't imagine
    being here.
        My best friend and wife of 34 years--Katie. The grounding rod and
    conscience of our family, she has weathered the storms of this career
    mentoring young SOF families, rearing our children, and keeping me
    humble and centered. She grew up in an Army family, daughter to an
    infantry officer who served in Vietnam before joining me in the Navy,
    and has moved households 27 times--a testament to resilience if there
    ever was one.
        Our children and their families are here with me as well. Mary
    Katherine and husband Ralph--scientists and parents of our first
    granddaughter, Rosemary Louise. Our son--Henry, an FBI Special Agent
    and his wife Brianna, also an FBI employee . . . we seem to be making
    interagency cooperation a family business. Our son, Lieutenant Frank
    Bradley--a fellow SEAL, and his wife Kiley, a public servant in Hawaii.
    And our youngest son, James--a data scientist working in the National
    Industrial Base on autonomous underwater systems.
        I come from a small ranching community in southwest Texas, where I
    learned the foundations of meritocracy at an early age. I am the son of
    a WWII veteran, an Army Air Corps Master Sergeant who worked on P-38s
    from Operation TORCH in North Africa to the final assault on Berlin.
    After the war, my father ranched and served as the Justice of the
    Peace--an elected judge--in our small community. I learned a deep
    appreciation for our democracy and the judicial system watching him
    dispense judgment in our community. His example of service and the
    allure of adventure are what drew me to the United States Naval Academy
    and the SEAL Community . . . I have had ample opportunity for both in
    my 37 years since leaving Eldorado, TX.
        My mother was the compassionate influence. As much of a rancher as
    any man in our family, she and my grandmother were the matriarchs who
    would weave discipline with love in appropriate measure. Their
    influence looms large in everything I do.
        Finally, I must thank my siblings and the countless coaches,
    professors, and pastors who have shaped me both on and off the field.
    Special Operations is the ultimate team sport--where to win is to live,
    and to lose often means someone you care for does not.
        As such, I am grateful to be a member of the most precise and
    lethal fighting force the world has ever known.
        On a strategic landscape where adversaries and competitors
    challenge the rules-based international order, SOF provide the agility,
    precision, and nuance needed to confront and disrupt these threats in
    competition. Should the need arise, we are also ready to integrate into
    the joint force to respond to crisis and engage in high-end conflict,
    where the precise delivery of violence will be critical to shaping
    success on the battlefield.
        To this committee and your predecessors, thank you. SOCOM's
    existence reflects the strong bipartisan commitment in Congress to
    ensure the U.S. leads the world in special operations--and that
    commitment has paid off.
        If confirmed, I'll work closely with the ASD SO/LIC, my fellow
    Combatant Commanders, Service leadership, the Chairman, the Secretary
    of Defense, and this committee to sustain and strengthen the force--to
    man, train, equip, and care for our SOF warriors and their families.
        I will provide the SECDEF and President candid and clear military
    advice, and I will remain fully transparent with this Committee--
    ensuring that you have the information necessary to continue your
    critical constitutional oversight of our national defense.
        Thank you for your service to our country. I look forward to
    answering your questions and engaging with you on the important work
    ahead.

        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Admiral. General
    Anderson, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON, USAF, TO
         BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

        General Anderson. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished Committee Members, thank you for the opportunity
    to appear before you this morning. It is truly a humbling
    honor.
        I am honored by the President's trust and confidence in
    nominating me to serve as the Commander of United States Africa
    Command, and I am grateful for the support of the Secretary of
    Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would
    also like to recognize General Langley's 40 years of
    distinguished service and the strong leadership, and the team
    that he and Sergeant Major Mike Woods forged.
        I am joined today by my wife of 26 years, Liz, a native of
    the great State of Maine. Her unwavering support and sacrifice
    have been instrumental to my service and the success of the
    mission. Liz is the heart of our family, and despite nine
    schools in six states and three countries she is the reason we
    have two strong and talented daughters: Hala, who is watching
    from Paris today, and Lilja, who is here with us.
        My commitment to service is rooted in the values instilled
    in me by my family. My grandmother, a nurse, served her
    community well into her 80's. My grandfathers, one a sailor in
    World War I and the other a Marine in World War II, were
    ordinary people who answered the call during extraordinary
    times.
        My mother, Roberta, a special education teacher, and my
    father, Charles, a police officer, modeled public service,
    selflessness, and integrity. These values have guided me
    through 33 years of military service. My parents are watching
    from my hometown of Ypsilanti, Michigan, the home of Rosie the
    Riveter and Willow Run, where, at the age of 17, I learned to
    fly alongside these symbols of American ingenuity and
    resilience.
        It is an honor to sit beside Vice Admiral Mitch Bradley, a
    Special Operations teammate and one of the finest leaders and
    warfighters I have served with. If confirmed, I concur with
    Admiral Bradley that it is truly a team sport, and look forward
    to collaborating closely with him, and all the combatant
    commanders, to confront the complex emerging challenges of
    today.
        My career has followed a non-traditional path, with seven
    joint assignments across four commands, ranging from
    conventional warfighting exercises in the Indo-Pacific, to
    conducting special operations in the Middle East and Africa,
    and from global mobility to stateside training.
        My experiences abroad have shaped my career. I had the
    privilege of studying in the Czech Republic, where I witnessed
    an outpouring of support for America after 9/11. Almost 23
    years later, I had the honor to speak at the 80th anniversary
    of the liberation of Plze. by Patton's Third Army. Thousands
    gathered, waving Czech and American flags, a powerful reminder
    of our shared values and enduring ties.
        While I have flown several aircraft, the missions flying
    the U-28, a modest single-engine prop, were among my most
    rewarding. In under 2 years, a team of operators, engineers,
    and acquisitions experts turned an urgent need into a mission-
    ready, highly capable surveillance platform, a testament to
    empowered innovation meeting battlefield requirements.
        As the Commander of Special Operations Command Africa, I
    witnessed how Africa, strategically positioned between the
    Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, is increasingly at the convergence
    of great-power rivalry and terrorism. China is expanding its
    approach from a focus on economic influence to greater military
    and information operations. Russia's actions are frequently
    destabilizing and run counter to United States interests.
    Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces,
    posing a direct threat to our safety and security.
        During my time at Special Operations Command Africa, an
    American citizen was taken hostage in Niger. Within 96 hours,
    we located him, coordinated with multiple African partners and
    European allies, and Joint Special Operations Command executed
    the rescue. The speed and success of that mission underscored
    the seamless integration of the joint force and the importance
    of strong relationships. When we called in the middle of the
    night, our partners answered.
        If confirmed, I look forward to building on that success
    and those relationships. I will keep this Committee informed, I
    will be a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars, and I will
    lead by example to advance U.S. interests and counter adversary
    threats.
        Thank you for your unwavering support of the men and women
    of the U.S. Military and thank you for this opportunity. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Anderson follows:]

         Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson
        Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Committee
    Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this
    morning.
        I am honored by the President's trust and confidence in nominating
    me to serve as Commander, US AFRICA COMMAND, and I am grateful for the
    support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. I'd also like to recognize General Langley's 40 years
    of distinguished service and the strong leadership team he and Sergeant
    Major Mike Woods forged.
        I am joined today by my wife of 26 years, Liz, a native of the
    great State of Maine. Her unwavering support and sacrifice have been
    instrumental to my service and the success of the mission. Liz is the
    heart of our family and despite nine schools in six states and three
    countries, she is the reason we have two strong and talented daughters:
    Hala, who is watching from Paris, and Lilja, who is here today.
        My commitment to service is rooted in the values instilled in me by
    my family. My grandmother, a nurse, served her community well into her
    80's. My grandfathers, one a sailor in WWI and the other a marine in
    WWII, were ordinary people who answered the call during extraordinary
    times.
        My mother, Roberta, a special education teacher, and my father,
    Charles, a police officer, modeled public service, selflessness, and
    integrity. These values have guided me through 33 years of military
    service. My parents are watching from my hometown of Ypsilanti,
    Michigan, the home of Rosie the Riveter and Willow Run--where, at the
    age of 17, I learned to fly alongside these symbols of American
    ingenuity and resilience.
        It is an honor to sit beside VADM Mitch Bradley, a Special
    Operations teammate and one of the finest leaders and warfighters I've
    served with. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating closely with
    him--and the other combatant commanders--to confront emerging
    challenges.
        My career has followed a non-traditional path, with seven joint
    assignments across four commands--ranging from exercising conventional
    warfighting in the Indo-Pacific, to conducting special operations in
    the Middle East and Africa, and from global mobility to stateside
    training.
        My experiences abroad have shaped my career. I had the privilege of
    studying in the Czech Republic, where I witnessed an outpouring of
    support for America after 9/11. Almost 23 years later, I had the honor
    of returning to speak at the 80th anniversary of the liberation of
    Plzen by Patton's Third Army. Thousands gathered, waving Czech and
    American flags--a powerful reminder of our shared values and enduring
    ties.
        While I've flown several aircraft, the missions flying the U-28, a
    modest single-engine prop, were among my most rewarding. In under 2
    years, a team of operators, engineers, and acquisitions experts turned
    an urgent need into a mission-ready, highly capable surveillance
    aircraft--a testament to empowered innovation meeting battlefield
    requirements.
        As the Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), I
    witnessed how Africa--strategically positioned between the Atlantic and
    Indo-Pacific--is increasingly at the convergence of great-power rivalry
    and terrorism. China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic
    influence to greater military and information operations. Russia's
    actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to United States
    interests. Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces,
    posing a direct threat to our safety and security.
        During my time at SOCAF, an American citizen was taken hostage in
    Niger. Within 96 hours, we located him, coordinated with multiple
    African partners and European allies, and executed the rescue. The
    speed and success of that mission underscored the seamless integration
    of the Joint Force and the importance of strong relationships. When we
    called in the middle of the night, our partners answered.
        If confirmed, I look forward to building on that success and those
    relationships. I will keep this Committee informed, I will be a
    responsible steward of taxpayer dollars, and I will lead by example to
    advance U.S. interests and counter adversary threats.
        Thank you for your unwavering support of the men and women of the
    U.S. Military and thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to
    your questions.

        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, General Anderson, and
    thank you both for being with us. It is now time for me to ask
    some standard questions that we ask of all military nominees.
        To exercise it legislative and oversight responsibilities,
    it is important that this Committee and other appropriate
    committees of the Congress be able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information. So if you
    will just answer yes or no. You can answer simultaneously. And
    we will be watching.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes, Senator.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay. Just a yes or a no is fine. Do you
    agree when asked to give your personal views even if those
    views differ from the administration in power?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Admiral Bradley. No.
        General Anderson. No.
        Chairman Wicker. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requests for communications,
    including questions for the record in hearings?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon requests before this Committee?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communications, in a
    timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee,
    or to consult with that committee regarding the basis for any
    good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. And thus ends our standard questions. Let
    me ask one that has become somewhat standard, and we have
    gotten encouraging responses from all of our witnesses.
        Much of the funding in the defense reconciliation bill, the
    Big Beautiful Bill, as the President calls it, is unspecific
    and will technically be at the discretion of the Department of
    Defense, though this Committee will write recommendations for
    them. We do that because of the rules.
        A quick yes-or-no answer from each of you. Do you commit to
    follow the Congress' spending recommendations in defense
    reconciliation, unequivocally? Admiral Bradley.
        Admiral Bradley. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. General Anderson?
        General Anderson. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. And Admiral Bradley, you, in particular,
    will be receiving quite a sum of money for SOCOM priorities,
    and we want to work together to make sure it is used for the
    most pressing needs. So I thank you for your answers there.
        General Anderson, you talked about the activities of China
    and Africa. You talked about the activities of Russia under
    their dictator, Vladimir Putin. Why do they do this? Are they
    helping Africa out of the goodness of their hearts?
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate the concern. I see
    that from my time at SOCAFRICA and my time on the Joint Staff
    that there is growing activity from both China and Russia on
    the continent. Both of those nations see their futures running
    through the continent and as key to their strategy.
        I think we can look at several of the things that have been
    done that have not necessarily been good for the people of
    Africa. I think they are aware of that. I think when we can
    highlight that it helps them understand the risks of dealing
    with China and Russia, whether that be debt diplomacy from
    China or the corrosive effects of the Africa Corps, previously
    known as Wagner, in those societies.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, okay, and so when we have programs
    such as PEPFAR or USAID, we would like to feel that that really
    helps the people there. But we have a strategic security
    purpose in doing that ourselves, do we not?
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay, and what is that?
        General Anderson. Senator, these programs are important as
    long as they provide for the security and prosperity of our
    Nation. I think as we target those in key areas they can help
    build stability in key regions.
        Chairman Wicker. If we abandoned the playing field in that
    regard, what would be the response in Moscow or Beijing? I
    think they would be celebrating, would they not?
        General Anderson. Well, Senator, I know that if there are
    opportunities, they will seize them.
        Chairman Wicker. Yes. Now, on SOCOM, let me just say, the
    SOCOM budget has been inadequate. There has been a 35 percent
    increase in combatant command requests for SOCOM support over
    the last 3 years. In the last decade, there has been a 200
    percent increase in crisis response missions executed by SOCOM.
    Fourteen percent budget cut, though, in SOCOM, as I pointed out
    in my opening statement, since 2019, when adjusted for
    inflation, and in raw numbers, 4,000 troops cut from SOCOM, and
    $757 million in unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2026.
        Now Admiral, the reconciliation bill included $1.64 billion
    to support SOCOM's readiness and modernization priorities. Do
    you agree with me that SOCOM's budget is inadequate to meet
    growing global demands?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, as you have described it, I have
    heard General Fenton make a compelling case with the same
    statistics and believe those to be true.
        Chairman Wicker. Let me just point out to, and make sure
    you agree. Reconciliation was always meant to be additive to,
    not a replacement for the core budget, absent real growth in
    SOCOM's future budget requests. Your command will face
    significant resourcing challenges. Is that correct?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, we will absolutely use the
    resources that are provided to us, with ruthless prioritization
    to go down through the tasks that are given to us. Inevitably,
    though, with the current operations commitment that exists,
    that will mean that we will have to mortgage some of our
    modernization initiatives to be able to pay for that readiness
    to sustain those current operations.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, listen. We will not be able to be
    generous with either of you, but we do want to hear what you
    really, really need. We are going to be depending on the two of
    you and your teams to let us know that, because if something
    goes wrong and you did not have the capacity to cover it, then
    they should not look to you if this body has not provided you
    with the resources.
        So thank you very much. Senator Reed, you are recognized.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. When
    General Fenton delivered the posture statement last year he
    said, and I quote, ``Our interagency efforts also have included
    close cooperation with the Department of State and U.S. Agency
    for International Development. With the implementation of the
    Global Fragility Act in Coastal West Africa fundamentally
    focused on preventing crises in failed states before they can
    occur.''
        Similarly, AFRICOM Commander, General Langley, testified,
    ``U.S. investment focused on stabilization, conflict prevention
    and peace-building, democracy, governance, economic growth, and
    public health attack the roots of terrorism and tyranny more
    than bullets and air strikes ever will.''
        For both of you gentlemen, why are such efforts in our
    vital national security interests and not just humanitarian
    good deeds, and what do we risk by walking away from these
    investments? Admiral Bradley?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. In my 34 years I have
    had the opportunity on many continents to work closely with our
    humanitarian, our AID, our diplomats, and I have seen the
    executors, even at the non-governmental organization level,
    provide important capability for the U.S. I also recognize,
    however, that there are many priorities, as we just talked
    about, and the prioritization of the budget across those is a
    difficult thing to balance and to manage.
        I pledge, and I believe, that throughout time we have
    always worked as an integrated interagency to be able to bring
    the multiple levers of influence and power that the U.S. needs
    to achieve its policy objectives, and if confirmed, I would
    pledge to continue that.
        Senator Reed. General Anderson, and particularly in Africa.
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator. From my time at SOCAFRICA,
    much like Admiral Bradley, I worked extensively with State
    Department, USAID, and NGO's across the continent to meet
    requirements. Africa is very much an economy of force theater
    so we have to maximize the limited resources we have. So going
    forward we will look at where we can find those opportunities,
    whether it is with State Department and the aid that they can
    provide, bringing and working with the non-governmental
    organizations--we have worked closely with several in Africa--
    also looking at opportunities with the Office of Strategic
    Capital or private equity as private firms may be able to
    invest and help in some of these areas, as well.
        I think one of the things that AFRICOM is positioned well
    to do is to convene people to have these discussions,
    understanding we provide the military aspect of it, we can
    provide a venue to bring folks together to look at the security
    implications of these investments.
        Senator Reed. Given the current situation, in which the
    State Department is being hollowed out and that USAID is being
    effectively abolished, have you lost a valuable strategic tool?
        General Anderson. Senator, I understand that is still under
    review for the foreign assistance and that much of that is
    being transferred to State, so if I am confirmed I would have
    to assess what is available and how we can best use that for
    our national interests.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Bradley, the same question. Are you
    losing a very valuable tool?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I am very confident that however
    the distribution of those tasks and those efforts are made, we
    will continue to work with them closely to make sure we bring
    the best combination of those levers and tools to bear.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Bradley, what are your modernization
    priorities for SOCOM?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. As we look to the
    future, the conflicts that SOCOM might be called to participate
    in, I have had the opportunity this last 3 years to participate
    in General Fenton's leadership team as a member of the Board of
    Directors. We focused, as you have seen and in his testimony,
    on how to penetrate and power project in contested
    environments. We see that through the lessons learned on the
    battlefields of Ukraine, even into the Red Sea, and certainly
    as we contemplate what a future fight against China might look
    like. So contested environments and being able to arrive with
    the element of surprise are a critical component.
        A second priority, though, is also the ability to operate
    within the ubiquitous technical surveillance environment that
    is evolving around us today. It provides certainly challenges
    to our ability to again arrive with that element of surprise,
    but also opportunities, and here, the partnership with
    CYBERCOM, with SPACECOM, and with your Special Operators is
    particularly important. So those strategic partnership and
    relationships and modernization of that partnership I think is
    critical.
        Senator Reed. Finally, General Anderson, if I may, you have
    had valuable experience on the ground already as commander of
    Special Operations in AFRICOM. With respect to Somalia, do you
    think a continuous presence is essential?
        General Anderson. I am sorry, Senator. I missed--where?
        Senator Reed. In Somalia.
        General Anderson. In Somalia. Senator, as you know, we have
    had presence there for quite some time. We have seen some
    limited success there in training their forces. The Danab force
    is a capable counterterrorism force. I do believe that that
    area is volatile. Al-Shabaab has shown the desire and will to
    attack the United States and the United States' interests. They
    are increasing cooperation with the Houthis. So I think it is
    in our interests to have some level of engagement in that
    region. Whether that is with the Federal Government or the
    member states, I think that is something I would have to
    assess, if confirmed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, to both of you and to both of your families, as
    well, for your many years of service and sacrifice.
        Countering China has been, and will continue to be, an
    important mission for both SOCOM and AFRICOM. The Indo-Pacific
    region, one of the most strategically vital and geographically
    expansive regions in the world, we have SOCOM, and SOCOM must
    be able to rapidly engage where the need is paramount over an
    immense expanse of land, sea, and air space.
        Admiral Bradley, as the United States military prepares for
    a potential war with China, what do you envision Special
    Operations Forces, what kind of role will they be playing in
    the Indo-Pacific, and how will you be able to balance that with
    other SOF responsibilities?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. I believe that the
    role that SOF has played over its history has been founded on a
    critical value proposition that will be very relevant, even
    more relevant against China, and that is our ability to build
    strong relationships, to partner and to build capacity,
    essentially to be a force multiplier across a strong alliance,
    and to strengthen that alliance by doing such.
        In fact, the credibility we have generated over these last
    two-plus decades in the counterterrorism fight give us great
    ability to be able to help sustain and extrapolate that
    credibility into the Indo-Pacific, where building partnerships
    with our allies will be very critical. That will allow us
    placement and access to then help develop enhanced
    understanding of our adversaries' actions that might be against
    us. Then if deterrence fails and we cascade to crisis or
    conflict, it will give us the ability to leverage that
    placement and access for the delivery of irregular kinetic and
    non-kinetic effects.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Anderson, we talked a
    little bit yesterday about the growing influence of China on
    the continent, and talked about that influence that they have
    and the threats that they are posing. What do you think are the
    greatest areas of threats that you are going to have to focus
    on if you are confirmed?
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate the
    discussion that we had on this. I think China does pose a
    significant threat to United States interests on the continent.
    We have seen how they have used the Belt and Road Initiative to
    be a primarily economic focus in the past. We are seeing them
    expand into more information operations on the continent, for
    providing the communist propaganda to the continent. We are
    also seeing them engage in more military-to-military
    engagements, which is concerning.
        We are also looking at some of the infrastructure they are
    looking to development, and ports that could become dual use
    are of concern, especially if they have something on the
    Atlantic. Atlantic base of sea-based Chinese ships would
    greatly complicate our security picture writ large.
        So working across Africa I think to identify where China is
    not working in everyone's interests is important, and I think
    also engaging in the information domain to highlight some of
    these malign activities is important.
        Senator Fischer. We also spoke a little bit about losing
    some of our Nation partners who have been a great help to us on
    the continent. We talked about looking at National Guard and
    the partnerships that they have in various countries, and not
    just in Africa but also around the world.
        Just briefly, could you kind of hit on the importance of
    developing those or using those partnerships as tools to help
    develop good relationships?
        General Anderson. Absolutely, Senator. I think the State
    Partnership Program is one of the best programs we have within
    our Department. It establishes long-term relationships, it
    allows engagement, and builds capability and readiness for our
    forces as well as theirs.
        I think what you brought up is an interesting point,
    especially Nebraska, who has partners on the continent, but
    also with the Czech Republic, as there are opportunities that
    the State Partnership Program can bring these partners together
    and help burden share some of the effort, so that we can use
    the expertise--the Czech's bring great expertise and
    capabilities--to help train our African partners. Combined with
    the State Partnership Program, I think there are some
    opportunities there, without a doubt.
        Senator Fischer. Admiral Bradley, short question, Mr.
    Chairman, please. What is your view on the importance of the
    space domain with regards to Special Operations Forces, and how
    would you leverage that new command? If you would take that for
    a question for the record, the Chairman is anxious to gavel me
    out.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I will.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Wicker. Very, very fine question, Senator Fischer,
    which is going to require a lengthy response on the record.
    Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to
    both of you for your nominations. I just noticed, in looking at
    your bios, you both have had, in your professional careers,
    some significant experience in programs kind of with
    international partners. So Admiral Bradley, your posting to the
    Italian equivalent of their sort of SEALs, the Incursori, and
    General Anderson, your reception of the Olmsted scholarship.
    Talk about how in each instance this was important to your
    professional development.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. I think I was most
    surprised and rewarded with being able to see the world through
    the eyes of a different culture, and as close even as the
    Italian culture is to America, in fact, many immigrants, a
    large portion of the country here. But they could still see the
    same event in a decidedly different way.
        I believe that experience both deepened my family's
    closeness and appreciation for the rest of the world but also
    helped to deepen my own empathy, to be able to understand the
    way other people might see things.
        Senator Kaine. So you clearly conveyed a benefit to these
    Italian allies by being posted there, but also received a
    benefit in return that has helped you in the leader you are
    today.
        General Anderson, tell us about the Olmsted program.
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator, it was, in hindsight, a
    transformative program to be able to study abroad and to be
    immersed in the culture. Like I said in the opening statement,
    when I was there after 9/11 you could not walk through any town
    square without seeing a memorial to the United States and to
    the Americans that were lost.
        As a matter of fact, when I walked to school that morning,
    on September 12th, there was a status of Tomas Garrigue
    Masaryk, the first President of the Czech Republic. On that
    square you could not walk through it because it was covered
    with flowers and candles, and across the chest of the statue
    was, in Czech, a banner that said, ``We stand with you for
    democracy.'' It was a pretty powerful reminder of what those
    relations mean and what the American way of life and our values
    stand for to many people.
        Senator Kaine. This was a number of years ago, at a time
    when it probably would have been hard to imagine a land war in
    Europe. But the relationship the United States has had with the
    Czech Republic, including in the current conflict in Ukraine,
    has been a very important one.
        We also have a lot of programs where we bring military
    leaders from other nations to the United States to participate
    in programs at the Naval War College and the Army War College
    and others. If you benefited from the experiences in the Czech
    Republic and in Italy, I believe, from my own observation,
    these programs are also pretty important to building
    relationships with foreign military leaders who come to the
    United States. Do you share that view?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do.
        Senator Kaine. The reason I ask the question--I was
    interested in the commonality in your resumes in this way--is I
    am very, very worried about the budget that the Administration
    has submitted, and the recissions package we voted on is
    dramatically undercutting these exchange programs. I have not
    yet seen the effect in the DOD, but in the recission package
    that we passed last week, it was very nonspecific about
    details. But you can tell a little bit from how these
    recissions will be used from looking at the Administration's
    submitted budget.
        The Administration's submitted budget for 2026 basically
    eliminates a lot of funding that goes into this. The Bureau of
    Education and Cultural Affairs in the State Department, which
    handles these programs for diplomates, the recommendation is
    that it be cut by 93 percent, and many of the RIFs that were
    done a couple of Fridays ago in the State Department, laying
    off people who do this work. This is the Fulbright Program, and
    this is other exchange programs. These programs that the U.S.
    has funded have educated more than 600 current or former heads
    of other nations. They have come to the United States and
    gained experience here. Eighty-eight Nobel Prize winners are
    alumni of these exchanges, and the Administration proposes to
    cut the budget by 93 percent. I am very worried about that.
        Let me ask one other question. How important is it, in your
    work in AFRICOM or Special Forces, going forward, that the U.S.
    be a strong competitor in the information domain?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I will start there. It is
    critical. In the competition, in the information domain, truth
    is the high ground. We in the United States have a history of
    leveraging the truth, telling the truth, and I think that is
    powerful.
        Senator Kaine. General Anderson?
        General Anderson. Senator, I think it is absolutely
    critical across the continent, and I agree with Admiral
    Bradley. The fact that we have a credible news source and that
    we tell the truth is a very powerful information operation.
        Senator Kaine. The Administration's proposed budget for
    2026 slashes the U.S. Agency for Global Media's budget by 82
    percent. The Voice of America, the Middle East Broadcasting
    Network, VOA Persian, all of these are being dramatically
    reduced, and I think many of the RIFs that happened at the
    State Department are in that space.
        Mr. Chair, I would conclude, I would like to just introduce
    in the record an article from the Washington Institute of Near
    East Policy, ``Here's How State Department Cuts Would Impede
    U.S. Policy,'' dated July 3, 2025.
        Chairman Wicker. Is there objection? Without objection, so
    ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, welcome. Congratulations. Thank
    you for your continued service. Thanks to your families for
    their service and sacrifice, as well.
        Admiral Bradley, Special Forces were targeted for
    reductions in forces and funding in recent years by the past
    administration. Could you explain what it takes to turn a
    conventional soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, into a Special
    Operator? How many years does it take to build that kind of
    expertise and ability?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. First, I have to say
    we have the benefit of being able to draw from the best and the
    brightest across the great population of the United States. Our
    services do the principal recruiting, and we have the
    opportunity to be able to draw from within those recruits.
        But Special Operations provides a very valuable recruiting
    tool for those services, as well. Once a candidate assesses
    into a service and has the initiative to want to volunteer to
    come to one of our selection assessments programs, a rigorous
    process, both of their resume, of their psychological
    resilience, of their physical capabilities begins, followed by
    some amount of training and really grit determination. On the
    back side of that, that may take anywhere up to a year,
    depending upon the program. Then additional advanced training
    will continue. Then finally, the operator or the member will be
    assigned to an operational unit where, frankly, another amount
    of apprentice to master a progression begins.
        So for a fully up and around operator to reach leadership
    status it is not uncommon for that to take 6 or 7 years.
        Senator Cotton. So if Special Operations Forces were to
    face cuts, you do not just lose capability. You lose a lot of
    time, as well. That is correct?
        Admiral Bradley. It does take time to build that operator.
    Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Versus, say, just for the sake of
    comparison, the Army can send someone from the first day of
    basic training through infantry training to an infantry platoon
    in maybe 6 months. Obviously, they are brand new privates just
    out of training, about 6 months versus many years. I think we
    should be mindful of that contrast.
        What is your assessment on how drones are changing the
    modern battlefield? Every day there are new reports of new
    developments in drone warfare in Ukraine. We saw a couple of
    months ago Ukraine launched audacious attacks from inside of
    Russia with pre-positioned drones. It appears that Israel may
    have done something similar inside of Iran. I know you have
    probably given this a lot of thought in your current job and
    looking ahead to your future job.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do not think it is unfair to
    call this a revolution in military affairs. The changing,
    accelerating pace of technology, the ubiquitous information
    environment, and the advent of man-machine teamed autonomy on
    the battlefields of the world today are absolutely changing the
    character of warfare in our very eyes.
        Within Special Operations, and I believe the initiatives,
    frankly, that you have initiated here with the FORGED Act, the
    SPEED Act across the way, and the President and the Secretary's
    initiatives to drive innovation within the Department are
    critical to allowing us to use the innovative spirit of our
    operators, to be able to capture those problems and
    opportunities we see on the battlefield and turn them into new
    man-machine teamed approaches.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. General Anderson, given your
    current role and also the threat of drone attacks from
    terrorist groups and your future role, what are your thoughts
    on this question?
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that. It is
    transforming the battlefield. We are at a critical inflection
    point in history, much like the Industrial Age matured in the
    early 20th century, the Digital Age maturing now. As Admiral
    Bradley mentioned, it is not just the drones we see today. It
    is what does it mean when we have autonomy and AI behind those
    drones, and we have swarm attacks. That is not necessarily
    science fiction. That is in the future.
        So we have to take this very seriously, not just taking on
    the drone operations but also what do we do to counter them and
    defend against them. This is a grave concern for me as I look
    at the African continent, as there are vulnerabilities out
    there for our forces. But it is also a vulnerability for our
    partners, as well.
        Senator Cotton. I guess I should say this, not just
    potential terrorist groups. It is also potential insurgencies,
    uprisings, clashes of the kind that we see with more frequency
    in Africa, as well.
        Okay, thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to
    welcome both of you, congratulate you on your nominations, and
    acknowledge Liz in the audience, a resident of Maine, as you
    noted, General Anderson, proud graduate of the University of
    Maine. I hope, Liz, you will convey to your family in Maine
    that you saw me working. I appreciate you being here today.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a statement from our brother, Jim
    Inhofe, on the AFRICOM legislation from 2008, when it was first
    adopted, and I would like unanimous consent to enter it into
    the record of this hearing.
        Chairman Wicker. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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        Senator King. As all of us know, Senator Inhofe was a great
    champion of our interests in Africa, probably the greatest in
    the Senate. I noted in his statement, again from 2008, ``My
    resolution recognizes the strategic importance of the African
    continent and encourages the Department of Defense, the State
    Department, and USAID to work cooperatively together with our
    African allies to bring hope to the continent.''
        We sort of have been talking around this today. We just
    made one of the greatest geopolitical mistakes in my lifetime
    in the last several weeks by essentially abolishing USAID. I do
    not expect either of you to answer questions directly about
    that because it could jeopardize your appointment. But there is
    just no question.
        The term ``soft power'' is kind of unfortunate, because the
    emphasis is on soft, but it is power, and as both of you have
    testified, communications is important, relationships with the
    countries' stabilization, anti-terrorism, developing good
    relationships, the PEPFAR program, the malaria program,
    education programs, democracy promotion programs are essential
    to our ability to compete with the Chinese and the Russians in
    the African continent.
        In talking to some friends who have been deployed there,
    their view was that we just made an enormous gift, particularly
    to the Chinese. As the Chairman suggested in his opening
    statement and questions, there is no question in my mind that
    our recent actions in essentially dismantling and abolishing
    AID has met with celebration and approbation in Russia and
    China.
        General Anderson, one of the things that concerns me, and
    it relates somewhat to the AID question but more generally, is
    the rise of terrorism. You mentioned September 11th. That was
    19 people, and my concern is with our so-called pivot to the
    Indo-Pacific we are taking our eye off the terrorism ball.
    Could you share with us the thoughts about the status of al
    Qaeda and ISIS in Africa and what we should be watching out for
    and being concerned of?
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator. I appreciate that concern,
    and if confirmed, I will definitely make this a priority to
    assess, as it has been 4 years since I was at SOCAFRICA.
        With that said, though, we have seen the terrorist groups
    move much of their operations into the ungoverned spaces of
    Africa, both ISIS and al Qaeda. We are seeing ISIS active in
    Somalia, as well as in West Africa, ISIS West Africa. AQIM and
    their affiliate, JNIM, are also very active in the Sahel, both
    with intent to attack U.S. interests. Whether or not they have
    that capability is not clear.
        So to your point, one of the greatest concerns we have is
    having enough resources and enough relationships to be able to
    understand how these threats are progressing. So we have the
    adequate amount of indicators and warnings and we know what the
    threat to the United States could be, so we could take action.
        The access is also critical with our partners to understand
    what is happening with these threats, and I would also say what
    is happening with some of the other powers there and how they
    may be working with them or maybe not acting in our interests,
    so that we can understand what the threat landscape is on the
    continent.
        Senator King. Well, I think one of the new duties of your
    job, as you take this on, since State Department and USAID is
    essentially retreating, you are going to have diplomatic duty,
    whether you signed up for that or not. But you are going to
    have to build relationships, not necessarily strictly military,
    but with the local governments and the local leadership. Do you
    see that as a priority?
        General Anderson. Senator, where we prioritize those areas
    we have the best return on our investment. I think it is
    important to build those relationships. I think it is important
    to look at creative ways, as we go forward. One of the greatest
    powers the United States brings is our economy. That is largely
    done through private investment. So finding opportunities in
    the continent as it continues to expand and grow in population
    I think is an opportunity. Then working with NGO's to identify
    some of these. I have worked with several in the past that have
    been very productive, and engaging some of those areas that you
    are talking about, that we help them understand the environment
    and then they are able to execute the actual engagements.
        Senator King. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I will
    have a question for the record for Admiral Bradley about brain
    health and the protecting of our troops from traumatic brain
    injury. I will followup on the record. Thank you very much,
    gentlemen.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you for your interest in that,
    Senator King. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, first
    of all, thank you for your service to our country. To your
    families also, I just want to say thank you, because you
    sacrificed a lot, as well, and we most certainly recognize
    that, and we appreciate what you do to help both of these
    gentlemen be successful in their careers.
        Gentlemen, I have heard from, at least now from 29 senior
    Department officials, including every service chief and eight
    combatant commanders, that vacating the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz and 7.7
    to 8 GHz bands of the spectrum would have negative consequences
    for our warfighting capabilities. Being forced to share these
    bands with commercial interests in a non-optimal way would have
    the same impact.
        Admiral Bradley, does the Special Operations Force have
    capabilities operating on the 3.1 to 3.45 band and the 7 and 8
    bands of spectrum, which would be used in a conflict with
    China?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. I have to say that I
    am not intimately aware of all of the systems across SOCOM. I
    can speak to my personal experience in these last 3 years. I do
    agree that both directly, some of our systems operated in those
    bands that we rely upon for critical tactical capability, but
    also indirectly the service systems that operate on those bands
    are very important for us as we integrate with the Joint Force.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. would those capabilities be
    negatively impacted if DOD were forced to share those bands?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I believe they would.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Anderson, same question.
    Does AFRICOM make use of capabilities which reside on our make
    use of those bands of the spectrum?
        General Anderson. Senator, Africa being a remote location,
    we depend upon satellite communications that use some of those
    bands, as well as the air and missile defense systems that are
    on the continent.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Admiral Bradley, your
    predecessor testified earlier this year that SOCOM makes up 3
    percent of DOD's forces and less than 2 percent of the budget,
    all while missions have increased by over 170 percent compared
    to the last decade. Is it fair to say that if we are going to
    continue to ask more of SOCOM, more resources will be needed to
    enable those increased missions?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. As I have watched
    General Fenton make the compelling case about that exact
    equation you described, I think that is a conclusion that comes
    out. An alternative is we just do less, we do fewer missions.
    We have to say no more times.
        Senator Rounds. You are the tip of the spear. It seems to
    me that we should be doing everything possible to make sure
    that those young men and women have the best and capable
    technologies and weapon systems available to them.
        General Anderson, how do you assess AFRICOM's role in
    countering Chinese and Russian influence in Africa,
    particularly in regions where entities such as the Wagner Group
    or the PRC-affiliated commercial ventures are exploiting
    governance or security gaps? What strategies do you believe are
    most effective in addressing these challenges?
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate that question. I
    think that is a critical area, how do we counter what these
    powers are doing on the continent when they run counter to U.S.
    interests. One of the areas, when I was at SOCAFRICA, that was
    useful was engaging with the partners and explaining to them
    what those risks were when they were working with these
    partners, especially when Wagner was trying to expand into the
    Sahel. While they have gotten a foothold there, we were able to
    explain to them the risks that that would entail, the corrosive
    nature of those engagements, the lack of human rights that
    those nations bring. That was helpful in buffering. It also
    helped in some of the other Coastal West Africa states, as
    well.
        As far as China, I would say it is similar, engaging and
    countering some of the malign influence operations that are out
    there. We saw, across the Sahel, counter-Western, counter-
    French, counter-United States propaganda take hold, and that
    then turns the populations against our interests.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there is a
    combination of hard power, military power, but there is also
    the desire to have not just that stick but the ability to offer
    other capabilities, as well? Can you give me some examples of
    what we would call soft power that might be available or be
    very helpful to you, based upon our current situations in
    Africa?
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator. Across the breadth of what
    our Nation brings is important, whether that is called hard
    power or soft power, its influence and how could we engage
    constructively with them. Can we encourage investment? Can we
    open sources to critical minerals? Can we partner with the
    nations that are in our interest that also benefit them, as
    well? Those are opportunities, as well, that are slightly
    outside the military lane, but I do believe we have the
    opportunity to convene some of the right folks to have these
    types of discussions. Then, again, engagement and building
    trust and partnership is critical, as we found in the past.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
    gentlemen, both for being here today and your continued service
    to our great United States. Your families, as well. We
    appreciate their selfless service and sacrifice on your behalf,
    as well.
        General Anderson, we will start with you, and we will
    continue to buildupon what Senator Rounds was discussing.
    History has shown that when America reduces her presence, our
    adversaries are quickly seeking to fill the void. So sustained
    U.S. leadership is essential to deterring those threats and
    preserving stability. This is something we talked about in my
    office, that I firmly believe that presence is power,
    especially when it comes to the forward posture of our American
    servicemembers.
        General Anderson, can you speak to why continued American
    leadership around the globe is essential, and in your
    particular case in Africa, why it is essential that we maintain
    a presence and how it is in America's best interests.
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate the question, and I
    agree that that engagement is absolutely vital. Having that
    access and that engagement and building of trust makes a
    difference in times of crisis or in times of need. When we call
    in the middle of the night, we want our partners to answer, and
    we want them to help.
        At the same time, it needs to be in our mutual interests.
    One thing I have found, as you talked about, in SOCAFRICA is
    that we could often bring parties together that normally would
    not. We could bring some of the European partners together with
    the African partners and create a dialog. And sometimes just
    that American presence as a trusted partner opened that door to
    be more effective.
        I would also say, as you mentioned, small investments and
    small teams go a long way on the continent in working with our
    African partners. As an example, I was the first general
    officer to go back to Cote D'Ivoire after 19 years. The very
    first person who met me was the chief of the army, and the
    first thing he told me was he thanked me for the training that
    the Special Forces team had given him as a captain, 19 years
    before. He said it was the best training he ever had, and he
    was very excited that we were able to restore relationship,
    because it was the best training he had received, and he was
    looking forward to that for his army.
        It did not take a persistent presence. It took some
    episodic engagements and continued investment in that partner.
    What I have found in Africa is many of those partners that we
    work with are incredibly good partners. They are not looking
    for a handout. They are looking for helping hand, and if we can
    help them build that capacity they are willing to try to stand
    on their own.
        Senator Ernst. That is amazing, and thank you for
    reaffirming what I have always believed, as well, is that
    relationships matter, and our friends will never forget that.
    Neither will our enemies. So we will continue on. We could talk
    more about China's presence. I think a number of our colleagues
    have covered down on that, so we will go ahead and turn to
    SOCOM.
        Admiral Bradley, thank you so much for your continued
    leadership within the organization. We have already talked a
    little bit about the fact that SOCOM, you have earned the
    reputation that the command can do more with less. I have heard
    SOCOM commander after SOCOM commander come in front of the
    Committee and State it really does not matter, we will salute
    smartly and move out and execute our mission.
        But we are reaching a point where, as you have very clearly
    stated today, that if you do not continue to see growth,
    especially just for inflation, within the department, that you
    will have to do less. You will have to dig in deeper and make
    the necessary cuts.
        So we are in an era of heightened threats and expanding
    mission demands. I believe that do-more-with-less mindset can
    no longer be sustainable. Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do, and, in fact, we have
    adopted the term ``less with less'' to ensure we apply the
    ruthless prioritization to achieve the highest priority of
    those missions.
        Senator Ernst. Mm-hmm, and given the increasingly complex
    threat environment, we need to be able to strengthen SOCOM's
    capacity to deter our near-peer adversaries. So that does
    require us moving beyond a stagnant budget. So if confirmed,
    Admiral Bradley, then what is the vision for SOCOM and how do
    you do that ruthless prioritization?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. If confirmed, our
    priorities are the priorities of the Department--defend the
    Homeland, ensure that we deter China, and ensure that our force
    multiplication of an already strong alliance is strengthened
    even further.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much, and again
    to your families, thank you for your sacrifice, as well. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Schmitt.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually,
    Admiral, I am glad that you ended that way, because that, those
    sort of prioritizations of America, which is defend the
    Homeland and really this pivot to the Indo-Pacific has been
    absent in a lot of the questions that have been asked. A lot of
    the questions that have been asked, I feel like I have been
    teleported into the Foreign Relations Committee.
        I want to ask you, since it was brought up--I had no plan
    to talk about this--I am going to just read off a few things: a
    half a million dollars for electric buses in Rwanda, $3.3
    million for civic engagement in Zimbabwe, $300,000 to hold a
    private parade in Lesotho, and almost $900,000 for electrical
    reforms and voter education in Kenya, $1.2 million for an
    Afrobarometer public opinion survey, $116,000 for media
    strengthening activity in Liberia, $800 for promoting vegan
    food in Zambia, African hide camping and tours to create
    adventure camps for backpackers, graphic design training in
    Nigeria.
        Do you think these are in the best interest of the United
    States of America, given the scarcity that we have?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I know there are a lot of
    priorities that have to be balance through the budget process.
        Senator Schmitt. I know that, and I appreciate your story.
    You were very willing to opine about other things that were
    sort of policy matters, in my view. These are policy matters,
    and I think that when we do this stuff, it totally undermines
    the desire to have real soft power. Like I am not disputing the
    idea that soft power exists. My contention is that all of this
    nonsense that continues to be defended, in many ways, inhibits
    the ability to do exactly what you are articulating, which is
    there are smart things to do that are not just about blowing
    things up and killing people. But that has been crowded out
    with a mission creep in this wandering foreign policy that just
    believes that we can just do all of this do-gooding stuff
    around the world.
        Getting back to what you said at the end of your last
    statement, which is, ``Defend the Homeland and understand that
    our chief threat is in China,'' that is what I wanted to ask
    you questions about, and I am going to. But I cannot let this
    go without it being responded to.
        Like we are moving away from this stuff, whether people
    like it or not. Like the American people do not support it. We
    have an Administration that wants to move away from this stuff,
    and I applaud it. I might be in the minority on this Committee.
    I do not really know. I do not really care, because I think
    that is in the best interest of the United States, and we can
    have a robust debate about it.
        But I do want to ask you, because we are in this great
    powers competition, how does SOCOM assess the right balance
    between sort of the counterterrorism mission that has existed
    for a long time, and is not necessarily going away, versus this
    kind of direct action, and especially as it relates to
    irregular deterrence and China's gray zone activity that is
    happening in the South China Sea and places where our allies
    are really--a real threat. We are not talking about electric
    buses in Rwanda. We are talking about, you know, communist
    China here.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. Having had the
    opportunity to be a part of our counterterrorism operations
    since 9/11, I have seen us achieve some great successes to
    diminish the threat against the Homeland. The credibility that
    has come from that gives us a very powerful entree with the
    alliance members in the Indo-Pacific. All of our national
    defense strategies since 2018, the INDSG all illuminate the
    importance of that alliance. I believe that force
    multiplication effort is a critical capability.
        As you know, General Fenton is the coordinating authority
    for counter-VEO, as well, within the Department of Defense, and
    so still maintains a principal responsibility to be able to
    oversee and advise the Secretary on the approach for
    counterterrorism.
        The most acute of those threats, those VEOs with external
    operations, aspiration, and capability, are the top priority
    threats that we, as a whole, integrated interagency, orient our
    priorities against. I believe, in many cases, and one instance
    in particular, the case in the Philippines is a great example--
    --
        Senator Schmitt. I was going to ask you about that, yes.
        Admiral Bradley.--where our work with the Filipinos over
    the last two decades has allowed them to be able to keep that
    terrorist threat at bay, and frankly, allowed us to weather a
    very difficult diplomatic season with a particular leader
    there, and now come out an even stronger ally.
        Senator Schmitt. I agree. I think that is a great example,
    which completes sort of like the last question I have, in
    limited time. Do you feel like our other really important
    allies in that region, say Australia and Japan, are prepared or
    sufficiently ready to work alongside us the way that the
    Philippines has?
        Admiral Bradley. Sir, I absolutely believe the Australians
    are, and I believe our other allies are working to come to that
    place, as well.
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. Thank you. Good luck.
    Congratulations.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Schmitt.
    Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    congratulations to both of you on your nominations.
        So the American military is built to defeat our enemies,
    not to create more of them, and that is why Republican and
    Democratic administrations have worked to reduce risks to
    innocent civilians as part of military options. In fact, the
    last Trump administration issued DOD first instruction to
    establish policies to mitigate civilian harm after concerns
    grew about civilian casualties in the campaign against ISIS.
        Now, one of the tools that commanders now have in the
    toolkit is working with Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response
    advisors, from refining war games to real attack planning in
    the Middle East and Africa operations, and more.
        Vice Admiral Bradley, your predecessor at Special
    Operations Command recently said that these experts, quote,
    ``assisted commanders and their staffs in mitigating civilian
    harm without compromising lethality.'' What's more, their
    knowledge, quote, ``enhanced precision, preserving legitimacy,
    and enabling mission success.''
        So Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to keeping civilian harm prevention experts at SOCOM to
    advise you and your team?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, first, just to resonate, it is
    not only an obligation to adhere to the law of armed conflict
    to protect civilians, it is critical to our success and
    competition to represent our values. I believe that every
    uniformed, every civilian, and every contractor that is
    employed or in oversight of the use of lethal force has a
    critical obligation to be able to do that, and I do commit to
    keeping that as a focus for our command, if confirmed.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. That is a strong answer, and I
    appreciate it.
        Other tools in the toolkit here are the Civilian Harm
    Mitigation and Response Action Plan and DOD's Policy
    Instruction on Civilian Harm, which outlines DOD's plans and
    policies to reduce civilian harm risks. AFRICOM has made
    progress in implementing these policies, including through
    training allies and partners on how to reduce risks to innocent
    civilians. We are serving as a model that our other partners
    are now beginning to adopt. In May, the Nigerian Air Force
    announced its own Civilian Harm Prevention Plan. These are
    efforts that save innocent lives.
        Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are confirmed, will you
    carry forward these efforts to integrate civilian harm
    mitigation planning into AFRICOM operations and train allies in
    the region to help them do the same?
        General Anderson. Senator, to echo Vice Admiral Bradley's
    importance of this, this is a critically important show of our
    values. It is also important that we maintain the laws of armed
    conflict, and when we engage with our partners that we help
    them education and that we model this. This has been something
    that, when I was at Special Operations Command Africa, we did.
    We worked with partners, and when we saw things or heard of
    things that were credible, we encouraged them to investigate
    and to look into this, and then we gave them assistance, as
    needed, in order for them to conduct their own investigations.
    So I will continue, if confirmed, to take that on at AFRICOM.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I want to hit one other
    point here, because we also need to reduce harm to our own
    Special Operators. I have worked with Senator Ernst and others
    on this Committee for years to address high levels of brain
    injury caused by blast overpressure. Exposed servicemembers
    have reported debilitating systems, from seizures to depression
    to suicidality. Now preliminary research is showing high rates
    of heart disease, chronic pain, hypertension, even links to
    brain cancer and neurogenerative diseases. Clearly, we have a
    lot more we need to learn.
        So let me ask, Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, you will
    oversee tens of thousands of Special Operations personnel. Do
    you support DOD partnering with outside experts to study the
    long-term effects of blast overpressure?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do. I have seen great benefit
    from our partnership with academic and other organizations that
    are studying this problem critically. Our number one SOF truth
    is that people are more important than hardware, and the
    critical part of those people is the intellectual capacity. Of
    course, that is jeopardized by these brain health issues. We
    see them as a critical contract with our operators and our
    operators' families to ensure that we keep them sustainable.
        Senator Warren. Oh, I appreciate that very, very much. If
    you are confirmed, I will be calling on you to help us with
    that. There is language in both the House and the Senate NDAA
    that would help us get this study, and there are lots of
    organizations like Home Base Massachusetts who have the
    expertise to help us get these answers. We owe this to our
    servicemembers.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator
    Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
    Thanks to both of you. Thank you for what you have done for our
    country over your careers, you and your families. What a
    sacrifice it has been. But you have done an outstanding job.
        Admiral, I think for far too long we have had our eyes on
    other things and not on our hemisphere, whether it is illegal
    migrants, drugs, or both. So what is Special Operations
    community doing to assist the militaries and governments in our
    hemisphere, like Panama, to combat narcoterrorists?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, in my current capacity I am not
    privy to all of the activities that SOCOM is engaged in in the
    Southern Hemisphere. But in listening and watching General
    Fenton and his leadership over these last 3 years, I know that
    the partnerships that our teams have been engaging in and
    developing remain critical to being able to help them build
    capacity, to be able to defend themselves, but also to provide
    security locally, which, of course, helps to prevent and secure
    our southern border, as well.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. I am sure you are up on the point
    of the Darien Gap and the problems it has caused over the
    years, and relationship with our Special Ops down in that area,
    training people. That will probably be in your forte going
    forward. What are your thoughts about cooperation activities
    with Latin America, as going into this job?
        Admiral Bradley. Yes, sir. I think, as the counterterrorism
    fight informs us, it is far better to find the root of the
    problem well away from our borders than it is to have to defend
    them internal to the United States. So if confirmed, making it
    a priority to provide assistance to all of our combatant
    commanders as far forward as possible and with those partnered
    forces to help them to be able to secure their own territory.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes, and we have problems all over the
    world, but if we do not watch our back door then we are going
    to have really problems within our country, which we already
    have.
        General, I think we need to be reinforcing our military
    presence in AFRICOM. Unfortunately, under the previous
    administration we seemed like we were doing just the opposite.
    In Niger--you and I talked about this in a meeting in my
    office--the vacuum that was caused there. China, Russia, Iran
    were all too happy to fill the things that we were doing there.
        What is your assessment of our withdrawal from Air Base 201
    and have we learned from these lessons, and your thoughts about
    maybe the future there.
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate that question, and
    there was significant investment that went into that air base.
    It was in a key area for us to be able to monitor the threat,
    so the loss of that is one that we will have to find creative
    ways to continue to get the indicators and warnings of what the
    terrorists are doing in this area.
        I think we also have to understand that there is some
    volatility across the continent, so how do we make smart
    investments with the partners that we can continue to sustain.
    I will say that the relationships that we built in Niger with
    the military over several decades are still there. When the
    time is right, I believe there will be an opportunity, but that
    time will have to be determined, and if confirmed, I will look
    at what that is.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes. After your confirmation, I guess
    by telling the Committee, and people even watching at home, why
    do we need to have presence in Africa? What are your thoughts?
        General Anderson. Africa is key to any strategy. It is just
    on strategic terrain, just the waterways that it forms between
    the Straits or Gibraltar all the way down through the Suez
    Canal and the Red Sea. It is critical minerals and resources
    that are on the continent that we need for the future economy.
    Both China and Russia see their strategies going through the
    continent, and they are going to engage there.
        So we can cede that ground or we can compete in that
    ground, and I think we have a very powerful tool to compete
    with. As Admiral Bradley mentioned, nobody brings more
    credibility to the counterterrorism fight than the U.S. As a
    matter of fact, when we rescued that hostage in Niger, the next
    morning there was an influential blogger that posted, ``The
    Americans came like the lion in the night. They killed their
    enemies and rescued their own.'' No other nation on Earth could
    do that, and that is a powerful symbol across the continent and
    around the world of what our military and what the United
    States is capable of. I do think that some level of engagement
    in Africa does matter. I agree it is an economy of force, but a
    small investment goes a long way, so that we do not have
    strategic surprise that then distracts the United States from
    focusing on the rising threats in the Pacific and other areas.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Tuberville, and well
    said, General Anderson. Senator Sheehy.
        Senator Sheehy. Thank you, Chairman. General, I want to
    thank you for what you just said there, because we have been
    hearing a lot today about how pulling back investment in
    certain programs in Africa is going to end the world and cede
    the entire dominance to China. The reality is what you just
    said is what the real power projection is. When we can display
    to the world that we are going to protect our interests and our
    people ruthlessly, no matter what, that is what the real power
    projection of the U.S. Military is about. The SOF stuff is
    absolutely important. Being able to project economic power and
    stability is important. But nothing will ever supersede what
    you just said, so thanks for saying that.
        Thanks to both of you and your families for what you have
    done for this country and continue to do.
        Admiral, over to you. We are facing a very challenging
    naval atmosphere against China. They are building ships faster
    than we can, 230 times faster than we do, as a matter of fact.
    So if we should face a maritime conflict, our most asymmetric
    advantage is going to be our undersea Special Operations
    capability, how we can project that power, manned and unmanned.
        Would you take a moment here and just explain to me your
    commitment to that program and how we are going to make sure it
    remains dominant?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you, and thanks for your
    service in that community, as well. I believe, from my time
    serving in our undersea community, that the partnership between
    Special Operations and the Navy in this regard is singular in
    the world in its sophistication. The ability to arrive with the
    element of surprise is unparalleled through this approach. It
    gives us advantage, asymmetric advantage, not just in
    warfighting but also in the ability, in competition and in
    crisis.
        The Special Operations community has a unique and growing
    and deepening relationship with the United States Navy in this
    regard, and if confirmed, I would very much look forward to
    advancing that and continuing to maintain that asymmetry.
        Senator Sheehy. Thank you, and for both of you a similar
    question. The last time we fought a war in INDOPACOM we had
    about 5,000 seaplanes that were a critical part of our
    logistical and tactical network across the region, from moving
    insurgents, to supplies, to logistics, to rescuing ships' crew
    and downed airmen in areas that, at the time, were out of
    range.
        Right now we have precisely zero planes that can land, or
    any aircraft that can land on water in the entire U.S.
    Military. General, with your background in non-standard
    aviation, as I do too--I used to fly seaplanes and PC-12s like
    you--this is a capability that as we are entering a new era of
    great power competition I believe we need to reinvest in it,
    and SOCOM would be the tip of that spear.
        I recently worked with INDOPACOM to try to reinvigorate the
    ability for them to access this capability. Would either of you
    care to comment on what you think amphibious aviation could
    mean for our ability to project power all over the world?
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate the question. I do
    think there are several types of new technologies, emerging
    technologies, that we need to invest in that allow different
    types of logistics and different types of support. Seaplanes
    could be part of that. I think unmanned systems,
    semisubmersibles, but a plethora of capabilities that allow us
    to operate in a contested environment, with a combination of
    manned and unmanned systems is critical. In the Indo-Pacific,
    there is a lot of water across that area, so having the ability
    to operate in those areas, and to be able to resupply small
    islands I think will be very important to a potential Pacific
    fight.
        Senator Sheehy. Yes. I would say on an AO that in some
    cases is over 90 percent water, having the entire AO be a
    runway seems like a pretty good idea.
        I was recently in Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt. I went over there
    for a reason. We also served many years in the Middle East. But
    Africa is now going to have 2.5 billion people, become the most
    populous continent in the world here, potentially, in the next
    decade. It is very possible that the 21st century could be an
    African century, and as that 2.5 billion people plug into the
    global economy, as they become global citizens, active on the
    internet, as they become banked, as they become crypto
    citizens, we are going to have to reckon with the great power
    competition that is happening there.
        As I look at some of our engagement across the Horn of
    Africa, and through all of Africa really, what do you see that
    your biggest challenge is going to be? What do your first 90,
    120 days look like, as you try to grapple with the fact that we
    have a massive geopolitical battlefield emerging?
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate those comments, and
    I agree that Africa is growing rapidly. There is a large youth
    population. That youth can either be challenged to contribute
    to the global economy or they could become terrorists or other
    nefarious actions.
        What I would say to that is that the first thing I would
    look at is do we have the right access and placement in order
    to have the indicators and warnings to prevent that strategic
    surprise. To your point earlier, I think it is a combination of
    hard power and soft power, as you put it. But having the
    relationships and the trust to have the access, when needed, in
    order to project power, to be able to counter terrorism, to be
    able to respond to a crisis somewhere on the continent, and
    then also to understand what other powers are doing.
        So my first few days, if confirmed, would be focused on
    assessing that, and do we have the right posture and footprint,
    and what can we do to maximize the indicators and warnings.
        Senator Sheehy. Thank you. I am out of time, but I would
    also encourage you to take a look at Camp Simba and upgrades
    required there. It is a key point of power projection for us in
    that region. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sheehy. Let me ask both
    of you, with regard to the first set of questions Senator
    Sheehy brought up about seaplanes, that sort of capacity. Is
    there anything on the horizon in that regard?
        General Anderson. Senator, there are a few out there that
    are being developed. I know DARPA is working on a project.
    There are some other companies that are looking at seaplanes
    and unmanned seaplanes, as well.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, across Special Operations there
    have been experiments with that kind of capability.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator
    Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Bradley,
    General Anderson, thank you for being here and for continuing
    to volunteer to serve our Nation.
        SOCOM and AFRICOM both leverage economies of force
    principles, so applying limited resources for having an
    outsized impact. This requires some careful planning and using
    the right assets against the right problem.
        Within this economy of force principle, how important are
    interagency partnership, like the Department of State, for
    SOCOM and AFRICOM's campaign plan?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I will start. Across the Special
    Operations community our partnership with the integrated
    interagency, also our law enforcement, Federal and, frankly,
    even our local law enforcement partnerships have been critical
    to us over these last 25 years. I see that as nothing but
    growing in the future. If confirmed as the SOCOM Commander, the
    relationships that we have inside our integrated interagency,
    cultivating those and sustaining them I think would have to be
    a top priority. I can tell you that today the State of those
    relationships, from my current experience, is, frankly, a high-
    water mark certainly of my 34 years, and I suspect even longer
    than that.
        Senator Kelly. General, do you share that view?
        General Anderson. Senator, I agree that we have very
    limited resources, and so we have to partner across all
    government agencies to maximize those resources and to find
    where we can complement each other. We provide the military
    piece of that, but to Admiral Bradley's point, my entire career
    with Special Operations has been working with multiple
    different agencies in order to maximize that, whether that is
    the FBI and using legal authorities in different parts of the
    world, working with our intelligence community, or with State
    Department and others to make sure we leverage the full
    authorities and capabilities of our Nation.
        Senator Kelly. One of my big concerns here is the impact
    that the cuts to USAID within the State Department is going to
    have on our ability to build some trust with partner nations.
    That is a concern of mine. I am not going to put you on the
    spot here on that topic, but I think it is something that I
    hope the two of you think about.
        Admiral Bradley, China and Russia currently waging some
    irregular warfare campaigns against us and our allies in a lot
    of different places. PRC is using violence to impose their will
    in the Philippines in the Second Thomas Shoal, and Russia has a
    long history of using irregular warfare, most recently in
    Ukraine. Leveraging your most recent experience as the
    Commander of JSOC, how does the United States effectively wage
    irregular warfare to compete and win with Russia and China in
    the gray zones?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. In my last 3 years I
    have had the opportunity to be a member of the SOCOM Board of
    Directors and really watch our theater of Special Operations
    commands who are responsible for operations from the joint SOF
    community inside those areas. I can tell you that our principal
    advantage that the SOF value proposition brings is
    understanding, and enhanced understanding, of those insidious
    actions, which are really preying on our alliance structure.
    Being able to illuminate that predatory activity gives our
    diplomats and our whole-of-government and our allies power to
    be able to stand against it and be resilient to it. That, in
    turn, strengthens our alliance and deepens our credibility when
    we want to partnership and build capacity there.
        Senator Kelly. Great. Well, thank you, and finally, in my
    last minute here, General Anderson, I traveled, and it has been
    about a year and a half now, in the Sahel, and part of Africa
    where Wagner is pretty active, especially on social media, to
    exploit coups in Western Africa, commit human rights abuses.
    When the Russians gain a foothold in these countries they use a
    significant amount of disinformation to intimidate the local
    population, stifling opposing views, while they claim to
    provide security.
        So General, how does Russia's social media activity impact
    security and stability in AFRICOM?
        General Anderson. Senator, I think that is one of Russia's
    greatest weapons that they are employing across the continent.
    One of the things they use quite often is disinformation. They
    play on historic grievances, historic colonial issues, fears of
    sovereignty, and they play that up into an anti-democratic,
    anti-Western that then has impacts to U.S. support.
        I believe that the Russian influence in the information
    operations was critical in turning populations against the
    French in the Sahel. I think it is very much not in our
    interest with what the Russians are doing in the information
    domain.
        Senator Kelly. Not only in Africa but, if I could just take
    a couple more seconds, do you feel like we are losing this
    information warfare with the Russians, Chinese, Iranians?
        General Anderson. Senator, I refer to what we discussed
    earlier. The truth is incredibly powerful. We have that still.
    We are still a very credible source of information. We need to
    leverage that. I think we need to be more aggressive about that
    in this domain. But I would not say we are necessarily losing
    it. But if we do not engage, we risk losing it.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Admiral Bradley,
    General Anderson, congratulations. First off, thanks for your
    service. Thanks to your family for being here. Thank you for
    their sacrifice while you have served. You both are going to do
    an outstanding job.
        number one, do you believe that the government of China has
    decided to be our adversary?
        General Anderson. Senator, I do.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I concur.
        Senator Scott. So this Committee has put a lot of effort
    into getting rid of Chinese drones, in the military and in our
    country, and we have made a lot of progress. As you know, we
    are seeing drone warfare increase around the world. We have
    watched what happened in Ukraine. We have watched what has
    happened in the Red Sea. We have watched what the Houthis have
    been doing to shoot down ships.
        So do you believe drone technology is going to be important
    in warfare, going forward?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do.
        General Anderson. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Scott. So do you think it is really important to
    make sure that we do not have, you know, Chinese products in
    our military, such as drones?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I know that there are nefarious
    aspects to Chinese products that come out. We must be careful
    not to include any of those.
        General Anderson. Senator, I would agree that we need to
    make sure that we do not open back doors or other
    vulnerabilities. We need to understand what products we are
    using.
        Senator Scott. So whether it is Chinese drones, computers,
    printers, drugs, products like garlic that is grown in raw
    sewage, do you think it is important that we make sure none of
    that--none of that--is used by our military, or never dependent
    on any of it?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do resonate with those
    thoughts, and though I cannot speak to all the details,
    certainly we must be cautious of anything that comes from China
    that would be part of our kill chain or part of a military
    chain of production.
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator. I think that is something
    that we need to assess is where are those critical
    vulnerabilities, where do we need to ensure we have alternate
    supply chains as we look at the future.
        Senator Scott. How about drugs? Do you think we ought to be
    buying Chinese drugs for our service men, service women?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I have to say I cannot speak to
    the details of our drug production chain. Sorry.
        General Anderson. Senator, I am not familiar with the
    details of that either.
        Senator Scott. Off the top of your head, so you think we
    ought to have Chinese drug in our bodies, should anybody be
    relying on them when we go to war? Do you think they might hold
    them back?
        General Anderson. Senator, that could be a risk, any time
    we become dependent on a sole source. I have full faith in the
    American system, and I would prefer American-made medicines.
        Senator Scott. I was encouraged to see Secretary Hegseth
    announce last week that he was removing CCP cloud services out
    of the DOD, which was added, unfortunately, during the Obama
    era initiative.
        So last question. Do you think it is really important that
    we continue to do everything we can to get all Chinese
    products, all Chinese apps, everything, drones, computers,
    printers, drugs, everything, as much as we can, out of our
    supply chain for our military?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, I do agree with that.
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I agree we should eliminate
    as many vulnerabilities as we possibly can.
        Senator Scott. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
    Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking
    Member Reed for holding this hearing. I want to thank our
    nominees and your families, of course, for your service--it
    takes a whole family when you give a lifetime of service--and,
    of course, your willingness to continue to serve, and
    congratulations on your nominations.
        I want to go right into the Houthis and their relations
    with al-Shabaab, because the Iranian-backed Houthis are
    diversifying their military capabilities and leveraging
    regional conflicts to expand their influence. U.S. intelligence
    reports indicate that the Houthis are working to provide
    weapons to al-Shabaab. This development is incredibly
    concerning, as al-Shabaab could utilize more sophisticated
    Houthi weapons to target United States equities in the Horn of
    Africa, such as our base in Djibouti.
        So to both General and Admiral, please, to the extent that
    you are able in this open setting, can you share more about the
    growing partnership between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, the
    risk that it poses, not only to the United States equities but
    personnel in the region, global shipping in the Red Sea, the
    Gulf of Aden? How are we going to address this challenge?
        Since you are closest, Admiral, I am going to start with
    you.
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, thank you. The Houthi militia and
    Iranian-supported renegade element inside Yemen has been a
    destabilizing force in the southern Arabian Peninsula and
    across the Horn for some time, and continues to act
    belligerently. Any connection that they might make as an
    outreach to a violent extremist organization, like al-Shabaab,
    an al Qaeda affiliate, definitely bears close concern and,
    frankly, interdiction. The potential for them to partner is
    what we would see with grave concern.
        If confirmed as the SOCOM Commander, I would have the
    responsibility as a coordinating authority for an advisor to
    the Secretary on counter-ciolent extremist organizations, and a
    combination of those two actors would be a serious measure.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. General?
        General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that question.
    As having been the Commander of Special Operations Command
    Africa, I am well aware that the al Qaeda affiliate, that al-
    Shabaab is, is fully intent, has full intent to attack United
    States interests in the United States Homeland, if they can
    build the capability. The concern is that cooperation now
    across the Red Sea with the Houthis, who are backed by the
    Iranians, and what that could mean, and give them the
    capability, not just have the will but now the capability, to
    attack the United States or United States interests in a more
    robust way.
        Again, the Houthis and al-Shabaab operate in critical
    terrain for the United States and for global shipping, and so
    the means for them to disrupt that and have impact on our
    interests is significant.
        Senator Rosen. So we need to do everything we can to stop
    that partnership.
        I want to move on to talking about ISR strategy in the
    Sahel. We know that Senator Kelly was talking about the Sahel a
    little bit, but I want to go a little bit further, because
    since our withdrawal from the two air bases in Niger last year,
    at the behest of the host nation, our ability to conduct ISR
    within the Sahel, throughout the African continent, has been
    severely degraded. This also hurts other activities, as well.
        So to both of you, can you speak to the challenges of our
    withdrawal from Niger, the loss of the ISR, what is poses to
    countering this violent extremism in the region, these
    partnerships between the Houthis, al-Shabaab, and other things,
    any other groups, and what are the latest updates to
    establishing ISR basing elsewhere in Africa?
        General Anderson. Senator, I appreciate that question, and
    we did use the ISR coming out of Niger extensively. The loss of
    that does make it more difficult. There is never enough ISR to
    meet global demand, as I understand, and that Africa, as an
    economy of force theater, will have limited assets available. I
    think it is important that we balance the exquisite high-end
    ISR capabilities where most needed, and then look at investing
    in other capabilities, whether it be emerging technologies that
    can allow some surveillance, partnering with key partners in
    the area, having intel-sharing agreements so that we can gain
    understanding from them on the ground. I think those are all
    critical areas as we look at balancing the ISR demand across
    the continent. As to where they could be in the future, if
    confirmed, I would look into that. I am not privy to those
    plans right now.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Admiral?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator, just quickly, the evolving,
    ubiquitous information environment provides us an opportunity
    here, the space-SOF-cyber triad, an opportunity to be able to
    leverage what we call horizontal ISR, to be able to leverage
    more and more information available publicly, that people are
    freely giving through their use of social media.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Budd.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both
    for being here. I enjoyed our meetings last week in the office.
    Congrats on your nominations, and thank you for your service
    and your sacrifice and that of your families, as well.
        Admiral Bradley, in our conversation last week, and I have
    said it publicly in this room many times, before this hearing,
    we need more and not fewer Special Operations Forces. A large
    reason is because of their ability to help train our foreign
    partners. You highlighted in your Advance Policy Questions that
    SOF are uniquely suited for building partner capacity in
    contested and sensitive areas.
        So how is SOCOM building partner capacity, particularly in
    the Indo-Pacific, and what is the Joint Force getting in return
    for those efforts?
        Admiral Bradley. Senator Budd, thank you. I very much
    appreciated the time to visit with you, and thank you for your
    great support for all of our bases, my current headquarters
    there in the great State of North Carolina.
        Sir, I think the example that best illustrates the essence
    is the Philippines, where over a period of 20 years our--well,
    for over 100 years, our strong societal relationship with the
    Philippine society has been strong. But just within these last
    20, our ability to help train, advise, assist the Philippines
    to counter the terrorism threat in their country has deepened
    that relationship and, in fact, helped us to withstand a very
    troubled period, diplomatically, during the Duterte regime.
    Now, on the back side, we have an even stronger alliance with
    the Philippines, which will be critical as we look at any
    action of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
        I certainly would not want to speak for Admiral Paparo to
    talk about the overall region and where this fits relative to
    his other priorities, but I know from a SOF perspective our
    contribution to partnerships throughout the region are
    important, and we really bring that credibility from the
    counterterrorism fight to help leaven and deepen those.
        Senator Budd. Thank you very much. General Anderson, I want
    to read you a quote from DOD's 2024 Annual Report to Congress
    on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC. I will
    tee it up with this, and I will ask you a question about it. It
    says, ``Some of PRC's Belt and Road Initiative projects could
    create potential military advantages such as PLA access to
    select foreign ports, to preposition necessary logistics to
    sustain naval deployments in water such as distant as the
    Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean.''
        So here is my concern. I am concerned about the PRC's
    access to ports and the potential military advantage that this
    could give them. So alongside Senator Kelly and Scott, I
    introduce the Strategic Ports Reporting Act. It is a bill to
    require monitoring of the PRC's access to foreign ports.
        So if confirmed, do you commit to looking into the PRC's
    access to foreign ports in your area of responsibility?
        General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will look into
    that, definitely.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, and would you be willing to share
    with us some of your concerns in that area, particularly with
    PRC access to foreign ports?
        General Anderson. Senator, I think as we have seen across
    the Indian Ocean and into the African AOR and to the Atlantic
    and even the Mediterranean, China is investing in ports
    globally. I think that should be concerning to us. I think it
    should be concerning to us not only that they could potentially
    use those as dual-use military ports but what access could they
    deny U.S. Forces or U.S. commerce as necessary in time of
    conflict.
        So I think this is an absolutely critical area that we need
    to understand, the vulnerabilities that may be posed by this.
    It does not mean that we do not believe in free commerce and
    economics, but at the same time we need to understand our
    national security interest and what this may entail.
        Senator Budd. Thank you very much. A question about the
    North Carolina National Guard. In particular, we have State
    partners in the AFRICOM AOR. It is Malawi, Zambia, and
    Botswana. So General, how do you view the future of the State
    Partnership Program and its ability to strengthen regional
    stability in Africa?
        General Anderson. Senator, I think the State Partnership
    Program is one of the greatest programs we have within the
    Department. It builds long-term relationships. The nice thing
    about the National Guard and the partner nation is those same
    people will see each other decade after decade, and that builds
    a really powerful relationship that I know we can buildupon. As
    a matter of fact, it was the California National Guard that we
    called upon to get the first information in Ukraine, because
    they had long-standing relationships with that State
    Partnership Program there. The same thing can happen in Africa,
    where a small investment can have a great return for us in the
    future.
        Senator Budd. Thank you both. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Further questions? We are told
    that Senator Shaheen is on her way.
        Senator King. I can fill a little time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. There is a vote going on also. But yes,
    the gentleman is recognized.
        Senator King. I was struck by the Admiral's comment that
    they had moved 27 times in their career. My first job was
    moving furniture for Allied Van Lines in this area. Most of our
    customers were military families, and I will never forget a
    military spouse saying, ``In terms of damage to the furniture,
    seven moves equals a fire.'' So congratulations on surviving
    multiple fires.
        [Laughter.]
        Admiral Bradley. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Senator King, I am a veteran myself, and I
    only served 4 years Active Duty. It seems to me that those
    people who have made 20 moves have been able to throw away a
    lot of things that my children and grandchildren may have to
    deal with, since I have not moved now in over 30 years.
        We think, within 10 seconds, Senator Shaheen will
    materialize. There is a vote going on, and we are trying to do
    our best.
        [Pause.]
        Chairman Wicker. I do not believe we will be able to go on
    with our hearing, so I want to thank our witnesses for their
    testimony. There will be an opportunity for questions on the
    record. So I would remind members, or I would inform members,
    that questions for the record will be due to the Committee by 5
    p.m. today.
        With that we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Vice Admiral Frank M.
    Bradley, USN by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing with
    answers supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?
        Answer. As a Unified Combatant Command with service-like
    responsibilities, USSOCOM is a strategic headquarters with
    responsibilities to organize, train, and equip four service components
    (Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air
    Force Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special
    Operations Command), the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and
    seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). In that role, in
    accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. Section 167, the Commander of USSOCOM
    is responsible as a force provider to the other supported Combatant
    Commands to provide ready forces to meet operational requirements and
    contingency war plans. As directed by the President or Secretary of
    Defense, and in accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. Section 164, the
    Commander USSOCOM conducts operations globally.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualify you to perform these duties?
        Answer. It has been an honor to serve within the special operations
    community since 1992, when I completed Basic Underwater Demolition
    School and became a U.S. Navy SEAL. Since then, I have been privileged
    to both serve and command at the tactical, operational, and strategic
    levels, including multiple Naval special warfare units, joint task
    forces, Special Operations Command Central, and for the last 3 years as
    the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). I have
    worked counternarcotics missions across South and Central America,
    served in our undersea forces, and deployed to Afghanistan soon after
    the September 11th attack. Later, I shaped counterterrorism strategy in
    the Joint Staff's Strategy, Plans and Policy directorate (J5), and
    worked as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph
    Dunford's executive officer (XO). I also served as a liaison officer to
    the Italian equivalent of the U.S. Navy SEALs. These experiences taught
    me the value our special operators bring in deterring adversaries,
    strengthening relationships with allies and partners, and disrupting
    terrorist threats to the homeland.
        Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, USSOCOM?
        Answer. Yes--absolutely. Under the leadership of General Fenton and
    Command Sergeant Major Shorter, USSOCOM is maximizing its comparative
    advantages, preserving crisis response capability, and modernizing
    toward modern warfare and the threat of China. If I am confirmed, I
    will seek to provide continuity and acceleration rather than course
    correction. To that end, I would humbly and actively seek the advice
    and counsel of the USSOCOM and Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) teams, the
    Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and other DOD leaders,
    interagency partners, and our combat-experienced special operators.
                                 relationships
        Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
    the Commander of USSOCOM to the following offices:
        The Secretary of Defense
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the USSOCOM Commander's next
    superior in the operational chain of command. If confirmed, I will look
    to the Secretary for guidance and resources to train, equip, and employ
    Special Operations Forces (SOF) to advance enduring U.S. national
    interests. The USSOCOM Commander owes the Secretary his best military
    advice on all aspects of special operations matters linked to national
    security objectives.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
        Answer. The Chairman is the senior military advisor to the
    President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. He
    may also consult with Congress, as required. His role is essential to
    communicating SOF capabilities and requirements to the President and
    the Secretary of Defense. Coordinating USSOCOM activities with the
    Chairman enables the Chairman to fulfill his responsibilities to the
    President, the Secretary of Defense, and to senior policymakers.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the
    Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of
    national security and defense policy. The USD(P) develops, coordinates,
    and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of Department policy,
    including matters related to special operations activities. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the USD(P) to ensure USSOCOM
    activities support Department policies.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence &
    Security
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I&S))
    is the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
    USD(I&S) exercises authority, direction, and control on behalf of the
    Secretary of Defense over all intelligence and security organizations
    within the Department of Defense (DoD), including the National Security
    Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial
    Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense
    Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and the intelligence
    components of the Combatant Commands and military Services. USD(I&S) is
    also dual hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office
    of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and reports to the DNI
    in this capacity. USD(I&S) is the Department's principal interface with
    the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence
    Community and represents the Department on intelligence and sensitive
    activities at the National Security Council. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with USD(I&S) to coordinate USSOCOM matters related to
    intelligence, intelligence-related activities, and security.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
    Sustainment
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
    Sustainment (USD(A&S)) serves as the DOD Senior Procurement Executive
    (SPE) and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) responsible for all
    matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including system
    design, development, procurement of goods and services, sustainment of
    systems, and providing Department-wide policy. Per Title 10 U.S.C.
    Section 167, the USSOCOM Special Operations Acquisition Executive
    (SOAE) derives authority to conduct acquisition from the DAE. If
    confirmed, I will ensure USSOCOM acquisition activities, in
    coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), are executed by
    the SOAE under the authorities delegated to the Command by the DAE. In
    addition, I will ensure that the Command is effectively implementing
    policies and procedures for logistics, maintenance, material readiness,
    and sustainment support to the warfighter.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
    (USD(R&E)) is responsible for overseeing the research, engineering, and
    technology development activities across the DOD enterprise, and is
    mandated with driving the key technologies (cyber, space, unmanned
    systems, machine learning/artificial intelligence, directed energy,
    hypersonics) to ensure technological superiority for the DOD. If
    confirmed, in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will ensure USSOCOM
    science and technology research activities and funding are
    complementary to and aligned with Department research policy,
    processes, and priorities. In addition, we will assist in the
    initiation and implementation of acquisition pathways that embrace
    agile practices that innovate, develop, exploit, and reduce barriers of
    entry for commercial technologies and non-traditional defense partners.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
    and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SOLIC))
        Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is the Principal Staff Assistant and civilian
    advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on special
    operations and low intensity conflict matters. The principal duty of
    the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall oversight of DOD special operations
    activities. The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section
    922 codified the administrative position of the ASD(SO/LIC) formally in
    the chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the
    Commander, USSOCOM to exercise of authority, direction, and control
    with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and
    support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and organization of SOF,
    resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure our forces are organized
    effectively, highly trained, and well-equipped to conduct global
    special operations.
        Question. The Service Secretaries
        Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act granted the USSOCOM Commander
    authority over the Service components assigned to him, but this
    relationship requires close coordination with the Service Secretaries,
    to respect and preserve each Service Secretary's legal
    responsibilities. Close coordination between the USSOCOM Commander and
    each of the Service Secretaries is also essential to gaining and
    maintaining the Services' support of SOF as an integral part of the
    Joint force.
        Question. The Service Chiefs
        Answer. In cooperation with the Service Chiefs, the USSOCOM
    Commander will ensure the preparedness of his forces to execute his
    assigned missions. The Service Chiefs play a critical role in the
    development, promotion, and assignment of SOF senior officers and
    enlisted personnel. The Service Chiefs are also a source of experience
    and judgment that every Combatant Commander may call upon. If
    confirmed, I will continue an open dialog and cooperative partnership
    with the Service Chiefs.
        Question. The other combatant commanders
        Answer. Successive USSOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere
    of teamwork and trust in their relationships with fellow Combatant
    Commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the years
    as trans-regional threats have taken hold and certainly since USSOCOM
    has been responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations
    against terrorist networks. If confirmed, I will continue to work
    closely and collaborate with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve
    our common objectives. I will be committed to providing the Combatant
    Commanders trained and ready SOF to support national and theater
    security objectives.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the next Commander of USSOCOM?
        Answer. The next USSOCOM Commander must continually evaluate and
    balance SOF readiness and employment with SOF modernization to preserve
    and advance our vital interests and those of our allies and partners--
    in a resource constrained environment. SOF must continue to enable the
    Joint Force and provide strategic leaders with options that span the
    continuum from competition to crisis and conflict, and across the
    spectrum of attribution.
        USSOCOM must preserve and protect the Department's crisis response
    capability and continue to serve as the Department's Coordinating
    Authority for Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (C-VEO). All
    of this allows the Services and other Combatant Commands to maintain
    focus on the pacing threat while building warfighting advantage. At the
    same time, USSOCOM must invest in modernizing for the future of
    campaigning in contested and denied areas, with China as the pacing
    threat.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we are always ready for
    our no-fail missions--crisis response and keeping the homeland safe
    from another major terrorist attack. I would also continue to invest in
    SOF's irregular warfare capabilities, by maintaining close ties with
    U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command; enhancing the ongoing work
    of the Joint Task Force-Strategic Reconnaissance and Enabling Command;
    and enabling joint campaigning as a partner with the Combatant Commands
    and other USG agencies. If confirmed, I would also fully leverage
    USSOCOM's flexible acquisition authorities--in close coordination with
    ASD(SO/LIC)--to continue accelerating USSOCOM's modernization campaign,
    against the Chinese pacing threat. These acquisition and modernization
    efforts enable SOF to capitalize on our Nation's innovation advantage,
    and to extend the reach and lethality of the Joint Force. I would also
    buildupon SOF's proud history of strengthening the resilience and
    resistance ability of partners and allies, in conjunction with the
    other Combatant Commands and the interagency. Additionally, I would
    maximize usage of the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF)
    program to ensure the readiness and resilience of our special operators
    and their families.
        Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned
    during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Department of
    Defense?
        Answer. Our purpose is our mission. Ultimately, we must answer our
    Nation's call to provide for a common defense. Our most important
    warfighting system is our people--we must man, train, equip, and
    sustain our world-class special operators for success in both the
    physical and virtual domains. SOF win by maintaining readiness and
    modernization--readiness to fight and win in combat; assure allies;
    illuminate peer adversary predation; and provide placement and access
    options for the Joint Force.
        The pace of technological advancement is accelerating and changing
    the character of warfare in a way that demands we transform to remain
    as decisive in the future as the past 25 years. SOF transform by
    modernizing and leveraging our Nation's technological advantage. This
    includes expanding SOF's capabilities in contested environments by
    leveraging rapid acquisition to integrate state-of-the-market and
    state-of-the-art capabilities into operational plans and coupling
    cutting-edge capabilities with our world-class people using man-machine
    teaming.
        Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish in
    terms of issues that must be addressed by the Commander of USSOCOM?
        Answer. I believe that USSOCOM should align its strategic
    priorities directly to those in the Interim National Defense Strategic
    Guidance (INDSG) and new strategic guidance as it is published. The
    first defense priority is defending the homeland. Here, SOF provide
    unique value in its Crisis Response and Countering Violent Extremist
    Organizations with the intent and capability of attacking the homeland
    and defending the territorial integrity of the United States from State
    and non-State threats. I also recognize we have the mission to insure
    against strategic distractions such as the rapid expansion of ISIS that
    destabilized an entire region and that might divert resources from the
    pacing threat.
        The next priority is deterring China. The INDSG offers a laser
    focus on deterring China--while simultaneously defending the U.S. Our
    longstanding ability to build relationships and increase the capacity
    of allies and partners is critical to strengthening our alliances
    maintaining U.S. global influence and ensuring deterrence. SOF have a
    unique role in building resistance and resilience in allies and
    partners. These relationships provide access and placement for enhanced
    understanding of adversary threats. They also provide warfighter
    advantage for the delivery of asymmetric and irregular kinetic and non-
    kinetic effects; holding adversary systems at risk around the world;
    and extending the reach, lethality, and maneuver space of the Joint
    Force.
                         civilian oversight of ussocom
        Question. Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2017, as amended, included modifications to the roles and
    responsibilities of the ASD (SOLIC) as well as the relationship between
    the ASD (SOLIC) and the Commander of USSOCOM in order for the ASD
    (SOLIC) to more effectively fulfill its ``service secretary-like''
    responsibilities to provide civilian oversight of and advocacy within
    DOD for USSOCOM's service-like requirements.
        What is your view of the role of the ASD (SOLIC) in promoting
    civilian control over the military?
        Answer. Civilian control over the military is a foundational
    element of our constitutional democracy. To that end, ASD(SO/LIC)
    assists in interpreting DOD policy guidance for SOF equities and
    provides administrative oversight to USSOCOM. Per Section 922 of the
    2017 National Defense Authorization Act codifying ASD(SO/LIC)'s roles
    and responsibilities in 10 U.S.C., ASD(SO/LIC) exercises authority,
    direction, and control over administrative matters relating to
    organizing, training, and equipping of SOF. ASD(SO/LIC) assists the
    Department in the development and supervision of policy, program
    planning and execution, and provides oversight for USSOCOM. His role
    also gives the SOF enterprise a stronger position to connect
    operational needs with Title 10 solutions.
        Question. What is your understanding of the organizational and
    administrative relationship between the ASD (SOLIC) and the Commander
    of USSOCOM?
        Answer. Section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA codified ASD(SO/
    LIC) in the chain of command for special operations-peculiar
    administration and support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and
    organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel.
    Section 922 specifically did not impact the Combatant Command's
    operational relationship between the Combatant Commander and the
    Secretary of Defense. ASD(SO/LIC) fulfills an important Secretary-like
    role in the coordination and relationship with the legislative branch
    and complements USSOCOM's long-standing Service-like role. ASD(SO/LIC)
    plays a critical role in senior level forums like the Special
    Operations Policy Oversight Counsel (SOPOC), providing Service
    Secretary-like advocacy for issues affecting SOF. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) as he provides civilian oversight and
    advocacy for SOF within DOD.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD (SOLIC)
    in:
        (1) The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget
    request;
        Answer. As codified in DOD Directive 5111.10, ASD(SO/LIC) performs
    a budgetary role and responsibility like those of the Secretaries of
    the Military Departments. In close partnership with Headquarters,
    USSOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC), provides overall supervision of the preparation
    and justification of special operations programs and budget for Major
    Force Program-11 to include review and approval of the USSOCOM annual
    budget request prior to submission to Congress. Further, ASD(SO/LIC)
    partners closely with USSOCOM during budget rollout activities and
    coordinates on all answers to congressional requests for information.
        Question. (2) Approving programs of record and the acquisition of
    special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM;
        Answer. ASD(SOLIC) is a full partner in the development and
    approval of two key processes for USSOCOM that define our programs of
    record: the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board
    (SOCREB) and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The SOCREB is
    USSOCOM's requirements validation board that approves all special
    operations-peculiar requirements and lays the foundation for the
    Special Operations Acquisition Executive to establish Programs of
    Record. The POM determines the resources we will apply to these
    programs of record.
        Question. (3) Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters
    and service components;
        Answer. Section 922 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA directs ASD(SO/
    LIC) to exercise authority, direction, and control of all special
    operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the
    organization, training, and equipping of SOF. This includes the
    organization of all USSOCOM elements.
        Question. (4) Ensuring the readiness of special operations forces
    (SOF); and
        Answer. Since the Section 922 amendment, USSOCOM has maintained a
    quarterly readiness brief with the ASD and the ASD(SO/LIC) staff to
    facilitate oversight of special operations readiness issues and discuss
    areas that warrant advocacy from the ASD(SO/LIC) office. The USSOCOM
    staff maintains regular contact with the ASD(SO/LIC) staff for actions
    that require attention between quarterly briefs.
        Question. (5) Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and
    accountability of SOF.
        Answer. The SOF enterprise is a meritocracy built on a foundation
    of ethical leadership, professionalism, and accountability. The SOF
    meritocracy is strong--the battlefield successes and competitive
    advantages our professionals have attained continue to grow. However,
    we must acknowledge we are human, and we make mistakes. A culture of
    meritocracy must also ensure accountability for those mistakes. We must
    learn from them and demonstrate that unacceptable behavior will not be
    tolerated. Leadership is the key to preventing and deterring poor
    behavior. Treating every teammate with dignity and respect is
    foundational to any culture, especially a meritocracy. Every individual
    must be given the opportunity to achieve success based on their own
    talents and contributions. Sustaining and cultivating a culture that
    reinforces dignity, respect, and accountability is vital to this. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to continue to ensure
    SOF maintain a meritocratic culture, built on a foundation of
    professionalism and accountability, empowering the innovative spirit to
    ensure readiness and mission accomplishment.
        strategic environment and the role of special operations forces
        Question. What is your assessment of the current strategic
    environment, including your assessment of the critical and enduring
    threats to the national security of the United States and its allies
    and partners?
        Answer. I believe the current strategic environment is
    characterized by danger, opportunity, and accelerating change. In light
    of this, the INDSG directs a strategy of peace through strength, and
    prioritizes homeland defense and deterring Chinese aggression in the
    Indo-Pacific, while empowering U.S. allies and partners to address
    other enduring threats. At the same time, the character of warfare is
    changing rapidly, with an increasing role for unmanned systems,
    artificial intelligence, man-machine teaming, and virtual domain
    sensing--with battlefield success rewarding those who can integrate
    these elements and shorten the cycle of innovation, experimentation,
    testing, and fielding. I judge that U.S. allies and partners are
    critical to mitigating the enduring threats to our national security
    identified in the INDSG, and that relationships--including those forged
    and strengthened by SOF--are essential to the cooperative threat
    reduction and burden sharing envisioned by our strategic guidance.
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of SOF in
    addressing these threats and challenges?
        Answer. In my view, the evolving operational environment and the
    emphasis on strategic competition across the Joint Force requires
    continual reassessment of SOF's operations and activities across the
    spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. SOF must maintain its
    core, no-fail missions of crisis response and counterterrorism, while
    integrating with conventional forces, interagency partners, and
    partners and allies to deter State adversaries to prevent large scale
    conflict. USSOCOM has been a proactive participant in the Joint Force's
    development of warfighting and competition concepts, and the lessons we
    are learning have driven assessment and modernization efforts within
    the SOF enterprise. If confirmed, I intend to continue USSOCOM's
    modernization to ensure SOF can continue to deliver asymmetric
    strategic effects for the Joint Force in competition and conflict while
    globally responding to crisis in any operational environment.
        Question. How do you intend to balance the competing requirements
    of countering violent extremist organizations, crisis response, and
    efforts to counter China and Russia?
        Answer. In my view, USSOCOM must balance sustainable
    counterterrorism, focusing on threats to the homeland and our no-fail
    Crisis Response mission, with precision access and global networks to
    support campaigning. There is shared interest among our partners and
    allies in countering terrorism, and I judge there are opportunities for
    effective collaboration and increased burden sharing. If confirmed, I
    will use the INDSG and additional strategic documents as a guide and
    prioritize the limited available resources for counterterrorism toward
    the most dangerous threats--specifically those with the demonstrated
    intent and capability to conduct external operations (EXOPs) attacks
    against the homeland--while also focusing USSOCOM's modernization and
    acquisition programs toward contested environments and China.
        Question. Do you believe SOF are appropriately organized and sized
    to meet global requirements?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the organization and size of
    SOF in light of the global requirements laid out in the INDSG and other
    strategic guidance, the rapidly evolving strategic environment, and the
    changing character of war and will make any recommendations for change
    through the Department and in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC).
                          special operations missions
        Question. Do you believe the special operations activities
    identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and
    appropriate?
        Answer. The ten special operations activities specified in USC
    Title 10, Section 167 are sufficient to meet the requirements of the
    evolving global security environment and the implementation of the NDS.
    The tenth specified authority in particular--to perform ``Such other
    activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of
    Defense''-provides adequate flexibility to meet INDSG requirements.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
        Answer. At this time, I am not prepared to advocate for changes in
    current USSOCOM missions. If confirmed, and using the INDSG as the
    foundation, I will review the range of SOF missions and recommend any
    necessary changes in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and the
    Department.
                         evolving operating environment
        Question. The operating environment facing SOF has evolved
    significantly over the last two decades, as adversary capabilities in
    areas such as area access/area denial, ubiquitous technical
    surveillance, and rapid advances in unmanned systems.
        What do you view as the most pressing challenges that special
    operation forces will face on the battlefield currently and over the
    next 10 years?
        Answer. This is the most complex and dynamic security environment
    I've seen in 34 years of service. The character of war is changing
    faster than ever. SOF face pressing battlefield challenges requiring
    adaptability and innovation. Technological advancements provide State
    and non-State actors with commercially available tools to confront us
    across the virtual and physical domains. Our adversaries' innovation
    cycles are days to weeks, not months to years. Our adversaries are
    leveraging asymmetric capabilities, such as using inexpensive, one-way
    drones to threaten U.S. forces, bases, and our allies and partners. We
    are also seeing the threats from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea,
    State proxies, and violent extremist organizations converge globally.
    In addition, our competitors seek to undermine U.S. global influence,
    competing with us, and our allies and partners, to expand their own
    partnerships and influence in critical regions such as Africa, South
    America, the Middle East, and Asia.
        Question. What will be your priorities in addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer. As proven by the increased demand for SOF by Combatant
    Commanders over the last several years, addressing these challenges
    will continue to require more from SOF. The operating environment will
    only become more and more complex, requiring unrelenting modernization
    for the most dangerous crises or conflicts we may face. We must balance
    the need to maintain SOF operational readiness to meet increasing
    global demand, with the imperative to modernize SOF to ensure we are as
    decisive in the future as we have been in the last 25 years.
    Additionally, SOF's decades-long relationships with allies and
    partners, and corresponding global placement and access, will continue
    to be critical to maintaining U.S. global influence, enhancing
    understanding, increasing burden-sharing, and enabling rapid response
    to crises. If confirmed, I will conduct a robust analysis against
    current and future challenges, and develop plans to ensure SOF remain a
    capable, ready, and resilient force.
                              combating terrorism
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda,
    the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other violent extremist
    organizations, to the U.S. homeland, and western interests, more
    broadly? Which group or groups, in your view, currently present the
    greatest threat to the United States?
        Answer. I believe ISIS, its senior leadership, and its affiliates
    including ISIS-Khorasan and ISIS-Somalia pose the greatest terrorist
    threat to the United States. Al Qaeda senior leadership, al Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula, and Al Shabaab also present a terrorist threat
    to the United States Homeland and United States interests abroad.
    Although our CT operations, combined with allied and local partner
    efforts, reduced the threat of sophisticated, large-scale attacks on
    the Homeland, the underlying causes that produce extremist ideologies
    persist. Although degraded, ISIS and al Qaeda retain operational
    networks across the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia, and
    continue to pose a threat to our regional interests.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to fulfill USSOCOM's
    assigned responsibilities for synchronizing global operations against
    terrorist networks?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would fulfill the USSOCOM responsibilities
    by coordinating with Combatant Commands and across the DOD and
    interagency, to plan, assess, and make recommendations to the Chairman
    and Secretary regarding C-VEO campaigning. Under current strategic
    guidance, SOF resources are focused on disrupting and degrading only
    the most dangerous VEOs (those demonstrating intent and capability to
    attack the U.S. homeland), while allocating fewer resources toward
    disrupting and monitoring VEOs which present a regional and/or local
    threat to U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage and
    seek burden sharing opportunities with like-minded partners and allies.
    In my experience, a wide-ranging partnership among U.S. and coalition
    military, interagency and law enforcement capabilities and authorities
    is key to addressing global, trans-regional VEO threats.
        Question. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy
    and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?
        Answer. In my experience, USSOCOM plays a pivotal role in
    supporting U.S. counterterrorism strategy. In my view, current
    strategic guidance is appropriate, and periodic reviews and risk
    assessments help refine priorities for addressing global VEO threats.
    Informed by this guidance and the evolving environment, USSOCOM helps
    focus SOF resources on monitoring and disrupting only the most
    dangerous VEOs, while allocating fewer resources to VEOs which present
    a regional or local threat to U.S. interests. In recent years, USSOCOM
    has recommended, approved, and implemented modest but highly impactful
    adjustments that have reduced risk of external operations attacks at a
    sustainable level of investment, consistent with U.S. counterterrorism
    strategy. If confirmed, I will work to sustain and improve this
    valuable process, which begins with tactical-level feedback from the
    special operators and intelligence professionals working our most
    challenging counterterrorism problems. USSOCOM also supports U.S.
    counterterrorism strategy by working with and leveraging like-minded
    partners to address the threat and mitigate the risk against less
    capable regional VEOs--this allows U.S. SOF to focus on the more
    capable, transregional VEO threats.
                 countering weapons of mass destruction (cwmd)
        Question. Under the Unified Campaign Plan, USSOCOM is tasked with
    coordinating DOD's efforts on CWMDs.
        Answer. Correct, the 2023 Unified Command Plan, with change #2 (dtd
    23 MAY 2025) states, ``Commander, USSOCOM is responsible for planning
    of DOD CWMD efforts in support of other Combatant Commands, DOD
    priorities, and, as directed, other U.S. Government agencies.
        Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities
    under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's
    efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?
        Answer. As the Department of Defense CWMD Coordinating Authority,
    USSOCOM is currently responsible for coordinating and planning DOD CWMD
    efforts in support of other Combatant Commands, DOD priorities, and as
    directed, other USG agencies; integrating DOD plans, in coordination
    with other Combatant Commands, against adversaries and networks that
    possess, seek or facilitate WMD; in support of Combatant Commands,
    executing global operations against adversaries and networks that
    possess or seek WMD.
        Question. In your assessment are there any resources, authorities,
    or organizational changes needed to better execute USSOCOM's CWMD
    mission?
        If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic review of USSOCOM's CWMD
    capabilities, and its role as CWMD Coordinating Authority. If changes
    are needed, I will make appropriate recommendations via the Chairman to
    the Secretary of Defense on resources, authorities, and organization as
    required to address current and emerging CWMD threats.
                           10 u.s.c. 127e operations
        Question. Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes
    the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
    to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
    facilitating military operations by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. I believe that 127e remains one of the most relevant tools
    for our forces countering terrorism overseas. It continues to provide
    outsized effects in return for a relatively small investment of U.S.
    training and resourcing of select foreign forces. 127e is the essence
    of burden-sharing; our ability to enable and leverage the access and
    local-area knowledge of select indigenous regular and irregular forces
    is critical to mission success, especially in remote or politically
    sensitive areas where a large U.S. military footprint is neither
    desirable nor feasible.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
    127e proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are
    complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government counterterrorism
    efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that proposals for the use of
    127e authority are aligned with INDSG priorities and focused on
    combatant command strategic objectives accomplished by U.S. SOF
    operations within the scope of Secretary of Defense-granted operational
    authority. 127e will not be used to build capacity; rather, it has and
    will continue to serve as a mechanism to facilitate burden-sharing with
    foreign allies, partners, and surrogates, as a component of our broader
    counterterrorism strategy. Proposals must be fully coordinated with the
    interagency with a well-defined end-State and off-ramp plan that
    considers the Combatant Command, U.S. Country Team, and Department of
    State long-term relationships with partner nations. 127e-resourced
    tactical maneuver forces must be fully vetted to ensure integrity of
    the force and mitigate the risk of human rights violations.
                               irregular warfare
        Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
    U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
    below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as
    irregular warfare and ``gray zone operations.''
        What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
    adversaries in this domain of warfare?
        Answer. The threat to U.S. interests posed by adversaries employing
    irregular techniques and hybrid warfare strategies includes peer and
    near-peer competitor nations, whose actions could drain U.S. resources
    and those of our allies and partners. In my judgment, adversary nations
    and their proxies are increasing the frequency and severity of their
    gray zone operations. By their nature, these operations fall below the
    level of war and provide attractive and inexpensive options for our
    adversaries, in part because it increases the difficulty of identifying
    perpetrators, understanding red lines, and identifying the thresholds
    at which adversaries would intensify or escalate violence. They also
    provide the means for a militarily inferior force to coerce advantage
    through a more limited and insidious approach that falls between
    traditional diplomacy and our conventional military deterrence
    approaches.
        Question. What should be the guiding principles of the Department
    of Defense's strategy to counter these threats?
        Answer. The INDSG provides clear guidance to focus Department of
    Defense strategy on U.S. homeland defense and deterring Chinese
    aggression in the Indo-Pacific, while empowering allies and partners
    against other threats with more limited support from the U.S.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of irregular
    warfare in supporting Department of Defense strategy and operations?
    What role should SOF have in executing such a strategy?
        Answer. Irregular Warfare (IW) activities support the DOD's
    strategic and operational priorities, including competing against and
    deterring China and Russia; combating non-State actors such as al-
    Qaida, ISIS, and state-backed proxies like the Houthis; assisting
    allies and partners against State and non-State actors; and preparing
    for large-scale combat.
        SOF have been executing IW operations and activities for more than
    80 years. SOF's operations in support of broader USG deterrence efforts
    help undermine adversaries' confidence; alter their decisionmaking
    calculus; and provide Combatant Commanders opportunities and
    advantages--to prevent conflict. With decades of combat experience and
    credibility, SOF's long-term relationships with allies and partners
    improve interoperability, while also ensuring broad access, placement,
    and influence across the globe. This provides the Joint Force with
    expanded situational awareness and increases options in competition,
    crisis, and conflict. Small, persistent, globally deployed SOF teams,
    working alongside regular and irregular forces, strengthen partner
    capacity, counter adversary malign activity, and promote regional
    stability.
        Question. Do you believe that SOF have the appropriate authorities
    and capabilities to operate effectively in this domain of warfare?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. I appreciate Congress's efforts to provide the DOD and
    USSOCOM with the tools needed to fight and win. In my experience, one
    of our most important tools is the array of fiscal authorities that we
    can apply to enable foreign forces that support our operations. To
    build our military advantage in a changing operational environment, we
    must adapt and innovate our authorities and capabilities to provide
    flexibility and operational agility. If confirmed, I intend to assess
    current authorities in close coordination with the USSOCOM staff and
    components, as well as ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.
        Section 127d of title 10, United States Code, authorizes the
    provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to
    regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
    facilitating irregular warfare operations by U.S. SOF.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. I am grateful to Congress for codifying the former 1202
    authority into title 10. The ability to enable and leverage the access
    and local area knowledge of select foreign forces allows U.S. SOF to
    achieve specific effects in direct support of ongoing priority
    Combatant Command irregular warfare operations. This enables outsized
    returns from a relatively small investment in our efforts to impose
    costs upon malign actors and enhance resiliency of frontline allies. As
    a resourcing tool, 127d is the mechanism that sets conditions for
    current and future burden-sharing with partners and surrogate forces.
    If confirmed, I would work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to provide Congress
    with the transparency necessary to build the necessary trust and
    confidence that this authority is being appropriately implemented to
    maintain our military advantage.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
    section 127d proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are
    complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government irregular warfare
    efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that proposals for the use of
    127d are aligned with INDSG priorities, consistent with congressional
    intent, within the scope of Secretary of Defense-granted operational
    authority and fully coordinated and synchronized with interagency
    partners. Proposals must include detailed counterintelligence plans to
    mitigate risk and ensure integrity of the enabled force, with defined
    control measures to mitigate risk of inadvertent escalation. Proposals
    must also include well-defined milestones and end State, with
    consideration for eventual off-ramp, executed in concert with the
    Combatant Command and the Department of State.
                             information operations
        Question. In your view, are the Department and the broader
    interagency appropriately organized to compete with State and non-State
    adversaries in the information environment? If not, what
    recommendations would you make?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would like to examine this issue in greater
    detail and assess how USSOCOM and our other capabilities can contribute
    to a broader USG effort by integrating and coordinating efforts both
    within DOD and the Interagency. The DOD has conducted analysis of force
    structure, authorities, and standing capabilities to meet our Nation's
    requirements to compete in the information environment. This has
    resulted in several initiatives across the Joint Staff, the Services,
    and at USSOCOM. I believe SOF are well-positioned both to support
    Combatant Commanders and to help synchronize the Department's messaging
    across the Department and interagency.
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department and,
    specifically, SOF in the broader information operations and strategic
    communications efforts of the U.S. Government?
        Answer. I understand that the Department's role in the broader USG
    information operations effort is typically to support the designated
    lead agencies for strategic communications. In most cases,
    communication efforts take place outside declared areas of hostility
    with the Department of State as the designated lead. In a broader
    sense, DOD is emphasizing throughout the force that every operation,
    action, and investment planned has an accompanying informational
    component which together contribute to strategic campaigning. Every
    action we take conveys the principle of Peace through Strength.
        As directed in the Unified Command Plan and Title 10 USC Section
    167, USSOCOM is the Department's SOF Joint Force Provider with the
    responsibility to provide combat ready SOF, including Psychological
    Operations (PSYOP) forces. The UCP also specifies that the USSOCOM
    Commander's ``responsibilities include integrating and coordinating DOD
    Military Information Support Operations (MISO) capabilities, and when
    directed, executing MISO in support of Combatant Commands.'' Working
    primarily through the Theater Special Operations Commands, USSOCOM
    provides military information support operations capabilities and
    exercises its coordinating authority role to support achievement of
    supported Combatant Commanders' objectives. Outside of areas of
    hostilities, PSYOP forces conduct military information support
    operations in close coordination with Department of State and other
    interagency personnel to support the achievement of U.S. Government
    information objectives, consistent with Department of State mission
    strategic plans.
        Question. Do you believe that USSOCOM's military information
    support capabilities can be more effectively utilized? If so, are there
    doctrinal, organizational, training, or authority modifications that
    you believe could make military information support capabilities more
    effective?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with USSOCOM, supported Combatant
    Commands, and interagency partners to review the agility and
    effectiveness of USSOCOM's military information support capabilities.
    In my current position, I have witnessed the increasing importance of
    these capabilities--and other related capabilities in the virtual
    domain, such as cyber and horizontal ISR--and judge these capabilities
    to be critical enablers in our current and future operations. I firmly
    believe that USSOCOM's innovation in this arena--and its fruitful
    partnership with USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM in particular--should be
    reinforced and accelerated. If confirmed, I will remain a strong
    partner to other Combatant Commands--such as USINDOPACOM--that are
    integrating information environment operations into their theater
    campaign plans.
        Question. Are there additional military capabilities that should be
    developed by the Department to more effectively compete in the
    information environment?
        Answer. At this time, I am not prepared to advocate for the
    development of additional military capabilities in this area. If
    confirmed, I will coordinate employment of these capabilities closely
    with Department, Combatant Command, and interagency stakeholders. As
    with many other military capabilities, it is essential that these
    effects are employed with speed, agility, appropriate discipline, and
    consistent with the relevant law.
                            intelligence operations
        Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
    by SOF different from those carried out by others in the intelligence
    community?
        Answer. In my experience, SOF principally conduct intelligence-
    related activities, in support of the warfighter and the Department--to
    achieve national security objectives. However, SOF do not do this
    alone; they integrate, coordinate, and deconflict these activities with
    partners in the Intelligence Community and interagency, often setting
    conditions for potential DOD operations in support of deterrence,
    crisis response, and conflict. SOF's unique capabilities, access, and
    placement enables enhanced understanding, and extends the operational
    reach and collection capabilities of the Joint Force and intelligence
    community.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence
    activities carried out by SOF are properly coordinated with activities
    carried out by the intelligence community?
        Answer. If confirmed, and in coordination with OUSD(I&S), I will
    direct USSOCOM to adhere to Intelligence Community and DOD directives
    for coordination of intelligence collection and intelligence-related
    activities. I will also ensure that USSOCOM works closely with our
    intelligence community partners to share best practices, particularly
    those tied to counterintelligence and force protection, as required by
    the increasing adversary use of technical surveillance. USSOCOM will
    also continue to leverage its SOF liaison network and Intelligence
    Community senior representatives and liaison officers to collaborate,
    coordinate, and leverage intelligence expertise to support operations.
    Theater Special Operations Commands and SOF Joint Task Forces will
    continue to conduct coordination with Country Teams and the
    Intelligence Community to deconflict activities, share information,
    leverage available capabilities, and enable operations.
                          crisis response capabilities
        Question. What is your understanding of the demand for and
    associated costs of USSOCOM's crisis response capabilities over the
    last decade?
        Answer. Employed at the direction of the President and Secretary of
    Defense, USSOCOM's crisis response forces eliminate threats to the
    homeland, rescue American citizens, and protect our diplomats, all at a
    moment's notice. These urgent missions lack predictability in terms of
    timing, duration, and total cost. In the past three-and-a-half years,
    the frequency of these Presidentially directed missions has increased
    by over 200 percent. During this same time, composite strategic airlift
    costs increased over 76 percent. Adequate funding for crisis response
    and National Command Authority-directed missions is critical to ensure
    critical readiness exercises and modernization efforts are not
    sacrificed to resource the increased frequency, duration and cost of
    crisis response.
        Question. What implications, in your view, does a significant
    increase in the demand for USSOCOM's crisis response capabilities over
    the last decade have for the readiness and resourcing of the force?
        Answer. Crisis response operations are inherently unpredictable and
    vary year-to-year in number, timing, duration, and total cost. In
    particular, the last 2 years have seen some of the most complex and
    longest crisis response operations in U.S. history. The increased
    demand for SOF to respond to crises, and the duration and cost of those
    operations, have impacted SOF's ability to modernize for the future.
    Crisis response is no-fail mission for SOF. We must balance SOF
    readiness for immediate crisis response requirements, with the need to
    modernize the force to be able successfully execute the crisis response
    in contested environments.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to USSOCOM's
    crisis response posture, capabilities, and employment?
        Answer. USSOCOM provides the most capable crisis response force in
    the world. To sustain this, we must continue to modernize our crisis
    response capabilities, focused on the potential requirement to execute
    crisis response operations in environments either directly or
    indirectly contested by China or other State and/or state-supported
    proxies. Advanced autonomous and remotely controlled unmanned systems,
    man-machine teaming, counter-unmanned systems capabilities, and virtual
    domain sensing and effects will be critical to future crisis response
    operations. If confirmed, I will continue to accelerate USSOCOM's
    modernization program--including those capabilities required for crisis
    response, and in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)--with China as the
    pacing threat.
                        ussocom acquisition authorities
        Question. Section 167(e)(4) of title 10, U.S. Code, assigns to the
    Commander, USSOCOM the authority to develop and acquire special
    operations-peculiar equipment, and to acquire special operations-
    peculiar material, supplies, and services. The Commander, USSOCOM is
    advised and assisted in these matters by a command acquisition
    executive.
        What technology areas and capabilities do you believe should be
    prioritized to enable SOF to most effectively support the objectives of
    the NDS?
        Answer. The increasing pace of technological advancement demands
    SOF modernize rapidly to outpace our adversaries through the
    unrelenting development and integration of cutting-edge technologies.
    This includes harnessing the power of man-machine teaming and fusing
    all-domain capabilities to achieve decisive advantages. The pervasive
    technical surveillance environment presents both unique challenges and
    unprecedented opportunities. Recognizing this, I am committed to
    strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the combined
    strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF's operational
    effectiveness in support of national security objectives. My vision
    encompasses integrating technological advancements across all domains--
    physical and virtual--including surface and subsurface maritime
    platforms; autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned systems; next-
    generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; stand-off
    precision effects; and modernized mission command systems. If
    confirmed, I will leverage the INDSG and other strategic documents to
    guide a comprehensive review of USSOCOM's priorities and capabilities
    and make recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) aimed at ensuring SOF remain at
    the forefront of military innovation and preparedness.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating
    a determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel,
    supplies, or services is ``special operations-peculiar''?
        Answer. The SOF enterprise relies on Service-common investments in
    foundational capabilities such as personnel, infrastructure, mobility
    platforms, and weapons systems. However, SOF provide the Nation unique
    capabilities, and therefore, require specialized capabilities. This may
    involve modifications of Service-common systems or developing entirely
    unique SOF capabilities. SOF should continue to look for opportunities
    to enhance or build from Joint Force solutions wherever possible. I
    also believe SOF should be viewed as the vanguard for innovation and
    will work with the Services to develop capabilities with transition to
    the joint force at the forefront of our development. If confirmed, I
    will partner with ASD(SO/LIC) to validate SOF capabilities through our
    established process SOF Capability Integration and Development System
    (SOFCIDS). Any capability deemed non-special operations-peculiar will
    be transitioned to the appropriate Service sponsor--in collaboration
    with the Joint Staff and leveraging the Joint Capabilities Integration
    and Development System (JCIDS) framework.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to improve each
    of the three aspects of the special operations-peculiar acquisition
    process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring SOF remain a vanguard
    for agility across the Department and I will assess current USSOCOM
    requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes to identify what
    improvements may be required. I recognize the critical need to respond
    to adversary innovation cycles with speed and precision. It will be
    important to reduce capability fielding and employment timelines by
    empowering leaders to make risk-informed capability development
    decisions and enabling rapidly fielded capabilities against emerging
    threats. Openness with industry will foster strategic partnerships,
    competition, and innovation. Allowing companies insight into SOF
    requirements will unlock the ingenuity of the American industrial base
    and drive development of critical cutting-edge technologies.
        If confirmed, I will also assess USSOCOM's business systems and
    processes, and look to modernize them, as required. I will continue to
    make strides toward achieving a clean audit to earn your full trust and
    confidence in the management and expenditure of the resources entrusted
    to USSOCOM. I will continually seek to enhance transparency throughout
    the requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
    ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic,
    technically achievable, and prioritized?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a Commander-driven prioritization
    process, ensuring that precious MFP-11 resources are allocated to
    programs that are demonstrably relevant, realistic, and aligned with
    addressing the current and most dangerous future threats. I will look
    to divest of obsolete programs, freeing up resources for modernization.
    In my experience, special operator-identified capability gaps combined
    with agile authorities, and iterative experimentation and modernization
    exercises are invaluable to the successful development and fielding of
    special operations-peculiar capabilities. To sustain this advantage, we
    must cultivate a battlefield test lab environment with realistic and
    technically achievable requirements. If confirmed, I commit to equip
    our operators with the best tools possible while remaining good
    stewards of the resources entrusted to USSOCOM.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that special operations
    capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research,
    development, and acquisition programs?
        Answer. I believe a strong partnership with the Department is
    critical for success in this area. If confirmed, I will prioritize
    maintaining a close partnership with USD(A&S), USD(R&E), the Strategic
    Capabilities Office (SCO), and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). I
    will also continue the practice of co-chairing the Acquisition Summit,
    fostering collaboration between SOF acquisition efforts and those of
    the Services and key DOD leaders. This synergy will enable SOF to
    leverage its unique ability to be both a first mover on emerging
    technologies and an early adopter of innovations developed across the
    Department. The USSOCOM enterprise's ongoing partnerships with the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and SCO exemplifies
    this approach, increasing collaboration on defining SOF requirements
    and serving as a transition partner for their groundbreaking
    technologies. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring transparency and
    interoperability by integrating USSOCOM developmental efforts and
    capabilities into the broader DOD and Joint Force to maximize our
    collective impact.
                           ethics and accountability
        Question. What are your views on the current culture of ethics and
    accountability in SOF?
        Answer. In my view, the SOF enterprise is a meritocracy built on a
    foundation of ethical leadership, professionalism, and accountability.
    A meritocratic culture must also ensure accountability for mistakes. We
    must learn from them and demonstrate that unacceptable behavior will
    not be tolerated. Strong, ethical leadership is the key to preventing
    and deterring poor behavior. Sustaining and cultivating a culture that
    reinforces dignity, respect, and accountability is vital to this. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to continue to ensure
    SOF maintain a meritocratic culture, built on a foundation of
    professionalism and accountability, empowering the innovative spirit to
    ensure readiness and mission accomplishment.
        Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to foster a
    culture of ethics and accountability in SOF?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am fully committed to fostering an
    enduring, meritocratic culture underpinned by ethical leadership and
    accountability across the USSOCOM enterprise. I will work closely with
    ASD(SO/LIC) and subordinate commanders to promote this culture within
    SOF, and to make professionalism and accountability pillars of SOF
    leadership, training, and assessment programs at all echelons.
        Question. What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment
    play in decisions relating to misconduct by SOF?
        Answer. As a general matter, mission accomplishment does not excuse
    criminal or corrosive behaviors. Accountability is fundamental to
    ensuring good order and discipline in any formation, and SOF commanders
    at all levels have a responsibility to uphold standards. In making
    decisions relating to misconduct, leaders must evaluate each case on
    its own merits.
                      health of special operations forces
        Question. What is your assessment of the health and readiness of
    SOF?
        Answer. U.S. SOF are the most capable special operations forces in
    the world. This is an achievement that would not be possible without a
    strong foundation of health and readiness. To maintain this, if
    confirmed, I will ensure the USSOCOM force continues to have access to
    the range of services provided by the command's Preservation of the
    Force and Families (POTFF) program.
        Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing
    the stress on SOF?
        Answer. If confirmed, first and foremost, I will continue the
    efforts of my predecessors with respect to POTFF. We ask people to do
    difficult things, and this produces stress--we owe our teammates
    resources to help with stress. The SOF enterprise knows from hard
    learned lessons the importance of managing operational tempo and giving
    our warriors the resources and opportunities to reset and strengthen
    their minds, bodies, and spirits. If confirmed, my priorities will
    include closely monitoring the health and well-being of the force
    through screening and data, initiatives that cultivate an empathetic
    culture of self and buddy care, sustaining POTFF resources, and
    investing in innovations to improve the physical, psychological, and
    cognitive performance of SOF.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address
    suicides in SOF?
        Answer. Even one suicide in our formation is one too many. With the
    cessation of large-scale combat operations, suicide is now the leading
    cause of deaths among our service members. Suicide is preventable.
    Prevention requires involved leaders, peers, and subordinates; constant
    vigilance; the willingness to ask incisive questions; and access to
    mental healthcare and spiritual guidance. If confirmed, I will assess,
    and enhance as required, routine screening and resources for mental
    health, cognitive impairment, and interpersonal relationship problems--
    and to increase continuity of care between caregivers. The cultural
    measures we take--to increase empathy and decrease the stigma of asking
    for help--also have a tremendous positive impact. In my current
    command, I am proud to report nearly 50 percent of personnel have
    visited and used mental health services, a high rate unprecedented in
    my career, and not always for acute care but to increase resilience and
    performance.
        Question. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM's Preservation
    of the Force and Families program?
        Answer. The POTFF program is a powerful capability for the USSOCOM
    enterprise, augmenting Service-provided efforts. We must continue to
    care for our people--particularly those who have been injured on the
    battlefield--and their families. Having benefited from the POTFF
    program as a Commander, I understand and appreciate the value of having
    embedded, multidisciplinary teams within our formations. The POTFF
    construct provides top-quality physical and psychological care to our
    members, and the spiritual and family services enhance the
    belongingness and interpersonal relationships of our members and their
    families. I understand that in FY24 some 89 percent of SOF members were
    served by the POTFF program, and that USSOCOM's data showed positive
    results in physical performance and reduced severity of injuries,
    better mental health access, improved cognitive functioning and deeper
    family and community connections.
                            recruiting and retention
        Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in
    the USSOCOM community?
        Answer. In my current role, I have limited visibility on USSOCOM's
    recruiting and retention challenges, but if confirmed, I will examine
    this issue closely, in partnership with the Services. I anticipate one
    of the biggest challenges to retention in the SOF community is
    competition from the civilian workforce. To mitigate this, SOF rely on
    Service compensation policies as a significant contributor to retain
    the best and most qualified members. Continued support of compensation
    policies can only serve to sustain our already positive retention
    rates. However, service members assessed into SOF have already
    demonstrated their propensity to serve and are some of the most
    innovative and adaptive problem solvers in the world. We improve
    retention and our collective capability by providing SOF service
    members with a purposeful mission and venues that empower their
    innovative nature--from training ranges at home to our most
    sophisticated adversaries at the forward edge of the battlefield.
        Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the
    recruiting and retention goals of each of the services' SOF?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment with the
    USSOCOM team and Services to better understand recruiting and retention
    issues. Recruiting new service members falls under the purview of each
    of the Services, and it is evident that they are taking the recruiting
    challenge seriously. I fully support and applaud the actions that all
    the Services are taking to ensure that we appeal to today's youth, from
    compensation and benefit reviews that bolster both recruiting and
    retention, to studying the factors that disqualify young Americans from
    serving--such as physical, medical, and educational requirements. I am
    confident the Services are making positive progress on these
    challenges, with beneficial downstream effects on SOF's overall
    readiness and manning.
      capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
        Question. What is your assessment of the mix of responsibilities
    assigned to general purpose and SOF, particularly with respect to
    security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?
        Answer. Both SOF and GPF have important and complementary roles in
    Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Security Force Assistance (SFA)
    missions; and both have demonstrated their ability to conduct these
    missions across the globe. It is likely that both SOF and GPF will
    continue to prove vital to the Department's approach to campaigning. In
    general, SOF is designed for, and best utilized, as small teams in
    contested or politically sensitive areas to achieve low-cost, high-
    return results with partner nations. Because SOF is a high demand, low
    density force, it is often necessary to use GPF for SFA and BPC
    missions at larger scale. In my experience, GPF are most effective when
    specially trained to deliver conventional capabilities to foreign
    military forces--and in environments where U.S. presence is acceptable
    to the host-country government. Both GPF and SOF are utilized in the
    conduct of security cooperation for BPC under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 333 and
    other Chapter 16 security cooperation authorities.
                    special operations enabling capabilities
        Question. In your view, how should the responsibility for providing
    enabling capabilities for special operations missions be divided
    between USSOCOM and the services?
        Answer. In my 34-years of experience within the SOF community, the
    5th SOF Truth, ``most special operations require non-SOF support,'' has
    proven accurate. USSOCOM and SOF units depend on the Services in a wide
    variety of ways, from administrative needs including recruiting,
    personnel, and logistics, to operational needs such as Service-common
    equipment and training. In return, SOF serve as a vanguard for the
    Services, integrating unique capabilities into operational plans and
    creating military options that conventional forces cannot readily
    provide. The symbiotic relationship between SOF and the Services is a
    critical variable in the success or failure of both special and
    conventional operations. This dynamic also highlights the importance of
    ASD(SO/LIC) providing oversight and advocacy in a role comparable to
    that of a service secretary. If confirmed, I pledge to partner with the
    Services--in close collaboration with ASD(SO/LIC)--to bring outsized
    return-on-investment and value to the Services and the Joint Force.
        Question. How would you ensure that the enabler requirements of SOF
    are appropriately communicated to, and receive support, from the
    services?
        Answer. The Joint Staff Global Force Management Process provides
    the appropriate means to communicate special operations requirements
    for Service support and allows DOD leadership to consider the strategic
    risk associated with the allocation of forces. If confirmed, I would
    also leverage the Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council--in
    cooperation with ASD(SO/LIC)--to address any support concerns with the
    Services.
        Question. Do you believe USSOCOM and the services are maintaining
    adequate enabling capabilities to support special operations missions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess this topic in greater detail
    and provide transparency and recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the
    Department. USSOCOM and the Services are adjusting their structure and
    focus to align with strategic guidance, with downstream effects on SOF
    enabling capabilities.
                           interagency collaboration
        Question. The collaboration between SOF, general purpose forces,
    and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a
    significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and
    counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this
    collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
    collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and
    elsewhere, and what lessons, in your view, are applicable to efforts
    against China and Russia?
        Answer. In my view, the most important lesson learned from recent
    decades of combat in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere is the importance
    of relationships--within DOD, with other U.S. departments and agencies,
    and with foreign allies and partners. Whether fighting insurgents,
    conducting counterterrorism operations, competing against and deterring
    China and Russia, combating non-State actors, assisting allies and
    partners, or preparing for large scale combat, special operations is
    most often a team sport. With decades of combat experience and
    credibility, SOF's long-term relationships are directly applicable to
    efforts against China and Russia. These relationships are foundational
    to SOF's ability to provide the Joint Force with placement and access,
    enhanced understanding, and increased options in competition, crisis,
    and conflict.
                          supported combatant command
        Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by
    the President or Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM may operate as a
    supported combatant command.
        In your view, under what circumstances should USSOCOM conduct
    operations as a supported combatant command?
        Answer. In my view, USSOCOM's primary role is to provide trained
    and ready SOF to Combatant Commanders with physical areas of
    responsibility to execute operations in support of their respective
    theater objectives. By exception, and if directed by the Secretary and
    President, USSOCOM could be designated as the supported combatant
    command, particularly when crisis response operations are trans-
    regional and dynamic, or when exquisite sensitive capabilities may be
    employed. However, this has not been the historical norm.
        Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force
    structure changes, if any, are required in order for USSOCOM to more
    effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command
    responsibilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, and using the INDSG and other strategic
    guidance as a guide, I will conduct a holistic review of the SOF
    enterprise resource, organization, and force structure, and make
    appropriate adjustments and recommendations to the Department in close
    coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and the Services.
                      theater special operations commands
        Question. Based on your professional military experience, how would
    you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations
    component to a geographic combatant command in providing responsive
    special operations planning and capabilities in support of the
    combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?
        Answer. As a former commander of Special Operations Command Central
    (SOCCENT), I know firsthand the crucial role our TSOC's play in support
    of Combatant Commands' campaign plans. TSOCs are the primary theater
    SOF organization responsible for planning, executing, and controlling
    theater special operations in support of their respective Combatant
    Commands. Similarly, TSOC Commanders also serve as the senior SOF
    representative on Combatant Command staffs responsible for advising
    Combatant Commanders on the best use of SOF in support of theater
    campaign plans and any other emergent theater operational or training
    requirements.
                              civilian casualties
        Question. In your view, what are the primary challenges for the
    combatant commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to
    allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military
    operations?
        Answer. Minimizing civilian harm is one of the core purposes of the
    Law of Armed Conflict, and crucial for maintaining local support,
    strengthening partnership, and denying adversaries exploitable
    propaganda. Civilian casualties are never routine--every civilian death
    is a tragedy, and we will always take feasible precautions to mitigate
    CIVCAS--and every time we fail, we will examine where and how we failed
    and adjust our processes to mitigate civilian casualties to the best of
    our ability. In my experience, the mitigation, investigation, and
    reporting of civilian casualties have been improved through measures
    such as the use of training, technology (weaponeering and modeling),
    refined processes, and dedicated personnel and funding. If confirmed, I
    will prioritize the minimization of civilian harm, and I will provide
    feedback and recommendations on the associated challenges to the
    Department, in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and supported
    Combatant Commands.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure civilian casualty
    allegations are adequately and promptly investigated by USSOCOM?
        Answer. USSOCOM actively works with supported Combatant Commands to
    ensure all CIVCAS incidents and allegations are promptly investigated
    and reported. USSOCOM has subject matter experts who are involved in
    responding to all allegations of civilian harm in accordance with
    Department of Defense policy, and in identifying potential trends of
    issues specific to SOF. If confirmed, and when USSOCOM forces are
    operating under another Combatant Command's operational authority, I
    will emphasize full cooperation with that command's processes to ensure
    we are taking all appropriate action to investigate and resolve
    civilian harm allegations.
        Question. Do you believe credible civilian casualty incidents
    should be independently investigated by personnel who are sufficiently
    removed from the unit or chain of command associated with the incident?
    Please be specific in your response.
        Answer. The Civilian Harm Assessment Cells (CHAC) at Combatant
    Commands are organized to ensure that they are not part of the
    targeting process, to maintain a degree of separation that enables an
    impartial review of civilian harm allegations. At the same time, these
    CHAC personnel, by working as part of the staff, maintain real-time
    awareness of operations, policies, battle rhythm, battle damage
    assessments, civilian damage estimates, and have access to all relevant
    information regarding military operations, including classified
    material that requires special access. In my judgment, this ensures the
    CHACs are well-positioned to evaluate all civilian harm allegations
    thoroughly and in a timely manner, while maintaining their
    impartiality. This model provides commanders with maximum flexibility
    and discretion to assign and oversee incidents of civilian harm and
    results in more relevant investigations as the personnel understand the
    organization, policy, and processes involved, and have the expertise to
    make relevant recommendations to create institutional change.
    Additionally, partnerships with civilian non-governmental organizations
    can provide important access to information on civil context in and
    around battlefields.
        Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's obligation to
    report civilian casualty incidents to Congress?
        Answer. USSOCOM forces conduct combat operations under the
    operational authority of a combatant commander with a physical area of
    responsibility. USSOCOM provides required inputs to Congress via
    Combatant Commanders with physical areas of responsibility and the
    Joint Staff. This report is submitted annually by USD(P). These reports
    include specific operational details, such as the date, location, and
    the number of civilian deaths and/or injuries that occurred, among
    other relevant details.
        Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
    to provide ex gratia payments when civilian casualties or other
    civilian harm result from unilateral or partnered U.S. military
    operations?
        Answer. Ex gratia is an expression of condolence or sympathy with
    the aim to maintain good relationships with the local community. There
    are many factors to consider when making the decision to use ex gratia
    funds including the extent of harm, local culture, local economic
    situation, the ability to confirm the identity of the affected
    individuals, and the command's ability to communicate with them. There
    are also the considerations that an ex-gratia payment could put those
    individuals in danger, or that the payments could be diverted to
    support terrorist activities. There are cases when ex gratia payments
    are appropriate due to damage or destruction of property, or injury or
    death due to U.S. military operations. In my view, while ex gratia is a
    means to maintain positive relationships with affected communities, it
    must be weighed against potential risks to the recipients and/or future
    operations.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records (including documents and
    electronic communications) and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records (including documents and electronic
    communications) and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer with a simple yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                    naval special warfare detachment kodiak
        1. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, President Trump recently
    said, ``We will ensure Alaska gets even more defense investment as we
    fully rebuild our military, especially as Russia and China are making
    menacing moves in the Pacific.'' As you know, Alaska offers some of the
    most challenging and realistic training environments in the world,
    especially for cold-weather and maritime operations. Naval Special
    Warfare Detachment Kodiak has played a vital role for decades in
    preparing our SEALs for missions in Arctic conditions--an area of the
    world that is increasingly relevant given the strategic competition in
    the High North. How does SOCOM view the importance of Kodiak in
    sustaining the readiness of our Naval Special Warfare units?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. While I cannot speak for USSOCOM's view writ
    large, I believe Naval Special Warfare Detachment Kodiak provides
    critical training to enable NSW personnel to operate in extreme, cold-
    weather maritime environments.

        2. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, are there plans to
    expand or modernize Naval Special Warfare Detachment Kodiak's
    capabilities as the Arctic becomes a more contested environment?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my current position, I am not aware if
    there are plans to expand Naval Special Warfare Detachment Kodiak. If
    confirmed, I will review this, as well as SOF's other artic-focused
    training capabilities.
                                8(a) contracting
        3. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, the Small Business Act
    (SBA) 8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a contract vehicle
    through which sole source and set aside contracts can be awarded to
    small businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations, Community
    Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian
    organizations. These corporations are tied to political relationships,
    not racial classifications. They also are some of our most efficient
    contractors, earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment
    Reporting System (CPARS) marks. Last, many of these small businesses
    employ veterans at rates far exceeding the national average, allowing
    our Nation's finest to continue to service after they take off the
    uniform. Will you commit to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a)
    contracting for the Department of Defense?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        4. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, I recently toured an SBA
    8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to
    the Federal customer in terms of cost and efficiency while delivering
    mission-critical solutions that increase our national security and
    warfighting readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best ``bang for the
    buck'' for taxpayers, giving contracting officers additional
    flexibility while also maximizing efficiency by reducing red tape. Do
    you see the value in increasing efficiency in flexibility brought from
    initiatives such as the 8(a) program?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I believe we must use every tool available to
    leverage the incredible power of the U.S. industrial base to support
    warfighting readiness, innovation, and modernization. This absolutely
    includes small business and any legally available mechanism that allows
    acceleration and delivery of mission critical services and capabilities
    should be leveraged.

        5. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Bradley, rapid response
    capabilities are essential to enable our warfighters to win on the
    battlefield. At the same time, our defense contractors must rapidly
    respond to the needs of our military to make the U.S. Military more
    lethal. Flexible and efficient contracting through the SBA 8(a) program
    is one trusted way to do this, but many of these small businesses do
    not have the past performance that other traditional vendors may boast.
    How does SOCOM evaluate their operational performance in program awards
    and procurement planning?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I am aware that the DOD has a partnership
    agreement with the Small Business Administration that allows flexible
    and efficient contracting through the 8(a) program. From my current
    position, I do not have insight on how SOCOM evaluates operational
    performance in program awards and procurement planning, but if
    confirmed I will do an assessment of this important function.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
                               mq-9 availability
        6. Senator Cramer. Vice Admiral Bradley, I've heard from both the
    Special Operations community and from our own 119th Air National Guard
    unit in North Dakota that the MQ-9 is doing critical work for
    conventional and special operations around the world. But attrition is
    taking its toll on the MQ-9 fleet, and it doesn't look like the Air
    Force has an immediate plan to replace the fleet with existing or
    future capabilities. Can you briefly explain the importance of the MQ-
    9's capabilities to the Special Operations mission?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my experience, MQ-9s have been, and will
    continue to be, a critical and enduring platform in SOF's airborne ISR
    (A-ISR) toolkit. SOF require an array of complementary physical and
    virtual ISR capabilities for permissive, contested, and denied
    environments to identify and locate targets, characterize adversary
    activities, and provide overwatch of our forces during operations. This
    includes A-ISR. My assessment is that we will continue to need MQ-9s,
    which we can apply to a range of SOF missions. We must balance our ISR
    portfolio with other capabilities, in order to protect essential
    platforms like the MQ-9 that our enemies seek to destroy/defeat through
    kinetic and non-kinetic (jamming) means. As MQ-9s are primarily used in
    more permissive environments, we must also modernize our A-ISR
    platforms for operations in contested airspace.
                                   __________

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                   background
        7. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, as part of my
    responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
    to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions
    within the Department of Defense, I will be asking the same two
    questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I
    serve:?'Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
    requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical
    harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        8. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever faced
    discipline, or entered into a settlement related to this kind of
    conduct?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
                            great power competition
        9. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, as United States Special
    Operations Forces pivot to address threats beyond counterterrorism--
    particularly from great power competitors like China and Russia--U.S.
    Special Operations Command (SOCOM) must adapt its structure, mission
    set, and technology investments. SOCOM has a unique role to play in
    irregular warfare, strategic influence, and information operations that
    can disrupt or deter adversaries operating below the threshold of armed
    conflict. In this context, the ability of SOCOM to counter malign
    influence and support resistance networks in contested environments has
    become increasingly important. How would you assess SOCOM's current
    readiness to deter or disrupt Chinese and Russian irregular influence
    campaigns in regions like the Pacific Islands, Africa, or Eastern
    Europe?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. While I don't have complete visibility of the
    readiness of the entire USSOCOM enterprise in my current position, I
    can say that SOF are successfully conducting critical deterrence and
    shaping activities today across the globe, including in the Indo-
    Pacific, Africa, Central and South America, and Europe. On any given
    day, more than 6,000 SOF are deployed to over 80 countries supporting
    over 30 named operations and other Combatant Command requirements.

        10. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, what role should SOCOM
    play in shaping strategic influence operations and countering hybrid
    threats that fall outside traditional kinetic engagements?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Drawing upon decades of combat-experience and
    credibility, SOF provide tailorable, asymmetric options while creating
    dilemmas for our adversaries. With a range of kinetic and non-kinetic
    options to deter aggression and counter coercion, SOF leverage unique
    authorities to collaborate and operate with allies and partners--our
    greatest strategic advantage for tackling shared challenges. This also
    helps bolster our global influence and counter attempts by our
    adversaries to undermine our alliances and partnerships. SOF have a
    unique role in building resistance and resilience, and our long-term
    partnerships also provide SOF incredible placement and access across
    the globe, enhancing our understanding of adversary activities.

        11. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, how are you prioritizing
    investments in emerging technologies--such as artificial intelligence
    (AI), unmanned systems, and cyber tools--to give our operators a
    decisive edge in irregular and information warfare?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The increasing pace of technological
    advancement demands SOF modernize rapidly to outpace our adversaries
    through the unrelenting development and integration of cutting-edge
    technologies. This includes harnessing the power of man-machine teaming
    and fusing all-domain capabilities to achieve decisive advantages. The
    pervasive technical surveillance environment presents both unique
    challenges and unprecedented opportunities. Recognizing this, I am
    committed to strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the
    combined strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF's
    operational effectiveness in support of national security objectives.
    My vision encompasses integrating technological advancements across all
    domains--physical and virtual--including surface and subsurface
    maritime platforms; autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned
    systems; next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance; stand-off precision effects; and modernized mission
    command systems. If confirmed, I will leverage the INDSG and other
    strategic documents to guide a comprehensive review and prioritization
    of USSOCOM's priorities and capabilities and make recommendations to
    ASD(SO/LIC) aimed at ensuring SOF remain at the forefront of military
    innovation and preparedness.
     civilian harm prevention and mitigation for special operations command
        12. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, General Bryan Fenton,
    current SOCOM Commander, when asked during posture hearing whether the
    Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CPCOE) has been an asset to
    SOCOM operations: ``I think certainly.
        [ . . . ] We absolutely, as your SOCOM team, always aim to do the
    mission . . . and then protect noncombatants and civilians as part of
    who we are and what we stand for. And I think to your point, that sends
    a very--that sends a very powerful message across the globe that we're
    there to eliminate or disrupt a bad actor yet at the same time protect
    innocents and vulnerable and noncombatants. That's a very different
    signal from a nation. And that's what your SOCOM team works to do every
    day.'' Do you agree with General Fenton's comments on CPCOE and
    protecting noncombatants?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I absolutely agree. While SOF are laser-
    focused on mission accomplishment, ensuring we do everything we can to
    protect noncombatants and civilians from harm represents our values as
    a Nation, and is critical to our success in competition.

        13. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, if so, how will you
    continue SOCOM's mitigation and prevention of civilian harm?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my experience, the mitigation,
    investigation, and reporting of civilian casualties have been improved
    through measures such as the use of training, technology (weaponeering
    and modeling), refined processes, and dedicated personnel and funding.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize the minimization of civilian harm, and
    I will provide feedback and recommendations on the associated
    challenges to the Department, in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)
    and supported Combatant Commands.

        14. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, what do you
    understand to be your roles and responsibilities regarding civilian
    harm mitigation and response?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I understand my role and
    responsibilities regarding the mitigation of civilian harm and
    mitigation response as provided in Under Department of Defense
    Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17 and the Civilian Harm Mitigation and
    Response Action Plan. My role would be to continue to apply resources
    and leverage our staff to identify the risks of our military operations
    to civilians and make every effort to minimize harmful effects while
    achieving our military objectives. I would also work with Combatant
    Commands on investigating reports of civilian harm resulting from SOF
    operations and responding accordingly when civilian harm does occur.

        15. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, furthermore, do you agree
    that preventing and responding to civilian harm is a critical
    responsibility of the U.S. Military and makes the United States more
    effective?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I agree. We have a moral and strategic
    obligation to avoid civilian casualties and investigate allegations
    thereof. This is at the heart of who we are as a Military and a Nation.
                        scaling innovative capabilities
        16. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, it's broadly agreed that
    the Department of Defense needs more rapid procurement and acquisition
    authorities. However, SOCOM is unique in how it rapidly acquires and
    fields cutting-edge technologies for special forces around the world.
    If confirmed, what specific procurement or innovation practices are you
    most interested in expanding or institutionalizing within SOCOM?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring SOF remain
    a vanguard for innovation and agility and will assess current USSOCOM
    procurement and innovation practices in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)
    and the Department. I recognize the critical need to respond to
    adversary innovation cycles with speed and precision and reduce
    capability fielding and employment timelines. I believe openness with
    industry will foster strategic partnerships, competition, and
    innovation. Allowing companies insight into SOF requirements will
    unlock the ingenuity of the American industrial base and drive
    development of critical cutting-edge technologies. SOF's ability to
    rapidly test, evaluate, and make combat-informed judgments on a
    product's viability for its intended function is key to informing the
    iterative nature of product development.

        17. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would you build on
    SOCOM's existing authorities and innovative processes?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I appreciate Congress's efforts to provide
    the DOD and USSOCOM with the tools needed to fight and win. In my
    experience, one of our most important tools is the array of fiscal
    authorities that we can apply to enable foreign forces that support our
    operations. To build our military advantage in a changing operational
    environment, we must adapt and innovate our authorities and
    capabilities to provide flexibility and operational agility. If
    confirmed, I intend to assess current authorities in close coordination
    with the USSOCOM staff and Components, ASD(SO/LIC), and the Department.

        18. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, rapid acquisition often
    increases risk. How do you propose measuring and managing risk without
    eroding accountability?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will assess and strengthen
    internal controls, managing cost schedule and performance risk
    throughout our acquisition programs, ensuring accountability and
    stewardship of resources.

        19. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, how would
    you advocate within the broader Department of Defense to scale SOCOM's
    agile acquisition practices across other commands?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. USSOCOM's unique alignment of flexible budget
    authorities, mission command, and capability-based programming have
    been instrumental in SOF's ability to address critical and emergent
    requirements--specifically unmanned systems development and capacity. I
    commit to ensuring SOF remain a vanguard for innovation and agility and
    commit to working with the Services to develop capabilities with
    transition to the joint force at the forefront of our development. If
    confirmed, I will commit to assess these authorities and provide
    recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.
                                   __________

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                 counter-unmanned aircraft systems capabilities
        20. Senator Kaine. Vice Admiral Bradley, in your advance policy
    questions (APQ) you cited the threat that one-way drones pose to U.S.
    Forces, bases, and allies and partners as one of ``the most pressing
    challenges'' facing special operations forces over the next 10 years.
    What role does SOCOM have to play in counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
    (c-UAS) operations?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The ability to counter threats from unmanned
    systems, of all types, from both static and dynamic positions, is a
    critical capability for SOF--and will only become more important with
    the constant advances in commercial unmanned and autonomous
    technologies. The ability to rapidly innovate to solve hard problems is
    a hallmark of SOF, and if confirmed, I will ensure USSOCOM continues to
    work closely with the rest of the Department, and international
    partners and allies to advance our c-UAS capabilities for fixed site,
    mobile, and expeditionary scenarios.

        21. Senator Kaine. Vice Admiral Bradley, how is SOCOM integrating
    with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) (as synchronizer) and the Army
    (as executive agent) to develop c-UAS technology?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my current position, I do not have
    complete visibility on how SOCOM is integrating with NORTHCOM on c-UAS
    technologies. If confirmed, I will review SOCOM's efforts in this
    critical capability area.

        22. Senator Kaine. Vice Admiral Bradley, what are our biggest
    technology gaps?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The increasing pace of technological
    advancement demands SOF modernize rapidly to outpace our adversaries
    through the unrelenting development and integration of cutting-edge
    technologies. My vision encompasses integrating technological
    advancements and man-machine teaming across all domains--physical and
    virtual--including surface and subsurface maritime platforms;
    autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned systems; next-generation
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; stand-off precision
    effects; and modernized mission command systems. I am committed to
    strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the combined
    strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF's operational
    effectiveness in support of national security objectives.
                                   __________

               Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        23. Senator King. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support the
    ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS)?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. U.S. Forces currently follow UNCLOS as a
    matter of customary international law. As to the policy decision of
    whether UNCLOS should be ratified, I defer to the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense.
                                  brain health
        24. Senator King. Vice Admiral Bradley, Special Operations Command
    leads the Department with regards to blast overpressure testing.
    Special operators are a high-risk population when it comes to brain
    health including blast overpressure and brain health, what specific
    plans do you have to keep this a priority?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Our people are the most important resource.
    SOF's lethality and readiness is an obligation to defend the Nation, as
    is our commitment to safe training while still maintaining critical
    combat skills. USSOCOM has been a leader in brain health and continues
    to lead efforts with respect scientific research and advances. As we
    gain more fidelity on the impacts of the range of traumatic brain
    injuries, USSOCOM is also taking steps to identify better mitigation
    and protection measures, as well as improving treatment and care for
    our impacted service members. In partnership with Massachusetts General
    Hospital and Harvard Medical School, USSOCOM concluded The Repeated
    Exposure to Blast (ReBlast) Study, the most comprehensive work of this
    kind to date. If confirmed, I will remain committed to prioritizing
    brain health, and I will ensure USSOCOM continues to align with, lead,
    and inform the Department of Defense.

        25. Senator King. Vice Admiral Bradley, how can the Congress be
    helpful to you to support brain health for special operators?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Congress and this committee have been very
    supportive of fiscal resources in support of SOF and brain health
    initiatives. I ask for your continued commitment and support to SOF,
    the Department, and our families to better understand brain health
    issues and develop solutions to mitigate and treat them.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                     ethics
        26. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit not to seek any employment with or compensation from a
    defense contractor, including through serving on a board, as a
    consultant, or as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving DOD?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I intend to focus on the job at
    hand. I have no intentions of seeking such employment. I commit to
    following applicable statutes, policies, and regulations regarding
    post-government employment and conflicts of interest.

        27. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit not to engage in any lobbying activities, including
    unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the
    guise of consulting or advising, focused on DOD or any of its
    components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I intend to focus on the job at
    hand. I have no intentions of engaging in such activities. I commit to
    following applicable statutes, policies, and regulations regarding
    post-government employment and conflicts of interest.

        28. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit not to
    seek employment, board membership with, or any other form of
    compensation from a company that you regulated or otherwise interacted
    with while in government, for at least 4 years after leaving office?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I intend to focus on the job at
    hand. I have no intentions of seeking such employment. I commit to
    following applicable statutes, policies, and regulations regarding
    post-government employment and conflicts of interest.

        29. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, during your nomination
    process, did anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other
    closely related entity approach you about your loyalty to President
    Trump?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        30. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you were approached
    about your loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or
    other similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that
    pledge or oath.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I was not approached about my loyalty to
    President Trump.

        31. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you were approached
    about your loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal
    representations of loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I was not approached about loyalty to
    President Trump.

        32. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, in November 2024, the New
    York Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top
    adviser to President Trump, allegedly requested payment from
    prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
    positions within the administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
    joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        33. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you did discuss the
    possibility of joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr.
    Epshteyn seek payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a
    position within the administration?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I have never spoken to Mr. Epshteyn.

        34. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, at any time, did lawyers
    for President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
    regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
    describe the information that they provided you (including copies of
    documents), what was discussed during any calls, and any other
    information pertaining to this interaction.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        35. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, were you in contact with
    Mr. Elon Musk at any time during your nomination process? If so, please
    describe the nature of those contacts.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        36. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, was Mr. Musk present or
    involved in any interviews you did related to your nomination? If so,
    please describe the nature of his involvement.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        37. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, was Mr. Musk involved in
    any way with your nomination, including but not limited to directly or
    indirectly contacting Senators regarding their position on your
    nomination?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        38. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, who was in the room or
    participated in any of your interviews regarding your nomination?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. During my interview with President Trump for
    the position, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, the potential nominees for USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and
    USCENTCOM, and a notetaker were also present.
        During my office calls with SASC members and staff, my current
    Commander's Action Group (CAG) Director and a representative from the
    Joint Staff Legislative Affairs were present in the room.

        39. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you own any stock or
    hold any other interest in any defense industry contractors, will you
    divest it to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do not hold any stock or hold any interest
    in any defense industry contractors.

        40. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what do you consider the
    role of the press in a democracy?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I am a firm believer in the U.S. Constitution
    and the First Amendment which provides for freedom of the press. This
    is the cornerstone of our democracy. The press helps hold the
    government accountable by exercising the right of all Americans to
    freedom of speech through their reporting without censorship.

        41. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit not to
    retaliate, including by denying access to government officials or
    facilities, against news outlets or individual journalists who publish
    articles that are critical of you, your office, your agency, or the
    Trump administration?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I commit to not retaliate or deny access
    to news outlets or journalists if they publish articles critical of me,
    my office, my agency, or the administration.

        42. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever been
    accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
    environment for another individual in a personal or professional
    capacity? Provide a list of all instances in which you have been
    accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
    environment for an individual and the behavior of which you were
    accused.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        43. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you requested, or
    has anyone requested on your behalf, that any other person or third
    party sign a nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-disparagement, or
    similar agreement regarding your conduct in a personal or professional
    capacity?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        44. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you voluntarily
    release any individual from any such agreements before this committee
    votes on your nomination?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do not have any such agreement in place.

        45. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever paid or
    promised to pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your behalf,
    an individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality, non-
    disparagement, or similar agreement?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        46. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if the answer to the
    previous question was yes, how much was promised, how much was paid,
    and what were the circumstances?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do not have any such agreement in place.

        47. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, were you at any time, or
    are you currently, contacted by or under investigation or review by any
    inspector general or any inspector general's office for any reason?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
        48. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of the Hatch Act?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The Hatch Act is a law that restricts the
    partisan political activity of civilian executive branch employees of
    the Federal Government. While it does not apply to members of the Armed
    Forces, there are Department of Defense Policies that similarly
    restrict partisan political activities for Active Duty servicemembers.

        49. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what disciplinary actions
    are appropriate for violations of the Hatch Act?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The penalty structure for violations of the
    Hatch Act by Federal employees includes removal from Federal service,
    reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a period not
    to exceed 5 years, suspension, reprimand, or a civil penalty. The
    nature of the violation, rank/position of the employee, and other
    extenuating or mitigating circumstances should drive the appropriate
    disciplinary action in any given case.

        50. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
    family currently or ever been a member, founder, or investor of the
    ``Executive Branch'' social club? Please provide their name and role
    related to the club.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        51. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
    family ever visited the club or attended an event at the club?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        52. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if a member of your
    family has ever visited the club or attended an event at the club,
    please provide the date, circumstances of the visit, and the event.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Neither I nor any members of my family have
    visited the club or attended an event at the club.

        53. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you had any meetings
    at the club? If so, what were these meetings about and with whom?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        54. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
    family had any meetings at the club? If so, which family member(s),
    what were these meetings about, and with whom were these meetings?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        55. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you encouraged
    anyone to join the club or promoted the club in any other way? If so,
    in what ways did you promote the club?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        56. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, has a member of your
    family encouraged anyone to join the club or promoted the club in any
    other way? If so, which family member(s) and in what ways did they
    promote the club?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
                    congressional oversight and transparency
        57. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of the role of the Department of Defense Inspector
    General and service Inspectors General?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The DOD Inspector General acts as the
    principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in matters regarding DOD
    fraud, waste, and abuse. The DOD OIG combats fraud, waste and abuse by
    conducting audits, investigations and evaluations. In addition, the IG
    ensures the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress are fully informed
    of problems in the Department.
        The Military Services Inspectors General provide oversight and
    assistance through inspections, investigations, and evaluations within
    the DOD. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force each
    maintain their own IG office, focusing on their respective branches and
    investigating matters affecting them. These Service IGs operate under
    similar principles of independence and objectivity, ensuring
    transparency and accountability within the armed forces.

        58. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you ensure your
    staff complies with any Inspector General deadlines established for
    requested communications, documents, and witnesses, and that staff will
    be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.

        59. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are not able to
    comply with any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you
    notify the Republican and Democratic members of this committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.

        60. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from any
    individual, including the President?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        61. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what actions would you
    take if you were given an illegal order from any individual, including
    the President?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I would first seek clarification on the
    order, as I do not anticipate that I would receive an illegal order. I
    would then seek advice and counsel from the Chairman and my legal
    advisor. If I ultimately determine that the order is an illegal order,
    I would not follow the order.

        62. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
    voluntarily provide a deposition if you are requested by Congress to
    provide one?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        63. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
    voluntarily testify in front of Congress if you are requested by
    Congress to do so?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        64. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
    testify or provide a deposition in front of Congress if you are issued
    a subpoena to do so?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        65. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
    providing information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are
    requested to do so?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In accordance with all applicable laws and
    regulations, I will provide information or documents voluntarily to
    Congress if requested to do so.

        66. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you provide
    information or documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to do
    so?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In accordance with all applicable laws and
    regulations, I will provide information or documents to Congress if
    issued a subpoena.

        67. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, will you commit to
    following current precedent for responding to information requests,
    briefings, and other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and
    House Armed Services Committees and their minority members?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        68. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, will you
    commit to posting your official calendar monthly?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I commit to conducting a
    security review to ensure OPSEC before I publicly release any
    information.

        69. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you think the Federal
    Government has an overclassification problem? If so, please provide
    examples of overclassification you have encountered.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. While there is always room for improvement in
    our classification processes and procedures, the Joint Force regularly
    writes for release and utilizes classification markings at the lowest
    classification levels to ensure dissemination to the widest audience in
    a timely manner.

        70. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, do you
    think your department should pursue strategic technology to support
    automated declassification?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I believe there are great opportunities to
    leverage advancing technologies such as artificial intelligence and
    machine learning to assist in both the classification and
    declassification of information. However, I believe there will still
    need to be a human in the loop to confirm the accuracy of
    classification recommendations made by any machine, especially before
    officially declassifying information.
                                  project 2025
        71. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you discussed
    Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the
    Trump transition team, or other members of the Trump administration? If
    so, please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with
    whom you discussed it.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.

        72. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you discussed
    Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Heritage
    Foundation? If so, please explain what you discussed, when you
    discussed it, and with whom you discussed it.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No.
                               foreign influence
        73. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you received any
    payment from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
    government within the past 5 years?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No, I have not.

        74. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you communicated
    with any foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
    government within the past 5 years?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, as a part of my official duties.

        75. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, please disclose any
    communications or payments you have had with representatives of any
    foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
    the past 5 years and describe the nature of the communication.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In the course of my official duties over the
    past 5 years, I have had various contacts with, but no payments to,
    foreign governments and entities controlled by foreign governments. I
    am happy to answer specific lines of inquiry on this topic, in a
    closed/classified setting, as appropriate.
                            impoundment control act
        76. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you believe the
    Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to block the disbursement
    of funds appropriated by Congress?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I am aware of the Congressional Budget and
    Impoundment Control Act of 1974 detailing procedures available to allow
    Congress to consider Presidential proposals to delay or rescind budget
    authority expeditiously. However, I defer questions regarding the legal
    authorities of the Secretary of Defense to OSD.

        77. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of the Impoundment Control Act?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I am aware of the Congressional Budget and
    Impoundment Control Act of 1974 detailing procedures available to allow
    Congress to consider Presidential proposals to delay or rescind budget
    authority expeditiously.

        78. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
    complying with the Impoundment Control Act?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        79. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
    notifying the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the
    majority and minority, if you are asked not to comply with the
    Impoundment Control Act or not to expend the money that Congress
    appropriates or authorizes?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        80. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of the requirements for Federal agencies to obligate
    funding that Congress authorizes and appropriates, in accordance with
    the time period that Congress deems it to do so?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I understand the Anti-Deficiency Act requires
    Federal agencies to obligate dollars for the purposes appropriated, in
    the year apportioned, and within our allocated budget. I understand
    funds cannot be expended in advance of or in excess of an
    appropriation.

        81. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
    expending the money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        82. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you commit to
    following and implementing every provision of the annual National
    Defense Authorization Act passed into law?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        83. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you became aware of a
    potential violation of the Antideficiency Act, Impoundment Control Act,
    or other appropriations laws, what steps would you take?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I commit to comply with and prevent
    violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, Impoundment Control Act, and
    other appropriations laws by ensuring proper internal controls are in
    place to ensure all appropriated dollars are responsibly and accurately
    expended for the purposes appropriated, in the year apportioned, and
    within our allocated budget. I will promptly and thoroughly investigate
    and report any potential violations.
                                 civilian harm
        84. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you agree that one
    difference between the United States and its potential adversaries is
    the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human
    life and liberty at home and abroad?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        85. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian
    Protection Center of Excellence?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Title 10 U.S.C. 184 establishes the Civilian
    Protection Center of Excellence (CP CoE) as a specialized military
    organization that serves as the Department of Defense's primary
    institution for advancing civilian protection capabilities. The CPCoE
    operates as a hub and facilitator of Department-wide analysis,
    learning, and strategic approaches to civilian harm mitigation and
    response during military operations.

        86. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, the U.S. Military has
    spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate
    civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including through the
    development of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first
    Trump administration, which I commend. These efforts received
    bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the
    U.S. Military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
    warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
    civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
    psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. If
    confirmed, will you commit to continued leadership on civilian harm
    issues?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.

        87. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    what do you understand to be your role and responsibilities regarding
    civilian harm mitigation and response?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed I understand my role and
    responsibilities regarding the mitigation of civilian harm and
    mitigation response as provided in Under Department of Defense
    Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17 and the Civilian Harm Mitigation and
    Response Action Plan. My role would be to continue to apply resources
    and leverage our staff to identify the risks of our military operations
    to civilians and make every effort to minimize harmful effects while
    achieving our military objectives. I would also work with Combatant
    Commands on investigating reports of civilian harm resulting from SOF
    operations and responding accordingly when civilian harm does occur.

        88. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what do you understand to
    be the importance of mitigating civilian harm in military operations?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. While SOF forces are laser-focused on mission
    accomplishment, ensuring we do everything we can to protect
    noncombatants and civilians from harm represents our values as a
    Nation, and is critical to our success in competition. Furthermore, we
    have a moral and strategic obligation to avoid civilian casualties and
    investigate allegations thereof. This is at the heart of who we are as
    a Military and a Nation.

        89. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what value can advisors
    with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response provide to
    commanders?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Civilian harm mitigation and response
    advisors provide commanders with crucial data on the civilian
    environment, tailored mitigation advice, and enhanced understanding of
    the impact of operations on civilians, preserving the commander's vital
    decision space.

        90. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have SOCOM and
    AFRICOM, respectively, benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of
    Excellence?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The CPCoE provides reach-back support should
    our team require it and has provided training for our CHMR personnel.
    Additionally, CPCoE has provided coordination across the Department.

        91. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have SOCOM and
    AFRICOM, respectively, supported and implemented the Civilian Harm
    Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The CHMR-AP formed the basis for SOCOM's
    approach to CHMR and resulted in a range of policies and operational
    processes designed to reduce the risk to civilians prior to conducting
    U.S. Military operations. During my time in the SOF enterprise, I have
    seen firsthand that SOCOM has been focused on incorporating CHMR
    principles into planning, training, and exercises.

        92. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what have been the
    benefits for SOCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, in supporting and
    implementing Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response efforts and the
    CHMR-AP?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Supporting and implementing CHMR efforts has
    promoted consistency and efficiency in operations by standardizing
    processes across SOF. The standards developed following CHMR-AP
    implementation govern lethal activities by enhancing precision,
    repeatability, and accountability.

        93. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you believe that our
    troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of civilian
    deaths from U.S. Military operations or U.S.-led military operations
    increases?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. While I cannot correlate specific incidents
    of civilian casualties with instances of retribution against troops, I
    believe terrorist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS exploit galvanizing
    events to inspire supporters worldwide.

        94. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how does preventing and
    mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. National Security?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Minimizing civilian harm is one of the core
    purposes of the Law of Armed Conflict, and is crucial for maintaining
    local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries
    exploitable propaganda.

        95. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, does having civilian-harm
    prevention personnel build trust and relationships with local civil
    society groups help commanders to collect useful intelligence
    information?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Civilian harm mitigation and response
    advisors provide commanders with crucial data on the civilian
    environment and enhanced understanding of the impact of operations on
    civilians, preserving the commander's vital decision space.

        96. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, in what ways do you see
    civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM and
    AFRICOM's missions and the effectiveness of their operations,
    respectively?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Civilian harm mitigation is crucial for
    maintaining local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying
    adversaries exploitable propaganda.

        97. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian Protection
    Center of Excellence?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will continue to follow all
    the Department's policies and instructions regarding civilian harm
    mitigation, to include supporting the Civilian Protection Center of
    Excellence.

        98. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how will you prevent and
    mitigate civilian harm?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my experience, the mitigation,
    investigation, and reporting of civilian casualties have been improved
    through measures such as the use of training, technology (weaponeering
    and modeling), refined processes, and dedicated personnel and funding.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize the minimization of civilian harm, and
    I will provide feedback and recommendations on the associated
    challenges to the Department, in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC)
    and supported Combatant Commands.

        99. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
    these roles, will you commit to working with civil society and
    interviewing civilian witnesses during civilian harm investigations?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, when USSOCOM forces are
    operating under another combatant command's operational authority, I
    will emphasize full cooperation with that combatant command's
    processes, to include working with civil society and interviewing
    civilian witnesses, to ensure we are taking all appropriate action to
    investigate and resolve civilian harm allegations.

        100. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
    these roles, how do you plan to work with civil society to reduce
    civilian harm in military operations?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will leverage the tools
    available at my disposal--including working with civil society through
    combatant commands when appropriate--to ensure mission success while
    mitigating civilian harm.

        101. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
    these roles, will you commit to supporting thorough investigations of
    allegations of civilian harm, including by partners and allies?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I will continue to follow all
    the Department's policies and instructions regarding civilian harm
    mitigation, to include policies on investigating allegations of
    civilian harm. Learning from instances of civilian harm helps us
    improve our processes and mitigate future instances of civilian harm.

        102. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would a potential
    high-intensity conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary that
    purposefully embeds itself in densely populated operational
    environments impact targeting capabilities, precision, and risks to
    servicemembers?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In general, purposely using humans as shields
    is a Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) violation. Nevertheless, despite
    adversaries' actions, U.S. Forces maintain an obligation to apply LOAC
    to all operations, including the principles of distinction and
    proportionality. As such, to counter an adversary embedded in densely
    populated operation environments, it is critical that SOF have range of
    options available, to include precision weapons, AI, and non-kinetic
    tools.

        103. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would current
    technology, capabilities, planning, and rules of engagement, including
    efforts to prevent and mitigate civilian harm, help to mitigate such
    impacts from the previous question?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Technology, planning, and tailored rules of
    engagement are tools that can be utilized to ensure mission completion
    against adversaries in densely populated areas while mitigating
    civilian harm. If confirmed, I will strive to keep USSOCOM's
    capabilities and forces agile to anticipate and respond to evolving
    adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures.

        104. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed for
    these roles, will you commit to sharing all findings of each
    investigation of civilian harm with Congress, including the members of
    the Senate Armed Services Committee within 15 days of the
    investigation's completion?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In accordance with all applicable laws,
    policies, and regulations, I will work through the combatant commands,
    Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide
    investigations of civilian harm to Congress.

        105. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian Harm
    Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes. I will follow all Department policies
    and instructions regarding civilian harm mitigation.

        106. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian Harm
    Mitigation Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes. I will follow all Department policies
    and instructions regarding civilian harm mitigation.
             protecting classified information and federal records
        107. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of the need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Preserving the element of surprise through
    operational security is paramount. Operational security measures should
    always be implemented and adhered to in order to not unnecessarily put
    the lives of our service members at risk and jeopardizing mission
    success.

        108. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what are the national
    security risks of improperly disclosing classified information?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The national security risks of improperly
    disclosing classified information depend on the information disclosed,
    but all classified information should be handled properly and only
    discussed in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) or
    shared on approved networks for that classification level.

        109. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what would you do if you
    learned an official had improperly disclosed classified information?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If I witnessed an official improperly
    disclosing classified information, I would redirect them to the
    appropriate channels for sharing the information and ensure that the
    incident was reported to the applicable security manager.

        110. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of Government officials' duties under the Federal Records
    Act?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The Federal Records Act is the legal
    framework that maintains transparency and accountability for our
    government by requiring each Federal agency, to include those within
    the Department of Defense, to properly maintain all recorded
    information to include electronic records. Government officials are
    required to abide by their organization's records management program.

        111. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, should classified
    information be shared on unclassified commercial systems?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No, classified information should not be
    shared on unclassified commercial systems.

        112. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, is it damaging to
    servicemembers' confidence in the chain of command if the pilots flying
    a mission find out that the official who ordered them to perform that
    mission shared sensitive information that could have made it more
    likely that the mission would fail or they would be killed?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I believe that it could potentially be
    damaging to a servicemember's confidence in the chain of command if
    information that put their mission or safety at risk was improperly
    shared.

        113. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you had information
    about the status of specific targets, weapons being used, and timing
    for imminent U.S. strikes against an adversary, under what
    circumstances would you feel comfortable receiving or sharing that
    information on an unclassified commercial application like Signal?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I would not feel comfortable sharing
    classified information on an unclassified commercial application.
                   retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
        114. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you believe that
    servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
    protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
    illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
    any other concern that they wish to raise?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, all servicemembers, civilians, grantees
    and contractors should feel protected from retaliation and empowered to
    come forward about any concern they wish to raise.

        115. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what do you consider to
    be the purpose of Federal whistleblower protection laws?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Federal whistleblower protection laws protect
    Federal employees and uniformed servicemembers who come forward with
    claims about agency wrongdoing from reprisal through adverse personnel
    actions or other threats.

        116. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, have you ever retaliated
    against any individual for coming forward about an illegal order,
    sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other
    concern that they wish to raise?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No, I have not.

        117. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please specify how
    you will do so.
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes. I will adhere to the mandates of the
    Federal whistleblower protection laws. I will not levy any adverse
    actions or condone retaliation against whistleblowers related to their
    coming forward to expose violations, mismanagement, or other
    allegations.

        118. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to preventing retaliation against any individual for
    coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or harassment,
    negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish to raise?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I commit to preventing retaliation
    against any individual for coming forward about an illegal order,
    sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other
    concern they wish to raise.

        119. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you consider it to be
    retaliation to demote an individual, prevent the promotion or
    advancement of an individual, remove an individual from the military or
    their role, or take other adverse actions related to personnel
    decisions for an individual, in response to that individual engaging in
    protected activity?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do consider it to be retaliation if an
    individual faces adverse personnel actions in response to their
    engaging in a protected activity.

        120. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you consider it to be
    retaliation to encourage another person(s) to demote an individual,
    prevent the promotion or advancement of an individual, remove an
    individual from the military or their role, or take other adverse
    actions related to personnel decisions for an individual, in response
    to that individual engaging in protected activity?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do consider it to be retaliation to
    encourage someone else to levy adverse personnel actions against an
    individual in response to their engaging in a protected activity.
                                  data privacy
        121. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of your obligations to protect sensitive servicemember,
    contractor, and civilian employee information from unauthorized
    disclosure and from foreign governments?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Protecting sensitive and personally
    identifiable information for servicemembers, contractors, and civilian
    employees is a legal requirement. Everyone within the Department of
    Defense has the responsibility for safeguarding and properly handling
    sensitive information and preventing unauthorized disclosure.

        122. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what are the risks of
    any failure to protect sensitive servicemember, contractor, and
    civilian employee information from unauthorized disclosure and from
    foreign governments?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The failure to protect sensitive
    servicemember, contractor, or civilian employee information from
    unauthorized disclosure and from foreign governments could potentially
    put them or their families at risk of being targeted by an adversary or
    nefarious actor looking to exploit them or put national security at
    risk.

        123. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what is your
    understanding of the Protecting Americans' Data from Foreign
    Adversaries Act?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The act protects American's personally
    identifiable information (PII) by prohibiting data brokers from selling
    or transferring that information to foreign adversaries to include
    China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

        124. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you oppose private
    entities such as DOD contractors and data brokers selling servicemember
    data to China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea
    and entities controlled by those countries?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes.

        125. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, would you support any
    contracts for the sale or transfer of servicemember data including a
    prohibition on reselling or transferring servicemember data to China,
    Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea and entities
    controlled by those countries?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. No, I would not.

        126. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, a 2023 Duke University
    study found that data brokers with datasets about Active Duty
    servicemembers were willing to sell to buyers in Asia for as little as
    12 cents per record. Do you think selling service member data in
    foreign countries creates a national security risk?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do.

        127. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, would you support
    stronger enforcement of existing protections for U.S. and servicemember
    data?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I would.
                               blast overpressure
        128. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    will you commit to protecting servicemembers from blast overpressure
    and increasing their options for seeking care after being exposed?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.

        129. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    what steps will you take to protect servicemembers from blast
    overpressure and increase their options for seeking care after being
    exposed?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. USSOCOM has been a leader in brain health and
    continues to lead efforts with respect scientific research and
    advances. As we gain more fidelity on the impacts of the range of
    traumatic brain injuries, including blast overpressure, USSOCOM is also
    taking steps to identify better mitigation and protection measures, as
    well as improving treatment and care for our impacted service members.
    In partnership with Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical
    School, USSOCOM concluded The Repeated Exposure to Blast (ReBlast)
    Study, the most comprehensive work of this kind to date. If confirmed,
    I will remain committed to prioritizing brain health, and I will ensure
    USSOCOM continues to align with, lead, and inform the Department of
    Defense.

        130. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you plan to work
    with the Department of Veterans Affairs to make sure that
    servicemembers, veterans, and their families are aware of the risks of
    blast overpressure and traumatic brain injury?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Historically, military medical research and
    experience have benefited the civilian healthcare community, academia,
    and industry partners. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring USSOCOM's
    understanding of these risks, risk mitigation tools, and treatment
    options, are shared with the Department of Veterans Affairs.

        131. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support
    establishing logs for soldiers on blast overpressure exposure and
    traumatic brain injury (TBI)?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do. USSOCOM is currently exploring the
    use of sensors and wearable technology to monitor blast exposure in
    real-time, enabling cognitive monitoring.

        132. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support requiring
    neurocognitive assessments of soldiers annually, before they begin
    training to establish a baseline, and before they leave the military to
    determine when their change in cognitive health over time?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Yes, I do.

        133. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    how will you address the links between blast overpressure exposure and
    increased risks of suicide?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The first SOF truth is ``humans are more
    important than hardware.'' Protecting the health of the special
    operations force is paramount. There is much we still do not know about
    the impact of blast overpressure on our brains, but USSOCOM, alongside
    the DOD, is committed to finding solutions and protecting our people
    now. If confirmed, I commit to continue studying the impacts so we can
    diagnose, treat, and institute better preventative measures to protect
    our service members.

        134. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, what steps would you
    take to improve suicide prevention efforts, including investing in peer
    support programs, crisis intervention, and community-based mental
    health initiatives?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Losing even one service member to suicide is
    one too many and compels us to reflect on what signs we may have
    missed. I commit to ensuring service members have the support, tools,
    and resources necessary for mental fitness and health while being
    afforded appropriate confidentiality. We must eliminate the stigma of
    seeking help. As we go to the physical gym to strengthen our bodies, we
    must leverage the full range mental health tools available to us to
    strengthen our minds. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
    broad range of programs that emphasize and aid mental wellness.

        135. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed, what steps would
    you take to ensure that servicemembers and their families are aware of
    the potential increased risks of suicide after exposure to blast
    overpressure?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Protecting the health and well-being of our
    SOF and their families is paramount to ensuring SOF's readiness, now
    and in the future. We must educate our service members and their
    families about the risks associated with any traumatic brain injury and
    provide resources to help them address the impacts. If confirmed, I
    commit to ensuring these critical education initiatives and response
    resources are available.

        136. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed,
    what resources and support will you provide for families of special
    operators so that they can understand the risks of blast overpressure
    and recognize if their loved one may be experiencing symptoms as a
    result of this exposure?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Family and community support are essential
    for recovery. The well-being of our service members is closely linked
    to their support networks, which is why SOCOM provides resources and
    programs to assist families, including counseling, education and
    support groups. Additionally, the Preservation of the Force and Family
    (POTFF), provides a robust mental health programs that include regular
    screenings, access to mental health professionals, and peer support
    networks. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring these critical resources
    remain available to our force and families and will constantly seek to
    improve them.

        137. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, it appears that U.S.
    Army Green Beret Master Sgt. Matthew Livelsberger, who died by suicide
    in a cybertruck explosion on January 1, 2025, may have had a history of
    traumatic brain injury. What do you understand to be the consequences
    and long-term effects of blast overpressure exposure and brain injury
    on servicemembers?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. While I'm not intimately familiar with MSG
    Matthew Livelsberger's medical history, any potential connection to
    traumatic brain injury continues to highlight the urgent need to
    understand the consequences and long-term effects of blast overpressure
    exposure and other brain injuries on service members to find solutions
    now. Prevention is critical, which is why SOF are continually looking
    for ways to improve protective equipment and exploring wearable
    technology to monitor blast exposure in real time.

        138. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support
    addressing the risks of blast overpressure to service members through
    the swift implementation of sections 721 through section 725 of the
    Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I support all efforts to address the risks of
    blast overpressure to service members and am grateful to Congress for
    their emphasis on this critical issue. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Department as they implement the comprehensive brain
    health initiatives outlined in the FY25 NDAA.

        139. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, which occupational
    specialties do you understand to be at the highest risk for blast
    overpressure exposure?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. SOF operate as a team of teams, so while our
    breachers and explosive ordinance disposal teams are clearly the
    highest risk, I believe all team members in proximity to a blast are at
    risk. It is critical that we do not exclude portions of our SOF
    formation from cognitive assessment, monitoring, and protection measure
    for traumatic brain injuries.

        140. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, do you support making
    blast overpressure training mandatory for all troops?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        141. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have special
    operators benefited from working with community partners to treat
    servicemembers who have been exposed to blast overpressure or suffered
    brain injuries?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Our SOF service members benefit greatly from
    programs like the National Intrepid Center of Excellence (NICOE) and
    Home Base--which provide our service members with vital brain health
    care. In partnership with Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard
    Medical School, USSOCOM also concluded The Repeated Exposure to Blast
    (ReBlast) Study, the most comprehensive work of this kind to date. If
    confirmed, I will remain committed to prioritizing service members'
    brain health and I will ensure USSOCOM continues to align with
    community partners, the military health system, and the Department of
    Defense.

        142. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, if you are confirmed, do
    you commit to working with community partners to treat servicemembers
    who have been exposed to blast overpressure or suffered brain injuries?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.

        143. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, since 2019 Home Base has
    partnered with SOCOM to provide comprehensive TBI and poly trauma
    evaluations to over 750 operators through its Comprehensive Brain
    Health and Trauma Program--or ``ComBHaT.'' Ninety-three percent of
    SOCOM servicemembers who have attended ComBHaT have returned to duty
    after attending. General Bryan Fenton, current Commander of U.S.
    Special Operations Command, has stated that ``This high return-to-duty
    rate demonstrates the effectiveness of ComBHaT, and the value of
    partnership with community organizations like Home Base in supporting
    the health and readiness of our operators.'' Do you support continuing
    this partnership with the ComBHaT program and Home Base if you are
    confirmed?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I am committed to ensuring service members
    have access to as many resources as possible when it comes to brain
    health. While I am not intimately familiar with the specifics of
    ComBHaT program, if confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
    the benefits it provides our special operators.

        144. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have special
    operators benefited from the ComBHaT Program at Home Base?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I am not intimately familiar with the
    specifics of ComBHaT program, but if confirmed, I look forward to
    learning about all the program has done in support of our SOF warriors.

        145. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, why is it important to
    mitigate the risks of blast overpressure for special operators?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Our people are SOF's competitive and
    comparative advantage--this is, first and foremost, because of their
    incredible cognitive capabilities. We must continue to ensure SOF's
    physical, psychological and cognitive readiness. Understanding the
    impacts of all traumatic brain injuries and developing / advancing
    mitigation and protection measures are critical to ensuring SOF remain
    ready for current and future challenges.

        146. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, why is it important to
    ensure special operators have access to quality care after exposure to
    blast overpressure?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Understanding the impacts of all traumatic
    brain injuries, including blast overpressure, and advancing care and
    treatment for those injuries is critical to ensuring SOF remain ready
    for current and future challenges.

        147. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, over the past several
    years, this Committee has supported efforts to better understand the
    links between blast exposure, brain injuries, and declining health. The
    Home Base program partners with SOCOM to provide TBI and poly trauma
    evaluations to operators. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the
    focus on TBI remains at the forefront of SOCOM's efforts to ensure
    readiness and longevity of the force?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Without our people and their families, we
    cannot accomplish our missions. If confirmed, I will remain committed
    to continue SOCOM's efforts to trailblaze for DOD and partner with
    other agencies to ensure the readiness and longevity of the force when
    it comes to brain health.

        148. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, SOCOM currently partners
    with the Home Base Program to provide operators with TBI and poly
    trauma evaluations and care plans to help mitigate TBI related issues.
    This program is a prime example of how SOCOM can leverage best-in-class
    researchers and innovators to ensure longevity of the force and
    readiness. If you are confirmed, will you continue to work with Home
    Base and ensure SOCOM stays at the forefront of innovation?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.

        149. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, research suggests
    exposure to repeated blasts can cause microscopic brain injuries that
    lead to profound challenges like mood swings, insomnia, substance
    abuse, panic attacks and suicide. At Home Base, researchers are working
    on HealthSpan--with early findings showing that repeated blast injury
    and TBI, along with other exposures from a SOF career, correlate to
    advanced aging and fewer years healthy and free of disease. Will you
    commit to support efforts to better understand and mitigate TBI-related
    chronic conditions, and ensure SOF personnel remain the Command's
    priority?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I will.

        150. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Bradley, how would Special
    Operators benefit from working with outside experts on a longitudinal
    study to better understand the long-term effects from blast
    overpressure?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. There is much to learn about the cognitive
    impacts on the brain from blast overpressure exposure. Cognitive
    monitoring and longitudinal studies are critical to assess and track
    exposures and impacts over time. I am committed to advancing the
    research in this area, including working with outside experts who are
    deeply invested in the study of brain health.
                                   __________

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
                         impact of cuts to foreign aid
        151. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how have you seen
    U.S. diplomatic and economic tools--such as development aid and State
    Department engagement--play a decisive role in either deterring
    conflict or shaping escalation outcomes?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my 34 years of service, I've had the
    opportunity to work closely with U.S. diplomatic and development
    professionals on many continents. I have seen firsthand the benefits
    they bring in helping to deter conflict--through the application of
    American statecraft and economic development power. These efforts
    helped increase stability in critical regions, directly supporting U.S.
    National Security. If confirmed, I pledge to continue to work closely
    with our interagency partners to ensure we are maximizing the use of
    the resources available to meet U.S. policy objectives.

        152. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you perceive
    U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) role in forging and
    maintaining partnerships, given the aforementioned gaps in our
    interagency toolkit resulting from cuts to aid and diplomatic presence?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Drawing upon decades of combat-experience and
    coalition credibility, an important part of SOF's value proposition is
    our ability to build and maintain strong relationships with partners
    and allies. If confirmed, I pledge to continue to work closely with
    interagency and international partners, and NGO's, as appropriate, to
    ensure we are maximizing the use of all the resources available to meet
    U.S. policy objectives.
                            interagency cooperation
        153. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how has your
    experience as a commander been made easier when you have support from
    the interagency--such as expert negotiators and other tools like
    economic aid and civic-institution-building--to maintain positive
    bilateral relations that facilitate your military missions?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Special operations are most often a team
    sport. Our interagency partners are critical members of that team, and
    I have benefited greatly from their expertise and teamwork over the
    course of my career. The efforts of our diplomats, law enforcement
    officials, economic and development advisors, treasury officials,
    intelligence community partners, and more, are critical--whether
    fighting insurgents, conducting CT operations, competing against and
    deterring China and Russia, combating non-State actors, assisting
    allies and partners, or preparing for large scale combat. Building the
    strong, enduring relationships with partners and allies which are
    essential to most of our military missions--is best achieved by
    leveraging all elements of our national power.
                                   future war
        154. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, how
    will you work with U.S. Transportation Command and other stakeholders
    to navigate complex and contested logistical challenges in your
    commands?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
    USTRANSCOM and the rest of the DOD logistics enterprise to tackle these
    critical challenges. From my perspective, the US advantage is in our
    ability to surge combat power rapidly to deliver effects on the enemy--
    no one does that better than USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM. SOF has the
    advantage of tactical networks that strategic commands such as
    USTRANSCOM do not. Through a close partnership, USSOCOM could leverage
    these networks to provide vital information to USTRANSCOM by setting
    the stage in a contested environment where the DOD may have to ``fight
    to the fight''.

        155. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, what
    concrete ideas would you bring into your roles to drive innovation in
    contested logistics and implement solutions that enable more agile
    force posture and sustainment?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
    USSOCOM team, and the DOD logistics enterprise, to identify ways to
    drive innovation for contested logistics, and develop and implement
    sustainment solutions to ensure SOF can remain agile. Two such examples
    are:
        1. Establishing energy independence through self-sufficient power
    grids. Such grids enable warfighters to establish C2 and basing nodes
    anywhere in the word free from dependency on traditional logistics
    supply lines and contracted solutions.
        2. Autonomous resupply over land, sea, and air able to achieve
    large standoff to avoid enemy A2AD threats, while delivering
    substantial payload to objectives. These systems enable flexible,
    responsive resupply of warfighters across the conflict continuum.
    Autonomous systems also present the opportunity to create an unmanned
    system of systems allowing one pilot to orchestrate a multitude of
    systems across the battlespace providing commanders more capability
    with the same manning.

        156. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, how
    would you work with our international partners to combat complex and
    contested logistical challenges and test the concepts that we will need
    for future warfare?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
    SOF's robust network of international partners and allies, 30 of which
    are represented at the USSOCOM headquarters on these challenges. This
    knowledge becomes critical in bridging gaps U.S. Forces would face in
    contested environments where the tyranny of distance is multiplied. SOF
    are the leaders in fostering these relationships. Additionally, our
    international relationships provide another perspective on the same
    contested environment challenges that we grapple with globally. By
    gathering a multi-national consortium, we can address these problems
    collectively and multiply the possible solutions.
                    u.s. special operations command posture
        157. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, what
    would your top priorities be for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the
    Indo-Pacific theater?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed I will consult with Commander,
    USINDOPACOM, and Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)
    to assess what SOF's priorities should be in the Indo-Pacific.

        158. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you assess the
    role of SOF in countering PRC gray zone activities in areas like the
    South China Sea or the first island chains?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. Drawing upon decades of combat-experience and
    credibility, SOF provide tailorable, asymmetric options while creating
    dilemmas for the Communist Chinese. With a range of options to deter
    aggression and counter coercion, SOF leverage unique authorities to
    collaborate and operate with allies and partners--our greatest
    strategic advantage for tackling shared challenges. This helps assure
    and bolster our global relationships and helps counter the predatory
    approach of the Chinese against our alliances and partnerships.
    Deterrence is a function of influence, and SOF contribute to deterring
    China with the influence generated by our enduring engagements with
    partner and allied forces. These relationships also provide SOF
    incredible placement and access, enhancing our understanding of Chinese
    activities in the Indo-Pacific, but also places like Africa and South
    America. Additionally, SOF have a unique role in building resistance
    and resilience. If deterrence fails, SOF's speed and agility to project
    force offer warfighting advantages in crisis and conflict--to deliver
    precision effects with the element of surprise, and to establish small
    but meaningful levers of dominance.

        159. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, which Indo-Pacific
    nations do you view as the most promising for new SOF partnerships?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. In my current position, I do not have in-
    depth understanding of all the nations in this critical region, to be
    able to identify those most promising for new partnerships. If
    confirmed, I would consult with Commander, USINDOPACOM, and Commander,
    Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) to identify these
    opportunities.

        160. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, for the nations with
    whom we already maintain partnerships, what specific steps would you
    take to expand those relationships, if confirmed?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. If confirmed I will consult with Commander,
    USINDOPACOM, and Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC)
    to identify the appropriate steps to expand our current relationships
    in the Indo-Pacific.

        161. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how do you see SOCOM
    aligning with the Trump administration's prioritization shift to the
    Indo-Pacific, as reportedly outlined in the interim National Defense
    Strategy?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. From my perspective in my current position as
    a USSOCOM Subunified Commander, USSOCOM has been steadily shifting
    focus to the Indo-Pacific over the last several years. SOF deployed
    continuously to the Indo-Pacific region throughout the last 20+ years
    of the CT-focused fight, maintaining our placement and access in the
    region, and paving the way for greater SOF presence and partnerships
    over the last few years.

        162. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, how can SOCOM
    continue to maintain credible forward presence in all geographic
    commands without overextending?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. As General Fenton has spoken about, the
    global demand for SOF increased by 35 percent in just the last 2 years.
    If confirmed, I will ruthlessly prioritize the allocation of SOF,
    aligned with DOD's priorities defined in the INDSG and future guidance
    documents, as appropriate.

        163. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, given SOCOM's track
    record of pioneering some of our military's most adaptive solutions in
    austere environments, how do you plan to expand or accelerate that role
    to benefit the joint force?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. The ability to rapidly adapt and innovate to
    address changes to the operating environment is a hallmark of our SOF
    operators. They have been, and will continue to be, pathfinders for the
    Department in identifying, leveraging, and integrating new technologies
    to support operations. If confirmed, I will continue the great work
    USSOCOM is already doing to rapidly develop and field new capabilities
    to SOF, and transition them, as appropriate to the broader Joint Force.
                                     ethics
        164. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, would you follow an
    illegal, unlawful or immoral order?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I would not.

        165. Senator Duckworth. Vice Admiral Bradley, if confirmed, do you
    commit that your deliberations and decisions will only be communicated
    through official, secure channels and any decisions properly documented
    for both oversight and institutional memory?
        Vice Admiral Bradley. I do.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley,
    USN follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley,
    USN, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Vice Admiral
    Frank M. Bradley, USN in connection with his nomination
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on July 29, 2025,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2025.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Dagvin
    R.M. Anderson, USAF by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing
    with answers supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                                     duties
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)?
        Answer. Under section 164 of title 10, United States Code,
    Combatant Commanders are responsible to the President and the Secretary
    of Defense for the performance of assigned missions within their
    respective areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I would command U.S.
    Armed Forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by
    the President and ensure USAFRICOM has ready and postured forces to
    execute directed national defense missions, respond to military
    contingencies, and deter conflict. I would provide authoritative
    directions to subordinate commands and forces to carry out the missions
    assigned to USAFRICOM, identify and request any additional required
    support, engage the interagency, allies, and partners.
        I would execute these duties informed by the National Security
    Strategy (NSS), the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance
    (INDSG), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), National Military Strategy
    (NMS), and other plans.
        Question. What qualifications, qualities, and characteristics would
    you bring to the position of Commander, AFRICOM, if confirmed?
        Answer. Throughout my assignments across the last 33 years of
    service to this Nation, I have been consistently humbled by, and
    inspired to lead and serve alongside, the talented men and women of our
    Armed Forces and our civilian teammates, who make it possible for us to
    achieve our mission.
        Since commissioning in 1992, I have been fortunate to command at
    every level below Combatant Command which gives me a wide breadth of
    experience across conventional and Special Operations missions. From
    commanding the Joint Task Force during Operation Octave Quartz, leading
    Air Force Special Operations units from Squadron to Wing, serving as
    the Deputy Director of Operations at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
    (USINDOPACOM), or as the Joint Staff Director of Force Development, my
    path has been non-traditional and gives me a unique perspective.
    Specific to Africa, my previous experience as the Commander of Special
    Operations Command--Africa (SOCAF), provides me with insight into the
    threats to our Homeland, our interests, and our forces, but also the
    opportunities across the African continent to advance U.S. interests.
        Additionally, my time as the Deputy for Operations in USINDOPACOM
    and my current role as the Director for Joint Force Development informs
    my understanding of the changing character of war and how the future
    Joint Force needs to change to counter the growing threat from China.
        I possess the joint qualifications required by sections 661 and
    664(d) of title 10, United States Code. Specifically, I have completed
    seven joint tours at various echelons, most notably as Director for
    Joint Force Development, the Pentagon; Vice Director, Joint Staff
    Operations, the Pentagon; Commander, SOCAF; and Deputy Director for
    Operations, USINDOPACOM.
        Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of Commander, AFRICOM?
        Answer. Key actions I would need to take include assessing the
    theater operating environment, securing partner and allied engagement
    to solve shared problems, and clearly communicating the risks and
    requirements relevant to our national security and defense strategies.
    If confirmed, I will learn from the USAFRICOM staff about the current
    intelligence assessments, ongoing efforts and campaigns, and the
    associated approaches of components, the interagency, and allies and
    partners.
        Africa is truly the world's crossroads--throughout its history, its
    location between the Atlantic and Pacific, and now in terms of its
    rising populations and economies. It is also of vital and growing
    importance to the world--and to U.S. interests. The continent is one of
    the world's most dynamic. As it rapidly changes, I will need to
    constantly reevaluate the significant opportunities but also the
    substantial risks Africa offers. Ungoverned African spaces host global
    terrorist organizations with growing reach and ill intent. China and
    Russia seek their own advantages at the expense of African nations and
    the United States.
        If confirmed, I will buildupon the successes of the Commanders and
    teams who came before while taking steps to ensure USAFRICOM's plans
    are adjusted, as necessary, to any strategic guidance that encompasses
    coordinated equities across the U.S. Government.
                                chain of command
        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
    that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
    Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
    Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
    direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
    effective chain of command?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
    civilian control of the military?
        Answer. These provisions enhance civilian control of the military.
    In essence, ensuring that all lawful orders are passed from the
    President to Combatant Commanders through the Secretary of Defense and/
    or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures that policy
    direction flows through individuals that have been nominated by the
    Administration and confirmed by the Senators on the Armed Services
    Committee elected to represent their constituents.
        Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
    appropriate for U.S. Military Forces to be under the operational
    command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
    established under title 10, United States Code?
        Answer. I understand that national command authority over U.S.
    Forces is always retained by the President. This includes authority and
    responsibility for, as consistent with law, the organization,
    direction, coordination, control, and employment of U.S. Forces. To the
    extent practicable, operational command and control should remain under
    the chain of command established through title 10 of the United States
    Code. That said, I also understand that there are historical cases in
    which U.S. Forces have operated in multinational forces, and there may
    be such cases in the future. Generally, national command was often
    retained through political negotiations or U.S.-led NATO roles. These
    historical cases have formed the bedrock of our doctrine on
    Multinational Operations. In my role as the Joint Staff J-7, I led and
    supervised the review and development of this doctrine and am
    comfortable in its application.
        Nations operating in an alliance or coalition should always seek to
    achieve and maintain unity of effort with all missions, tasks,
    responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all
    involved--as that is a pre-requisite to achieving mission success in an
    allied, coalition, or partnered operation.
                                 relationships
        Question. The law and traditional practice establish important
    relationships between the Commander, AFRICOM, and other senior
    officials of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your
    understanding of the relationship of the Commander, AFRICOM, to each of
    the following officials:
        The Secretary of Defense
        Answer. My understanding is that the relationship with the
    Secretary of Defense is informed by title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 113,
    162(b), and 164(b). Unless otherwise directed by the President, the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of USAFRICOM. If
    confirmed, I would be directly responsible to the Secretary for the
    preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the
    command. I would be responsible for interpreting and implementing
    defense strategic guidance within the bounds of USAFRICOM's area of
    responsibility (AOR), with careful consideration of application of the
    Nation's resources.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. My understanding is that the relationship with the Under
    Secretaries of Defense is informed by title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 133-137.
    These appointees are principal staff assistants and advisors to the
    Secretary on all matters that pertain to their specific portfolios.
    They serve as valuable counsel to the Secretary, and to the Combatant
    Commanders, and are an integral part of the overall decisionmaking
    process within the Department.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs.
        Answer. My understanding is that the relationship with the
    Assistant Secretaries of Defense, including for International Security
    Affairs, is based on their roles and responsibilities as specified by
    title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 138. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    International Security Affairs (ASD (ISA)) is the principal advisor to
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of
    Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of
    Departmental interest that relate to the nations and international
    organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, their governments
    and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation
    programs and foreign military sales programs within these regions. If
    confirmed, I would ensure that the staff of USAFRICOM continues to
    maintain positive and proactive relationships with the ASD (ISA), given
    the need to establish more effective ways to collaborate with our
    allies and partners for burden sharing in Africa.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
    and Low Intensity Conflict.
        Answer. As the former Commander of Special Operations Command--
    Africa, I'm familiar with the work of the ASD for Special Operations
    (SO) and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Per title 10, U.S. Code
    Sec. 138(b)(2), the ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to
    the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity
    conflict matters and (after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary) is the
    principal special operations and low intensity conflict official within
    the senior management of the Department. The ASD (SO/LIC) oversees and
    advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the
    Department to ensure these capabilities are properly employed in
    accordance with Administration priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure
    we maintain coordination with this office on policy issues related to
    special operations capabilities and resourcing, given the propensity
    for special operations forces to operate on the African continent.
        Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.
        Answer. The Chairman's roles are delineated by title 10, U.S. Code
    Sec. 151-3 and Sec. 163. The Chairman is the principal military adviser
    to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland
    Security Council (HSC), and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out
    his functions, duties, and responsibilities the Chairman shall consult
    with and seek the advice of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified
    Combatant Commands and the Service Chiefs, as necessary. The Chairman
    transmits communications between the National Command Authority and the
    Commander of USAFRICOM and oversees the activities of the same, as
    directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is a key conduit
    between Combatant Commanders as well as the Service Chiefs.
        The Vice Chairman's roles are specified by title 10, U.S. Code
    Sec. 151 and Sec. 154. As a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, the Vice Chairman is a military adviser to the President, NSC,
    HSC, and Secretary of Defense who may provide advice after first
    informing the Secretary and the Chairman. When there is a vacancy in
    the office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the
    Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of
    the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or
    disability ceases. The Vice Chairman serves on several councils and
    boards whose decisions affect USAFRICOM, including the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, the
    Defense Advisory Working Group, and the Senior Readiness Oversight
    Council. Regular communication between Combatant Commanders and the
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is key to ensure these
    boards and councils make informed choices on matters affecting the
    command. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman informed on significant
    issues regarding the command's area of operations, provide advice
    regarding the USAFRICOM mission and theater as appropriate, and
    communicate directly with the Chairman and Vice Chairman on a regular
    basis.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service
    Chiefs.
        Answer. The roles of the Service Secretaries are clearly delineated
    in title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 7013, 8013, and 9013. Generally, they are
    responsible for, and have the authority necessary to, the conduct of
    all affairs for their respective Departments. These affairs include the
    functions of organizing, supplying, equipping, training, administering,
    and maintaining their forces. They exercise administrative control
    through the Service Component Commands assigned to USAFRICOM.
        Duties of the Service Chiefs are covered in title 10, U.S. Code
    Sec. 7033 (Chief of Staff of the Army), Sec.  8033 (Chief of Naval
    Operations), Sec.  8043 (Commandant of the Marine Corps), Sec.  9033
    (Chief of Staff of the Air Force), Sec.  9082 (Chief of Space
    Operations), and Sec.  10502 (Chief of the National Guard Bureau).
    Additionally, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their roles and
    responsibilities are further defined in title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 151.
    The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the readiness of their
    Service branch. As members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Service
    Chiefs can also serve as advisers to the President, NSC, HSC and the
    Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I would rely on the Service Chiefs
    to provide properly trained and equipped forces to accomplish the
    mission.
        Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
        Answer. The responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Special
    Operations Command (USSOCOM) are defined in title 10, U.S. Code
    Sec. 167. The Commander, USSOCOM is responsible for the administration
    and support of special operations forces assigned or attached to
    USAFRICOM. Unless directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
    however, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted
    under the command of the Combatant Commander in whose geographic area
    the activity or mission is to be conducted. If confirmed, I would
    maintain an exceptionally close relationship with the Commander,
    USSOCOM, on issues of mutual interest. SOCAF serves as a Theater
    Special Operations Command and is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM
    under the operational control of USAFRICOM. As a former SOCAF
    commander, I look forward to maintaining the close relationship between
    USAFRICOM and USSOCOM.
        Question. The other combatant commanders.
        Answer. Duties of the other combatant commanders are defined in
    title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 164, the Unified Command Plan, and other
    Departmental guidance and directives. While each Combatant Commander
    may be assigned a specific geographic area or functional
    responsibility, it is imperative that they all work together. Today's
    strategic operating environment is characterized by global threats that
    cannot be addressed solely in one theater. Additionally, each combatant
    commander is vying for the same resources from the Military
    Departments. Collaboration and consultation between commanders are
    critical to assisting the Chairman in ensuring all operations are
    integrated globally to execute the NMS.
        USAFRICOM has close relationships with several other Combatant
    Commanders, namely the Commanders of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM),
    U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and USSOCOM. Shared boundaries
    between USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM require close coordination as
    military operations in one AOR have systemic impacts on the other
    areas. The Commander, USAFRICOM has an especially close relationship
    with the Commander of USEUCOM as they share four component commands
    (USAREUR/AF, NAVEUR/AF, MARFOREUR/AF, SPACEEUR/AF), as well as forces
    and assets. Additionally, as the Combatant Commander for special
    operations forces operating in Africa under the control of USAFRICOM,
    close collaboration is necessary with USSOCOM. If confirmed, I pledge
    to continue to maintain the great relationships that have been formed
    before me.
        Question. The U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the AFRICOM area of
    responsibility (AOR).
        Answer. My understanding of the roles and responsibilities of U.S.
    Chiefs of Mission is informed by title 22, U.S. Code Sec. 3927. Upon
    presenting their credentials to the host government, Chiefs of Mission
    are recognized as the principal diplomatic representative of the U.S.
    Government. Serving as the official representative of the U.S.
    President, they have the task of carrying out overarching U.S. foreign
    policy goals and strategic objectives in their country of assignment.
    The Chiefs of Mission have full responsibility for the direction,
    coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch
    employees in a given country, except those employees under the command
    of a U.S. area military commander. If confirmed, recognizing their
    scope of authority, I will ensure USAFRICOM's partner engagement
    complements the Ambassadors' priorities as directed by the President
    and Secretary of State.
        Question. The U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches (SDO/
    DATT) in the AFRICOM AOR.
        Answer. The roles and responsibilities of the SDO/DATT are defined
    in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5205.75, ``DoD Operations at
    U.S. Embassies.'' Unified DOD representation in U.S. embassies is
    critical to the accomplishment of national security objectives. The
    SDO/DATT is the Chief of Mission's principal advisor on defense issues
    and the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned
    to a U.S. diplomatic mission. All DOD elements under Chief of Mission
    authority are under the coordination authority of the SDO/DATT, except
    for the Marine Security Guard Detachment and naval support units. While
    they do not work directly for USAFRICOM, they represent the Command's
    perspective on a Country Team. There is a supervisory relationship
    between the Commander, USAFRICOM and the SDO/DATT. This relationship
    ensures they maintain close coordination on all matters as the
    Command's senior representative. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
    staff at USAFRICOM continues to maintain positive relationships with
    the SDOs/DATTs within the AOR.
                       major challenges and opportunities
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you will face if confirmed as Commander, AFRICOM?
        Answer. If confirmed, the most significant challenges I will face
    as USAFRICOM Commander include maintaining awareness and understanding
    of the growing threat, monitoring and countering terrorists that
    threaten the Homeland, countering expanding Chinese malign activity.
    aggression. ISIS, centered in Somalia, has demonstrated the capability
    and intent for external operations to threaten the Homeland, while al-
    Shabaab threatens our forces in East Africa. West Africa, meanwhile, is
    becoming a growing hotbed of terrorism as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-
    Muslmin (JNIM) and ISIS-WA expand their control over large swaths of
    the Sahel and destabilize the region.
        Concurrently, China's military and economic influence over the
    continent continues to grow as Beijing continues to exploit Africa as a
    source of power. China is expanding beyond traditional economic
    activity with increasing military engagement and information
    activities. If confirmed, I will direct USAFRICOM resources to defend
    the Homeland, counter China, and prepare for crises--to include
    enabling joint force freedom of maneuver during a conflict. I will also
    direct aggressive engagement with partners as the ability to rapidly
    respond to crisis requires effective relationships to gain and maintain
    the required access.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAFRICOM's priorities
    remain centered on achieving the goals of the INDSG, and the
    forthcoming NDS and the NMS. Secretary Hegseth has given USAFRICOM two
    overarching priorities: prevent terrorist groups in Africa from
    exporting threats to the United States and to deter Chinese military
    advances across the continent. I will continue to place pressure on
    terrorists with the intent and capability to threaten the Homeland and
    work to improve indications and warnings of emerging threats.
    Additionally, I will task assigned forces to take actions that
    undermine any Chinese malign intent throughout the continent. Key to
    this effort will be to work with willing and capable allies and
    partners, where feasible and mutually beneficial. Any security
    cooperation should be tailored and time-bound based on demonstrated
    partner will and capacity with the goal to build partner independence
    to operate against mutual security threats.
        Africa is a theater where threats, opportunities, adversaries,
    partners, and allies converge. The challenges in Africa go beyond just
    terrorism and require a nuanced approach that spans multiple agencies.
    While working on these priorities, I will also seek ways to balance
    investment between United States Forces, African and other partners,
    and allies on shared objectives throughout the theater. I know that
    USAFRICOM and its forces are not the right tool to solve all these
    problems alone. I will prioritize working with the whole-of-government,
    international institutions, and our global network of partners and
    allies to advance U.S. interests.
        Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
    will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
    other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
    identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, AFRICOM?
        Answer. Beyond the identified major challenges, I would also seek
    to create opportunities for U.S. advantage. While Africa has many
    challenges including terrorism, political instability, and malign
    foreign actors, it also shows great promise. This promise will create
    extraordinary opportunities for our Nation but realizing it will take
    time and investment to find. As China and Russia both focus their
    strategies on Africa, I want to ensure the U.S. realizes these
    opportunities first.
        Additionally, many African nations are susceptible to instability
    to threats and other unforeseen challenges to governance--sometimes
    with little to no notice. The responsibility to safeguard American
    lives, property, and interests at U.S. Military installations and
    diplomatic facilities across the continent factor into my crisis
    response priority. Force protection remains a key and critical concern
    of mine, and I understand my responsibility to protect the
    servicemembers assigned to African-based operating locations. I
    understand my role in identifying, communicating, and integrating
    capabilities across all domains to protect the force from potential
    threats. I will also coordinate with fellow Combatant Commanders to
    close seams that adversaries would exploit. I acknowledge my mandate to
    support the Department of State in safeguarding our embassies and the
    people assigned to them--especially the 14 high threat embassies in
    theater.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your
    Command's efforts on each of these priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize my efforts to understand
    the situation on the continent as quickly as possible, specifically
    related to our counterterrorism efforts against ISIS and al-Shabaab. I
    will also work to better distinguish CCP military objectives in Africa,
    where I will seek ways to prevent further military encroachment that
    disrupts U.S. access and relationships. This will involve visiting the
    AOR and meeting with key U.S. Ambassadors, my counterparts from our
    allies and partners, and senior military and diplomatic officials from
    our multilateral security institutions who share our security
    objectives. I would also seek guidance from USD(P) and partner with
    USINDOPACOM to see where we can deepen mutual efforts to counter
    Chinese malign objectives in Africa.
        I will obtain assessments from subordinate Service Component
    Commanders and discuss regional issues with African Ministers of
    Defense and Chiefs of Defense. These efforts will inform USAFRICOM's
    priorities as we receive a new NDS and update our own guiding
    documents. I will carefully review command priorities to maximize
    scarce resources for greatest effect.
                           national defense strategy
        Question. What is your understanding of the 2025 Interim National
    Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG) and its implications for the AFRICOM
    AOR?
        Answer. My understanding of United States strategic objectives in
    Africa is informed by the INDSG through the Secretary of Defense. The
    United States strategic objectives in Africa are to defend America
    forward by preventing terrorists from coordinating attacks on the
    Homeland from the continent and contribute to deterrence against CCP
    aggression. The implications for the USAFRICOM AOR are a ruthless
    prioritization of terror organizations that are looking to attack the
    Homeland. Additionally, it calls for a more targeted focus on CCP
    military activity and the impact it has on our objectives. Finally, the
    INDSG calls for a deliberate effort to shift activities over time to
    our allies and partners.
        Question. What is your understanding of United States strategic
    objectives in Africa and what role do you believe AFRICOM should play
    in supporting these objectives?
        Answer. My understanding of United States strategic objectives in
    Africa is informed by the INDSG through the Secretary of Defense. The
    U.S. strategic objectives in Africa are to defend America forward by
    preventing terrorists from coordinating attacks on the Homeland from
    the continent and contribute to deterrence against CCP aggression.
    USAFRICOM accomplishes these objectives by building partner operational
    independence through tailored and high-impact security cooperation with
    African partners, exposing CCP and Russian malign influence that is
    counter to our interests, and retaining access for contingency
    operations.
        Question. In your view, what does ``great power competition'' look
    like in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. USAFRICOM's priorities are to defend the U.S. Homeland from
    terrorist threats and to deter CCP global military ambitions on the
    African continent in alignment with the 2025 INDSG. As the Department
    of Defense balances resources to the Pacific, USAFRICOM's greatest
    challenge will be to undermine China's expanding military goals across
    Africa while preventing strategic surprise from an attack on the United
    States Homeland by external threats. Additionally, USAFRICOM would need
    to consider the effect of Russia's destabilizing activity on the
    continent and how it impacts United States interests and military
    requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with the interagency to
    undermine China's military activities in key areas and apply
    USAFRICOM's modest resources for a high return on investment.
        Question. Are United States policies and programs, as applicable to
    Africa, appropriate to ensure the United States can succeed in great
    power competition in the AFRICOM AOR? Are there additional measures we
    should be considering? What do you perceive as the areas of highest
    risk?
        Answer. As China is the Department of Defense pacing threat,
    USAFRICOM would need to balance countering China with preventing
    attacks on the United States Homeland by Africa-based terrorists'
    organizations. Terrorist attacks would create strategic surprise and
    serve as a strategic distraction from countering China's global malign
    ambitions. Specific to Africa, USAFRICOM would look to counter any
    additional CCP military basing in Africa--especially on the West coast.
    To accomplish both, USAFRICOM would need to detect the indications and
    warnings provided by sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) and partner and allied information, access, and
    placement.
        Question. Do you believe the Command's resources and authorities
    are aligned in a manner consistent with U.S. strategic objectives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review the Command's current
    assigned tasks and missions, resources, and authorities considering
    their alignment to Defense guidance and U.S. strategic objectives. From
    this review, I will provide an assessment on any additional
    requirements or residual risk to the Secretary and Chairman.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance or expedite
    the implementation of the U.S. strategic objectives in AFRICOM?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will update the theater strategy, campaign
    plan, and campaign order as appropriate to align with the forthcoming
    NDS and support of overarching U.S. foreign policy goals. In alignment
    with the current guidance in the INDSG, I will engage with African,
    European, and interagency partners to maximize our combined efforts and
    achieve United States advantage.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to balance the
    requirements for increased emphasis on great power competition with
    China and Russia with countering violent extremism in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure USAFRICOM has a balanced
    approach between countering violent extremist organizations with the
    intent to attack the Homeland and competing with China and Russia.
    Successfully executing both efforts requires increased partners and
    allies' capability and engagement to actively take the lead on regional
    terror threats. This shift will allow limited U.S. resources to be
    focused on threats to the U.S. Homeland and countering China.
                                     china
        Question. What is your assessment of China's strategic objectives
    in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. China views Africa as critical to its future and central to
    its strategy. China seeks to build diplomatic influence and supremacy
    in the information, military, and economic spheres to achieve regional
    hegemony. The CCP seeks to secure access to markets and resources in
    Africa to decrease its reliance on supply chains and financial systems
    led by the United States and Western allies and promote China as leader
    of the so-called ``Global South.'' Frequent senior leader engagement
    with African leaders, political parties, and militaries serves
    Beijing's strategic objective to build international support for its
    global leadership at the expense of the United States. The CCP has
    increased People's Liberation Army (PLA) engagements across the
    continent, offering professional military education, military equipment
    donations and sales, and training and exercises to African militaries
    to deepen strategic access and influence.
        Question. In what ways, if any, do their strategic objectives
    conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? In what ways, if any, do they
    align with those of the U.S.?
        Answer. The strategic objectives of the CCP in Africa aim to ensure
    continued CCP rule, domestic economic growth, and regional hegemony
    despite Beijing's narrative of championing the Global South. Beijing
    uses all instruments of national power with little regard to the rule
    of law, stable and open international system, democratic governance,
    and multilateral institutions. CCP State and non-State entities lack
    fair and transparent practices, which has challenged African
    governments to achieve favorable terms and has undermined debt
    restructuring efforts.
        In comparison, the strategic objectives of the United States and
    our Western allies include promoting a favorable distribution of power
    to ensure equal and fair access to the global commons. We are concerned
    that expanding PLA security presence in Africa could restrict freedom
    of navigation and global commerce through strategic sea lines of
    communication. While the CCP searches for clients and customers, the
    United States seeks partners and allies. This reality puts our two
    nations' long-term strategic objectives at direct odds.
        Question. In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with
    African militaries had on those militaries and on United States
    security interests?
        Answer. The CCP has likely marginally improved some African
    militaries through delivering military equipment sales on a quicker and
    cheaper basis than the U.S. The opportunity to seemingly more rapidly
    modernize their military forces entices African partners to purchase
    CCP equipment, but these purchases frequently do not address the
    underlying military need, are of low-quality, and lack robust training
    and maintenance support. The prevalence of Chinese military equipment
    can complicate U.S. security assistance and interoperability. The CCP
    contributes up to 2,000 personnel to United Nations peacekeeping
    operations, but Beijing's deployments are tailored toward its security
    interests, including gaining overseas operational experience for its
    military personnel.
        Question. Are United States policies and the associated
    authorities--as applicable to Africa--sufficient to counter China's
    influence, where needed, or are additional measures required? What role
    should AFRICOM play in this regard?
        Answer. The second most important task the Secretary of Defense has
    given USAFRICOM is to deny CCP encroachment on United States interests
    in Africa, after countering terrorist threats to the Homeland. If
    confirmed, I will thoroughly review USAFRICOM's policies and
    authorities to determine if the Command is sufficiently postured to
    counter China's malign activities in Africa. I will seek to work with
    partners and allies to expose and hold the CCP accountable for its
    activities in Africa and determine ways to strengthen African
    institutional capacity to withstand those efforts to undermine
    international norms.
        Question. Do you foresee China's growing energy and resource
    demands affecting security developments in Africa?
        Answer. Yes. Beijing has agreements with at least 45 African
    countries to extract natural resources, including critical minerals. It
    continues to acquire new mines and expand production and investment in
    strategic minerals to reduce critical dependencies on the West. China's
    dominance in this sector, from extraction to processing, is resulting
    in strangleholds over global bauxite, cobalt, iron ore, lithium, and
    tantalum supply chains.
        CCP private security companies are playing an increasingly pivotal
    role in securing economic investments in Africa. While Beijing
    typically avoids investing in countries deemed unsafe or incapable of
    protecting its citizens or interests, Africa is a continent with a
    rapidly shifting threat environment. Increased presence of these and
    other CCP-affiliated groups or state-owned enterprises could pose a
    challenge to U.S. access and influence in the region.
                                     russia
        Question. What is your assessment of Russia's strategic objectives
    in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. Across all theaters, Russia seeks to systematically counter
    Western interests and bolster its influence through military/
    intelligence cooperation, arms sales, and energy partnerships. Moscow
    sees Africa as a vehicle necessary for its own success centered on
    developing the partnerships necessary for its vision of a multipolar
    world, while also presenting an opportunity for Russia to extract
    natural resources, weaken the West's dominance of global governance,
    and recognize economic opportunities for Russian companies,
    particularly those closed off to Western markets because of sanctions.
        Question. In what ways, if any, do their strategic objectives
    conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? In what ways, if any, do they
    align with those of the United States?
        Answer. Russia intends to undermine Western influence and access
    wherever possible. USAFRICOM assists allies in combatting violent
    extremists to protect United States and Western interests. In contrast,
    Russia's assistance is focused on gaining influence to serve Moscow's
    needs and its business interests. Russia's strategic objectives do not
    align with those of the United States.
        Russia seeks to pressure NATO's southern flank through its
    activities in North Africa, but its influence there remains unlikely to
    threaten the alliance in the near future, especially while Moscow is
    focused on the war in Ukraine.
        Russia presents its limited efforts in humanitarian and economic
    aid, infrastructure development, and security assistance, including
    counterterrorism, as broadly consistent with objectives shared by the
    United States and Western partners; however, Moscow views these
    activities primarily as tools to compete with Western influence. In
    pursuit of these goals, Kremlin-linked groups such as the private
    military company Wagner Group have been implicated in practices--
    including human rights abuses and illicit mining--that are counter to
    United States and Western values.
        Question. In your opinion, what effect has Russia's engagement with
    African militaries had on those militaries and on United States
    security interests?
        Answer. Russia provides extensive arms sales and limited training
    to African militaries, specifically to former Soviet partners. Moscow
    is the largest exporter of weapons systems to Africa, though this
    support has faced constraints due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Russia
    is historically a leading supplier of military equipment--to include
    small arms and heavier weapons such as armor and artillery, as well as
    air defense systems, fighter aircraft, and naval vessels--to select
    African militaries. These systems increase host nation lethality, but
    several of these systems are difficult to sustain and decrease
    interoperability with Western military norms and systems. Russia's lack
    of robust end-user agreements and support for authoritarian regimes
    undermines United States objectives in Africa and fosters human rights
    abuses by host nations.
        Question. Do you view Russia's activities on the continent of
    Africa as a threat or challenge to United States national security
    interests? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Russia's current activities challenge United States
    national security interests in the USAFRICOM AOR. Russian military and
    security advisers currently do not pose a direct military threat to
    United States personnel, but Russian deployments and influence
    organizations severely limit USAFRICOM's placement and access
    throughout the region, inhibiting campaign effectiveness. Russia's
    pursuit of a permanent military presence and the deployment of Russian
    military and paramilitary personnel across Africa undermines democratic
    norms, destabilizes vulnerable security environments, disrupts U.N.
    missions, and threatens United States and Western progress.
    Additionally, Russia's pervasive propaganda, guised as information
    operations, seeks to actively undermine United States influence and
    highlight anti-western narratives throughout Africa. These propaganda
    efforts are as much an impediment to United States Government access as
    its military operations. Ultimately, Russia's operations, activities,
    and investments complicate future United States Military and economic
    access and heighten the risk to United States national security
    interests in Africa.
        Question. Are United States policies, associated authorities, and
    resources--as applicable to Africa--sufficient to counter Russia's
    influence, where needed, or are additional measures required? What role
    should AFRICOM play in this regard?
        Answer. Based on my prior experience at SOCAF, the current
    authorities extended to USAFRICOM appear sufficient, though a
    comprehensive review upon confirmation would definitively assess their
    adequacy considering updated strategic guidance and priorities.
    USAFRICOM's role is to continue interagency collaboration, integrating
    with Defense plans, and to work with partners and allies to expose and
    hold Russia accountable for its activities in Africa. USAFRICOM's
    future role in countering Russian influence and propaganda will require
    nuanced adjustments focused on military-to-military relationships with
    African partners and information operations.
        Question. In your view, is the interagency effectively unified in
    implementing a strategy to compete with Russia in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of
    interagency integration and the appropriate role for USAFRICOM. An
    interagency approach is critical to effectively counter Russian
    influence across the continent. Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, which
    include disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, political
    interference, and security partnerships, demand a coordinated response
    that transcends purely military solutions. Our success hinges on
    leveraging the diverse expertise of agencies focused on diplomacy,
    intelligence, cybersecurity, economic policy, law enforcement,
    development assistance, and public diplomacy to ensure a comprehensive
    and impactful strategy. USAFRICOM has played a vital supporting role in
    this effort, enabling diplomatic and development initiatives that
    support U.S. interests.
                             availability of forces
        Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
    required to compete for forces in the global force management process.
        What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
    forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
    Campaign Plan and other requirements in the AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the current posture and force
    allocation to ensure the command has the necessary forces to accomplish
    the tasked mission.
        Question. What is your understanding of the challenges and risks to
    U.S. security interests, if any, resulting from the lack of assigned
    forces to AFRICOM?
        Answer. Predictable, postured, and ready forces and resources are
    essential to the successful execution of any mission. Based on my
    previous experience as the SOCAF commander, rotational forces increase
    the complexity and lose some momentum with partners due to turnover.
    Effective partnering is based on relationships, which can be difficult
    to maintain in a rotational construct. If confirmed, I would assess how
    to optimize the force allocated to USAFRICOM against the assigned tasks
    and mission to maximize effectiveness.
        Question. What is your assessment of the utility of the assignment
    of the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade to AFRICOM?
        Answer. From my time as the SOCAF commander, the Security Force
    Assistance Brigade has conducted training throughout the African
    continent, advanced partner capacity, and developed relationships
    demonstrating the United States as the partner of choice. These
    deployments significantly contributed to USAFRICOM's Theater Campaign
    Plan, providing multiple teams capable of conducting military-to-
    military engagements.
                       theater special operations command
        Question. Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF) is under the
    operational control of AFRICOM and employs United States Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) to conduct operations, exercises, and theater
    security cooperation activities.
        What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of
    SOCAF in supporting AFRICOM's Theater Campaign Plan and associated
    requirements?
        Answer. Based on my experience as a previous SOCAF commander, SOCAF
    plays an important role in executing USAFRICOM's Campaign plan as
    operationalized through the USAFRICOM Campaign Order. SOCAF provides
    SOF expertise dedicated to the security challenges and operational
    environment unique to the USAFRICOM AOR. SOCAF supports USAFRICOM
    across the competition continuum, leading the theater counter terrorism
    campaign, overseeing the integration of SOF capabilities, and advising
    the Combatant Commander, Service component commanders, and others on
    the proper employment of SOF.in executing USAFRICOM's Campaign plan as
    operationalized through the USAFRICOM Campaign Order. SOCAF provides
    SOF expertise dedicated to the security challenges and operational
    environment unique to the USAFRICOM AOR. SOCAF supports USAFRICOM
    across the competition continuum, leading the theater counter terrorism
    campaign, overseeing the integration of SOF capabilities, and advising
    the Combatant Commander, Service component commanders, and others on
    the proper employment of SOF.
        Question. Based on your professional military experience, how would
    you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations
    component for a geographic combatant command in supporting the
    combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?
        Answer. A dedicated special operations component allows for
    singularity of focus with economy of force, development of long-term
    relationships, and theater-specific operational approaches. USAFRICOM
    requires dedicated SOF support to effectively counter malign
    competitors in addressing the complexities of strategic competition,
    disrupt terrorist threats, and maintain relationships with key allies
    and partners through its niche skills and capabilities that are not
    present in other elements of the joint force. This also facilitates
    greater integration of planning efforts amongst all components and the
    USAFRICOM staff.
        SOF offers low cost for the high return on investment to shape
    conditions for to counter terrorist attacks on the Homeland, counter
    adversary exploitation of the resources and people of Africa and create
    United States advantage. U.S. SOF are the premier training partner for
    our African partners and enable them to continue the fight against
    extremists. Their quality shows through exercises like FLINTLOCK and
    the example they set through Joint Combined Exchange Training events
    throughout the continent.
        Question. What special operations capabilities are in highest
    demand by AFRICOM?
        Answer. From my previous experience as the SOCAF commander and in
    my current capacity, I believe the Special Operations capabilities that
    are in the highest demand in USAFRICOM are the expert training and
    advising of counter terrorist forces as well as the ISR capabilities to
    assist partner forces in counterterrorism operations. Personnel
    recovery, search and rescue, and casualty evacuation assets are also in
    extremely high demand.
        Question. Which countries in the AFRICOM AOR do you believe have
    the greatest need for engagement with SOF?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine all USAFRICOM's
    requirements to include those for the unique capabilities of SOF. I
    will encourage engagement that is driven by analysis, yet flexible
    enough to be adapted to the dynamic environment in the USAFRICOM AOR. I
    would consider the feasibility of future partnerships based on the
    partner nation's will and capacity to absorb and operationalize U.S.
    engagement. enough to be adapted to the dynamic environment in the
    USAFRICOM AOR. I would consider the feasibility of future partnerships
    based on the partner nation's will and capacity to absorb and
    operationalize U.S. engagement.
                violent extremist organizations (veos) in africa
        Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism
    strategy as it relates to the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. Countering terrorist threats in Africa with the capability
    of affecting the United States Homeland is the number one priority
    given to USAFRICOM by the Secretary of Defense. I understand that the
    National Strategy for Counterterrorism outlines a comprehensive
    approach to combating terrorism by leveraging all elements of national
    power and collaborating with international partners. In the USAFRICOM
    AOR, and in alignment with the INDSG, assigned and allocated forces
    focus their efforts on countering the most pressing threats to the U.S.
    Homeland. Separately, remaining limited resources are used to help
    African partners to independently address regionally focused terror
    threats.
        Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
    counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the
    threat posed by violent extremist organizations?
        Answer. My view on this varies by region, and the situation has
    evolved since my time as the Commander of SOCAF. For example, in North
    Africa, groups like JNIM are expanding south to pose a significant
    threat to the Sahel and increasingly Coastal West Africa. In the East,
    counterterrorism operations against ISIS-Somalia have garnered some
    success at halting external operations plots targeting the West and
    United States Homeland and paused the group's ability to freely move
    additional forces to Somalia, many of whom possess technical expertise.
    A reduction in pressure against ISIS-Somalia without increasing
    counterterrorism burden sharing with allies and partners, will likely
    undo hard-won gains made by partner ground operations and U.S. air
    strikes.
        Also in Somalia, al-Shabaab has retaken nearly all the territory
    the group lost in the 2022 Somali National Army (SNA) offensive, while
    continuing to collaborate with the Huthis, directly threatening the
    security of United States Forces in the region. While United States and
    partner CT efforts likely have slowed the pace of the group's offensive
    and immediate threat to Mogadishu, the Huthi-al-Shabaab relationship
    constitutes a serious threat to United States Force protection in the
    USAFRICOM AOR.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
    or associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the
    underlying causes of extremism be a component of our counterterrorism
    strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to assess our
    counterterrorism operations, activities, and investments to ensure they
    align to the priorities of the INDSG. I welcome the opportunity to work
    with the Department to further refine our strategy, in conjunction with
    USSOCOM, USCENTCOM, and the interagency, to ensure a global approach to
    deterring terrorist threats to the Homeland.
        Question. Within the AFRICOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
    counterterrorism priorities?
        Answer. USAFRCIOM's number one counter terrorism priority is
    countering those organizations that pose the highest threat to the
    United States Homeland and United States personnel. Terrorists continue
    to expand and adapt to locations that allow greater freedom to
    maneuver. They are seeking to shift recruiting, financial and weapons
    transactions, and planning for external operations to locations in
    Western Africa. We must continue to adapt to these threats to minimize
    risks to American citizens at home and abroad.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
    the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations operating
    in Africa, to nations in the AFRICOM AOR, the United States Homeland,
    and broader western interests?
        Answer. The global center of terrorism has shifted from the
    USCENTCOM AOR to the USAFRICOM AOR. While al Qaeda and ISIS have
    suffered setbacks outside Africa, their affiliates on the continent
    have expanded in tempo and lethality to pose an increased threat to
    African partners and other United States and Western interests on the
    continent. Africa-based al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates aspire to attack
    the United States Homeland.
        In East Africa, Al-Shabaab--al Qaeda's largest, wealthiest, and
    most lethal global affiliate--is the main organization that threatens
    United States and partner interests. Additionally, they have publicly
    advocated for attacks against United States targets, including lone-
    actor attacks against the United States. ISIS-Somalia is expanding and
    continues to aspire to attack the United States Homeland and foreign
    deployed U.S. personnel and facilities abroad. In West Africa, JNIM has
    emerged as one of al Qaeda's most capable and deadly affiliates and has
    increased the frequency and lethality of its attacks in Burkina Faso,
    Mali, and Niger. It also has positioned itself to effectively threaten
    West African littoral states including Benin and Togo.
        Question. Which VEOs do you find most concerning, and why?
        Answer. As ISIS and al Qaeda shift from the Middle East to Africa,
    both have the intent to attack the United States and our Homeland.
    Africa's ungoverned spaces provide them the opportunity to plan where
    they are difficult to find. I am concerned about our ability to detect
    the indications and warnings of an attack on our Homeland that would
    create strategic surprise and distraction from our focus on China. If
    confirmed, addressing this concern will be a priority.opportunity to
    plan where they are difficult to find. I am concerned about our ability
    to detect the indications and warnings of an attack on our Homeland
    that would create strategic surprise and distraction from our focus on
    China. If confirmed, addressing this concern will be a priority.
                                    somalia
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
    States National Security interests in Somalia?
        Answer. The critical United States interest in Somalia is
    preventing terrorists from using Somalia as a safe haven to threaten
    the United States Homeland and United States persons and facilities in
    East Africa. United States national security interests in Somalia
    remain focused on our commitment to our allies and partners in
    coordinating and addressing the shared security threat presented by al-
    Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
    States strategy for Somalia?
        Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
    assessment of United States strategy in Somalia. I would consider how
    USAFRICOM can enable Somalia and other allies and partners to
    effectively contribute to countering shared threats.
        Question. What role should AFRICOM play in supporting that
    strategy?
        Answer. Given al-Shabab's continued resilience within Somalia,
    USAFRICOM should continue to play two key roles in Somalia. First, it
    should continue to plan, enable, coordinate, and facilitate ongoing
    kinetic actions to disrupt Somali terror networks. Second it should
    identify opportunities to burden share while also supporting our
    network of allies and partners on the ground.
        Question. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of United States
    efforts to counter Al Shabab and ISIS to date?
        Answer. Al-Shabaab's manpower has swelled in the past few years,
    increasing the resources needed to counter the group's capabilities and
    influence. Over the past 6 months, USAFRICOM's air support to Somali
    National Army (SNA) operations has mitigated the immediate threat to
    Mogadishu, but al-Shabaab still controls substantial territory, has
    increased their attacks in Mogadishu, and has been able to increase the
    group's overall capability. If confirmed, I will assess our persistent
    presence that the President has approved to ensure it provides an
    adequate force to work with our interagency partners and international
    allies and partners to degrade and disrupt al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
        Question. What is your assessment of the prospect for long-term
    stability in Somalia?
        Answer. I believe that long-term stability in Somalia will require
    the establishment of inclusive, representative, and accountable
    governance at all levels. Having previously grappled with this
    challenging problem as the Commander of SOCAF, I know what a challenge
    long-term stability in Somalia is. Creating stability there is beyond
    the scope of the military alone to solve.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of United
    States efforts to build the capacity of the Somali National Army to
    date and what should the objectives of such efforts be in the near-,
    mid-, and long-term?
        Answer. As the SOCAF commander, we saw moderate success with the
    Danab as a component of the SNA. I would need to reassess our progress
    to date and determine what appropriate timeline objectives should be. I
    would also look to engage other regional allies and partners to
    determine their level of interest and investment to determine what
    limited role the U.S. would play in concert with other contributors.
                         lake chad basin and the sahel
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
    States national security interests in the Lake Chad Basin? The Sahel?
        Answer. JNIM is now one of the most active and lethal terrorist
    groups in the world and poses a direct threat to the governments in the
    Lake Chad Basin, Sahel, and coastal West Africa regions. The ungoverned
    spaces in Northern Mali and the Sahel pose a challenge to detect
    indications and warnings for an attack on the United States Homeland.
    Additionally, China and Russia seek to exploit instability in the
    region to achieve their own strategic ends.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
    States strategy to address threats in the Lake Chad Basin and across
    the Sahel?
        Answer. I have not had the opportunity to do a thorough assessment
    of United States strategy for the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. If
    confirmed, I will advocate for where possible United States and African
    partner engagement to advance an African-led regional counter-terrorism
    strategy.
        Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
    supporting that strategy?
        Answer. I believe that USAFRICOM supports partner efforts to
    counter threats emanating from Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa and does
    so through bilateral and multilateral United States security force
    assistance to our partners in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure
    USAFRICOM coordinates closely with the interagency to meet our Nation's
    objectives in the region.force assistance to our partners in the
    region. If confirmed, I will ensure USAFRICOM coordinates closely with
    the interagency to meet our Nation's objectives in the region.
        Question. Do you view the problem sets in the Lake Chad Basin and
    the Sahel to be the same? If not, how do they differ and how should we
    account for that in our strategies?
        Answer. No, I do not. However, a more detailed assessment will be
    necessary for my full understanding of the relationships between these
    problems. The Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel problem sets differ in the
    nuances of grievances between terrorist organizations and nation states
    and long histories of ethnic tension. They are separated geographically
    and ideologically.
        Question. What is your assessment of the efforts of governments in
    the region to combat VEOs, as well as other regional security and
    governance challenges?
        Answer. My assessment on this topic is informed by my time as the
    Commander of SOCAF. Security and political challenges continue to
    undermine stability in the Sahel. Mali and Burkina Faso remain the
    epicenter of instability and a haven for many terrorist groups to stage
    and launch attacks across the region. Governments are willing to combat
    terrorists. Yet, these countries are among the world's poorest, face
    severe resource constraints, and have relatively limited military
    capability.
        Similarly, in the Lake Chad Region, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger,
    and Nigeria are largely willing to confront terrorists operating out of
    Nigeria and do so through unilateral operations and the five-nation
    Multinational Joint Task Force. Multiple competing national security
    priorities in each of the Lake Chad Region nations have prevented them
    from focusing adequate resources to counterterrorism operations, which
    has allowed terrorists freedom to operate.
        Question. What do you view as the most pressing impediments to
    regional efforts to address security and governance challenges?
        Answer. Regional efforts to improve security and governance are
    often interrupted by urgent internal crises, whether they be caused by
    terrorist organizations, military coups, natural and man-made
    disasters, or displaced populations. These events redirect the state's
    attention and limited resources and distract from capacity and
    institution-building endeavors. Weak and hollow State institutions
    struggle to reorganize and grow while confronting constant challenges
    and limited resources. One of the most pressing impediments to regional
    efforts, however, is corruption. Sudden crises also hinder progress on
    security and governance challenges by requiring time and resources at
    the expense of capacity building work.
        Question. In your view, what measures should the United States
    incorporate into current and future military-to-military engagements to
    help avoid violence by regional police and the militaries of other
    nations against civilians during operations?
        Answer. I believe that the United States should continue to press
    for partner compliance with long established international norms and
    not hesitate to restrict security forces from receiving assistance when
    there is credible evidence of gross violation of human rights by
    security forces. Consistent application of these standards as a basis
    for access to the benefits accrued from military-to-military
    engagements with the United States will further legitimize these norms,
    reinforce the concept of the rule of law, and act as a deterrent to
    violators.
                                  north africa
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
    States national security interests in North Africa?
        Answer. United States interests are directly tied to maintaining
    stability in North Africa by preventing malign foreign and non-State
    actors from expanding their presence. The United States can do so by
    leveraging two of our most capable African partner nations, Morocco and
    Tunisia, who are able to serve as security exporters, most notably when
    it comes to training other African nations. The United States should
    also strive to reorient Algeria away from its historic dependence on
    Russia, and to prevent Libya from serving as an access point for
    Russian malign actions and expansion. Unchanged for 225 years, the
    United States's desired objectives for North Africa are stable,
    western-oriented nations that ensure access to critical sea lines of
    communication through the Mediterranean.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
    States strategy for North Africa?
        Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
    assessment. I do know that the United States continues to support
    Morocco and Tunisia, and continues to encourage them to take the lead
    in training other African partner nations. Both nations demonstrated
    this willingness during my time at SOCAF by serving as the first
    African training leads during exercise FLINTLOCK. NATO is another
    important ally in addressing the challenges of North Africa as
    terrorism and immigration challenge their southern flank.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
    States strategy for Libya?
        Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
    assessment of the United States strategy for Libya. I do know the
    United States continues to pursue a diplomatic and political
    reunification process.
        Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
    supporting the United States strategy for North Africa broadly and
    Libya specifically?
        Answer. I believe that USAFRICOM primarily works to facilitate
    military engagement and training opportunities for North African
    partner nations, encouraging them to assume a primary role for African
    security challenges. A priority for USAFRICOM is to guarantee United
    States overflight through North Africa to the remainder of the
    continent, and to maintain access to critical sea lines of
    communication. USAFRICOM coordinates these efforts with partners such
    as Turkiye, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and NATO to synchronize
    and layer our activities. For Libya specifically, USAFRICOM strives to
    facilitate military engagement and training opportunities between both
    Libyan sides to encourage the formation of an integrated military force
    capable of conducting independent counterterrorism operations with the
    oversight of a unified government.
        Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges and
    opportunities with regards to the AFRICOM interests and objectives in
    North Africa?
        Answer. Libya remains a key challenge in North Africa. I would
    continue to seek opportunities to engage with Libya and despite the
    political instability and other challenges to focus on countering
    terrorism that could affect the United States Homeland. Additionally, I
    would continue to engage with Morocco and Tunisia to leverage their
    partnerships and leadership in our various exercises and security
    cooperation with other African partners.
                          central and southern africa
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
    States National Security interests in central and southern Africa?
        Answer. Our national security interests in Central and Southern
    Africa extend beyond counterterrorism to include strategic competition
    with China and Russia, transnational threats such as trafficking and
    piracy, global health security, and commercial access to natural
    resources. Instability in the region can directly impact U.S. security,
    while the economic and political trajectory of these nations is
    increasingly important to U.S. investments.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
    States strategy for central and southern Africa?
        Answer. The U.S. strategy prioritizes partnership with African
    nations to promote security and economic opportunity and respond to
    crises. Key pillars include counterterrorism focused on root causes,
    investment in sustainable development where interests align, security
    sector reform to support operationally independent partners, and
    countering malign influence. African leadership and ownership are
    central to this approach, emphasizing a collaborative rather than
    prescriptive model.
        Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
    supporting the U.S. strategy?
        Answer. USAFRICOM protects the United States Homeland from external
    threats to prevent strategic surprise, counters malign actors such as
    China, and maintains a ready and responsive crisis response force.
    USAFRICOM provides extraordinary value for a very modest investment to
    advance U.S. interests, by maintaining access and placement to detect
    indications and warnings and find opportunities to gain advantage.
    USAFRICOM does this in close partnership with African nations, allies,
    and the interagency.
        Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges and
    opportunities with regards to the AFRICOM interests and objectives in
    central and southern Africa?
        Answer. Key challenges in central and southern Africa include
    expanding terrorist groups, increased Chinese investment in military
    exercises and engagement, and integrating into whole of government
    approaches across the region. USAFRICOM is limited in its resources and
    infrastructure focused on this region--especially in the lack of a
    contingency location for crisis response. Southern Africa presents a
    variety of opportunities where nations have approached the United
    States for engagement.
               building partner capacity and security assistance
        Question. In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in
    building the capacities of partner nations in the AFRICOM AOR through
    defense security cooperation activities or other means?
        Answer. I believe that USAFRICOM's building partner capacity (BPC)
    efforts should focus on partners that are directly supporting
    USAFRICOM's efforts to combat threats to the Homeland and advance
    United States interests. BPC efforts should also support advancing
    partners to the point where they can train, conduct, and sustain their
    own operations against shared threats in a manner that supports U.S.
    strategic interests, and regional security. USAFRICOM can also use BPC
    programs to counter China as it works to expand its influence across
    the continent. If confirmed, my aim will be to make sure we are a
    valued security partner throughout the continent by supporting
    partners' efforts to field sustainable, accountable security forces
    that possess the capability and capacity to address their own security
    needs.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate balance between
    efforts to build partnership capacity at the tactical and operational
    levels and at the institutional and ministerial levels?
        Answer. Any assessment of the appropriate balance begins with a
    nation's commitment to some shared U.S. interest. Engagement with
    nations should be based on our assessment of feasibility--including
    both a nation's will and their capacity to absorb and operationalize
    U.S. engagement. Then, we would balance building partnership capacity
    at both the national and operational levels as appropriate for that
    nation. Building only one would be ineffective without the other.
    Efforts to build partner capacity must be very select, judicious, and
    balanced to ensure a partner nation's ability to maintain a
    comprehensive defense approach conducive to U.S. strategic interests.
        Question. Do you believe the ability of a partner nation to sustain
    U.S.-provided equipment and capabilities should be a key factor in
    determining the level and type of assistance to be provided?
        Answer. I do. Providing unsupportable aid ultimately undermines our
    relationships and creates vulnerabilities malign State actors are
    likely to exploit.
        Question. How would you characterize the importance of adherence to
    human rights as an objective of AFRICOM security cooperation programs
    and activities?
        Answer. Adherence to human rights underpins USAFRICOM's
    relationships with our partners and allies, and, ultimately, increases
    our mission effectiveness to advance U.S. interests. Support for human
    rights is the cornerstone of an effective military. Security
    cooperation improves partner nations' ability to mitigate civilian
    casualties and enhances operational effectiveness by maintaining
    government legitimacy and differentiating from adversaries who violate
    human rights. If confirmed, I will ensure every engagement with a
    partner nation, regardless of topic or objective, is an opportunity to
    emphasize the core values of human rights and a professional military.
        Question. When credible allegations of violence against civilians
    by partner nation security forces arise, what should the U.S. response
    be?
        Answer. Allegations of violations of human rights, the rule of law,
    or law of armed conflict undermine governance and should be fully and
    transparently investigated. If reports are deemed credible, we will
    call on our partners to hold perpetrators accountable via legitimate
    judicial processes in addition to internal disciplinary actions.
    Incidents of civilian harm by partner nation security forces should
    also inform the planning, design, and execution of security cooperation
    activities and programs. If confirmed, I will support full and
    transparent investigations into credible allegations of civilian
    casualties, and violations of the law of armed conflict.
                          crisis response capabilities
        Question. What is your understanding of the crisis response
    capabilities available to AFRICOM?
        Answer. My experience as Commander of SOCAF provides direct insight
    into the critical role of USAFRICOM's crisis response capabilities.
    Properly equipped, postured, and ready forces are essential for
    protecting U.S. personnel, property, and interests during crises.
    USAFRICOM possesses limited organic crisis response forces. Their
    missions include reinforcing embassy security and facilitating
    military-assisted departures of Department of State-designated
    personnel. Furthermore, subject to the Secretary of Defense's approval,
    additional crisis response assets from the United States, Europe, and
    the Middle East can supplement USAFRICOM's resources.
        Question. Do you believe that the availability of crisis response
    capabilities and the mechanism for obtaining and deploying those
    capabilities are both appropriate and adequate to meet crisis response
    requirements in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. Africa's vast size and overall lack of an integrated
    logistics infrastructure make the movement, employment, and sustainment
    of military forces exceedingly difficult. Many locations suffer from
    unstable and delicate security conditions. On any given day, a crisis
    could arise that requires USAFRICOM to commit military forces either to
    augment the security of a U.S. facility or to evacuate personnel.
    Allocation of assets to crisis response in Africa will be balanced
    against global requirements in line with security and defense
    strategies. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment to determine if
    additional capabilities or contingency locations are necessary given
    the current and future risks and mission requirements. I will also
    examine how to best develop access with partners to enhance USAFRICOM's
    ability to respond to crises.
        Question. In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be
    taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and
    personnel by terrorist organizations and other threats throughout
    AFRICOM?
        Answer. The Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service is
    the lead agency for embassy protection supported by Marine Security
    Guard Detachments, and Marine Security Augmentation Units as needed. If
    confirmed, I will review the current authorities and resources
    available to support the Department of State to reduce the risk of
    attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and personnel. Key factors of
    that assessment would consider available military response forces, ISR
    and associated collection for indications and warnings, the posturing
    of forward coordinating elements, and regular information sharing and
    coordination with agencies, allies and partners.
                              civilian casualties
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure civilian casualty
    allegations are adequately and promptly investigated by AFRICOM?
        Answer. I understand that USAFRICOM has a long-standing process to
    assess or investigate allegations of civilian casualties. I also
    understand that staff sections review allegations of civilian
    casualties in a holistic fashion, considering all the information
    available. This includes classified information to assess the
    allegation and, as necessary, determine whether a further assessment or
    investigation is necessary. To the extent permissible by law and
    policy, and except as necessary to ensure operational security,
    USAFRICOM publishes the results of these assessments. If confirmed, I
    intend to continue to implement and refine that process consistent with
    Department policy and law.
        Question. Do you believe credible civilian casualty incidents
    should be independently investigated by personnel who are sufficiently
    removed from the unit or chain of command associated with the incident?
    Please be specific in your response.
        Answer. I believe that to be useful and fair, any assessment must
    be impartial. I understand that USAFRICOM's current civilian harm
    assessment process ensures an appropriate level of separation or
    distance between the unit and/or chain of command involved in a
    potential allegation and the unit that is conducting the assessment.
        Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's current policies
    with respect to public transparency, and if confirmed, what policies
    would you seek to establish in this regard?
        Answer. I understand that USAFRICOM publishes press releases after
    any kinetic strike taken by units under its commander and, since 2020,
    has publicly reported information on its assessment of allegations of
    civilian casualties. If confirmed, I will continue to support
    transparency through the release of information in accordance with law
    and policy while protecting operational security.
        Question. Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate
    to provide ex gratia payments when civilian casualties or other
    civilian harm result from U.S. unilateral or partnered military
    operations?
        Answer. I understand that, consistent with law, ex gratia payments
    may be an appropriate response for damage to civilian property or the
    personal injury or death of a civilian that is incident to the use of
    force by U.S. Armed Forces, a coalition that includes the United
    States, a military organization supporting the United States, or a
    military organization supporting the United States or such coalition. I
    believe that the decision to offer such payments should be made
    consistent with law and implementing Department guidance, on an
    individual and case-by-case basis, considering factors such as whether
    the relevant facts can be verified and any potential risks to both U.S.
    personnel and the intended recipients, including any risk that such
    funding could be exploited by malign actors.United States or such
    coalition. I believe that the decision to offer such payments should be
    made consistent with law and implementing Department guidance, on an
    individual and case-by-case basis, considering factors such as whether
    the relevant facts can be verified and any potential risks to both U.S.
    personnel and the intended recipients, including any risk that such
    funding could be exploited by malign actors.
       intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
        Question. Demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years,
    largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting
    capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the geographic
    combatant commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being
    met.
        What is your understanding of the support AFRICOM is currently
    receiving to respond to its ISR requirements?
        Answer. ISR availability remains a challenge not only for USAFRICOM
    given its lack of organic assets, but also to all other Combatant
    Commands given the high global demand for ISR. The need for ISR in the
    USAFRICOM AOR remains high to maintain indications and warnings of
    attacks on the Homeland and to characterize malign State actor activity
    on the continent.
        Question. Do you believe the threats emanating from the AFRICOM AOR
    warrant additional resources from within DOD? If so, how do you intend
    to advocate for additional ISR and other enabling assets, if confirmed?
        Answer. Threats emanating from Africa are likely to distract from
    our strategic focus and give our adversaries the advantage if not
    checked--both from terrorists and State actors such as China. While
    additional resourcing is a question of policy, I will assess the
    current risk and advocate for the required resources as appropriate to
    achieve the national security and defense strategies. I will also
    engage allies and partners to continue developing the relationships
    that mitigate potential shortfalls and enhance our domain and threat
    awareness.
                               maritime security
        Question. What is your assessment of AFRICOM's ongoing maritime
    security initiatives?
        Answer. My perspective from my current capacity is that USAFRICOM
    has been expanding the maritime capabilities of partners through a mix
    of security cooperation efforts and exercises. USAFRICOM appears to be
    prioritizing its maritime security efforts appropriately given current
    security challenges, which I intend to reassess, if confirmed, given
    the evolving circumstances of our security interests in North, West,
    and East Africa.
        Question. Very few African countries have the capacity to project
    naval forces beyond their coastal waters. As a result, the economic
    exclusion zones of many coastal African countries are exploited by a
    variety of international actors.
        Answer. I agree and see this topic as an opportunity to engage
    African partners and encourage them to hold malign actors, such as
    China, accountable.
        Question. What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanded U.S.
    engagement on maritime security in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess opportunities to expand U.S.
    Military, interagency, partner, and allied engagement on maritime
    security across the USAFRICOM AOR. The AOR's expansive maritime domain
    holds both significant challenges and strategic opportunities that
    demand a robust and collaborative approach. I envision enhanced
    coordination with our European allies and other non-traditional
    partners to advance shared national security objectives, from
    strengthening security in NATO's southern flank to combating illegal,
    unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
        Through focused maritime exercises, security cooperation training,
    information sharing, and bilateral law enforcement engagements,
    USAFRICOM can empower partners to operate independently, detect and
    expose malign activity, and achieve these vital shared goals. Moreover,
    I will coordinate with adjacent Combatant Commands to maximize regional
    outcomes. A critical area for disruption involves United States-
    designated drug cartels whose involvement in West Africa's drug supply
    chain poses a threat to the United States Homeland.
                     quality-of-life challenges in africom
        Question. What unique quality-of-life challenges affect service
    members, civilians, and their families assigned to the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. From my experience, the USAFRICOM AOR presents unique
    challenges to Service members, civilians and their families assigned on
    the African continent. These challenges include access to medical care,
    access to education, local environmental concerns impacting health,
    adequate religious/spiritual fitness resources, isolation from serving
    in remote locations, high operational tempo, local crime, language
    barriers, and potential armed conflict exposure. If confirmed, I will
    assess the extent to which those serving forward have the necessary
    resources and support to fulfill their mental, physical, and spiritual
    needs to execute the mission.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you address these theater-wide
    challenges to help improve the quality-of-life and retention of these
    personnel and their families?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will complete a thorough assessment of the
    current initiatives USAFRICOM employs to address quality of life and
    retention. In addition, I will assess subordinate command climates
    through site visits, surveys, and feedback. Leveraging my experience as
    the Commander of SOCAF, I will refine and promote quality of life
    initiatives for personnel deployed within Africa based on eligibility,
    threat environment, and mission requirements. I would ensure that
    forward-deployed personnel are provided a clear mission, defined
    objectives, necessary resources, and appropriate capabilities required
    for mission success.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
                                    `rwanda
        1. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Anderson, Rwanda is a capable
    and reliable United States partner on the African Continent,
    particularly in the areas of peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and
    regional stability. For example, Rwanda's deployment in northern
    Mozambique to combat the ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
    affiliate in Mozambique has been a vital contribution to restoring
    security in Cabo Delgado and protecting critical energy infrastructure.
    Given United States Africa Command's (AFRICOM) increasing focus on
    strategic partnerships and burden-sharing in counterterrorism efforts,
    can you commit to strengthening United States coordination and support
    for Rwanda's operations in Mozambique, and more broadly, to deepening
    AFRICOM's engagement with Rwanda as a trusted partner in promoting
    security and stability across the region?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I commit to support the
    priorities identified in national strategic guidance, to include
    continuing partnerships with capable and willing African nations to
    degrade and defeat terrorist organizations who pose a threat to the
    United States Homeland.
                                   __________

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                8(a) contracting
        2. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, the Small
    Business Act (SBA) 8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a
    contract vehicle through which sole source and set aside contracts can
    be awarded to small businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations,
    Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian
    organizations. These corporations are tied to political relationships,
    not racial classifications. They also are some of our most efficient
    contractors, earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment
    Reporting System (CPARS) marks. Last, many of these small businesses
    employ veterans at rates far exceeding the national average, allowing
    our Nation's finest to continue to service after they take off the
    uniform. Will you commit to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a)
    contracting for the Department of Defense?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working with you to ensure our defense industrial base is
    more agile and flexible so that our warfighters have the most advanced
    and capable equipment to meet our national security priorities.

        3. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, I recently toured
    an SBA 8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a)
    brings to the Federal customer in terms of cost and efficiency while
    delivering mission-critical solutions that increase our national
    security and warfighting readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best
    ``bang for the buck'' for taxpayers, giving contracting officers
    additional flexibility while also maximizing efficiency by reducing red
    tape. Do you see the value in increasing efficiency in flexibility
    brought from initiatives such as the 8(a) program?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. As I committed in my
    testimony to the Committee, I will be a responsible steward of taxpayer
    dollars. I see significant value in increasing warfighting readiness
    through enhanced efficiency. If confirmed, I will prioritize efficiency
    as well as low-cost solutions to address the greatest threats to U.S.
    national security in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
                                    morocco
        4. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, 2 years ago, this
    Committee, at my request, asked for a briefing on the options to
    establish a forward deployed AFRICOM headquarters in AFRICOM. In
    response, I understand that DOD has assessed that AFRICOM's current
    location in Stuttgart provides key efficiencies and logistical benefits
    it requires. Still, Africa is a long way from Stuttgart. Given
    Morocco's status as a longstanding and valuable United States security
    partner--and the vast range of potential contingencies in Africa--if
    not as a subordinate command of AFRICOM, how can we leverage our
    partnership with Morocco to more effectively advance AFRICOM's security
    objective on the Continent?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, USAFRICOM's security
    objectives on the Continent are focused on undermining China's malign
    activities while simultaneously defending the United States Homeland
    from terrorist attack. It's my understanding that USAFRICOM continues
    this critical partnership with Morrocco to ensure we can focus our
    efforts on these objectives.

        5. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Anderson, how do you assess
    the threat posed by Iran and its proxies on the African Continent,
    specifically in North Africa and the Sahel?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, Iran and its proxies pose a
    growing threat to stability across Africa, exploiting existing
    vulnerabilities and seeking to expand their influence. Looking across
    the Continent, I am most concerned about the Iranian and Iranian proxy
    threat in East Africa, where the Iran-backed Huthis pose a force
    protection threat to United States personnel in Djibouti and Somalia,
    as well as to maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. If
    confirmed, I can assure you that USAFRICOM will continue to monitor
    their activities and work with partners to counter their malign
    influence through intelligence sharing, capacity building, and
    coordinated security efforts.
                                   __________

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
                                    somalia
        6. Senator Budd. Lieutenant General Anderson, in 2022, the
    Department of Defense deployed hundreds of Special Operations Forces to
    Somalia to counter Al-Shabab. After 3 years of operations, I'd like to
    know your assessment of the fight and what you think AFRICOM needs to
    accomplish the mission?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I am not fully informed on
    the details of the current United States strategy in Somalia. I am
    aware that al-Shabaab has demonstrated resilience and, as al Qaeda's
    largest, wealthiest, and most lethal global affiliate, is the main
    organization that threatens United States and partner interests.
    Additionally, they have publicly advocated for attacks against U.S.
    targets, including lone-actor attacks against the United States.
        I am concerned by al-Shabaab's continued collaboration with the
    Huthis, which also directly threatens the security of United States
    Forces in the region. While United States and partner counterterrorism
    efforts likely have slowed the pace of the group's offensive and the
    immediate threat to Mogadishu, the Huthi-al-Shabaab relationship
    constitutes a serious threat to United States Force protection in the
    USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
        I understand that to successfully counter al-Shabaab, all
    stakeholders and the government of Somalia need to act with a singular,
    unified objective. The United States, along with our allies and
    partners, must deliver a strong message to Somali leadership that
    counterterrorism is the international priority in Somalia. If
    confirmed, you have my assurances that I will assess our persistent
    presence to ensure it provides an adequate force to enable Somalia and
    other partners to effectively contribute to countering shared threats.
                                   __________

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                   background
        7. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, as part of my
    responsibility as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and
    to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior positions
    within the Department of Defense, I will be asking the same two
    questions that I ask nominees to all of the committees on which I
    serve:?'Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
    requests for sexual favors, or committed any verbal or physical
    harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        8. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever faced
    discipline, or entered into a settlement related to this kind of
    conduct?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
                           posture/budget reductions
        9. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, AFRICOM operates
    under persistent resource constraints compared to other geographic
    combatant commands, despite the Continent's growing strategic
    importance. Budget limitations, combined with recent discussions about
    restructuring or even merging AFRICOM with United States European
    Command (EUCOM), risk sending the wrong message to our African partners
    and ceding influence to China, Russia, and other malign actors. Any
    reduction in posture or personnel would likely diminish the command's
    ability to respond to crises and maintain long-standing security
    relationships. What risks do you see in the current review of AFRICOM's
    posture, particularly if it results in budget or force reductions?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as the former Commander of
    Special Operations Command--Africa, I witnessed first-hand the ability
    of USAFRICOM component units accomplishing their missions with limited
    resources, leveraging both innovation and strong partnerships. We have
    opportunities to seek capable partnerships on the African Continent,
    enabled by our allies and partners, to address regional security
    concerns and allow our command elements to focus on the most pressing
    national interests. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing that
    same effort to maximize resources by working with allies and partners
    toward shared security goals.

        10. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would such a
    decision affect our ability to counter violent extremist organizations
    and support regional stability efforts in places like Somalia, the
    Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, violent extremist threats
    emanating from Africa are likely to distract from our strategic focus
    and give our adversaries--both terrorists and State actors such as
    China--advantage if not sufficiently checked. While additional
    resourcing is a question of policy, I will assess the current risk and
    advocate for the required resources as appropriate to achieve the
    national security objectives. I will also engage allies and partners to
    continue developing relationships that mitigate potential shortfalls
    and enhance domain and threat awareness.

        11. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, in your view, what
    resources or authorities are most urgently needed to maintain or grow
    AFRICOM's impact given the strategic competition playing out across the
    Continent?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, our Nation's greatest pacing
    threat is China. Beijing sees Africa as an important theater to secure
    international support for its policies, strategic resources for its
    economy and defense industrial base, and operational experience in
    military power projection. As we look at China beyond the next 3 years,
    we must consider Africa as a major source of China's long-term
    capability to sustain a globally protracted conflict. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Department to identify resources and authorities
    needed for USAFRICOM to support United States National Security
    objectives and constrain China's efforts to achieve hegemony in the
    Indo-Pacific and beyond.
                                  foreign aid
        12. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, I am very
    concerned about how this Administration's mass firing of State
    Department employees, cuts to foreign aid, and the dismantling of U.S.
    Agency for International Development (USAID) affect our standing with
    allies and partners in the Region. How does ending foreign assistance
    programs and other regional aid efforts impact AFRICOM's security
    cooperation missions and the command's relationship with partners in
    the region??
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, in alignment to national
    security and defense priorities, I am committed to defending the U.S.
    Homeland and countering China's malign activities on the Continent. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with the interagency, allies, and
    partners, to ensure that USAFRICOM's limited resources are maximized to
    responsibly execute and enable African partners to be more independent
    and ensure our shared strategic objectives are achieved.

        13. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your best
    military advice on the potential risk of the United States ceding
    influence in the region by abandoning our allies, partners, and foreign
    aid commitments??
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, one of the greatest tools we
    have in defeating terrorist activity and undermining malign Chinese
    activities is enhanced engagement and collaboration with strong African
    partners and other allies. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
    the work currently underway at USAFRICOM to engage with key African
    partners and enable their ability to operate independently.

        14. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, I am reminded of
    former Defense Secretary James Mattis' comment: ``If you don't fund the
    State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.'' Do you
    agree with that statement??
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the State Department is
    essential to interagency efforts in Africa that further United States
    and partner shared interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working
    with the Department of State and other interagency members as I did as
    Commander, SOCAF, to ensure that the United States Homeland is safe
    from terrorist attacks and United States security interests are
    advanced on the African Continent.
                           china and russia in africa
        15. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, China has
    dramatically expanded its presence in Africa through the Belt and Road
    Initiative, dual-use port investments, and a permanent military base in
    Djibouti. Russia, meanwhile, is deploying private military companies to
    support autocratic regimes and secure access to critical minerals.
    These efforts often come at the expense of good governance,
    transparency, and civilian safety. AFRICOM plays a crucial role in
    helping African partners resist coercion and maintain sovereignty but
    faces growing competition in both the security and diplomatic domains.
    How do you assess the evolving security risks posed by China's military
    and commercial expansion in East Africa, and how is AFRICOM postured to
    respond?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, China's approach to security
    and economic engagement allows Beijing to expand its influence and
    normalize its military presence through its base in Djibouti, the
    continuous presence of Chinese warships assigned to the Naval Escort
    Task Force, and extensive Chinese economic investment. I am very
    concerned about the China's growing efforts, not just in East Africa,
    but across Africa. Attempts to entrench Chinese influence with African
    Governments and militaries poses challenges to United States
    relationships. If confirmed, I will assess USAFRICOM's efforts to
    undermine China's military ambitions and work closely with the
    Department of Defense and the interagency to address risks to United
    States national security because of those activities.

        16. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, what role is
    Russia's paramilitary presence--especially in Central and West Africa--
    playing in destabilizing partner governments or disrupting United
    States interests?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as I stated in my testimony,
    Russia is a destabilizing force whose actions often run counter to
    United States interests. Russia's deployments in multiple African
    nations and use of persistent information operation campaigns undermine
    USAFRICOM and Western military support and relationships. Russia uses
    its presence to bolster and protect transitional and fragile regimes--
    many with highly objectionable practices toward local populations--to
    derive geopolitical, military, and economic benefits. This also
    disrupts United States and Allied military access to countries in
    Central and West Africa that are key terrain for countering ISIS and al
    Qaeda terrorist groups that could pose a threat to the United States
    Homeland. If confirmed, I will work with allies to address the
    destabilizing propaganda that Russia uses to further its malign goals
    of instability across the Continent.

        17. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, how can AFRICOM
    better coordinate with the Department of State and international
    partners to provide a viable, values-based alternative to Chinese and
    Russian engagement?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, USAFRICOM must remain in
    close coordination with the Departments of State, Commerce, and
    Homeland Security, as well as other elements of the interagency, to
    ensure that we achieve U.S. national security objectives and advance
    U.S. national interests. USAFRICOM must also work with African
    partners, traditional allies, other global partners, and multinational
    organizations with shared security objectives to enable a broader
    approach to safeguard national interests.
        One of the greatest powers the United States brings is our economic
    power, largely through private investment. I believe this approach has
    the potential to offer additional opportunities across the USAFRICOM
    area of responsibility, particularly as the populations of Africa grow.
    In my prior role at SOCAF, we were successful in partnering with non-
    governmental organizations and elements of civil society to identify
    other opportunities to demonstrate the value proposition and power of
    U.S. partnerships.
        If confirmed, I look forward to further developing both internal
    and external relationships to provide viable, credible alternatives to
    Chinese and Russian malign efforts that exploit African partner
    nations.
                    civilian harm prevention and mitigation
        18. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, the U.S. Military
    has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and
    mitigate civilian harm from its operations without sacrificing
    lethality, consistent with both U.S. values and strategic goals,
    including through the development of the Department of Defense (DOD)
    Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first Trump administration and
    the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP).
    Congress also mandated the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence to
    provide support to warfighters across the force, and combatant commands
    have onboarded expert staff to support civilian harm mitigation and
    response. As you know, these efforts received bipartisan support from
    Congress and grew out of a recognition that warfighters needed better
    tools and trustworthy systems to prevent civilian harm in today's wars
    and in the future. Do you agree that preventing and responding to
    civilian harm is a critical responsibility of the U.S. Military and
    makes the United States more effective?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        19. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, what
    do you understand to be your roles and responsibilities regarding
    civilian harm mitigation and response?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, it is my understanding that
    Combatant Commanders regularly ensure that Civilian Harm Mitigation and
    Response (CHMR) considerations are integrated into all phases of
    planning and execution, including operational planning, intelligence
    preparation of the environment, and targeting processes. If confirmed,
    I will work with the Department to ensure compliance in accordance with
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5840.01.
                                   __________

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                                unmanned systems
        20. Senator Kaine. Lieutenant General Anderson, the events at
    Langley Air Force Base (AFB) 18 months ago, and Operation Spider's Web
    last month, both underscore the role that unmanned systems currently
    play in modern warfare. How do you assess the threat from unmanned
    systems to U.S. interests in AFRICOM?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, threat actors operating in
    and within reach of U.S. interests in the USAFRICOM area of
    responsibility have benefited greatly from the proliferation of
    inexpensive, advanced unmanned system technology. Their access to this
    technology and ability to integrate these capabilities into more
    complex and lethal attacks present a high risk to U.S. forces,
    operations, and interests in Africa. As I did as Director, Joint Force
    Development, I will continue to prioritize innovative ways to increase
    capabilities with respect to unmanned technologies in line with the
    Secretary's imperative to achieve drone dominance. I will also seek
    solutions to help African and other partner nations build their
    capacity and capability related to UAS opportunities and threats.

        21. Senator Kaine. Lieutenant General Anderson, what are our
    capability gaps?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed and after
    completing my initial assessment, I welcome the opportunity to have a
    conversation on this subject in a secure setting.
                                   __________

               Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        22. Senator King. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you support the
    ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS)?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I understand that the United
    States considers the vast majority of UNCLOS to be reflective of
    customary international law, and I support the continued leadership of
    the United States in promoting international norms that advance
    American interests in the freedom of the seas and safe navigation.
                                   __________

                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                     ethics
        23. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit not to seek any employment with or
    compensation from a defense contractor, including through serving on a
    board, as a consultant, or as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving
    DOD?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I will abide by U.S. law and
    all ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions pertaining to post-
    government employment.

        24. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit not to engage in any lobbying activities,
    including unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying
    under the guise of consulting or advising, focused on DOD or any of its
    components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. I will abide by U.S. law and all
    ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions pertaining to post-
    government employment.

        25. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit
    not to seek employment, board membership with, or any other form of
    compensation from a company that you regulated or otherwise interacted
    with while in government, for at least 4 years after leaving office?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. I will abide by U.S. law and all
    ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions pertaining to post-
    government employment.

        26. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, during your
    nomination process, did anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team,
    or other closely related entity approach you about your loyalty to
    President Trump?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        27. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you were
    approached about your loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a
    loyalty pledge or other similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of
    the text of that pledge or oath.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        28. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you were
    approached about your loyalty to President Trump, did you make any
    verbal representations of loyalty? If so, please describe this
    representation.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        29. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, in November 2024,
    the New York Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn,
    a top adviser to President Trump, allegedly requested payment from
    prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
    positions within the administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
    joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        30. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you did discuss
    the possibility of joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did
    Mr. Epshteyn seek payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a
    position within the administration?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        31. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, at any time, did
    lawyers for President Trump or members of President Trump's team
    approach you regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If
    so, please describe the information that they provided you (including
    copies of documents), what was discussed during any calls, and any
    other information pertaining to this interaction.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        32. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, were you in
    contact with Mr. Elon Musk at any time during your nomination process?
    If so, please describe the nature of those contacts.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        33. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, was Mr. Musk
    present or involved in any interviews you did related to your
    nomination? If so, please describe the nature of his involvement.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        34. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, was Mr. Musk
    involved in any way with your nomination, including but not limited to
    directly or indirectly contacting Senators regarding their position on
    your nomination?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        35. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, who was in the
    room or participated in any of your interviews regarding your
    nomination?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, during my nomination process
    I interviewed with the Secretary of Defense and the President. In my
    courtesy calls with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
    was accompanied by an aide from the Joint Staff.

        36. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you own any
    stock or hold any other interest in any defense industry contractors,
    will you divest it to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of
    interest?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        37. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you
    consider the role of the press in a democracy?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. The press is vital to our Nation and
    democratic governance, and to the military's civic duties and civil
    engagement. DOD doctrine recognizes this importance, emphasizing a
    responsibility to proactively engage with the media while balancing
    operational security with the public's right to information.

        38. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit
    not to retaliate, including by denying access to government officials
    or facilities, against news outlets or individual journalists who
    publish articles that are critical of you, your office, your agency, or
    the Trump administration?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        39. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever been
    accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
    environment for another individual in a personal or professional
    capacity? Provide a list of all instances in which you have been
    accused of sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work
    environment for an individual and the behavior of which you were
    accused.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        40. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you
    requested, or has anyone requested on your behalf, that any other
    person or third party sign a nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-
    disparagement, or similar agreement regarding your conduct in a
    personal or professional capacity?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        41. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you
    voluntarily release any individual from any such agreements before this
    committee votes on your nomination?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I have no such agreements.

        42. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever paid
    or promised to pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your
    behalf, an individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality,
    non-disparagement, or similar agreement?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        43. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if the answer to
    the previous question was yes, how much was promised, how much was
    paid, and what were the circumstances?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I have no such arrangements.

        44. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, were you at any
    time, or are you currently, contacted by or under investigation or
    review by any inspector general or any inspector general's office for
    any reason?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        45. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of the Hatch Act?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. As I understand it, the Hatch Act is
    applicable to civilian Federal employees and generally restricts them
    from engaging in partisan political activities while on duty, in a
    Federal facility, or using Federal property. Military personnel are
    subject to DOD Instruction (DODI) 1344.10, which governs military
    engagement with political activities.

        46. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what disciplinary
    actions are appropriate for violations of the Hatch Act?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Potential penalties for violations of
    the Hatch Act are detailed in law and include the possibility of
    disciplinary actions, including suspension, removal from Federal
    employment, or assessment of civil penalties. I believe that
    appropriate disciplinary action should be consistent with law and, as
    provided for by law, made on a case-by-case basis after considering all
    lawful factors.

        47. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
    your family currently or ever been a member, founder, or investor of
    the ``Executive Branch'' social club? Please provide their name and
    role related to the club.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        48. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
    your family ever visited the club or attended an event at the club?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        49. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if a member of
    your family has ever visited the club or attended an event at the club,
    please provide the date, circumstances of the visit, and the event.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        50. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you had any
    meetings at the club? If so, what were these meetings about and with
    whom?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        51. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
    your family had any meetings at the club? If so, which family
    member(s), what were these meetings about, and with whom were these
    meetings?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        52. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you
    encouraged anyone to join the club or promoted the club in any other
    way? If so, in what ways did you promote the club?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        53. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, has a member of
    your family encouraged anyone to join the club or promoted the club in
    any other way? If so, which family member(s) and in what ways did they
    promote the club?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
                    congressional oversight and transparency
        54. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of the role of the Department of Defense Inspector
    General and service Inspectors General?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. It's my understanding that the DOD
    Inspector General (IG) serves as an independent watchdog and objective
    oversight body within the Department of Defense. Their primary role is
    to detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in DOD programs and
    operations, promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Each
    military service also has its own Inspector General focused on
    readiness, standards, and addressing servicemember complaints within
    their branch. Together, they uphold ethical conduct, improve
    efficiency, and provide a trusted channel for reporting concerns. This
    dual structure creates a system of checks and balances, ensuring the
    integrity of the DOD workforce and operations.

        55. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you ensure
    your staff complies with any Inspector General deadlines established
    for requested communications, documents, and witnesses, and that staff
    will be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        56. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are not
    able to comply with any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will
    you notify the Republican and Democratic members of this committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        57. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from
    any individual, including the President?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        58. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what actions would
    you take if you were given an illegal order from any individual,
    including the President?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I do not anticipate that I
    will receive an unlawful order. I swore an oath to support and defend
    the constitution of the United States 33 years ago. I have reaffirmed
    this oath eight times and will continue to adhere to it as long as I'm
    able to serve.

        59. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
    voluntarily provide a deposition if you are requested by Congress to
    provide one?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        60. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
    voluntarily testify in front of Congress if you are requested by
    Congress to do so?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        61. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
    testify or provide a deposition in front of Congress if you are issued
    a subpoena to do so?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        62. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
    providing information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are
    requested to do so?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        63. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you provide
    information or documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to do
    so?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        64. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, will you commit to
    following current precedent for responding to information requests,
    briefings, and other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and
    House Armed Services Committees and their minority members?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        65. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, will
    you commit to posting your official calendar monthly?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. I will comply with DOD guidance
    related to operational security and force protection.

        66. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you think the
    Federal Government has an overclassification problem? If so, please
    provide examples of overclassification you have encountered.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I can only speak to my
    experience with the Department of Defense (DoD). Due to the complex
    nature and multiple factors involved in the classification process, DOD
    does face challenges with overclassification. While enterprise
    solutions and training can help to address specific shortfalls, the
    classification process seeks to strike a balance between required
    access to capabilities, tools, and information to execute a mission and
    protecting those elements--to the greatest extent possible--from
    compromise by adversaries. If confirmed, I will seek to encourage a
    ``write for release'' environment and support efforts to limit
    overclassification.

        67. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, do
    you think your department should pursue strategic technology to support
    automated declassification?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, based on my experience as a
    military leader at multiple echelons, the Department possesses a vital
    need to declassify or sanitize classified information in an
    operationally timely manner to enhance interoperability and support
    transparency. I believe there is great potential for emerging
    technologies to enhance the efficiency, accuracy, and cost-
    effectiveness of declassifying government records.
        Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are at the
    forefront of these innovations. Challenges will remain in achieving a
    balance of transparency with risk to national security, as well as
    ensuring the responsible and ethical implementation of AI for this
    application. If confirmed, I will support classification and
    declassification tools authorized and promulgated by the Department and
    Joint Staff.
                                  project 2025
        68. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you discussed
    Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the
    Trump transition team, or other members of the Trump administration? If
    so, please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with
    whom you discussed it.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        69. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you discussed
    Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Heritage
    Foundation? If so, please explain what you discussed, when you
    discussed it, and with whom you discussed it.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.
                               foreign influence
        70. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you received
    any payment from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
    government within the past 5 years?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        71. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you
    communicated with any foreign government or entity controlled by a
    foreign government within the past 5 years?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator, throughout my 33 years
    of service, I was required to interact regularly with military and
    other representatives of foreign governments.

        72. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, please disclose
    any communications or payments you have had with representatives of any
    foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
    the past 5 years and describe the nature of the communication.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. My engagement with representatives of
    foreign governments is consistent with existing U.S. law and those
    ethical rules, regulations, and restrictions applicable to a serving
    Officer in the U.S. Military.
                            impoundment control act
        73. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you believe the
    Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to block the disbursement
    of funds appropriated by Congress?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, it's my understanding that
    the President must obligate funds appropriated by Congress, unless
    otherwise authorized by Congress to withhold them. I would defer any
    specific questions related to legal authorities to my colleagues in the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense.

        74. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of the Impoundment Control Act?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974
    codified the limits of Presidential discretion with respect to either
    withholding or delaying the spending of funds appropriated by Congress
    and established legal processes by which impoundment can be executed.

        75. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
    complying with the Impoundment Control Act?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        76. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
    notifying the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the
    majority and minority, if you are asked not to comply with the
    Impoundment Control Act or not to expend the money that Congress
    appropriates or authorizes?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        77. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of the requirements for Federal agencies to obligate
    funding that Congress authorizes and appropriates, in accordance with
    the time period that Congress deems it to do so?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. It's my understanding that in Federal
    budgeting, an obligation of funds represents a legal commitment by a
    Federal agency to use funds for the purposes appropriated, in the year
    apportioned, and may not be expended in advance of or in excess of an
    enacted appropriation.

        78. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
    expending the money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        79. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you commit to
    following and implementing every provision of the annual National
    Defense Authorization Act passed into law?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator, without reservation, I
    will follow U.S. law and defend the U.S. Constitution in accordance
    with my Oath of Office.

        80. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you became
    aware of a potential violation of the Antideficiency Act, Impoundment
    Control Act, or other appropriations laws, what steps would you take?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. In the event of a violation, I will
    comply with the legal reporting requirements. I will promptly and
    thoroughly investigate and report such violations, taking remedial
    actions to prevent future violations.
                                 civilian harm
        81. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you agree that
    one difference between the United States and its potential adversaries
    is the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human
    life and liberty at home and abroad?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        82. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian
    Protection Center of Excellence?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, my understanding is that this
    law established the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence to
    institutionalize and advance knowledge, practices, and tools for
    preventing, mitigating, and responding to civilian harm.

        83. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, the U.S. Military
    has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent and
    mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including through
    the development of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first
    Trump administration, which I commend. These efforts received
    bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the
    U.S. Military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
    warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
    civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
    psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. If
    confirmed, will you commit to continued leadership on civilian harm
    issues?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator, I do. In my 33 years of
    experience, the U.S. Military takes extreme care to avoid civilian harm
    and are more transparent than any other military in the world.

        84. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, what do you understand to be your role and responsibilities
    regarding civilian harm mitigation and response?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, my understanding is that
    Combatant Commanders ensure that civilian harm considerations are
    integrated into all phases of planning and execution, including
    operational planning, intelligence preparation of the environment, and
    targeting processes. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to
    ensure compliance in accordance with Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Instruction 5840.01.

        85. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you
    understand to be the importance of mitigating civilian harm in military
    operations?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Civilian harm mitigation and response
    efforts support Department missions by enhancing operational
    effectiveness, strengthening partnerships, and reducing the risk of
    unintended consequences, such as the loss of human life.

        86. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what value can
    advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response
    provide to commanders?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I would defer to those with
    dedicated experience in this field to offer more substantive insights
    into the potential impact of military operations on civilians. Based on
    my experience as Commander, SOCAF, I can personally attest to the value
    of that expertise.

        87. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how have SOCOM and
    AFRICOM, respectively, benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of
    Excellence?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Department to assess the specific benefits.

        88. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how have SOCOM and
    AFRICOM, respectively, supported and implemented the Civilian Harm
    Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will work
    with my staff to assess how the Command has implemented the Civilian
    Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan.

        89. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what have been the
    benefits for SOCOM and AFRICOM, respectively, in supporting and
    implementing Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response efforts and the
    CHMR-AP?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will work
    with my staff to assess how the Command has implemented the Civilian
    Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan and what specific benefits
    have come from those actions.

        90. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you believe
    that our troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of
    civilian deaths from U.S. Military operations or U.S.-led military
    operations increases?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as a former commander at
    other echelons, I believe civilian deaths can be a factor in military
    operations.

        91. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how does
    preventing and mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. national
    security?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the U.S. Military should
    minimize civilian casualties in warfare as a matter of moral obligation
    and strategic imperative. As DOD continues to incorporate civilian harm
    and mitigation and associated response efforts into planning and
    operations, we strengthen our standing among allies and partners,
    separating ourselves from adversaries.

        92. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, does having
    civilian-harm prevention personnel build trust and relationships with
    local civil society groups help commanders to collect useful
    intelligence information?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, it can, Senator.

        93. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, in what ways do
    you see civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM
    and AFRICOM's missions and the effectiveness of their operations,
    respectively?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I look forward to
    continuing the current efforts of integrating civilian harm and
    mitigation and response efforts into operations and plans at USAFRICOM.

        94. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian
    Protection Center of Excellence?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I commit to
    working with the Department to ensure I comply with all legal and
    policy directives to ensure our national security objectives are met.

        95. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how will you
    prevent and mitigate civilian harm?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I will continue to
    ensure that civilian harm and mitigation and response considerations
    are integrated into all phases of planning and execution, including
    operational planning, intelligence preparation of the environment, and
    targeting processes.

        96. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed for these roles, will you commit to working with civil
    society and interviewing civilian witnesses during civilian harm
    investigations?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        97. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed for these roles, how do you plan to work with civil society
    to reduce civilian harm in military operations?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will continue
    to ensure that civilian harm and mitigation and response considerations
    are integrated into all phases of planning and execution, including
    operational planning, intelligence preparation of the environment, and
    targeting processes.

        98. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed for these roles, will you commit to supporting thorough
    investigations of allegations of civilian harm, including by partners
    and allies?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. I commit to working with the
    Department to ensure I comply with all legal and policy requirements
    associated with civilian harm.

        99. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would a
    potential high-intensity conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary
    that purposefully embeds itself in densely populated operational
    environments impact targeting capabilities, precision, and risks to
    servicemembers?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, based on my experience, a
    peer adversary embedded within dense urban environments significantly
    degrades our targeting capabilities and increases risks to U.S.
    servicemembers. Precision targeting is compromised by the difficulty in
    distinguishing combatants from civilians, increasing the potential for
    collateral damage. To mitigate this, we must prioritize refining our
    rules of engagement, enhancing intelligence gathering, and adapting our
    tactics to minimize civilian harm and maintain mission legitimacy.

        100. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would current
    technology, capabilities, planning, and rules of engagement, including
    efforts to prevent and mitigate civilian harm, help to mitigate such
    impacts from the previous question?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, our advanced ISR, precision
    munitions, and specialized units, coupled with rigorous planning and
    rules of engagement designed to prevent civilian harm, provide a strong
    foundation for mitigating the impacts of the situation described above.
    Our deliberate targeting process and civilian harm mitigation
    frameworks prioritize minimizing collateral damage and ensuring
    compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.

        101. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed for these roles, will you commit to sharing all findings of
    each investigation of civilian harm with Congress, including the
    members of the Senate Armed Services Committee within 15 days of the
    investigation's completion?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will continue
    to support transparency through the release of information in
    accordance with existing U.S. law and policy, while protecting
    operational security.

        102. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian
    Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I commit
    to working with the Department to ensure I comply with all legal and
    policy requirements associated with Civilian Harm Mitigation and
    Response.

        103. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian
    Harm Mitigation Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I commit
    to working with the Department to ensure I comply with all legal and
    policy requirements associated with Civilian Harm Mitigation and
    Response.
             protecting classified information and federal records
        104. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of the need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, operational security (OPSEC)
    is paramount to mission success and the safety of our personnel.
    Failure to protect OPSEC can result in the compromise of sensitive
    information, data, or capabilities, which may provide advantage to U.S.
    adversaries as they seek to exploit vulnerabilities.

        105. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what are the
    national security risks of improperly disclosing classified
    information?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the disclosure of classified
    information can have far-reaching and detrimental consequences for
    national security. Such disclosure can provide adversaries with
    critical insights into our capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
    intentions, potentially impacting ongoing operations, compromising
    relationships with allies and partners, and eroding public trust.

        106. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what would you do
    if you learned an official had improperly disclosed classified
    information?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I would follow DOD guidance
    and report the incident in accordance with DOD Directive 5210.50.

        107. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of Government officials' duties under the Federal Records
    Act?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, it is my understanding that
    the Federal Records Act is the primary law governing the management of
    records created by U.S. Federal agencies. It establishes a framework
    for the creation, maintenance, and disposition of Federal records,
    ensuring the preservation of documents relevant to government
    activities and decisions.

        108. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, should classified
    information be shared on unclassified commercial systems?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Classified information should be
    communicated on an appropriately classified system.

        109. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, is it damaging to
    servicemembers' confidence in the chain of command if the pilots flying
    a mission find out that the official who ordered them to perform that
    mission shared sensitive information that could have made it more
    likely that the mission would fail, or they would be killed?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I wouldn't want to speculate
    or generalize. We should always preserve the element of surprise and
    never put our warfighters in harm's way.

        110. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you had
    information about the status of specific targets, weapons being used,
    and timing for imminent United States strikes against an adversary,
    under what circumstances would you feel comfortable receiving or
    sharing that information on an unclassified commercial application like
    Signal?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. As I have throughout my career, I will
    continue to communicate classified information through the appropriate
    channels.
                   retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
        111. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you believe
    that servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
    protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
    illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
    any other concern that they wish to raise?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. I understand that
    Federal law provides whistleblower protections to specific individuals,
    and I firmly believe that servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and
    contractors should be protected from retaliation for any protected
    activity.

        112. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you
    consider to be the purpose of Federal whistleblower protection laws?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. ework to insulate those who make
    protected communications or engage in other protected activity from
    retaliation or reprisal for their actions. The legal framework is
    intended to encourage those persons to report potential wrongdoing so
    it can be appropriately investigated and, as warranted, addressed.

        113. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, have you ever
    retaliated against any individual for coming forward about an illegal
    order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any
    other concern that they wish to raise?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        114. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please
    specify how you will do so.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator. If confirmed, I will
    comply with Federal whistleblower protection laws and will not take any
    adverse actions or condone retaliation against whistleblowers who
    engage in protected activities.

        115. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if you are
    confirmed, will you commit to preventing retaliation against any
    individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or
    harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish
    to raise?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        116. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you consider
    it to be retaliation to demote an individual, prevent the promotion or
    advancement of an individual, remove an individual from the military or
    their role, or take other adverse actions related to personnel
    decisions for an individual, in response to that individual engaging in
    protected activity?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        117. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you consider
    it to be retaliation to encourage another person(s) to demote an
    individual, prevent the promotion or advancement of an individual,
    remove an individual from the military or their role, or take other
    adverse actions related to personnel decisions for an individual, in
    response to that individual engaging in protected activity?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
                                  data privacy
        118. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of your obligations to protect sensitive servicemember,
    contractor, and civilian employee information from unauthorized
    disclosure and from foreign governments?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, all personnel, regardless of
    component or status, must diligently safeguard personally identifiable
    information from compromise, including from foreign governments and
    their agents. This requires strict adherence to established policies
    regarding data handling, storage and transmission, and destruction, as
    well as a constant awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities.
    Personnel complete annual training to ensure adherence to policies and
    procedures.

        119. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what are the
    risks of any failure to protect sensitive servicemember, contractor,
    and civilian employee information from unauthorized disclosure and from
    foreign governments?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. ncial exploitation, and physical harm
    to individuals and their families. Operationally, compromised data can
    reveal critical vulnerabilities, enabling adversaries to target
    personnel, disrupt operations, and undermine strategic objectives.
    Maintaining robust security measures is therefore not merely a
    compliance requirement, but an imperative for safeguarding our people,
    protecting our mission, and preserving national security.

        120. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what is your
    understanding of the Protecting Americans' Data from Foreign
    Adversaries Act?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the Act generally prohibits
    data brokers from selling, licensing, or transferring personally
    identifiable sensitive data to certain foreign adversary countries or
    to any entity controlled by those foreign adversary countries. I take
    the safeguarding of personally identifiable information seriously and
    will continue to abide by U.S. law and all DOD policies and guidance.

        121. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, do you oppose
    private entities such as DOD contractors and data brokers selling
    servicemember data to China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and
    North Korea and entities controlled by those countries?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        122. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, would you support
    any contracts for the sale or transfer of servicemember data including
    a prohibition on reselling or transferring servicemember data to China,
    Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, and North Korea and entities
    controlled by those countries?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. No, Senator.

        123. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, a 2023 Duke
    University study found that data brokers with datasets about Active
    Duty servicemembers were willing to sell to buyers in Asia for as
    little as 12 cents per record. Do you think selling service member data
    in foreign countries creates a national security risk?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.

        124. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, would you support
    stronger enforcement of existing protections for U.S. and servicemember
    data?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
                            interagency cooperation

        125. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how has your
    experience as a commander been made easier when you have support from
    the interagency--such as expert negotiators and other tools like
    economic aid and civic-institution-building--to maintain positive
    bilateral relations that facilitate your military missions?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, during my career I have
    worked with the interagency to achieve national security objectives.
    Going forward, I believe that support from the interagency will be
    critical to ensure we can maintain close relationships with allies and
    partners who are willing and capable of meeting shared security
    objectives. If confirmed, I anticipate building on these partnerships
    to achieve the security priorities set forth in national strategic
    guidance.
                                   future war
        126. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    will you work with U.S. Transportation Command and other stakeholders
    to navigate complex and contested logistical challenges in your
    commands?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the presence of terrorists,
    malign State actors, maritime chokepoints, vast geography, austere
    environmental conditions, and insufficient infrastructure represent
    many of the logistical challenges within the area of responsibility. It
    is essential for USAFRICOM to synchronize and collaborate with
    USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other key logistics
    support agencies. If confirmed, I will ensure the Command continues to
    work with these partners to develop a resilient, robust array of
    methods, modes, and means to deploy and distribute personnel,
    equipment, and supplies.

        127. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed,
    what concrete ideas would you bring into your roles to drive innovation
    in contested logistics and implement solutions that enable more agile
    force posture and sustainment?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I am a strong proponent of
    leveraging the latest concepts and technology to overcome the
    significant logistical challenges to the Joint Force. Ideas such as
    additive manufacturing, autonomous drone delivery of essential
    supplies, and simulation-enabled wargaming to identify optimal
    logistics methods, among others, offer the potential not only for
    greater efficiency in our logistics operations but also for possible
    cost savings once implemented. These same concepts and technologies can
    also enable greater agility in our ability to support new or emergent
    posture requirements. Together, such innovations can reduce our
    dependency on vulnerable or time-consuming transoceanic supply lines.
    If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to adopt and adapt emerging
    technologies to address USAFRICOM's most pressing logistical
    challenges.

        128. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    would you work with our international partners to combat complex and
    contested logistical challenges and test the concepts that we will need
    for future warfare?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the USAFRICOM area of
    responsibility includes partner nations with significant logistical
    support capabilities and infrastructure that we leverage for access,
    basing, and overflight needed for daily mission success, as well as
    crisis and contingency response. Key to leveraging these capabilities
    is investing the necessary time and resources to establish and maintain
    relationships with select governments and their militaries, including
    incorporating them into logistics-focused exercises. In addition,
    USAFRICOM must continue to leverage the logistics-sharing arrangements
    we have with several of our NATO allies, especially for airlift
    delivery.

        129. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, in your
    experience as the Director for Joint Force Development for the Joint
    Staff, how has the Joint Staff incorporated lessons from engagements
    with partners in Africa into the Joint Warfighting Concept and the
    Joint Concept for Contested Logistics, particularly around agile and
    resilient logistics, assured joint power projection, and sustainment
    for distributed operations?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, the Joint Warfighting Concept
    (JWC) aims to address how the Joint Force will overcome future military
    challenges, including those posed in a highly contested environment by
    sophisticated adversaries. The JWC emphasizes agility, speed, and the
    ability to execute multi-domain operations to achieve objectives and
    maintain strategic advantage. A key element of the JWC is the Joint
    Concept for Contested Logistics (JCL), which seeks to provide the Joint
    Force with concepts of operations (CONOPs) for planning, executing, and
    enabling the movement and support of military forces in austere and
    wide-ranging operating environments.
        The JWC and JLC have global application for the Joint Force, but
    the specific emphasis on contested and globally integrated logistics is
    particularly relevant to the USAFRICOM area of responsibility and our
    ability to conduct operations on--and from--the African continent. The
    sheer size of Africa, when combined with population growth, harsh
    environments, austere conditions, lack of infrastructure, and the
    presence of malign actors and terrorist organizations, creates
    multifaceted logistical challenges. The JWC and JLC present solutions
    for navigating complex environments by building agility and resilience,
    fostering strong partnerships, and leveraging emerging technology to
    bridge infrastructure gaps. The implementation of the JWC and
    adaptation of logistics strategies are vital for the United States to
    maintain a strategic presence in Africa to ensure power projection and
    to defend the Homeland from external threats.
                      united states africa command posture

        130. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, press reports
    indicate that the Trump administration is considering plans to combine
    United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) under United States European
    Command. If confirmed, do you commit to consulting with this committee
    before recommending or implementing any change to these two commands?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as a matter of policy, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with revisions to the
    Unified Campaign Plan. I believe that there needs to be an entity
    focused entirely on the African continent, whether that takes the form
    of a sub-unified or unified command. If confirmed, I can offer my
    assessment of risk to mission and the potential impact to United States
    strategic interests. If asked, I will provide military advice through
    my Chain of Command.

        131. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what threats do
    Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) pose to United States
    Forces in Africa?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as I testified before the
    Committee, China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic
    influence to include military and information operations, while
    Russia's actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to United
    States interests.

        132. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    will you work to deter PRC and Russian influence and activities that
    undermine democracy and exacerbate conflicts on the Continent?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will work to
    ensure that malign activity and regional instability are addressed by
    engaging with those allies and partners with shared interests. If
    confirmed, I will also work with the interagency to prioritize those
    activities that directly address threats to the United States national
    security interests and counter China's strategy on the African
    Continent.

        133. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, the PRC continues
    to pursue control of key port and other dual-use infrastructure as part
    of its Belt and Road Initiative across Africa that could also support
    their future military operations. What do you believe is the most
    productive way AFRICOM and the United States Military can or should
    check the PRC's expanding military and economic footprint in Africa?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, China's military and economic
    influence over the continent continues to grow as Beijing continues to
    exploit Africa as a source of industrial and financial power. China is
    expanding beyond traditional economic activity with increasing military
    engagement and information activities, with a clear intent to undermine
    Western influence and access wherever possible. If confirmed, USAFRICOM
    will support interagency efforts to disrupt Beijing's military efforts
    and malign activities in African.

        134. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would AFRICOM
    manage relationships with partners who do not want to have to choose
    between the United States and any other security partner, including the
    PRC and Russia?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I believe a moderate
    investment can yield out-sized returns in the USAFRICOM area of
    responsibility. If confirmed, I will pursue focused relationships
    through operations, activities, and investments that achieve
    warfighting advantage and support U.S. security interests. African
    partners are sovereign nations, free to make their own security and
    economic decisions in accordance with their national interests. As
    China and Russia's malign activities are exposed over time, African
    partners will pursue those relationships that best serve their
    interests. Through prioritized and targeted engagement, the United
    States must present ourselves as a valuable partner to African nations,
    specifically those with the will and capacity to address shared threats
    on the Continent.

        135. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    will you promote maritime security in Africa?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, I will assess
    opportunities to expand U.S. Military, interagency, partner, and allied
    engagement on maritime security across the USAFRICOM area of
    responsibility. Africa's expansive maritime domain holds both
    significant challenges and strategic opportunities that demand a robust
    and collaborative approach. I will pursue enhanced coordination with
    our European allies and other non-traditional partners to advance
    shared national security objectives, from strengthening security in
    NATO's southern flank to combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated
    fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Through focused maritime exercises,
    security cooperation training, information sharing, and bilateral law
    enforcement engagements, USAFRICOM can empower partners to operate
    independently, detect and expose malign activity, and achieve vital
    shared goals. Moreover, I will coordinate with adjacent Combatant
    Commands to maximize regional outcomes and safeguard U.S. national
    security interests.

        136. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how can AFRICOM
    support or complement United States efforts to secure sea lines of
    communication?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, U.S.-led naval exercises
    present the greatest opportunities to demonstrate freedom of navigation
    in key sea lines of communication, both military and commercial. These
    annual exercises, conducted by USAFRICOM's assigned naval forces,
    demonstrate U.S. capabilities and send the message to malign actors
    that the United States is ready to defend freedom of navigation and
    global commerce. Additionally, if confirmed, I will continue to work
    with our NATO allies to find additional opportunities for maritime
    cooperation, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Red Seas.

        137. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    will you ensure effective intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance coverage in Africa to combat destabilizing, violent
    extremist activity from non-State actors?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as you know, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is a high-demand/low-density
    asset. Its availability remains a challenge not only for USAFRICOM but
    for all other Combatant Commands.
        As an economy of force theater, I understand USAFRICOM will have
    limited ISR assets while the need for ISR coverage remains high. If
    confirmed, I will assess the current risk and advocate for the required
    resources to safeguard U.S. national security interests. To maintain
    timely and relevant indications and warnings, I will also seek to
    balance the requirement for exquisite, airborne ISR with other cost-
    effective means to enhance domain and threat awareness. There are
    suitable emerging technologies we can look to leverage. I would also
    engage allies and our African partners to strengthen relationships, to
    include exploring the potential for enhanced intelligence-sharing
    agreements.

        138. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    would you assess and adapt AFRICOM's posture following recent U.S.
    troop withdrawals in countries like Niger?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, as I discussed in my
    testimony, the United States used Niger extensively to support ISR
    activities. We invested significant resources, particularly at the air
    base, which was a key foothold for us to monitor regional threats. As a
    result, we'll have to find creative ways to ensure we have timely,
    reliable indicators and warnings to counter terrorist threats to the
    U.S. Homeland and advance U.S. security interests.
        You have my assurance that, if confirmed, I will assess USAFRICOM's
    current posture so we can achieve the objectives identified by national
    strategic guidance.

        139. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    will you leverage security cooperation, diplomatic engagements, and
    other tools to build long-term strategic relationships across Africa?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I believe that a modest
    investment of resources in Africa can yield an outsized return where
    U.S. security interests are concerned. If confirmed, I will ensure that
    USAFRICOM strategy is aligned to the U.S. national security priorities
    identified in national strategic guidance. I will also engage with
    allies and African partners by leveraging security cooperation and
    capacity-building activities, and exercises to better enable our
    African partners to address regional challenges.

        140. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, how would you
    continue to ensure that these efforts remain consistent with U.S.
    commitments to democratic governance, civilian oversight, and human
    rights?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, these commitments are
    critical to the standing of the U.S. Military across the globe. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Department to ensure USAFRICOM
    activities are conducted in accordance with those U.S. law and
    policies.

        141. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, can you describe
    your priorities for burden-sharing and security capacity-building in
    Africa, should you be confirmed?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I commit to support the
    priorities identified in national strategic guidance, to include
    continuing partnerships with capable and willing African nations to
    degrade and defeat terrorist organizations who pose a threat to the
    United States Homeland.

        142. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, which countries
    would you prioritize and deprioritize?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. If confirmed, I will assess the
    current strategy to ensure that all USAFRICOM activities, operations,
    and investments align to United States national security objectives,
    including decisions on the prioritization of African partner nations.

        143. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what areas of
    cooperation would you emphasize or de-emphasize, and why?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, if confirmed, my focus at
    USAFRICOM will be to: (1) counter terrorism to protect the U.S.
    Homeland and prevent strategic surprise; (2) counter adversary
    strategies on the Continent, and (3) ensure Joint Force readiness to
    respond to crisis. I look forward to working with both allies and
    partners to enhance their capacity to execute against shared security
    objectives and enable our African partners to address regional security
    challenges independently.

        144. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, what do you see
    as the role of our partners in Africa in developing and fielding
    innovative new technologies for use in security?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. USAFRICOM continuously looks for
    opportunities to work with our African partners--whether it be through
    combined military exercises, individual technology demonstrations, or
    establishing relationships to further research that is mutually
    beneficial. Many of our African partners also have strong military-
    affiliated research and development facilities and innovation
    ecosystems. The ingenuity of our African partners will be critical as
    USAFRICOM continues to evolve its military technological edge in
    coordination with allies and partners.

        145. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, how
    do you anticipate AFRICOM to align with the Trump administration's
    prioritization shift to the Indo-Pacific, as reportedly outlined in the
    interim National Defense Strategy?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, my understanding is that
    USAFRICOM staff and components are already operating with a theater
    strategy and campaign plan in support of U.S. national security
    objectives. If confirmed, I will assess the strategy and ensure that
    all USAFRICOM activities, operations, and investments align to national
    strategic guidance.
                                     ethics
        146. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, would you follow
    an illegal, unlawful or immoral order?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Senator, I do not anticipate that I
    will receive an unlawful order. I swore an oath to support and defend
    the Constitution of the United States 33 years ago. I have reaffirmed
    this oath eight times and will continue to adhere to it as long as I'm
    able to serve.

        147. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Anderson, if confirmed, do
    you commit that your deliberations and decisions will only be
    communicated through official, secure channels and any decisions
    properly documented for both oversight and institutional memory?
        Lieutenant General Anderson. Yes, Senator.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M.
    Anderson, USAF follows:]

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                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M.
    Anderson, USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
    time the nomination was referred, follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
    General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF in connection with his
    nomination follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

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                                     ______

        [The nomination of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson,
    USAF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on July 29,
    2025, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
    The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 2025.]

                                 [all]