[Senate Hearing 119-324]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-324
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF: MR.
MICHAEL P. CADENAZZI, JR. TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL
BASE POLICY; AND VICE ADMIRAL SCOTT
W. PAPPANO, USN TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECU-
RITY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, INDIANA MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
april 29, 2025
Page
To Consider the Nominations of: Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr. to 1
be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy;
and Vice Admiral Scott W. Pappano, USN to be Principal Deputy
Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration.
Members Statements
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 2
Witness Statements
Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr., Nominated to be Assistant 3
Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 33
Questions for the Record....................................... 49
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 66
Biographical Sketch............................................ 67
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 69
Signature Page................................................. 75
Pappano, Vice Admiral Scott W., USN, Nominated to be Principal 75
Deputy Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 75
Questions for the Record....................................... 94
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 104
Biographical Sketch............................................ 105
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 106
Signature Page................................................. 111
(iii)
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF: MR. MICHAEL P. CADENAZZI, JR. TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY; AND VICE
ADMIRAL SCOTT W. PAPPANO, USN TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2025
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Budd, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Rosen, and
Kelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Chairman Wicker. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. I welcome our witnesses and their families and I thank
them for being here this morning.
The United States is up against the most dangerous threat
environment we've faced since World War II. I say it
frequently, but it needs to be said even more frequently. I'm
grateful that these two individuals have stepped up to help us
in these challenging times.
Mr. Scott Pappano has been nominated to be Principal Deputy
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). In this position, Mr. Pappano will help lead an
organization tasked with rebuilding and modernizing our long,
neglected nuclear weapons stock pile. He must be up to the task
because our nuclear dangers are more complex than ever.
Over the past several years, we've watched as Russia,
China, and North Korea have rapidly expanded their nuclear
arsenals and developed new types of weapons, weapons for which
we are not prepared. In his previous position, Mr. Pappano saw
firsthand that the U.S. is far behind in ship building. I hope
he'll bring important lessons from that experience and apply
them to this role. Modernizing our nuclear deterrent is a
national imperative, and this Committee expects to see results.
I look forward to hearing how Mr. Pappano intends to drive NNSA
to achieve this objective.
Mr. Michael Cadenazzi has been nominated to be the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for industrial based policy at
the Department of Defense (DOD). Mr. Cadenazzi served 10 years
in the U.S. Navy as a cryptologic officer, and then took his
talents to private industry. He spent 20 years addressing
strategic and operational defense and aerospace challenges. He
has launched or participated in startups working on analytics,
technical service, and artificial intelligence (AI).
He has been nominated to a position that is relatively new,
but it must not be overlooked. As a matter of fact, it should
be given very serious attention. The Office of Industrial Base
Policy is one of the most important posts in the Pentagon. We
need a large and capable cohort of defense industrial policy
analysts who can bring serious options to the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress, and we need those analysts to be
guided by a capable leader.
I look forward to hearing Mr. Cadenazzi's opinions on how
we can improve and simplify the department's analytic capacity
and investment authorities to build a more resilient industrial
base. I look forward to their testimony.
I now turn to my dear friend and Ranking Member, Senator
Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me welcome Mr. Cadenazzi and Admiral Pappano. Thank you,
gentlemen. Welcome. Congratulations on your nomination.
Also, this is a special moment because we have a reunion of
Rogers High School in Newport, Rhode Island here, and I want to
recognize all the Rhode Islanders.
Chairman Wicker. We're pressed for time.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. I know. Well, I can name them one by one if
you'd like, but all right, I will move on.
Mr. Cadenazzi, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy serves as a principal advisor to the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, for
all industrial base policies and related matters. The position
has a wide scope of responsibilities from ensuring supply chain
security, to guiding Department-wide investments into critical
defense technology sectors, to coordinating small business
programs.
If you are confirmed, you'll be the second person to hold
this office. As such, there are a number of important
challenges you will need to address. In particular, the Defense
Department needs a coordinated strategy for working with the
defense industry to expand production capacity of weapon
systems, munitions, and key technologies such as
microelectronics, hyper sonics, and biomanufacturing. These
technologies will be crucial for maintaining America's global
competitiveness and will require working with industry across
the broad from prime contractors to sub-tier suppliers and
producers of raw materials. I would ask for your plans for
addressing this significant challenge as we go forward.
Further, as we've seen with greater clarity over the past
several years, ensuring supply chain security and access to
strategic minerals such as rare earth elements is critical for
the Department and the defense industrial base. The Defense
Department must take a proactive approach to identifying
threats and vulnerabilities for its supply chains and develop
plans and tools to mitigate those risks.
I would note that doing so will require the Department to
work across the inter-agency with multiple other Federal
agencies. I would like to know your thoughts on how you would
address this challenge. Mr. Cadenazzi, if confirmed, your
experience as a Navy officer and as a business leader in a
high-tech field will be valuable for meeting these challenges.
However, I would indicate too that you'll have to pick up
and grow your knowledge very rapidly because these fields are
changing so rapidly. You have a challenging task and I wish you
well.
Admiral Pappano, you have been nominated to be Deputy
Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administrator
or NNSA. You retired last month as the Vice Admiral after a 36-
year career in the Navy. Thank you for your service, sir. You
were a principal leader and military deputy to the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research. So, you come well equipped
to this task.
If confirmed, you'll lead the day-to-day operations of the
NNSA. Most importantly, you'll lead efforts to modernize the
warheads and our nuclear triad of submarines, heavy bombers,
and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The NNSA has been
working for years to complete this modernization, but the
Department is experiencing tremendous workload as it
simultaneously recapitalizes warhead programs and undertakes
the major rebuilding of its nuclear infrastructure, much of
which dates back to the Manhattan Project.
I would note that the NNSA's workforce is specialized
nuclear scientists and engineers is fundamental to
accomplishing these missions. I'm concerned that morale in the
Department has been badly harmed in recent months as hundreds
of employees have been fired or threatened with firing. Mr.
Pappano, as a career Navy officer, I would like to know how you
will approach these challenges, including how you'll work to
retain the skilled civil servants to maintain our nuclear
deterrent.
Thank you again to our nominees and I look forward to your
testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Reed, and I too am
delighted that the State of Rhode Island is so well
represented----
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker.--by individuals. At this point we will
recognize our guests for their opening statements. Mr.
Cadenazzi, you are recognized for your opening statements, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL P. CADENAZZI, JR., NOMINATED TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY
Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Wicker, Ranking
Member Reed, Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
would like to thank President Trump, the Administration,
Secretary Hegseth, and his team, for their support of my
nomination to serve as the next Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Industrial Base Policy.
I must also thank and acknowledge my family. My father,
retired Navy Commander Michael Sr., my mother Joanne, and my
sister Marisa. My three daughters, Mhairi, Hannah, and Iona.
Their energy and laughter give my life color and their
successes fill me with immeasurable pride. I want to thank my
wife, Sarah. I would not be anywhere, much less here, without
her.
My entire adult life has been spent in the defense sector
and in support of the effort to address the critical needs of
our industrial base. From my oath to the Nation as a Tulane
NROTC midshipman in August 1991, through 10 years of Active
Duty service as a naval cryptologic officer, I had the
privilege to serve with dedicated military professionals of
every rank and branch. Over the past 2 decades, I have been
fortunate enough to work with the defense industrial base from
the primes down into the supply chain while tackling myriad
business issues.
At this critical time, I see the scale of challenges facing
our military while competing with a near peer pacing us in many
ways. In my view, the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, we face
constraints in crucial and exquisite capabilities delivered in
uncomfortably limited quantities over long timelines,
experiencing delivery delays, and increasing costs. There are
simply not enough weapons or platforms and our readiness is
inadequate. These are national level challenges that undermine
our lethality and security.
Senators, I want this role because I want America to win. I
want to contribute to America's future victories, and I want to
take part in overcoming these challenges and forging a more
resilient, innovative, and responsive version of the industrial
machine that has underpinned our natural security since World
War II.
This role is critical to Secretary Hegseth's commitment to
rebuild the military by revitalizing the defense industrial
base. If confirmed, I will execute the role with three guiding
principles: prioritization, productivity, and production.
First, prioritization. We must focus on the urgent needs of
war fighters today while positioning for the challenges of
tomorrow. There are immediate problems in lethality, lower tier
supply chain, and readiness. There is the need for long-term
transformation flowing from increased private capital,
invigorated domestic manufacturing, and secure access to vital
materials and minerals.
There is an abundance of analysis on our industrial
problems and thankfully, an equally abundant set of proposed
solutions, all of which outstrip our cash and capabilities to
respond. Hard choices await us as a department and as a Nation.
Second, productivity. This office must be a catalyst to
increase industrial productivity at every level. If confirmed,
I will collaborate across government and industry to target
critical investment into the most pressing supply chain gaps
and bottlenecks. I believe we must accelerate adoption of
today's digital tools to secure the leap ahead benefits of AI
and quantum for the future. Our goal must be to maximize the
productive impact of every defense dollar.
Third, production. The DOD must accelerate and scale
industrial base production now in advance of major conflict,
and we must position industry to surge in fulfillment of future
demands. Progress against these objectives will make a
measurable difference in our national security.
In closing, I want to acknowledge the outpouring of support
and my pursuit of this effort. It has been truly humbling. What
has been equally gratifying is the unabashed commitment of
individuals across government and industry to work together to
make the industrial base better. We have done this work before
and now we must do it again.
Senators, I respectfully request your support for my
confirmation and for the vital tasks that lie ahead to reawaken
the innovative spirit of the American industrial base and to
ensure that our Nation remains a force for peace and stability
through strength. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr.
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr.
I would like to thank President Trump, the Administration,
Secretary Hegseth and his team for their support of my nomination to
serve as the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base
Policy.
I must also thank and acknowledge my family.
My father, retired Navy Commander Michael Sr, my mother Joanne, and
my sister Marisa.
My three daughters, Mhairi, Hannah and Iona. Their energy and
laughter give my life color. Their successes fill me with immeasurable
pride.
And I want to thank my wife, Sarah. I would not be anywhere, much
less here, without her.
My entire adult life has been spent in the defense sector and in
support of the effort to address the critical needs of our industrial
base. From my oath to the Nation as a Tulane NROTC midshipman in August
1991 through 10 years of Active Duty service as a Naval Cryptologic
officer, I had the privilege of serving with dedicated military
professionals of every rank and branch. And over the past two decades I
have been fortunate enough to work with the defense industrial base
from the primes down into the supply chain while tackling myriad
business issues.
At this critical time, I see the scale of challenges facing our
military while competing with a near peer pacing us in many ways. In my
view of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, we face constraints in
crucial and exquisite capabilities, delivered in uncomfortably limited
quantities over long timelines, while experiencing delivery delays and
increasing costs. There are simply not enough weapons or platforms. And
our readiness is inadequate.
These are national level challenges that undermine our lethality
and security.
Senators, I want this role because I want America to win. I want to
contribute to America's future victories. And I want to take part in
overcoming these challenges and forging a more resilient, innovative,
and responsive version of the industrial machine that has underpinned
our national security since World War II.
This role is critical to Secretary Hegseth's commitment to
``Rebuild the Military'' by ``Revitalizing the defense industrial
base''.
If confirmed, I will execute the role with three guiding
principles:
Prioritization. Productivity. And Production.
First, Prioritization: We must focus on the urgent needs of
warfighters today, while positioning for the challenges of tomorrow.
There are immediate problems in lethality, lower tier supply chains &
readiness. And there is the need for long-term transformation flowing
from increased private capital, invigorated domestic manufacturing, and
secure access to vital materials and minerals.
There is an abundance of analysis on our industrial problems. And,
thankfully, an equally abundant set of proposed solutions. All of which
outstrip our cash and capabilities to respond. Hard choices await us as
a Department and a Nation.
Second, Productivity: This office must be a catalyst to increase
industrial productivity at every level. If confirmed, I will
collaborate across government and industry to target critical
investment into the most pressing supply chain gaps and bottlenecks.
And I believe we must accelerate adoption of today's digital tools to
secure the leap-ahead benefits of AI and quantum. Our goal must be to
maximize the productive impact of every defense dollar.
Third, Production: The DOD must accelerate and scale industrial
base production now in advance of conflict. And we must position
industry to surge in fulfillment of future demands. Progress against
these objectives will make a measurable difference in our national
security.
In closing, I want to acknowledge the outpouring of support in my
pursuit of this role--it has been humbling. What has been equally
gratifying is the unabashed commitment of individuals across government
and industry committed to ``work together to make the industrial base
better.'' We have done this work before, and now we must do it again.
Senators, I respectfully request your support for my confirmation
and for the vital tasks that lie ahead: to reawaken the innovative
spirit of the American Industrial Base and to ensure that our Nation
remains a force for peace and stability through strength.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Cadenazzi. Vice
Admiral Pappano.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL SCOTT W. PAPPANO, USN, NOMINATED TO
BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Vice Admiral Pappano. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed,
and Members of the Committee, thank you for your consideration
of my nomination to be the Principal Deputy Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA at the U.S.
Department of Energy.
Since first taking the oath of office in July, 1985, I have
devoted my entire adult life to serving our Nation as
commissioned officer in the Navy. I thank President Trump and
Energy Secretary Wright for affording me the opportunity to
shift course and continue my public service in a greater and
more impactful capacity.
I also need to thank my wife of 34 years, Kate, for joining
me here today and for her service to the Nation as the
commander-in-chief of the Pappano household. Nothing I have
achieved would've been possible without her love and support,
and her commitment to raising our children throughout my
frequent absences is a testament to her strength and
resilience. We are both proud of the adults our children have
grown up to be.
Foundational qualifications to serve as the principal
deputy administrator of NNSA, include an extensive background
in organizational management and being well qualified to manage
nuclear weapons, infrastructure, construction and maintenance,
non-proliferation, material disposition programs, in a manner
to enhance and protect U.S. national security through the
military application of nuclear energy.
I believe that, if confirmed, my background, experience,
and expertise would be well suited to execute the duties of
this office. I also believe deeply in the mission. Strategic
nuclear deterrence is fundamental to our national security and
modernizing our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear
forces, and supporting infrastructure is a critical national
security priority.
My qualifications are founded upon the bedrock of a strong
technical education, with an undergraduate degree in marine
engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, and a graduate degree
in nuclear engineering for the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Both my education and leadership were honed across
a 36-year career as a nuclear submarine officer and a military
acquisition professional.
I have humbly led exceptional teams at all levels with the
understanding that my calling was to make the people around me
more effective and achieve greater outcomes than they otherwise
could have achieved by empowering them, building esprit de
corps, fostering deep technical competence, and removing
barriers to their success. As a submarine line officer, I
completed sea rotations on five submarines across all classes,
culminating in command of a nuclear attack submarine. I also
served as military assistant for Assistant Secretary of
Defense, charged with both strategic nuclear deterrence and
non-proliferation policy.
As a military acquisition professional, I served as major
program manager for lifecycle sustainment of operational,
strategic, and attack submarines, oversaw research and
development activities of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center
Laboratories, established a program executive office to focus
on cradle to grave of lifecycle activities for all nuclear
strategic ballistic missile submarines, and eventually served
as a principal deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, charged
with overseeing the procurement and sustainment of all Navy and
Marine Corps weapon systems.
This has all led me to this unique moment in time where, if
confirmed, my expertise and experience would align well with
the leadership necessary for NNSA, to overcome generational
challenges and deliver programs of record to meet national
security needs. I understand the complexity of the threats and
the critical importance of the NNSA mission. I have a deep
understanding of naval nuclear propulsion, from construction
and testing, through operations, lifecycle sustainment, and
eventual decommissioning.
I oversaw the recapitalization of our sea-based strategic
nuclear deterrent and work closely with other stakeholders
engaged in nuclear modernization efforts to include United
States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Strategic Assistance
Programs, the United Kingdom Dreadnought Alliance, and other
legs of the U.S. nuclear triad.
I supervised contract performance in our nuclear ship
builders and led the standup of a navy industrial based team to
spearhead data driven assessment of the submarine supply chain,
and collaboration across U.S. Department of Defense and
Congress to target industrial base investment in critical
infrastructure, supply chain capacity and resilience,
manufacturing, technology, workforce attraction, recruitment,
training, and retention.
I believe that if confirmed the lessons I have learned on
my Navy journey would translate well to the NNSA journey that
must ultimately modernize the nuclear stockpile in supporting
infrastructure without disrupting production activities to
ensure that the Nation maintains a safe, secure, reliable, and
credible strategic nuclear deterrent.
I understand this is a no fail mission. I am honored and
humbled to be considered for this nomination and look forward
to answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Pappano follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Scott Pappano
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee,
thank for your consideration of my nomination to be the Principal
Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) at the U.S. Department of Energy. Since first taking the Oath of
Office in July 1985, I have devoted my entire adult life to serving our
Nation as a commissioned officer in the Navy, and I thank President
Trump and Energy Secretary Wright for affording me the opportunity to
shift course and continue my public service in a greater and more
impactful capacity. I also need to thank my wife of 34 years--Kate--for
joining me here today and for her service to the Nation as commander-
in-chief of the Pappano household. Nothing I have achieved would have
been possible without her love and support, and her commitment to
raising our children throughout my frequent absences is a testament to
her strength and resilience--we are both proud of the adults our
children have grown up to be.
Foundational qualifications to serve as Principal Deputy
Administrator of NNSA include an extensive background in organizational
management and being well-qualified to manage nuclear weapons,
infrastructure construction and maintenance, non-proliferation, and
material disposition programs in a manner to enhance and protect U.S.
national security through the military application of nuclear energy. I
believe that, if confirmed, my background, experience, and expertise
would be well-suited to execute the duties of this office. I also
believe deeply in the mission--strategic nuclear deterrence is
fundamental to our national security and modernizing our Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear forces, and supporting
infrastructure is a critical national security priority.
My qualifications are founded upon the bedrock of a strong
technical education with an undergraduate degree in marine engineering
from the U.S. Naval Academy and a graduate degree in nuclear
engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Both
my education and leadership were honed across a 36-year career as a
nuclear submarine officer and military acquisition professional. I have
humbly led exceptional teams at all levels with the understanding that
my calling was to make the people around me more effective and achieve
greater outcomes than they otherwise could have achieved by empowering
them, building esprit de corps, fostering deep technical competence,
and identifying and removing barriers to their success. As a submarine
line officer, I completed sea rotations on five submarines across all
classes, culminating in command of a nuclear attack submarine. I also
served as a Military Assistant for an Assistant Secretary of Defense
charged with both strategic nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation
policy. As a military acquisition professional, I served as major
program manager for lifecycle sustainment of operational strategic and
attack submarines, oversaw research and development activities of the
Naval Undersea Warfare Center labs, established a program executive
office to focus on cradle-to-grave lifecycle activities for all nuclear
strategic ballistic missile submarines, and eventually served as
Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy charged with
overseeing the procurement and sustainment of all Navy and Marine Corps
weapon systems.
This has all led me to this unique moment in time where, if
confirmed, my expertise and experience would align with the leadership
necessary for NNSA to overcome generational challenges and deliver
programs of record to meet national security needs. I understand the
complexity of the threats and the critical importance of the NNSA
mission. I have a deep understanding of Naval nuclear propulsion--from
construction and testing, through operations, lifecycle sustainment,
and eventual decommissioning. I oversaw the recapitalization of our
sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent and worked closely with other
stakeholders engaged in nuclear modernization efforts to include
STRATCOM, Strategic Systems Programs, the United Kingdom Dreadnought
Alliance, and other legs of the U.S. Nuclear Triad. I supervised
contract performance at our nuclear shipbuilders and led the stand-up
of a Navy industrial base team to spearhead data-driven assessment of
the submarine supply chain and collaboration across the U.S. Department
of Defense and Congress to target industrial base investment in
critical infrastructure, supply chain capacity and resilience,
manufacturing technology, and workforce attraction, recruitment,
training, and retention.
I believe that, if confirmed, the lessons I have learned on my Navy
journey would translate well to the NNSA journey that must ultimately
modernize the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure--without
disrupting production activities--to ensure the Nation maintains a
safe, secure, reliable, and credible strategic nuclear deterrent.
I understand this is a no fail mission. I am honored and humbled to
be considered for this nomination, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you both for your excellent
testimony.
At this point, I am required to ask standard questions that
we ask of every civilian nominee. So, if both of you would turn
your mics on and just answer yes or no into the microphone.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
[Both witnesses answered in the negative.]
Chairman Wicker. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee when requested?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide records,
documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner
when requested by this committee, it's subcommittees, or other
appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the
requester regarding the basis for any good faith delay or
denial in providing such records?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Wicker. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Wicker. There may be some from this hearing. Will
you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response
to congressional requests?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much.
Now we'll proceed to questions. I'm going to defer my
questions until later and recognize for the first questions,
Chairwoman Fischer, who is chair of the Strategic Subcommittee
and along with Senator King has done yeoman work in the subject
matter of nuclear security. So, Madam Chairwoman, you are
recognized.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Reed. Thank you, gentlemen for being here today
and for your willingness to continue to serve this country.
Admiral, thank you for coming in to visit. I appreciated you
taking time and the conversation that we had.
If confirmed, can you tell me how you will work to ensure
that NNSA weapons production remains on schedule?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. Yes, if
confirmed, obviously, shifting to production is a key element
right now for us to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile
right now. We've done a very good job of stockpile management
in a science-based manner and kept that over the years.
However, now we have to transition that from the science-based
stockpile management to actual production facilities and make
sure we modernize those facilities, making sure that we don't
lose the science in the process and continue that going
forward.
I'll do that by looking across how we are modernizing our
facilities right now, and try to bring as much advanced
manufacturing capability as we can. As we look at the Manhattan
Era Project buildings that we're dealing with, a lot of these
facilities as we modernize those, bring in modern technology so
that we can be much more effective going forward in our
production of nuclear weapons stockpile.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
We talked a little bit about NNSA's 25-year Enterprise
Blueprint, a roadmap to modernize the infrastructure there, and
some of which as you brought up in our discussion, it dates
back to the Manhattan Project. We won't be able to produce the
weapons that we need without the facilities needed to process
materials like uranium, lithium, high explosives that go in
those nuclear weapons. So, anything we can do as you look at
that modernization process, please let us know.
Mr.--can you say your last name? I think the chairman
mispronounced it.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, not at all. I heard it all, ma'am.
Cadenazzi.
Senator Fischer. Cadenazzi.
Chairman Wicker. Take that back.
[Laughter.]
Senator Fischer. I take that back. Both the Department of
Defense and NNSA have similar challenges with their industrial
bases, and I believe that we have an opportunity now to address
underlying issues in a way that strengthens both the nuclear
industrial base and the defense industrial base.
If confirmed, do you commit to working closely with NNSA
and the Department of Energy on policies like increasing our
skilled manufacturing workforce that would impact both of those
industrial bases?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question. The
significance of it, particularly in light of the workforce
issues and access to materials that we're facing across the
industrial base, these are major challenges that both the NNSA
and the broader defense industry face and are dealing with. If
confirmed, I'm thrilled at the opportunity to speak to you
about how and where the Industrial Base Policy Office and I
might be able to focus.
Senator Fischer. Great. What we've seen happen in the
Ukraine war has shown us that militaries and modern conflicts,
they expend munitions at a much faster pace than we ever
expected before. Our stockpiles must be adjusted to account for
this, and we must expand our munitions production capacity. We
have to expand that.
We've taken some steps to address it in recent years, and
we have the opportunity to make those generational investments
through the reconciliation process. In your opening statement,
sir, you said that production must be scaled now before
conflict starts. I agree with that. If confirmed, what steps
would you take to accomplish that goal?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Appreciate the question again, Senator. The
issue of munitions production, is the top of the priority list
and something I've discussed with multiple Senators on this
Committee. I'm excited to work with the Committee, if
confirmed, on this topic.
There are a couple of major things that I think will drive
this. One is predictable and stable defense budget and program
spend. So, the more we can stabilize that, the more industry
we'll be able to align around it. A better understanding of
industry, of what the expectations for surge capacity are, will
make it clear what the potential opportunities are for them and
the level of capital required to increase facilities and
workforce.
That's a major opportunity for the Department to articulate
what would be a big, hairy, audacious goal in business school
terms. To go ahead and say, we need a lot more capability from
you and we need to agree then on the investment required to
meet that point.
We need to scale the workforce as well. There are many
initiatives underway to improve workforce capabilities across
the country. We need to grow those and take advantage of small
businesses as well. If confirmed, these are all exciting
opportunities for us to help address what is an obvious and
well-reported gap on this issue.
Senator Fischer. Are you familiar with the Department's
National Defense Industrial Strategy?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I am Senator, yes.
Senator Fischer. Do you have any concerns with that
strategy or think that there are gaps there that still need to
be addressed?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I think the strategy is solid.
Given the expectations of the previous Administration and the
goals they were looking to achieve, I've reviewed the external
open-source material for that and the associated implementation
plan. If confirmed, I'm eager to work with the Industrial Base
Policy Office, the Administration, and the committees to
understand what changes we believe are necessary. I'm happy to
work with you on that and to make sure that we tune that to
meet the current needs of the moment, particularly in light of
the changing requirements of the new Administration.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Madam Chairwoman, it may not be adequately
staffed at the Department, and that's something we'll want to
talk about. The way I understood how to pronounce the witness's
name, was he said it rhymes with snazzy. I now recognize my
distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Reed from Rhode Island.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you. I'm just amazed that you
can't pronounce a simple name like Cadenazzi and Pappano. Hey,
this is amazing.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Okay. Mr. Cadenazzi.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Cadenazzi.
Senator Reed. Cadenazzi. I have an Italian--I grew up in
Cranston and Knightsville with all the Italians from Itri.
The recent tariffs enacted by the Trump administration will
have a definite impact on the defense industrial base, and if
they're matched by reciprocal tariffs, that will exacerbate the
impact on the supply chain, the cost of materiel. So, how will
you assess the impacts of the tariffs on DOD and the defense
industrial base, and how do you intend to work with the
industrial base to deal with this issue?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question and the
significance of it. The tariffs were a complicated non-linear
set of decisions being made on the global scale. I do think
you're right that there are impacts to the industrial base.
However, I'm not currently aware of any particular analysis
regarding the particular impacts on the aerospace and defense
industrial base. I understand that the purpose of the tariffs
for a whole-of-government approach to reshape certain elements
of the economy, manufacturing, access to materials, some of
which we agree are good. Increased domestic manufacturing,
increased domestic production are good things. Where we can
achieve those ends, we should be pleased to work on that
subject.
If confirmed, I'm excited to work with the Committee, with
you, and with the industrial base to understand what the
impacts on the industrial base will be, any negative impacts,
and to prepare actions necessary to mitigate the effect of
those negative impacts over time.
Senator Reed. Another aspect of this whole tariff situation
is that part of, I think the way to accelerate the growth of
our industrial base is to partner closely with our allies. But
we're involved with a heated discussion with Canada and other
natural allies about tariffs. I think that will inhibit our
ability to cooperate and to integrate with them and to expand
quickly our industrial base. What view do you have on that?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, our allies and partners at the
industrial base level are critical. There's an incredible,
robust exchanges between companies and between countries that
enable us to work and operate and actually enable substantial
weapons sales overseas. Last year's, 2024's defense exports
total exceeded $300 billion. Those relationships remain strong.
I'm convinced that there's still robust interest across
companies to work with their partners wherever possible.
I see substantial opportunities for us to increase that
collaboration, particularly in the sharing of the sale of
parts, assemblies, sub components, those kinds of things where
we can go ahead and close gaps and mitigate efforts, issues
that we have in the domestic U.S. defense industrial base, by
working more closely in a more targeted way with our allies and
partners. So, if confirmed, I'm excited to work on that.
Senator Reed. If you see a severe impact of tariffs on our
production in the United States, our industrial base, will you
let this Committee know very rapidly?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, of course.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Admiral Pappano, again, thank you
for your extraordinary service in the submarines. They are our
key tier in the deterrence and the nuclear triad. Thank you.
You're going into NNSA right now, and you've got the
highest demand since 1980's in terms of nuclear weapons and
nuclear systems. At the same time, you're trying to rebuild an
aged infrastructure. I'm being polite.
But recent actions by DOGE [Department of Government
Efficiency] in coming in and dismissing people, and then many
times, 5 days later, hiring them back, which is even more
disturbing. The 2000 Federal workforce that NNSA had, is now
down to about 1,650. They're at perhaps a breaking point in
terms of not only the demands on them to do the job, but also
this sense of, ``Will I be going next week or will I still be
here?'' How are you going to respond to this morale problem and
this personnel problem?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. I'm not fully
apprised of all the hirings and firings or goings on personnel-
wise inside NNSA right now, only what's available, open source.
However, if confirmed, that will be a top priority of mine.
Understanding what that workforce needs, making sure it is
properly resourced in people and funding as required to
accomplish this no-fail mission of recapitalizing our strategic
nuclear infrastructure, and getting back to weapons production.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Again, thank you
for your service, both of you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you both for being
here. Thanks to your families as well, for your long service
and your willing to continue in service in these unique and
important roles.
Mr. Cadenazzi, and we'll just go with sir for you, since
we've had all the challenges of pronunciation. On April 4th of
this year, China's Ministry of Commerce, they imposed export
restrictions on seven rare earth elements in magnets. So,
giving our ongoing heavy reliance on China, for many of these
rare earths, there's an increasingly unacceptable level of risk
to our ability to produce everything from planes to munitions.
The United States should have created a rare earth supply chain
independent of China a decade ago.
Companies like Vulcan Elements, which is a rare earth
magnet manufacturer that's fully decoupled from China, and is
based in North Carolina, they're attempting to do just that.
But efforts need to accelerate and accelerate at scale. So, in
your advanced policy questions, you discussed your intent to
leverage the DPA or the Defense Production Act, as well as the
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment, or the IBAS, to
support private sector investment in our defense industrial
base.
So, if confirmed, how will you leverage these authorities
to end our reliance on China for rare earths?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, this is a critical opportunity for
the country to go ahead and increase its ability to develop
domestic resources and decrease our reliance on China within
the industrial base. If confirmed, I'm eager to work with this
Committee, with you, on the issues associated with the
application of DPA and IBAS as direct opportunities to increase
our investment into the domestic mineral production chain. I
believe DPA and IBAS collectively invested over $540 million
into these resource developments efforts over the past few
years.
We can continue that. We should. There are other additional
capabilities we should explore: partnership with allies to go
ahead and secure additional resources and increase production
capabilities, recycling. There's numerous strategies which are
available to us to go ahead and take advantage of this time in
this window where there's some sense of urgency about it.
Before we lose that sense of urgency, I believe we need to make
real initiatives and real effort to go ahead and close the gap.
So, if confirmed, Senator, it's an exciting opportunity and
time for us to help on that.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that answer.
So, if confirmed, will you commit to working with not only
this Committee, but also the Banking Committee to make
improvements to the DPA?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Budd. Thank you. The Committee on Foreign
Investment in the U.S. or CFIUS, is also primarily within the
banking jurisdiction, but the Department of Defense and the
Industrial Base Policy Office in particular, play an important
role in reviews conducted by the committee. I frequently hear
folks from North Carolina, including those that are military
installations in North Carolina with concerns about foreign
investments, specifically from China, near military
installations.
So, do you see a need for the DOD to improve engagement on
the topic of foreign investment risks to national security?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, thank you for the question. This is
a critical topic and one that's at the top of the list for the
industrial based policy office, currently. The CFIUS office,
the associated authorities around identification of adversarial
capital and adversarial companies, Chinese companies working in
the defense industrial base, is a top priority for the office.
All those issues around purchasing of land and those sort
of things around military installations. This is something that
I think requires additional resourcing to look at. I believe
that those issues are understaffed relative to the demand to
look at all the transactions that are potentially high risk. If
confirmed, I'm eager to work with you and the Committee to
understand--the other committees to understand what can be done
to bring additional scrutiny to bear on this topic and what we
can do to resource the analysis that's required.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
You mentioned additional resources. I think that's
important. Do you see bottlenecks of the DODs engagement on
this issue?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I'm not aware of any particular
bottlenecks that currently exist. I'm aware that there's a
significant number of transactions that have been looked at and
there's a belief generally that there's a need for more.
However, I can't comment specifically on what the scale of that
gap is. If confirmed, I'm eager to understand and work with you
to understand what is additional resources would be required to
close any gap relative to the risk exposure we're willing to
tolerate.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. Admiral, a question. This
is different than SMRs, which are often talked about, but what
are your views on using modular micro reacts as an
expeditionary power source and how do you balance their
adoption with security and the concern about proliferation?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed,
obviously there's some significant potential with micro
reactors and what we could do with those either in civilian or
military application. Certainly, if confirmed, I'll work with
the NNSA administrator and the Secretary of Energy to make sure
that we are properly monitoring and overseeing what we would do
with those micro reactors to make sure we don't have a
nonproliferation condition.
Senator Budd. Thank you both for your time. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Senator
Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to both of
you and your families. Going to the fitness to serve question,
I ask the following two initial questions of all nominees
before any of the committees on which I sit, so I will ask you.
We'll start with Mr. Cadenazzi. Since you became a legal
adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors
or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a
sexual nature?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Pappano? Admiral?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
[Both witnesses answered in the negative.]
Senator Hirono. For Mr. Cadenazzi, I championed a provision
in last year's NDAA that created a program focused on advanced
manufacturing capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to more quickly
construct unmanned systems and parts for ships and submarine
repairs, and this program is essential to bolstering deterrence
in the region. DOD and the services have always struggled to
coordinate industrial based modernization efforts.
How do you plan to foster greater integration across the
services for this important program?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question. This is
a critical issue. Hawaii represents a significant portion of
the organic industrial base and our broader defense industrial
base. There are many tools we have to bring alignment across
the industrial base initiatives that are there and the groups
that are responsible for it.
The first thing is leadership. That is the wherewithal to
go ahead and get into the weeds. The macro issues, I think,
thankfully, there's a substantial number of authorities and
resources available that are made available by the Congress
over time to the DOD to take action on these issues.
At the micro level, we need to get into the details to
understand where individual organizations may not be getting it
with regards to the opportunities here, in particular, the new,
I think, acquisition and industrial based executive order does
a good job to highlight the acquisition personnel to workforce
training initiatives, and things that we can do to go ahead and
drive more understanding into the leaders at the tactical
level, we need to make decisions to invest in the integration
of the industrial base.
Senator Hirono. I hope that you will focus on this aspect
of what we need to do, because I know you are aware that Indo-
Pacific is the largest AOR [area of responsibility], and we
need to provide flexibilities when the ships are out to sea and
they need to have flexibility and repair and doing all the
things that will keep them going.
So, I hope that you'll visit Hawaii and see for yourself
the capabilities that we need to strengthen. Again for you, I
have met with small businesses in the past as they struggle to
comply with the requirements to meet the cybersecurity maturity
model certification requirements, and it's pretty complicated,
and they have a hard time complying, as I said.
So, I am prioritizing a provision in this year's NDAA that
would require the DOD to provide additional support and
innovative tools for small businesses to ensure that they are
aligned with DODs CMMC requirements, allowing them to save
money and contribute to diversifying the defense industrial
base that you are very focused on strengthening.
What are your thoughts on the provision that would require
DOD to provide more assistance to small businesses to enable
them to work with you all?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, this is a critical topic, and it
has been a bit of a roadblock for small businesses over time.
It's great that you're bringing this issue up. Within the small
business office, within the Industrial Base Policy Office,
there's a program called Project Spectrum, which is intended to
go out to small businesses that are operating in the defense
sector to help them go ahead and get the resources and
understanding and analysis they need to accelerate and reduce
the cost of their compliance with CMMC.
If confirmed, I'm eager to work with you on this provision,
your proposals going forward. I think anything we can do to
streamline the requirements while also ensuring a more robust
and resilient security and base for our cyber infrastructure,
is critical opportunity for the Department and we should look
at that.
Senator Hirono. Should you be confirmed, as I believe you
will be, that I would like to work with you on how we can
better strengthen this part of our supply chain. Because
without our small businesses, many of whom are dropping out of
working with the DOD for a number of reasons, including
complying with the security requirements. So, this is something
that I would want to be very specific in following up with you.
One more question for you. The COVID-19 pandemic and
geopolitical competition with China has exposed the deep
fragilities in the United States defense supply chain, as we
mentioned. So, for example, we remain heavily reliant on
foreign sources for critical earth elements. So, what steps do
you plan to take to address this significant issue?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question. The
issue of access to raw materials, rare earths in particular, is
one that is particularly challenging. The Industrial Base
Policy Office has invested over $540 million in the past on
these topics. I think we need to accelerate and invigorate
those investments, but also align them to the most critical and
impactful opportunities that'll have the most impact on our
most critical near-term needs.
Whether that's munitions lethality or readiness, we should
make those decisions in those investments promptly and get them
moving so we can see the impact as soon as possible. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with you on that issue.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Sheehy.
Senator Sheehy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll start with you, Admiral. You talked about the
Manhattan Project in your comments, and I think you know, that
was an era when the Government was oftentimes the hot bed of
innovation, and I think we can all agree that's not the case
anymore. So, as we're looking at--you know, I was reading about
China having a salt-based fission reactor online just recently,
which of course is a huge leap in technology.
How are you going to incentivize private industry
innovation to make sure that we either regain or stay in the
lead for nuclear innovation around the world?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes. Thank you for that question,
Senator. Obviously, you know, our national labs, our strategic
labs, they are really leading edge on some of this innovation
and technology and really a national treasure for all of us.
So, I want to make sure we continue that science-based approach
that we have at our national labs, but also making sure that we
take the opportunity to coordinate with other business and
other academic institutions to go leverage what other
innovations are going on across the country.
Senator Sheehy. For example, there's a number of smaller
companies innovating in micro reactors, and they're having a
very hard time getting access to processed fissionable material
so they can proceed with, not just their development, but
actually the production of these items. How can you streamline
the access of this material? Of course, it has to be
controlled, and we have to vet these companies, but many of
them are vetted and are capable of receiving this material, yet
they'll wait years on a very simple approval. How can you
expedite that?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I'm not fully apprised, Senator, on
all of the details within NNSA on the processes for that, but I
commit that I will work with the NNSA administrator and the
Secretary of Energy and as necessary, the Department of Defense
to make sure I look at those processes and find ways to
streamline those as appropriate.
Senator Sheehy. You know, our triad is from a bygone era.
Our B-52s are coming up on 70 years old as far as the
airframes. Our silos in Montana for the minuteman, you know,
those are half a century old technology, if not older, and you
know, luckily our undersea leg of the triad is pretty healthy,
but we can't build those subs fast enough, as you know. So, how
are you going to contribute to a revitalization of that triad
to make sure we are competing with and leading China and other
near peers?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes. Thank you for the question,
Senator. Obviously, I'm completely aligned with you on the need
to recapitalize all legs of our nuclear triad right now. If
confirmed, NNSA's key role in that is making sure we maintain
the nuclear stockpile stewardship as we move into production of
new weapons. Also look for, obviously, innovative technologies
or innovative ways to design weapons or weapons materials
through advanced technologies to get after weapons production
more quickly going forward here.
Senator Sheehy. Mr. Cadenazzi, regarding acquisition
reform, I think in the past 25 years since the global war on
terror started, we've all seen every lab accelerator, you know,
innovation unit, lots of little tents are stood up saying,
``We're going to change innovation for acquisition. We're going
to accelerate acquisition, we're going to get geared to the war
fighter.''
All we hear is a lot of offices stood up, a lot of money
spent, but very little progress is made. It's time for real
progress, as we've seen across the world in Israel and the war
in Ukraine. Defense acquisition has to turn a page and be
fundamentally restructured, so we can buy things faster. We can
welcome more suppliers to our industrial base. Welcome them,
not scare them away with unneeded regulation and burdensome
compliance requirements like Senator Hirono just mentioned.
So, what are the top three things you're going to do as
fast as you can do, besides ask for more money, to actually
change the defense acquisition paradigm, to broaden our
industrial base and strengthen it?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question. It was a
pleasure to talk to you last week. Thank you for the time. So,
when it comes to the acquisition reform process, I think former
Secretary Kendall said it best that, ``There's no such thing as
acquisition reform, there's just acquisition improvement.'' I
think that holds true, that there's a lot to be done.
My particular focus in this area is centered on a couple of
particular things. One, is to more fully leverage the available
authorities like middle tier of acquisition, other transaction
authority, through education of the acquisition workforce. I
think the new executive order captures that we need to move
that into law and make sure that that becomes something that's
driven in a more actionable way by the Department.
Two, is predictable, stable budgets will allow us to go
ahead and mitigate some of the risks associated with how the
industrial base and the programs respond. They make plans,
budgets change, and then necessarily their activities in the
industrial base alignment around them have to change as well.
Then, third, is anything we can do to sort of decrease the
level of regulation, the level of difficulty in getting access
to work. So, you mentioned new vendors, new companies. We want
that. We now have a time when there's a lot of new interest in
the Defense Department in serving it. We should take advantage
of that as every way we can.
If confirmed, I'm excited to work with you and the
committee on that issue.
Senator Sheehy. Well, our acquisition structure usually
fights the last war, and in my era, it was the MRAPV, the Mine
Resistant Armor Protected Vehicles. Bob Gates pushed those
through. We got it done and saved a lot of lives, including a
lot of folks I know.
Chairman Wicker. Here. Here.
Senator Sheehy. But it came too late. Instead of innovating
after our 17, 18, 19-year-old kids are dying on the
battlefield, let's innovate beforehand. Because they're the
ones that are going to pay the price for our failures. So, for
both of you, I ask you, you focus heavily on the reforms we
need because we need to be ready next time. Thanks.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sheehy. Senator King,
before I recognize you, let me just followup Mr. Cadenazzi. On
middle tier acquisition needing to be put into law, I trust
you've read my FoRGED Act?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. That the enactment of that would be one of
the very ways we could statutorily authorize these sorts of
things.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator. I think it's a critical
improvement on the process along with rescissions and the
various changes to other laws that are mentioned in it.
Chairman Wicker. Good. Well, Senator Reed and I and the
Committee are hard at work on that. We hope we could do it
quickly. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Pappano, I want to talk about two or three things
with you: capacity, proliferation, and speed. Capacity, are you
aware of whether or not there's still a hiring freeze at NNSA?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Senator, I'm not aware of the
personnel policies at NNSA right now.
Senator King. Well, I think capacity is a concern because
the staff level is down 8 or 9 percent since January. I believe
the hiring freeze is still in place, and yet, as you've
testified today, you have some pretty serious responsibilities,
particularly with the upgrading of the triad.
So, I hope that that's something you can look into,
followup on, advocate for, having the adequate capacity in
order to meet the responsibilities that are being thrust upon
you. Is that something you can work toward?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes, sir. If confirmed, I commit to
you that I will advocate for the men and women of NNSA, make
sure that we have the right amount of people, the right skill
sets, the right training, and the right resources to accomplish
the mission that we have to do.
Senator King. I appreciate that. A piece of the
responsibility of NNSA that isn't talked about all that much is
proliferation and anti-proliferation around the world. The
reason I consider that so important is our whole defense
strategy is based upon the idea of deterrence. If terrorists
get a hold of nuclear material, deterrence doesn't work. They
don't have a capital city to bomb. They don't care about dying.
So, that is a true nightmare scenario. That makes non-
proliferation, anti-proliferation an incredibly important
responsibility right now, because of the fact that terrorist
groups are still out there. Al Qaeda, ISIS [Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria] are on the rebound in many parts of the world.
So, I hope that you'll put some emphasis and real focus on the
proliferation responsibilities of NNSA.
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes, thank you for that, Senator. Of
course, if confirmed, I will focus as well on non-proliferation
and counterproliferation. We sometimes get bogged on and
focusing on weapons production and strategic deterrence. But
another critical mission of NNSA is the non-proliferation
counterproliferation, making sure we provide the tools
necessary to prevent the spread of nuclear materials.
Senator King. The technology, the development of the
technology, for example, to detect nuclear material. That would
be a huge breakthrough. I hope that's part of the mission
you'll pursue.
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes, Senator. Thank you. I'm not
fully apprised of all the programs in progress with NNSA and
counterproliferation, but clearly the ability to detect nuclear
materials and do nuclear materials forensics, is a key mission
of NNSA that I will certainly prioritize to go after the things
that you suggest there, if confirmed.
Senator King. Final question for you. As the Chairman
mentioned, Senator Fischer and I have been working on these
issues together for some years. I'm concerned about the speed
of NNSA's development of the next generation warhead capacity
pits. For example, because we're moving forward pretty fast on
the B-1 bomber, on the Columbia-class submarine. We're
beginning work on Sentinel, but we want to have--but all that's
for naught if we don't have the modern warheads available.
So, speed, I think, is an issue that you're going to have
to look at. I have not been overly impressed, I guess I would
say with the with the execution of, for example, as I
mentioned, pit production.
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes, thank you, Senator. I share your
concern for urgency on this and make sure we move out quickly
here and properly. Part of that in my view is, if confirmed,
taking a look at what the barriers are to that speed, making
sure we attack those barriers, whether it's policies or
processes that we need to overcome, whether it's bringing
technology to bear and how we design or build or manufacture
equipment.
But anything that we can do to speed the process and make
all the very effective people more effective in what they do
through technology.
Senator King. I think the key word you used is urgency. Mr.
Cadenazzi, I don't have as much time. I do have a suggestion on
the issue of smaller businesses, which several senators have
talked about. Call your own 800 number in effect. What I mean
by that is, have a red team pretend to be a small business
applying to the Pentagon and see what the barriers are, see
what the requirements are, how many pages are the requirements.
I have found that very effective over the years to actually
experience what a potential contractor would experience.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, appreciate the point there. As I've
formally founded and ran and sold multiple small businesses, I
know the pain of difficulty of working with the Department of
Defense. I concur with you entirely, that's a great reminder on
the practical experience of that. So, thank you for the
suggestion.
Senator King. There've been a lot of discussion about
workforce in this Committee and workforce is one of the key
bottlenecks, and we can't ignore the fact that we could put
billions of dollars into some area of defense procurement, and
there just aren't the people to build a weapon system.
So, I think strong attention to workforce and to building
the workforce, and to providing the amenities necessary to
attract the workforce into our defense industrial base, is
going to be a big part of this job. It's not just a question of
money, it's a question of being sure the people are there to do
the welding.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I wish we could have some Top Gun
Maverick style movie that was going to talk about just how
incredible the opportunity is to work at the shipyards in
Virginia and elsewhere across the industrial base.
Senator King. Maine. There are two in Maine.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Oh, in Maine, sorry, and Mississippi as
well. Sorry.
Senator King. This is Virginia.
Mr. Cadenazzi. I got you there, Senator. But I think we're
going to have to do the hard work of actually developing
apprenticeship programs, looking at the application of
scholarships, Pell grants for welding, the kind of things that
we've had these discussions in the past. Now's the time to move
ahead on making sure that people understand the significance of
these jobs, the economic opportunities to grow and live,
families, the importance of this. We need to make people feel
valued in these jobs as well.
If confirmed, I'm eager to work with this Committee with
you and with the rest of the Congress on programs that'll
actually accelerate, increase the movement of workforce into
the defense industrial base.
Senator King. Thank you very much. I'll just leave you with
one phrase, consistent demand signal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Agree totally.
Chairman Wicker. Well, that's a good phrase. But also,
Senator King, you said to Vice Admiral Pappano, and it applies
to both witnesses, the word urgency needs to have meaning right
now. So, thank you very much for that line of questioning.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Good morning. Welcome to both of you.
Thank you for being here and for your willingness to continue
to serve the country.
I couldn't agree more with you, Mr. Cadenazzi, on your
response to Senator King's question about workforce, and I
think the Maine and New Hampshire delegations are both very
proud of our Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the mission of the
workforce there and the good work that they do. So, I think you
explained very well what the benefits are of working on the
civilian side in the defense industry.
Chairman Wicker. Of course, you got your education in the
State of Mississippi, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. I did, and so, I know how important
Mississippi is to the ship building too, Senator Wicker. You
said in your remarks that you weren't aware of the impact of
the tariffs on the aerospace industry, and I just wanted to
give you an example.
Last week, I visited a company called New Hampshire Ball
Bearings that makes bearings for the aerospace industry, solely
does a lot of its business with the defense industry. What they
told me is that as the result of the steel tariffs, the
uncertainty around that, and the President's intent to raise
the tariffs on steel, that their lead time for steel has gone
from 20 weeks to 2-\1/2\ years.
So, think about that. What the impact of that is going to
be on our defense industrial base and our ability to supply the
military with what they need. Which has already been under
stress, as we've seen, as the result of the war in Ukraine.
So, I just want to followup on Senator Reed's question
about how you expect to keep track of the impact of these kinds
of tariffs on the defense industrial base, and how do you think
about addressing the shortage of steel? Which is not just a
shortage in terms of capacity, but they said as the result of
the tariffs. Their one domestic suppliers has increased prices
significantly because they're able to do that because of the
tariffs and they can't get supply from our allies, which they
had been doing, which helped with both the cost and the
availability. So, how do you think about addressing that
problem, because that's significant.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question and your
concerns on this issue. As I mentioned before, the tariffs
issue is significant and obviously is going to have impact in
differential ways. First, I'm not aware of any analysis that
the Industrial Base Policy Office has produced in this. I
presume that they have, but I have not been provided with that.
So, I'd be loath to go ahead and provide an assessment of what
the Department believes the impact is in the industrial base
right now.
It is likely wide and varied. There's probably pockets
where they're benefiting from it and other pockets where you're
highlighting one of the challenges.
Senator Shaheen. Well, not to interrupt, but----
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen.--I think the concern is, is there an
analysis that's been done? Where does that start and what are
we seeing as a result of these tariffs over time? It's not at
all clear to me that that analysis has been done. Certainly,
I'm not aware that this Committee has seen any of that work.
So, I think that's number one, we need to see that.
Second, we need to track what happens and to feel like we
are responding to the shortcomings that we're seeing as the
result of policies. So that we're not further handicapping our
defense industry.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, if confirmed, I commit to come back
and make sure to provide whatever analysis has been done, and
if there's particular requests for the type of analysis on the
mix of companies you're talking about, or particular technology
area. I'm happy to work with you on those issues as well.
That's critically important.
Regarding the steel issue specifically, again, I'm not
aware of any particular analysis on the impact of tariffs on
steel or the steel in the context of the industrial base. The
industrial base consumes a lot of domestic steel. So, there's
some unique characteristics of that relative to other
industries. Again, if confirmed, I'm eager to discuss this
issue with you and what can be done to mitigate the issues on
the industrial base.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Chairman Wicker. That's a pretty good answer, isn't it,
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. The proof is in the pudding.
Chairman Wicker. Right.
Senator Shaheen. Admiral Pappano, since the invasion of
Ukraine, this Committee has supported the National Nuclear
Security Administration's cooperation with Ukraine by
monitoring Russian occupied power plants in Ukraine and
training the Ukrainians to detect radiation releases. This
cooperation has been really important. Particularly as we look
at Russian attacks on the largest power plant in Europe, the
Zaporizhzhia Power Plant.
Can you speak to the importance of NNSA's cooperation with
Ukraine, especially during ongoing negotiations?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. I am not fully
apprised at all the details of that cooperation right now. But,
if confirmed, I would make sure that NNSA provided the tools
and capabilities to go do those verifications so that we could
monitor, verify whatever we need to do as far as the
Administration desires.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator
Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
being with us today.
So, artificial intelligence presents big opportunities and
big risks for national security. Federal agencies should
benefit from AI innovation, but instead, a few big tech
companies could lock the Government into expensive anti-
competitive products. I'm working with Senator Schmitt on this
and last month, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
published guidance to ensure that the Government can, ``Benefit
from a competitive American AI marketplace.''
The guidance does not apply to DOD, but is all the more
important at DOD, given the billions of dollars that DOD is set
to give out in AI and cloud contracts. So, today, I want to
just run through some of the lessons from OMB's guidance.
Number one, interoperability. A big tech contractor could
build its cloud tool so that works only with its own AI, which
would trap DOD into paying sky high prices potentially for
subpar products. That is why OMB encouraged agencies to require
AI tools to work with other companies' products.
Mr. Cadenazzi, do you agree that DOD would benefit from
interoperability?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question. I'm not
familiar with the term interoperability as defined in that
particular report. But more broadly, in general, yes, it's a
great thing for the Department to secure.
Senator Warren. Okay, good. I'm going to take that as a
yes. That you think the product should be able to work with
other products, work in connection.
Mr. Cadenazzi. In general, more connectivity and
flexibility to enable a networked approach is a good thing for
software.
Senator Warren. Good. We're at the same place then. Let's
do another one. Data use. The biggest AI contractors can also
stomp out competition by training their models on troves of
government data so that smaller companies don't stand a chance.
This is a disaster for competition and a disaster for data
security.
Data on the location of our servicemembers or on DODs
contracts should not be anywhere near a commercial AI model,
for example. The White House is clear here. It says contractors
should not use government data to train publicly or
commercially available AI algorithms without an agency's
permission.
So, Mr. Cadenazzi, do you agree it's important for both
competition and data security to limit contractors from
training their government tools--from training their commercial
tools on government data?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question. In
general, yes, I'd say we want to make sure we're following the
law with regards to the application of these tools.
Senator Warren. No, that's not my question. This is not a
question of law yet. This is just a question of what we should
be doing in our acquisitions at DOD.
Mr. Cadenazzi. So, Senator, I'm not familiar with the White
House particular guidance on this issue, but as you laid it
out, it seems to make sense and I would be supportive of
discussing that with you, if confirmed.
Senator Warren. Look, government contracts for AI and for
cloud tools should one, prevent lock-in, and two, protect
government data. That's all we're talking about here.
Senator Schmitt and I have a bipartisan bill to make sure
that DOD contracts do exactly that. Next week, we will
reintroduce the Protecting Cloud and AI Competition in Defense
Act to make sure that billions of dollars in DOD contracts go
toward fueling innovation in AI and cloud technology, and not
just helping the biggest companies get even bigger.
So, let me ask you, Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to
working with me and with Senator Schmitt to stop any
competitive practices by big tech that could threaten our
national security?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, artificial intelligence represents
the most promising capabilities for transformational
productivity and impact to the Department. I would be thrilled
if confirmed, to work with you and Senator Schmitt on this
issue.
Senator Warren. That looks good. I look forward to working
with Senator Schmitt and with you and all of the Members of
this Committee. I think we could make some real progress here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Thanks, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. This Senator yields back her time. Now,
Senator Kaine, I haven't asked my questions yet. Do you think I
should?
Senator Kaine. I'm not in a rush, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Wicker. No, go ahead and ask your questions,
Senator.
Senator Kaine. Well, thank you, and congratulations to the
nominees. You're both very qualified. I look forward to
supporting you.
I want to begin, actually just by putting some breaking
news on the record. This morning, the Secretary of Defense,
Pete Hegseth, tweeted as follows, ``This morning, I proudly
ended the Women Peace and Security Program inside the
Department of Defense. WPS is yet another woke divisive social
justice Biden initiative that overburdens our commanders and
troops distracting from our core task, war fighting. WPS is a
United Nations program pushed by feminists and left-wing
activists, politicians fawn over it, troops hate it. DOD will
hereby execute the minimum of WPS required by statute and fight
to end the program for our next budget. Good riddance, WPS.''
I wanted to read this because that tweet contains some
glaring inaccuracies that are far beneath the standard we
should expect from a Department of Defense. First, ``WPS is yet
another woke divisive social justice Biden initiative.'' WPS
was passed by a unanimous vote in the Senate in October 2017,
when the Senate was majority Republican and Donald Trump was
president, and he signed it.
Does our Secretary of Defense not know the difference
between a bill that was passed by the Biden administration, or
one that was passed and signed in the Trump administration?
Second, ``Politicians fawn over it. Troops hate it.'' I
returned to the hearing this Committee had to consider the
confirmation of General Caine, and I read the following
testimony.
``Senator Shaheen: General Caine, congratulations on your
nomination. One of the things that we discussed was the Women
Peace and Security legislation that was signed by President
Trump during his first term. It mandates that women should be
at the table in conflict resolution and peace negotiations. At
DOD, that's men having women involved in security cooperation
programs that really give us, I think, an advantage over our
adversaries like China and Russia. Just for the record, are you
familiar with the WPS program, General Caine?
General Caine. I am Senator, yes.
Senator Shaheen. Do you believe that it's a DEI [diversity,
equity, and inclusion] program?
General Caine. I do not.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Can you provide some examples
of the operational advantage that from your perspective, this
gives us?
General Caine. Well, Senator, I can just give you my own
personal recollections from being deployed. Before this was
precursors of the program, but when we would go out into the
field and after concluding an assault, we would have female
members who would speak with those women and children who were
on the objective, and they would help us to understand the
human terrain in new and novel ways.
So, WPS is, I think, a program that really helps us to
understand the full spectrum of challenges that are in front of
us.''
From the testimony of our confirmed chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. If the Secretary of Defense cannot understand
the difference between a Biden initiative and a Trump
administration, and when the Secretary of Defense claims that
troops hate something that the newly confirmed head of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciates, I have to add this to the
1,000 questions about the judgment of this secretary that I've
already raised.
I'm stunned at the lack of professionalism that this tweet
demonstrates. Look, we aired out pretty carefully at this
hearing, the Secretary's own antipathy to women in service, and
his own track record of poor treatment of women in leadership
positions. The fact that he doesn't like WPS, that's one thing.
But the fact that he claims that it's a Biden initiative when
it isn't, an initiative that was supported unanimously by a
Republican majority Senate, and that troops hate it when the
newly confirmed head of the joint chiefs of staff testifies to
its value, I find shocking.
Now, I'll go to my questions if I could. Admiral Pappano,
you were asked a question earlier about recruiting and hiring
within NNSA, and you pointed out that you weren't fully up to
speed on the current. But I want to go back. The Goverment
Accountability Office (GAO) did a report in May, 2024 that I
imagine you probably are aware of. It discussed challenges that
the NNSA faced in recruiting and retaining staff because of
intense competition with other industries and other agencies.
This is a skill set that's in pretty high demand.
So, should you be confirmed, how would you approach that
challenge, making sure that we keep the good talent we have and
continue to attract new talent in an important place where
there's a lot of competition in the private sector and the
public sector too?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Yes, if confirmed, I will certainly advocate for the men and
women of NNSA and laboratories understanding that there's a
unique skill set critical to national security. Everywhere from
skilled trades up to weapons designers and nuclear physicists.
It is sometimes hard to find those people, and we need to
make sure that we are doing everything we can to go attract,
recruit, train, retain those people as part of national
security. That could start everywhere from looking at programs
in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics K-12
up to colleges, what opportunities we have out there to go get
people interested in that line of work and develop them going
forward.
Senator Kaine. I'm sure you probably have the tools you
need to do that, but should you find that you don't, please let
the Committee know if there are additional tools we can provide
to help you meet that mission.
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with the Committee if I need additional
tools.
Senator Kaine. I yield back, having taken the 38 seconds
that Senator Warren undershot.
Chairman Wicker. The gentleman has nothing to yield back.
Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking
Member Reed holding this hearing, and gentlemen, thank you for
your willingness to serve.
I want to move on to small business defense production
because, Mr. Cadenazzi, Nevada's home to a growing number of
small businesses, manufacturers, technology startups that have
capabilities that could directly support our national security.
These companies are highly innovative, but they face
significant challenges when it comes to breaking into the
defense marketplace, which remains dominated by large incumbent
contractors.
The current acquisition system is too slow, too complex,
and too risk adverse to effectively engage with non-traditional
players. So, Mr. Cadenazzi, if confirmed, how do you plan to
address the systemic barriers in order to create a more open
and competitive environment for small businesses and emerging
technology firms including those like in my State of Nevada,
that have not traditionally played a large role in defense.
More specifically, what are your priorities for
streamlining the acquisition pathways for these companies? How
can the Department of Defense better leverage innovation across
all 50 states as part of a broader industrial base strategy?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, thank you for bringing this topic
up. The small business office within the Industrial Base Policy
Office is a critical element of what the Department counts on
us to bring policies, priorities, and a focus on small
businesses. They represent some of the most dynamic and
innovative parts of the economy, particularly in the places
that are offering the technology. That's the most exciting
going forward. Artificial intelligence, quantum mechanics,
machine learning, and advanced manufacturing.
So, this is a major priority for the Department and for me.
Going forward, I want to understand more about what the
Industrial Base Policy Office's programs are doing, what effect
they're having, things like small business innovative research,
where we work with the R and E component of the Department
project, the apex accelerators which exist across the country,
to go ahead and provide access to small businesses to
understand the Department. If confirmed, I'm eager to learn
more about those capabilities, what the resourcing is, and what
we can do to accelerate the impact over time.
Senator Rosen. I'm glad to set up a meeting with you and
talk about a lot of things happening in Nevada. So, thank you.
But I'm going to move on to nuclear testing, building a lot
on the Nuclear Security Administration. Of course, Admiral
Pappano, I asked a similar line of questioning to Congressman
Williams at his confirmation hearing. Given your potential role
as his deputy, I'm going to ask you the same questions.
So, as I'm sure you do know, the Nevada National Security
Site, NNSS, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site--Nevada
still call it the test site--was the primary location for U.S.
nuclear testing from 1951 to 1992 with 100 atmospheric tests
and 828 underground tests. I lived there during those times of
the underground tests. Trust me, that ground would shake like
nobody's business once a month.
This era, unfortunately, left lasting radioactive
contamination across millions of acres, exposed countless
people to dangerous radiation. It's an outcome that we must not
repeat. Since the 1992 testing moratorium was signed by
President George H.W. Bush, the NNSA has used subcritical
experiments to ensure the safety, reliability, and
effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile without the need for
explosive testing.
For decades, its approach has received annual validation
from the heads of National Labs, United States Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), the secretaries of defense and energy,
including throughout the first Trump administration. Despite
this consensus, some have advocated for a return to explosive
nuclear testing. Can you imagine?
Experts warn such a move can encourage countries like
Russia and China to follow suit risking a new dangerous and
unnecessary nuclear arms race. So, Admiral Pappano, I'm just
going to ask you to answer yes or no, same as I did the
Congressman.
If President Trump sought your counsel on restarting
explosive nuclear testing, would you advise the resumption of
explosive nuclear testing?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Based on what you suggested there--
Senator, thank you for the question. But if confirmed, I would
not advocate for nuclear testing based on the amount of data we
have, from explosive testing, our extensive modeling simulation
capability, subcritical testing capabilities, and the annual
verification.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. The second question I'm going to
ask you is, given that the stockpile has been annually
certified as safe and effective without explosive testing, do
you see any technical or strategic justification for resuming
explosive testing?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. Again, based on
the amount of explosive test data that we have, the model
simulation capability, subcritical testing capabilities at the
Nevada test site among other places, and the annual
verification, I do not see a need to return to explosive
testing. I would not advocate for that, if confirmed.
Senator Rosen. Normally, I would ask a longer answer, but I
just want to ask you if you will commit to prioritizing ongoing
scientific advancements in stockpile stewardship?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I look forward to
enhancing anything we can do technology-wise in advancing
stockpile stewardship, science-based.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Senator Rosen, I understand that the
massive casino hotels back in the day would alert their
customers and patrons as to when a nuclear explosion was going
to be had so that they could watch. Isn't that correct?
Senator Rosen. Yes, it is that. In fact, there's still some
bars and lounges called the Atomic Lounge and other things that
are still there. You're absolutely right. I would love to lead
a congressional delegation to Las Vegas and come see not only
the test cycle, one mile underground, where they do the
subcritical testing, it's amazing, but also to the Atomic
Testing Museum, which gives you all the history of what they
did.
It's quite informative and the test site going down
underground in that tunnel where they do those tests, it's
pretty amazing.
Chairman Wicker. Might be educational, Senator Reed. But
the publicity surrounding a congressional delegation trip to
Las Vegas would be a negative.
Senator Rosen. We'll go straight. We can land at Nellis Air
Force base, the crown jewel of the Air Force, thank you very
much, and we can head right over there, see the remote sensing
lab and the Nevada test site. We'll put the curtains down, you
don't even have to see the Las Vegas strip.
Chairman Wicker. Well, don't go overboard.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Senator Kelly, you are recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have to point
out though, that the museum you mentioned, which I have been
to----
Senator Rosen. It's amazing.
Senator Kelly.--it's in Las Vegas.
Senator Rosen. It is. It is. It's at the university,
though.
Senator Kelly. Yes.
Senator Rosen. It's at the university.
Senator Kelly. It's a great museum. I highly recommend it.
Senator Rosen. Research institute.
Senator Kelly. Vice Admiral Pappano and Mr. Cadenazzi--am I
pronouncing that correctly?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Cadenazzi, close.
Senator Kelly. Cadenazzi, thank you. Thank you both for
being here. Mr. Cadenazzi, I'd like to understand your plan to
enhance our critical mineral stockpiles. So, the United States,
we import nearly 100 percent of our cobalt sulfate and cobalt
metal requirements despite cobalt playing a critical role in a
lot of defense technologies. Meanwhile, China produces more
than 70 percent of the world's refined cobalt.
It's imperative that we decouple and substantially bolster
our domestic critical mineral supply chain. So, given the
national security importance of these rare minerals, such as
cobalt, how do you plan on supporting American cobalt and other
critical mineral processing companies?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I appreciate the question and the
significance of this issue. I've spent more time looking at the
periodic table of elements now since I have, like in my
chemistry class in high school.
China's clearly weaponized the periodic table of elements.
They've made efforts to go ahead and secure access to materials
that we require within the defense industrial base. The
Industrial Base Policy Office has made investments totaling
$540 million into various mineral capabilities, processing
source materials over the past several years.
If confirmed, I'm eager to understand more about the
particular issues associated with cobalt, but also the broader
needs for access to strategic and critical minerals, and ensure
that we're taking the necessary action to ensure American
requirements are met domestically or through allies and
partners over time.
If confirmed, I'm eager to work with you on that subject,
Senator.
Senator Kelly. Now, do you think we should have our own--
build our own stockpile of critical minerals?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, yes, absolutely. We do have a
strategic and critical materials stockpile in place now. I'm
not aware of the scale of that relative to the demand of the
industrial base. However again, if confirmed, I'm here to work
further on this and understand the scale of required investment
of both government and private capital necessary to secure
access to those materials.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and, Admiral, in your advanced
policy questionnaire, when asked what your main priority will
be as the principal deputy administrator, you responded that
you would work to maximize the efficiency, effectiveness,
capability, and capacity of NNSA. I want to followup on this
because while I agree on the priority, I'm concerned that
recent freezes on civilian hirings and the firing of
probationary employees across the Federal Government will
hamper your ability to accomplish your priorities, and
ultimately, the agency's mission.
Part of that mission is to stockpile nuclear weapons and
reduce the overall global nuclear threat. To accomplish this
mission, the agency employs nuclear physicists, and other
highly technical professionals. These professionals cannot be
mass produced and are incredibly difficult to coax into Federal
service.
So, how do you assess the recent firings and termination
letters for NNSA employees and how that will affect your
ability to accomplish the agency's mission?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you for the question, Senator.
I agree that that is a critical workforce. Right now, I am not
fully apprised about the details of what is happening at NNSA.
I only read about what I see in the news. But if confirmed, it
will be a priority of mine to make sure that I assess the
workforce needs, the resourcing of the number of people, and
whatever facilities, training, capability they have, whatever
we need to do to attract, recruit, train, and retain that
critical workforce will be a priority of mine.
Senator Kelly. Do you see that one of your first
responsibilities, if confirmed, is to make sure you have the
workforce you need?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. Yes, certainly.
Having the critical workforce, if confirmed, is something I
will assess and make sure I advocate for the men and women of
NNSA and the National Laboratories to make sure they are
resourced properly to accomplish this no fail mission
Senator Kelly. Admiral, DOD is at an unfortunate
intersection here, where all legs of our nuclear triad are
needing modernization at the same time, and this modernization
requirement has a direct impact on the NNSA. Additionally,
civil service integration is critical for the agency's mission.
The NNSA's partnership with the scientific and academic
community is paramount for maintaining our comparative
advantage.
How are you planning on managing the modernization projects
with infrastructure recapitalization efforts that span civil
and Federal infrastructure? You have 3 seconds.
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Senator. I will
certainly--another priority of mine will be to assess the
enterprise blueprint going forward and making sure we look for
where the barriers are, the driving, getting the enterprise
recapitalized, all the infrastructure recapitalized, look for
opportunities for where we can insert modern manufacturing
technology to drive a sense of urgency in our stockpile
stewardship programs.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Let me ask a
question basically a yes or no question to each of you.
Congress is in the process of attempting to pass a
reconciliation bill much of which will deal with the Defense
Department. Because of the rules that we are required to
operate under, the Defense Reconciliation Bill must be
unspecific as to how the money is spent and will technically be
at the discretion of the Department of Defense, and we are
required in the rules to write recommendations for how the
money is spent.
Do you commit to follow unequivocally, the Congress's
spending recommendations in the Defense Reconciliation Bill?
Mr. Cadenazzi?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Admiral Pappano?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes, sir. I look forward to working
with this committee on prioritizing.
Chairman Wicker. Very good. Now I think we've talked about,
Mr. Cadenazzi, we've talked about middle tier acquisition. This
is something that my legislation, the FoRGED Act would very
much address. I believe you told me that you had read the Act
and liked much of it. If you want to expand on that answer?
Mr. Cadenazzi. More praise for the Act? Absolutely,
Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Yes, right. Yes, heap that on.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Keep going. Yes, sir. Please go on.
Chairman Wicker. Okay. I do believe, I think, once you're
confirmed, you're going to have some middle tier authorization
already. But I can say that Senator Reed and I are very much
likely to put much of the FoRGED Act in the NDAA--in the
upcoming NDAA. I hope you won't wait for that. If you have
tools such as other transaction agreements and middle tier
acquisition, will you commit to going ahead with that?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, thank you for the point.
Absolutely. I'm excited to use all the available authorities
more aggressively to make sure we're meeting the needs of the
industrial bases, and the delivering what the Department needs
at this critical time. If confirmed, I'm eager to work with you
and Ranking Member Reed on this issue going forward.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Now I think you are
going to have a staffing shortage. If you are able to do the
things that we've talked about today, you're going to need
people that look at production rates and limiting factors in
the supplier base. Isn't that right?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. You're going to need to have people that
actually visit the production lines to assess whether companies
are doing things the right way, spending money the right way,
and that sort of thing. Is that correct?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. You're going to need people who develop
options when we ask questions like, how do we build more
munitions? Which I think we've had testimony today that often
we spin down on munitions more quickly than we intend to.
You're going to need people to do that, are you not?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Chairman Wicker.
Chairman Wicker. But unfortunately, the size of the office
remains only a handful of people. As my understanding, only
five government people work on the Defense Production Act. Do
you know that number to be correct? Am I'm well informed there?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Chairman Wicker, I'm not aware of exactly
how many people are working in any element of the components of
the Industrial Base Policy Office at this time.
Chairman Wicker. If that is true, and I think it is. That
represents a crisis, which is why we have already required a
staffing plan for these functions in last year's fiscal year,
NDAA, the statute under which we're operating today.
So, will you bring us this plan as soon as possible, Mr.
Cadenazzi?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Chairman Wicker.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Now Vice Admiral
Pappano, what you are going to be tasked with, you and others,
is going to require a huge infrastructure investment. Am I
correct there?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Would you advise the committee as to how
you're going to do that and exactly what you're going to need?
Am I correct, you're going to need more workforce by a great
deal to get this done?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If
confirmed, certainly it'll be a priority of mine to look across
the enterprise blueprint plan. Make sure we don't have to
reinvent the wheel there. But assess how that plan goes forward
and our infrastructure investments over the next 25 to 50
years, and then figure out where the barriers are to getting
that done with urgency. Whether it's policy, procedure,
whatever we need to go look at to make sure we can break down
those barriers and drive more urgency into our infrastructure
recapitalization. Then obviously, the workforce that goes along
with that, that we need to demand that infrastructure for our
stockpile stewardship and the production.
Chairman Wicker. Senator Reed and I have been told that
this is going to be one of the largest infrastructure
requirements that the Federal Government has ever had. Are we
well advised on that?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not
know that as a fact, but it seems a reasonable assumption to
make that is a significantly large infrastructure. We talk
about recapitalizing, you know, the Manhattan Project Era
facilities and driving those into the future.
Chairman Wicker. I think the public needs to be aware of
this. This is most important, and again, Senator King and
Senator Fischer have taken the lead on this.
Let's talk about cooperation with our allies on industrial
base policy. There's been talk in recent years about this.
AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, United States] Pillar 2
production diplomacy in Europe, the partnership for the Indo-
Pacific Industrial resilience. But most people think there's
been very little success in that regard. Do you have an opinion
as to whether we're way behind in that area, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly,
I'm aligned with President Trump's Peace Through Strength,
which a part of that I think is our willingness to work with
willing partners and allies to increase our overall strength. I
think that in my experience, we've done pretty well with that
so far. Some of the strategic nuclear deterrents cooperation
we've had with the United Kingdom. There's a lot of history
there in that. Then obviously starting to move forward with the
AUKUS Accords. The work is going on with the Pillar One and
Pillar 2 of AUKUS.
Chairman Wicker. Well, there may have been some infighting
within the Department about this particular task. So last year
we made it clear in the NDAA that the acquisition
undersecretary owns these issues like the ones I have
mentioned. If confirmed, you'll oversee the low-level Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense designated to be the lead on
this issue. Right now, that position has maybe a dozen members,
inadequate number, many of whom are not from industry.
Will you commit to us and to this Committee, that you will
work on the issue of stagnation and industrial base integration
with our allies, such as the areas that I've mentioned?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly,
if confirmed, I'll commit to you that I will work with this
Committee and partners and allies as necessary to drive this
forward.
Chairman Wicker. Mr. Reed, I believe we've covered a lot of
things. I think the questions have been very good, and it
appears to me that we've got the right folks in place for these
positions. Does anyone else have anything? If not, let's see if
I need to make any announcements. Are we good to go?
Questions for the record will be due to the Committee
within two business days of the conclusion of the hearing,
which is right now. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi,
Jr. by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy?
Answer. My understanding is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy (ASD(IBP)) is the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment's principal advisor on maintaining a
healthy and resilient defense industrial base (DIB). This includes
supply chain vulnerability analysis, oversight of the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and the mergers &
acquisitions (M&A) process, assessing risks associated with adversarial
capital, developing policies for modern economic competition, promoting
small business participation, and strengthening partnerships with
industry and international allies and performing assessments,
developing strategies and policies to ensure the DIB can meet DOD
requirements.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform these duties? What background or experience, if
any, do you have in industrial base issues, including supply chain
management?
Answer. I have spent the past 20 years working in and on the DIB.
The majority of my time was spent either as the owner of a defense
industry small business or as a management consultant working directly
with the defense industry on their many strategic, manufacturing and
supply chain challenges. I have worked for domestic and international
firms across nearly every conceivable product and service category.
Through this I have developed a deep understanding of the defense
industry, its challenges and, critically, the many opportunities for
improvement.
In addition, I served 10 years on active duty in the United States
Navy. My service provided me with an understanding of the warfighter's
mission and needs. My Active Duty experience informs and reinforces the
urgency which I apply to my work for the defense customer.
This industry, its companies and their work have been and remain my
professional passion.
Question. If you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you
expect that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment will assign to you?
Answer. I anticipate duties prescribed by statute (10 U.S.C. Sec.
138(b)(6)) and DOD policy, including oversight of industrial base
resilience, industry engagement, international armaments cooperation,
foreign investment reviews, domestic supplier competition reviews,
small business programs, incentives and loan guarantees, and priorities
and allocations, including the Defense Production Act (DPA) program. I
will work closely with the Under Secretary and across the Department to
ensure a robust and secure DIB.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy
(ASD(IBP)) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) for all industrial base
policies and related matters. If confirmed, in supporting the USD(A&S),
you will be responsible for establishing policy and conducting
oversight of the defense industrial base which supports the acquisition
and sustainment of our military forces.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
ensuring and implementing supply chain management and security?
Answer. I have deep, global experience in the analysis, management
and improvement of defense industry supply chains. My experience
includes mapping supply chains, analysis of product/program supply
chain challenges, and developing solutions to supply chain gaps &
bottlenecks.
As a small business owner and entrepreneur, I developed a software
solution that included automated supply chain mapping and analysis,
bringing my knowledge of this subject to others. I was also recruited
for my deep expertise to serve as the key product developer for a
defense industry supply chain risk analysis software tool.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
conducting global investment reviews and forecasts that help inform
acquisitions and investments?
Answer. As a small business owner and entrepreneur, the software
solution I developed provided analytic tools and generated forecasts of
US defense spending. I am a legitimate global expert in the analysis of
defense budgets, investments, acquisitions and the drivers which
underpin defense industry change at every level.
In my professional consulting life, I have delivered literally
hundreds of analyses on defense budgets, markets and forecasts of
future spend. This has included work for both domestic and
international clients across a broad array of defense product & service
categories.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
overseeing commercial mergers and acquisitions or conducting antitrust
reviews?
Answer. In my 20 years as a defense industry consultant, I have
participated in over 50 different M&A related initiatives. My
experience has spanned every aspect of M&A from strategy development to
due diligence all the way to post-merger integration. These initiatives
have also included the impact of anti-trust considerations. In
addition, I have twice negotiated and completed the sale of my own
company. These small, but meaningful (to me!), transactions provided
invaluable experience in the realities of these efforts for buyers,
sellers and customers.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
developing policy and processes for programs to acquire products and/or
services, as well as policies and processes for oversight of such
programs?
Answer. In my 20 years as a defense industry small business owner
and consultant, I have experience at every level of defense acquisition
across a diverse mix of products and services. I have worked on
everything from requirements to contract execution. I have worked at
each stage of the program lifecycle from concept ideation to program
launch through to sustainment.
Question. What qualifications do you have using modern data
approaches, tools, and methods that prepare you to maintain visibility
of, analyze, and manage data on the volume, variety, and complexity of
the inventory of acquisition and industrial base initiatives and
programs in the Department?
Answer. As a small business owner, I created a (at the time)
cutting edge Software-as-a-Service product focused on the analysis and
visualization of the U.S. defense budget and associated contract and
acquisition information. This product embedded my defense industry
expertise in a fast, multi-purpose, time-saving solution that was in
use by many defense industry firms. I successfully sold this business
to a major global consulting company.
I have also worked on the direct application of data approaches,
tools, and methods in use by my employers. I have consulted numerous
firms on their use of data tools to cut costs, increase productivity
and improve quality. I also have deep experience with the most common
data tools in use by analysts and experts across the defense industry.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
managing programs which encourage small business and/or nontraditional
business participation in government contracting?
Answer. Upon leaving Active Duty Naval service in 2005, I
participated in the launch of a veteran owned small business focused on
defense technology development. I subsequently joined a small defense
industry focused consulting business. After gaining experience in these
businesses, I personally founded & launched two defense industry small
businesses. I successfully sold both businesses. In addition to my
direct work as a small business owner and employee, I have consulted
numerous prime and mid-tier defense firms on their use of small
business as a capacity, technology and capability enabler.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
overseeing, pursuing or managing programs that support international
armaments or security cooperation?
Answer. In my 20 years as a defense industry business operator,
employee and consultant, I have led countless international defense
initiatives. My industry outreach initiatives have spanned:
More than one dozen countries
Service to large, middle-tier and startup firms
Multiple defense sectors and product/service areas
These outreach initiatives have touched on every aspect of the
defense market, including:
Export of U.S. defense systems & technology to
international allies & partners,
Import of international defense systems & technology to
the United States
Business case analysis and launch planning for U.S.
businesses seeking to operate in foreign countries
Business case analysis and launch planning for non-U.S.
businesses seeking to operate in the United States
In parallel with these efforts, I have delivered public and private
presentations to international defense businesses and organizations/
industry associations.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in
overseeing, or managing programs that support industry engagement?
Answer. In my 20 years as a defense industry business operator,
employee and consultant, I have led outreach and discussions with
countless defense businesses. This includes the hard work of cold
calling new contacts and the sustained effort to build and maintain
enduring relationships over time.
My industry outreach initiatives have spanned the full range of
defense firms:
Every U.S. prime
Most U.S.-based subsidiaries of non-U.S. defense firms
Large numbers of Tier 1 & middle tier firms
Small businesses
These outreach initiatives have touched on every aspect of the
defense market, including:
Aircraft platforms & related systems/weapons
Naval platforms & related systems/weapons
Ground platforms (armor & tactical wheeled vehicles) &
related systems/weapons
Space & intelligence
Sustainment & logistics
Services
These conversations have spanned the full mix of defense industry
leadership priorities:
Defense industry trends
Strategy and growth
Mergers & acquisitions
Operations & manufacturing
Supply chain
Technology
Workforce & organizational change
I am fully conversant across a broad range of diverse topics
immediately relevant to leaders, managers and employees of most defense
firms. These initiatives have led to myriad projects for defense firms,
directly impacting their strategy, operations, organization and
success. In addition, in support of these efforts, I have delivered a
large number of public and private presentations to defense industry
firms and organizations/industry associations.
conflicts of interest
Question. Federal ethics laws, to include 18 U.S.C. Sec. 208,
prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they,
or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain
relationships, have a financial interest.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any
potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties,
family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as
influencing your decisionmaking?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that
if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from
participating in any decisions regarding that specific matter?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to
decide matters on the merits, and exclusively in the public interest,
without regard to private gain or personal benefit?
Answer. Yes.
priorities and challenges
Question. If confirmed, what are the top priorities you would plan
to focus on during your tenure as the ASD(IBP)? What would be your
plans for achieving these priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, my top priority will be strengthening the DIB
and its supply chains. This includes assessing and mitigating
vulnerabilities (especially for critical materials), protecting against
adversarial capital, supporting small businesses, and fostering
innovation. I will work to prioritize investments to meet warfighter
needs and future challenges addressing supply chain bottlenecks.
Leveraging congressional authorities, I will work with Congress,
industry, and interagency partners to scale production and surge
capacity. I also plan to use the DPA to ensure the DIB is working to
support the warfighter.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges facing
the defense industrial base?
Answer. Decades of de-industrialization, fragile supply chains, and
inconsistent investment have created vulnerabilities in the DIB,
including reliance on foreign sources for critical components.
Unpredictable budgets hinder long-term planning, stifle innovation, and
discourage private sector engagement.
Question. What would be your plans for addressing these challenges,
if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, the Department,
and industry to strengthen the DIB by focusing on resilient supply
chains, expanding small business participation, incentivizing private
capital investments, and providing stable demand signals. I will also
prioritize protecting the DIB from adversarial capital and cyber
threats, and deepening partnerships with allies to reduce supply chain
vulnerabilities, ensuring our warfighters have the capabilities they
need.
Question. By what metrics will you measure your progress toward
achieving these priorities and addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will measure progress as a stronger, more
resilient DIB and enhanced warfighter readiness. Metrics will include:
shorter lead times and diversified sourcing; domestic manufacturing
growth and cost-effectiveness; increased small business participation;
expanded private capital investments in the DIB that are aligned with
Department priorities; successful technology transition; and joint
investments with allies. I also plan to rely on proven DOD standardized
metrics, such as Milestone Completion Rates, Joint Initiative Success
Rates, Demand Forecast Accuracy data, and Supplier Performance Rating
data could prove to be assets in shoring up improvements in supply
chain resilience, DIB cyber security posture, and foreign alliance
performance. Ultimately, success means reducing readiness shortfalls
and meeting national security needs.
office of the asd(ibp)
Question. If confirmed, you will serve as the second Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy. Throughout the last
several years, the Industrial Base Policy office has continually
amassed important responsibilities while not seeing commensurate staff
or resource increases to reflect the significant increase in
requirements.
How would you ensure the office of the ASD(IBP) is adequately
resourced (in terms of personnel, budget, and authority) and provided
with the high-level support necessary to perform its duties and
responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Congress and Department
leadership to ensure ASD(IBP) has the authorities, expertise, and
resources--including stable funding--needed to strengthen the DIB. This
includes advocating for effective use of tools like the DPA to address
supply chain vulnerabilities. Adequate personnel, budget, and high-
level support for ASD(IBP) are critical to industrial resilience and
national security.
Question. Are there any organizational or legislative changes to
the office of the ASD(IBP) you believe would be beneficial to carrying
out the duties of the ASD(IBP)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the ASD(IBP) office's
structure and authorities. While aware of DPA reauthorization
discussions, I will withhold specific recommendations until I have a
deeper understanding of the Department's challenges and opportunities.
This will inform my recommendations to Congress and the Secretary on
any necessary legislative or organizational changes.
Question. How would you work with other offices outside of the
office of the ASD(IBP) that have key roles in the defense industrial
base, such as the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
& Engineering, the service ManTech programs, the manufacturing
innovation institutes, service small business offices, and
counterintelligence field offices?
Answer. Effective collaboration across the Department and other
agencies is essential. I understand that activities like the ManTech
programs, manufacturing innovation institutes, small business offices,
and counterintelligence field offices all play crucial roles. If
confirmed, I will prioritize establishing regular communication and
coordination mechanisms with these stakeholders to ensure aligned
efforts and maximize our collective impact on strengthening the DIB.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025, section 904, increased the number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries
of Defense by two, and the conferees recommended that these two
positions be used to further strengthen the capabilities of the office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy
(ASD(IBP)). If confirmed, would you advocate for IBP to receive these
positions? If so, how would you utilize them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate for IBP to receive the
additional Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense positions and work
with the Secretary to prioritize their allocation. I envision focusing
these roles on critical areas like supply chain resilience and emerging
technologies but would make final decisions after a thorough internal
assessment.
health of the defense industrial base (dib)
Question. Over the past several years, there have been increasing
concerns in Congress, industry, and the Department over the health of
the DIB and its ability to reliably meet current and future defense
needs.
What steps will you take to ensure the DIB has the appropriate
scientific, technical, and manufacturing workforces to support current
and future needs of DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to establish a predictable and
stable demand signal to assist in enabling a DIB workforce capable of
meeting current and emerging DOD needs. This requires a balanced
approach, fostering both traditional trade skills and cutting-edge
expertise in science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing.
I will commit to leveraging all appropriate authorities to
prioritize workforce training and ensure access to the technical
expertise necessary to produce, sustain, and modernize our weapon
systems, thereby maintaining DOD's competitive advantage.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the DIB has the
appropriate manufacturing and production infrastructure to support
current and future needs of the DOD? If confirmed, how will you measure
``appropriate manufacturing and production infrastructure''? What
metrics will you utilize?
Answer. If confirmed, ensuring a robust manufacturing and
production infrastructure for current and future DOD needs will be a
priority. This will require a comprehensive assessment with OSD
partners, the Military Departments, and industry to identify capability
gaps and prioritize investments, as well as prioritize and allocate
resources to ensure on time delivery, as needed. The robustness of
infrastructure will be measured by assessing capacity against projected
demand (including surge), tracking lead times, evaluating cost-
effectiveness and supply chain resilience, and considering factors like
advanced manufacturing integration, skilled labor availability, and
cybersecurity posture.
Question. What steps should the Department take--on its own or as
part of a ``whole of government'' approach--to increase domestic
industrial capacity and reduce reliance on suppliers in China or other
adversaries?
Answer. Reducing reliance on China and other adversaries for
critical defense components requires a decisive, interagency approach
to strengthen domestic industrial capacity and secure supply chains. If
confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to onshore and nearshore key
manufacturing capabilities, leveraging the Department's existing
authorities--such as the DPA and Industrial Base Analysis and
Sustainment (IBAS) program--to incentivize private sector investment in
critical industries.
If confirmed, I will advocate for policies that drive long-term
investment in domestic and allied production, protect critical
industries from adversarial capital and cyber threats, and ensure that
DOD procurement prioritizes secure, U.S.-based supply chains.
Strengthening America's industrial resilience will be key to sustaining
our technological advantage and ensuring national security in an era of
strategic competition.
Question. Supply chain tracking and risk mitigation is imperative
for determining the overall health of the defense industrial base. The
office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment currently has two ongoing internal efforts related to
supply chain mapping and transparency. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Sustainment has worked on a supply chain
mapping tool called Supply Chain Risk Evaluation Environment (SCREEn).
The Office of Industrial Base Policy has also worked to produce a
Defense Industrial Base Map (DIBMAP) tool that tracks weapons systems,
suppliers, and availability in one single place to address supply chain
risk.
If confirmed, will you commit to reviewing both tools and
determining whether continuing with development of both tools provides
value or whether consolidation and broad use of a single tool would
provide the Department more value?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing both SCREEn and DIBMAP
to assess the value of each program and evaluate whether consolidation
is necessary.
Question. If confirmed, how do you envision using these tools to
improve visibility into the defense industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I envision these supply chain tools, whether
consolidated into a single platform or maintained separately, as
critical for enhancing visibility into the DIB. They will provide real-
time insights into potential vulnerabilities, such as single points of
failure, dependencies on adversarial nations, and emerging bottlenecks.
This enhanced visibility will inform data-driven decisionmaking
regarding resource allocation, acquisition strategies, and industrial
base policy development.
These tools exist to facilitate improved communication and
collaboration between government, industry, and international partners,
enabling proactive risk mitigation and a more coordinated response to
potential disruptions. By leveraging tools like SCREEn and DIBMAP, we
can create a more resilient, secure, and transparent DIB capable of
meeting current and future national security needs.
Question. If confirmed, one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries
that will report to you is focused on industrial base resiliency. What
is your understanding of how resilience within the defense industrial
base is currently measured and assessed?
Answer. I understand that assessing DIB resilience involves a
multi-faceted approach, encompassing domestic capabilities, reducing
reliance on adversarial nations, and securing critical material supply
chains. If confirmed, I look forward to gaining a deeper understanding
of current assessment methodologies and exploring opportunities for
improvement.
Question. Are there other metrics or data frameworks that you think
should be developed to improve measurement and assessment capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed as ASD(IBP), I will prioritize developing
metrics that capture not just current capabilities, but also surge
capacity, innovation, cybersecurity resilience, and allied
interoperability. This includes assessing the ability to rapidly
increase production, the speed of technology adoption, vulnerability to
cyberattacks, and the capacity for seamless collaboration with allies.
I will aim to review existing frameworks and incorporate lessons
learned from new and robust Presidential Directives, such as President
Trump's 2025 Executive Order on critical minerals and derivative
products, which highlighted the national security risks of foreign
dependence and emphasized the importance of bolstering domestic
production. By developing these additional metrics and incorporating
the focus on domestic strength and security exemplified by previous
Administrations, we can gain a more comprehensive understanding of DIB
resilience and inform more effective policies to ensure its long-term
strength and adaptability.
Question. Section 4819 of title 10, United States Code, established
a framework for modernizing and digitizing the approach for mitigating
risks to the defense industrial base.
What is your understanding of the status of implementing that
framework?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to obtaining a deeper
understanding the implementation of Sec. 4819. This will involve
conducting a thorough assessment of current progress, identifying any
roadblocks or challenges, and developing a clear roadmap for completing
the implementation process. I will also ensure effective coordination
and collaboration across the Department and with interagency partners
to leverage existing resources and expertise. Furthermore, I will work
closely with Congress to provide regular updates on implementation
progress and address any legislative adjustments that may be necessary
to ensure the successful execution of this critical initiative. My goal
is to fully leverage the framework established by Section 4819 to
create a more secure, resilient, and adaptable DIB.
Question. What other steps would you take to assess the health of
the current and future defense industrial base?
Answer. Beyond existing assessments, if confirmed, I would focus on
direct industry engagement across all tiers, develop robust data
analytics for key indicators, conduct wargaming exercises, and
collaborate with allies to assess collective capabilities.
domestic and allied sourcing
Question. The first Trump Administration and the Biden
Administration made domestic sourcing a key part of the policy agenda.
If confirmed, you would oversee the continued push to increase DOD's
procurement of American-made goods, products, and materials.
Do you see any associated challenges or opportunities? Please
elaborate.
Answer. While prioritizing domestic sourcing offers significant
opportunities to strengthen the U.S. industrial base and enhance supply
chain security, it also presents challenges. Rebuilding domestic
manufacturing capacity in key sectors requires strategic investment,
workforce development, and a stable demand signal from the DOD.
Overreliance on domestic sources without considering allied
capabilities could also limit access to innovation and potentially
increase costs.
If confirmed, I will focus on maximizing the opportunities of
domestic sourcing while mitigating potential challenges. This includes
targeted investments in critical sectors, leveraging DPA Title III and
IBAS authorities to incentivize domestic production, and ensuring
predictable budgeting and acquisition strategies to provide industry
with the confidence to invest. Simultaneously, I will prioritize
strengthening partnerships with allies and ``friend-shoring'' to
diversify supply chains, access cutting-edge technologies, and foster a
more robust and globally competitive industrial base. This balanced
approach will ensure we can effectively support our warfighters while
bolstering American manufacturing and strengthening national security.
Question. In your opinion, what role should domestic sourcing
requirements play in efforts to manage the DIB, support domestic
companies, increase capacity, and ensure trusted and reliable supplies
of goods and services?
Answer. Reviving the American DIB must be a top priority. If
confirmed, I will ensure that every industrial base investment
decision--whether through the DPA, IBAS, or other tools--is informed by
an assessment of where it strengthens U.S. production capacity,
workforce readiness, and supply chain security.
Question. In your opinion, what role should the Department play in
reviewing and recommending domestic sourcing requirements prior to such
requirements going into effect?
Answer. If confirmed, we should actively coordinate with other
stakeholders within DOD, such as the Military Departments, innovation
organizations, and acquisition executives, to ensure alignment with
broader defense priorities and operational needs. This collaborative
approach will ensure that domestic sourcing requirements are
strategically implemented to strengthen the DIB and support warfighter
readiness, while also considering potential second-and third-order
effects on the broader industrial ecosystem.
Question. In your view, what would be the benefits of greater
Departmental input and involvement prior to domestic sourcing decisions
being made?
Answer. Greater DOD input prior to domestic sourcing decisions is
essential for ensuring these decisions align with national security
priorities and the specific needs of the DIB. Early involvement allows
DOD to provide critical insights into the potential impacts of sourcing
decisions on industrial capacity, supply chain resilience, cost, and
technological innovation. This proactive engagement can help avoid
unintended consequences, such as creating bottlenecks or over-reliance
on single sources.
If confirmed, I would prioritize ensuring DOD's voice is heard
early and often in these deliberations, advocating for a more strategic
and holistic approach to sourcing that strengthens, rather than
weakens, our defense capabilities. Furthermore, early input allows for
better coordination with allied nations and fosters a more robust and
resilient DIB.
Question. In your view, what steps should the Department take to
ensure and/or incentivize that companies are able to find needed
financing and resources from trusted sources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize facilitating access to
trusted financing and resources for DIB modernization, particularly for
small and medium-sized enterprises and non-traditional suppliers. This
includes developing and disseminating clear guidance on available
funding sources, streamlining application processes, and potentially
exploring innovative financing mechanisms like public-private
partnerships. Leveraging my interagency experience, I will work to
identify and address any gaps in existing authorities to ensure
companies have efficient access to secure and reliable funding.
Question. What actions should the Department take to address the
threat of ``adversarial capital'' from China and other sources that
seek to gain undue influence over the DIB?
Answer. Combating adversarial capital requires a proactive, multi-
pronged approach. If confirmed, I will prioritize robust implementation
of the CFIUS, Team Telecom, Information and Communications Technology
and Services, and the 1260H List of Chinese Military Companies,
advocate for increased transparency in foreign investment, and explore
expanded authorities as needed. Simultaneously, I will seek to foster
domestic alternatives through trusted sources of private investment to
protect the DIB from undue foreign influence and safeguard U.S.
technological advantage.
Question. If confirmed, how can the Department better leverage
suppliers in the national technology and industrial base (NTIB) and
among allies and partners?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to enhance the NTIB by reducing
barriers to integrating companies from close allies into the DIB,
streamlining regulations, and improving reciprocal defense trade.
Expanding collaboration with private capital, academia, and defense-
adjacent industries will broaden access to innovation. A whole-of-
government approach, coordinating across agencies and with
international partners, is essential for strengthening collective
defense production, accelerating technology adoption, and ensuring
supply chain resilience. This will modernize our technological base and
enhance deterrence.
mergers and acquisitions
Question. The February 2022 State of Competition within the Defense
Industrial Base report highlights the consolidation of the defense
industrial base into fewer large prime contractors as a significant
risk to competition within the DIB.
In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Department with
respect to proposed and ongoing private sector merger and acquisition
activities of DOD contractors?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD plays a critical role in
assessing the impact of M&A activities on the DIB and ensuring that
consolidation does not undermine competition or innovation. While
private sector investment and market efficiencies are important,
excessive consolidation can reduce competition, drive up costs, and
stifle technological advancements--ultimately weakening the defense
ecosystem.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the DOD rigorously
evaluates the implications of M&A activities on the industrial and
technological base, leveraging its unique perspective to assess
potential risks to supply chain resilience, innovation, and operational
readiness. The Department must also maintain active awareness of how
ongoing M&A activities influence cost, schedule, and performance across
defense acquisition programs. When appropriate, the DOD should voice
concerns and work with regulatory agencies to address acquisitions that
give rise to concerns.
I will advocate for a proactive approach that strengthens oversight
mechanisms, enhances interagency coordination, and ensures that
America's DIB remains competitive, secure, and aligned with national
security priorities.
Question. Do you believe DOD's acquisition processes contribute to
industry incentives to consolidate? If so, what changes would you
suggest?
Answer. My understanding is that several factors contribute to
industry consolidation, including DOD acquisition processes. For
example, the complexity and cost of complying with DOD regulations can
create barriers to entry for smaller companies, potentially
incentivizing them to merge with or be acquired by larger firms.
Additionally, large, consolidated companies may be perceived as having
a competitive advantage in securing large defense contracts. However, I
also recognize the importance of maintaining a competitive and robust
industrial base that includes both large and small businesses.
If confirmed, I will carefully review DOD's acquisition processes
to identify and mitigate aspects that inadvertently discourage
competition and innovation. This includes examining regulatory burdens,
contract structures, and promoting greater participation of small and
non-traditional businesses. Fostering a more diverse industrial base is
essential for resilience and technological advancement.
Question. In your opinion, does DOD focus enough on the potential
consolidation of sub-contractors and suppliers in addition to prime
contractors?
Answer. It is my understanding that while the DOD has made strides
in recognizing the importance of supply chain resiliency, more
attention needs to be focused on the potential consolidation of sub-
tier suppliers and subcontractors. A lack of visibility into these
lower tiers poses a significant challenge to fully assessing and
mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities. While I understand the
Department is exploring ways to enhance visibility, I believe we must
accelerate these efforts.
If confirmed, I will conduct a review of current departmental
initiatives aimed at increasing visibility into sub-tier suppliers to
leverage their expertise in this area. This review will focus on
identifying any gaps in data collection and analysis, as well as
exploring opportunities to leverage existing authorities and emerging
technologies to improve supply chain mapping and monitoring. Based on
this review, I will make recommendations to enhance our understanding
of the sub-tier landscape, including the impact of mergers and
acquisitions. This improved visibility is crucial not only for
assessing the potential risks of consolidation, but also for
proactively identifying and supporting critical sub-tier suppliers,
fostering a more robust and resilient DIB.
organic industrial base
Question. In your opinion, what role does the organic industrial
base play in modernization efforts and in the sustainment of
warfighting capabilities?
Answer. The Organic Industrial Base (OIB) is absolutely essential
for both modernizing and sustaining warfighting capabilities. It
provides a unique and irreplaceable foundation for ensuring readiness
throughout the lifecycle of DOD weapon systems. The OIB's core
capabilities--including maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade of
critical systems--are often not commercially viable or readily
available in the private sector. This is especially true for
specialized equipment, legacy systems, and surge capacity requirements.
The OIB also produces critical supply chain materials that do not have
commercial or civilian application. The OIB serves as a vital
repository of technical expertise and skilled personnel, preserving
institutional knowledge and providing a crucial training ground for
future generations of maintainers and engineers.
If confirmed, I will focus on modernizing the OIB through
investments in advanced manufacturing, workforce development, and
improved facilities, recognizing its strategic importance for long-term
readiness and reduced reliance on external sources. I will emphasize
its value as a strategic asset.
Question. What is your assessment of the status of the facilities
and workforce in DOD depots, logistics centers, arsenals, and other
elements of the organic industrial base?
Answer. Our depots, logistics centers, and arsenals serve an
important role as part of the overall DIB in maintaining military
readiness. While I understand investments have been made to improve the
facilities and workforce of the OIB, if confirmed, I will work with the
ASD for Sustainment, who is responsible for the OIB, and the Services
to formally assess the State of our OIB with a focus on ensuring the
Department maintains the proper mix of capabilities to meet future
warfighting needs while staying adaptable for future missions.
Question. What role, if any, should the organic industrial base
play in the sustainment of software in defense systems?
Answer. The sustainment of software in defense systems is a
combination of organic and commercial support. The OIB plays a role
with software maintenance no different than weapon system maintenance
in totality. Software maintenance is a function of DOD core depot
capabilities and workload. Its involvement ensures long-term
operational readiness and security through software maintenance and
updates, cybersecurity, maintaining technical expertise, cost control
and mission continuity. If confirmed, in partnership with the ASD for
Sustainment who is responsible for the OIB, I would ensure that we have
the spectrum of support necessary from the OIB for software
sustainment.
Question. What role should the organic industrial base play in the
sustainment of dual use and commercial technologies used by DOD?
Answer. I understand that the sustainment of fielded commercial
technologies poses significant challenges for warfighter readiness and
can be expensive because the commercial providers operate outside of
our acquisition lifecycle on a proprietary basis which may increase the
risk of vendor lock. Additionally, I understand that the cost for the
sustainment of commercial technologies is not always programmed. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the ASD for Sustainment,
Director of the Defense Innovation Unit, the military Departments, and
other stakeholders to tackle the challenges associated with the
sustainment of commercial technologies to ensure the warfighter has
interoperable tools they need to complete the mission.
Question. What role, if any, does ASD(IBP) have in ensuring that
the facilities and equipment at the military depots are modern,
operable, and effective?
Answer. As I understand it, the primary responsibility for ensuring
that military depots are modern, operable, and effective falls to the
ASD for Sustainment. If confirmed, it is a priority to maintain a close
partnership with Sustainment to understand the optimal balance of
organic and commercial capabilities necessary to maintain readiness.
Question. What changes can be made to upgrade the indigenous
production capability within the OIB to bring it forward from 1940's
technology?
Answer. I understand that our depots continue to evolve in their
organic production capabilities, including the adoption of advanced
manufacturing techniques and digital engineering, cyber-resilient
systems, and innovations. I also understand that these measures
modernize OIB capabilities and emphasize its cutting-edge nature to
ensure its ability to meet the demands of modern defense operations.
If confirmed, I will work closely with ASDthe for Sustainment to
identify and address the depots' most pressing modernization needs.
This includes advocating for necessary investments in advanced
manufacturing technologies, infrastructure improvements, and workforce
development initiatives to enhance their efficiency, responsiveness,
and ability to support evolving warfighter requirements. This
collaborative approach will ensure the OIB remains a strategic asset
for long-term readiness.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to strengthen the
Department's organic industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD for Sustainment and
other stakeholders to help assess the areas of greatest need and, where
necessary, request resources to support the modernization and
optimization of our OIB facilities and workforce, together with other
key elements of our domestic defense industry. If confirmed, I will
work with Sustainment to ensure that we have the right investment
strategy to strengthen both our organic and commercial capabilities and
that we have the best balance of those capabilities for the Department.
defense industrial base cybersecurity
Question. What is your understanding of the challenges of enhancing
cybersecurity of the DIB?
Answer. My understanding is that enhancing the cybersecurity of the
DIB presents a complex challenge, requiring a multi-pronged approach
that addresses both immediate threats and long-term vulnerabilities.
The chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and protecting systems
across the defense supply chain from increasingly sophisticated
cyberattacks is paramount. A key challenge lies in balancing the need
for robust cybersecurity standards with the practical realities faced
by small and medium-sized businesses, many of which lack the resources
to implement comprehensive security measures. We must avoid a one-size-
fits-all approach and instead tailor solutions to the specific needs
and capabilities of different tiers of suppliers.
If confirmed, I will collaborate with DOD Chief Information Officer
(CIO), Congress, and other key stakeholders to conceive, develop, and
implement scalable cybersecurity solutions for the DIB. This will
include exploring options such as shared cybersecurity services, robust
training and technical assistance tools, targeted funding assistance,
and streamlined compliance frameworks that are achievable for
businesses of all sizes. Leveraging existing programs and ensuring
effective implementation while avoiding undue burdens on smaller
companies, will be critical. Furthermore, if confirmed, I will focus on
fostering stronger public-private partnerships to share threat
intelligence, develop best practices, and promote a culture of
cybersecurity awareness across the DIB.
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance the needs of
improving cybersecurity with the burden of compliance on small and
medium sized businesses?
Answer. I believe that balancing the critical need for improved DIB
cybersecurity with the compliance burden on small and medium-sized
businesses will be paramount to the success of the industrial base.
However, we must achieve this without inadvertently creating barriers
to entry or participation in the defense supply chain. If confirmed, my
focus will be on developing and implementing solutions that are
effective and scalable, yet still recognize the resource constraints
faced by smaller companies.
Implementation will involve leveraging existing DOD authorities and
programs, such as the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program and
Project Spectrum, to provide tailored guidance, tools, and financial
and technical assistance specifically designed for smaller businesses.
If confirmed, I will also explore innovative approaches such as
incentivizing cybersecurity investments through preferential
contracting mechanisms and promoting the adoption of industry-standard
security practices that can be readily implemented by businesses of all
sizes.
If confirmed, my goal is to create a cybersecurity ecosystem where
smaller companies are empowered and equipped to contribute to a secure
and resilient DIB without being unduly burdened by compliance
requirements. I believe this approach will foster a more diverse,
innovative, and secure DIB.
Question. In the last few years, the focus of the Acquisition &
Sustainment model has been on one element of the framework: the
Cybersecurity Maturity Model certification (CMMC).
What is your understanding of the current State of CMMC and its
impact on large, medium, and small businesses?
Answer. My understanding is CMMC is vital for strengthening
cybersecurity across the DIB, protecting sensitive information, and
ensuring fair competition. While large businesses may have more
resources, CMMC's complexities affect all sizes of businesses, with
medium and small businesses facing significant cost and compliance
challenges. The program aims to provide clarity and predictability,
especially for the numerous small businesses in the DIB, using self-
assessments and independent assessments. Effective CMMC implementation,
including tailored support for small businesses, is crucial for
strengthening the DIB and national security. I look forward to learning
more if confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, are there any changes you would make or
recommend to the CMMC efforts beyond those already mandated by the
previous program rule?
Answer. If confirmed as ASD(IBP), I will prioritize strengthening
DIB cybersecurity while minimizing burdens on smaller businesses.
Although changes made in CMMC from initial framing to the final rule
are positive steps, further improvements may still be needed. Beyond
existing mandates, I will work with the CIO to explore streamlining
compliance processes through a risk-based approach, expanding access to
cost-effective cybersecurity solutions, increasing funding assistance
for smaller businesses, and fostering greater collaboration across
government, industry, and academia to develop and deploy innovative
cybersecurity technologies. My goal is a robust cybersecurity ecosystem
that strengthens the DIB without stifling smaller suppliers.
microelectronics
Question. Over the last few decades, Taiwan, South Korea, and the
People's Republic of China have implemented large-scale national
industrial policies to build microelectronics manufacturing facilities.
In contrast, the availability of large-scale state-of-the-art
microelectronics manufacturing foundries in the United States has been
steadily declining. DOD has a diverse set of requirements and needs for
the domestic production of measurably secure state-of-the-art, State of
the practice, and legacy integrated circuits in low volumes to meet its
needs.
What is your assessment of the Department's microelectronics needs,
to include both legacy, state-of-the-practice, and state-of-the-art?
Answer. Assured access to both legacy and cutting-edge
microelectronics is critical for maintaining existing and developing
future defense systems. The Department's microelectronics needs are
complex and multifaceted, requiring a strategic approach that addresses
the full spectrum of legacy systems, state-of-the-practice
technologies, and state-of-the-art advancements, all while prioritizing
security and trustworthiness. If confirmed, I will aim for secure and
reliable domestic and allied sources for these components. I am
committed to working across the government to develop a comprehensive
microelectronics strategy. This will include close collaboration with
Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering (USD(R&E)) to
anticipate and meet evolving technological requirements for national
security.
Question. In your view, what role should the Department play in
working with the interagency and industry to increase domestic
production of dual use microelectronics?
Answer. Increasing domestic production of dual-use microelectronics
demands a robust, whole-of-government approach, working in close
partnership with industry. If confirmed, I will prioritize interagency
coordination to ensure a cohesive and comprehensive strategy,
leveraging existing authorities and exploring new avenues to
incentivize domestic microelectronics production.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take to
support increased domestic production of dual use microelectronics?
Answer. If confirmed, increasing domestic production of dual-use
microelectronics will be a priority. I will seek to leverage existing
authorities, such as DPA Title III or IBAS, to incentivize private
sector investment in dual-use manufacturing, ensuring national security
needs are integrated into broader industrial policy. I will work across
the Department through existing microelectronics governance structures
to ensure our warfighters have the access they need to critical
microelectronics. Congress, and the USD(R&E) have an important role to
play to ensure we have an effective strategy for sourcing
microelectronics.
Question. What actions would you take to partner with the USD(R&E)
on this issue?
Answer. Collaboration within the DOD and across the executive
branch is essential for supporting the DIB. If confirmed, I will work
closely with USD(R&E) to ensure we have the workforce and capacity to
address current and future microelectronics requirements, including
innovative production initiatives.
small business
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the
participation of small businesses in the defense industrial base?
Answer. Small businesses are vital to the DIB and drive innovation.
If confirmed, I commit to increasing their participation through
enhanced outreach, especially to new entrants, and successful
leveraging of the Department's small business programs. This includes
ensuring effective market research by the acquisition workforce to
maximize small business participation and improving communication of
upcoming procurement opportunities. If confirmed, I will work across
the Department and the Services to integrate these efforts with other
small business initiatives.
Question. In your view, what are the biggest barriers that prevent
small businesses from becoming prime contractors to the Department?
Answer. One of the biggest barriers, in my view, is the complexity
of the acquisition process itself--particularly for companies that have
not previously done business with the government. Navigating defense
procurement can be overwhelming, especially for small firms that lack
dedicated compliance or contracting teams.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the DOD Office of Small
Business Programs (OSBP) to reduce administrative burdens and help make
the Department a more reliable and attractive customer--fully aligned
with President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's direction to streamline
defense acquisition and unleash the power of the American industrial
base.
Question. In your view, are their adequate authorities and
incentives in place that offer small businesses an opportunity to
transition from small to medium-sized businesses?
Answer. I would assess whether existing authorities and incentives
adequately facilitate their growth into medium-sized businesses. This
includes examining potential gaps and areas for improvement to ensure a
robust and dynamic DIB.
Question. Do you believe the Department is using all available
authorities to provide small businesses the opportunity to subcontract
with existing prime contractors to ensure programs of record have
access to the most advanced and effective technologies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the Department's effectiveness
in using existing authorities to create subcontracting opportunities
for small businesses. I understand programs like the Mentor-Protege
Program, APEX Accelerators, and others aim to connect small firms with
major defense programs. If confirmed, I would work with the OSBP to
ensure these and other tools under its jurisdiction are fully leveraged
to maximize the Department's access to advanced technologies and
support small business participation in programs of record.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
small businesses that provide goods and services to the Department of
Defense are monitored and supported when facing financial pressures
that challenge their viability?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with relevant stakeholders
across the Department, including the OSBP, to enhance monitoring and
support for small businesses facing financial pressures. This could
include improved financial health assessments, early warning
indicators, and streamlined access to resources and assistance
programs. The goal is to proactively identify and mitigate risks to
small business viability within the DIB.
Question. What do you see as the benefits of diversifying the
defense industrial base through more engagement with small and
disadvantaged businesses?
Answer. Diversifying the DIB through greater engagement with small
and disadvantaged businesses enhances innovation, agility, and regional
reach, enabling the Department to better meet demands and surge
requirements. It also strengthens our economic deterrent by
demonstrating the ability to mobilize the full breadth of American
industry in support of national security.
Question. What recommendations would you have to improve the
Department's use of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program to
develop and field new, advanced capabilities?
Answer. The SBIR program is crucial for developing advanced
capabilities, but transitioning technologies into fielded systems
remains a challenge. If confirmed, I would work closely with Office of
the USD(R&E) to improve this process by strengthening collaboration
between SBIR program managers, acquisition professionals, and
warfighters; developing streamlined transition pathways, potentially
through dedicated funding, tailored acquisition strategies, and
leveraging of relevant A&S programs; and implementing metrics to track
success and integrating SBIR/STTR with other small business
initiatives. This will maximize SBIR's impact and deliver cutting-edge
capabilities to the warfighter.
Question. The Office of Small Business Programs has worked over
several years to increase participation in the Department of Defense
Mentor Protege Program to expand the number of small businesses in the
defense industrial base. If confirmed, how will you continue to expand
the participation of small businesses in the DOD Mentor-Protege
Program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the OSBP to explore
opportunities for expanding small business participation and
participation within agencies across the Department in the DOD Mentor-
Protege Program. This includes examining potential program adjustments,
incentives, and outreach efforts to encourage greater participation and
ensure its continued effectiveness in strengthening the DIB.
Question. The DOD Office of Small Business Programs rebranded the
Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTACs), as APEX Accelerators,
and expanded them to provide broader assistance to small businesses
looking to work with the Department. Some of the expanded offerings
include cybersecurity assistance and foreign ownership, control, and
influence guidance. This guidance is imperative for businesses who may
not be familiar with working with the Department. If confirmed, how
will you continue to support the offerings of the APEX Accelerators?
Answer. The APEX Accelerators provide crucial support to businesses
of all sizes seeking to work with DOD. If confirmed, I would seek
opportunities to enhance their offerings, ensuring they remain a
valuable resource for small businesses navigating the DIB.
Question. Small businesses that receive awards from programs such
as SBIR/STTR remain at risk from foreign adversarial capital. Often the
intellectual property and government-sensitive information are targeted
and stolen from these innovative small businesses. If confirmed, how
would you support efforts for small businesses to understand and
mitigate foreign ownership and control risks?
Answer. Protecting small businesses, especially SBIR/STTR
recipients, from adversarial capital is crucial. If confirmed, I would
work with the USD(R&E) and other stakeholders to enhance support for
small businesses in understanding and mitigating foreign ownership and
control risks. This could include improved training, resources, and
proactive threat assessments.
intellectual property/technical data rights
Question. Do you believe that DOD has sufficiently implemented
intellectual property (IP) best practices to ensure that the government
has appropriate access to IP and technical data to give proper return
on investments in Federal research and development (R&D), retain the
ability to re-compete programs to control costs, and exercise better
control over program sustainment costs?
Answer. Rapid technological advancements necessitate a renewed
focus on intellectual property. If confirmed, I would work with
stakeholders to review and enhance DOD's IP best practices, ensuring
they adequately address return on R&D investment, re-competition
opportunities, and sustainment cost control. This will include
examining early integration of IP considerations into planning and
addressing long-term needs. The DOD should implement best practices to
identify IP needs early in the acquisition process to ensure it is an
evaluation factor in competitive awards.
Question. Does the Department need a different approach to access
to technical data when dealing with primarily commercial companies?
Answer. The DOD needs to ensure procurement approaches attract new
entrants, acquire the best available technology, and ensure effective
implementation and sustainment enabled by access to technical data. If
confirmed, I will partner with my colleagues in the Office of the ASD
for Acquisition to review the current approaches to procuring and
accessing technical data for commercial products.
Question. In what circumstances should DOD pursue reverse
engineering or reengineering of parts when access to technical data is
not available?
Answer. Reverse engineering or reengineering should be considered
when access to technical data and accompanying license rights are
unavailable and essential system sustainment is at risk. If confirmed,
I would work closely with USD(A&S) and USD(R&E) to leverage existing
authorities to streamline qualification of alternate suppliers and
remove barriers to reverse engineering. This collaborative approach
will improve readiness and reduce costs while strengthening the
industrial base, aligning with Administration priorities of
revitalizing the DIB and reforming acquisition processes.
defense production act
Question. The Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
saw the expanded use of Defense Production Act (DPA) authorities for
the defense industrial base, and to support national emergencies and
other contingencies.
How would you use DPA authorities to support prioritization of
Federal contracts and expand domestic production of key supply chain
bottlenecks (ex. Microelectronics, batteries), if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to use DPA authorities
strategically to address supply chain bottlenecks like microelectronics
and batteries, as well as other parts, components and rare materials
causing constraints in the DIB. This includes implementing DPA Title I
Defense Priorities and Allocations System authorities delegated from
the Department of Commerce to prioritize and allocate critical
industrial resources necessary or appropriate for the national defense,
expediting production schedules, manufacturing capacity, and delivery
performance, ensuring that programs of the highest national urgency are
receiving appropriate priority performance of contracts and orders by
the DIB. This also includes using the full scope of the DPA, including
leveraging Title III authorities (loans, loan guarantees, purchase
commitments, and purchases) to incentivize domestic production of key
materials and reduce reliance on foreign sources and expand domestic
production. I would also integrate DPA authorities with other tools
like public-private partnerships and R&D investments for a more
holistic approach to strengthening critical supply chains, coordinating
closely with interagency partners.
Question. In your opinion, to what extent and how should DOD best
utilize DPA Title III authorities for loan guarantees, purchase
commitments, and grants and subsidies to expand domestic production in
areas of strategic interest?
Answer. In my opinion, DPA Title III authorities, including loan
guarantees, purchase commitments, and grants/subsidies, represent
valuable tools for expanding domestic production in areas of strategic
interest to the DOD. However, their use should be strategic and
targeted, based on a rigorous assessment of need and potential
effectiveness. A one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate.
If confirmed, I will conduct a comprehensive review of DPA Title
III authorities to ensure their alignment with the needs of the DIB and
the efficient use of taxpayer dollars, as well as coordinate with
legislators to ensure DPA Title III is positioned to make use of loans,
loan guarantees, and purchase commitments to the maximum extent
possible. This review will inform a framework for determining the most
appropriate type of incentive for a given situation. For example,
grants or contracts may be more effective for quickly addressing urgent
needs or stimulating initial investment in emerging technologies, while
loan guarantees may be better suited for sustaining long-term
investments in critical infrastructure. My goal is to utilize these
authorities judiciously, maximizing their impact while minimizing risk
and ensuring a robust and resilient domestic DIB. This will involve
close coordination with other Federal agencies and industry partners to
leverage expertise and avoid duplication of effort.
Question. Are there sectors or items you believe should see
expanded use of DPA Title III authorities to support domestic
production?
Answer. Several sectors, such as critical minerals and
shipbuilding, warrant immediate attention for potential expanded DPA
Title III use due to their criticality and supply chain
vulnerabilities, including microelectronics, critical minerals, and
high-performance materials. If confirmed, I would assess these sectors
to identify areas where DPA Title III authorities could bolster
domestic production and resilience. This assessment will consider
current and future needs, informing recommendations for resource
prioritization and potential additional authorities.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2024 expanded the definition of domestic source to include the United
Kingdom and Australia, if there were no domestic sources available. In
addition to recognizing that the AUKUS partnership is critical to joint
capability development and interoperability, both the United Kingdom
and Australia have been forward leaning on improving supply chain
transparency for critical and strategic materials.
If confirmed, will you commit to leveraging the Defense Production
Act authority not only for necessary domestic sources, but also to
utilize existing alliances and supply chains for the benefit of the
defense industrial base and the warfighter?
Answer. If confirmed, and to the extent the efforts are in line
with Presidential action, I am committed to using the DPA
strategically, both domestically and with allies like the U.K., Canada,
and Australia. I will focus on operationalizing the expanded definition
of ``domestic source'' to address critical supply chain needs. This
includes exploring creative uses of Title III authorities, such as
incentives and innovative financing, to bolster domestic production and
strengthen partnerships for a resilient industrial base.
Question. The National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) is
codified in statute and is composed of the defense industrial bases of
the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. According to statute, the Department of Defense is required to
have a national security strategy for the national technology and
industrial base and is supposed to chair the National Defense
Technology and Industrial Base Council. However, there are very few
outcomes from these requirements.
If confirmed, how will you utilize the National Technology and
Industrial Base as an asset to continue expansion and investment in the
defense industrial base? Are there any statutory adjustments that you
would recommend that would allow NTIB to be more effective?
Answer. If confirmed, I will leverage the NTIB to expand and
strengthen the DIB by deepening information sharing, pursuing joint
action with NTIB partners to address supply chain vulnerabilities, and
prioritizing ``ally shoring'' and ``friend-shoring.'' I will also work
to reduce barriers to integrating allied companies into the DIB,
streamline regulations, and improve reciprocal defense trade. This
whole-of-government approach will strengthen collective defense
production and ensure supply chain resilience, crucial for modernizing
our technological base and enhancing deterrence.
international armaments cooperation (iac)
Question. The Department conducts a number of activities that
support International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) to promote US
strategic goals. IAC is defined as (1) cooperative research,
development, test, and evaluation of defense technologies, systems, or
equipment; (2) joint production and follow-on support of defense
articles or equipment and; (3) procurement of foreign technology,
equipment, systems or logistics support. In addition to activities like
information exchange agreements, defense trade, and cooperative
logistics, the Department also funds activities that can be used to
promote interoperability and joint development, such as the Defense
Exportability Features (DEF) program, Coalition Warfare Support
Program, and Foreign Comparative Test Program.
In your view, how are international armaments cooperation
activities used to shape and support broader DOD warfighting needs and
priorities? Are there new approaches or activities we should consider
to be more effective and strategic?
Answer. IAC strengthens alliances, improves interoperability, and
fosters innovation, all crucial for supporting DOD warfighting needs.
If confirmed, I would examine streamlining acquisition with key
partners, focusing on co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment
of critical capabilities to maintain technological advantage, while
ensuring these partnerships enhance U.S. industrial competitiveness and
security. This includes exploring new approaches like joint investments
in emerging technologies, flexible production, and enhanced information
sharing.
Question. Based on the work of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group,
what recommendations would you draw from its success to help streamline
and improve security cooperation, foreign military sales, and
cooperative logistics processes in order to be more responsive to
rapidly changing security situations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would draw upon valuable lessons out of the
Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) to advocate for streamlined
processes for expediting security assistance requests, enhanced
interoperability of equipment and systems among partner nations, pre-
positioning of critical supplies and equipment in strategic locations,
maintaining an industrial base that can expand to meet emergent
requirements during a conflict, and improved coordination mechanisms
for joint planning and logistics. These improvements would enable more
agile and effective responses to rapidly changing security situations
while strengthening partnerships, interoperability, and
interchangeability--ultimately ensuring our collective security.
Question. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group offers valuable lessons
in security cooperation. If confirmed, I would closely examine its
successes and challenges to inform future decisionmaking regarding
streamlining foreign military sales, cooperative logistics, and
responsiveness to evolving security situations. This includes exploring
opportunities to expedite assistance requests, enhance
interoperability, pre-position critical supplies, and improve joint
planning and logistics coordination.
If confirmed, would you review how the U.S. could rapidly model the
Ukraine Defense Contact Group in the event of a different conflict?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the lessons learned from the
Ukraine conflict, including the effectiveness of the UDCG, to inform
future contingency planning, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
Examining best practices and areas for improvement in coordinating
multinational support for growing our collective DIBs is crucial for
ensuring we can respond rapidly and effectively to any future conflict.
Question. In your view, how are newer initiatives like the Defense
Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) with India, the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (or Quad), or the AUKUS initiative being used to
support our defense posture, and are there recommendations for
improvements of those activities that should be considered to make them
more effective?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DTTI, the Quad, and AUKUS
are vital for strengthening our defense posture through
interoperability, technology cooperation, and collective security.
However, maximizing their effectiveness requires prioritizing expedited
technology sharing, co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment
that is focused on interoperability, strengthened industrial base
collaboration, and regular strategic dialog.
If confirmed, I will review these initiatives to ensure they are
impactful partnerships that enhance our collective defense capabilities
and shared security.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
8(a) contracts
1. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, the Small Business Act (SBA)
8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a contract vehicle through
which sole source and set aside contracts can be awarded to small
businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations, Community Development
Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations. These
corporations are tied to political relationships, not racial
classifications. They also are some of our most efficient contractors,
earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System
(CPARS) marks. Last many of these small businesses employ veterans at
rates far exceeding the national average, allowing our Nation's finest
to continue to serve after they take off the uniform. Will you commit
to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a) contracting for the
Department of the Defense?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is my understanding that 8(a) companies are an
invaluable asset to the Department's workforce. If confirmed, I will
commit to preserve and strengthen 8(a) contracting in the Department.
2. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi and Vice Admiral Pappano, I
recently toured an SBA 8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the
value 8(a) brings to the Federal customer in terms of cost and
efficiency while delivering mission-critical solutions that increase
our national security and warfighter readiness. 8(a) contracts
represent the best ``bang for the buck'' for taxpayers, giving
contracting officers additional flexibility while also maximizing
efficiency by reducing red-tape. Do you see the value in increased
efficiency in flexibility brought from initiatives such as the 8(a)
program?
Mr. Cadenazzi. In my view, the 8(a) program delivers substantial
value to the Department of Defense by connecting innovative small
businesses with prime contractors. This infusion of speed and
innovation strengthens the defense industrial base, resulting in
effective outcomes for the Department.
alaska
3. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, on President Trump's first day
in office he signed the Executive Order ``Unleashing Alaska's
Extraordinary Resource Potential.'' This sent a strong message to
Alaska, America, and the world, that unleashing Alaska's extraordinary
resources and jobs in a growing economy is one of his Administration's
top priorities. For years, I've worked toward the success of the Alaska
LNG project. Not only could Alaska LNG shipments provide our allies
with energy security, reaching them in 6 days without any strategic
choke points, but this pipeline crosses directly through some of our
most prominent military bases in my State, several of which have had
issues with supply. Now, purchase agreements and other ways to commit
to the project, beyond just the Department of Defense's (DOD) immediate
need, will help secure financing for the project quickly and at the
lowest cost in line with President Trump's America First Energy and
National Security agenda. Can I get your commitment to work with me on
the Alaska LNG (AKLNG) Project?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I appreciate your longstanding commitment to the
Alaska LNG project and its potential benefits for both Alaska and our
national security. I understand the importance of this project for
energy security, job creation, and supporting our military
installations in Alaska. If confirmed, I will commit to working with
you to explore this project's opportunities for the DOD and nation.
defense production act and critical minerals
4. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, Alaska represents a wealth of
critical minerals. In the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), the Secretary of Defense was tasked with providing a way
forward to address all critical mineral shortfalls. This came after a
2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that of the 99
materials for which there is a current shortfall, over 90 percent had
either zero or one domestic supplier. In 2024, the previous
Administration went to Australia and the United Kingdom and offered to
purchase minerals from there rather than source them domestically. So,
in 2024, I got an amendment into the NDAA that said that domestic
sources, namely the United States and Canada, would be the primary
source of development, and then, only if unable to source domestically,
then we could go to those other countries. What are the risks to
continued reliance on foreign, and often un-friendly, sources for these
critical minerals?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is my understanding that addressing our reliance
on foreign sources of critical minerals is not just an industrial base
issue, it is one of national security. Reliance on foreign sources for
critical minerals exposes the U.S. defense industrial base to supply
chain disruptions and adversarial manipulation, jeopardizing our
ability to produce essential defense systems and maintain technological
superiority.
5. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, how can Congress help
``onshore'' or, at the very least, ``friendly shore'' some of these
material sources?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is in my view that Congress can bolster domestic
critical mineral production by providing predictable and stable
resources for infrastructure, R&D, and workforce development that
supports the onshoring of these materials.
6. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, I also got a provision in the
2025 NDAA that required the Secretary of Defense to consult with the
head of any agency responsible for development of an ``environmental
document'' for a project that would result in an increase in
availability of strategic and critical minerals. These environmental
impact studies have been weaponized against my State to block
development and limit economic opportunity at a cost to our national
security. Will you commit to me to ensuring the Defense Production Act
stays focused on defense and on improving our domestic industrial base?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will commit to leveraging the
Defense Production Act to secure reliable domestic sources of critical
minerals and defense-critical capabilities that will strengthen our
defense industrial base and reduce reliance on vulnerable foreign
supply chains.
protecting the u.s. industrial base
7. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, the United States defense
industrial base has always been a major target for foreign espionage--
especially by major adversaries like China and Russia. One concerning
trend the last few years is the very real threat of sabotage of
industrial base assets by foreign agents. We saw attempts attributed to
Russia to sabotage critical defense industrial base infrastructure in
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] countries since 2022. Germany
and the United Kingdom for instance both saw fires and explosions break
out at ammunition and missile facilities linked to the War in Ukraine.
We saw an assassination plot against the CEO of Rheinmettal, a major
German arms supplier, and fires set by explosive devices that went off
at DHL logistics hubs in Germany, England, and Poland bound for
aircraft. If confirmed, will you commit to doing an assessment of the
security of the U.S. defense industrial base against the types of plots
I just described and report back to Congress as soon as possible about
ways we could better protect these critical nodes?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
relevant interagency partners and Congress to assess the security of
the U.S. defense industrial base and explore ways to enhance its
protection. I understand the importance of this issue and commit to
giving it full and careful consideration.
collaboration with israel
8. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Cadenazzi, the Department of Defense's
2023 National Defense Industrial Strategy, as well as the DOD's
implementation plan for fiscal year 2025, emphasize the importance of
collaboration with allies and partners to enhance defense production,
innovation, and overall capability. Israel, with its robust and
innovative defense industry, is a natural fit for inclusion in the
National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB). Israel's defense
sector, which emerged out of necessity, has become a leader in cutting-
edge technologies such as cybersecurity, unmanned systems, and missile
defense. The United States and Israel already have a strong foundation
of cooperation through the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) and
the U.S.-Israel Defense Industrial Base Working Group. With rising
threats from adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, do you believe
it is in the United States' national interest to deepen our industrial
collaboration with Israel?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I look forward to examining the
potential benefits and challenges of deepening defense industrial
cooperation collaboration with Israel, particularly in light of
evolving geopolitical dynamics. I recognize the importance of strong
international partnerships to our national security and economic
interests.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
electronics industrial base
9. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Cadenazzi, what specific actions will your
office take to identify and close manufacturing shortfalls in essential
electronic components such as printed circuit boards (PCBs) and flat
panel displays to ensure a resilient and secure industrial base for
advanced defense electronics?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, my office will work to assess supply
chain risks and explore opportunities to strengthen domestic production
through targeted investments and strategic partnerships. We will work
to evaluate ways to address manufacturing gaps in PCBs and flat panel
displays while supporting efforts to diversify supply sources.
10. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Cadenazzi, how can your office rapidly
ramp up domestic capacity for crucial electronic needs, like PCBs, so
that the United States can match the output of our adversaries?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I look forward to thoroughly assessing
our domestic capacity for crucial electronics like PCBs and developing
a comprehensive plan to leverage all available tools, including the
Defense Production Act, Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS)
Program and other authorities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
industrial resilience
11. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, the United States faces a pacing
threat from China, and we must ensure that our industrial policy
accounts for forward-deployed capabilities, long supply lines, and the
need for distributed manufacturing. Hawaii, in particular, offers a
strategic location for investment in resilient infrastructure and
sustainment. What specific role do you see forward-positioned
industrial capabilities--such as those in Hawaii or Guam--playing in
future contingency planning and sustainment operations in the Indo-
Pacific?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Forward-positioned industrial capabilities in
locations like Hawaii and Guam are absolutely crucial for future
contingency planning and sustainment operations in the Indo-Pacific.
They provide essential logistical support, reduce reliance on long and
vulnerable supply lines, and enhance our ability to respond quickly and
effectively to crises. If confirmed, I would prioritize investing in
and strengthening these forward-positioned capabilities as a key
element of our Indo-Pacific strategy.
12. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, how will you work to ensure that
industrial base initiatives don't just concentrate on major defense
primes, but also include small businesses and community-based partners,
particularly in underserved regions like Hawaii?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I recognize the vital role that small businesses
play in our national security innovation and industrial base
resilience. They possess agility and specialized expertise and often
represent the leading edge of technological advancement. It is
essential that we leverage these strengths and ensure they are not lost
or forgotten in relation to the larger defense primes.
If confirmed, I will direct IBP's industrial base initiatives to
prioritize engagement with these businesses and communities to
understand their capabilities and tailor DOD support to their needs.
This will involve streamlining acquisition processes, investing in
workforce development, and increasing transparency in contracting.
native hawaiian organizations and the defense industrial base
13. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, I've long believed that
sustaining and strengthening the defense industrial base is not just
about procurement, it's about people, places, and partnerships. Hawaii
is uniquely positioned to contribute to the resilience and
modernization of the defense industrial base, led by local and Native
Hawaiian Organizations. How will you ensure that small and
underrepresented communities, including Native Hawaiian Organizations,
are more fully integrated into the DOD's industrial base planning and
investment strategy?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I agree that a robust defense industrial base relies
on people, places, and partnerships, and I share your view that Hawaii
offers unique capabilities and contributions. It's not simply about
procuring equipment--but more so about cultivating a diverse and
resilient ecosystem of suppliers, innovators, manufacturers, and
vocationally skilled workers.
If confirmed, I will leverage existing authorities and small
business programs, such as the DOD Mentor-Protege and APEX Accelerator
Programs, and as well as existing close partnerships with the Hawaiian
small business and defense industrial organizations through INDOPACOM
and the Defense Innovation Unit. I will also explore new mechanisms to
lower barriers to entry, encourage prime-contractor partnerships, and
invest in workforce development specific to these communities.
14. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, how do you plan to both
strengthen our supply chain resilience and ensure that communities like
those in Hawaii--which have historically been underutilized--are
included in the defense innovation ecosystem?
Mr. Cadenazzi. In my view, strengthening supply chain resilience
and ensuring inclusivity of underutilized suppliers are mutually
reinforcing goals. If confirmed, I will prioritize proactive outreach
to Hawaiian businesses, especially Native Hawaiian Organizations,
leverage existing IBP programs to attract suppliers from underutilized
communities, and tailor DOD support through streamlined acquisition
(e.g., expanded OTAs), incentives for prime-contractor partnerships,
and targeted workforce development. This inclusive approach will
leverage local potential, driving innovation and strengthening defense
supply chains. If confirmed, I am committed to visiting Hawaii to
gather stakeholder input and inform future efforts.
acquisition reform
15. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, there is bipartisan support for
acquisition reform, especially reforms that are meaningful for our
warfighters in the Indo-Pacific--the Department's priority theater. But
for too long, we've seen a mismatch between our strategic objectives
and how we fund and prioritize capabilities for the region. How will
you ensure that industrial base planning is aligned with real-world
requirements?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Aligning industrial base planning with Indo-Pacific
needs would be crucial. If confirmed, I will prioritize collaboration
with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to define requirements,
leverage data analysis to address vulnerabilities, promote agile
acquisition from our defense industry partners for faster delivery, and
ensure transparency and accountability throughout the process. This
data-driven approach will deliver warfighters the capabilities they
need.
16. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you support the creation of a
dedicated U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Acquisition Executive
to represent the region's need; and how do you see your office
coordinating with that role, if established?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is important to ensure the USINDOPACOM has the
necessary acquisition leadership to support the region's strategic
needs. I would welcome the opportunity to better understand the role of
a dedicated USINDOPACOM Acquisition Executive.
17. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, would you support reforms to
give combatant commanders more direct input into acquisition and
industrial base decisions?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I understand OSD has been increasing delegation of
authority to requirements owners, wherever possible, to reduce
administrative burden associated with multiple layers of bureaucratic
oversight. If confirmed, I will work closely with my colleagues
throughout A&S and partners such as the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering and Defense Innovation Unit to
identify opportunities where combatant commanders may provide more
direct input into acquisition and industrial base decisions.
18. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, reforming acquisition practices
to better support our forward-deployed forces is essential to ensuring
deterrence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific. Yet in the fiscal year
2025 budget, INDOPACOM submitted over $11 billion in unfunded
priorities--a clear signal that our current acquisition systems aren't
keeping pace with operational demands in the region. How do you plan to
tailor acquisition and sustainment strategies to meet the unique needs
of Indo-Pacific forces--particularly those based in Hawaii and
operating throughout the Pacific Island chains?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will work closely with my colleagues
throughout A&S to best understand the requirements unique to each
combatant command and will support acquisition reform efforts to meet
the operational needs of the warfighter.
19. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, in light of the urgency to field
capabilities quickly while maintaining transparency and accountability,
what specific acquisition reforms would you advocate for to ensure the
timely delivery of systems without compromising oversight or wasting
taxpayer dollars?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will work closely with my colleagues
throughout A&S to support acquisition reform efforts to enable faster
procurement, production, and to ensure innovative capabilities are
delivered into the hands of the warfighter. As such, if confirmed I
welcome the opportunity to partner my A&S colleagues on reform efforts
to fulfill the President's objective of restoring common sense to
Federal procurement.
unmanned systems sustainability
20. Senator Hirono. Mr. Cadenazzi, DOD is rapidly expanding its use
of autonomous and unmanned systems across all domains, especially in
the Indo-Pacific. But many of these systems are not designed for
sustainability, lifecycle logistics, or rapid reconstitution in
theater. How do you see your office helping shape procurement and
production strategies for autonomous systems to ensure they are
scalable, sustainable, and field-ready for operational needs in
contested environments like the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Secretary Hegseth acknowledged the importance of
autonomous and unmanned systems across all domains. Additionally, I
understand there are many stakeholders within the Department focused on
delivering these capabilities at speed and scale to the warfighters. It
is critical the Department assess the needs within all domains,
including the Indo-Pacific when procuring autonomous and unmanned
systems. If confirmed, I will assist the appropriate stakeholders
across the Department identify the best strategies to deliver
warfighters scalable, sustainable, and field-ready autonomous and
unmanned systems.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
ethics
21. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are confirmed, will you
commit not to seek any employment with or compensation from a defense
contractor, including through serving on a board, as a consultant, or
as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I will abide by the extensive post-government
employment ethics rules required by Federal law. These provisions set
forth comprehensive restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation
from defense contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal
Government on behalf of any future employers and clients. I believe
that these existing rules are appropriate and sufficient to protect the
public interest. If confirmed, I will carry out the responsibilities of
my office honorably, and I will seek any post-government employment in
full compliance with the applicable ethics rules.
22. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are confirmed, will you
commit not to engage in any lobbying activities, including unregistered
``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the guise of
consulting or advising, focused on DOD or any of its components for 4
years after leaving DOD?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I will abide by the extensive post-government
employment ethics rules required by Federal law. These provisions set
forth comprehensive restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation
from defense contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal
Government on behalf of any future employers and clients. I believe
that these existing rules are appropriate and sufficient to protect the
public interest. If confirmed, I will carry out the responsibilities of
my office honorably, and I will seek any post-government employment in
full compliance with the applicable ethics rules.
23. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit not to seek
employment, board membership with, or any other form of compensation
from a company that you regulated or otherwise interacted with while in
government, for at least 4 years after leaving office?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I will abide by the extensive post-government
employment ethics rules required by Federal law. These provisions set
forth comprehensive restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation
from defense contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal
Government on behalf of any future employers and clients. I believe
that these existing rules are appropriate and sufficient to protect the
public interest. If confirmed, I will carry out the responsibilities of
my office honorably, and I will seek any post-government employment in
full compliance with the applicable ethics rules.
24. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, during your nomination process,
did anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other closely
related entity approach you about your loyalty to President Trump?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No. I was not approached regarding this subject.
25. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you were approached about
your loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or other
similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that pledge
or oath.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No. I was not approached regarding this subject.
26. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you were approached about
your loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal
representations of loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No. I was not approached regarding this subject.
27. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in November 2024, the New York
Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top
adviser to President Trump, allegedly requested payment from
prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
positions within the Administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
joining the Administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
28. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you did discuss the
possibility of joining the Administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr.
Epshteyn seek payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a
position within the Administration?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Not applicable.
29. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, at any time, did lawyers for
President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
describe the information that they provided you (including copies of
documents), what was discussed during any calls, and any other
information pertaining to this interaction.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, I was not approached on this subject.
30. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, were you in contact with Mr.
Elon Musk at any time during your nomination process? If so, please
describe the nature of those contacts.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, I was not in contact with Mr. Musk at any time
during the nomination process.
31. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, was Mr. Musk present or involved
in any interviews you did related to your nomination? If so, please
describe the nature of his involvement.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, he was not present or involved in any interviews
related to my nomination.
32. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, was Mr. Musk involved in any way
with your nomination, including but not limited to, directly or
indirectly contacting Senators regarding their position on your
nomination?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, he was not involved in any way with my
nomination process.
33. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, who was in the room or
participated in any of your interviews regarding your nomination?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I had three discussions with Administration
personnel and staff from PPO and DOD prior to my nomination. None of
these were defined to me as ``interviews.''
34. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you own any stock or hold any
other interest in any defense industry or Department of Energy
contractors, will you divest it to avoid even the appearance of a
conflict of interest?
Mr. Cadenazzi. My ethics agreement, which was previously provided
to the Committee, sets forth my ethics commitments, if confirmed.
35. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what do you consider the role of
the press in a democracy?
Mr. Cadenazzi. An objective, apolitical press is intended to
provide factual reporting on events in the Nation and the world while
delivering a level of accountability on corporations, governments and
their officials of any and all political parties operating at any level
(from the Federal to State and local).
36. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you think it would be an
appropriate use of taxpayer resources to ``dig up dirt'' on journalists
who investigate or criticize you, your office, or the Trump
administration?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
37. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit not to
retaliate, including by denying access to government officials or
facilities, against news outlets or individual journalists who publish
articles that are critical of you, your office, your agency, or the
Trump administration?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, with the bounds of the law and guidance from
legal counsel.
38. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you requested, or has
anyone requested on your behalf, that any other person or third party
sign a nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-disparagement, or similar
agreement regarding your conduct in a personal or professional
capacity?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
39. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you voluntarily release any
individual from any such agreements before this committee votes on your
nomination?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Not applicable.
40. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you ever paid or promised
to pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your behalf, an
individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality, non-
disparagement, or similar agreement?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
41. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi if the answer to the previous
question was yes, how much was promised, how much was paid, and what
were the circumstances?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Not applicable.
42. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to recuse
yourself from all particular matters involving your former clients and
employers for the duration of your service at DOD?
Mr. Cadenazzi. My ethics agreement, which was previously provided
to the Committee, sets forth my ethics commitments, if confirmed.
congressional oversight and transparency
43. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what is your understanding of
the role of the Department of Defense Inspector General and service
Inspectors General?
Mr. Cadenazzi. The Inspector General operates with the DOD and
Services as independent entities which conduct independent unbiased
investigation and analysis of a broad array of topic to maintain
accountability within the Department.
44. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you ensure your staff
complies with any Inspector General deadlines established for requested
communications, documents, and witnesses, and that staff will be
protected from reprisal for their testimony?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes.
45. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are not able to comply
with any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you notify the
Republican and Democratic members of this committee regarding the basis
for any good faith delay or denial?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
46. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from any individual,
including the President?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes.
47. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what actions would you take if
you were given an illegal order from any individual, including the
President?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If I had concerns about the legality of an order, I
would first contact the Office of Legal Counsel to address my concerns.
Based upon their response, I would take appropriate actions.
48. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to voluntarily
provide a deposition if you are requested by Congress to provide one?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
49. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to voluntarily
testify in front of Congress if you are requested by Congress to do so?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
50. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to testify or
provide a deposition in front of Congress if you are issued a subpoena
to do so?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
51. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to providing
information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are requested
to do so?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
52. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you provide information or
documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to do so?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
53. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to following
current precedent for responding to information requests, briefings,
and other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees and their minority members?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes
54. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if confirmed, will you commit to
posting your official calendar monthly?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I commit to complying with the Freedom
of Information Act, which covers all agency records to include my
official calendar.
55. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you think the Federal
Government has an overclassification problem? If so, please provide
examples of overclassification you have encountered.
Mr. Cadenazzi. I do not have current personal experience with this
issue. However, I have read in public reports and heard from both
experts and government officials that the Federal Government has an
overclassification problem. As result, I do not have a strong
perspective on this topic and would be open to arguments on either
side.
56. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if confirmed, do you think your
department should pursue strategic technology to support automated
declassification?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Technology can be a powerful enabler of productivity
and efficiency for myriad administrative tasks. Where declassification
is appropriate, the application of strategic technology could be a
complement to existing declassification processes, serve as a check on
manual declassification process, or serve as starting point for more
advanced solutions in the future.
project 2025
57. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you discussed Project 2025
with any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the Trump
transition team, or other members of the Trump administration? If so,
please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom
you discussed it.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, I have never discussed Project 2025 with any
members of the Trump campaign, Trump transition team or other members
of the Trump administration.
58. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you discussed Project 2025
with any officials associated with the Heritage Foundation? If so,
please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom
you discussed it.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No, I have never discussed Project 2025 with any
officials associated with the Heritage Foundation.
foreign influence
59. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you received any payment
from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government
within the past 5years?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
60. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you communicated with any
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
61. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, please disclose any
communications or payments you have had with representatives of any
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years and describe the nature of the communication.
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
62. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you believe that
servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
any other concern that they wish to raise?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes.
63. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, have you ever retaliated against
any individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual
assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern
that they wish to raise?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
64. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please specify how you will
do so.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes. I am not currently aware of DOD rules and
regulations for whistleblower protection. I would need to familiarize
myself with this topic to provide specific steps. In addition, I would
seek advice from counsel and coordinate any actions or response with
them.
impoundment control act
65. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you believe the Secretary of
Defense or the Secretary of Energy has the legal authority to block the
disbursement of funds appropriated by Congress?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I fully acknowledge and respect Congress'
constitutional role in appropriating funds to be carried out by the
executive branch for designated purposes.
66. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what is your understanding of
the Impoundment Control Act?
Mr. Cadenazzi. My understanding is that the Impoundment Control Act
provides a framework for handling circumstances in which the President
seeks to defer or cancel execution of appropriated funds.
I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities consistent
with the Constitution and the law on this matter, as on all others. I
would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of Defense on
this matter are informed by the Administration's legal positions and
advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
67. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you commit to complying with
the Impoundment Control Act?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law on this
matter as on all others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to
the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by the
Administration's legal positions and advice from the Department's
General Counsel's office.
68. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you commit to notifying the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the majority and
minority, if you are asked not to comply with the Impoundment Control
Act or not to expend the money that Congress appropriates or
authorizes?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law on this
matter as on all others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to
the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by advice the
Administration's legal positions and from the Department's General
Counsel's office.
69. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, the Constitution's Spending
Clause (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1) and Appropriations Clause (Art. I,
Sec. 9, cl. 7) give Congress, not the Executive, power of the purse.
The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld this power. Do you believe
that impoundments are constitutional?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law on this
matter as on all others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to
the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by the
Administration's legal positions and advice from the Department's
General Counsel's office.
70. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, the funding levels in
appropriations bills passed into law are not targets or ceilings;
instead, they are amounts the executive branch must spend, unless
stated otherwise. Congress could--if it wanted the President to have
discretion--write those amounts as ceilings. Do you agree?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law on this
matter as on all others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to
the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by the
Administration's legal positions and advice from the Department's
General Counsel's office.
71. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what is your understanding of
the requirements for DOD/NNSA to obligate funding that Congress
authorizes and appropriates, in accordance with the time period that
Congress deems it to do so?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law on this
matter as on all others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to
the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by the
Administration's legal positions and advice from the Department's
General Counsel's office.
72. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you commit to expending the
money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law on this
matter as on all others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to
the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by advice the
Administration's legal positions and from the Department's General
Counsel's office.
73. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you commit to following and
implementing every provision of the annual National Defense
Authorization Act passed into law?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law,
including the National Defense Authorization Acts.
74. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you became aware of a
potential violation of the Antideficiency Act, Impoundment Control Act,
or other appropriations laws, what steps would you take?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law. If I
receive information of a potential legal violation, I would direct the
gathering of relevant facts, ensure all relevant stakeholders are
engaged, and consult with the Department's General Counsel's office.
right-to-repair
75. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you believe ensuring the
services have access to the technical data rights needed to repair
their own equipment could advance military readiness?
Mr. Cadenazzi. The ability to quickly and cost-effectively repair,
maintain, and overhaul equipment is essential to military readiness and
deterrence. As such, I believe the Department should procure the
necessary data and associated rights to enable repair of its own
equipment where appropriate. If confirmed, I will work to support the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and my
counterparts across the Department to ensure there is a review of the
Department's policies regarding the acquisition of technical data
rights and the impact on readiness.
76. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to helping DOD lower sustainment costs by promoting competition
for repair contracts and ensuring DOD has access to technical data
rights needed for repairs?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will work with my counterparts
across Acquisition and Sustainment to explore how best to leverage
right-to-repair and technical data rights in acquisition and
sustainment contracts to lower costs, enhance competition, and foster
innovation within the defense industrial base.
77. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to ensuring services and components have guidance and necessary
support to include right-to-repair/technical data rights clauses in
acquisition contracts that DOD enters into as part of a broader
strategy to lower sustainment costs and expand the defense industrial
base?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I note that Secretary Hegseth directed the Secretary
of the Army to identify and propose contract modifications to
incorporate right-to-repair provisions and seek to include these
provisions in all new contracts to accelerate modernization and
efficacy. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting Department policy
on right-to-repair provisions as a tool to foster competition and
innovation in the defense industrial base.
78. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what is your understanding of
how DOD can use suspension and debarment to advance DOD acquisition and
policy priorities?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It's my understanding that suspension and debarment
are tools for ensuring the defense industrial base is comprised of
responsible and reliable contractors. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to
better understand available DOD options, such as suspension and
debarment, to ensure a robust DIB.
79. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, will you commit to conducting an
assessment of how acquisition strategies and contract mechanisms can be
used to protect DOD's interest in acquisition and sustainment, the
results of which you would make public for review by Congress, the
public, and the Department of Government Efficiency?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will commit to working with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who has primary
responsibility for this area, to support an assessment of acquisition
strategies and contract mechanisms. I believe a thorough understanding
of these tools is critical for protecting the DOD's interests in
acquisition and sustainment.
acquisition reform
80. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi and Vice Admiral Pappano, what is
your understanding of the Procurement Integrity Act and your
obligations under that law?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I understand I am obligated to protect source
selection information from unauthorized disclosure and that
safeguarding this sensitive information is essential to maintain the
integrity of the process. As a Government official, I understand I must
ensure all prospective contractors have the fair opportunity to compete
for Federal contracts, and the Procurement Integrity Act prohibits
former Government officials from accepting compensation from
contractors to varying degrees, depending on the procurement
decisionmaking role performed by the former official and the dollar
value of those decisions. The Act also imposes meaningful restrictions
on post-Government employment of covered officials, and these
restrictions are important to ensure an unbiased operation of the
procurement system.
81. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi and Vice Admiral Pappano, do you
believe that it is important to be able to assess accurate cost and
pricing data from contractors, especially for sole-or single-source
contracts?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (ASD(A)) to understand the
implications of accurate cost and pricing data--particularly in sole-
source situations--on acquiring goods and services at fair and
reasonable prices. I understand competition is the preferred method for
obtaining fair and reasonable pricing, however that is not always
possible. I understand that access to accurate cost and pricing data
from contractors, provides the Government with a reliable way to verify
contractor assertions or statements during negotiations.
82. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi and Vice Admiral Pappano, if you
are confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that contractors are
not price-gouging or overcharging the Federal Government?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I believe competition affords the U.S. Government
means to acquire goods and services at the best value, thus preventing
or reducing risk of price gouging. If confirmed, I will work with the
ASD(A), where appropriate, to understand what measures are in place,
and what additional efforts may be needed to safeguard against price
gouging.
83. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, should DOD's industrial base
strategy be influenced by partisan political activities?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I believe DOD's industrial base
strategy should be driven by objective national security requirements.
My focus will be on strengthening the industrial base through objective
assessments and ensuring predictable, stable resourcing to effectively
support our warfighters.
84. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, should DOD's acquisition
decisions be influenced by individuals with conflicts of interest
involving contracts or other business before DOD?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will ensure OASD(IBP) priorities, in
partnership with my colleagues throughout A&S, align with those of the
President, and Secretary Hegseth, while ensuring robust, secure,
resilient, and innovative industrial capabilities are delivered to the
warfighter.
research and development
85. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, does the Federal Government
benefit from partnering with colleges, universities, nonprofits, and
federally funded research and development centers?
Mr. Cadenazzi. In my view, yes. Partnering with colleges,
universities, nonprofits, and FFRDCs is essential for the Federal
Government, especially when it comes to the defense industrial base.
These organizations bring a wealth of expertise, cutting-edge research,
and a talent pipeline that we simply can't replicate on our own.
However, the Department must work with these entities to ensure that
national defense information is safe and secure from exploitation and
expropriation. By working together, we can leverage their strengths to
address critical national security challenges and maintain our
technological advantage.
86. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, under your leadership, will your
agencies continue to work with colleges, universities, nonprofits, and
federally funded research and development centers to research and
address our toughest national security challenges?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed--yes. Collaborating with colleges,
universities, nonprofits, and FFRDCs is certainly something I see as
valuable. If confirmed, I will continue to consider these relationships
as a key avenue for addressing national security challenges.
protecting classified information and federal records
87. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what is your understanding of
the need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Operational Security is practiced to deny
adversaries the opportunity for an advantage over U.S. forces. Proper
OPSEC protects critical information and the mission and the men and
women executing it.
88. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what are the national security
risks of improperly disclosing classified information?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is generally accepted that the improper or
unauthorized disclosure of classified information could be expected to
cause identifiable or describable damage to national security. The
describable damage and certainty of that damage would depend on the
details of the information released, including the level of
classification, as well as the extent and nature of the disclosure.
Determining the extent of damage to national security is part of the
unauthorized disclosure process as outlined in DOD policy, and I would
defer to the Department for additional specifics.
89. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what would you do if you learned
an official had improperly disclosed classified information?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed and in such a situation, I would
immediately take steps to secure the information, assess the situation,
and report the incident to the appropriate security officials for
mitigation and appropriate action in accordance with law and policy.
90. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what is your understanding of
government officials' duties under the Federal Records Act?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will adhere to the Federal Records
Act and the applicable DOD policies that implement it, which ensure
that the Federal records I create or receive are appropriately
maintained.
91. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, should classified information be
shared on unclassified commercial systems?
Mr. Cadenazzi. No.
competition
92. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, how can DOD's acquisition
policies increase competition in the defense industrial base?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Several acquisition policy adjustments can increase
competition in the defense industrial base. These include streamlining
the process, especially for smaller and non-traditional vendors;
promoting modular open systems architectures; increasing the use of
Other Transaction Authorities via the Commercial Solutions Opening
process and other flexible contracting mechanisms; and actively
engaging a diverse range of potential suppliers, including small
businesses and startups. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on these and other
initiatives as well as partnering with the Defense Innovation Unit to
strengthen the defense industrial base.
93. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, under what circumstances should
DOD pursue those policies?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Policies to increase competition should be pursued
strategically, considering the specific circumstances of each
acquisition program. Factors like criticality, technology maturity,
urgency, and potential risks of using non-traditional vendors should be
weighed. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the ASD(A) on
these and other initiatives to strengthen the defense industrial base.
94. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in what ways might DOD be
negatively impacted by ``vendor lock-in,'' that is by becoming
dependent on a single vendor?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Vendor lock-in can hinder competition, drive up
costs, and limit innovation both in acquisition and in sustainment.
Relying on a single vendor risks disruptions from financial
instability, cybersecurity breaches, or production delays. If
confirmed, I would leverage all of the authorities and programs under
the ASD(IBP)'s purview to prioritize fostering competition in the DIB,
attract new and non-traditional entrants, and carefully evaluate vendor
dependencies to mitigate these risks.
95. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, according to the GAO, DOD's
mergers and acquisitions team consists of only two to three full-time
equivalent employees. Do you think that indicates DOD is adequately
prioritizing and resourcing its processes to determine if prospective
mergers and acquisitions harm national security?
Mr. Cadenazzi. While I am not familiar with the precise figures
cited by the GAO, I do agree that adequate staffing and resourcing are
critical for effectively evaluating the national security implications
of mergers and acquisitions. A workforce of two to three full-time
equivalents certainly seems like a small team to handle such a large,
complex, and important task. If confirmed, I will assess the current
workload, the complexity of the transactions being reviewed, and the
resources available to determine if adjustments are needed to ensure
we're properly safeguarding national security.
96. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in your advance policy questions
you wrote, ``If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the DOD
rigorously evaluates the implications of M&A activities on the
industrial and technological base, leveraging its unique perspective to
assess potential risks to supply chain resilience, innovation, and
operational readiness. The Department must also maintain active
awareness of how ongoing M&A activities influence cost, schedule, and
performance across defense acquisition programs. When appropriate, the
DOD should voice concerns and work with regulatory agencies to address
acquisitions that give rise to concerns. I will advocate for a
proactive approach that strengthens oversight mechanisms, enhances
interagency coordination, and ensures that America's DIB remains
competitive, secure, and aligned with national security priorities.''
Do you think DOD's industrial base strategy should be informed by an
understanding of the impacts of past mergers and acquisitions on the
current health of the defense industrial base, including the most
vulnerable sectors like missiles and munitions?
Mr. Cadenazzi. In my view, understanding the impacts of past
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is essential for informing a robust and
effective industrial base strategy. Analyzing historical trends,
particularly in vulnerable sectors like missiles and munitions, can
help us identify potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with
future M&A activity. This includes assessing the impact on competition,
innovation, supply chain resilience, consolidation, and overall cost
and performance of defense programs. If confirmed, I will focus on
incorporating these historical lessons learned into our strategic
planning to ensure a more proactive and informed approach to
safeguarding the health and competitiveness of the defense industrial
base.
97. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you think using modular open
systems approaches in acquisition can help encourage competition and
result in reducing costs and program delays and increasing technical
performance?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Modular open systems approaches can enhance
competition, reduce costs and delays, and improve technical
performance. By enabling interoperability and integrating components
from multiple vendors, they help avoid vendor lock-in and encourage
innovation. Effective implementation requires careful planning, and if
confirmed, I would promote their use where appropriate.
artificial intelligence
98. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in what ways might DOD benefit
from increased competition in the artificial intelligence and cloud
computing markets?
Mr. Cadenazzi. The American artificial intelligence (AI) industry
is currently a source of competitive advantage over our adversaries.
Our commercial sector is the leading edge of innovation, driving
powerful capabilities into both private industry and the DOD. Increased
competition in the AI market--with respect to both AI model development
and cloud infrastructure--would benefit DOD by driving down costs,
fostering innovation, and accelerating the development of cutting-edge
AI capabilities. A more competitive landscape also ensures a wider
range of vendors--especially small and medium sized businesses--
reducing reliance on single-source providers. The diversified market
created by increased competition would likely allow DOD to promote
greater interoperability and prevent vendor lock-in, enabling DOD to
adopt best-in-class solutions. Finally, a robustly competitive
environment promotes higher quality and more tailored AI solutions to
address DOD's unique and complex operational requirements.
Increased competition in the market offers significant benefits to
DOD including greater competition to drive down costs, fueling
innovation, enhance resilience and avoid vendor lock, and creating more
tailored solutions.
99. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in what ways might DOD be
impacted by consolidation in the artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud
computing markets?
Mr. Cadenazzi. Consolidation in the AI and cloud computing markets
would likely negatively impact DOD. A consolidation of the AI or cloud
computing market, similar to the post-cold war consolidation of the
defense and aerospace industry, would likely stifle competition and
increase costs; suppress innovation; and reduce access to frontier AI
and cloud capabilities. Furthermore, a consolidated market could lead
to increased vendor lock-in, making it more difficult for DOD to adopt
best-in-class solutions from alternative non-traditional vendors.
Furthermore, a less diverse market could hinder the development of
specialized AI solutions tailored to DOD's unique operational
requirements, ultimately frustrating DOD's ability to integrate
advanced applications of AI in support of lethality and management
efficiencies.
100. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in what ways might DOD benefit
from the adoption of interoperable AI and cloud computing tools?
Mr. Cadenazzi. The adoption of interoperable AI and cloud computing
tools have the ability to greatly enhance DOD's lethality and
efficiency, as well as increase coordination across the Department. It
would also increase operational agility and result in cost
efficiencies. Interoperability allows AI and cloud systems to share
data, models, and outputs, enabling operational agility.
Interoperability also increases opportunities for scalability, reducing
duplicability and costs of fielding AI and cloud systems across the
enterprise. Interoperability encourages a more modular and open
approach to technology development. This allows smaller, innovative
companies to contribute to the DOD's technology ecosystem, fostering a
more dynamic and competitive market. It also makes it easier to
integrate cutting-edge commercial technologies into military
applications.
101. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, in what ways might DOD benefit
from multicloud solutions when contracting for cloud computing tools?
Mr. Cadenazzi. The Department of Defense (DoD) can benefit
significantly from multicloud solutions when contracting for cloud
computing tools in several ways:? avoiding vendor lock, enhanced
security and resilience, optimization for specific workloads, increased
flexibility and innovation, fostering competition and innovation,
meeting data sovereignty and regulatory requirements, leveraging
specialized services, improving recovery capabilities from disaster and
outages, and cost optimization.
102. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, earlier this month the White
House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a memorandum
titled ``Driving Efficient Acquisition of Artificial Intelligence in
Government'' (hereinafter the ``OMB memo''). That memo states that ``As
agencies seek to accelerate the adoption of AI-enabled services, they
must pay careful attention to vendor sourcing, data portability, and
long-term interoperability to avoid significant and costly dependencies
on a single vendor.'' Do you believe this statement might provide
useful guidance for DOD? Please explain why or why not.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, this statement provides useful guidance for
DOD. The rapidly developing nature of AI capabilities requires DOD to
be able to access the latest commercial solutions from not only
traditional defense companies, but also newer and non-traditional
entities. Vendor lock-in stifles agility and innovation, which
undermines DOD's ability to act quickly and efficiently. Vendor
sourcing is also important in terms of supply chain risk management,
since digital technologies often rely on people or parts from outside
the United States.
103. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, the OMB memo also states that
terms regarding ``Vendor Lock-In Protections . . . are necessary to
reduce the risk that switching vendors could become cost-prohibitive.
Protections against vendor lock-in can vary, but include requirements
for vendor knowledge transfers, data and model portability, providing
agencies with rights to code and models produced in performance of a
contract, and transparency in licensing and pricing.'' Do you believe
this statement might provide useful guidance for DOD? Please explain
why or why not.
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I will review the methods the DOD
currently employs to protect against vendor-lock, as I do agree that
the Department should take measures to ensure robust competition is
maintained to continue encouraging innovation from industry.
104. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, the OMB memo states that
``agency processes should address . . . Data Handling'' by
``[p]roviding clear guidance on handling, access, and use of agency
data or information to ensure, among other purposes, that such
information must only be collected and retained by a vendor when
reasonably necessary to serve the intended purposes of the contract.''
Do you believe this statement might provide useful guidance for DOD?
Please explain why or why not.
Mr. Cadenazzi. Data is critical to mission success, and the OMB
memo's emphasis on careful data handling provides useful guidance. If
confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with DOD colleagues to
ensure OASD(IBP) alignment with departmental guidance on this vital
issue.
105. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, the OMB memo states that
``agency processes should address . . . Use of Government Data'' by
``[e]nsuring contracts permanently prohibit the use of non-public
inputted agency data and outputted results to further train publicly or
commercially available AI algorithms, consistent with applicable law,
absent explicit agency consent.'' Do you believe this statement might
provide useful guidance for DOD? Please explain why or why not.
Mr. Cadenazzi. The DOD takes data protection seriously and, if
confirmed, I will ensure that all policy and regulations are enforced
so Government data is secure and used appropriately.
defense production act
106. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, what role does the Defense
Production Act (DPA) play in addressing economic coercion from the
People's Republic of China?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is my understanding that an authority like the
Defense Production Act (DPA) plays a crucial role in countering
economic coercion from China by allowing for efforts to reduce our
reliance on foreign sources for critical materials and technologies. It
also gives us a meaningful role in reviewing foreign investment in U.S.
businesses for potential coercive influence. If confirmed, I would work
to ensure the DPA is utilized strategically and effectively to mitigate
the risks of economic coercion from China.
107. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, some critics argue that the DPA
is too broad and affords too much discretion to the President. Do you
agree?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I understand the perspectives regarding the scope of
the DPA and the Presidential authorities it provides. The DPA's breadth
allows for flexibility in responding to national security needs, but it
also necessitates careful consideration of its application.
Transparency, congressional oversight, and engagement with stakeholders
are important elements in ensuring its responsible and effective use.
If confirmed, I would be committed to working with this committee to
address these considerations.
108. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, would a lapse of the DPA damage
U.S. national security and industrial preparedness?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is my understanding that a lapse of the DPA would
certainly present challenges to U.S. national security and industrial
preparedness, since it provides valuable authorities for prioritizing
critical industries, strengthening supply chains, and ensuring timely
access to essential materials and technologies. Losing these tools
would undoubtedly impact our ability to respond effectively to national
security emergencies and could potentially leave us vulnerable to
adversarial pressures. Maintaining a robust and adaptable DPA is
important for ensuring our national security and industrial resilience.
If confirmed, I would advocate for ensuring the DPA remains a viable
tool for the Department.
109. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, did the first Trump
administration and Biden administration effectively use the DPA to
address the threat to Americans posed by the coronavirus pandemic?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is my understanding that both the Trump and Biden
administrations utilized the DPA and similar CARES Act authorities to
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, taking actions to address critical
supply shortages and bolster domestic production of essential medical
equipment and supplies. The effectiveness of these actions is a complex
issue with varying perspectives, and there are certainly lessons to be
learned from both Administrations' experiences. If confirmed, I would
be committed to reviewing those lessons learned and working with this
committee to ensure the DPA is utilized effectively in future crises.
110. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you believe there are ways
that the first Trump administration and Biden administration fell short
or were misguided in their use of the DPA?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I'm not aware of all past decisions on DPA
utilization from both Administrations to make that assessment. I trust
that those decisions were made based on the best available information
and analysis at the time, given the evolving circumstances. If
confirmed, I'm committed to continually refining our approach to DPA
implementation and leveraging lessons learned to ensure its effective
and strategic application in the future.
111. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, is DOD currently using the DPA
in an appropriate manner to map critical national security supply
chains and illuminate dependencies and chokepoints?
Mr. Cadenazzi. I am not aware of all the DPA efforts. If confirmed,
I look forward to reviewing the process to ensure we are optimally
utilizing the DPA to map critical national security supply chains,
identify dependencies, and address potential chokepoints effectively.
112. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, how do you plan to use lesser-
used authorities in title VII of the DPA, including voluntary
agreements and mandatory survey authorities?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I look forward to gaining a deeper
understanding on how authorities have been utilized. I commit to assess
the effectiveness and determine how we can better leverage these tools
to strengthen the DIB.
113. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, DPA allows the President of the
United States and subsequently DOD to influence domestic industry in
the interest of national defense. DOD can utilize funding under this
authority to ``establish, expand, maintain, or restore'' domestic
capacity for critical components and technologies. How should DOD plan
to improve competition in the defense industry under this authority?
Mr. Cadenazzi. The DPA is a critical tool that enables the DOD to
strengthen domestic industrial capacity in support of national defense.
If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the ongoing efforts under
this authority, identifying opportunities to enhance competition within
the defense industry, and ensuring that we are effectively utilizing
the DPA to strengthen the DIB.
114. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, should DPA reauthorization
include any new or expanded authorities?
Mr. Cadenazzi. DPA reauthorization presents an opportunity to
strengthen and expand authorities that support national security and
industrial resilience. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding
where gaps may exist in the current framework and recommending specific
areas for consideration to ensure we are maximizing the DPA's
effectiveness in addressing critical supply chain challenges and
emerging defense needs.
115. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, would it be preferable to have
a flexible DPA authority that allows the President to ameliorate
shortfalls by supply chain sector or a more narrow one that requires it
only be used for specific program requirements?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It's my understanding that a flexible DPA authority
would allow us address supply chain shortfalls more effectively across
sectors. If confirmed, I look forward to evaluating and identifying
ways to optimize its use to strengthen the defense industrial base.
116. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, do you believe that the
President should have the full authority granted to him by the Defense
Production Act?
Mr. Cadenazzi. It is my understanding that DPA provides significant
authority to the President, and the appropriate use of that authority
requires careful consideration and balance. If confirmed, I will work
with this committee to ensure the DPA is utilized effectively.
117. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi, would you support congressional
efforts to limit or strip the full authority granted to the President
by the Defense Production Act?
Mr. Cadenazzi. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress to better understand the perspectives on the DPA's authorities
and flexibilities.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr.
follows:]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr.,
which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Michael P.
Cadenazzi, Jr. in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
______
[The nomination of Mr. Michael P. Cadenazzi, Jr. was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on May 13, 2025, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 18, 2025.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Vice Admiral Scott W.
Pappano, USN by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 3213 of the National Nuclear Security
Administration Act states that the Principal Deputy Administrator shall
be appointed ``from among persons who have extensive background in
organizational management and are well qualified to manage the nuclear
weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the
Administration in a manner that advances and protects the national
security of the United States.''
What background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
qualify you for appointment to this position?
Answer. My qualifications are founded upon the bedrock of a strong
technical education with an undergraduate degree in marine engineering
from the U.S. Naval Academy and a graduate degree in nuclear
engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Both my
education and leadership were honed across a 36-year career as a
nuclear submarine officer and military acquisition professional where I
humbly led exceptional teams at all levels. As a submarine line
officer, I completed sea rotations on five submarines across all
classes, culminating in command of a nuclear attack submarine. I also
served as a Military Assistant for an Assistant Secretary of Defense
charged with both strategic nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation
policy. As a military acquisition professional, I served as major
program manager for lifecycle sustainment of operational strategic and
attack submarines, oversaw research and development activities of the
Naval Undersea Warfare Center labs, established a program executive
office to focus on cradle-to-grave lifecycle activities for all nuclear
strategic ballistic missile submarines, and eventually served as
Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy charged with
overseeing the procurement and sustainment of all Navy and Marine Corps
weapon systems. I understand the complexity of the threats and the
critical importance of the NNSA mission. I have a deep understanding of
Naval nuclear propulsion. I oversaw the recapitalization of our sea-
based strategic nuclear deterrent and worked closely with other
stakeholders engaged in nuclear modernization efforts to include
STRATCOM, Strategic Systems Programs, the United Kingdom Dreadnought
Alliance, and other legs of the U.S. Nuclear Triad. I supervised
contract performance at our nuclear shipbuilders and led the stand-up
of a Navy industrial base team to collaborate with Department of
Defense stakeholders and Congress to target industrial base investment
in critical infrastructure, supply chain capacity and resilience,
manufacturing technology, and workforce development. I believe that, if
confirmed, my background, experience, and expertise would be well-
suited to execute the duties of NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
this position?
Answer. If confirmed as NNSA Principal Deputy, I will be
responsible for executing duties and responsibilities as prescribed by
the Administrator in support of maintaining and enhancing the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile;
reducing the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; providing
the U.S. Navy with safe and militarily effective nuclear propulsion;
and responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies. I would be
required to act for, and exercise the powers of, the Administrator when
the Administrator is disabled or the position is vacant.
Question. Section 3213 goes on to State that the Principal Deputy
Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
activities among the elements of the Administration.''
If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities, if any,
do you expect that the Administrator for Nuclear Security would
prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, and subject to the authorities of the
Administrator, I would expect to oversee the implementation and
accountability of contracts, procurement, administrative, budget, and
planning activities. In addition to coordinating activities among the
elements of the Administration, I would be required to engage with
other key leaders across the Department of Energy, as well as external
stakeholders, to ensure collaborative efforts to drive for resiliency,
efficiency, and innovation across the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your main priorities be in
this position?
Answer. If confirmed, my main priority would be to maximize the
efficiency, effectiveness, capability, and capacity of NNSA, national
security labs, plants, and production facilities to achieve priorities
established by Administrator for nuclear stockpile stewardship, nuclear
weapons production, critical infrastructure recapitalization, non-
proliferation and counter-proliferation activities, and advancing
technology and innovation.
Question. What are the major challenges you would expect to
confront if confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. NNSA is currently executing seven simultaneous stockpile
modernization programs while also recapitalizing its aging and
deteriorating production infrastructure and design, certification, and
assessment capabilities to support the current and future deterrent.
Additionally, nuclear proliferation challenges are rising because of
the evolving geopolitical environment.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, the NNSA
leadership team, the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of
Energy, DOD, and Congress to recognize challenges early and implement
strategies to address them.
conflicts of interest
Question. Federal ethics laws, to include 18 U.S.C. Sec. 208,
prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they,
or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain
relationships, have a financial interest.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any
potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties,
family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as
influencing your decisionmaking?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that
if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from
participating in any decisions regarding that specific matter?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to
decisionmaking on the merits and exclusively in the public interest,
without regard to private gain or personal benefit?
Answer. Yes.
nnsa organization and management structure
Question. The NNSA Act of 2000, as amended, establishes that the
Administrator for Nuclear Security``. . . shall be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary [of Energy]. Such
authority, direction, and control may be delegated only to the Deputy
Secretary of Energy, without re-delegation.''
What is your view on the relationship between the Secretary of
Energy and the Administrator of NNSA in statute and in recent practice?
Answer. Statutorily, NNSA is subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary of Energy. I believe that the NNSA
Administrator must have a strong and healthy relationship with the
Secretary of Energy and Deputy Secretary of Energy in order for NNSA to
succeed. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary, Deputy
Secretary, and the Administrator to ensure successful execution and
delivery of NNSA's missions.
Question. How is the ``semi-autonomous'' nature of the NNSA, as set
forth in the NNSA Act, reflected in NNSA's organizational structure?
What makes NNSA different from the domains of the other Under
Secretaries of the Department of Energy (DOE)--in both law and
practice?
Answer. The NNSA Act provides the guidance and authority necessary
for the NNSA Administrator to carry out NNSA's various missions under
the direction of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The NNSA Act
provides that the NNSA has full authority over and is responsible for
the core functions of the NNSA which include: maintaining the safety,
security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent; preventing,
countering and responding to proliferation and terrorism threats; and
providing operational support for naval nuclear propulsion. To carry
out those core missions, the NNSA Act further provides that the NNSA
Administrator has full responsibility for the following areas that
support performance of the core functions: budget formulation and
execution, personnel, health and environmental safety, emergency
management, procurement, legal, legislative matters, and public
affairs. For all other DOE organizations over which the Under
Secretaries have cognizance, all of these core functions are performed
centrally by DOE support organizations. Finally, all NNSA Federal
personnel and NNSA contractors are subject only to the direction and
control of the Administrator, who is accountable to the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary.
Question. With a view to improving organizational management and
operational effectiveness, would you recommend the Administrator pursue
any changes to the structure of NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on strengthening the
coordination and integration of activities across NNSA's nuclear
security enterprise to bolster the organization's ability to deliver in
line with its commitments. I will work with the Administrator and NNSA
leadership to enable productive relationships across NNSA's
laboratories, plants, and sites, and with interagency partners while
also fostering a strong culture of accountability, responsibility, and
efficiency.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Principal Deputy Administrator with the following officials:
The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy
Answer. If confirmed, I will report through the Administrator to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Energy. In the
Administrator's absence, I will represent NNSA.
Question. The Administrator for Nuclear Security
Answer. If confirmed, I will report directly to the Administrator.
Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Administrators to
support the execution of their respective missions.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management
Answer. If confirmed, I will interact with the Assistant Secretary
of Energy for Environmental Management on environmental management
issues that overlap with NNSA.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs
Answer. NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs serves as
the primary point of contact with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and
Programs. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA's
priorities with the Assistant Secretary, as appropriate.
Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council
Answer. The Administrator is a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA's
priorities to the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA's
priorities to the Commander of United States Strategic Command.
Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA's
priorities to the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Acquisition and
Project Management
Answer. I understand NNSA reorganized its Office of Acquisition and
Project Management to the Office of Infrastructure and the Office of
Partnership Acquisition Services. If confirmed, I will support the
Administrator by providing management oversight for the Associate
Administrator for Infrastructure and the Associate Administrator for
Partnership Acquisition Services.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator and NNSA's
priorities to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
relationship with the department of defense (dod)
Question. If confirmed, you will support the Administrator in his
role as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), together with
the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,
Policy, and Research and Engineering, as well as the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
Since the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, when it was designated as the
``Military Liaison Committee,'' the primary purpose of the NWC is to
serve as the civilian-military interface and set the military
requirements for the nuclear weapons stockpile, which form the basis of
the core mission of NNSA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is, in a
sense, NNSA's primary customer.
How would you assess the relationship between NNSA and the DOD, at
both senior management levels, as well as at working levels?
Answer. Coming from the Navy and having worked on a major future
leg of the deterrent, I have been able to witness these relationships
first-hand. From my current perspective, NNSA and DOD integrate their
work well and maintain a positive working relationship. This
collaboration will be essential to manage the increased demands being
placed on the nuclear security enterprise. It is imperative that NNSA
and DOD continue to integrate their unique capabilities,
responsibilities, and schedules to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to maintain regular engagements with
my DOD counterparts. I hope to use my previous experience within DOD to
foster a positive and proactive relationship in support of NNSA's role
as a dynamic partner.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA is adequately responsive to the
requirements set by the DOD?
Answer. Yes, but I recognize the shifting strategic environment has
increased demands on the nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed, my
goal is to maintain continual communication and collaboration with DOD,
ensure that DOD requirements are appropriately informed by the nuclear
security enterprise's design and production capacity, and, if
necessary, improve NNSA's ability to rapidly respond to DOD
requirements.
Question. Do you believe it important for the NWC to ensure the
NNSA is adequately funded through the interagency budget process to
meet DOD's requirements?
Answer. Having been the Program Executive Officer for Strategic
Submarines, I recognize the breadth of the NNSA portfolio and the
requirement for NNSA to maintain a budget capable of supporting
activities necessary to meet DOD requirements. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Secretary of Energy, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the NWC to ensure NNSA alignment with the
DOD.
nnsa budget
Question. The workload of the NNSA has seen an unprecedented
increase over the past several years, a increase that is expected to
continue for the foreseeable future. However, growth in the NNSA budget
has consistently failed to keep pace with inflation and failed to fully
resource a variety of projects understood to be critical capability
needs, such as tritium and conventional high explosives production.
Multiple independent commissions, including congressional
Commissions on the National Defense Strategy, Reforms to the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution, and Strategic Posture of the
United States have highlighted that U.S. defense investments are
inadequate for addressing the international security threats facing the
United States. These conclusions have been echoed by many Members of
Congress.
Do you agree that sustained real growth in the defense budget,
including the national security functions of the Department of Energy,
of at least 3 to 5 percent is necessary to meet global security
challenges without incurring significant additional risk?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details on
budget development for the national security functions of DOE. If
confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, the Secretary of Energy,
the Deputy Secretary of Energy, and the Office of Management and Budget
to request the funding necessary for NNSA to achieve its national
security missions.
Question. 10 U.S.C. 179 requires the Nuclear Weapons Council to
examine the NNSA budget before its submission to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to ensure it can meet DOD requirements, and
provide confirmation of such review to Congress.
If confirmed, do you commit, without qualification, to complying
with the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 179 with regard to the annual NWC
examination of the NNSA budget prior to its submission to OMB?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How would you support the Administrator in ensuring
compliance with this provision, including providing the NWC with
adequate time to review the budget before its submission to OMB?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not been briefed on this
process. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, the NWC, and
the Secretary of Energy to ensure compliance with this provision.
Question. If confirmed, what standards would you recommend the
Administrator employ in measuring the adequacy of the NNSA budget?
Answer. Measuring the adequacy of the NNSA budget requires
considering how well the implementation of NNSA strategy documents
meets statutory requirements and achieves the goals of the
Administration. If confirmed, I look forward to evaluating NNSA's
budget in cooperation with my departmental and interagency counterparts
and establishing the budget levels required to fulfill NNSA's statutory
and administrative objectives.
nuclear policy and modernization
Question. United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our
Nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have
deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with
systems and production capabilities beyond or nearing the end of their
useful lives. These capabilities must be updated to maintain a viable
nuclear deterrent.
Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of Defense
that nuclear deterrence is the Nation's highest priority mission and
that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national
security priority?
Answer. Yes. Our nuclear deterrent has been the backbone of U.S.
national defense for decades, and its modernization is essential. NNSA
must continue to deliver a safe, secure, and effective stockpile to the
DOD. If confirmed, I commit to supporting this critical mission.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to support and advocate for
full funding for efforts to comprehensively modernize the Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile, including supplemental capabilities like the
warhead for the sea-launched cruise missile, the supporting sustainment
and production infrastructure, and experimental capabilities, and
accelerate such programs wherever possible?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will help advance the modernization of
the U.S. nuclear stockpile, including SLCM-N, and the facilities and
capabilities across the enterprise that underpin the deterrent.
Question. In its unanimous bipartisan conclusions, the 2023
Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) highlighted the rapidly growing
threats facing the United States, now and in the coming decades from
China's unprecedented nuclear and military force expansion, Russia's
aggression and investment in destabilizing strategic capabilities, and
growing regional nuclear and missile threats from North Korea and Iran.
To address these threats, the SPC recommended, among other steps, that
the U.S. should expedite its ongoing nuclear force modernization
activities, modify its strategic nuclear force structure to account for
the rapid growth of China's nuclear forces and the unprecedented need
to deter two nuclear-armed peer adversaries, and urgently develop
additional theater range nuclear options.
Do you agree with the conclusions of the SPC regarding global
threats to U.S. interests?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the SPC's conclusions about global
threats to U.S. interests, the challenges posed by two near-peer,
nuclear-armed adversaries, and the risk of coordinated or opportunistic
aggression. If confirmed, I will consider what efforts NNSA has already
undertaken to respond to such challenges and how NNSA can harness its
unique assets and workforce to promote peace through strength and
enable a more stable global environment.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and
North Korea have expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force
capabilities?
Answer. The geopolitical threat landscape is dynamic, and in recent
years its complexity has only increased. If confirmed, I will support
NNSA's efforts to maintain America's technological superiority over our
adversaries and ensure that they cannot gain a strategic advantage. I
will also seek relevant briefings on nuclear threats to ensure that
NNSA's work is aligned with the requirement to deter and counter
potential threats to U.S. interests.
Question. In your view, how does NNSA support strategic competition
with the countries highlighted by the SPC and contribute to the overall
national security of the United States?
Answer. NNSA's multiple nuclear-related missions support the
Nation's nuclear deterrent, U.S. counterterrorism and
counterproliferation goals, nonproliferation, arms control, and
militarily effective naval nuclear propulsion. Each of these efforts
allows the United States to project power and influence well beyond its
shores, and all make positive contributions to the Nation's safety and
security. Each of these key mission areas contribute to a strong
national defense and cause adversaries to question whether they can
match our Nation in the nuclear domain.
Question. Do you support continued collaboration with the United
Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
Answer. Yes, collaboration with the United Kingdom is a key element
of our national security. As one of the United States' longest and most
reliable partners, continued cooperation with the United Kingdom on the
capabilities and technologies that underpin our respective nuclear
deterrents advances out mutual defense and security.
Question. Past Administrations have conducted Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) to define the upcoming overarching U.S. nuclear policy and
strategy. The last NPR, conducted in 2022 by the Biden administration,
emphasized the importance of modernizing our stockpile, NNSA
facilities, and the workforce. Although the Secretary of Defense is the
primary cabinet official responsible for policymaking regarding nuclear
weapons, the support of the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator
for Nuclear Security are crucial to successful execution of the nuclear
mission.
If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect the Administrator
to assign to you in the conduct of the Trump administration's NPR,
should it choose to conduct one?
Answer. If confirmed, pending any new NPR deliberations, I will
work with the Administrator to determine what duties and
responsibilities I could best execute to support this Administration in
its efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent and promote peace
through strength.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to the policies outlined by
the 2022 NPR would you recommend the Trump administration consider?
Answer. I am not yet aware of what deliberations may be occurring
regarding a planned or future NPR. I support full scope modernization
of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, its triad, nuclear command, control, and
communications, and the infrastructure and scientific capabilities that
support a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear stockpile. If
confirmed, I would prioritize the necessary briefings to understand the
complex threats posed to the United States and how the nuclear security
enterprise, in coordination with DOD, can best deter those threats.
Question. Should the upcoming NPR call for the development of
additional nuclear capabilities, will you commit, if confirmed, to
supporting those additions and ensuring that NNSA fully supports the
new requirements?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Arms control, when effective and verifiable, has been a
valuable tool for managing competition and international security
concerns. In contrast, unverifiable arms control regimes observed by
only one party can generate instability.
Do you believe that further reductions should be taken only within
the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreement with Russia,
China and other nuclear-armed powers?
Answer. The decision to pursue future arms control agreements will
be made by the President. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
partners at other agencies, including State, the Intelligence
Community, and Defense, to support the President in this area. I will
also leverage NNSA's unique expertise and capabilities to develop
monitoring and verification tools, including the ability to
unilaterally monitor activities, so that the United States is prepared
to meet future arms control opportunities and challenges.
nuclear weapons council
Question. In your view, what are the most significant issues the
Council should take up in the coming years?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the NNSA
Administrator, broadening my knowledge of the nuclear security
enterprise, and collaborating with my fellow DOD colleagues through the
NWC. While I am not currently informed of internal deliberations of the
NWC, I do believe that the NWC should take a strategic approach to
prioritizing the execution of the existing Program of Record. The NWC
should continue to identify opportunities to accelerate the Program of
Record, but equal attention to the recapitalization of the enterprise
is required to secure NNSA's ability to continue serving the deterrent
into the future.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to fully supporting the
Administrator's participation in NWC matters?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the staffs
of the other members of the NWC and the interagency to ensure that
annual budgets adequately support the modernization and sustainment of
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act
restructured the existing Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs into the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense
Policy and Programs. Congress took this action to cut through
bureaucratic stovepipes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
designate a single official as the principal civilian staff assistant
responsible for nuclear policies, programs, and operations.
What is your understanding of the role of this position in relation
to the Nuclear Weapons Council and with regard to the overall DOD
relationship with the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to engagements with my
counterparts as they implement this restructuring and aim to support
further coordination between our organizations. I will support the
Administrator and work with DOD partners to streamline communications
between DOD and NNSA.
defense programs
Question. Do you believe that the United States currently possesses
the capabilities to ensure the stockpile is safe, secure, and
reliable--without the need to resume nuclear explosive testing?
Answer. Yes, and I agree with the nominee for NNSA Administrator's
position on this matter. For nearly 30 years, the three national
security laboratory directors and the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command have annually assessed the nuclear stockpile and determined
that it remains safe, secure, and effective, with no technical issue
that would require a return to underground nuclear explosive testing.
The confidence provided by this annual assessment process has, in part,
allowed the United States to continue observing an enduring moratorium
on nuclear tests since 1992. If confirmed, I will continue to support
the annual assessment process and will ensure NNSA continues to adhere
to nuclear test readiness requirements while supporting a rigorous and
effective Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Question. What is your understanding of the current nuclear weapons
stockpile modernization plan?
Answer. I understand that NNSA is currently focused on delivering
modernized warheads across all three legs of the nuclear triad in
alignment with our DOD partners and continues to meet all DOD
requirements. The current program of record includes weapons that have
already been delivered such as the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370; weapons in
advanced development and production stages that will soon be delivered
such as the B61-13 and W80-4; and weapons in earlier stages of design
and engineering that will be delivered in the 2030's, such as the W87-
1, W93, and the warhead for the SLCM-N. These programs are all
dependent on the recapitalization of infrastructure for producing
weapons components and designing, certifying, and assessing these
modernized warheads in addition to our existing stockpile. While I am
encouraged by the nuclear security enterprise's responsiveness in
rapidly standing up the B61-13 and SLCM-N programs to meet emerging
requirements, deterrence is not static. Rather, it is a condition that
must continually be maintained. I am certain that NNSA will need to be
agile in responding to new DOD requirements as the security environment
and the threats posed by our adversaries evolve.
Question. Do you have any concerns with this level of effort
required of NNSA and, in particular, concurrency between the plants and
the laboratories?
Answer. I have a high degree of confidence that NNSA and its
nuclear security enterprise will be able to meet the challenge of
delivering the growing program of record on time and on budget. If
confirmed, I will reinforce the Administrator's enterprise-wide
coordination efforts and work closely with my counterparts across the
enterprise to ensure we remain aligned in our efforts and continue
building on the progress we've made toward achieving our ambitious
modernization and infrastructure recapitalization schedules.
Question. Congress has authorized the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program for the last several years in order to exercise design and
engineering skills in support of the nuclear weapons mission, but this
authority has not been fully utilized by NNSA.
If confirmed, how would you support the Stockpile Responsiveness
Program and make full use of the authorities it provides NNSA?
Answer. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP) is among NNSA's
most critical mechanisms for developing innovative technology,
prototypes, and new capabilities needed to meet the emerging security
environment. It also serves to develop talented nuclear security
professionals. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator's goals
for fully leveraging the SRP.
Question. If confirmed, what are your long-term plans for the
National Ignition Facility and other critical experimental facilities?
Answer. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the world's highest
energy laser and is one of the most important parts of NNSA's science-
based stockpile stewardship program. It remains unrivaled due to the
environments that are created, which were previously only possible with
underground nuclear testing. If confirmed, I look forward to being
briefed on NNSA's current long-term plans for NIF and other critical
experimental facilities and to working with the Administrator, NNSA
subject matter experts, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
Congress to determine any required updates to these plans.
Question. What are your views of the Advanced Computing Program and
what is your vision for the use of advanced computing in furtherance of
NNSA missions?
Answer. I understand that NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing
Program has delivered unparalleled modeling and simulation capabilities
that provide new insights into complex interactions within the nuclear
weapons explosion process. As we deliver the current modernization
programs of record and consider new weapon programs to meet emerging
needs, I anticipate we will need even more powerful computing
capabilities to run even more advanced physics models to ensure U.S.
nuclear weapons remain safe, reliable, and able to meet DOD
requirements. This will be especially true as NNSA integrates
artificial intelligence and quantum computing capabilities. If
confirmed, I will work with the NNSA Administrator to fully leverage
the laboratories' deployed high-performance computing capabilities as
well as acquire necessary new capabilities.
Question. What role do you see in the application of artificial
intelligence and machine learning tools in support of NNSA missions?
Answer. Artificial intelligence (AI) has possible applications that
may significantly advance national security activities. Integrating AI-
based tools with NNSA's world-leading high-performance computing
capabilities could enable greater efficiency in optimizing designs and
discovering new materials to produce nuclear weapons components, which
could accelerate the path from new concepts to delivering capabilities.
If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to accelerate
integration of AI and machine learning applications to support NNSA's
stockpile modernization and sustainment mission, as well as its
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and other critical objectives.
Question. The NNSA depends upon a unique mix of private sector and
government sources for research, development, and manufacture of
critical technologies to support its national security missions.
However, U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or
has disappeared. Our competitors are engaging in aggressive military
modernization and advanced weaponry development. Much of the innovation
in critical technologies suitable for national defense purposes is
occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.
In your view, what technologies do you see as having the greatest
impact on the missions of the NNSA in the future?
Answer. AI and machine learning technologies hold vast potential
for allowing NNSA to improve the nuclear security enterprise's existing
systems and advance our modernization efforts. Fully integrating these
tools into the enterprise will allow us to leverage the significant
advantage we maintain over our adversaries in historical nuclear test
data and production data to make nuclear weapon design and
manufacturing faster and more efficient. If confirmed, I will work
alongside the NNSA Administrator and coordinate with NNSA's labs,
plants, and sites to ensure we use these technologies appropriately for
our national security missions.
Question. Do you believe NNSA is effectively developing this
technology in comparison to our adversaries?
Answer. I do not yet have insight into activities NNSA may be
undertaking to develop this technology, but like the nominee for NNSA
Administrator, I recognize the need to compete aggressively with our
adversaries in this field. If confirmed, fully understanding this
question will be a priority for me, and I will immediately seek to
understand NNSA's efforts to date.
Question. Are NNSA's investments in these technologies
appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized across all of the
Administration's missions and with the DOD, where appropriate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will diligently support and amplify the
NNSA Administrator's efforts to coordinate technology investments
across the nuclear security enterprise and with our DOD partners.
Question. In general, do you see NNSA as a good partner for
innovative, private sector entities?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the unique and challenging work being
done at NNSA's labs, plants and sites creates unique opportunities for
private sector innovation and requires public-private collaboration. If
confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and leadership at the
labs, plants, and sites to enhance collaboration with the private
sector to advance our world-class scientific preeminence.
Question. What steps would you take to improve the NNSA's ability
to engage industry, particularly innovative firms outside the
traditional Nuclear Security Enterprise?
Answer. Details about NNSA's engagements with industry partners are
not yet available to me, but I understand that NNSA maintains strong
engagement with industry partners on available contracting
opportunities through various formal and informal means. If confirmed,
I commit to soliciting feedback and suggestions from industry partners
and implementing lessons learned from previous contract competitions.
construction and project management
Question. NNSA has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays,
and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
facilities, including the Uranium Processing Facility, the Savannah
River Plutonium Processing Facility, and the High Explosive Synthesis,
Formulation, and Production Facility.
In your opinion, what are the primary causes of these repeated
failures in project management?
Answer. NNSA's large construction projects face cost overruns and
schedule delays. This is due to several factors, including contractor
underperformance, lack of effective Federal oversight, supply chain
challenges leading to delays in procurement, and contracts structured
in ways that insufficiently incentivize performance. COVID-19 and
economic conditions have also contributed to challenges facing these
projects. If confirmed, I commit to advancing these important projects
in support of our national security.
Question. In your view, are the changes in NNSA project management
practices undertaken over the last few years sufficient to address
these problems?
Answer. NNSA is improving its project management practices, but I
recognize the need for further efforts in this area. If confirmed, I
plan to seek out opportunities to leverage innovative strategies to
deliver NNSA's mission more efficiently.
Question. If not, what additional steps would you take, if
confirmed, to improve the availability of highly qualified talent
capable of managing intensive capital infrastructure projects?
Answer. NNSA's infrastructure projects cannot be successful without
qualified professionals. If confirmed, I will support efforts to
recruit and retain talented individuals with commercial project
management experience. I am also committed to developing effective
teams to address our most pressing challenges in partnerships with the
labs, plants, and sites.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
ensure that these project management failures are not repeated in the
future?
Answer. NNSA must balance minimizing burdensome oversight
requirements with ensuring optimal oversight to improve project
performance. If confirmed, I am committed to holding the individuals
responsible for project management accountable, acting decisively when
necessary, implementing lessons learned, improving cost estimating
procedures, and identifying and taking advantage of opportunities for
acceleration.
Question. What specific change in policy, practice, organization,
or regulation would you recommend in furtherance of this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to taking stock of NNSA's
current initiatives and policies to identify opportunities for
improvement. I plan to refine policy to help the agency more accurately
estimate costs, eliminate redundant requirements, and streamline
acquisition and project management processes. Additionally, I will
ensure that contracts are structured to incentivize performance.
Question. In your view, does the Administrator for Nuclear Security
need any additional authorities or flexibilities to address the root
causes of these project management failures? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. My understanding is that DOE Order 413.3B governs program
and project management for capital assets across the Department,
including at NNSA. Applying thorough project management processes is
key to minimizing risk and delivering capabilities in time to meet the
needs they are intended to address at an acceptable cost. I support the
recent memorandum released by Energy Secretary Wright, which
prioritizes efficiency and mission execution at our national labs. If
confirmed, I look forward to being briefed on how this applies to
NNSA's infrastructure modernization efforts and working together to
identify additional opportunities for implementing process changes in
support of effective, efficient project management.
Question. In 2014, largely in response to a string of the large
project management failures, Congress created the Office of Cost
Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE) in the Department of Energy.
CEPE was modeled on the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE).
In your view, is CEPE sufficiently staffed to effectively provide
the Administrator for Nuclear Security with costing and project
management advice on the variety of projects within NNSA?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to NNSA's staffing
details. I am also aware that, if confirmed, I will also serve as the
Federal Salaries and Expenses Account Integrator and will oversee
staffing needs for all of NNSA. I will ensure that CEPE is
appropriately staffed to support the Administrator.
Question. Does CEPE have sufficient authority and access to DOE
data and information to serve its statutory purpose?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to the procedures
for accessing DOE data. I understand the importance of data in
executing NNSA's statutory mission. I understand that data is key for
CEPE's ability to provide independent advisement to me, the
Administrator, NWC, and Congress. If confirmed, I will review whether
CEPE has sufficient authority and access.
Question. CEPE reports directly to the Administrator for Nuclear
Security. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that CEPE
has adequate access to information and senior leaders in your
organization, as necessary and appropriate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will have regular engagements with CEPE and
ensure access to senior leaders in order for CEPE to conduct its work
and provide valuable insight for decisionmaking.
Question. If confirmed, specifically how would you undertake to
support and sustain CEPE capabilities and independence?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to all of the
capabilities that CEPE possesses. If confirmed, I will seek to better
understand these unique and important capabilities and take the actions
needed to maintain them.
plutonium strategy
Question. NNSA has selected two sites for plutonium pit production:
Los Alamos will produce approximately 30 pits per year and the Savannah
River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) will produce up to 50 pits
per year, for a projected two-site total of no fewer than 80 pits per
year. These production targets were established several years ago,
prior to revelations about the speed and scope of potential adversary
nuclear force expansions.
Do you believe and overall production target of no fewer than 80
pits per year is sufficient to meet future demands for modernizing and
adapting the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. I am unaware of internal discussions regarding production
targets to meet the current and future demands of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the NNSA
Administrator and laboratory, plant, and site leadership across the
nuclear security enterprise to achieve full rate production and pursue
opportunities to accelerate the production capability in support of the
nuclear deterrent.
Question. Do you support the two-site solution, initiated under
President Trump's first term, for meeting statutory requirements for
pit production?
Answer. Yes, I support NNSA's two-site approach to supply no fewer
than 80 war reserve plutonium pits.
Question. What are your views on the January 16, 2025, district
court settlement halting installation of classified equipment and
construction of associated facilities at SRPPF until such time as NNSA
prepares a new Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement?
Answer. I am aware that the settlement agreement that brought an
end to the lawsuit challenging the National Environmental Protection
Act work done in support of pit production was mutually agreed upon by
the NNSA and the plaintiffs. Per the Agreement, NNSA will conduct a
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) and issue a Record
of Decision based on the findings of the PEIS. The Department agreed to
complete this process within two and a half years and provide for
enhanced public participation. If confirmed, I plan to carefully track
this matter to ensure that pit production and the specific SRPPF
project are not negatively affected.
Question. What are your views on the Los Alamos site and its
capabilities to achieve its pits per year production target to support
the demands of the ongoing stockpile program?
Answer. I congratulate NNSA, LANL, and the nuclear security
enterprise on producing the first war reserve plutonium pit for the
W87-1 last year. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator to
prioritize and accelerate the production capacity required to support
the nuclear deterrent.
Question. SRPPF has been plagued by issues with design and
construction since the decision was made to convert the partially
completed Mixed Oxide Fabrication Facility into a facility for
producing plutonium pits. The project also experienced significant cost
growth and delays due to impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic and the
post-pandemic spike in inflation.
What is your understanding of the status of SRPPF and the project's
likelihood of supporting NNSA efforts to meet the statutory requirement
to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year?
Answer. My understanding is that SRPPF will allow NNSA to produce
at least 50 war reserve pits per year. I am also cognizant that NNSA
must mitigate further schedule delays and cost growth.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to improve the
performance of the project, both in terms of cost management and
construction efficiency?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA's contract structures
properly hold contractors accountable for their performance as well as
incentivize efforts to accelerate project schedules and decrease costs.
uranium strategy and tritium production
Question. Since the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
ceased enrichment operations in 2013, DOE has relied on the existing
stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to support Naval Nuclear
Propulsion, as well as the down-blending of recycled HEU to meet
requirements for unobligated LEU for tritium production, but the
available supply of HEU is finite. To address this supply limitation,
the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 National Defense Authorization (NDAA)
directed the Secretary of Energy to identify two to four sites for
reestablishing unobligated domestic uranium enrichment, for both
defense and civilian energy purposes, with an eye to begin construction
no later than 2027.
If confirmed, will you support the Secretary of Energy in meeting
the requirement in the fiscal year 2025 NDAA outlined above?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I am eager to learn more about NNSA's
current plans to support departmental leadership in meeting this
requirement.
Question. The fiscal year 2025 NDAA specified that plans for
reestablishing the enrichment capability should focus on ``modular,
scalable facilities''. What are your ideas for how to proceed with such
an effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed with the NNSA
Administrator on how NNSA can best reestablish a domestic uranium
enrichment capability in a flexible and resilient manner to meet
defense mission requirements and the requirements in the fiscal year
2025 NDAA.
Question. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2014
entitled ``Interagency Review Needed to Update U.S. Position on
Enriched Uranium That Can Be Used for Tritium Production'' concluded
that the DOE's policy on identification of obligated uranium was based
on three international agreements and a series of policy decisions. Of
the three agreements, GAO concluded that only one explicitly addressed
tritium production, but that past State Department findings had
consistently interpreted the other two agreements as imposing peaceful
use restrictions on LEU for tritium production.
Do you believe this GAO reading of all three agreements remains
consistent with U.S. policy goals? In your view, should the State
Department's prior findings be reevaluated?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed on this
report. I do know that ensuring a consistent and continued supply of
tritium is critical to the deterrent. I will support the NNSA
Administrator in determining whether future actions are necessary. I
will also work with the Administrator to ensure NNSA's production of
tritium remains consistent with U.S. governmental policy and
international agreements. I also understand that the views of
international partners and the U.S. interagency may have changed in the
time since this report was released and it would be worth reengaging
our domestic and foreign partners to assess consistency with U.S.
policy goals.
Question. Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 directed the Department of Energy to
``determine whether the Agreement [between the United States of America
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] for
Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes,
signed at Washington, July 3, 1958, . . . permits the United States to
obtain low-enriched uranium for the purposes of producing tritium in
the United States.'' The Secretary of Energy affirmed that such
procurement of low enriched uranium can occur.
What are your views on the accuracy of the Secretary of Energy's
determination in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and the
Administrator to evaluate the previous determination. Ultimately, I
seek to maintain our mutually beneficial partnership with the United
Kingdom.
fissile materials disposition
Question. The United States and Russia committed to the disposition
of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium under the Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) in 2000. The original plan
by the United States was to convert excess weapons grade plutonium to
mixed oxide reactor fuel for civilian reactors at the Savannah River
Site (SRS). After spending billions of dollars, and following Russia's
withdrawal from the PMDA in 2016, this project was abandoned in favor
of diluting the plutonium and disposing of it at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose process involves shipping
the plutonium pits from Pantex to Los Alamos to be turned into oxide
powder, then shipping then on to SRS for packaging, followed by final
shipment to WIPP for disposal.
Do you believe the United States should continue to dispose of its
stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium despite Russia's abrogation of
the PMDA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue NNSA's work to remove excess
plutonium from South Carolina, consistent with the DOE-South Carolina
Settlement Agreement. Regarding NNSA's broader excess plutonium
disposition work, I will work with interagency partners to assess
whether the United States should continue to comply with PMDA
unilaterally.
Question. What are your views on the dilute and disposal method?
Answer. I am not currently privy to the details of the program. If
confirmed, I look forward to being informed of the details of this
program so that I can provide effective executive leadership.
Question. What are your views on permanent disposal at WIPP?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of
the program, though I understand that dilute and dispose, NNSA's
program of record for plutonium disposition, includes disposal at WIPP.
If confirmed, I look forward to familiarizing myself with the details
of this program so that I can provide effective executive leadership.
Question. What are your views of the logistics of shipping
plutonium between Pantex, Los Alamos, SRS, and WIPP? In your opinion,
could this process be simplified by shipping the pits directly to SRS
to be converted to oxide powder there?
Answer. I am not currently privy to the details of the program. If
confirmed, I look forward to being briefed the details of this program
so that I can provide effective executive leadership.
Question. What are your views on reprocessing as an alternative to
dilution and disposal?
Answer. While I am not currently privy to the details of this
program, I do know that changing NNSA's technical approach to plutonium
disposition could be costly and could create challenges relative to the
DOE-South Carolina Settlement Agreement.
nuclear safety and security
NNSA was created partially in response to security lapses at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nonetheless, periodic security lapses
have continued to occur, risking exposure of some of our Nation's most
closely guarded secrets.
Question. To what extent have the conditions that allowed such
lapses to occur been corrected, in your view?
Answer. I am dedicated to the continuous enhancement of security
across all NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites, but I do not have
details regarding current security infrastructure. If confirmed, I look
forward to being briefed on existing security measures and related
operations.
Question. Section 3112 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense
Authorization Act prohibits the Secretary of Energy or the
Administrator for Nuclear Security, after April 15, 2025, from
admitting citizens or agents of the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the
Islamic Republic of Iran to any national security laboratory, nuclear
weapons production facility, or any site that supports the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program.
If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring full compliance with this
provision across NNSA by the statutorily directed April 15, 2025, date
for implementation?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, are there further changes in policy,
practice, management, or oversight to reduce the frequency of security
issues at NNSA facilities that should be considered?
Answer. I am not aware of any current security infraction that
prompted this change; however, if confirmed, I will seek briefings on
the NNSA's adherence to this prohibition and any additional measures
that should be taken to protect operations. I am committed to close
collaboration with Congress to guarantee the robust protection of
NNSA's labs, plants, and sites. We must ensure that no adversary gains
unauthorized access, except as explicitly required by current or future
treaty obligations.
Question. Over the past several years, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of unmanned aerial systems operating, both
lawfully and unlawfully, in U.S. airspace domestically and over
American military installations overseas.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the NNSA
appropriately prioritizes and resources detection and defeat
capabilities for UAS that pose a threat to NNSA facilities and assets?
Answer. Protecting NNSA facilities and assets from Uncrewed
Aircraft System (UAS) threats is a top priority. If confirmed, I look
forward to being briefed on NNSA's UAS detection and defeat
capabilities. I will also reinforce our collaborative efforts with
other agencies to proactively address evolving threats and leverage the
latest Counter UAS (CUAS) technologies.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with Congress
and the interagency to better clarify U.S. Government roles and
responsibilities for detecting, tracking, and if necessary, defeating,
UAS within U.S. airspace?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
Office of Enterprise Assessments have periodically reported accidents
at various Department of Energy facilities over recent years, including
explosions, radiation exposure, and leakage of hazardous materials--
putting both personnel and the mission at risk. Yet, while personnel
safety is critically important, the nuclear mission by definition
involves some of the most hazardous materials on earth. Consequently,
acceptance of a measure of risk is a prerequisite to accomplish NNSA's
assigned missions.
How should we balance safety, risk, and mission at NNSA facilities?
Answer. The production, handling, and disposal of nuclear materials
inherently involve significant risks. Therefore, prudent risk
management of safety, programmatic, and other regulatory initiatives is
achieved by maintaining vigilant and continuous oversight, supported by
robust risk controls. If confirmed, I am committed to prioritizing
safety across the organization, ensuring that risks are identified and
effectively minimized while NNSA continues to successfully execute its
critical and time-sensitive mission.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve
the safety culture at the various NNSA labs and sites while still
meeting mission requirements?
Answer. The actions of senior leadership to establish and reinforce
safety expectations are essential to cultivating a positive safety
environment. I will work closely with the NNSA Administrator to ensure
these expectations are communicated effectively by partnering with the
leadership of our Management and Operating partners. I will emphasize
NNSA's long-term commitment to safe operations by fostering an
effective governance and management culture. Additionally, I will
underscore the critical importance of empowering and actively engaging
employees to provide feedback, while also promoting organizational
learning. Reinforcing these principles will establish a strong
foundation for enhancing the safety culture. If confirmed, I will
prioritize a safety-conscious work environment where employees feel
comfortable raising safety concerns, knowing that leadership is
prepared to address these issues effectively. Furthermore, I will
support our leadership by ensuring they have the necessary resources
and tools to address any safety concerns in a timely and efficient
manner.
cybersecurity
Question. What do you see as the primary cyber policy challenges
for the NNSA and what suggestions do you have for addressing them?
Answer. Cybersecurity threats are rapidly changing and evolving. If
confirmed, I will ensure that we work in lockstep across the
enterprise, as well as with our partners around the globe, to bolster
cybersecurity, meet mission needs, and promote national security.
Question. Do you believe that the NNSA's current capabilities,
policies, and authorities allow for effective cybersecurity? If not,
what steps should NNSA and the Department of Energy take to address any
shortfalls?
Answer. I have not yet been briefed on NNSA's current cybersecurity
capabilities, policies, and authorities, but, if confirmed, will
prioritize cybersecurity briefings to gain a deeper understanding
before determining effectiveness.
Question. What do you conclude from the recent cyber-attacks on
telecommunications infrastructure involving Volt Typhoon and Salt
Typhoon about the State of our cyber defenses?
Answer. These recent attacks show the interconnectivity between
public and private sectors. These partnerships must be strong, so that
communication and coordination occur, and mitigations can be
implemented expeditiously. It also highlights the importance of the
work NNSA must do to maintain a highly capable cybersecurity program.
Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
improve cybersecurity culture across the NNSA workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on continued collaboration among
cybersecurity teams across the enterprise, departmental elements, and
other government partners. I will identify opportunities to streamline
operations and gain efficiencies to improve secure mission activities.
Question. How would you empower and hold key leaders accountable
for improvements in NNSA cybersecurity?
Answer. I have not yet been briefed on NNSA's cybersecurity posture
but will leverage my experience in different fields within the Navy to
drive operational improvements across the organization, including
cybersecurity. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA empowers key leaders
from the top down to be accountable for adopting essential
cybersecurity tools and enforcing critical cybersecurity mitigations.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to work with the Department
of Defense and other agencies in the coordination of cyber security
initiatives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to remove obstacles that could
impede NNSA's responsibilities to interagency partners. I understand
NNSA actively collaborates with DOD and other agencies to support
cybersecurity goals and explore ways to enhance the protection,
exchange, and use of data.
regulation and oversight
Question. Staff at NNSA's national laboratories often complain that
they are overburdened by regulation and oversight, both internal and
external, and that these contribute to the challenges in staying under
cost and on schedule for major projects.
Do you believe that environmental, safety, and construction
regulations are properly applied to NNSA projects and operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I am fully committed to ensuring the safe
execution of operations across the nuclear security enterprise. This
includes safeguarding the workforce, the public, and the environment in
a manner that aligns with and supports NNSA mission execution. I am
aware of and support the Administration's initiatives aimed at
streamlining permitting processes and regulations for construction
projects at DOE's national laboratories.
Question. Do you believe these regulations undermine effective
performance by the labs and efficient mission execution overall?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to streamline
regulatory processes, standardize performance expectations, and promote
a practical, common-sense approach to the interpretation and
application of requirements--aimed at enhancing NNSA's efficiency,
innovation, and modernization across the enterprise. While I am not
currently informed of the detailed implementation of regulations
throughout the enterprise, I recognize that excessively rigid
interpretations of regulatory requirements can result in operational
inefficiencies. I am committed to utilizing available flexibilities,
such as exemptions and equivalencies, to implement necessary controls
while also pursuing regulatory relief where appropriate.
Question. In your view, are the NNSA labs and production facilities
subject to the appropriate level of oversight from the NNSA, DOE, the
EPA, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and/or Congress?
Are there certain oversight processes that are unnecessarily
duplicative or purely bureaucratic, in your view?
Answer. DOE Order 413.3B, which governs program and project
management for the acquisition of capital assets, applies to NNSA.
While this order provides essential structure and oversight, I
recognize that its implementation can, at times, be burdensome. If
confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring that critical work is
carried out in a timely and efficient manner within the framework of
this order. I will leverage my experience as an acquisition
professional in the Navy to actively engage with stakeholders to
identify and address any inefficiencies arising from current oversight
processes, and to develop effective solutions that support mission
success.
Question. If confirmed, what changes in regulatory or oversight
structures would you recommend, and why?
Answer. While I am not currently aware of the details of NNSA's
regulatory and oversight frameworks, if confirmed, I will actively
pursue opportunities to enhance operational efficiency, including the
potential reform of regulatory requirements where such changes are both
practical and beneficial.
safeguards and security
Question. What role, if any, will you have in ensuring safety and
security in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. I will collaborate with the Administrator to champion
initiatives that enhance modernization of safety and security at NNSA
facilities, fostering a robust safety and security culture built on
transparency, trust, and collaboration. This includes establishing
clear expectations with our partners for sustained safety performance
alongside successful mission accomplishment, recognizing that these
goals are mutually reinforced. Additionally, I will partner with the
Administrator and the security program office to implement systems and
processes that prevent security breaches. I will actively engage in
initiatives to improve security effectiveness and efficiency at all
NNSA facilities. Working with our partners, we will ensure oversight
practices support these objectives, driving continuous improvement in
both safety and security.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Administrator to
prioritize safe operations while accomplishing the mission and
mitigating security threats such as cyber, material, transportation,
and physical risks to NNSA. Ensuring the safety and security of NNSA's
facilities and nuclear materials is paramount.
Question. What role, if any, will you have in the NNSA's
interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board?
Answer. I recognize and value the importance of maintaining a
constructive working relationship with the DNFSB, supported by
transparent and open lines of communication. While it is my
understanding that the Department's overall engagement with the Board
is managed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy, if confirmed, I will work
closely with the NNSA Administrator in addressing DNFSB recommendations
and advice related to safety matters at defense nuclear facilities
across NNSA.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and NNSA's
Office of Enterprise Assessments have reported a number of accidents at
the national laboratories in recent years that put both personnel and
mission at risk. Yet, while personnel safety is critically important,
the nuclear mission by definition involves some of the most hazardous
materials with which we work in this country, and risk cannot be
eliminated completely at the labs while continuing to accomplish the
mission.
How should we balance safety, risk, and mission at the national
laboratories?
Answer. NNSA must maintain consistent and robust safety
performance, as safety and mission success are inherently
interdependent. Achieving this balance requires thorough risk
understanding, along with effective control and management of those
risks. If confirmed, I will remain focused on strengthening
collaboration between the laboratories and productionsites, while
emphasizing the importance of continuous improvement in the safe and
effective execution of NNSA's mission. I will be dedicated to fostering
a culture that empowers employees to proactively anticipate, identify,
report, and resolve safety concerns.
Question. What steps would you recommend to improve safety culture
at the labs while still meeting mission requirements?
Answer. Senior leadership can cultivate a positive safety
environment by establishing and reinforcing safety expectations. I will
work closely with the NNSA Administrator to ensure these expectations
are communicated effectively by partnering with the leadership of our
Management and Operating contractors. I will emphasize NNSA's long-term
commitment to safe operations by fostering an effective governance and
management culture. Additionally, I will underscore the critical
importance of empowering and actively engaging employees to provide
feedback, while also promoting organizational learning. Reinforcing
these principles will establish a strong foundation for enhancing the
safety culture. If confirmed, I will prioritize creating a safety-
conscious work environment where employees feel comfortable raising
safety concerns, knowing that leadership is prepared to address these
issues effectively. Furthermore, I will support our leadership by
ensuring they have the necessary resources and tools to address any
safety concerns in a timely and efficient manner.
nonproliferation
Question. What do you perceive as the highest priorities of the
nuclear nonproliferation programs at NNSA?
Answer. The first priority is addressing the nuclear programs of
Iran and North Korea. If confirmed, I will leverage NNSA's unique
technical capabilities to support the Administration's policy toward
Iran, and to implement and verify any future nuclear dismantlement
agreement with either country. The second priority is improving our
ability to detect nuclear proliferation activities as early as
possible, including in denied areas like space. If confirmed, I will
make it a priority to develop cutting-edge technologies to detect such
threats. This will provide maximum time for policymakers to formulate a
response and to stop threats as far from U.S. shores as possible. The
third priority is enabling the American nuclear renaissance while
ensuring that U.S. nuclear exports advance our national security
interests. If confirmed, I will strengthen NNSA's engagements with U.S.
nuclear companies and nuclear newcomer countries, to facilitate U.S.
exports while meeting the highest standards of safeguards, security,
and emergency preparedness.
Question. What challenges does the emerging multilateral nuclear
competition between the U.S., China, Russia, and North Korea pose to
existing nonproliferation efforts?
Answer. Emerging nuclear competition and greater cooperation among
U.S. adversaries in opposition to U.S. interests are among the most
challenging aspects of today's geopolitical environment. This dynamic
makes it more difficult to reach arms control agreements and to mount
coordinated international responses to attempts by nuclear proliferant
states to acquire nuclear weapons. If confirmed, I am committed to
leveraging NNSA's unique capabilities to mount a multi-layered defense
against nuclear proliferation, even in the face of this challenging
global environment.
Question. Do you believe additional cooperative nonproliferation
efforts are feasible in light of China, Russia, and North Korea's
burgeoning cooperation on nuclear technologies and materials?
Answer. Cooperation among China, Russia, and North Korea poses a
major challenge to nonproliferation efforts. The days when China and
Russia could be counted on to stand against North Korea's violation of
its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations are long gone. However,
a highly dynamic global security environment can present new
opportunities alongside challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to
discussing such opportunities in the nonproliferation sphere at the
direction of the Administration.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your nonproliferation R&D
priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize nonproliferation R&D that
allows for earlier detection of global nuclear threats, including:
Building space-based sensors for delivery to DOD for the U.S.
Nuclear Detonation detection System (USNDS)
Developing capabilities to detect and characterize
foreign nuclear weapons activities;
Improving capabilities to interdict nuclear materials
outside of regulatory control; and
Developing and advancing technical nuclear forensics
analysis capabilities that can support strategic deterrence with time-
critical decisions in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident.
I will also prioritize R&D that strengthens fundamental
competencies at the national laboratories, so they are prepared to
respond flexibly to future threats.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve
coordination across the NNSA on nonproliferation R&D and reduce
duplicative efforts?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to the details of
NNSA's organizational structure for nonproliferation R&D. However, to
be effective and efficient, this office must conduct its work in full
coordination with all relevant offices, not just across NNSA, but
across the entire U.S. Government. If confirmed, I look forward to
being briefed on any duplicative efforts in this area and discussing
efforts to increase efficiency.
emergency response
Question. What is your understanding of the NNSA's roles and
responsibilities with regard to responding to domestic and
international radiological events?
Answer. NNSA's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) is prepared to
respond to radiological and nuclear emergencies that may occur around
the world. Additionally, as a party to the IAEA's Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
NNSA leads nuclear and radiological response in the international
arena. This includes cooperating with other states to promptly provide
assistance in such cases. In some cases that involve U.S. national
security, public health and safety, and economic interests, NNSA also
provides direct bilateral or multilateral assistance to international
partners. This includes forensic capabilities in support of
international law enforcement efforts to investigate and attribute an
incident. Domestically, NNSA oversees the Department's Emergency
Operation Center and 24/7 Watch Office, which provides watch and
warning, situational awareness, and decision support capabilities for
domestic and international incidents.
Question. Do you believe NNSA is adequately resourced and staffed
to fulfill its existing emergency response responsibilities?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to details
concerning the resources and staffing of NNSA's emergency response
capabilities. Emergency response is a vital part of NNSA's mission. If
confirmed, I will assess NNSA's current staffing levels and resources
in this area, and work to ensure their sufficiency.
Question. In your view, how would you characterize the allocation
of roles and responsibilities across the interagency, particularly with
regard to the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. When it comes to nuclear and radiological emergency
response, NNSA coordinates closely with interagency partners,
especially DOD for international incidents and DHS for domestic
incidents. If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure that roles
and responsibilities are clear. To the extent possible, I would reduce
interagency redundancies and bureaucracy so that NNSA can efficiently
respond to emergencies. Leveraging decades worth of technical expertise
and response capabilities, NNSA helps keep America safe, secure, and
prosperous. Additionally, NNSA and its national laboratories' technical
nuclear weapons program expertise allow them to assess foreign nuclear
weapons programs.
Question. If confirmed, are there any adjustments to the allocation
of interagency responsibilities you would expect to recommend or
pursue?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to supporting the Administrator in
streamlining emergency response processes and implementing efficiencies
to ensure that NNSA provides Federal, State and local partners the
support they need during crises. I will also support the agency's
efforts to strengthen State and local response capabilities to enhance
domestic resiliency.
personnel management
Question. In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing
the NNSA in effectively and efficiently managing its workforce?
Answer. In terms of workforce, the biggest challenges facing NNSA
are recruitment and retention of highly skilled technical employees.
Factors contributing to this challenge include an aging workforce,
remote duty stations with high cost of living competition with the
private sector for the same skill sets, and the requirement for high
level security clearances.
Question. What recommendations do you have to improve NNSA's
management of its workforce?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am unaware of NNSA's workforce
management practices. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator
to effectively manage the workforce to include mitigating recruitment
and retention challenges.
Question. In your judgment, how effective is the Department of
Energy and the NNSA at identifying, promoting, and rewarding top
performers?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the DOE's or NNSA's performance
management policies and practices. However, the success of NNSA depends
on its workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring NNSA's
ability to recognize and reward top performers.
Question. Similarly, how effective is the Department of Energy and
the NNSA at identifying and removing underperforming or
counterproductive personnel?
Answer. While I am not currently privy to personnel matters at
NNSA, if confirmed, I will support the Administrator in fostering a
culture of accountability and performance.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend be done to improve
NNSA talent management?
Answer. Talent management is critical to NNSA's success. If
confirmed, I would adopt a holistic approach to talent management,
ensuring these efforts are aligned with agency goals. This includes
identifying and filling talent gaps, managing employee performance
through continuous feedback and recognition, offering training and
professional development opportunities, and developing a pipeline of
talent for future workforce needs.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate number of
civilian employees to perform its mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review NNSA's staffing and ensure it
is appropriately staffed.
Question. If not, what would be the appropriate size of the NNSA
civilian workforce and what, in your view, would the additional
personnel accomplish that NNSA is not able to accomplish today? If
confirmed, which specific components of the NNSA would you recommend
growing?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not privy to details about
NNSA's civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will assess NNSA's staffing
levels and requirements.
Question. Do you believe that NNSA has the appropriate
capabilities--in both its civilian employee and contractor workforces--
to perform its mission?
Answer. I am not currently privy to details about NNSA's civilian
and contractor workforces, but if confirmed, I look forward to
assessing NNSA's current staffing levels and future needs.
Question. If not, please explain what capabilities each such
workforce requires to ensure that NNSA is fully mission capable?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am not aware of the full extent
of capabilities required by the NNSA Federal and contractor workforces.
However, I believe there are areas for improvement such as project
management and AI. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator in
rapidly assessing and addressing these issues.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both NNSA the civilian and
the contractor workforces?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to foster and develop internal
talent pipelines at headquarters and across the nuclear security
enterprise.
Question. What programs, policies, or tools does NNSA need to
better attract the diverse range of skillsets required to support the
missions of the Administration to national security focused careers?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing current programs,
policies, and tools leveraged by NNSA to attract and retain a highly
skilled workforce.
sexual harassment
Question. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding
sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the DOE and NNSA?
Answer. I take the prevention and reporting of sexual harassment
and sex discrimination seriously and, if confirmed, will continue to
raise awareness and emphasize prevention at DOE and NNSA. In the event
that an issue of this nature is brought to my attention, I will consult
with appropriate stakeholders in DOE and NNSA and take appropriate
action without delay.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to
receive or become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or
discrimination from an employee or contractor of the DOE or NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that complaints of this nature
receive the serious attention they deserve across the enterprise. Any
contractor or Federal employee who raises such an issue will be treated
in accordance with all Federal laws and regulations.
relations with congress
Question. What are your views on the State of the relationship
between the NNSA and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular,
and with Congress in general?
Answer. Support from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC),
and Congress more broadly, is vital to NNSA's ability to successfully
advance its missions. Given SASC's role in authorizing the activities
of NNSA, I understand the importance of sustaining a strong
relationship with this Committee. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining
a strong relationship with the Committee during my tenure.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and
the NNSA?
Answer. A productive relationship with Congress depends on the
unfettered exchange of information. If confirmed, I am committed to
supporting NNSA's strong relationship with Congress, including this
Committee, and fostering consistent, transparent communication.
Question. The safety, security, and functionality of the United
States nuclear weapons stockpile is of paramount importance to our
Nation's national security, and any potential issues that could
undermine confidence in the reliability of U.S. nuclear forces are of
the highest interest to Congress.
If confirmed, will you commit, without qualification, that you will
promptly notify this Committee of any significant issues in the safety,
security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In much the same manner as the Combatant Commanders
within the Department of Defense, the Administrator for Nuclear
Security is required by Section 4716 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act
(50 U.S.C. 2756) to annually submit a list of priorities that were
insufficiently funded by that year's budget request by the President.
While unfunded requirements lists are invaluable tools in helping
Congress understand executable funding opportunities, past
Administrators have only sparingly fulfilled this requirement.
If confirmed, will you commit to supporting the Administrator in
fully complying with the statutory requirement to submit an annual
unfunded priority list to Congress with the annual budget submission of
the President?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner without delay? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees, and their
respective staffs with records and other information within their
oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
8(a) contracts
1. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Pappano, I recently toured an SBA
8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to
the Federal customer in terms of cost and efficiency while delivering
mission-critical solutions that increase our national security and
warfighter readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best ``bang for the
buck'' for taxpayers, giving contracting officers additional
flexibility while also maximizing efficiency by reducing red-tape. Do
you see the value in increased efficiency in flexibility brought from
initiatives such as the 8(a) program?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more
about small business programs supporting our national security
missions. I will welcome and support approaches that streamline Federal
procurement processes, provide maximum practicable opportunities to
small businesses, while delivering cost effective solutions for our
critical national security missions that align with the
Administration's priorities.
alaska
2. Senator Sullivan. Vice Admiral Pappano, my State of Alaska is
``resource-rich but infrastructure poor''. We have fewer roads miles
than the State of Connecticut, despite being 118 times larger. Alaska
is also a lynchpin to American homeland defense and home to multiple
bases which contribute to our national security. Some of these bases
recently experienced energy security issues which highlighted the need
for resiliency in our grid. The Department of Energy (DOE) contracts
for many micro reactors have already been finalized. At what point will
fuel be produced and allocated so that these innovators can start
production?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Fuel for micro reactors is not in the purview
of the National Nuclear Security Administration. I defer to the
Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy on this matter.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
national nuclear security administration workforce
3. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Pappano, at facilities like the Y-
12 National Security Complex and Los Alamos, more than 30 percent of
employees are eligible for retirement in the coming years. We need a
strategy to recruit, train, and retain the next generation of nuclear
professionals if we are going to sustain the stockpile and support our
Navy's nuclear propulsion needs. What is your assessment of the
National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) current workforce
development pipeline, and what specific steps would you take to
strengthen recruitment and retention--especially for high-skill trades
and early career nuclear professionals?
Vice Admiral Pappano. In my current capacity, I am not aware of
NNSA's current workforce development pipeline. If confirmed, I look
forward to learning about NNSA's recruitment and retention efforts. In
terms of workforce, the biggest challenges facing NNSA are recruitment
and retention of highly skilled technical employees. If confirmed, I
will work with the Administrator to address these challenges. This
includes working with NNSA's M&O contractors, universities, and trade
schools to ensure a pipeline of talent for future workforce needs.
4. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Pappano, NNSA has struggled to add
additional personnel required to update the nuclear arsenal. In your
professional opinion, is this a good time to fire or offer buyouts to
NNSA employees?
Vice Admiral Pappano. NNSA's success is highly dependent on its
workforce. If confirmed, I will advocate for NNSA's workforce to ensure
the agency is able to deliver on its critical national security
mission.
nuclear deterrence
5. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Pappano, the NNSA is being asked to
simultaneously modernize the stockpile, expand plutonium pit
production, support the Navy's nuclear propulsion needs, and keep
nuclear materials secure--all while a large portion of your workforce
is nearing retirement. Without a robust and sustainable workforce, no
amount of funding will deliver on these missions. How will you
prioritize and accelerate NNSA's workforce development pipeline,
particularly to replace retiring experts in areas like plutonium
science, engineering, and uranium processing?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I look forward to learning
about NNSA's recruitment and retention efforts. In terms of workforce,
the biggest challenges facing NNSA are recruitment and retention of
highly skilled technical employees. If confirmed, I will work with the
Administrator to address these challenges. This includes working with
NNSA's M&O contractors, universities, and trade schools to ensure a
pipeline of talent for future workforce needs.
6. Senator Hirono. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you believe the NNSA
has done enough to partner with Historically Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCU), minority-serving institutions, and tribal colleges
to build a diverse and resilient nuclear workforce? If not, how would
you expand these efforts?
Vice Admiral Pappano. In my current capacity, I am not aware of the
details on NNSA's partnership with HBCUs, minority serving
institutions, and tribal colleges. However, I am aware that NNSA and
the Department of Energy have a long history of collaboration with
HBCUs, minority serving institutions, and tribal colleges. If
confirmed, I will review NNSA's efforts in this area.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
ethics
7. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed, will
you commit not to seek any employment with or compensation from a
defense contractor, including through serving on a board, as a
consultant, or as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations regarding future employment for executive branch officials.
8. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed, will
you commit not to engage in any lobbying activities, including
unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the
guise of consulting or advising, focused on DOD or any of its
components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations regarding future employment for executive branch officials.
9. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed, will
you commit to not engage in any lobbying activities, including
unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the
guise of consulting or advising, on Department of Energy (DOE)-related
matters, focused on DOE or any of its components for 4 years after
leaving NNSA?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations regarding future employment for executive branch officials.
10. Senator Warren. Admiral Pappano, will you commit not to seek
employment, board membership with, or any other form of compensation
from a company that you regulated or otherwise interacted with while in
government, for at least 4 years after leaving office?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations regarding future employment for executive branch officials.
11. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, during your nomination
process, did anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other
closely related entity approach you about your loyalty to President
Trump?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
12. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you were approached
about your loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or
other similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that
pledge or oath.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
13. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you were approached
about your loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal
representations of loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
14. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, in November 2024, the New
York Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top
adviser to President Trump, allegedly requested payment from
prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
positions within the Administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
joining the Administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
15. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you did discuss the
possibility of joining the Administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr.
Epshteyn seek payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a
position within the Administration?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
16. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, at any time, did lawyers
for President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
describe the information that they provided you (including copies of
documents), what was discussed during any calls, and any other
information pertaining to this interaction.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
17. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, were you in contact with
Mr. Elon Musk at any time during your nomination process? If so, please
describe the nature of those contacts.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
18. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, was Mr. Musk present or
involved in any interviews you did related to your nomination? If so,
please describe the nature of his involvement.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
19. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, was Mr. Musk involved in
any way with your nomination, including but not limited to, directly or
indirectly contacting Senators regarding their position on your
nomination?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I am not aware of any such involvement.
20. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, who was in the room or
participated in any of your interviews regarding your nomination?
Vice Admiral Pappano. During the nomination process, I spoke with
several members of the Trump-Vance Presidential Transition Team.
21. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you own any stock or
hold any other interest in any defense industry or Department of Energy
contractors, will you divest it to avoid even the appearance of a
conflict of interest?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will follow the counsel of
DOE ethics officials regarding any potential conflicts or perceived
conflicts of interest.
22. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what do you consider the
role of the press in a democracy?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Freedom of the press is a clearly defined
protection as stated in the First Amendment.
23. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you think it would be
an appropriate use of taxpayer resources to ``dig up dirt'' on
journalists who investigate or criticize you, your office, or the Trump
administration?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Freedom of the press is a clearly defined
protection as stated in the First Amendment.
24. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you commit not to
retaliate, including by denying access to government officials or
facilities, against news outlets or individual journalists who publish
articles that are critical of you, your office, your agency, or the
Trump administration?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I commit to following the law
and upholding the duties of my office.
25. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, have you requested, or
has anyone requested on your behalf, that any other person or third
party sign a nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-disparagement, or
similar agreement regarding your conduct in a personal or professional
capacity?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
26. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you voluntarily
release any individual from any such agreements before this committee
votes on your nomination?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Not applicable.
27. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, have you ever paid or
promised to pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your behalf,
an individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality, non-
disparagement, or similar agreement?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
28. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if the answer to the
previous question was yes, how much was promised, how much was paid,
and what were the circumstances?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Not applicable.
congressional oversight and transparency
29. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your
understanding of the role of the Department of Energy Inspector
General?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Per the Inspector General Act, the Department
of Energy's Inspector General is charged with investigating and
auditing Department programs to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.
30. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you ensure your
staff complies with any Inspector General deadlines established for
requested communications, documents, and witnesses, and that staff will
be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations related to service in the U.S. Government.
31. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are not able to
comply with any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you
notify the Republican and Democratic members of this committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will work to comply with
requests from the Department's Inspector General in a timely manner. I
would defer to the Office of the Inspector General to update the
Committee on the progress of ongoing reviews.
32. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from any
individual, including the President?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I do not accept the premise that the
President will issue me an unlawful order. If confirmed, I will comply
with all laws and regulations related to service in the U.S.
Government.
33. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what actions would you
take if you were given an illegal order from any individual, including
the President?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I do not accept the premise that the
President will issue me an unlawful order. If confirmed, I will comply
with all laws and regulations related to service in the U.S.
Government.
34. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you commit to
voluntarily provide a deposition if you are requested by Congress to
provide one?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
35. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you commit to
voluntarily testify in front of Congress if you are requested by
Congress to do so?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
36. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you commit to
testify or provide a deposition in front of Congress if you are issued
a subpoena to do so?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, in such a scenario, I will
follow the advice of DOE's and NNSA's General Counsel regarding
compliance with a subpoena.
37. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you commit to
providing information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are
requested to do so?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
38. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you provide
information or documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to do
so?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, in such a scenario, I will
follow the advice of DOE's and NNSA's General Counsel regarding
compliance with a subpoena.
39. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you commit to
following current precedent for responding to information requests,
briefings, and other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees and their minority members?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
40. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if confirmed, will you
commit to posting your official calendar monthly?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will post official
engagements as needed and as appropriate. Given the sensitive nature of
much of NNSA's work, not all official engagements may be made public.
41. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you think the Federal
Government has an overclassification problem? If so, please provide
examples of overclassification you have encountered.
Vice Admiral Pappano. In my current role and the one I am nominated
for, I cannot speak to classification of documents and materials across
the Federal Government.
42. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if confirmed, do you
think your department should pursue strategic technology to support
automated declassification?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will review potential efforts
on the use of strategic technology that supports automated
declassification while protecting national security.
project 2025
43. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, have you discussed
Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the
Trump transition team, or other members of the Trump administration? If
so, please explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with
whom you discussed it.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
44. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, have you discussed
Project 2025 with any officials associated with the Heritage
Foundation? If so, please explain what you discussed, when you
discussed it, and with whom you discussed it.
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
foreign influence
45. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, have you received any
payment from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
government within the past 5years?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
46. Senator Warren. Mr. Cadenazzi and Vice Admiral Pappano, have
you communicated with any foreign government or entity controlled by a
foreign government within the past 5 years?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I have disclosed all connections to foreign
nationals as part of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management SF-86 and
the related background investigation that was previously conducted and
required for my nomination as the NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator.
47. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, please disclose any
communications or payments you have had with representatives of any
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years and describe the nature of the communication.
Vice Admiral Pappano. I have disclosed all connections to foreign
nationals as part of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management SF-86 and
the related background investigation that was previously conducted and
required for my nomination as the NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator.
I have received no payments from representatives of any foreign
government or entity controlled by a foreign government.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
48. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you believe that
servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
any other concern that they wish to raise?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations related to whistleblowers.
49. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, have you ever retaliated
against any individual for coming forward about an illegal order,
sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other
concern that they wish to raise?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
50. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please specify how
you will do so.
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with the
Department's whistleblower protection policies and standards.
impoundment control act
51. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you believe the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy has the legal authority
to block the disbursement of funds appropriated by Congress?
Vice Admiral Pappano. During a transition year, it is routine for
an incoming Administration to review expenditures before payments are
made to ensure compliance with the law. I am not aware of any direct
impacts to program funding from agency reviews related to NNSA.
52. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your
understanding of the Impoundment Control Act?
Vice Admiral Pappano. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 is a Federal law that governs the role of Congress
in the U.S. budget process.
53. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you commit to
complying with the Impoundment Control Act?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all laws and
regulations related to service to the U.S. Government.
54. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you commit to
notifying the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the
majority and minority, if you are asked not to comply with the
Impoundment Control Act or not to expend the money that Congress
appropriates or authorizes?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all
applicable laws and statutes regarding the Federal budgetary process.
55. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, the Constitution's
Spending Clause (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1) and Appropriations Clause
(Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7) give Congress, not the Executive, power of the
purse. The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld this power. Do you
believe that impoundments are constitutional?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all
applicable laws and statutes regarding the Federal budgetary process.
56. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, the funding levels in
appropriations bills passed into law are not targets or ceilings;
instead, they are amounts the executive branch must spend, unless
stated otherwise. Congress could--if it wanted the President to have
discretion--write those amounts as ceilings. Do you agree?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will execute my
responsibilities consistent with the Constitution and the law, to
include appropriations legislation. I will ensure actions on this
matter are informed by the Administration's legal positions.
57. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your
understanding of the requirements for DOD/NNSA to obligate funding that
Congress authorizes and appropriates, in accordance with the time
period that Congress deems it to do so?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will comply with all
applicable laws and statues regarding the obligation of funds.
58. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you commit to
expending the money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will follow the law.
59. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you commit to
following and implementing every provision of the annual National
Defense Authorization Act passed into law?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will follow the law.
60. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you became aware of a
potential violation of the Antideficiency Act, Impoundment Control Act,
or other appropriations laws, what steps would you take?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will follow all applicable
law and statutes.
acquisition reform
61. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your
understanding of the Procurement Integrity Act and your obligations
under that law?
Vice Admiral Pappano. The Procurement Integrity Act (PIA) is
intended to prohibit, and lay out consequences for, certain actions of
Federal officials and others that would potentially compromise the
integrity of Federal acquisitions. Under the PIA, I would be obligated:
(1) not to knowingly disclose contractor bid/proposal information or
source selection information prior to the award of a Federal
procurement to which the information relates; (2) if I'm personally and
substantially participating in a Federal procurement valued in excess
of the Simplified Acquisition Threshold, to report any contact with
offerors regarding non-Federal employment to designated officials, and
either reject the offer or recuse myself from the procurement; and (3)
not to accept compensation from a contractor as an employee, officer,
director, or consultant, for a period of 1 year after I have taken
certain actions in excess of $10 million, that have benefited the
contractor (e.g., served as a Source Selection Authority or otherwise
personally made a decision for NNSA to award a contract, subcontract,
order, or modification thereto).
62. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, do you believe that it is
important to be able to assess accurate cost and pricing data from
contractors, especially for sole-or single-source contracts?
Vice Admiral Pappano. It is important to be a responsible steward
of taxpayer dollars. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding
NNSA's procurement and acquisition processes.
63. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed,
what steps will you take to ensure that contractors are not price-
gouging or overcharging the Federal Government?
Vice Admiral Pappano. It is important to be a responsible steward
of taxpayer dollars. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA processes include
protections to preclude such activities from taking place.
64. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are confirmed,
will you commit to seeking refunds, including voluntary refunds, from
contractors and companies that overcharge the Federal Government?
Vice Admiral Pappano. It is important to be a responsible steward
of taxpayer dollars. If confirmed, I will ensure NNSA processes address
this and will ensure those processes are implemented.
65. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if so, how do you plan to
do so?
Vice Admiral Pappano. It is important to be a responsible steward
of taxpayer dollars. If confirmed, I will work with NNSA procurement
and acquisition professionals and legal counsel to leverage national
security requirements to ensure contractors are refunding overcharges.
66. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, should DOD's acquisition
decisions be influenced by individuals with conflicts of interest
involving contracts or other business before DOD?
Vice Admiral Pappano. As a nominee for the position of Principal
Deputy Administrator at the National Nuclear Security Administration, I
will not have purview over DOD acquisitions.
research and development
67. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, does the Federal
Government benefit from partnering with colleges, universities,
nonprofits, and federally funded research and development centers?
Vice Admiral Pappano. NNSA and the Department of Energy have a long
history of collaboration with such entities. Much of the work done at
the national laboratories is at the forefront of science and national
security.
68. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, under your leadership,
will your agencies continue to work with colleges, universities,
nonprofits, and federally funded research and development centers to
research and address our toughest national security challenges?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I look forward to learning
about the current collaborations between NNSA and such entities.
protecting classified information and federal records
69. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your
understanding of the need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
Vice Admiral Pappano. OPSEC is a critically important national
program that applies to all agencies and is designed to deny
adversaries the ability to collect, analyze, and exploit information
that might provide an advantage against the United States. OPSEC
protects information against inadvertent compromise through a process
of continual assessment.
70. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what are the national
security risks of improperly disclosing classified information?
Vice Admiral Pappano. The improper disclosure of classified
information may compromise sensitive national security information to
adversaries, potentially endangering the United States and its allies
and partners. Improperly disclosing classified information is also a
violation of law.
71. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what would you do if you
learned an official had improperly disclosed classified information?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Any person who has knowledge that classified
information has been or may have been lost, possibly compromised, or
disclosed to an unauthorized person must immediately report the
circumstances to those who have the authority and responsibility for
conducting incidents of security concern inquiries at NNSA.
72. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your
understanding of government officials' duties under the Federal Records
Act?
Vice Admiral Pappano. The Federal Records Act of 1950 is a U.S.
Federal law that provides the legal framework for Federal records
management, including record creation, maintenance, and disposition.
73. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, should classified
information be shared on unclassified commercial systems?
Vice Admiral Pappano. No.
national nuclear security administration
74. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what criteria should be
used to reduce NNSA's workforce?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing
NNSA's current staffing levels and future needs. Determination of
NNSA's staffing must be based on analysis that ensures the critical
national security mission the organization undertakes. The complexity
of that mission dictates careful analysis to ensure that NNSA is both
right-sized and staffed with the varied expertise required to sustain
mission success.
75. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what will you do if you
determine workforce reductions in NNSA's workforce that occurred before
your confirmation put NNSA's mission at risk?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will work with the
Administrator, the Secretary of Energy, and the White House to ensure
NNSA has the funding and staffing needed to execute its mission.
76. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, how will you assess the
impact of potential workforce reductions on stockpile sustainment,
nonproliferation, and modernization programs?
Vice Admiral Pappano. NNSA's success is highly dependent on its
workforce. If confirmed, I will advocate for the resources needed to
ensure NNSA's workforce is able to deliver on NNSA's critical national
security mission.
77. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, NNSA depends on a mix of
Federal employees, contractors, and lab scientists to manage critical
programs. If you determine that reductions in force have harmed NNSA's
mission, what contingency plans would you implement to ensure continued
oversight, safety, and security of the nuclear stockpile?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I am not aware of reductions-in-force that
have been implemented at NNSA at this time. If confirmed, I will review
the contingency plans currently in place and will ensure the oversight,
safety, and security of the nuclear stockpile.
78. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, NNSA is conducting some
of the largest modernization programs in its history. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) recently published a report that noted that
NNSA's internal review ``concluded that it wouldn't be able to meet
this workload without changes.'' Are you familiar with NNSA's review?
Vice Admiral Pappano. In my current capacity, I am not privy to
NNSA's internal review. If confirmed, I will review the report's
findings.
79. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are familiar with
the NNSA's review referenced in the question above, how would you
address the recommendations in the review?
Vice Admiral Pappano. I am not familiar with the review referenced
above. If confirmed, I will review the report's findings and determine
whether plans are needed to address its recommendations.
80. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, if you are not familiar
with the NNSA's review referenced in the question above, will you
provide this committee with your plan to address its recommendations in
30 days?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will review the report's
findings and determine whether plans are needed to address its
recommendations.
81. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what is your plan to
address NNSA's significant management challenges?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will review current program
management practices and explore potential innovative strategies that
could be implemented to more efficiently deliver NNSA's mission, such
as streamlining project management requirements. I will support the
Administrator in fostering a culture of accountability, determining the
optimal level of oversight, implementing lessons learned, and
reinforcing best practices for cost estimating.
82. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, would it be harmful for
NNSA workforce reductions to weaken U.S. leadership in
nonproliferation?
Vice Admiral Pappano. In my current capacity, I am not aware of the
structure of NNSA's workforce. NNSA's success is highly dependent on
its workforce. If confirmed, I will advocate for the resources needed
to ensure NNSA's workforce is able to deliver on NNSA's critical
national security mission.
83. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, how do you think
increasing our nuclear weapons spending will impact our adversaries'
interest in doing the same?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Our adversaries have already been
accelerating their nuclear modernization efforts for years. Our nuclear
weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective. NNSA
must continue to be responsive to DOD requirements while developing
capabilities to meet deterrence gaps of any kind that may emerge well
into the future.
84. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, how do you think our
adversaries would interpret the United States resuming live fire
nuclear weapons testing?
Vice Admiral Pappano. For nearly 30 years, the three national
security laboratory directors and the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command have annually assessed the nuclear stockpile and determined
that it remains safe, secure, and effective, with no technical issue
that would require a return to underground nuclear explosive testing.
The confidence provided by this annual assessment process has, in part,
allowed the United States to continue observing an enduring moratorium
on nuclear tests since 1992. If confirmed, I will continue to support
the annual assessment process and will ensure NNSA continues to adhere
to nuclear test readiness requirements while supporting a rigorous and
effective Stockpile Stewardship Program.
85. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, given the Pentagon's $1.5
trillion nuclear modernization program and Donald Trump's commitment to
examining every aspect of the Federal Government for wasteful spending,
will you assess whether any nuclear modernization programs should be
identified for possible re-evaluation to cut unnecessary costs for the
American taxpayer?
Vice Admiral Pappano. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is the bedrock of
our Nation's defense, ensuring the United States fields modern,
reliable, and effective weapons to deter our adversaries. NNSA is
entrusted with stewardship of taxpayer dollars which requires
appropriate scrutiny. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator to
identify areas where we can adopt innovative strategies to more
efficiently deliver NNSA's mission.
86. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, the NNSA's Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) works globally to prevent State
and non-State actors from developing nuclear weapons or acquiring
weapons-usable nuclear or radiological materials, equipment,
technology, and expertise. Given that $185 million has been redirected
from defense nuclear non-proliferation to weapons development, what
impact will this shift have on non-proliferation programs at NNSA?
Vice Admiral Pappano. In my current capacity, I am not aware of the
particulars related to that funding or the reasoning leading to its
redirection. If confirmed, I am committed to protecting the United
States from the threat of nuclear proliferation.
87. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, what will you do to
ensure the non-proliferation programs referenced in the question above
get the funding they need?
Vice Admiral Pappano. If confirmed, I will work with the
Administrator, Secretary of Energy, and the White House Office of
Management and Budget to ensure NNSA's nonproliferation programs have
the resources needed to execute their mission.
88. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, will you provide, within
60 days, an update on how the NNSA will execute its obligation under
section 3124 of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
to ``seek to enter into an arrangement with the private scientific
advisory group known as JASON to conduct, not later than 2030, an
assessment of plutonium pit aging?''
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
89. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, should NNSA generally
follow GAO's best practices for an integrated master schedule to manage
its programs?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
90. Senator Warren. Vice Admiral Pappano, is program management
enhanced by reliable lifecycle cost estimates and program milestones?
Vice Admiral Pappano. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of Vice Admiral Scott W. Pappano,
USN follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Vice Admiral Scott W. Pappano,
USN, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Vice Admiral
Scott W. Pappano, USN in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Vice Admiral Scott W. Pappano, USN was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on May 13, 2025, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 18, 2025.]
[all]