[Senate Hearing 119-322]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-322
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT
GENERAL JOHN D. CAINE, USAF (RETIRED)
TO BE GENERAL AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 1, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-038 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, INDIANA MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
april 1, 2025
Page
To Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General John D. Caine, 1
USAF (Retired) to be General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Members Statements
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 3
Witness Statements
Caine, Lieutenant General John D., Retired, Nominee for 5
Appointment to Grade of General and to the Position of Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 48
Questions for the Record....................................... 101
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 137
Biographical Sketch............................................ 138
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 141
Signature Page................................................. 145
(iii)
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN D. CAINE, USAF
(RETIRED) TO BE GENERAL AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2025
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville,
Mullin, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Duckworth,
Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Chairman Wicker. The Committee will come to order. Our
eager Members of the fourth estate are welcome to clear away,
thanking them for their presence. This morning, the Committee
meets to consider the nomination of retired Lieutenant General
Dan Caine for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
General Caine has a tremendous responsibility before him. I
believe President Trump has made an excellent choice in
selecting him to meet the challenges. So I thank General Caine
for his willingness to serve our country, especially in this
hour of need. We live in the most dangerous national security
moment since World War II. An axis of aggressors led by the
Chinese Communist Party, and Vladimir Putin's Russia means us
harm. This axis does not want this century to be an American-
led century or a freedom led century.
Our adversaries have started two wars against Ukraine and
Israel. They threaten to open a third front against Taiwan. We
must restore peace and we could do that only through strength.
Since his nomination was announced, some people have written
that General Caine is unqualified. They point out that he has
not served as a combatant commander, as a service chief or as a
vice-chairman, roles which are contemplated in 10 USC 152.
I would suggest these same people read or reread the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Those who read that law and then
read General Caine's resume will see that the architects of
that legislation would conclude that their reforms were
successful. The driving force behind Goldwater-Nichols was to
inspire, and in some cases, require jointness. So, let's talk
about jointness with regard to Lieutenant General Caine.
They believed that when our military services work
together, those services are greater than the sum of their
parts. General Caine agrees and his record reflects that. He
began his career as an Air Force fighter pilot in 1992. By the
time he was done, General Caine had operated in every domain,
and he had developed relationships with every service. That
would not have been true 40 years ago.
General Caine flew and committed aircraft, but he's also
worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, having helped in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, in the midst of a bird flu
outbreak. At the White House, General Caine wrote early
homeland security strategies. He deployed and commanded
repeatedly to Iraq and Syria, serving within various special
operations forces units. He ran our most secretive programs for
all military services. General Caine worked extensively as the
CIA's [Central Intelligence Agency] senior military officer,
again, collaborating with every military service and combatant
command.
It's difficult to imagine a better joint and interagency
background for a nominee of this position. Our threat
environment is complex, and General Caine understands how the
services can work together to meet today's dangers. We have
much work to do as this committee knows. We need to grow our
defense budget. We need to reform the Pentagon's processes
drastically. If confirmed, General Caine would play a
significant role in providing military advice to the Secretary
of Defense and the President of the United States on both of
those topics.
In particular, the chairman plays a significant role in the
requirements process. I hope he will make a priority to
modernize this critical aspect. The statutory role of the
chairman may be limited, but the position is explicitly the
voice of the combatant commanders. That voice matters because
the commanders are largely absent from our requirements and
budgeting processes. The chairman can and should also be an
advocate for a more agile planning process, one that considers
the problems--and I'm going to use two big words here, the
problems of simultaneity and protracted warfare. I guess that's
three big terms, three big words, and two big terms.
These are technical terms for fairly straightforward facts.
First, that our adversaries are likely to act against us in a
coordinated fashion; simultaneity. Second, that once that war
breaks out, it tends to take on a life of its own; protracted
warfare.
Last, a chairman is responsible to deliver a serious,
honest chairman's risk assessment to this Committee as soon as
possible. I look forward to General Caine's thoughts on each of
these points. Based on my conversations with the nominee and
based on his actions in uniform, I'm confident that General
Caine will give President Trump his best military advice.
He will do so without bias as he's required to do. He would
not consider whether the President may like or dislike that
advice. That's exactly what a United States President deserves.
I'm convinced that General Caine sees this role as absolutely
nonpartisan. We can argue politics up here on this dais, but I
expect General Caine to stay out of it no matter the subject.
I thank the nominee for his service and for appearing
today, and I turn now to my friend and colleague, Ranking
Member Reed for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lieutenant General
Caine, welcome and congratulations on your nomination.
Also, I would like to extend my appreciation to your family
because I know they've been with you throughout your entire
career and they're with you today. I also want to offer my
deepest condolences to the families of the United States Army
soldiers who tragically lost their lives in Lithuania during a
mission last week.
General Caine, you have been nominated to be Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I'm going to start by acknowledging
the unusual conditions around your nomination. Six weeks ago,
President Trump abruptly dismissed General CQ Brown, who was
not even halfway into his tenure as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Hegseth, also dismissed
several other senior officers, including Admiral Lisa
Franchetti, the Chief of Naval Operations, General James Slife,
the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, and all three Judge Advocate
Generals (JAGs) for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
To this day, no explanation has been given for the
dismissal of these officers. As such, I remain deeply concerned
that they were dismissed for political reasons, which sends a
chilling message throughout the ranks. I would take a moment to
salute General CQ Brown, who served this Nation honorably for
more than four decades and led the joint chiefs with dedication
and skill. He and each of the officers who were dismissed had
outstanding careers in the military and represented our Nation
with great courage, honor, and distinction. We all owe them a
debt of gratitude for their service and sacrifice.
General Caine, I trust that you understand the fraught
situation within which you have been nominated to be the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. In this regard, your
distinguished record of service is encouraging. As an F16 pilot
with thousands of flight hours and multiple combat deployments,
you have served with distinction in the Air Force and the Air
National Guard. You have also served in senior leadership roles
at the Pentagon, the White House, and overseas, including in
the special operations and intelligence communities.
General, if confirmed, you will serve as the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security
Council, the Secretary of Defense and Congress. You'll be
expected to be an effective strategist, advisor, and manager,
and your counsel will be relied upon as we confront the
multitude of national security issues before us. Indeed, we
face significant challenges.
China clearly remains our primary competitor as the only
nation with both the intent and capability to challenge the
interest of the United States and our allies and partners. At
the same time, Russia remains a violent destabilizing force,
and nations like Iran and North Korea continue to push the
boundaries of military brinkmanship.
To succeed in this environment, the United States Military
must better develop its joint capabilities across all domains,
including space, cyber, and information. Moreover, we must not
lose the combined strength of our allies, nor can we abandon
the soft power of our diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. To
retreat to Fortress America will encourage our adversaries to
exert their influence throughout the world.
General Caine, I'm interested to know how you would ensure
our military remains the world's premier fighting force. If
confirmed, you'll be responsible for identifying new joint
capabilities and performing net assessments to ensure each of
the services are procuring the right capabilities needed for
the joint force. The chairman must review capabilities
holistically across the total force, which can conflict with
the priorities of individual services. The committee would be
interested to learn how you plan to manage this dynamic.
In addition, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
National Military Strategy, and the annual chairman's risk
assessment of vital documents, this Committee relies upon to
perform its oversight functions. As the Administration begins
its work to review and revise these documents, General Caine, I
would like your assessment of the current strategy and whether
you would recommend any changes to these documents.
Finally, the joint force is fundamentally about people. As
the Nation's senior most military officer, it will be your
responsibility to understand the needs of America's
servicemembers and to be their greatest advocate. If confirmed,
you'll be the most visible military officer in the Nation.
It'll be critical for you to represent the force with total
professionalism and trustworthiness.
Frankly, I'm concerned about the health of civilian
military relations in our country. Over the past several
months, the military has been dragged into dangerous political
fights, public trust in the military is eroding, and I fear
that the military's trust in civilian leadership has been
shaken. Civilian control of the military is a sacred duty that
must be carried out responsibly and not exploited. General, I'd
like to know how you work to help improve civil military
relations and demonstrate this ethos yourself every day.
Above all else, I expect you to pledge to always provide
your best military advice to the President and the Secretary of
Defense, even if that advice is not what they want to hear. The
safety of our servicemembers and the American people depends
upon such candor. General Caine, if confirmed, you will lead
the joint force at a momentous time. I thank you and I look
forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Reed.
General Caine, we will now hear your testimony. You're
recognized.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN D. CAINE, RETIRED, NOMINEE
FOR APPOINTMENT TO GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO THE POSITION OF
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, thank you, Senator Chairman
Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, Members of this Committee. My name
is Dan Caine and I am honored and humbled to sit before you
today as the President's nominee to be the 22d chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I'd like to start by thanking the President and the
Secretary for their trust and confidence in me and if
confirmed, allowing me to again, serve our great Nation. I'd
also like to thank General CQ Brown and his wife Shereen and
their family for their more than 40 years of selfless service
to our Nation. I'd like to thank the team that helped prepare
me for this hearing today.
Finally, I'd like to thank my family and friends who have
given me so much. It is my family who has made my service
possible always at their own expense. They have given more than
I have and there are not words to express my thanks to each of
them, especially my family in our Nation's Midwest.
I sit here before you the proud son of an Air Force fighter
pilot who flew F4 Phantoms in Vietnam. My mom was a pediatric
critical care nurse who worked nights so she could be home when
my sister and I got up in the morning and when we got home in
the afternoon. I learned about service from my parents and the
other members of my family who served, not because it was easy,
but because it was the right thing to do.
In our family, we serve. When asked, we always say yes.
Senators, I acknowledge that I'm an unconventional nominee.
These are unconventional times. It is 9:48 p.m. in Beijing,
6:48 p.m. in Tehran, 4:48 p.m. in Moscow, and 10:48 p.m. in
Pyong Yang. As we sit here now, our Nation faces an
unprecedented rising global risk. Our adversaries are
advancing, global nuclear threats are on the rise and
deterrence is paramount. Our national defense requires urgent
action and reform across the board. We must go faster. We must
move with a sense of urgency.
We can never forget that our No. 1 job is to create peace
through overwhelming strength and if need be, fight and win our
Nation's wars. I realize for many Americans I'm an unknown
leader, and it is with a heart full of gratitude that I've been
given a given a truly unique set of experiences that I believe
have prepared me to be the 22d chairman.
For the past 34 years, I've served in the Active Title 10
Force, in the Title 32 National Guard Force, in the Title 50
Force at the CIA. I've served in the interagency and at the
White House, and I've deployed in combat as a fighter pilot, a
special operations officer, and a CIA officer, and I've been an
entrepreneur and investor in the business sector while a
citizen soldier in the National Guard.
As a general officer, I've had the privilege of serving
three Presidents from both political parties and most recently
was the associate director for military affairs at the CIA. A
job where I was charged to provide military advice to the
director of the CIA and globally integrate DOD and CIA
activities across the world.
Along the way, I've proudly served alongside some of
America's most incredible warriors and civilian teammates and
their families. I've witnessed them do awe-inspiring things in
the service of our Nation and to a person they've poured more
into me than I could ever have poured into them. Especially our
non-commissioned officer corps. Sadly, I've been there with
them as they made the ultimate sacrifice on the fields of
battle and been with their families as we told them of their
loved one service and sacrifice. I think of our fallen every
single day.
These experiences help me to better understand how our
Nation considers and uses military force to achieve our
national security objectives. They directly inform my views of
the importance of carefully considering the use of that force
and the risks associated with it beforehand, and always asking
the important question, and then what, before we do, and if the
decision is made to use military force crushing our enemies and
winning.
I've also had the privilege of serving alongside incredible
business leaders, starting and scaling companies as an
entrepreneur. Along the way I learned what a different kind of
grit looks like. Our American entrepreneurial spirit is a force
multiplier, and my time as an entrepreneur has made me a better
general officer and leader, and if confirmed, I'll bring more
of that spirit into the joint force.
Senators I'm here today to earn your trust and the trust of
the American people. If confirmed, I'll continue to work as I
have for my entire 34 years in uniform, always focused on the
mission and our incredible people. If confirmed, I'll continue
the traditions and standards of my oath of office and my
commissioned as a non-partisan leader who will always strive to
do the right thing.
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for your time and your consideration. As
we gather here today, let us never forget our deployed forces
and their families, and may we always remember our fallen and
their families, especially those three that Senator Reed
mentioned and our one missing. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much General Caine. I
am required to ask you some standard questions that we ask of
all nominees in your situation. If you'll just answer yes or no
to these questions, keep your talk button pressed. Have you
adhered to the applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, Senator, I have.
Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Lieutenant General Caine. No. Senator, I have not.
Chairman Wicker. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee when requested?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree when asked before this
committee to give your personal views even if your views differ
from the Administration?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide records,
documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner
when requested by this Committee, it's subcommittees or other
appropriate committees of Congress and to consult with the
requester regarding the basis for any good faith, delay or
denial in providing such records?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Two more General. Will you cooperate in
providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional
requests?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes Senator, I will.
Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Lieutenant General Caine. They will, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much. Now let me just
start out by asking about some hyperbole that may have been out
there in the press. General Caine, did you wear a MAGA [Make
America Great Again] hat in front of the President?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Did you wear a MAGA hat at any time?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Would you like to elaborate on that
answer?
Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, for 34 years, I've upheld my
oath of office and my commitment to my commission and I have
never worn any political merchandise.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that answer. Now previous
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of staff have somewhat equivocated
when asked about top line spending issues. I think you know
about the proposals that will soon be before this Senate and
this Congress.
Is it in your best military advice based on your
experience, is it your opinion that we need real growth in the
defense budget to maintain deterrence against the very capital
cities and interests that you mentioned in your testimony?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
question. We definitely must have a sense of urgency related to
the budget. I think it comes down to ultimately finding more
deployable or allocatable capital, and there's really three
ways to do that. We can find greater efficiencies in the budget
through cost savings. We can reprogram from different programs,
or we can get a higher top line, I think of it in terms of a
business model where we get more revenue. So we have to move
quickly and figure out how we can get real purchasing growth
over time.
Chairman Wicker. Well, let's talk about efficiency. In the
special operations community and with the CIA, you've worked
with some of the most innovative and risk-taking parts of
national security enterprise. You also mentioned your
experience in the private sector, which I think can serve you
well. Startup ventures in the private sector. Is that right,
General Caine?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wicker. If confirmed, you will conduct oversight
on the military's requirement processes. We hear constantly
from our combatant commanders that it takes years for their
military needs to be converted into requirements. Based on your
experience, do you believe the requirements process needs to be
fixed, and do you agree with those who say it needs to be
entirely torn down and rebuilt to get our war fighters what
they need according to a timeline in which they need it?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I definitely agree
something has to be done. The solution is probably somewhere in
the middle. I don't know that we need to tear the whole thing
down. I definitely agree that we need to improve the speed and
agility of our requirements process. Technology is evolving so
fast, our requirements process does not evolve at the same
time, and we have to have our combatant commander's voice in
the requirements process.
The one area that I think we also need to do is to keep a
global picture on those requirement processes. No two combatant
commands have the same requirements, and only the joint staff
has the global view on those requirements along with OSD
[Office of The Secretary of Defense]. So, if confirmed, I'd
like to continue to work with you and the rest of the Congress
to sort through this, so I appreciate it.
Chairman Wicker. Will have you had a chance to read my
white paper on the FoRGED Act and that proposed legislation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Don't you agree that it's a masterful
piece of legislation?
[Laughter.]
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, sir. It was a beautiful
read, sir. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Would you like to elaborate on that?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. Well, sir, I mean, I think
it certainly lays out a lot of good markers for improvement in
the requirements process.
Chairman Wicker. Well, it seems to me you've worked in the
private sector and you work with startups. The number of people
in DOD who have to touch something, touch an idea sign off on
an idea to actually get something done, is far different from
those people who are actually making innovative changes in the
private sector. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree then that we need to move in
the direction of efficiency and that a lot of the top line
money that I mentioned in my second question can be found by
efficiencies and moving things faster, and also we could get to
the war fighter what they need in a timely manner?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Well, let me ask--I've got 12 seconds. I
might do a followup at the end there, but thank you very much
for your testimony. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General
Caine, as you're aware, it was recently revealed that Senior
Trump administration officials, including the Secretary of
Defense, were sharing sensitive information about upcoming
strikes in Yemen on a Signal group chat.
In your professional opinion, should a member of the joint
chiefs or the relevant combatant commander been included in
that discussion?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, thanks for that
question. I understand that the voice of the joint force had
been expressed through the incredible work of the acting
chairman and current vice chairman. I understand he put a
statement out yesterday or the day before saying that they'd
consulted with the secretary. From what I understand of that
chat, that was a partisan political chat, and so the joint
force should not have been represented in there, sir.
Senator Reed. In your professional opinion, should the
Yemen strengths have been discussed in a Signal group chat on
an unclassified platform?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I understand that
both you and the Chairman have asked for an inquiry into that.
So I don't want to comment specifically on that matter. What I
will say is that we should always preserve the element of
surprise, and that should translate across every information
domain and format and never put our war fighters in any harm's
way.
Senator Reed. Well, let me ask you, if you were on that
conversation, would you have objected to the fact that it was
being conducted on Signal?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I was not in that
chat. I would----
Senator Reed. I know that, that's why I asked, if you were.
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I've always communicated
proper information in the proper channels.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Immediately following the
announcement--and this is a followup to Chairman Wicker's,
first question. Immediately following the announcement of your
nomination press stories started to circulate about comments
President Trump made about you in your past relationship.
According to the reports, the President tells a story where he
spoke to you while you were serving in Iraq on Active Duty, and
you said that you loved him and, ``I'll kill for you, sir.''
The President then said that you followed up these comments
by putting on a Make America Great Again hat. General Caine, is
any of this true?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, as I mentioned to the
Chairman, for 34 years, I've upheld my oath of office and the
responsibilities of my commission. I think I went back and
listened to those tapes and I think the President was actually
talking about somebody else, and I've never worn any political
merchandise or said anything to that effect.
Senator Reed. Thank you. General Caine, during the
consideration of your nomination, were you ever asked who you
voted for in the last election or 2020 election?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I was not.
Senator Reed. Are you aware of any presently serving
servicemembers or senior civilians in DOD being asked questions
like this?
Lieutenant General Caine. I'm not, Senator.
Senator Reed. Do you agree that it's the utmost importance
to keep the military apolitical and questions like this should
not be asked?
Lieutenant General Caine. I agree with you. Yes, Senator.
Senator Reed. What steps will you'll take to guard against
potential politicization?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think the question was
what steps will I take to guard against politicalization. I
think it starts with being a good example from the top and
making sure that we are nonpartisan and apolitical and speaking
the truth to power every day.
Senator Reed. General Caine, do you believe there's any
situation where it would be appropriate for you not to be
consulted prior to a military operation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm not in the job
yet, so I can't imagine any hypothetical situation where I
would not be in the conversation, if that's what you're asking.
You know, I believe the joint force, if confirmed, and even if
I'm not in the job, the joint force has a responsibility to
provide best options to the Secretary, the NSC [National
Security Council], and the President. So I can't imagine a case
where the joint force would not be in the conversation.
Senator Reed. Final question. If confirmed--and you've got
40 seconds and this probably will take longer than that. So
just brief thoughts. How are you going to ensure that the
parochialism, which is endemic in every organization, but
certainly also in the Department of Defense (DOD) is curtailed
or focused to a more joint effort?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate that
and I'll be quick and come back to you with more if need be,
but you know, I'm encouraged by the 648 years of experience
that currently exist in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the
joint staff, and I think they're all absolute professionals.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Fisher.
Senator Fischer. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome General.
Thank you for putting yourself forward to continue to serve
your country. As you are aware, there's ongoing efforts to
force the Department of Defense to vacate portions of key bands
of the electromagnetic spectrum, particularly the lower three
gigahertz and the seven to eight gigahertz bands.
General Caine, do you agree that the Department of Defense
should have a meaningful co-leadership in any inter-agency
determinations about the future use of Federal spectrum?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, thanks for that
question. You know, there are certain elements of the spectrum
that have unique physics associated with them that can impact
our combat capabilities. So we certainly want to have a voice
in the conversation.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that it should be a co-
leadership, though, not just a seat at the table, but because
of the exquisite assets that the Department has and your
knowledge of what those are that you would need to have that
co-leadership position?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, you asked what the views
of the Department was. Mindful that I'm not in the job yet, and
if confirmed, I'd have that conversation with the Secretary
about co-leadership related to that.
Senator Fischer. What are the risks to national security if
the Department is forced to vacate those spectrum bands?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator some of that may be
reserved for a conversation in closed session at some point in
the future, but certainly if we lose portions of that spectrum,
we'll lose some exclusivity related to our combat capability.
Certainly one, don't want to tip that off to our adversaries
who might be listening, but two, would rather talk about that
in closed session.
Senator Fischer. I look forward to having those discussions
with you if you are confirmed, sir. General Caine, for the
first time in history of the United States faces two nuclear
peer adversaries in China and in Russia. Yet our planned
nuclear force was decided back in 2010 when the threat
environment looked very, very different and it hasn't been
reconsidered since then.
For example, just over the past few years, China surpassed
the United States in the number of ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] launchers it possesses. Russia has suspended
the New START treaty and nuclear saber rattling has been a
defining feature of its invasion to Ukraine. North Korea has
claimed to test the first solid fuel ICBM. I'm concerned that
our current programs or record may not be sufficient to address
these future threats or these current threats, let alone future
threats.
So if confirmed, how would you work with the Secretary, the
services, STRATCOM, to identify and address any insufficiencies
so that our nuclear deterrent would remain credible?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator and it must remain
credible. We must invest in the deterrent side of our nuclear
triad, and there's a lot of work to be done there. If
confirmed, you know, I look to work with the incredible
leadership at STRATCOM. We have a great commander out there
who's very smart, dedicated, and technically all over the
program out there. This will be an area of significant emphasis
to make sure that we're fielding the capabilities that we need.
Senator Fischer. Have you had an opportunity to review the
Strategic Posture Commission's 2023 report?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I've not.
Senator Fischer. I would highly recommend that you do so.
It very clearly articulates projected threats. It identifies
potential gaps in our capabilities, and it makes a number of
actionable recommendations, many of which were included in last
year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
Finally, General Caine, the Nuclear Arms Sea Launch Cruise
Missile or SLCM-N, is a Navy program of record that has been
supported by this Committee on a strong bipartisan basis. I was
pleased to see you affirm the importance of SLCM-N in your
advanced policy questions.
Can you explain to this Committee the importance of
providing the President with additional theater nuclear options
such as SLCM-N?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, when we look at
the global lay down of nuclear weapons that you alluded to, the
United States, having an additional option is a key and
essential component to our overall deterrence. That's where
SLCM-N fits into the equation.
Senator Fischer. So it's important that our Commander-in-
Chief would have those options?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, I won't get out in front of
the President. It may be a decision that he has a different
view on, but certainly the Joint Force should offer him that
option for his consideration based on the needs of the
deterrent capabilities.
Senator Fischer. It is a program of record?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Senator
Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. General Caine, congratulations on your
nomination and thank you for your willingness to continue to
serve the country. I appreciated the time we spent in my office
talking about this role and the challenges that you will be
facing.
One of the things that we discussed was the Women, Peace,
and Security (WPS) legislation that was signed by President
Trump during his first term. It mandates that women should be
at the table in conflict resolution and peace negotiations, and
at DOD, that's meant having women involved in security
cooperation programs that really give us, I think, an advantage
our adversaries like China and Russia.
Just for the record, are you familiar with the WPS program,
General Caine?
Lieutenant General Caine. I am Senator, yes.
Senator Shaheen. Do you believe that's a DEI [Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion] program?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do not.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Can you provide some examples
of the operational advantage that from your perspective, this
gives us? General Caine: Well, Senator, I can just give you my
own personal recollections from being deployed. Before this was
precursors of the program, but when we would go out into the
field and after concluding an assault, we would have female
members who would speak with those women and children who are
on the objective, and they would help us to understand the
human terrain in a new and novel way.
WPS is I think a program that really help us to understand
the full spectrum of challenges that are in front of us.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you for that. One of the combatant
commands that has been most effective in using the WPS law has
been United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Can you
talk about how this contributes to the mission that INDOPACOM
has?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm not familiar
with the INDOPACOM specific example. If confirmed, I'll look
into it and come back to you with my thoughts on that matter.
Senator Shaheen. Great, thank you. I appreciate that. We've
been hearing some rumors that have suggested that the
Administration is considering ending the dual-hat policy under
which our commander of European command serves as the Supreme
Allied Commander of NATO. The commander of EUCOM has served as
the Supreme Allied Commander since Eisenhower, and part of the
reason is to ensure that U.S. command and control of nuclear
weapons on the continent also prevents nuclear proliferation in
Europe.
So I'm not going to ask you to comment on what the policy
of this Administration may or may not be since I assume it's
not been determined. But can you talk about the importance of
U.S. leadership in NATO as a result of this dual-hat
arrangement? And how would you approach mil-to-mil obligations
with NATO partners?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, allies and
partners are a critical component to our ability to protect and
defend our values and virtues around the world. NATO is a key
component to that. The President's been clear on his views of,
of the importance of NATO, as has the Secretary. You know,
related to whether or not SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe] stays a United States military officer, I'll defer to
the President on that.
I think that's a discussion that he currently is ongoing.
But, for me in particular, I value our allies and partners and
if confirmed, that'll be a significant portion of the job that
I have ahead of me.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and I appreciate that that's a
policy decision, but what I'm really asking is what the
advantage is for the United States in having the SACEUR be an
American.
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, as always, anytime we
have United States Forces deployed, we generally have wanted
them under a United States commander. That was the history
behind the establishment of SACEUR and putting the dual-hat
EUCOM commander and SACEUR together. I think it is an
opportunity for global leadership in particular in Europe, but
again, would defer to the President as he considers what the
future policy may look like.
Senator Shaheen. I know that Senator Reed asked you this
question, and it was part of your official questions from
Senator Wicker, but when you have situations where your
military advice may be different from the direction that the
Administration is heading on policy, how do you intend to
approach those situations and how would you continue to make
sure that the military perspective that you're supposed to
represent is actually being presented?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, the same way I
have for 34 years, with candor. Candor has gotten me here
today, and candor will continue to allow me to do my job moving
forward. The President doesn't have to accept the military
advice or the Secretary of the NSC, but we owe it to them for
us to deliver that military advice.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Cotton
Senator Cotton. General Caine, congratulations on your
nomination and thank you for your 34 years of service. Thank
you also for your service at times in the intelligence
community where your reputation is as strong as it is in the
Department of Defense.
Let's continue on the theme of Senator Shaheen's question
about providing your candid military advice. I think as the
chairman and Senator Reed pointed out, a lot of people don't
understand the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not in the chain
of command. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. By law, your role is the principal of
military advisor. So if the President makes a decision on this,
that, or the other, policy or operation about this, that, or
the other country that goes from him to the Secretary of
Defense down to some other commander, say the United States
Central Command (CENTCOM) commander or the Secretary of the
Army or what have you. You're on the side giving advice to
everyone, but you're not actually carrying out decisions in the
chain of command.
Lieutenant General Caine. That's correct, sir.
Senator Cotton. I think Congress gave the chairman that
role because we wanted someone who was free from those day-to-
day demands of operational or managerial duties to provide that
candid military advice. As Senator Shaheen said it, it's
important that you provide that advice even when you think the
principal doesn't want to hear it, the Secretary of Defense, or
the NSC, or the President.
But I think you said in your opening statement that you
were an unusual or an unconventional nominee, which was it?
Lieutenant General Caine. I think it was unconventional,
sir.
Senator Cotton. Unconventional. I agree with that. I think
most people would as well. You don't strike me as the kind of
guy who has been angling for this job for 34 years. Is that a
fair statement?
Lieutenant General Caine. That would be a fair statement,
Senator.
Senator Cotton. Did you expect to get this job as recently
as, I don't know, 3 or 6 months ago?
Lieutenant General Caine. I did not, Senator.
Senator Cotton. So is there any reason to think that you're
not going to be providing your candid and best professional
military advice even, and maybe especially, when you've gotten
wind, say a little birdie has tipped you off that maybe the
Secretary or the President doesn't want to hear what you have
to say?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, no, and you know, I went
to VMI [Virginia Military Institute] where I lived in the new
barracks for 4 years and looked out on a statue of George
Catlett Marshall for 4 years. Sir, if I failed to provide my
candid advice to the Secretary, or the NSC, or the President, I
think General Marshall would climb out of his grave and hunt me
down.
Senator Cotton. Good, thank you. Because I think every
President, every NSC, every Secretary of Defense needs that,
especially from a chairman. Not to give them their candid
advice when it's welcome, but even when they know it's
unwelcome.
Now, as you said, though, you're advisor, you're not a
decider, you're not a commander. Once the Secretary in some
cases, or the President probably in most cases has made the
decision, then you're on the side making sure that decision is
going to be carried out by the relevant commanders, right?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Let's look at something specific
in this area now, and that's the threat of Iran's nuclear
program. By some estimates say it could be just weeks away from
having at least testable of not workable nuclear devices, maybe
as few as a couple years away from having missiles that could
hit us here in the United States. The President has said
repeatedly that he wants a peaceful resolution to this crisis,
but he is also said, I think as recently as last week, ``If
they don't make a deal, there will be bombing''.
He said, for at least a decade I've known him, that Iran
cannot be allowed to get a nuclear weapon. Do you agree with
the President's assessment that Iran cannot be allowed to get a
nuclear weapon?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, sir.
Senator Cotton. Do you agree that because of their missile
programs, especially the flimsy cover of the space launch
program, that this is not just a threat to our troops in the
region or Israel or our Arab friends in the region, this could
be an imminent and existential threat to the United States
itself in just a few short years?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's an
accurate statement.
Senator Cotton. If the President asks for military options
to support what he has said publicly, that if Iran is not
willing to make a deal that there will be bombing, do you
commit to provide him the best and candid advice you can about
viable military options and the likely consequences of each?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's what the
job of the joint staff is to do. Is to provide a range of
options for the President to consider and then allow him to
select whatever those options work best for him.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. Finally, there's some hysteria
about the prospect of the President ordering these strikes, or
someone like you in uniform providing him advice that is going
to lead to another forever war or another endless war.
Are you aware of operations, maybe operations against Iran,
like the Tanker Wars in 1988, in which the forceful but
discriminate application of military power did not lead to a
forever war or an endless war, but rather led to peace and
stability?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. Those examples in our
history do exist, yes.
Senator Cotton. Maybe the Qasem Soleimani strike in 2020 as
well that caused Iran to pull in its horns for the rest of
President Trump's first term. Thank you, General Caine.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. You can answer that question verbally. I
noticed you nodded. General Caine, you nodded your head.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. I wasn't sure exactly
what the question was, but I agree with you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cotton, and thank you
General. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
General Caine for visiting my office, for your service and your
families to our Nation. You have a record that is exemplary and
lengthy. You've served in the Air Force, the Air National
Guard, and within the intelligence community with extraordinary
distinction. This position is not one that you sought, is it?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Or ever expected?
Lieutenant General Caine. No. No, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. The reason is quite simply that the
President of the United States decided to fire the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for political and personal reasons,
and I must say that I find that abhorrent, and I know that you
are not going to comment in those terms on the treatment of
your potential predecessor, but would you agree with me that
politicization of the military is something that should be
avoided at all costs?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. The Nation and the
Constitution all require a non-partisan military.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me that this
apparent myth, because you've credibly denied it, that you wore
a MAGA hat, is extremely regrettable and unfortunate?
Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, I just know that I have
always upheld my oath of office and don't believe the President
said I was wearing a MAGA hat from what I've listened to the
tapes.
Senator Blumenthal. You don't believe he ever said it, but
it has been attributed to him.
Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, I think maybe he was talking
about somebody else when I went and listened to the tapes.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you because of your
extraordinary service General, and I can't imagine anyone
better qualified to answer this question. If you heard that a
mission of a kind that was discussed on an unsecure platform,
Signal, and you were in one of those planes about to launch on
that mission against the Houthis, knowing what you do about the
substance of that conversation, how would you feel?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I stand by what I said
before. I think we all can agree that we need to always protect
the element of surprise.
Senator Blumenthal. That element of surprise was very
likely lost if there had been any intercept by one of our
enemies or adversaries that could be conveyed to the Houthis,
correct?
Lieutenant General Caine. I mean, sir, that's a little bit
of a hypothetical question, but I am thankful as always that we
protect our servicemen and women who are going into combat
operations.
Senator Blumenthal. But there are a lot of pilots and other
military men and women who are understandably angry about that
call, correct?
Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, I've not had anybody come to
me and tell me that they're angry about it. So I can't comment
on that.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you read reports about that
reaction to the call?
Lieutenant General Caine. I have not, Senator. No.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that that kind of
reliance on Signal for that kind of conversation should be
avoided in the future?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I just know that I have
always used the right system for the right kinds of
communications. I don't know in particular you know, what
information was classified in what way on that Signal chat. I
know that we must preserve the element of surprise.
Senator Blumenthal. That platform is not a hardened and
secure platform?
Lieutenant General Caine. That platform is encrypted but
not secure, I believe in the definition of the term secure.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you quickly on another
topic. Would you agree that the Columbia-class program is the
Navy's--should continue to be an acquisition priority along
with the Virginia-class?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I do think Columbia
needs to continue forward at a pace and tempo equal to the
threat.
Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Caine,
once again, thank you for taking the time in my office to visit
with me about a number of the items that you're hearing about
today. I want to go back specifically to an item that Senator
Fischer began talking with you about. That is with regard to
the spectrum and the challenges surrounding it.
The reason why I want to use that as an example is because
I know that General Milley and General CQ Brown, both in their
role as the chief of staff and providing their best military
opinion and advice were put in a position literally of saying
to other people within other Administrations, that this
particular part of the electromagnetic spectrum, which is
currently controlled by the Department of Defense, is critical
to our national defense.
In fact, over the last several years, I have asked in front
of this particular Committee, well over two dozen uniformed
officers to specifically discuss the need to maintain control
of specific portions of the electronic spectrum. In particular,
I've asked whether or not the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band, if we
were to lose that from DODs specific use, if that would
negatively have or would have negative consequences for our war
fighting capabilities.
I have had 100 percent agreement that if we lost that it
would have negative consequences. Would you agree with that
assessment?
Lieutenant General Caine. I would, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. You will be asked at some point,
because this is a valuable commodity. There's a limited amount
of electromagnetic spectrum available, but there are interests
within the United States that would love to have access to this
without regard to what it would do or would not understanding
what the impact would be on our national defense.
Are you aware that under President Trump's proposed concept
of a Golden Dome or a missile protection system, that a number
of the radar systems that would be required to be in effect for
that to move forward, are found within the 3.1 to 3.45 portions
of the spectrum because of their unique physics competencies?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I'm familiar with the
basics of that frequency spectrum. I don't know what particular
radars Golden Dome has brought into their mix of equipment, but
that would not surprise me.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. I just think part of the
discussion that's been here today has been a concern by the
Committee that any person that has the role of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs recognize just how serious their role is with
regard to providing to a very, very group of powerful
individuals, the best professional military advice that they
can provide, and recognizing that while you don't control the
policy that is set, your role as this Committee sees it is in
many cases, the last resort to providing the right types of
advice that elected leaders have to hear regardless of whether
or not they want to hear it. My understanding, and once again,
I'll ask you to just confirm it, you recognize that that is
your primary responsibility,
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's the most
important part of this job and the essential part of this job.
If confirmed, you have my commitment that I'll always speak
truth to power.
Senator Rounds. Well, I think you'll find that this
committee will be very supportive of you in that role. General,
the B-21 Raider is one of the most capable military platforms
in the world has ever seen. It will play a crucial role in any
conflict the US faces against a near peer adversary because of
its ability to operate in a highly contested environment. The
Air Force has committed to at least 100 B-21s.
But given its dual missions of conventional long-range
strike and nuclear deterrence, many of us believe that we will
need a number closer to 200 bombers. If confirmed, would you be
prepared to advocate for more than 100 and perhaps as many as
200 of these platforms if a review of our war plan suggested
that that is what required for our operational plans moving
forward?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, the last part of your
question, I think is the key part for me. After the analysis
portion, and, you know, mindful that I've not been confirmed
for this job yet, I'd like to speak to the other joint chiefs
and the combat commanders whose requirements Raider will
fulfill before I commit to supporting any particular number of
B-21s.
It's an essential part of our nuclear and conventional
program, and certainly a key component of it. But before I
commit to any number, I'd like to study the matter and come
back to you.
Senator Rounds. But if that appears to be the case, you
would not hesitate to recommend more if those studies warranted
it?
Lieutenant General Caine. I would not hesitate.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Caine,
with all due respect to you, we should not be here today. This
hearing is happening only because of the unprecedented
dismissal without cause of General Brown as chairman. As a
highly respected military leader, General Brown faithfully
served our country for decades. He provided exactly what the
Constitution asked of him, the best non-partisan military
advice to civilian leadership.
However, for an Administration that is claiming to be the
most ``transparent in history,'' no reasonable justification
has been provided for General Brown's termination. Instead,
General Brown's dismissal reveals once again, President Trump's
intention to install yes men and women with fealty to him and
not to the Constitution or the American people.
Now, General Caine, you said you will always speak truth to
power in your responses to advanced questions, and you
indicated that you would provide independent advice. But let me
just mention what happens to people who stand up to President
Trump. General Milley was a former Chair of Joint Chiefs, stood
up to President Trump, and here's what happened to him.
President Trump took away his security detail, his security
clearance. He even took down his portrait in the Pentagon.
That's not all. General Milley is now under investigation by
the Department's Inspector General to see if you'll be able to
retire as a four-star general. It's always a challenge to stand
up to this President.
Let me just start with the two initial questions, and I'll
get to some of the questions that have to do with your fitness
to serve. I ask these questions of all nominees on any of the
committees on which I sit. Since you became a legal adult, have
you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed
any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Lieutenant General Caine. I have not, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
Lieutenant General Caine. I have not, Senator.
Senator Hirono. General, you've been asked a number of
questions regarding what the President attributed to you, that
it's always been reported that you wore a MAGA hat. You
testified you did not. If you did wear a MAGA hat, would that
constitute partisan political activity by a uniform officer?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I did not wear any
political merchandise.
Senator Hirono. If you wore such a hat, would that
constitute partisan political activity by a uniform officer?
Yes or no?
Lieutenant General Caine. I think it probably would. Yes,
Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. General Caine, you've been asked
also a number of questions about what's being referred to as
Signal Gate, and I commend the Chair of this Committee and the
Ranking Member for asking for an IGA inquiry. You were the
director for special access programs at the Pentagon, an office
that manages our Nation's most classified programs. Have you
ever discussed classified information on an unclassified
medium, such as Signal?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, Senator. I have not.
Senator Hirono. What would be the consequences for
discussing a special access program on Signal?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, we'd have to first
do an investigation. We'd have to look into the particular
matters associated with it. We'd have to consult with counsel
to determine what the way forward was, and then ultimately turn
it over to the leadership in the Department.
Senator Hirono. You wouldn't just let this matter drop?
Which is basically what this Administration wants to do?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I think that it's
a little bit of a hypothetical situation asking me about what
would happen if a SAP [Special Access Program] was dropped into
Signal.
Senator Hirono. It's really not a hypothetical. It is what
is confronting this Administration and what's happening. You
know that we need to preserve the element of surprise. Is
discussing the kinds of matters that were discussed on signal
preserving the element of surprise?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I don't want to--given
the fact that the Chairman and Ranking Member of an ask for an
investigation, I don't want to comment on the particulars. I do
want to stay at the strategic altitude and say that we should
always preserve the element of surprise.
Senator Hirono. I think it was a very simple question,
whether or not talking about the things that have been
reported, whether that preserved the element of surprise. I
would say that if you're truly speaking truth to power, that
the answer would obviously be, no, it does not preserve the
element of surprise. That is why we need to have an inquiry.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I first would like
to acknowledge the loss of three soldiers from the Third
Infantry Division, and pray for a speedy recovery on the
fourth.
General Caine, thank you so much for being in front of this
Committee today, and we all understand that there's a little
bit of political theatrics that always occur on this Committee,
but I would like to thank you very much for your integrity and
your measured responses to the questions today. You are
carrying yourself with dignity and respect, and that's what we
would anticipate and expect of anyone that will be serving as
the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. So thank you very
much for that.
You stated that you are an unconventional leader moving
forward, and I in particular, am very excited about that
because you have served on Active Duty and Active Duty Air
Force. But also in regards to my own service, you are a
national guardsman, and thank you. It gives you a very well-
rounded perspective when it comes to the men and women that
serve in various capacities for our great Armed Services.
But also very important to me is the fact that you have
served as an entrepreneur, and this brings a different level
into the position that you are hoping to attain. That leads me
into my question. I've been very focused on our defense budget,
efficiency, and auditability. We spoke about this in my office.
Because you have the eye of a businessman, you know that your
investment dollars are very important going into a business.
So you will understand that every dollar going into our
Department of Defense is also going to be very important for
our war fighters and those that support them. The Department of
Defense despite managing the largest discretionary budget of
the Federal Government, has yet to pass a full financial audit.
We understand that this failure is eroding public trust in the
Department and hinders our ability as Congress to allocate
those resources effectively, and our frustrations just continue
to grow.
So, General Caine, if you are confirmed, what steps will
you take to ensure the DOD finally passes a full audit by 2028
as required by the law or ideally if at all possible, even
sooner?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thanks for that
question. Is not only as an entrepreneur alum, but also an
American taxpayer, we owe it to the Nation for the Department
to pass an audit. There are very few levers that the chairman,
if I'm confirmed, that the chairman can throw other than to
encourage the services to be prepared for that audit. That's
something that I'll take on if I'm confirmed for the job.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you very much for that. In
regards to our Special Operations Forces (SOF), I serve as the
chair of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee,
and we'll continue to advocate on behalf of our SOF. They're a
very cost-effective force multiplier, and they deliver those
high impact results with a very small footprint. And I know we
have spoken about this, you do get that.
Cuts to SOF funding risk ceding ground to our adversaries.
So, General Caine, given SOF's proven role in great power
competition, do you believe a justification exists for reducing
their footprint and their budget at a time when unconventional
threats are on the rise?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator mindful that I'm
not in the job yet, I do understand and appreciate the
exponential value that SOF can bring to the competition phase
that we're in right now. If confirmed, I'd like to take that on
and come back to you with my thoughts on it.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, and I will expect that as
well.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. I know we could go on, I'll submit a
question for the record on recruitment and retention
challenges.
Senator Ernst. But I just want to close by saying I'm very
grateful that President Trump has nominated you to serve as our
Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do think that you
will bring a different level into this position, a different
eye, a different way of looking at things. We are in very
challenging times. We all recognize this. We need a change. You
are that change. So thank you very much for being willing to
continue to serve in this capacity. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
congratulations on your nomination. We've discussed almost
every member of this panel has discussed the importance of
giving straight advice to the President and the Secretary of
Defense. These are two very strong personalities. The Oval
Office is probably the most intimidating room in the world. I
hope you'll reiterate. You mentioned you owe it to them to give
you the best advice. You also owe it to the country that you
give them the best advice.
You mentioned to me when we discussed this before, you have
been retired, you didn't expect this job, you don't need this
job. Give me your straight-ahead commitment that when the chips
are down, you're going to argue for your best military advice.
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I don't know any other
way to operate as a leader. My job, if confirmed, is to always
provide best military advice to the President, the Secretary of
the NSC, and to Congress, and to do so with candor every day.
Senator King. That, as everybody has mentioned,
particularly Senator Rounds mentioned, that this is really the
principle responsibility of the job. We are in a very dangerous
moment, as you know, there are potential conflicts and
conflicts all over the world. So you're going to be called upon
probably in a matter of weeks to make these kind of calls and
to provide that advice to the President.
So I look forward to your honoring that commitment that you
just made, and making clear not only providing advice that
sounds sort of neutral, but advocating for advice, saying, this
is what we believe the best military advice is. Let me move on.
It worries me sometimes that we have a tendency
particularly in national security, to move our focus from one
area to the other, and then we neglect the area that we're
missing. What I'm very worried about now is a resurgence of
terrorism. Syria potentially could become another base for ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. There are thousands of ISIS
fighters in jails in Syria, if they're released, that could be
a major challenge. West Africa is now a major area of al Qaeda
activity.
Talk to me about the terrorism threat and the fact that we
can't forget it because 19 people changed American history on
September 11th, and it doesn't take many terrorists to create
serious problems for this country and for people around the
world.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, sir, I think you--I don't
know that I could say it any better than you just did. We have
to keep our pressure on the terrorists who would continue to
like----
Senator King. Can you be sure that you got that in the
record what he just said? Go ahead.
Lieutenant General Caine. It's not something Senator,
unfortunately, we can ever take our eyes off of completely. The
challenge that somebody who would want to do harm to us or to
our interests around the world is not going to go away anytime
soon.
Senator King. One of the concerns that I have, we always
talk about deterrence. That's the main spring of our defense
strategy. But deterrence doesn't work with a terrorist, with a
nuclear weapon. They don't have a capital to blow up. They
don't care about dying. The defense against that eventuality,
which I think is absolutely terrifying, is intelligence. I hope
that you will continue to focus the forces in the Pentagon on
intelligence and intervening if there's any threat of nuclear
material getting into the hands of a terrorist organization.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Finally, in terms of your leadership within
the military, and I know that you're a passionate advocate for
our war fighters. One of the things that concerns me, and I'm
going from this meeting to a meeting of the Veterans Affairs
Committee, is the transition from Active Duty military to
retired, which you have experienced.
The testimony that we've had at numerous hearings is it's
inadequate. It's improved in recent years, but there are still
gaps that it's very complex and military Active Duty people
going into veteran status, it turns out it's the highest
propensity for suicide in the first couple of years after the
transition from Active Duty.
So I hope that's something that you'll pay some attention
to. I believe that as much money, effort, and time should be
spent on transition out as we spend on recruiting in.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it is a bit of an
arduous process. I can personally attest to that. I appreciate
your leadership on helping the veterans of the Nation to
transition appropriately. It is an area of risk for sure, and
I'll keep my eye on it if confirmed.
Senator King. I hope you will. Thank you very much General,
and again, congratulations on your nomination.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
General for your service and for your willingness to step back
into the gap. While I agree that the dismissal of your
predecessor was unfortunate, it's behind us, and I cannot think
of a better person to replace General Brown than you. Frankly,
the unconventionalness of you us as the President's pick is in
and of itself brilliant in my view.
But when you look at your actual history and your actual
service and the diversity of it, I just can't imagine a better
choice. So congratulations on that and I look forward to
supporting you strongly. In your opening statement, you said
some things that we hear a lot from people that come before the
Committee and your response to, to Chairman Wicker's
legislation dealing with the acquisition reform stuff. Very
welcoming.
But everyone says that. Everyone says that, and yet I find
it--and this is why, frankly, you being unconventional is
encouraging to me because they all mean it, by the way, when
they say it. I believe that at the moment they mean it. They
mean it until the particular service that they served in or the
particular agency within the service they served in, it was
disrupted by the very thing they say they support.
Who we're dealing with the situation right now, perhaps the
most disruptive innovator taking over, becoming the first
director of the most disruptive innovative agency, The Space
Development Agency, has been on leave for 3 months during a
witch hunt that's began on the last day of the last
Administration. Everybody that that says they're an innovator,
is an innovator, except in this case, maybe we should check
further into it.
All the while, satellites don't go up, all the while China
goes at the speed of China. So I believe there's a cultural
problem as well as we have some work to do as Congress,
policymakers have work to do, the Administration has work to
do, but we have a culture challenge as well.
General, I'd like you to elaborate a little bit on how we
can really make the difference that you say you want to make,
and I believe you do want to make, so that we aren't just
consolidating all of our industry into a couple of giants,
whether it be a land, airspace, sea.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, you're hitting on
an area that that is a point of passion for me. We have to stop
admiring the problem and we have to start executing. I do think
your point about culture is where it all starts. I think we
have to take an, an ownership and an entrepreneurial mindset to
all of these reforms that are in front of us. We can't do this
alone. We have to do it with you here in the Congress in order
to actually make these changes.
I'm encouraged by the leaders who are coming into the
Department who have deep substantive business background that
are not known as people who admire problems. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with the various leaders in order to
actually move the ball, and of course, working with the
Congress to execute these things without continuing to admire
these challenges in front of us.
Senator Cramer. Well, and I appreciate your reference to
the new style of leaders coming in the entrepreneurs and
whatnot. I have the same optimism as a result of it, but I am
getting anxious about actually seeing it happen. So, maybe
you're the leader that can make that a reality for us now.
You know, we get to talk to the combatant commanders.
You'll get to talk to them a lot. One of the things we hear
over and over from commanders, of course, is that intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, ISR, is in great need and low
supply these days. The Air Force, specifically, has been on a
mission to eliminate ISR as one of their key missions. It's
disappeared even as a term in several of their documents in
recent years.
It's not just their fault. I mean, we have a--as we've all
been talking about, we have a resource challenge in our Defense
Department, and we're trying to work on that. I just think we
all have to do a lot more. For sure, I want to recognize that.
But I also worry that there's this divide between what the
commanders say they need in the field and frankly what we're
seeing and where we're investing.
I would just love you to, your remaining seconds with me,
expound a little bit on ISR, where you see it, you know,
landing as a mission set. Maybe it's everybody has their own
form, but I don't think that's very practical.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, just in my
remaining 5 seconds. You know, ISR, and the ability to have
indications and warnings to make decisions for commanders who
hold risk is a key and essential part of our overall ability to
execute the missions that we must do.
Senator Cramer. I think that Air Force should keep it as a
mission. I get that. Other services will have some form of it.
But anyway, thank you. I look forward to supporting you.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General. Good to see you. I
enjoyed our visit. I would encourage my colleagues not to hold
your last name against you. I share comments that some of my
colleagues have made about the unfortunate circumstances with
General Brown, but you didn't have anything to do with that.
I know from our conversations and my own due diligence VMI
is very proud of you and folks who've worked with you in the
past who I hold in high regard, are very proud of you. A lot of
the questions that have been asked, kind of trying to really
drill into your ability to give the best candidate advice, I
think your career has demonstrated to my satisfaction that you
will do so.
One of the things that I really like about your background,
and I think Senator Ernst and others have commented on it, is
active and guard, DOD and private sector at the Pentagon, at
the White House, at the CIA. You've seen pretty deep
interaction with allies.
You've really seen the breadth of our military mission in a
way that I think is the kind of experience that would inform
that judgment that you need to provide. In fact, in a way, the
role of the Head of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, as Senator Cotton was walking you through the work that
you did at the CIA, was a little bit the same role.
Why don't you describe in a little more detail that posting
to the CIA ?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. What your job was in that, because I think
it's almost analogous, the advice you are providing to the CIA
director, best military advice, is pretty analogous to the
advice you'd be providing to SEC DEF [Secretary of Defense] and
the and the Commander-in-Chief.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
question. You know, I do agree. The ADMA, the Associate
Director for Military Affairs, was actually established by the
Congress to detail a three star military officer over to the
CIA under title 50 authorities in order to provide best
military advice to the director, the deputy director, and to
work daily with the secretary, the chairman, the combatant
commanders, and the service chiefs in order to globally
integrate same functions that the chairman has, in order to
globally integrate CIA and DOD activities.
If confirmed, I'll continue to do that, working with the
best of the title 10 forces, the best of title 50, what the
State Department can bring to the table, what the rest of the
interagency can bring to the table, along with our allies and
partners. So, while I'm mindful that I've not led at the four-
star level, this is not a command job that I'm being considered
for. It's an advisory job, and there's very similar traits to
the last job in this one
Senator Kaine. The posting that you had to the CIA for this
important role, was that a--were you delegated by the SEC DEF
to do that, or did you like interview with the CIA to get that
post?
Lieutenant General Caine. I was nominated by the Department
and interviewed by the CIA. As far as I understand it, the CIA
made the selection.
Senator Kaine. But you were the nominee of the Department.
So, I do think that the role is an important one. The one thing
I don't see in your resume, but I suspect it's probably there,
and I just--your resume's too long, is interaction that you've
had with the State Department over the course of your career.
Could you talk about that a little bit?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. My first real
substantive interaction with the State Department was actually
when I was a White House fellow at USDA, and we were charged
with working on the Global Pandemic Plan surrounding avian
influenza H5N1.
Senator Kaine. During the Bush administration?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. During the Bush
administration. That really began my substantive appreciation
for what the diplomatic element of power can do, and that
continued through my time in the military overseas, and have
deep regard and appreciation for what the State Department can
do for us.
Senator Kaine. I think all of us at times have been
frustrated with silos. The states and their silo, intel and
theirs, DOD Pentagon, and their own silo. Sometimes having the
different perspectives is great. If everybody's just singing
the exact same note, you sometimes wonder whether it's
groupthink. So, getting some different perspectives can be
helpful. The fact that you've been in all parts of the kind of
broad national security family gives me some real confidence in
your judgment coming into this position.
Last thing I'll just ask is what would you say has been
your signature experience of the course of your career in terms
of interacting with our allies?
Lieutenant General Caine. Probably sir the scud hunt in
2003, where I had the opportunity to work very closely with our
British, UK, and Australian allies, which was absolutely a
coalition effort from day one. We went to war alongside them,
and I've thankfully sustained all of those relationships now. I
have deep relationships with our closest allies, and if
confirmed, look forward to continuing those.
Senator Kaine. I'm a strong promoter of the AUKUS
[Australia, United Kingdom, United States] framework and the
fact that you've had those relationships in the past and
maintain them, that's a positive.
I yield back. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Where were you exactly during that scud
operation, sir?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, sir, the location that we
flew out of, I think is still classified. Happy to talk about
that in closed session.
Chairman Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
General, congratulations. You've got the right background.
I think you're going to do a great job. Always like to see
business guys succeed. So, that's fun. This is all doable. I
mean, you look at where we are. We've got Communist China's,
built a military to defeat us. We've got allies that have not
invested like they should have. We've got Iran, which appears
to have, you know, enough money now to continue to support the
Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah.
We've got China all over Latin America. I mean, what we
have to do to defend the freedom of this country and try to do
our best to police a world. Is this actually doable? Do are you
optimistic? Are you pessimistic?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I'm always an optimistic
leader.
Senator Scott. Why do you believe that we can do it?
Lieutenant General Caine. There's a lot of reasons, but the
power of the American spirit is what leaps out to me right off
the bat. There are very few things that we set our mind to that
we can achieve. Despite some of the very serious challenges in
front of us, we've always rogered up to those challenges.
Senator Scott. Do you think the budget that we're going to
be able to provide is going to allow you to be able to do the
things you need to do?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I won't get in
front of the President, or OMB [Office of Management and
Budget], on what budget markers they set. What I will do
confirm to you and commit to you, is that whatever capital
we're given will make the best out of it.
Senator Scott. In Florida we have 20 military bases and
three unified commands. One is Homestead, and we talked about
this a little bit. It's not that far from Cuba. Homestead is a
little bit north of Key West, and it hasn't had a dedicated
flying mission in a while. It seems like it's, it would be an
important base. Do you see a future for Homestead? Do you think
it ought to have a flying mission?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I won't get out in
front of the service, but if confirmed, I'll definitely talk to
the Air Force Reserve Command and the Air Force to see what
they're thinking around flying mission at Homestead.
The history of that unit, and that base is exemplary. They
were with us in the Scud Hunt, a small component of them were
there with us back in 2003. I've got deep appreciation for the
culture and history of that unit.
Senator Scott. This is the first time I have the
opportunity to be the chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower.
As you know, we have not been able to build ships, maintain
ships, keep ships ready. How do you think that's going to
change?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, I think it's a significant
challenge for us, and we've got to up our game. I'm encouraged
by the SEC Navs focus on this, and we've got to get to our
congressionally mandated number of 355 ships as soon as
possible, which includes our ability to sustain them and repair
them around the world. We've got real limits right now,
Senator Scott. According to the Navy, they provide the
combatant commanders with 40 percent of their requirements.
Didn't make much sense in business. If one division need, well,
you know, they need to deliver 40 percent, but it's work, we'd
based the budget on the requirements needed. Do you think
there's a different way we ought to be allocating resources?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I'm sorry, could you
repeat the question again?
Senator Scott. Command and commanders that, you know,
they're only getting a portion of what they're asking. Is there
a better way to allocate the resources?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate the
question. You know, that the challenge is that we have to
globally integrate all the combatant commands, and there's
never a loss for tension between the COCOMs. What I trust is
that the joint staff and the joint chiefs are looking carefully
and thoughtfully considering where that balance is, and then
passing those options to the secretary for him to decide on
where that allocation may be. Until we have such capacity that
there's no need to do that, I think we're going to continue to
balance those capabilities and capacities across all the
COCOMs.
Senator Scott. So, my final question is, what drives you?
Why do you want to do this? Let's say you did this for 4 years,
what would your goal be at the end of those 4 years that you
said we got this accomplished?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, doing my part to
make sure that we have a safe and prosperous United States of
America. That the military element of power has delivered the
deterrence capability that we needed, and we've taken care of
our families and our force along the way.
Senator Scott. Thank you. You'll do a great job.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Mullin.
Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you,
General, for wanting to step back into service. Your retirement
didn't last too long, and the idea that you're willing to jump
back and serve just speaks volume to the true inner spirit that
you have. I want to thank you for doing that. You have made a
tremendous amount of sacrifice already and, you know, eyes wide
open what this job is going to entail. You have some real
challenges ahead of you.
I want to start first talking about the defense industry. I
know you're familiar with the so-called ``last Supper'' in 1994
to where we basically encouraged our defense industry to
consolidate. I'm a firm believer in looking back and looking at
things of where it went wrong. Because since then, our defense
industry really hasn't been to deliver on time and on budget on
some of the most critical needs we have.
We've seen from our planes in the air, to our ships in the
shipyards, to the equipment that we're needing is constantly
behind what we're needing today. When we ask for technology
that's being used against us or that our adversaries have
already may achieved. When we ask our defense industry to
deliver, it's 5 to 7 years, if we're lucky, it's 3, and yet,
it's never on time.
Now, you come from a unique position, being Active, being
Reserve, and being in the private sector. I feel like that this
is one of the biggest threats that we have. We have a
technology need today, and it's being delivered 5 years from
now. We are 5 years behind. How do you plan on tackling this?
Because I do feel like this is the biggest threat to our
military today.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I agree. It's a
huge problem. Technology is evolving so quickly that every time
we field capabilities, they're obsolete oftentimes when they
hit the force. That's not acceptable. I think it goes back to
something that the Chairman and I talked about at the beginning
of the hearing, and that's related to having agility in our
requirements and building a system of acquisition that allows
us to take advantage of the current technologies, not those of
the past.
If confirmed, I'll work with the joint staff, the joint
chiefs, and of course OSD to pick up the speed, pace, and tempo
of fielding the capabilities that we need that are not
obsolete.
Senator Mullin. How do you plan on bringing private
industry back in to actually go around some of our primes that
are incapable of delivering in a quick fashion?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I think we need a
mix of both startups that are new entrants to the industry, but
we also do need the primes. The answer is all of the above.
There are components that the primes can only do, and we have
to leverage that capability. Then there's a bunch of things
that new entrants will do to move forward. So, I think the
answer is, as I mentioned, all of the above.
Senator Mullin. I agree that the primes are important, but
they have felt they have failed miserably on staying on budget
and on time and being adequate to delivering today's needs. I
don't like rewarding those that have not delivered on
adequately when we've asked. We know that's been a problem. So,
holding them accountable is important.
Now, I want to switch gears real quick about Afghanistan.
It's deeply personal to me, and I know it is to you and anyone
else that had the privilege of serving the Nation in
Afghanistan. But because our disastrous withdrawal, I feel like
there's a hesitation in our military and our military family to
actually step forward and make that sacrifice again.
I think there's a lot of doubt that the United States is
able to stand behind what our first mission is, and then to be
able to bring pride to those that sacrificed. With that brings
a morale issue to those that are still serving. Those are
sometimes with the most experience in there. I feel like we may
be having a drain in knowledge of those that that have
sacrificed so much.
How do you plan on retaining those and restoring that trust
back in the military that says, 'Hey, we got you. We're not
going to leave you on the battlefield. We're not going to let
your sacrifice die, but we're going to let you walk away with a
tremendous amount of pride knowing that your sacrifice meant
something to this country.?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate the
question. I think that's one of our most important jobs as
leaders, whether it be at the chairman level or all the way
down to the platoon leader level, is inspiring those who serve.
Taking care of them always, but also making sure they know how
much we appreciate them, and their families, and their service.
Senator Mullin. But that doesn't address what happened.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, you mean in
Afghanistan?
Senator Mullin. Yes.
Lieutenant General Caine. You know, that withdrawal was not
what anyone would've wanted. Very difficult circumstances. I
think the officers on the ground did the best that they could
with the policy decisions that were made. We mourned the loss
of the 13 at Abbey Gate, and we have to hold those accountable
if there was something for them to be held accountable for. I
know the Department is looking into that. But again, most of
those professional military officers were executing the
direction and orders of policymakers above them.
Senator Mullin. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. General, is it accurate to say that
Afghanistan was a 'forever war??
Lieutenant General Caine. I'm not sure what the doctrinal
definition of a forever war is, but it certainly took a--it was
a long, long time.
Chairman Wicker. What was the engagement of NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] and American troops at the time
of our disastrous withdrawal?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, sir, I think there were
still U.S. Forces on the ground and still NATO Forces on the
ground. I'm not exactly sure what your question is.
Chairman Wicker. Were there casualties?
Lieutenant General Caine. At the very end, there were. Yes,
sir.
Chairman Wicker. Oh, no, in the last year before the
disastrous withdrawal. There were no American casualties?
Lieutenant General Caine. Not that I'm aware.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Caine, for being here. Thank you for
your family, for their support of this appointment. Based on
your understanding of relevant classification and authorities,
do you believe that any of the information that was shared on
the Signal chat was classified at the time it was sent,
particularly the details about timing of the target and for the
manned U.S. aircraft and other details related to the exact
plan?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I didn't see the
original CONOP [Contingency Operations Plan]. As I mentioned
earlier in my testimony, I think we should always preserve the
element of surprise. That's a key and essential thing that we
owe our warfighters.
Senator Gillibrand. What would you have done if you were on
that text chain?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, first, I wasn't and I think
that was a political partisan text chain with policymakers at
the political level only. So, I can't hypothetically guess what
I would've done, but I would not have--we would not have----
Senator Gillibrand. --I wouldn't call that a political or
partisan text chain. It had the head of intelligence, it had
the head of CIA, it had our Secretary of Defense, it had the
National Security top advisors for the President, and to share
that type of information from a military perspective, I can't
imagine if a subordinate of yours shared that type of military
information in an unclassified setting, such as a Signal text
chain, they would be fired, would they not?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, as I mentioned
earlier, I think, the Chairman and Ranking Member have called
for an investigation, and so, I feel like it's appropriate for
me to withhold comment until such time that it's either
determined that there will be an investigation or not.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, what would you do in a different
scenario if you see classified information or war plans,
information, or tactical information on an unclassified chain?
What would you do to stop the conversation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, I think I would weigh in
and stop it if I was a, a part of it, but in this case, I
wasn't.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. The worldwide proliferation
of unmanned aerial systems is an undeniable national security
threat, creating challenges in both funding and capability. How
do you believe the Department and Joint Force should approach
these two challenges of funding and capability?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it's definitely a
big challenge in front of us. The mass and simultaneity of
especially small UAS [Unmanned Aircraft System] is one that is
concerning to me, both from a technical standpoint, but also
from a policy standpoint. As I'm sure you're aware, we have
somewhat limited capabilities in some cases inside the domestic
U.S. to stop some of these UASs. I think we have to continue to
fund the research and development to counter them.
Senator Gillibrand. Well, let's make it more direct to you.
When you have drones hovering over Langley for a 2-week period,
appearing and disappearing without our technology being able to
track or trace it, without having the authorities to follow the
UAS to its point of departure and its point of return, that
creates a serious national security risk if those UAS are
indeed being operated by Russia, China, or Iran. So, what will
you do to protect the military bases and the military secrets
that are under your purview?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed, I'll
continue to put the appropriate amount of pressure and interest
on that to work in conjunction with the Commander of NORAD
[North American Aerospace Defense Command], NORTHCOM, General
Guillot, who's doing a fantastic job on this issue and others
to continue to work with the private sector, to find the
capabilities that we must have, that we currently don't have to
prevent this from happening again.
Senator Gillibrand. Which capabilities don't you have, do
you have the, do you lack the authorities or do you lack the
technological capability,
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think it's a little
bit of a mix of both. There are some authorities? issues
related to airspace directly over U.S. military bases, and then
transitioning outside of the geographical boundaries of that
military base and who has cognizant authority over those small
UASs at that point. Then, I think there's some technological
challenges in the states around stopping them and actually
downing them. There's always collateral damage concerns in
those types of things.
Senator Gillibrand. Will you seek the authority to be able
to take down UASs above military bases?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I'll speak with the
Commander of NORAD, NORTHCOM, and the relevant State and local
authorities to make sure that we're illuminating those
discussion points.
Senator Gillibrand. Senator Cotton and I have legislation
to do exactly that, and I would request that you review that
legislation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Do you have co-sponsors, Senator?
Senator Gillibrand. I don't know yet, but I can ask.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you General, for being here, your service, and
congratulations on your nomination. You're nominated to be the
senior military advisor to the President of the United States.
What a chore. I remember a time when generals and retired
senior officers would avoid political discussions. It was
extremely uncommon for a former senior officer to even endorse
a candidate for political office.
Lately, that approach seems to be an exception, not to
rule. Some of your predecessors even appear to support
political positions while in uniform. Your predecessor was
deeply involved in politics, which should not be part of this
approach.
General Caine, in your own words, how would you describe to
this Committee the importance of your responsibility and
commitment to provide the best military advice, even when that
advice might differ from what the President of the United
States believes?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
question. It ultimately is the whole job is to be the principal
military advisor to the President, and pursuant to that job,
provide the President with best military advice even when the
President may have different feelings about it. That is exactly
what the Nation pays me to do. So, if confirmed, that is
exactly what I'll do.
Senator Tuberville. General, when you take this job, what's
your No. 1 concern?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, right now, the No. 1
concern is the passage of time and ensuring that the joint
force is ready, properly armed with the right capabilities out
at the tactical edge, properly globally integrated with the
services themselves, with the other elements of the
interagency, with our allies and partners, and with the private
sector, and ready to go tonight. That means their families are
ready, they're ready, they're properly trained and equipped.
So, we have much to do.
Senator Tuberville. We all know that the machines that we
build, the guns and the bullets that we have, everything at the
disposal of the warfighter. But it's usually and is the people
involved. Our recruiting has much improved in the last couple
of months. What do you see your role as an advisor to the
President in recruiting for our all of our military?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, we don't have much
of a military without the incredible 2.8 million members of the
joint force that selflessly join the service to do something
more important than themselves. To answer your question, if
confirmed, I think it's an opportunity for me to be another
voice of encouragement for those young men and women who have
the capability and meet the standards to come into the service
and do something that they will forever hold so high in their
past history. The chance to serve this Nation is a special
privilege for those of us that have come into the cloth of our
Nation and served. I hope that I'll be able to encourage others
to do so.
Senator Tuberville. Being the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Personnel of the Armed Services, we had a hearing last week
with our academies, Naval Academy and Air Force Academy. I
would hope in the future, and I know your job is to inform our
President and keep him advised of everything, but I think that
your job, too, would be able to work with our academies in
terms of our leadership, help build that leadership to a higher
standard. To keep it to a higher standard and let our young men
and women know that that's where it all starts.
If we don't have leadership, we don't have anything. I
think that's a good point, that it pass on to the President.
Obviously, your information you give to the President is going
to be No. 1, but also build and help build our military is
going to be a huge part of you, I think, a part of your job.
What do you think?
Lieutenant General Caine. I agree, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. You're here. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by expressing my deep gratitude for the
outstanding service of General Brown and so many other
dedicated military leaders who were unjustly dismissed as part
of a politically motivated purge of senior Department of
Defense officials.
General Caine, I really enjoyed our conversations we've had
recently over the last couple of weeks. If you are confirmed as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you will serve as the President's
principal military advisor, and be expected to bring your
military judgment to bear, to advise against illegal, immoral,
and advisable courses of action, regardless of partisan
pressure.
However, we are in a moment where that very principle is
under strain, such as with the dismissal of Judge Advocates
General responsible for providing critical legal expertise
because their counsel did not align with the political
preferences of Secretary Hegseth. This pattern has had a
chilling effect on the open, honest discourse essential to
national security decisionmaking at the highest level.
Now, the lives of self servicemembers and future of our
national security depend on expert qualified leaders who
understand that their decisions have real life or death
consequences. How will you insulate and empower general
officers across the force to remain professional and
importantly nonpartisan and provide unbiased advice to civilian
policymakers without fear of coercion, undue partisanship, or
retaliation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I thank you. I
also enjoyed our time together. This is the whole job. This is
why you and I both took our oath of office. It's what is
contained in our commission and aligned with the Constitution,
and so, that is what the Nation expects out of our professional
officer corps, I'm sure what we'll continue to do moving
forward in history.
Senator Duckworth. And will you do your best to ensure that
the general officer corps, those who give that advice, remain
unbiased and non-partisan?
Lieutenant General Caine. Always.
Senator Duckworth. Well, maybe bias on the side of the
servicemembers and national security.
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, yes, ma'am, but
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and it's great to see a guard
guy at that table going through the confirmation hearing, so.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. You'll also be the senior most uniformed
officer entrusted with being a model and a leader for the joint
force. Recently, we've witnessed troubling signs, signs of
blurred lines between private power and public trust. A
striking lack of regard for protecting vital national security
secrets and the absence of accountability for top leadership;
from Elon Musk receiving invitations for briefings on China, to
a pattern of mishandling classified information, to Secretary
Hegseth bringing family members into sensitive meetings with
allies and partners. Very concerningly.
We have also seen a concerted effort to skirt transparency
to the American people on the use of force with decisionmaking
being done over disappearing Signal chat. It seems like this
Administration is more interested in keeping secrets from the
American people than protecting national security secrets for
the American people. You have experience running some of our
most sensitive operations. So, you know that even the need for
secrecy to enable mission success does not mean skirting
accountability to the American people.
Do you commit to providing the legally required
transparency to Congress and the American people over decisions
related to the use of force even in the face of pressure from
civilian leadership?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Another concerning focus of
this Administration has been to distract the military from its
core mission approval of protecting the American people from
external threats by redirecting military personnel assets and
platforms to domestic law enforcement missions.
President Trump may have learned from his first term that
asking one of your Presidents to deploy the military to fire on
civilian protestors was a no-go. So, instead, he has turned to
form insidious tactics linking criminal activities or undesired
political speech to hostile governments like Venezuela or
terrorist groups like Hamas in order to legitimize military
involvement.
In fact, this kind of threat inflation is exactly what
dictators do. The separation between military missions and
civilian law enforcement is a core tenet of our democracy, and
exists not only to protect the rights of American citizens, but
also to preserve the integrity of our Armed Forces.
When military personnel are thrust into law enforcement
missions, it places them at risk of moral injury of being asked
to enforce partisan concerns rather than to defend the Nation.
It compromises not just their mission, but their conscience.
What steps will you take to ensure that U.S. military personnel
or assets are not inappropriately used in law enforcement
capacities that distract the military from its core mission
undermine readiness and threaten public trust?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
question. I think there's strong systems in place, legal
systems in place that prevent any missteps there. It ranges
from title 32 authorities to title 10 authorities and have no
reason to believe at this point that those are insufficient in
any way.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I enjoy working with you,
General.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by agreeing with our ranking member and
others, you, Lieutenant General Caine on commending General
C.Q. Brown for his exceptional four decades of service. I fully
agree with the accolades he's receiving in this committee, and
wish him and his family the best.
I've worked, served under, met with hundreds of flag
officers in my positions as a U.S. senator, as a U.S. marine,
and I will say, General, I think you are one of the most
impressive flag officers I've met with. I don't say that
lightly, like I said, I've met with hundreds. I think it's the
combination of all the experiences, to Senator Duckworth's
point, Guard, Reserve private sector. I mean, you're bringing a
lot in here, and I think that's going to be very, very
important.
I do want to touch on this topic that we're playing up a
lot here on keeping politics out of our military. I couldn't
agree more with that. I think it's really important. Big part
of my career here. I've tried to make sure that happens, but I
will say we're not talking about what just happened the last 4
years. I think the military was politicized in a huge way,
particularly from the civilian leaders who were pushing left
wing theories on the military, pushing climate change over a
ship building.
The Under Secretary for Policy came before this committee
and told us that our military is, 'systemically racist.? It's
ridiculous, right? Do you believe our military is systemically
racist? Is that what you saw in your 30-plus years of service?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, senator.
Senator Sullivan. So, do you agree, just to make 100
percent sure, what the Secretary of Defense's testimony when he
came here, that our are military professionals, uniform
professionals, need to remain apolitical and committed to our
Constitution identified not as republicans or democrats, but
warriors and leaders. Is that your commitment?
General Caine. It is, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Will you commit to this committee to
doing that?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I'm not going to let this
hearing go by without a famous quote from the father of the
U.S. Air Force, Billy Mitchell, who was talking about a certain
place in the world. He said, 'Whoever controls this place
controls the world. It is the most strategic place in the
world.? What place was Billy Mitchell talking about, General?
Lieutenant General Caine. Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. Do you agree with Billy Mitchell's
incredibly insightful analysis?
Lieutenant General Caine. Mitchell was a brilliant
airpower.
Senator Sullivan. That's a yes, I assume, you're saying?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Well, look, our adversaries agree.
You and I talked about this in my office. Again, I appreciate
the hearing. We've had huge incursions, huge number of
incursions in the last 2 years. Russian and Chinese. Joint
Russian and Chinese strategic bomber task forces into our ADIZ
[Air Defense Identification Zone], joint Russian and Chinese
naval task forces into our EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] up in
Alaska. We are on the front lines of great power competition.
With regard to our adversaries, you and I talked about
infrastructure in Alaska for our military. The President after
his election said, we will ensure Alaska gets even more defense
investments as we rebuild our military, especially as Russia
and China are making menacing moves in the North Pacific.
That's from the Commander-in-Chief.
The INDOPACOM, NORTHCOM commander recently said that this
very vital naval base, former naval base, and ADAK, is a former
sub base, air base, huge fuel depot, one of the biggest fuel
depots for our Navy in the world. We have a Navy team there
right now this week looking at reopening that. Can I get your
commitment to work with this committee and me on infrastructure
that can protect our northern flying--because as the NORTHCOM
commander recently testified, these incursions are only going
to increase.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Let me talk about another issue. It
doesn't come up a lot. You talked about urgent action reform to
go faster with greater efficiency. I think one of our unsung
success stories in this regard is 8(a) contractors working with
the Department of Defense. DOD can use these 8(a) contractors
if they want. They don't have to, but they bring efficiency,
speed, low-cost contracts, and quality services.
I saw a recent example of an integrated request from DOD to
have a wheeled vehicle that can put a harpoon anti-ship system
on it. This 8(a) a contractor got it designed in 2 weeks, got
it produced in a month--or I'm sorry, with inside of 12 months.
They're already in Taiwan. They're going to produce 20 more in
18 months. The OEMs, big primes, if they tried to do that,
would've taken them 10 years.
Can you commit to me to continue to work with these small
businesses that I think deliver readiness, efficiency, and
modernization?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Without objection, that chart will be copied into the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Wicker. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking
Member Reed for holding this hearing. My thanks to you, General
Caine, for meeting with me. We had a great conversation about
Nevada, and for your willingness to serve.
But I'm going to keep on the subject of Nevada assets and
documenting exposure at classified locations. From your time as
a director of special access programs and from your own
experience serving at a data mass location, a duty station
whose location and existences classified. You're familiar with
the delicate balance between protecting sensitive information
and ensuring that servicemembers' records actually reflect
their service-connected injuries at those sensitive or data
mass locations.
I've heard from constituents who served at such locations
like the Nevada Test and Training Range, who believe they were
exposed to radiation from our days of conducting explosive
nuclear weapons testing and to burn pits, which dispose of
classified waste.
However, DOD does not classify the range as a place where
exposure occurred. Despite the Department of Energy (DOE)
providing a presumption of exposure for their personnel who
served there at these exact same locations within the range.
Because their service records are data masked, as you know,
these veterans can't even prove to the VA that they were ever
actually stationed there.
In fact, Nevada, there are six DOE covered facilities, most
of most of which are within the Nevada Test and Training Range,
where DOE employees presumed to have been exposed to a
radiation. But for our servicemembers, the VA only recognizes
one, the Nevada test site as a presumed exposure location. So,
one such facility that is covered for DOE, but not for DOD, is
the Tonopah test range, which is both A DOE and Air Force
installation. Portions of the range are still fenced off and
contaminated.
A 1975 environmental assessment acknowledged the
contamination and the harm it would cause, but the airmen, they
were never told. They do not have a presumption of exposure as
their DOE counterparts they served alongside with do, and
further adding insult to this, they can't even show that they
were there. All of this have prevented them from being able to
receive their well-deserved veterans? benefits.
I know we talked about this. We need to make this right,
and I'm committed to fixing this problem in this year's NDAA. I
hope that I can count on your support to making it happen. Will
you commit to working with me, of course, and the Committee to
find a solution that provides DOD, the presumption of exposure
at such data mass locations, and provides those who served, and
are serving at these locations, sufficient documentation so
they can submit their health-related issues, without ever
compromising the security of their service details?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, thank you for raising
this in our office call, and thank you for your leadership on
this matter. I do think we owe our servicemembers a way forward
through these important jobs that they have, that they can
never talk about. I do commit to staying close with you on this
matter, and trying to sort out a way that we can help them
transition, take the credit and the risk that they've bought in
the service of their nation with them into the next chapter of
their lives.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I know the
men and women who serve there will be very pleased if we're
able to do this. It really means a lot to them.
I just have about a minute we left. So, I want to just ask
about the force of the future, because over the course of your
service, you've gone through the rigors of actually training in
Nevada skies while stationed at Dallas Air Force Base, thank
you.
You know, personally, our military readiness depends on
meeting immediate warfighting needs while preparing for
potential conflict our country might face. It requires evolving
and changing how we train to fight. Which is one of the reasons
I fought so hard to make sure Nevada's military training
regions are modernized, keeping pace with emerging threats.
So, if confirmed, how would you prioritize investments in
readiness, in modernization, in force structure, especially in
these emerging domains like cyber warfare and AI [artificial
intelligence]?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, we've got to train
to the realistic threat in order to ensure that we're prepared
if we ever do go into conflict. Part of that is making sure
that our training ranges either live virtual or constructive
accurately replicate the threat so that our warfighters can
train to the realistic threat. I think we still have some work
to do both in our fiscal range, at physical ranges, and in our
virtual ranges. If confirmed, that'll be an area along the
readiness line of effort that I spend some time on.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you on that. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, it's good to
see you, again. Thanks for your willingness to serve. I enjoyed
our meeting in my office last week. It was a great discussion.
Let's talk for a minute about China. You know, their
strategy for expanding their power, it's operated a lot in
using gray zone tactics or military and civil action, somewhere
between the boundaries of peace and war, and it's difficult to
confront with conventional military force. Admiral Paparo, he
stated that Special Operations Forces are crucial for competing
in the gray zone, and that is under invested in the Pacific
command.
Can you talk about your views on the role of SOF at all
stages of conflict and what investments should be made to grow
these capabilities?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator thanks for that
question. You know, as somebody who's proudly been a part of
the Special Operations Forces, I appreciate greatly the
exponential return that those forces can provide to the Nation.
When I think about creating multiple dilemmas for Xi Jinping,
many of those dilemmas are created through America's special
operations forces where we build great partnerships, we help
train our allies and partners, when required we're able to
execute sensitive missions that help us to illuminate the
threat in a more thoughtful way.
I would agree with Admiral Paparo's views on soft forces in
the Pacific, but would defer to General Fenton who probably has
strong views on that. If confirmed, I'll consult with him on
these matters.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
I appreciate your commentary that they deliver an
exponential return, I believe indeed they do. In your advanced
policy questions, you underscore the importance of
synchronization between the DOD and the intelligence community.
How do you propose we do that?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it really starts
with trusting and deep relationships. You know, I am fortunate
in my last job to have learned the value of making sure that
the best of the title 10 community is linked up with the best
of the title 50 community to get to almost title 60-like
outcomes.
I realize that there is no title 60, but I put that in
quotation marks. You know, and if confirmed, I'll continue with
that pathway forward. We have an incredible associate director
for military affairs at the CIA now Lieutenant General Mike
Downs, who carries on and is probably doing a much better job
than I ever did over there.
If confirmed, will continue to build on those
relationships. I think it extends beyond just the DOD and CIA
relationship. It extends into the relationship that we have
with the State Department. It extends into the relationship
that we have with the other elements of the interagency as
well.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Also, in your advanced policy questions, you mentioned that
the service chiefs and combatant commanders, they use their
unfunded priorities list as essential tools in communicating to
us here in Congress the ideas where, or in the areas where
additional resources could significantly enhance military
readiness and capabilities. You also State that unfunded
priority lists, they're not the only tool to build a strategy
informed defense budget. Where do you think the DOD is
currently leveraging to align the defense budget and the
defense strategy, and where's there room for improvement on
that?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, you know, I'm not
yet back in the service, so I need to read the current version
of the National Defense Strategy. If I'm----
Senator Budd. Best guess outside looking in, sir.
Lieutenant General Caine. I think we need to continue our
efforts in the Pacific, and that would be my early read without
actually being into the Intel record.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Last year, combatant commanders,
they testified before this Committee speaking to the value and
the relevance of the F-15E Strike Eagle and their respective
areas of responsibility. So, as a fighter pilot with extensive
experience in combat and Homeland defense missions, can you
speak to the value and utility of the fourth-generation fleet,
specifically the F-15E and the F-16, which you flew, and
whether you find it wise to reduce these inventories prior to
taking delivery of the potential replacements? I guess it's the
divest to invest strategy. If you'd comment on that, please?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, Senator, thanks for that
question. You know, what we can't do is leave something
uncovered in the interim. When I think about at least the F-16,
for example, they're predominantly tasked with Homeland defense
at this point in time, and, you know, we can't ever let another
9/11 happen.
So, we have to make sure that we do not divest so much that
we lose coverage in places that we must have to sustain that
combat capability. We obviously need a probably fourth, and
fifth gen, and sixth gen mix for a while until we get to the
point where we're all where we need to be in sixth gen.
Senator Budd. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations.
So, if confirmed, you would serve as the principal military
advisor to the President and swear an oath to defend the
Constitution of the United States. President Trump once
described your predecessor, General CQ Brown as, ``an
outstanding leader'', and it's true, CQ Brown served for 40
years in seven assignments across four combatant commands.
The President's removal of the only Black officer and
removal of the only female officer from the Joint Chiefs of
staff has sent a chilling message about who is and who is not
welcome in our military. This worries me deeply about the
future of our military and the defense of our Nation.
I am also concerned that President Trump wants to turn the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into just another political
position. Last year, President Trump claimed that you once said
you would kill for him and then you slapped a MAGA hat on. I
know that others have disputed that story, but it raises
questions about whether you were selected because Donald Trump
thinks that you would be loyal to him rather than to the
Constitution of the United States.
Secretary Hegseth has now removed the top legal advisors
for military services and recommended replacements at a lower
rank. So, Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, your job will
be to present your best military advice. Do you agree that in
order to be able to comply with the law and make sure that your
advice complies with the law that military commanders need
legal advisors with both enough expertise and a high enough
rank that they will be listened to during this process?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator. I know I've always
had great legal advice regardless of what rank they were, but I
do agree.
Senator Warren. So, you think that you need people who have
good advice, but do you think it helps in making sure that
others--I'm glad that you listen to good advice no matter where
it comes from--but that others are more willing to listen if
the people offering legal advice have high enough rank to carry
some weight in the room when those decisions are taking place?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator. Although, as I
mentioned, I've sincerely had great legal advice from O-5s to
O-7s. I think it's the officer and their professionalism and
intellect versus what rank they have. I do appreciate the
efforts to ask the question about what rank they should be, but
would defer to the secretary on what rank he would want them to
be.
Senator Warren. I have to say that that gives me some real
concern because the whole point of elevating the rank was the
concern that not enough people were listening to good legal
advice. While I appreciate that you say you listen, we need
people to listen who are making decisions up and down the line.
I understand Lieutenant General Caine that the
circumstances of your nomination are beyond your control, but
they also place a significant burden on you to show leadership,
to restore public confidence in the military, and to show that
you work for the American people. I've long been concerned by
senior Pentagon leaders who trade on their time in public
service to cash out afterwards to work for defense contractors.
That is why during his confirmation hearing, General Brown
agreed that he would not become a lobbyist or join the board of
a defense contractor after he resigned.
Lieutenant General Caine, are you willing to demonstrate
that you're taking this job to serve the American people and
commit that after you leave this job, you'll not work for any
major defense contractors or companies that are affected by
your official actions?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, for myself, I've got no
intent to do so.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, you can commit to that?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, Senator. That's not my
intent.
Senator Warren. President Trump's removal of highly
qualified and talented military leaders is a permanent stain on
this Nation's history, as well as a blow to our ability to
recruit the force that we need to compete with China.
If confirmed, you will have an important responsibility to
show the American people that you will defend our Nation with
integrity, that you will follow the law, and that you will lead
our men and women in uniform with integrity.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator, and we'll
now move to Senator Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see
you again, General. Congratulations.
Let me first by start by saying I think the people who talk
the most about making sure you give advice to President Trump
have no experience with President Trump and interpersonally, I
should say, and he does seek out advice among a lot of people.
I think that your background and your experience will be
invaluable to him as he asks tough questions, and you give
honest advice as you've committed here today. So anyway, I
think the dynamic's going to be great. I think your background
and experience really prepare you very well for this important
role.
So, I wanted to ask you about a couple of things where I
think that your experience will play an important role in
specific decisions. So, this great powers competition that we
are, you know, with China, I was really happy to see President
Trump and Secretary Hegseth move quickly on NGAD and not just
deciding that we were going to move forward with next
generation air dominance, but actually selecting the F-47 so we
can move forward on this.
I think that was a bold stroke of leadership and
decisiveness that we need right now. That aircraft will see
further, go faster, carry bigger payloads, which matter a lot
in the Indo-Pacific. With your experience, I know that you can
appreciate that.
But one of the big challenges we have, has been mentioned
by a few already, is just the inability for us to go from point
A to point B. When we recognize a problem, how do we solve the
problem? Everyone recognizes that it's an issue. But we haven't
made a whole lot of progress up until this point. I believe
there is a commitment to do something about it.
You and I talked about this at our office. In your view,
what would we do differently if we were at war right now? Like,
if we're at war, what would we do differently than we're doing
right now on the procurement side and the execution side?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thanks for the
question. You know, the Chairman's bill builds on a book that
was written about the defense industrial base back in the mid-
?30's. I think if we were in a gunfight at this point in time,
we'd be doing a lot more with a greater sense of urgency than
we probably have right now. If I'm confirmed, I'll carry that
sense of urgency that I think we share into the Department and
into the joint force to make sure that we do not end up in a
case where our young war fighters do not have the kit that they
need prior to them needing it.
Senator Schmitt. Yes. That overwhelming force that we need
to have that advantage that we have is just critical. And the
concern that I have is that we talk a lot about it, but it's we
have to move forward on this. We have to move forward.
So, again, before I run out of time. Again, your varied
experience in the military and now outside, I think, give you a
glimpse of one of the challenges that we face, too. So,
Missouri is--sort of a Missouri asset. Here is the home of
Whiteman Air Force Base, which is more broadly known as the
home of the B-2 stealth bomber and soon to be the B-21. But the
442d Fighter Wing is also there. The 442d Fighter Wing like
many of these units punch above its weight class, has flown the
A-10 in combat missions for decades.
The A-10's going away, and I think there's a frustration
that there hasn't been a follow-on mission named here. We
talked about this in my office, and there's opportunities,
whether it's in the short-term, the F-15E and eventually the F-
15EX.
The real danger is that because we've delayed these
decisions, these experienced maintainers, and pilots, they go
somewhere else, right? They just don't have the certainty of
knowing that there's going to be a follow-on mission.
Will you work with my office and the folks that are
responsible for these decisions we just have to start making
these decisions more decisively and timely. I think that
Whiteman stands right in the front of that line.
Lieutenant General Caine. Sure, I will. But, you know, I
want to make sure I bring the Air Force leadership ?
Senator Schmitt. Absolutely.
Lieutenant General Caine.--into that conversation as well.
I've got very little throw weight on those decisions.
Senator Schmitt. No, I know. But you're going to be in an
important spot.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. I think, sir, recognizing strategically
that this is important and we've had conversations with the Air
Force about this ?----
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt.--As well. I guess with the last remaining
seconds I have. Just sort of your view of this great powers?
competition with China. What are some things that we need to
get better at? What are some things that we need to do to
prepare for the end as we shift and pivot to Asia so many
people have talked about of the Pacific?
Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, that's with deep respect for
the question. That's a pretty big question.
Senator Schmitt. What is the most important thing? The one
thing?
Lieutenant General Caine. Probably taking advantage of the
time that we have. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony,
making sure that we're moving with the speed, precision, sense
of urgency to get the kit that we need. The challenges range
from contested logistics, to long range fires, to command and
control. So, it's a much deeper conversation.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Look forward to working with
you. Congratulations.
Chairman Wicker. Well, will you supplement that on the
record then, General, because it was a very intricate question
that was sprung on you with 10 seconds to go.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir, and you want me to do
that now, I assume?
Chairman Wicker. No. Just take it for the record.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. Got it. Thank you very
much. I'm getting some signals from behind you.
Chairman Wicker. All right. And Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to followup on Senator Schmitt's question in my
second part, if I have time, because I think that is the big
question of the day; how do we handle the challenges we'll face
in the Western Pacific.
General Caine, first of all, congratulations on your
nomination. It's a very important role. First, I want to talk a
little bit about General Milley. So, as a career military
officer, lifelong public servant who served in this role as
Chairman under President Trump and President Biden, he's now
facing an investigation by this Administration and possible
demotion. This is allegedly because he, in coordination with
the then Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, made phone calls to
Chinese military officials to reassure them that the United
States was not going to launch an attack preventing unnecessary
conflict.
General Milley did this out of a deep respect and
commitment to the Constitution of the United States, in my
view. I asked about this in my office when we met privately,
but I want to ask, in this public setting, if you are confirmed
and sworn into this position, to whom or what do you swear an
oath to?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I as I have for 34
years, it's to the Constitution.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, and setting aside the specifics
of this scenario, if necessary, will you choose the right thing
to do, even if it's hard over the easier, wrong option?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I've always strived to
do the right thing, and that's not going to change now.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. And are you willing to
get fired from this job for doing the right thing and following
the Constitution?
Lieutenant General Caine. I am.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. So, back to what Senator
Schmitt was getting at, a part of what he wanted to discuss.
So, I want to gears here and go back to INDOPACOM force
projection, repositioning of forces and resource requirements.
I think you mentioned TRANSCOM. They play a pivotal role in
projecting forces from the United States into INDOPACOM.
That's why I'm reintroducing the SHIPS for America Act,
which is a bipartisan bill aimed at strengthening our
commercial shipping base, which would have the added benefit of
giving our combatant commander's additional capability so we
can rapidly respond in crisis and in conflict.
If confirmed, what will you recommend to the Secretary of
Defense and the President to ensure our industrial ship belt
building base from forging supply chains and production are
ready for competition in crisis?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm not in the job
yet and I'm, I'm not back in the service yet, but if confirmed,
I'd like to take that one for study and come back to you.
Senator Kelly. It's a logistical problem. 5,000 miles of
ocean. The Chinese, if we wind up in a conflict in the Western
Pacific, they've got to go just hundreds of miles to resupply
their forces. So, I appreciate you being willing to take a look
at it.
One last topic. I want to talk about efforts across the
Department to modernize our acquisition process. This is a
topic that I'm focused on as the co-chair of the Defense
Modernization Caucus. Our system is too slow, it's too
unwieldy, and it can't modernize currently at the pace of
China. We currently cannot match them on how fast we can
innovate.
So, we need to foster an ecosystem change that encourages
some risk from small businesses so they can innovate faster and
ensures that if a technology meets a current demand signal, we
have an effective mechanism to bridge the testing and
evaluation gap that often exists to get that stuff over to
production.
So, General, if confirmed, what changes will you recommend
to the Secretary and the President to ensure that we take
advantage of smaller, innovative companies, and acquire at the
speed that technology is moving forward?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it's we've got to
have everyone weighing in small businesses, new entrants, and
even the primes. The ability to bring advanced technologies
from new companies, startups into the joint force and make it
easier for them to bring their products and services into the
military is something that I'm passionate about. Given my
background and experience, if confirmed, I think that that'll
be an area where I spend some time on. I know I'm out of time.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Banks
Senator Banks. General Caine, congratulations on your
nomination, and thank you for being willing to come out of
retirement and serve your country in this most significant way.
I look forward to having a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs whose
only focus is national security, but you have a hard road ahead
of you.
As you and I discussed before, General Milley modeled
inappropriate and political behavior to a whole generation of
officers. It's why I fully support President Trump's decision
to relieve General CQ Brown and the unconventional decision to
go beyond the usual four-star choices and pick an outsider like
you for this most important role.
You spent much of your military career outside of
Washington, DC not exclusively inside of the Pentagon.
Because of this, you have a much better understanding of what's
important to our warfighters and to the average American. You
also know that the National Guard often gets the short end of
the stick and the budget fights, and having a chairman who
properly appreciates the importance of the guard is critical.
So, because of all of that, I can't wait to get you confirmed
as soon as possible.
I want to go back and talk for a moment. As I said before,
General Milley was the most political Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs that I believe that we've ever had. He actively
undermined his commander-in-chief. General Milley admitted to
calling Speaker Pelosi and disparaging President Trump's mental
fitness and questioning his nuclear command authority. That was
completely inappropriate and unacceptable. General Caine, I
want to ask you, how will you communicate differently than that
with congressional leadership?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm committed to
open and transparent communication, but the first duty of the
chairman is the advisor to the President. So, you know, I would
flow through that chain of command, while providing always
options to the President.
Senator Banks. General Milley admitted that under his
watch, the Pentagon wasted nearly 6-million-man hours on DEI
and woke trainings. Milley also testified to me before the
House Armed Services Committee that he wanted to read more
about critical race theory and understand white rage. Under
your leadership, General Caine, what kind of training can we
expect our servicemembers to be focused on?
Lieutenant General Caine. Warfighting, lethality, and
readiness?
Senator Banks. General Milley was also the chairman during
the disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal, and as a veteran of the
war in Afghanistan, this is very personal to me. Under his
watch, there was no accountability at all for the deaths of
American heroes at Abbey Gate, no accountability for the chaos
at the Kabul Airport, and no accountability for leaving
Americans behind when military failure and incompetence result
in the death of U.S. troops. Do you agree that the officers in
charge must be held accountable?
Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate the
question. You know, the Afghanistan withdrawal was not anything
anybody would've wanted. It was very difficult circumstances,
and the officers on the ground had very little to do with the
policies that they were directed to follow. We all mourned the
13 lost at Abbey Gate. Those officers, I'm sure did the best in
a situation that was not of their making. Certainly,
accountability is an important tenant in the United States, but
I hope that we consider the fact that those officers were just
doing the duties that they were assigned to do.
Senator Banks. You do agree, though, accountability
matters?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do.
Senator Banks. We should always learn from our mistakes and
hold those----
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
Senator Banks.--accountable who made those mistakes?
General Milley told his aides that President Trump was
preaching, 'the gospel of the furher.? I asked General C.Q.
Brown last year before the House Armed Services Committee, if
that was inappropriate. Even General CQ Brown agreed publicly,
under oath before that committee, that that was a very
inappropriate statement by General Milley. Do you agree with
General Brown that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should
never disparage the commander-in-chief, the President of the
United States of America?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
Senator Banks. When he was Chairman, General Milley
testified that he, 'does interviews regularly with print media,
books, documentaries, video, on TV because it is a part of a
senior official's job. Milley also said he talked to the media
2, 3, 4 times a week. Do you think that's an appropriate use of
the chairman's job,
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed, I'll spend
my time focused on the essential tasks in front of me.
Senator Banks. My last question. General Milley promised
Chinese generals without the President's knowledge that he'd
warn them if the United States was about to attack. Do you
think it's inappropriate, were appropriate for the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to warn our greatest adversary when
we're about to attack or what we might do?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
Senator Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. I guess that does it, no,
Senator Slotkin. Thank you. You're recognized.
Senator Slotkin. Thank you, Chairman.
I apologize for being late. I just got off a plane. We've
had some weather issues and some followup weather issues. I
apologize. Congratulations. Happy to see you here. You're
almost done. I'm between you and being done. So, I'm aware of
that. I just wanted to make sure we all are on the same page.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is what established in
law that the chairman is the principal, military advisor to the
President, also to the Secretary of Defense, the National
Security Council. It mandates that you provide strategic
direction to the Armed Forces, oversee strategic planning
program recommendations, budget proposals. It gives you a very
big purview. I think the President Trump even issued a
memorandum on Inauguration Day that the chairman be a part of
the National Security Council meetings at the highest level in
the White House.
That's an extremely important role, especially now. We've
talked--I've heard that other members talked about the fact
that there was no joint chief representative in this Signal
chain about military operations, imminent military operations.
I want you in those rooms giving your best military advice to
anyone. I was keenly aware that all the decisionmakers on that
chain were all political appointees. There was not a single
person there that was there just as a representative, as a
military officer. There was no COCOM Commander. There was
nothing, and that I don't think missed anybody's notice.
Will you, if confirmed, make a point to get into the rooms
where military operations are being discussed, planned at the
strategic level, and when advice to the President is being
given about the confidence in those military plans, will you
push to be in that room?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Slotkin. Good. We want you there. You know, I've
asked a number of folks who have come up here, very similar
questions and former people who have sat in that chair about
the importance that I put in swearing an oath to the
Constitution of the United States. Not to any one President not
to any political leader. You will swear an oath. You've done it
many times before. This is not uncommon for you in your
extensive experience.
I have asked all of these appointees or these nominees to
say, if the President asked you to do something that was
unconstitutional, to use the military in a way that was
unconstitutional to put military into the streets of our cities
or policing and performing law enforcement roles, which they
are not trained for, et cetera, et cetera. If he asks you to do
that, will you push back and lay down the law on behalf of the
Constitution, not for the President's whims?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator. I don't expect
that to happen, but of course I would.
Senator Slotkin. Well, we don't expect it to happen, but it
did happen under the Trump administration. The first time
Secretary Esper was asked to bring in the 82d Airborne Active
Duty military troops to put down a peaceful protest in
Washington, DC, and in his own book, he wrote that he convinced
President Trump in the dark of night not to do that.
I don't need it to be public. I don't need you to have a
public fight with President Trump. I'm not asking that. I'm
asking in the same exact situation, would you act honorably in
the same way and protect the rules and the of the road for the
U.S. military to protect the institution you've given your life
for and make sure that this country doesn't see their uniform
military as a political arm of any one party. Will you stand up
and push back similarly to Secretary Esper?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's the duty
and job that I have.
Senator Slotkin. Yes. Well, I appreciate that. I think
there's lots of other important work. We all want you to be
focused on the warfighter. Can you confirm for me, though,
because these reports that keep coming out of Department of
Defense and uniform military press outlets taking down Jackie
Robinson's page on and his service to the country, the Tuskegee
Airmen, which have such a connection to Detroit, Michigan.
They're taken down, they're putting back up. Can you confirm
that war heroes, no matter what their color, should be
recognized by the Department of Defense, and it's not some DEI
thing to recognize warriors of color.
Lieutenant General Caine. Ma'am, I think we should always
recognize warriors. Period.
Senator Slotkin. Okay. Well, I hope you uphold that as this
ridiculousness continues of taking people and erasing them from
our military history. It's really, to me, offensive. But we
look forward to you standing up for those good values. Thank
you for your work, and I yield back
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator, and this concludes
today's hearing. I want to thank our distinguished witness for
his testimony. And without anything further, we are indeed
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General John D.
Caine, USAF (retired) by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing
with answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser
to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense,
section 153 of title 10 further assigns the Chairman responsibility for
assisting the President and the Secretary in providing for the
strategic direction of the Armed Forces; strategic and contingency
planning; global military integration; comprehensive joint readiness;
joint capability development; and joint force development activities,
among other matters.
Answer. Given the responsibilities of the Chairman, as enumerated
in law, what background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
qualify you to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Question. In my 34 years of military service, I have led
warfighters in a variety of roles across the Joint Force, Total Force,
and Interagency. These experiences have ranged from flying an F-16 in
combat overseas and over Washington, DC on September 11th, 2001, to
helping coordinate our response to Hurricane Katrina while at the
Department of Agriculture, to serving alongside our Special Operations
warriors in combat.
Answer. My years in the National Guard make me uniquely aware of
the challenges faced by our citizen-soldiers. I also may be the only
officer ever nominated for this position with experience in the venture
capital world, an experience I will draw on as the DOD looks to
modernize its business systems and revitalize America's Defense
Industrial Base.
Finally, in my last role as Associate Director for Military Affairs
at the CIA, I built a global perspective on the challenges America
faces in achieving effective deterrence against our adversaries. Each
of these experiences have prepared me for the humbling responsibility
of serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this crucial
time in our Nation's history.
Question. Do you believe there is any action that you need to take
to enhance your ability to exercise the responsibilities of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I do not have any recommendations at present. If confirmed,
I will be attuned to any possible actions necessary to exercise the
responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In matters requiring global military strategic and operational
integration, the Chairman is responsible for providing advice to the
President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing military operations and
advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces among
geographic and functional Combatant Commands, as may be necessary, to
address transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats.
Question. If confirmed, how would you execute these advisory
functions, while ensuring that your role does not invoke command
authority or infringe on the responsibilities of the Combatant
Commanders?
Answer. I understand the advisory functions of the Chairman and the
command authorities and responsibilities of the Combatant Commanders.
If confirmed, I would perform the roles and functions of the
Chairman consistent with all laws and policies, while maintaining
awareness and knowledge of issues within and across Combatant Command
areas of responsibility.
Question. If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship
with the Combatant Commanders to carry out these responsibilities?
Answer. I am grateful that, during my last assignment as the
Associate Director for Military Affairs, I had regular interaction with
all United States Combatant Commanders and I have close relationships
with each. If confirmed I look forward to working with each of them and
my relationship with the Combatant Commanders will be structured
according to the existing mechanisms and procedures specified in law
and policy.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
providing to the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and
operation of the Joint Staff?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to look more closely at the Joint
Staff's use of advanced tech tools (AI/ML) to improve efficiencies and
make recommendations for the prioritization and allocation of forces to
the Secretary.
Question. To the extent the Joint Staff performs functions that
overlap with those of other DOD components--particularly with regard to
regional or functional topics--what would be your approach, if
confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?
Answer. If confirmed, my approach to this topic would be based on
thoroughly examining the details and history of related functions and
processes prior to making any recommendations.
Question. Section 163(a) of title 10 provides that the President
may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the
Secretary of Defense in exercising their command function.
In your view, are there other roles or responsibilities that should
be assigned to the Chairman, to better enable the Chairman's assistance
to the President and the Secretary of Defense in their exercise of
command functions?
Answer. At this time, I believe the roles and responsibilities
currently assigned to the Chairman are sufficient. I do not have
recommendations for any additional roles and responsibilities.
If confirmed, I will consult with the Secretary and with Congress
should I conclude there are additional roles or responsibilities that
should be considered.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you would face if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff?
Answer. The President directed the Joint Force to achieve Peace
through Strength and defend our Homeland.
The President made clear that this begins with securing our own
borders. The Joint Force is moving out alongside our Interagency
partners to achieve this objective, but significant challenges remain
to achieve lasting security of America's borders.
Additionally, the threat posed by China to American interests in
the Indo-Pacific is real and growing. Th U.S. needs to work with Allies
and Partners to deter China's aggression in this region.
Unfortunately, at this critical moment, the Joint Force is
contending with an acquisition process and Defense Industrial Base that
are not optimized for protracted conflict. The U.S. does not have the
throughput, responsiveness, or agility needed to deter our adversaries.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. Given the global set of challenges before the United States
the Joint Force must enhance the integration of options with the
Services, the Interagency, our Allies and Partners and the Private
Sector. The U.S. cannot miss a single opportunity to integrate fully
our mutual efforts to provide the greatest return on those investments.
If confirmed, I will focus on working with the Secretary of Defense
and Congress to implement recommendations made by recent congressional
commissions on PPBE, Acquisition Reform, and Strategic Posture. I will
also review the Joint Staff's recommendations on reforming the
requirements process as directed by the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. We know
what the problems are and how to solve them, we just need to focus on
implementing the solutions.
I strongly believe in the primacy of people. The Joint Force needs
the talent found in America's sons and daughters to meet the challenges
of the 21st century. The warrior ethos, meritocracy, and clear
standards will attract this talent, and I will work with the Services
and the Department to strengthen recruiting.
civilian control of the military
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that your tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the
Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. For my 34 years of service, I have been fully committed to
the laws, policies, and norms of civilian control of the military. It
is a fundamental pillar of our Armed Services.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy are fully engaged in preparing guidance for and reviewing
contingency plans?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stress to my Staff in the J3 and J5
the need for a close and trusting relationship with OUSD/P as both
Staffs prepare plans.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness are fully engaged in evaluating and
reporting on the readiness of DOD components, and if necessary, in
mitigating readiness gaps and shortfalls?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the relationship and practice
of frequent coordination and collaboration on readiness issues between
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, ensuring
we are fully engaged in evaluating and reporting the readiness of DOD
components. OSD and the Joint Staff share a statutorily mandated title
10 sec 482 readiness reports with each other before submitting to
Congress, and each host high level reviews and discussions at Deputies
Management Action Group (DMAGs) and JCS Readiness Tanks semi-annually.
The statutory functions of the CJCS require joint planning sessions to
align priorities and strategies for mitigating readiness issues, while
also advocating for necessary resources and funding to address
identified gaps.
Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the
military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive
branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays
a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
Answer. Per Article 1, the Congress is charged to raise our Army
and Navy and, therefore a key constituent in the totality of our
National Defense. If confirmed, I intend to have a strong, trusting,
bipartisan relationship with the Congress.
Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and
defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the
responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian
leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political
priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, in accordance with my oath to support and
defend the constitution, I will provide military advice to the chain of
command, identifying options in support of national policy and
security. The advice would be focused on overall strategy, risk,
readiness and resourcing considerations to best enable decisions from
the Nation's civilian leadership. As I always have for 34 years, I will
always speak truth to power.
If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will
testify regularly before Congress and may be asked to comment on
partisan political matters.
Question. What is your view of your responsibility to provide your
best military advice to Congress while also ensuring that you and your
office remain apolitical, recognizing that you serve as a model for
other senior uniformed officers and the entire Armed Forces?
Answer. If confirmed as Chairman, I will meet my responsibilities
to advise the President and Secretary and consult with Congress. My
best military advice will remain non-partisan and apolitical.
the joint chiefs of staff
Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, codifies the role of
the Joint Chiefs as military advisors to the President, the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense.
If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best military advice
to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland
Security Council, even when your advice and opinions might differ from
those of other members of the Cabinet, the President's other senior
advisors, or from the President's own views?
Answer. I will.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best
military advice to the Secretary of Defense, even when your advice and
opinions might differ from those of other DOD senior officials, or from
the Secretary's own views?
Answer. I will.
Question. If confirmed, how would you elicit from the individual
Service Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the
Combatant Commanders, their best military advice, including advice and
opinions that may diverge your own?
Answer. If confirmed, I would elicit military analysis and advice
from the Joint Force, to include other Service Chiefs, the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau, and Combatant Commanders. The Unified Command
Plan directs communications between the President, or the Secretary and
the Combatant Commanders be transmitted through the CJCS unless
otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary. As the global
integrator, I will have mechanisms in place to elicit this advice and
communications from all Combatant Commanders and pass them through the
appropriate channels along with my own advice.
Question. What is your assessment of the size and effectiveness of
the Joint Staff?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to observe and assess
the Joint Staff's size and effectiveness. If confirmed, I will conduct
a thorough assessment before deciding to recommend any changes to the
Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. In my past
experience, they are the most professional staff in the world.
role of department of defense inspector general
Question. The Inspector General Act of 1978 requires that
Inspectors General of Federal departments ``be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without
regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity
and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis,
law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations'' in
order to ``conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to
the programs and operations of'' the Department of Defense.
What is your view of the necessity of the Department of Defense
Inspector General to conduct and supervise audits and investigations
relating to the programs and operations of the Department in an
independent, objective, and apolitical manner?
Answer. The necessity of the Department of Defense Inspector
General (DoD IG) conducting and supervising audits and investigations
in an independent, objective, and apolitical manner is crucial for
ensuring the integrity, accountability, and effectiveness of DOD
programs and operations.
The DOD IG is necessary for combating waste, fraud, and abuse,
promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness on government programs
and operations by identifying and recommending corrective actions.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to respecting the
independence of the DOD Inspector General, subject only to the
requirements and limitations contained in the Inspector General Act of
1978?
Answer. Yes.
role of judge advocates general
Question. Federal law states that no officer or employee of the
Department of Defense may interfere with the ability of the Judge
Advocate General of a military service to give independent legal advice
to their chief of service, or interfere with the ability of judge
advocates of the military services assigned or attached to, or
performing duty with, military units to give independent legal advice
to commanders.
What is your view of the propriety of and need for uniformed
military lawyers to exercise their independent legal and professional
judgment when providing legal advice to military commanders, military
service leadership, and Department of Defense leadership?
Answer. I absolutely value the independence and professionalism of
uniformed military lawyers to provide legal advice to military
commanders, military service leadership, and Department of Defense
leadership. I have relied on JAGs throughout my career to provide
candid and independent legal advice on the broad range of legal issues
involved in military operations and activities. I will continue to do
so.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to respecting the
independence of uniformed military attorneys to provide their best
legal advice free from inappropriate influence and reprisal?
Answer. I commit to respecting the independence of uniformed
military attorneys to provide their best legal advice free from
inappropriate influence and reprisal. I have done so throughout my
career and, if confirmed, will do so as Chairman.
strategic guidance documents within the department of defense
Question. If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
specifically what would be your role in generating and shaping the
content of, and improving DOD component compliance with, each such
document?
National Security Strategy
Answer. If confirmed, as the senior military advisor to the
President and the Secretary of Defense, I will advise both on the Joint
Force capabilities necessary to deter aggression and implement the
President's national security priorities. I will advise on ability,
options, and risk to execute the strategic direction given to the
military in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and work closely with
the Secretary of Defense to implement it.
Question. National Defense Strategy
Answer. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense to
provide advice and assistance on the military ways, means, and options
for implementing the Secretary's defense priorities. I will focus
particular attention on the threats and opportunities we face in the
strategic environment; the military roles, missions, posture, and
capabilities necessary to defend U.S. interests; and determine the
investments necessary to protect and simultaneously defend the U.S.
Homeland and deter or defeat adversaries that work against our Nation's
interests and security. I will ensure the Joint Staff is collaborative
and responsive to the Secretary of Defense's staff to ensure they have
everything they need to develop a strategy that achieves peace through
strength.
Question. National Military Strategy
Answer. Title 10, Sec. 153 directs the NMS to support the
objectives of the United States as articulated by the President and
Secretary of Defense through national security and defense guidance,
direction, and strategies. If confirmed as Chairman, I will lead the
NMS development to support the President's objectives to achieve peace
through strength and the Secretary of Defense's priorities. If
confirmed, I will develop an NMS that is integrated with the National
Defense Strategy. Together, we can ensure the Joint Force has a clear
understanding of the country's strategic defense priorities over the
near-and long-term to defend America's interests. I will work closely
with the Services and Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to provide a strategy
that includes clear military options to the Secretary of Defense and
the President. If confirmed, I will provide my military advice on
implementation of the NMS, assess progress and risk, and adjust when
necessary and as directed.
Question. Chairman's Risk Assessment
Answer. Title 10, Sec. 153 directs the Chairman to prepare an
annual assessment that identifies and defines the military strategic
risks to United States interests and military risks to the execution of
the NMS. The Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) is developed in
collaboration with the Services and CCMDs, with the final approval and
discretion of the Chairman, using a common methodology to appraise and
communicate risk. If confirmed, I will continue to use the CRA as my
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, and ultimately Congress, on
risks to U.S. security interests and executing the NMS to inform
resourcing and capability development decisions in the Department.
Question. Contingency Planning Guidance
Answer. The Chairman directs the implementation of the Contingency
Planning Guidance (CPG) and integrates contingency planning across
Combatant Commands for each of the National Defense Strategy key
threats. The Chairman uses the guidance in the CPG in the development
of the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). Additionally, the Chairman
provides guidance for preparing and reviewing contingency plans that
conform to policy guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense.
Last, the Chairman ensures that plans are feasible, suitable,
acceptable, and complete for presentation to the Secretary. If
confirmed, I will continue directing the implementation of the CPG and
its use in the development of the JSCP.
Question. Defense Planning Guidance
Answer. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) establishes the
Secretary of Defense's strategic resource priorities. If confirmed, as
the Chairman I would produce the Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CPR) which directly informs the DPG. I would consider a multitude of
assessments to include the annual Capability Gap Assessment, Chairman's
Risk Assessment, and others to ensure the Joint Force aligns means to
ends and ways, in light of risk.
Question. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
Answer. The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) enables the
execution of the Chairman's statutory responsibilities for strategic
and contingency planning, global military integration, and the
Chairman's oversight prescribed in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 153,
163, and 113. If confirmed, I would use the JSCP to implement the
President and Secretary of Defense's strategic planning guidance by
providing direction for development of campaign and contingency plans
that advance strategic objectives, priorities, and tasks.
Question. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
Answer. The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
enables the Secretary of Defense to integrate complementary policy and
guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment,
and assessment into a single authoritative document. If confirmed, my
role is to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of readiness and
requirements of the CCMDs to achieve U.S. defense objectives.
Additionally, I would advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of
risk related to allocation and assignment of forces to better support
resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically
employed.
Question. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would undertake
all necessary action to ensure that each of these strategic guidance
documents is timely generated and issued, and updated, as necessary to
reflect changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?
Answer. Yes.
use of military force
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force
and the rules of engagement?
Answer. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to
use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the
President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on
the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.
Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
use of military force?
Answer. The use of military force must always be carefully
considered. If confirmed, my recommendations to the President and
Secretary of Defense on the use of military force will be consistent
with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I would
consider probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and
strategic risk.
Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
recommending to the Secretary of Defense which forces of other nations
should be eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces, and
under what conditions?
Answer. When ``collective self-defense'' rules of engagement are
authorized, U.S. forces may defend foreign forces against any attack or
threat of imminent attack. The key factors I would consider in a
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense would be if it is legal to
do so, and if it is in U.S. interests to do so.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel
to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? If
confirmed, how would you modify these agreements or authorities, if at
all?
Answer. I understand that relevant authorities and agreements
provide the necessary framework for military forces to support
activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies when
called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as the situation
dictates. I believe that the current authorities and agreements are
sufficient. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing work within the
Department and with colleagues in other U.S. Government departments and
agencies to adjust existing arrangements as the need arises.
civilian casualties
Question. In your view, what are the primary challenges for the
combatant commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to
allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military
operations?
Answer. The primary challenges combatant commands face is timely
access to evidence and the ability to share evidence with our allies,
our partners, and non-governmental organizations. These challenges are
due to restrictive data sharing policies with each of these entities,
which slows the assessment and response process. This results in
decreased integration, analysis, and dissemination of civilian casualty
information and effects.
Question. What is your understanding of the implementation status
of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) and
what additional actions do you believe should be taken to enable the
Department of Defense to effectively and credibly mitigate,
investigate, and respond to allegations of civilian casualties
resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. The Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, or
CHMR-AP, is in its fourth and final year of implementation. A workforce
is in place, doctrine has been updated, and education and training are
ongoing. I understand the combatant commands see positive impacts from
the program. As with any new program, there comes a time to pause and
reflect, listen to feedback, and assess the future path. That is where
we are today. It is appropriate to look at the resources, the
distribution of those resources, and the changing world environment to
determine the best course of action moving forward.
joint operations
Question. The Goldwater Nichols Act enabled an unprecedented degree
of jointness within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Combatant
Commanders. Today, both the DOD and Congress recognize the need for a
deeper level of integration and interoperability to overcome anti-
access and area denial (A2/AD) networks and to deter and defeat large-
scale aggression.
What do you perceive to be the role and capability requirements for
close combat formations in future joint force operations?
Answer. Service led joint and coalition experimentation events are
improving interoperability and identifying critical gaps.
Question. What is the Joint Staff's appropriate role in
experimentation?
Answer. There are two main experimentation roles in the Joint
Staff. One, within the Chairman's responsibilities for Joint Force
development, the Chairman formulates policies for experimentation on
urgent and long-term concepts for force employment, to include
analyzing prioritized gaps in capabilities. Two, within the Chairman's
responsibilities for joint capability development, the Joint Staff
works to recommend new joint military capabilities that maintain
technological and operational superiority of the Joint Force based on
advances of new technology and new joint concepts. To do this, the
Chairman leverages convening power, Joint Experimentation Guidance, the
Warfighter Lab Incentive Fund, and other tools to catalyze a campaign
approach to joint experimentation that promises progress in addressing
specific problems, gaps, and critical capabilities identified in the
Joint Warfighting Concept. The Chairman also uses the learning from
this campaign to make annual program recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense.
Question. How would you ensure the Joint Staff is appropriately
facilitating joint experimentation during the capabilities development
process?
Answer. I would publish specific Joint Experimentation Guidance and
continue to integrate and synchronize Joint Force experimentation not
only across the Department of Defense and with Allies and Partners, but
also with Interagency Partners.
Question. What role do you foresee playing in influencing joint and
enabling capabilities development that will link or knit together
service-specific capabilities, such as Joint All Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) or contested logistics?
Answer. The Chairman's title 10 authorities for joint capability
development are exercised through the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council. The JROC plays a critical role in developing a globally
integrated and interoperable joint force, without which the DOD risks
stove-piped, Service-specific capabilities. This function is
particularly critical with key capability areas such as JADC2 or
contested logistics, which are inherently joint, multi-domain, and
multi-theater.
joint force headquarters and component commands
Question. Is the current model for creating joint force
headquarters below the unified command level appropriate and adequate
to meet the challenges articulated in the 2022 National Defense
Strategy? In your view, are there other models you have seen that we
should be considering?
Answer. While the existing framework for establishing Joint Force
headquarters beneath the unified command level is suitable and
sufficient, if confirmed, I will be committed to exploring alternative
models. This review will encompass an examination of various Joint
Force headquarters structures to ensure the Joint Force is optimally
postured to address the challenges outlined in the 2022 National
Defense Strategy.
Question. Given the time required to stand up, man, and train joint
force headquarters, and the short warning time that is expected before
a potential conflict in certain areas of operation, would Combatant
Commanders' operations and contingency planning and preparedness be
improved by creating and exercising subordinate joint force
headquarters during the competition phase?
Answer. Proactively establishing subordinate Joint Force
headquarters before a crisis erupts could indeed enhance operational
readiness, planning, and preparedness. However, this must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. A thorough analysis is crucial to determine
when the benefits of early establishment outweigh the potential costs,
including manpower allocation, staff workload, and financial
implications across the Joint Force. If confirmed, I will collaborate
with the Combatant Commanders and Joint Chiefs to carefully evaluate
this approach.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) required the Secretary of Defense to establish a standing joint
force headquarters (JFHQ) in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility
(AOR). What is your view on the need for a JFHQ in this AOR?
Answer. The Indo-Pacific region is a top priority for a United
States military, with China presenting a significant and evolving
challenge. As such, the ability to respond effectively to crises in the
region, using the Joint Force with all its combined capabilities, is
paramount.
While the 2023 NDAA mandates a standing Joint Force Headquarters
(JFHQ) in the INDOPACOM AOR, the current approach provides a strong
foundation for responding to potential crises.
Admiral Paparo has stated that, in a Joint Operations Area (JOA)
within the Theater of War, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would serve as the
Joint Task Force (JTF), a capability for which they were certified in
2023.
The existing structure, which leverages the proven capabilities of
service components and their ability to function as JTFs, provides the
necessary flexibility and responsiveness to address a wide range of
potential crises within the INDOPACOM AO, and meets the intent of the
NDAA to ensure optimal C2 for winning any conflict in the region.
Question. What are the most significant obstacles to establishing
and exercising such joint force headquarters in advance of a crisis,
and what could be done to overcome those obstacles, in your view?
Answer. One of the primary challenges in prematurely establishing
Joint Force headquarters lies in the potential strain on resources.
Combatant Commanders currently possess sufficient staffing to manage
daily operations and pre-crisis scenarios. Creating additional
headquarters prematurely could divert critical resources from other
ongoing global missions. Therefore, if confirmed, I will work with the
Combatant Commanders and Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess each unique
situation in advance of a crisis on its resources in order to best
posture the joint force for success.
Question. What new technical capabilities, processes, or concepts
of employment do you think would be needed to improve our ability to
achieve high levels of readiness for, and realistically exercise, such
joint force headquarters prior to a crisis, or to rapidly establish in
the event of an unforeseen crisis?
Answer. The Combatant Commanders prioritize maintaining a high
level of readiness when it comes to establishing Joint Force
headquarters. The Joint Force conducts regular exercises and tests to
ensure the ability to stand up these headquarters efficiently, even in
the face of unforeseen crises.
The Joint Force remains committed to innovation, constantly
evaluating emerging technologies, refining processes, and exploring new
operational concepts. Regular joint exercises play a crucial role in
this process, allowing the Joint Force to test and refine these
advancements while informing the development of new concepts.
If confirmed, I will ensure these efforts continue and will
actively seek opportunities to further enhance readiness in this
critical area.
2022 national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy outlines that the
United States faces a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the
continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. The Chairman
and Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Strategy Commission testified
in July 2024 that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have formed an
``axis of aggressors'', supporting each other's military aggression and
illegal wars.
What is your assessment of the military threat posed by the
People's Republic of China?
Answer. The PLA has made significant military improvements to
include adjusting its military structures, fielding modern indigenous
systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to
conduct joint operations. Numerically, China has the largest navy in
the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines,
including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLA Air Force is
modernizing and indigenizing its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems
rapidly, matching U.S. standards. The PLA Rocket Force and China's
hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past
20 years. Many of China's missile programs are comparable to other
international top-tier producers. However, the PLA still has
deficiencies in commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, urban
warfare, and the PLA lacks modern warfare experience writ large.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
Russia?
Answer. Russia very likely remains deterred from an overt military
attack against the United States or NATO; however, Moscow retains the
ability and willingness to conduct asymmetric activity below what it
assesses to be the threshold of military conflict. The conflict in
Ukraine very likely has strained its conventional military forces,
increasing Russia's dependence on its nuclear arsenal as a means of
deterrence to protect itself from perceived external military threats.
Despite the near-term increase in Russia's Defense Industrial Base,
this production is unlikely sustainable over the mid-to long-term due
to labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment shortfalls, and
inability to fully compensate for dual-use components they can no
longer acquire due to sanctions.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
collusion among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea?
Answer. Russia, China, Iran and the DPRK share broadly similar
goals and transactionally cooperate at the bilateral--and sometimes
trilateral--levels on arms sales, sanctions evasion, and limited
military exercises. However, these countries are not acting as a bloc,
nor are they trending toward a NATO-style alliance. Militarily, Russia
likely is emboldened to continue its war in Ukraine, in part, due to
munitions and soldiers provided by the DPRK, as well as armed UAVs
supplied by Iran. Moscow and Pyongyang have committed to strengthening
their defense capacities as part of their comprehensive strategic
partnership treaty, which could expedite the DPRK's military
modernization goals. Beijing supports Moscow by purchasing oil, selling
dual-use technologies such as microelectronics, and providing
diplomatic cover in international fora, though it has avoided providing
military aid. Though it is a partner to the DPRK and Russia, Beijing
has publicly distanced itself from Moscow and Pyongyang's growing
defense cooperation, referring to it as a strictly bilateral matter.
Tehran seeks to deepen its bilateral relationships with other U.S.
adversaries to derive maximum diplomatic, economic, and military
benefits.
Question. In your view, should the Defense Department's force
sizing construct be based on the need to conduct simultaneous conflicts
in Asia and Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review and
evaluate the force sizing construct to ensure that it is focused on the
most pressing requirements.
Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
DOD has been unable to leverage, or has leveraged only in part, since
the National Defense Strategy was published in 2022? If so, how would
you correct this situation, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review threats
posed by collusion among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. I am
willing to discuss more detail in a classified setting.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do if you determine that the
DOD cannot meet the demands placed on it by the 2022 National Defense
Strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take a disciplined approach to assess
risk and the Joint Force's posture and capabilities in accordance with
guidance from the Secretary and the President. I will also work closely
with allies and partners to advance interoperability and burden-sharing
to help decrease risk globally and strengthen ability to meet current
and future defense challenges. If necessary, I would recommend re-
prioritizing and re-allocating resources to focus on the most critical
areas by reducing or eliminating less critical programs or initiative
to free up resources for more pressing needs. I will communicate
clearly and transparently with you and the Secretary of Defense, via my
Chairman's Risk Assessment, about the risks, challenges, and
limitations facing the Joint Force.
Question. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments, if any,
would you recommend the Secretary of Defense make to the 2022 National
Defense Strategy as a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or
other factors?
Answer. If confirmed, my recommendations will prioritize Joint
Force preparation and flexibility for both global opportunities and
challenges in a dynamic strategic environment. Title 10 directs the
Chairman to provide advice relating to global military and strategic
and operational integration. Effective global integration of the Joint
Force is necessary to support defense objectives in the modern
strategic environment. I will advise the Secretary of Defense to align
the National Defense Strategy guidance and priorities to reflect
strategic global integration and will ensure consistency with the
President's national policy directives and the NSS. I will also
advocate investment and use of emerging technologies. Finally, I will
advance options for the Secretary that will facilitate cross
coordination and integration with other departments and agencies.
department of defense budget
Question. In your view, are the programs and resources required to
generate the capabilities necessary to implement the 2022 National
Defense Strategy properly prioritized within the Department of Defense?
If confirmed, do you believe the Department needs to realign or refocus
programs and funding, if at all?
Answer. The fiscal year 2025 budget request was strategy-driven and
focused on executing the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I
will work with the Administration to ensure future budgets have the
right mix of capabilities and capacity to defend against current and
future threats. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department
in aligning resources to current strategy.
Question. Do you believe that 3-5 percent real budgetary growth
through the FYDP is required to implement the 2022 National Defense
Strategy effectively? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The fiscal year 2025 budget request was strategy-driven and
focused on executing the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I
will work with the Administration to ensure future budgets have the
right mix of capabilities and capacity to defend against current and
future threats. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department
in aligning resources to current strategy.
Question. Looking forward, what types of resource shortfalls are
likely to hamper the Department's execution of the 2022 National
Defense Strategy and other national defense priorities in your view?
How would you address or mitigate these shortfalls, if confirmed?
Answer. The fiscal year 2025 budget request adequately resourced
the Department to execute the 2022 National Defense Strategy. If
confirmed, I will work with the Administration to ensure future budgets
have the right mix of capabilities and capacity to defend against
current and future threats. I will also continue to work with Congress
and advocate for on-time appropriations so that we may fully capitalize
on executing the Administration's strategy.
Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
later than 10 days after the President's submission of the annual
defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander
must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
lists, in order of priority, the unfunded priorities of the armed force
or combatant command.
What are your views of this statutory requirement and the utility
of unfunded priorities lists?
Answer. I recognize the critical importance of this statutory
requirement in ensuring transparency and strategic alignment of defense
priorities. These lists serve as essential tools in communicating to
Congress the areas where additional resources could significantly
enhance military readiness and capabilities. The Department relies on
several tools to illuminate joint priorities and develop a budget that
is aligned to the Department's strategy. While the unfunded priority
lists are required by law, they are not the only tool to build a
strategy-informed defense budget.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to supporting the Service
Chiefs and Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities
lists to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with the fiscal year
2026 budget request?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to supporting the
Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded
priorities lists (UPLs) to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with
the Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 budget request.
joint officer management
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wields
significant influence over joint officer management--the policies and
procedures that guide joint officer career development and the
attainment of joint experience and education. The NDAA for fiscal year
2017 modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened
the statutory definition of ``joint matters'' to expand the types of
positions for which an officer can receive joint duty credit. Further,
it reduced from 3 years to two the minimum tour length required for
joint duty credit.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the fiscal year
2017 modifications to the JQO system?
Answer. The two significant modifications have provided the
Department additional flexibility in the Joint Qualification System.
The expansion of the ``joint matters'' definition has ensured the
ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making
contributions to the development and achievement of strategic
objectives. The reduced statutory tour length required (From 36 Months
to 24 Months) for joint duty credit has provided the Services
additional flexibility in officer assignment for tightly managed career
timelines and milestones.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
eligibility for promotion to General/Flag (G/FO) officer rank,
consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service
line officers?
Answer. Yes. Although careers are managed according to Service
specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint
tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification are
sensible and greatly enhance an officer's perspective and knowledge to
perform at the GO/FO ranks.
Question. In your view, what additional modifications to the JQO
system are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to
attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership
experience, and adequate professional development?
Answer. The existing joint officer qualification requirements
provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the
skills necessary for successful service at the operational and
strategic levels; therefore, no additional modification to the JQO
system is necessary at this time.
Question. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better
to meet the needs of Reserve component officers?
Answer. Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to
incorporate Reserve component officers and the Reserve policy was
adjusted in 2018 to increase joint qualification opportunities for
Reserve component officers. I do not currently recommend changing the
JQO system with respect to the Reserve component, but we must continue
to explore areas that allow Reserve component officers to attend
training while balancing their civilian job.
Question. Should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a
consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?
Answer. No. JQO requirements enhance the ability of General/Flag
officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the
operational and strategic level. Officers who meet the requirements
provide benefit to both the Services and joint organizations, and
ultimately the Department as a whole.
Question. If confirmed, what modifications would you suggest to
provide DOD and the Military Services the force management and talent
management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a
21st century, joint, All-Volunteer Force?
Answer. To maintain the competitive edge and strengthen the
lethality of the All-Volunteer Force, I will collaborate with OSD and
the Service Chiefs to enhance force and talent management strategies.
This involves leveraging advanced technologies like AI for recruitment,
developing targeted outreach campaigns, revising training programs to
include leadership and technical skills, and expanding educational
opportunities. Additionally, I will prioritize initiatives to improve
the quality of life for service members, incentivize performance, and
implement flexible policies aligned with executive orders, while
fostering leadership accountability to effectively recruit, develop,
sustain, and retain a modern, joint, All-Volunteer Force.
Question. Do you believe current DOD and Military Service
procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending
the President's nomination for promotion or assignment are sufficient
to enable fully informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the President?
Answer. Yes, the Services evaluate officer qualifications, past
performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable
information, and each service has a rigorous process in place to ensure
all decisions are fully informed.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to
the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or
assignment process?
Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and
reasonable for the officers involved.
joint professional military education (jpme)
Question. Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United
States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities
will officers need to succeed in great power competition against the
Nation's adversaries?
Answer. The Joint Force's professional military education programs
must provide an integrated approach to understanding joint warfighting
and our adversaries within the context of a rapidly changing character
of war, from accession to senior leader courses for general and flag
officers and senior enlisted leaders. Future leaders require the
knowledge and skills to prepare them for service as joint warfighting
leaders, senior staff positions, and strategists who:
Discern the military dimensions of a challenge affecting
national interests, frame the issue at the policy level, and recommend
viable military options within the overarching frameworks of globally
integrated operations, and be able to develop strategies nested with
U.S. interests.
Anticipate and lead rapid adaptation and innovation
during a dynamic period of acceleration in the rate of change in
warfare, under the conditions of great power competition and disruptive
technology;
Plan and conduct joint warfighting at the operational to
strategic levels, as all-domain, globally integrated operations,
including the ability to integrate allied and partner contributions.
Remain agile to develop, execute, and adapt strategy
through campaigns and operations to achieve policy end states; and
Demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills,
emotional intelligence, and effective written, verbal, and visual
communications skills to support the development and implementation of
military strategies and complex operations and communicate to senior
officials and subordinates.
A number of independent reviews have found that the current JPME
system insufficiently prepares future military leaders to operate in a
geopolitical environment shaped by multiple nuclear-armed adversaries
and lacks sufficient rigor and instruction in strategic deterrence
missions.
Question. In your view, what additional steps should be taken to
increase the proficiency of future senior military leaders in leading
the joint force during a period of increased strategic competition,
particularly in the nuclear domain?
Answer. In terms of the military's contribution to strategic
competition, the Joint Force has mature doctrine on the uses and
applications of military force short of war. All the JPME programs
leverage this doctrine as part of their curriculum and instruction.
The war colleges have existing programs on deterrence, to
include coursework on coercion theory. As such, strategic deterrence is
an enduring special area of interest as assessed by Joint Staff J-7 for
the Chairman.
Every year, the Joint Staff J-7 in coordination with
Marine Corps University sponsors a Faculty Development Seminar for
instructors from all the DOD's JPME programs. This year's agenda will
focus on contemporary nuclear operations and the latest thinking
surrounding strategic deterrence and experts from across the DOD will
present the instruction.
Additionally, the Joint Staff will nominate a special
area of emphasis on nuclear operations and combat operations in a
nuclear environment. Every officer enrolled in a JPME program will
benefit from this expanded instruction.
Question. In your view, are there opportunities in JPME to improve
STEM cognizance and cyber fluency across the joint force to ensure that
leaders understand and can effectively employ technologies to fight and
win our Nation's wars?
Answer. Understanding and anticipating emerging technologies and
applications of cyber capabilities are important skills to be taught at
all levels of professional military education. STEM is the hallmark of
several military educational institutions including all the Service
Academies and graduate schools such as Naval Post Graduate School and
Air Force Institute of Technology. These institutions develop ``deep''
expertise in cyber and technology, tailored to the needs of the Joint
Force. STEM aspects are balanced with joint warfighting considerations
at the staff college and war college levels. Cyber and disruptive
technology considerations are woven into curriculum and students are
expected to demonstrate ability to consider these factors in their
joint planning and operations assessments. In all, the JPME enterprise
works extensively to develop both ``depth and breadth'' of
operationally minded warfighters.
Question. In your view, is there a role for JPME in developing
basic product management skills across the joint force to ensure that
military leaders are proficient in the employment of software and
automation in warfighting?
Answer. Future warfighters and warfighting leaders will inevitably
confront both the opportunities and limitations associated with
employing forces supported or enabled by software and automation. As
operations and campaigns become increasingly complex, product
management skills can enable and speed critical decisionmaking. I am
committed to preparing joint warfighters to strategically employ
software and automation skills and resources across all joint
endeavors.
legal counsel to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
Question. Section 156 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be selected by
a board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. To this day,
the Chairman's Legal Counsel remains the only joint duty officer
selected from among qualified officers of the Armed Forces in this
manner.
Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156
to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to
serve in this critical joint position?
Answer. Yes, I believe the selection process for the position of
the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an
effective, efficient, and equitable means to select an officer for this
position from a pool of talented judge advocate leaders across the
Services.
Question. Would you support expanding application of the process
employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?
Answer. I do not believe it is necessary to expand the LC selection
process to other joint billets. The LC selection process pertains to a
uniquely specific, statutorily authorized JS billet. The current, well-
established processes used to select general/flag officers to other
joint staff positions effectively facilitates a pool of candidates
representing the best officers from each service. The JS process for
identifying officers gives the Combatant Commander and the Chairman
flexibility to meet operational demands and emergent requirements. The
JS can select from across the Services (to include the Coast Guard) and
the Active, Guard, and Reserve components to identify the individual
with appropriate skills and experience. Moreover, the current process
provides commanders and other senior leaders an opportunity to quickly
review a slate of nominated officers and conduct interviews as
necessary. The JS can alert the Services to quickly identify eligible
personnel, select candidates, nominate them, and have them in position
in as little as 90 days, if necessary.
alliances and partnerships
Question. U.S. alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S.
success in competition with, deterrence of, and potential conflict
against long term strategic competitors.
What is your view of the strength of our current alliances,
relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners have in the
willingness of the U.S. to meet its obligations? If confirmed, how
would you enhance that trust?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with and seek
ways to incorporate our highly capable and frontline Allies and
partners in defense planning to maximize our global efforts against
adversaries. As the President and Secretary have made clear, our allies
and partners, particularly those in Europe, must increase their
contributions to collective security and I look forward to carrying
this message to my Chief of Defense counterparts.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each Combatant
Commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
Answer. We must continue to project unity and strength while
strengthening military to military relationships with our Allies and
partners. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with and seek
ways to incorporate our highly capable and frontline Allies and
partners in defense planning to maximize our global efforts against
adversaries. I will continue the regular engagements with Ally and
partner counterparts to understand their strategic concerns and to
identify areas for increased global cooperation. Synchronization and
transparency of our collective military global approaches results in
greater pressure on our adversaries while also enabling increased
flexibility to refocus U.S. military resources on U.S. national
priorities.
In NORTHCOM, defense of the Homeland and ensuring operational
control of the U.S. southern border will be my top priority. I will
focus on the efforts to modernize NORAD and improve coordination with
Canada to ensure our efforts are complementary. I will also continue to
foster the strong mil-to-mil relationship with Mexico to confront
shared challenges.
In INDOPACOM, if confirmed, I will focus on modernizing our
Alliance with Japan by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a
more integrated manner and deepening our Alliance with Australia
through investments in posture and interoperability through the
critical AUKUS security partnership, as well as expanding ongoing co-
production and maintenance efforts for critical munitions, essential to
building resilience into our Defense Industrial Base. The Joint Force
stands to gain from the deepening strategic interests between the U.S.
and India, by elevating military cooperation across multiple domains,
increasing new procurements and co-production arrangements, and
applying effort to streamline defense trade, technology exchange and
maintenance, spare supplies and in-country repair and overhaul of U.S.-
provided defense systems. If confirmed, I will continue to support our
ongoing efforts to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.
In SOUTHCOM, I will take specific actions to further strengthen
defense of the Homeland, including greater focus on PRC military and
financial investments in the theater, specifically in Panama. I will
also strengthen existing alliances and partnerships and identify new
partnerships, as necessary, to further degrade PRC influence in the
hemisphere.
In EUCOM, we must encourage our Allies and partners to increase
their capability and capacity, and prioritize outcome driven
relationships. I will continue to work alongside our NATO Allies to
deter and, if necessary, defend against any threat, and build
resilience against malign influence and hybrid activities.
In CENTCOM, I will prioritize cooperation with our regional
partners that results in a maximum pressure campaign to deter and
defend against Iranian aggression. I will buildupon the existing
regional security constructs to enhance Integrated Air and Missile
Defense and Maritime Security to best defend U.S. personnel and vital
interests in the region, support allies and partners, and deter
adversaries. I will also look for new opportunities for the entire
Joint Force--including our new State Partnership Program relationships
with Saudi Arabia and UAE--to contribute to shared regional security
priorities.
In AFRICOM, I will prioritize partner-led, U.S. enabled efforts to
achieve our shared security interests in degrading terrorist
organizations, strengthening multilateral coordination, and promoting
stability with the long-term goal of our partners achieving operational
independence.
In SPACECOM, I will prioritize sustained freedom of action in
space, optimization of our resources, and enhancing mission assurance.
We must promote norms of behavior by all space-faring nations in space
which support U.S. national security, economic, scientific, and
commercial interests.
Question. Industrial and technological integration between alliance
members and international partners are critical to ensuring
interoperability and economies of scale when modernizing and
maintaining combat forces.
Based on your experience, do you have any recommendations for how
DOD can leverage foreign military sales and industrial base integration
as a tool to improve our own military systems, as well as improve our
ability to fight by, with and through our allies and partners?
Answer. Foreign military sales have the potential to strengthen the
U.S. Defense Industrial Base by increasing the demand signal for
manufacturers, which, if properly incentivized, can enable needed
investments in capacity expansion. Some capacity limitations can be
offset by co-production initiatives in cases where the business case
and U.S. national security benefits align. Ultimately, by equipping
partners with U.S. systems, the U.S. increases interoperability and set
the stage for more seamless coalition operations.
u.s. africa command (africom)
Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
required to compete for the vast majority of its U.S. forces in the
global force management process.
What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
Campaign Plan, the National Defense Strategy, and other emergency
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and the AFRICOM Commander as part of the Global Force
Management Process. For AFRICOM, their forces include allocated forces
and CONUS-based regionally aligned forces that rotate into the Area of
Responsibility (AOR) execute activities in support of the AFRICOM
Theater Campaign Plan. Current posture allows for the forward staging
of forces to provide required operational flexibility and timely crisis
response, as required. Across AORs, I will work with the Department to
balance competing requirements and resourcing demands in-line with DOD
priorities.
Question. Are there any changes you would implement to the
allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and the Combatant Commanders to review global force posture, to
include that within the AFRICOM AOR, and make my recommendations.
Question. What should be the primary objectives of the DOD
specifically, and the United States more broadly, in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. Defending U.S. interests, protecting the Homeland, and
deterring our adversaries are global requirements for DOD. Africa is an
important AOR to implement our national security objectives to degrade
terrorists' capability to strike the Homeland and our personnel and
facilities abroad; and to counter our adversaries' ability to undermine
U.S. strategic interests.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
Russia and China in Africa? In what areas, if any, do these oppose U.S.
and partner objectives?
Answer. China and Russia both seek to expand their influence in
Africa. China primarily focuses on economic investment and
infrastructure projects via its Belt and Road Initiative, though there
is nascent military cooperation with some nations. Russia focuses on
military partnerships, arms sales, and resource extraction. Both powers
aim to challenge Western influence, though China's approach has
generally been more systematic and economically focused compared to
Russia's more opportunistic and security-oriented strategy.
u.s. central command (centcom)
Question. In your opinion, what are the key U.S. national security
interests in the Middle East? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Key U.S. national security interests in the Middle east are
(1) deterring threats to the U.S. Homeland that emanate from the Middle
East (Iranian Threat Network, potential nuclear weapons, and VEOs), (2)
supporting our allies and partners in the region (Israel, NATO, etc.),
(3) counter-proliferation, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon, and (4) ensuring the free flow of goods, trade, and stability
in the world energy supply.
Question. In your opinion, to what extent does achieving U.S.
national security interests in the Middle East require a continuous
U.S. military presence, and in your view is the current U.S. force
presence appropriately sized? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The Middle East continues to face challenges emanating from
terrorism, failed and fragile states, and pressure from Russia, China,
and Iran. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the U.S. military
presence in the Middle East against our national strategic interests
and in light of broader global requirements and make recommendations to
the Secretary and the President.
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with U.S. partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the
CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The CENTCOM AOR faces a number of threats across multiple
domains. The combined military, economic, humanitarian, and
environmental threats that impact across the globe must be addressed by
the combined efforts of U.S. and its allies and partners.
Our partners in the Middle East are eager to improve security
cooperation and assume a greater share of the burden defending
themselves against Iranian aggression and terrorist threats such as the
Houthis and ISIS.
Improving ally and partner capability through training and
improving the Foreign Military Sales process, as well as building and
strengthening intelligence sharing and cooperative agreements like the
RSC (Regional Security Construct) and MEAD (Middle East Air Defense)
partnership will enable our A&P to assume a greater role in addressing
regional security issues, while solidifying U.S. influence and our role
as partner of choice for strategically important allies.
Question. What threat does Chinese and Russian involvement in the
Middle East pose to U.S. operations and interests and to what extent
does a continuous U.S. presence counter their involvement? In your
view, what other policy tools might be useful in this regard?
Answer. Russia has historically used its military presence in the
Middle East to threaten the U.S. and our allies from the Mediterranean
Sea and into Africa. Russian-affiliated forces attacked U.S. troops in
Syria but were disavowed by Moscow. Russian government and Chinese
state-owned enterprises have aligned with Iran to proliferate weapons,
technology, and expertise used by terrorist organizations such as the
Houthis that attack the U.S. military, Israel and our other allies and
partners in the region. Chinese IT also introduces risk into the
defense infrastructure of those Middle Eastern countries that choose to
procure Chinese tech and equipment. Therefore, it is important for the
military to work alongside other departments and agencies in the U.S.
Government to address the diplomatic, economic, and informational
threat posed by China and Russia as well as the direct military threat.
Iran
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the U.S.
national security interests with respect to Iran? What is the role of
the U.S. military in this strategy?
Answer. U.S. policy and our interest to deny Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon, neutralize Iran's campaign of regional aggression, and
disrupt the IRGC's destabilizing activities.
The Joint Force will retain the ability to deny Iran a nuclear
weapon; identify and support action against Iranian and Iranian-backed
threats; and disrupt terrorist threats that endanger the U.S. Homeland
and U.S. interests. The U.S. military will work with our regional
Middle East partners to increase their ability to deter and defend
against Iranian aggression.
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran? What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iranian
proxy groups?
Answer.
IRAN. Iran possesses thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, and one-way attack UAVs capable of ranging Israeli and U.S.
interests in the region and, over the past year, demonstrated its
ability to employ its conventional military capabilities in two large-
scale attacks directly against Israel. Their consideration of nuclear
capability is troubling.
IRANIAN PROXIES. Iran maintains a network of nonState partners and
proxies in the Middle East which have targeted U.S. and partner
interests across the region and in international shipping lanes, and
they have publicly justified these attacks due to Israeli operations
against HAMAS and Lebanese Hizballah.
HOUTHIS. Since Oct 2023, the Houthis have launched
missiles and UAVs against Israeli territory, U.S. military ships and
aircraft, hit multiple commercial vessels in the Red Sea, and seized
and impounded one commercial vessel.
IAMGs. Since 19 Oct 2023, Iranian-aligned groups have
conducted over 200 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria,
as recently January--demonstrating they maintain at least limited
operational capabilities in Syria--and they may resume sustained
attacks with little to no warning, pending Iranian approval.
HIZBALLAH. Since Oct 2023, Hizballah has conducted cross-
border attacks against Israel and combatting Israeli forces in Lebanon
and has not expressed an intent to target U.S. forces or interests in
the Middle East.
HAMAS. As of early Mar, HAMAS is focused on its long-term
survival and has not publicly expressed an intent to target U.S. forces
or interests in the Middle East; however, HAMAS political officials
have publicly opposed plans for a sustained foreign presence in Gaza,
suggesting the group likely would seek to target any non-Palestinian
security force deployed to Gaza after the conflict.
Question. In your view, what would be the security implications for
U.S. and regional security interests should Iran acquire a nuclear
weapons capability?
Answer. Iranian leadership's decision calculus may be affected if
its national priorities are threatened to include ensuring regime
survival, maintaining national security from internal and external
threats, and establishing itself as the regional dominant power in the
Middle East.
Military force alone may not be sufficient to deter Iran, and an
approach that includes diplomatic engagement and economic incentives
may be necessary.
Question. In your opinion, can Iran be sufficiently deterred
through military force alone? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Iranian leadership's decision calculus may be affected if
its national priorities are threatened to include ensuring regime
survival, maintaining national security from internal and external
threats, and establishing itself as the regional dominant power in the
Middle East.
Military force alone may not be sufficient to deter Iran, and an
approach that includes diplomatic engagement and economic incentives
may be necessary.
Israel
Question. In your opinion, what are U.S. national security
objectives with regards to Israel?
Answer. Israel is a model U.S. ally, and the U.S.-Israel alliance
is of great importance to the United States. Enabling Israel's security
and ability to defend itself is thus a key U.S. national security
objective. Achieving durable security for Israel and strengthening
formal and informal security cooperation between Israel and its Arab
neighbors will reduce the burden on the Joint Force and enable greater
focus on threats elsewhere around the globe.
Question. In your opinion, what should DOD's role be in supporting
Israeli efforts to degrade and defeat Hamas?
Answer. I defer to the Secretary and the President to set our
policies toward foreign states, to include Israel. If confirmed, I will
ensure that our military strategy and operations are aligned with the
Secretary and the President's priorities and policies.
Syria and Iraq
Question. What is your understanding of current U.S. strategy and
objectives in Syria? How have those objectives changed, if at all, in
light of the recent fall of the Assad regime?
Answer. The United States is in Syria to ensure the enduring defeat
of ISIS and to prevent external operations from ISIS and al-Qaeda from
threatening the U.S. Homeland. The December 2024 fall of the Assad
regime does not fundamentally alter these U.S. objectives.
I will work with the Secretary as this Administration assesses and
develops United States policy for Syria.
Question. From a DOD perspective, what must be done to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS? What non-military efforts are needed for the
enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS must continue to
cooperate on counterterrorism efforts. U.S. must continue to work
closely with allies and partners to address shared security concerns
through a whole-of-government approach to eliminate threats to the
Homeland.
Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in countering ISIS and al
Qaeda?
Answer. It is my understanding that our partners in the SDF and ISF
lead the fight against ISIS by shouldering the burden of operations
with some U.S. assistance. These partners play a critical role in
enabling our CT objectives while keeping the risk to and investment
from U.S. forces low and economical. I will seek to work with the
Secretary and interagency on the future of these relationships as
regional dynamics continue to change and the Administration reviews its
policies regarding Syria and Iraq.
Question. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied
to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what
conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the President
on future troop levels in Syria?
Answer. I believe that U.S. troop levels in Syria should accord
with our national policy and objectives. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Commander USCENTCOM to
review our strategy and posture in Syria and make my recommendations.
Question. In September, the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission
announced the transition of the global coalition to defeat ISIS to a
bilateral security relationship with the Government of Iraq. However,
many of the details of such a transition are still being negotiated
with the Iraqi Government.
In your view, what should the guiding principles for DOD's presence
in Iraq moving forward? Do you assess that U.S. forces should remain in
Iraq beyond next September? Why or why not?
Answer. Iraq has become a key partner for the U.S. in the region.
The U.S. Mission in Iraq is committed to a lasting strategic
partnership with the Government of Iraq and its people. The U.S.
Government, along with the U.S. Mission to Iraq, actively collaborates
with Iraqi partners to support a stable, prosperous, democratic, and
unified Iraq. Our security relationship is an advisory, enabling, and
assisting role.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and
the Commander USCENTCOM to review our strategy and posture in Iraq and
make my recommendations.
South Asia
Question. In your opinion, what are U.S. national security
objectives in Afghanistan, and what is your understanding of the
current strategy to achieve them?
Answer. The most immediate U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to
ensure the country is not a breeding ground for terrorist attacks
against the United States, our overseas interests, and our allies and
partners. This includes ensuring weapons provided to the former Afghan
government do not fall into the hands of terrorists planning attacks on
the United States. The U.S. works with partners in the region to
achieve this objective. Over the long term, a more stable and self-
sufficient Afghanistan would facilitate security and possibly open
alternative trade routes from Central Asia.
Question. In your view, is the United States properly postured to
counter ISIS-Khorasan and al Qaeda and related groups in Afghanistan?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and the Combatant Commanders to review global force posture and
capabilities, to include that within the CENTCOM AOR, and make my
recommendations.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to U.S. relations with Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan's location bordering China, India, Iran, and
Afghanistan, and its status as a nuclear power make an ongoing
strategic relationship important. I would aim to preserve the military-
to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan in
areas of mutual interest such as counterterrorism. A constructive
defense relationship facilitates regional stability and enhances
counterterrorism efforts.
u.s. european command (eucom)
Question. Do you believe the deterrent posture in Europe is
sufficient to deter further Russian aggression in Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review our force
posture, to include that in the USEUCOM AOR, and make my
recommendations.
Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
shortfalls in current U.S. posture that affect the U.S. ability to
carry out the EUCOM Theater Campaign Plan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review our
capabilities, capacity, and force posture, to include that in the
USEUCOM AOR, and make my recommendations.
Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
critical infrastructure in EUCOM? If not, what are the areas of highest
risk?
Answer. I have not been able to conduct an assessment of the United
States air and missile defense capabilities and capacities to defend
EUCOM critical infrastructure. However, If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Joint Chiefs, and all of the Combatant Commanders to
review our capabilities, capacity, and force posture across all
theaters, to include EUCOM, in order to make fully informed
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the
department will continue to work closely with Allies and Partners to
ensure that we have an efficient and effective air and missile defense
force posture across the theater.
Question. If confirmed, what specific changes would you make to
U.S. capabilities or force posture in Europe to execute the Interim
National Defense Strategic Guidance more effectively?
Answer. Europe continues to face challenges emanating from
conventional to transnational threats in its immediate vicinity and
beyond. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the U.S. military
presence in Europe against our national strategic interests and in
light of broader global requirements and make recommendations to the
Secretary and the President.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
Question. Since establishment of the EDI in 2014, the NDAA has
authorized billions of dollars each year for EDI investments to support
stability and security, and to deter Russian aggression.
In your view, has EDI improved U.S. and allied capability and
capacity to deter Russian aggression in the European theater?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review our
capabilities, capacity, and force posture, to include the EDI, and make
my recommendations.
Question. Do you believe continued, robust dedicated funding for
programs under EDI's five lines of effort is required to support
implementation of the National Defense Strategy in Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the future requirements
in Europe, with the Service Chiefs, to make recommendations regarding
future EDI funding.
NATO Alliance
Question. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests
is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty, especially Article 5?
Answer. The North Atlantic Treaty is very important to U.S.
strategic interests. Any use of armed force to fulfill our commitments
under Article 5 would need to be carried out pursuant to the
President's powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the War
Powers Act, and subsequent congressional authorizations for use of
military force or a formal declaration of war.
Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance and what do you perceive to be the greatest
challenges in meeting those objectives?
Answer. At the 2024 Washington Summit, the Alliance reaffirmed its
purpose and principles found in NATO's Strategic Concept, and its three
core tasks of Collective Defense, Cooperative Security, and Crisis
Management. I'm aligned with these objectives and in my view, the
greatest challenge the Alliance faces is its ability to adapt and
develop, politically and militarily, to meet the challenges of an
unpredictable and competitive world.
Question. NATO has long held the position that, ``as long as
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your
view, do you believe this principle requires the United States to
continue to deploy nuclear weapons in NATO countries?
Answer. As long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance, it is important
for the U.S. to maintain nuclear weapons forward deployed in NATO
countries. These forward-based weapons contribute to U.S. extended
deterrence, complicate adversary decision calculus, and reassure our
NATO Allies.
The United States nuclear commitment to NATO remains a core element
of our deterrence policy and strategy. As the backbone of deterrence
since its founding, NATO nuclear policy seeks to preserve peace,
prevent coercion and deter aggression.
Question. Do you believe that NATO should expand the nuclear
sharing role to additional alliance members?
Answer. Nuclear sharing arrangements can refer both to U.S. nuclear
weapons hosted on the territory of NATO Allies and to Allied provision
of Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) that could carry U.S. nuclear weapons as
part of a NATO nuclear mission. While these facets of nuclear sharing
are related, one does not require the other. From a military
perspective, expanding NATO allies' participation in the nuclear
deterrence mission in some capacity would enhance flexibility,
survivability, and military capability. If confirmed, I will work with
USEUCOM and SACEUR to evaluate the cost/benefit of such a decision.
Question. What do you see as the benefits, or negative
consequences, of NATO countries individually pursuing their own nuclear
weapons?
Answer. Nuclear proliferation, even among Allies, significantly
limits U.S. ability to manage escalation risk. It could trigger further
acceleration of adversary efforts to modernize and expand their nuclear
arsenals. Additionally, it would irreparably erode the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and could encourage
proliferation around the world.
Question. The dual-hatted position of the Commander of EUCOM as
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) allows U.S. and Allied
forces to be highly integrated in Europe. Similar dual-hat
responsibilities have been integrated to other senior U.S. Commanders,
including Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe and Africa as Commander
NATO Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) and Commander U.S. Army Europe and
Africa as Commander NATO Allied Land Command
What is your assessment of the benefits of these dual-hatted
structures to allied cohesion and integration?
Answer. U.S. leadership within the Alliance is critical to Alliance
cohesion and integration. As the most capable and largest NATO member,
the U.S. is the only member that has the stature to lead the Alliance
in a cohesive and unified manner. The dual-hatted positions throughout
the NATO command structure ensure close integration of U.S. thought and
operational intent and maintain unity of effort and focus across the
Alliance. The dual-hatted arrangement, in which SACEUR is an American
combatant commander, is particularly important for the fulfillment of
the United States' nuclear deterrence commitment to NATO.
Russia
Question. In your view, is Russia a threat to the United States and
its allies?
Answer. Russia very likely remains deterred from an overt military
attack against the U.S. or NATO; however, Moscow retains the ability
and willingness to conduct asymmetric activity below what it assesses
to be the threshold of military conflict. The conflict in Ukraine very
likely has strained its conventional military forces, increasing
Russia's dependence on its nuclear arsenal as a means of deterrence to
protect itself from perceived external military threats.
Question. In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities most deter
Russia and mitigate the Russian threat to NATO Allies and partners?
Answer. Russia very likely is deterred by the U.S. and NATO's
nuclear arsenal and the threat of direct military confrontation with
the U.S. and NATO. Russia's threat perceptions almost certainly are
driven by a belief that the U.S. and broader West seek the strategic
defeat of the Russian State. As such, Moscow views any actions by the
U.S. and broader West, especially those in the vicinity of Moscow's
perceived sphere of influence, as intended to undermine Russian
interests. However, Moscow calibrates its responses to these perceived
undermining activities to demonstrate resolve without prompting an
escalatory response from the U.S. and/or the broader West.
Question. What aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture do you assess
as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?
Answer. Russia very likely is deterred by the U.S. and NATO's
nuclear arsenal and the threat of direct military confrontation with
the U.S. and NATO. Russia's threat perceptions almost certainly are
driven by a belief that the U.S. and broader West seek the strategic
defeat of the Russian State. As such, Moscow views any actions by the
U.S. and broader West, especially those in the vicinity of Moscow's
perceived sphere of influence, as intended to undermine Russian
interests. However, Moscow calibrates its responses to these perceived
undermining activities to demonstrate resolve without prompting an
escalatory response from the U.S. and/or the broader West.
Question. In your view, what should DOD do to counter Russian
malign influence in Europe?
Answer. We must encourage our Allies and partners to increase their
capability and capacity, and prioritize outcome driven relationships. I
will continue to work alongside our NATO Allies to deter and, if
necessary, defend against any threat, and build resilience against
malign influence and hybrid activities.
Ukraine
Question. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale,
unprovoked, and illegal invasion on Ukraine.
How do you assess the trajectory of the conflict and the role that
the Department of Defense should play?
Answer. Russian President Putin remains committed to pursuing his
objectives in Ukraine to include securing territorial gains and forcing
Ukrainian neutrality. Moscow likely views the conflict is in its favor
and will continue to prosecute the war in 2025 despite high casualties
from continued operations. Russia's approved 2025 budget contains
higher levels of defense spending compared to 2024 and is the highest
it has been since the cold war. Defense spending is projected to be
double that of social spending, which suggests Moscow is committed to
sustaining its war efforts. The conflict in 2025 likely will continue
to be a war of attrition, with both sides suffering heavy losses of
personnel and materiel. Russian forces gained nearly 4,000 square
kilometers in 2024, seven times more than in 2023, with the majority of
those advances occurring in eastern Donetsk.
Following the 18 February meeting between U.S. and Russian
officials in Riyadh, the Kremlin publicly reiterated willingness to
work with Washington on a negotiated settlement and expressed interest
in continued high-level dialog with the United States. Russia later
reiterated Moscow will not accept a cease-fire without a long-term
settlement that addresses Russia's core security concerns.
Question. Do you believe it is important for the United States to
continue providing security assistance to Ukraine, including after the
conclusion of the war, as a means to help Ukraine deter and defeat
Russian aggression?
Answer. From a military standpoint, Ukraine has the right to self-
defense, and from that standpoint our security assistance helps Ukraine
to defend itself. Our assistance improves Ukraine's position at the
negotiating table and deters Russia from further aggression. The United
States is only a part of the network of states supporting Ukraine's
defense, and we should focus on what unique capabilities only the U.S.
can provide, while Europe increases its share of support. After the
conclusion of the war, we should continue to assist Ukraine with its
future force development and long-term stability.
Question. What do you see as the role of U.S. security assistance
in building the capabilities and capacity of Ukraine to meet its
military requirements to defend its sovereignty and territorial
integrity in the short, medium, and long-term?
Answer. The U.S. and our Allies are studying Ukraine's immediate
wartime needs to defend the front line, as well as how to build its
future force and defense industry to develop organic capabilities for
long-term self-defense. In this way, we are helping Ukraine become more
self-sufficient. Other aspects of short, and long-term force
development include advising missions and training.
u.s. indo-pacific command (indopacom)
Question. U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region remains
heavily concentrated in Japan and South Korea.
Is the current U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region
sufficient to support the Trump Administration's Interim National
Defense Strategic Guidance? How would you propose to restructure U.S.
security posture in the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese aggression, if
confirmed? Please explain your answer.
Answer. An increasingly aggressive China poses both short and long-
term challenges. If confirmed, I will assess the U.S. military presence
in the Indo-Pacific against our national strategic interests and make
recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of significant
reductions to our force posture in Japan or South Korea on the security
situation in the Indo-Pacific region?
Answer. North Korea's long-range missile and nuclear programs
represent an immediate security challenge. If confirmed, I will assess
the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea and make
recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make to implement the National Defense Strategy and improve the
military balance in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. The Department works closely with INDOPACOM and allies and
partners in the region to ensure the Department is making investments
that advance National Defense Strategy priorities, close Combatant
Commanders priority gaps, and improve integrated deterrence.
Participating in regional multi-national exercises and sustaining
forward forces assists with improving the military balance in the
region. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Services and
Congress to advance investments that improve lethality within INDOPACOM
to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Question. Do you believe that continued, dedicated funding for the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative is required to support implementation of
the National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. The programs, investments, and activities included in the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are critical for providing a
credible combat deterrent and maintaining the free and open order in
the Western Pacific. PDI is a subset of the Department's budget
request, not a separate fund. If confirmed, I will work with the
INDOPACOM and the Services to ensure we continue to fund the most
important programs to strengthen deterrence.
Question. In your view, what is the role of ground forces in the
Indo-Pacific during competition, crisis, and conflict?
Answer. The role of ground forces in the Indo-Pacific region is
complex and multifaceted, evolving across the spectrum of competition,
crisis, and conflict. Right now, they serve as a deterrent and offer
opportunities to expand training and partnerships with allies. In times
of crisis, they can offer a rapid response option as well as a way of
protecting U.S. interests in the region (U.S. citizens, infrastructure,
etc). During conflict, they can provide options for force projection,
area denial/control, and stabilization/reconstruction. In any case, the
China threat is dynamic and United States ground forces must continue
to adapt and modernize to maintain a competitive edge.
Question. Congress mandated the establishment of the Joint Force
Headquarters at INDOPACOM. What is your view of INDOPACOM's progress in
establishing the Joint Force Headquarters? What are the requirements
for the Joint Force Headquarters at INDOPACOM to fully execute its
function?
Answer. The ability to respond effectively to crises in the region,
using the Joint Force with all its combined capabilities, is paramount.
Admiral Paparo has stated that, in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) within
the Theater of War, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would serve as the Joint
Task Force (JTF), a capability for which they were certified in 2023.
The existing structure, which leverages the proven capabilities of
service components and their ability to function as JTFs, provides the
necessary flexibility and responsiveness to address a wide range of
potential crises within the INDOPACOM AOR. It should be able to fully
execute its purpose in its current form.
Question. Can you describe the strategic and operational importance
of Guam to executing INDOPACOM's plans and operations in the region?
Can you describe the State of military infrastructure and facilities on
Guam in the wake of Typhoon Mawar? Do you agree that it is critical for
Guam to be reconstructed in a resilient manner so that the U.S.
military can utilize Guam as a power projection platform in the Indo-
Pacific?
Answer. Guam's strategic location and military capabilities make it
a key hub indispensable hub for United States power projection in the
Indo-Pacific. However, Typhoon Mawar, which struck Guam in May 2023,
caused significant damage to military infrastructure and facilities on
the island. This highlighted the vulnerability of the island's critical
infrastructure to natural disasters, which underscores the need to
invest in order to ensure its ability to withstand future threats, both
natural and man-made. A resilient Guam helps ensure the United States
can effectively deter aggression, respond to crises, and protect its
interests in the region.
Question. Do you support the efforts by the United States and Japan
to establish a modernized command-and-control structure, to include an
improved U.S. Forces Japan? Do you agree that the Department of Defense
should move as fast as possible to establish a new command-and-control
structure with Japan, considering its strategic importance as a capable
ally in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Yes, modernizing the United States-Japan command-and-
control structure will help maintain a credible deterrent and ensure
the alliance's effectiveness in a rapidly changing security
environment.
China
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy describes the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as ``the most comprehensive and serious
challenge to U.S. national security'' and states ``The PRC seeks to
undermine U.S. alliances and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic
influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and
military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their
interest.''
How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with
China?
Answer. The President has made it clear we must be clear-eyed about
China's intentions and actions. Many of the Chinese Communist Party's
values and interests are at odds with those of the United States.
However, I defer to the Secretaries of Defense and State to
characterize our current relationship.
Question. What is your assessment of the current State of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should be the
objectives of U.S.-China military-to-military dialog? What are the
limitations on this kind of dialog?
Answer. Engagements with the PLA may offer opportunities for the
U.S. to influence China's military behavior and encourage adherence to
norms and standards, but we should be realistic about what we can
achieve. A properly postured and equipped Joint Force does more to
influence China's behavior than engagement. If the President and the
Secretary believe I can move U.S. objectives forward by engaging with
my PLA counterpart, I will.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
erosion of U.S. advantages?
Answer. The PLA remains focused on developing its capabilities
across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full
range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space,
counterspace, EW, and cyberspace operations. The PLA remains focused on
developing capabilities to provide options for China to dissuade,
deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-
Pacific region. China's stated defense policy remains oriented toward
advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while
emphasizing a greater global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated
an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to
achieve these aims. The PLA's rapid developments in missile, aircraft,
and unmanned aerial systems have greatly advanced in the past 20 years.
Question. In your view what are the implications of China's nuclear
buildup on the credibility of deterrence and extended deterrence in
Asia?
Answer. China's nuclear buildup presents a challenge to U.S.
deterrence capabilities and extended deterrence commitments to allies
in the Indo-Pacific. To preserve stability in the region and deter
potential aggression from China, the U.S. must continue to fully invest
in a modernized nuclear force. This will ensure credibility for our
deterrent and extended deterrence commitments in the future.
Taiwan
Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
Taiwan Strait? What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S.
military assistance to Taiwan? Do you think Taiwan is making
appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities and if not, what
changes would you recommend?
Answer. There is a very stark imbalance in capabilities across the
Taiwan Strait. As indicated in DOD's annual China Military Power Report
(CMPR), China continues to modernize its military capabilities and
invest in advanced weapons systems. These include aircraft carriers,
anti-ship missiles, submarines, ballistic missiles, and cyber
capabilities. The PLA is capable of projecting power through operations
and exercises near Taiwan and throughout the region. Taiwan's military,
although growing, is much smaller in comparison and lacks many similar
capabilities.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and
the Commander USINDOPACOM to review the capabilities and requirements
of Taiwan and make my recommendations.
Question. Some have argued that the United States should explicitly
State that we would respond militarily to any Chinese use of force
against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your view, what
would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change?
Answer. My focus is implementing the President's current policy,
which opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side
and to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Respectfully, I will provide my military advice on significant policy
changes when the President and Secretary invite me to do so.
The Korean Peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by North
Korea to regional and global stability?
Answer. The DPRK nuclear, missile, and cyber capabilities continue
to threaten the United States and its allies on a global scale.
Pyongyang has tested multiple missile systems capable of striking U.S.
forces in the ROK and Japan, as well as Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and
CONUS. Additionally, the DPRK conducts persistent cyber activities,
such as cryptocurrency theft and adaptive cybercrime TTPs to generate
funds and obtain technical information in support of the regime's
military and WMD programs. Pyongyang's comprehensive strategic
partnership with Moscow very likely will enable it to further improve
its military capabilities, increasing the threat to regional stability
and U.S. interests.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD should
take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's nuclear
and missile capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and the USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM, USINDOPACOM, and
Combined Forces Command-Korea Commanders to review and enhance the
status of our missile defense capabilities against the DPRK and make my
recommendations in line with President Trump's Golden Dome for America.
Question. What will you do to ensure that trilateral military
cooperation between the U.S., Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
accelerates?
Answer. I support the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework
and, if confirmed, will continue to advocate for using the Trilateral
Security Cooperation Framework as a blueprint for military cooperation
in exercises like FREEDOM EDGE and operationally through efforts such
as our trilateral missile data warning sharing mechanism.
Question. Do you believe that the ROK has met the requirements for
the conditions-based operational control transition plan allowing it to
assume wartime control of its military? If not, what does the ROK still
need to do to achieve OPCON transition?
Answer. The United States and ROK currently have a conditions-based
operational control transition plan (COTP) in place. The COTP requires
the ROK to meet the conditions associated with their stand-alone
capability and that the security environment is conducive for the ROK
to assume the lead of a U.S.-ROK combined command prior to transition.
The ROK continues to increase and improve capabilities by acquiring
equipment and experience through multi-domain and trilateral exercises.
If confirmed, I will review the conditions outlined within the existing
plan before making my recommendation.
Question. What are your views on the use of landmines to deter
conflict on the Korean Peninsula? Do you support continuing efforts by
DOD to modernize related terrain shaping capabilities?
Answer. Landmines have been used on the Korean peninsula since the
Korean War and there are still millions of landmines deployed along the
demilitarized zone to deter North Korean aggression. If confirmed, I
will review the deployment of landmines on the Korean peninsula.
u.s. northern command (northcom)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Question. Civil authorities may request DOD support for domestic
disasters and certain counter-drug operations as well as in managing
the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass
destruction.
In your view, are the procedures by which Federal, State, and Local
agencies request DOD support efficient, effective, and timely?
Answer. Yes, the procedures by which Federal, State, and Local
agencies request DOD support have been honed over decades and are
effective in ensuring that DOD is able to provide a rapid and flexible
response for potential or actual emergencies or disasters within the
United States, territories, possessions, and protectorates, upon
receiving a validated request for assistance formally asking DOD to
provide assistance to a local, State, tribal, or other Federal agency.
Question. What factors should be considered in determining whether
DOD will provide support to a civil authority?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD remains a reliable
and responsive partner to civil authorities while adhering to legal and
operational principles. By continuously refining procedures, enhancing
interagency training, and leveraging lessons learned from past
emergencies, we can strengthen our collective ability to respond
effectively to crises and safeguard the American people.
Question. Do you believe it is in the best interests of DOD to
provide support to civil authorities on a reimbursable basis?
Answer. Yes, providing DOD resources, when appropriately requested
and validated, in response to emergencies, law enforcement support, and
other domestic activities when non-DoD capabilities are overwhelmed or
unavailable is appropriate.
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are engaged in a
wide variety of illicit activities, including money laundering, human
trafficking illicit financial flows, illegal trade in natural resources
and wildlife, and trade in illegal drugs, precursors and weapons. These
activities reach not only the entirety of the Western Hemisphere, but
increasingly throughout the world.
In your assessment, how has the threat to the United States from
transnational criminal organizations evolved?
Answer. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) almost
certainly will continue to prioritize their profits and will engage in
activities that may threaten the United States such as drug or human
trafficking in pursuit of illicit business interests. Over the past two
decades, TCOs have adapted to increased government regulation and
enforcement efforts by diversifying their revenue streams, updating
drug manufacturing processes, and changing trafficking TTP. Most
fentanyl is trafficked through U.S. ports of entry, judging from CBP
seizure information. TCO adaptability likely will challenge Latin
American governments' capacities to effectively counter criminal
violence for at least the next year.
TCOs likely seek to avoid excessive violence in the United States
or against U.S. citizens that may attract additional law enforcement
scrutiny. However, TCO-driven criminal violence in Latin America--
particularly Mexico--raises the risk of spillover violence in the
United States or toward U.S. personnel operating near the U.S. southern
border. TCOs degrade Latin American State capacity through their
engagement in corruption and some organizations' ability to overwhelm
security forces in limited engagements. Weakened Latin American states
almost certainly are less able to contain violence. In Mexico, the
military generally maintains the capabilities to counter TCO attacks
but lacks the capacity to sustain a long-term campaign to decisively
defeat criminal groups.
u.s. southern command (southcom)
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
President to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the
SOUTHCOM AOR?
Answer. The Chinese and Russian governments use economic pressure
and disinformation campaigns to influence the governments in Latin
America and the Caribbean in their favor. Their actions often counter
U.S. interests and destabilize democratic partner nations. The U.S.
should work to remain the partner of choice by maintaining strong
regional presence and investing in programs that will build partner
capacity to deter Chinese, Russian, and Cuban influence.
Question. Do you believe these influences threaten hemispheric
security and prosperity?
Answer. China and Russia use varying tools to influence the Western
Hemisphere according to their interests. While in the short-term
Chinese activities might translate into positive economic outcomes,
long-term, we have seen that many of these projects undercut local
competition or impede on partner nation's sovereignty. Russia's actions
support authoritarian regimes who undermine the security and prosperity
of the United States and other peace seeking nations.
Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by Section 1045 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. Yes.
Counternarcotics Activities
Question. DOD serves as lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing
toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD expends nearly $1
billion to build the counternarcotics capacity of U.S. Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies and certain foreign governments.
What changes, if any, should be made to DOD's counternarcotics
strategy and supporting activities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and the Combatant Commanders to review our approach to
counternarcotics.
Question. In your view, what should be DOD's role in countering the
flow of narcotics to nations other than the United States?
Answer. The Joint Force should continue to assess how it can best
leverage intelligence assets and partnership capacity building to
support these partners' efforts to disrupt and degrade drug-trafficking
organizations at the source. If confirmed, I can better assess the
DOD's role in countering the global flow of narcotics.
Question. How, if at all, should U.S. security assistance be scoped
to address factors at the root of counternarcotics trafficking, in your
opinion?
Answer. The Joint Force should continue to assess how it can best
leverage intelligence assets and partnership capacity building to
support these partners' efforts to disrupt and degrade drug-trafficking
organizations at the source. If confirmed, I can better assess the
DOD's role in countering the global flow of narcotics.
Venezuela
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Venezuela and to what degree is the illegitimate Maduro regime
dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?
Answer. Disputed President Nicolas Maduro continues to hold on to
power with support from the Venezuelan military and key partners
Russia, China, and Iran very likely mitigating the impact of
international sanctions through limited economic and defense support.
Historically, Russia was Venezuela's largest defense supplier,
although military supply has declined in recent years. China provides
economic cooperation, but mirrors Russia with declining defense
support. Ties with Iran have weakened under President Maduro, but
current security cooperation includes aircraft maintenance, chemical
plant construction, and UAV sales. Cuba and Venezuela have shared a
robust security, political, and economic relationship for nearly two
decades.
Question. How would you assess Venezuelan relations with China,
Cuba, Iran, and Russia vis-`-vis the national interests of the United
States?
Answer. The rationale for Venezuelan relations with China, Cuba,
Iran, and Russia is the desire to prosper under U.S. sanctions through
mutual trade and support. A current goal of the Maduro regime is to
gain formal admittance into the international economic bloc, Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Caracas uses its oil
reserves as its main barging tool, primarily with Beijing to whom they
export the majority of their crude oil. The U.S. is Venezuela's
preferred oil customer, and Caracas' dependance on foreign support
correlates with U.S. sanctions. Russia and Venezuela are increasing
economic trade and investment in the face of sanctions by the U.S. and
other western countries. Venezuela has also signed various agreements
with Iran in energy, science, oil, defense, culture, economy, and food
sectors.
u.s. space force and u.s. space command (spacecom)
Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
both economically and militarily. Our great power competitors are
making concerted efforts to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact
U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain. The Space
Force, within the Department of the Air Force, and a unified Space
Command, deal with the contested domain of space, upon which the
terrestrial forces of the United States and peer competitors are highly
reliant for support.
In your view, does the current National Defense Strategy accurately
assess the strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space?
If confirmed, what changes would you make to the National Defense
Strategy regarding the space domain?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the specifics of the 2025
Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG) as it applies to
Space. Our competitors continue to view space as a key competitive
environment and future National Defense Strategy documents should
reflect this strategic reality.
Question. In your view, what will ``great power competition'' look
like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia's
activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S.
national security interests?
Answer. Both China and Russia have developed and fielded
counterspace capabilities designed to hold U.S. Government and
commercial satellites at risk and undermine U.S. advantages. We must
accelerate the transition to a more resilient space architecture,
strengthen our ability to deter, counter, and defeat threats in, from,
though, and to space, and protect our Joint Force from adversary
hostile uses of space. If confirmed, I will support the development of
innovative concepts and cutting-edge space-based capabilities to
maintain deterrence and preserve U.S. freedom of action in the space
domain.
Question. Are there other nation-states or actors operating in
space that you perceive as a risk to the United States, or as cause for
concern? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. This past year, it was revealed that Russia is working
on a nuclear space-based antisatellite (ASAT) capability, which would
violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and indiscriminately threaten the
vast majority of satellites operated by countries and companies around
the world, leading to worldwide commercial disruptions. China is
testing counterspace capabilities, including satellites capable of
rendezvous and proximity operations and use of electronic jamming and
cyber operations against ground networks; China's aggressive cyber
targeting of U.S. infrastructure, including satellite networks, may
deny critical U.S. capabilities in the event of a conflict in the Indo-
Pacific. In 2024, Iran placed six space payloads into orbit and
continues to develop its space launch capabilities; knowledge gained
from orbital launches is applicable to development of an ICBM that
could directly threaten the U.S. Homeland, if Iran chose to pursue such
a capability. The commercial sector and other nations are rapidly
expanding activities in space, leading to the risk of increasing
orbital congestion.
Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
the 2022 National Defense Strategy and U.S. strategic objectives as
they relate to the domain of space?
Answer. The United States' space superiority is being challenged
because our adversaries, notably China and Russia, continue to rapidly
develop counterspace systems to hold our space-based assets and
capabilities at risk. China specifically is launching advanced threats
at breakneck speeds which can target multiple capabilities across all
orbital regimes. Additionally, Iran and North Korea are strengthening
their own space programs with the assistance of China and Russia, which
is increasing the threat environment. The United States needs to
continue to prioritize the robustness and defense of our Space
architecture across ground, link, and space segments to promote
resilience, restore deterrence, and ensure that space-based
capabilities are ready for the joint warfighter 24/7.
Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
our national security space satellites and commercial space systems
owned by U.S. companies?
Answer. This past year, it was revealed that Russia is working on a
nuclear space-based antisatellite (ASAT) capability, which would
violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and indiscriminately threaten the
vast majority of satellites operated by countries and companies around
the world, leading to worldwide commercial disruptions. China is
testing counterspace capabilities, including satellites capable of
rendezvous and proximity operations and use of electronic jamming and
cyber operations against ground networks; China's aggressive cyber
targeting of U.S. infrastructure, including satellite networks, might
help it deny the U.S. with critical capabilities in the event of a
conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In 2024, Iran placed six space payloads
into orbit and continues to develop its space launch capabilities;
knowledge gained from orbital launches is applicable to development of
an ICBM that could directly threaten the U.S. Homeland, if Iran chose
to pursue such a capability. The commercial sector and other nations
are rapidly expanding activities in space, leading to the risk of
increasing orbital congestion.
Question. Do you support the development of offensive space systems
to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
Answer. Yes, I support the development of space systems that can be
used offensively to protect the United State' and our allies' space
systems and to restore deterrence. Space capabilities are only
defensive, or offensive based on how they are employed. Space is
integral to everyday life and a crucial component underpinning global
security and the global economy. Competitors continue to grow their
counterspace capabilities. To protect our national security interests,
we should continue to scale a breadth of options across all domains to
deter aggression, and if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.
Question. Do you support the development of defensive space systems
to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
Answer. Space capabilities are only defensive, or offensive based
on how they are employed. Space is integral to everyday life and a
crucial component underpinning global security and the global economy.
Competitors continue to grow their counterspace and space capabilities.
We need to take actions to protect all our assets, to include those in
space. There are both active and passive measures we can take to deter
an attack on our space systems. By placing capabilities in different
orbits, in different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, or on ally
or commercial satellites, we can complicate our enemy's decisionmaking.
Active on-orbit defensive capabilities are something we should consider
and implement if it needed.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
technology is appropriately incorporated into SPACECOM mission
execution at acceptable risk levels?
Answer. If confirmed, a priority will be understanding the
USSPACECOM and U.S. Space Force's methods of addressing capability gaps
and leveraging commercial technologies to fulfil emerging requirements.
I will seek ways to support the space industrial base and accelerate
the acquisitions process. I intend to improve USSPACECOM's ability to
rapidly field emerging technology to assist the joint force in being
the strongest and most lethal force in the world.
cybersecurity and u.s. cyber command (cybercom)
Question. In September 2023, DOD released its 2023 Cyber Strategy.
The strategy charges DOD to persistently engage malicious cyber actors
and other malign threats to U.S. interests in cyberspace.
What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in
defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law enforcement
communities?
Answer. The Department's role in defending the Nation from an
attack in cyberspace continues to evolve. DOD partners with the
Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, State and local law
enforcement agencies in protecting against and responding to cyber-
attacks against the Nation and its critical infrastructure. The Cyber
Mission Force is primarily charged with defending forward, conducting
defensive cyber operations abroad, while DHS and law enforcement work
directly with organizations at home.
The Joint Force is uniquely suited to integrating actions in
multiple domains in defense of the DOD Information Network (DODIN) to
compete now and prepare for escalation. Since cyber knows no borders,
we must partner with our interagency partners and law enforcement to
address the entire spectrum of cyberspace challenges.
While agencies like DHS and the FBI focus on civilian
infrastructure and criminal investigations, the DOD and CMF's priority
is defending against cyber threats with strategic or military
implications. This includes global power projection, nuclear command
and control, and support to DHS's CISA when responding to threats to
the Defense Industrial Base. Effective national cybersecurity demands
close collaboration between DOD and other entities. As an example, in
January 2025, the DOD and DHS signed an Annex to the 2017 DOD-DHS
Memorandum of Agreement on Cybersecurity and Cyberspace Operations. The
Annex establishes a framework for the Coast Guard Cyber Command to
present United States Coast Guard cyber forces to the CMF under
USCYBERCOM, which will further bolster CMF readiness and capabilities.
It also provides a process for USCYBERCOM to present forces to the
Coast Guard.
Question. How will ``defend forward'' and ``persistent engagement''
concepts deter and disrupt Russia and China in cyberspace?
Answer. The DOD uses ``defend forward'' to disrupt malicious cyber
activity at its source and ``persistent engagement'' to intercept and
halt cyber threats, degrade the capabilities and networks of
adversaries, and continuously strengthen the cybersecurity of DOD
networks and missions. This occurs both geographically (beyond DOD
networks and into the networks of our Allies and partners) and
temporally (ahead of potential adversary exploitation) to enable
resilience in both domestic and foreign partner networks. For example,
U.S. CYBERCOM hunt forward missions in the SOUTHCOM area of
responsibility have discovered CCP malware on multiple foreign partner
networks.
Question. If confirmed, what role should DOD and the Cyber Mission
Force have in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
conducted via social media?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the role the Cyber Mission
Force plays alongside our interagency partners to combat foreign
influence on our shores. While our domestic authority is rightly
limited, our foreign intelligence enterprise helps ascertain sources
and objectives of foreign influence operations and can contribute to
designing persistent approaches to counter these operations at their
source.
Question. What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force have in
anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on U.S. commercial
entities?
Answer. The DOD will partner with DHS, DOJ, and other entities to
help defend U.S. key interests--especially where those entities
underpin military operations. Cooperatively streamlining industry
information sharing and seamlessly cooperating with interagency
partners will enable us to predict, present, or, when necessary, speed
the response of the most appropriate government agency.
Question. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S.
Cyber Command should be dual-hatted? What are the ``pros'' and ``cons''
of this arrangement, in your view? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, I believe that the Commander, USCYBERCOM and Director,
NSA should be filled by the same person. The 2022 ``Joint Study on the
Dual-Hat'' recommended the dual-hat arrangement not only be maintained
but strengthened. I continue to agree with the findings of that study.
The Dual-Hat arrangement provides the ability to look across both
organizations and has empowered both USCYBERCOM and NSA to fulfill
their missions better than each could do alone. It promotes agility and
enables intelligence to be operationalized rapidly. It also facilitates
relationships with key foreign allies and partners in part because the
corresponding foreign organizations with signals intelligence (SIGINT)
and cyber operations missions are fully integrated, operating under a
Dual-Hat leadership structure. The span of control, does however, place
a burden on one leader.
Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
improve cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce? How would you
empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD
cybersecurity?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to taking action to foster a
culture of cybersecurity and cyber awareness across the various levels
of professional military and civilian education. Every member of the
Joint Force, to include General Officer and Senior Executive Service
leadership, must understand their role in cybersecurity and protecting
DOD networks.
Question. In your opinion, what characteristics of a cyberattack
would constitute an ``act of war''? Do you consider the recent breaches
in telecommunications infrastructure involving Salt Typhoon to be an
``act of war'' or an espionage operation that falls within de facto
norms? In your view, does the nature and scope of this intrusion
operation merit a strong and tangible response? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. A holistic and interagency response is vital to any
provocation, including in the cyber domain. The following should be
considered when examining the aspects of a cyberattack: Scale and
Impact; Intention to Cause Physical Harm or Damage; Targeting of
civilian populations; State Actor Involvement; and Military Objectives.
If confirmed, I will review the classified details and provide my
recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense.
Question. What do you conclude from cyber-attacks carried out by
Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon about the State of our cyber defenses?
Answer. To the extent that cyber actors affiliated with the CCP can
compromise U.S. networks, it is certainly a national security concern
and suggest that the U.S. needs to invest in hardening its critical IT
infrastructure. This should be a combination of private and public
investment, and such investment should stand alongside public and
private partnerships to identify and defend portions of infrastructure
that the DOD deems critical to our national interest.
Question. Based on your experience, what do you see as areas where
the structure and training of the Cyber Mission Force should evolve to
meet emerging cyber threats?
Answer. The CMF structure is largely unchanged since its inception
over a decade ago. The commander of United States Cyber Command needs
to have the latitude to structure and restructure the force to address
rapidly evolving challenges, and to develop and promulgate training
that will maximize the competence and capability of cyber operators
both inside and outside the CMF. The Department is working rapidly
toward those ends with the CYBERCOM 2.0 initiative, which emphasizes
managing cyber talent and use of emerging technology like Artificial
Intelligence. The CMF will benefit greatly from better access to, and
assistance from, top technical talent at civilian technology companies,
while continuing to leverage Reserve component expertise.
Question. In your view, are there elements missing from our current
approach for offensive and defensive cyber operations that you would
recommend we pursue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review CYBERCOM 2.0 to ensure we are
on an upward trajectory and will continue pursuing mastery at scale to
counter maneuvering adversaries and a rapidly changing threat
landscape.
Question. How would you characterize our deterrent posture when it
comes to cyber effects?
Answer. Through partnerships, information sharing, and persistent
engagement, we may impose enough costs on our adversaries forcing them
to relook their strategic calculus in creating cyber effects against
key U.S. interests. To deter our adversaries from using cyber effects
against the U.S., a whole of government approach is needed,
incorporating all elements of national power.
u.s. transportation command (transcom)
Question. In your view, what is the role of TRANSCOM in supporting
implementation of the 2022 National Defense Strategy?
Answer. The priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy,
whether defending the Homeland, deterring attacks on the United States
and partners, or deterring aggression do not happen without USTRANSCOM
providing strategic flexibility through globally integrated operations.
The TRANSCOM infrastructure is an area of American exclusivity. No
other nation in the world can do the things we do on a daily basis.
USTRANSCOM ensures rapid response anywhere in the world by
conducting globally integrated mobility operations, leading the Unified
Command Plan (UCP)-directed Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise, and providing the capabilities to project and sustain the
Joint Force in support of National Objectives. Additionally,
USTRANSCOM's role as the Single Manager for Global Bulk Fuel Management
and Delivery drives synchronization across the Joint Petroleum
Enterprise (JPE) for posture, planning, execution, and capabilities in
support of combatant command requirements and national security
objectives.
With respect to the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic
Guidance, as the leader of the Joint Deployment and Distribution
Enterprise, USTRANSCOM projects, maneuvers, and sustains military power
at a time and place of choice. This gives the President and Secretary
of Defense options that are lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable,
agile, and ready to defeat any adversary. This enterprise is critical
to the re-alignment of Joint Force priorities and essential to
deterring adversaries across the globe.
Question. What is your understanding of how TRANSCOM balances both
organic and privately owned sealift equities to support the National
Defense Strategy?
Answer. USTRANSCOM follows direction contained in the National
Security Directive on Sealift (NSD 28) which states, ``The U.S.-owned
commercial ocean carrier industry, to the extent it is capable, will be
relied upon to provide sealift in peace, crisis, and war. This
capability will be augmented during crisis and war by reserve fleets
comprised of ships with national defense features that are not
available in sufficient numbers or types in the active U.S.-owned
commercial industry.'' For commercial sealift, USTRANSCOM relies on the
authorities of the Department of Transportation (DoT) to expand civil
transportation through voluntary programs under the Defense Production
Act.
Two Emergency Preparedness Programs, the Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement (VISA) and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA)
provide DOD a coordinated, seamless transition from peacetime to
wartime by providing assured access to U.S. commercial dry cargo and
bulk fuel cargo sealift capacity. Within VISA, the Maritime Security
Program (MSP) and within VTA, the Tanker Security Program (TSP) provide
fleets of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately
owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements
and maintain a United States presence in international commercial
shipping.
For organic sealift, USTRANSCOM relies on the Maritime
Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a subset of the
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). The RRF consists of 52 vessels,
including forty-six (46) Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) vessels which provide
DOD the ability to surge a sizable land force from the continental
United States to any point of need. The RRF also contains four (4)
Auxiliary Crane Ships which provide in-stream and austere delivery
capabilities and two (2) USMC Aviation Maintenance ships.
u.s. special operations command (socom)
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of U.S.
Special Operations Forces in supporting the implementation of the Joint
Warfighting Concept, the Joint Concept for Competing, and the National
Defense Strategy?
Answer. Special Operations Forces support the national security
objectives of preserving strategic focus; preventing great power
conflict; and preparing the environment for the Joint Force to prevail
in conflict if deterrence fails. Special Operations Forces are the
premier global counterterrorism forces charged with defending the
Homeland. Special Operations Forces also play a critical role in global
crisis response and securing the safety of American citizens abroad
when in extremis situations occur.
Question. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, successive NDAAs have
empowered the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to serve as a ``service secretary-
like'' civilian official for special operations forces. Among other
reforms, the law defines the administrative chain of command for SOCOM
as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense for
issues impacting the readiness and organization of special operations
forces.
What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
implementing the ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities of the
ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. The Department has been making excellent progress in
implementing the service secretary-like responsibilities of ASD(SO/LIC)
for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special
operations forces, resources, equipment, and civilian personnel. The
ASD(SO/LIC) fills a critical role in coordinating with Congress and in
advocating on behalf of the Special Operations enterprise in areas
related to budget, training, and modernization.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to fully implementing
these reforms?
Answer. Yes.
Irregular Warfare
Question. Section 1091 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2024 expresses the Sense of the Congress that the
Secretary of Defense has the authority to conduct irregular warfare
operations, including clandestine irregular warfare operations, to
defend the United States, allies of the United States, and interests of
the United States, when such operations have been appropriately
authorized.
What is your understanding of the inherent authority of the
Secretary of Defense to conduct irregular warfare operations?
Answer. Irregular warfare is a critical tool for the Department to
campaign across the spectrum of conflict, enhance interoperability and
access, and disrupt competitor warfighting advantages while enhancing
our own. As the Department pivots to face the difficult realities of
today's strategic environment, it must elevate and expand its use of
irregular warfare approaches and tools.
Specifically, with regard to the Secretary of Defense's inherent
authority to conduct irregular warfare, there are some very important
tools at the Department's disposal, such as USC 10 127d, 127e and 127f.
However, given the complexity of the current operating environment, if
confirmed, I will work to ensure the Departments Irregular Warfare
authorities and supporting processes allow the scope, speed and agility
required.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of irregular
warfare in supporting Department of Defense strategy and operations?
Answer. Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare where State and non-
State actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups
through indirect, non-attributable or asymmetric activities.
Irregular warfare offers a range of military activities that allow
the U.S. to compete with adversaries below the threshold of armed
conflict to maximize American influence abroad, illuminate malign
activity, deter adversaries from actions most detrimental to our
national security and disruptive to the international order, and shape
the environment in ways necessary to prevail in conflict, should
deterrence fail.
Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
resourced to effectively operate in the irregular warfare domain? What
changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. Absent an institutionalized approach to irregular warfare,
the DOD will remain underprepared for the enduring requirements of
irregular war, and not postured to employ irregular warfare
capabilities proactively to compete, deter, and win across the spectrum
of competition and conflict. The Joint Force continues to
institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency. However,
irregular warfare campaigning against State adversaries requires a
whole of government approach and the DOD has room to improve
interagency planning, coordination, and synchronization in the
irregular warfare space against peer and near peer adversaries. There
are solid lessons to be learned from how the Department worked with the
interagency in the counterterrorism space during the Global War on
Terror.
Authorities
Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
special operations forces to provide support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and
individuals supporting or facilitating military operations for the
purpose of combatting terrorism. Section 127d of title 10, U.S. Code,
authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide similar support to
forces or individuals supporting or facilitating irregular warfare
operations.
What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
these authorities in the current strategic environment?
Answer. Those authorities allow the Department to conduct
counterterrorism or irregular warfare activities by, with, and through
foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals since they
often have access and placement to adversary operating areas that U.S.
forces lack. DOD expends funds to support partner forces as they in
turn lend their support to achieving the objectives of the United
States' military. By expending relatively small amounts of funding,
combined with advice and assistance from U.S. military forces, the
Department use these local forces to protect the U.S. Homeland and
Americans abroad by maintaining continuous pressure on strategic
competitors and terrorists.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply to the
evaluation of proposals for the use of each of these authorities, with
a view to mitigating the risks associated with the conduct of
counterterrorism and irregular warfare activities below the level of
traditional armed conflict?
Answer. If confirmed, I would confirm partners are trustworthy and
reliable, using SOCOMs proven screening and vetting standards and
processes. Choosing the right partners is the best way to ensure
compliance with Law of Armed Conflict principles, proper expenditure of
funds, and accountability of defense articles.
u.s. strategic command (stratcom)
Nuclear Policy
Question. United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our
Nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have
deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with
systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must
be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
Do you agree with Secretary Hegseth and past Secretaries of Defense
that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that
modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security
priority?
Answer. Yes. The U.S. nuclear triad, consisting of land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear-capable bombers,
and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), remains the backbone of the
Nation's strategic deterrent. It should remain DOD's top priority
mission to ensure we retain a modern, capable, and effective nuclear
deterrent.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and
North Korea have expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force
capabilities? In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. Over the next decade, China likely will continue to rapidly
modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PLA seeks a
larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging
from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton
yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation ladder.
DOD estimates China has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in
its stockpile as of 2024.
Russia is nearing the completion of the current round of
modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, and has successfully
introduced new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and long-range
ALCMs. Russia is adding new military capabilities to its large
stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), including those
employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Russia holds the
largest foreign nuclear stockpile in the world and maintains
approximately 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and
long-range heavy bombers. Moscow also retains roughly 2,000 NSNW to
include ASMs, SRBMs, gravity bombs, torpedoes, anti-ship, anti-
submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles.
Under Kim Jong-un, the DPRK has improved its ability to hold the
U.S. and its allies at risk with its missile and nuclear capabilities.
In 2021, KJU announced a 5-year defense development plan, which
included improving its ballistic missile capabilities and developing
new nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has also vowed to ``exponentially
increase'' Pyongyang's nuclear weapons stockpile. The DPRK has made
notable progress on missile-related goals, such as testing claimed
solid-propellant ICBM and hypersonic systems and unveiling a new
``tactical'' nuclear warhead. During some of its missile testing, the
DPRK has also claimed to simulate tactical nuclear exercises.
Pyongyang's cooperation with Moscow may also provide opportunities for
the DPRK to advance its missile capabilities, as the DPRK has provided
ballistic missiles to Russia that have been employed against Ukraine--
the first time these DPRK systems have been used in combat.
Question. Do you believe our current deterrence policy and force
structure effectively accounts for two near peer nuclear competitors?
If not, do you believe the U.S. will require additional capabilities, a
numerically larger force than exists today, or a combination of both?
Answer. I am aware of the findings of the recent bipartisan
Strategic Posture Commission that our nuclear forces are necessary, but
not sufficient. The threat continues to grow while our weapons have
remained largely static for decades. While I have confidence in the
lethality of the Joint Force, it is incumbent on the Department to
understand options, which includes potential for new capabilities and/
or a larger force. If confirmed, I will assess the current deterrence
policy and force posture and work with the professionals across the
Department to ensure we can adequately deter two nuclear peers in the
future.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons
and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and
the defense of allies?
Answer. Our nuclear forces undergird all our defense priorities,
and it remains indispensable to our national security. In a dynamic
security environment, a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
underpins our broader U.S. defense strategy and the extended deterrence
commitments we have made to allies and partners.
Question. What are your views on deterrence now that the United
States is facing the prospect of simultaneously deterring two nuclear-
armed peer competitors in Russia and China?
Answer. We are facing increasing nuclear competition with Russia
and the pace and scope of China's nuclear expansion will present new
strategic dilemmas requiring increased focus on the DOD's ability to
modernize our strategic deterrence capability. This starts with
maintaining credible and effective U.S. nuclear forces as the bedrock
of our deterrence against potential aggression from both Russia and
China. Not only must the United States aggressively modernize its
nuclear capability, but we must pursue initiatives like the President's
Golden Dome Executive Order to render any act of aggression against the
Unites States Homeland ineffective.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia and China have
expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?
Answer. Over the next decade, China is likely to continue to
rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PLA
seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems
ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-
megaton yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation
ladder. DOD estimates China has surpassed 600 operational nuclear
warheads in its stockpile as of 2024.
Russia is nearing the completion of the current round of
modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, and has successfully
introduced new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and long-range
ALCMs. Russia is adding new military capabilities to its large
stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), including those
employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Russia holds the
largest foreign nuclear stockpile in the world and maintains
approximately 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and
long-range heavy bombers. Moscow also retains roughly 2,000 NSNW to
include ASMs, SRBMs, gravity bombs, torpedoes, anti-ship, anti-
submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. China probably is developing advanced nuclear delivery
systems, in part due to long-term concerns about U.S. missile defense
capabilities. The PLA's expanding nuclear force will enable it to
target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites than
ever before in a potential a nuclear conflict. Additionally, the
PLAAF's H-6N bomber, when armed with a nuclear-capable ALBM, likely can
conduct nuclear precision strikes against targets in the Indo-Pacific
theater.
Moscow will continue to emphasize nuclear weapons in its national
strategy, while building new delivery systems and modernizing its
nuclear stockpile, primarily by replacing Soviet-legacy non-strategic
nuclear weapons with new weapons and new capabilities. The escalation
of conflict with Ukraine and Russia's suspension of the New START
Treaty represents two key areas of continuing risk.
Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?
Answer. I have no reason to doubt Moscow has employed nuclear
coercion including nuclear exercises, senior leader statements on
Russia's nuclear capabilities and use calculus, and participation in
strategic arms control agreements to respond to perceived Western
aggression and deter future Western activity Moscow assesses is counter
to Russian interests. For example, since 2022, Russia has updated its
public nuclear doctrine to expand nuclear use cases, deployed some non-
strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) to Belarus, de-ratified the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and conducted its first-ever NSNW
exercise with Belarusian forces. During the same time, Moscow
repeatedly warned the West about crossing Russian ``red lines'', for
example by providing advanced weapons to Ukraine, and emphasized Russia
retained the right and capability to use nuclear forces to defend
against a Western attack.
Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
Answer. DoD estimates China has surpassed 600 operational nuclear
warheads in its stockpile as of 2024 and will have over 1,000
operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at
higher readiness levels. I expect China to continue growing its force
through 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is
``basically complete'' that year, an important milestone on the road to
Xi's goal of a ``world class'' military by 2049.
Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of ``no
first use''?
Answer. The PRC has long maintained a ``no first use'' policy.
However, that it has we have repeatedly called on China to explain how
its NFU nuclear doctrine is consistent with its non-transparent but
well-documented, rapid nuclear arsenal buildup. China has refused to
seriously engage on these questions bilaterally, through the P5, or in
multilateral disarmament fora. Absent answers to these concrete
questions, we must conclude that China's rhetorical, unverifiable NFU
policy is not credible.
Question. Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
assurances are effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to
pursue their own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?
Answer. I recognize our allies' concerns about adversary nuclear
threats and attempts to weaken our alliances for their own strategic
advantages. I believe we should make every effort to reinforce our
extended deterrence commitments, and that these commitments enhance the
safety and security of the American people. Furthermore, our extended
deterrence contributes to nuclear nonproliferation.
Question. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation
will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear
deterrence assurances?
Answer. It is imperative that we maintain allied confidence in our
nuclear umbrella both to assure our allies and to dissuade adversaries
from attempting to coerce our partners around the globe.
Question. What is your understanding of the State of U.S. nuclear
forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production
capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?
Answer. Although our nuclear forces and existing NC3 architecture
are safe, secure, and effective today, we have greatly exceeded their
intended design life, and they are showing their age. Deferred
modernization has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay.
This is further challenged by atrophy in both the DOD industrial base
for nuclear delivery platforms and National Nuclear Security
Administration production capabilities and infrastructure.
Question. Do you agree that modernizing each leg of the nuclear
triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a
critical national security priority?
Answer. Yes. The three legs of the triad each serve an important
and distinct purpose and offer unique but mutually reinforcing
attributes. All three legs are needed to preserve deterrence in the
face of growing adversarial threats.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad,
including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?
Answer. The current United States nuclear force was designed in a
different security environment. I understand the Strategic Posture
Commission concluded that the current program of record is necessary
but not sufficient. If confirmed, I intend to consult with key
Department stakeholders to assess the risks, implications, and benefits
of pursuing additional capabilities to address any modernization
insufficiency and ensure our nuclear deterrence remains credible and
effective.
Question. Senior Service leaders and several Combatant Commanders
have stated that they support the continued development of a nuclear-
armed sea-launched cruise missile as a means of addressing Russia's
advantages in theater-range nuclear weapons, managing escalation in a
potential conflict with China, and enhancing assurance to U.S. allies.
Do you agree with these views?
Answer. Yes. A nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)
is one capability that will help address regional deterrence challenges
in the face of China and Russia's rapid theater nuclear force
modernization, while assuring allies and partners. Additionally, I
believe it is important to work within the Joint Staff and Interagency
to assess other supplemental theater nuclear options as suggested by
the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission.
Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to
mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will ``age
out'' simultaneously at the end of the 2020's?
Answer. The Department must implement a risk-management strategy to
identify, prioritize, and recommend actions across the portfolio of
nuclear programs. This is essential for maintaining the overall health
of the nuclear deterrent as the DOD sustains current capabilities and
transition to modernized systems.
Question. Successive Nuclear Posture Reviews have concluded that
the adoption of a nuclear ``No First Use'' (NFU) or Sole policy by the
United States is not advisable.
Do you believe a NFU policy would be appropriate for the United
States, and what do you believe would be the implications of such a
policy on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to
our allies?
Answer. I do not support a nuclear ``No First Use'' or ``Sole
Purpose'' policy for the United States. I believe such a policy would
result in an unacceptable level of risk.
Question. The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear
weapons, which are established through the interagency NWC. NNSA's
principal challenge over the next 20 years is to rebuild the cold war-
era U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure into a responsive and resilient
enterprise.
Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's capabilities to
design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons
stockpile?
Answer. Yes. Recapitalization is necessary to ensure delivery of
the program of record and sustain an effective force into the future.
Question. Do you support continued collaboration with the United
Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
Answer. Yes. Our collaboration with the UK is mutually beneficial
and serves U.S. nuclear interests.
Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program
provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are
needed?
Answer. Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has
developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify
the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons
testing. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for
the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.
Question. Do you perceive utility in the work of the Council on
Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and
Communications System? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, there is utility in the work of the Council and its
various governance forums. The establishment of the Council ensures
oversight of a diverse and complicated system of systems. The utility
lies in unifying efforts across the Department for sustaining and
modernizing NC3, senior leader communications, nuclear command and
control, and continuity of government communications.
Arms Control
Question. What are your views of the New START Treaty, taking into
account Russia's recent actions to suspend participation in the Treaty?
Answer. I understand that Russia remains in violation of its
obligations under the New START Treaty as a result of its suspension.
As a result, both sides have ceased implementation of the New START
Treaty's verification mechanisms, and the United States is unable to
confirm that Russia is abiding by all the Treaty's limits.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges for negotiating
future treaties with Russia and China, and would you support U.S.
participation in such a negotiation?
Answer. I support diplomacy that contributes to national security,
particularly any efforts toward an agreement capturing the full scope
of Russia and China's nuclear capabilities. Most importantly, our
national security depends on verifiable agreements.
Question. What are your views on the asymmetry in the number of
non-strategic weapons between Russia and the United States and should
they be accounted for in any follow-on treaty?
Answer. I am concerned by Russia's approximately 2,000 non-
strategic nuclear weapons that are not numerically constrained by any
arms control treaty. Future arms control engagements with Moscow, if
they are initiated, should take these forces into careful and serious
account.
Question. What are your views of missile defense and nuclear arms
control with either Russia or China?
Answer. The increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear
states demonstrates the importance of the President's Golden Dome
initiative. As important and if not more so, the United States will
continue to rely on strategic deterrence--underwritten by a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal--to address and deter large
intercontinental range, nuclear capable missile threats to the Homeland
from Russia and China.
Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or canceling
current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
Answer. Delaying or canceling current nuclear modernization plans
and programs on a unilateral basis would reduce our strategic
deterrence and arms control leverage with Russia and China.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges for any nuclear
risk reduction or arms control negotiations with China?
Answer. China continues to deny its nuclear buildup and reject
calls for even modest nuclear risk reduction measures. China needs to
be more transparent about its nuclear forces. Any agreement with China
must first enhance U.S. national security and second be verifiable.
Missile Defense
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. Homeland
continues to grow. However, in an executive order, the President has
directed the development of a comprehensive national missile defense
architecture to counter all types of missile threats.
What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and
nuclear deterrence?
Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons undergird all defense priorities:
deterring nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attack, assuring our allies
and partners, and enabling achievement of Presidential objectives if
deterrence fails. We rely on a whole-of-government effort to defeat
missile technology of all adversaries while raising the threshold of
escalation by maintaining a credible kinetic defense. A comprehensive
missile defeat and the U.S. nuclear arsenal are complementary and
mutually reinforcing, they are essential for deterring an attack
against the U.S. or our Allies and partners.
Question. If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
what would be your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for
the Homeland?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be aligned with those set
by the President's Golden Dome Executive Order. My priority is to
ensure the deployment of a next-generation missile shield to provide
for the common defense of our citizens and the Nation. Protecting the
Homeland from an adversary ICBM attack, the Ground-Based Midcourse-
Defense system contributes directly to the U.S. deterrent strategies
for rouge State ICBM threats to the Homeland and would defend against
an ICBM attack. My second priority is to deter--and defend our citizens
and critical infrastructure against--any foreign aerial attack on the
Homeland leveraging modern and future missile defense technology
combined with a robust proliferated space-based architecture that
provides early warning and missile tracking.
Question. Do you believe the U.S. ground-based interceptor fleet is
appropriately sized to address potential ICBM threats from North Korea
or other rogue nations?
Answer. I understand the current fleet of Ground-based Interceptors
(GBIs) is adequate against the existing North Korean threat, and our
planned upgrade to the Next Generation Interceptor and modest increase
to the number of interceptors in the fleet is currently sufficient to
defeat a limited attack. If confirmed, I will support continuing annual
reviews to assess any required changes to U.S. Homeland missile defense
systems.
Question. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy
should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea
and Iran?
Answer. I support the Administration's Golden Dome Executive Order
which states that the United States will develop missile defenses
against aerial attacks against the Homeland by peer, near-peer, and
rogue adversaries.
Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
threats, such as Russia and China?
Answer. Integrated air and missile defense of the Homeland is vital
to our resiliency at home and to our ability to project power abroad.
The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and NORTHCOM have
been working on a comprehensive plan to strengthen our Homeland defense
against air and missile threats in the continental United States,
Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam. If confirmed, I will support development of
active and passive defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats
and pursue a persistent and resilient sensor network to track all
hypersonic threats, improve attribution, and enable engagement.
Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor?
Answer. I support improving the capability and reliability of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which currently includes
development of the Next Generation Interceptor to augment and
potentially replace the existing Ground-Based Interceptors.
Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor eventually
replacing the existing 44 ground based interceptors?
Answer. I support improving the capability and reliability of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which currently includes
development of the Next Generation Interceptor to augment and
potentially replace the existing Ground-Based Interceptors.
Question. What are your views on the advisability of building a
second Homeland missile defense site on the eastern coast of the United
States?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to evaluating this requirement and
providing my recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. capabilities for
defending against maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicles?
Answer. Maneuvering missiles, such as hypersonic glide vehicles
(HGV), present a challenge to existing defensive systems because they
can travel on unpredictable flight paths at low altitudes making them
difficult to track using standard terrestrial radar systems. If
confirmed, I will continue to seek out kinetic and non-kinetic
solutions to defeat hypersonic threats that create cost imposition for
adversaries.
Question. The Missile Defense Agency has previously indicated that
the Glide Phase Interceptor program for hypersonic defense would not
reach initial operational capability until after 2035. Do you believe
this timeline is sufficient to meet current and anticipated hypersonic
threats?
Answer. No. If confirmed, I will evaluate this timeline and provide
my recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
Question. Do you support a space-based sensor layer for improved
tracking and targeting of advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles?
Answer. Yes. Space-based sensor layer investments continue to
improve our ability to monitor launch sites and detect launches from
locations almost anywhere on the globe. Coupled with new technologies
for data processing at the edge of the network, AI/ML, and mesh
communications capabilities, space-based sensors provide unique insight
required to identify and respond within the short timelines necessary
to defeat advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles.
Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase
intercept and space-based intercept or directed energy programs?
Answer. I assess that the efficacy of boost-phase intercept, space-
based intercept and directed energy programs is still an open question.
While these concepts have great potential, if confirmed, I will explore
how best resolve the challenges associated with developing and fielding
these capabilities and provide my recommendations to the SecDef and
POTUS.
Question. In your opinion, has DOD developed and implemented
operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance
and utilization of such programs? What would you do to address this
issue, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain involved in operational
discussions with senior Department leadership to ensure a thorough
examination of these operational concepts, plans and policies, and
their governance processes.
Question. The United States is currently developing a missile
defense architecture to better support the protection of U.S. citizens
and forces on Guam, however this effort has been plagued by uneven
funding and an unclear management structure for aligning the various
lines of effort. What is your understanding of the status of this
effort, and its operational importance to the U.S. in the Western
Pacific?
Answer. Guam is both an unequivocal part of the U.S. Homeland as
well as a vital regional operational hub. The protection of this U.S.
territory is critical to the U.S. National Defense Strategy. I am aware
that the Department is focused on increasing its missile defense
capabilities on the island as part of efforts to strengthen deterrence
in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for
unity of effort and progress on the Guam Defense System.
Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations
Question. Has DOD adequately integrated electronic warfare into its
joint concepts and operational plans?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's integration of
electronic warfare into joint concepts and operational plans.
Question. What major issues attend the United States' conduct of
joint electronic warfare operations, especially at the relevant
combatant commands?
Answer. The United States is facing a variety of challenges when
considering joint EW operations, which begin with access to the
spectrum itself. Additionally, the Department must balance investment
in exquisite capabilities with investment in systems that are
inexpensive and can be produced at scale. Other factors include
leveraging artificial intelligence, deepening the Joint Force's
knowledge through training and education on Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations, and working across the whole-of-government to evolve laws
and regulations on the use of the EMSO internally and externally to the
United States. DOD spectrum access is critical for EMSO to protect the
Homeland and the military's ability to conduct its missions. Combatant
commands need spectrum to increase lethality, restore deterrence, win
wars, and achieve Presidential priorities, such as Golden Dome for
America and Border Security.
Question. Do you support a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations Center at U.S. Strategic Command?
Answer. Capability to maintain advantage in the electromagnetic
spectrum across the entire Joint Force will be necessary to win future
wars. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center (JEMSOC) at
USSTRATCOM has filled a key gap in Joint Force capabilities by
preparing the U.S. military for the complexities of the electromagnetic
spectrum. The JEMSOC facilitates realistic joint training, equipping
warfighters with the skills and knowledge to dominate this increasingly
contested domain by centralizing expertise and resources. This
centralized approach ensures consistent implementation of national EMS
strategy and fosters a force ready to achieve electromagnetic
superiority.
Question. Does the DOD adequately conduct joint Tier One exercises
utilizing adversary level electronic warfare?
Answer. The Joint Force faces significant challenges in conducting
effective Tier One exercises that accurately portray adversary
electronic warfare capabilities. Current model and simulation
capabilities used in these exercises are inadequate, relying on human
modelers to subjectively assess and apply the effects of friendly and
enemy electronic warfare on units in the simulation. The Joint Force's
ability to operate effectively in the electromagnetic spectrum is
crucial to deterring and winning future engagements, and it is
essential that Tier One joint exercises prioritize this task. A recent
study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense found the Department of
Defense lacks access to adequate live, virtual, constructive or
synthetic advanced threat systems and environments that can be easily
integrated into existing training programs. This shortfall poses a
significant risk to Joint Force readiness and its ability to operate in
future engagements, highlighting the need for improved modeling and
simulation capabilities and increased attention to training on
electronic warfare.
Question. What is your opinion of training ranges for electronic
warfare?
Answer. The current State of training ranges for electromagnetic
warfare is inadequate. Despite some investments, these ranges have not
kept pace with current technology or the threat environments in which
we expect to fight. These ranges often fail to provide the necessary
fidelity, capacity, and complexity required to prepare forces for
modern electromagnetic warfare threats.
Question. Do you believe our systems are adequately protected from
adversary electronic attack?
Answer. No. Against the most advanced adversaries, the Joint Force
would likely face challenges protecting itself from electromagnetic
attack. Two factors contribute to these challenges: 1) Over the past
few decades, the Joint Force has lost some muscle memory defending
against electromagnetic attack by conducting operations within a
permissive electromagnetic spectrum. 2) Over the same period,
operations within this spectrum have changed significantly while the
most advanced adversaries have done their best to rapidly evolve. If
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that DOD continues to invest in
training and additional capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum.
Question. Does DOD have adequate simulation capability to
experiment with and test joint electronic warfare concepts, in your
view?
Answer. No. The DOD's simulation capabilities for electromagnetic
warfare are insufficient. Although facilities like the Air Force
Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) and the Joint
Simulation Environment (JSE) exist, they are not fully integrated with
other systems and lack sufficient capacity to fully develop new joint
electromagnetic warfare concepts. These gaps hamper the Joint Force's
ability to experiment with and refine concepts in this area, leaving us
vulnerable to emerging threats.
Question. Spectrum is a vital asset in the conduct of electronic
warfare--what is your opinion on the DOD use of the S band for spectrum
operations and potential impacts on its loss--please be specific in
citing examples.
Answer. The S band (2-4 GHz) is a critical frequency range for
various DOD systems, including radar, electromagnetic warfare (EW)
systems. The DOD's use of the S band for spectrum operations is
essential for maintaining operational advantage, and its loss or
disruption could have significant impacts on military effectiveness
affecting the defense of the Homeland from strategic and missile
attack.
For example, the loss of S band spectrum could impact the
performance of the Navy's Aegis Combat System, which relies on S band
radar to detect and engage airborne targets. Similarly, the loss of S
band spectrum could disrupt the operation of the Army's Patriot air
defense system, which uses S band radar to detect and track incoming
missiles. Furthermore, the loss of S band spectrum could also impact
the DOD's ability to conduct electronic warfare operations, as many EW
systems, such as the Navy's SLQ-32 and the Air Force's ALQ-211, rely on
S band spectrum to detect and disrupt enemy radar and communication
systems.
security cooperation and arms transfers
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend, if any, to
ensure that the Department of Defense is taking a strategic approach to
its security cooperation with allies and partners?
Answer. Capable partners offer one of the strongest strategic
offsets the U.S. can employ. Security cooperation--whether arms sales,
training, or other forms of capacity building--enhance the partner's
ability to handle security challenges before they reach the threshold
of threating U.S. vital interests. But a partner's ability is only part
of the calculus; their willingness to handle those challenges is
equally, if not more, important. Because of this, security cooperation
initiatives must focus on partners with shared interests that can
feasibly translate U.S. security cooperation activities into legitimate
capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that security cooperation
activities remain tightly tethered to U.S. national interests and focus
on partners who meet those criteria. If confirmed and I re-enter active
service, I intend to look at increased use of the National Guard State
Partnership Program (SPP).
Question. What is your understanding of DOD's role in the foreign
military sales and arms transfer process? In your view, what are the
greatest challenges for DOD in fulfilling this role in a timely and
effective manner?
Answer. For Foreign Military Sales, the role of the Department of
Defense (DoD) is to effectively execute programs in coordination with
other government agencies while promoting stronger international
defense relationships and greater military interoperability. The most
significant challenges are timely deliveries to allies and partners.
Both capacity limitations in the Defense Industrial Base as well as the
bureaucratic processes and policies that govern FMS contribute to that
timeliness. I understand, in 2024, the DOD implemented a Continuous
Process Improvement Board for the FMS process. If confirmed as
Chairman, I will work aggressively with the Department to improve
processes and reduce administrative burdens to improve the timeliness
of FMS implementation, along with relentless advocacy to strengthen the
Defense Industrial Base to more rapidly respond to customer needs--both
domestically and the Nation's partners.
Question. Is DOD appropriately organized, trained, and resourced to
execute security cooperation and foreign military sales effectively? If
not, and if confirmed, what changes to defense security assistance
organizations, training, and processes would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense to review security cooperation organizations, training, and
processes and make my recommendations.
contested logistics
Question. Who do you believe acts as the lead for contested
logistics in how both efficiencies are created and executed to support
the National Defense Strategy?
Answer. Currently, the Joint Staff works with the Combatant
Commanders to define requirements and identify the risks associated
with a contested logistics environment. Additionally, the Joint Staff
works with the Services through the Joint Logistics Board to align
their investments in infrastructure, force design, and posture to
prepare the Joint Logistics Enterprise to deploy and sustain joint
warfighters in a contested environment.
Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense needs to
identify a single service or entity to act as the global contested
logistics manager?
Answer. The Joint Staff works with the Services to align their
investments in infrastructure, force design, and posture, and supports
the Combatant Commanders as they engage with allies and partners. If
confirmed, I will continue to assess any changes in how global
logistics is managed. If changes are required, I will advise the
President, SecDef, and Congress on any authorities that may require
change.
Question. What is your current assessment for how the Department of
Defense views contested logistics when it comes to both war games and
operational planning?
Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept and supporting concepts have
focused the Department's attention on the contested logistics problem
set. Logistics was once considered an enabling function. However, it
has always been one of the six warfighting functions . . . and now it
is clearly a pacing function. All analytic and experimentation efforts
must be logistics-informed, since the ability to sustain the force
underwrites everything else.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR Program, which has focused historically on
accounting for, securing, and eliminating cold war era weapons of mass
destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has
expanded its focus to other countries. In addition, the CTR Program is
widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including
biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the
development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats as well as
working with host nations to secure stockpiles of dangerous pathogens
at their high containment laboratories.
What are your views on the efficacy of the CTR Program?
Answer. Over the years, the CTR Program has detected, secured, and
eliminated Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) at their source, before
they can threaten the Homeland or the Joint Force. In line with the
Secretary's priorities, the CTR Program protects Joint Force readiness
and lethality by providing indicators and warnings of chemical,
biological, and nuclear threats. It remains a vital tool in layered
defense against WMD threats.
Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical weapons
documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60 percent of CTR
resources are allocated to biological programs.
Question. Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
accurately reflects the current threat?
Answer. Yes. The Department's Biodefense Posture Review documented
that biological threats to the Joint Force have increased. The use of
biological weapons by State or nonState actors presents a significant
challenge to national security. Emerging technologies could further
enable potential adversaries to use biological weapons in new and novel
ways. Eliminating biological threats is a key mission for the CTR
program.
Biological threats could affect the readiness and lethality of the
Joint Force and the security of the Homeland. Increasingly, adversaries
seek to develop and use biological weapons that would evade existing
capabilities for detection, attribution, or treatment. Eliminating
these threats will continue to be an important mission for the CTR
Program, but I support reviewing current prioritization to ensure the
program addresses the most urgent WMD threats.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you recommend to
ensure the CTR program is capable of meeting its mission to roll back
the threat of weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate for a thorough review and
cost-benefit analysis of the CTR Program to ensure activities fully
support its congressionally authorized countering WMD mission and
contribute to a lethal and effective fighting force.
dod auditability
Question. The Department of Defense has invested significant effort
and dollars in preparing its financial information for annual audit
reviews. However, the 2024 DOD-wide financial audit again resulted in a
disclaimer of opinion.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or direct to
improve DOD auditability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will demonstrate a consistent and informed
commitment to achieving an unmodified audit opinion by setting the
``tone from the top'' by highlighting the importance of financial
accountability and transparency within the Department. Setting
expectations, holding senior leadership accountable, visibly messaging
the importance of financial management and audit process adherence
sends a clear message throughout the Department. I can emphasize
financial integrity and accountability to encourage a culture where
those values are prioritized across the Joint Force.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to instill
responsibility for audit progress among command leadership, and not
just default to a financial management community?
Answer. Maintaining transparency, accountability, and operational
efficiency is key to improving auditability. These are cornerstones to
successful military operations, and auditability of the Department's
accounts is a military mission. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to ensure that auditability is integrated in the overall
command structure of the constituent services, establishing clear roles
and responsibilities related to financial management, ensuring the
emphasis on auditability is pervasive from the most senior roles and
commands to the most junior.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
identified 14 critical technology areas in which investment to develop
next generation operational capabilities is imperative. These areas
include: hypersonics; future generation wireless technology; advanced
materials; integrated network systems-of-systems; directed energy;
integrated sensing and cyber; space technology; quantum science;
trusted artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy; microelectronics;
renewable energy generation and storage; advanced computing and
software; human-machine interfaces; and biotechnology. Much of the
innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national
defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense
industry.
What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to DOD's development of these
key technologies, or gaining access to such technologies from the
commercial marketplace?
Answer. DOD must aggressively take steps to illustrate how these
innovative technologies are conceptually employed. Through this
analysis process, the Joint Staff and military departments can define
future requirements. This will provide industry clear DOD demand
signals.
The United States commercial marketplace is teaming with innovative
solutions for defending the United States. The most significant
challenge is getting these innovative solutions into the Force. The
Department must work to exploit these solutions via rapid prototyping
programs, defense innovation organizations, and congressionally granted
authorities.
The Department must grow the capacity of the Defense Industrial
Base (DIB) and expand the defense ecosystem through investments that
promote resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, closer
collaboration with commercial industry, flexible acquisition, and
mutual support with Allies and partners. The Joint Force should re-
evaluate its interactions with industry and fight for access to the
commercial space, leveraging organizations like the Defense Innovation
Unit. The Department can collaborate with the DIB to adopt a whole of
nation approach to delivering capability and maximize economy of scale.
The DIB will grow and evolve if it receives the proper demand signals
from the Joint Force. The Department can do a better job at that.
The 14 critical technology areas cover a wide range of disciplines
with inherent developmental challenges. A significant common challenge
that affects all critical technology areas are the force development
implications for the warfighters that will employ them. We must ensure
that the organizations and people of the DOD are trained and ready to
use capabilities in these 14 critical technology areas to their maximum
potential and deliver peace through strength.
Question. How well do you think DOD investments in these
technologies are appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized
across all Military Departments and Agencies?
Answer. There continues to be room for improvement in this area. If
confirmed, I'll work with Secretary Hegseth and his team as the
Department continues to evaluate these technologies and other aspects
of the defense budget in order to provide the Joint Force with the
tools they need to defend the Nation.
Question. In addition to the technologies identified in the 2022
National Defense Strategy, are there other technology areas in which
you believe DOD must invest to ensure that the United States maintains
its technological superiority in the long-term?
Answer. The 2022 National Defense Strategy provides a suitable list
of critical technology areas, but I believe the DOD must also invest in
advanced manufacturing technology. Investments in advanced
manufacturing will have impacts across the listed 14 critical
technology areas and enable the United States to produce complex
components and systems more quickly and cost effectively. If confirmed,
I'll work with Secretary Hegseth to refine the development and
acquisition of these technologies in order to enable rapid employment
to meet the needs of the Joint Warfighter to fulfill the
Administration's strategy.
Question. What efforts is DOD making to identify new technologies
developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to national
security and warfighter purposes?
Answer. The Joint Staff has been heavily engaged in DOD Innovation
programs such as Replicator, the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
(RDER), Warfighting Lab Incentive Fund (WLIF), etc . . . that focus on
identifying commercial technologies and expediting them into the hands
of the Warfighter.
Recently, the Joint Staff has revamped capability portfolio
management, creating a new approach to drive strategic alignment across
requirements, acquisition, and R&D. The Joint Staff has partnered with
the offices of the undersecretaries for Acquisitions and Sustainment,
and Research and Engineering to create a holistic portfolio view of
capability development. This effort allows warfighters producing
capability requirements to be fully informed of new technologies and
commercially developed products that may fill requirements and
capability gaps identified by the Joint Force.
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that technologies
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment
of capability to the warfighter.
What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning
technologies from research programs into programs of record or deployed
capabilities?
Answer. Effectively transitioning technologies from research
programs into programs of record or deployed capabilities is
challenging because of the time it takes to mature a technology into a
viable prototype for experimentation and concepts of operation
development. Over time, changing priorities within the DOD can shift
focus away from early investments, losing sight of work done to date.
Funding to support the implementation of promising capabilities is
not protected in budgets. Budgetary constraints and the impacts of
Continuing Resolutions (CR) add challenges for transitioning programs.
Some technologies may not mature in time to be integrated into
programs, while others may mature more rapidly than the existing budget
cycle can accommodate. DOD also must quickly become a better buyer. The
DOD is frankly a poor buyer and must devote energy to this effort.
Question. How can the operational experience of the warfighter
better be integrated into the research and development process? Are
there appropriate places to interject warfighters in the interaction
between the DOD research and engineering community and the private
sector?
Answer. Frequent vector checks with potential end-users are
essential to ensuring that technology innovation meets warfighter
needs. Additionally, creating opportunities for the research and
development community to present potential solutions and exchange ideas
with warfighters about innovative employment options enriches both
communities. Using the Joint Warfighting Concept to inform the
selection and prioritization of R&D projects facilitates stronger
alignment with warfighting needs from the onset. Engagements to
introduce concept frameworks to the broader research and engineering
community, to include industry, academia, labs, defense innovation
entities, allies, and partners, has the potential to influence their
respective internal investment strategies to help accelerate
development of needed capabilities. Frequent vector checks with
potential end-users to reinforce alignment to warfighting needs is
essential if it is not distracting or oversaturating the units at the
tactical edge. Additionally, creating opportunities for the R&D
community to present potential solutions and exchange ideas with
warfighters about innovative employment options enriches both
communities.
Question. If confirmed as Chairman, what specific steps would you
take to ensure that the warfighter is benefiting more quickly and
directly from research being performed across the defense research
enterprise?
Answer. A lot of work has been done but the DOD must stop confusing
work with results. The U.S. faces a rapidly evolving security
environment; therefore, it is imperative that the DOD speed the
transition of advanced technologies to benefit the warfighters more
swiftly and effectively. If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to
ensure that defense research translates into operational capabilities
for the forces to meet warfighter needs.
I will enhance focus on programs that involve warfighters in the
research process to ensure their operational experience informs
decisionmaking and technology development. This approach helps keep
solutions grounded in the real-world challenges faced by troops and
fosters a culture of collaboration among warfighters and technologists.
I will ensure full support for efforts to close capability gaps in
joint warfighting concepts and share data across the DOD, such as the
recent Joint Experimentation Forum (JEF). Events like these gather
personnel from combatant commands, military services, federally funded
research centers, industry partners, and university-affiliated research
centers for collaborative discussions to share valuable insights that
will inform experimentation guidance across the defense enterprise.
Continued engagement with key innovators such as the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) will be the key to success.
By actively engaging warfighters in the research process,
leveraging collaborative forums, and fostering relationships with key
defense agencies, I am committed to breaking down barriers and
facilitating open dialog among stakeholders. This approach will enable
the timely transition of critical capabilities into the hands of the
Joint Force, ensuring that the military remains at the forefront of
innovation and prepared to outpace evolving threats.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to increase the
interaction between DOD labs and the private sector, and between DOD
labs and the rest of the DOD innovation enterprise to include the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency?
Answer. There is a lot of good work going on, but I do have some
concerns that innovation entities are actually colliding with each
other in the incubation process. The DOD must have a greater level of
collaboration between entities in order to maximize the return on the
USG's invested capital. If confirmed, I would continue to build on the
integration of the DOD labs with OSD R&E, SCO, DIU, and DARPA through
Innovation programs like Replicator, WLIF, and RDER. The Department
also has the opportunity to increase integration through Joint
Experimentation events.
Question. In the past, for example in the Manhattan Project and the
Space Race, the United States made great use of foreign technical
talent to achieve national goals. Today, there is growing concern that
China is making great progress in recruiting technical talent that has
been trained at United States universities. The Chinese are also
investing significant resources to provide funding and facilities to
technical experts in critical fields to attract them to work in China.
In your view, what steps should the Department take to ensure that
the foreign technical talent that we educate and support remains in
here in the United States and commits to working on our high-priority
national missions to maintain our technological superiority?
Answer. I have not been read into the specifics on this topic, but
if confirmed, I look forward to learning how the Department can secure
the appropriate technical talent required to empower the joint
warfighter. Ultimately, attracting and retaining the right talent in
any organization hinges on the ability to establish and maintain a
positive work environment that encourages innovation and values the
talent of its people. If confirmed and I re-enter the military I am
keen to get up to speed on this matter. We must have a better way to
inspire and retain STEM talent here in the United States.
Question. How could we leverage our defense labs and DOD research
funding programs to overmatch Chinese efforts by providing resources
and facilities to attract technical talent to stay and work in the
United States?
Answer. The United States offers many advantages over China for
talented researchers and engineers to work and provide for national
security. Technological prowess, state-of-the-art facilities, and
American way of life can all be used to draw top talent from around the
world and away from China. Embedding young scientists and engineers in
defense-oriented labs early and often to incentivize a unique form of
service, ways they can harness their skill set to advance national
interests. Defense labs and DOD research funding programs can be used
to invest in facilities and maintain technological prowess where we
lead the world, regain where we have slipped, and pioneer new fields.
joint acquisition
Question. What are your views regarding the effectiveness of joint
acquisition programs, especially in delivering integrated and
interoperable solutions for the Department and which programs would you
consider to be candidates for joint development and acquisition?
Answer. Joint acquisition programs have been effective at
delivering integrated and interoperable solutions for the Department.
One example is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, which has been
balancing performance and cost to provide the Joint Force with a
tactical vehicle fleet that is more lethal and sustainable. The Golden
Dome for America will require a level of coordination across the
Services that makes it a natural candidate for joint acquisition.
Additionally, the Future Vertical Lift family of systems is a good
candidate for joint development. It implements a Modular Open Systems
Approach that improves affordability, enhances capability, and reduces
supply chain risk across the Services.
Question. What are your views on joint, enabling or cross-cutting
capabilities that may not be treated as acquisition programs, such as
JADC2? Do you have sufficient authority to advocate or direct the
services to ensure there are no seams in planning or execution of such
efforts?
Answer. In the current global security environment, the United
States military faces agile adversaries who increasingly seek to
undermine the Nation's strategic and operational strengths by impeding,
and where possible, denying command and control (C2) capabilities. The
ability of the U.S. military to regain and maintain information and
decision advantage through non acquisition programs, considered in the
CJADC2 continuous modernization efforts, must remain a top priority for
the Department. The capabilities developed by Services, Agencies, and
partners across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum are programs of record by
exception, not by rule. CJCS has full authority to advocate for
Combatant Command and Services' capabilities and, if confirmed, I will
use the granted authorities and assess whether additional authorities
are required to assist the Combatant Commands and Services with
planning to foster joint capability and manage Joint Force development.
If confirmed, I will continue to partner with OUSD (A&S) [Acquisition],
OUSD (R&E), and CAPE/Comptroller [PPBE] to strengthen planning and
execution to enable integrated, end-to-end mission capability.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you assign to yourself in
ensuring that joint acquisition priorities are given full and fair
consideration in Military Service budget processes?
Answer. If confirmed, part of my responsibility through the Vice
Chairman is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council which represents
the voice of the joint force and the joint warfighter. If confirmed, I
will give my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense on all
matters, including the budget. The Chairman's Program Recommendation
(CPR) provides the Chairman with a formal mechanism to communicate
statutory military advice on programs and budget issues, to include
joint acquisition priorities.
Question. Do you believe that the combatant command's role in the
acquisition process is sufficient to ensure that they can get needed
capabilities fielded to them in a timelier manner? If not, are there
other tools or authorities needed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Defense Acquisition System
(DAS) continues to seek and consider input from the Combatant
Commanders through the JROC process. This ensures that the voices of
the Combatant Commanders are globally integrated and carefully
considered holistically. I understand the importance of maintaining and
continuing to evolve the Department's Adaptive Acquisition Framework
(AAF) comprised of several acquisition pathways, each tailored for the
unique characteristics and risk profile of the capability being
acquired. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities for increased
Combatant Command involvement in the AAF, particularly in the
development of software, where operator input to the developer can
create more useful capability in a shorter timeline.
joint requirements oversight council (jroc)
Question. The JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess
joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance
requirements that ensure interoperability between military
capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on
advances in technology and concepts of operation.
How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in establishing
joint requirements for submission to the DOD acquisition process?
Answer. Within the Joint Force, no other entity is more responsible
for Joint Force Design and balancing the current needs of the Joint
Force with the future needs of the Joint Force than the JROC. The JROC
provides a critical forum for the Service Vice Chiefs to assess joint
military capabilities, identify, approve, and prioritize capabilities
to ensure the Joint Force can implement the National Defense Strategy.
One of the JROC's key strengths is its ability to provide a high-level,
strategic perspective on capability development, ensuring that major
acquisition programs align with Joint Warfighting Concepts and multi-
domain operational needs. It has also improved cross-Service
coordination, particularly through initiatives like Capability
Portfolio Management Reviews, which help identify capability gaps,
solutions, redundancies and promote integration. Authorities of the
JROC have changed over time. While the JROC is effective, it could be
improved by ensuring that its authorities match its responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the JROC focuses
on joint performance requirements without overprescribing key
performance parameters and key system attributes that overly constricts
system design space?
Answer. The JROC should be in the business of providing top-down,
strategic-level direction to the Services to promote Joint Force design
instead of micro-managing Service acquisition decisions. The JROC
currently delegates key performance parameters and system attributes to
the Services unless they are deemed Joint Performance Requirements,
meaning they are critical to ensure interoperability or integration of
the Joint Force.
Through recent changes such as expanding the use of the Middle Tier
of Acquisitions (MTA) pathway, even more authority is being delegated
to the Services. While use of rapid acquisitions pathways such as MTA
are designed to improve speed and efficiency, that must be balanced
with strong joint oversight to prevent fragmentation of the future
force. The JROC's ability to assess and enforce joint performance
requirements remains critical in ensuring that the warfighters receive
interoperable, integrated, and effective capabilities for future
conflicts.
Question. What is your view on the Capability Management Portfolio
Review process for the JROC to issue requirements from the top-down?
Answer. Recently, the Joint Staff revamped capability portfolio
management, creating a new approach to drive strategic alignment across
requirements, acquisition, and R&D. I believe this approach has been
successful at holistically evaluating gaps from a portfolio perspective
as well as promoting top-down, concept-driven, future-facing
requirements.
Additionally, the Joint Staff has partnered with the offices of the
undersecretaries for Acquisitions and Sustainment, and Research and
Engineering to create a holistic portfolio view of capability
development. This effort allows warfighters producing capability
requirements to be fully informed of new technologies and commercially
developed products that may fill requirements and capability gaps
identified in support of the Joint Force.
the joint capabilities integration and development systems (jcids)
Question. Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 required the Joint Staff to review and propose a
clean-sheet approach to the JCIDS process focused on streamlining
approvals, integration of commercial technologies, and taking advantage
of iterative development processes.
Is the JCIDS process effective in providing the information the
JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of
the joint force?
Answer. The intent of JCIDS is to ensure jointness,
interoperability, joint warfighter voice, and strategic alignment and
prioritization of future capability development. While JCIDS has been
effective in reducing redundancy and improving coordination across the
services, it needs reform in order to keep pace with rapidly emerging
threats and technological advancements. As part of Fiscal Year 2024
Section 811 Report to Congress, the Joint Staff is currently developing
evolutionary and revolutionary reforms to the joint requirements
process, including a clean-sheet rewrite of JCIDS, in order to deliver
the right capability to the warfighter at speed and at capacity.
Question. How effective has JCIDS been in delivering capabilities
that meet the evolving needs of the joint force, particularly in the
face of rapidly advancing threats?
Answer. The JCIDS process was developed to ensure due diligence and
accountability for the development of large, legacy platforms that cost
billions of dollars of taxpayer money. Today, given rapid technological
change and the rapid modernization of the Nation's adversaries, this
system no longer fully meets the Department's needs. The Department has
made a number of changes, through the Middle Tier of Acquisition and
Software Acquisition Pathway, to respond to the evolving needs of the
Joint Force amidst a rapidly changing technology environment.
However, an overreliance on rapid acquisition increases the risk of
service-centric solutions that may not align with broader joint
operational concepts. Additionally, without appropriate joint
oversight, programs leveraging the rapid acquisition pathways may move
quickly at the expense of joint integration and interoperability.
Furthermore, increased use of these pathways increases the risk of
overall inefficiency as Services may be unaware of the similar efforts
by their sister Services and unnecessarily duplicate their efforts. If
confirmed, I will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs and JROC to
ensure that Service controlled initiatives are not stove-piped or
unnecessarily redundant and that all strive to present joint integrated
solutions.
Question. What do you see as the most significant gaps in the
current JCIDS process that prevent it from ensuring interoperability
and channeling investments toward warfighters' priorities?
The 2021 General Accountability Report ``Weapon Systems
Requirements'' found that staffing documents through JCIDS took an
average of 800 days compared to a notional timeline of 103 days.
Answer. While the JROC and JCIDS processes provide a structured
framework for identifying opportunities for multi-Service
collaboration, there is still room for improvement in fully leveraging
joint synergies and aligning related acquisition programs. The JROC has
made progress in fostering cross-Service coordination, particularly
through initiatives like Joint Warfighting Concept and Capability
Portfolio Management Reviews. JCIDS has been effective in reducing
redundancy and improving coordination across the services, but it must
continue to evolve to keep pace with rapidly emerging threats and
technological advancements.
However, the JROC lacks directive acquisition and budget authority,
which prevents it from filling the high-priority gaps identified by the
Combatant Commands. Additionally, the JCIDS process and documentation
is antiquated and cumbersome, which is why the Joint Staff is working
to streamline it to ensure outcomes over process. Last, continued
modernization of KMDS, the joint requirements data base, is critical to
ensure real-time visibility of joint and Service requirements. DOD must
smartly go faster and pick up the pace.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Combatant
Commanders in the JCIDS process?
Answer. Combatant Commanders play a critical role in the JCIDS
process, as they are uniquely positioned to articulate both near-term
operational needs and long-term capability gaps based on real-world
threats and evolving mission requirements. Their direct input ensures
that joint requirements are not just service-driven but are aligned
with the operational realities of multi-domain conflict and regional
security challenges. The Combatant Commanders submit their Integrated
Priority Lists (IPLs) annually, which are prioritized by the JROC and
submitted to Congress, and the Urgent Acquisition pathway allows for
the Combatant Commander to raise issues for acceleration. If confirmed,
I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the
Combatant Commanders.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve the effectiveness of
the process in identifying both the near-term and long-term needs of
the Combatant Commander?
Answer. The needs of the Combatant Commanders are currently
addressed through the Capability Gap Assessment process, where the JROC
evaluates and prioritizes CCMD IPLs, as well as executes the Joint and
Emergent Operational Need (JUON/JEON) processes, whereby urgent CCMD
requirements are rapidly triaged and sent to OSD(A&S) for immediate
funding, if validated. While the CGA/IPL process is successful at
identifying gaps, these gaps often remain unfilled because of the
JROC's limited acquisition and budget authorities. In contrast, a
validated JUON/JEON can result in funding direction from OSD(A&S),
however, this approach still requires hard to come by Service offsets.
A funding set aside for JUONs/JEONs may be able to address this
problem.
Question. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the
structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?
Answer. The Joint Staff is currently developing recommendations to
the structure, authorities, and process of the JROC and JCIDS. The
recommendations will be included in the response to Section 811 tasking
and will align with the following principles:
Accelerate the right capability to the warfighter at
capacity
Empower the Joint warfighter voice while balancing speed
and operational risk
Reduce bureaucracy while ensuring Joint interoperability
and integration
Optimize alignment and agility between requirements,
acquisition, and budgeting
Ensure authorities match responsibilities across DOD,
Congress, and DIB
test and evaluation
Question. Test and evaluation is critical to ensuring that the
systems warfighters rely on in combat are proven to work effectively,
reliably, and safely.
How do you assess the current separation of developmental testing
(DT) and operational testing (OT) in terms of its impact on delivering
combat-ready systems to the joint force? Does maintaining these silos
delay the identification of critical issues that affect warfighter
effectiveness?
Answer. The Department of Defense must better integrate
developmental testing and operational testing. As Chairman, if
confirmed, I will work closely with the Office of Secretary of Defense,
the Services, and other Defense organizations to ensure the Department
balances the need for robust testing to verify that capabilities
provided to the warfighter operate as intended with the need to move
faster in fielding new technologies. Throughout, if confirmed, I will
be an advocate for developing, operating, and testing in a joint manner
to the maximum extent possible.
Question. How effective do you find the DOD's reliance on discrete,
milestone-driven test events--such as Initial Operational Test &
Evaluation--in meeting the rapid pace of modern threats and
technological change? Are these singular evaluations keeping pace with
warfighter needs?
Answer. In my experience, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach
to developmental and operational testing across the wide spectrum of
military capabilities the Joint Force develops and operates.
Operational Test and Evaluation is not a Joint Staff function. Across
the board, though, we must go faster. We must allow greater iteration
and more rapid cycles of feedback as we experiment with and test
emerging capabilities. As Chairman, if confirmed, I will work closely
with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Services, and other
Defense organizations to inform testing practices with input from the
warfighter, focusing on balancing the need for robust testing to ensure
that the capabilities provided to the warfighter operate as intended
with the need to move faster in fielding new technologies.
Question. Do you think the current operational test and evaluation
system also provides for the flexibility to assess commercial
technologies that might be acquired or fields by DOD through means or
processes that are not traditional acquisition programs of record?
Answer. No. From my experience with private sector investment, I
know that acquisition processes and procedures slow the adoption of
commercial technologies by the Department of Defense at many steps in
the process. If confirmed, as Chairman, I will be an advocate for
moving faster and increasing flexibility in processes, so path-breaking
capabilities are delivered to the warfighter more quickly. At the same
time, effective operational test and evaluation must be fundamental
aspects of any faster capability development effort, as it is essential
that any capabilities delivered to the warfighter perform as intended.
Question. Are you satisfied with DOD's test and evaluation
capabilities, including the test and evaluation workforce and
infrastructure of the Military Services? In which areas, if any, do you
feel the Department should be developing new test and evaluation
capabilities?
Answer. No. The Department's current mix of development test and
operational test range infrastructure is unsatisfactory for today's
modern threat environment. One area in which the Joint Force should
enhance the ability to test, and train is in the Electromagnetic
Operational Environment. Investment in joint live virtual constructive
training is essential. The Joint Staff is also currently working to
write a report to Congress on the feasibility and advisability of
establishing a regional joint multi-domain non-kinetic training and
experimentation environment. The development of a regionally aligned
multi-domain non-kinetic training, testing, and experimentation
environment is critical to provide the Joint Force and the United
States' Allies and partners an immersive and realistic operational
environment to train across all domains against emerging technologies
and peer threats. This environment needs to replicate a contested,
congested, and constrained Electromagnetic Operational Environment with
an accurate threat representation to facilitate quality training and
testing at scale to support throughput and readiness of the Nation's
warfighters.
dod readiness
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
components--across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel,
and training--to execute the 2022 National Defense Strategy and
Combatant Commanders' associated plans?
Answer. Based on my own experience, as well as public reporting on
the status of the Joint Force, I am confident that the Joint Force--
including materiel, equipment, training, and personnel--is ready to
meet its current challenges. This includes protecting the Homeland,
meeting alliance commitments, and maintaining advantage over any
potential adversary. If confirmed, I commit to continued assessment and
providing my recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant
Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to
their readiness to execute the operational plans associated with the
2022 National Defense Strategy?
Answer. Based on my own experience, as well as public reporting on
the status of the Joint Force, I recognize that operational tempo over
the last two-plus decades has had impacts. If confirmed, I commit to
assessing the extent of that risk and providing my recommendations to
the SecDef and POTUS. I also look forward to working alongside
Congress, specifically on the acquisition of new platforms,
strengthening of the Defense Industrial Base, and taking care of
personnel, to ensure the Joint Forces is ready to meet global
operational requirements. Additionally, with sustained, predictable,
adequate, and timely funding from Congress and the Secretary-directed
reprioritization, we can improve readiness, build the future force that
maintains the competitive advantage, and decrease risk.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you
recommend to restore full spectrum readiness in all DOD components--
across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training--
and on what timelines?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate and discuss readiness with
Service Chiefs and Combatant Commands and make recommendations to the
SecDef and POTUS. We also must be clear eyed and explicit about what
things we cannot do.
operational energy and energy resilience
Question. The Department defines operational energy as the energy
required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and
weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by
tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. On the
battlefield of the future, warfighters will need exponentially more
energy with rapid recharge and resupply over longer operating
distances. The quality of electricity will matter too--the DOD's
vehicles, sensors, robots, cyber forces, directed energy weapons, and
artificial intelligence will be controlled by systems sensitive to
fluctuations in voltage or frequency.
If confirmed, are there actions you can take to harness innovations
in operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational
concepts?
Answer. The need for large volumes of Operational Energy remains
one of the Department's greatest logistical burdens and largest
vulnerabilities, especially in a contested environment. If confirmed, I
will work with the Military Departments to prioritize energy demand
reduction and the adoption of technologies that reduce logistics
requirements in contested or austere environments. Through the
implementation of the Joint Warfighting Concept, the Joint Staff is
seeking innovative capabilities to address key operational problems.
Operational energy innovations contribute to offsetting those problems
and are being examined in wargames, tested in field experiments, and
integrated into joint exercises.
Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe DOD needs
to improve the incorporation of energy considerations in strategic
planning processes?
Answer. In my view, DOD can improve the incorporation of energy
considerations in the following specific areas:
Continue to assess Combatant Command posture and
readiness annually through the Chairman's Risk Assessment. These
reviews can highlight where energy considerations may be overlooked
within the strategic planning process.
Ensure that Joint concepts and operational plans are
fully informed of risks associated with contested logistics and threats
to the assured delivery of energy.
Align force development and design efforts with
appropriate risks to energy supportability and required posture.
If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff to include
requirements for joint force energy supportability and demand reduction
in recurring strategic guidance.
Question. How can DOD acquisition systems better address
requirements related to a military platform's use of energy?
Answer. The Joint Staff conducts an energy analysis for all JROC
requirements and energy is one of the four mandatory KPPs. If
confirmed, I will expect to focus the analysis of a systems energy
consumption in terms of how it contributes to the warfighting
capability by adding to lethality and/or reducing the logistics support
needed.
Question. If confirmed, are there actions you can take to
prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DOD, including
acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to
support mission critical functions, and address known vulnerabilities?
Answer. Energy resilience is part of every assessment performed on
existing critical infrastructure. If confirmed, I will ensure that
identification, vulnerability assessment, and risk mitigation of
mission critical assets remain a Joint Staff priority.
defense department and intelligence community collaboration
Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
and operational--between DOD and the Intelligence Community has grown
increasingly close. On one hand, seamless collaboration is vital to an
effective and rapid response to non-traditional threats and bringing
together the strengths of the full spectrum of defense and intelligence
capabilities can generate more effective solutions to complex problems.
On the other hand, without effective management and oversight, such
collaboration risks blurring distinct agency missions, authorities, and
funding, as well as creating redundant lines of effort.
In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between
the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-
examined or modified?
Answer. Risk Management, Prioritization, and Warning. Intelligence
analysis (likelihood) remains a key part of informing risk analysis,
while intelligence gaps/shortfalls are increasingly a driver of the
risk assessment process. As the Intelligence Community (IC) refines its
risk processes, efforts to improve DOD and IC integration on risk
assessment and mitigation should be enhanced. Recommendation: DIE and
IC seniors re-examine strategic processes associated with risk and
processes that set overall IC-DIE priorities.
Capability Development and Programming Recommendation. NIPF and DOD
priorities bring with them separate funding streams (National
Intelligence Program (NIP) under title 50 and Military Intelligence
Program (MIP) under Title 10). These competing priorities can limit the
DIE's ability to appropriately posture for emerging Joint Force
concerns and significantly slow the Joint Force's response time to the
changed environment. Recommendation: The Joint Capability Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) or a successor process should re-examine
and consider adopting streamlined procedures for capability
requirements principally developed by Defense Intelligence Enterprise
(DIE) elements with Combat Support Agency status and/or
responsibilities. Codify the Joint Intelligence Program Recommendation
(JIPR), issued for the first time on a pilot basis in fiscal year 2024,
and spanning both DOD-and IC-resourced intelligence capabilities, as
part of my Joint Strategic Planning System to cement gains for
warfighter intelligence support.
Crisis Response. On the topic of DOD and IC synchronization across
the competition-conflict continuum, DOD and IC employ distinct
processes that may challenge efforts to synchronization when responding
to contingencies and crises. Recommendation: Creation of a DOD-IC
Crisis Response framework will enable development of agile, coherent
models to test and evaluate Joint Concepts and improve Joint Force
readiness. Currently, DOD and IC lessons learned elements are examining
potential improvements to their pre-crisis coordination.
We cannot afford to miss any opportunities to integrate the title
10 and title 50 community. We must integrate early and always with each
other. This was a foundational core tenet of mine while serving at CIA
and if confirmed, will be as the Chairman
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
Question. Demand for ISR of every kind has grown exponentially in
recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and
targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the
geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are
not being met.
What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets
across the Combatant Commands?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review ISR asset allocation to
Combatant Commands to ensure it is aligned with National Defense
Strategy priorities and provide my recommendations to the SecDef and
POTUS.
Question. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in
both the capability and availability of ISR assets?
Answer. Demand for ISR has and will likely always outpace supply.
Evolving adversary capabilities are driving a deliberate move toward
higher capacity modernized ISR systems. To keep pace, if confirmed, I
will advocate for developing tools to take advantage of space-based ISR
and publicly available information.
Question. What is your assessment of current service efforts to
develop increased capabilities, as well as the processing,
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and capacity to support
increased collection?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the recently completed Space-
Derived Exploitation Capability Portfolio Management Review and
encourage the Services, NGA, and NRO to invest in artificial
intelligence/machine learning solutions which are at various stages of
technical maturity and confidence levels.
Question. How does increased demand square with Services' plans to
divest many of the platforms providing ISR to the Combatant Commanders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Service's capabilities
against the Combatant Commands requirements and provide my
recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
for victims and hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual
assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
servicemembers aged 17 to 24, remains high.
Given your experience as a military officer, do you believe the
policies, programs, and resources, including the DOD Restricted
(Confidential) Reporting Policy, that DOD and the Military Services
have put in place to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct, and to
protect service members who report sexual misconduct from retaliation,
are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. Congress and the Department have collaborated on many
helpful actions to counter sexual assault in the military. Indications
are that these are starting to have an impact: prevalence of sexual
assault and sexual harassment decreased in 2023 in the Armed Forces for
the first time in several years. However, more must be done to sustain
these changes. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously support
policies and programs implemented to prevent sexual assault, improve
support to victims, and hold offenders appropriately accountable. I
will stress that Joint Force readiness hinges on the preparedness of
the warfighters, which is most effectively achieved within cohesive
units led by empowered chains of command. It is imperative to foster
healthy command climates and prevent harmful behaviors. To this end I
support applying the resources provided to us for this purpose, which
include the prevention and response workforces and regular assessments
of military unit health worldwide. I anticipate leading the other
Service Chiefs in continued focus on this issue, and support having a
high-level official dedicated to sexual assault prevention and response
in the military. [Note: Such an official already exists: The Director
of the DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office is an SES, a
position already required by Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act Section 1611 and Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act Section 583.] Sexual assault and sexual harassment
destroy unit cohesion, degrade readiness, and deter both men and women
from serving. There is no place for these crimes in the United States
Armed Forces.
active and reserve component end strength
Question. In the face of historic recruiting challenges, active
force end strength continues to shrink across all military services
except the Space Force.
What aggregate Active end strength do you believe is necessary to
meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the 2022 National
Defense Strategy and associated operational plans?
Answer. The requested end strength in the Administration's budget
submission aligns with manpower needs across the services, and the
evolution of the force planning construct within the 2022 National
Defense Strategy. This budget aims to balance readiness and
modernization challenges today, tomorrow, and into the future with
necessary resources. If confirmed, as the Administration provides any
updates to strategic guidance, I will be prepared to assist the
Secretary of Defense in evaluating appropriate end strength to meet the
national security priorities.
Question. In your view, do the Reserve components serve as an
operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your
answer, should the Reserve components be supported by improved
equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing
for readiness going forward?
Answer. The Reserve component plays a vital role in the total
force, serving as both an operational and strategic reserve. To
effectively execute their key responsibilities, they deserve access to
the best equipment and training, with the same standards of the Active
component. This ensures that the Reserve component is fully prepared
and equipped to support national defense objectives.
role of the reserve component
Question. Historically, the Reserve components have been used as a
strategic reserve in the event of significant armed conflict involving
the United States. Post-9/11, reserve forces have been used more
extensively to support both contingency operations and ongoing military
requirements in a garrison environment. Today, in addition to being an
operational reserve, members of the Reserve component are used
continuously as a part-time workforce for the Department of Defense to
perform its ongoing training and readiness requirements.
In your view, should the Reserve components serve as a part-time
workforce, an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or some
combination of those?
Answer. The Reserve component serves a vital and multifaceted role
within the Total Force, offering strategic depth and operational
flexibility. It is not simply a part-time workforce, an operational
reserve, or a strategic reserve, but rather a powerful combination of
all three. Reserve units provide essential warfighting capabilities and
expertise, strategically aligned with mission requirements. The Reserve
component provides scalable readiness to ensure the DOD can respond
effectively to both ongoing operations and large-scale crises. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, reservists provide the strategic depth
and endurance as part of the Total Force necessary to sustain
operations in a prolonged conflict if deterrence fails. They are, in
essence, a force multiplier, ensuring the military remains ready and
capable of meeting any challenge to national security. Finally, to echo
the Secretary's previous comments, as the Department continues to adapt
its Total Force to meet the demands of the dynamic strategic
environment, the Joint Staff continues to carefully consider and
balance the multitude of roles the Reserve component plays in support
of the National Defense Strategy.''
Question. Do the Reserve components require increased levels of
full-time support and oversight by the Active component, including
improved equipment, increased training, adequate compensation and
reimbursement, effective career management, balanced Professional
Military Education requirements, and higher levels of overall
resourcing for readiness going forward?
Answer. The Department continuously assesses the readiness of the
Reserve components, to include levels of full-time support, resourcing,
training, and equipment modernization, to ensure seamless Total Force
integration. The DOD also ensures all Reserve component units that
deploy in support of global operations have achieved required readiness
levels prior to deployment. Regarding Reserve component compensation
and reimbursement, the Department has been engaged in a long-term
effort to develop duty status reform recommendations for Congress to
streamline these issues. Finally, the Services continuously manage
reserve members' careers and ensure Reserve component members are also
afforded every opportunity to complete Professional Military Education,
attend required schools, and complete formal education requirements to
achieve advancement.
Question. In your view, what reforms, if any, should be made in
order to facilitate easier transitions for members of all components
between active and reserve status?
Answer. The Department has been engaged in a long-term effort to
develop duty status reform recommendations for Congress to streamline
these issues. The need for RC duty status reform (DSR) cannot be
overstated and is long overdue. Today's complex system is overly
burdensome and results in pay/benefits inequities. Working
collaboratively across the Department and the whole of government, DOD
has developed an RC duty status reform proposal that is a fundamental
redesign of the current system--it streamlines and consolidates the
current system and addresses many of its long-standing problems. An
integrated, cohesive legislative proposal designed to comprehensively
address the long-standing problems with the current duty status system
will ensure that we take care of people and actively take steps to
rebuild the military. In addition, ongoing efforts to reform current
Separation History and Physical Examination Status policy should
continue, with the intent of maximizing the retention of personnel
leaving Active component service who wish to continue service in the
Reserve component. Finally, continued modernization of Service pay and
personnel systems is essential to ensuring timely and efficient
transitions of personnel between active and reserve status.
military quality of life and family readiness
Question. The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of
key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
advocacy and parenting skills programs; childcare; spouse education and
employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation
(MWR) services such as Commissary and Military Exchange stores.
If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
consider a priority?
Answer. The Department of Defense has a sacred obligation to take
care of service members and their families. Quality of Life is
fundamental to recruiting and retaining the all-volunteer force today
and in the future.
If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Service Chiefs to
strengthen quality of life programs that support service members and
their families. I will also review existing programs to identify and
prioritize those most critical to military communities and overall
force readiness.
I will continue to encourage the advancement of MWR programs and
community partnerships that both promote well-being while also adapting
to the current demands of servicemembers. These programs include
outdoor recreation, sports and fitness, and child development and youth
programs.
Question. What factors would you consider in assessing which MWR
programs are ineffective or outmoded and thus potentially suitable for
elimination or reduction in scope?
Answer. The maintenance and the development of effective quality of
life programs is a priority for Service members and their families. If
confirmed, I would work with the Service Chiefs and look primarily at
usage metrics, benefit, cost, and Service member and family feedback.
These programs are critical recruiting and retention tools and must be
adequately resourced to ensure a resilient force.
Question. The military services continue to operate at an
historically high OPTEMPO, which senior civilian and military leaders
in the Department of Defense have deemed unsustainable.
What recommendations do you have to adjust OPTEMPO in the Armed
Forces to ensure that servicemembers and their families are healthy,
fit, adequately rested, and have a sustainable lifestyle so that they
are prepared for our next major conflict?
Answer. We continuously monitor and assess the global deployment of
forces to ensure they are committed in line with National Defense and
National Military Strategies. In addition, the Secretary has
established Deployment-to-Dwell and Mobilization-to-Dwell standards,
that are monitored by the Services, to ensure service-members are not
overutilized. Through these measures, the aim is to ensure the All-
Volunteer Force is optimized for global commitments while ensuring the
needs of service-members and their families.
military health system reform
Question. Section 702 of the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act, as modified by Sections 711 and 712 of the Fiscal
Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, transferred the
administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from
the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), a Combat
Support Agency. Additionally, Section 732 of the Fiscal Year 2019
National Defense Authorization Act required the development of joint
force medical capabilities that meet the operation planning
requirements of the combatant commands.
In your view, in the aggregate, how many military medical providers
and what medical capabilities, are required to support the Combatant
Commanders' operational plans associated with the 2022 National Defense
Strategy?
Answer. The National Defense Strategy contains globally integrated
medical requirements of rapidly aggregating medical capabilities during
conflict, moving casualties in a contested environment, and expanding
military trauma centers in the Homeland to care for casualties. The
medical force of roughly 180,000 will be close to fully employed to
execute and sustain operational plans for a large-scale overseas
conflict. The medical force does require additional surge medical
capacity within medical centers of the Department, as well as
leveraging partnerships with Veterans Health Administration and
National Disaster Medical System to execute Homeland contingency plan
requirements. As DOD designs a future medical force, the Military
Health System needs to prioritize efforts to meet these globally
integrated requirements and enable air, land, and sea platforms to
deploy agile medical capabilities worldwide. If confirmed, I will work
across DOD and with Congress on these efforts.
Question. In your view, do military medical providers across the
Military Departments possess today the critical wartime medical
competencies required to save the lives of service members injured in
combat or contingency operations?
Answer. Yes. I believe the joint medical force possesses the
competencies necessary to save lives in a kinetic environment, as
evidenced by their performance in overseas contingency operations over
the last 20 years. As DOD continues to lose personnel with combat
casualty care experience, it is imperative that DOD invests in the
workforce to generate critical wartime medical professionals in
military medical centers and hospitals. The Department must also
leverage partnerships with Veterans Health Administration, Health &
Human Services, and National Disaster Medical System, and in private
sector partnerships to treat complex care patients in peacetime and
sustain the competency and capacity to recover combat casualties in
wartime. Additionally, DOD must embed medical capabilities far forward
to increase survivability in a contested, degraded, and contaminated
wartime environment of the future.
Question. In your view, are the Services adequately supporting DHA
by assigning to MTFs the appropriate number of military medical
providers in the specialties needed at the MTFs?
Answer. The Department is working to invest in the healthcare
workforce that includes the Services' military medical providers and
Defense Health Agency civilian medical providers to improve primary and
specialty care access in MTFs. The DOD continues to assess the adequacy
of military medical providers in the MTFs and their overall readiness.
Additional military and civilian workforce in the MTFs improve access
to care for 9.6 million beneficiaries, improves readiness and maximizes
education programs for medical professionals, and mitigates the rising
costs to provide care in the civilian network. If confirmed, I will
work across DOD and with Congress on these efforts.
suicide prevention
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that sufficient suicide prevention and mental health resources are
available to deployed servicemembers, as well as to servicemembers and
their families at home station?
Answer. I recognize that physically and mentally fit servicemembers
are a critical component of Total Force readiness. If confirmed, I
would strongly recommend prioritizing mental health resources for all
servicemembers and their families by enhancing the access to mental
health professionals by advocating for the expansion of telehealth
services and embedded mental health professionals at the unit level. I
would work closely with policymakers in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that adequate resources are made available for
evidence-based suicide prevention programs and regularly monitor all
programs for effectiveness to ensure and enhance Service member
readiness. Additionally, I will promote leadership involvement in
recognizing warning signs and strengthening family support initiatives
that promote resilience and open discussion around mental health. My
commitment is to ensure every servicemember and their family has access
to the mental health resources they need.
mental health
Question. DOD has made great strides in reducing the stigma
associated with help-seeking behaviors, but many servicemembers,
especially senior leaders, remain concerned that their military careers
will be adversely affected should their chains of command become aware
that they are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same
time, the military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware
of physical and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness
of the service members under their command.
In your view, does DOD effectively bridge the gap between a service
member's desire for confidentiality and the chain of command's
legitimate need to know about matters that may affect individual
service member and the unit readiness?
Answer. Yes, I believe DOD has made significant changes to bridge
the gap between Service Members' desires and the chain of command's
legitimate need to know. The DOD continues to assess how it can help
those who struggle with complex issues, while still ensuring the
readiness and lethality of the force. Mental health is an element of
total health, and the DOD needs to optimize every aspect of the
Warfighter and their families. I fully support Service Members and
their families seeking mental health care.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes,
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Senator Tom Cotton
u.s. nuclear deterrent
1. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, on February 25, 2025,
Chairman Wicker and I wrote a classified letter to Secretary of Defense
Peter Hegseth and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright on matters relating
to U.S. nuclear deterrence and modernization. Will you commit to
reviewing this letter, the attached documents, and receiving a briefing
on the subject from the Joint Staff, J-5 upon confirmation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. If confirmed, I will look forward to
this briefing.
terrorism
2. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, you have extensive
experience in the Middle East, particularly when dealing with
terrorists like Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In the cases of
military force, how would you advise we use the military to contain
Iran's proxy terrorist groups like Hamas, Houthis, and Hezbollah?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough
review of our operations and plans in the Middle East in the context of
the policy guidance provided by the President and the Secretary of
Defense. I will then provide my military advice on how to best employ
the United States Military to achieve United States national policy
goals, as appropriate.
u.s. indo-pacific command
3. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, any potential conflict
in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will need large amounts of
high-end munitions. How will you instill a sense of urgency at the
Pentagon, as well as our private sector, so they make the investments
necessary to rebuild America's defense industrial base?
Lieutenant General Caine. As I stated in testimony, we must be
clear in our sense of urgency. The Joint Staff has established a Joint
Munitions Working Group (JMWG) from organizations across DOD to
specifically address this problem. Acknowledging we have munitions
shortages relative to our requirements and barriers within the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) to respond to the urgent demand for more critical
munitions in a combat scenario, the JMWG is focused on finding near-
term solutions to rapidly increase magazine depth for the high priority
munitions most relevant to warfighting success in INDOPACOM. To that
end, we have identified a set of INDOPACOM-focused priority munitions
both in development and in production. The JWMG will recommend
investments to diminish or eliminate the bottlenecks preventing the DIB
from delivering these decisive munitions on time and at scale. I and
the Joint Staff will work with OSD and the Services to impart that
sense of warfighting urgency and to increase the agility of the DIB to
reload our combat forces in the event of conflict.
4. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, I am concerned that we
are not taking active steps in INDOPACOM to preposition material and
take advantage of ``left of conflict'' capabilities. Are you aware of
any legislative roadblocks prohibiting the pre-positioning of deterrent
capabilities today?
Lieutenant General Caine. At present I am not aware of any
legislative roadblocks preventing the pre-positioning of deterrent
capabilities in INDOPACOM today. While the Department of Defense (DoD)
is required to maintain pre-positioning programs, resource constraints
remain a challenge. Increased funding and prioritization for pre-
positioned war reserve materiel would help accelerate efforts, enabling
more effective deterrence and support for operational readiness
5. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
advising the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of
Defense on the full extent of existing authorities like the Defense
Sensitive Support program to best posture the United States and our
allies for success against Communist China?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
6. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
releasing a memo within your first 30 days as a Chairman requiring that
INDOPACOM come back with all possible operational requirements that may
require title 50 or unique authority support?
Lieutenant General Caine. Consistent with my testimony, I believe
an early integrated approach is foundational to maintain the strong
working relationships that currently exist. We cannot afford to miss
any opportunities to integrate the Title 10 and Title 50 community. If
confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure relevant frameworks for
military forces to support activities of other U.S. Government
departments and agencies are appropriately leveraged to pursue U.S.
interests, to include at INDOPACOM.
7. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
expanding the Defense Sensitive Support staff if required based on
those findings?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will ensure our staffs
are appropriately organized and staffed to meet current and future
requirements. Consistent with my confirmation testimony, I look forward
to continuing work within the Department and with colleagues in other
U.S. Government departments and agencies to adjust existing
arrangements as the need arises.
readiness
8. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, our Air Force's fleet-
wide mission capable rate has dropped in 62 percent. Out of more than
5,000 planes, which is already the smallest fleet in the service's
history, 1,900 are unavailable for tasking at any given time. What do
we need to improve the readiness of the Air Force?
Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experiences, there are many
variables such as aircraft use and inventory, plan requirements,
modernization efforts, divestment, and supply chain/maintenance issues
that impact readiness. If confirmed, I look forward to working
alongside Congress and the Department of the Air Force to appropriately
resource the Air Force and improve is capability and capacity.
9. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, what investments
should we be making to help you maintain or increase the Air Force's
readiness?
Lieutenant General Caine. We should balance an acute need to
modernize capabilities of our aircraft to ensure they remain effective
against evolving threats, while at the same time adequately funding
weapons system sustainment and modernization. If confirmed, I pledge
continued collaboration with the Air Force and Congress to analyze and
develop courses of action to best pursue our national security
objectives.
10. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, what other readiness
concerns do you have or the Department of Defense?
Lieutenant General Caine. I have not been briefed on specific
readiness challenges to the Department, but based on my experience,
readiness challenges exist across many elements that span materiel,
personnel, and training. Specifically, depleted munition inventories
due to operational tempo and the transfer of munitions to allies,
recruiting challenges, unrealized interoperability and shared
operational concepts, and a challenged defense industrial base, to
include modernized facilities like shipyards.
counter-unmanned aircraft systems
11. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you advise
the Department of Defense to organize, train and equip for the counter-
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mission?
Lieutenant General Caine. Defending against the rapidly evolving
UAS threat set presents both a capacity and capability challenge. If
confirmed, I will review how the Department organizes, trains, and
equips the counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mission to ensure
our warfighters can meet this rapidly evolving threat.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
alaska
12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in a 2018
interview, then Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, said that the
Navy ``need[s] to have on-sea presence [in the Arctic] now that we have
a blue water Arctic more times than not.'' He additionally pushed the
Navy to look at ``warm[ing] up Adak again,'' not only for additional
training but also for naval sea and air facilities as well as bulk fuel
capability. When Chinese and Russian naval vessels and air assets enter
the Alaska Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ), aircraft and ships must often travel long distances, which
stretch sustainment and make it more difficult to keep a constant
presence in the region where our adversaries are located. Will you
commit to reviewing our Arctic posture and specifically pushing for a
naval base and bulk fuel facilities at Adak Island to increase presence
in the Arctic?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. The United States is an Arctic
nation and the strategic importance of the Arctic to America's enduring
security and prosperity is clear. If confirmed, I commit to review our
Arctic posture (forces, footprint, and agreements) and to provide the
Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), and President
best military advice regarding the Arctic and our presence there.
13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Alaska is the only
U.S. State in the Arctic region. What advantages do you see in having
multiple ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S.
Navy ships?
Lieutenant General Caine. Multiple refueling ports in Western
Alaska and the Aleutians would enhance U.S. Navy operational reach,
reduce reliance on distant resupply points, and improve response
capabilities in potential conflicts. Collaboration with commercial
entities could strengthen logistics through warm port support
contracts, dual-use facilities, and effective crisis-transition
authorities. It also increases our strategic survivability.
14. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in Alaska, we have
seen joint Russian-Chinese air and naval exercises off our shores,
incursions into our ADIZ and EEZ, and a Chinese spy balloon floating
over our communities. In your opinion, what capabilities must advance
to improve all-domain awareness in Alaska to respond to and be a
persistent presence in the Arctic, while Russia and China have
developed capabilities to hold our Homeland at risk?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I would continue efforts
underway in the department aligned with the Golden Dome for America
Executive Order. This effort is assessing the necessary capabilities to
improve all-domain awareness across the country, to include Alaska, and
provide a persistent presence in the needed regions. We must bolster
our overall detection posture.
15. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Alaska's importance
as a strategic place is not only due to its location but because it
forms the ``Three Pillars of Military Might'': 1) it acts as the
cornerstone of missile defense by housing the majority of the Nation's
ground based nuclear interceptors and many of the Nation's advanced
radars; 2) by providing a strategic platform for expeditionary forces
including the 11th Airborne Division (Arctic); and 3) being a hub for
Air Combat Power where the largest concentration of fifth generation
fighters in the world is located. Will you commit to visiting Alaska to
understand the unique capabilities our State brings to deterrence?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I will.
16. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Eielson Air Force
Base (AFB) which in addition to being home to F-35 squadrons, F-16
interceptors, and KC-135s along with hosting many nations each year for
Red Flag events, still needs many more ``warm'' facilities to house KC-
135 airframes. It can only really fit two right now. Additionally,
other infrastructure is very outdated, and facilities are not keeping
pace with Wainwright Army base. Will you work with me to acquire the
infrastructure necessary to hold the tankers?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, my staff and I will work to
ensure that the Joint Force has the right infrastructure in place to
support our campaigning and contingency requirements. We will
continually work to balance our infrastructure needs to ensure that we
are making best use of congressional dollars. I look forward to working
with you on the issues at Eielson Air Force Base, in particular.
17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, my State holds the
highest concentration of combat-coded fifth generation aircraft
anywhere else in the country (over 100). Any conflict in the Indo-
Pacific region will undoubtedly call upon Alaskan warfighters and our
military assets.
Lieutenant General Caine. For the last decade I've pressed every
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of the Air Force, and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force on the need for more aerial refueling assets in
Alaska to support the increasing training requirements and intercept
missions.
Last year, I wrote a letter to the previous Secretary of the Air
Force, Frank Kendall, pressing him to fulfill the Air Force's
commitments on this issue and Kendall replied with a signed memorandum
finally codifying the movement of 4x KC-135s to Eielson AFB in so
called ``active association''. This MUST NOT be delayed any longer.
18. Senator Sullivan. Can I get your commitment that, if confirmed,
you will see the completion of that KC-135 basing through to the end?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to working with
the SECAF and CSAF toward resolving this issue.
19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, can I also get your
commitment to work expedite the delivery time and increase the
readiness rates of the KC-46?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, you have my commitment to working
with the SECAF, CSAF, and vendor on expediting the delivery time and
increasing the readiness rates of the KC-46.
20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in our discussion
in my office we spoke about the need for additional hangar and
infrastructure capability at Deadhorse (near Prudhoe Bay) to help
extend the Air Force's reach in the Arctic. The U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) Commander, General Gregory Guillot, as well as the U.S.
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Commander, General Kevin Schneider have both
expressed interest in this location. Will you work with me, if
confirmed, to get the military construction approved to support
operations out of Deadhorse?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, my staff and I will work to
ensure that the Joint Force has the right infrastructure in place to
support our campaigning and contingency requirements. We will
continually work to balance our infrastructure needs to ensure that we
are making best use of congressional dollars. I look forward to working
with you issues at Deadhorse, in particular.
21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the 18th Fighter
Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Eielson AFB is responsible for
interception of Russian and Chinese strategic bombers and fighters that
cross into the Alaskan ADIZ. Oftentimes however the 18th FIS is short
of either pilots or mechanics to accomplish their mission. They always
do accomplish the mission, but often at great extra cost in manpower
and time (especially as intercepts have increased in the last year).
Will you commit to looking at the task organization and real-life
manning of this unit and its sustainers and ensure that they are manned
100 percent to finish their mission?
Lieutenant General Caine. Personnel staffing at individual
installations is a Service specific requirement, if confirmed, I will
commit to working with your office and the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force to thoroughly review task organization and manning requirements
of the 18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Eielson AFB.
22. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, as you are aware
I've been fighting to get the KC-135 Active Association complete at
Eielson AFB for nearly a decade and your predecessor signed off on it.
I appreciate your commitment during your hearing to see this through to
completion. I've ran into a number of issues with the Air Force Site
Activation Task Force (SATF) which has visited Eielson nearly six times
to conduct housing surveys. It appears they are using housing data from
2023 to make decisions regarding the amount of available housing at
Eielson. Will you commit to work with me to ensure that SATF is using
the most current housing data to inform its decisions about housing at
Eielson and to relook the Air Force's housing requirements as soon as
possible to ensure we are meeting mission need at the base?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to working with
the SecAf and CSAF to resolve this issue.
23. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, as part of
President Trump's Golden Dome program, there will almost certainly be a
need to ensure that our advanced early warning radar systems like the
E-7 are capable of detecting incoming aircraft and missile threats both
at home and, if necessary, forward deployed. We have had a number of
issues in Alaska with E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
readiness rates due to aging airframes and parts. Will you commit to
reviewing the E-7 program to make sure we are properly resourcing it
and work with me to ensure that we have that capability on hand when
required in Alaska?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I can commit to reviewing the E-7
program with the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs to advise the
Department on resourcing the right mix of sensors that best supports
the Joint Force in defending the Homeland.
24. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, 6 years ago, the
Marine Corps was poised to alter its Indo-Pacific force laydown to
account for the inherent risk of access, basing, and overflight (ABO)
denial and limited training opportunities on Marine Corps bases across
the Indo-Pacific. The 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
Robert Neller, sent several teams to Alaska to assess infrastructure
and training opportunities to support a Unit Deployment Program (UDP)
to preposition assets the Marine Corps would need to surge forward in
the event of conflict with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Alaska's
benefits were as obvious then as they are now: Alaska provides year-
round training for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in nearly
every clime and place found on the globe; Alaska's cold weather
training opportunities are cheaper than other overseas options and
permit significantly larger forces to train simultaneously; perhaps
most importantly, Alaska is in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Do you agree in your
professional military opinion that it is vital for the Marine Corps to
regularly practice in Arctic conditions here in the United States in a
place that our adversaries regularly train in?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Marine Corps, as well as all the
Services, must be able to operate in any climate or region to defend
our national interests. In line with the DOD Arctic Strategy, the Joint
Force must be trained, ready, and equipped to mitigate the risks
associated with potential contingencies in the Arctic.
defense acquisition reform
25. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, last year, Congress
received the report of the Commission on Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Reform--a comprehensive report that
outlined issues with the Department of Defense's defense acquisition
system. I plan to lead efforts to cut bureaucracy and speed up
innovation in the Pentagon and defense technology sector and I believe
the recommendations in this report are a crucial step in doing so. Many
of the reforms in that report do not need congressional legislation to
execute but rather can be enacted by the Department of Defense. Will
you commit to review the findings of that report and direct a Pentagon
working group to begin implementation of the reform measures it
outlined?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the report
and work with the Department to implement the findings that will help
achieve our strategic objectives and improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the resource allocation process.
26. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, I am working with
the Pentagon and through legislation to lead efforts that help
innovative defense startups avoid the ``Valley of Death'' which results
in long-procurement timelines and shuttered defense firms. Will you
commit to work with me to fix this issue and to get feedback from non-
traditional defense technology leaders and scholars to reform the
Pentagon's processes?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
27. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, what issues did you
run into as a defense entrepreneur related to this issue?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, the issues varied from the
initial process of bidding for contracts, to the competition phase, to
moving requirements, and then the burden of once selected,
operationally providing the goods or services we were hired to provide.
The FAR is extensive, and I acknowledge it was built for a reason, but
if we want to go faster, we need to smartly remove bureaucracy, not add
it in. I am not saying we need to make mistakes but rather look for
ways to optimize efficiency and effectiveness. There are likely some
elements of the FAR that may not be ideally suited for small
businesses.
28. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
reviewing the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
as outlined in the PPBE Reform Commission report and provide Congress
with updates as to the regulations that need to be removed or amended
to speed up acquisition?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I will review the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) as outlined in the PPBE
Reform Commission report and work with the Department to provide
Congress updates.
29. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in my view, one of
the most important findings of the PPBE commission report involved
reviewing defense technology portfolios and budget line items to align
them with capabilities and provide agile budgeting flexibility by
consolidating budget line items. The Vice Chiefs of each service all
testified in a recent Readiness Subcommittee hearing that they agreed
with the need for budget flexibility. Do you agree that this idea will
give the Pentagon more agility to identify and execute important
programs at scale that are needed by the warfighter?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I agree. Aligning defense portfolios
and budget line items to enhance budget flexibility is a critical step
toward ensuring our warfighters have the resources they need when they
need them. I support the PPBE Commission's recommendations to
consolidate budget line items. This increased flexibility will allow
the Joint Force to respond faster to emerging threats and technological
advancements, increasing our alignment to strategic direction while
speeding delivery of critical capabilities to the Joint warfighter.
30. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, one of the most
successful programs in the Pentagon the last several years has been the
Space Development Agency (SDA), which has significantly reduced the
time it takes to get satellite sensor systems into orbit cheaply and at
scale. However, I am growing concerned that this program is going to be
pulled into the slower Pentagon Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS), and potentially lose its technological
edge. Will you commit to reviewing this program and helping Congress
protect its current organizational configuration to enable scalable
satellite launches?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, the space domain continues to
become a more critical warfighting domain. I'm not familiar with all of
the particulars and unable to commit until such time that I can do so.
If confirmed I will look into this matter.
31. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the Replicator
Initiative seems to be trending positively overall with certain
exquisite capabilities already acquired. The goal is to scale these
capabilities this year. If the Replicator Initiative is successful,
there will likely be several lessons learned from it about the
procurement process. How do you plan to incorporate lessons learned
from Replicator into the rest of the DOD procurement process?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff has been partnered with
DIU, the Military Departments, and OSD since the inception of
Replicator. DIU recently released Replicator lessons learned to the
Deputy's Innovation Steering Group (DISG). If confirmed, I intend for
the Joint Staff to review these lessons and incorporate any lessons
that can positively influence Department procurement processes.
32. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the F-47 program
was awarded recently to Boeing. While I have no doubt that Boeing was
chosen because it had the best aircraft prototype, I'd like to know how
you plan to hold contractors (including Boeing) accountable for any
failures or delays in this program given its recent history with the
KC-46 which is ongoing?
Lieutenant General Caine. With all new acquisitions there is risk.
It is important to have open, clear communication of that risk with the
contractor for the effective use of our limited resources. I will work
with the Department to find the tools to support, and if needed
motivate, contractors to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals to
deliver this dominant capability to the Joint Force. I will also
strongly partner with OUSD (A&S), OUSD (R&E), DSD, and others to ensure
the fully aligned messaging of expectations to the contractor.
33. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you think
we learned from these previous programs that we should do differently
with the F-47?
Lieutenant General Caine. There is tremendous interplay between
technological maturity and program performance. I will work with the
Department to ensure valuable lessons learned are being applied to
acquisition programs providing capabilities to the Joint Force. Some of
the things we've learned include the importance of focusing on a
limited set of key capabilities to reduce requirements creep, robust
intellectual property management, and using Modular Open System
Architecture (MOSA) to prevent vendor lock.
critical mineral, national environmental policy act, energy
34. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, during his term,
President Biden passed 70 executive orders that restricted Alaska's
ability to extract its own natural resources despite an acute need for
them on both commercial and national security grounds. These executive
orders have slowed down or completely hindered resource extraction and
critical infrastructure projects important not just to the State but to
the Nation as a whole. On the first day of his presidency, January 20,
2025, President Trump signed an executive order entitled Unleashing
Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. The order in part reads as
follows:
``Section 3 Specific Agency Actions
a. The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including
but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of
Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful
authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps
to:
(i) rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions from
any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any
other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy set
forth in section 2 of this order, including but not limited to agency
actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20, 2021, and
January 20, 2025; and
(ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG potential,
including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and export
infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due
consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated
with such development . . .
Section 3(d) in addition to the actions outlined in subsection (a)
of this section, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, shall render all
assistance requested by the Governor of Alaska to facilitate the
clearing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, consistent
with applicable law. All such requests for assistance shall be
transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy for approval prior to
initiation.
Section 3(e) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, shall immediately
review, revise, or rescind any agency action that may in any way
hinder, slow or otherwise delay any critical project in the State of
Alaska.''
Will you commit fully to the intent of the President's executive
order referenced above where the Department of the Army and the U.S
Army Corps of Engineers will play a vital role?
Lieutenant General Caine. Consistent with my role and authorities
as CJCS, I commit to providing the President with my advice on all
Executive Orders concerning the employment of the Joint Force.
35. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, one of the results
of President Biden's energy policies and the ``lock up'' of my State
through his executive orders is an energy emergency affecting our
national security that is unfolding on some Alaska bases. I spoke to
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently about this issue and
explained to him that there has been a number of instances where
commanders of bases like Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) in
Anchorage had to tell servicemembers and their families to turn-down
their heat, unplug personal property, and turn-off certain critical
systems that sustain the base. This was done to preserve electricity
and avoid brownouts in the region. Would U.S. national security be
enhanced if there was a reliable source of clean-burning Alaskan
natural gas available to supply the energy needs of these bases?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, reliable energy sources are
critical to national security.
36. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
working with the State of Alaska and me to secure a reliable source of
energy for Alaska military bases? (LA/CAG/Nominee)
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
golden dome for america
37. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Billy Mitchell, the
Father of the U.S. Air Force once said, ``I believe . . . whoever
controls Alaska controls the world. I think it is the most strategic
place in the world. No other State but Alaska is strategically located
to provide such a high level of Homeland Defense.'' At Fort Greely, the
49th Missile Defense Battalion provides our Nation's first line of
defense, tasked to defend against the threat of an intercontinental
ballistic missile attack, command of 40 of the Nation's 44 ballistic
missile interceptors, and reception of data from the nearby Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR). Fort Greely will soon house the new Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI) missiles, but the program for this system
has stalled due to high-cost overruns and manufacturing delays. The NGI
will be an essential part of our national ballistic missile system.
Will you commit to reviewing the NGI program, if confirmed, and keep
Congress informed of what resources are required to field the missile
on time?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
38. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Alaska is strategic
not only for its geographic location but also because of its
concentration of over 100 fifth generation fighters (the highest
concentration in the world) as well as it being home to the 11th
Airborne Division, the Nation's preeminent Arctic combat unit. If a war
occurred in the INDOPACOM AOR, forces in Alaska would almost certainly
be part of that fight and therefore would also be potentially targeted
in their home bases. Do you believe that President Trump's ``Golden
Dome for America'' should include Alaska as a critical site to be
defended from missile attack given the facts stated above?
Lieutenant General Caine. I understand that Golden Dome of America
is a strategic priority for the administration and that there are
ongoing efforts to determine the way forward with respect to how we are
going to defend all of the Homeland from these threats, all within the
guidance of the administration. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the
current status of this work and associated analysis used to determine
the geographic coverage of Golden Dome.
39. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, as we discussed in
my office, Alaska is the cornerstone of America's missile defense. My
colleague Senator Cramer and I introduced the IRON DOME Act to
complement President Trump's executive order and we will release a new
GOLDEN DOME Act soon to build on DOD and industry's continued
development of this system and we will continue to work on it
throughout the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process.
Lieutenant General Caine. I asked the Vice Chief of Space
Operations at Space Force, General Michael Guetlein, in my Readiness
Subcommittee hearing on Joint Force Posture how we should think about
integrate such a complex system as Golden Dome. His response was
excellent.
He said this undertaking is comparable in his mind only to The
Manhattan Project. He said it's not because of technological complexity
however, ``it is complex because of the number of organizations and the
number of agencies that need to be involved.''
He went on to say: ``Organizational behavior and culture are going
to be our biggest challenges,'' and that we must have ``one entity in
charge that has the full support of the Nation, from the President,
from the Hill, and from the American people.''
He then said we must empower that person or entity to be resourced
and make decisions across organizational boundaries and that we must
reinvigorate our industrial base--to include bringing in new,
innovative entrants to create Golden Dome.
Do you agree with General Guetlein?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. Given the heavy emphasis on the
space domain and other critical organizations involved in delivering
Golden Dome, it is imperative that we identify an entity to serve as
the Department lead to synchronize the efforts of the Department across
the full scope of capabilities.
40. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you plan to
get after these problems of organizational behavior, culture, and
resourcing involved in Golden Dome?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commanders, Services and other
stakeholders to identify areas where we can streamline decisionmaking,
increase efficiency and speed delivery of capability.
I will prioritize cultural change where required, by promoting and
encouraging a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking,
recognizing and rewarding innovative thinking and problem-solving.
I will address resourcing by working with the Services and OSD to
prioritize our investments and allocate resources more effectively. I
will review the operational requirements for Golden Dome to ensure that
our resources are aligned with our strategic priorities.
Overall, addressing the problems of organizational behavior,
culture, and resourcing within Golden Dome will require a sustained
effort and commitment to change. I am committed to setting an
environment that ensures the DOD is postured to deploy and maintain a
next-generation missile defense shield.
budget
41. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, since World War II,
U.S. defense spending has only dropped below 3 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) 4 times. Right now, we are barely spending over
that threshold and the services are paying the heavy price for it in
readiness. Senator Wicker's ``Peace Through Strength'' Act seeks to
increase defense spending from 3 percent to 5 percent over time. Do you
commit to advocate for the resources that we need to strengthen our
services and ultimate save servicemembers' lives in the event of a
conflict?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
small business administration 8(a) contractor
42. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, I recently toured
an Small Business Administration (SBA) 8(a) contracting operation and
saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to the Federal customer in terms of
cost and efficiency while delivering mission-critical solutions that
increase our national security and warfighter readiness. When the rate
for big government contractors is double 8(a) shops and about 45 days
for 8(a) contractors versus 3 months for big government contractors,
and 8(a) shops give the intellectual property (IP) to the government
unlike big government contractors--would you agree as a former defense
entrepreneur that the SBA 8(a) program one of the most efficient and
effective ways to deliver results to the Federal Government?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
43. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, 8(a) contractors
provide tremendous value to the Department of Defense. In addition to
the rapid contracting capabilities and reduced costs compared to large
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and other services providers,
8(a) organizations transfer the IP to the government. They do not
encumber it with legal restrictions like the big government
contractors. Clearly, SBA 8(a) programs are one of the most efficient
ways to deliver immediate and enduring results to the Federal
Government. Wouldn't you agree with me?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
44. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, rapid response
capabilities are essential to enable our warfighter to win on the
battlefield. At the same time, our defense contractors must rapidly
respond to the needs of our military to make the U.S. Military more
lethal. Flexible and efficient contracting through the SBA 8(a) program
is one trusted way to do this. Please explain how you will ensure that
proven, dependable, and cost-effective 8(a) programs remain in place
and supported by the Department of Defense.
Lieutenant General Caine. Maintaining a robust field of defense
contractors and contract vehicles that can rapidly respond to
warfighter requirements is necessary to provide a lethal Joint Force. I
will work with the Department's acquisition authorities to deliver new
capabilities and advanced technologies to our Joint Force through
flexible and efficient contracting.
shipbuilding and amphibious ship readiness
45. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, we are in an
emergency situation when it comes to amphibious ship readiness for the
Marine Corps. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
stated that roughly 50 percent of the amphibious fleet was in ``poor
material condition'' including 5 out of 9 LHA/LHD [landing helicopter
assault/landing helicopter dock] carriers and 90 percent of LSD (Dock
Landing Ships). Those numbers are both shocking and unacceptable.
Lieutenant General Caine. Last year, the Marine Corps did not
deploy a full complement of ships for the entirety of the 15th
Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit's (ARG/MEU) deployment
because the USS Boxer broke down not long after leaving port. This is
supposed to be America's 9-1-1 force. I have a feeling if this were a
Carrier Strike Group this wouldn't be happening and that's why I need
your help.
Will you commit to solving any disagreements between the Navy and
the Marine Corps about amphibious ship repair and maintenance and
ensure we are able to deploy at least three ARG/MEUs at any one time as
per the Commandant's guidance to the Corps?
If confirmed, I commit to working with the Secretary, the CNO, and
the CMC toward this benchmark.
46. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, if you need
Congress's help when it comes to resourcing amphibious ship readiness,
will you commit to reporting back to us as soon as possible with a
realistic account of what it would take to fix this issue?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
47. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, President Trump has
expressed a vision where we work with our allies to make use of their
existing shipbuilding capacity, leverage lessons learned from their
shipyards and encourage their investment in our own maritime industrial
base. What is the role that you see our allies playing in expanding our
navy shipbuilding infrastructure and growing the Navy?
Lieutenant General Caine. We must look at all options to increase
our capabilities, including increasing our fleet. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Department of the Navy on this critical
matter.
48. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, I am very concerned
about both our ship and submarine readiness. I know the Navy has
established an 80 percent surge readiness goal, but we are nowhere near
there today. President Xi is deathly afraid of our submarines. What do
you think needs to be done to get subs in and out of maintenance on
time and what will you do to simultaneously increase sub maintenance
capacity?
Lieutenant General Caine. The capability and capacity of our
submarine industrial base is critical. I would defer to the Department
of the Navy for specifics on this matter, but if confirmed, I am
committed to focusing on this important topic.
49. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, recognizing that
attack submarines are one of our biggest advantages compared to the
People's Republic of China (PRC) do you agree that our inability to
produce at least two submarines per year (and deliver them on time)
increases risk in the Indo-Pacific during this decade?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. The inability to produce the
requisite number of submarines increases risk. We must focus on the
submarine industrial base and motivate the contractors to recruit and
retain their workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
SECNAV and CNO on this matter.
50. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, our inability to
produce at least two submarines per year obviously creates doubt in
Australia that we can deliver 3-5 Virginia-class submarines as part of
the optimal pathway for Pillar I. What will you tell your Australian
counterparts to assure them of our commitment to increasing Virginia
production and executing the optimal pathway?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Secretary of Defense has confirmed
the U.S. commitment to AUKUS. If confirmed I will continue to work to
boost the capacity and output of the Navy's four public shipyards,
which are crucial for building, repairing, and modernizing Virginia-
class submarines.
marine corps force design
51. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Marine Corps Force
Design and its ``divest to invest'' initiatives are a bold idea to
create an agile and lethal force that can maneuver effectively in a
maritime environment. However, many Marine Corps advocates--myself
included--are concerned that Force Design may be hollowing out certain
critical combat capabilities that will detract from the Marine Corps'
mission as the Nation's premiere ``9-1-1'' rapid response force.
Militaries around the world have long understood ``combined arms'' to
mean employing a combination of infantry, tanks, cannon artillery,
engineers, and close support aircraft in a coordinated manner. Those
same military today are endeavoring to add these systems to their
inventories and we see their utility on battlefields in Ukraine. Yet,
the Marine Corps has divested all the Marine Corps' tanks, two-thirds
of its cannon artillery, nearly all its engineering equipment to breach
enemy minefields and obstacles, all its engineering equipment that
enables clearing and proofing of minefields, all its bridging, and
nearly a third of its close support rotary and fixed wing aircraft. How
is it possible for the Corps to have ``the most proficient combined
arms teams on the globe'' without these needed weapons and items of
equipment?
Lieutenant General Caine. The capabilities of the Marine Corps to
serve as a rapid reaction force are critical. If confirmed, I commit to
working with the Commandant of the Marine Corps on ensuring that Marine
Corps Force Design is in line with globally integrated requirements.
52. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, part of Force
Design rests on the assumption that the Marine Corps will be able to
fill gaps in its combat power (i.e. borrowing tanks, bridging assets,
etc.) from other services including the Navy and Army if the need
arises. While the services do train together, there are concerns that
training for specialized equipment between the services as well as
inventory constraints in a major conflict will hinder the Marine Corps'
ability to operate effectively. Given the assumptions of Force Design
regarding equipment support, will you commit to reviewing integration
between the Marine Corps and other services in support of operations
plan (OPLAN) execution to include the readiness of the joint force to
support Force Design?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes Senator. If confirmed I will serve as
the Global Integrator and thus must understand these critical elements
and the associated risks with each branch and sequel.
53. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the Marine Corps is
making a lot of assumptions in my opinion about Navy and Army support
for Force Design to be successful. If confirmed, how do you intend to
work with General Eric Smith and Admiral James Kilby in order to ensure
alignment across the Navy and Marine Corps?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Navy Marine Corps Team, especially in
the form of the ARG/MEU is a national asset. I am committed to working
with the Marine Corps and Navy and all Services to advise the Secretary
on how to develop a total force designed and aligned to meet the
national defense strategy.
54. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
reviewing the need for a formal agreement or memorandum of
understanding between the services for equipment sharing and training
in support of Force Design's assumptions and OPLAN execution?
Lieutenant General Caine. If need be, yes Senator.
55. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the Marine Corps'
ability to conduct shore-to-shore operations in a contested maritime
environment relies on its ability to field sufficient numbers of
medium-sized ocean-going craft that can execute movement and landing
operations at the operational and tactical level. The Landing Ship
Medium (LSM) program is supposed to create a new ship that will achieve
those operational requirements. The LSM program however has hit a major
snag as the projected costs and time needed to construct these ships is
much higher than anticipated requiring the Navy and Marine Corps to
look for alternative solutions. These ships are vital to any
contingency in the South China Sea or elsewhere. Will you commit to
review the LSM program with the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval
Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps and place influence on
the need for speed in this program both within the services and in your
communications with Congress?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to working with
the Department of the Navy to ensure that capabilities are in line with
globally integrated requirements.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
inspector general investigation
56. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Caine, Chairman Wicker and I
sent a letter to the Acting Department of Defense Inspector General
asking for an inquiry into the group chat on the commercially available
communications application called Signal, which included members of the
National Security Council.
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, in your capacity as the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will you ensure that no one
under your preview will interfere with the independence of the
Inspector General's investigation?
I will, Senator.
57. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Caine, if it comes to your
attention that there is interference in the investigation, will you act
accordingly?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace and security
58. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Caine, could you describe
the strategic advantage that authorities under the Women, Peace and
Security Act at the Department of Defense give the United States over
China?
Lieutenant General Caine. By addressing destabilizing conditions
that China ignores and by improving interoperability, DOD WPS
authorities have strengthened critical United States military-to-
military relationships in the Indo Pacific region, by increasing our
understanding and value to the addressed cohorts, all of which provides
the United States advantage over China.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
u.s. indo-pacific command unfunded priorities
59. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, successive
administrations have identified China as the pacing threat and the
Indo-Pacific as the priority theater. However, INDOPACOM provided
Congress this year with $11 billion dollars in unfunded priorities,
which includes missile defense systems, electronic warfare, munitions,
and posture initiatives. Do you agree there is misalignment between
DOD's strategy and spending priorities?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will examine the unfunded
priorities from the Combatant Commands and pay close attention to where
our strategy requirements have created significant gaps between the
resources currently allocated to fund them.
60. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what are the most
significant operational and strategic risks to U.S. deterrence and
warfighting credibility if INDOPACOM's funding gaps are not addressed?
Lieutenant General Caine. Our priorities in the INDOPACIFIC focus
on an integrated Joint Force and deterring China. Investment in these
capabilities would go to ensure United States Forces are postured in
the right locations, with the right capabilities to deter in
competition and win in the event of crisis or conflict. If confirmed, I
will review the operational challenges with the USINDOPACOM commander
and be available to further address funding gaps in detail in a
classified setting.
61. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, would you be willing
to consider significant changes to how the DOD develops and validates
capability requirements (JCIDS process) because of how lengthy,
inflexible, and bureaucratic it has become?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff is fully supportive and
actively involved in modernizing the joint requirements process.
Through our efforts in response to the FY24 NDAA Sec 811 and the
proposed FORGED Act, we are developing evolutionary and revolutionary
reforms to the JCIDS and JROC processes. This includes a
congressionally directed clean-sheet rewrite of JCIDS in order to
deliver the right capability to the warfighter at speed and at
capacity. However, through these reform efforts, we must not sacrifice
the CJCS's and JROC's ability to ensure a globally integrated and
interoperable joint force that is responsive to the warfighter and
aligned to the Department's strategy. Additionally, wholistic reform is
needed, including the acquisition system and budget processes, to
ensure significantly improve our capability development and delivery.
We must also continue to retain the global view.
62. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, given the pacing
challenge posed by China, do you think the INDOPACOM Commander should
have more of a say in the budgeting and joint resourcing process to
ensure we are addressing the combatant commands' operational needs?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff will continue to work
closely with INDOPACOM as the priority theater, to ensure their
priorities are appropriately represented in the Program and Budget
Review process.
border security/department of homeland security mission
63. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, while this
Administration has repeatedly stated that the Indo-Pacific is the
priority theater, Secretary Hegseth has authorized DOD to fund wasteful
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions at the border on a non-
reimbursable basis. These growing costs threaten our readiness in the
Indo-Pacific. What impact does non-reimbursable spending on the border
mission have on DOD's ability to deter China's increasingly aggressive
actions in the Indo-Pacific?
Lieutenant General Caine. I am unfamiliar with the costs or funding
source associated with this mission. If confirmed, I commit to
reviewing the impacts of this spending with regard to our other
critical mission sets.
64. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, do you think it makes
any sense for DOD to spend $2.5 million dollars--on one flight--to
deport 100 undocumented immigrants to India?
Lieutenant General Caine. I am unfamiliar with the costs expended
on these flights. Being good stewards of the taxpayer's money is
critical, and if confirmed, I commit to acting in a fiscally
responsible manner.
65. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, the Defense
Department has spent $376 million in the 2 months on immigration
activities related to securing the border and spent about $40 million
of that moving fewer than 400 migrants designated for deportation
through lockups at Guantanamo Bay. The majority of this is on a non-
reimbursable basis for the DHS mission. Is spending almost $10 million
per person a strategic and responsible use of DOD and taxpayer dollars?
Lieutenant General Caine. I am unfamiliar with the costs expended
on these flights. Being good stewards of the taxpayer's money is
critical, and if confirmed, I commit to acting in a fiscally
responsible manner.
66. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, furthermore, does
this type of conflict prepare the joint force for great power conflict?
Lieutenant General Caine. The United States must be able to both
defend our Homeland and deter and, if necessary, prevail in a great
power conflict. If confirmed, as Chairman, I will work to advance the
Joint Force's readiness for both missions.
67. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, you highlighted
securing the Homeland as a top priority. What specific role do you see
for the military in assisting with border security, and how do you
balance that with global operational commitments?
Lieutenant General Caine. The POTUS and SecDef have made clear the
protection of our sovereign territory is a key role of the Defense
Department. Based on public reporting, the Department has moved out
swiftly on border security, to include surging troops, reinforcing and
repairing barriers, and supporting illegal alien removal operations
through the operational leadership of Commander, U.S. Northern Command.
If confirmed, I will review the specifies of our military tasks at the
border and ensure my advice to the SecDef includes an assessment on the
impact to our other global missions.
68. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe the
DOD's involvement in border security is a misallocation of resources?
Why or why not?
Lieutenant General Caine. I understand the Department is responding
to a specific Requested for Assistance (RFA) from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) at the southern border. If confirmed, I will
review Department involvement and resource allocations and provide my
recommendations to the SecDef.
69. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, has there been any
assessment of how this non-reimbursable spending affects military
readiness?
Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experience, the Department
manages impacts on readiness regardless of mission set through detailed
and coordinated unit selection, and mission assignment processes. If
confirmed, I will review the impacts for non-reimbursable spending on
readiness.
70. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, would you recommend
changes to the policy of using military assets for immigration
enforcement?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will continually work
with the Services and Combatant Commands to assess the risk and cost of
ongoing operations and advise the SecDef and POTUS on any recommended
policy changes.
71. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what alternative
solutions do you propose to address border security concerns without
impacting DOD operations?
Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experience, over time I would
expect that the application of advanced technologies and sensor
networks could reduce the need for DOD to support and supplement DHS
with manpower at the border.
missile defense of hawaii
72. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, missile defense is an
urgent priority as near-peer adversaries develop advanced long-range
weapons. Hawaii, as the strategic center of the Indo-Pacific and home
to command and control for INDOPACOM, is particularly vulnerable to
these emerging threats. Do you agree that defending Hawaii against
advanced missile threats--including hypersonics--should be a top
priority for the Department?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, defending all our Homeland is the
top priority for the department.
73. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
ensuring that any future missile defense strategy and posture provides
adequate protection to Hawaii from all types of missile threats?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review our missile
defense strategy and posture to ensure it adequately considers defense
of our entire Homeland.
74. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what advancements in
missile defense technology should the DOD prioritize to counter
hypersonic threats?
Lieutenant General Caine. As our adversaries' hypersonic systems
become more advanced and more lethal, a multitude of DOD technological
investments are required. I will defer specific technology advancements
to the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Research and Engineering and
Acquisition and Sustainment, however, countering the hypersonic threat
requires leveraging the full suite of DOD capability. We must address
the threat in all phases of flight, including left of launch, with all
means available, beyond traditional kinetic hit-to-kill interceptors.
75. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how does Hawaii's
vulnerability compare to other key strategic locations in the Indo-
Pacific?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with my team to
assess any vulnerabilities not only with Hawaii, but other key
strategic locations across the Indo-Pacific.
76. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific
infrastructure failures in Hawaii have been most detrimental to
readiness, and how would you address them?
Lieutenant General Caine. Infrastructure failures at Red Hill and
the Pearl Harbor port and shipyard have undermined readiness. I support
the current plan to address Red Hill and back the Navy's Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)--a initiative to upgrade dry
docks, facilities, and equipment by streamlining workflows and boosting
efficiency.
77. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, should DOD prioritize
cyber defenses for critical infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
alongside physical missile defense?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, based on my experience, I expect
adversaries will persistently target our critical infrastructure to
disrupt the movement of United States Forces and resources at the
outset of any conflict. To counter this, I would recommend continued
close collaboration with the DHS, other Federal agencies, and industry
partners. This includes investing in enhanced sensors, defense systems,
redundancy, and resilience measures. We should also consider studying
additional options to protect our Nation's critical infrastructure and
key resources.
infrastructure failures in hawaii and the indo-pacific
78. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, the Indo-Pacific
region has a massive need for infrastructure investment. Hawaii has
faced multiple high-profile DOD failures, including watermain breaks
and electrical issues. This affects readiness and our strategic posture
in the region. How will you prioritize infrastructure recapitalization
versus acquisition of new platforms when finalizing DOD's budget?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to leverage the Program and Budget Review process to
prioritize Service investments in the infrastructure required to
support our current and future weapon systems, platforms, and posture.
79. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, will you hold the
services accountable for ensuring that facilities critical to INDOPACOM
are maintained and modernized?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. I am committed to working with all
Services and combatant commands to advise the Secretary on how to
maintain and modernize critical facilities to meet the national defense
strategy.
allies and partners
80. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, the Department of
Defense must work closely alongside our allies and partners to meet the
pacing challenge posed by China. The Joint Staff plays a key role in
driving collaboration and integration of these efforts. How will you
support and expand collaboration with allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will work closely with the Secretary of
Defense and the Commander USINDOPACOM to review our engagement strategy
in the South China and East China Seas. Everything we do in the South
and East China Seas requires close coordination with allies and
partners. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to
operate and exercise with them in the region.
classified information and operational security
81. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever
witnessed or been aware of others mishandling classified information
within DOD and how was it addressed?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, as the Director of the Special
Access Program Central Office I was aware of the fact that deviations
had occurred from time to time. Those matters were handled by the
relevant service and not by me or my office.
82. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific
safeguards would you implement to prevent leaks of Special Access
Program (SAP) information?
Lieutenant General Caine. Special Access Programs (SAPs) are highly
classified programs that require special access controls to protect
sensitive information. To prevent leaks, the following safeguards are
typically implemented:
1. Need-to-Know Principle: Access to SAP information is strictly
limited to individuals who have a legitimate need to know the
information to perform their official duties. This principle ensures
that only authorized personnel with a valid reason have access to
sensitive information.
2. Security Clearances: Personnel with access to SAP information
must hold a high-level security clearance, which involves a thorough
background investigation and screening process. This ensures that only
trustworthy individuals with a proven track record of handling
sensitive information are granted access.
3. Compartmentalization: SAP information is often
compartmentalized, meaning that it is divided into smaller, isolated
segments, and access is restricted to specific compartments. This
limits the amount of information an individual can access, reducing the
risk of unauthorized disclosure.
4. Access Controls: Physical and electronic access controls, such
as biometric authentication, secure doors, and encryption, are used to
protect SAP information. These controls ensure that only authorized
personnel can access sensitive areas or systems.
5. Encryption: SAP information is often encrypted to protect it
from unauthorized access. Encryption algorithms and techniques, such as
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), are used to safeguard sensitive
data both in transit and at rest.
6. Secure Communication Channels: SAP information is transmitted
through secure communication channels, such as Secure Sockets Layer/
Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME), to prevent interception or eavesdropping.
Please note that these safeguards are general in nature and may not
be exhaustive or specific to a particular SAP. The actual security
controls in place may vary depending on the program's specific
requirements and the organization's security policies.
83. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, can you confirm
whether you have ever used personal or encrypted messaging applications
for official communications?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, in my last job we occasionally
used encrypted message apps for routine scheduling or logistical
matters.
84. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you balance
operational security concerns with the need for rapid communication in
crisis situations?
Lieutenant General Caine. Protecting operational security is a
responsibility I take seriously. Rapid communication at the onset of a
crisis should occur through networks appropriate for the information
being discussed to prevent compromising military operations.
u.s. indo-pacific command funding and strategic risks
85. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific
programs within INDOPACOM's unfunded priorities list do you believe are
most urgent?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will continue to assess
the capabilities from Unfunded Priority Lists from all Combatant
Commands. With INDOPACOM specifically, I believe that Guam Defense
System, Space enabling capabilities, Joint Fires Network, and long-
range fires require Department level attention.
86. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how should Congress
prioritize funding between missile defense, electronic warfare, and
posture initiatives?
Lieutenant General Caine. Funding prioritization should be based on
the strategic needs of the Joint Force to meet the National Defense
Strategy. Focusing on expanding the inventories of current and future
munitions, increasing electronic warfare capabilities in the space
domain, and fielding the necessary forces are critical to protect the
Homeland.
87. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, wat are the long-term
consequences if these funding gaps persist beyond this fiscal year?
Lieutenant General Caine. Long-term persistent funding gaps in
INDOPACOM will impact the Joint Force's ability to defend U.S.
territories and interests in the Pacific, hinder the development of
kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and slow the advancement of ISR
and C2 systems.
88. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, are there any
inefficiencies within the DOD budget that could be reallocated to meet
INDOPACOM's needs?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's efforts to analyze the budget for wasteful and low impact
programs with the intent to reallocate resourcing to meet the
Department's strategic goals.
loyalty and constitutional duty
89. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you respond
if given an order that falls in a legal gray area but is politically
charged?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I will consult with relevant
counsel, and I will not follow an unlawful order. I am bound by my oath
to follow all lawful orders.
90. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, can you provide an
example from your career where you had to push back against unlawful or
unethical directives?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I have not been issued an
unlawful or unethical directive during my previous tours in the
service.
91. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what steps would you
take to reinforce the apolitical nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed, I commit to
speaking truth to power, regardless of politics and upholding the
standards of conduct contained in my Commission, my Oath of Office and
the Constitution.
allies and partners in the indo-pacific
92. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you enhance
military-to-military cooperation with key allies like Japan and
Australia?
Lieutenant General Caine. For Japan, if confirmed, I would support
the current actions, as recently reported in the news following the
Secretary of Defense's trip. These include pursuing concrete steps to
deepen defense cooperation with Japan across a range of areas, such as
enhancing bilateral training and exercises, strengthening Alliance
force posture and presence and promoting defense equipment and
technology cooperation.
For Australia I would continue to support engagements, exercises
and interoperability, examine United States force posture initiatives,
and support broader United States initiatives such as AUKUS and defense
industrial collaboration.
93. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what role do you see
emerging partners (e.g., India, the Philippines) playing in countering
Chinese aggression?
Lieutenant General Caine. I agree with the President and Secretary
of Defense's statements concerning the importance of allies and
partners playing a leading role in providing for their own defense. If
confirmed, I would examine how the military can best support United
States policy, to include increasing interoperability, expanding joint
and combined operations, and making targeted activities and investments
that provide measurable returns on investment in their defense
capabilities.
94. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you
navigate tensions between allies who have differing threat perceptions
of China?
Lieutenant General Caine. While our allies may have differing
threat perceptions of China, they share our vision of a free and open
Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary to advance
this shared understanding among our allies while taking into account
any differences in perspectives.
95. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how can the DOD
improve joint military exercises to enhance interoperability with
regional partners?
Lieutenant General Caine. Currently, Combatant Commands regularly
exercise and train with their regional allies and partners. One area
where the DOD has improved and can continue to improve joint military
exercise interoperability is by leveraging our annual Large Scale
Global Exercise (LSGE), a series of multiple Field Training Exercises
that occur within a 90-day window. As part of ELITE CONSTELLATION, a
multi-year Joint Force global integration readiness campaign, LSGE
consists of large-scale training and exercises that validate joint and
combined interoperability; improve joint force readiness; and provide a
venue for future force design, testing, and evaluation. LSGE
demonstrates United States, Allied and Partner military capacity and
capability to deter great power adversaries. The Joint Force will
conduct the FY25 LSGE in the USINDOPACOM AOR with multiple, global
linkages to other Combatant Command exercises and multiple, integrated
joint/combined major force elements.
Additionally, DOD, through the Combatant Commands, can use 10 USC
Section 321 ``Training with friendly foreign countries: payment of
training and exercise expenses'' to enhance interoperability of United
States Forces with allies and partners. Section 321 authorizes
Combatant Commands to pay incremental expenses of participating
developing nations when training in exercises alongside United States
Forces. These exercises enhance interoperability with allies and
partners by increasing the scale and frequency of partner engagements,
benefiting the United States and improving allied burden sharing over
the long term.
96. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you view the
current United States force posture of 28,500 servicemembers in South
Korea?
Lieutenant General Caine. An increasingly aggressive China poses
both short and long-term challenges, along with North Korea's long-
range missile and nuclear programs represent an immediate security
challenge. If confirmed, I will assess the United States Military
presence in the Indo-Pacific against our national strategic interests
and make recommendations to the SecDef and the President.
97. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, are you open to
removing troops from South Korea?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
USINDOPACOM, United States Forces Korea, South Korea, and other
regional allies to review the United States force posture in South
Korea and provide my recommendations.
98. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, if so, how many?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
USINDOPACOM, United States Forces Korea, South Korea, and other
regional allies to review the United States force posture in South
Korea and provide my recommendations.
overall department of defense strategic vision
99. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you see as
the greatest challenge facing the United States Military over the next
decade?
Lieutenant General Caine. I believe the greatest challenge facing
the United States Military over the next decade is China's rapid
modernization and expansion of its military capabilities.
100. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you
balance traditional military deterrence with emerging domains like
cyber and space warfare?
Lieutenant General Caine. Balancing traditional military deterrence
with emerging domains like cyber and space requires integrating both
established and modern capabilities. Traditional deterrence focuses on
strength and military readiness, while space and cyber are about
resilience and competition. These domains are crucial to our security,
as they support military and economic infrastructure. Protecting space
and cyber capabilities is vital for maintaining credible deterrence. If
confirmed, I will actively work to normalize operations in these
emerging domains alongside traditional operations, prioritizing
warfighting and protecting the Joint Force.
101. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, in your view, what
is the most significant misalignment between U.S. defense strategy and
budgetary allocations?
Lieutenant General Caine. Implementing the National Defense
Strategy requires rigorous prioritization to resource the critical
capabilities necessary to achieve the Nation's strategic objectives.
Congressional support through timely and sustained appropriations
and budget flexibility is crucial for aligning resources with the
Department's defense strategy.
modernization and innovation
102. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, you mentioned your
experience in the venture capital world as a unique asset for
modernizing business systems and revitalizing the Defense Industrial
Base. How would you leverage that experience to accelerate innovation,
particularly in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, and
emerging technologies?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, we need to establish a process
to allow our IT and business systems to onboard critical emerging
technologies and the authorities to operate at a much faster pace. We
will occasionally fail, but that is a part of quick and thoughtful
innovation.
103. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, how will you support
initiatives like Replicator, which is focused on accelerating the
delivery of critical joint capabilities to the warfighter at speed and
scale?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff is supportive of
initiatives like Replicator and has specifically supported Replicator
since its inception through joint experimentation, joint requirements,
and congressional engagement. I intend for the Joint Staff to continue
to provide this support to accelerate the delivery of critical joint
capabilities to the warfighter.
104. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you see as the Joint Staff's
role in rapidly delivering innovative and commercial capabilities to
the warfighter?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff ensures capabilities are
founded on Joint Requirements, to ensure warfighters receive solutions
that fill Joint Warfighting needs. The Joint Staff also conducts joint
experimentation to provide capabilities that are optimized for the
Joint fight. Both of these functions also facilitate the Joint
Emergent/Urgent Operational Needs (JEON/JUON) processes, which are
designed to rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter in response
to Combatant Command operational needs. The Joint Staff and the
Chairman, as the Global Integrator, represent the voice of the Joint
Warfighter in the reform conversation.
joint force readiness
105. Lieutenant General Caine, given the increasing threats from
peer competitors and the challenges posed by a protracted conflict, how
would you ensure that the Joint Force maintains a high level of
readiness while balancing resource constraints?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will carefully weigh my
advice and recommendations against the priorities of the Nation Defense
Strategy (NDS) and recommend prudent use of the Joint Force in order to
preserve readiness for our highest priority threats.
china strategy
106. Lieutenant General Caine, you noted that China poses a growing
threat in the Indo-Pacific. What military strategies do you believe
will be most effective in deterring China's aggression while avoiding
escalation into open conflict?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will undertake a thorough
review of the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific and develop my
recommendations for appropriate military strategies.
combatant command coordination
107. Lieutenant General Caine, you have strong relationships with
combatant commanders. How would you ensure effective coordination
between commands while avoiding bureaucratic inefficiencies or
conflicts over jurisdiction?
Lieutenant General Caine. In my 34 years of military service, I
have led warfighters in a variety of roles across the Joint Force and
Interagency. I have built a global perspective on the challenges
America faces in achieving effective deterrence against our
adversaries. Each of these experiences has prepared me for the humbling
responsibility of serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
as the global integrator. If confirmed, I will continue to work with
Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs to ensure effective
coordination.
personnel and recruiting challenges
108. Lieutenant General Caine, recruiting and retention remain
critical challenges for the Armed Forces. What new approaches would you
consider to strengthen recruitment, particularly among younger
generations with shifting career expectations?
Lieutenant General Caine. Recruiting the next generation of
servicemembers is a national imperative. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Services to ensure our approach reflects the realities
of today's competitive labor market. The Joint Force depends on the
talent, drive, and dedication found in America's sons and daughters to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. I will support efforts across
the Department to strengthen recruiting and ensure our force remains
ready, capable, and representative of the Nation we serve.
military advice and policy disagreements
109. Lieutenant General Caine, you emphasized providing apolitical
military advice. Can you share an example from your career where your
advice differed from civilian leadership's priorities, and how you
handled that situation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, in my last role as the Associate
Director for Military Affairs at CIA I would often present a range of
options for Director Burns and Deputy Director Cohen to consider. If
asked to provide my recommendation I would do so. Once a decision was
made by my civilian leaders my job became the implementation of that
decision. If confirmed I will continue with this tradition and the
associated standard of conduct.
warrior ethos and culture
110. Lieutenant General Caine, you emphasized the importance of a
strong warrior ethos and clear standards. How do you balance
maintaining high military standards with evolving societal expectations
regarding diversity, inclusion, and personnel policies?
Lieutenant General Caine. We don't have much of a military without
the incredible 2.8 million members of the Joint Force that selflessly
joined the service to do something more important than themselves. If
confirmed, I think it's an opportunity for me to be another voice of
encouragement for those young men and women who have the capability and
meet the standards to come into the service and do something that they
will forever hold so high in their history. The chance to serve this
Nation is a special privilege for those of us that have come into the
cloth of our Nation and served, and I hope that I'll be able to
encourage others to do so.
lessons from past conflicts
111. Lieutenant General Caine, given your experience in combat and
strategic roles, what key lessons from past conflicts--such as Iraq,
Afghanistan, or Ukraine--do you believe should shape United States
Military planning moving forward?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, warfighting at scale is quickly
progressing. We are now facing kinetic exchanges with significantly
more rounds per hour than we have ever seen before. Mass and
simultaneity are real threats, and we must evolve our warfighting
approach to meet the mass challenges we will face. Autonomy and AI are
all a part of this. Actions in space and cyber are now the norm and we
must evolve our holistic warfighting approach in an ever more joint,
coalition, and interoperable way to win on the battlefields of the
future.
allied and partner coordination
112. Lieutenant General Caine, with the emphasis on working with
allies and partners to deter adversaries, what steps would you take to
strengthen military interoperability and joint planning with key allies
such as NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], Japan, and
Australia?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will undertake a thorough
review of the military situation in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and,
informed by the President and the Secretary's guidance, develop my
recommendations for specific steps we should take to strengthen
military interoperability and joint planning with key allies.
independence of uniformed military attorneys
113. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that uniformed
military attorneys are shielded from external pressures that could
compromise their legal advice?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, IAW 10 USC 156, there is a
Legal Counsel selected by a board of officers who is an independent
legal advisor to me. The statute specifically states that ``[n]o
officer or employee of the Department of Defense may interfere with the
ability of the Legal Counsel to give independent legal advice to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.'' I will work closely with my LC and his team as I prepare my
military advice for the Secretary of Defense and the President.
114. Lieutenant General Caine, can you provide an example from your
career where you upheld the independence of military attorneys in a
challenging situation?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, there were several examples
during the assignment at the Joint Special Operations Command where a
legal counsel's opinion shaped the outcome of a particular tactical
operation. This was a routine event, and I greatly respect and
appreciate the counsel that I have had.
strategic guidance documents
115. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure seamless
integration and coordination between the National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will first work with the
Secretary of Defense to have clear processes and governance in place
for the Joint Force to implement United States strategies. I will
ensure the Joint Force leaders have a shared understanding of the
President and SecDef's priorities and guidance across their missions
and responsibilities, including from the NSS, NDS, and NMS. To maintain
integration throughout strategy implementation, I will review the
existing processes for the Joint Force to implement the strategies and
cyclically assess progress and risk.
116. Lieutenant General Caine, what mechanisms would you implement
to improve compliance with strategic guidance documents across DOD
components?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review existing
processes for reporting and assessing progress against strategic
guidance and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense if I
determine changes are necessary. I will work with Joint Force leaders
to maintain shared understanding of strategic guidance and risks to
executing the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy.
I will make necessary changes to Joint Staff processes to ensure we
maintain a global perspective and can provide military options to the
Secretary of Defense and President, aligned to their strategic
guidance.
117. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you address potential
conflicts or misalignment between the President's National Security
Strategy and the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will advise and provide
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and President on any
potential conflicts or misalignment between the National Security
Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
118. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you measure the
effectiveness of the Chairman's Risk Assessment in shaping defense
policy?
Lieutenant General Caine. Identifying risk to our strategic
guidance helps us determine what resources and authorities to pursue to
achieve the policies of the department and the administration. If
confirmed, I will seek to maximize effectiveness of the Chairman's Risk
Assessment by aligning the risk assessed with other strategic documents
created by the Joint Staff that inform the budget and Defense Planning
Guidance. Effectiveness is in part measured by whether the risks and
gaps identified are addressed in the DPG and the President's budget. As
such, based on my military assessments, we will partner with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for DOD's budget submissions and
legislative proposals.
If confirmed, I look forward to briefing my risk assessment to
Congress in 2026 to inform the congressional budgeting process.
use of military force
119. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you balance military
effectiveness with legal and ethical considerations when recommending
rules of engagement?
Lieutenant General Caine. The President, as Commander-in-Chief,
determines when to use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and should
actively advise on the policies for the use of military force and the
rules of engagement. If confirmed, my recommendations to the President
and Secretary of Defense on the use of military force will be
consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I
would consider the probability of success, cost in terms of casualties,
and strategic risk.
120. Lieutenant General Caine, what role do you see emerging
technologies (e.g., AI, autonomous systems) playing in shaping future
rules of engagement?
Lieutenant General Caine. Emerging technologies offer the potential
to revolutionize warfare and delivering those capabilities in a timely
manner will continue to posture the Joint force for success on the
modern battlefield. If confirmed, I would serve as one of the tri-
chairs with OSD on the DODD 3000.09 Senior Review Board (SRB), which
reviews autonomous capabilities with a focus on minimizing the
probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems.
121. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that U.S.
Forces are properly trained and equipped to operate under evolving
rules of engagement?
Lieutenant General Caine. The CJCS must ensure the military's ROE
are regularly reviewed and updated in response to changing geopolitical
environments, threats, and legal considerations. This review involves
working closely with senior defense officials, legal advisors, and
policymakers to ensure ROE are adapted as needed. These updates should
be disseminated throughout the military leadership chain ensuring
alignment with the broader strategic objectives and national defense
priorities. The CJCS should ensure training programs for all
servicemembers are continuously updated to include ROE considerations.
These updates involve incorporating ROE into combat and mission
planning, simulation exercises, and real-world operations. The training
should cover not just the ``how'' of engaging targets, but also the
``why,'' emphasizing the strategic, ethical, and legal imperatives
behind the rules.
collective self-defense
122. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific criteria would you use
to determine which allied forces qualify for U.S. collective self-
defense support?
Lieutenant General Caine. When collective self-defense rules of
engagement are authorized, United States Forces may defend foreign
forces against any attack or threat of imminent attack. If confirmed, I
will consider the legal basis of the request, necessity and
proportionality, alignment with U.S. interests, and operational
circumstances of the request. If confirmed, I will review these factors
before I make any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and
President.
123. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you see collective self-
defense fitting into broader U.S. deterrence strategies?
Lieutenant General Caine. Collective self-defense is a cornerstone
of broader U.S. deterrence strategies. It demonstrates a commitment to
protecting allies, which strengthens partnerships and deters
adversaries from attacking weaker States. Additionally, it shows the
U.S. is willing to act decisively in defense of its allies, bolstering
our credibility and thereby increasing deterrence. Additionally, it
fosters a sense of shared responsibility and burden-sharing among
allies, encouraging them to invest in their own defense and deterrence
strategies. If confirmed, I will consider what our partners are doing
to deter shared threats before making a recommendation to the Secretary
of Defense and President.
title 50 authorities
124. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you assess the current
effectiveness of title 50 authorities in enabling interagency
cooperation in military operations?
Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experience, the current title
50 authorities are highly effective in enabling interagency cooperation
in military operations. Title 50 actions have a proven track record of
success in providing the needed intelligence support to make our
military operations more effective. If confirmed I will continue to
collaborate and leverage the interagency to pursue U.S. interests
globally.
125. Lieutenant General Caine, under what circumstances would you
advocate for changes or modifications to title 50 authorities?
Lieutenant General Caine. If changes or modifications are required
to support maximizing the effectiveness of military operations in
support of U.S. interests, I will advocate on the issue.
civilian casualties and civilian harm and mitigation
126. Lieutenant General Caine, what steps would you take to improve
data-sharing policies to facilitate timely investigations of civilian
casualties?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I would seek to improve
data-sharing by supporting efforts that balance efficiency with
security and accountability.
127. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that findings
from civilian casualty investigations are effectively used to refine
operational practices and reduce future risks?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I would support ensuring
effective utilization of civilian casualty investigation findings by
pursuing a systematic approach that integrates analysis,
implementation, and continuous monitoring.
128. Lieutenant General Caine, the Joint Staff plays a crucial role
in implementing the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) Action
Plan (CHMR-AP), including incorporating CHMR into joint doctrine,
planning, and operations and ensuring that efforts to mitigate civilian
harm are considered in all phases of military operations. If confirmed,
how will you continue to advance and resource these efforts?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will comply with
statutory requirements and carry out the guidance set forth in DOD
policy on CHMR.
129. Lieutenant General Caine, how will you implement civilian harm
and mitigation response efforts in security cooperation initiatives and
programs with allies and partners?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will comply with
statutory requirements and carry out the guidance set forth in DOD
policy on CHMR. I will examine and provide my military advice on
incorporating civilian harm risk assessment and mitigation methods into
DOD security cooperation efforts.
joint force operations and experimentation
130. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you foresee joint force
experimentation contributing to overcoming anti-access and area denial
(A2/AD) threats?
Lieutenant General Caine. Addressing the challenge posed by anti-
access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities is a critical priority for
the Joint Force. Joint force experimentation plays a vital role in
understanding and mitigating these threats. I would assess that a
focused experimentation campaign, centered on threat-based concepts of
employment, is essential to identifying and refining the capabilities
needed to maintain our warfighter advantage.
Specifically, experimentation allows us to evaluate emerging
technologies and innovative approaches to overcome A2/AD systems, and
to articulate critical capability requirements for future development.
This is important as competitors continue to advance their systems to
defeat ours and we must constantly experiment and adapt to stay ahead.
From experimentation with technology to experimenting with new
operating approaches, the Joint Force can only be ready if we
constantly adapt to the changing character of war.
131. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that lessons
from joint experimentation are effectively translated into operational
capabilities?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff has established a process
to translate the Joint Warfighting Concept into needed capabilities.
This includes identifying key requirements, prioritizing those needing
acceleration, and coordinating with the Services through Joint
Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to assign development leads.
Recognizing the need for speed, the Joint Staff is continuously
reviewing these processes to identify capabilities that should be
accelerated. We are also increasing end-user involvement in
experimentation to better align capabilities with operational needs and
facilitate smoother transitions.
Translating experimental lessons into operational capabilities
remains challenging. A collaborative approach with OSD, Combatant
Commands, and the Services is essential. We focus on identifying
materiel and non-materiel solutions through rigorous experimentation
and field demonstrations, informing investment recommendations. We will
continue supporting Joint Staff-led collaboration venues and
prioritizing coordination with stakeholders to ensure effective
implementation and Joint Force integration of new capabilities.
132. Lieutenant General Caine, what role should private sector
innovation play in joint experimentation efforts?
Lieutenant General Caine. Private sector innovation is crucial for
DOD joint experimentation. It accelerates technology integration,
reduces development time, and fosters dual-use applications.
Collaboration enables rapid prototyping, testing, and burden-sharing.
Aligning private sector investment with DOD needs and incorporating
warfighter feedback ensures technologies meet operational requirements.
Frequent communication and iterative development are key to successful
partnerships.
joint force headquarters and contingency planning
133. Lieutenant General Caine, given the short warning times for
potential conflicts, do you believe the current model for standing up
Joint Force Headquarters is sufficient?
Lieutenant General Caine. Proactively establishing subordinate
Joint Force headquarters before a crisis erupts could indeed enhance
operational readiness, planning, and preparedness. However, this must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A thorough analysis is crucial to
determine when the benefits of early establishment outweigh the
potential costs.
134. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you assess the tradeoffs
between maintaining a standing Joint Force Headquarters versus
activating them in a time of crisis?
Lieutenant General Caine. Existing structures leverages the proven
capabilities of service components and their ability to function as
JTFs, provides flexibility and responsiveness to address a wide range
of potential crises but they take time to transition to full JTFs.
Meanwhile, standby JTFs are ready but comes with costs such as manpower
allocation, staff workload, and financial implications.
135. Lieutenant General Caine, what metrics would you use to
determine the effectiveness of a Joint Force Headquarters in executing
contingency plans?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
Department's lessons learned and best practices from recent operations
and exercises to establish metrics and measures of effectiveness to
guide future use of Joint Force Headquarters during contingencies.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
ethics
136. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to not engaging in any lobbying activities (including
unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the
guise of consulting or advising on DOD-related matters) at DOD or any
of its components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed I will continue to
comply with DOD Ethics regulations and guidance. As I did in my first
retirement, I have no intent to lobby. I am focused on the job at
hand--if confirmed.
137. Lieutenant General Caine, during your nomination process, did
anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other closely related
entity approach you about your loyalty to President Trump?
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
138. Lieutenant General Caine, if you were approached about your
loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or other
similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that pledge
or oath.
Lieutenant General Caine. I was not approached about my loyalty to
the President. My loyalty remains in the oath I have upheld for 34
years, the oath to support and defend the Constitution. I was never
asked a single loyalty question during my interview process.
139. Lieutenant General Caine, if you were approached about your
loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal representations of
loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
Lieutenant General Caine. I was not approached about my loyalty to
the President. My loyalty remains in the oath I have upheld for 34
years, the oath to support and defend the Constitution. I was never
asked a single loyalty question during my interview process.
140. Lieutenant General Caine, in November 2024, the New York Times
and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top adviser to
President Trump, allegedly requested payment from prospective political
appointees to promote their candidacies for top positions within the
administration. Did you discuss the possibility of joining the
administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Lieutenant General Caine. I don't know who Boris Epshteyn is nor
have I met anyone by that name.
141. Lieutenant General Caine, if you did discuss the possibility
of joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr. Epshteyn seek
payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a position within the
administration?
Lieutenant General Caine. I don't know who Boris Epshteyn is nor
have I met anyone by that name.
142. Lieutenant General Caine, at any time, did lawyers for
President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
explain the information that they provided you, including copies of
documents, what was discussed during any calls, and any other
information pertaining to this interaction.
Lieutenant General Caine. I don't know who Boris Epshteyn is nor
have I met anyone by that name.
143. Lieutenant General Caine, if you own any defense contractor
stock, will you divest it to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of
interest?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed and pursuant to ethics
guidance issued to me by the Department, I will instruct my financial
advisor to comply with any/all legal guidance from ethics counsel on
any defense related holdings.
144. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you consider the role of the
press in a democracy?
Lieutenant General Caine. The press plays an essential role in
informing the American public. In a democracy, access to timely and
accurate information builds trust and understanding between the
military and the citizens we serve. If confirmed, I will support
efforts to ensure the Joint Staff communicates clearly and credibly,
while staying aligned with civilian leadership and respecting the
responsibilities of the services and combatant commands.
145. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit not to retaliate,
including by denying access to DOD officials or facilities, against
news outlets or individual journalists who publish articles that are
critical of you, your office, DOD, or the Trump administration?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
146. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever been accused of
sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work environment
for another individual in a personal or professional capacity? Provide
a list of all instances in which you have been accused of sexually
harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work environment for an
individual and the behavior of which you were accused.
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
147. Lieutenant General Caine, have you requested, or has anyone
requested on your behalf, that any other person or third party sign a
nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-disparagement, or similar agreement
regarding your conduct in a personal or professional capacity?
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
148. Lieutenant General Caine, will you voluntarily release any
individual from any such agreements before a committee vote on your
nomination?
Lieutenant General Caine. I have no such agreements in place with
anyone.
149. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever paid or promised to
pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your behalf, an
individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality, non-
disparagement, or similar agreement?
Lieutenant General Caine. I have not.
150. Lieutenant General Caine, if the answer to question above was
yes, how much was promised, how much was paid, and what were the
circumstances?
Lieutenant General Caine. None of the applicable answers were
``Yes''
151. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to recuse yourself
from all particular matters involving your former clients and employers
for at least 4 years?
Lieutenant General Caine. I will comply with any/all legal guidance
provided to me by the DOD Office of Ethics and if appropriate pursuant
to that guidance recuse myself. At this time, I do not believe that I
have any particular matters or concerns that would fit this situation.
152. Lieutenant General Caine, were you at any time, or are you
currently, contacted by or under investigation or review by any
inspector general personnel for any reason?
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
domestic deployment
153. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed will you make sure the
public knows as much as practicable why and under what authorities the
Guard is being deployed domestically?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and other senior leaders to
ensure there is clarity, both inside and outside the Department,
regarding the role, authority, and purpose behind National Guard
deployments. While those deployment decisions are made by civilian
leaders or Governors, the Joint Staff plays an important role in
ensuring consistent and accurate communication. I will support efforts
to inform the public, to the extent practicable, when significant
changes occur in how or why the Guard is being used domestically,
always in coordination with the appropriate authorities.
154. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed will you make sure the
public knows as much as practicable when there are significant changes
in why and under what authorities the Guard is being deployed
domestically?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and other senior leaders to
ensure there is clarity, both inside and outside the Department,
regarding the role, authority, and purpose behind National Guard
deployments. While those deployment decisions are made by civilian
leaders or Governors, the Joint Staff plays an important role in
ensuring consistent and accurate communication. I will support efforts
to inform the public, to the extent practicable, when significant
changes occur in how or why the Guard is being used domestically,
always in coordination with the appropriate authorities.
155. Lieutenant General Caine, do you support the Department of
Homeland Security submitting requests for assistance at the southwest
border from the Department of Defense and the National Guard at least
180 days in advance?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to providing as
much notice as possible servicemembers, particularly for members of the
National Guard who must make plans with employers and others before
deploying anywhere.
156. Lieutenant General Caine, what benefits could advance notice
from the Department of Homeland Security provide for readiness and
national security?
Lieutenant General Caine. Early notification of requirements
enables the Joint Force to strategically plan for deployments,
improving readiness by synchronizing training and modernization
schedules with operational needs.
157. Lieutenant General Caine, Department of Defense Directive
3025.18 ``Defense Support of Civil Authorities'' and Department of
Defense Instruction 3025.21 ``Defense Support of Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies,'' and Joint Publication 3-28 ``Defense Support to
Civil Authorities'' provide doctrine for planning, conducting, and
assess defense support of civil authorities. If confirmed, will you
evaluate whether those policy documents provide sufficient clarity,
including on emergency authorities, and provide your assessment to this
committee?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
158. Lieutenant General Caine, Department of Defense Directive
3025.18 ``Defense Support of Civil Authorities'' and Department of
Defense Instruction 3025.21 ``Defense Support of Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies,'' and Joint Publication 3-28 ``Defense Support to
Civil Authorities'' provide doctrine for planning, conducting, and
assess defense support of civil authorities. If confirmed, will you
evaluate whether those policy documents provide procedures to inform
the public about the authorities, mission, and duration for domestic
deployments and provide your assessment to this committee?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
159. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of the
training provided to the National Guard for Federal standing rules for
the use of force on domestic military deployments?
Lieutenant General Caine. National Guard personnel receive training
from their service post mobilization on training requirements provided
by the Combatant Command. After the service ensures the training is
completed, they validate these units to support their assigned mission.
Additionally, our National Guard forces conduct a handover with the
unit currently conducting the mission to both mitigate risk and ensure
they are prepared for execution. As a part of this process, units
receive training on the Federal standing rules for the use of force
(SRUF).
160. Lieutenant General Caine, is there any distinction in the
standing rules of force for the National Guard during domestic military
deployments when in ``title 10'' status versus when operating under
State or ``title 32'' status?
Lieutenant General Caine. While our National Guard forces always
have the inherent right to self-defense, there is a distinction in the
standing rules for the use of force for the National Guard during
domestic military operations when in Title 10 status versus when
operating under State or Title 32 status. While in a Title 10 status,
National Guard members will not participate in domestic law enforcement
activities, unless they are actively covered by an exception to the
Posse Comitatus Act.
congressional oversight and transparency
161. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of the
role of the Department of Defense Inspector General and service
Inspectors General?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Department of Defense Inspector
General (DoD IG) and Service Inspectors General play a crucial role in
maintaining accountability and integrity within the DOD by conducting
audits, investigations, and evaluations to prevent and detect fraud,
waste, and abuse, while promoting economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness.
162. Lieutenant General Caine, will you ensure your staff complies
with any Inspector General deadlines established for requested
communications, providing witnesses, providing documents, and that
those witnesses will be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
163. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are not able to comply with
any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you notify the
Republican and Democratic members of the committee regarding the basis
for any good faith delay or denial?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
164. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from any individual,
including the President?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
165. Lieutenant General Caine, what actions would you take if you
were given an illegal order from any individual, including the
President?
Lieutenant General Caine. I do not expect to be given an illegal
order. For all orders given to me from the President and the Secretary
of Defense, I will work closely with my staff, including my independent
legal counsel, to best advise the President and Secretary of Defense on
the way forward in response to those orders.
166. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to testify or
provide a deposition if you are called upon by Congress to testify or
provide a deposition voluntarily?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
167. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to testify or
provide a deposition to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to
testify or provide a deposition?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
168. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to providing
information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are requested
to do so?
Lieutenant General Caine. In accordance with all applicable laws
and regulations, I will provide information or documents voluntarily to
Congress if requested to do so.
169. Lieutenant General Caine, will you provide information or
documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena?
Lieutenant General Caine. In accordance with all applicable laws
and regulations, I will provide information or documents to Congress if
issued a subpoena.
170. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to following current
DOD precedent for responding to information requests, briefings, and
other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees and their minority members?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
171. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, will you commit to
posting your official calendar monthly?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to conducting a
security review to ensure OPSEC before I publicly release any
information.
172. Lieutenant General Caine, do you think the DOD has an over-
classification problem?
Lieutenant General Caine. While there is always room for
improvement in our classification processes and procedures, the Joint
Force regularly writes for release and utilizes classification markings
at the lowest classification levels to ensure dissemination to the
widest audience in a timely manner.
173. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, do you think DOD
should pursue strategic technology to support automated
declassification?
Lieutenant General Caine. From the Joint Force perspective, while
Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds extraordinary potential to support
declassification requirements, we must ensure we adhere to existing
legal, cybersecurity, information, operational security, and
classification policies and authorities. Generative AI models can
provide an initial review of documents to highlight availability for
declassification and any potential areas of concern if the information
is declassified. However, AI models do not check for truth in outputs
and can potentially carry forward inaccuracies inherent in the data
inputs; therefore, these technologies should be used to augment, rather
than replace a human at this time.
project 2025
174. Lieutenant General Caine, have you discussed Project 2025 with
any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the Trump transition
team, or other members of the Trump administration? If so, please
explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom you
discussed it.
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
175. Lieutenant General Caine, have you discussed Project 2025 with
any officials associated with the Heritage Foundation? If so, please
explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom you
discussed it.
Lieutenant General Caine. I have not.
nuclear weapons
176. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you think increasing our
nuclear weapons spending will impact our adversaries' interest in doing
the same?
Lieutenant General Caine. While Russian and Chinese nuclear
decisionmaking is driven by multiple factors, a marked increase in
United States nuclear weapons spending would likely be perceived by
Russia and China as a potential threat to strategic stability,
prompting them to bolster their own nuclear capabilities. Russia views
its nuclear capabilities as mostly in parity with the United States and
would view a significant increase in spending as a threat to that
parity. China is already expanding its forces to ensure the capability
to survive a first strike and respond with the threat of unacceptable
damage--increased United States spending may spur further modernization
efforts to meet their nuclear objectives. However, United States
spending is unlikely to significantly influence North Korea and Iran's
nuclear ambitions as they are driven by their own strategic goals.
177. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you think our adversaries
would interpret the United States resuming live fire nuclear weapons
testing?
Lieutenant General Caine. Our adversaries would likely interpret
the United States resuming live fire nuclear weapons testing as
threatening, provocative, and destabilizing and a possible
justification to do the same. Russia and China could consider similar
tests in response, while North Korea and Iran would see it as a
justification for their own nuclear actions and preparations. All four
countries would likely use the situation to criticize the United States
and justify their own defensive measures.
178. Lieutenant General Caine, which conventional weapons should be
cut to pay for nuclear modernization or missile defense systems?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will lead an analysis to
find more deployable capital, through which we can do in three ways:
find efficiencies through cost savings, reprogram internally, or
increase our topline.
foreign influence
179. Lieutenant General Caine, have you received any payment from a
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years?
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
180. Lieutenant General Caine, have you communicated with any
foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
the past 5 years?
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
181. Lieutenant General Caine, please disclose any communications
or payments you have had with representatives of any foreign government
or entity controlled by a foreign government within the past 5 years
and describe the nature of the communication.
Lieutenant General Caine. I remain personal friends with a group of
Senior Leaders from our Allies and Partners that I met during my time
in uniform. Many of these senior leaders remain in the military of
their governments. None of these agreements have a financial component
to them and all are based on pre-existing USG MIL-MIL relationships. If
confirmed and I reenter the military I will disclose them as part of my
security re-entry as I always have.
sexual assault and harassment
182. Lieutenant General Caine, the most recent DOD statistics found
that about 29,000 Active Duty troops--which accounts for 6.8 percent of
female servicemembers and 1.3 percent of male servicemembers--
experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2023. A Brown University study
estimates that the actual rates are two to four times higher. How do
you plan to address and reduce sexual assault and sexual harassment in
the military?
Lieutenant General Caine. One incident of sexual assault or sexual
harassment in the U.S. Armed Forces is too many. I understand that
prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment decreased in 2023 in
the Armed Forces for the first time in several years. More must be done
to sustain these changes. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously
support policies and programs to reduce the occurrence of sexual
assault, improve support to victims, and hold offenders appropriately
accountable.
183. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD support and protect
your department servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors
who come forward with reports of sexual assault and sexual harassment?
Lieutenant General Caine. Congress has granted us robust
authorities to ensure that we can assist sexual assault and sexual
harassment victims, hold offenders appropriately accountable, and
prevent these crimes. Joint Force readiness hinges on the preparedness
of our warfighters, which is most effectively achieved within cohesive
units led by empowered chains of command. It is imperative to foster
healthy command climates and prevent harmful behaviors. To this end I
support applying the resources provided to us for this purpose, which
include our prevention and response workforces and our regular
assessments of military unit health worldwide. I am committed to
ensuring our people receive support and resources that are trauma-
informed, responsive to need, and recovery-oriented.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
184. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe that servicemembers,
civilians, grantees, and contractors should be protected from any form
of retaliation for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual
assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern
that they wish to raise?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
185. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever retaliated against any
individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or
harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish
to raise?
Lieutenant General Caine. No.
186. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please specify how you will
do so.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
civilian harm
187. Lieutenant General Caine, do you agree that one difference
between the United States and its potential adversaries is the greater
value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human life and
liberty at home and abroad?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes
188. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of title
10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian Protection Center of
Excellence?
Lieutenant General Caine. Title 10 U.S.C. 184 establishes the
Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP CoE) as a specialized
military organization that serves as the Department of Defense's
primary institution for advancing civilian protection capabilities. The
center operates as a hub and facilitator of Department-wide analysis,
learning, and strategic approaches to civilian harm mitigation and
response during military operations.
189. Lieutenant General Caine, the United States Military has spent
many years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate
civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including through the
development of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first
Trump administration, which I commend. These efforts received
bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the
United States Military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. If
confirmed, will you commit to continued leadership on civilian harm
issues?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
190. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, what do you
understand to be your role and responsibilities regarding civilian harm
mitigation and response?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I understand my role and
responsibilities as outlined in statutory requirements and DOD policy
is to prioritize and integrate capability requirements to support the
Joint Force's ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm by
ensuring CHMR learning and training objectives are incorporated into
joint education, training, strategies, plans, exercises, and
operations.
191. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you understand to be the
importance of mitigating civilian harm in military operations?
Lieutenant General Caine. Mitigating civilian harm in military
operations results in more efficient and effective mission-set that
retains the freedom of the joint force to maneuver in host nations,
establishing trust and security of the local population, and the
protection of the joint force.
192. Lieutenant General Caine, what value can advisors with
expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response provide to
commanders?
Lieutenant General Caine. Civilian harm mitigation and response
advisors provide commanders with crucial data on the civilian
environment, tailored mitigation advice, and enhanced understanding of
the impact of operations on civilians, preserving the commander's vital
decision space.
193. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian Protection Center of
Excellence?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I am committed to carrying
out all statutory requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the roles and responsibilities placed upon me and my staff
by the Secretary of Defense.
194. Lieutenant General Caine, how will you prevent and mitigate
civilian harm?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will provide the
President and Secretary of Defense with expert military advice and
implement guidance to mitigate civilian harm, in accordance with DOD
policy and the Chairman's responsibilities.
195. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian Harm Mitigation
Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I am committed to carrying
out all statutory requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the roles and responsibilities placed upon me and my staff
by the Secretary of Defense.
196. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe that our troops are
at higher risk for retribution as the number of civilian deaths from
United States Military operations or U.S.-led military operations
increases?
Lieutenant General Caine. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS
will continue to exploit galvanizing events, such as the Israel-HAMAS
conflict, which they link to the United States, and the 2023 Quran
burnings in Sweden and the Netherlands, to inspire supporters
worldwide. The United States has been consistent in policy to mitigate
unintended or incidental damage or injury to civilian or noncombatant
persons or property or the environment and we have policies to assist
commanders in weighing risks against military necessity and in
evaluating proportionality within the framework of the joint planning
process.
right-to-repair
197. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe giving the DOD access
to the technical data rights needed to repair its own equipment could
advance the DOD's readiness?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, giving servicemembers access to all
the training, technical data, and tooling necessary to repair and
sustain our weapon systems would make a positive impact on overall
readiness of the Joint Force.
198. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe giving the DOD access
to the technical data rights needed to repair its own equipment could
help reduce the DOD's repair and sustainment costs?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, granting servicemembers access to
technical data rights for repairing its own equipment could
significantly reduce repair and sustainment costs. By enabling the DOD
to perform repairs in-house, it would decrease reliance on external
contractors, lower service fees, and allow for more efficient
maintenance practices, ultimately leading to long-term cost savings.
199. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD ensure servicemembers
who are stationed abroad can repair equipment in a timely and cost-
effective manner, especially in a contested logistics environment?
Lieutenant General Caine. To ensure servicemembers stationed abroad
can repair equipment in a timely and cost-effective manner, especially
in a contested logistics environment, the DOD should focus on pre-
positioning critical repair parts and tools closest to the point of
need, establishing local repair capabilities with trained personnel,
and utilizing additive/advanced manufacturing for on-demand parts
production. Additionally, enhancing partnerships with local industries
and leveraging remote diagnostic technologies can reduce reliance on
long supply chains and external support, improving operational
readiness and minimizing delays in maintenance. We must also employ
advanced manufacturing to expedite repairs at the forward edge.
research and development
200. Lieutenant General Caine, does DOD benefit from partnering
with colleges, universities, nonprofits, and federally funded research
and development centers?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Department does benefit from
collaborating with these entities. Research is the foundation of Joint
Force design and development and underpins concept development,
experimentation, and the fielding of the critical technologies and
techniques that will deter or win in a future conflict. Colleges,
universities, nonprofits, and federally funded research and development
centers offer scope, scale, and collective expertise, all of which help
advance. From the tactical to the strategic level, partnering with
these centers is critical to the DOD's ability to bring the right
technology to bear in order to deter and if needed, defeat a peer
adversary.
Further, the U.S. faces a rapidly evolving security environment,
making a swift and effective transition to advanced technology a DOD
imperative. However, warfighters should be involved in the research
process to ensure their operational experience informs decisionmaking
and technology development. Events such as the FFRDC Summit in
particular have broadened networks for warfighters (end-users),
enabling a more rapid pull of relevant capabilities into operational
environments from DOE and FFRDC Labs.
protecting classified information and federal records
201. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of the
need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
Lieutenant General Caine. Operational Security (OPSEC) is a
critical aspect of protecting sensitive information and preventing
adversaries from gaining an advantage.
202. Lieutenant General Caine, what are the national security risks
of improperly disclosing classified information?
Lieutenant General Caine. The national security risks of improperly
disclosing classified information are significant. Depending on the
classification of the information disclosed, and the unintended
recipient, the consequences could include the compromise of operations,
intelligence gathering, or international relationships.
203. Lieutenant General Caine, is it your opinion that information
about imminent military targets is generally sensitive information that
needs to be protected?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
204. Lieutenant General Caine, what would you do if you learned an
official had improperly disclosed classified information?
Lieutenant General Caine. In any situation of concern, I would
immediately report it to my security officer and determine the best
away ahead to minimize any potential risk to national security.
205. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of
Government officials' duties under the Federal Records Act?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Federal Records Act requires
government officials to ensure the creation, preservation, and proper
management of Federal records.
206. Lieutenant General Caine, should classified information be
shared on unclassified commercial systems?
Lieutenant General Caine. No, classified information should not be
shared on unclassified commercial systems.
207. Lieutenant General Caine, is it damaging to servicemembers'
confidence in DOD if the pilots flying a mission find out that the
official who ordered them to perform that mission shared sensitive
information that could have made it more likely that the mission would
fail or they would be killed?
Lieutenant General Caine. The information domain is always a threat
to our forces and we must always preserve the element of surprise.
208. Lieutenant General Caine, if you had information about the
status of specific targets, weapons being used, and timing for imminent
U.S. strikes against an adversary, under what circumstances would you
feel comfortable receiving or sharing that information on an
unclassified commercial application like Signal?
Lieutenant General Caine. We should always preserve the element of
surprise and that should translate across every information domain and
format and never put our war fighters in any harm's way.
medical capacity
209. Lieutenant General Caine, in your judgment, is the United
States Military's medical system prepared to support large-scale combat
operations?
Lieutenant General Caine. One single capability is best understood
in the context of the entire joint force requirement. I understand
there is likely opportunity to improve the preparedness of the United
States Military medical system to support military response to future
challenges. If confirmed, I will look at medical readiness in the
context of warfighting capabilities that the joint force projects and
support efforts to assure we are ready to respond if necessary.
210. Lieutenant General Caine, if the United States Military's
medical system is not prepared to support large-scale combat
operations, what steps should DOD take to be adequately prepared?
Lieutenant General Caine. As I learn more about the challenges
facing the military health system, I will, if confirmed, formulate
recommendations to minimize risk to the joint force.
effect of border operations on readiness and morale
211. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, will you provide to
the committee within 60 days a list of any training exercises that have
been delayed or canceled due to the recent deployments to the southern
border or Guantanamo? Please provide the date and type of any affected
training exercises and explain which units were impacted.
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
212. Lieutenant General Caine, is DOD separating units when sending
personnel to the border or Guantanamo? If so, please explain the
rationale for doing so, given evidence of how doing so from 2018-2020
harmed units' readiness.
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the
deployment of personnel to the border or Guantanamo and review the
2018-2020 readiness findings to ensure we are instituting lessons
learned and reducing impacts on readiness.
213. Lieutenant General Caine, the GAO previously found that ``DOD
has not defined what it considers to be a manageable impact on
readiness.'' How should DOD determine when an anticipated impact on
readiness is ``manageable''?
Lieutenant General Caine. Impacts on readiness are usually
determined by analyzing risk to mission and risk to force statements
provided by the potentially affected Combatant Commands and the
Military Departments. If confirmed, I will weigh the magnitude and
nature of these risks relative to their probability as I provide my
recommendations to the SecDef.
214. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD monitor the impact of
the border deployment on troops' morale?
Lieutenant General Caine. The immediate frontline supervisors,
Senior Enlisted Leaders, and Commanders have a direct responsibility
for their soldiers, sailors, airman, marines, guardians, and sentinels
on morale of all military members. If confirmed it is my obligation to
provide clear mission intent and ensure that our members have
everything, they need to complete their mission.
215. Lieutenant General Caine, will DOD commit to inform the Senate
Armed Services Committee if it sees patterns of suicide, substance
abuse, and other warning signs that the border operations are degrading
servicemembers' mental health?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
216. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD assess whether its
southern border and Guantanamo operations are militarily effective?
Lieutenant General Caine. The DOD is responding to a request for
Assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. Since DHS is the
lead Federal agency, DOD should work with DHS to assess the
effectiveness of these operations based on DHS desired objectives and
effects.
217. Lieutenant General Caine, what should DOD's role be at the
Migrant Operations Center (MOC) and Guantanamo's Camp 6?
Lieutenant General Caine. My understanding is that DOD is
responding to an RFA from DHS and operating pursuant to a signed MOU
between DOD and DHS. If confirmed, I will review DOD's role at the MOC
and Camp 6 and provide any recommendations to the SecDef.
218. Lieutenant General Caine, there are reports that DOD personnel
are guarding migrants at Camp 6. Is this an appropriate use of
servicemembers' time and DOD resources?
Lieutenant General Caine. My understanding is that DHS/ICE maintain
legal and physical custody of the illegal aliens at Guantanamo Bay with
DOD support. If confirmed, and I find that DOD personnel are guarding
migrants I will report this to Congress.
conduct and conditions of border operations
219. Lieutenant General Caine, what are the rules of engagement
that govern each unit deployed to the border?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the current
Rules for the Use of Force and provide any recommended changes to the
SecDef and POTUS.
220. Lieutenant General Caine, are servicemembers authorized to use
force at the border?
Lieutenant General Caine. Unit commanders always retain the
inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense and receive
training to make sound, legally grounded decisions in situations where
the use of force may be necessary.
221. Lieutenant General Caine, in 2020, the DOD Inspector General
found that some troops did not receive Standing Rules for the Use of
Force (SRUF) training. Should troops receive this training?
Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. Every servicemember must receive
comprehensive and recurring Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)
training.
222. Lieutenant General Caine, should servicemembers under DOD's
command be authorized to use force against unarmed civilians at the
border?
Lieutenant General Caine. The use of force, especially deadly
force, against unarmed civilians is prohibited unless it is necessary
to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm to oneself or another
person. While DOD personnel are trained in techniques to de-escalate
hostile situations, United States servicemembers always retain the
right of self-defense.
223. Lieutenant General Caine, under what circumstances, if any,
should servicemembers under DOD's command be authorized to make arrests
at the border?
Lieutenant General Caine. Servicemembers in a title 10 status are
not authorized to make arrests at the border as this is a law
enforcement function.
224. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD handle encounters
with citizens at the border?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the current
guidance and if appropriate make any recommended changes to the SecDef
and POTUS. I also defer to DHS for questions concerning DHS operations.
225. Lieutenant General Caine, what should DOD's plan be for
migrants held at Guantanamo whose home country will not accept their
repatriation?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the current
guidance and if appropriate make any recommended changes to the SecDef
and POTUS. I also defer to DHS for questions concerning DHS operations.
226. Lieutenant General Caine, what should be DOD's plan for
evacuating the MOC during extreme weather events?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with SOUTHCOM
to understand their current evacuation plans for facilities at Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB).
227. Lieutenant General Caine, what government entities, if any,
should conduct onsite inspections of Guantanamo's MOC and Camp 6?
Lieutenant General Caine. Historically, the U.N. International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) has had access to pertinent operations at Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay. If confirmed, I will work with SOUTHCOM assess
their current plan for inspections.
228. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD handle requests for
access to the MOC or Camp 6 from legal service providers, humanitarian
organizations, the press, or other members of the public?
Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with SOUTHCOM
to better understand the process for access to Naval Station Guantanamo
Bay. I defer questions on specific requests to DHS / ICE as the lead
Federal agency.
229. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD's facilitate
migrants' access to counsel?
Lieutenant General Caine. DOD is operating in support of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains custody and control of
the migrants. DOD should facilitate migrants' access to counsel in
accordance with the interdepartmental MOU between DHS and DOD and all
U.S. laws and international obligations.
230. Lieutenant General Caine, what standards of care should DOD
personnel be bound to provide at Guantanamo?
Lieutenant General Caine. DOD is operating in support of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains custody and control of
the migrants. DOD should be bound to the Standards of Care addendum to
the interdepartmental MOU between DHS and DOD and all U.S. laws and
international obligations.
231. Lieutenant General Caine, what emergency and non-emergency
medical services should be provided to migrants at Guantanamo?
Lieutenant General Caine. DOD is operating in support of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains custody and control of
the migrants. DOD should provide medical services in accordance with
the interdepartmental MOU between DHS and DOD and all U.S. laws and
international obligations.
recruitment and retention
232. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you plan to improve the
military's recruitment efforts?
Lieutenant General Caine. The Department's ability to attract,
recruit, and assess a highly qualified force is a national imperative.
If confirmed, I will work directly with the Services to drive
connection with the American communities, demonstrate value in military
service and build trust through quality interactions with today's
youth. Our ability to recruit and retain high quality individuals is
critical to sustaining a long-term strategic advantage over pacing
threats and dynamic security environment.
233. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you plan to ensure that
Americans of diverse backgrounds feel welcome to join the military?
Lieutenant General Caine. The strength of the Joint Force comes
from the character, competence, and commitment of those who serve,
across all backgrounds. If confirmed, I will support efforts that
ensure every qualified American sees military service as a place where
they can belong, contribute, and lead. Upholding clear standards,
reinforcing the warrior ethos, sense of unity, and fostering a culture
of professionalism and respect are essential to attracting and
retaining the talent we need to meet today's security challenges.
234. Lieutenant General Caine, in response to President Trump and
Secretary Hegseth's efforts to eliminate diversity, equity, and
inclusion (DEI), the military has canceled recruiting efforts with
long-standing partners. The Army abandoned its long-standing
partnership with the Black Engineer of the Year Awards, and the Navy,
Air Force, and Space Force also pulled out of the event. The Army also
ended a long-standing partnership with Ashley Hall, an all-girls prep
school located in South Carolina and which existed during the first
Trump administration. Why are partnerships with organizations like
these important for our ability to recruit individuals to the military?
Lieutenant General Caine. Partnerships like these help us connect
with high-performing individuals who might not otherwise consider
military service. If confirmed, I will support recruiting efforts that
are grounded in the military's core values, uphold high standards, and
reflect the diversity of our Nation. The Joint Force must draw from the
full range of America's talent to remain competitive. When we engage
with trusted institutions, whether schools, professional organizations,
or community groups, we send a message that military service is open to
all who are qualified and willing to serve.
235. Lieutenant General Caine, why is it important to have a
military whose diversity reflects the U.S. population?
Lieutenant General Caine. In the current operational environment,
it is important that the military focus on increasing lethality with
high but fair standards to ensure opportunities for the best Americans
to serve.
236. Lieutenant General Caine, the Army achieved its recruiting
goals in 2024 for the first time in several years ``primarily due to an
increase in female recruits.'' Almost 10,000 women signed up for active
duty in 2024, ``an 18 percent jump from the previous year, while male
recruitment increased by just 8 percent.'' Why is it important to
recruit women to the military?
Lieutenant General Caine. Current policy allows for members to
serve in all roles. We set and maintain high standards throughout the
Services and members that meet those standards are given the
opportunity to serve.
237. Lieutenant General Caine, why is it important for women to
have access to combat roles, including for potential long-term
promotions, and how does this tie into being able to effectively
recruit and retain women in the military?
Lieutenant General Caine. Current policy allows for women to serve
in all roles. We must set and maintain high standards; Any member who
meets the standard is afforded the opportunity to serve in combat
roles. We must promote Servicemembers based on demonstrated performance
and potential to serve with increased levels of responsibility.
238. Lieutenant General Caine, why is the quality of military
housing important for the retention of servicemembers?
Lieutenant General Caine. It is fundamental to Quality of Service
(Gate Commission on the All-Volunteer Force) policy. FRSM Cap and the
BCA have had impacts over the last decade. The quality of military
housing is important for retention because it directly impacts the
well-being and satisfaction of servicemembers. Safe, comfortable, and
affordable housing improves moral, reduces stress, and allows
servicemembers to focus on warfighting duties.
239. Lieutenant General Caine, why is quality access to healthcare
for servicemembers and their families important for the retention of
servicemembers?
Lieutenant General Caine. Access to quality healthcare is a
fundamental requirement for maintaining and retaining a strong and
ready fighting force. Ensuring quality access to healthcare is an
investment in our Servicemembers, signaling the DOD values the service
and commitment of Servicemembers and their families.
240. Lieutenant General Caine, while the Army has improved its
recruitment efforts, recent data has shown that ``[n]early one-quarter
of soldiers recruited since 2022 have failed to complete their initial
contracts.'' How do you plan to address challenges with retention
across the military?
Lieutenant General Caine. Retention rates throughout the military
are trending toward a positive increase. If confirmed I will work
closely with each of the Services to ensure that we are retaining the
most qualified members that want to continue military service, within
the needs of each of the Services.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
great power competition
241. ``I guess with the last remaining seconds I have, I'll just
sort of . . . Your view of this great power competition with China,
what are some things that we need to get better at? What are some
things that we need to do to prepare as we shift and pivot to Asia?
What's the most important thing one, the one thing?''
Lieutenant General Caine. [Lt Gen Caine responded, ``Taking
advantage of the time that we have, as I mentioned earlier in my
testimony, making sure that we're moving with the speed, precision,
sense of urgency to get the kit that we need. The challenges range from
contested logistics to long-range fires to command and control. So,
it's a much deeper conversation, Senator.]
[Chairman Wicker continued, ``Will you supplement that on the
record then, General? Because it was a very intricate question that was
sprung on you with 10 seconds to go.'']
We need to move with speed, precision, and a sense of urgency to
get the capabilities necessary to address challenges that range from
contested logistics to long-range fires to command and control. If
confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of the military situation
and then provide the President and the Secretary of Defense my best
military advice on the actions and investments.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General John D.
Caine, USAF (retired) follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General John D.
Caine, USAF (retired), which was transmitted to the Committee
at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General John D. Caine, USAF (retired) in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the Committee's executive files.]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General John D. Caine, USAF
(retired) was reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on
April 8, 2025, with the recommendation that the nomination be
confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April
11, 2025.]
[all]