    [Senate Hearing 119-322]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-322

                    TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT
                     GENERAL JOHN D. CAINE, USAF (RETIRED)
                     TO BE GENERAL AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
                     JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 1, 2025

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-038 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2026
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JACK REED, Rhode Island
      TOM COTTON, Arkansas			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
      MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
      JONI ERNST, Iowa			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
      DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
      KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia
      RICK SCOTT, Florida			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
      TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
      MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	        GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
      TED BUDD, North Carolina		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
      ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri			JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
      JIM BANKS, INDIANA			MARK KELLY, Arizona
      TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA                  	ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN

      		   John P. Keast, Staff Director
      		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                 C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 april 1, 2025

                                                                       Page
    To Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General John D. Caine,       1
      USAF (Retired) to be General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
      of Staff.

                               Members Statements

    Wicker, Senator Roger F..........................................     1

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Caine, Lieutenant General John D., Retired, Nominee for               5
      Appointment to Grade of General and to the Position of Chairman
      of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    48

      Questions for the Record.......................................   101

      Nomination Reference and Report................................   137

      Biographical Sketch............................................   138

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................   141

      Signature Page.................................................   145

                                     (iii)

     TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN D. CAINE, USAF
       (RETIRED) TO BE GENERAL AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2025

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
    Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville,
    Mullin, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Duckworth,
    Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

        Chairman Wicker. The Committee will come to order. Our
    eager Members of the fourth estate are welcome to clear away,
    thanking them for their presence. This morning, the Committee
    meets to consider the nomination of retired Lieutenant General
    Dan Caine for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.
        General Caine has a tremendous responsibility before him. I
    believe President Trump has made an excellent choice in
    selecting him to meet the challenges. So I thank General Caine
    for his willingness to serve our country, especially in this
    hour of need. We live in the most dangerous national security
    moment since World War II. An axis of aggressors led by the
    Chinese Communist Party, and Vladimir Putin's Russia means us
    harm. This axis does not want this century to be an American-
    led century or a freedom led century.
        Our adversaries have started two wars against Ukraine and
    Israel. They threaten to open a third front against Taiwan. We
    must restore peace and we could do that only through strength.
    Since his nomination was announced, some people have written
    that General Caine is unqualified. They point out that he has
    not served as a combatant commander, as a service chief or as a
    vice-chairman, roles which are contemplated in 10 USC 152.
        I would suggest these same people read or reread the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Those who read that law and then
    read General Caine's resume will see that the architects of
    that legislation would conclude that their reforms were
    successful. The driving force behind Goldwater-Nichols was to
    inspire, and in some cases, require jointness. So, let's talk
    about jointness with regard to Lieutenant General Caine.
        They believed that when our military services work
    together, those services are greater than the sum of their
    parts. General Caine agrees and his record reflects that. He
    began his career as an Air Force fighter pilot in 1992. By the
    time he was done, General Caine had operated in every domain,
    and he had developed relationships with every service. That
    would not have been true 40 years ago.
        General Caine flew and committed aircraft, but he's also
    worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, having helped in
    the wake of Hurricane Katrina, in the midst of a bird flu
    outbreak. At the White House, General Caine wrote early
    homeland security strategies. He deployed and commanded
    repeatedly to Iraq and Syria, serving within various special
    operations forces units. He ran our most secretive programs for
    all military services. General Caine worked extensively as the
    CIA's [Central Intelligence Agency] senior military officer,
    again, collaborating with every military service and combatant
    command.
        It's difficult to imagine a better joint and interagency
    background for a nominee of this position. Our threat
    environment is complex, and General Caine understands how the
    services can work together to meet today's dangers. We have
    much work to do as this committee knows. We need to grow our
    defense budget. We need to reform the Pentagon's processes
    drastically. If confirmed, General Caine would play a
    significant role in providing military advice to the Secretary
    of Defense and the President of the United States on both of
    those topics.
        In particular, the chairman plays a significant role in the
    requirements process. I hope he will make a priority to
    modernize this critical aspect. The statutory role of the
    chairman may be limited, but the position is explicitly the
    voice of the combatant commanders. That voice matters because
    the commanders are largely absent from our requirements and
    budgeting processes. The chairman can and should also be an
    advocate for a more agile planning process, one that considers
    the problems--and I'm going to use two big words here, the
    problems of simultaneity and protracted warfare. I guess that's
    three big terms, three big words, and two big terms.
        These are technical terms for fairly straightforward facts.
    First, that our adversaries are likely to act against us in a
    coordinated fashion; simultaneity. Second, that once that war
    breaks out, it tends to take on a life of its own; protracted
    warfare.
        Last, a chairman is responsible to deliver a serious,
    honest chairman's risk assessment to this Committee as soon as
    possible. I look forward to General Caine's thoughts on each of
    these points. Based on my conversations with the nominee and
    based on his actions in uniform, I'm confident that General
    Caine will give President Trump his best military advice.
        He will do so without bias as he's required to do. He would
    not consider whether the President may like or dislike that
    advice. That's exactly what a United States President deserves.
    I'm convinced that General Caine sees this role as absolutely
    nonpartisan. We can argue politics up here on this dais, but I
    expect General Caine to stay out of it no matter the subject.
        I thank the nominee for his service and for appearing
    today, and I turn now to my friend and colleague, Ranking
    Member Reed for his opening remarks.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lieutenant General
    Caine, welcome and congratulations on your nomination.
        Also, I would like to extend my appreciation to your family
    because I know they've been with you throughout your entire
    career and they're with you today. I also want to offer my
    deepest condolences to the families of the United States Army
    soldiers who tragically lost their lives in Lithuania during a
    mission last week.
        General Caine, you have been nominated to be Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I'm going to start by acknowledging
    the unusual conditions around your nomination. Six weeks ago,
    President Trump abruptly dismissed General CQ Brown, who was
    not even halfway into his tenure as Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Hegseth, also dismissed
    several other senior officers, including Admiral Lisa
    Franchetti, the Chief of Naval Operations, General James Slife,
    the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, and all three Judge Advocate
    Generals (JAGs) for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
        To this day, no explanation has been given for the
    dismissal of these officers. As such, I remain deeply concerned
    that they were dismissed for political reasons, which sends a
    chilling message throughout the ranks. I would take a moment to
    salute General CQ Brown, who served this Nation honorably for
    more than four decades and led the joint chiefs with dedication
    and skill. He and each of the officers who were dismissed had
    outstanding careers in the military and represented our Nation
    with great courage, honor, and distinction. We all owe them a
    debt of gratitude for their service and sacrifice.
        General Caine, I trust that you understand the fraught
    situation within which you have been nominated to be the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. In this regard, your
    distinguished record of service is encouraging. As an F16 pilot
    with thousands of flight hours and multiple combat deployments,
    you have served with distinction in the Air Force and the Air
    National Guard. You have also served in senior leadership roles
    at the Pentagon, the White House, and overseas, including in
    the special operations and intelligence communities.
        General, if confirmed, you will serve as the principal
    military advisor to the President, the National Security
    Council, the Secretary of Defense and Congress. You'll be
    expected to be an effective strategist, advisor, and manager,
    and your counsel will be relied upon as we confront the
    multitude of national security issues before us. Indeed, we
    face significant challenges.
        China clearly remains our primary competitor as the only
    nation with both the intent and capability to challenge the
    interest of the United States and our allies and partners. At
    the same time, Russia remains a violent destabilizing force,
    and nations like Iran and North Korea continue to push the
    boundaries of military brinkmanship.
        To succeed in this environment, the United States Military
    must better develop its joint capabilities across all domains,
    including space, cyber, and information. Moreover, we must not
    lose the combined strength of our allies, nor can we abandon
    the soft power of our diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. To
    retreat to Fortress America will encourage our adversaries to
    exert their influence throughout the world.
        General Caine, I'm interested to know how you would ensure
    our military remains the world's premier fighting force. If
    confirmed, you'll be responsible for identifying new joint
    capabilities and performing net assessments to ensure each of
    the services are procuring the right capabilities needed for
    the joint force. The chairman must review capabilities
    holistically across the total force, which can conflict with
    the priorities of individual services. The committee would be
    interested to learn how you plan to manage this dynamic.
        In addition, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
    National Military Strategy, and the annual chairman's risk
    assessment of vital documents, this Committee relies upon to
    perform its oversight functions. As the Administration begins
    its work to review and revise these documents, General Caine, I
    would like your assessment of the current strategy and whether
    you would recommend any changes to these documents.
        Finally, the joint force is fundamentally about people. As
    the Nation's senior most military officer, it will be your
    responsibility to understand the needs of America's
    servicemembers and to be their greatest advocate. If confirmed,
    you'll be the most visible military officer in the Nation.
    It'll be critical for you to represent the force with total
    professionalism and trustworthiness.
        Frankly, I'm concerned about the health of civilian
    military relations in our country. Over the past several
    months, the military has been dragged into dangerous political
    fights, public trust in the military is eroding, and I fear
    that the military's trust in civilian leadership has been
    shaken. Civilian control of the military is a sacred duty that
    must be carried out responsibly and not exploited. General, I'd
    like to know how you work to help improve civil military
    relations and demonstrate this ethos yourself every day.
        Above all else, I expect you to pledge to always provide
    your best military advice to the President and the Secretary of
    Defense, even if that advice is not what they want to hear. The
    safety of our servicemembers and the American people depends
    upon such candor. General Caine, if confirmed, you will lead
    the joint force at a momentous time. I thank you and I look
    forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    General Caine, we will now hear your testimony. You're
    recognized.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN D. CAINE, RETIRED, NOMINEE
      FOR APPOINTMENT TO GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO THE POSITION OF
                 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, thank you, Senator Chairman
    Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, Members of this Committee. My name
    is Dan Caine and I am honored and humbled to sit before you
    today as the President's nominee to be the 22d chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        I'd like to start by thanking the President and the
    Secretary for their trust and confidence in me and if
    confirmed, allowing me to again, serve our great Nation. I'd
    also like to thank General CQ Brown and his wife Shereen and
    their family for their more than 40 years of selfless service
    to our Nation. I'd like to thank the team that helped prepare
    me for this hearing today.
        Finally, I'd like to thank my family and friends who have
    given me so much. It is my family who has made my service
    possible always at their own expense. They have given more than
    I have and there are not words to express my thanks to each of
    them, especially my family in our Nation's Midwest.
        I sit here before you the proud son of an Air Force fighter
    pilot who flew F4 Phantoms in Vietnam. My mom was a pediatric
    critical care nurse who worked nights so she could be home when
    my sister and I got up in the morning and when we got home in
    the afternoon. I learned about service from my parents and the
    other members of my family who served, not because it was easy,
    but because it was the right thing to do.
        In our family, we serve. When asked, we always say yes.
    Senators, I acknowledge that I'm an unconventional nominee.
    These are unconventional times. It is 9:48 p.m. in Beijing,
    6:48 p.m. in Tehran, 4:48 p.m. in Moscow, and 10:48 p.m. in
    Pyong Yang. As we sit here now, our Nation faces an
    unprecedented rising global risk. Our adversaries are
    advancing, global nuclear threats are on the rise and
    deterrence is paramount. Our national defense requires urgent
    action and reform across the board. We must go faster. We must
    move with a sense of urgency.
        We can never forget that our No. 1 job is to create peace
    through overwhelming strength and if need be, fight and win our
    Nation's wars. I realize for many Americans I'm an unknown
    leader, and it is with a heart full of gratitude that I've been
    given a given a truly unique set of experiences that I believe
    have prepared me to be the 22d chairman.
        For the past 34 years, I've served in the Active Title 10
    Force, in the Title 32 National Guard Force, in the Title 50
    Force at the CIA. I've served in the interagency and at the
    White House, and I've deployed in combat as a fighter pilot, a
    special operations officer, and a CIA officer, and I've been an
    entrepreneur and investor in the business sector while a
    citizen soldier in the National Guard.
        As a general officer, I've had the privilege of serving
    three Presidents from both political parties and most recently
    was the associate director for military affairs at the CIA. A
    job where I was charged to provide military advice to the
    director of the CIA and globally integrate DOD and CIA
    activities across the world.
        Along the way, I've proudly served alongside some of
    America's most incredible warriors and civilian teammates and
    their families. I've witnessed them do awe-inspiring things in
    the service of our Nation and to a person they've poured more
    into me than I could ever have poured into them. Especially our
    non-commissioned officer corps. Sadly, I've been there with
    them as they made the ultimate sacrifice on the fields of
    battle and been with their families as we told them of their
    loved one service and sacrifice. I think of our fallen every
    single day.
        These experiences help me to better understand how our
    Nation considers and uses military force to achieve our
    national security objectives. They directly inform my views of
    the importance of carefully considering the use of that force
    and the risks associated with it beforehand, and always asking
    the important question, and then what, before we do, and if the
    decision is made to use military force crushing our enemies and
    winning.
        I've also had the privilege of serving alongside incredible
    business leaders, starting and scaling companies as an
    entrepreneur. Along the way I learned what a different kind of
    grit looks like. Our American entrepreneurial spirit is a force
    multiplier, and my time as an entrepreneur has made me a better
    general officer and leader, and if confirmed, I'll bring more
    of that spirit into the joint force.
        Senators I'm here today to earn your trust and the trust of
    the American people. If confirmed, I'll continue to work as I
    have for my entire 34 years in uniform, always focused on the
    mission and our incredible people. If confirmed, I'll continue
    the traditions and standards of my oath of office and my
    commissioned as a non-partisan leader who will always strive to
    do the right thing.
        Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the
    Committee, thank you for your time and your consideration. As
    we gather here today, let us never forget our deployed forces
    and their families, and may we always remember our fallen and
    their families, especially those three that Senator Reed
    mentioned and our one missing. I look forward to your
    questions.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much General Caine. I
    am required to ask you some standard questions that we ask of
    all nominees in your situation. If you'll just answer yes or no
    to these questions, keep your talk button pressed. Have you
    adhered to the applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, Senator, I have.
        Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No. Senator, I have not.
        Chairman Wicker. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
    receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    Committee when requested?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Do you agree when asked before this
    committee to give your personal views even if your views differ
    from the Administration?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide records,
    documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner
    when requested by this Committee, it's subcommittees or other
    appropriate committees of Congress and to consult with the
    requester regarding the basis for any good faith, delay or
    denial in providing such records?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established by this committee for the production
    of reports, records, and other information including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Two more General. Will you cooperate in
    providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional
    requests?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes Senator, I will.
        Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Lieutenant General Caine. They will, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much. Now let me just
    start out by asking about some hyperbole that may have been out
    there in the press. General Caine, did you wear a MAGA [Make
    America Great Again] hat in front of the President?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Did you wear a MAGA hat at any time?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Would you like to elaborate on that
    answer?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, for 34 years, I've upheld my
    oath of office and my commitment to my commission and I have
    never worn any political merchandise.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that answer. Now previous
    chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of staff have somewhat equivocated
    when asked about top line spending issues. I think you know
    about the proposals that will soon be before this Senate and
    this Congress.
        Is it in your best military advice based on your
    experience, is it your opinion that we need real growth in the
    defense budget to maintain deterrence against the very capital
    cities and interests that you mentioned in your testimony?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
    question. We definitely must have a sense of urgency related to
    the budget. I think it comes down to ultimately finding more
    deployable or allocatable capital, and there's really three
    ways to do that. We can find greater efficiencies in the budget
    through cost savings. We can reprogram from different programs,
    or we can get a higher top line, I think of it in terms of a
    business model where we get more revenue. So we have to move
    quickly and figure out how we can get real purchasing growth
    over time.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, let's talk about efficiency. In the
    special operations community and with the CIA, you've worked
    with some of the most innovative and risk-taking parts of
    national security enterprise. You also mentioned your
    experience in the private sector, which I think can serve you
    well. Startup ventures in the private sector. Is that right,
    General Caine?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. If confirmed, you will conduct oversight
    on the military's requirement processes. We hear constantly
    from our combatant commanders that it takes years for their
    military needs to be converted into requirements. Based on your
    experience, do you believe the requirements process needs to be
    fixed, and do you agree with those who say it needs to be
    entirely torn down and rebuilt to get our war fighters what
    they need according to a timeline in which they need it?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I definitely agree
    something has to be done. The solution is probably somewhere in
    the middle. I don't know that we need to tear the whole thing
    down. I definitely agree that we need to improve the speed and
    agility of our requirements process. Technology is evolving so
    fast, our requirements process does not evolve at the same
    time, and we have to have our combatant commander's voice in
    the requirements process.
        The one area that I think we also need to do is to keep a
    global picture on those requirement processes. No two combatant
    commands have the same requirements, and only the joint staff
    has the global view on those requirements along with OSD
    [Office of The Secretary of Defense]. So, if confirmed, I'd
    like to continue to work with you and the rest of the Congress
    to sort through this, so I appreciate it.
        Chairman Wicker. Will have you had a chance to read my
    white paper on the FoRGED Act and that proposed legislation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Don't you agree that it's a masterful
    piece of legislation?
        [Laughter.]
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, sir. It was a beautiful
    read, sir. Yes.
        Chairman Wicker. Would you like to elaborate on that?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. Well, sir, I mean, I think
    it certainly lays out a lot of good markers for improvement in
    the requirements process.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, it seems to me you've worked in the
    private sector and you work with startups. The number of people
    in DOD who have to touch something, touch an idea sign off on
    an idea to actually get something done, is far different from
    those people who are actually making innovative changes in the
    private sector. Is that correct?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Do you agree then that we need to move in
    the direction of efficiency and that a lot of the top line
    money that I mentioned in my second question can be found by
    efficiencies and moving things faster, and also we could get to
    the war fighter what they need in a timely manner?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, let me ask--I've got 12 seconds. I
    might do a followup at the end there, but thank you very much
    for your testimony. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General
    Caine, as you're aware, it was recently revealed that Senior
    Trump administration officials, including the Secretary of
    Defense, were sharing sensitive information about upcoming
    strikes in Yemen on a Signal group chat.
        In your professional opinion, should a member of the joint
    chiefs or the relevant combatant commander been included in
    that discussion?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, thanks for that
    question. I understand that the voice of the joint force had
    been expressed through the incredible work of the acting
    chairman and current vice chairman. I understand he put a
    statement out yesterday or the day before saying that they'd
    consulted with the secretary. From what I understand of that
    chat, that was a partisan political chat, and so the joint
    force should not have been represented in there, sir.
        Senator Reed. In your professional opinion, should the
    Yemen strengths have been discussed in a Signal group chat on
    an unclassified platform?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I understand that
    both you and the Chairman have asked for an inquiry into that.
    So I don't want to comment specifically on that matter. What I
    will say is that we should always preserve the element of
    surprise, and that should translate across every information
    domain and format and never put our war fighters in any harm's
    way.
        Senator Reed. Well, let me ask you, if you were on that
    conversation, would you have objected to the fact that it was
    being conducted on Signal?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I was not in that
    chat. I would----
        Senator Reed. I know that, that's why I asked, if you were.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I've always communicated
    proper information in the proper channels.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir. Immediately following the
    announcement--and this is a followup to Chairman Wicker's,
    first question. Immediately following the announcement of your
    nomination press stories started to circulate about comments
    President Trump made about you in your past relationship.
    According to the reports, the President tells a story where he
    spoke to you while you were serving in Iraq on Active Duty, and
    you said that you loved him and, ``I'll kill for you, sir.''
        The President then said that you followed up these comments
    by putting on a Make America Great Again hat. General Caine, is
    any of this true?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, as I mentioned to the
    Chairman, for 34 years, I've upheld my oath of office and the
    responsibilities of my commission. I think I went back and
    listened to those tapes and I think the President was actually
    talking about somebody else, and I've never worn any political
    merchandise or said anything to that effect.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. General Caine, during the
    consideration of your nomination, were you ever asked who you
    voted for in the last election or 2020 election?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I was not.
        Senator Reed. Are you aware of any presently serving
    servicemembers or senior civilians in DOD being asked questions
    like this?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I'm not, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Do you agree that it's the utmost importance
    to keep the military apolitical and questions like this should
    not be asked?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I agree with you. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Reed. What steps will you'll take to guard against
    potential politicization?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think the question was
    what steps will I take to guard against politicalization. I
    think it starts with being a good example from the top and
    making sure that we are nonpartisan and apolitical and speaking
    the truth to power every day.
        Senator Reed. General Caine, do you believe there's any
    situation where it would be appropriate for you not to be
    consulted prior to a military operation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm not in the job
    yet, so I can't imagine any hypothetical situation where I
    would not be in the conversation, if that's what you're asking.
    You know, I believe the joint force, if confirmed, and even if
    I'm not in the job, the joint force has a responsibility to
    provide best options to the Secretary, the NSC [National
    Security Council], and the President. So I can't imagine a case
    where the joint force would not be in the conversation.
        Senator Reed. Final question. If confirmed--and you've got
    40 seconds and this probably will take longer than that. So
    just brief thoughts. How are you going to ensure that the
    parochialism, which is endemic in every organization, but
    certainly also in the Department of Defense (DOD) is curtailed
    or focused to a more joint effort?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate that
    and I'll be quick and come back to you with more if need be,
    but you know, I'm encouraged by the 648 years of experience
    that currently exist in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the
    joint staff, and I think they're all absolute professionals.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Fisher.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome General.
    Thank you for putting yourself forward to continue to serve
    your country. As you are aware, there's ongoing efforts to
    force the Department of Defense to vacate portions of key bands
    of the electromagnetic spectrum, particularly the lower three
    gigahertz and the seven to eight gigahertz bands.
        General Caine, do you agree that the Department of Defense
    should have a meaningful co-leadership in any inter-agency
    determinations about the future use of Federal spectrum?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, thanks for that
    question. You know, there are certain elements of the spectrum
    that have unique physics associated with them that can impact
    our combat capabilities. So we certainly want to have a voice
    in the conversation.
        Senator Fischer. Do you believe that it should be a co-
    leadership, though, not just a seat at the table, but because
    of the exquisite assets that the Department has and your
    knowledge of what those are that you would need to have that
    co-leadership position?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, you asked what the views
    of the Department was. Mindful that I'm not in the job yet, and
    if confirmed, I'd have that conversation with the Secretary
    about co-leadership related to that.
        Senator Fischer. What are the risks to national security if
    the Department is forced to vacate those spectrum bands?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator some of that may be
    reserved for a conversation in closed session at some point in
    the future, but certainly if we lose portions of that spectrum,
    we'll lose some exclusivity related to our combat capability.
    Certainly one, don't want to tip that off to our adversaries
    who might be listening, but two, would rather talk about that
    in closed session.
        Senator Fischer. I look forward to having those discussions
    with you if you are confirmed, sir. General Caine, for the
    first time in history of the United States faces two nuclear
    peer adversaries in China and in Russia. Yet our planned
    nuclear force was decided back in 2010 when the threat
    environment looked very, very different and it hasn't been
    reconsidered since then.
        For example, just over the past few years, China surpassed
    the United States in the number of ICBM [intercontinental
    ballistic missile] launchers it possesses. Russia has suspended
    the New START treaty and nuclear saber rattling has been a
    defining feature of its invasion to Ukraine. North Korea has
    claimed to test the first solid fuel ICBM. I'm concerned that
    our current programs or record may not be sufficient to address
    these future threats or these current threats, let alone future
    threats.
        So if confirmed, how would you work with the Secretary, the
    services, STRATCOM, to identify and address any insufficiencies
    so that our nuclear deterrent would remain credible?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator and it must remain
    credible. We must invest in the deterrent side of our nuclear
    triad, and there's a lot of work to be done there. If
    confirmed, you know, I look to work with the incredible
    leadership at STRATCOM. We have a great commander out there
    who's very smart, dedicated, and technically all over the
    program out there. This will be an area of significant emphasis
    to make sure that we're fielding the capabilities that we need.
        Senator Fischer. Have you had an opportunity to review the
    Strategic Posture Commission's 2023 report?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I've not.
        Senator Fischer. I would highly recommend that you do so.
    It very clearly articulates projected threats. It identifies
    potential gaps in our capabilities, and it makes a number of
    actionable recommendations, many of which were included in last
    year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
        Finally, General Caine, the Nuclear Arms Sea Launch Cruise
    Missile or SLCM-N, is a Navy program of record that has been
    supported by this Committee on a strong bipartisan basis. I was
    pleased to see you affirm the importance of SLCM-N in your
    advanced policy questions.
        Can you explain to this Committee the importance of
    providing the President with additional theater nuclear options
    such as SLCM-N?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, when we look at
    the global lay down of nuclear weapons that you alluded to, the
    United States, having an additional option is a key and
    essential component to our overall deterrence. That's where
    SLCM-N fits into the equation.
        Senator Fischer. So it's important that our Commander-in-
    Chief would have those options?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, I won't get out in front of
    the President. It may be a decision that he has a different
    view on, but certainly the Joint Force should offer him that
    option for his consideration based on the needs of the
    deterrent capabilities.
        Senator Fischer. It is a program of record?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Senator
    Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. General Caine, congratulations on your
    nomination and thank you for your willingness to continue to
    serve the country. I appreciated the time we spent in my office
    talking about this role and the challenges that you will be
    facing.
        One of the things that we discussed was the Women, Peace,
    and Security (WPS) legislation that was signed by President
    Trump during his first term. It mandates that women should be
    at the table in conflict resolution and peace negotiations, and
    at DOD, that's meant having women involved in security
    cooperation programs that really give us, I think, an advantage
    our adversaries like China and Russia.
        Just for the record, are you familiar with the WPS program,
    General Caine?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I am Senator, yes.
        Senator Shaheen. Do you believe that's a DEI [Diversity,
    Equity, and Inclusion] program?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do not.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Can you provide some examples
    of the operational advantage that from your perspective, this
    gives us? General Caine: Well, Senator, I can just give you my
    own personal recollections from being deployed. Before this was
    precursors of the program, but when we would go out into the
    field and after concluding an assault, we would have female
    members who would speak with those women and children who are
    on the objective, and they would help us to understand the
    human terrain in a new and novel way.
        WPS is I think a program that really help us to understand
    the full spectrum of challenges that are in front of us.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you for that. One of the combatant
    commands that has been most effective in using the WPS law has
    been United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Can you
    talk about how this contributes to the mission that INDOPACOM
    has?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm not familiar
    with the INDOPACOM specific example. If confirmed, I'll look
    into it and come back to you with my thoughts on that matter.
        Senator Shaheen. Great, thank you. I appreciate that. We've
    been hearing some rumors that have suggested that the
    Administration is considering ending the dual-hat policy under
    which our commander of European command serves as the Supreme
    Allied Commander of NATO. The commander of EUCOM has served as
    the Supreme Allied Commander since Eisenhower, and part of the
    reason is to ensure that U.S. command and control of nuclear
    weapons on the continent also prevents nuclear proliferation in
    Europe.
        So I'm not going to ask you to comment on what the policy
    of this Administration may or may not be since I assume it's
    not been determined. But can you talk about the importance of
    U.S. leadership in NATO as a result of this dual-hat
    arrangement? And how would you approach mil-to-mil obligations
    with NATO partners?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, allies and
    partners are a critical component to our ability to protect and
    defend our values and virtues around the world. NATO is a key
    component to that. The President's been clear on his views of,
    of the importance of NATO, as has the Secretary. You know,
    related to whether or not SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander,
    Europe] stays a United States military officer, I'll defer to
    the President on that.
        I think that's a discussion that he currently is ongoing.
    But, for me in particular, I value our allies and partners and
    if confirmed, that'll be a significant portion of the job that
    I have ahead of me.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, and I appreciate that that's a
    policy decision, but what I'm really asking is what the
    advantage is for the United States in having the SACEUR be an
    American.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, as always, anytime we
    have United States Forces deployed, we generally have wanted
    them under a United States commander. That was the history
    behind the establishment of SACEUR and putting the dual-hat
    EUCOM commander and SACEUR together. I think it is an
    opportunity for global leadership in particular in Europe, but
    again, would defer to the President as he considers what the
    future policy may look like.
        Senator Shaheen. I know that Senator Reed asked you this
    question, and it was part of your official questions from
    Senator Wicker, but when you have situations where your
    military advice may be different from the direction that the
    Administration is heading on policy, how do you intend to
    approach those situations and how would you continue to make
    sure that the military perspective that you're supposed to
    represent is actually being presented?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, the same way I
    have for 34 years, with candor. Candor has gotten me here
    today, and candor will continue to allow me to do my job moving
    forward. The President doesn't have to accept the military
    advice or the Secretary of the NSC, but we owe it to them for
    us to deliver that military advice.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Cotton
        Senator Cotton. General Caine, congratulations on your
    nomination and thank you for your 34 years of service. Thank
    you also for your service at times in the intelligence
    community where your reputation is as strong as it is in the
    Department of Defense.
        Let's continue on the theme of Senator Shaheen's question
    about providing your candid military advice. I think as the
    chairman and Senator Reed pointed out, a lot of people don't
    understand the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is not in the chain
    of command. Is that correct?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. By law, your role is the principal of
    military advisor. So if the President makes a decision on this,
    that, or the other, policy or operation about this, that, or
    the other country that goes from him to the Secretary of
    Defense down to some other commander, say the United States
    Central Command (CENTCOM) commander or the Secretary of the
    Army or what have you. You're on the side giving advice to
    everyone, but you're not actually carrying out decisions in the
    chain of command.
        Lieutenant General Caine. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I think Congress gave the chairman that
    role because we wanted someone who was free from those day-to-
    day demands of operational or managerial duties to provide that
    candid military advice. As Senator Shaheen said it, it's
    important that you provide that advice even when you think the
    principal doesn't want to hear it, the Secretary of Defense, or
    the NSC, or the President.
        But I think you said in your opening statement that you
    were an unusual or an unconventional nominee, which was it?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I think it was unconventional,
    sir.
        Senator Cotton. Unconventional. I agree with that. I think
    most people would as well. You don't strike me as the kind of
    guy who has been angling for this job for 34 years. Is that a
    fair statement?
        Lieutenant General Caine. That would be a fair statement,
    Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Did you expect to get this job as recently
    as, I don't know, 3 or 6 months ago?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I did not, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. So is there any reason to think that you're
    not going to be providing your candid and best professional
    military advice even, and maybe especially, when you've gotten
    wind, say a little birdie has tipped you off that maybe the
    Secretary or the President doesn't want to hear what you have
    to say?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, no, and you know, I went
    to VMI [Virginia Military Institute] where I lived in the new
    barracks for 4 years and looked out on a statue of George
    Catlett Marshall for 4 years. Sir, if I failed to provide my
    candid advice to the Secretary, or the NSC, or the President, I
    think General Marshall would climb out of his grave and hunt me
    down.
        Senator Cotton. Good, thank you. Because I think every
    President, every NSC, every Secretary of Defense needs that,
    especially from a chairman. Not to give them their candid
    advice when it's welcome, but even when they know it's
    unwelcome.
        Now, as you said, though, you're advisor, you're not a
    decider, you're not a commander. Once the Secretary in some
    cases, or the President probably in most cases has made the
    decision, then you're on the side making sure that decision is
    going to be carried out by the relevant commanders, right?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. Let's look at something specific
    in this area now, and that's the threat of Iran's nuclear
    program. By some estimates say it could be just weeks away from
    having at least testable of not workable nuclear devices, maybe
    as few as a couple years away from having missiles that could
    hit us here in the United States. The President has said
    repeatedly that he wants a peaceful resolution to this crisis,
    but he is also said, I think as recently as last week, ``If
    they don't make a deal, there will be bombing''.
        He said, for at least a decade I've known him, that Iran
    cannot be allowed to get a nuclear weapon. Do you agree with
    the President's assessment that Iran cannot be allowed to get a
    nuclear weapon?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Do you agree that because of their missile
    programs, especially the flimsy cover of the space launch
    program, that this is not just a threat to our troops in the
    region or Israel or our Arab friends in the region, this could
    be an imminent and existential threat to the United States
    itself in just a few short years?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's an
    accurate statement.
        Senator Cotton. If the President asks for military options
    to support what he has said publicly, that if Iran is not
    willing to make a deal that there will be bombing, do you
    commit to provide him the best and candid advice you can about
    viable military options and the likely consequences of each?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's what the
    job of the joint staff is to do. Is to provide a range of
    options for the President to consider and then allow him to
    select whatever those options work best for him.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. Finally, there's some hysteria
    about the prospect of the President ordering these strikes, or
    someone like you in uniform providing him advice that is going
    to lead to another forever war or another endless war.
        Are you aware of operations, maybe operations against Iran,
    like the Tanker Wars in 1988, in which the forceful but
    discriminate application of military power did not lead to a
    forever war or an endless war, but rather led to peace and
    stability?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. Those examples in our
    history do exist, yes.
        Senator Cotton. Maybe the Qasem Soleimani strike in 2020 as
    well that caused Iran to pull in its horns for the rest of
    President Trump's first term. Thank you, General Caine.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. You can answer that question verbally. I
    noticed you nodded. General Caine, you nodded your head.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. I wasn't sure exactly
    what the question was, but I agree with you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cotton, and thank you
    General. Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    General Caine for visiting my office, for your service and your
    families to our Nation. You have a record that is exemplary and
    lengthy. You've served in the Air Force, the Air National
    Guard, and within the intelligence community with extraordinary
    distinction. This position is not one that you sought, is it?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Or ever expected?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No. No, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. The reason is quite simply that the
    President of the United States decided to fire the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff for political and personal reasons,
    and I must say that I find that abhorrent, and I know that you
    are not going to comment in those terms on the treatment of
    your potential predecessor, but would you agree with me that
    politicization of the military is something that should be
    avoided at all costs?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. The Nation and the
    Constitution all require a non-partisan military.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree with me that this
    apparent myth, because you've credibly denied it, that you wore
    a MAGA hat, is extremely regrettable and unfortunate?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, I just know that I have
    always upheld my oath of office and don't believe the President
    said I was wearing a MAGA hat from what I've listened to the
    tapes.
        Senator Blumenthal. You don't believe he ever said it, but
    it has been attributed to him.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, I think maybe he was talking
    about somebody else when I went and listened to the tapes.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you because of your
    extraordinary service General, and I can't imagine anyone
    better qualified to answer this question. If you heard that a
    mission of a kind that was discussed on an unsecure platform,
    Signal, and you were in one of those planes about to launch on
    that mission against the Houthis, knowing what you do about the
    substance of that conversation, how would you feel?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I stand by what I said
    before. I think we all can agree that we need to always protect
    the element of surprise.
        Senator Blumenthal. That element of surprise was very
    likely lost if there had been any intercept by one of our
    enemies or adversaries that could be conveyed to the Houthis,
    correct?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I mean, sir, that's a little bit
    of a hypothetical question, but I am thankful as always that we
    protect our servicemen and women who are going into combat
    operations.
        Senator Blumenthal. But there are a lot of pilots and other
    military men and women who are understandably angry about that
    call, correct?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, I've not had anybody come to
    me and tell me that they're angry about it. So I can't comment
    on that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Have you read reports about that
    reaction to the call?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have not, Senator. No.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that that kind of
    reliance on Signal for that kind of conversation should be
    avoided in the future?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I just know that I have
    always used the right system for the right kinds of
    communications. I don't know in particular you know, what
    information was classified in what way on that Signal chat. I
    know that we must preserve the element of surprise.
        Senator Blumenthal. That platform is not a hardened and
    secure platform?
        Lieutenant General Caine. That platform is encrypted but
    not secure, I believe in the definition of the term secure.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you quickly on another
    topic. Would you agree that the Columbia-class program is the
    Navy's--should continue to be an acquisition priority along
    with the Virginia-class?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I do think Columbia
    needs to continue forward at a pace and tempo equal to the
    threat.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Caine,
    once again, thank you for taking the time in my office to visit
    with me about a number of the items that you're hearing about
    today. I want to go back specifically to an item that Senator
    Fischer began talking with you about. That is with regard to
    the spectrum and the challenges surrounding it.
        The reason why I want to use that as an example is because
    I know that General Milley and General CQ Brown, both in their
    role as the chief of staff and providing their best military
    opinion and advice were put in a position literally of saying
    to other people within other Administrations, that this
    particular part of the electromagnetic spectrum, which is
    currently controlled by the Department of Defense, is critical
    to our national defense.
        In fact, over the last several years, I have asked in front
    of this particular Committee, well over two dozen uniformed
    officers to specifically discuss the need to maintain control
    of specific portions of the electronic spectrum. In particular,
    I've asked whether or not the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band, if we
    were to lose that from DODs specific use, if that would
    negatively have or would have negative consequences for our war
    fighting capabilities.
        I have had 100 percent agreement that if we lost that it
    would have negative consequences. Would you agree with that
    assessment?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I would, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. You will be asked at some point,
    because this is a valuable commodity. There's a limited amount
    of electromagnetic spectrum available, but there are interests
    within the United States that would love to have access to this
    without regard to what it would do or would not understanding
    what the impact would be on our national defense.
        Are you aware that under President Trump's proposed concept
    of a Golden Dome or a missile protection system, that a number
    of the radar systems that would be required to be in effect for
    that to move forward, are found within the 3.1 to 3.45 portions
    of the spectrum because of their unique physics competencies?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I'm familiar with the
    basics of that frequency spectrum. I don't know what particular
    radars Golden Dome has brought into their mix of equipment, but
    that would not surprise me.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. I just think part of the
    discussion that's been here today has been a concern by the
    Committee that any person that has the role of the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs recognize just how serious their role is with
    regard to providing to a very, very group of powerful
    individuals, the best professional military advice that they
    can provide, and recognizing that while you don't control the
    policy that is set, your role as this Committee sees it is in
    many cases, the last resort to providing the right types of
    advice that elected leaders have to hear regardless of whether
    or not they want to hear it. My understanding, and once again,
    I'll ask you to just confirm it, you recognize that that is
    your primary responsibility,
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's the most
    important part of this job and the essential part of this job.
    If confirmed, you have my commitment that I'll always speak
    truth to power.
        Senator Rounds. Well, I think you'll find that this
    committee will be very supportive of you in that role. General,
    the B-21 Raider is one of the most capable military platforms
    in the world has ever seen. It will play a crucial role in any
    conflict the US faces against a near peer adversary because of
    its ability to operate in a highly contested environment. The
    Air Force has committed to at least 100 B-21s.
        But given its dual missions of conventional long-range
    strike and nuclear deterrence, many of us believe that we will
    need a number closer to 200 bombers. If confirmed, would you be
    prepared to advocate for more than 100 and perhaps as many as
    200 of these platforms if a review of our war plan suggested
    that that is what required for our operational plans moving
    forward?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, the last part of your
    question, I think is the key part for me. After the analysis
    portion, and, you know, mindful that I've not been confirmed
    for this job yet, I'd like to speak to the other joint chiefs
    and the combat commanders whose requirements Raider will
    fulfill before I commit to supporting any particular number of
    B-21s.
        It's an essential part of our nuclear and conventional
    program, and certainly a key component of it. But before I
    commit to any number, I'd like to study the matter and come
    back to you.
        Senator Rounds. But if that appears to be the case, you
    would not hesitate to recommend more if those studies warranted
    it?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I would not hesitate.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Caine,
    with all due respect to you, we should not be here today. This
    hearing is happening only because of the unprecedented
    dismissal without cause of General Brown as chairman. As a
    highly respected military leader, General Brown faithfully
    served our country for decades. He provided exactly what the
    Constitution asked of him, the best non-partisan military
    advice to civilian leadership.
        However, for an Administration that is claiming to be the
    most ``transparent in history,'' no reasonable justification
    has been provided for General Brown's termination. Instead,
    General Brown's dismissal reveals once again, President Trump's
    intention to install yes men and women with fealty to him and
    not to the Constitution or the American people.
        Now, General Caine, you said you will always speak truth to
    power in your responses to advanced questions, and you
    indicated that you would provide independent advice. But let me
    just mention what happens to people who stand up to President
    Trump. General Milley was a former Chair of Joint Chiefs, stood
    up to President Trump, and here's what happened to him.
        President Trump took away his security detail, his security
    clearance. He even took down his portrait in the Pentagon.
    That's not all. General Milley is now under investigation by
    the Department's Inspector General to see if you'll be able to
    retire as a four-star general. It's always a challenge to stand
    up to this President.
        Let me just start with the two initial questions, and I'll
    get to some of the questions that have to do with your fitness
    to serve. I ask these questions of all nominees on any of the
    committees on which I sit. Since you became a legal adult, have
    you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed
    any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
    nature?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have not, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have not, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. General, you've been asked a number of
    questions regarding what the President attributed to you, that
    it's always been reported that you wore a MAGA hat. You
    testified you did not. If you did wear a MAGA hat, would that
    constitute partisan political activity by a uniform officer?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I did not wear any
    political merchandise.
        Senator Hirono. If you wore such a hat, would that
    constitute partisan political activity by a uniform officer?
    Yes or no?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I think it probably would. Yes,
    Senator.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. General Caine, you've been asked
    also a number of questions about what's being referred to as
    Signal Gate, and I commend the Chair of this Committee and the
    Ranking Member for asking for an IGA inquiry. You were the
    director for special access programs at the Pentagon, an office
    that manages our Nation's most classified programs. Have you
    ever discussed classified information on an unclassified
    medium, such as Signal?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, Senator. I have not.
        Senator Hirono. What would be the consequences for
    discussing a special access program on Signal?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, we'd have to first
    do an investigation. We'd have to look into the particular
    matters associated with it. We'd have to consult with counsel
    to determine what the way forward was, and then ultimately turn
    it over to the leadership in the Department.
        Senator Hirono. You wouldn't just let this matter drop?
    Which is basically what this Administration wants to do?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I think that it's
    a little bit of a hypothetical situation asking me about what
    would happen if a SAP [Special Access Program] was dropped into
    Signal.
        Senator Hirono. It's really not a hypothetical. It is what
    is confronting this Administration and what's happening. You
    know that we need to preserve the element of surprise. Is
    discussing the kinds of matters that were discussed on signal
    preserving the element of surprise?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I don't want to--given
    the fact that the Chairman and Ranking Member of an ask for an
    investigation, I don't want to comment on the particulars. I do
    want to stay at the strategic altitude and say that we should
    always preserve the element of surprise.
        Senator Hirono. I think it was a very simple question,
    whether or not talking about the things that have been
    reported, whether that preserved the element of surprise. I
    would say that if you're truly speaking truth to power, that
    the answer would obviously be, no, it does not preserve the
    element of surprise. That is why we need to have an inquiry.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Ernst.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I first would like
    to acknowledge the loss of three soldiers from the Third
    Infantry Division, and pray for a speedy recovery on the
    fourth.
        General Caine, thank you so much for being in front of this
    Committee today, and we all understand that there's a little
    bit of political theatrics that always occur on this Committee,
    but I would like to thank you very much for your integrity and
    your measured responses to the questions today. You are
    carrying yourself with dignity and respect, and that's what we
    would anticipate and expect of anyone that will be serving as
    the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. So thank you very
    much for that.
        You stated that you are an unconventional leader moving
    forward, and I in particular, am very excited about that
    because you have served on Active Duty and Active Duty Air
    Force. But also in regards to my own service, you are a
    national guardsman, and thank you. It gives you a very well-
    rounded perspective when it comes to the men and women that
    serve in various capacities for our great Armed Services.
        But also very important to me is the fact that you have
    served as an entrepreneur, and this brings a different level
    into the position that you are hoping to attain. That leads me
    into my question. I've been very focused on our defense budget,
    efficiency, and auditability. We spoke about this in my office.
    Because you have the eye of a businessman, you know that your
    investment dollars are very important going into a business.
        So you will understand that every dollar going into our
    Department of Defense is also going to be very important for
    our war fighters and those that support them. The Department of
    Defense despite managing the largest discretionary budget of
    the Federal Government, has yet to pass a full financial audit.
    We understand that this failure is eroding public trust in the
    Department and hinders our ability as Congress to allocate
    those resources effectively, and our frustrations just continue
    to grow.
        So, General Caine, if you are confirmed, what steps will
    you take to ensure the DOD finally passes a full audit by 2028
    as required by the law or ideally if at all possible, even
    sooner?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thanks for that
    question. Is not only as an entrepreneur alum, but also an
    American taxpayer, we owe it to the Nation for the Department
    to pass an audit. There are very few levers that the chairman,
    if I'm confirmed, that the chairman can throw other than to
    encourage the services to be prepared for that audit. That's
    something that I'll take on if I'm confirmed for the job.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you very much for that. In
    regards to our Special Operations Forces (SOF), I serve as the
    chair of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee,
    and we'll continue to advocate on behalf of our SOF. They're a
    very cost-effective force multiplier, and they deliver those
    high impact results with a very small footprint. And I know we
    have spoken about this, you do get that.
        Cuts to SOF funding risk ceding ground to our adversaries.
    So, General Caine, given SOF's proven role in great power
    competition, do you believe a justification exists for reducing
    their footprint and their budget at a time when unconventional
    threats are on the rise?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator mindful that I'm
    not in the job yet, I do understand and appreciate the
    exponential value that SOF can bring to the competition phase
    that we're in right now. If confirmed, I'd like to take that on
    and come back to you with my thoughts on it.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, and I will expect that as
    well.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ernst. I know we could go on, I'll submit a
    question for the record on recruitment and retention
    challenges.
        Senator Ernst. But I just want to close by saying I'm very
    grateful that President Trump has nominated you to serve as our
    Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do think that you
    will bring a different level into this position, a different
    eye, a different way of looking at things. We are in very
    challenging times. We all recognize this. We need a change. You
    are that change. So thank you very much for being willing to
    continue to serve in this capacity. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General,
    congratulations on your nomination. We've discussed almost
    every member of this panel has discussed the importance of
    giving straight advice to the President and the Secretary of
    Defense. These are two very strong personalities. The Oval
    Office is probably the most intimidating room in the world. I
    hope you'll reiterate. You mentioned you owe it to them to give
    you the best advice. You also owe it to the country that you
    give them the best advice.
        You mentioned to me when we discussed this before, you have
    been retired, you didn't expect this job, you don't need this
    job. Give me your straight-ahead commitment that when the chips
    are down, you're going to argue for your best military advice.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I don't know any other
    way to operate as a leader. My job, if confirmed, is to always
    provide best military advice to the President, the Secretary of
    the NSC, and to Congress, and to do so with candor every day.
        Senator King. That, as everybody has mentioned,
    particularly Senator Rounds mentioned, that this is really the
    principle responsibility of the job. We are in a very dangerous
    moment, as you know, there are potential conflicts and
    conflicts all over the world. So you're going to be called upon
    probably in a matter of weeks to make these kind of calls and
    to provide that advice to the President.
        So I look forward to your honoring that commitment that you
    just made, and making clear not only providing advice that
    sounds sort of neutral, but advocating for advice, saying, this
    is what we believe the best military advice is. Let me move on.
        It worries me sometimes that we have a tendency
    particularly in national security, to move our focus from one
    area to the other, and then we neglect the area that we're
    missing. What I'm very worried about now is a resurgence of
    terrorism. Syria potentially could become another base for ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. There are thousands of ISIS
    fighters in jails in Syria, if they're released, that could be
    a major challenge. West Africa is now a major area of al Qaeda
    activity.
        Talk to me about the terrorism threat and the fact that we
    can't forget it because 19 people changed American history on
    September 11th, and it doesn't take many terrorists to create
    serious problems for this country and for people around the
    world.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, sir, I think you--I don't
    know that I could say it any better than you just did. We have
    to keep our pressure on the terrorists who would continue to
    like----
        Senator King. Can you be sure that you got that in the
    record what he just said? Go ahead.
        Lieutenant General Caine. It's not something Senator,
    unfortunately, we can ever take our eyes off of completely. The
    challenge that somebody who would want to do harm to us or to
    our interests around the world is not going to go away anytime
    soon.
        Senator King. One of the concerns that I have, we always
    talk about deterrence. That's the main spring of our defense
    strategy. But deterrence doesn't work with a terrorist, with a
    nuclear weapon. They don't have a capital to blow up. They
    don't care about dying. The defense against that eventuality,
    which I think is absolutely terrifying, is intelligence. I hope
    that you will continue to focus the forces in the Pentagon on
    intelligence and intervening if there's any threat of nuclear
    material getting into the hands of a terrorist organization.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Finally, in terms of your leadership within
    the military, and I know that you're a passionate advocate for
    our war fighters. One of the things that concerns me, and I'm
    going from this meeting to a meeting of the Veterans Affairs
    Committee, is the transition from Active Duty military to
    retired, which you have experienced.
        The testimony that we've had at numerous hearings is it's
    inadequate. It's improved in recent years, but there are still
    gaps that it's very complex and military Active Duty people
    going into veteran status, it turns out it's the highest
    propensity for suicide in the first couple of years after the
    transition from Active Duty.
        So I hope that's something that you'll pay some attention
    to. I believe that as much money, effort, and time should be
    spent on transition out as we spend on recruiting in.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it is a bit of an
    arduous process. I can personally attest to that. I appreciate
    your leadership on helping the veterans of the Nation to
    transition appropriately. It is an area of risk for sure, and
    I'll keep my eye on it if confirmed.
        Senator King. I hope you will. Thank you very much General,
    and again, congratulations on your nomination.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. Senator Cramer.
        Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    General for your service and for your willingness to step back
    into the gap. While I agree that the dismissal of your
    predecessor was unfortunate, it's behind us, and I cannot think
    of a better person to replace General Brown than you. Frankly,
    the unconventionalness of you us as the President's pick is in
    and of itself brilliant in my view.
        But when you look at your actual history and your actual
    service and the diversity of it, I just can't imagine a better
    choice. So congratulations on that and I look forward to
    supporting you strongly. In your opening statement, you said
    some things that we hear a lot from people that come before the
    Committee and your response to, to Chairman Wicker's
    legislation dealing with the acquisition reform stuff. Very
    welcoming.
        But everyone says that. Everyone says that, and yet I find
    it--and this is why, frankly, you being unconventional is
    encouraging to me because they all mean it, by the way, when
    they say it. I believe that at the moment they mean it. They
    mean it until the particular service that they served in or the
    particular agency within the service they served in, it was
    disrupted by the very thing they say they support.
        Who we're dealing with the situation right now, perhaps the
    most disruptive innovator taking over, becoming the first
    director of the most disruptive innovative agency, The Space
    Development Agency, has been on leave for 3 months during a
    witch hunt that's began on the last day of the last
    Administration. Everybody that that says they're an innovator,
    is an innovator, except in this case, maybe we should check
    further into it.
        All the while, satellites don't go up, all the while China
    goes at the speed of China. So I believe there's a cultural
    problem as well as we have some work to do as Congress,
    policymakers have work to do, the Administration has work to
    do, but we have a culture challenge as well.
        General, I'd like you to elaborate a little bit on how we
    can really make the difference that you say you want to make,
    and I believe you do want to make, so that we aren't just
    consolidating all of our industry into a couple of giants,
    whether it be a land, airspace, sea.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, you're hitting on
    an area that that is a point of passion for me. We have to stop
    admiring the problem and we have to start executing. I do think
    your point about culture is where it all starts. I think we
    have to take an, an ownership and an entrepreneurial mindset to
    all of these reforms that are in front of us. We can't do this
    alone. We have to do it with you here in the Congress in order
    to actually make these changes.
        I'm encouraged by the leaders who are coming into the
    Department who have deep substantive business background that
    are not known as people who admire problems. If confirmed, I
    look forward to working with the various leaders in order to
    actually move the ball, and of course, working with the
    Congress to execute these things without continuing to admire
    these challenges in front of us.
        Senator Cramer. Well, and I appreciate your reference to
    the new style of leaders coming in the entrepreneurs and
    whatnot. I have the same optimism as a result of it, but I am
    getting anxious about actually seeing it happen. So, maybe
    you're the leader that can make that a reality for us now.
        You know, we get to talk to the combatant commanders.
    You'll get to talk to them a lot. One of the things we hear
    over and over from commanders, of course, is that intelligence,
    surveillance, reconnaissance, ISR, is in great need and low
    supply these days. The Air Force, specifically, has been on a
    mission to eliminate ISR as one of their key missions. It's
    disappeared even as a term in several of their documents in
    recent years.
        It's not just their fault. I mean, we have a--as we've all
    been talking about, we have a resource challenge in our Defense
    Department, and we're trying to work on that. I just think we
    all have to do a lot more. For sure, I want to recognize that.
    But I also worry that there's this divide between what the
    commanders say they need in the field and frankly what we're
    seeing and where we're investing.
        I would just love you to, your remaining seconds with me,
    expound a little bit on ISR, where you see it, you know,
    landing as a mission set. Maybe it's everybody has their own
    form, but I don't think that's very practical.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, just in my
    remaining 5 seconds. You know, ISR, and the ability to have
    indications and warnings to make decisions for commanders who
    hold risk is a key and essential part of our overall ability to
    execute the missions that we must do.
        Senator Cramer. I think that Air Force should keep it as a
    mission. I get that. Other services will have some form of it.
    But anyway, thank you. I look forward to supporting you.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, General. Good to see you. I
    enjoyed our visit. I would encourage my colleagues not to hold
    your last name against you. I share comments that some of my
    colleagues have made about the unfortunate circumstances with
    General Brown, but you didn't have anything to do with that.
        I know from our conversations and my own due diligence VMI
    is very proud of you and folks who've worked with you in the
    past who I hold in high regard, are very proud of you. A lot of
    the questions that have been asked, kind of trying to really
    drill into your ability to give the best candidate advice, I
    think your career has demonstrated to my satisfaction that you
    will do so.
        One of the things that I really like about your background,
    and I think Senator Ernst and others have commented on it, is
    active and guard, DOD and private sector at the Pentagon, at
    the White House, at the CIA. You've seen pretty deep
    interaction with allies.
        You've really seen the breadth of our military mission in a
    way that I think is the kind of experience that would inform
    that judgment that you need to provide. In fact, in a way, the
    role of the Head of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, as Senator Cotton was walking you through the work that
    you did at the CIA, was a little bit the same role.
        Why don't you describe in a little more detail that posting
    to the CIA ?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kaine. What your job was in that, because I think
    it's almost analogous, the advice you are providing to the CIA
    director, best military advice, is pretty analogous to the
    advice you'd be providing to SEC DEF [Secretary of Defense] and
    the and the Commander-in-Chief.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
    question. You know, I do agree. The ADMA, the Associate
    Director for Military Affairs, was actually established by the
    Congress to detail a three star military officer over to the
    CIA under title 50 authorities in order to provide best
    military advice to the director, the deputy director, and to
    work daily with the secretary, the chairman, the combatant
    commanders, and the service chiefs in order to globally
    integrate same functions that the chairman has, in order to
    globally integrate CIA and DOD activities.
        If confirmed, I'll continue to do that, working with the
    best of the title 10 forces, the best of title 50, what the
    State Department can bring to the table, what the rest of the
    interagency can bring to the table, along with our allies and
    partners. So, while I'm mindful that I've not led at the four-
    star level, this is not a command job that I'm being considered
    for. It's an advisory job, and there's very similar traits to
    the last job in this one
        Senator Kaine. The posting that you had to the CIA for this
    important role, was that a--were you delegated by the SEC DEF
    to do that, or did you like interview with the CIA to get that
    post?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I was nominated by the Department
    and interviewed by the CIA. As far as I understand it, the CIA
    made the selection.
        Senator Kaine. But you were the nominee of the Department.
    So, I do think that the role is an important one. The one thing
    I don't see in your resume, but I suspect it's probably there,
    and I just--your resume's too long, is interaction that you've
    had with the State Department over the course of your career.
    Could you talk about that a little bit?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. My first real
    substantive interaction with the State Department was actually
    when I was a White House fellow at USDA, and we were charged
    with working on the Global Pandemic Plan surrounding avian
    influenza H5N1.
        Senator Kaine. During the Bush administration?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. During the Bush
    administration. That really began my substantive appreciation
    for what the diplomatic element of power can do, and that
    continued through my time in the military overseas, and have
    deep regard and appreciation for what the State Department can
    do for us.
        Senator Kaine. I think all of us at times have been
    frustrated with silos. The states and their silo, intel and
    theirs, DOD Pentagon, and their own silo. Sometimes having the
    different perspectives is great. If everybody's just singing
    the exact same note, you sometimes wonder whether it's
    groupthink. So, getting some different perspectives can be
    helpful. The fact that you've been in all parts of the kind of
    broad national security family gives me some real confidence in
    your judgment coming into this position.
        Last thing I'll just ask is what would you say has been
    your signature experience of the course of your career in terms
    of interacting with our allies?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Probably sir the scud hunt in
    2003, where I had the opportunity to work very closely with our
    British, UK, and Australian allies, which was absolutely a
    coalition effort from day one. We went to war alongside them,
    and I've thankfully sustained all of those relationships now. I
    have deep relationships with our closest allies, and if
    confirmed, look forward to continuing those.
        Senator Kaine. I'm a strong promoter of the AUKUS
    [Australia, United Kingdom, United States] framework and the
    fact that you've had those relationships in the past and
    maintain them, that's a positive.
        I yield back. Thank you.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Where were you exactly during that scud
    operation, sir?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, sir, the location that we
    flew out of, I think is still classified. Happy to talk about
    that in closed session.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay. Thank you very much. Senator Scott.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
        General, congratulations. You've got the right background.
    I think you're going to do a great job. Always like to see
    business guys succeed. So, that's fun. This is all doable. I
    mean, you look at where we are. We've got Communist China's,
    built a military to defeat us. We've got allies that have not
    invested like they should have. We've got Iran, which appears
    to have, you know, enough money now to continue to support the
    Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah.
        We've got China all over Latin America. I mean, what we
    have to do to defend the freedom of this country and try to do
    our best to police a world. Is this actually doable? Do are you
    optimistic? Are you pessimistic?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I'm always an optimistic
    leader.
        Senator Scott. Why do you believe that we can do it?
        Lieutenant General Caine. There's a lot of reasons, but the
    power of the American spirit is what leaps out to me right off
    the bat. There are very few things that we set our mind to that
    we can achieve. Despite some of the very serious challenges in
    front of us, we've always rogered up to those challenges.
        Senator Scott. Do you think the budget that we're going to
    be able to provide is going to allow you to be able to do the
    things you need to do?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I won't get in
    front of the President, or OMB [Office of Management and
    Budget], on what budget markers they set. What I will do
    confirm to you and commit to you, is that whatever capital
    we're given will make the best out of it.
        Senator Scott. In Florida we have 20 military bases and
    three unified commands. One is Homestead, and we talked about
    this a little bit. It's not that far from Cuba. Homestead is a
    little bit north of Key West, and it hasn't had a dedicated
    flying mission in a while. It seems like it's, it would be an
    important base. Do you see a future for Homestead? Do you think
    it ought to have a flying mission?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I won't get out in
    front of the service, but if confirmed, I'll definitely talk to
    the Air Force Reserve Command and the Air Force to see what
    they're thinking around flying mission at Homestead.
        The history of that unit, and that base is exemplary. They
    were with us in the Scud Hunt, a small component of them were
    there with us back in 2003. I've got deep appreciation for the
    culture and history of that unit.
        Senator Scott. This is the first time I have the
    opportunity to be the chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower.
    As you know, we have not been able to build ships, maintain
    ships, keep ships ready. How do you think that's going to
    change?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, I think it's a significant
    challenge for us, and we've got to up our game. I'm encouraged
    by the SEC Navs focus on this, and we've got to get to our
    congressionally mandated number of 355 ships as soon as
    possible, which includes our ability to sustain them and repair
    them around the world. We've got real limits right now,
        Senator Scott. According to the Navy, they provide the
    combatant commanders with 40 percent of their requirements.
    Didn't make much sense in business. If one division need, well,
    you know, they need to deliver 40 percent, but it's work, we'd
    based the budget on the requirements needed. Do you think
    there's a different way we ought to be allocating resources?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I'm sorry, could you
    repeat the question again?
        Senator Scott. Command and commanders that, you know,
    they're only getting a portion of what they're asking. Is there
    a better way to allocate the resources?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate the
    question. You know, that the challenge is that we have to
    globally integrate all the combatant commands, and there's
    never a loss for tension between the COCOMs. What I trust is
    that the joint staff and the joint chiefs are looking carefully
    and thoughtfully considering where that balance is, and then
    passing those options to the secretary for him to decide on
    where that allocation may be. Until we have such capacity that
    there's no need to do that, I think we're going to continue to
    balance those capabilities and capacities across all the
    COCOMs.
        Senator Scott. So, my final question is, what drives you?
    Why do you want to do this? Let's say you did this for 4 years,
    what would your goal be at the end of those 4 years that you
    said we got this accomplished?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, doing my part to
    make sure that we have a safe and prosperous United States of
    America. That the military element of power has delivered the
    deterrence capability that we needed, and we've taken care of
    our families and our force along the way.
        Senator Scott. Thank you. You'll do a great job.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Mullin.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you,
    General, for wanting to step back into service. Your retirement
    didn't last too long, and the idea that you're willing to jump
    back and serve just speaks volume to the true inner spirit that
    you have. I want to thank you for doing that. You have made a
    tremendous amount of sacrifice already and, you know, eyes wide
    open what this job is going to entail. You have some real
    challenges ahead of you.
        I want to start first talking about the defense industry. I
    know you're familiar with the so-called ``last Supper'' in 1994
    to where we basically encouraged our defense industry to
    consolidate. I'm a firm believer in looking back and looking at
    things of where it went wrong. Because since then, our defense
    industry really hasn't been to deliver on time and on budget on
    some of the most critical needs we have.
        We've seen from our planes in the air, to our ships in the
    shipyards, to the equipment that we're needing is constantly
    behind what we're needing today. When we ask for technology
    that's being used against us or that our adversaries have
    already may achieved. When we ask our defense industry to
    deliver, it's 5 to 7 years, if we're lucky, it's 3, and yet,
    it's never on time.
        Now, you come from a unique position, being Active, being
    Reserve, and being in the private sector. I feel like that this
    is one of the biggest threats that we have. We have a
    technology need today, and it's being delivered 5 years from
    now. We are 5 years behind. How do you plan on tackling this?
    Because I do feel like this is the biggest threat to our
    military today.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I agree. It's a
    huge problem. Technology is evolving so quickly that every time
    we field capabilities, they're obsolete oftentimes when they
    hit the force. That's not acceptable. I think it goes back to
    something that the Chairman and I talked about at the beginning
    of the hearing, and that's related to having agility in our
    requirements and building a system of acquisition that allows
    us to take advantage of the current technologies, not those of
    the past.
        If confirmed, I'll work with the joint staff, the joint
    chiefs, and of course OSD to pick up the speed, pace, and tempo
    of fielding the capabilities that we need that are not
    obsolete.
        Senator Mullin. How do you plan on bringing private
    industry back in to actually go around some of our primes that
    are incapable of delivering in a quick fashion?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I think we need a
    mix of both startups that are new entrants to the industry, but
    we also do need the primes. The answer is all of the above.
    There are components that the primes can only do, and we have
    to leverage that capability. Then there's a bunch of things
    that new entrants will do to move forward. So, I think the
    answer is, as I mentioned, all of the above.
        Senator Mullin. I agree that the primes are important, but
    they have felt they have failed miserably on staying on budget
    and on time and being adequate to delivering today's needs. I
    don't like rewarding those that have not delivered on
    adequately when we've asked. We know that's been a problem. So,
    holding them accountable is important.
        Now, I want to switch gears real quick about Afghanistan.
    It's deeply personal to me, and I know it is to you and anyone
    else that had the privilege of serving the Nation in
    Afghanistan. But because our disastrous withdrawal, I feel like
    there's a hesitation in our military and our military family to
    actually step forward and make that sacrifice again.
        I think there's a lot of doubt that the United States is
    able to stand behind what our first mission is, and then to be
    able to bring pride to those that sacrificed. With that brings
    a morale issue to those that are still serving. Those are
    sometimes with the most experience in there. I feel like we may
    be having a drain in knowledge of those that that have
    sacrificed so much.
        How do you plan on retaining those and restoring that trust
    back in the military that says, 'Hey, we got you. We're not
    going to leave you on the battlefield. We're not going to let
    your sacrifice die, but we're going to let you walk away with a
    tremendous amount of pride knowing that your sacrifice meant
    something to this country.?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate the
    question. I think that's one of our most important jobs as
    leaders, whether it be at the chairman level or all the way
    down to the platoon leader level, is inspiring those who serve.
    Taking care of them always, but also making sure they know how
    much we appreciate them, and their families, and their service.
        Senator Mullin. But that doesn't address what happened.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, you mean in
    Afghanistan?
        Senator Mullin. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Caine. You know, that withdrawal was not
    what anyone would've wanted. Very difficult circumstances. I
    think the officers on the ground did the best that they could
    with the policy decisions that were made. We mourned the loss
    of the 13 at Abbey Gate, and we have to hold those accountable
    if there was something for them to be held accountable for. I
    know the Department is looking into that. But again, most of
    those professional military officers were executing the
    direction and orders of policymakers above them.
        Senator Mullin. Thank you.
        Chairman Wicker. General, is it accurate to say that
    Afghanistan was a 'forever war??
        Lieutenant General Caine. I'm not sure what the doctrinal
    definition of a forever war is, but it certainly took a--it was
    a long, long time.
        Chairman Wicker. What was the engagement of NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization] and American troops at the time
    of our disastrous withdrawal?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, sir, I think there were
    still U.S. Forces on the ground and still NATO Forces on the
    ground. I'm not exactly sure what your question is.
        Chairman Wicker. Were there casualties?
        Lieutenant General Caine. At the very end, there were. Yes,
    sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Oh, no, in the last year before the
    disastrous withdrawal. There were no American casualties?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Not that I'm aware.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Caine, for being here. Thank you for
    your family, for their support of this appointment. Based on
    your understanding of relevant classification and authorities,
    do you believe that any of the information that was shared on
    the Signal chat was classified at the time it was sent,
    particularly the details about timing of the target and for the
    manned U.S. aircraft and other details related to the exact
    plan?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I didn't see the
    original CONOP [Contingency Operations Plan]. As I mentioned
    earlier in my testimony, I think we should always preserve the
    element of surprise. That's a key and essential thing that we
    owe our warfighters.
        Senator Gillibrand. What would you have done if you were on
    that text chain?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, first, I wasn't and I think
    that was a political partisan text chain with policymakers at
    the political level only. So, I can't hypothetically guess what
    I would've done, but I would not have--we would not have----
        Senator Gillibrand. --I wouldn't call that a political or
    partisan text chain. It had the head of intelligence, it had
    the head of CIA, it had our Secretary of Defense, it had the
    National Security top advisors for the President, and to share
    that type of information from a military perspective, I can't
    imagine if a subordinate of yours shared that type of military
    information in an unclassified setting, such as a Signal text
    chain, they would be fired, would they not?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, as I mentioned
    earlier, I think, the Chairman and Ranking Member have called
    for an investigation, and so, I feel like it's appropriate for
    me to withhold comment until such time that it's either
    determined that there will be an investigation or not.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, what would you do in a different
    scenario if you see classified information or war plans,
    information, or tactical information on an unclassified chain?
    What would you do to stop the conversation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, I think I would weigh in
    and stop it if I was a, a part of it, but in this case, I
    wasn't.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. The worldwide proliferation
    of unmanned aerial systems is an undeniable national security
    threat, creating challenges in both funding and capability. How
    do you believe the Department and Joint Force should approach
    these two challenges of funding and capability?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it's definitely a
    big challenge in front of us. The mass and simultaneity of
    especially small UAS [Unmanned Aircraft System] is one that is
    concerning to me, both from a technical standpoint, but also
    from a policy standpoint. As I'm sure you're aware, we have
    somewhat limited capabilities in some cases inside the domestic
    U.S. to stop some of these UASs. I think we have to continue to
    fund the research and development to counter them.
        Senator Gillibrand. Well, let's make it more direct to you.
    When you have drones hovering over Langley for a 2-week period,
    appearing and disappearing without our technology being able to
    track or trace it, without having the authorities to follow the
    UAS to its point of departure and its point of return, that
    creates a serious national security risk if those UAS are
    indeed being operated by Russia, China, or Iran. So, what will
    you do to protect the military bases and the military secrets
    that are under your purview?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed, I'll
    continue to put the appropriate amount of pressure and interest
    on that to work in conjunction with the Commander of NORAD
    [North American Aerospace Defense Command], NORTHCOM, General
    Guillot, who's doing a fantastic job on this issue and others
    to continue to work with the private sector, to find the
    capabilities that we must have, that we currently don't have to
    prevent this from happening again.
        Senator Gillibrand. Which capabilities don't you have, do
    you have the, do you lack the authorities or do you lack the
    technological capability,
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think it's a little
    bit of a mix of both. There are some authorities? issues
    related to airspace directly over U.S. military bases, and then
    transitioning outside of the geographical boundaries of that
    military base and who has cognizant authority over those small
    UASs at that point. Then, I think there's some technological
    challenges in the states around stopping them and actually
    downing them. There's always collateral damage concerns in
    those types of things.
        Senator Gillibrand. Will you seek the authority to be able
    to take down UASs above military bases?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I'll speak with the
    Commander of NORAD, NORTHCOM, and the relevant State and local
    authorities to make sure that we're illuminating those
    discussion points.
        Senator Gillibrand. Senator Cotton and I have legislation
    to do exactly that, and I would request that you review that
    legislation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Do you have co-sponsors, Senator?
        Senator Gillibrand. I don't know yet, but I can ask.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you General, for being here, your service, and
    congratulations on your nomination. You're nominated to be the
    senior military advisor to the President of the United States.
    What a chore. I remember a time when generals and retired
    senior officers would avoid political discussions. It was
    extremely uncommon for a former senior officer to even endorse
    a candidate for political office.
        Lately, that approach seems to be an exception, not to
    rule. Some of your predecessors even appear to support
    political positions while in uniform. Your predecessor was
    deeply involved in politics, which should not be part of this
    approach.
        General Caine, in your own words, how would you describe to
    this Committee the importance of your responsibility and
    commitment to provide the best military advice, even when that
    advice might differ from what the President of the United
    States believes?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
    question. It ultimately is the whole job is to be the principal
    military advisor to the President, and pursuant to that job,
    provide the President with best military advice even when the
    President may have different feelings about it. That is exactly
    what the Nation pays me to do. So, if confirmed, that is
    exactly what I'll do.
        Senator Tuberville. General, when you take this job, what's
    your No. 1 concern?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, right now, the No. 1
    concern is the passage of time and ensuring that the joint
    force is ready, properly armed with the right capabilities out
    at the tactical edge, properly globally integrated with the
    services themselves, with the other elements of the
    interagency, with our allies and partners, and with the private
    sector, and ready to go tonight. That means their families are
    ready, they're ready, they're properly trained and equipped.
    So, we have much to do.
        Senator Tuberville. We all know that the machines that we
    build, the guns and the bullets that we have, everything at the
    disposal of the warfighter. But it's usually and is the people
    involved. Our recruiting has much improved in the last couple
    of months. What do you see your role as an advisor to the
    President in recruiting for our all of our military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, we don't have much
    of a military without the incredible 2.8 million members of the
    joint force that selflessly join the service to do something
    more important than themselves. To answer your question, if
    confirmed, I think it's an opportunity for me to be another
    voice of encouragement for those young men and women who have
    the capability and meet the standards to come into the service
    and do something that they will forever hold so high in their
    past history. The chance to serve this Nation is a special
    privilege for those of us that have come into the cloth of our
    Nation and served. I hope that I'll be able to encourage others
    to do so.
        Senator Tuberville. Being the chairman of the Subcommittee
    on Personnel of the Armed Services, we had a hearing last week
    with our academies, Naval Academy and Air Force Academy. I
    would hope in the future, and I know your job is to inform our
    President and keep him advised of everything, but I think that
    your job, too, would be able to work with our academies in
    terms of our leadership, help build that leadership to a higher
    standard. To keep it to a higher standard and let our young men
    and women know that that's where it all starts.
        If we don't have leadership, we don't have anything. I
    think that's a good point, that it pass on to the President.
    Obviously, your information you give to the President is going
    to be No. 1, but also build and help build our military is
    going to be a huge part of you, I think, a part of your job.
    What do you think?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I agree, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. You're here. Senator Duckworth.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to begin by expressing my deep gratitude for the
    outstanding service of General Brown and so many other
    dedicated military leaders who were unjustly dismissed as part
    of a politically motivated purge of senior Department of
    Defense officials.
        General Caine, I really enjoyed our conversations we've had
    recently over the last couple of weeks. If you are confirmed as
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you will serve as the President's
    principal military advisor, and be expected to bring your
    military judgment to bear, to advise against illegal, immoral,
    and advisable courses of action, regardless of partisan
    pressure.
        However, we are in a moment where that very principle is
    under strain, such as with the dismissal of Judge Advocates
    General responsible for providing critical legal expertise
    because their counsel did not align with the political
    preferences of Secretary Hegseth. This pattern has had a
    chilling effect on the open, honest discourse essential to
    national security decisionmaking at the highest level.
        Now, the lives of self servicemembers and future of our
    national security depend on expert qualified leaders who
    understand that their decisions have real life or death
    consequences. How will you insulate and empower general
    officers across the force to remain professional and
    importantly nonpartisan and provide unbiased advice to civilian
    policymakers without fear of coercion, undue partisanship, or
    retaliation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I thank you. I
    also enjoyed our time together. This is the whole job. This is
    why you and I both took our oath of office. It's what is
    contained in our commission and aligned with the Constitution,
    and so, that is what the Nation expects out of our professional
    officer corps, I'm sure what we'll continue to do moving
    forward in history.
        Senator Duckworth. And will you do your best to ensure that
    the general officer corps, those who give that advice, remain
    unbiased and non-partisan?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Always.
        Senator Duckworth. Well, maybe bias on the side of the
    servicemembers and national security.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, yes, ma'am, but
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you, and it's great to see a guard
    guy at that table going through the confirmation hearing, so.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, ma'am.
        Senator Duckworth. You'll also be the senior most uniformed
    officer entrusted with being a model and a leader for the joint
    force. Recently, we've witnessed troubling signs, signs of
    blurred lines between private power and public trust. A
    striking lack of regard for protecting vital national security
    secrets and the absence of accountability for top leadership;
    from Elon Musk receiving invitations for briefings on China, to
    a pattern of mishandling classified information, to Secretary
    Hegseth bringing family members into sensitive meetings with
    allies and partners. Very concerningly.
        We have also seen a concerted effort to skirt transparency
    to the American people on the use of force with decisionmaking
    being done over disappearing Signal chat. It seems like this
    Administration is more interested in keeping secrets from the
    American people than protecting national security secrets for
    the American people. You have experience running some of our
    most sensitive operations. So, you know that even the need for
    secrecy to enable mission success does not mean skirting
    accountability to the American people.
        Do you commit to providing the legally required
    transparency to Congress and the American people over decisions
    related to the use of force even in the face of pressure from
    civilian leadership?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Another concerning focus of
    this Administration has been to distract the military from its
    core mission approval of protecting the American people from
    external threats by redirecting military personnel assets and
    platforms to domestic law enforcement missions.
        President Trump may have learned from his first term that
    asking one of your Presidents to deploy the military to fire on
    civilian protestors was a no-go. So, instead, he has turned to
    form insidious tactics linking criminal activities or undesired
    political speech to hostile governments like Venezuela or
    terrorist groups like Hamas in order to legitimize military
    involvement.
        In fact, this kind of threat inflation is exactly what
    dictators do. The separation between military missions and
    civilian law enforcement is a core tenet of our democracy, and
    exists not only to protect the rights of American citizens, but
    also to preserve the integrity of our Armed Forces.
        When military personnel are thrust into law enforcement
    missions, it places them at risk of moral injury of being asked
    to enforce partisan concerns rather than to defend the Nation.
    It compromises not just their mission, but their conscience.
    What steps will you take to ensure that U.S. military personnel
    or assets are not inappropriately used in law enforcement
    capacities that distract the military from its core mission
    undermine readiness and threaten public trust?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thank you for that
    question. I think there's strong systems in place, legal
    systems in place that prevent any missteps there. It ranges
    from title 32 authorities to title 10 authorities and have no
    reason to believe at this point that those are insufficient in
    any way.
        Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I enjoy working with you,
    General.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you.
        Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
    Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to begin by agreeing with our ranking member and
    others, you, Lieutenant General Caine on commending General
    C.Q. Brown for his exceptional four decades of service. I fully
    agree with the accolades he's receiving in this committee, and
    wish him and his family the best.
        I've worked, served under, met with hundreds of flag
    officers in my positions as a U.S. senator, as a U.S. marine,
    and I will say, General, I think you are one of the most
    impressive flag officers I've met with. I don't say that
    lightly, like I said, I've met with hundreds. I think it's the
    combination of all the experiences, to Senator Duckworth's
    point, Guard, Reserve private sector. I mean, you're bringing a
    lot in here, and I think that's going to be very, very
    important.
        I do want to touch on this topic that we're playing up a
    lot here on keeping politics out of our military. I couldn't
    agree more with that. I think it's really important. Big part
    of my career here. I've tried to make sure that happens, but I
    will say we're not talking about what just happened the last 4
    years. I think the military was politicized in a huge way,
    particularly from the civilian leaders who were pushing left
    wing theories on the military, pushing climate change over a
    ship building.
        The Under Secretary for Policy came before this committee
    and told us that our military is, 'systemically racist.? It's
    ridiculous, right? Do you believe our military is systemically
    racist? Is that what you saw in your 30-plus years of service?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, senator.
        Senator Sullivan. So, do you agree, just to make 100
    percent sure, what the Secretary of Defense's testimony when he
    came here, that our are military professionals, uniform
    professionals, need to remain apolitical and committed to our
    Constitution identified not as republicans or democrats, but
    warriors and leaders. Is that your commitment?
        General Caine. It is, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Will you commit to this committee to
    doing that?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. I'm not going to let this
    hearing go by without a famous quote from the father of the
    U.S. Air Force, Billy Mitchell, who was talking about a certain
    place in the world. He said, 'Whoever controls this place
    controls the world. It is the most strategic place in the
    world.? What place was Billy Mitchell talking about, General?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Alaska.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you agree with Billy Mitchell's
    incredibly insightful analysis?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Mitchell was a brilliant
    airpower.
        Senator Sullivan. That's a yes, I assume, you're saying?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Well, look, our adversaries agree.
    You and I talked about this in my office. Again, I appreciate
    the hearing. We've had huge incursions, huge number of
    incursions in the last 2 years. Russian and Chinese. Joint
    Russian and Chinese strategic bomber task forces into our ADIZ
    [Air Defense Identification Zone], joint Russian and Chinese
    naval task forces into our EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] up in
    Alaska. We are on the front lines of great power competition.
        With regard to our adversaries, you and I talked about
    infrastructure in Alaska for our military. The President after
    his election said, we will ensure Alaska gets even more defense
    investments as we rebuild our military, especially as Russia
    and China are making menacing moves in the North Pacific.
    That's from the Commander-in-Chief.
        The INDOPACOM, NORTHCOM commander recently said that this
    very vital naval base, former naval base, and ADAK, is a former
    sub base, air base, huge fuel depot, one of the biggest fuel
    depots for our Navy in the world. We have a Navy team there
    right now this week looking at reopening that. Can I get your
    commitment to work with this committee and me on infrastructure
    that can protect our northern flying--because as the NORTHCOM
    commander recently testified, these incursions are only going
    to increase.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me talk about another issue. It
    doesn't come up a lot. You talked about urgent action reform to
    go faster with greater efficiency. I think one of our unsung
    success stories in this regard is 8(a) contractors working with
    the Department of Defense. DOD can use these 8(a) contractors
    if they want. They don't have to, but they bring efficiency,
    speed, low-cost contracts, and quality services.
        I saw a recent example of an integrated request from DOD to
    have a wheeled vehicle that can put a harpoon anti-ship system
    on it. This 8(a) a contractor got it designed in 2 weeks, got
    it produced in a month--or I'm sorry, with inside of 12 months.
    They're already in Taiwan. They're going to produce 20 more in
    18 months. The OEMs, big primes, if they tried to do that,
    would've taken them 10 years.
        Can you commit to me to continue to work with these small
    businesses that I think deliver readiness, efficiency, and
    modernization?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        Without objection, that chart will be copied into the
    record.

        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Chairman Wicker. Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking
    Member Reed for holding this hearing. My thanks to you, General
    Caine, for meeting with me. We had a great conversation about
    Nevada, and for your willingness to serve.
        But I'm going to keep on the subject of Nevada assets and
    documenting exposure at classified locations. From your time as
    a director of special access programs and from your own
    experience serving at a data mass location, a duty station
    whose location and existences classified. You're familiar with
    the delicate balance between protecting sensitive information
    and ensuring that servicemembers' records actually reflect
    their service-connected injuries at those sensitive or data
    mass locations.
        I've heard from constituents who served at such locations
    like the Nevada Test and Training Range, who believe they were
    exposed to radiation from our days of conducting explosive
    nuclear weapons testing and to burn pits, which dispose of
    classified waste.
        However, DOD does not classify the range as a place where
    exposure occurred. Despite the Department of Energy (DOE)
    providing a presumption of exposure for their personnel who
    served there at these exact same locations within the range.
    Because their service records are data masked, as you know,
    these veterans can't even prove to the VA that they were ever
    actually stationed there.
        In fact, Nevada, there are six DOE covered facilities, most
    of most of which are within the Nevada Test and Training Range,
    where DOE employees presumed to have been exposed to a
    radiation. But for our servicemembers, the VA only recognizes
    one, the Nevada test site as a presumed exposure location. So,
    one such facility that is covered for DOE, but not for DOD, is
    the Tonopah test range, which is both A DOE and Air Force
    installation. Portions of the range are still fenced off and
    contaminated.
        A 1975 environmental assessment acknowledged the
    contamination and the harm it would cause, but the airmen, they
    were never told. They do not have a presumption of exposure as
    their DOE counterparts they served alongside with do, and
    further adding insult to this, they can't even show that they
    were there. All of this have prevented them from being able to
    receive their well-deserved veterans? benefits.
        I know we talked about this. We need to make this right,
    and I'm committed to fixing this problem in this year's NDAA. I
    hope that I can count on your support to making it happen. Will
    you commit to working with me, of course, and the Committee to
    find a solution that provides DOD, the presumption of exposure
    at such data mass locations, and provides those who served, and
    are serving at these locations, sufficient documentation so
    they can submit their health-related issues, without ever
    compromising the security of their service details?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, thank you for raising
    this in our office call, and thank you for your leadership on
    this matter. I do think we owe our servicemembers a way forward
    through these important jobs that they have, that they can
    never talk about. I do commit to staying close with you on this
    matter, and trying to sort out a way that we can help them
    transition, take the credit and the risk that they've bought in
    the service of their nation with them into the next chapter of
    their lives.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I know the
    men and women who serve there will be very pleased if we're
    able to do this. It really means a lot to them.
        I just have about a minute we left. So, I want to just ask
    about the force of the future, because over the course of your
    service, you've gone through the rigors of actually training in
    Nevada skies while stationed at Dallas Air Force Base, thank
    you.
        You know, personally, our military readiness depends on
    meeting immediate warfighting needs while preparing for
    potential conflict our country might face. It requires evolving
    and changing how we train to fight. Which is one of the reasons
    I fought so hard to make sure Nevada's military training
    regions are modernized, keeping pace with emerging threats.
        So, if confirmed, how would you prioritize investments in
    readiness, in modernization, in force structure, especially in
    these emerging domains like cyber warfare and AI [artificial
    intelligence]?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, we've got to train
    to the realistic threat in order to ensure that we're prepared
    if we ever do go into conflict. Part of that is making sure
    that our training ranges either live virtual or constructive
    accurately replicate the threat so that our warfighters can
    train to the realistic threat. I think we still have some work
    to do both in our fiscal range, at physical ranges, and in our
    virtual ranges. If confirmed, that'll be an area along the
    readiness line of effort that I spend some time on.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I look forward to working with
    you on that. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Budd.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, it's good to
    see you, again. Thanks for your willingness to serve. I enjoyed
    our meeting in my office last week. It was a great discussion.
        Let's talk for a minute about China. You know, their
    strategy for expanding their power, it's operated a lot in
    using gray zone tactics or military and civil action, somewhere
    between the boundaries of peace and war, and it's difficult to
    confront with conventional military force. Admiral Paparo, he
    stated that Special Operations Forces are crucial for competing
    in the gray zone, and that is under invested in the Pacific
    command.
        Can you talk about your views on the role of SOF at all
    stages of conflict and what investments should be made to grow
    these capabilities?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator thanks for that
    question. You know, as somebody who's proudly been a part of
    the Special Operations Forces, I appreciate greatly the
    exponential return that those forces can provide to the Nation.
    When I think about creating multiple dilemmas for Xi Jinping,
    many of those dilemmas are created through America's special
    operations forces where we build great partnerships, we help
    train our allies and partners, when required we're able to
    execute sensitive missions that help us to illuminate the
    threat in a more thoughtful way.
        I would agree with Admiral Paparo's views on soft forces in
    the Pacific, but would defer to General Fenton who probably has
    strong views on that. If confirmed, I'll consult with him on
    these matters.
        Senator Budd. Thank you.
        I appreciate your commentary that they deliver an
    exponential return, I believe indeed they do. In your advanced
    policy questions, you underscore the importance of
    synchronization between the DOD and the intelligence community.
    How do you propose we do that?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it really starts
    with trusting and deep relationships. You know, I am fortunate
    in my last job to have learned the value of making sure that
    the best of the title 10 community is linked up with the best
    of the title 50 community to get to almost title 60-like
    outcomes.
        I realize that there is no title 60, but I put that in
    quotation marks. You know, and if confirmed, I'll continue with
    that pathway forward. We have an incredible associate director
    for military affairs at the CIA now Lieutenant General Mike
    Downs, who carries on and is probably doing a much better job
    than I ever did over there.
        If confirmed, will continue to build on those
    relationships. I think it extends beyond just the DOD and CIA
    relationship. It extends into the relationship that we have
    with the State Department. It extends into the relationship
    that we have with the other elements of the interagency as
    well.
        Senator Budd. Thank you.
        Also, in your advanced policy questions, you mentioned that
    the service chiefs and combatant commanders, they use their
    unfunded priorities list as essential tools in communicating to
    us here in Congress the ideas where, or in the areas where
    additional resources could significantly enhance military
    readiness and capabilities. You also State that unfunded
    priority lists, they're not the only tool to build a strategy
    informed defense budget. Where do you think the DOD is
    currently leveraging to align the defense budget and the
    defense strategy, and where's there room for improvement on
    that?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, you know, I'm not
    yet back in the service, so I need to read the current version
    of the National Defense Strategy. If I'm----
        Senator Budd. Best guess outside looking in, sir.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I think we need to continue our
    efforts in the Pacific, and that would be my early read without
    actually being into the Intel record.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Last year, combatant commanders,
    they testified before this Committee speaking to the value and
    the relevance of the F-15E Strike Eagle and their respective
    areas of responsibility. So, as a fighter pilot with extensive
    experience in combat and Homeland defense missions, can you
    speak to the value and utility of the fourth-generation fleet,
    specifically the F-15E and the F-16, which you flew, and
    whether you find it wise to reduce these inventories prior to
    taking delivery of the potential replacements? I guess it's the
    divest to invest strategy. If you'd comment on that, please?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, Senator, thanks for that
    question. You know, what we can't do is leave something
    uncovered in the interim. When I think about at least the F-16,
    for example, they're predominantly tasked with Homeland defense
    at this point in time, and, you know, we can't ever let another
    9/11 happen.
        So, we have to make sure that we do not divest so much that
    we lose coverage in places that we must have to sustain that
    combat capability. We obviously need a probably fourth, and
    fifth gen, and sixth gen mix for a while until we get to the
    point where we're all where we need to be in sixth gen.
        Senator Budd. Thank you.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Warren.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    congratulations.
        So, if confirmed, you would serve as the principal military
    advisor to the President and swear an oath to defend the
    Constitution of the United States. President Trump once
    described your predecessor, General CQ Brown as, ``an
    outstanding leader'', and it's true, CQ Brown served for 40
    years in seven assignments across four combatant commands.
        The President's removal of the only Black officer and
    removal of the only female officer from the Joint Chiefs of
    staff has sent a chilling message about who is and who is not
    welcome in our military. This worries me deeply about the
    future of our military and the defense of our Nation.
        I am also concerned that President Trump wants to turn the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into just another political
    position. Last year, President Trump claimed that you once said
    you would kill for him and then you slapped a MAGA hat on. I
    know that others have disputed that story, but it raises
    questions about whether you were selected because Donald Trump
    thinks that you would be loyal to him rather than to the
    Constitution of the United States.
        Secretary Hegseth has now removed the top legal advisors
    for military services and recommended replacements at a lower
    rank. So, Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, your job will
    be to present your best military advice. Do you agree that in
    order to be able to comply with the law and make sure that your
    advice complies with the law that military commanders need
    legal advisors with both enough expertise and a high enough
    rank that they will be listened to during this process?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator. I know I've always
    had great legal advice regardless of what rank they were, but I
    do agree.
        Senator Warren. So, you think that you need people who have
    good advice, but do you think it helps in making sure that
    others--I'm glad that you listen to good advice no matter where
    it comes from--but that others are more willing to listen if
    the people offering legal advice have high enough rank to carry
    some weight in the room when those decisions are taking place?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator. Although, as I
    mentioned, I've sincerely had great legal advice from O-5s to
    O-7s. I think it's the officer and their professionalism and
    intellect versus what rank they have. I do appreciate the
    efforts to ask the question about what rank they should be, but
    would defer to the secretary on what rank he would want them to
    be.
        Senator Warren. I have to say that that gives me some real
    concern because the whole point of elevating the rank was the
    concern that not enough people were listening to good legal
    advice. While I appreciate that you say you listen, we need
    people to listen who are making decisions up and down the line.
        I understand Lieutenant General Caine that the
    circumstances of your nomination are beyond your control, but
    they also place a significant burden on you to show leadership,
    to restore public confidence in the military, and to show that
    you work for the American people. I've long been concerned by
    senior Pentagon leaders who trade on their time in public
    service to cash out afterwards to work for defense contractors.
    That is why during his confirmation hearing, General Brown
    agreed that he would not become a lobbyist or join the board of
    a defense contractor after he resigned.
        Lieutenant General Caine, are you willing to demonstrate
    that you're taking this job to serve the American people and
    commit that after you leave this job, you'll not work for any
    major defense contractors or companies that are affected by
    your official actions?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, for myself, I've got no
    intent to do so.
        Senator Warren. Okay. So, you can commit to that?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, Senator. That's not my
    intent.
        Senator Warren. President Trump's removal of highly
    qualified and talented military leaders is a permanent stain on
    this Nation's history, as well as a blow to our ability to
    recruit the force that we need to compete with China.
        If confirmed, you will have an important responsibility to
    show the American people that you will defend our Nation with
    integrity, that you will follow the law, and that you will lead
    our men and women in uniform with integrity.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator, and we'll
    now move to Senator Schmitt.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see
    you again, General. Congratulations.
        Let me first by start by saying I think the people who talk
    the most about making sure you give advice to President Trump
    have no experience with President Trump and interpersonally, I
    should say, and he does seek out advice among a lot of people.
        I think that your background and your experience will be
    invaluable to him as he asks tough questions, and you give
    honest advice as you've committed here today. So anyway, I
    think the dynamic's going to be great. I think your background
    and experience really prepare you very well for this important
    role.
        So, I wanted to ask you about a couple of things where I
    think that your experience will play an important role in
    specific decisions. So, this great powers competition that we
    are, you know, with China, I was really happy to see President
    Trump and Secretary Hegseth move quickly on NGAD and not just
    deciding that we were going to move forward with next
    generation air dominance, but actually selecting the F-47 so we
    can move forward on this.
        I think that was a bold stroke of leadership and
    decisiveness that we need right now. That aircraft will see
    further, go faster, carry bigger payloads, which matter a lot
    in the Indo-Pacific. With your experience, I know that you can
    appreciate that.
        But one of the big challenges we have, has been mentioned
    by a few already, is just the inability for us to go from point
    A to point B. When we recognize a problem, how do we solve the
    problem? Everyone recognizes that it's an issue. But we haven't
    made a whole lot of progress up until this point. I believe
    there is a commitment to do something about it.
        You and I talked about this at our office. In your view,
    what would we do differently if we were at war right now? Like,
    if we're at war, what would we do differently than we're doing
    right now on the procurement side and the execution side?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, thanks for the
    question. You know, the Chairman's bill builds on a book that
    was written about the defense industrial base back in the mid-
    ?30's. I think if we were in a gunfight at this point in time,
    we'd be doing a lot more with a greater sense of urgency than
    we probably have right now. If I'm confirmed, I'll carry that
    sense of urgency that I think we share into the Department and
    into the joint force to make sure that we do not end up in a
    case where our young war fighters do not have the kit that they
    need prior to them needing it.
        Senator Schmitt. Yes. That overwhelming force that we need
    to have that advantage that we have is just critical. And the
    concern that I have is that we talk a lot about it, but it's we
    have to move forward on this. We have to move forward.
        So, again, before I run out of time. Again, your varied
    experience in the military and now outside, I think, give you a
    glimpse of one of the challenges that we face, too. So,
    Missouri is--sort of a Missouri asset. Here is the home of
    Whiteman Air Force Base, which is more broadly known as the
    home of the B-2 stealth bomber and soon to be the B-21. But the
    442d Fighter Wing is also there. The 442d Fighter Wing like
    many of these units punch above its weight class, has flown the
    A-10 in combat missions for decades.
        The A-10's going away, and I think there's a frustration
    that there hasn't been a follow-on mission named here. We
    talked about this in my office, and there's opportunities,
    whether it's in the short-term, the F-15E and eventually the F-
    15EX.
        The real danger is that because we've delayed these
    decisions, these experienced maintainers, and pilots, they go
    somewhere else, right? They just don't have the certainty of
    knowing that there's going to be a follow-on mission.
        Will you work with my office and the folks that are
    responsible for these decisions we just have to start making
    these decisions more decisively and timely. I think that
    Whiteman stands right in the front of that line.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Sure, I will. But, you know, I
    want to make sure I bring the Air Force leadership ?
        Senator Schmitt. Absolutely.
        Lieutenant General Caine.--into that conversation as well.
    I've got very little throw weight on those decisions.
        Senator Schmitt. No, I know. But you're going to be in an
    important spot.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Schmitt. I think, sir, recognizing strategically
    that this is important and we've had conversations with the Air
    Force about this ?----
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir.
        Senator Schmitt.--As well. I guess with the last remaining
    seconds I have. Just sort of your view of this great powers?
    competition with China. What are some things that we need to
    get better at? What are some things that we need to do to
    prepare for the end as we shift and pivot to Asia so many
    people have talked about of the Pacific?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Sir, that's with deep respect for
    the question. That's a pretty big question.
        Senator Schmitt. What is the most important thing? The one
    thing?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Probably taking advantage of the
    time that we have. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony,
    making sure that we're moving with the speed, precision, sense
    of urgency to get the kit that we need. The challenges range
    from contested logistics, to long range fires, to command and
    control. So, it's a much deeper conversation.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Look forward to working with
    you. Congratulations.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, will you supplement that on the
    record then, General, because it was a very intricate question
    that was sprung on you with 10 seconds to go.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir, and you want me to do
    that now, I assume?
        Chairman Wicker. No. Just take it for the record.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, sir. Got it. Thank you very
    much. I'm getting some signals from behind you.
        Chairman Wicker. All right. And Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm going to followup on Senator Schmitt's question in my
    second part, if I have time, because I think that is the big
    question of the day; how do we handle the challenges we'll face
    in the Western Pacific.
        General Caine, first of all, congratulations on your
    nomination. It's a very important role. First, I want to talk a
    little bit about General Milley. So, as a career military
    officer, lifelong public servant who served in this role as
    Chairman under President Trump and President Biden, he's now
    facing an investigation by this Administration and possible
    demotion. This is allegedly because he, in coordination with
    the then Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, made phone calls to
    Chinese military officials to reassure them that the United
    States was not going to launch an attack preventing unnecessary
    conflict.
        General Milley did this out of a deep respect and
    commitment to the Constitution of the United States, in my
    view. I asked about this in my office when we met privately,
    but I want to ask, in this public setting, if you are confirmed
    and sworn into this position, to whom or what do you swear an
    oath to?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I as I have for 34
    years, it's to the Constitution.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, and setting aside the specifics
    of this scenario, if necessary, will you choose the right thing
    to do, even if it's hard over the easier, wrong option?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I've always strived to
    do the right thing, and that's not going to change now.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. And are you willing to
    get fired from this job for doing the right thing and following
    the Constitution?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I am.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. So, back to what Senator
    Schmitt was getting at, a part of what he wanted to discuss.
    So, I want to gears here and go back to INDOPACOM force
    projection, repositioning of forces and resource requirements.
    I think you mentioned TRANSCOM. They play a pivotal role in
    projecting forces from the United States into INDOPACOM.
        That's why I'm reintroducing the SHIPS for America Act,
    which is a bipartisan bill aimed at strengthening our
    commercial shipping base, which would have the added benefit of
    giving our combatant commander's additional capability so we
    can rapidly respond in crisis and in conflict.
        If confirmed, what will you recommend to the Secretary of
    Defense and the President to ensure our industrial ship belt
    building base from forging supply chains and production are
    ready for competition in crisis?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm not in the job
    yet and I'm, I'm not back in the service yet, but if confirmed,
    I'd like to take that one for study and come back to you.
        Senator Kelly. It's a logistical problem. 5,000 miles of
    ocean. The Chinese, if we wind up in a conflict in the Western
    Pacific, they've got to go just hundreds of miles to resupply
    their forces. So, I appreciate you being willing to take a look
    at it.
        One last topic. I want to talk about efforts across the
    Department to modernize our acquisition process. This is a
    topic that I'm focused on as the co-chair of the Defense
    Modernization Caucus. Our system is too slow, it's too
    unwieldy, and it can't modernize currently at the pace of
    China. We currently cannot match them on how fast we can
    innovate.
        So, we need to foster an ecosystem change that encourages
    some risk from small businesses so they can innovate faster and
    ensures that if a technology meets a current demand signal, we
    have an effective mechanism to bridge the testing and
    evaluation gap that often exists to get that stuff over to
    production.
        So, General, if confirmed, what changes will you recommend
    to the Secretary and the President to ensure that we take
    advantage of smaller, innovative companies, and acquire at the
    speed that technology is moving forward?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, it's we've got to
    have everyone weighing in small businesses, new entrants, and
    even the primes. The ability to bring advanced technologies
    from new companies, startups into the joint force and make it
    easier for them to bring their products and services into the
    military is something that I'm passionate about. Given my
    background and experience, if confirmed, I think that that'll
    be an area where I spend some time on. I know I'm out of time.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Banks
        Senator Banks. General Caine, congratulations on your
    nomination, and thank you for being willing to come out of
    retirement and serve your country in this most significant way.
    I look forward to having a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs whose
    only focus is national security, but you have a hard road ahead
    of you.
        As you and I discussed before, General Milley modeled
    inappropriate and political behavior to a whole generation of
    officers. It's why I fully support President Trump's decision
    to relieve General CQ Brown and the unconventional decision to
    go beyond the usual four-star choices and pick an outsider like
    you for this most important role.
        You spent much of your military career outside of
        Washington, DC not exclusively inside of the Pentagon.
    Because of this, you have a much better understanding of what's
    important to our warfighters and to the average American. You
    also know that the National Guard often gets the short end of
    the stick and the budget fights, and having a chairman who
    properly appreciates the importance of the guard is critical.
    So, because of all of that, I can't wait to get you confirmed
    as soon as possible.
        I want to go back and talk for a moment. As I said before,
    General Milley was the most political Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs that I believe that we've ever had. He actively
    undermined his commander-in-chief. General Milley admitted to
    calling Speaker Pelosi and disparaging President Trump's mental
    fitness and questioning his nuclear command authority. That was
    completely inappropriate and unacceptable. General Caine, I
    want to ask you, how will you communicate differently than that
    with congressional leadership?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I'm committed to
    open and transparent communication, but the first duty of the
    chairman is the advisor to the President. So, you know, I would
    flow through that chain of command, while providing always
    options to the President.
        Senator Banks. General Milley admitted that under his
    watch, the Pentagon wasted nearly 6-million-man hours on DEI
    and woke trainings. Milley also testified to me before the
    House Armed Services Committee that he wanted to read more
    about critical race theory and understand white rage. Under
    your leadership, General Caine, what kind of training can we
    expect our servicemembers to be focused on?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Warfighting, lethality, and
    readiness?
        Senator Banks. General Milley was also the chairman during
    the disastrous Afghanistan withdrawal, and as a veteran of the
    war in Afghanistan, this is very personal to me. Under his
    watch, there was no accountability at all for the deaths of
    American heroes at Abbey Gate, no accountability for the chaos
    at the Kabul Airport, and no accountability for leaving
    Americans behind when military failure and incompetence result
    in the death of U.S. troops. Do you agree that the officers in
    charge must be held accountable?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Well, Senator, I appreciate the
    question. You know, the Afghanistan withdrawal was not anything
    anybody would've wanted. It was very difficult circumstances,
    and the officers on the ground had very little to do with the
    policies that they were directed to follow. We all mourned the
    13 lost at Abbey Gate. Those officers, I'm sure did the best in
    a situation that was not of their making. Certainly,
    accountability is an important tenant in the United States, but
    I hope that we consider the fact that those officers were just
    doing the duties that they were assigned to do.
        Senator Banks. You do agree, though, accountability
    matters?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do.
        Senator Banks. We should always learn from our mistakes and
    hold those----
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
        Senator Banks.--accountable who made those mistakes?
    General Milley told his aides that President Trump was
    preaching, 'the gospel of the furher.? I asked General C.Q.
    Brown last year before the House Armed Services Committee, if
    that was inappropriate. Even General CQ Brown agreed publicly,
    under oath before that committee, that that was a very
    inappropriate statement by General Milley. Do you agree with
    General Brown that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should
    never disparage the commander-in-chief, the President of the
    United States of America?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.
        Senator Banks. When he was Chairman, General Milley
    testified that he, 'does interviews regularly with print media,
    books, documentaries, video, on TV because it is a part of a
    senior official's job. Milley also said he talked to the media
    2, 3, 4 times a week. Do you think that's an appropriate use of
    the chairman's job,
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed, I'll spend
    my time focused on the essential tasks in front of me.
        Senator Banks. My last question. General Milley promised
    Chinese generals without the President's knowledge that he'd
    warn them if the United States was about to attack. Do you
    think it's inappropriate, were appropriate for the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to warn our greatest adversary when
    we're about to attack or what we might do?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, sir.
        Senator Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you. I guess that does it, no,
    Senator Slotkin. Thank you. You're recognized.
        Senator Slotkin. Thank you, Chairman.
        I apologize for being late. I just got off a plane. We've
    had some weather issues and some followup weather issues. I
    apologize. Congratulations. Happy to see you here. You're
    almost done. I'm between you and being done. So, I'm aware of
    that. I just wanted to make sure we all are on the same page.
        The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is what established in
    law that the chairman is the principal, military advisor to the
    President, also to the Secretary of Defense, the National
    Security Council. It mandates that you provide strategic
    direction to the Armed Forces, oversee strategic planning
    program recommendations, budget proposals. It gives you a very
    big purview. I think the President Trump even issued a
    memorandum on Inauguration Day that the chairman be a part of
    the National Security Council meetings at the highest level in
    the White House.
        That's an extremely important role, especially now. We've
    talked--I've heard that other members talked about the fact
    that there was no joint chief representative in this Signal
    chain about military operations, imminent military operations.
    I want you in those rooms giving your best military advice to
    anyone. I was keenly aware that all the decisionmakers on that
    chain were all political appointees. There was not a single
    person there that was there just as a representative, as a
    military officer. There was no COCOM Commander. There was
    nothing, and that I don't think missed anybody's notice.
        Will you, if confirmed, make a point to get into the rooms
    where military operations are being discussed, planned at the
    strategic level, and when advice to the President is being
    given about the confidence in those military plans, will you
    push to be in that room?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Slotkin. Good. We want you there. You know, I've
    asked a number of folks who have come up here, very similar
    questions and former people who have sat in that chair about
    the importance that I put in swearing an oath to the
    Constitution of the United States. Not to any one President not
    to any political leader. You will swear an oath. You've done it
    many times before. This is not uncommon for you in your
    extensive experience.
        I have asked all of these appointees or these nominees to
    say, if the President asked you to do something that was
    unconstitutional, to use the military in a way that was
    unconstitutional to put military into the streets of our cities
    or policing and performing law enforcement roles, which they
    are not trained for, et cetera, et cetera. If he asks you to do
    that, will you push back and lay down the law on behalf of the
    Constitution, not for the President's whims?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator. I don't expect
    that to happen, but of course I would.
        Senator Slotkin. Well, we don't expect it to happen, but it
    did happen under the Trump administration. The first time
    Secretary Esper was asked to bring in the 82d Airborne Active
    Duty military troops to put down a peaceful protest in
    Washington, DC, and in his own book, he wrote that he convinced
    President Trump in the dark of night not to do that.
        I don't need it to be public. I don't need you to have a
    public fight with President Trump. I'm not asking that. I'm
    asking in the same exact situation, would you act honorably in
    the same way and protect the rules and the of the road for the
    U.S. military to protect the institution you've given your life
    for and make sure that this country doesn't see their uniform
    military as a political arm of any one party. Will you stand up
    and push back similarly to Secretary Esper?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I think that's the duty
    and job that I have.
        Senator Slotkin. Yes. Well, I appreciate that. I think
    there's lots of other important work. We all want you to be
    focused on the warfighter. Can you confirm for me, though,
    because these reports that keep coming out of Department of
    Defense and uniform military press outlets taking down Jackie
    Robinson's page on and his service to the country, the Tuskegee
    Airmen, which have such a connection to Detroit, Michigan.
    They're taken down, they're putting back up. Can you confirm
    that war heroes, no matter what their color, should be
    recognized by the Department of Defense, and it's not some DEI
    thing to recognize warriors of color.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Ma'am, I think we should always
    recognize warriors. Period.
        Senator Slotkin. Okay. Well, I hope you uphold that as this
    ridiculousness continues of taking people and erasing them from
    our military history. It's really, to me, offensive. But we
    look forward to you standing up for those good values. Thank
    you for your work, and I yield back
        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator, and this concludes
    today's hearing. I want to thank our distinguished witness for
    his testimony. And without anything further, we are indeed
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    ------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General John D.
    Caine, USAF (retired) by Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing
    with answers supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser
    to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority,
    direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense,
    section 153 of title 10 further assigns the Chairman responsibility for
    assisting the President and the Secretary in providing for the
    strategic direction of the Armed Forces; strategic and contingency
    planning; global military integration; comprehensive joint readiness;
    joint capability development; and joint force development activities,
    among other matters.
        Answer. Given the responsibilities of the Chairman, as enumerated
    in law, what background, experience, and expertise do you possess that
    qualify you to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Question. In my 34 years of military service, I have led
    warfighters in a variety of roles across the Joint Force, Total Force,
    and Interagency. These experiences have ranged from flying an F-16 in
    combat overseas and over Washington, DC on September 11th, 2001, to
    helping coordinate our response to Hurricane Katrina while at the
    Department of Agriculture, to serving alongside our Special Operations
    warriors in combat.
        Answer. My years in the National Guard make me uniquely aware of
    the challenges faced by our citizen-soldiers. I also may be the only
    officer ever nominated for this position with experience in the venture
    capital world, an experience I will draw on as the DOD looks to
    modernize its business systems and revitalize America's Defense
    Industrial Base.
        Finally, in my last role as Associate Director for Military Affairs
    at the CIA, I built a global perspective on the challenges America
    faces in achieving effective deterrence against our adversaries. Each
    of these experiences have prepared me for the humbling responsibility
    of serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this crucial
    time in our Nation's history.
        Question. Do you believe there is any action that you need to take
    to enhance your ability to exercise the responsibilities of the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. I do not have any recommendations at present. If confirmed,
    I will be attuned to any possible actions necessary to exercise the
    responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        In matters requiring global military strategic and operational
    integration, the Chairman is responsible for providing advice to the
    President and Secretary of Defense on ongoing military operations and
    advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces among
    geographic and functional Combatant Commands, as may be necessary, to
    address transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you execute these advisory
    functions, while ensuring that your role does not invoke command
    authority or infringe on the responsibilities of the Combatant
    Commanders?
        Answer. I understand the advisory functions of the Chairman and the
    command authorities and responsibilities of the Combatant Commanders.
        If confirmed, I would perform the roles and functions of the
    Chairman consistent with all laws and policies, while maintaining
    awareness and knowledge of issues within and across Combatant Command
    areas of responsibility.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship
    with the Combatant Commanders to carry out these responsibilities?
        Answer. I am grateful that, during my last assignment as the
    Associate Director for Military Affairs, I had regular interaction with
    all United States Combatant Commanders and I have close relationships
    with each. If confirmed I look forward to working with each of them and
    my relationship with the Combatant Commanders will be structured
    according to the existing mechanisms and procedures specified in law
    and policy.
        Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
    providing to the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and
    operation of the Joint Staff?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to look more closely at the Joint
    Staff's use of advanced tech tools (AI/ML) to improve efficiencies and
    make recommendations for the prioritization and allocation of forces to
    the Secretary.
        Question. To the extent the Joint Staff performs functions that
    overlap with those of other DOD components--particularly with regard to
    regional or functional topics--what would be your approach, if
    confirmed, to consolidating and reducing those redundancies?
        Answer. If confirmed, my approach to this topic would be based on
    thoroughly examining the details and history of related functions and
    processes prior to making any recommendations.
        Question. Section 163(a) of title 10 provides that the President
    may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the
    Secretary of Defense in exercising their command function.
        In your view, are there other roles or responsibilities that should
    be assigned to the Chairman, to better enable the Chairman's assistance
    to the President and the Secretary of Defense in their exercise of
    command functions?
        Answer. At this time, I believe the roles and responsibilities
    currently assigned to the Chairman are sufficient. I do not have
    recommendations for any additional roles and responsibilities.
        If confirmed, I will consult with the Secretary and with Congress
    should I conclude there are additional roles or responsibilities that
    should be considered.
                       major challenges and opportunities
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
    challenges you would face if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff?
        Answer. The President directed the Joint Force to achieve Peace
    through Strength and defend our Homeland.
        The President made clear that this begins with securing our own
    borders. The Joint Force is moving out alongside our Interagency
    partners to achieve this objective, but significant challenges remain
    to achieve lasting security of America's borders.
        Additionally, the threat posed by China to American interests in
    the Indo-Pacific is real and growing. Th U.S. needs to work with Allies
    and Partners to deter China's aggression in this region.
        Unfortunately, at this critical moment, the Joint Force is
    contending with an acquisition process and Defense Industrial Base that
    are not optimized for protracted conflict. The U.S. does not have the
    throughput, responsiveness, or agility needed to deter our adversaries.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. Given the global set of challenges before the United States
    the Joint Force must enhance the integration of options with the
    Services, the Interagency, our Allies and Partners and the Private
    Sector. The U.S. cannot miss a single opportunity to integrate fully
    our mutual efforts to provide the greatest return on those investments.
        If confirmed, I will focus on working with the Secretary of Defense
    and Congress to implement recommendations made by recent congressional
    commissions on PPBE, Acquisition Reform, and Strategic Posture. I will
    also review the Joint Staff's recommendations on reforming the
    requirements process as directed by the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA. We know
    what the problems are and how to solve them, we just need to focus on
    implementing the solutions.
        I strongly believe in the primacy of people. The Joint Force needs
    the talent found in America's sons and daughters to meet the challenges
    of the 21st century. The warrior ethos, meritocracy, and clear
    standards will attract this talent, and I will work with the Services
    and the Department to strengthen recruiting.
                        civilian control of the military
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    ensure that your tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the
    Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?
        Answer. For my 34 years of service, I have been fully committed to
    the laws, policies, and norms of civilian control of the military. It
    is a fundamental pillar of our Armed Services.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy are fully engaged in preparing guidance for and reviewing
    contingency plans?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will stress to my Staff in the J3 and J5
    the need for a close and trusting relationship with OUSD/P as both
    Staffs prepare plans.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Personnel and Readiness are fully engaged in evaluating and
    reporting on the readiness of DOD components, and if necessary, in
    mitigating readiness gaps and shortfalls?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the relationship and practice
    of frequent coordination and collaboration on readiness issues between
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, ensuring
    we are fully engaged in evaluating and reporting the readiness of DOD
    components. OSD and the Joint Staff share a statutorily mandated title
    10 sec 482 readiness reports with each other before submitting to
    Congress, and each host high level reviews and discussions at Deputies
    Management Action Group (DMAGs) and JCS Readiness Tanks semi-annually.
    The statutory functions of the CJCS require joint planning sessions to
    align priorities and strategies for mitigating readiness issues, while
    also advocating for necessary resources and funding to address
    identified gaps.
        Question. How would you define effective civilian control of the
    military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the executive
    branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays
    a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
        Answer. Per Article 1, the Congress is charged to raise our Army
    and Navy and, therefore a key constituent in the totality of our
    National Defense. If confirmed, I intend to have a strong, trusting,
    bipartisan relationship with the Congress.
        Question. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and
    defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the
    responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian
    leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political
    priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, in accordance with my oath to support and
    defend the constitution, I will provide military advice to the chain of
    command, identifying options in support of national policy and
    security. The advice would be focused on overall strategy, risk,
    readiness and resourcing considerations to best enable decisions from
    the Nation's civilian leadership. As I always have for 34 years, I will
    always speak truth to power.
        If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will
    testify regularly before Congress and may be asked to comment on
    partisan political matters.
        Question. What is your view of your responsibility to provide your
    best military advice to Congress while also ensuring that you and your
    office remain apolitical, recognizing that you serve as a model for
    other senior uniformed officers and the entire Armed Forces?
        Answer. If confirmed as Chairman, I will meet my responsibilities
    to advise the President and Secretary and consult with Congress. My
    best military advice will remain non-partisan and apolitical.
                           the joint chiefs of staff
        Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S. Code, codifies the role of
    the Joint Chiefs as military advisors to the President, the National
    Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of
    Defense.
        If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best military advice
    to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland
    Security Council, even when your advice and opinions might differ from
    those of other members of the Cabinet, the President's other senior
    advisors, or from the President's own views?
        Answer. I will.
        Question. If confirmed, would you commit to provide your best
    military advice to the Secretary of Defense, even when your advice and
    opinions might differ from those of other DOD senior officials, or from
    the Secretary's own views?
        Answer. I will.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you elicit from the individual
    Service Chiefs, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the
    Combatant Commanders, their best military advice, including advice and
    opinions that may diverge your own?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would elicit military analysis and advice
    from the Joint Force, to include other Service Chiefs, the Chief of the
    National Guard Bureau, and Combatant Commanders. The Unified Command
    Plan directs communications between the President, or the Secretary and
    the Combatant Commanders be transmitted through the CJCS unless
    otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary. As the global
    integrator, I will have mechanisms in place to elicit this advice and
    communications from all Combatant Commanders and pass them through the
    appropriate channels along with my own advice.
        Question. What is your assessment of the size and effectiveness of
    the Joint Staff?
        Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to observe and assess
    the Joint Staff's size and effectiveness. If confirmed, I will conduct
    a thorough assessment before deciding to recommend any changes to the
    Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. In my past
    experience, they are the most professional staff in the world.
                role of department of defense inspector general
        Question. The Inspector General Act of 1978 requires that
    Inspectors General of Federal departments ``be appointed by the
    President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without
    regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity
    and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis,
    law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations'' in
    order to ``conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to
    the programs and operations of'' the Department of Defense.
        What is your view of the necessity of the Department of Defense
    Inspector General to conduct and supervise audits and investigations
    relating to the programs and operations of the Department in an
    independent, objective, and apolitical manner?
        Answer. The necessity of the Department of Defense Inspector
    General (DoD IG) conducting and supervising audits and investigations
    in an independent, objective, and apolitical manner is crucial for
    ensuring the integrity, accountability, and effectiveness of DOD
    programs and operations.
        The DOD IG is necessary for combating waste, fraud, and abuse,
    promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness on government programs
    and operations by identifying and recommending corrective actions.
        Question. If confirmed, do you commit to respecting the
    independence of the DOD Inspector General, subject only to the
    requirements and limitations contained in the Inspector General Act of
    1978?
        Answer. Yes.
                        role of judge advocates general
        Question. Federal law states that no officer or employee of the
    Department of Defense may interfere with the ability of the Judge
    Advocate General of a military service to give independent legal advice
    to their chief of service, or interfere with the ability of judge
    advocates of the military services assigned or attached to, or
    performing duty with, military units to give independent legal advice
    to commanders.
        What is your view of the propriety of and need for uniformed
    military lawyers to exercise their independent legal and professional
    judgment when providing legal advice to military commanders, military
    service leadership, and Department of Defense leadership?
        Answer. I absolutely value the independence and professionalism of
    uniformed military lawyers to provide legal advice to military
    commanders, military service leadership, and Department of Defense
    leadership. I have relied on JAGs throughout my career to provide
    candid and independent legal advice on the broad range of legal issues
    involved in military operations and activities. I will continue to do
    so.
        Question. If confirmed, do you commit to respecting the
    independence of uniformed military attorneys to provide their best
    legal advice free from inappropriate influence and reprisal?
        Answer. I commit to respecting the independence of uniformed
    military attorneys to provide their best legal advice free from
    inappropriate influence and reprisal. I have done so throughout my
    career and, if confirmed, will do so as Chairman.
         strategic guidance documents within the department of defense
        Question. If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    specifically what would be your role in generating and shaping the
    content of, and improving DOD component compliance with, each such
    document?
        National Security Strategy
        Answer. If confirmed, as the senior military advisor to the
    President and the Secretary of Defense, I will advise both on the Joint
    Force capabilities necessary to deter aggression and implement the
    President's national security priorities. I will advise on ability,
    options, and risk to execute the strategic direction given to the
    military in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and work closely with
    the Secretary of Defense to implement it.
        Question. National Defense Strategy
        Answer. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense to
    provide advice and assistance on the military ways, means, and options
    for implementing the Secretary's defense priorities. I will focus
    particular attention on the threats and opportunities we face in the
    strategic environment; the military roles, missions, posture, and
    capabilities necessary to defend U.S. interests; and determine the
    investments necessary to protect and simultaneously defend the U.S.
    Homeland and deter or defeat adversaries that work against our Nation's
    interests and security. I will ensure the Joint Staff is collaborative
    and responsive to the Secretary of Defense's staff to ensure they have
    everything they need to develop a strategy that achieves peace through
    strength.
        Question. National Military Strategy
        Answer. Title 10, Sec. 153 directs the NMS to support the
    objectives of the United States as articulated by the President and
    Secretary of Defense through national security and defense guidance,
    direction, and strategies. If confirmed as Chairman, I will lead the
    NMS development to support the President's objectives to achieve peace
    through strength and the Secretary of Defense's priorities. If
    confirmed, I will develop an NMS that is integrated with the National
    Defense Strategy. Together, we can ensure the Joint Force has a clear
    understanding of the country's strategic defense priorities over the
    near-and long-term to defend America's interests. I will work closely
    with the Services and Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to provide a strategy
    that includes clear military options to the Secretary of Defense and
    the President. If confirmed, I will provide my military advice on
    implementation of the NMS, assess progress and risk, and adjust when
    necessary and as directed.
        Question. Chairman's Risk Assessment
        Answer. Title 10, Sec. 153 directs the Chairman to prepare an
    annual assessment that identifies and defines the military strategic
    risks to United States interests and military risks to the execution of
    the NMS. The Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) is developed in
    collaboration with the Services and CCMDs, with the final approval and
    discretion of the Chairman, using a common methodology to appraise and
    communicate risk. If confirmed, I will continue to use the CRA as my
    recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, and ultimately Congress, on
    risks to U.S. security interests and executing the NMS to inform
    resourcing and capability development decisions in the Department.
        Question. Contingency Planning Guidance
        Answer. The Chairman directs the implementation of the Contingency
    Planning Guidance (CPG) and integrates contingency planning across
    Combatant Commands for each of the National Defense Strategy key
    threats. The Chairman uses the guidance in the CPG in the development
    of the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). Additionally, the Chairman
    provides guidance for preparing and reviewing contingency plans that
    conform to policy guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense.
    Last, the Chairman ensures that plans are feasible, suitable,
    acceptable, and complete for presentation to the Secretary. If
    confirmed, I will continue directing the implementation of the CPG and
    its use in the development of the JSCP.
        Question. Defense Planning Guidance
        Answer. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) establishes the
    Secretary of Defense's strategic resource priorities. If confirmed, as
    the Chairman I would produce the Chairman's Program Recommendation
    (CPR) which directly informs the DPG. I would consider a multitude of
    assessments to include the annual Capability Gap Assessment, Chairman's
    Risk Assessment, and others to ensure the Joint Force aligns means to
    ends and ways, in light of risk.
        Question. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
        Answer. The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) enables the
    execution of the Chairman's statutory responsibilities for strategic
    and contingency planning, global military integration, and the
    Chairman's oversight prescribed in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 153,
    163, and 113. If confirmed, I would use the JSCP to implement the
    President and Secretary of Defense's strategic planning guidance by
    providing direction for development of campaign and contingency plans
    that advance strategic objectives, priorities, and tasks.
        Question. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
        Answer. The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
    enables the Secretary of Defense to integrate complementary policy and
    guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment,
    and assessment into a single authoritative document. If confirmed, my
    role is to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of readiness and
    requirements of the CCMDs to achieve U.S. defense objectives.
    Additionally, I would advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of
    risk related to allocation and assignment of forces to better support
    resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically
    employed.
        Question. Will you commit that, if confirmed, you would undertake
    all necessary action to ensure that each of these strategic guidance
    documents is timely generated and issued, and updated, as necessary to
    reflect changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?
        Answer. Yes.
                             use of military force
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff in establishing policies for the use of military force
    and the rules of engagement?
        Answer. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, determines when to
    use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors to the
    President and the Secretary of Defense and should actively advise on
    the policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement.
        Question. If confirmed, what factors would you consider in making
    recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the
    use of military force?
        Answer. The use of military force must always be carefully
    considered. If confirmed, my recommendations to the President and
    Secretary of Defense on the use of military force will be consistent
    with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I would
    consider probability of success, cost in terms of casualties, and
    strategic risk.
        Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
    recommending to the Secretary of Defense which forces of other nations
    should be eligible for Collective Self-Defense by U.S. forces, and
    under what conditions?
        Answer. When ``collective self-defense'' rules of engagement are
    authorized, U.S. forces may defend foreign forces against any attack or
    threat of imminent attack. The key factors I would consider in a
    recommendation to the Secretary of Defense would be if it is legal to
    do so, and if it is in U.S. interests to do so.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    authorities and agreements in place to permit U.S. military personnel
    to carry out missions under the provisions of title 50, U.S. Code? If
    confirmed, how would you modify these agreements or authorities, if at
    all?
        Answer. I understand that relevant authorities and agreements
    provide the necessary framework for military forces to support
    activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies when
    called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense as the situation
    dictates. I believe that the current authorities and agreements are
    sufficient. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing work within the
    Department and with colleagues in other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies to adjust existing arrangements as the need arises.
                              civilian casualties
        Question. In your view, what are the primary challenges for the
    combatant commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to
    allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military
    operations?
        Answer. The primary challenges combatant commands face is timely
    access to evidence and the ability to share evidence with our allies,
    our partners, and non-governmental organizations. These challenges are
    due to restrictive data sharing policies with each of these entities,
    which slows the assessment and response process. This results in
    decreased integration, analysis, and dissemination of civilian casualty
    information and effects.
        Question. What is your understanding of the implementation status
    of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) and
    what additional actions do you believe should be taken to enable the
    Department of Defense to effectively and credibly mitigate,
    investigate, and respond to allegations of civilian casualties
    resulting from U.S. military operations?
        Answer. The Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, or
    CHMR-AP, is in its fourth and final year of implementation. A workforce
    is in place, doctrine has been updated, and education and training are
    ongoing. I understand the combatant commands see positive impacts from
    the program. As with any new program, there comes a time to pause and
    reflect, listen to feedback, and assess the future path. That is where
    we are today. It is appropriate to look at the resources, the
    distribution of those resources, and the changing world environment to
    determine the best course of action moving forward.
                                joint operations
        Question. The Goldwater Nichols Act enabled an unprecedented degree
    of jointness within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Combatant
    Commanders. Today, both the DOD and Congress recognize the need for a
    deeper level of integration and interoperability to overcome anti-
    access and area denial (A2/AD) networks and to deter and defeat large-
    scale aggression.
        What do you perceive to be the role and capability requirements for
    close combat formations in future joint force operations?
        Answer. Service led joint and coalition experimentation events are
    improving interoperability and identifying critical gaps.
        Question. What is the Joint Staff's appropriate role in
    experimentation?
        Answer. There are two main experimentation roles in the Joint
    Staff. One, within the Chairman's responsibilities for Joint Force
    development, the Chairman formulates policies for experimentation on
    urgent and long-term concepts for force employment, to include
    analyzing prioritized gaps in capabilities. Two, within the Chairman's
    responsibilities for joint capability development, the Joint Staff
    works to recommend new joint military capabilities that maintain
    technological and operational superiority of the Joint Force based on
    advances of new technology and new joint concepts. To do this, the
    Chairman leverages convening power, Joint Experimentation Guidance, the
    Warfighter Lab Incentive Fund, and other tools to catalyze a campaign
    approach to joint experimentation that promises progress in addressing
    specific problems, gaps, and critical capabilities identified in the
    Joint Warfighting Concept. The Chairman also uses the learning from
    this campaign to make annual program recommendations to the Secretary
    of Defense.
        Question. How would you ensure the Joint Staff is appropriately
    facilitating joint experimentation during the capabilities development
    process?
        Answer. I would publish specific Joint Experimentation Guidance and
    continue to integrate and synchronize Joint Force experimentation not
    only across the Department of Defense and with Allies and Partners, but
    also with Interagency Partners.
        Question. What role do you foresee playing in influencing joint and
    enabling capabilities development that will link or knit together
    service-specific capabilities, such as Joint All Domain Command and
    Control (JADC2) or contested logistics?
        Answer. The Chairman's title 10 authorities for joint capability
    development are exercised through the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council. The JROC plays a critical role in developing a globally
    integrated and interoperable joint force, without which the DOD risks
    stove-piped, Service-specific capabilities. This function is
    particularly critical with key capability areas such as JADC2 or
    contested logistics, which are inherently joint, multi-domain, and
    multi-theater.
                joint force headquarters and component commands
        Question. Is the current model for creating joint force
    headquarters below the unified command level appropriate and adequate
    to meet the challenges articulated in the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy? In your view, are there other models you have seen that we
    should be considering?
        Answer. While the existing framework for establishing Joint Force
    headquarters beneath the unified command level is suitable and
    sufficient, if confirmed, I will be committed to exploring alternative
    models. This review will encompass an examination of various Joint
    Force headquarters structures to ensure the Joint Force is optimally
    postured to address the challenges outlined in the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy.
        Question. Given the time required to stand up, man, and train joint
    force headquarters, and the short warning time that is expected before
    a potential conflict in certain areas of operation, would Combatant
    Commanders' operations and contingency planning and preparedness be
    improved by creating and exercising subordinate joint force
    headquarters during the competition phase?
        Answer. Proactively establishing subordinate Joint Force
    headquarters before a crisis erupts could indeed enhance operational
    readiness, planning, and preparedness. However, this must be assessed
    on a case-by-case basis. A thorough analysis is crucial to determine
    when the benefits of early establishment outweigh the potential costs,
    including manpower allocation, staff workload, and financial
    implications across the Joint Force. If confirmed, I will collaborate
    with the Combatant Commanders and Joint Chiefs to carefully evaluate
    this approach.
        Question. The Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) required the Secretary of Defense to establish a standing joint
    force headquarters (JFHQ) in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility
    (AOR). What is your view on the need for a JFHQ in this AOR?
        Answer. The Indo-Pacific region is a top priority for a United
    States military, with China presenting a significant and evolving
    challenge. As such, the ability to respond effectively to crises in the
    region, using the Joint Force with all its combined capabilities, is
    paramount.
        While the 2023 NDAA mandates a standing Joint Force Headquarters
    (JFHQ) in the INDOPACOM AOR, the current approach provides a strong
    foundation for responding to potential crises.
        Admiral Paparo has stated that, in a Joint Operations Area (JOA)
    within the Theater of War, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would serve as the
    Joint Task Force (JTF), a capability for which they were certified in
    2023.
        The existing structure, which leverages the proven capabilities of
    service components and their ability to function as JTFs, provides the
    necessary flexibility and responsiveness to address a wide range of
    potential crises within the INDOPACOM AO, and meets the intent of the
    NDAA to ensure optimal C2 for winning any conflict in the region.
        Question. What are the most significant obstacles to establishing
    and exercising such joint force headquarters in advance of a crisis,
    and what could be done to overcome those obstacles, in your view?
        Answer. One of the primary challenges in prematurely establishing
    Joint Force headquarters lies in the potential strain on resources.
    Combatant Commanders currently possess sufficient staffing to manage
    daily operations and pre-crisis scenarios. Creating additional
    headquarters prematurely could divert critical resources from other
    ongoing global missions. Therefore, if confirmed, I will work with the
    Combatant Commanders and Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess each unique
    situation in advance of a crisis on its resources in order to best
    posture the joint force for success.
        Question. What new technical capabilities, processes, or concepts
    of employment do you think would be needed to improve our ability to
    achieve high levels of readiness for, and realistically exercise, such
    joint force headquarters prior to a crisis, or to rapidly establish in
    the event of an unforeseen crisis?
        Answer. The Combatant Commanders prioritize maintaining a high
    level of readiness when it comes to establishing Joint Force
    headquarters. The Joint Force conducts regular exercises and tests to
    ensure the ability to stand up these headquarters efficiently, even in
    the face of unforeseen crises.
        The Joint Force remains committed to innovation, constantly
    evaluating emerging technologies, refining processes, and exploring new
    operational concepts. Regular joint exercises play a crucial role in
    this process, allowing the Joint Force to test and refine these
    advancements while informing the development of new concepts.
        If confirmed, I will ensure these efforts continue and will
    actively seek opportunities to further enhance readiness in this
    critical area.
                         2022 national defense strategy
        Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy outlines that the
    United States faces a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the
    continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. The Chairman
    and Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Strategy Commission testified
    in July 2024 that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have formed an
    ``axis of aggressors'', supporting each other's military aggression and
    illegal wars.
        What is your assessment of the military threat posed by the
    People's Republic of China?
        Answer. The PLA has made significant military improvements to
    include adjusting its military structures, fielding modern indigenous
    systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to
    conduct joint operations. Numerically, China has the largest navy in
    the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines,
    including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLA Air Force is
    modernizing and indigenizing its aircraft and unmanned aerial systems
    rapidly, matching U.S. standards. The PLA Rocket Force and China's
    hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past
    20 years. Many of China's missile programs are comparable to other
    international top-tier producers. However, the PLA still has
    deficiencies in commander proficiency, long-distance logistics, urban
    warfare, and the PLA lacks modern warfare experience writ large.
        Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
    Russia?
        Answer. Russia very likely remains deterred from an overt military
    attack against the United States or NATO; however, Moscow retains the
    ability and willingness to conduct asymmetric activity below what it
    assesses to be the threshold of military conflict. The conflict in
    Ukraine very likely has strained its conventional military forces,
    increasing Russia's dependence on its nuclear arsenal as a means of
    deterrence to protect itself from perceived external military threats.
    Despite the near-term increase in Russia's Defense Industrial Base,
    this production is unlikely sustainable over the mid-to long-term due
    to labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment shortfalls, and
    inability to fully compensate for dual-use components they can no
    longer acquire due to sanctions.
        Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
    collusion among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea?
        Answer. Russia, China, Iran and the DPRK share broadly similar
    goals and transactionally cooperate at the bilateral--and sometimes
    trilateral--levels on arms sales, sanctions evasion, and limited
    military exercises. However, these countries are not acting as a bloc,
    nor are they trending toward a NATO-style alliance. Militarily, Russia
    likely is emboldened to continue its war in Ukraine, in part, due to
    munitions and soldiers provided by the DPRK, as well as armed UAVs
    supplied by Iran. Moscow and Pyongyang have committed to strengthening
    their defense capacities as part of their comprehensive strategic
    partnership treaty, which could expedite the DPRK's military
    modernization goals. Beijing supports Moscow by purchasing oil, selling
    dual-use technologies such as microelectronics, and providing
    diplomatic cover in international fora, though it has avoided providing
    military aid. Though it is a partner to the DPRK and Russia, Beijing
    has publicly distanced itself from Moscow and Pyongyang's growing
    defense cooperation, referring to it as a strictly bilateral matter.
    Tehran seeks to deepen its bilateral relationships with other U.S.
    adversaries to derive maximum diplomatic, economic, and military
    benefits.
        Question. In your view, should the Defense Department's force
    sizing construct be based on the need to conduct simultaneous conflicts
    in Asia and Europe?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review and
    evaluate the force sizing construct to ensure that it is focused on the
    most pressing requirements.
        Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
    DOD has been unable to leverage, or has leveraged only in part, since
    the National Defense Strategy was published in 2022? If so, how would
    you correct this situation, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review threats
    posed by collusion among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. I am
    willing to discuss more detail in a classified setting.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do if you determine that the
    DOD cannot meet the demands placed on it by the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will take a disciplined approach to assess
    risk and the Joint Force's posture and capabilities in accordance with
    guidance from the Secretary and the President. I will also work closely
    with allies and partners to advance interoperability and burden-sharing
    to help decrease risk globally and strengthen ability to meet current
    and future defense challenges. If necessary, I would recommend re-
    prioritizing and re-allocating resources to focus on the most critical
    areas by reducing or eliminating less critical programs or initiative
    to free up resources for more pressing needs. I will communicate
    clearly and transparently with you and the Secretary of Defense, via my
    Chairman's Risk Assessment, about the risks, challenges, and
    limitations facing the Joint Force.
        Question. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments, if any,
    would you recommend the Secretary of Defense make to the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy as a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or
    other factors?
        Answer. If confirmed, my recommendations will prioritize Joint
    Force preparation and flexibility for both global opportunities and
    challenges in a dynamic strategic environment. Title 10 directs the
    Chairman to provide advice relating to global military and strategic
    and operational integration. Effective global integration of the Joint
    Force is necessary to support defense objectives in the modern
    strategic environment. I will advise the Secretary of Defense to align
    the National Defense Strategy guidance and priorities to reflect
    strategic global integration and will ensure consistency with the
    President's national policy directives and the NSS. I will also
    advocate investment and use of emerging technologies. Finally, I will
    advance options for the Secretary that will facilitate cross
    coordination and integration with other departments and agencies.
                          department of defense budget
        Question. In your view, are the programs and resources required to
    generate the capabilities necessary to implement the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy properly prioritized within the Department of Defense?
    If confirmed, do you believe the Department needs to realign or refocus
    programs and funding, if at all?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2025 budget request was strategy-driven and
    focused on executing the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Administration to ensure future budgets have the
    right mix of capabilities and capacity to defend against current and
    future threats. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department
    in aligning resources to current strategy.
        Question. Do you believe that 3-5 percent real budgetary growth
    through the FYDP is required to implement the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy effectively? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The fiscal year 2025 budget request was strategy-driven and
    focused on executing the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Administration to ensure future budgets have the
    right mix of capabilities and capacity to defend against current and
    future threats. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department
    in aligning resources to current strategy.
        Question. Looking forward, what types of resource shortfalls are
    likely to hamper the Department's execution of the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy and other national defense priorities in your view?
    How would you address or mitigate these shortfalls, if confirmed?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2025 budget request adequately resourced
    the Department to execute the 2022 National Defense Strategy. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Administration to ensure future budgets
    have the right mix of capabilities and capacity to defend against
    current and future threats. I will also continue to work with Congress
    and advocate for on-time appropriations so that we may fully capitalize
    on executing the Administration's strategy.
        Question. Section 222a of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that not
    later than 10 days after the President's submission of the annual
    defense budget to Congress, each Service Chief and Combatant Commander
    must submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
    lists, in order of priority, the unfunded priorities of the armed force
    or combatant command.
        What are your views of this statutory requirement and the utility
    of unfunded priorities lists?
        Answer. I recognize the critical importance of this statutory
    requirement in ensuring transparency and strategic alignment of defense
    priorities. These lists serve as essential tools in communicating to
    Congress the areas where additional resources could significantly
    enhance military readiness and capabilities. The Department relies on
    several tools to illuminate joint priorities and develop a budget that
    is aligned to the Department's strategy. While the unfunded priority
    lists are required by law, they are not the only tool to build a
    strategy-informed defense budget.
        Question. If confirmed, would you commit to supporting the Service
    Chiefs and Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded priorities
    lists to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with the fiscal year
    2026 budget request?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to supporting the
    Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders in providing their unfunded
    priorities lists (UPLs) to Congress in a timely manner, beginning with
    the Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 budget request.
                            joint officer management
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wields
    significant influence over joint officer management--the policies and
    procedures that guide joint officer career development and the
    attainment of joint experience and education. The NDAA for fiscal year
    2017 modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system established by
    the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways. First, it broadened
    the statutory definition of ``joint matters'' to expand the types of
    positions for which an officer can receive joint duty credit. Further,
    it reduced from 3 years to two the minimum tour length required for
    joint duty credit.
        What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the fiscal year
    2017 modifications to the JQO system?
        Answer. The two significant modifications have provided the
    Department additional flexibility in the Joint Qualification System.
    The expansion of the ``joint matters'' definition has ensured the
    ability to award joint duty credit to additional officers making
    contributions to the development and achievement of strategic
    objectives. The reduced statutory tour length required (From 36 Months
    to 24 Months) for joint duty credit has provided the Services
    additional flexibility in officer assignment for tightly managed career
    timelines and milestones.
        Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
    becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
    eligibility for promotion to General/Flag (G/FO) officer rank,
    consistent with the operational and professional demands of Service
    line officers?
        Answer. Yes. Although careers are managed according to Service
    specific milestones and operational demands, the 24-month minimum joint
    tour and associated JPME completion for joint qualification are
    sensible and greatly enhance an officer's perspective and knowledge to
    perform at the GO/FO ranks.
        Question. In your view, what additional modifications to the JQO
    system are necessary to ensure that military officers are able to
    attain both meaningful joint and Service-specific leadership
    experience, and adequate professional development?
        Answer. The existing joint officer qualification requirements
    provide a tested and flexible means to ensure officers develop the
    skills necessary for successful service at the operational and
    strategic levels; therefore, no additional modification to the JQO
    system is necessary at this time.
        Question. What are your ideas for improving the JQO system better
    to meet the needs of Reserve component officers?
        Answer. Major changes to the JQO system were made in 2007 to
    incorporate Reserve component officers and the Reserve policy was
    adjusted in 2018 to increase joint qualification opportunities for
    Reserve component officers. I do not currently recommend changing the
    JQO system with respect to the Reserve component, but we must continue
    to explore areas that allow Reserve component officers to attend
    training while balancing their civilian job.
        Question. Should the requirement to be a JQO be eliminated as a
    consideration in selecting officers for promotion and assignment?
        Answer. No. JQO requirements enhance the ability of General/Flag
    officers to operate effectively in the joint environment at the
    operational and strategic level. Officers who meet the requirements
    provide benefit to both the Services and joint organizations, and
    ultimately the Department as a whole.
        Question. If confirmed, what modifications would you suggest to
    provide DOD and the Military Services the force management and talent
    management tools necessary to recruit, develop, sustain, and retain a
    21st century, joint, All-Volunteer Force?
        Answer. To maintain the competitive edge and strengthen the
    lethality of the All-Volunteer Force, I will collaborate with OSD and
    the Service Chiefs to enhance force and talent management strategies.
    This involves leveraging advanced technologies like AI for recruitment,
    developing targeted outreach campaigns, revising training programs to
    include leadership and technical skills, and expanding educational
    opportunities. Additionally, I will prioritize initiatives to improve
    the quality of life for service members, incentivize performance, and
    implement flexible policies aligned with executive orders, while
    fostering leadership accountability to effectively recruit, develop,
    sustain, and retain a modern, joint, All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. Do you believe current DOD and Military Service
    procedures and practices for reviewing the records of officers pending
    the President's nomination for promotion or assignment are sufficient
    to enable fully informed decisions by the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
    of Defense, and the President?
        Answer. Yes, the Services evaluate officer qualifications, past
    performance, future potential, and any available adverse or reportable
    information, and each service has a rigorous process in place to ensure
    all decisions are fully informed.
        Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to
    the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or
    assignment process?
        Answer. Yes. I believe these procedures and practices are fair and
    reasonable for the officers involved.
                  joint professional military education (jpme)
        Question. Based on your assessment of the threats facing the United
    States, now and in the future, what knowledge, skills, and abilities
    will officers need to succeed in great power competition against the
    Nation's adversaries?
        Answer. The Joint Force's professional military education programs
    must provide an integrated approach to understanding joint warfighting
    and our adversaries within the context of a rapidly changing character
    of war, from accession to senior leader courses for general and flag
    officers and senior enlisted leaders. Future leaders require the
    knowledge and skills to prepare them for service as joint warfighting
    leaders, senior staff positions, and strategists who:
          Discern the military dimensions of a challenge affecting
    national interests, frame the issue at the policy level, and recommend
    viable military options within the overarching frameworks of globally
    integrated operations, and be able to develop strategies nested with
    U.S. interests.
          Anticipate and lead rapid adaptation and innovation
    during a dynamic period of acceleration in the rate of change in
    warfare, under the conditions of great power competition and disruptive
    technology;
          Plan and conduct joint warfighting at the operational to
    strategic levels, as all-domain, globally integrated operations,
    including the ability to integrate allied and partner contributions.
          Remain agile to develop, execute, and adapt strategy
    through campaigns and operations to achieve policy end states; and
          Demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills,
    emotional intelligence, and effective written, verbal, and visual
    communications skills to support the development and implementation of
    military strategies and complex operations and communicate to senior
    officials and subordinates.
        A number of independent reviews have found that the current JPME
    system insufficiently prepares future military leaders to operate in a
    geopolitical environment shaped by multiple nuclear-armed adversaries
    and lacks sufficient rigor and instruction in strategic deterrence
    missions.
        Question. In your view, what additional steps should be taken to
    increase the proficiency of future senior military leaders in leading
    the joint force during a period of increased strategic competition,
    particularly in the nuclear domain?
        Answer. In terms of the military's contribution to strategic
    competition, the Joint Force has mature doctrine on the uses and
    applications of military force short of war. All the JPME programs
    leverage this doctrine as part of their curriculum and instruction.
          The war colleges have existing programs on deterrence, to
    include coursework on coercion theory. As such, strategic deterrence is
    an enduring special area of interest as assessed by Joint Staff J-7 for
    the Chairman.
          Every year, the Joint Staff J-7 in coordination with
    Marine Corps University sponsors a Faculty Development Seminar for
    instructors from all the DOD's JPME programs. This year's agenda will
    focus on contemporary nuclear operations and the latest thinking
    surrounding strategic deterrence and experts from across the DOD will
    present the instruction.
          Additionally, the Joint Staff will nominate a special
    area of emphasis on nuclear operations and combat operations in a
    nuclear environment. Every officer enrolled in a JPME program will
    benefit from this expanded instruction.
        Question. In your view, are there opportunities in JPME to improve
    STEM cognizance and cyber fluency across the joint force to ensure that
    leaders understand and can effectively employ technologies to fight and
    win our Nation's wars?
        Answer. Understanding and anticipating emerging technologies and
    applications of cyber capabilities are important skills to be taught at
    all levels of professional military education. STEM is the hallmark of
    several military educational institutions including all the Service
    Academies and graduate schools such as Naval Post Graduate School and
    Air Force Institute of Technology. These institutions develop ``deep''
    expertise in cyber and technology, tailored to the needs of the Joint
    Force. STEM aspects are balanced with joint warfighting considerations
    at the staff college and war college levels. Cyber and disruptive
    technology considerations are woven into curriculum and students are
    expected to demonstrate ability to consider these factors in their
    joint planning and operations assessments. In all, the JPME enterprise
    works extensively to develop both ``depth and breadth'' of
    operationally minded warfighters.
        Question. In your view, is there a role for JPME in developing
    basic product management skills across the joint force to ensure that
    military leaders are proficient in the employment of software and
    automation in warfighting?
        Answer. Future warfighters and warfighting leaders will inevitably
    confront both the opportunities and limitations associated with
    employing forces supported or enabled by software and automation. As
    operations and campaigns become increasingly complex, product
    management skills can enable and speed critical decisionmaking. I am
    committed to preparing joint warfighters to strategically employ
    software and automation skills and resources across all joint
    endeavors.
           legal counsel to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
        Question. Section 156 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Legal
    Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be selected by
    a board of officers convened by the Secretary of Defense. To this day,
    the Chairman's Legal Counsel remains the only joint duty officer
    selected from among qualified officers of the Armed Forces in this
    manner.
        Do you consider the board selection process required by section 156
    to be an effective and efficient process for selecting an officer to
    serve in this critical joint position?
        Answer. Yes, I believe the selection process for the position of
    the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an
    effective, efficient, and equitable means to select an officer for this
    position from a pool of talented judge advocate leaders across the
    Services.
        Question. Would you support expanding application of the process
    employed to select the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff to other joint officer positions? Why or why not?
        Answer. I do not believe it is necessary to expand the LC selection
    process to other joint billets. The LC selection process pertains to a
    uniquely specific, statutorily authorized JS billet. The current, well-
    established processes used to select general/flag officers to other
    joint staff positions effectively facilitates a pool of candidates
    representing the best officers from each service. The JS process for
    identifying officers gives the Combatant Commander and the Chairman
    flexibility to meet operational demands and emergent requirements. The
    JS can select from across the Services (to include the Coast Guard) and
    the Active, Guard, and Reserve components to identify the individual
    with appropriate skills and experience. Moreover, the current process
    provides commanders and other senior leaders an opportunity to quickly
    review a slate of nominated officers and conduct interviews as
    necessary. The JS can alert the Services to quickly identify eligible
    personnel, select candidates, nominate them, and have them in position
    in as little as 90 days, if necessary.
                           alliances and partnerships
        Question. U.S. alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S.
    success in competition with, deterrence of, and potential conflict
    against long term strategic competitors.
        What is your view of the strength of our current alliances,
    relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners have in the
    willingness of the U.S. to meet its obligations? If confirmed, how
    would you enhance that trust?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with and seek
    ways to incorporate our highly capable and frontline Allies and
    partners in defense planning to maximize our global efforts against
    adversaries. As the President and Secretary have made clear, our allies
    and partners, particularly those in Europe, must increase their
    contributions to collective security and I look forward to carrying
    this message to my Chief of Defense counterparts.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
    strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each Combatant
    Commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
        Answer. We must continue to project unity and strength while
    strengthening military to military relationships with our Allies and
    partners. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with and seek
    ways to incorporate our highly capable and frontline Allies and
    partners in defense planning to maximize our global efforts against
    adversaries. I will continue the regular engagements with Ally and
    partner counterparts to understand their strategic concerns and to
    identify areas for increased global cooperation. Synchronization and
    transparency of our collective military global approaches results in
    greater pressure on our adversaries while also enabling increased
    flexibility to refocus U.S. military resources on U.S. national
    priorities.
        In NORTHCOM, defense of the Homeland and ensuring operational
    control of the U.S. southern border will be my top priority. I will
    focus on the efforts to modernize NORAD and improve coordination with
    Canada to ensure our efforts are complementary. I will also continue to
    foster the strong mil-to-mil relationship with Mexico to confront
    shared challenges.
        In INDOPACOM, if confirmed, I will focus on modernizing our
    Alliance with Japan by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a
    more integrated manner and deepening our Alliance with Australia
    through investments in posture and interoperability through the
    critical AUKUS security partnership, as well as expanding ongoing co-
    production and maintenance efforts for critical munitions, essential to
    building resilience into our Defense Industrial Base. The Joint Force
    stands to gain from the deepening strategic interests between the U.S.
    and India, by elevating military cooperation across multiple domains,
    increasing new procurements and co-production arrangements, and
    applying effort to streamline defense trade, technology exchange and
    maintenance, spare supplies and in-country repair and overhaul of U.S.-
    provided defense systems. If confirmed, I will continue to support our
    ongoing efforts to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
    capability.
        In SOUTHCOM, I will take specific actions to further strengthen
    defense of the Homeland, including greater focus on PRC military and
    financial investments in the theater, specifically in Panama. I will
    also strengthen existing alliances and partnerships and identify new
    partnerships, as necessary, to further degrade PRC influence in the
    hemisphere.
        In EUCOM, we must encourage our Allies and partners to increase
    their capability and capacity, and prioritize outcome driven
    relationships. I will continue to work alongside our NATO Allies to
    deter and, if necessary, defend against any threat, and build
    resilience against malign influence and hybrid activities.
        In CENTCOM, I will prioritize cooperation with our regional
    partners that results in a maximum pressure campaign to deter and
    defend against Iranian aggression. I will buildupon the existing
    regional security constructs to enhance Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense and Maritime Security to best defend U.S. personnel and vital
    interests in the region, support allies and partners, and deter
    adversaries. I will also look for new opportunities for the entire
    Joint Force--including our new State Partnership Program relationships
    with Saudi Arabia and UAE--to contribute to shared regional security
    priorities.
        In AFRICOM, I will prioritize partner-led, U.S. enabled efforts to
    achieve our shared security interests in degrading terrorist
    organizations, strengthening multilateral coordination, and promoting
    stability with the long-term goal of our partners achieving operational
    independence.
        In SPACECOM, I will prioritize sustained freedom of action in
    space, optimization of our resources, and enhancing mission assurance.
    We must promote norms of behavior by all space-faring nations in space
    which support U.S. national security, economic, scientific, and
    commercial interests.
        Question. Industrial and technological integration between alliance
    members and international partners are critical to ensuring
    interoperability and economies of scale when modernizing and
    maintaining combat forces.
        Based on your experience, do you have any recommendations for how
    DOD can leverage foreign military sales and industrial base integration
    as a tool to improve our own military systems, as well as improve our
    ability to fight by, with and through our allies and partners?
        Answer. Foreign military sales have the potential to strengthen the
    U.S. Defense Industrial Base by increasing the demand signal for
    manufacturers, which, if properly incentivized, can enable needed
    investments in capacity expansion. Some capacity limitations can be
    offset by co-production initiatives in cases where the business case
    and U.S. national security benefits align. Ultimately, by equipping
    partners with U.S. systems, the U.S. increases interoperability and set
    the stage for more seamless coalition operations.
                         u.s. africa command (africom)
        Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
    required to compete for the vast majority of its U.S. forces in the
    global force management process.
        What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
    forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
    Campaign Plan, the National Defense Strategy, and other emergency
    requirements?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the AFRICOM Commander as part of the Global Force
    Management Process. For AFRICOM, their forces include allocated forces
    and CONUS-based regionally aligned forces that rotate into the Area of
    Responsibility (AOR) execute activities in support of the AFRICOM
    Theater Campaign Plan. Current posture allows for the forward staging
    of forces to provide required operational flexibility and timely crisis
    response, as required. Across AORs, I will work with the Department to
    balance competing requirements and resourcing demands in-line with DOD
    priorities.
        Question. Are there any changes you would implement to the
    allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the Combatant Commanders to review global force posture, to
    include that within the AFRICOM AOR, and make my recommendations.
        Question. What should be the primary objectives of the DOD
    specifically, and the United States more broadly, in the AFRICOM AOR?
        Answer. Defending U.S. interests, protecting the Homeland, and
    deterring our adversaries are global requirements for DOD. Africa is an
    important AOR to implement our national security objectives to degrade
    terrorists' capability to strike the Homeland and our personnel and
    facilities abroad; and to counter our adversaries' ability to undermine
    U.S. strategic interests.
        Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
    Russia and China in Africa? In what areas, if any, do these oppose U.S.
    and partner objectives?
        Answer. China and Russia both seek to expand their influence in
    Africa. China primarily focuses on economic investment and
    infrastructure projects via its Belt and Road Initiative, though there
    is nascent military cooperation with some nations. Russia focuses on
    military partnerships, arms sales, and resource extraction. Both powers
    aim to challenge Western influence, though China's approach has
    generally been more systematic and economically focused compared to
    Russia's more opportunistic and security-oriented strategy.
                         u.s. central command (centcom)
        Question. In your opinion, what are the key U.S. national security
    interests in the Middle East? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Key U.S. national security interests in the Middle east are
    (1) deterring threats to the U.S. Homeland that emanate from the Middle
    East (Iranian Threat Network, potential nuclear weapons, and VEOs), (2)
    supporting our allies and partners in the region (Israel, NATO, etc.),
    (3) counter-proliferation, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
    weapon, and (4) ensuring the free flow of goods, trade, and stability
    in the world energy supply.
        Question. In your opinion, to what extent does achieving U.S.
    national security interests in the Middle East require a continuous
    U.S. military presence, and in your view is the current U.S. force
    presence appropriately sized? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. The Middle East continues to face challenges emanating from
    terrorism, failed and fragile states, and pressure from Russia, China,
    and Iran. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the U.S. military
    presence in the Middle East against our national strategic interests
    and in light of broader global requirements and make recommendations to
    the Secretary and the President.
        Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
    with U.S. partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the
    CENTCOM AOR?
        Answer. The CENTCOM AOR faces a number of threats across multiple
    domains. The combined military, economic, humanitarian, and
    environmental threats that impact across the globe must be addressed by
    the combined efforts of U.S. and its allies and partners.
        Our partners in the Middle East are eager to improve security
    cooperation and assume a greater share of the burden defending
    themselves against Iranian aggression and terrorist threats such as the
    Houthis and ISIS.
        Improving ally and partner capability through training and
    improving the Foreign Military Sales process, as well as building and
    strengthening intelligence sharing and cooperative agreements like the
    RSC (Regional Security Construct) and MEAD (Middle East Air Defense)
    partnership will enable our A&P to assume a greater role in addressing
    regional security issues, while solidifying U.S. influence and our role
    as partner of choice for strategically important allies.
        Question. What threat does Chinese and Russian involvement in the
    Middle East pose to U.S. operations and interests and to what extent
    does a continuous U.S. presence counter their involvement? In your
    view, what other policy tools might be useful in this regard?
        Answer. Russia has historically used its military presence in the
    Middle East to threaten the U.S. and our allies from the Mediterranean
    Sea and into Africa. Russian-affiliated forces attacked U.S. troops in
    Syria but were disavowed by Moscow. Russian government and Chinese
    state-owned enterprises have aligned with Iran to proliferate weapons,
    technology, and expertise used by terrorist organizations such as the
    Houthis that attack the U.S. military, Israel and our other allies and
    partners in the region. Chinese IT also introduces risk into the
    defense infrastructure of those Middle Eastern countries that choose to
    procure Chinese tech and equipment. Therefore, it is important for the
    military to work alongside other departments and agencies in the U.S.
    Government to address the diplomatic, economic, and informational
    threat posed by China and Russia as well as the direct military threat.
    Iran
        Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the U.S.
    national security interests with respect to Iran? What is the role of
    the U.S. military in this strategy?
        Answer. U.S. policy and our interest to deny Iran from obtaining a
    nuclear weapon, neutralize Iran's campaign of regional aggression, and
    disrupt the IRGC's destabilizing activities.
        The Joint Force will retain the ability to deny Iran a nuclear
    weapon; identify and support action against Iranian and Iranian-backed
    threats; and disrupt terrorist threats that endanger the U.S. Homeland
    and U.S. interests. The U.S. military will work with our regional
    Middle East partners to increase their ability to deter and defend
    against Iranian aggression.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
    posed by Iran? What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iranian
    proxy groups?
        Answer.
        IRAN. Iran possesses thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise
    missiles, and one-way attack UAVs capable of ranging Israeli and U.S.
    interests in the region and, over the past year, demonstrated its
    ability to employ its conventional military capabilities in two large-
    scale attacks directly against Israel. Their consideration of nuclear
    capability is troubling.
        IRANIAN PROXIES. Iran maintains a network of nonState partners and
    proxies in the Middle East which have targeted U.S. and partner
    interests across the region and in international shipping lanes, and
    they have publicly justified these attacks due to Israeli operations
    against HAMAS and Lebanese Hizballah.
          HOUTHIS. Since Oct 2023, the Houthis have launched
    missiles and UAVs against Israeli territory, U.S. military ships and
    aircraft, hit multiple commercial vessels in the Red Sea, and seized
    and impounded one commercial vessel.
          IAMGs. Since 19 Oct 2023, Iranian-aligned groups have
    conducted over 200 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria,
    as recently January--demonstrating they maintain at least limited
    operational capabilities in Syria--and they may resume sustained
    attacks with little to no warning, pending Iranian approval.
          HIZBALLAH. Since Oct 2023, Hizballah has conducted cross-
    border attacks against Israel and combatting Israeli forces in Lebanon
    and has not expressed an intent to target U.S. forces or interests in
    the Middle East.
          HAMAS. As of early Mar, HAMAS is focused on its long-term
    survival and has not publicly expressed an intent to target U.S. forces
    or interests in the Middle East; however, HAMAS political officials
    have publicly opposed plans for a sustained foreign presence in Gaza,
    suggesting the group likely would seek to target any non-Palestinian
    security force deployed to Gaza after the conflict.
        Question. In your view, what would be the security implications for
    U.S. and regional security interests should Iran acquire a nuclear
    weapons capability?
        Answer. Iranian leadership's decision calculus may be affected if
    its national priorities are threatened to include ensuring regime
    survival, maintaining national security from internal and external
    threats, and establishing itself as the regional dominant power in the
    Middle East.
        Military force alone may not be sufficient to deter Iran, and an
    approach that includes diplomatic engagement and economic incentives
    may be necessary.
        Question. In your opinion, can Iran be sufficiently deterred
    through military force alone? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Iranian leadership's decision calculus may be affected if
    its national priorities are threatened to include ensuring regime
    survival, maintaining national security from internal and external
    threats, and establishing itself as the regional dominant power in the
    Middle East.
        Military force alone may not be sufficient to deter Iran, and an
    approach that includes diplomatic engagement and economic incentives
    may be necessary.
    Israel
        Question. In your opinion, what are U.S. national security
    objectives with regards to Israel?
        Answer. Israel is a model U.S. ally, and the U.S.-Israel alliance
    is of great importance to the United States. Enabling Israel's security
    and ability to defend itself is thus a key U.S. national security
    objective. Achieving durable security for Israel and strengthening
    formal and informal security cooperation between Israel and its Arab
    neighbors will reduce the burden on the Joint Force and enable greater
    focus on threats elsewhere around the globe.
        Question. In your opinion, what should DOD's role be in supporting
    Israeli efforts to degrade and defeat Hamas?
        Answer. I defer to the Secretary and the President to set our
    policies toward foreign states, to include Israel. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that our military strategy and operations are aligned with the
    Secretary and the President's priorities and policies.
    Syria and Iraq
        Question. What is your understanding of current U.S. strategy and
    objectives in Syria? How have those objectives changed, if at all, in
    light of the recent fall of the Assad regime?
        Answer. The United States is in Syria to ensure the enduring defeat
    of ISIS and to prevent external operations from ISIS and al-Qaeda from
    threatening the U.S. Homeland. The December 2024 fall of the Assad
    regime does not fundamentally alter these U.S. objectives.
        I will work with the Secretary as this Administration assesses and
    develops United States policy for Syria.
        Question. From a DOD perspective, what must be done to ensure the
    enduring defeat of ISIS? What non-military efforts are needed for the
    enduring defeat of ISIS?
        Answer. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS must continue to
    cooperate on counterterrorism efforts. U.S. must continue to work
    closely with allies and partners to address shared security concerns
    through a whole-of-government approach to eliminate threats to the
    Homeland.
        Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
    Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in countering ISIS and al
    Qaeda?
        Answer. It is my understanding that our partners in the SDF and ISF
    lead the fight against ISIS by shouldering the burden of operations
    with some U.S. assistance. These partners play a critical role in
    enabling our CT objectives while keeping the risk to and investment
    from U.S. forces low and economical. I will seek to work with the
    Secretary and interagency on the future of these relationships as
    regional dynamics continue to change and the Administration reviews its
    policies regarding Syria and Iraq.
        Question. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied
    to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what
    conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the President
    on future troop levels in Syria?
        Answer. I believe that U.S. troop levels in Syria should accord
    with our national policy and objectives. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Commander USCENTCOM to
    review our strategy and posture in Syria and make my recommendations.
        Question. In September, the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission
    announced the transition of the global coalition to defeat ISIS to a
    bilateral security relationship with the Government of Iraq. However,
    many of the details of such a transition are still being negotiated
    with the Iraqi Government.
        In your view, what should the guiding principles for DOD's presence
    in Iraq moving forward? Do you assess that U.S. forces should remain in
    Iraq beyond next September? Why or why not?
        Answer. Iraq has become a key partner for the U.S. in the region.
    The U.S. Mission in Iraq is committed to a lasting strategic
    partnership with the Government of Iraq and its people. The U.S.
    Government, along with the U.S. Mission to Iraq, actively collaborates
    with Iraqi partners to support a stable, prosperous, democratic, and
    unified Iraq. Our security relationship is an advisory, enabling, and
    assisting role.
        If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and
    the Commander USCENTCOM to review our strategy and posture in Iraq and
    make my recommendations.
    South Asia
        Question. In your opinion, what are U.S. national security
    objectives in Afghanistan, and what is your understanding of the
    current strategy to achieve them?
        Answer. The most immediate U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to
    ensure the country is not a breeding ground for terrorist attacks
    against the United States, our overseas interests, and our allies and
    partners. This includes ensuring weapons provided to the former Afghan
    government do not fall into the hands of terrorists planning attacks on
    the United States. The U.S. works with partners in the region to
    achieve this objective. Over the long term, a more stable and self-
    sufficient Afghanistan would facilitate security and possibly open
    alternative trade routes from Central Asia.
        Question. In your view, is the United States properly postured to
    counter ISIS-Khorasan and al Qaeda and related groups in Afghanistan?
    Please explain your answer.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the Combatant Commanders to review global force posture and
    capabilities, to include that within the CENTCOM AOR, and make my
    recommendations.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to U.S. relations with Pakistan?
        Answer. Pakistan's location bordering China, India, Iran, and
    Afghanistan, and its status as a nuclear power make an ongoing
    strategic relationship important. I would aim to preserve the military-
    to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan in
    areas of mutual interest such as counterterrorism. A constructive
    defense relationship facilitates regional stability and enhances
    counterterrorism efforts.
                         u.s. european command (eucom)
        Question. Do you believe the deterrent posture in Europe is
    sufficient to deter further Russian aggression in Europe?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review our force
    posture, to include that in the USEUCOM AOR, and make my
    recommendations.
        Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
    shortfalls in current U.S. posture that affect the U.S. ability to
    carry out the EUCOM Theater Campaign Plan?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review our
    capabilities, capacity, and force posture, to include that in the
    USEUCOM AOR, and make my recommendations.
        Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
    sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
    critical infrastructure in EUCOM? If not, what are the areas of highest
    risk?
        Answer. I have not been able to conduct an assessment of the United
    States air and missile defense capabilities and capacities to defend
    EUCOM critical infrastructure. However, If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Joint Chiefs, and all of the Combatant Commanders to
    review our capabilities, capacity, and force posture across all
    theaters, to include EUCOM, in order to make fully informed
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the
    department will continue to work closely with Allies and Partners to
    ensure that we have an efficient and effective air and missile defense
    force posture across the theater.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific changes would you make to
    U.S. capabilities or force posture in Europe to execute the Interim
    National Defense Strategic Guidance more effectively?
        Answer. Europe continues to face challenges emanating from
    conventional to transnational threats in its immediate vicinity and
    beyond. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the U.S. military
    presence in Europe against our national strategic interests and in
    light of broader global requirements and make recommendations to the
    Secretary and the President.
    European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
        Question. Since establishment of the EDI in 2014, the NDAA has
    authorized billions of dollars each year for EDI investments to support
    stability and security, and to deter Russian aggression.
        In your view, has EDI improved U.S. and allied capability and
    capacity to deter Russian aggression in the European theater?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense, Joint Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders to review our
    capabilities, capacity, and force posture, to include the EDI, and make
    my recommendations.
        Question. Do you believe continued, robust dedicated funding for
    programs under EDI's five lines of effort is required to support
    implementation of the National Defense Strategy in Europe?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the future requirements
    in Europe, with the Service Chiefs, to make recommendations regarding
    future EDI funding.
    NATO Alliance
        Question. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests
    is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under the North Atlantic
    Treaty, especially Article 5?
        Answer. The North Atlantic Treaty is very important to U.S.
    strategic interests. Any use of armed force to fulfill our commitments
    under Article 5 would need to be carried out pursuant to the
    President's powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the War
    Powers Act, and subsequent congressional authorizations for use of
    military force or a formal declaration of war.
        Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
    the NATO Alliance and what do you perceive to be the greatest
    challenges in meeting those objectives?
        Answer. At the 2024 Washington Summit, the Alliance reaffirmed its
    purpose and principles found in NATO's Strategic Concept, and its three
    core tasks of Collective Defense, Cooperative Security, and Crisis
    Management. I'm aligned with these objectives and in my view, the
    greatest challenge the Alliance faces is its ability to adapt and
    develop, politically and militarily, to meet the challenges of an
    unpredictable and competitive world.
        Question. NATO has long held the position that, ``as long as
    nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your
    view, do you believe this principle requires the United States to
    continue to deploy nuclear weapons in NATO countries?
        Answer. As long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance, it is important
    for the U.S. to maintain nuclear weapons forward deployed in NATO
    countries. These forward-based weapons contribute to U.S. extended
    deterrence, complicate adversary decision calculus, and reassure our
    NATO Allies.
        The United States nuclear commitment to NATO remains a core element
    of our deterrence policy and strategy. As the backbone of deterrence
    since its founding, NATO nuclear policy seeks to preserve peace,
    prevent coercion and deter aggression.
        Question. Do you believe that NATO should expand the nuclear
    sharing role to additional alliance members?
        Answer. Nuclear sharing arrangements can refer both to U.S. nuclear
    weapons hosted on the territory of NATO Allies and to Allied provision
    of Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) that could carry U.S. nuclear weapons as
    part of a NATO nuclear mission. While these facets of nuclear sharing
    are related, one does not require the other. From a military
    perspective, expanding NATO allies' participation in the nuclear
    deterrence mission in some capacity would enhance flexibility,
    survivability, and military capability. If confirmed, I will work with
    USEUCOM and SACEUR to evaluate the cost/benefit of such a decision.
        Question. What do you see as the benefits, or negative
    consequences, of NATO countries individually pursuing their own nuclear
    weapons?
        Answer. Nuclear proliferation, even among Allies, significantly
    limits U.S. ability to manage escalation risk. It could trigger further
    acceleration of adversary efforts to modernize and expand their nuclear
    arsenals. Additionally, it would irreparably erode the Treaty on the
    Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and could encourage
    proliferation around the world.
        Question. The dual-hatted position of the Commander of EUCOM as
    NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) allows U.S. and Allied
    forces to be highly integrated in Europe. Similar dual-hat
    responsibilities have been integrated to other senior U.S. Commanders,
    including Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe and Africa as Commander
    NATO Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) and Commander U.S. Army Europe and
    Africa as Commander NATO Allied Land Command
        What is your assessment of the benefits of these dual-hatted
    structures to allied cohesion and integration?
        Answer. U.S. leadership within the Alliance is critical to Alliance
    cohesion and integration. As the most capable and largest NATO member,
    the U.S. is the only member that has the stature to lead the Alliance
    in a cohesive and unified manner. The dual-hatted positions throughout
    the NATO command structure ensure close integration of U.S. thought and
    operational intent and maintain unity of effort and focus across the
    Alliance. The dual-hatted arrangement, in which SACEUR is an American
    combatant commander, is particularly important for the fulfillment of
    the United States' nuclear deterrence commitment to NATO.
    Russia
        Question. In your view, is Russia a threat to the United States and
    its allies?
        Answer. Russia very likely remains deterred from an overt military
    attack against the U.S. or NATO; however, Moscow retains the ability
    and willingness to conduct asymmetric activity below what it assesses
    to be the threshold of military conflict. The conflict in Ukraine very
    likely has strained its conventional military forces, increasing
    Russia's dependence on its nuclear arsenal as a means of deterrence to
    protect itself from perceived external military threats.
        Question. In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities most deter
    Russia and mitigate the Russian threat to NATO Allies and partners?
        Answer. Russia very likely is deterred by the U.S. and NATO's
    nuclear arsenal and the threat of direct military confrontation with
    the U.S. and NATO. Russia's threat perceptions almost certainly are
    driven by a belief that the U.S. and broader West seek the strategic
    defeat of the Russian State. As such, Moscow views any actions by the
    U.S. and broader West, especially those in the vicinity of Moscow's
    perceived sphere of influence, as intended to undermine Russian
    interests. However, Moscow calibrates its responses to these perceived
    undermining activities to demonstrate resolve without prompting an
    escalatory response from the U.S. and/or the broader West.
        Question. What aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture do you assess
    as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?
        Answer. Russia very likely is deterred by the U.S. and NATO's
    nuclear arsenal and the threat of direct military confrontation with
    the U.S. and NATO. Russia's threat perceptions almost certainly are
    driven by a belief that the U.S. and broader West seek the strategic
    defeat of the Russian State. As such, Moscow views any actions by the
    U.S. and broader West, especially those in the vicinity of Moscow's
    perceived sphere of influence, as intended to undermine Russian
    interests. However, Moscow calibrates its responses to these perceived
    undermining activities to demonstrate resolve without prompting an
    escalatory response from the U.S. and/or the broader West.
        Question. In your view, what should DOD do to counter Russian
    malign influence in Europe?
        Answer. We must encourage our Allies and partners to increase their
    capability and capacity, and prioritize outcome driven relationships. I
    will continue to work alongside our NATO Allies to deter and, if
    necessary, defend against any threat, and build resilience against
    malign influence and hybrid activities.
    Ukraine
        Question. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale,
    unprovoked, and illegal invasion on Ukraine.
        How do you assess the trajectory of the conflict and the role that
    the Department of Defense should play?
        Answer. Russian President Putin remains committed to pursuing his
    objectives in Ukraine to include securing territorial gains and forcing
    Ukrainian neutrality. Moscow likely views the conflict is in its favor
    and will continue to prosecute the war in 2025 despite high casualties
    from continued operations. Russia's approved 2025 budget contains
    higher levels of defense spending compared to 2024 and is the highest
    it has been since the cold war. Defense spending is projected to be
    double that of social spending, which suggests Moscow is committed to
    sustaining its war efforts. The conflict in 2025 likely will continue
    to be a war of attrition, with both sides suffering heavy losses of
    personnel and materiel. Russian forces gained nearly 4,000 square
    kilometers in 2024, seven times more than in 2023, with the majority of
    those advances occurring in eastern Donetsk.
        Following the 18 February meeting between U.S. and Russian
    officials in Riyadh, the Kremlin publicly reiterated willingness to
    work with Washington on a negotiated settlement and expressed interest
    in continued high-level dialog with the United States. Russia later
    reiterated Moscow will not accept a cease-fire without a long-term
    settlement that addresses Russia's core security concerns.
        Question. Do you believe it is important for the United States to
    continue providing security assistance to Ukraine, including after the
    conclusion of the war, as a means to help Ukraine deter and defeat
    Russian aggression?
        Answer. From a military standpoint, Ukraine has the right to self-
    defense, and from that standpoint our security assistance helps Ukraine
    to defend itself. Our assistance improves Ukraine's position at the
    negotiating table and deters Russia from further aggression. The United
    States is only a part of the network of states supporting Ukraine's
    defense, and we should focus on what unique capabilities only the U.S.
    can provide, while Europe increases its share of support. After the
    conclusion of the war, we should continue to assist Ukraine with its
    future force development and long-term stability.
        Question. What do you see as the role of U.S. security assistance
    in building the capabilities and capacity of Ukraine to meet its
    military requirements to defend its sovereignty and territorial
    integrity in the short, medium, and long-term?
        Answer. The U.S. and our Allies are studying Ukraine's immediate
    wartime needs to defend the front line, as well as how to build its
    future force and defense industry to develop organic capabilities for
    long-term self-defense. In this way, we are helping Ukraine become more
    self-sufficient. Other aspects of short, and long-term force
    development include advising missions and training.
                     u.s. indo-pacific command (indopacom)
        Question. U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region remains
    heavily concentrated in Japan and South Korea.
        Is the current U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region
    sufficient to support the Trump Administration's Interim National
    Defense Strategic Guidance? How would you propose to restructure U.S.
    security posture in the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese aggression, if
    confirmed? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. An increasingly aggressive China poses both short and long-
    term challenges. If confirmed, I will assess the U.S. military presence
    in the Indo-Pacific against our national strategic interests and make
    recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
        Question. In your view, what would be the impact of significant
    reductions to our force posture in Japan or South Korea on the security
    situation in the Indo-Pacific region?
        Answer. North Korea's long-range missile and nuclear programs
    represent an immediate security challenge. If confirmed, I will assess
    the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea and make
    recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
        Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
    could make to implement the National Defense Strategy and improve the
    military balance in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. The Department works closely with INDOPACOM and allies and
    partners in the region to ensure the Department is making investments
    that advance National Defense Strategy priorities, close Combatant
    Commanders priority gaps, and improve integrated deterrence.
    Participating in regional multi-national exercises and sustaining
    forward forces assists with improving the military balance in the
    region. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Services and
    Congress to advance investments that improve lethality within INDOPACOM
    to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
        Question. Do you believe that continued, dedicated funding for the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative is required to support implementation of
    the National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. The programs, investments, and activities included in the
    Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are critical for providing a
    credible combat deterrent and maintaining the free and open order in
    the Western Pacific. PDI is a subset of the Department's budget
    request, not a separate fund. If confirmed, I will work with the
    INDOPACOM and the Services to ensure we continue to fund the most
    important programs to strengthen deterrence.
        Question. In your view, what is the role of ground forces in the
    Indo-Pacific during competition, crisis, and conflict?
        Answer. The role of ground forces in the Indo-Pacific region is
    complex and multifaceted, evolving across the spectrum of competition,
    crisis, and conflict. Right now, they serve as a deterrent and offer
    opportunities to expand training and partnerships with allies. In times
    of crisis, they can offer a rapid response option as well as a way of
    protecting U.S. interests in the region (U.S. citizens, infrastructure,
    etc). During conflict, they can provide options for force projection,
    area denial/control, and stabilization/reconstruction. In any case, the
    China threat is dynamic and United States ground forces must continue
    to adapt and modernize to maintain a competitive edge.
        Question. Congress mandated the establishment of the Joint Force
    Headquarters at INDOPACOM. What is your view of INDOPACOM's progress in
    establishing the Joint Force Headquarters? What are the requirements
    for the Joint Force Headquarters at INDOPACOM to fully execute its
    function?
        Answer. The ability to respond effectively to crises in the region,
    using the Joint Force with all its combined capabilities, is paramount.
    Admiral Paparo has stated that, in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) within
    the Theater of War, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would serve as the Joint
    Task Force (JTF), a capability for which they were certified in 2023.
    The existing structure, which leverages the proven capabilities of
    service components and their ability to function as JTFs, provides the
    necessary flexibility and responsiveness to address a wide range of
    potential crises within the INDOPACOM AOR. It should be able to fully
    execute its purpose in its current form.
        Question. Can you describe the strategic and operational importance
    of Guam to executing INDOPACOM's plans and operations in the region?
    Can you describe the State of military infrastructure and facilities on
    Guam in the wake of Typhoon Mawar? Do you agree that it is critical for
    Guam to be reconstructed in a resilient manner so that the U.S.
    military can utilize Guam as a power projection platform in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Answer. Guam's strategic location and military capabilities make it
    a key hub indispensable hub for United States power projection in the
    Indo-Pacific. However, Typhoon Mawar, which struck Guam in May 2023,
    caused significant damage to military infrastructure and facilities on
    the island. This highlighted the vulnerability of the island's critical
    infrastructure to natural disasters, which underscores the need to
    invest in order to ensure its ability to withstand future threats, both
    natural and man-made. A resilient Guam helps ensure the United States
    can effectively deter aggression, respond to crises, and protect its
    interests in the region.
        Question. Do you support the efforts by the United States and Japan
    to establish a modernized command-and-control structure, to include an
    improved U.S. Forces Japan? Do you agree that the Department of Defense
    should move as fast as possible to establish a new command-and-control
    structure with Japan, considering its strategic importance as a capable
    ally in the Indo-Pacific?
        Answer. Yes, modernizing the United States-Japan command-and-
    control structure will help maintain a credible deterrent and ensure
    the alliance's effectiveness in a rapidly changing security
    environment.
    China
        Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy describes the People's
    Republic of China (PRC) as ``the most comprehensive and serious
    challenge to U.S. national security'' and states ``The PRC seeks to
    undermine U.S. alliances and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
    region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic
    influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and
    military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their
    interest.''
        How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with
    China?
        Answer. The President has made it clear we must be clear-eyed about
    China's intentions and actions. Many of the Chinese Communist Party's
    values and interests are at odds with those of the United States.
    However, I defer to the Secretaries of Defense and State to
    characterize our current relationship.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current State of U.S.-
    China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should be the
    objectives of U.S.-China military-to-military dialog? What are the
    limitations on this kind of dialog?
        Answer. Engagements with the PLA may offer opportunities for the
    U.S. to influence China's military behavior and encourage adherence to
    norms and standards, but we should be realistic about what we can
    achieve. A properly postured and equipped Joint Force does more to
    influence China's behavior than engagement. If the President and the
    Secretary believe I can move U.S. objectives forward by engaging with
    my PLA counterpart, I will.
        Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
    increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
    program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
    erosion of U.S. advantages?
        Answer. The PLA remains focused on developing its capabilities
    across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full
    range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space,
    counterspace, EW, and cyberspace operations. The PLA remains focused on
    developing capabilities to provide options for China to dissuade,
    deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-
    Pacific region. China's stated defense policy remains oriented toward
    advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests while
    emphasizing a greater global role for itself. Beijing has demonstrated
    an increasing willingness to use military coercion and inducements to
    achieve these aims. The PLA's rapid developments in missile, aircraft,
    and unmanned aerial systems have greatly advanced in the past 20 years.
        Question. In your view what are the implications of China's nuclear
    buildup on the credibility of deterrence and extended deterrence in
    Asia?
        Answer. China's nuclear buildup presents a challenge to U.S.
    deterrence capabilities and extended deterrence commitments to allies
    in the Indo-Pacific. To preserve stability in the region and deter
    potential aggression from China, the U.S. must continue to fully invest
    in a modernized nuclear force. This will ensure credibility for our
    deterrent and extended deterrence commitments in the future.
    Taiwan
        Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
    Taiwan Strait? What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S.
    military assistance to Taiwan? Do you think Taiwan is making
    appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities and if not, what
    changes would you recommend?
        Answer. There is a very stark imbalance in capabilities across the
    Taiwan Strait. As indicated in DOD's annual China Military Power Report
    (CMPR), China continues to modernize its military capabilities and
    invest in advanced weapons systems. These include aircraft carriers,
    anti-ship missiles, submarines, ballistic missiles, and cyber
    capabilities. The PLA is capable of projecting power through operations
    and exercises near Taiwan and throughout the region. Taiwan's military,
    although growing, is much smaller in comparison and lacks many similar
    capabilities.
        If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and
    the Commander USINDOPACOM to review the capabilities and requirements
    of Taiwan and make my recommendations.
        Question. Some have argued that the United States should explicitly
    State that we would respond militarily to any Chinese use of force
    against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your view, what
    would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change?
        Answer. My focus is implementing the President's current policy,
    which opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side
    and to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
    Respectfully, I will provide my military advice on significant policy
    changes when the President and Secretary invite me to do so.
    The Korean Peninsula
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by North
    Korea to regional and global stability?
        Answer. The DPRK nuclear, missile, and cyber capabilities continue
    to threaten the United States and its allies on a global scale.
    Pyongyang has tested multiple missile systems capable of striking U.S.
    forces in the ROK and Japan, as well as Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and
    CONUS. Additionally, the DPRK conducts persistent cyber activities,
    such as cryptocurrency theft and adaptive cybercrime TTPs to generate
    funds and obtain technical information in support of the regime's
    military and WMD programs. Pyongyang's comprehensive strategic
    partnership with Moscow very likely will enable it to further improve
    its military capabilities, increasing the threat to regional stability
    and U.S. interests.
        Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD should
    take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's nuclear
    and missile capabilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM, USINDOPACOM, and
    Combined Forces Command-Korea Commanders to review and enhance the
    status of our missile defense capabilities against the DPRK and make my
    recommendations in line with President Trump's Golden Dome for America.
        Question. What will you do to ensure that trilateral military
    cooperation between the U.S., Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
    accelerates?
        Answer. I support the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework
    and, if confirmed, will continue to advocate for using the Trilateral
    Security Cooperation Framework as a blueprint for military cooperation
    in exercises like FREEDOM EDGE and operationally through efforts such
    as our trilateral missile data warning sharing mechanism.
        Question. Do you believe that the ROK has met the requirements for
    the conditions-based operational control transition plan allowing it to
    assume wartime control of its military? If not, what does the ROK still
    need to do to achieve OPCON transition?
        Answer. The United States and ROK currently have a conditions-based
    operational control transition plan (COTP) in place. The COTP requires
    the ROK to meet the conditions associated with their stand-alone
    capability and that the security environment is conducive for the ROK
    to assume the lead of a U.S.-ROK combined command prior to transition.
    The ROK continues to increase and improve capabilities by acquiring
    equipment and experience through multi-domain and trilateral exercises.
    If confirmed, I will review the conditions outlined within the existing
    plan before making my recommendation.
        Question. What are your views on the use of landmines to deter
    conflict on the Korean Peninsula? Do you support continuing efforts by
    DOD to modernize related terrain shaping capabilities?
        Answer. Landmines have been used on the Korean peninsula since the
    Korean War and there are still millions of landmines deployed along the
    demilitarized zone to deter North Korean aggression. If confirmed, I
    will review the deployment of landmines on the Korean peninsula.
                        u.s. northern command (northcom)
    Defense Support to Civil Authorities
        Question. Civil authorities may request DOD support for domestic
    disasters and certain counter-drug operations as well as in managing
    the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass
    destruction.
        In your view, are the procedures by which Federal, State, and Local
    agencies request DOD support efficient, effective, and timely?
        Answer. Yes, the procedures by which Federal, State, and Local
    agencies request DOD support have been honed over decades and are
    effective in ensuring that DOD is able to provide a rapid and flexible
    response for potential or actual emergencies or disasters within the
    United States, territories, possessions, and protectorates, upon
    receiving a validated request for assistance formally asking DOD to
    provide assistance to a local, State, tribal, or other Federal agency.
        Question. What factors should be considered in determining whether
    DOD will provide support to a civil authority?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD remains a reliable
    and responsive partner to civil authorities while adhering to legal and
    operational principles. By continuously refining procedures, enhancing
    interagency training, and leveraging lessons learned from past
    emergencies, we can strengthen our collective ability to respond
    effectively to crises and safeguard the American people.
        Question. Do you believe it is in the best interests of DOD to
    provide support to civil authorities on a reimbursable basis?
        Answer. Yes, providing DOD resources, when appropriately requested
    and validated, in response to emergencies, law enforcement support, and
    other domestic activities when non-DoD capabilities are overwhelmed or
    unavailable is appropriate.
    Transnational Criminal Organizations
        Question. Transnational criminal organizations are engaged in a
    wide variety of illicit activities, including money laundering, human
    trafficking illicit financial flows, illegal trade in natural resources
    and wildlife, and trade in illegal drugs, precursors and weapons. These
    activities reach not only the entirety of the Western Hemisphere, but
    increasingly throughout the world.
        In your assessment, how has the threat to the United States from
    transnational criminal organizations evolved?
        Answer. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) almost
    certainly will continue to prioritize their profits and will engage in
    activities that may threaten the United States such as drug or human
    trafficking in pursuit of illicit business interests. Over the past two
    decades, TCOs have adapted to increased government regulation and
    enforcement efforts by diversifying their revenue streams, updating
    drug manufacturing processes, and changing trafficking TTP. Most
    fentanyl is trafficked through U.S. ports of entry, judging from CBP
    seizure information. TCO adaptability likely will challenge Latin
    American governments' capacities to effectively counter criminal
    violence for at least the next year.
        TCOs likely seek to avoid excessive violence in the United States
    or against U.S. citizens that may attract additional law enforcement
    scrutiny. However, TCO-driven criminal violence in Latin America--
    particularly Mexico--raises the risk of spillover violence in the
    United States or toward U.S. personnel operating near the U.S. southern
    border. TCOs degrade Latin American State capacity through their
    engagement in corruption and some organizations' ability to overwhelm
    security forces in limited engagements. Weakened Latin American states
    almost certainly are less able to contain violence. In Mexico, the
    military generally maintains the capabilities to counter TCO attacks
    but lacks the capacity to sustain a long-term campaign to decisively
    defeat criminal groups.
                        u.s. southern command (southcom)
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
    President to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the
    SOUTHCOM AOR?
        Answer. The Chinese and Russian governments use economic pressure
    and disinformation campaigns to influence the governments in Latin
    America and the Caribbean in their favor. Their actions often counter
    U.S. interests and destabilize democratic partner nations. The U.S.
    should work to remain the partner of choice by maintaining strong
    regional presence and investing in programs that will build partner
    capacity to deter Chinese, Russian, and Cuban influence.
        Question. Do you believe these influences threaten hemispheric
    security and prosperity?
        Answer. China and Russia use varying tools to influence the Western
    Hemisphere according to their interests. While in the short-term
    Chinese activities might translate into positive economic outcomes,
    long-term, we have seen that many of these projects undercut local
    competition or impede on partner nation's sovereignty. Russia's actions
    support authoritarian regimes who undermine the security and prosperity
    of the United States and other peace seeking nations.
    Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
    Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
    required by Section 1045 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?
        Answer. Yes.
    Counternarcotics Activities
        Question. DOD serves as lead agency for the detection and
    monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing
    toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD expends nearly $1
    billion to build the counternarcotics capacity of U.S. Federal, State,
    and local law enforcement agencies and certain foreign governments.
        What changes, if any, should be made to DOD's counternarcotics
    strategy and supporting activities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the Combatant Commanders to review our approach to
    counternarcotics.
        Question. In your view, what should be DOD's role in countering the
    flow of narcotics to nations other than the United States?
        Answer. The Joint Force should continue to assess how it can best
    leverage intelligence assets and partnership capacity building to
    support these partners' efforts to disrupt and degrade drug-trafficking
    organizations at the source. If confirmed, I can better assess the
    DOD's role in countering the global flow of narcotics.
        Question. How, if at all, should U.S. security assistance be scoped
    to address factors at the root of counternarcotics trafficking, in your
    opinion?
        Answer. The Joint Force should continue to assess how it can best
    leverage intelligence assets and partnership capacity building to
    support these partners' efforts to disrupt and degrade drug-trafficking
    organizations at the source. If confirmed, I can better assess the
    DOD's role in countering the global flow of narcotics.
    Venezuela
        Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
    Venezuela and to what degree is the illegitimate Maduro regime
    dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?
        Answer. Disputed President Nicolas Maduro continues to hold on to
    power with support from the Venezuelan military and key partners
    Russia, China, and Iran very likely mitigating the impact of
    international sanctions through limited economic and defense support.
        Historically, Russia was Venezuela's largest defense supplier,
    although military supply has declined in recent years. China provides
    economic cooperation, but mirrors Russia with declining defense
    support. Ties with Iran have weakened under President Maduro, but
    current security cooperation includes aircraft maintenance, chemical
    plant construction, and UAV sales. Cuba and Venezuela have shared a
    robust security, political, and economic relationship for nearly two
    decades.
        Question. How would you assess Venezuelan relations with China,
    Cuba, Iran, and Russia vis-`-vis the national interests of the United
    States?
        Answer. The rationale for Venezuelan relations with China, Cuba,
    Iran, and Russia is the desire to prosper under U.S. sanctions through
    mutual trade and support. A current goal of the Maduro regime is to
    gain formal admittance into the international economic bloc, Brazil,
    Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Caracas uses its oil
    reserves as its main barging tool, primarily with Beijing to whom they
    export the majority of their crude oil. The U.S. is Venezuela's
    preferred oil customer, and Caracas' dependance on foreign support
    correlates with U.S. sanctions. Russia and Venezuela are increasing
    economic trade and investment in the face of sanctions by the U.S. and
    other western countries. Venezuela has also signed various agreements
    with Iran in energy, science, oil, defense, culture, economy, and food
    sectors.
               u.s. space force and u.s. space command (spacecom)
        Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
    both economically and militarily. Our great power competitors are
    making concerted efforts to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact
    U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain. The Space
    Force, within the Department of the Air Force, and a unified Space
    Command, deal with the contested domain of space, upon which the
    terrestrial forces of the United States and peer competitors are highly
    reliant for support.
        In your view, does the current National Defense Strategy accurately
    assess the strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space?
    If confirmed, what changes would you make to the National Defense
    Strategy regarding the space domain?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the specifics of the 2025
    Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (INDSG) as it applies to
    Space. Our competitors continue to view space as a key competitive
    environment and future National Defense Strategy documents should
    reflect this strategic reality.
        Question. In your view, what will ``great power competition'' look
    like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia's
    activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S.
    national security interests?
        Answer. Both China and Russia have developed and fielded
    counterspace capabilities designed to hold U.S. Government and
    commercial satellites at risk and undermine U.S. advantages. We must
    accelerate the transition to a more resilient space architecture,
    strengthen our ability to deter, counter, and defeat threats in, from,
    though, and to space, and protect our Joint Force from adversary
    hostile uses of space. If confirmed, I will support the development of
    innovative concepts and cutting-edge space-based capabilities to
    maintain deterrence and preserve U.S. freedom of action in the space
    domain.
        Question. Are there other nation-states or actors operating in
    space that you perceive as a risk to the United States, or as cause for
    concern? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes. This past year, it was revealed that Russia is working
    on a nuclear space-based antisatellite (ASAT) capability, which would
    violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and indiscriminately threaten the
    vast majority of satellites operated by countries and companies around
    the world, leading to worldwide commercial disruptions. China is
    testing counterspace capabilities, including satellites capable of
    rendezvous and proximity operations and use of electronic jamming and
    cyber operations against ground networks; China's aggressive cyber
    targeting of U.S. infrastructure, including satellite networks, may
    deny critical U.S. capabilities in the event of a conflict in the Indo-
    Pacific. In 2024, Iran placed six space payloads into orbit and
    continues to develop its space launch capabilities; knowledge gained
    from orbital launches is applicable to development of an ICBM that
    could directly threaten the U.S. Homeland, if Iran chose to pursue such
    a capability. The commercial sector and other nations are rapidly
    expanding activities in space, leading to the risk of increasing
    orbital congestion.
        Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
    the 2022 National Defense Strategy and U.S. strategic objectives as
    they relate to the domain of space?
        Answer. The United States' space superiority is being challenged
    because our adversaries, notably China and Russia, continue to rapidly
    develop counterspace systems to hold our space-based assets and
    capabilities at risk. China specifically is launching advanced threats
    at breakneck speeds which can target multiple capabilities across all
    orbital regimes. Additionally, Iran and North Korea are strengthening
    their own space programs with the assistance of China and Russia, which
    is increasing the threat environment. The United States needs to
    continue to prioritize the robustness and defense of our Space
    architecture across ground, link, and space segments to promote
    resilience, restore deterrence, and ensure that space-based
    capabilities are ready for the joint warfighter 24/7.
        Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
    our national security space satellites and commercial space systems
    owned by U.S. companies?
        Answer. This past year, it was revealed that Russia is working on a
    nuclear space-based antisatellite (ASAT) capability, which would
    violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and indiscriminately threaten the
    vast majority of satellites operated by countries and companies around
    the world, leading to worldwide commercial disruptions. China is
    testing counterspace capabilities, including satellites capable of
    rendezvous and proximity operations and use of electronic jamming and
    cyber operations against ground networks; China's aggressive cyber
    targeting of U.S. infrastructure, including satellite networks, might
    help it deny the U.S. with critical capabilities in the event of a
    conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In 2024, Iran placed six space payloads
    into orbit and continues to develop its space launch capabilities;
    knowledge gained from orbital launches is applicable to development of
    an ICBM that could directly threaten the U.S. Homeland, if Iran chose
    to pursue such a capability. The commercial sector and other nations
    are rapidly expanding activities in space, leading to the risk of
    increasing orbital congestion.
        Question. Do you support the development of offensive space systems
    to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
        Answer. Yes, I support the development of space systems that can be
    used offensively to protect the United State' and our allies' space
    systems and to restore deterrence. Space capabilities are only
    defensive, or offensive based on how they are employed. Space is
    integral to everyday life and a crucial component underpinning global
    security and the global economy. Competitors continue to grow their
    counterspace capabilities. To protect our national security interests,
    we should continue to scale a breadth of options across all domains to
    deter aggression, and if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.
        Question. Do you support the development of defensive space systems
    to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
        Answer. Space capabilities are only defensive, or offensive based
    on how they are employed. Space is integral to everyday life and a
    crucial component underpinning global security and the global economy.
    Competitors continue to grow their counterspace and space capabilities.
    We need to take actions to protect all our assets, to include those in
    space. There are both active and passive measures we can take to deter
    an attack on our space systems. By placing capabilities in different
    orbits, in different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, or on ally
    or commercial satellites, we can complicate our enemy's decisionmaking.
    Active on-orbit defensive capabilities are something we should consider
    and implement if it needed.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
    technology is appropriately incorporated into SPACECOM mission
    execution at acceptable risk levels?
        Answer. If confirmed, a priority will be understanding the
    USSPACECOM and U.S. Space Force's methods of addressing capability gaps
    and leveraging commercial technologies to fulfil emerging requirements.
    I will seek ways to support the space industrial base and accelerate
    the acquisitions process. I intend to improve USSPACECOM's ability to
    rapidly field emerging technology to assist the joint force in being
    the strongest and most lethal force in the world.
                cybersecurity and u.s. cyber command (cybercom)
        Question. In September 2023, DOD released its 2023 Cyber Strategy.
    The strategy charges DOD to persistently engage malicious cyber actors
    and other malign threats to U.S. interests in cyberspace.
        What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in
    defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
    role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law enforcement
    communities?
        Answer. The Department's role in defending the Nation from an
    attack in cyberspace continues to evolve. DOD partners with the
    Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, State and local law
    enforcement agencies in protecting against and responding to cyber-
    attacks against the Nation and its critical infrastructure. The Cyber
    Mission Force is primarily charged with defending forward, conducting
    defensive cyber operations abroad, while DHS and law enforcement work
    directly with organizations at home.
        The Joint Force is uniquely suited to integrating actions in
    multiple domains in defense of the DOD Information Network (DODIN) to
    compete now and prepare for escalation. Since cyber knows no borders,
    we must partner with our interagency partners and law enforcement to
    address the entire spectrum of cyberspace challenges.
        While agencies like DHS and the FBI focus on civilian
    infrastructure and criminal investigations, the DOD and CMF's priority
    is defending against cyber threats with strategic or military
    implications. This includes global power projection, nuclear command
    and control, and support to DHS's CISA when responding to threats to
    the Defense Industrial Base. Effective national cybersecurity demands
    close collaboration between DOD and other entities. As an example, in
    January 2025, the DOD and DHS signed an Annex to the 2017 DOD-DHS
    Memorandum of Agreement on Cybersecurity and Cyberspace Operations. The
    Annex establishes a framework for the Coast Guard Cyber Command to
    present United States Coast Guard cyber forces to the CMF under
    USCYBERCOM, which will further bolster CMF readiness and capabilities.
    It also provides a process for USCYBERCOM to present forces to the
    Coast Guard.
        Question. How will ``defend forward'' and ``persistent engagement''
    concepts deter and disrupt Russia and China in cyberspace?
        Answer. The DOD uses ``defend forward'' to disrupt malicious cyber
    activity at its source and ``persistent engagement'' to intercept and
    halt cyber threats, degrade the capabilities and networks of
    adversaries, and continuously strengthen the cybersecurity of DOD
    networks and missions. This occurs both geographically (beyond DOD
    networks and into the networks of our Allies and partners) and
    temporally (ahead of potential adversary exploitation) to enable
    resilience in both domestic and foreign partner networks. For example,
    U.S. CYBERCOM hunt forward missions in the SOUTHCOM area of
    responsibility have discovered CCP malware on multiple foreign partner
    networks.
        Question. If confirmed, what role should DOD and the Cyber Mission
    Force have in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
    conducted via social media?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the role the Cyber Mission
    Force plays alongside our interagency partners to combat foreign
    influence on our shores. While our domestic authority is rightly
    limited, our foreign intelligence enterprise helps ascertain sources
    and objectives of foreign influence operations and can contribute to
    designing persistent approaches to counter these operations at their
    source.
        Question. What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force have in
    anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on U.S. commercial
    entities?
        Answer. The DOD will partner with DHS, DOJ, and other entities to
    help defend U.S. key interests--especially where those entities
    underpin military operations. Cooperatively streamlining industry
    information sharing and seamlessly cooperating with interagency
    partners will enable us to predict, present, or, when necessary, speed
    the response of the most appropriate government agency.
        Question. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S.
    Cyber Command should be dual-hatted? What are the ``pros'' and ``cons''
    of this arrangement, in your view? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, I believe that the Commander, USCYBERCOM and Director,
    NSA should be filled by the same person. The 2022 ``Joint Study on the
    Dual-Hat'' recommended the dual-hat arrangement not only be maintained
    but strengthened. I continue to agree with the findings of that study.
    The Dual-Hat arrangement provides the ability to look across both
    organizations and has empowered both USCYBERCOM and NSA to fulfill
    their missions better than each could do alone. It promotes agility and
    enables intelligence to be operationalized rapidly. It also facilitates
    relationships with key foreign allies and partners in part because the
    corresponding foreign organizations with signals intelligence (SIGINT)
    and cyber operations missions are fully integrated, operating under a
    Dual-Hat leadership structure. The span of control, does however, place
    a burden on one leader.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
    improve cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce? How would you
    empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD
    cybersecurity?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to taking action to foster a
    culture of cybersecurity and cyber awareness across the various levels
    of professional military and civilian education. Every member of the
    Joint Force, to include General Officer and Senior Executive Service
    leadership, must understand their role in cybersecurity and protecting
    DOD networks.
        Question. In your opinion, what characteristics of a cyberattack
    would constitute an ``act of war''? Do you consider the recent breaches
    in telecommunications infrastructure involving Salt Typhoon to be an
    ``act of war'' or an espionage operation that falls within de facto
    norms? In your view, does the nature and scope of this intrusion
    operation merit a strong and tangible response? Please explain your
    answer.
        Answer. A holistic and interagency response is vital to any
    provocation, including in the cyber domain. The following should be
    considered when examining the aspects of a cyberattack: Scale and
    Impact; Intention to Cause Physical Harm or Damage; Targeting of
    civilian populations; State Actor Involvement; and Military Objectives.
    If confirmed, I will review the classified details and provide my
    recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What do you conclude from cyber-attacks carried out by
    Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon about the State of our cyber defenses?
        Answer. To the extent that cyber actors affiliated with the CCP can
    compromise U.S. networks, it is certainly a national security concern
    and suggest that the U.S. needs to invest in hardening its critical IT
    infrastructure. This should be a combination of private and public
    investment, and such investment should stand alongside public and
    private partnerships to identify and defend portions of infrastructure
    that the DOD deems critical to our national interest.
        Question. Based on your experience, what do you see as areas where
    the structure and training of the Cyber Mission Force should evolve to
    meet emerging cyber threats?
        Answer. The CMF structure is largely unchanged since its inception
    over a decade ago. The commander of United States Cyber Command needs
    to have the latitude to structure and restructure the force to address
    rapidly evolving challenges, and to develop and promulgate training
    that will maximize the competence and capability of cyber operators
    both inside and outside the CMF. The Department is working rapidly
    toward those ends with the CYBERCOM 2.0 initiative, which emphasizes
    managing cyber talent and use of emerging technology like Artificial
    Intelligence. The CMF will benefit greatly from better access to, and
    assistance from, top technical talent at civilian technology companies,
    while continuing to leverage Reserve component expertise.
        Question. In your view, are there elements missing from our current
    approach for offensive and defensive cyber operations that you would
    recommend we pursue?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review CYBERCOM 2.0 to ensure we are
    on an upward trajectory and will continue pursuing mastery at scale to
    counter maneuvering adversaries and a rapidly changing threat
    landscape.
        Question. How would you characterize our deterrent posture when it
    comes to cyber effects?
        Answer. Through partnerships, information sharing, and persistent
    engagement, we may impose enough costs on our adversaries forcing them
    to relook their strategic calculus in creating cyber effects against
    key U.S. interests. To deter our adversaries from using cyber effects
    against the U.S., a whole of government approach is needed,
    incorporating all elements of national power.
                     u.s. transportation command (transcom)
        Question. In your view, what is the role of TRANSCOM in supporting
    implementation of the 2022 National Defense Strategy?
        Answer. The priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy,
    whether defending the Homeland, deterring attacks on the United States
    and partners, or deterring aggression do not happen without USTRANSCOM
    providing strategic flexibility through globally integrated operations.
    The TRANSCOM infrastructure is an area of American exclusivity. No
    other nation in the world can do the things we do on a daily basis.
        USTRANSCOM ensures rapid response anywhere in the world by
    conducting globally integrated mobility operations, leading the Unified
    Command Plan (UCP)-directed Joint Deployment and Distribution
    Enterprise, and providing the capabilities to project and sustain the
    Joint Force in support of National Objectives. Additionally,
    USTRANSCOM's role as the Single Manager for Global Bulk Fuel Management
    and Delivery drives synchronization across the Joint Petroleum
    Enterprise (JPE) for posture, planning, execution, and capabilities in
    support of combatant command requirements and national security
    objectives.
        With respect to the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic
    Guidance, as the leader of the Joint Deployment and Distribution
    Enterprise, USTRANSCOM projects, maneuvers, and sustains military power
    at a time and place of choice. This gives the President and Secretary
    of Defense options that are lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable,
    agile, and ready to defeat any adversary. This enterprise is critical
    to the re-alignment of Joint Force priorities and essential to
    deterring adversaries across the globe.
        Question. What is your understanding of how TRANSCOM balances both
    organic and privately owned sealift equities to support the National
    Defense Strategy?
        Answer. USTRANSCOM follows direction contained in the National
    Security Directive on Sealift (NSD 28) which states, ``The U.S.-owned
    commercial ocean carrier industry, to the extent it is capable, will be
    relied upon to provide sealift in peace, crisis, and war. This
    capability will be augmented during crisis and war by reserve fleets
    comprised of ships with national defense features that are not
    available in sufficient numbers or types in the active U.S.-owned
    commercial industry.'' For commercial sealift, USTRANSCOM relies on the
    authorities of the Department of Transportation (DoT) to expand civil
    transportation through voluntary programs under the Defense Production
    Act.
        Two Emergency Preparedness Programs, the Voluntary Intermodal
    Sealift Agreement (VISA) and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA)
    provide DOD a coordinated, seamless transition from peacetime to
    wartime by providing assured access to U.S. commercial dry cargo and
    bulk fuel cargo sealift capacity. Within VISA, the Maritime Security
    Program (MSP) and within VTA, the Tanker Security Program (TSP) provide
    fleets of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately
    owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements
    and maintain a United States presence in international commercial
    shipping.
        For organic sealift, USTRANSCOM relies on the Maritime
    Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a subset of the
    National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). The RRF consists of 52 vessels,
    including forty-six (46) Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) vessels which provide
    DOD the ability to surge a sizable land force from the continental
    United States to any point of need. The RRF also contains four (4)
    Auxiliary Crane Ships which provide in-stream and austere delivery
    capabilities and two (2) USMC Aviation Maintenance ships.
                    u.s. special operations command (socom)
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of U.S.
    Special Operations Forces in supporting the implementation of the Joint
    Warfighting Concept, the Joint Concept for Competing, and the National
    Defense Strategy?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces support the national security
    objectives of preserving strategic focus; preventing great power
    conflict; and preparing the environment for the Joint Force to prevail
    in conflict if deterrence fails. Special Operations Forces are the
    premier global counterterrorism forces charged with defending the
    Homeland. Special Operations Forces also play a critical role in global
    crisis response and securing the safety of American citizens abroad
    when in extremis situations occur.
        Question. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, successive NDAAs have
    empowered the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
    Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to serve as a ``service secretary-
    like'' civilian official for special operations forces. Among other
    reforms, the law defines the administrative chain of command for SOCOM
    as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense for
    issues impacting the readiness and organization of special operations
    forces.
        What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
    implementing the ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities of the
    ASD(SOLIC)?
        Answer. The Department has been making excellent progress in
    implementing the service secretary-like responsibilities of ASD(SO/LIC)
    for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special
    operations forces, resources, equipment, and civilian personnel. The
    ASD(SO/LIC) fills a critical role in coordinating with Congress and in
    advocating on behalf of the Special Operations enterprise in areas
    related to budget, training, and modernization.
        Question. If confirmed, would you commit to fully implementing
    these reforms?
        Answer. Yes.
    Irregular Warfare
        Question. Section 1091 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2024 expresses the Sense of the Congress that the
    Secretary of Defense has the authority to conduct irregular warfare
    operations, including clandestine irregular warfare operations, to
    defend the United States, allies of the United States, and interests of
    the United States, when such operations have been appropriately
    authorized.
        What is your understanding of the inherent authority of the
    Secretary of Defense to conduct irregular warfare operations?
        Answer. Irregular warfare is a critical tool for the Department to
    campaign across the spectrum of conflict, enhance interoperability and
    access, and disrupt competitor warfighting advantages while enhancing
    our own. As the Department pivots to face the difficult realities of
    today's strategic environment, it must elevate and expand its use of
    irregular warfare approaches and tools.
        Specifically, with regard to the Secretary of Defense's inherent
    authority to conduct irregular warfare, there are some very important
    tools at the Department's disposal, such as USC 10 127d, 127e and 127f.
    However, given the complexity of the current operating environment, if
    confirmed, I will work to ensure the Departments Irregular Warfare
    authorities and supporting processes allow the scope, speed and agility
    required.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of irregular
    warfare in supporting Department of Defense strategy and operations?
        Answer. Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare where State and non-
    State actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups
    through indirect, non-attributable or asymmetric activities.
        Irregular warfare offers a range of military activities that allow
    the U.S. to compete with adversaries below the threshold of armed
    conflict to maximize American influence abroad, illuminate malign
    activity, deter adversaries from actions most detrimental to our
    national security and disruptive to the international order, and shape
    the environment in ways necessary to prevail in conflict, should
    deterrence fail.
        Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
    resourced to effectively operate in the irregular warfare domain? What
    changes, if any, would you recommend?
        Answer. Absent an institutionalized approach to irregular warfare,
    the DOD will remain underprepared for the enduring requirements of
    irregular war, and not postured to employ irregular warfare
    capabilities proactively to compete, deter, and win across the spectrum
    of competition and conflict. The Joint Force continues to
    institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency. However,
    irregular warfare campaigning against State adversaries requires a
    whole of government approach and the DOD has room to improve
    interagency planning, coordination, and synchronization in the
    irregular warfare space against peer and near peer adversaries. There
    are solid lessons to be learned from how the Department worked with the
    interagency in the counterterrorism space during the Global War on
    Terror.
    Authorities
        Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
    special operations forces to provide support (including training,
    funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and
    individuals supporting or facilitating military operations for the
    purpose of combatting terrorism. Section 127d of title 10, U.S. Code,
    authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide similar support to
    forces or individuals supporting or facilitating irregular warfare
    operations.
        What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
    these authorities in the current strategic environment?
        Answer. Those authorities allow the Department to conduct
    counterterrorism or irregular warfare activities by, with, and through
    foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals since they
    often have access and placement to adversary operating areas that U.S.
    forces lack. DOD expends funds to support partner forces as they in
    turn lend their support to achieving the objectives of the United
    States' military. By expending relatively small amounts of funding,
    combined with advice and assistance from U.S. military forces, the
    Department use these local forces to protect the U.S. Homeland and
    Americans abroad by maintaining continuous pressure on strategic
    competitors and terrorists.
        Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply to the
    evaluation of proposals for the use of each of these authorities, with
    a view to mitigating the risks associated with the conduct of
    counterterrorism and irregular warfare activities below the level of
    traditional armed conflict?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would confirm partners are trustworthy and
    reliable, using SOCOMs proven screening and vetting standards and
    processes. Choosing the right partners is the best way to ensure
    compliance with Law of Armed Conflict principles, proper expenditure of
    funds, and accountability of defense articles.
                       u.s. strategic command (stratcom)
    Nuclear Policy
        Question. United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our
    Nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have
    deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
    years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with
    systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must
    be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
        Do you agree with Secretary Hegseth and past Secretaries of Defense
    that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that
    modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security
    priority?
        Answer. Yes. The U.S. nuclear triad, consisting of land-based
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear-capable bombers,
    and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), remains the backbone of the
    Nation's strategic deterrent. It should remain DOD's top priority
    mission to ensure we retain a modern, capable, and effective nuclear
    deterrent.
        Question. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and
    North Korea have expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force
    capabilities? In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
    threat to the United States and its allies?
        Answer. Over the next decade, China likely will continue to rapidly
    modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PLA seeks a
    larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging
    from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton
    yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation ladder.
    DOD estimates China has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in
    its stockpile as of 2024.
        Russia is nearing the completion of the current round of
    modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, and has successfully
    introduced new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and long-range
    ALCMs. Russia is adding new military capabilities to its large
    stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), including those
    employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Russia holds the
    largest foreign nuclear stockpile in the world and maintains
    approximately 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and
    long-range heavy bombers. Moscow also retains roughly 2,000 NSNW to
    include ASMs, SRBMs, gravity bombs, torpedoes, anti-ship, anti-
    submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles.
        Under Kim Jong-un, the DPRK has improved its ability to hold the
    U.S. and its allies at risk with its missile and nuclear capabilities.
    In 2021, KJU announced a 5-year defense development plan, which
    included improving its ballistic missile capabilities and developing
    new nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has also vowed to ``exponentially
    increase'' Pyongyang's nuclear weapons stockpile. The DPRK has made
    notable progress on missile-related goals, such as testing claimed
    solid-propellant ICBM and hypersonic systems and unveiling a new
    ``tactical'' nuclear warhead. During some of its missile testing, the
    DPRK has also claimed to simulate tactical nuclear exercises.
    Pyongyang's cooperation with Moscow may also provide opportunities for
    the DPRK to advance its missile capabilities, as the DPRK has provided
    ballistic missiles to Russia that have been employed against Ukraine--
    the first time these DPRK systems have been used in combat.
        Question. Do you believe our current deterrence policy and force
    structure effectively accounts for two near peer nuclear competitors?
    If not, do you believe the U.S. will require additional capabilities, a
    numerically larger force than exists today, or a combination of both?
        Answer. I am aware of the findings of the recent bipartisan
    Strategic Posture Commission that our nuclear forces are necessary, but
    not sufficient. The threat continues to grow while our weapons have
    remained largely static for decades. While I have confidence in the
    lethality of the Joint Force, it is incumbent on the Department to
    understand options, which includes potential for new capabilities and/
    or a larger force. If confirmed, I will assess the current deterrence
    policy and force posture and work with the professionals across the
    Department to ensure we can adequately deter two nuclear peers in the
    future.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of nuclear weapons
    and the importance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. national security and
    the defense of allies?
        Answer. Our nuclear forces undergird all our defense priorities,
    and it remains indispensable to our national security. In a dynamic
    security environment, a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
    underpins our broader U.S. defense strategy and the extended deterrence
    commitments we have made to allies and partners.
        Question. What are your views on deterrence now that the United
    States is facing the prospect of simultaneously deterring two nuclear-
    armed peer competitors in Russia and China?
        Answer. We are facing increasing nuclear competition with Russia
    and the pace and scope of China's nuclear expansion will present new
    strategic dilemmas requiring increased focus on the DOD's ability to
    modernize our strategic deterrence capability. This starts with
    maintaining credible and effective U.S. nuclear forces as the bedrock
    of our deterrence against potential aggression from both Russia and
    China. Not only must the United States aggressively modernize its
    nuclear capability, but we must pursue initiatives like the President's
    Golden Dome Executive Order to render any act of aggression against the
    Unites States Homeland ineffective.
        Question. What is your understanding of how Russia and China have
    expanded and modernized their nuclear force capabilities?
        Answer. Over the next decade, China is likely to continue to
    rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PLA
    seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems
    ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-
    megaton yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation
    ladder. DOD estimates China has surpassed 600 operational nuclear
    warheads in its stockpile as of 2024.
        Russia is nearing the completion of the current round of
    modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, and has successfully
    introduced new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and long-range
    ALCMs. Russia is adding new military capabilities to its large
    stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), including those
    employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. Russia holds the
    largest foreign nuclear stockpile in the world and maintains
    approximately 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and
    long-range heavy bombers. Moscow also retains roughly 2,000 NSNW to
    include ASMs, SRBMs, gravity bombs, torpedoes, anti-ship, anti-
    submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles.
        Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
    threat to the United States and its allies?
        Answer. China probably is developing advanced nuclear delivery
    systems, in part due to long-term concerns about U.S. missile defense
    capabilities. The PLA's expanding nuclear force will enable it to
    target more U.S. cities, military facilities, and leadership sites than
    ever before in a potential a nuclear conflict. Additionally, the
    PLAAF's H-6N bomber, when armed with a nuclear-capable ALBM, likely can
    conduct nuclear precision strikes against targets in the Indo-Pacific
    theater.
        Moscow will continue to emphasize nuclear weapons in its national
    strategy, while building new delivery systems and modernizing its
    nuclear stockpile, primarily by replacing Soviet-legacy non-strategic
    nuclear weapons with new weapons and new capabilities. The escalation
    of conflict with Ukraine and Russia's suspension of the New START
    Treaty represents two key areas of continuing risk.
        Question. Do you believe Russia has or is willing to employ nuclear
    coercion as a means of advancing its military and foreign policy goals?
        Answer. I have no reason to doubt Moscow has employed nuclear
    coercion including nuclear exercises, senior leader statements on
    Russia's nuclear capabilities and use calculus, and participation in
    strategic arms control agreements to respond to perceived Western
    aggression and deter future Western activity Moscow assesses is counter
    to Russian interests. For example, since 2022, Russia has updated its
    public nuclear doctrine to expand nuclear use cases, deployed some non-
    strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) to Belarus, de-ratified the
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and conducted its first-ever NSNW
    exercise with Belarusian forces. During the same time, Moscow
    repeatedly warned the West about crossing Russian ``red lines'', for
    example by providing advanced weapons to Ukraine, and emphasized Russia
    retained the right and capability to use nuclear forces to defend
    against a Western attack.
        Question. Do you agree with DOD's assessment that China intends to
    double or triple the size of its nuclear arsenal over the next decade?
        Answer. DoD estimates China has surpassed 600 operational nuclear
    warheads in its stockpile as of 2024 and will have over 1,000
    operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at
    higher readiness levels. I expect China to continue growing its force
    through 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is
    ``basically complete'' that year, an important milestone on the road to
    Xi's goal of a ``world class'' military by 2049.
        Question. Do you believe that as China completes its build out of a
    triad of delivery platforms it will adhere to the full meaning of ``no
    first use''?
        Answer. The PRC has long maintained a ``no first use'' policy.
    However, that it has we have repeatedly called on China to explain how
    its NFU nuclear doctrine is consistent with its non-transparent but
    well-documented, rapid nuclear arsenal buildup. China has refused to
    seriously engage on these questions bilaterally, through the P5, or in
    multilateral disarmament fora. Absent answers to these concrete
    questions, we must conclude that China's rhetorical, unverifiable NFU
    policy is not credible.
        Question. Do you believe U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
    assurances are effective in reassuring allies that they do not need to
    pursue their own nuclear arsenals to ensure their national security?
        Answer. I recognize our allies' concerns about adversary nuclear
    threats and attempts to weaken our alliances for their own strategic
    advantages. I believe we should make every effort to reinforce our
    extended deterrence commitments, and that these commitments enhance the
    safety and security of the American people. Furthermore, our extended
    deterrence contributes to nuclear nonproliferation.
        Question. Do you believe that the risk of nuclear proliferation
    will increase if U.S. allies lose confidence in our extended nuclear
    deterrence assurances?
        Answer. It is imperative that we maintain allied confidence in our
    nuclear umbrella both to assure our allies and to dissuade adversaries
    from attempting to coerce our partners around the globe.
        Question. What is your understanding of the State of U.S. nuclear
    forces, its global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
    architecture, and the supporting weapons sustainment and production
    capabilities within the National Nuclear Security Administration?
        Answer. Although our nuclear forces and existing NC3 architecture
    are safe, secure, and effective today, we have greatly exceeded their
    intended design life, and they are showing their age. Deferred
    modernization has removed margin and there is no longer room for delay.
    This is further challenged by atrophy in both the DOD industrial base
    for nuclear delivery platforms and National Nuclear Security
    Administration production capabilities and infrastructure.
        Question. Do you agree that modernizing each leg of the nuclear
    triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a
    critical national security priority?
        Answer. Yes. The three legs of the triad each serve an important
    and distinct purpose and offer unique but mutually reinforcing
    attributes. All three legs are needed to preserve deterrence in the
    face of growing adversarial threats.
        Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
    sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad,
    including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?
        Answer. The current United States nuclear force was designed in a
    different security environment. I understand the Strategic Posture
    Commission concluded that the current program of record is necessary
    but not sufficient. If confirmed, I intend to consult with key
    Department stakeholders to assess the risks, implications, and benefits
    of pursuing additional capabilities to address any modernization
    insufficiency and ensure our nuclear deterrence remains credible and
    effective.
        Question. Senior Service leaders and several Combatant Commanders
    have stated that they support the continued development of a nuclear-
    armed sea-launched cruise missile as a means of addressing Russia's
    advantages in theater-range nuclear weapons, managing escalation in a
    potential conflict with China, and enhancing assurance to U.S. allies.
    Do you agree with these views?
        Answer. Yes. A nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)
    is one capability that will help address regional deterrence challenges
    in the face of China and Russia's rapid theater nuclear force
    modernization, while assuring allies and partners. Additionally, I
    believe it is important to work within the Joint Staff and Interagency
    to assess other supplemental theater nuclear options as suggested by
    the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission.
        Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to
    mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will ``age
    out'' simultaneously at the end of the 2020's?
        Answer. The Department must implement a risk-management strategy to
    identify, prioritize, and recommend actions across the portfolio of
    nuclear programs. This is essential for maintaining the overall health
    of the nuclear deterrent as the DOD sustains current capabilities and
    transition to modernized systems.
        Question. Successive Nuclear Posture Reviews have concluded that
    the adoption of a nuclear ``No First Use'' (NFU) or Sole policy by the
    United States is not advisable.
        Do you believe a NFU policy would be appropriate for the United
    States, and what do you believe would be the implications of such a
    policy on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to
    our allies?
        Answer. I do not support a nuclear ``No First Use'' or ``Sole
    Purpose'' policy for the United States. I believe such a policy would
    result in an unacceptable level of risk.
        Question. The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the Nation's
    nuclear weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear
    weapons, which are established through the interagency NWC. NNSA's
    principal challenge over the next 20 years is to rebuild the cold war-
    era U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure into a responsive and resilient
    enterprise.
        Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's capabilities to
    design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons
    stockpile?
        Answer. Yes. Recapitalization is necessary to ensure delivery of
    the program of record and sustain an effective force into the future.
        Question. Do you support continued collaboration with the United
    Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
        Answer. Yes. Our collaboration with the UK is mutually beneficial
    and serves U.S. nuclear interests.
        Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the
    nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are
    needed?
        Answer. Yes, the rigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program has
    developed the computational and experimental tools needed to certify
    the current stockpile without the need for full-scale nuclear weapons
    testing. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for
    the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.
        Question. Do you perceive utility in the work of the Council on
    Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control, and
    Communications System? Please explain your answer.
        Answer. Yes, there is utility in the work of the Council and its
    various governance forums. The establishment of the Council ensures
    oversight of a diverse and complicated system of systems. The utility
    lies in unifying efforts across the Department for sustaining and
    modernizing NC3, senior leader communications, nuclear command and
    control, and continuity of government communications.
    Arms Control
        Question. What are your views of the New START Treaty, taking into
    account Russia's recent actions to suspend participation in the Treaty?
        Answer. I understand that Russia remains in violation of its
    obligations under the New START Treaty as a result of its suspension.
    As a result, both sides have ceased implementation of the New START
    Treaty's verification mechanisms, and the United States is unable to
    confirm that Russia is abiding by all the Treaty's limits.
        Question. What do you see as the major challenges for negotiating
    future treaties with Russia and China, and would you support U.S.
    participation in such a negotiation?
        Answer. I support diplomacy that contributes to national security,
    particularly any efforts toward an agreement capturing the full scope
    of Russia and China's nuclear capabilities. Most importantly, our
    national security depends on verifiable agreements.
        Question. What are your views on the asymmetry in the number of
    non-strategic weapons between Russia and the United States and should
    they be accounted for in any follow-on treaty?
        Answer. I am concerned by Russia's approximately 2,000 non-
    strategic nuclear weapons that are not numerically constrained by any
    arms control treaty. Future arms control engagements with Moscow, if
    they are initiated, should take these forces into careful and serious
    account.
        Question. What are your views of missile defense and nuclear arms
    control with either Russia or China?
        Answer. The increasing capabilities of peer and near-peer nuclear
    states demonstrates the importance of the President's Golden Dome
    initiative. As important and if not more so, the United States will
    continue to rely on strategic deterrence--underwritten by a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear arsenal--to address and deter large
    intercontinental range, nuclear capable missile threats to the Homeland
    from Russia and China.
        Question. In your assessment, how would delaying or canceling
    current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms
    control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?
        Answer. Delaying or canceling current nuclear modernization plans
    and programs on a unilateral basis would reduce our strategic
    deterrence and arms control leverage with Russia and China.
        Question. What do you see as the major challenges for any nuclear
    risk reduction or arms control negotiations with China?
        Answer. China continues to deny its nuclear buildup and reject
    calls for even modest nuclear risk reduction measures. China needs to
    be more transparent about its nuclear forces. Any agreement with China
    must first enhance U.S. national security and second be verifiable.
    Missile Defense
        Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
    ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
    but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
    hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. Homeland
    continues to grow. However, in an executive order, the President has
    directed the development of a comprehensive national missile defense
    architecture to counter all types of missile threats.
        What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and
    nuclear deterrence?
        Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons undergird all defense priorities:
    deterring nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attack, assuring our allies
    and partners, and enabling achievement of Presidential objectives if
    deterrence fails. We rely on a whole-of-government effort to defeat
    missile technology of all adversaries while raising the threshold of
    escalation by maintaining a credible kinetic defense. A comprehensive
    missile defeat and the U.S. nuclear arsenal are complementary and
    mutually reinforcing, they are essential for deterring an attack
    against the U.S. or our Allies and partners.
        Question. If confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    what would be your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for
    the Homeland?
        Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be aligned with those set
    by the President's Golden Dome Executive Order. My priority is to
    ensure the deployment of a next-generation missile shield to provide
    for the common defense of our citizens and the Nation. Protecting the
    Homeland from an adversary ICBM attack, the Ground-Based Midcourse-
    Defense system contributes directly to the U.S. deterrent strategies
    for rouge State ICBM threats to the Homeland and would defend against
    an ICBM attack. My second priority is to deter--and defend our citizens
    and critical infrastructure against--any foreign aerial attack on the
    Homeland leveraging modern and future missile defense technology
    combined with a robust proliferated space-based architecture that
    provides early warning and missile tracking.
        Question. Do you believe the U.S. ground-based interceptor fleet is
    appropriately sized to address potential ICBM threats from North Korea
    or other rogue nations?
        Answer. I understand the current fleet of Ground-based Interceptors
    (GBIs) is adequate against the existing North Korean threat, and our
    planned upgrade to the Next Generation Interceptor and modest increase
    to the number of interceptors in the fleet is currently sufficient to
    defeat a limited attack. If confirmed, I will support continuing annual
    reviews to assess any required changes to U.S. Homeland missile defense
    systems.
        Question. In your view, do you believe missile defense policy
    should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea
    and Iran?
        Answer. I support the Administration's Golden Dome Executive Order
    which states that the United States will develop missile defenses
    against aerial attacks against the Homeland by peer, near-peer, and
    rogue adversaries.
        Question. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and
    missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating
    smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger
    threats, such as Russia and China?
        Answer. Integrated air and missile defense of the Homeland is vital
    to our resiliency at home and to our ability to project power abroad.
    The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and NORTHCOM have
    been working on a comprehensive plan to strengthen our Homeland defense
    against air and missile threats in the continental United States,
    Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam. If confirmed, I will support development of
    active and passive defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats
    and pursue a persistent and resilient sensor network to track all
    hypersonic threats, improve attribution, and enable engagement.
        Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor?
        Answer. I support improving the capability and reliability of the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which currently includes
    development of the Next Generation Interceptor to augment and
    potentially replace the existing Ground-Based Interceptors.
        Question. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor eventually
    replacing the existing 44 ground based interceptors?
        Answer. I support improving the capability and reliability of the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which currently includes
    development of the Next Generation Interceptor to augment and
    potentially replace the existing Ground-Based Interceptors.
        Question. What are your views on the advisability of building a
    second Homeland missile defense site on the eastern coast of the United
    States?
        Answer. If confirmed, I commit to evaluating this requirement and
    providing my recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
        Question. What is your understanding of U.S. capabilities for
    defending against maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicles?
        Answer. Maneuvering missiles, such as hypersonic glide vehicles
    (HGV), present a challenge to existing defensive systems because they
    can travel on unpredictable flight paths at low altitudes making them
    difficult to track using standard terrestrial radar systems. If
    confirmed, I will continue to seek out kinetic and non-kinetic
    solutions to defeat hypersonic threats that create cost imposition for
    adversaries.
        Question. The Missile Defense Agency has previously indicated that
    the Glide Phase Interceptor program for hypersonic defense would not
    reach initial operational capability until after 2035. Do you believe
    this timeline is sufficient to meet current and anticipated hypersonic
    threats?
        Answer. No. If confirmed, I will evaluate this timeline and provide
    my recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
        Question. Do you support a space-based sensor layer for improved
    tracking and targeting of advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles?
        Answer. Yes. Space-based sensor layer investments continue to
    improve our ability to monitor launch sites and detect launches from
    locations almost anywhere on the globe. Coupled with new technologies
    for data processing at the edge of the network, AI/ML, and mesh
    communications capabilities, space-based sensors provide unique insight
    required to identify and respond within the short timelines necessary
    to defeat advanced threats such as hypersonic missiles.
        Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase
    intercept and space-based intercept or directed energy programs?
        Answer. I assess that the efficacy of boost-phase intercept, space-
    based intercept and directed energy programs is still an open question.
    While these concepts have great potential, if confirmed, I will explore
    how best resolve the challenges associated with developing and fielding
    these capabilities and provide my recommendations to the SecDef and
    POTUS.
        Question. In your opinion, has DOD developed and implemented
    operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance
    and utilization of such programs? What would you do to address this
    issue, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will remain involved in operational
    discussions with senior Department leadership to ensure a thorough
    examination of these operational concepts, plans and policies, and
    their governance processes.
        Question. The United States is currently developing a missile
    defense architecture to better support the protection of U.S. citizens
    and forces on Guam, however this effort has been plagued by uneven
    funding and an unclear management structure for aligning the various
    lines of effort. What is your understanding of the status of this
    effort, and its operational importance to the U.S. in the Western
    Pacific?
        Answer. Guam is both an unequivocal part of the U.S. Homeland as
    well as a vital regional operational hub. The protection of this U.S.
    territory is critical to the U.S. National Defense Strategy. I am aware
    that the Department is focused on increasing its missile defense
    capabilities on the island as part of efforts to strengthen deterrence
    in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for
    unity of effort and progress on the Guam Defense System.
    Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations
        Question. Has DOD adequately integrated electronic warfare into its
    joint concepts and operational plans?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's integration of
    electronic warfare into joint concepts and operational plans.
        Question. What major issues attend the United States' conduct of
    joint electronic warfare operations, especially at the relevant
    combatant commands?
        Answer. The United States is facing a variety of challenges when
    considering joint EW operations, which begin with access to the
    spectrum itself. Additionally, the Department must balance investment
    in exquisite capabilities with investment in systems that are
    inexpensive and can be produced at scale. Other factors include
    leveraging artificial intelligence, deepening the Joint Force's
    knowledge through training and education on Electromagnetic Spectrum
    Operations, and working across the whole-of-government to evolve laws
    and regulations on the use of the EMSO internally and externally to the
    United States. DOD spectrum access is critical for EMSO to protect the
    Homeland and the military's ability to conduct its missions. Combatant
    commands need spectrum to increase lethality, restore deterrence, win
    wars, and achieve Presidential priorities, such as Golden Dome for
    America and Border Security.
        Question. Do you support a Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
    Operations Center at U.S. Strategic Command?
        Answer. Capability to maintain advantage in the electromagnetic
    spectrum across the entire Joint Force will be necessary to win future
    wars. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center (JEMSOC) at
    USSTRATCOM has filled a key gap in Joint Force capabilities by
    preparing the U.S. military for the complexities of the electromagnetic
    spectrum. The JEMSOC facilitates realistic joint training, equipping
    warfighters with the skills and knowledge to dominate this increasingly
    contested domain by centralizing expertise and resources. This
    centralized approach ensures consistent implementation of national EMS
    strategy and fosters a force ready to achieve electromagnetic
    superiority.
        Question. Does the DOD adequately conduct joint Tier One exercises
    utilizing adversary level electronic warfare?
        Answer. The Joint Force faces significant challenges in conducting
    effective Tier One exercises that accurately portray adversary
    electronic warfare capabilities. Current model and simulation
    capabilities used in these exercises are inadequate, relying on human
    modelers to subjectively assess and apply the effects of friendly and
    enemy electronic warfare on units in the simulation. The Joint Force's
    ability to operate effectively in the electromagnetic spectrum is
    crucial to deterring and winning future engagements, and it is
    essential that Tier One joint exercises prioritize this task. A recent
    study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense found the Department of
    Defense lacks access to adequate live, virtual, constructive or
    synthetic advanced threat systems and environments that can be easily
    integrated into existing training programs. This shortfall poses a
    significant risk to Joint Force readiness and its ability to operate in
    future engagements, highlighting the need for improved modeling and
    simulation capabilities and increased attention to training on
    electronic warfare.
        Question. What is your opinion of training ranges for electronic
    warfare?
        Answer. The current State of training ranges for electromagnetic
    warfare is inadequate. Despite some investments, these ranges have not
    kept pace with current technology or the threat environments in which
    we expect to fight. These ranges often fail to provide the necessary
    fidelity, capacity, and complexity required to prepare forces for
    modern electromagnetic warfare threats.
        Question. Do you believe our systems are adequately protected from
    adversary electronic attack?
        Answer. No. Against the most advanced adversaries, the Joint Force
    would likely face challenges protecting itself from electromagnetic
    attack. Two factors contribute to these challenges: 1) Over the past
    few decades, the Joint Force has lost some muscle memory defending
    against electromagnetic attack by conducting operations within a
    permissive electromagnetic spectrum. 2) Over the same period,
    operations within this spectrum have changed significantly while the
    most advanced adversaries have done their best to rapidly evolve. If
    confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that DOD continues to invest in
    training and additional capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum.
        Question. Does DOD have adequate simulation capability to
    experiment with and test joint electronic warfare concepts, in your
    view?
        Answer. No. The DOD's simulation capabilities for electromagnetic
    warfare are insufficient. Although facilities like the Air Force
    Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) and the Joint
    Simulation Environment (JSE) exist, they are not fully integrated with
    other systems and lack sufficient capacity to fully develop new joint
    electromagnetic warfare concepts. These gaps hamper the Joint Force's
    ability to experiment with and refine concepts in this area, leaving us
    vulnerable to emerging threats.
        Question. Spectrum is a vital asset in the conduct of electronic
    warfare--what is your opinion on the DOD use of the S band for spectrum
    operations and potential impacts on its loss--please be specific in
    citing examples.
        Answer. The S band (2-4 GHz) is a critical frequency range for
    various DOD systems, including radar, electromagnetic warfare (EW)
    systems. The DOD's use of the S band for spectrum operations is
    essential for maintaining operational advantage, and its loss or
    disruption could have significant impacts on military effectiveness
    affecting the defense of the Homeland from strategic and missile
    attack.
        For example, the loss of S band spectrum could impact the
    performance of the Navy's Aegis Combat System, which relies on S band
    radar to detect and engage airborne targets. Similarly, the loss of S
    band spectrum could disrupt the operation of the Army's Patriot air
    defense system, which uses S band radar to detect and track incoming
    missiles. Furthermore, the loss of S band spectrum could also impact
    the DOD's ability to conduct electronic warfare operations, as many EW
    systems, such as the Navy's SLQ-32 and the Air Force's ALQ-211, rely on
    S band spectrum to detect and disrupt enemy radar and communication
    systems.
                    security cooperation and arms transfers
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you recommend, if any, to
    ensure that the Department of Defense is taking a strategic approach to
    its security cooperation with allies and partners?
        Answer. Capable partners offer one of the strongest strategic
    offsets the U.S. can employ. Security cooperation--whether arms sales,
    training, or other forms of capacity building--enhance the partner's
    ability to handle security challenges before they reach the threshold
    of threating U.S. vital interests. But a partner's ability is only part
    of the calculus; their willingness to handle those challenges is
    equally, if not more, important. Because of this, security cooperation
    initiatives must focus on partners with shared interests that can
    feasibly translate U.S. security cooperation activities into legitimate
    capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that security cooperation
    activities remain tightly tethered to U.S. national interests and focus
    on partners who meet those criteria. If confirmed and I re-enter active
    service, I intend to look at increased use of the National Guard State
    Partnership Program (SPP).
        Question. What is your understanding of DOD's role in the foreign
    military sales and arms transfer process? In your view, what are the
    greatest challenges for DOD in fulfilling this role in a timely and
    effective manner?
        Answer. For Foreign Military Sales, the role of the Department of
    Defense (DoD) is to effectively execute programs in coordination with
    other government agencies while promoting stronger international
    defense relationships and greater military interoperability. The most
    significant challenges are timely deliveries to allies and partners.
    Both capacity limitations in the Defense Industrial Base as well as the
    bureaucratic processes and policies that govern FMS contribute to that
    timeliness. I understand, in 2024, the DOD implemented a Continuous
    Process Improvement Board for the FMS process. If confirmed as
    Chairman, I will work aggressively with the Department to improve
    processes and reduce administrative burdens to improve the timeliness
    of FMS implementation, along with relentless advocacy to strengthen the
    Defense Industrial Base to more rapidly respond to customer needs--both
    domestically and the Nation's partners.
        Question. Is DOD appropriately organized, trained, and resourced to
    execute security cooperation and foreign military sales effectively? If
    not, and if confirmed, what changes to defense security assistance
    organizations, training, and processes would you recommend?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense to review security cooperation organizations, training, and
    processes and make my recommendations.
                              contested logistics
        Question. Who do you believe acts as the lead for contested
    logistics in how both efficiencies are created and executed to support
    the National Defense Strategy?
        Answer. Currently, the Joint Staff works with the Combatant
    Commanders to define requirements and identify the risks associated
    with a contested logistics environment. Additionally, the Joint Staff
    works with the Services through the Joint Logistics Board to align
    their investments in infrastructure, force design, and posture to
    prepare the Joint Logistics Enterprise to deploy and sustain joint
    warfighters in a contested environment.
        Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense needs to
    identify a single service or entity to act as the global contested
    logistics manager?
        Answer. The Joint Staff works with the Services to align their
    investments in infrastructure, force design, and posture, and supports
    the Combatant Commanders as they engage with allies and partners. If
    confirmed, I will continue to assess any changes in how global
    logistics is managed. If changes are required, I will advise the
    President, SecDef, and Congress on any authorities that may require
    change.
        Question. What is your current assessment for how the Department of
    Defense views contested logistics when it comes to both war games and
    operational planning?
        Answer. The Joint Warfighting Concept and supporting concepts have
    focused the Department's attention on the contested logistics problem
    set. Logistics was once considered an enabling function. However, it
    has always been one of the six warfighting functions . . . and now it
    is clearly a pacing function. All analytic and experimentation efforts
    must be logistics-informed, since the ability to sustain the force
    underwrites everything else.
                   cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
        Question. The CTR Program, which has focused historically on
    accounting for, securing, and eliminating cold war era weapons of mass
    destruction and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has
    expanded its focus to other countries. In addition, the CTR Program is
    widening its focus to biological weapons and capabilities, including
    biological surveillance and early warning, and encouraging the
    development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats as well as
    working with host nations to secure stockpiles of dangerous pathogens
    at their high containment laboratories.
        What are your views on the efficacy of the CTR Program?
        Answer. Over the years, the CTR Program has detected, secured, and
    eliminated Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) at their source, before
    they can threaten the Homeland or the Joint Force. In line with the
    Secretary's priorities, the CTR Program protects Joint Force readiness
    and lethality by providing indicators and warnings of chemical,
    biological, and nuclear threats. It remains a vital tool in layered
    defense against WMD threats.
        Notwithstanding the use and proliferation of chemical weapons
    documented recently in Libya and Syria, about 60 percent of CTR
    resources are allocated to biological programs.
        Question. Do you believe this shift in focus to biological programs
    accurately reflects the current threat?
        Answer. Yes. The Department's Biodefense Posture Review documented
    that biological threats to the Joint Force have increased. The use of
    biological weapons by State or nonState actors presents a significant
    challenge to national security. Emerging technologies could further
    enable potential adversaries to use biological weapons in new and novel
    ways. Eliminating biological threats is a key mission for the CTR
    program.
        Biological threats could affect the readiness and lethality of the
    Joint Force and the security of the Homeland. Increasingly, adversaries
    seek to develop and use biological weapons that would evade existing
    capabilities for detection, attribution, or treatment. Eliminating
    these threats will continue to be an important mission for the CTR
    Program, but I support reviewing current prioritization to ensure the
    program addresses the most urgent WMD threats.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you recommend to
    ensure the CTR program is capable of meeting its mission to roll back
    the threat of weapons of mass destruction?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate for a thorough review and
    cost-benefit analysis of the CTR Program to ensure activities fully
    support its congressionally authorized countering WMD mission and
    contribute to a lethal and effective fighting force.
                                dod auditability
        Question. The Department of Defense has invested significant effort
    and dollars in preparing its financial information for annual audit
    reviews. However, the 2024 DOD-wide financial audit again resulted in a
    disclaimer of opinion.
        If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or direct to
    improve DOD auditability?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will demonstrate a consistent and informed
    commitment to achieving an unmodified audit opinion by setting the
    ``tone from the top'' by highlighting the importance of financial
    accountability and transparency within the Department. Setting
    expectations, holding senior leadership accountable, visibly messaging
    the importance of financial management and audit process adherence
    sends a clear message throughout the Department. I can emphasize
    financial integrity and accountability to encourage a culture where
    those values are prioritized across the Joint Force.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to instill
    responsibility for audit progress among command leadership, and not
    just default to a financial management community?
        Answer. Maintaining transparency, accountability, and operational
    efficiency is key to improving auditability. These are cornerstones to
    successful military operations, and auditability of the Department's
    accounts is a military mission. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Department to ensure that auditability is integrated in the overall
    command structure of the constituent services, establishing clear roles
    and responsibilities related to financial management, ensuring the
    emphasis on auditability is pervasive from the most senior roles and
    commands to the most junior.
                      science, technology, and innovation
        Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
    or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
    military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
    identified 14 critical technology areas in which investment to develop
    next generation operational capabilities is imperative. These areas
    include: hypersonics; future generation wireless technology; advanced
    materials; integrated network systems-of-systems; directed energy;
    integrated sensing and cyber; space technology; quantum science;
    trusted artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy; microelectronics;
    renewable energy generation and storage; advanced computing and
    software; human-machine interfaces; and biotechnology. Much of the
    innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national
    defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense
    industry.
        What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
    technical, organizational, or cultural) to DOD's development of these
    key technologies, or gaining access to such technologies from the
    commercial marketplace?
        Answer. DOD must aggressively take steps to illustrate how these
    innovative technologies are conceptually employed. Through this
    analysis process, the Joint Staff and military departments can define
    future requirements. This will provide industry clear DOD demand
    signals.
        The United States commercial marketplace is teaming with innovative
    solutions for defending the United States. The most significant
    challenge is getting these innovative solutions into the Force. The
    Department must work to exploit these solutions via rapid prototyping
    programs, defense innovation organizations, and congressionally granted
    authorities.
        The Department must grow the capacity of the Defense Industrial
    Base (DIB) and expand the defense ecosystem through investments that
    promote resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, closer
    collaboration with commercial industry, flexible acquisition, and
    mutual support with Allies and partners. The Joint Force should re-
    evaluate its interactions with industry and fight for access to the
    commercial space, leveraging organizations like the Defense Innovation
    Unit. The Department can collaborate with the DIB to adopt a whole of
    nation approach to delivering capability and maximize economy of scale.
    The DIB will grow and evolve if it receives the proper demand signals
    from the Joint Force. The Department can do a better job at that.
        The 14 critical technology areas cover a wide range of disciplines
    with inherent developmental challenges. A significant common challenge
    that affects all critical technology areas are the force development
    implications for the warfighters that will employ them. We must ensure
    that the organizations and people of the DOD are trained and ready to
    use capabilities in these 14 critical technology areas to their maximum
    potential and deliver peace through strength.
        Question. How well do you think DOD investments in these
    technologies are appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized
    across all Military Departments and Agencies?
        Answer. There continues to be room for improvement in this area. If
    confirmed, I'll work with Secretary Hegseth and his team as the
    Department continues to evaluate these technologies and other aspects
    of the defense budget in order to provide the Joint Force with the
    tools they need to defend the Nation.
        Question. In addition to the technologies identified in the 2022
    National Defense Strategy, are there other technology areas in which
    you believe DOD must invest to ensure that the United States maintains
    its technological superiority in the long-term?
        Answer. The 2022 National Defense Strategy provides a suitable list
    of critical technology areas, but I believe the DOD must also invest in
    advanced manufacturing technology. Investments in advanced
    manufacturing will have impacts across the listed 14 critical
    technology areas and enable the United States to produce complex
    components and systems more quickly and cost effectively. If confirmed,
    I'll work with Secretary Hegseth to refine the development and
    acquisition of these technologies in order to enable rapid employment
    to meet the needs of the Joint Warfighter to fulfill the
    Administration's strategy.
        Question. What efforts is DOD making to identify new technologies
    developed commercially by the private sector and apply them to national
    security and warfighter purposes?
        Answer. The Joint Staff has been heavily engaged in DOD Innovation
    programs such as Replicator, the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve
    (RDER), Warfighting Lab Incentive Fund (WLIF), etc . . . that focus on
    identifying commercial technologies and expediting them into the hands
    of the Warfighter.
        Recently, the Joint Staff has revamped capability portfolio
    management, creating a new approach to drive strategic alignment across
    requirements, acquisition, and R&D. The Joint Staff has partnered with
    the offices of the undersecretaries for Acquisitions and Sustainment,
    and Research and Engineering to create a holistic portfolio view of
    capability development. This effort allows warfighters producing
    capability requirements to be fully informed of new technologies and
    commercially developed products that may fill requirements and
    capability gaps identified by the Joint Force.
        Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
    enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
    to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that technologies
    quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
    evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment
    of capability to the warfighter.
        What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning
    technologies from research programs into programs of record or deployed
    capabilities?
        Answer. Effectively transitioning technologies from research
    programs into programs of record or deployed capabilities is
    challenging because of the time it takes to mature a technology into a
    viable prototype for experimentation and concepts of operation
    development. Over time, changing priorities within the DOD can shift
    focus away from early investments, losing sight of work done to date.
        Funding to support the implementation of promising capabilities is
    not protected in budgets. Budgetary constraints and the impacts of
    Continuing Resolutions (CR) add challenges for transitioning programs.
    Some technologies may not mature in time to be integrated into
    programs, while others may mature more rapidly than the existing budget
    cycle can accommodate. DOD also must quickly become a better buyer. The
    DOD is frankly a poor buyer and must devote energy to this effort.
        Question. How can the operational experience of the warfighter
    better be integrated into the research and development process? Are
    there appropriate places to interject warfighters in the interaction
    between the DOD research and engineering community and the private
    sector?
        Answer. Frequent vector checks with potential end-users are
    essential to ensuring that technology innovation meets warfighter
    needs. Additionally, creating opportunities for the research and
    development community to present potential solutions and exchange ideas
    with warfighters about innovative employment options enriches both
    communities. Using the Joint Warfighting Concept to inform the
    selection and prioritization of R&D projects facilitates stronger
    alignment with warfighting needs from the onset. Engagements to
    introduce concept frameworks to the broader research and engineering
    community, to include industry, academia, labs, defense innovation
    entities, allies, and partners, has the potential to influence their
    respective internal investment strategies to help accelerate
    development of needed capabilities. Frequent vector checks with
    potential end-users to reinforce alignment to warfighting needs is
    essential if it is not distracting or oversaturating the units at the
    tactical edge. Additionally, creating opportunities for the R&D
    community to present potential solutions and exchange ideas with
    warfighters about innovative employment options enriches both
    communities.
        Question. If confirmed as Chairman, what specific steps would you
    take to ensure that the warfighter is benefiting more quickly and
    directly from research being performed across the defense research
    enterprise?
        Answer. A lot of work has been done but the DOD must stop confusing
    work with results. The U.S. faces a rapidly evolving security
    environment; therefore, it is imperative that the DOD speed the
    transition of advanced technologies to benefit the warfighters more
    swiftly and effectively. If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to
    ensure that defense research translates into operational capabilities
    for the forces to meet warfighter needs.
        I will enhance focus on programs that involve warfighters in the
    research process to ensure their operational experience informs
    decisionmaking and technology development. This approach helps keep
    solutions grounded in the real-world challenges faced by troops and
    fosters a culture of collaboration among warfighters and technologists.
        I will ensure full support for efforts to close capability gaps in
    joint warfighting concepts and share data across the DOD, such as the
    recent Joint Experimentation Forum (JEF). Events like these gather
    personnel from combatant commands, military services, federally funded
    research centers, industry partners, and university-affiliated research
    centers for collaborative discussions to share valuable insights that
    will inform experimentation guidance across the defense enterprise.
    Continued engagement with key innovators such as the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency (DARPA) will be the key to success.
        By actively engaging warfighters in the research process,
    leveraging collaborative forums, and fostering relationships with key
    defense agencies, I am committed to breaking down barriers and
    facilitating open dialog among stakeholders. This approach will enable
    the timely transition of critical capabilities into the hands of the
    Joint Force, ensuring that the military remains at the forefront of
    innovation and prepared to outpace evolving threats.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to increase the
    interaction between DOD labs and the private sector, and between DOD
    labs and the rest of the DOD innovation enterprise to include the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
    the Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation Unit, and the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency?
        Answer. There is a lot of good work going on, but I do have some
    concerns that innovation entities are actually colliding with each
    other in the incubation process. The DOD must have a greater level of
    collaboration between entities in order to maximize the return on the
    USG's invested capital. If confirmed, I would continue to build on the
    integration of the DOD labs with OSD R&E, SCO, DIU, and DARPA through
    Innovation programs like Replicator, WLIF, and RDER. The Department
    also has the opportunity to increase integration through Joint
    Experimentation events.
        Question. In the past, for example in the Manhattan Project and the
    Space Race, the United States made great use of foreign technical
    talent to achieve national goals. Today, there is growing concern that
    China is making great progress in recruiting technical talent that has
    been trained at United States universities. The Chinese are also
    investing significant resources to provide funding and facilities to
    technical experts in critical fields to attract them to work in China.
        In your view, what steps should the Department take to ensure that
    the foreign technical talent that we educate and support remains in
    here in the United States and commits to working on our high-priority
    national missions to maintain our technological superiority?
        Answer. I have not been read into the specifics on this topic, but
    if confirmed, I look forward to learning how the Department can secure
    the appropriate technical talent required to empower the joint
    warfighter. Ultimately, attracting and retaining the right talent in
    any organization hinges on the ability to establish and maintain a
    positive work environment that encourages innovation and values the
    talent of its people. If confirmed and I re-enter the military I am
    keen to get up to speed on this matter. We must have a better way to
    inspire and retain STEM talent here in the United States.
        Question. How could we leverage our defense labs and DOD research
    funding programs to overmatch Chinese efforts by providing resources
    and facilities to attract technical talent to stay and work in the
    United States?
        Answer. The United States offers many advantages over China for
    talented researchers and engineers to work and provide for national
    security. Technological prowess, state-of-the-art facilities, and
    American way of life can all be used to draw top talent from around the
    world and away from China. Embedding young scientists and engineers in
    defense-oriented labs early and often to incentivize a unique form of
    service, ways they can harness their skill set to advance national
    interests. Defense labs and DOD research funding programs can be used
    to invest in facilities and maintain technological prowess where we
    lead the world, regain where we have slipped, and pioneer new fields.
                               joint acquisition
        Question. What are your views regarding the effectiveness of joint
    acquisition programs, especially in delivering integrated and
    interoperable solutions for the Department and which programs would you
    consider to be candidates for joint development and acquisition?
        Answer. Joint acquisition programs have been effective at
    delivering integrated and interoperable solutions for the Department.
    One example is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, which has been
    balancing performance and cost to provide the Joint Force with a
    tactical vehicle fleet that is more lethal and sustainable. The Golden
    Dome for America will require a level of coordination across the
    Services that makes it a natural candidate for joint acquisition.
    Additionally, the Future Vertical Lift family of systems is a good
    candidate for joint development. It implements a Modular Open Systems
    Approach that improves affordability, enhances capability, and reduces
    supply chain risk across the Services.
        Question. What are your views on joint, enabling or cross-cutting
    capabilities that may not be treated as acquisition programs, such as
    JADC2? Do you have sufficient authority to advocate or direct the
    services to ensure there are no seams in planning or execution of such
    efforts?
        Answer. In the current global security environment, the United
    States military faces agile adversaries who increasingly seek to
    undermine the Nation's strategic and operational strengths by impeding,
    and where possible, denying command and control (C2) capabilities. The
    ability of the U.S. military to regain and maintain information and
    decision advantage through non acquisition programs, considered in the
    CJADC2 continuous modernization efforts, must remain a top priority for
    the Department. The capabilities developed by Services, Agencies, and
    partners across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum are programs of record by
    exception, not by rule. CJCS has full authority to advocate for
    Combatant Command and Services' capabilities and, if confirmed, I will
    use the granted authorities and assess whether additional authorities
    are required to assist the Combatant Commands and Services with
    planning to foster joint capability and manage Joint Force development.
    If confirmed, I will continue to partner with OUSD (A&S) [Acquisition],
    OUSD (R&E), and CAPE/Comptroller [PPBE] to strengthen planning and
    execution to enable integrated, end-to-end mission capability.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you assign to yourself in
    ensuring that joint acquisition priorities are given full and fair
    consideration in Military Service budget processes?
        Answer. If confirmed, part of my responsibility through the Vice
    Chairman is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council which represents
    the voice of the joint force and the joint warfighter. If confirmed, I
    will give my best military advice to the Secretary of Defense on all
    matters, including the budget. The Chairman's Program Recommendation
    (CPR) provides the Chairman with a formal mechanism to communicate
    statutory military advice on programs and budget issues, to include
    joint acquisition priorities.
        Question. Do you believe that the combatant command's role in the
    acquisition process is sufficient to ensure that they can get needed
    capabilities fielded to them in a timelier manner? If not, are there
    other tools or authorities needed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Defense Acquisition System
    (DAS) continues to seek and consider input from the Combatant
    Commanders through the JROC process. This ensures that the voices of
    the Combatant Commanders are globally integrated and carefully
    considered holistically. I understand the importance of maintaining and
    continuing to evolve the Department's Adaptive Acquisition Framework
    (AAF) comprised of several acquisition pathways, each tailored for the
    unique characteristics and risk profile of the capability being
    acquired. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities for increased
    Combatant Command involvement in the AAF, particularly in the
    development of software, where operator input to the developer can
    create more useful capability in a shorter timeline.
                  joint requirements oversight council (jroc)
        Question. The JROC is vested with the responsibility to assess
    joint military capabilities; establish and approve joint performance
    requirements that ensure interoperability between military
    capabilities; and identify new joint military capabilities based on
    advances in technology and concepts of operation.
        How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in establishing
    joint requirements for submission to the DOD acquisition process?
        Answer. Within the Joint Force, no other entity is more responsible
    for Joint Force Design and balancing the current needs of the Joint
    Force with the future needs of the Joint Force than the JROC. The JROC
    provides a critical forum for the Service Vice Chiefs to assess joint
    military capabilities, identify, approve, and prioritize capabilities
    to ensure the Joint Force can implement the National Defense Strategy.
    One of the JROC's key strengths is its ability to provide a high-level,
    strategic perspective on capability development, ensuring that major
    acquisition programs align with Joint Warfighting Concepts and multi-
    domain operational needs. It has also improved cross-Service
    coordination, particularly through initiatives like Capability
    Portfolio Management Reviews, which help identify capability gaps,
    solutions, redundancies and promote integration. Authorities of the
    JROC have changed over time. While the JROC is effective, it could be
    improved by ensuring that its authorities match its responsibilities.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the JROC focuses
    on joint performance requirements without overprescribing key
    performance parameters and key system attributes that overly constricts
    system design space?
        Answer. The JROC should be in the business of providing top-down,
    strategic-level direction to the Services to promote Joint Force design
    instead of micro-managing Service acquisition decisions. The JROC
    currently delegates key performance parameters and system attributes to
    the Services unless they are deemed Joint Performance Requirements,
    meaning they are critical to ensure interoperability or integration of
    the Joint Force.
        Through recent changes such as expanding the use of the Middle Tier
    of Acquisitions (MTA) pathway, even more authority is being delegated
    to the Services. While use of rapid acquisitions pathways such as MTA
    are designed to improve speed and efficiency, that must be balanced
    with strong joint oversight to prevent fragmentation of the future
    force. The JROC's ability to assess and enforce joint performance
    requirements remains critical in ensuring that the warfighters receive
    interoperable, integrated, and effective capabilities for future
    conflicts.
        Question. What is your view on the Capability Management Portfolio
    Review process for the JROC to issue requirements from the top-down?
        Answer. Recently, the Joint Staff revamped capability portfolio
    management, creating a new approach to drive strategic alignment across
    requirements, acquisition, and R&D. I believe this approach has been
    successful at holistically evaluating gaps from a portfolio perspective
    as well as promoting top-down, concept-driven, future-facing
    requirements.
        Additionally, the Joint Staff has partnered with the offices of the
    undersecretaries for Acquisitions and Sustainment, and Research and
    Engineering to create a holistic portfolio view of capability
    development. This effort allows warfighters producing capability
    requirements to be fully informed of new technologies and commercially
    developed products that may fill requirements and capability gaps
    identified in support of the Joint Force.
       the joint capabilities integration and development systems (jcids)
        Question. Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2024 required the Joint Staff to review and propose a
    clean-sheet approach to the JCIDS process focused on streamlining
    approvals, integration of commercial technologies, and taking advantage
    of iterative development processes.
        Is the JCIDS process effective in providing the information the
    JROC requires to anticipate both the current and the future needs of
    the joint force?
        Answer. The intent of JCIDS is to ensure jointness,
    interoperability, joint warfighter voice, and strategic alignment and
    prioritization of future capability development. While JCIDS has been
    effective in reducing redundancy and improving coordination across the
    services, it needs reform in order to keep pace with rapidly emerging
    threats and technological advancements. As part of Fiscal Year 2024
    Section 811 Report to Congress, the Joint Staff is currently developing
    evolutionary and revolutionary reforms to the joint requirements
    process, including a clean-sheet rewrite of JCIDS, in order to deliver
    the right capability to the warfighter at speed and at capacity.
        Question. How effective has JCIDS been in delivering capabilities
    that meet the evolving needs of the joint force, particularly in the
    face of rapidly advancing threats?
        Answer. The JCIDS process was developed to ensure due diligence and
    accountability for the development of large, legacy platforms that cost
    billions of dollars of taxpayer money. Today, given rapid technological
    change and the rapid modernization of the Nation's adversaries, this
    system no longer fully meets the Department's needs. The Department has
    made a number of changes, through the Middle Tier of Acquisition and
    Software Acquisition Pathway, to respond to the evolving needs of the
    Joint Force amidst a rapidly changing technology environment.
        However, an overreliance on rapid acquisition increases the risk of
    service-centric solutions that may not align with broader joint
    operational concepts. Additionally, without appropriate joint
    oversight, programs leveraging the rapid acquisition pathways may move
    quickly at the expense of joint integration and interoperability.
    Furthermore, increased use of these pathways increases the risk of
    overall inefficiency as Services may be unaware of the similar efforts
    by their sister Services and unnecessarily duplicate their efforts. If
    confirmed, I will continue to work with the Joint Chiefs and JROC to
    ensure that Service controlled initiatives are not stove-piped or
    unnecessarily redundant and that all strive to present joint integrated
    solutions.
        Question. What do you see as the most significant gaps in the
    current JCIDS process that prevent it from ensuring interoperability
    and channeling investments toward warfighters' priorities?
        The 2021 General Accountability Report ``Weapon Systems
    Requirements'' found that staffing documents through JCIDS took an
    average of 800 days compared to a notional timeline of 103 days.
        Answer. While the JROC and JCIDS processes provide a structured
    framework for identifying opportunities for multi-Service
    collaboration, there is still room for improvement in fully leveraging
    joint synergies and aligning related acquisition programs. The JROC has
    made progress in fostering cross-Service coordination, particularly
    through initiatives like Joint Warfighting Concept and Capability
    Portfolio Management Reviews. JCIDS has been effective in reducing
    redundancy and improving coordination across the services, but it must
    continue to evolve to keep pace with rapidly emerging threats and
    technological advancements.
        However, the JROC lacks directive acquisition and budget authority,
    which prevents it from filling the high-priority gaps identified by the
    Combatant Commands. Additionally, the JCIDS process and documentation
    is antiquated and cumbersome, which is why the Joint Staff is working
    to streamline it to ensure outcomes over process. Last, continued
    modernization of KMDS, the joint requirements data base, is critical to
    ensure real-time visibility of joint and Service requirements. DOD must
    smartly go faster and pick up the pace.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Combatant
    Commanders in the JCIDS process?
        Answer. Combatant Commanders play a critical role in the JCIDS
    process, as they are uniquely positioned to articulate both near-term
    operational needs and long-term capability gaps based on real-world
    threats and evolving mission requirements. Their direct input ensures
    that joint requirements are not just service-driven but are aligned
    with the operational realities of multi-domain conflict and regional
    security challenges. The Combatant Commanders submit their Integrated
    Priority Lists (IPLs) annually, which are prioritized by the JROC and
    submitted to Congress, and the Urgent Acquisition pathway allows for
    the Combatant Commander to raise issues for acceleration. If confirmed,
    I will ensure the JROC continues to seek and consider input from the
    Combatant Commanders.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve the effectiveness of
    the process in identifying both the near-term and long-term needs of
    the Combatant Commander?
        Answer. The needs of the Combatant Commanders are currently
    addressed through the Capability Gap Assessment process, where the JROC
    evaluates and prioritizes CCMD IPLs, as well as executes the Joint and
    Emergent Operational Need (JUON/JEON) processes, whereby urgent CCMD
    requirements are rapidly triaged and sent to OSD(A&S) for immediate
    funding, if validated. While the CGA/IPL process is successful at
    identifying gaps, these gaps often remain unfilled because of the
    JROC's limited acquisition and budget authorities. In contrast, a
    validated JUON/JEON can result in funding direction from OSD(A&S),
    however, this approach still requires hard to come by Service offsets.
    A funding set aside for JUONs/JEONs may be able to address this
    problem.
        Question. Do you have any recommendations for changes to the
    structure, authority, or processes of the JROC or the JCIDS?
        Answer. The Joint Staff is currently developing recommendations to
    the structure, authorities, and process of the JROC and JCIDS. The
    recommendations will be included in the response to Section 811 tasking
    and will align with the following principles:
          Accelerate the right capability to the warfighter at
    capacity
          Empower the Joint warfighter voice while balancing speed
    and operational risk
          Reduce bureaucracy while ensuring Joint interoperability
    and integration
          Optimize alignment and agility between requirements,
    acquisition, and budgeting
          Ensure authorities match responsibilities across DOD,
    Congress, and DIB
                              test and evaluation
        Question. Test and evaluation is critical to ensuring that the
    systems warfighters rely on in combat are proven to work effectively,
    reliably, and safely.
        How do you assess the current separation of developmental testing
    (DT) and operational testing (OT) in terms of its impact on delivering
    combat-ready systems to the joint force? Does maintaining these silos
    delay the identification of critical issues that affect warfighter
    effectiveness?
        Answer. The Department of Defense must better integrate
    developmental testing and operational testing. As Chairman, if
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Office of Secretary of Defense,
    the Services, and other Defense organizations to ensure the Department
    balances the need for robust testing to verify that capabilities
    provided to the warfighter operate as intended with the need to move
    faster in fielding new technologies. Throughout, if confirmed, I will
    be an advocate for developing, operating, and testing in a joint manner
    to the maximum extent possible.
        Question. How effective do you find the DOD's reliance on discrete,
    milestone-driven test events--such as Initial Operational Test &
    Evaluation--in meeting the rapid pace of modern threats and
    technological change? Are these singular evaluations keeping pace with
    warfighter needs?
        Answer. In my experience, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach
    to developmental and operational testing across the wide spectrum of
    military capabilities the Joint Force develops and operates.
    Operational Test and Evaluation is not a Joint Staff function. Across
    the board, though, we must go faster. We must allow greater iteration
    and more rapid cycles of feedback as we experiment with and test
    emerging capabilities. As Chairman, if confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Services, and other
    Defense organizations to inform testing practices with input from the
    warfighter, focusing on balancing the need for robust testing to ensure
    that the capabilities provided to the warfighter operate as intended
    with the need to move faster in fielding new technologies.
        Question. Do you think the current operational test and evaluation
    system also provides for the flexibility to assess commercial
    technologies that might be acquired or fields by DOD through means or
    processes that are not traditional acquisition programs of record?
        Answer. No. From my experience with private sector investment, I
    know that acquisition processes and procedures slow the adoption of
    commercial technologies by the Department of Defense at many steps in
    the process. If confirmed, as Chairman, I will be an advocate for
    moving faster and increasing flexibility in processes, so path-breaking
    capabilities are delivered to the warfighter more quickly. At the same
    time, effective operational test and evaluation must be fundamental
    aspects of any faster capability development effort, as it is essential
    that any capabilities delivered to the warfighter perform as intended.
        Question. Are you satisfied with DOD's test and evaluation
    capabilities, including the test and evaluation workforce and
    infrastructure of the Military Services? In which areas, if any, do you
    feel the Department should be developing new test and evaluation
    capabilities?
        Answer. No. The Department's current mix of development test and
    operational test range infrastructure is unsatisfactory for today's
    modern threat environment. One area in which the Joint Force should
    enhance the ability to test, and train is in the Electromagnetic
    Operational Environment. Investment in joint live virtual constructive
    training is essential. The Joint Staff is also currently working to
    write a report to Congress on the feasibility and advisability of
    establishing a regional joint multi-domain non-kinetic training and
    experimentation environment. The development of a regionally aligned
    multi-domain non-kinetic training, testing, and experimentation
    environment is critical to provide the Joint Force and the United
    States' Allies and partners an immersive and realistic operational
    environment to train across all domains against emerging technologies
    and peer threats. This environment needs to replicate a contested,
    congested, and constrained Electromagnetic Operational Environment with
    an accurate threat representation to facilitate quality training and
    testing at scale to support throughput and readiness of the Nation's
    warfighters.
                                 dod readiness
        Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
    components--across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel,
    and training--to execute the 2022 National Defense Strategy and
    Combatant Commanders' associated plans?
        Answer. Based on my own experience, as well as public reporting on
    the status of the Joint Force, I am confident that the Joint Force--
    including materiel, equipment, training, and personnel--is ready to
    meet its current challenges. This includes protecting the Homeland,
    meeting alliance commitments, and maintaining advantage over any
    potential adversary. If confirmed, I commit to continued assessment and
    providing my recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
        Question. What is your assessment of the risk the Combatant
    Commands and the Combat Support Agencies have accepted in regard to
    their readiness to execute the operational plans associated with the
    2022 National Defense Strategy?
        Answer. Based on my own experience, as well as public reporting on
    the status of the Joint Force, I recognize that operational tempo over
    the last two-plus decades has had impacts. If confirmed, I commit to
    assessing the extent of that risk and providing my recommendations to
    the SecDef and POTUS. I also look forward to working alongside
    Congress, specifically on the acquisition of new platforms,
    strengthening of the Defense Industrial Base, and taking care of
    personnel, to ensure the Joint Forces is ready to meet global
    operational requirements. Additionally, with sustained, predictable,
    adequate, and timely funding from Congress and the Secretary-directed
    reprioritization, we can improve readiness, build the future force that
    maintains the competitive advantage, and decrease risk.
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you
    recommend to restore full spectrum readiness in all DOD components--
    across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training--
    and on what timelines?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate and discuss readiness with
    Service Chiefs and Combatant Commands and make recommendations to the
    SecDef and POTUS. We also must be clear eyed and explicit about what
    things we cannot do.
                    operational energy and energy resilience
        Question. The Department defines operational energy as the energy
    required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and
    weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by
    tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. On the
    battlefield of the future, warfighters will need exponentially more
    energy with rapid recharge and resupply over longer operating
    distances. The quality of electricity will matter too--the DOD's
    vehicles, sensors, robots, cyber forces, directed energy weapons, and
    artificial intelligence will be controlled by systems sensitive to
    fluctuations in voltage or frequency.
        If confirmed, are there actions you can take to harness innovations
    in operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational
    concepts?
        Answer. The need for large volumes of Operational Energy remains
    one of the Department's greatest logistical burdens and largest
    vulnerabilities, especially in a contested environment. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Military Departments to prioritize energy demand
    reduction and the adoption of technologies that reduce logistics
    requirements in contested or austere environments. Through the
    implementation of the Joint Warfighting Concept, the Joint Staff is
    seeking innovative capabilities to address key operational problems.
    Operational energy innovations contribute to offsetting those problems
    and are being examined in wargames, tested in field experiments, and
    integrated into joint exercises.
        Question. In what specific areas, if any, do you believe DOD needs
    to improve the incorporation of energy considerations in strategic
    planning processes?
        Answer. In my view, DOD can improve the incorporation of energy
    considerations in the following specific areas:
          Continue to assess Combatant Command posture and
    readiness annually through the Chairman's Risk Assessment. These
    reviews can highlight where energy considerations may be overlooked
    within the strategic planning process.
          Ensure that Joint concepts and operational plans are
    fully informed of risks associated with contested logistics and threats
    to the assured delivery of energy.
          Align force development and design efforts with
    appropriate risks to energy supportability and required posture.
        If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff to include
    requirements for joint force energy supportability and demand reduction
    in recurring strategic guidance.
        Question. How can DOD acquisition systems better address
    requirements related to a military platform's use of energy?
        Answer. The Joint Staff conducts an energy analysis for all JROC
    requirements and energy is one of the four mandatory KPPs. If
    confirmed, I will expect to focus the analysis of a systems energy
    consumption in terms of how it contributes to the warfighting
    capability by adding to lethality and/or reducing the logistics support
    needed.
        Question. If confirmed, are there actions you can take to
    prioritize energy resilience and mission assurance for DOD, including
    acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to
    support mission critical functions, and address known vulnerabilities?
        Answer. Energy resilience is part of every assessment performed on
    existing critical infrastructure. If confirmed, I will ensure that
    identification, vulnerability assessment, and risk mitigation of
    mission critical assets remain a Joint Staff priority.
          defense department and intelligence community collaboration
        Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
    and operational--between DOD and the Intelligence Community has grown
    increasingly close. On one hand, seamless collaboration is vital to an
    effective and rapid response to non-traditional threats and bringing
    together the strengths of the full spectrum of defense and intelligence
    capabilities can generate more effective solutions to complex problems.
    On the other hand, without effective management and oversight, such
    collaboration risks blurring distinct agency missions, authorities, and
    funding, as well as creating redundant lines of effort.
        In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between
    the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-
    examined or modified?
        Answer. Risk Management, Prioritization, and Warning. Intelligence
    analysis (likelihood) remains a key part of informing risk analysis,
    while intelligence gaps/shortfalls are increasingly a driver of the
    risk assessment process. As the Intelligence Community (IC) refines its
    risk processes, efforts to improve DOD and IC integration on risk
    assessment and mitigation should be enhanced. Recommendation: DIE and
    IC seniors re-examine strategic processes associated with risk and
    processes that set overall IC-DIE priorities.
        Capability Development and Programming Recommendation. NIPF and DOD
    priorities bring with them separate funding streams (National
    Intelligence Program (NIP) under title 50 and Military Intelligence
    Program (MIP) under Title 10). These competing priorities can limit the
    DIE's ability to appropriately posture for emerging Joint Force
    concerns and significantly slow the Joint Force's response time to the
    changed environment. Recommendation: The Joint Capability Integration
    and Development System (JCIDS) or a successor process should re-examine
    and consider adopting streamlined procedures for capability
    requirements principally developed by Defense Intelligence Enterprise
    (DIE) elements with Combat Support Agency status and/or
    responsibilities. Codify the Joint Intelligence Program Recommendation
    (JIPR), issued for the first time on a pilot basis in fiscal year 2024,
    and spanning both DOD-and IC-resourced intelligence capabilities, as
    part of my Joint Strategic Planning System to cement gains for
    warfighter intelligence support.
        Crisis Response. On the topic of DOD and IC synchronization across
    the competition-conflict continuum, DOD and IC employ distinct
    processes that may challenge efforts to synchronization when responding
    to contingencies and crises. Recommendation: Creation of a DOD-IC
    Crisis Response framework will enable development of agile, coherent
    models to test and evaluate Joint Concepts and improve Joint Force
    readiness. Currently, DOD and IC lessons learned elements are examining
    potential improvements to their pre-crisis coordination.
        We cannot afford to miss any opportunities to integrate the title
    10 and title 50 community. We must integrate early and always with each
    other. This was a foundational core tenet of mine while serving at CIA
    and if confirmed, will be as the Chairman
       intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
        Question. Demand for ISR of every kind has grown exponentially in
    recent years, largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and
    targeting capabilities they afford commanders. Almost all of the
    geographic Combatant Commands have validated ISR requirements that are
    not being met.
        What is your assessment of DOD's current disposition of ISR assets
    across the Combatant Commands?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review ISR asset allocation to
    Combatant Commands to ensure it is aligned with National Defense
    Strategy priorities and provide my recommendations to the SecDef and
    POTUS.
        Question. What do you perceive as the most concerning shortfalls in
    both the capability and availability of ISR assets?
        Answer. Demand for ISR has and will likely always outpace supply.
    Evolving adversary capabilities are driving a deliberate move toward
    higher capacity modernized ISR systems. To keep pace, if confirmed, I
    will advocate for developing tools to take advantage of space-based ISR
    and publicly available information.
        Question. What is your assessment of current service efforts to
    develop increased capabilities, as well as the processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and capacity to support
    increased collection?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the recently completed Space-
    Derived Exploitation Capability Portfolio Management Review and
    encourage the Services, NGA, and NRO to invest in artificial
    intelligence/machine learning solutions which are at various stages of
    technical maturity and confidence levels.
        Question. How does increased demand square with Services' plans to
    divest many of the platforms providing ISR to the Combatant Commanders?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Service's capabilities
    against the Combatant Commands requirements and provide my
    recommendations to the SecDef and POTUS.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
    enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
    for victims and hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual
    assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
    servicemembers aged 17 to 24, remains high.
        Given your experience as a military officer, do you believe the
    policies, programs, and resources, including the DOD Restricted
    (Confidential) Reporting Policy, that DOD and the Military Services
    have put in place to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct, and to
    protect service members who report sexual misconduct from retaliation,
    are working? If not, what else must be done?
        Answer. Congress and the Department have collaborated on many
    helpful actions to counter sexual assault in the military. Indications
    are that these are starting to have an impact: prevalence of sexual
    assault and sexual harassment decreased in 2023 in the Armed Forces for
    the first time in several years. However, more must be done to sustain
    these changes. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously support
    policies and programs implemented to prevent sexual assault, improve
    support to victims, and hold offenders appropriately accountable. I
    will stress that Joint Force readiness hinges on the preparedness of
    the warfighters, which is most effectively achieved within cohesive
    units led by empowered chains of command. It is imperative to foster
    healthy command climates and prevent harmful behaviors. To this end I
    support applying the resources provided to us for this purpose, which
    include the prevention and response workforces and regular assessments
    of military unit health worldwide. I anticipate leading the other
    Service Chiefs in continued focus on this issue, and support having a
    high-level official dedicated to sexual assault prevention and response
    in the military. [Note: Such an official already exists: The Director
    of the DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office is an SES, a
    position already required by Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
    Authorization Act Section 1611 and Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
    Authorization Act Section 583.] Sexual assault and sexual harassment
    destroy unit cohesion, degrade readiness, and deter both men and women
    from serving. There is no place for these crimes in the United States
    Armed Forces.
                   active and reserve component end strength
        Question. In the face of historic recruiting challenges, active
    force end strength continues to shrink across all military services
    except the Space Force.
        What aggregate Active end strength do you believe is necessary to
    meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy and associated operational plans?
        Answer. The requested end strength in the Administration's budget
    submission aligns with manpower needs across the services, and the
    evolution of the force planning construct within the 2022 National
    Defense Strategy. This budget aims to balance readiness and
    modernization challenges today, tomorrow, and into the future with
    necessary resources. If confirmed, as the Administration provides any
    updates to strategic guidance, I will be prepared to assist the
    Secretary of Defense in evaluating appropriate end strength to meet the
    national security priorities.
        Question. In your view, do the Reserve components serve as an
    operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? In light of your
    answer, should the Reserve components be supported by improved
    equipment, increased training, and higher levels of overall resourcing
    for readiness going forward?
        Answer. The Reserve component plays a vital role in the total
    force, serving as both an operational and strategic reserve. To
    effectively execute their key responsibilities, they deserve access to
    the best equipment and training, with the same standards of the Active
    component. This ensures that the Reserve component is fully prepared
    and equipped to support national defense objectives.
                         role of the reserve component
        Question. Historically, the Reserve components have been used as a
    strategic reserve in the event of significant armed conflict involving
    the United States. Post-9/11, reserve forces have been used more
    extensively to support both contingency operations and ongoing military
    requirements in a garrison environment. Today, in addition to being an
    operational reserve, members of the Reserve component are used
    continuously as a part-time workforce for the Department of Defense to
    perform its ongoing training and readiness requirements.
        In your view, should the Reserve components serve as a part-time
    workforce, an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or some
    combination of those?
        Answer. The Reserve component serves a vital and multifaceted role
    within the Total Force, offering strategic depth and operational
    flexibility. It is not simply a part-time workforce, an operational
    reserve, or a strategic reserve, but rather a powerful combination of
    all three. Reserve units provide essential warfighting capabilities and
    expertise, strategically aligned with mission requirements. The Reserve
    component provides scalable readiness to ensure the DOD can respond
    effectively to both ongoing operations and large-scale crises. Finally,
    and perhaps most importantly, reservists provide the strategic depth
    and endurance as part of the Total Force necessary to sustain
    operations in a prolonged conflict if deterrence fails. They are, in
    essence, a force multiplier, ensuring the military remains ready and
    capable of meeting any challenge to national security. Finally, to echo
    the Secretary's previous comments, as the Department continues to adapt
    its Total Force to meet the demands of the dynamic strategic
    environment, the Joint Staff continues to carefully consider and
    balance the multitude of roles the Reserve component plays in support
    of the National Defense Strategy.''
        Question. Do the Reserve components require increased levels of
    full-time support and oversight by the Active component, including
    improved equipment, increased training, adequate compensation and
    reimbursement, effective career management, balanced Professional
    Military Education requirements, and higher levels of overall
    resourcing for readiness going forward?
        Answer. The Department continuously assesses the readiness of the
    Reserve components, to include levels of full-time support, resourcing,
    training, and equipment modernization, to ensure seamless Total Force
    integration. The DOD also ensures all Reserve component units that
    deploy in support of global operations have achieved required readiness
    levels prior to deployment. Regarding Reserve component compensation
    and reimbursement, the Department has been engaged in a long-term
    effort to develop duty status reform recommendations for Congress to
    streamline these issues. Finally, the Services continuously manage
    reserve members' careers and ensure Reserve component members are also
    afforded every opportunity to complete Professional Military Education,
    attend required schools, and complete formal education requirements to
    achieve advancement.
        Question. In your view, what reforms, if any, should be made in
    order to facilitate easier transitions for members of all components
    between active and reserve status?
        Answer. The Department has been engaged in a long-term effort to
    develop duty status reform recommendations for Congress to streamline
    these issues. The need for RC duty status reform (DSR) cannot be
    overstated and is long overdue. Today's complex system is overly
    burdensome and results in pay/benefits inequities. Working
    collaboratively across the Department and the whole of government, DOD
    has developed an RC duty status reform proposal that is a fundamental
    redesign of the current system--it streamlines and consolidates the
    current system and addresses many of its long-standing problems. An
    integrated, cohesive legislative proposal designed to comprehensively
    address the long-standing problems with the current duty status system
    will ensure that we take care of people and actively take steps to
    rebuild the military. In addition, ongoing efforts to reform current
    Separation History and Physical Examination Status policy should
    continue, with the intent of maximizing the retention of personnel
    leaving Active component service who wish to continue service in the
    Reserve component. Finally, continued modernization of Service pay and
    personnel systems is essential to ensuring timely and efficient
    transitions of personnel between active and reserve status.
                 military quality of life and family readiness
        Question. The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of
    key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
    advocacy and parenting skills programs; childcare; spouse education and
    employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation
    (MWR) services such as Commissary and Military Exchange stores.
        If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
    consider a priority?
        Answer. The Department of Defense has a sacred obligation to take
    care of service members and their families. Quality of Life is
    fundamental to recruiting and retaining the all-volunteer force today
    and in the future.
        If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Service Chiefs to
    strengthen quality of life programs that support service members and
    their families. I will also review existing programs to identify and
    prioritize those most critical to military communities and overall
    force readiness.
        I will continue to encourage the advancement of MWR programs and
    community partnerships that both promote well-being while also adapting
    to the current demands of servicemembers. These programs include
    outdoor recreation, sports and fitness, and child development and youth
    programs.
        Question. What factors would you consider in assessing which MWR
    programs are ineffective or outmoded and thus potentially suitable for
    elimination or reduction in scope?
        Answer. The maintenance and the development of effective quality of
    life programs is a priority for Service members and their families. If
    confirmed, I would work with the Service Chiefs and look primarily at
    usage metrics, benefit, cost, and Service member and family feedback.
    These programs are critical recruiting and retention tools and must be
    adequately resourced to ensure a resilient force.
        Question. The military services continue to operate at an
    historically high OPTEMPO, which senior civilian and military leaders
    in the Department of Defense have deemed unsustainable.
        What recommendations do you have to adjust OPTEMPO in the Armed
    Forces to ensure that servicemembers and their families are healthy,
    fit, adequately rested, and have a sustainable lifestyle so that they
    are prepared for our next major conflict?
        Answer. We continuously monitor and assess the global deployment of
    forces to ensure they are committed in line with National Defense and
    National Military Strategies. In addition, the Secretary has
    established Deployment-to-Dwell and Mobilization-to-Dwell standards,
    that are monitored by the Services, to ensure service-members are not
    overutilized. Through these measures, the aim is to ensure the All-
    Volunteer Force is optimized for global commitments while ensuring the
    needs of service-members and their families.
                         military health system reform
        Question. Section 702 of the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense
    Authorization Act, as modified by Sections 711 and 712 of the Fiscal
    Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, transferred the
    administration and management of military hospitals and clinics from
    the Military Departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), a Combat
    Support Agency. Additionally, Section 732 of the Fiscal Year 2019
    National Defense Authorization Act required the development of joint
    force medical capabilities that meet the operation planning
    requirements of the combatant commands.
        In your view, in the aggregate, how many military medical providers
    and what medical capabilities, are required to support the Combatant
    Commanders' operational plans associated with the 2022 National Defense
    Strategy?
        Answer. The National Defense Strategy contains globally integrated
    medical requirements of rapidly aggregating medical capabilities during
    conflict, moving casualties in a contested environment, and expanding
    military trauma centers in the Homeland to care for casualties. The
    medical force of roughly 180,000 will be close to fully employed to
    execute and sustain operational plans for a large-scale overseas
    conflict. The medical force does require additional surge medical
    capacity within medical centers of the Department, as well as
    leveraging partnerships with Veterans Health Administration and
    National Disaster Medical System to execute Homeland contingency plan
    requirements. As DOD designs a future medical force, the Military
    Health System needs to prioritize efforts to meet these globally
    integrated requirements and enable air, land, and sea platforms to
    deploy agile medical capabilities worldwide. If confirmed, I will work
    across DOD and with Congress on these efforts.
        Question. In your view, do military medical providers across the
    Military Departments possess today the critical wartime medical
    competencies required to save the lives of service members injured in
    combat or contingency operations?
        Answer. Yes. I believe the joint medical force possesses the
    competencies necessary to save lives in a kinetic environment, as
    evidenced by their performance in overseas contingency operations over
    the last 20 years. As DOD continues to lose personnel with combat
    casualty care experience, it is imperative that DOD invests in the
    workforce to generate critical wartime medical professionals in
    military medical centers and hospitals. The Department must also
    leverage partnerships with Veterans Health Administration, Health &
    Human Services, and National Disaster Medical System, and in private
    sector partnerships to treat complex care patients in peacetime and
    sustain the competency and capacity to recover combat casualties in
    wartime. Additionally, DOD must embed medical capabilities far forward
    to increase survivability in a contested, degraded, and contaminated
    wartime environment of the future.
        Question. In your view, are the Services adequately supporting DHA
    by assigning to MTFs the appropriate number of military medical
    providers in the specialties needed at the MTFs?
        Answer. The Department is working to invest in the healthcare
    workforce that includes the Services' military medical providers and
    Defense Health Agency civilian medical providers to improve primary and
    specialty care access in MTFs. The DOD continues to assess the adequacy
    of military medical providers in the MTFs and their overall readiness.
    Additional military and civilian workforce in the MTFs improve access
    to care for 9.6 million beneficiaries, improves readiness and maximizes
    education programs for medical professionals, and mitigates the rising
    costs to provide care in the civilian network. If confirmed, I will
    work across DOD and with Congress on these efforts.
                               suicide prevention
        Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
    that sufficient suicide prevention and mental health resources are
    available to deployed servicemembers, as well as to servicemembers and
    their families at home station?
        Answer. I recognize that physically and mentally fit servicemembers
    are a critical component of Total Force readiness. If confirmed, I
    would strongly recommend prioritizing mental health resources for all
    servicemembers and their families by enhancing the access to mental
    health professionals by advocating for the expansion of telehealth
    services and embedded mental health professionals at the unit level. I
    would work closely with policymakers in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense to ensure that adequate resources are made available for
    evidence-based suicide prevention programs and regularly monitor all
    programs for effectiveness to ensure and enhance Service member
    readiness. Additionally, I will promote leadership involvement in
    recognizing warning signs and strengthening family support initiatives
    that promote resilience and open discussion around mental health. My
    commitment is to ensure every servicemember and their family has access
    to the mental health resources they need.
                                 mental health
        Question. DOD has made great strides in reducing the stigma
    associated with help-seeking behaviors, but many servicemembers,
    especially senior leaders, remain concerned that their military careers
    will be adversely affected should their chains of command become aware
    that they are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same
    time, the military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware
    of physical and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness
    of the service members under their command.
        In your view, does DOD effectively bridge the gap between a service
    member's desire for confidentiality and the chain of command's
    legitimate need to know about matters that may affect individual
    service member and the unit readiness?
        Answer. Yes, I believe DOD has made significant changes to bridge
    the gap between Service Members' desires and the chain of command's
    legitimate need to know. The DOD continues to assess how it can help
    those who struggle with complex issues, while still ensuring the
    readiness and lethality of the force. Mental health is an element of
    total health, and the DOD needs to optimize every aspect of the
    Warfighter and their families. I fully support Service Members and
    their families seeking mental health care.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes,
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this committee? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                               Senator Tom Cotton
                             u.s. nuclear deterrent
        1. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, on February 25, 2025,
    Chairman Wicker and I wrote a classified letter to Secretary of Defense
    Peter Hegseth and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright on matters relating
    to U.S. nuclear deterrence and modernization. Will you commit to
    reviewing this letter, the attached documents, and receiving a briefing
    on the subject from the Joint Staff, J-5 upon confirmation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. If confirmed, I will look forward to
    this briefing.
                                   terrorism
        2. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, you have extensive
    experience in the Middle East, particularly when dealing with
    terrorists like Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In the cases of
    military force, how would you advise we use the military to contain
    Iran's proxy terrorist groups like Hamas, Houthis, and Hezbollah?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough
    review of our operations and plans in the Middle East in the context of
    the policy guidance provided by the President and the Secretary of
    Defense. I will then provide my military advice on how to best employ
    the United States Military to achieve United States national policy
    goals, as appropriate.
                           u.s. indo-pacific command
        3. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, any potential conflict
    in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will need large amounts of
    high-end munitions. How will you instill a sense of urgency at the
    Pentagon, as well as our private sector, so they make the investments
    necessary to rebuild America's defense industrial base?
        Lieutenant General Caine. As I stated in testimony, we must be
    clear in our sense of urgency. The Joint Staff has established a Joint
    Munitions Working Group (JMWG) from organizations across DOD to
    specifically address this problem. Acknowledging we have munitions
    shortages relative to our requirements and barriers within the Defense
    Industrial Base (DIB) to respond to the urgent demand for more critical
    munitions in a combat scenario, the JMWG is focused on finding near-
    term solutions to rapidly increase magazine depth for the high priority
    munitions most relevant to warfighting success in INDOPACOM. To that
    end, we have identified a set of INDOPACOM-focused priority munitions
    both in development and in production. The JWMG will recommend
    investments to diminish or eliminate the bottlenecks preventing the DIB
    from delivering these decisive munitions on time and at scale. I and
    the Joint Staff will work with OSD and the Services to impart that
    sense of warfighting urgency and to increase the agility of the DIB to
    reload our combat forces in the event of conflict.

        4. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, I am concerned that we
    are not taking active steps in INDOPACOM to preposition material and
    take advantage of ``left of conflict'' capabilities. Are you aware of
    any legislative roadblocks prohibiting the pre-positioning of deterrent
    capabilities today?
        Lieutenant General Caine. At present I am not aware of any
    legislative roadblocks preventing the pre-positioning of deterrent
    capabilities in INDOPACOM today. While the Department of Defense (DoD)
    is required to maintain pre-positioning programs, resource constraints
    remain a challenge. Increased funding and prioritization for pre-
    positioned war reserve materiel would help accelerate efforts, enabling
    more effective deterrence and support for operational readiness

        5. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    advising the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of
    Defense on the full extent of existing authorities like the Defense
    Sensitive Support program to best posture the United States and our
    allies for success against Communist China?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        6. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    releasing a memo within your first 30 days as a Chairman requiring that
    INDOPACOM come back with all possible operational requirements that may
    require title 50 or unique authority support?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Consistent with my testimony, I believe
    an early integrated approach is foundational to maintain the strong
    working relationships that currently exist. We cannot afford to miss
    any opportunities to integrate the Title 10 and Title 50 community. If
    confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure relevant frameworks for
    military forces to support activities of other U.S. Government
    departments and agencies are appropriately leveraged to pursue U.S.
    interests, to include at INDOPACOM.

        7. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    expanding the Defense Sensitive Support staff if required based on
    those findings?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will ensure our staffs
    are appropriately organized and staffed to meet current and future
    requirements. Consistent with my confirmation testimony, I look forward
    to continuing work within the Department and with colleagues in other
    U.S. Government departments and agencies to adjust existing
    arrangements as the need arises.
                                   readiness
        8. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, our Air Force's fleet-
    wide mission capable rate has dropped in 62 percent. Out of more than
    5,000 planes, which is already the smallest fleet in the service's
    history, 1,900 are unavailable for tasking at any given time. What do
    we need to improve the readiness of the Air Force?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experiences, there are many
    variables such as aircraft use and inventory, plan requirements,
    modernization efforts, divestment, and supply chain/maintenance issues
    that impact readiness. If confirmed, I look forward to working
    alongside Congress and the Department of the Air Force to appropriately
    resource the Air Force and improve is capability and capacity.

        9. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, what investments
    should we be making to help you maintain or increase the Air Force's
    readiness?
        Lieutenant General Caine. We should balance an acute need to
    modernize capabilities of our aircraft to ensure they remain effective
    against evolving threats, while at the same time adequately funding
    weapons system sustainment and modernization. If confirmed, I pledge
    continued collaboration with the Air Force and Congress to analyze and
    develop courses of action to best pursue our national security
    objectives.

        10. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, what other readiness
    concerns do you have or the Department of Defense?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have not been briefed on specific
    readiness challenges to the Department, but based on my experience,
    readiness challenges exist across many elements that span materiel,
    personnel, and training. Specifically, depleted munition inventories
    due to operational tempo and the transfer of munitions to allies,
    recruiting challenges, unrealized interoperability and shared
    operational concepts, and a challenged defense industrial base, to
    include modernized facilities like shipyards.
                       counter-unmanned aircraft systems
        11. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you advise
    the Department of Defense to organize, train and equip for the counter-
    unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mission?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Defending against the rapidly evolving
    UAS threat set presents both a capacity and capability challenge. If
    confirmed, I will review how the Department organizes, trains, and
    equips the counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mission to ensure
    our warfighters can meet this rapidly evolving threat.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                     alaska
        12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in a 2018
    interview, then Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, said that the
    Navy ``need[s] to have on-sea presence [in the Arctic] now that we have
    a blue water Arctic more times than not.'' He additionally pushed the
    Navy to look at ``warm[ing] up Adak again,'' not only for additional
    training but also for naval sea and air facilities as well as bulk fuel
    capability. When Chinese and Russian naval vessels and air assets enter
    the Alaska Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification
    Zone (ADIZ), aircraft and ships must often travel long distances, which
    stretch sustainment and make it more difficult to keep a constant
    presence in the region where our adversaries are located. Will you
    commit to reviewing our Arctic posture and specifically pushing for a
    naval base and bulk fuel facilities at Adak Island to increase presence
    in the Arctic?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. The United States is an Arctic
    nation and the strategic importance of the Arctic to America's enduring
    security and prosperity is clear. If confirmed, I commit to review our
    Arctic posture (forces, footprint, and agreements) and to provide the
    Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), and President
    best military advice regarding the Arctic and our presence there.

        13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Alaska is the only
    U.S. State in the Arctic region. What advantages do you see in having
    multiple ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S.
    Navy ships?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Multiple refueling ports in Western
    Alaska and the Aleutians would enhance U.S. Navy operational reach,
    reduce reliance on distant resupply points, and improve response
    capabilities in potential conflicts. Collaboration with commercial
    entities could strengthen logistics through warm port support
    contracts, dual-use facilities, and effective crisis-transition
    authorities. It also increases our strategic survivability.

        14. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in Alaska, we have
    seen joint Russian-Chinese air and naval exercises off our shores,
    incursions into our ADIZ and EEZ, and a Chinese spy balloon floating
    over our communities. In your opinion, what capabilities must advance
    to improve all-domain awareness in Alaska to respond to and be a
    persistent presence in the Arctic, while Russia and China have
    developed capabilities to hold our Homeland at risk?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I would continue efforts
    underway in the department aligned with the Golden Dome for America
    Executive Order. This effort is assessing the necessary capabilities to
    improve all-domain awareness across the country, to include Alaska, and
    provide a persistent presence in the needed regions. We must bolster
    our overall detection posture.

        15. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Alaska's importance
    as a strategic place is not only due to its location but because it
    forms the ``Three Pillars of Military Might'': 1) it acts as the
    cornerstone of missile defense by housing the majority of the Nation's
    ground based nuclear interceptors and many of the Nation's advanced
    radars; 2) by providing a strategic platform for expeditionary forces
    including the 11th Airborne Division (Arctic); and 3) being a hub for
    Air Combat Power where the largest concentration of fifth generation
    fighters in the world is located. Will you commit to visiting Alaska to
    understand the unique capabilities our State brings to deterrence?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I will.

        16. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Eielson Air Force
    Base (AFB) which in addition to being home to F-35 squadrons, F-16
    interceptors, and KC-135s along with hosting many nations each year for
    Red Flag events, still needs many more ``warm'' facilities to house KC-
    135 airframes. It can only really fit two right now. Additionally,
    other infrastructure is very outdated, and facilities are not keeping
    pace with Wainwright Army base. Will you work with me to acquire the
    infrastructure necessary to hold the tankers?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, my staff and I will work to
    ensure that the Joint Force has the right infrastructure in place to
    support our campaigning and contingency requirements. We will
    continually work to balance our infrastructure needs to ensure that we
    are making best use of congressional dollars. I look forward to working
    with you on the issues at Eielson Air Force Base, in particular.

        17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, my State holds the
    highest concentration of combat-coded fifth generation aircraft
    anywhere else in the country (over 100). Any conflict in the Indo-
    Pacific region will undoubtedly call upon Alaskan warfighters and our
    military assets.
        Lieutenant General Caine. For the last decade I've pressed every
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of the Air Force, and Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force on the need for more aerial refueling assets in
    Alaska to support the increasing training requirements and intercept
    missions.
        Last year, I wrote a letter to the previous Secretary of the Air
    Force, Frank Kendall, pressing him to fulfill the Air Force's
    commitments on this issue and Kendall replied with a signed memorandum
    finally codifying the movement of 4x KC-135s to Eielson AFB in so
    called ``active association''. This MUST NOT be delayed any longer.

        18. Senator Sullivan. Can I get your commitment that, if confirmed,
    you will see the completion of that KC-135 basing through to the end?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to working with
    the SECAF and CSAF toward resolving this issue.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, can I also get your
    commitment to work expedite the delivery time and increase the
    readiness rates of the KC-46?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, you have my commitment to working
    with the SECAF, CSAF, and vendor on expediting the delivery time and
    increasing the readiness rates of the KC-46.

        20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in our discussion
    in my office we spoke about the need for additional hangar and
    infrastructure capability at Deadhorse (near Prudhoe Bay) to help
    extend the Air Force's reach in the Arctic. The U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) Commander, General Gregory Guillot, as well as the U.S.
    Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Commander, General Kevin Schneider have both
    expressed interest in this location. Will you work with me, if
    confirmed, to get the military construction approved to support
    operations out of Deadhorse?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, my staff and I will work to
    ensure that the Joint Force has the right infrastructure in place to
    support our campaigning and contingency requirements. We will
    continually work to balance our infrastructure needs to ensure that we
    are making best use of congressional dollars. I look forward to working
    with you issues at Deadhorse, in particular.

        21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the 18th Fighter
    Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Eielson AFB is responsible for
    interception of Russian and Chinese strategic bombers and fighters that
    cross into the Alaskan ADIZ. Oftentimes however the 18th FIS is short
    of either pilots or mechanics to accomplish their mission. They always
    do accomplish the mission, but often at great extra cost in manpower
    and time (especially as intercepts have increased in the last year).
    Will you commit to looking at the task organization and real-life
    manning of this unit and its sustainers and ensure that they are manned
    100 percent to finish their mission?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Personnel staffing at individual
    installations is a Service specific requirement, if confirmed, I will
    commit to working with your office and the Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force to thoroughly review task organization and manning requirements
    of the 18th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Eielson AFB.

        22. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, as you are aware
    I've been fighting to get the KC-135 Active Association complete at
    Eielson AFB for nearly a decade and your predecessor signed off on it.
    I appreciate your commitment during your hearing to see this through to
    completion. I've ran into a number of issues with the Air Force Site
    Activation Task Force (SATF) which has visited Eielson nearly six times
    to conduct housing surveys. It appears they are using housing data from
    2023 to make decisions regarding the amount of available housing at
    Eielson. Will you commit to work with me to ensure that SATF is using
    the most current housing data to inform its decisions about housing at
    Eielson and to relook the Air Force's housing requirements as soon as
    possible to ensure we are meeting mission need at the base?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to working with
    the SecAf and CSAF to resolve this issue.

        23. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, as part of
    President Trump's Golden Dome program, there will almost certainly be a
    need to ensure that our advanced early warning radar systems like the
    E-7 are capable of detecting incoming aircraft and missile threats both
    at home and, if necessary, forward deployed. We have had a number of
    issues in Alaska with E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
    readiness rates due to aging airframes and parts. Will you commit to
    reviewing the E-7 program to make sure we are properly resourcing it
    and work with me to ensure that we have that capability on hand when
    required in Alaska?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I can commit to reviewing the E-7
    program with the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs to advise the
    Department on resourcing the right mix of sensors that best supports
    the Joint Force in defending the Homeland.

        24. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, 6 years ago, the
    Marine Corps was poised to alter its Indo-Pacific force laydown to
    account for the inherent risk of access, basing, and overflight (ABO)
    denial and limited training opportunities on Marine Corps bases across
    the Indo-Pacific. The 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
    Robert Neller, sent several teams to Alaska to assess infrastructure
    and training opportunities to support a Unit Deployment Program (UDP)
    to preposition assets the Marine Corps would need to surge forward in
    the event of conflict with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Alaska's
    benefits were as obvious then as they are now: Alaska provides year-
    round training for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in nearly
    every clime and place found on the globe; Alaska's cold weather
    training opportunities are cheaper than other overseas options and
    permit significantly larger forces to train simultaneously; perhaps
    most importantly, Alaska is in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
    (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Do you agree in your
    professional military opinion that it is vital for the Marine Corps to
    regularly practice in Arctic conditions here in the United States in a
    place that our adversaries regularly train in?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Marine Corps, as well as all the
    Services, must be able to operate in any climate or region to defend
    our national interests. In line with the DOD Arctic Strategy, the Joint
    Force must be trained, ready, and equipped to mitigate the risks
    associated with potential contingencies in the Arctic.
                           defense acquisition reform
        25. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, last year, Congress
    received the report of the Commission on Planning, Programming,
    Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Reform--a comprehensive report that
    outlined issues with the Department of Defense's defense acquisition
    system. I plan to lead efforts to cut bureaucracy and speed up
    innovation in the Pentagon and defense technology sector and I believe
    the recommendations in this report are a crucial step in doing so. Many
    of the reforms in that report do not need congressional legislation to
    execute but rather can be enacted by the Department of Defense. Will
    you commit to review the findings of that report and direct a Pentagon
    working group to begin implementation of the reform measures it
    outlined?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the report
    and work with the Department to implement the findings that will help
    achieve our strategic objectives and improve the effectiveness and
    efficiency of the resource allocation process.

        26. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, I am working with
    the Pentagon and through legislation to lead efforts that help
    innovative defense startups avoid the ``Valley of Death'' which results
    in long-procurement timelines and shuttered defense firms. Will you
    commit to work with me to fix this issue and to get feedback from non-
    traditional defense technology leaders and scholars to reform the
    Pentagon's processes?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        27. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, what issues did you
    run into as a defense entrepreneur related to this issue?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, the issues varied from the
    initial process of bidding for contracts, to the competition phase, to
    moving requirements, and then the burden of once selected,
    operationally providing the goods or services we were hired to provide.
    The FAR is extensive, and I acknowledge it was built for a reason, but
    if we want to go faster, we need to smartly remove bureaucracy, not add
    it in. I am not saying we need to make mistakes but rather look for
    ways to optimize efficiency and effectiveness. There are likely some
    elements of the FAR that may not be ideally suited for small
    businesses.

        28. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    reviewing the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
    as outlined in the PPBE Reform Commission report and provide Congress
    with updates as to the regulations that need to be removed or amended
    to speed up acquisition?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I will review the Defense Federal
    Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) as outlined in the PPBE
    Reform Commission report and work with the Department to provide
    Congress updates.

        29. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, in my view, one of
    the most important findings of the PPBE commission report involved
    reviewing defense technology portfolios and budget line items to align
    them with capabilities and provide agile budgeting flexibility by
    consolidating budget line items. The Vice Chiefs of each service all
    testified in a recent Readiness Subcommittee hearing that they agreed
    with the need for budget flexibility. Do you agree that this idea will
    give the Pentagon more agility to identify and execute important
    programs at scale that are needed by the warfighter?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, I agree. Aligning defense portfolios
    and budget line items to enhance budget flexibility is a critical step
    toward ensuring our warfighters have the resources they need when they
    need them. I support the PPBE Commission's recommendations to
    consolidate budget line items. This increased flexibility will allow
    the Joint Force to respond faster to emerging threats and technological
    advancements, increasing our alignment to strategic direction while
    speeding delivery of critical capabilities to the Joint warfighter.

        30. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, one of the most
    successful programs in the Pentagon the last several years has been the
    Space Development Agency (SDA), which has significantly reduced the
    time it takes to get satellite sensor systems into orbit cheaply and at
    scale. However, I am growing concerned that this program is going to be
    pulled into the slower Pentagon Joint Capabilities Integration and
    Development System (JCIDS), and potentially lose its technological
    edge. Will you commit to reviewing this program and helping Congress
    protect its current organizational configuration to enable scalable
    satellite launches?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, the space domain continues to
    become a more critical warfighting domain. I'm not familiar with all of
    the particulars and unable to commit until such time that I can do so.
    If confirmed I will look into this matter.

        31. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the Replicator
    Initiative seems to be trending positively overall with certain
    exquisite capabilities already acquired. The goal is to scale these
    capabilities this year. If the Replicator Initiative is successful,
    there will likely be several lessons learned from it about the
    procurement process. How do you plan to incorporate lessons learned
    from Replicator into the rest of the DOD procurement process?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff has been partnered with
    DIU, the Military Departments, and OSD since the inception of
    Replicator. DIU recently released Replicator lessons learned to the
    Deputy's Innovation Steering Group (DISG). If confirmed, I intend for
    the Joint Staff to review these lessons and incorporate any lessons
    that can positively influence Department procurement processes.

        32. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the F-47 program
    was awarded recently to Boeing. While I have no doubt that Boeing was
    chosen because it had the best aircraft prototype, I'd like to know how
    you plan to hold contractors (including Boeing) accountable for any
    failures or delays in this program given its recent history with the
    KC-46 which is ongoing?
        Lieutenant General Caine. With all new acquisitions there is risk.
    It is important to have open, clear communication of that risk with the
    contractor for the effective use of our limited resources. I will work
    with the Department to find the tools to support, and if needed
    motivate, contractors to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals to
    deliver this dominant capability to the Joint Force. I will also
    strongly partner with OUSD (A&S), OUSD (R&E), DSD, and others to ensure
    the fully aligned messaging of expectations to the contractor.

        33. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you think
    we learned from these previous programs that we should do differently
    with the F-47?
        Lieutenant General Caine. There is tremendous interplay between
    technological maturity and program performance. I will work with the
    Department to ensure valuable lessons learned are being applied to
    acquisition programs providing capabilities to the Joint Force. Some of
    the things we've learned include the importance of focusing on a
    limited set of key capabilities to reduce requirements creep, robust
    intellectual property management, and using Modular Open System
    Architecture (MOSA) to prevent vendor lock.
          critical mineral, national environmental policy act, energy
        34. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, during his term,
    President Biden passed 70 executive orders that restricted Alaska's
    ability to extract its own natural resources despite an acute need for
    them on both commercial and national security grounds. These executive
    orders have slowed down or completely hindered resource extraction and
    critical infrastructure projects important not just to the State but to
    the Nation as a whole. On the first day of his presidency, January 20,
    2025, President Trump signed an executive order entitled Unleashing
    Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. The order in part reads as
    follows:
        ``Section 3 Specific Agency Actions
        a. The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including
    but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of
    Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
    Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful
    authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps
    to:
        (i) rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions from
    any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any
    other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy set
    forth in section 2 of this order, including but not limited to agency
    actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20, 2021, and
    January 20, 2025; and
        (ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG potential,
    including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and export
    infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due
    consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated
    with such development . . .
        Section 3(d) in addition to the actions outlined in subsection (a)
    of this section, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, shall render all
    assistance requested by the Governor of Alaska to facilitate the
    clearing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, consistent
    with applicable law. All such requests for assistance shall be
    transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and
    Assistant to the President for Economic Policy for approval prior to
    initiation.
        Section 3(e) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
    under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, shall immediately
    review, revise, or rescind any agency action that may in any way
    hinder, slow or otherwise delay any critical project in the State of
    Alaska.''
        Will you commit fully to the intent of the President's executive
    order referenced above where the Department of the Army and the U.S
    Army Corps of Engineers will play a vital role?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Consistent with my role and authorities
    as CJCS, I commit to providing the President with my advice on all
    Executive Orders concerning the employment of the Joint Force.

        35. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, one of the results
    of President Biden's energy policies and the ``lock up'' of my State
    through his executive orders is an energy emergency affecting our
    national security that is unfolding on some Alaska bases. I spoke to
    Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently about this issue and
    explained to him that there has been a number of instances where
    commanders of bases like Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) in
    Anchorage had to tell servicemembers and their families to turn-down
    their heat, unplug personal property, and turn-off certain critical
    systems that sustain the base. This was done to preserve electricity
    and avoid brownouts in the region. Would U.S. national security be
    enhanced if there was a reliable source of clean-burning Alaskan
    natural gas available to supply the energy needs of these bases?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, reliable energy sources are
    critical to national security.

        36. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    working with the State of Alaska and me to secure a reliable source of
    energy for Alaska military bases? (LA/CAG/Nominee)
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
                            golden dome for america
        37. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Billy Mitchell, the
    Father of the U.S. Air Force once said, ``I believe . . . whoever
    controls Alaska controls the world. I think it is the most strategic
    place in the world. No other State but Alaska is strategically located
    to provide such a high level of Homeland Defense.'' At Fort Greely, the
    49th Missile Defense Battalion provides our Nation's first line of
    defense, tasked to defend against the threat of an intercontinental
    ballistic missile attack, command of 40 of the Nation's 44 ballistic
    missile interceptors, and reception of data from the nearby Long Range
    Discrimination Radar (LRDR). Fort Greely will soon house the new Next
    Generation Interceptor (NGI) missiles, but the program for this system
    has stalled due to high-cost overruns and manufacturing delays. The NGI
    will be an essential part of our national ballistic missile system.
    Will you commit to reviewing the NGI program, if confirmed, and keep
    Congress informed of what resources are required to field the missile
    on time?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        38. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Alaska is strategic
    not only for its geographic location but also because of its
    concentration of over 100 fifth generation fighters (the highest
    concentration in the world) as well as it being home to the 11th
    Airborne Division, the Nation's preeminent Arctic combat unit. If a war
    occurred in the INDOPACOM AOR, forces in Alaska would almost certainly
    be part of that fight and therefore would also be potentially targeted
    in their home bases. Do you believe that President Trump's ``Golden
    Dome for America'' should include Alaska as a critical site to be
    defended from missile attack given the facts stated above?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I understand that Golden Dome of America
    is a strategic priority for the administration and that there are
    ongoing efforts to determine the way forward with respect to how we are
    going to defend all of the Homeland from these threats, all within the
    guidance of the administration. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the
    current status of this work and associated analysis used to determine
    the geographic coverage of Golden Dome.

        39. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, as we discussed in
    my office, Alaska is the cornerstone of America's missile defense. My
    colleague Senator Cramer and I introduced the IRON DOME Act to
    complement President Trump's executive order and we will release a new
    GOLDEN DOME Act soon to build on DOD and industry's continued
    development of this system and we will continue to work on it
    throughout the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I asked the Vice Chief of Space
    Operations at Space Force, General Michael Guetlein, in my Readiness
    Subcommittee hearing on Joint Force Posture how we should think about
    integrate such a complex system as Golden Dome. His response was
    excellent.
        He said this undertaking is comparable in his mind only to The
    Manhattan Project. He said it's not because of technological complexity
    however, ``it is complex because of the number of organizations and the
    number of agencies that need to be involved.''
        He went on to say: ``Organizational behavior and culture are going
    to be our biggest challenges,'' and that we must have ``one entity in
    charge that has the full support of the Nation, from the President,
    from the Hill, and from the American people.''
        He then said we must empower that person or entity to be resourced
    and make decisions across organizational boundaries and that we must
    reinvigorate our industrial base--to include bringing in new,
    innovative entrants to create Golden Dome.
        Do you agree with General Guetlein?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. Given the heavy emphasis on the
    space domain and other critical organizations involved in delivering
    Golden Dome, it is imperative that we identify an entity to serve as
    the Department lead to synchronize the efforts of the Department across
    the full scope of capabilities.

        40. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you plan to
    get after these problems of organizational behavior, culture, and
    resourcing involved in Golden Dome?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commanders, Services and other
    stakeholders to identify areas where we can streamline decisionmaking,
    increase efficiency and speed delivery of capability.
        I will prioritize cultural change where required, by promoting and
    encouraging a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking,
    recognizing and rewarding innovative thinking and problem-solving.
        I will address resourcing by working with the Services and OSD to
    prioritize our investments and allocate resources more effectively. I
    will review the operational requirements for Golden Dome to ensure that
    our resources are aligned with our strategic priorities.
        Overall, addressing the problems of organizational behavior,
    culture, and resourcing within Golden Dome will require a sustained
    effort and commitment to change. I am committed to setting an
    environment that ensures the DOD is postured to deploy and maintain a
    next-generation missile defense shield.
                                     budget
        41. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, since World War II,
    U.S. defense spending has only dropped below 3 percent of gross
    domestic product (GDP) 4 times. Right now, we are barely spending over
    that threshold and the services are paying the heavy price for it in
    readiness. Senator Wicker's ``Peace Through Strength'' Act seeks to
    increase defense spending from 3 percent to 5 percent over time. Do you
    commit to advocate for the resources that we need to strengthen our
    services and ultimate save servicemembers' lives in the event of a
    conflict?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
                 small business administration 8(a) contractor
        42. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, I recently toured
    an Small Business Administration (SBA) 8(a) contracting operation and
    saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to the Federal customer in terms of
    cost and efficiency while delivering mission-critical solutions that
    increase our national security and warfighter readiness. When the rate
    for big government contractors is double 8(a) shops and about 45 days
    for 8(a) contractors versus 3 months for big government contractors,
    and 8(a) shops give the intellectual property (IP) to the government
    unlike big government contractors--would you agree as a former defense
    entrepreneur that the SBA 8(a) program one of the most efficient and
    effective ways to deliver results to the Federal Government?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.

        43. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, 8(a) contractors
    provide tremendous value to the Department of Defense. In addition to
    the rapid contracting capabilities and reduced costs compared to large
    original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and other services providers,
    8(a) organizations transfer the IP to the government. They do not
    encumber it with legal restrictions like the big government
    contractors. Clearly, SBA 8(a) programs are one of the most efficient
    ways to deliver immediate and enduring results to the Federal
    Government. Wouldn't you agree with me?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do, Senator.

        44. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, rapid response
    capabilities are essential to enable our warfighter to win on the
    battlefield. At the same time, our defense contractors must rapidly
    respond to the needs of our military to make the U.S. Military more
    lethal. Flexible and efficient contracting through the SBA 8(a) program
    is one trusted way to do this. Please explain how you will ensure that
    proven, dependable, and cost-effective 8(a) programs remain in place
    and supported by the Department of Defense.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Maintaining a robust field of defense
    contractors and contract vehicles that can rapidly respond to
    warfighter requirements is necessary to provide a lethal Joint Force. I
    will work with the Department's acquisition authorities to deliver new
    capabilities and advanced technologies to our Joint Force through
    flexible and efficient contracting.
                   shipbuilding and amphibious ship readiness
        45. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, we are in an
    emergency situation when it comes to amphibious ship readiness for the
    Marine Corps. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
    stated that roughly 50 percent of the amphibious fleet was in ``poor
    material condition'' including 5 out of 9 LHA/LHD [landing helicopter
    assault/landing helicopter dock] carriers and 90 percent of LSD (Dock
    Landing Ships). Those numbers are both shocking and unacceptable.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Last year, the Marine Corps did not
    deploy a full complement of ships for the entirety of the 15th
    Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit's (ARG/MEU) deployment
    because the USS Boxer broke down not long after leaving port. This is
    supposed to be America's 9-1-1 force. I have a feeling if this were a
    Carrier Strike Group this wouldn't be happening and that's why I need
    your help.
        Will you commit to solving any disagreements between the Navy and
    the Marine Corps about amphibious ship repair and maintenance and
    ensure we are able to deploy at least three ARG/MEUs at any one time as
    per the Commandant's guidance to the Corps?
        If confirmed, I commit to working with the Secretary, the CNO, and
    the CMC toward this benchmark.

        46. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, if you need
    Congress's help when it comes to resourcing amphibious ship readiness,
    will you commit to reporting back to us as soon as possible with a
    realistic account of what it would take to fix this issue?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.

        47. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, President Trump has
    expressed a vision where we work with our allies to make use of their
    existing shipbuilding capacity, leverage lessons learned from their
    shipyards and encourage their investment in our own maritime industrial
    base. What is the role that you see our allies playing in expanding our
    navy shipbuilding infrastructure and growing the Navy?
        Lieutenant General Caine. We must look at all options to increase
    our capabilities, including increasing our fleet. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working with the Department of the Navy on this critical
    matter.

        48. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, I am very concerned
    about both our ship and submarine readiness. I know the Navy has
    established an 80 percent surge readiness goal, but we are nowhere near
    there today. President Xi is deathly afraid of our submarines. What do
    you think needs to be done to get subs in and out of maintenance on
    time and what will you do to simultaneously increase sub maintenance
    capacity?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The capability and capacity of our
    submarine industrial base is critical. I would defer to the Department
    of the Navy for specifics on this matter, but if confirmed, I am
    committed to focusing on this important topic.

        49. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, recognizing that
    attack submarines are one of our biggest advantages compared to the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) do you agree that our inability to
    produce at least two submarines per year (and deliver them on time)
    increases risk in the Indo-Pacific during this decade?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. The inability to produce the
    requisite number of submarines increases risk. We must focus on the
    submarine industrial base and motivate the contractors to recruit and
    retain their workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
    SECNAV and CNO on this matter.

        50. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, our inability to
    produce at least two submarines per year obviously creates doubt in
    Australia that we can deliver 3-5 Virginia-class submarines as part of
    the optimal pathway for Pillar I. What will you tell your Australian
    counterparts to assure them of our commitment to increasing Virginia
    production and executing the optimal pathway?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Secretary of Defense has confirmed
    the U.S. commitment to AUKUS. If confirmed I will continue to work to
    boost the capacity and output of the Navy's four public shipyards,
    which are crucial for building, repairing, and modernizing Virginia-
    class submarines.
                           marine corps force design
        51. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, Marine Corps Force
    Design and its ``divest to invest'' initiatives are a bold idea to
    create an agile and lethal force that can maneuver effectively in a
    maritime environment. However, many Marine Corps advocates--myself
    included--are concerned that Force Design may be hollowing out certain
    critical combat capabilities that will detract from the Marine Corps'
    mission as the Nation's premiere ``9-1-1'' rapid response force.
    Militaries around the world have long understood ``combined arms'' to
    mean employing a combination of infantry, tanks, cannon artillery,
    engineers, and close support aircraft in a coordinated manner. Those
    same military today are endeavoring to add these systems to their
    inventories and we see their utility on battlefields in Ukraine. Yet,
    the Marine Corps has divested all the Marine Corps' tanks, two-thirds
    of its cannon artillery, nearly all its engineering equipment to breach
    enemy minefields and obstacles, all its engineering equipment that
    enables clearing and proofing of minefields, all its bridging, and
    nearly a third of its close support rotary and fixed wing aircraft. How
    is it possible for the Corps to have ``the most proficient combined
    arms teams on the globe'' without these needed weapons and items of
    equipment?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The capabilities of the Marine Corps to
    serve as a rapid reaction force are critical. If confirmed, I commit to
    working with the Commandant of the Marine Corps on ensuring that Marine
    Corps Force Design is in line with globally integrated requirements.

        52. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, part of Force
    Design rests on the assumption that the Marine Corps will be able to
    fill gaps in its combat power (i.e. borrowing tanks, bridging assets,
    etc.) from other services including the Navy and Army if the need
    arises. While the services do train together, there are concerns that
    training for specialized equipment between the services as well as
    inventory constraints in a major conflict will hinder the Marine Corps'
    ability to operate effectively. Given the assumptions of Force Design
    regarding equipment support, will you commit to reviewing integration
    between the Marine Corps and other services in support of operations
    plan (OPLAN) execution to include the readiness of the joint force to
    support Force Design?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes Senator. If confirmed I will serve as
    the Global Integrator and thus must understand these critical elements
    and the associated risks with each branch and sequel.

        53. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the Marine Corps is
    making a lot of assumptions in my opinion about Navy and Army support
    for Force Design to be successful. If confirmed, how do you intend to
    work with General Eric Smith and Admiral James Kilby in order to ensure
    alignment across the Navy and Marine Corps?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Navy Marine Corps Team, especially in
    the form of the ARG/MEU is a national asset. I am committed to working
    with the Marine Corps and Navy and all Services to advise the Secretary
    on how to develop a total force designed and aligned to meet the
    national defense strategy.

        54. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    reviewing the need for a formal agreement or memorandum of
    understanding between the services for equipment sharing and training
    in support of Force Design's assumptions and OPLAN execution?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If need be, yes Senator.

        55. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Caine, the Marine Corps'
    ability to conduct shore-to-shore operations in a contested maritime
    environment relies on its ability to field sufficient numbers of
    medium-sized ocean-going craft that can execute movement and landing
    operations at the operational and tactical level. The Landing Ship
    Medium (LSM) program is supposed to create a new ship that will achieve
    those operational requirements. The LSM program however has hit a major
    snag as the projected costs and time needed to construct these ships is
    much higher than anticipated requiring the Navy and Marine Corps to
    look for alternative solutions. These ships are vital to any
    contingency in the South China Sea or elsewhere. Will you commit to
    review the LSM program with the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval
    Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps and place influence on
    the need for speed in this program both within the services and in your
    communications with Congress?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to working with
    the Department of the Navy to ensure that capabilities are in line with
    globally integrated requirements.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                        inspector general investigation
        56. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Caine, Chairman Wicker and I
    sent a letter to the Acting Department of Defense Inspector General
    asking for an inquiry into the group chat on the commercially available
    communications application called Signal, which included members of the
    National Security Council.
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, in your capacity as the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will you ensure that no one
    under your preview will interfere with the independence of the
    Inspector General's investigation?
        I will, Senator.

        57. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Caine, if it comes to your
    attention that there is interference in the investigation, will you act
    accordingly?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will, Senator.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                           women, peace and security
        58. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Caine, could you describe
    the strategic advantage that authorities under the Women, Peace and
    Security Act at the Department of Defense give the United States over
    China?
        Lieutenant General Caine. By addressing destabilizing conditions
    that China ignores and by improving interoperability, DOD WPS
    authorities have strengthened critical United States military-to-
    military relationships in the Indo Pacific region, by increasing our
    understanding and value to the addressed cohorts, all of which provides
    the United States advantage over China.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                 u.s. indo-pacific command unfunded priorities
        59. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, successive
    administrations have identified China as the pacing threat and the
    Indo-Pacific as the priority theater. However, INDOPACOM provided
    Congress this year with $11 billion dollars in unfunded priorities,
    which includes missile defense systems, electronic warfare, munitions,
    and posture initiatives. Do you agree there is misalignment between
    DOD's strategy and spending priorities?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will examine the unfunded
    priorities from the Combatant Commands and pay close attention to where
    our strategy requirements have created significant gaps between the
    resources currently allocated to fund them.

        60. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what are the most
    significant operational and strategic risks to U.S. deterrence and
    warfighting credibility if INDOPACOM's funding gaps are not addressed?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Our priorities in the INDOPACIFIC focus
    on an integrated Joint Force and deterring China. Investment in these
    capabilities would go to ensure United States Forces are postured in
    the right locations, with the right capabilities to deter in
    competition and win in the event of crisis or conflict. If confirmed, I
    will review the operational challenges with the USINDOPACOM commander
    and be available to further address funding gaps in detail in a
    classified setting.

        61. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, would you be willing
    to consider significant changes to how the DOD develops and validates
    capability requirements (JCIDS process) because of how lengthy,
    inflexible, and bureaucratic it has become?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff is fully supportive and
    actively involved in modernizing the joint requirements process.
    Through our efforts in response to the FY24 NDAA Sec 811 and the
    proposed FORGED Act, we are developing evolutionary and revolutionary
    reforms to the JCIDS and JROC processes. This includes a
    congressionally directed clean-sheet rewrite of JCIDS in order to
    deliver the right capability to the warfighter at speed and at
    capacity. However, through these reform efforts, we must not sacrifice
    the CJCS's and JROC's ability to ensure a globally integrated and
    interoperable joint force that is responsive to the warfighter and
    aligned to the Department's strategy. Additionally, wholistic reform is
    needed, including the acquisition system and budget processes, to
    ensure significantly improve our capability development and delivery.
    We must also continue to retain the global view.

        62. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, given the pacing
    challenge posed by China, do you think the INDOPACOM Commander should
    have more of a say in the budgeting and joint resourcing process to
    ensure we are addressing the combatant commands' operational needs?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff will continue to work
    closely with INDOPACOM as the priority theater, to ensure their
    priorities are appropriately represented in the Program and Budget
    Review process.
            border security/department of homeland security mission
        63. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, while this
    Administration has repeatedly stated that the Indo-Pacific is the
    priority theater, Secretary Hegseth has authorized DOD to fund wasteful
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions at the border on a non-
    reimbursable basis. These growing costs threaten our readiness in the
    Indo-Pacific. What impact does non-reimbursable spending on the border
    mission have on DOD's ability to deter China's increasingly aggressive
    actions in the Indo-Pacific?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I am unfamiliar with the costs or funding
    source associated with this mission. If confirmed, I commit to
    reviewing the impacts of this spending with regard to our other
    critical mission sets.

        64. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, do you think it makes
    any sense for DOD to spend $2.5 million dollars--on one flight--to
    deport 100 undocumented immigrants to India?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I am unfamiliar with the costs expended
    on these flights. Being good stewards of the taxpayer's money is
    critical, and if confirmed, I commit to acting in a fiscally
    responsible manner.

        65. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, the Defense
    Department has spent $376 million in the 2 months on immigration
    activities related to securing the border and spent about $40 million
    of that moving fewer than 400 migrants designated for deportation
    through lockups at Guantanamo Bay. The majority of this is on a non-
    reimbursable basis for the DHS mission. Is spending almost $10 million
    per person a strategic and responsible use of DOD and taxpayer dollars?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I am unfamiliar with the costs expended
    on these flights. Being good stewards of the taxpayer's money is
    critical, and if confirmed, I commit to acting in a fiscally
    responsible manner.

        66. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, furthermore, does
    this type of conflict prepare the joint force for great power conflict?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The United States must be able to both
    defend our Homeland and deter and, if necessary, prevail in a great
    power conflict. If confirmed, as Chairman, I will work to advance the
    Joint Force's readiness for both missions.

        67. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, you highlighted
    securing the Homeland as a top priority. What specific role do you see
    for the military in assisting with border security, and how do you
    balance that with global operational commitments?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The POTUS and SecDef have made clear the
    protection of our sovereign territory is a key role of the Defense
    Department. Based on public reporting, the Department has moved out
    swiftly on border security, to include surging troops, reinforcing and
    repairing barriers, and supporting illegal alien removal operations
    through the operational leadership of Commander, U.S. Northern Command.
    If confirmed, I will review the specifies of our military tasks at the
    border and ensure my advice to the SecDef includes an assessment on the
    impact to our other global missions.

        68. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe the
    DOD's involvement in border security is a misallocation of resources?
    Why or why not?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I understand the Department is responding
    to a specific Requested for Assistance (RFA) from the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) at the southern border. If confirmed, I will
    review Department involvement and resource allocations and provide my
    recommendations to the SecDef.

        69. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, has there been any
    assessment of how this non-reimbursable spending affects military
    readiness?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experience, the Department
    manages impacts on readiness regardless of mission set through detailed
    and coordinated unit selection, and mission assignment processes. If
    confirmed, I will review the impacts for non-reimbursable spending on
    readiness.

        70. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, would you recommend
    changes to the policy of using military assets for immigration
    enforcement?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will continually work
    with the Services and Combatant Commands to assess the risk and cost of
    ongoing operations and advise the SecDef and POTUS on any recommended
    policy changes.

        71. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what alternative
    solutions do you propose to address border security concerns without
    impacting DOD operations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experience, over time I would
    expect that the application of advanced technologies and sensor
    networks could reduce the need for DOD to support and supplement DHS
    with manpower at the border.
                           missile defense of hawaii
        72. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, missile defense is an
    urgent priority as near-peer adversaries develop advanced long-range
    weapons. Hawaii, as the strategic center of the Indo-Pacific and home
    to command and control for INDOPACOM, is particularly vulnerable to
    these emerging threats. Do you agree that defending Hawaii against
    advanced missile threats--including hypersonics--should be a top
    priority for the Department?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, defending all our Homeland is the
    top priority for the department.

        73. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to
    ensuring that any future missile defense strategy and posture provides
    adequate protection to Hawaii from all types of missile threats?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review our missile
    defense strategy and posture to ensure it adequately considers defense
    of our entire Homeland.

        74. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what advancements in
    missile defense technology should the DOD prioritize to counter
    hypersonic threats?
        Lieutenant General Caine. As our adversaries' hypersonic systems
    become more advanced and more lethal, a multitude of DOD technological
    investments are required. I will defer specific technology advancements
    to the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Research and Engineering and
    Acquisition and Sustainment, however, countering the hypersonic threat
    requires leveraging the full suite of DOD capability. We must address
    the threat in all phases of flight, including left of launch, with all
    means available, beyond traditional kinetic hit-to-kill interceptors.

        75. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how does Hawaii's
    vulnerability compare to other key strategic locations in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with my team to
    assess any vulnerabilities not only with Hawaii, but other key
    strategic locations across the Indo-Pacific.

        76. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific
    infrastructure failures in Hawaii have been most detrimental to
    readiness, and how would you address them?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Infrastructure failures at Red Hill and
    the Pearl Harbor port and shipyard have undermined readiness. I support
    the current plan to address Red Hill and back the Navy's Shipyard
    Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP)--a initiative to upgrade dry
    docks, facilities, and equipment by streamlining workflows and boosting
    efficiency.

        77. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, should DOD prioritize
    cyber defenses for critical infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
    alongside physical missile defense?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, based on my experience, I expect
    adversaries will persistently target our critical infrastructure to
    disrupt the movement of United States Forces and resources at the
    outset of any conflict. To counter this, I would recommend continued
    close collaboration with the DHS, other Federal agencies, and industry
    partners. This includes investing in enhanced sensors, defense systems,
    redundancy, and resilience measures. We should also consider studying
    additional options to protect our Nation's critical infrastructure and
    key resources.
             infrastructure failures in hawaii and the indo-pacific
        78. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, the Indo-Pacific
    region has a massive need for infrastructure investment. Hawaii has
    faced multiple high-profile DOD failures, including watermain breaks
    and electrical issues. This affects readiness and our strategic posture
    in the region. How will you prioritize infrastructure recapitalization
    versus acquisition of new platforms when finalizing DOD's budget?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Department to leverage the Program and Budget Review process to
    prioritize Service investments in the infrastructure required to
    support our current and future weapon systems, platforms, and posture.

        79. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, will you hold the
    services accountable for ensuring that facilities critical to INDOPACOM
    are maintained and modernized?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. I am committed to working with all
    Services and combatant commands to advise the Secretary on how to
    maintain and modernize critical facilities to meet the national defense
    strategy.
                              allies and partners
        80. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, the Department of
    Defense must work closely alongside our allies and partners to meet the
    pacing challenge posed by China. The Joint Staff plays a key role in
    driving collaboration and integration of these efforts. How will you
    support and expand collaboration with allies and partners in the Indo-
    Pacific?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and the Commander USINDOPACOM to review our engagement strategy
    in the South China and East China Seas. Everything we do in the South
    and East China Seas requires close coordination with allies and
    partners. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue opportunities to
    operate and exercise with them in the region.
                classified information and operational security
        81. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever
    witnessed or been aware of others mishandling classified information
    within DOD and how was it addressed?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, as the Director of the Special
    Access Program Central Office I was aware of the fact that deviations
    had occurred from time to time. Those matters were handled by the
    relevant service and not by me or my office.

        82. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific
    safeguards would you implement to prevent leaks of Special Access
    Program (SAP) information?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Special Access Programs (SAPs) are highly
    classified programs that require special access controls to protect
    sensitive information. To prevent leaks, the following safeguards are
    typically implemented:
        1.  Need-to-Know Principle: Access to SAP information is strictly
    limited to individuals who have a legitimate need to know the
    information to perform their official duties. This principle ensures
    that only authorized personnel with a valid reason have access to
    sensitive information.
        2.  Security Clearances: Personnel with access to SAP information
    must hold a high-level security clearance, which involves a thorough
    background investigation and screening process. This ensures that only
    trustworthy individuals with a proven track record of handling
    sensitive information are granted access.
        3.  Compartmentalization: SAP information is often
    compartmentalized, meaning that it is divided into smaller, isolated
    segments, and access is restricted to specific compartments. This
    limits the amount of information an individual can access, reducing the
    risk of unauthorized disclosure.
        4.  Access Controls: Physical and electronic access controls, such
    as biometric authentication, secure doors, and encryption, are used to
    protect SAP information. These controls ensure that only authorized
    personnel can access sensitive areas or systems.
        5.  Encryption: SAP information is often encrypted to protect it
    from unauthorized access. Encryption algorithms and techniques, such as
    Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), are used to safeguard sensitive
    data both in transit and at rest.
        6.  Secure Communication Channels: SAP information is transmitted
    through secure communication channels, such as Secure Sockets Layer/
    Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
    Extensions (S/MIME), to prevent interception or eavesdropping.
        Please note that these safeguards are general in nature and may not
    be exhaustive or specific to a particular SAP. The actual security
    controls in place may vary depending on the program's specific
    requirements and the organization's security policies.

        83. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, can you confirm
    whether you have ever used personal or encrypted messaging applications
    for official communications?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, in my last job we occasionally
    used encrypted message apps for routine scheduling or logistical
    matters.

        84. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you balance
    operational security concerns with the need for rapid communication in
    crisis situations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Protecting operational security is a
    responsibility I take seriously. Rapid communication at the onset of a
    crisis should occur through networks appropriate for the information
    being discussed to prevent compromising military operations.
             u.s. indo-pacific command funding and strategic risks
        85. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific
    programs within INDOPACOM's unfunded priorities list do you believe are
    most urgent?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will continue to assess
    the capabilities from Unfunded Priority Lists from all Combatant
    Commands. With INDOPACOM specifically, I believe that Guam Defense
    System, Space enabling capabilities, Joint Fires Network, and long-
    range fires require Department level attention.

        86. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how should Congress
    prioritize funding between missile defense, electronic warfare, and
    posture initiatives?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Funding prioritization should be based on
    the strategic needs of the Joint Force to meet the National Defense
    Strategy. Focusing on expanding the inventories of current and future
    munitions, increasing electronic warfare capabilities in the space
    domain, and fielding the necessary forces are critical to protect the
    Homeland.

        87. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, wat are the long-term
    consequences if these funding gaps persist beyond this fiscal year?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Long-term persistent funding gaps in
    INDOPACOM will impact the Joint Force's ability to defend U.S.
    territories and interests in the Pacific, hinder the development of
    kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities and slow the advancement of ISR
    and C2 systems.

        88. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, are there any
    inefficiencies within the DOD budget that could be reallocated to meet
    INDOPACOM's needs?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will support the
    Department's efforts to analyze the budget for wasteful and low impact
    programs with the intent to reallocate resourcing to meet the
    Department's strategic goals.
                        loyalty and constitutional duty
        89. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you respond
    if given an order that falls in a legal gray area but is politically
    charged?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I will consult with relevant
    counsel, and I will not follow an unlawful order. I am bound by my oath
    to follow all lawful orders.

        90. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, can you provide an
    example from your career where you had to push back against unlawful or
    unethical directives?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, I have not been issued an
    unlawful or unethical directive during my previous tours in the
    service.

        91. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what steps would you
    take to reinforce the apolitical nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed, I commit to
    speaking truth to power, regardless of politics and upholding the
    standards of conduct contained in my Commission, my Oath of Office and
    the Constitution.
                    allies and partners in the indo-pacific
        92. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you enhance
    military-to-military cooperation with key allies like Japan and
    Australia?
        Lieutenant General Caine. For Japan, if confirmed, I would support
    the current actions, as recently reported in the news following the
    Secretary of Defense's trip. These include pursuing concrete steps to
    deepen defense cooperation with Japan across a range of areas, such as
    enhancing bilateral training and exercises, strengthening Alliance
    force posture and presence and promoting defense equipment and
    technology cooperation.
        For Australia I would continue to support engagements, exercises
    and interoperability, examine United States force posture initiatives,
    and support broader United States initiatives such as AUKUS and defense
    industrial collaboration.

        93. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what role do you see
    emerging partners (e.g., India, the Philippines) playing in countering
    Chinese aggression?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I agree with the President and Secretary
    of Defense's statements concerning the importance of allies and
    partners playing a leading role in providing for their own defense. If
    confirmed, I would examine how the military can best support United
    States policy, to include increasing interoperability, expanding joint
    and combined operations, and making targeted activities and investments
    that provide measurable returns on investment in their defense
    capabilities.

        94. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you
    navigate tensions between allies who have differing threat perceptions
    of China?
        Lieutenant General Caine. While our allies may have differing
    threat perceptions of China, they share our vision of a free and open
    Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary to advance
    this shared understanding among our allies while taking into account
    any differences in perspectives.

        95. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how can the DOD
    improve joint military exercises to enhance interoperability with
    regional partners?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Currently, Combatant Commands regularly
    exercise and train with their regional allies and partners. One area
    where the DOD has improved and can continue to improve joint military
    exercise interoperability is by leveraging our annual Large Scale
    Global Exercise (LSGE), a series of multiple Field Training Exercises
    that occur within a 90-day window. As part of ELITE CONSTELLATION, a
    multi-year Joint Force global integration readiness campaign, LSGE
    consists of large-scale training and exercises that validate joint and
    combined interoperability; improve joint force readiness; and provide a
    venue for future force design, testing, and evaluation. LSGE
    demonstrates United States, Allied and Partner military capacity and
    capability to deter great power adversaries. The Joint Force will
    conduct the FY25 LSGE in the USINDOPACOM AOR with multiple, global
    linkages to other Combatant Command exercises and multiple, integrated
    joint/combined major force elements.
        Additionally, DOD, through the Combatant Commands, can use 10 USC
    Section 321 ``Training with friendly foreign countries: payment of
    training and exercise expenses'' to enhance interoperability of United
    States Forces with allies and partners. Section 321 authorizes
    Combatant Commands to pay incremental expenses of participating
    developing nations when training in exercises alongside United States
    Forces. These exercises enhance interoperability with allies and
    partners by increasing the scale and frequency of partner engagements,
    benefiting the United States and improving allied burden sharing over
    the long term.

        96. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you view the
    current United States force posture of 28,500 servicemembers in South
    Korea?
        Lieutenant General Caine. An increasingly aggressive China poses
    both short and long-term challenges, along with North Korea's long-
    range missile and nuclear programs represent an immediate security
    challenge. If confirmed, I will assess the United States Military
    presence in the Indo-Pacific against our national strategic interests
    and make recommendations to the SecDef and the President.

        97. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, are you open to
    removing troops from South Korea?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    USINDOPACOM, United States Forces Korea, South Korea, and other
    regional allies to review the United States force posture in South
    Korea and provide my recommendations.

        98. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, if so, how many?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    USINDOPACOM, United States Forces Korea, South Korea, and other
    regional allies to review the United States force posture in South
    Korea and provide my recommendations.
                 overall department of defense strategic vision
        99. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you see as
    the greatest challenge facing the United States Military over the next
    decade?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I believe the greatest challenge facing
    the United States Military over the next decade is China's rapid
    modernization and expansion of its military capabilities.

        100. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you
    balance traditional military deterrence with emerging domains like
    cyber and space warfare?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Balancing traditional military deterrence
    with emerging domains like cyber and space requires integrating both
    established and modern capabilities. Traditional deterrence focuses on
    strength and military readiness, while space and cyber are about
    resilience and competition. These domains are crucial to our security,
    as they support military and economic infrastructure. Protecting space
    and cyber capabilities is vital for maintaining credible deterrence. If
    confirmed, I will actively work to normalize operations in these
    emerging domains alongside traditional operations, prioritizing
    warfighting and protecting the Joint Force.

        101. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, in your view, what
    is the most significant misalignment between U.S. defense strategy and
    budgetary allocations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Implementing the National Defense
    Strategy requires rigorous prioritization to resource the critical
    capabilities necessary to achieve the Nation's strategic objectives.
        Congressional support through timely and sustained appropriations
    and budget flexibility is crucial for aligning resources with the
    Department's defense strategy.
                          modernization and innovation
        102. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Caine, you mentioned your
    experience in the venture capital world as a unique asset for
    modernizing business systems and revitalizing the Defense Industrial
    Base. How would you leverage that experience to accelerate innovation,
    particularly in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, and
    emerging technologies?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, we need to establish a process
    to allow our IT and business systems to onboard critical emerging
    technologies and the authorities to operate at a much faster pace. We
    will occasionally fail, but that is a part of quick and thoughtful
    innovation.

        103. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, how will you support
    initiatives like Replicator, which is focused on accelerating the
    delivery of critical joint capabilities to the warfighter at speed and
    scale?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff is supportive of
    initiatives like Replicator and has specifically supported Replicator
    since its inception through joint experimentation, joint requirements,
    and congressional engagement. I intend for the Joint Staff to continue
    to provide this support to accelerate the delivery of critical joint
    capabilities to the warfighter.

        104. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you see as the Joint Staff's
    role in rapidly delivering innovative and commercial capabilities to
    the warfighter?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff ensures capabilities are
    founded on Joint Requirements, to ensure warfighters receive solutions
    that fill Joint Warfighting needs. The Joint Staff also conducts joint
    experimentation to provide capabilities that are optimized for the
    Joint fight. Both of these functions also facilitate the Joint
    Emergent/Urgent Operational Needs (JEON/JUON) processes, which are
    designed to rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter in response
    to Combatant Command operational needs. The Joint Staff and the
    Chairman, as the Global Integrator, represent the voice of the Joint
    Warfighter in the reform conversation.
                             joint force readiness
        105. Lieutenant General Caine, given the increasing threats from
    peer competitors and the challenges posed by a protracted conflict, how
    would you ensure that the Joint Force maintains a high level of
    readiness while balancing resource constraints?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will carefully weigh my
    advice and recommendations against the priorities of the Nation Defense
    Strategy (NDS) and recommend prudent use of the Joint Force in order to
    preserve readiness for our highest priority threats.
                                 china strategy
        106. Lieutenant General Caine, you noted that China poses a growing
    threat in the Indo-Pacific. What military strategies do you believe
    will be most effective in deterring China's aggression while avoiding
    escalation into open conflict?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will undertake a thorough
    review of the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific and develop my
    recommendations for appropriate military strategies.
                         combatant command coordination
        107. Lieutenant General Caine, you have strong relationships with
    combatant commanders. How would you ensure effective coordination
    between commands while avoiding bureaucratic inefficiencies or
    conflicts over jurisdiction?
        Lieutenant General Caine. In my 34 years of military service, I
    have led warfighters in a variety of roles across the Joint Force and
    Interagency. I have built a global perspective on the challenges
    America faces in achieving effective deterrence against our
    adversaries. Each of these experiences has prepared me for the humbling
    responsibility of serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
    as the global integrator. If confirmed, I will continue to work with
    Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs to ensure effective
    coordination.
                      personnel and recruiting challenges
        108. Lieutenant General Caine, recruiting and retention remain
    critical challenges for the Armed Forces. What new approaches would you
    consider to strengthen recruitment, particularly among younger
    generations with shifting career expectations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Recruiting the next generation of
    servicemembers is a national imperative. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Services to ensure our approach reflects the realities
    of today's competitive labor market. The Joint Force depends on the
    talent, drive, and dedication found in America's sons and daughters to
    meet the challenges of the 21st century. I will support efforts across
    the Department to strengthen recruiting and ensure our force remains
    ready, capable, and representative of the Nation we serve.
                    military advice and policy disagreements
        109. Lieutenant General Caine, you emphasized providing apolitical
    military advice. Can you share an example from your career where your
    advice differed from civilian leadership's priorities, and how you
    handled that situation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, in my last role as the Associate
    Director for Military Affairs at CIA I would often present a range of
    options for Director Burns and Deputy Director Cohen to consider. If
    asked to provide my recommendation I would do so. Once a decision was
    made by my civilian leaders my job became the implementation of that
    decision. If confirmed I will continue with this tradition and the
    associated standard of conduct.
                           warrior ethos and culture
        110. Lieutenant General Caine, you emphasized the importance of a
    strong warrior ethos and clear standards. How do you balance
    maintaining high military standards with evolving societal expectations
    regarding diversity, inclusion, and personnel policies?
        Lieutenant General Caine. We don't have much of a military without
    the incredible 2.8 million members of the Joint Force that selflessly
    joined the service to do something more important than themselves. If
    confirmed, I think it's an opportunity for me to be another voice of
    encouragement for those young men and women who have the capability and
    meet the standards to come into the service and do something that they
    will forever hold so high in their history. The chance to serve this
    Nation is a special privilege for those of us that have come into the
    cloth of our Nation and served, and I hope that I'll be able to
    encourage others to do so.
                          lessons from past conflicts
        111. Lieutenant General Caine, given your experience in combat and
    strategic roles, what key lessons from past conflicts--such as Iraq,
    Afghanistan, or Ukraine--do you believe should shape United States
    Military planning moving forward?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, warfighting at scale is quickly
    progressing. We are now facing kinetic exchanges with significantly
    more rounds per hour than we have ever seen before. Mass and
    simultaneity are real threats, and we must evolve our warfighting
    approach to meet the mass challenges we will face. Autonomy and AI are
    all a part of this. Actions in space and cyber are now the norm and we
    must evolve our holistic warfighting approach in an ever more joint,
    coalition, and interoperable way to win on the battlefields of the
    future.
                        allied and partner coordination
        112. Lieutenant General Caine, with the emphasis on working with
    allies and partners to deter adversaries, what steps would you take to
    strengthen military interoperability and joint planning with key allies
    such as NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], Japan, and
    Australia?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will undertake a thorough
    review of the military situation in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and,
    informed by the President and the Secretary's guidance, develop my
    recommendations for specific steps we should take to strengthen
    military interoperability and joint planning with key allies.
                  independence of uniformed military attorneys
        113. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that uniformed
    military attorneys are shielded from external pressures that could
    compromise their legal advice?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, IAW 10 USC 156, there is a
    Legal Counsel selected by a board of officers who is an independent
    legal advisor to me. The statute specifically states that ``[n]o
    officer or employee of the Department of Defense may interfere with the
    ability of the Legal Counsel to give independent legal advice to the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.'' I will work closely with my LC and his team as I prepare my
    military advice for the Secretary of Defense and the President.

        114. Lieutenant General Caine, can you provide an example from your
    career where you upheld the independence of military attorneys in a
    challenging situation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, there were several examples
    during the assignment at the Joint Special Operations Command where a
    legal counsel's opinion shaped the outcome of a particular tactical
    operation. This was a routine event, and I greatly respect and
    appreciate the counsel that I have had.
                          strategic guidance documents
        115. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure seamless
    integration and coordination between the National Security Strategy,
    National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will first work with the
    Secretary of Defense to have clear processes and governance in place
    for the Joint Force to implement United States strategies. I will
    ensure the Joint Force leaders have a shared understanding of the
    President and SecDef's priorities and guidance across their missions
    and responsibilities, including from the NSS, NDS, and NMS. To maintain
    integration throughout strategy implementation, I will review the
    existing processes for the Joint Force to implement the strategies and
    cyclically assess progress and risk.

        116. Lieutenant General Caine, what mechanisms would you implement
    to improve compliance with strategic guidance documents across DOD
    components?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review existing
    processes for reporting and assessing progress against strategic
    guidance and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense if I
    determine changes are necessary. I will work with Joint Force leaders
    to maintain shared understanding of strategic guidance and risks to
    executing the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy.
    I will make necessary changes to Joint Staff processes to ensure we
    maintain a global perspective and can provide military options to the
    Secretary of Defense and President, aligned to their strategic
    guidance.

        117. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you address potential
    conflicts or misalignment between the President's National Security
    Strategy and the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will advise and provide
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and President on any
    potential conflicts or misalignment between the National Security
    Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

        118. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you measure the
    effectiveness of the Chairman's Risk Assessment in shaping defense
    policy?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Identifying risk to our strategic
    guidance helps us determine what resources and authorities to pursue to
    achieve the policies of the department and the administration. If
    confirmed, I will seek to maximize effectiveness of the Chairman's Risk
    Assessment by aligning the risk assessed with other strategic documents
    created by the Joint Staff that inform the budget and Defense Planning
    Guidance. Effectiveness is in part measured by whether the risks and
    gaps identified are addressed in the DPG and the President's budget. As
    such, based on my military assessments, we will partner with the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense for DOD's budget submissions and
    legislative proposals.
        If confirmed, I look forward to briefing my risk assessment to
    Congress in 2026 to inform the congressional budgeting process.
                             use of military force
        119. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you balance military
    effectiveness with legal and ethical considerations when recommending
    rules of engagement?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The President, as Commander-in-Chief,
    determines when to use military force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
    advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense and should
    actively advise on the policies for the use of military force and the
    rules of engagement. If confirmed, my recommendations to the President
    and Secretary of Defense on the use of military force will be
    consistent with U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, I
    would consider the probability of success, cost in terms of casualties,
    and strategic risk.

        120. Lieutenant General Caine, what role do you see emerging
    technologies (e.g., AI, autonomous systems) playing in shaping future
    rules of engagement?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Emerging technologies offer the potential
    to revolutionize warfare and delivering those capabilities in a timely
    manner will continue to posture the Joint force for success on the
    modern battlefield. If confirmed, I would serve as one of the tri-
    chairs with OSD on the DODD 3000.09 Senior Review Board (SRB), which
    reviews autonomous capabilities with a focus on minimizing the
    probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-
    autonomous weapon systems.

        121. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that U.S.
    Forces are properly trained and equipped to operate under evolving
    rules of engagement?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The CJCS must ensure the military's ROE
    are regularly reviewed and updated in response to changing geopolitical
    environments, threats, and legal considerations. This review involves
    working closely with senior defense officials, legal advisors, and
    policymakers to ensure ROE are adapted as needed. These updates should
    be disseminated throughout the military leadership chain ensuring
    alignment with the broader strategic objectives and national defense
    priorities. The CJCS should ensure training programs for all
    servicemembers are continuously updated to include ROE considerations.
    These updates involve incorporating ROE into combat and mission
    planning, simulation exercises, and real-world operations. The training
    should cover not just the ``how'' of engaging targets, but also the
    ``why,'' emphasizing the strategic, ethical, and legal imperatives
    behind the rules.
                            collective self-defense
        122. Lieutenant General Caine, what specific criteria would you use
    to determine which allied forces qualify for U.S. collective self-
    defense support?
        Lieutenant General Caine. When collective self-defense rules of
    engagement are authorized, United States Forces may defend foreign
    forces against any attack or threat of imminent attack. If confirmed, I
    will consider the legal basis of the request, necessity and
    proportionality, alignment with U.S. interests, and operational
    circumstances of the request. If confirmed, I will review these factors
    before I make any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and
    President.

        123. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you see collective self-
    defense fitting into broader U.S. deterrence strategies?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Collective self-defense is a cornerstone
    of broader U.S. deterrence strategies. It demonstrates a commitment to
    protecting allies, which strengthens partnerships and deters
    adversaries from attacking weaker States. Additionally, it shows the
    U.S. is willing to act decisively in defense of its allies, bolstering
    our credibility and thereby increasing deterrence. Additionally, it
    fosters a sense of shared responsibility and burden-sharing among
    allies, encouraging them to invest in their own defense and deterrence
    strategies. If confirmed, I will consider what our partners are doing
    to deter shared threats before making a recommendation to the Secretary
    of Defense and President.
                              title 50 authorities
        124. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you assess the current
    effectiveness of title 50 authorities in enabling interagency
    cooperation in military operations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Based on my experience, the current title
    50 authorities are highly effective in enabling interagency cooperation
    in military operations. Title 50 actions have a proven track record of
    success in providing the needed intelligence support to make our
    military operations more effective. If confirmed I will continue to
    collaborate and leverage the interagency to pursue U.S. interests
    globally.

        125. Lieutenant General Caine, under what circumstances would you
    advocate for changes or modifications to title 50 authorities?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If changes or modifications are required
    to support maximizing the effectiveness of military operations in
    support of U.S. interests, I will advocate on the issue.
              civilian casualties and civilian harm and mitigation
        126. Lieutenant General Caine, what steps would you take to improve
    data-sharing policies to facilitate timely investigations of civilian
    casualties?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I would seek to improve
    data-sharing by supporting efforts that balance efficiency with
    security and accountability.

        127. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that findings
    from civilian casualty investigations are effectively used to refine
    operational practices and reduce future risks?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I would support ensuring
    effective utilization of civilian casualty investigation findings by
    pursuing a systematic approach that integrates analysis,
    implementation, and continuous monitoring.

        128. Lieutenant General Caine, the Joint Staff plays a crucial role
    in implementing the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) Action
    Plan (CHMR-AP), including incorporating CHMR into joint doctrine,
    planning, and operations and ensuring that efforts to mitigate civilian
    harm are considered in all phases of military operations. If confirmed,
    how will you continue to advance and resource these efforts?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will comply with
    statutory requirements and carry out the guidance set forth in DOD
    policy on CHMR.

        129. Lieutenant General Caine, how will you implement civilian harm
    and mitigation response efforts in security cooperation initiatives and
    programs with allies and partners?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will comply with
    statutory requirements and carry out the guidance set forth in DOD
    policy on CHMR. I will examine and provide my military advice on
    incorporating civilian harm risk assessment and mitigation methods into
    DOD security cooperation efforts.
                   joint force operations and experimentation
        130. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you foresee joint force
    experimentation contributing to overcoming anti-access and area denial
    (A2/AD) threats?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Addressing the challenge posed by anti-
    access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities is a critical priority for
    the Joint Force. Joint force experimentation plays a vital role in
    understanding and mitigating these threats. I would assess that a
    focused experimentation campaign, centered on threat-based concepts of
    employment, is essential to identifying and refining the capabilities
    needed to maintain our warfighter advantage.
        Specifically, experimentation allows us to evaluate emerging
    technologies and innovative approaches to overcome A2/AD systems, and
    to articulate critical capability requirements for future development.
    This is important as competitors continue to advance their systems to
    defeat ours and we must constantly experiment and adapt to stay ahead.
    From experimentation with technology to experimenting with new
    operating approaches, the Joint Force can only be ready if we
    constantly adapt to the changing character of war.

        131. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you ensure that lessons
    from joint experimentation are effectively translated into operational
    capabilities?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Joint Staff has established a process
    to translate the Joint Warfighting Concept into needed capabilities.
    This includes identifying key requirements, prioritizing those needing
    acceleration, and coordinating with the Services through Joint
    Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to assign development leads.
    Recognizing the need for speed, the Joint Staff is continuously
    reviewing these processes to identify capabilities that should be
    accelerated. We are also increasing end-user involvement in
    experimentation to better align capabilities with operational needs and
    facilitate smoother transitions.
        Translating experimental lessons into operational capabilities
    remains challenging. A collaborative approach with OSD, Combatant
    Commands, and the Services is essential. We focus on identifying
    materiel and non-materiel solutions through rigorous experimentation
    and field demonstrations, informing investment recommendations. We will
    continue supporting Joint Staff-led collaboration venues and
    prioritizing coordination with stakeholders to ensure effective
    implementation and Joint Force integration of new capabilities.

        132. Lieutenant General Caine, what role should private sector
    innovation play in joint experimentation efforts?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Private sector innovation is crucial for
    DOD joint experimentation. It accelerates technology integration,
    reduces development time, and fosters dual-use applications.
    Collaboration enables rapid prototyping, testing, and burden-sharing.
    Aligning private sector investment with DOD needs and incorporating
    warfighter feedback ensures technologies meet operational requirements.
    Frequent communication and iterative development are key to successful
    partnerships.
               joint force headquarters and contingency planning
        133. Lieutenant General Caine, given the short warning times for
    potential conflicts, do you believe the current model for standing up
    Joint Force Headquarters is sufficient?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Proactively establishing subordinate
    Joint Force headquarters before a crisis erupts could indeed enhance
    operational readiness, planning, and preparedness. However, this must
    be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A thorough analysis is crucial to
    determine when the benefits of early establishment outweigh the
    potential costs.

        134. Lieutenant General Caine, how would you assess the tradeoffs
    between maintaining a standing Joint Force Headquarters versus
    activating them in a time of crisis?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Existing structures leverages the proven
    capabilities of service components and their ability to function as
    JTFs, provides flexibility and responsiveness to address a wide range
    of potential crises but they take time to transition to full JTFs.
    Meanwhile, standby JTFs are ready but comes with costs such as manpower
    allocation, staff workload, and financial implications.

        135. Lieutenant General Caine, what metrics would you use to
    determine the effectiveness of a Joint Force Headquarters in executing
    contingency plans?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
    Department's lessons learned and best practices from recent operations
    and exercises to establish metrics and measures of effectiveness to
    guide future use of Joint Force Headquarters during contingencies.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                     ethics
        136. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to not engaging in any lobbying activities (including
    unregistered ``shadow'' or ``behind-the-scenes'' lobbying under the
    guise of consulting or advising on DOD-related matters) at DOD or any
    of its components for 4 years after leaving DOD?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Senator, if confirmed I will continue to
    comply with DOD Ethics regulations and guidance. As I did in my first
    retirement, I have no intent to lobby. I am focused on the job at
    hand--if confirmed.

        137. Lieutenant General Caine, during your nomination process, did
    anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other closely related
    entity approach you about your loyalty to President Trump?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        138. Lieutenant General Caine, if you were approached about your
    loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or other
    similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that pledge
    or oath.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I was not approached about my loyalty to
    the President. My loyalty remains in the oath I have upheld for 34
    years, the oath to support and defend the Constitution. I was never
    asked a single loyalty question during my interview process.

        139. Lieutenant General Caine, if you were approached about your
    loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal representations of
    loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I was not approached about my loyalty to
    the President. My loyalty remains in the oath I have upheld for 34
    years, the oath to support and defend the Constitution. I was never
    asked a single loyalty question during my interview process.

        140. Lieutenant General Caine, in November 2024, the New York Times
    and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top adviser to
    President Trump, allegedly requested payment from prospective political
    appointees to promote their candidacies for top positions within the
    administration. Did you discuss the possibility of joining the
    administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I don't know who Boris Epshteyn is nor
    have I met anyone by that name.

        141. Lieutenant General Caine, if you did discuss the possibility
    of joining the administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr. Epshteyn seek
    payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a position within the
    administration?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I don't know who Boris Epshteyn is nor
    have I met anyone by that name.

        142. Lieutenant General Caine, at any time, did lawyers for
    President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
    regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
    explain the information that they provided you, including copies of
    documents, what was discussed during any calls, and any other
    information pertaining to this interaction.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I don't know who Boris Epshteyn is nor
    have I met anyone by that name.

        143. Lieutenant General Caine, if you own any defense contractor
    stock, will you divest it to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of
    interest?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed and pursuant to ethics
    guidance issued to me by the Department, I will instruct my financial
    advisor to comply with any/all legal guidance from ethics counsel on
    any defense related holdings.

        144. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you consider the role of the
    press in a democracy?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The press plays an essential role in
    informing the American public. In a democracy, access to timely and
    accurate information builds trust and understanding between the
    military and the citizens we serve. If confirmed, I will support
    efforts to ensure the Joint Staff communicates clearly and credibly,
    while staying aligned with civilian leadership and respecting the
    responsibilities of the services and combatant commands.

        145. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit not to retaliate,
    including by denying access to DOD officials or facilities, against
    news outlets or individual journalists who publish articles that are
    critical of you, your office, DOD, or the Trump administration?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        146. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever been accused of
    sexually harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work environment
    for another individual in a personal or professional capacity? Provide
    a list of all instances in which you have been accused of sexually
    harassing, assaulting, or creating a hostile work environment for an
    individual and the behavior of which you were accused.
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        147. Lieutenant General Caine, have you requested, or has anyone
    requested on your behalf, that any other person or third party sign a
    nondisclosure, confidentiality, non-disparagement, or similar agreement
    regarding your conduct in a personal or professional capacity?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        148. Lieutenant General Caine, will you voluntarily release any
    individual from any such agreements before a committee vote on your
    nomination?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have no such agreements in place with
    anyone.

        149. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever paid or promised to
    pay, or has anyone paid or promised to pay on your behalf, an
    individual as part of any non-disclosure, confidentiality, non-
    disparagement, or similar agreement?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have not.

        150. Lieutenant General Caine, if the answer to question above was
    yes, how much was promised, how much was paid, and what were the
    circumstances?
        Lieutenant General Caine. None of the applicable answers were
    ``Yes''

        151. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to recuse yourself
    from all particular matters involving your former clients and employers
    for at least 4 years?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I will comply with any/all legal guidance
    provided to me by the DOD Office of Ethics and if appropriate pursuant
    to that guidance recuse myself. At this time, I do not believe that I
    have any particular matters or concerns that would fit this situation.

        152. Lieutenant General Caine, were you at any time, or are you
    currently, contacted by or under investigation or review by any
    inspector general personnel for any reason?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.
                              domestic deployment
        153. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed will you make sure the
    public knows as much as practicable why and under what authorities the
    Guard is being deployed domestically?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and other senior leaders to
    ensure there is clarity, both inside and outside the Department,
    regarding the role, authority, and purpose behind National Guard
    deployments. While those deployment decisions are made by civilian
    leaders or Governors, the Joint Staff plays an important role in
    ensuring consistent and accurate communication. I will support efforts
    to inform the public, to the extent practicable, when significant
    changes occur in how or why the Guard is being used domestically,
    always in coordination with the appropriate authorities.

        154. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed will you make sure the
    public knows as much as practicable when there are significant changes
    in why and under what authorities the Guard is being deployed
    domestically?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and other senior leaders to
    ensure there is clarity, both inside and outside the Department,
    regarding the role, authority, and purpose behind National Guard
    deployments. While those deployment decisions are made by civilian
    leaders or Governors, the Joint Staff plays an important role in
    ensuring consistent and accurate communication. I will support efforts
    to inform the public, to the extent practicable, when significant
    changes occur in how or why the Guard is being used domestically,
    always in coordination with the appropriate authorities.

        155. Lieutenant General Caine, do you support the Department of
    Homeland Security submitting requests for assistance at the southwest
    border from the Department of Defense and the National Guard at least
    180 days in advance?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to providing as
    much notice as possible servicemembers, particularly for members of the
    National Guard who must make plans with employers and others before
    deploying anywhere.

        156. Lieutenant General Caine, what benefits could advance notice
    from the Department of Homeland Security provide for readiness and
    national security?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Early notification of requirements
    enables the Joint Force to strategically plan for deployments,
    improving readiness by synchronizing training and modernization
    schedules with operational needs.

        157. Lieutenant General Caine, Department of Defense Directive
    3025.18 ``Defense Support of Civil Authorities'' and Department of
    Defense Instruction 3025.21 ``Defense Support of Civilian Law
    Enforcement Agencies,'' and Joint Publication 3-28 ``Defense Support to
    Civil Authorities'' provide doctrine for planning, conducting, and
    assess defense support of civil authorities. If confirmed, will you
    evaluate whether those policy documents provide sufficient clarity,
    including on emergency authorities, and provide your assessment to this
    committee?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        158. Lieutenant General Caine, Department of Defense Directive
    3025.18 ``Defense Support of Civil Authorities'' and Department of
    Defense Instruction 3025.21 ``Defense Support of Civilian Law
    Enforcement Agencies,'' and Joint Publication 3-28 ``Defense Support to
    Civil Authorities'' provide doctrine for planning, conducting, and
    assess defense support of civil authorities. If confirmed, will you
    evaluate whether those policy documents provide procedures to inform
    the public about the authorities, mission, and duration for domestic
    deployments and provide your assessment to this committee?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        159. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of the
    training provided to the National Guard for Federal standing rules for
    the use of force on domestic military deployments?
        Lieutenant General Caine. National Guard personnel receive training
    from their service post mobilization on training requirements provided
    by the Combatant Command. After the service ensures the training is
    completed, they validate these units to support their assigned mission.
    Additionally, our National Guard forces conduct a handover with the
    unit currently conducting the mission to both mitigate risk and ensure
    they are prepared for execution. As a part of this process, units
    receive training on the Federal standing rules for the use of force
    (SRUF).

        160. Lieutenant General Caine, is there any distinction in the
    standing rules of force for the National Guard during domestic military
    deployments when in ``title 10'' status versus when operating under
    State or ``title 32'' status?
        Lieutenant General Caine. While our National Guard forces always
    have the inherent right to self-defense, there is a distinction in the
    standing rules for the use of force for the National Guard during
    domestic military operations when in Title 10 status versus when
    operating under State or Title 32 status. While in a Title 10 status,
    National Guard members will not participate in domestic law enforcement
    activities, unless they are actively covered by an exception to the
    Posse Comitatus Act.
                    congressional oversight and transparency
        161. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of the
    role of the Department of Defense Inspector General and service
    Inspectors General?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Department of Defense Inspector
    General (DoD IG) and Service Inspectors General play a crucial role in
    maintaining accountability and integrity within the DOD by conducting
    audits, investigations, and evaluations to prevent and detect fraud,
    waste, and abuse, while promoting economy, efficiency, and
    effectiveness.

        162. Lieutenant General Caine, will you ensure your staff complies
    with any Inspector General deadlines established for requested
    communications, providing witnesses, providing documents, and that
    those witnesses will be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        163. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are not able to comply with
    any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you notify the
    Republican and Democratic members of the committee regarding the basis
    for any good faith delay or denial?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
        164. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to refusing to follow illegal orders from any individual,
    including the President?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        165. Lieutenant General Caine, what actions would you take if you
    were given an illegal order from any individual, including the
    President?
        Lieutenant General Caine. I do not expect to be given an illegal
    order. For all orders given to me from the President and the Secretary
    of Defense, I will work closely with my staff, including my independent
    legal counsel, to best advise the President and Secretary of Defense on
    the way forward in response to those orders.

        166. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to testify or
    provide a deposition if you are called upon by Congress to testify or
    provide a deposition voluntarily?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        167. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to testify or
    provide a deposition to Congress if you are issued a subpoena to
    testify or provide a deposition?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        168. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to providing
    information or documents to Congress voluntarily if you are requested
    to do so?
        Lieutenant General Caine. In accordance with all applicable laws
    and regulations, I will provide information or documents voluntarily to
    Congress if requested to do so.

        169. Lieutenant General Caine, will you provide information or
    documents to Congress if you are issued a subpoena?
        Lieutenant General Caine. In accordance with all applicable laws
    and regulations, I will provide information or documents to Congress if
    issued a subpoena.

        170. Lieutenant General Caine, will you commit to following current
    DOD precedent for responding to information requests, briefings, and
    other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and House Armed
    Services Committees and their minority members?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        171. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, will you commit to
    posting your official calendar monthly?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I commit to conducting a
    security review to ensure OPSEC before I publicly release any
    information.

        172. Lieutenant General Caine, do you think the DOD has an over-
    classification problem?
        Lieutenant General Caine. While there is always room for
    improvement in our classification processes and procedures, the Joint
    Force regularly writes for release and utilizes classification markings
    at the lowest classification levels to ensure dissemination to the
    widest audience in a timely manner.

        173. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, do you think DOD
    should pursue strategic technology to support automated
    declassification?
        Lieutenant General Caine. From the Joint Force perspective, while
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds extraordinary potential to support
    declassification requirements, we must ensure we adhere to existing
    legal, cybersecurity, information, operational security, and
    classification policies and authorities. Generative AI models can
    provide an initial review of documents to highlight availability for
    declassification and any potential areas of concern if the information
    is declassified. However, AI models do not check for truth in outputs
    and can potentially carry forward inaccuracies inherent in the data
    inputs; therefore, these technologies should be used to augment, rather
    than replace a human at this time.
                                  project 2025
        174. Lieutenant General Caine, have you discussed Project 2025 with
    any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the Trump transition
    team, or other members of the Trump administration? If so, please
    explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom you
    discussed it.
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        175. Lieutenant General Caine, have you discussed Project 2025 with
    any officials associated with the Heritage Foundation? If so, please
    explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom you
    discussed it.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I have not.
                                nuclear weapons
        176. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you think increasing our
    nuclear weapons spending will impact our adversaries' interest in doing
    the same?
        Lieutenant General Caine. While Russian and Chinese nuclear
    decisionmaking is driven by multiple factors, a marked increase in
    United States nuclear weapons spending would likely be perceived by
    Russia and China as a potential threat to strategic stability,
    prompting them to bolster their own nuclear capabilities. Russia views
    its nuclear capabilities as mostly in parity with the United States and
    would view a significant increase in spending as a threat to that
    parity. China is already expanding its forces to ensure the capability
    to survive a first strike and respond with the threat of unacceptable
    damage--increased United States spending may spur further modernization
    efforts to meet their nuclear objectives. However, United States
    spending is unlikely to significantly influence North Korea and Iran's
    nuclear ambitions as they are driven by their own strategic goals.

        177. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you think our adversaries
    would interpret the United States resuming live fire nuclear weapons
    testing?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Our adversaries would likely interpret
    the United States resuming live fire nuclear weapons testing as
    threatening, provocative, and destabilizing and a possible
    justification to do the same. Russia and China could consider similar
    tests in response, while North Korea and Iran would see it as a
    justification for their own nuclear actions and preparations. All four
    countries would likely use the situation to criticize the United States
    and justify their own defensive measures.

        178. Lieutenant General Caine, which conventional weapons should be
    cut to pay for nuclear modernization or missile defense systems?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will lead an analysis to
    find more deployable capital, through which we can do in three ways:
    find efficiencies through cost savings, reprogram internally, or
    increase our topline.
                               foreign influence
        179. Lieutenant General Caine, have you received any payment from a
    foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
    the past 5 years?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        180. Lieutenant General Caine, have you communicated with any
    foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign government within
    the past 5 years?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        181. Lieutenant General Caine, please disclose any communications
    or payments you have had with representatives of any foreign government
    or entity controlled by a foreign government within the past 5 years
    and describe the nature of the communication.
        Lieutenant General Caine. I remain personal friends with a group of
    Senior Leaders from our Allies and Partners that I met during my time
    in uniform. Many of these senior leaders remain in the military of
    their governments. None of these agreements have a financial component
    to them and all are based on pre-existing USG MIL-MIL relationships. If
    confirmed and I reenter the military I will disclose them as part of my
    security re-entry as I always have.
                         sexual assault and harassment
        182. Lieutenant General Caine, the most recent DOD statistics found
    that about 29,000 Active Duty troops--which accounts for 6.8 percent of
    female servicemembers and 1.3 percent of male servicemembers--
    experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2023. A Brown University study
    estimates that the actual rates are two to four times higher. How do
    you plan to address and reduce sexual assault and sexual harassment in
    the military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. One incident of sexual assault or sexual
    harassment in the U.S. Armed Forces is too many. I understand that
    prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment decreased in 2023 in
    the Armed Forces for the first time in several years. More must be done
    to sustain these changes. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously
    support policies and programs to reduce the occurrence of sexual
    assault, improve support to victims, and hold offenders appropriately
    accountable.

        183. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD support and protect
    your department servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors
    who come forward with reports of sexual assault and sexual harassment?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Congress has granted us robust
    authorities to ensure that we can assist sexual assault and sexual
    harassment victims, hold offenders appropriately accountable, and
    prevent these crimes. Joint Force readiness hinges on the preparedness
    of our warfighters, which is most effectively achieved within cohesive
    units led by empowered chains of command. It is imperative to foster
    healthy command climates and prevent harmful behaviors. To this end I
    support applying the resources provided to us for this purpose, which
    include our prevention and response workforces and our regular
    assessments of military unit health worldwide. I am committed to
    ensuring our people receive support and resources that are trauma-
    informed, responsive to need, and recovery-oriented.
                   retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
        184. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe that servicemembers,
    civilians, grantees, and contractors should be protected from any form
    of retaliation for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual
    assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern
    that they wish to raise?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        185. Lieutenant General Caine, have you ever retaliated against any
    individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or
    harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish
    to raise?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No.

        186. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to protecting whistleblowers? If so, please specify how you will
    do so.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.
                                 civilian harm
        187. Lieutenant General Caine, do you agree that one difference
    between the United States and its potential adversaries is the greater
    value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human life and
    liberty at home and abroad?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes

        188. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of title
    10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian Protection Center of
    Excellence?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Title 10 U.S.C. 184 establishes the
    Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP CoE) as a specialized
    military organization that serves as the Department of Defense's
    primary institution for advancing civilian protection capabilities. The
    center operates as a hub and facilitator of Department-wide analysis,
    learning, and strategic approaches to civilian harm mitigation and
    response during military operations.

        189. Lieutenant General Caine, the United States Military has spent
    many years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate
    civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including through the
    development of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first
    Trump administration, which I commend. These efforts received
    bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the
    United States Military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
    warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
    civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
    psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. If
    confirmed, will you commit to continued leadership on civilian harm
    issues?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        190. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, what do you
    understand to be your role and responsibilities regarding civilian harm
    mitigation and response?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I understand my role and
    responsibilities as outlined in statutory requirements and DOD policy
    is to prioritize and integrate capability requirements to support the
    Joint Force's ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm by
    ensuring CHMR learning and training objectives are incorporated into
    joint education, training, strategies, plans, exercises, and
    operations.

        191. Lieutenant General Caine, what do you understand to be the
    importance of mitigating civilian harm in military operations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Mitigating civilian harm in military
    operations results in more efficient and effective mission-set that
    retains the freedom of the joint force to maneuver in host nations,
    establishing trust and security of the local population, and the
    protection of the joint force.

        192. Lieutenant General Caine, what value can advisors with
    expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response provide to
    commanders?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Civilian harm mitigation and response
    advisors provide commanders with crucial data on the civilian
    environment, tailored mitigation advice, and enhanced understanding of
    the impact of operations on civilians, preserving the commander's vital
    decision space.

        193. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian Protection Center of
    Excellence?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I am committed to carrying
    out all statutory requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, and the roles and responsibilities placed upon me and my staff
    by the Secretary of Defense.

        194. Lieutenant General Caine, how will you prevent and mitigate
    civilian harm?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will provide the
    President and Secretary of Defense with expert military advice and
    implement guidance to mitigate civilian harm, in accordance with DOD
    policy and the Chairman's responsibilities.

        195. Lieutenant General Caine, if you are confirmed, will you
    commit to supporting and implementing the Civilian Harm Mitigation
    Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I am committed to carrying
    out all statutory requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, and the roles and responsibilities placed upon me and my staff
    by the Secretary of Defense.

        196. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe that our troops are
    at higher risk for retribution as the number of civilian deaths from
    United States Military operations or U.S.-led military operations
    increases?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS
    will continue to exploit galvanizing events, such as the Israel-HAMAS
    conflict, which they link to the United States, and the 2023 Quran
    burnings in Sweden and the Netherlands, to inspire supporters
    worldwide. The United States has been consistent in policy to mitigate
    unintended or incidental damage or injury to civilian or noncombatant
    persons or property or the environment and we have policies to assist
    commanders in weighing risks against military necessity and in
    evaluating proportionality within the framework of the joint planning
    process.
                                right-to-repair
        197. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe giving the DOD access
    to the technical data rights needed to repair its own equipment could
    advance the DOD's readiness?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, giving servicemembers access to all
    the training, technical data, and tooling necessary to repair and
    sustain our weapon systems would make a positive impact on overall
    readiness of the Joint Force.

        198. Lieutenant General Caine, do you believe giving the DOD access
    to the technical data rights needed to repair its own equipment could
    help reduce the DOD's repair and sustainment costs?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes, granting servicemembers access to
    technical data rights for repairing its own equipment could
    significantly reduce repair and sustainment costs. By enabling the DOD
    to perform repairs in-house, it would decrease reliance on external
    contractors, lower service fees, and allow for more efficient
    maintenance practices, ultimately leading to long-term cost savings.

        199. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD ensure servicemembers
    who are stationed abroad can repair equipment in a timely and cost-
    effective manner, especially in a contested logistics environment?
        Lieutenant General Caine. To ensure servicemembers stationed abroad
    can repair equipment in a timely and cost-effective manner, especially
    in a contested logistics environment, the DOD should focus on pre-
    positioning critical repair parts and tools closest to the point of
    need, establishing local repair capabilities with trained personnel,
    and utilizing additive/advanced manufacturing for on-demand parts
    production. Additionally, enhancing partnerships with local industries
    and leveraging remote diagnostic technologies can reduce reliance on
    long supply chains and external support, improving operational
    readiness and minimizing delays in maintenance. We must also employ
    advanced manufacturing to expedite repairs at the forward edge.
                            research and development
        200. Lieutenant General Caine, does DOD benefit from partnering
    with colleges, universities, nonprofits, and federally funded research
    and development centers?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Department does benefit from
    collaborating with these entities. Research is the foundation of Joint
    Force design and development and underpins concept development,
    experimentation, and the fielding of the critical technologies and
    techniques that will deter or win in a future conflict. Colleges,
    universities, nonprofits, and federally funded research and development
    centers offer scope, scale, and collective expertise, all of which help
    advance. From the tactical to the strategic level, partnering with
    these centers is critical to the DOD's ability to bring the right
    technology to bear in order to deter and if needed, defeat a peer
    adversary.
        Further, the U.S. faces a rapidly evolving security environment,
    making a swift and effective transition to advanced technology a DOD
    imperative. However, warfighters should be involved in the research
    process to ensure their operational experience informs decisionmaking
    and technology development. Events such as the FFRDC Summit in
    particular have broadened networks for warfighters (end-users),
    enabling a more rapid pull of relevant capabilities into operational
    environments from DOE and FFRDC Labs.
             protecting classified information and federal records
        201. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of the
    need to protect operational security, or OPSEC?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Operational Security (OPSEC) is a
    critical aspect of protecting sensitive information and preventing
    adversaries from gaining an advantage.

        202. Lieutenant General Caine, what are the national security risks
    of improperly disclosing classified information?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The national security risks of improperly
    disclosing classified information are significant. Depending on the
    classification of the information disclosed, and the unintended
    recipient, the consequences could include the compromise of operations,
    intelligence gathering, or international relationships.

        203. Lieutenant General Caine, is it your opinion that information
    about imminent military targets is generally sensitive information that
    needs to be protected?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        204. Lieutenant General Caine, what would you do if you learned an
    official had improperly disclosed classified information?
        Lieutenant General Caine. In any situation of concern, I would
    immediately report it to my security officer and determine the best
    away ahead to minimize any potential risk to national security.

        205. Lieutenant General Caine, what is your understanding of
    Government officials' duties under the Federal Records Act?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Federal Records Act requires
    government officials to ensure the creation, preservation, and proper
    management of Federal records.

        206. Lieutenant General Caine, should classified information be
    shared on unclassified commercial systems?
        Lieutenant General Caine. No, classified information should not be
    shared on unclassified commercial systems.

        207. Lieutenant General Caine, is it damaging to servicemembers'
    confidence in DOD if the pilots flying a mission find out that the
    official who ordered them to perform that mission shared sensitive
    information that could have made it more likely that the mission would
    fail or they would be killed?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The information domain is always a threat
    to our forces and we must always preserve the element of surprise.

        208. Lieutenant General Caine, if you had information about the
    status of specific targets, weapons being used, and timing for imminent
    U.S. strikes against an adversary, under what circumstances would you
    feel comfortable receiving or sharing that information on an
    unclassified commercial application like Signal?
        Lieutenant General Caine. We should always preserve the element of
    surprise and that should translate across every information domain and
    format and never put our war fighters in any harm's way.
                                medical capacity
        209. Lieutenant General Caine, in your judgment, is the United
    States Military's medical system prepared to support large-scale combat
    operations?
        Lieutenant General Caine. One single capability is best understood
    in the context of the entire joint force requirement. I understand
    there is likely opportunity to improve the preparedness of the United
    States Military medical system to support military response to future
    challenges. If confirmed, I will look at medical readiness in the
    context of warfighting capabilities that the joint force projects and
    support efforts to assure we are ready to respond if necessary.

        210. Lieutenant General Caine, if the United States Military's
    medical system is not prepared to support large-scale combat
    operations, what steps should DOD take to be adequately prepared?
        Lieutenant General Caine. As I learn more about the challenges
    facing the military health system, I will, if confirmed, formulate
    recommendations to minimize risk to the joint force.
              effect of border operations on readiness and morale
        211. Lieutenant General Caine, if confirmed, will you provide to
    the committee within 60 days a list of any training exercises that have
    been delayed or canceled due to the recent deployments to the southern
    border or Guantanamo? Please provide the date and type of any affected
    training exercises and explain which units were impacted.
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        212. Lieutenant General Caine, is DOD separating units when sending
    personnel to the border or Guantanamo? If so, please explain the
    rationale for doing so, given evidence of how doing so from 2018-2020
    harmed units' readiness.
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the
    deployment of personnel to the border or Guantanamo and review the
    2018-2020 readiness findings to ensure we are instituting lessons
    learned and reducing impacts on readiness.

        213. Lieutenant General Caine, the GAO previously found that ``DOD
    has not defined what it considers to be a manageable impact on
    readiness.'' How should DOD determine when an anticipated impact on
    readiness is ``manageable''?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Impacts on readiness are usually
    determined by analyzing risk to mission and risk to force statements
    provided by the potentially affected Combatant Commands and the
    Military Departments. If confirmed, I will weigh the magnitude and
    nature of these risks relative to their probability as I provide my
    recommendations to the SecDef.

        214. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD monitor the impact of
    the border deployment on troops' morale?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The immediate frontline supervisors,
    Senior Enlisted Leaders, and Commanders have a direct responsibility
    for their soldiers, sailors, airman, marines, guardians, and sentinels
    on morale of all military members. If confirmed it is my obligation to
    provide clear mission intent and ensure that our members have
    everything, they need to complete their mission.

        215. Lieutenant General Caine, will DOD commit to inform the Senate
    Armed Services Committee if it sees patterns of suicide, substance
    abuse, and other warning signs that the border operations are degrading
    servicemembers' mental health?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes.

        216. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD assess whether its
    southern border and Guantanamo operations are militarily effective?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The DOD is responding to a request for
    Assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. Since DHS is the
    lead Federal agency, DOD should work with DHS to assess the
    effectiveness of these operations based on DHS desired objectives and
    effects.

        217. Lieutenant General Caine, what should DOD's role be at the
    Migrant Operations Center (MOC) and Guantanamo's Camp 6?
        Lieutenant General Caine. My understanding is that DOD is
    responding to an RFA from DHS and operating pursuant to a signed MOU
    between DOD and DHS. If confirmed, I will review DOD's role at the MOC
    and Camp 6 and provide any recommendations to the SecDef.

        218. Lieutenant General Caine, there are reports that DOD personnel
    are guarding migrants at Camp 6. Is this an appropriate use of
    servicemembers' time and DOD resources?
        Lieutenant General Caine. My understanding is that DHS/ICE maintain
    legal and physical custody of the illegal aliens at Guantanamo Bay with
    DOD support. If confirmed, and I find that DOD personnel are guarding
    migrants I will report this to Congress.
                  conduct and conditions of border operations
        219. Lieutenant General Caine, what are the rules of engagement
    that govern each unit deployed to the border?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the current
    Rules for the Use of Force and provide any recommended changes to the
    SecDef and POTUS.

        220. Lieutenant General Caine, are servicemembers authorized to use
    force at the border?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Unit commanders always retain the
    inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense and receive
    training to make sound, legally grounded decisions in situations where
    the use of force may be necessary.

        221. Lieutenant General Caine, in 2020, the DOD Inspector General
    found that some troops did not receive Standing Rules for the Use of
    Force (SRUF) training. Should troops receive this training?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Yes. Every servicemember must receive
    comprehensive and recurring Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF)
    training.

        222. Lieutenant General Caine, should servicemembers under DOD's
    command be authorized to use force against unarmed civilians at the
    border?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The use of force, especially deadly
    force, against unarmed civilians is prohibited unless it is necessary
    to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm to oneself or another
    person. While DOD personnel are trained in techniques to de-escalate
    hostile situations, United States servicemembers always retain the
    right of self-defense.

        223. Lieutenant General Caine, under what circumstances, if any,
    should servicemembers under DOD's command be authorized to make arrests
    at the border?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Servicemembers in a title 10 status are
    not authorized to make arrests at the border as this is a law
    enforcement function.

        224. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD handle encounters
    with citizens at the border?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the current
    guidance and if appropriate make any recommended changes to the SecDef
    and POTUS. I also defer to DHS for questions concerning DHS operations.

        225. Lieutenant General Caine, what should DOD's plan be for
    migrants held at Guantanamo whose home country will not accept their
    repatriation?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will review the current
    guidance and if appropriate make any recommended changes to the SecDef
    and POTUS. I also defer to DHS for questions concerning DHS operations.

        226. Lieutenant General Caine, what should be DOD's plan for
    evacuating the MOC during extreme weather events?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with SOUTHCOM
    to understand their current evacuation plans for facilities at Naval
    Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB).

        227. Lieutenant General Caine, what government entities, if any,
    should conduct onsite inspections of Guantanamo's MOC and Camp 6?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Historically, the U.N. International
    Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the
    Red Cross (ICRC) has had access to pertinent operations at Naval
    Station Guantanamo Bay. If confirmed, I will work with SOUTHCOM assess
    their current plan for inspections.

        228. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD handle requests for
    access to the MOC or Camp 6 from legal service providers, humanitarian
    organizations, the press, or other members of the public?
        Lieutenant General Caine. If confirmed, I will work with SOUTHCOM
    to better understand the process for access to Naval Station Guantanamo
    Bay. I defer questions on specific requests to DHS / ICE as the lead
    Federal agency.

        229. Lieutenant General Caine, how should DOD's facilitate
    migrants' access to counsel?
        Lieutenant General Caine. DOD is operating in support of the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains custody and control of
    the migrants. DOD should facilitate migrants' access to counsel in
    accordance with the interdepartmental MOU between DHS and DOD and all
    U.S. laws and international obligations.

        230. Lieutenant General Caine, what standards of care should DOD
    personnel be bound to provide at Guantanamo?
        Lieutenant General Caine. DOD is operating in support of the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains custody and control of
    the migrants. DOD should be bound to the Standards of Care addendum to
    the interdepartmental MOU between DHS and DOD and all U.S. laws and
    international obligations.

        231. Lieutenant General Caine, what emergency and non-emergency
    medical services should be provided to migrants at Guantanamo?
        Lieutenant General Caine. DOD is operating in support of the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security. DHS maintains custody and control of
    the migrants. DOD should provide medical services in accordance with
    the interdepartmental MOU between DHS and DOD and all U.S. laws and
    international obligations.
                           recruitment and retention
        232. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you plan to improve the
    military's recruitment efforts?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The Department's ability to attract,
    recruit, and assess a highly qualified force is a national imperative.
    If confirmed, I will work directly with the Services to drive
    connection with the American communities, demonstrate value in military
    service and build trust through quality interactions with today's
    youth. Our ability to recruit and retain high quality individuals is
    critical to sustaining a long-term strategic advantage over pacing
    threats and dynamic security environment.

        233. Lieutenant General Caine, how do you plan to ensure that
    Americans of diverse backgrounds feel welcome to join the military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. The strength of the Joint Force comes
    from the character, competence, and commitment of those who serve,
    across all backgrounds. If confirmed, I will support efforts that
    ensure every qualified American sees military service as a place where
    they can belong, contribute, and lead. Upholding clear standards,
    reinforcing the warrior ethos, sense of unity, and fostering a culture
    of professionalism and respect are essential to attracting and
    retaining the talent we need to meet today's security challenges.

        234. Lieutenant General Caine, in response to President Trump and
    Secretary Hegseth's efforts to eliminate diversity, equity, and
    inclusion (DEI), the military has canceled recruiting efforts with
    long-standing partners. The Army abandoned its long-standing
    partnership with the Black Engineer of the Year Awards, and the Navy,
    Air Force, and Space Force also pulled out of the event. The Army also
    ended a long-standing partnership with Ashley Hall, an all-girls prep
    school located in South Carolina and which existed during the first
    Trump administration. Why are partnerships with organizations like
    these important for our ability to recruit individuals to the military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Partnerships like these help us connect
    with high-performing individuals who might not otherwise consider
    military service. If confirmed, I will support recruiting efforts that
    are grounded in the military's core values, uphold high standards, and
    reflect the diversity of our Nation. The Joint Force must draw from the
    full range of America's talent to remain competitive. When we engage
    with trusted institutions, whether schools, professional organizations,
    or community groups, we send a message that military service is open to
    all who are qualified and willing to serve.

        235. Lieutenant General Caine, why is it important to have a
    military whose diversity reflects the U.S. population?
        Lieutenant General Caine. In the current operational environment,
    it is important that the military focus on increasing lethality with
    high but fair standards to ensure opportunities for the best Americans
    to serve.

        236. Lieutenant General Caine, the Army achieved its recruiting
    goals in 2024 for the first time in several years ``primarily due to an
    increase in female recruits.'' Almost 10,000 women signed up for active
    duty in 2024, ``an 18 percent jump from the previous year, while male
    recruitment increased by just 8 percent.'' Why is it important to
    recruit women to the military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Current policy allows for members to
    serve in all roles. We set and maintain high standards throughout the
    Services and members that meet those standards are given the
    opportunity to serve.

        237. Lieutenant General Caine, why is it important for women to
    have access to combat roles, including for potential long-term
    promotions, and how does this tie into being able to effectively
    recruit and retain women in the military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Current policy allows for women to serve
    in all roles. We must set and maintain high standards; Any member who
    meets the standard is afforded the opportunity to serve in combat
    roles. We must promote Servicemembers based on demonstrated performance
    and potential to serve with increased levels of responsibility.

        238. Lieutenant General Caine, why is the quality of military
    housing important for the retention of servicemembers?
        Lieutenant General Caine. It is fundamental to Quality of Service
    (Gate Commission on the All-Volunteer Force) policy. FRSM Cap and the
    BCA have had impacts over the last decade. The quality of military
    housing is important for retention because it directly impacts the
    well-being and satisfaction of servicemembers. Safe, comfortable, and
    affordable housing improves moral, reduces stress, and allows
    servicemembers to focus on warfighting duties.

        239. Lieutenant General Caine, why is quality access to healthcare
    for servicemembers and their families important for the retention of
    servicemembers?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Access to quality healthcare is a
    fundamental requirement for maintaining and retaining a strong and
    ready fighting force. Ensuring quality access to healthcare is an
    investment in our Servicemembers, signaling the DOD values the service
    and commitment of Servicemembers and their families.

        240. Lieutenant General Caine, while the Army has improved its
    recruitment efforts, recent data has shown that ``[n]early one-quarter
    of soldiers recruited since 2022 have failed to complete their initial
    contracts.'' How do you plan to address challenges with retention
    across the military?
        Lieutenant General Caine. Retention rates throughout the military
    are trending toward a positive increase. If confirmed I will work
    closely with each of the Services to ensure that we are retaining the
    most qualified members that want to continue military service, within
    the needs of each of the Services.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
                            great power competition
        241. ``I guess with the last remaining seconds I have, I'll just
    sort of . . . Your view of this great power competition with China,
    what are some things that we need to get better at? What are some
    things that we need to do to prepare as we shift and pivot to Asia?
    What's the most important thing one, the one thing?''
        Lieutenant General Caine. [Lt Gen Caine responded, ``Taking
    advantage of the time that we have, as I mentioned earlier in my
    testimony, making sure that we're moving with the speed, precision,
    sense of urgency to get the kit that we need. The challenges range from
    contested logistics to long-range fires to command and control. So,
    it's a much deeper conversation, Senator.]
        [Chairman Wicker continued, ``Will you supplement that on the
    record then, General? Because it was a very intricate question that was
    sprung on you with 10 seconds to go.'']
        We need to move with speed, precision, and a sense of urgency to
    get the capabilities necessary to address challenges that range from
    contested logistics to long-range fires to command and control. If
    confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of the military situation
    and then provide the President and the Secretary of Defense my best
    military advice on the actions and investments.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Lieutenant General John D.
    Caine, USAF (retired) follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General John D.
    Caine, USAF (retired), which was transmitted to the Committee
    at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
    General John D. Caine, USAF (retired) in connection with his
    nomination follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the Committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
    are contained in the Committee's executive files.]

                                      ______

        [The nomination of Lieutenant General John D. Caine, USAF
    (retired) was reported to the Senate by Chairman Wicker on
    April 8, 2025, with the recommendation that the nomination be
    confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April
    11, 2025.]

                                     [all]