[Senate Hearing 119-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-311
THE FUTURE OF
U.S. BLACK SEA STRATEGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-961 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL
SECURITY COOPERATION
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
RAND PAUL, Kentucky BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
Daines, Hon. Steve, U.S. Senator from Montana.................... 1
Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut.......... 3
Witnesses
Boyse, Matthew, Senior Fellow, Center on Europe and Eurasia,
Hudson Institute, Washington, DC............................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Starr, Dr. Stephen Frederick, Distinguished Fellow for Eurasia &
Founding Chairman, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Washington,
DC............................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Sendak, Catherine, Director of Tranatlantic Defense and Security,
Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC............ 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF U.S. BLACK SEA STRATEGY
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Steve Daines,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Daines and Murphy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DAINES,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Daines. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
First, I want to thank our three witnesses for being here
today to share their expertise on such an important topic, and
I also want to take a moment to thank my ranking member,
Senator Murphy, for his partnership on these issues, as well as
the work we are doing together to repeal the Jackson-Vanik
trade restrictions in Central Asia. It is time to put these
antiquated Soviet-era trade restrictions to bed and further
strengthen U.S. relations with the region. I am very
appreciative of his work on this issue. I am looking forward to
continuing to work with him on it.
The Black Sea holds many of the keys for European security
and U.S. national interests. A clearly defined Black Sea
strategy is imperative to the United States effectively
countering Russian aggression in Europe and elsewhere.
Matthew Boyse is a retired career Foreign Service officer,
who served as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs and has extensive experience as
Charge d'Affaires in Switzerland, Finland, Romania, and the
U.S. Mission to NATO. In addition to his service as a Foreign
Service officer, Mr. Boyse has written extensively about the
Black Sea and its importance to the U.S. national interests.
Frederick Starr is a longtime expert on the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and the Black Sea. Dr. Starr is the founding
chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk
Road Studies Program, and is a distinguished fellow for Eurasia
at the American Foreign Policy Council. Starr also served as
founding chairman at the Keenan Institute, vice president of
Tulane University, and president of Oberlin College. He has
written numerous books about Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Catherine Sendak joins us from the Center for European
Policy Analysis, where she is the director of the Transatlantic
Defense and Security Program. Prior to this, Ms. Sendak was the
principal director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia in the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, where she
led efforts on addressing national security priorities,
including great power competition with Russia instability and
security throughout Eastern Europe.
Thank you again to each of our three witnesses for agreeing
to appear here today. Now to the matter at hand.
Energy security is national security, and this fact was
made even more abundantly clear in the wake of Russia's
invasion of Ukraine. In some respects, Europe has made some
positive changes, but the fact of the matter is that
significant steps need to immediately be taken to protect
Europe's future. Reliance on Russia for energy supply is a
recipe for European acquiescence to Russian influence and
aggression.
The Western side of the Black Sea presents a warning--a
warning for the rest of the continent. The nations who border
the Black Sea face profound challenges to their national
security due to unreliable energy flows and lack of baseload
power. They are all taking positive steps toward rectifying the
situation, and their proactive action to address their
insecurity should motivate the rest of Europe and encourage
them to take steps to avoid a similar outcome. Now is the
moment for practical energy solutions, which countries like
Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria are pursuing.
The recent peace deal in the Caucasus uncorks Central
Asia's vast energy resources and creates a future wherein these
resources, as well as other sources of power, can flow, be they
gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, or others, to build the reliable
baseload power necessary for their economies and their national
security.
The Eastern side of the Black Sea holds many of the
solutions to problems found on the Western side. Now is the
moment for further engagement and for the Western world to
stand together and facilitate reliable energy flows that will
help ensure a bright and more secure future for the region.
Beyond energy, the Eastern shore of the Black Sea promises huge
opportunities for Western commerce.
The Caucasus and Central Asia contain large amounts of
natural resources, much of which has not yet been fully
utilized or even developed. Joint investment in westward trade
flows will create a rising tide that truly lifts not just the
countries of origin, but those along the trade route, as well
as Europe and the broader Western world.
What happens in Europe does not stay in Europe. Two world
wars have proven that fact. The United States must lead the
rest of the world in fighting back against the encroachment of
our adversaries. Without U.S. leadership and a secure Europe,
we may once again find ourselves fighting a war, cold or
otherwise, to protect the values of democracy and universal
human freedom.
My sincere hope for this hearing is that we can openly and
honestly discuss U.S. Black Sea strategy, the importance of the
region for global security, and work toward truly a more
cohesive, comprehensive U.S. policy toward the region. This
critically important part of the world needs more attention
from the United States and our allies, and I hope today serves
as the beginning of that new conversation. And with that, I
would like to recognize the distinguished ranking member for
his comments. Senator Murphy.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Chairman Daines, and I
do look forward to continuing to work with you to draw us
closer to our allies in Central Asia through the amendment of
the antiquated restrictions built into the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. I hope that we can move that bipartisan
legislation--that bipartisan effort through the Senate to the
President's desk quickly.
Thank you to the witnesses who are joining us here today.
We are facing one of the most dangerous moments in U.S.-Russia
relations since the end of the cold war. Unable to militarily
conquer Ukraine, but emboldened, in part, by American inaction,
the Kremlin is pushing the boundaries with increasingly direct
threats to NATO members.
Within the last month, Russia sent nuclear-capable fighter
jets into Estonia's airspace with their transponders turned off
and launched a swarm of over a dozen drones into Poland. The
aggression has now spread to the Black Sea with a drone
incursion into Romania.
Putin is acting with virtual impunity, in part because he
knows he will likely face zero consequences from President
Donald Trump. The President, who should be leading this
response to show Putin these actions are unacceptable, is not
leading. The President has rolled out the red carpet for
Vladimir Putin in Alaska, but Putin happily pocketed that
diplomatic win and went right back to firebombing Kyiv and
declined requests to enter serious negotiation.
The administration's deadlines for peace talks have just
come and gone, and yet they still refuse to support bipartisan
sanctions legislation that has been pending now in the Senate
for months, and there has been no new request for additional
funding for Ukraine in Congress.
As Britain's MI6 chief noted recently, Russia does not have
the wherewithal to fully subjugate Ukraine by force. So, the
only way that Moscow at this point can achieve its objectives
is by weakening the United States' and European support for
Ukraine and exploiting divisions within and among NATO nations,
and this is where our conversation today about the Black Sea
Region becomes so key.
Russia is pursuing an aggressive strategy to undermine pro-
Western, democratic governments throughout Europe, and the
Black Sea Region (BSR) is especially vulnerable. Moscow is
pouring billions into bribery, propaganda, subversion, and
energy bullying in order to install governments in this region
that are friendly to Moscow, but the administration's response
has been, basically, to unilaterally disarm. In Moldova, where
a pro-Western government was facing a barrage of hybrid attacks
from Russia ahead of the elections last weekend, the
administration's response was to pull two-thirds of our
assistance programs. While Russia is pouring billions into
propaganda and influence campaigns, the administration shut
down the capacity at the State Department to fight back against
Russian propaganda, the Global Engagement Center.
This Department of Justice has slashed anticorruption
programs and stopped enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, which prevented American companies from paying bribes at
the same time that we know bribery is one of the main pathways
for Russia to gain influence in this region.
In Romania, a key NATO frontline State, the Trump
administration is signaling they may draw down our military
presence, once again, weakening the argument for why citizens
should back a pro-Western, pro-American government.
History shows us that Russia does not respond to
concessions or mixed signals. It responds to strength and to
clear red lines. U.S. policy in the Black Sea Region must
reflect this reality. I thank our witnesses. I look forward to
your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Daines. Senator Murphy, thank you. Our first
witness is Matthew Boyse, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute
Center on Europe and Eurasia. Mr. Boyse, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BOYSE, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON EUROPE AND
EURASIA, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Boyse. Chairman Daines, Ranking Member Murphy,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
The Black Sea and the broader Black Sea Region (BSR) are
more important to the U.S. national interest than is often
appreciated. This hearing adds impetus to important work the
SFRC has done, including by pressing the State Department and
the Interagency to develop a Black Sea strategy by holding
hearings, by traveling to the area, and by shining a light on a
region of great geopolitical importance.
Thank you so much for organizing this important
conversation. The BSR is also important in the context of the
ongoing debate within the United States' foreign policy
community about it. Given the centrality of the BSR to the
balance of power in Europe and Eurasia, and the negative trends
there, the region should remain a major focus of U.S. foreign
policy, even as the administration focuses on the paramount
threat from communist China, challenges in the Western
Hemisphere and the Middle East, and other issues.
Putin's war against Ukraine has higher stakes than just
reincorporating that country into the Russian Federation. The
BSR is indispensable to his efforts to restore status and
project power regionally and globally. The BSR is also the
primary battlefield for his efforts to reshape a new
international order, together with Communist China, Iran, and
others, and is an important laboratory for hybrid war against
NATO.
In recent years, Russia has been scoring successes on the
Eastern Littoral of the Black Sea via its creeping State
capture of Georgia. On the Northern Littoral, how Russia's war
ends will affect the Black Sea Region in a major way, and the
Kremlin has been in a full-court press mode in Moldova, even if
on Sunday voters dodged a bullet and chose the West.
On the Western Littoral, the Kremlin has been using its
many assets in Bulgaria to turn that critical country away from
NATO and has been exploiting societal discontent in Romania,
long a bulwark of Atlanticism. Russia's efforts in these States
via State capture, weakening key institutions, or supporting
pro-Moscow forces could create an arc of--or corridor of
instability, from Southeast Europe and the Balkans into the
heart of Europe, including from Northern Macedonia through to
Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria, all with governments
amenable to Russian interests. Of course, this may not happen
and should be strongly opposed, but it shows that trends in the
BSR could ease Kremlin inroads into what Putin no doubt sees as
potential soft underbelly of NATO. The Southern Littoral, of
course, is a different case as Turkey is both opposed to many
and open to some Russian interests.
A comprehensive Black Sea strategy is necessary but
insufficient to advance U.S. security interests and to counter
Russian malign influence in the Black Sea Region and its energy
markets. Other political, diplomatic, military or economic
steps are necessary, which I will touch on briefly in a minute,
but just on energy, the USG should ramp up its engagement with
BSR States to diversify further away from Russian sources, such
as by supporting more LNG sales and nuclear energy cooperation,
including SMRs.
Now, the State Department strategy presented to this
committee in October 2023 was a start, but it was not whole-of-
government. It was more a laundry list of intentions, and it
was not that focused on energy, it did not contain a timeline,
and it was not resourced. A strategy that focuses more on
energy and includes these issues could very well advance U.S.
goals, but blunt language as we recently saw from President
Trump also reminds allies and friends that the U.S. cannot want
European energy security more than they do.
For trade and commerce to flourish in the Black Sea Region,
the Black Sea must remain free and open. Freedom of navigation
is essential. That is not currently the case. Yes, maritime
trade takes place, but the war negatively affects commerce and
economic relations in the BSR role as a trade crossroads over
the millennia. Crimea, under Russian control, considerably
increases Moscow's ability to mess with the Black Sea Region,
and if Russia were ever to control the entire Northern
Littoral--part of what Putin calls Novorossiya--it would
strangle Ukraine's maritime access to global markets. This must
not happen. The optimum outcome for trade, economic growth, and
peace and prosperity in this broad region is a demilitarized
Black Sea, as it was the case for a time after the Crimean War
in the 19th century.
The USG has many tools--many ways to advance its strategic
interests in the Black Sea Region. I will only mention a few
here as I am running out of time, but happy to go into more
detail on the discussion. I think the USG should look at the
BSR holistically--as a geopolitical region of major importance
to NATO and, thus, to the United States. I think the EU should
be urged to focus much more on the Black Sea Region now that
the Commission in May finally adopted a Black Sea Strategy.
I think allies should be pressed to further reduce the flow
of funds to the Russian war machine. NATO should be seized with
the BSR. A whole-of-government USG strategy is needed, as you
have called for. I believe that Black Sea security should be
mentioned in the Trump administration's National Security
Strategy. I believe that USG must not recognize Crimea as
Russian territory.
And of course, there are many other issues, for example,
vigorously engaging with Turkey as steward of the Montreux
Convention to prevent Russia from returning the Black Sea fleet
to pre-war status after hostilities end, and, of course, there
are also such issues as the Three Seas Initiative, revitalizing
that, working with our great Romanian allies.
Perhaps I should stop here. There is much more that can be
said, and my time is up. I have submitted a statement for the
record that goes into greater detail. Thank you again for the
opportunity to speak with you today, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boyse follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew Boyse
Chairman Daines, Ranking Member Murphy, distinguished members of
the subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
Before I joined the Hudson Institute, I served in the Foreign
Service for 35 years and spent much time dealing with the post-Soviet/
Warsaw Pact space, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary overseeing
U.S. policy toward Central Europe during most of the first Trump
Administration and early months of the Biden Administration. During
that time, I was also the Sherpa for the Three Seas Initiative and
served briefly as Charge d'Affaires in Romania in the Fall of 2021. I
was a Fulbright Scholar in Bulgaria in summer 2024 researching Black
Sea security.
The National Interest
The Black Sea and the broader Black Sea Region (BSR) are more
important to the U.S. national interest than is often appreciated. This
hearing adds impetus to important work the SFRC has done on this issue
in recent years, including by pressing the State Department to develop
a Black Sea strategy, by holding hearings, as well as by traveling to,
and shining light on, a critical region that needs more U.S. attention.
The BSR is also important in the context of the ongoing debate
about U.S. foreign policy priorities and where policy attention and
resources should be focused. Given the centrality of the BSR to the
balance of power in Europe and Eurasia, and trends there that are not
advantageous to the United States, the region should remain a major
focus of U.S. foreign policy, even as the Administration prioritizes
the threat from Communist China, as well as challenges in the Western
Hemisphere and other regions.
Strategic Backdrop
When I was responsible for policy toward Central Europe at the
State Department 2018-2021, USG policy regarding the Eastern Flank of
NATO tended to focus more on its NE than the SE sector; the latter of
course includes the Black Sea as an area of major geopolitical
importance. While the USG has in recent years assigned substantial
resources to the SE sector and thus the BSR, the historically heavy
concentration of Russian forces in the NE and extraordinary importance
of our Polish, Baltic and Nordic allies tended to produce more focus
there. Persistent and increasing Russian violations of Baltic, Polish,
and Nordic sovereignty in recent months and days continue to highlight
the ongoing Russian threat to this region. So a strong focus on that is
totally logical.
The NATO Summits after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 upgraded the attention to the SE region according to the
general idea of ``one flank, one threat, one presence,'' a phrase I
coined that became the title of an excellent study led by LTG (ret) Ben
Hodges, former Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe. NATO fixed this
anomaly after February 2022, deploying more forces in the SE and
investing more in Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, but also supporting
Ukraine in its titanic struggle against Kremlin efforts to wipe it off
the map. This increase in USG attention has been welcome, but there
appears to be a lingering difference between how NATO and EU Member
States look at the NE and SE regions, even as both institutions pay
increasing attention to the BSR. SE Europe often remains in the lower
right-hand corner of mental maps of Europe, away from the center of
gravity, even as it is squarely in the center of current geopolitical
struggles.
The SE, which for the sake of simplicity I will refer to as the
BSR, is exceptionally important geopolitically, not only because it has
been the only region in the European theater that has seen major
kinetic activity in the last several decades--mostly since the 2008
Georgia War and in Ukraine, but before that as well. Some 10 conflicts
have played out in the BSR in the post-cold war era. Indeed, security
trends in the BSR have been trending negatively for many years, and it
is high time to devote more USG attention to it. In 2020, my team in
the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia at the State Department was drafting a
Black Sea strategy to address this State of affairs when the clock ran
out on the first Trump Administration. It took some time for the Biden
Administration to collect its thoughts and draft one, which was an
important improvement, if ultimately insufficient.
Putin's war against Ukraine has higher stakes than his Stated goal
of reincorporating the country into the Russian Federation. Ukraine is
also at the center of Kremlin efforts to dominate the Black Sea and the
broader BSR, a strategy that Putin considers indispensable to his
efforts to restore Russian status and project power into adjacent
theaters and onto the world stage. Ukraine and the BSR are also the
primary battlefield in his efforts to shape a new international order,
together with Communist China, Iran--another potentially larger player
in the BSR--and others. Russia sees the BSR as the most strategic and
vulnerable region on its borders, and thus a particularly valuable and
promising ``zone of privileged interest,'' as it calls its ``near
abroad.'' The BSR has been contested space for some three decades, but
particularly since 2014, and it remains the most important laboratory
for the Kremlin to practice its hybrid war against NATO and the West.
The Kremlin started to challenge the post-Soviet order in the BSR
in the 1990's, even as it also concluded agreements with Ukraine and
other former Soviet ``republics'' and did not pursue an aggressive
policy toward other neighbors, including in the BSR. Western statesmen,
experts, and commentators tended to ignore or play down those signs
until Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and even then many did not react
robustly until Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. It is
unrealistic to expect the United States to care more about Black Sea
security than European countries, but Putin upended the European
security order and what happens in the BSR does not stay in the BSR--
and matters to the United States.
In recent years, Russia has been scoring successes on the eastern
littoral of the Black Sea via its creeping State capture of Georgia. On
the northern littoral, how Russia's war ends will have a major effect
on the BSR and the Kremlin has been in full court press mode in
Moldova, even if on Sunday voters dodged a bullet and chose the West.
Moscow is using its many assets in Bulgaria to turn that critical
country away from the West and has been exploiting societal discontent
in Romania, long a bulwark of Atlanticism. Russian efforts in these
States via State capture, weakening key institutions, or supporting
pro-Moscow forces could create an arc or corridor of instability from
SE Europe/the Balkans into the heart of Europe--from Northern Macedonia
and Serbia into Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria--with governments
amenable to Moscow. Of course, this may not happen and should be
strongly opposed, but it shows that negative trends in the BSR could
ease Kremlin inroads into what Putin no doubt sees as a potential soft
underbelly of NATO. The southern littoral is a separate case, as Turkey
is open to some, and opposed to other, Russian interests.
In the last several weeks alone, a Russian Geran-2 drone breached
Romanian airspace September 14, the 11th such case since February 2022.
The MoD noted that Russian drones have conducted about 50 strikes near
the Ukrainian border since 2022, including 30 in which drone debris
fell on Romanian territory. On August 28, a Russian naval drone struck
a Ukrainian vessel on the Danube River, on the Romanian-Ukrainian
border. These incidents receive much less attention than Russian
provocations against Polish, Baltic, and Nordic sovereignty, but they
are no less concerning--however serious the other cases are.
A Comprehensive Strategy and Furthering American Interests
A comprehensive Black Sea strategy has the potential to advance
U.S. security interests and counter malign influence from Russia in BSR
energy markets. Such a strategy is a necessary element in the U.S.
policy toolbox, but it is insufficient to move the needle significantly
without other political, diplomatic, military, or economic tools. The
USG should continue to support BSR States as they diversify away from
Russian energy, such as by supporting LNG sales and ramping up already
good cooperation on nuclear energy, including SMRs, by reengaging in
the Three Seas Initiative, and by countering the malign influence that
accompanies heavy dependence on Russian energy. There is room for
growth in this sector even as recent U.S. administrations have
prioritized it because results have not been quick to materialize. Some
EU member States have taken the goal of energy diversification very
seriously, but others have not, and the USG has also faced resistance
from the EU Commission, individual member States, and market realities,
which have slowed results.
The reasons for this vary from country to country, but the
unfortunate fact is that it took most EU member States too much time,
even after Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to prioritize energy
diversification and weaning themselves from their addiction to Russian
fossil fuels. Gas and oil imports are down considerably, but it has
taken blunt language from President Trump to accelerate the cutoff of
oil and gas imports that have pumped billions of Euros into Putin's war
machine since 2022. The Commission's proposal in the recent 19th
sanctions package to move up the deadline for cutting off Russian gas
by 1 year, to the end of 2026, is a major step forward but some member
States have Stated they will not abide by it. Hungary and Slovakia have
both pushed back on the Commission's recent proposal to incentivize a
decoupling from Russian sources. President Trump's recent pressure on
PM Erdogan in the White House may bear some fruit but Turkish firms
earn so much from their refining business and the world market demands
its products that it is difficult to imagine how that relationship will
end.
While the State Department strategy, which Assistant Secretary
Robert O'Brien presented to this committee in October 2023, was a
start, it was: 1) not a whole-ofgovernment; 2) not a roadmap but rather
more of a laundry list of intentions; 3) not focused on energy, whose
section was relatively modest and linked to climate, which the Trump
Administration will not support; and 4) not resourced. A greater energy
focus in a whole-of-government strategy that addresses weaknesses in
the 2023 paper has the potential to advance U.S. energy goals in the
BSR, but at times blunt language as we recently saw from President
Trump that our European friends need to do even more care necessary to
generate results.
Energy and Infrastructure Connectivity
It is in the U.S. interest that the large natural gas reserves in
the Black Sea be developed--in Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish waters--
because they will grow their economies, reduce their reliance on
Russian sources, and strengthen European energy security. The Black Sea
is also the central transit region through which Russian gas and oil
reach Europe, the Mediterranean, and beyond and needs to remain
peaceful. Romania will become the largest gas producer in the EU in
2027 when it starts to exploit the 7,500 square km Neptun Deep field,
which contains an estimated 100 bcm, for yields of 7-8 bcm per year.
Romania has been producing gas from the Midea project (with U.S.
investment) for several years. When Bulgaria begins to exploit the
estimated 60 bcm in its Khan Tervel and Khan Asparuh fields, it will be
able to cover its entire domestic production and export to the region.
The Sakarya field in Turkey contains an estimated 540 bcm, the largest
of the Black Sea gas reserves. Turkey also serves as a transit route
for Russian gas and oil, which it refines at three locations. It is an
open secret that these molecules are Russian, but the fact that they
continue reflects market forces while European consumers have generally
not cared where their oil products originate. Russia controls much of
Ukraine's huge gas reserves, which Ukraine cannot exploit, and uses the
drilling platforms it has seized as much for military as energy
purposes. Georgian Black Sea reserves are unknown.
Romanian and Bulgarian officials expect the Kremlin to use hybrid
measures to interfere with exploitation of their reserves, as many are
located in their EEZs, and are thus not subject to NATO Article 5 and
easier to disrupt. Russia has intruded into drilling perimeters in the
past, and neither country has the naval forces to prevent interference
in the development of these resources, which are very expensive to
exploit and especially vulnerable when drilling and other
infrastructure is being built. Moscow is less likely to interfere with
the exploitation of Turkish Black Sea energy resources because of that
special relationship.
The Black Sea also can support European energy security via the
submarine electricity cable to be laid with participation by
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, and Romania. Two Turkstream gas pipelines
and several data cables cross the Black Sea and strengthen
connectivity. Bulgaria's recent decision to end Russian gas transit
contracts on January 1, 2026, to fully exit the Russian gas market by
2028, and to switch to LNG imports is a major step forward in reducing
Moscow's ability to blackmail Sofia.
U.S. Engagement in the BSR to Promote Trade and Enhance Security
For trade and commerce to flourish and contribute to prosperity in
the BSR, the Black Sea must remain free and open. Freedom of navigation
is essential. That is not currently the case, as it is negatively
affected by Russia's war against Ukraine. Of course, ships ply the
waters and trade takes place, but Russia's hot war and creeping
takeover of Georgia and hybrid measures against other littoral States
have dampened the enormous potential the region has as a crossroads and
center of trade and exchange through the millenia.
Commentators have asserted in recent years that Russia has lost the
battle of the Black Sea, citing Ukraine's extraordinary success in
sinking, disabling, or damaging some one-third of the Black Sea Fleet
(BSF), forcing the rest from Crimea to Novorossiysk and elsewhere, and
largely preventing it from interfering too directly in the larger Black
Sea. This not incorrect, but is to conclude that the battle for the
Black Sea is over. Crimea bristles with offensive systems and continues
to be a platform for attacking Ukraine and threatening the Black Sea,
and missile and other attacks against Ukraine regularly originate from
Crimea and the Black Sea itself. Hundreds of naval mines are a factor
in maritime commerce and keep insurance rates higher than they should
be while Russia regularly interferes with GPS signals and has used the
pretext of naval exercises to close large parts of the Black Sea even
in NATO member State EEZs.
Russian rhetoric has become so shrill that it is easy to imagine
that the Kremlin will continue to interfere with trade and other
economic activity on the Black Sea after the guns fall silent.
Locations such as Snake Island and drilling towers can also affect
economic development and secure trade lines. Romanian experts consider
Snake Island as important to Black Sea security as Gotland is to the
Baltic Sea. A Russian reoccupation of Snake Island would have negative
consequences for navigation on the Danube and sea lanes along the
Istanbul-Odesa corridor. The BSF could deploy ISR and Electronic
Warfare systems to monitor and disrupt communications along the
Romanian coast, including where U.S. forces are deployed. NATO member
States would not welcome Iranian vessels traversing the Caspian Sea,
the Volga-Don Canal, and the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea for joint
naval exercises with Russia--a scenario that is not impossible to
imagine. The Kremlin has been using Crimea as a platform, an unsinkable
aircraft carrier, to launch attacks against Ukraine and to project
power.
Russian control of the northern littoral, which is part of what
Putin calls ``Novorossiya,'' must be prevented, as it would strangle
Ukraine's maritime access to global markets, making it difficult for
the country to survive, let alone thrive economically and function as
an independent, sovereign State--even if, for now, Moscow has been
unable to subjugate and occupy the country. It is not well known that
Moldova's southernmost tip is located just miles from the Black Sea, so
Moldova is also a Black Sea State. The optimum outcome for trade,
growth, and prosperity in the BSR is a demilitarized Black Sea, as was
the case for a number of years after the Crimean War.
Recommendations to Enhance the U.S. Strategic Posture in the BSR
The United States has a wide variety of concrete political,
diplomatic, military, and economic options that can advance its
strategic posture in the BSR. A few recommendations:
Conceptual/Political/Diplomatic
The USG national security bureaucracy should look at the BSR
wholistically as a geopolitical region of major importance to NATO and
the Global West. Most agencies divide the region into as many as four
or more parts, creating policy silos and stove piping that complicates
efforts to treat the region in a comprehensive manner.
Urge the EU to focus much more on the BSR, now that the
Commission in May finally adopted a Black Sea Strategy, in order to
improve regional resilience against Russian and Chinese malign
influence. The USG should pay closer attention to the correlation of
forces and security-related trends and developments in the BSR, but the
USG also cannot care about them more than our European Allies.
Press Allies to further reduce the flow of funds to the
Russian war machine. If the outcome of the war is as important to
European security as European leaders say it is, they should be doing
even more.
Ensure that NATO is seized with the BSR. NATO is unlikely
to adopt a BSR strategy, but the recommendations in the NATO October
2023 ``Troubled Waters'' Black Sea report should be implemented,
especially following Allies' formal recognition of the importance of
the region at the July 2023 Vilnius Summit. More robust efforts by NATO
member States will demonstrate to the Trump Administration that
European Allies take Black Sea security seriously.
A whole-of-government USG BSR Strategy is needed. The
paper that State Department EUR Assistant Secretary Robert O'Brien
presented to the SFRC in October 2023 was a start and overcame years of
mixed messaging and what might be considered benign neglect, but it
offered rather modest goals, was declarative in tone, only covered the
State Department, and did not advocate for additional resources. The
Biden Administration did not present a government-wide strategy before
the end of its term, as Congress had requested.
Revisit S. 804, the Black Sea Security Act of
2023,d pass an updated version in 2026. The Senate showed
strategic leadership by advocating for this legislation. The recent
introduction of the Eastern Flank Strategic Partnership Act is another
excellent Senate initiative, but separate Black Sea-focused legislation
is desirable.
Congress should appropriate funds explicitly for efforts
related to the BSR. A strategy that sets forth additional requirements
without resources will not succeed.
USG strategic interest in Black Sea security should be
reflected in the Trump Administration's National Security Strategy. The
Department of War's annual report to Congress on Freedom of Navigation
(FON) should also include language on Russia restricting FON in the
Black Sea.
The USG must not recognize Crimea as Russian territory.
The consequences of such a decision would go far beyond the BSR and
encourage further Russian aggression, as well as aggression from other
States that might see border changes by force as possible. The 1940
Welles Declaration regarding the three Baltic States can serve as a
guide, and former Secretary Pompeo's statement in 2020 should remain
operative.
Prioritize relations with Romania among U.S. Black Sea
Allies. Turkey and Bulgaria are also critical Allies, but Romania is
the most active on BSR issues.
Engage vigorously with Turkey as steward of the Montreux
Convention to prevent Russia from returning its BSF to pre-war status
after hostilities end. The Kremlin will likely attempt to restore the
BSF to its former size and composition as it has been so significantly
weakened. With Ankara, pursue a ``free and open'' strategy for the
Black Sea as the best long-term model for this strategic crossroads
(``Middle Corridor'') between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe,
while ensuring FONOPs can be conducted, as necessary. Russia can be
expected to condition a cease-fire or end to the war on a return to the
status quo ante, but a demilitarized Black Sea, as was the case for a
number of years after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, remains the
optimum end State.
Revitalize USG engagement with the Three Seas Initiative
(3SI) as a vehicle to support Eastern Flank countries politically,
strengthen them economically, and improve their resilience. During his
first term, President Trump visibly supported 3SI, but momentum slowed
after he left office. The USG should increase its attention to the 3SI,
provided 3SI countries themselves participate at significant levels.
The United States is the strongest non-member 3SI supporter, but it can
also not want 3SI more than the member States.
Military
Greater military engagement with the three NATO littoral
States can strengthen deterrence and ``sea denial'' strategy, including
air defense, mine sweepers, uncrewed surface vehicles, ISR, mobility,
Anti-Submarine Warfare infrastructure, and long-range anti-ship
missiles that can hold the BSF at risk should Russia behave
aggressively on the Black Sea itself.
The BSR theater will become more difficult if Putin's war
ends favorably for him. Russia will interpret any reduction in U.S.
forces in the BSR as a strategic retreat and increase its probes of
NATO territory via its toolbox of hybrid measures such as drones,
electronic warfare, GPS interference (jamming and spoofing),
infrastructure sabotage, etc.
Resource exportable defense packages for Black Sea
littoral harbors (e.g. radar, jammers, hard-kill defensive systems).
Enable NATO/USN to rotate mobile harbor-defense detachments. Work with
NATO member States to ensure that A2AD can protect coastlines,
commercial assets, and infrastructure arteries.
Respond more resolutely to Russian provocations against
sovereign NATO territory. NATO policy has tended to prioritize
``escalation avoidance,'' which has emboldened Russia to test NATO
territory repeatedly without sanction. This includes using NATO assets
to down air and sea drones and other provocations.
U.S. investment in Mihail Kog?lniceanu air base in
Constanta, Romania is a strategic use of U.S. taxpayer funds. It should
be increased to the extent that Allies participate similarly and
budgets allow.
Greater USG focus on the military relationship with
Bulgaria would also help strengthen resilience against further Russian
inroads into that key ally.
Continue military support for Kyiv via the
Administration's Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List mechanism so
that Ukraine can better defend itself and put Russian military assets
on Crimea and elsewhere at risk.
Support the NATO Mine Measures Group, including via
Countermeasure Vessels as urged by some littoral State Defense
Ministers to remove floating mines and enhance a collaborative
intervention force that would also safeguard energy infrastructure and
trade routes.
Improve ``unblinking eye'' assets such as the Varna Black
Sea Regional Naval Coordination Center to enhance maritime domain
awareness, develop a better Common Operating Picture, and NATO's
Maritime Situational Awareness platform. Urge NATO to review the
division of labor between Varna and NATO Maritime Command (Northwood,
UK).
Direct DHS/Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) to deepen partnerships with Romania and Bulgaria's cyber
centers. Fund joint ``red team'' exercises on ports and rail IT
infrastructure.
Consider conveying smaller ships to Romania that can
traverse the Danube and to Bulgaria that can bolster its coastal
forces.
Support Ukraine in ensuring it retains control of major
strategic territory such as Odesa, the northern littoral, as well as
Snake Island near the mouth of the Danube and drilling platforms in the
Black Sea.
Economic
Implement economic and energy measures in the State
Department's 2023 Black Sea Strategy and other strategies that are
compatible with the Trump Administration's approach to the region.
Engage Turkey regarding reciprocity for Russian shipping.
Russia should not receive free passage for ships carrying oil and grain
if it restricts the freedom of navigation of commercial vessels from
other nations.
Assist Romania in expanding the Danube as a transport
corridor, for example via the Three Seas Initiative infrastructure
program.
Engage more robustly on the Middle Corridor to diversify
trade Europe-Asia trade routes further away from Russia.
Encourage DFC and/or EXIM to finance hardened grain
silos, backup power for port IT, and digital customs systems. Encourage
World Bank co-financing on Danube logistics resilience.
Additional U.S. National Interests in the Black Sea
It would be a much better outcome for the United States if Putin
were to fail in Ukraine. If he ends the war on his terms, the
consequences will be very negative not only for Ukraine but are also
likely to seep into the other three NATO littoral States as well as the
arc or corridor stretching from North Macedonia, Serbia, into Hungary,
Slovakia, and Austria. This would continue to erode U.S. influence in
the region and demonstrate to adversaries that Russia can challenge
NATO interests and get away with it. This would also send a clear
signal to Communist China, our most important adversary that is also
increasingly active in the BSR.
In S. 804 from 2023, the Senate set forth its sense of the Congress
regarding national interests connected with the BSR. These tended to
focus on security, but economic issues were also a part, and they
remain as valid today as when the legislation was introduced. The
United States has an interest that the BSR be a benign, free and open,
positive, and stable security environment. A free and open Black Sea
will foster economic and other connectivity between Europe, Central
Asia, Asia Minor, and the Eastern Med and assure global food security,
which is seriously affected by grain and other food shipments via the
Black Sea.
The Kremlin has made it very clear that it will continue to treat
the Black Sea as a region of special and preponderant interest after
the guns fall silent, and Crimea will remain a platform from which
Moscow conducts hybrid war, interferes in the region, and projects
power beyond it. In other words, the BSR is unlikely to not return to
anything like its pre-2014 State. All Allies must do more to ensure
that Putin does not end the war on his terms. It is positive that
President Trump has spoken forthrightly on Ukraine recently, even if
the BSR itself has not figured directly in his public statements. As
Ukraine goes, so goes the Black Sea Region.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Additional Reading
One Flank, One Threat, One Presence: A Strategy for NATO's Eastern
Flank. Ben Hodges, Ray Wojcik, and Carsten Schmidl, Center for European
Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 26, 2020.
https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/one-flank-one-threat-one-
presence/
2023--Report--Troubled Waters--How Russia's War in Ukraine Changes
Black Sea Security, Lord Mark Lancaster (United Kingdom), October 7,
2023.
https://tinyurl.com/5n8ebswp
Understanding Russia's Black Sea Strategy, Natalie Sabanadze and
Galip Dalay, Chatham House,July 28, 2025.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/understanding-russias-black-sea-
strategy
Security Challenges in the Black Sea: NATO, the Wider Region and
the Global Order, George Scutaru and Peter Watkins, New Strategy
Center/LSE Ideas, 2024.
https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Research-Reports/2024-
ResearchReport-BlackSea-NSC-FinalV-DIGITAL.pdf
Romania Becomes Second NATO Country To Report Russian Drone In Its
Airspace, Ian Casey and Alex Boyd, BBC, 14 September 2025.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80g7g5rmlno
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Jessica Sobieski et al.,
Institute for the Study of War, September 14, 2025.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-
campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/
Ukraine Alert: Why Black Sea Could Emerge as the World's Next Great
Energy Battleground, Aura Sabadus, Atlantic Council, March 30, 2021.
https://tinyurl.com/y245ma9b
Black Sea's Offshore Energy Potential and Its Strategic Role At A
Regional and Continental Level, George Scutaru, New Strategy Center,
Bucharest, 2024.
https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Studiu-Kas-
Black-Sea-final-version.pdf
Russia Lost the Battle of the Black Sea, Brent M. Eastwood,
National Security Journal, August 26, 2025
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/russia-lost-the-battle-of-the-
black-sea/
The Battle for the Black Sea is Not Over, Matthew Boyce, et. al,
Hudson Institute, April 16, 2024
https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/battle-black-sea-not-over-
matthew-boyse-george-scutaru-mykhailo-samus-antonia-colibasanu
The Strategic Importance of the Black Sea: Regional Cooperation for
Energy and Defense, George Scutaru, et al.
https://tinyurl.com/3yp4m93b
Assessing the Department of State Strategy for Security in the
Black Sea Region, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, 118th Cong
(2023) (statement of Hon. James O'Brien, Assistant Secretary, European
and Eurasian Affairs).
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-department-of-
states-strategy-for-security-in-the-black-sea-region
Black Sea Security Act of 2023.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/804/text
Revisiting the Welles Declaration, Brian Whitmore, July 24, 2020.
https://cepa.org/article/revisiting-the-welles-declaration/
Crimea Is Ukraine, (press statement), Michael R. Pompeo, U.S.
Secretary of State, February 26, 2020.
https://2017-2021.state.gov/crimea-is-ukraine-3/
A Compact for a Free and Open Black Sea, Kaush Arha, et al., The
National Interest, May 18, 2024.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/compact-free-and-open-black-sea-
211076
The Middle Corridor: A Renaissance in Global Commerce, Hunter
Stoll, The Rand Corporation/Research & Commentary/Commentary, March 12,
2024.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/03/the-middle-corridor-a-
renaissance-in-global-commerce.html
Senator Daines. Mr. Boyse, thank you.
Dr. Fred Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia Caucasus
Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. Dr. Starr, the floor
is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK STARR, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW
FOR EURASIA & FOUNDING CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL ASIA CAUCASUS
INSTITUTE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Starr. Thank you. Thank you very much. First, I would
like to applaud the chairman and ranking member for their
attention to this issue. That yours is a bipartisan initiative
makes your attention all the more important, attention both to
the Black Sea Region, and, I should say, Jackson-Vanik. Bravo.
Let me start with a note on the geographic--geopolitical
context. Our focus on the Baltic countries is urgently needed
for they are under existential threat from Mr. Putin. However,
the entire Black Sea Region is also in crisis and for the same
reason. The difference is that Washington has yet fully to
acknowledge Black Sea issues.
Like the Baltic area, the Black Sea Region includes three
members of NATO: Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. NATO and the--
and the U.S. maintains three military bases in Turkey and an
important one in Romania. Like the Baltic, the Black Sea plays
an important economic role as a gateway to the world's oceans.
Without it, Europe's second-longest river, the Danube would be
cutoff from world shipping lanes.
Russia seeks to militarize and monopolize both the Baltic
and the Black Sea, challenging Europe and the United States. It
uses the Black Sea to control access to the West by the three
countries of the Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
For the five Central Asian countries, it--the Black Sea is
crucial for their access to the West and the West's access to
their energy, oil, gas, and also minerals. Beyond this, Russia
still maintains the most powerful military presence on the
Black Sea and continues to be able to use its assets there to
project power into the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.
Now, my written testimony details existing U.S. strategy
for the region and identifies some areas where updating and
change are called for. Here, however, let me focus on what a
strategy embracing current realities might include. A revised
strategy should be based on this committee's 2023 document on
the region but has to comb out its irrelevancies and be more
blunt in identifying and addressing threats. So, let me offer
six possible elements of a revised U.S. strategy for the
region.
First, add Ukraine, Moldova, and the three countries of the
Caucasus--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia--to the list of
States with direct vital interests in the Black Sea. Also,
acknowledge the critical importance of a free and open Black
Sea for Western access to the resources of the five countries
of Central Asia, and for those countries to--enable those
countries to build economic ties with the West that can balance
the tide of investment that is coming to them from China and
Russia.
Second, affirm the United Nations General Assembly's
resolution of 27 March 2014, declaring that Crimea belongs to
Ukraine and help Ukraine to implement it.
Third, consistent with NATO's forward posture, strengthen
the naval capacities of Bulgaria and Romania, and work with
other countries to assist non-NATO members Ukraine--non-NATO
member Ukraine to strengthen its navy.
Fourth, establish a rotating NATO naval presence in the
Black Sea.
Fifth, to ensure regional buy-in through regular
consultations, establish a permanent Black Sea Council, and
six, acknowledge Turkey's special relevance and interest in
Black Sea security and engage Turkey more actively in advancing
the above goals.
Now, these are just suggestions of how our current strategy
might be updated to confront current realities, but let me
conclude with a very different note. These suggestions identify
today's Russia as a malign force in the Black Sea Region.
However, President Putin's assault on Ukraine is faltering
badly, and Russia is on the brink of bankruptcy.
We grossly underestimate the significance of both these
developments, which are disgracefully underreported in the
American press and in American political discourse. A post-
Putin Russia is already dawning, but its contours remain
totally unknown. I, therefore, urge your committee as a whole
to begin now to review U.S. strategy in light of all the most
likely lines of Russia's further evolution. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Starr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen Frederick Starr
First, I would like to applaud the Chairman and Ranking Member for
their attention to an issue that warrants more focus by the United
States than it has received to date.
Allow me to start with a note on the geopolitical context and
existing U.S. strategy in the region.
The Context
Due to Russian military and economic pressure both the Baltic area
and the Black Sea regions are in acute crisis but in the case of the
Black Sea the crisis is less acknowledged than in the Baltic lands and
hence inadequately addressed. Like the Baltic area, the Black Sea
Region includes three members of NATO: Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
The U.S. maintains three military bases in Turkey and in Rumania. Like
the Baltic, the Black Sea plays an important economic role as a gateway
to the world's oceans; in the case of the Black Sea it is also the only
access to world shipping lanes for shipments on Europe's second longest
river, the Danube. And unlike the Baltic, on its shores are the homes
of the two largest and best equipped forces in Eurasia besides Russia,
i.e. Turkey and Ukraine. Finally, Russia has attempted to militarize
both the Baltic and the Black Sea, directly challenging Europe and the
United States. And Russia uses its Black Sea assets to project its
power into the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. For these and other
reasons, the Black Sea Region warrants the same level of attention as
the Baltic zone.
Existing U.S. Strategy
Washington's existing strategy for the Black Sea Region is serious
and multi-sided but falls short in several areas:
1. Because the Black Sea littoral states are less developed and
coordinated than their Baltic counterparts, they need a higher
level of initiative from Washington than they now receive.
2. Further, the U.S. approach to the Black Sea zone fails to
acknowledge that the fates of all three countries of the
Caucasus--Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan--see free access to
the Black Sea as key to their escaping complete control by
Moscow or Beijing. Two of these countries (Armenia and
Azerbaijan) have recently pivoted towards the West while
Georgia, with two ports on the Black Sea, will likely relaunch
its long-term positive relations with the U.S. once its current
government expires, as is likely once Moscow's backing flags,
as appears inevitable. Under any circumstances, control of the
Black Sea will determine the outcome of two important frozen
conflicts, in Georgia's Abkhazia and in Moldova's Transnistria.
For the five countries of Central Asia, rich with energy and
minerals, free access to the Black Sea is essential to
preventing domination by Russia and China. If they are denied
access to world ports via the Black Sea they will have no
choice but to return to Moscow's fold and submit to China's
economic dominance.
3. Finally, as with the Baltic countries, they main threat to all the
Black Sea states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia arises from
Putin's Russia. Taking advantage of western passivity following
the collapse of the USSR, Russia today aspires to restore its
colonial domination of the Black Sea. Russia's war on Ukraine
is a failure but it has greatly increased its exclusive
economic zone in the Black Sea and gained control of four
fifths of the ports by which Ukraine sent grains to world
markets.
U.S. Strategy to Now
1. Down to 2023 Washington's approach to the Black Sea Region can be
characterized as casual. It failed to respond decisively to
Russia's seizure of an entire region of Georgia in 2008 and to
Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014. Since then, two documents
have defined Washingtons strategy: first, the terms of the 2016
Three Seas initiative involving the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black
Sea, and, second, a 2023 statement by Congress on the Black
Sea.
The Three Seas initiative calls for increasing the cross-
border links, economic development. While laudable in many
respects, this project has focused more attention on the Baltic
than the Black Sea, and does not include two of the three main
littoral states, Turkey, and Ukraine, let alone the Caucasus.
And it is all but silent on security.
Acknowledging these lacunae, your committee in 2023 set forth
a more comprehensive strategy on the Black Sea and littoral
states. It calls for the U.S., NATO, and the EU to deter Russia
in the Black Sea by developing a permanent NATO base there,
initiating a rotating maritime presence, and fostering U.S.
investment in the region. This led to the creation of a NATO
base in Rumania at a cost of $2.7 billion. But the 2023
document, along with the 2024 National Defense Authorization
Act, was a Christmas tree with too many ornaments and too few
focused commitments and actions. And it was soon overtaken by
events, which gave rise to a reactive and improvisational
approach to the Black Sea Region.
What Is Needed Today?
A revised strategy should draw on the 2023 document but comb out
its irrelevancies, be more blunt in identifying threats, expand the
number of countries with which to partner, and engage Turkey in a more
active role. It must recognize that even though the Russian Navy has
been gravely wounded, it remains the most powerful force on the Black
Sea and uses its presence there to project its power into the Middle
East. Africa, and beyond. Hence Russia remains the greatest threat to
the goals of the U.S. and NATO.
The main elements of a revised strategy should include:
1. Adding Ukraine, Moldova, and the three countries of the Caucasus to
the list of states with recognized and compatible interests in
the Black Sea.
2. Consistent with NATO's forward posture, strengthening the naval
capacities of Bulgaria and Rumania, and also working with other
countries to assist non-NATO member Ukraine.
3. Establishing a rotating NATO naval presence in the Black Sea.
4. Affirming the UN General Assembly's resolution 68/262 of 27 March
2014 declaring that Crimea belongs to Ukraine and supporting
efforts by the U.S. and its partners to help Ukraine implement
it.
5. Assuring regional buy-in through regular consultations with
relevant governments in a Black Sea Council.
6. Acknowledging Turkey's special relevance and interest in Black Sea
security and engaging Turkey more actively in advancing the
above goals.
Concluding Note
These suggestions identify today's Russia as a malign force in the
Black Sea Region. However, President Putin's assault on Ukraine and the
region is faltering badly and Moscow's finances are on the brink of
bankruptcy. A post-Putin Russia is dawning but its contours remain
unknown. Your committee must therefore prepare now to revisit U.S.
strategy in the Black Sea Region in light of Russia's further
evolution.
Senator Daines. Dr. Starr, thank you for your testimony.
Catherine Sendak, director of the Transatlantic Defense and
Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Ms. Sendak, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF CATHERINE SENDAK, DIRECTOR OF TRANSATLANTIC
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Sendak. Thank you so much, Chairman Daines, Ranking
Member Murphy, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on
Europe and Regional Security Cooperation. It is an honor to
address you today on this critical and timely matter of U.S.
national Security and policy. I should note that the views
expressed in this testimony do not reflect those of the Center
for European Policy Analysis or its staff and fellows.
CEPA, for the past 20 years, has spent a lot of time
focusing on the Black Sea, producing a lot of analysis and
recommendations, looking how to highlight the importance of the
region to both European and global security. While much of the
policy focus has centered on the war inside Ukraine, rightfully
so, the broader regional strategy, particularly concerning the
Black Sea, as was Stated before, remains severely ill defined
and underdeveloped. This gap in a comprehensive, well-defined,
and well-resourced Black Sea strategy puts long-term prospects
for stability and security at risk, not only in Ukraine, but
across the European continent. We have a real opportunity to
seize the momentum to set forward a path for tangible policy
and achievable sustainable security in the Black Sea Region.
There are reasons to approach security challenges in the
region with some optimism and some pragmatism. In the wake of
what looks like to be a majority victory for the Party of
Action and Solidarity--the pro-EU party in Moldova--a
concentrated Western attention on Black Sea security in light
of Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine and its ongoing
aggressive actions in the region, increased investment on
defense technology and capabilities, and plussed-up defense
resources across the West, the time is now.
I had the opportunity to lead a year-long study on Ukraine
long-term security cooperation and assistance published earlier
this year. As a part of that study, we assessed the critical
requirements for stability and security in Ukraine with
reaching effects of security in the broader region.
In order to achieve long-term stability and security on the
European continent, the U.S. and NATO should undertake the
following in the Black Sea Region. One, we must enable Ukraine
to defend its territorial sovereignty over the long term. That
has far-reaching impacts to the security of the entire region.
We must draft, resource, and implement clear, concise, and
cohesive Black Sea strategies, both in the United States, NATO,
and we need to take a look at U.S.-Russia policy. And finally,
we need to provide sustained U.S. leadership in the region,
including engagement, presence, and assist our Black Sea NATO
allies to further cooperation to bring unified security.
As we know, the Black Sea Region sits at the crossroads of
Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia, with a
contested and competitive security environment, and we know
crucial to Russian's foreign policy objectives is to control
the methods and means of commerce and trade in the Black Sea
and enjoy unhampered access to project power to other theaters,
including the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and
Africa.
The threats from Russia, as we know, in the Black Sea
Region and all over Europe, are well known: militarily in
Ukraine, Transnistria, and Georgia; politically as we have seen
over the weekend in Moldova in their attempts to derail that
democratic process; and, of course, hybrid actions that are
continuing day by day.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the connections of
everything else happening on the European continent with Russia
hybrid actions and connecting those dots to what is happening
in the Black Sea Region. As was mentioned before by the ranking
member and others here, the drone incursions, the air
incursions in Poland and Estonia, both triggering Article 4
sessions at NATO, the potential drone incursions in Denmark and
Norway going on right now, the bombing of the EU building in
Kyiv, the GPS jamming of President von der Leyen's plane, these
are all cumulative in nature, Russia testing what Europe and
the West will actually respond to and react to and try to deter
against.
Let me briefly just go over my recommendations again, and I
welcome any questions you all have about these. Enabling
Ukraine to defend its territorial sovereignty over the long
term. So, our study took a look at multiple-year authorities
and multiyear funding for consistent and sustained support and
assistance from Congress. We also suggested a 5-year memorandum
of understanding between the U.S. and Ukraine, providing a full
set of objectives and goals and resources to solidify the
partnership.
That partnership and solidifying that partnership over the
long term, will provide consistency and have ripple effects
throughout the region. Security cooperation and assistance
programs spanning the spectrum of issue sets--military,
civilian, reforms, education--creating the opportunity for
substantive, generational capacity building and change
throughout the region. Drafting, resourcing, and implementing
Black Sea strategies and a U.S.-Russia policy are clear. We
need to re-look at the U.S. Black Sea Strategy and how to
implement that further.
We need to create a Black Sea strategy at NATO, and the
U.S. must examine a comprehensive U.S.-Russia policy moving
forward. And then finally, U.S. leadership is so critical in
this space, including engagement and presence in assisting our
Black Sea NATO allies--Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey--to work
together further, taking their Mine Countermeasures Task Group
and expanding it into other domains, including maritime domain
awareness and intelligence sharing. The opportunities are
great, and we look forward to those opportunities.
If the U.S. and NATO do not take these actions, then Russia
and other potential adversaries will have the unfettered
ability to continue to destabilize Ukraine and Black Sea
nations and control the strategic terrain, to include the
commerce that flows through it, not only putting European
stability at risk, but also the global economy. Thank you for
the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sendak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Catherine Sendak
Chairman Daines, Ranking Member Murphy, distinguished members of
the Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, It is an
honor to address you today on this critical and timely matter of U.S.
national security and foreign policy. I should note that the views
expressed in this testimony do not reflect those of the Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA) or its staff and fellows.
Since CEPA's founding 20 years ago, we have focused on the security
of the Black Sea Region. CEPA publishes extensive analysis and
recommendations on the region, we have a robust set of experts and
fellows focusing on the region, and we continually seek ways to
highlight the importance of the Black Sea to European and global
security.
Framing Statement
While much of the policy focus has centered on the war inside
Ukraine (rightfully so), the broader regional strategy--particularly
concerning the Black Sea--remains severely ill-defined and
underdeveloped. This gap in a comprehensive, well-defined, and well-
resourced Black Sea strategy puts long-term prospects for stability and
security at-risk not only in Ukraine but across the European continent.
I had the opportunity to lead a year-long study on Ukraine long-
term security assistance published earlier this year. As part of the
study, we assessed the critical requirements for stability and security
in Ukraine with reaching effects of security in the broader Black Sea
Region.\1\ The region is a critical juncture of commerce, trade,
energy, and agriculture--Russia's war in Ukraine and its long-term goal
of manipulation and control of the Black Sea have far reaching effects
to European and global security.
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\1\ Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ``Between Now and NATO: A
Security Strategy for Ukraine,'' (Center for European Policy Analysis,
January 2025),
https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/betweennow-and-nato-a-
security-strategy-for-ukraine/
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To ensure long-term stability and security on the European
continent, the U.S. and NATO should undertake the following in the
Black Sea Region (BSR): (1) enable Ukraine to defend its territorial
sovereignty over the long term; (2) draft, resource, and implement
clear, concise, and cohesive Black Sea security strategies; and (3)
provide sustained U.S. leadership in the region including engagement,
presence, and assisting Black Sea NATO allies to further cooperation to
bring unified security. If the U.S. and NATO do not take these actions,
then Russia and other potential adversaries will have the unfettered
ability to continue to destabilize Ukraine and Black Sea nations and
control the strategic terrain--to include the commerce that flows
through it--not only putting European stability at risk but also the
global economy.
I will proceed by describing the strategic importance of the Black
Sea and then further outline my three recommendations for U.S. policy.
Strategic Importance of the Black Sea
``Wishful thinking will not keep U.S. safe . . . hope is not
a strategy.'' \2\ (Rutte 9 June 2025)
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\2\ NATO News, ``Building a better NATO''; NATO Secretary General
speech at Chatham House, 9 JUN 2025,'' June 9, 2025,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYiE82ufdHM
``We see the Black Sea being weaponized.'' \3\ (Kallas 28 May
2025)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ European External Action Service, Black Sea Strategy: Press
remarks by High Representative/VicePresident Kaja Kallas, (Brussels,
Belgium: EEAS Press Team, 2025)
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/black-sea-strategy-press-remarks-
high-representativevice-presidentkaja-kallas--en
At the crossroads of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and
Central Asia is the BSR--a vital region of economic, commerce,
agricultural, and energy resources, with a contested and competitive
security environment. Economically, the region serves as a link between
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It is the center for vital regional
trade routes, with the EU, the largest trading partner for most of the
region, having an overall trade volume of ?310 billion/$360 billion.\4\
Agriculturally, grain production for the next season across the region
is projected at 225 million tons, slightly below record levels--
critical to global food supplies.\5\ As it relates to energy, Turkey is
ramping up its flagship Sakarya natural gas field in the Black Sea.\6\
And alternative energy corridors are being explored and seen as a step
for regional collaboration and green energy production, developing both
economic and strategic benefits for the region.\7\
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\4\ Delegation of the EU to Armenia, Questions and answers on the
European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea Region, (Yerevan,
Armenia: Delegation of the EU to Armenia, 2025),
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/questions-and-
answers-european-unions-strategicapproach-black-sea-region--en
\5\ Grains Prices, ``Black Sea Region Grain Market Analysis,''
GrainPrices, May 9, 2025,
https://grainsprices.com/article/18924
\6\ Nevzat Devranoglu, ``Turkey eyes regional energy expansion as
Black Sea gas output rises,'' Reuters, April 21, 2025,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-eyes-regional-
energy-expansion-blacksea-gas-output-rises-2025-04-21/
\7\ Natia Gamkrelidze, ``Can the Black Sea Energy Corridor Power
Europe's Green Future?'' Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 17, 2024,
https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/can-black-sea-
energy-corridor-power-europes-greenfuture
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Crucial to Russia's foreign policy objectives is to control the
methods and means of commerce and trade in the Black Sea\8\ and
unhampered access to power project to other theaters including the
Middle East unto Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Africa.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Daniel Hamilton and Angela Stent, ``Russia's Imperial Black Sea
Strategy,'' Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2025,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/georgia/russias-imperial-black-sea-
strategy
\9\ Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ``Between Now and NATO: A
Security Strategy for Ukraine,'' (Washington, DC: Center for European
Policy Analysis, 2025),
https://cepa.org/comprehensivereports/between-now-and-nato-a-
security-strategy-for-ukraine/; Samer al-Ahmed, ``Russia's military
presence in post-Assad Syria: A growing security liability undermining
stability,'' (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2025),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-military-presence-post-
assad-syriagrowing-security-liability-undermining
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For decades NATO allies and partners have confronted Russia in an
ad hoc fashion in the BSR including, but not limited to, the decades-
long presence in Transnistria, the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the
illegal annexation of Crimea and subsequent Russian-led separatists in
2014, and the closing of the Kerch Strait in 2018, severely restricting
access to the Sea of Azov for Ukraine--the list is long. And in still
other cases, we have ignored their intent in the region to our own
peril allowing Russia to exert its influence and its ability to sow
chaos to destabilize the region with minimal to no reaction including
consistent cyber-attacks, sabotage, and corruption.
As President von der Leyen laid out in her 2025 State of the Union,
Europe is in a fight.\10\ And a frontline of that fight is the Black
Sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Ursula von der Leyen, ``2025 State of the Union Address by
President von der Leyen,'' (European Union, September 2025)
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech--25--
2053
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Threats to U.S. Interests in the Black Sea
Threats include: 1) Russia's military activity; 2) Russian hybrid
operations; 3) Chinese and other actors.
First, Russia's war in Ukraine and ripple effects in the region are
felt by all nations. Russia's relentless attempts at dismantling
Ukrainian democracy, seeking a puppet state under the Kremlin's
control, is decades in the making. By sea, the Kremlin's efforts to
limit freedom of navigation impact global trade, food supplies, energy,
and commerce. Ukraine has shown undeniable success in thwarting the
Russian navy in the Black Sea, eliminating 30% of its Black Sea fleet
and pushing its basing to the Novorossiysk and the Abkhazia region of
Georgia given the vulnerability of Crimea.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Rayhan Demytrie, Paul Brown and Joshua Cheetham, ``Russia's
new Black Sea naval base alarms Georgia,'' BBC, December 12, 2023,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67625450
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This denial has increased the ability for Ukraine and the rest of
the BSR to conduct business but constant threats remain.\12\ By air,
for example, Romania is impacted regularly, by air incursions and drone
sightings including drone debris.\13\ While these actions span the
European continent, Russia has been using these methods for decades in
the Black Sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Natalie Sabanadze and Galip Dalay, Understanding Russia's
Black Sea strategy, (London, United Kingdom: Chatham House, 2025),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/understanding-russias-
blacksea-strategy/02-russias-use-conflicts-black-sea-region
\13\ ``Romania could partner Ukraine to make drones under EU-funded
defence scheme,'' Reuters, September 26, 2025,
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/romania-could-
partnerukraine-make-drones-under-eu-funded-defence-scheme-2025-09-26/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secondly, Russia's hybrid operations include a litany of misdeeds
and dangerous confrontations testing the region and alliance's resolve.
It is clear Russia views the Black Sea in their sphere of influence and
their ``. . . imperial ambitions aim to transform the Black Sea into a
``Russian lake'' through military occupation, economic coercion, and
hybrid warfare.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Tamas Harangozo, 2025--Revised--The War in Ukraine and
Mounting Economic Challenges in the Greater Black Sea Region,
(Brussels, Belgium, 2025),
https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2025-black-seareport-harangozo-
017-esctd
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Politically, at the time of this hearing, as we see from this past
weekend, the world is watching the outcomes of Moldova's elections.
Moldova, containing Transnistria, a region with approximately 1500
Russian troops and `peacekeepers', is on the frontlines of Russian
hybrid and kinetic tactics. Russia has long targeted Moldova with
political interference and influence operations, supporting pro-Russian
parties, financing illicit networks, and weaponizing energy dependence.
Since the election of pro-European leaders in 2020-21, the Kremlin has
intensified efforts to destabilize Moldova's democratic institutions
and derail its EU trajectory-most recently by financing largescale
vote-buying, engineering energy crises, and preparing to disrupt this
past Sunday's parliamentary elections. \15\ With the victory of the
pro-EU party, Moldova has shown a small nation can confront and deny
Russian tactics to influence and derail democratic principles.\16\ It
is a testament to the strength of those systems and of the Moldovan
people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Sarah E. Garding and Cory Welt, Moldova: Background and U.S.
Policy, CRS Report No. R48664, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2025)
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48664
\16\ Sarah Rainsford and Paul Kirby, ``Moldova's pro-EU party wins
vote mired in claims of Russian interference,'' BBC, September 29,
2025,
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2rdlj8ejgo
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Extending beyond the BSR, we must take into account the cumulative
effort of the Kremlin's campaign on European security including NATO
allies over just the past few months. Since August, the bombing of the
EU building in Kyiv; GPS jamming of European Commission President
Ursula von der Leyen's aircraft; 21 drone incursions in Polish airspace
in a single evening; Estonian air incursion (both of which triggered
Article 4 sessions at NATO); potential drone incursions in Danish and
Norwegian commercial and military airspace and the incidents go on and
on. And it is time to confront these challenges in a cohesive, timely,
and effective way.
Other actors, including China, Iran, and the Gulf States continue
to seek to expand their influence in the region. We clearly see
Russia's policy aims of dominance of the BSR but we must not ignore the
efforts by the PRC to exude influence including buying up critical
infrastructure, investing in energy corridors, and signing free trade
agreements not to mention its attempts at purchasing military
industrial assets like Ukraine's Motor Sich,\17\ interest in leading
the brokering of a peace deal in Ukraine, and eyeing opportunities to a
perceived easing of Western influences and engagement.\18\ In addition,
the Gulf States, Iran, and others are either increasing their influence
efforts in the BSR and/or working directly with Russia on its war in
Ukraine.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ William Echols, ``Chinese Intrigue Behind Ukraine's Seizure of
Aviation Firm Motor Sich,'' Voice of America, November 10, 2022,
https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-chinese-intrigue-behind-
ukraine-sseizure-of-aviation-firm-motor-sich/6829005.html
\18\ Michael Cercire, ``China's Black Sea Play,'' RAND, August 5,
2025
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/08/chinas-black-sea-
play.html; Nino Lezhava and Leon Hartwell, ``Russia and China at Odds
Over Black Sea Ambitions,'' Center for European Policy Analysis,
September 20, 2024, https://cepa.org/article/russia-and-china-at-odds-
over-black-sea-ambitions/
\19\ Iulia-Sabina Joja, ``Iran's growing influence in the Black Sea
Region: Consequences and Western responses,'' Middle East Institute,
December 6, 2024,
https://mei.edu/publications/irans-growinginfluence-black-sea-
region-consequences-and-western-responses; Natia Seskuria, ``A Strategy
Long Overdue: The EU's New Vision for the Black Sea,'' Royal United
Services Institute, August 22, 2025
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/
strategy-long-overdue-eus-newvision-black-sea
Recommendations Section
Enable Ukraine to defend itself providing capabilities,
platforms, training, and continue programs including the
ability for European allies to purchase U.S. platforms to
provide to Ukraine. These recommendations will have a far-
reaching effect on the entire region increasing regional
deterrence, capability, and stability.\20\ To do that, the U.S.
should consider the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ``Between Now and NATO:
A Security Strategy for Ukraine,'' (Center for European Policy
Analysis, January 2025),
https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/betweennow-and-nato-a-
security-strategy-for-ukraine/
The U.S. Congress should provide sustained, multiyear
funding and authorities for partnership with Ukraine
including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
(USAI). Providing the tools, support, and assistance
Ukraine needs to confront the Russian threat is a necessary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
step in obtaining a secure region.
Demonstrating a long-term commitment and partnership to
Ukraine and regional security, the U.S. should enter into a
5-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ukrainian
government to outline and formalize the priorities and
objectives of a long-term security partnership.
The U.S. has played and can continue to contribute
heavily to the democratic resilience programs and measures
to address corruption, further develop democratic
institutions and checks and balances, and reforms to many
Black Sea nations including the allied and partner
militaries and industrial bases. Security cooperation and
assistance programs as well as other U.S. government
efforts including programs focused on institutional
capacity building, government reforms, and educational and
exchange opportunities have the capacity to assist
generational changes in Ukraine and the region.\21\
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\21\ Education and exchange programs including, but not limited to,
International Military, Education, andTraining (IMET), Professional
Military Education (PME), and State Partnership Programs (SPP).
Develop, resource, and implement comprehensive security
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strategies for the Black Sea and Russia.
The U.S. Black Sea Security Strategy, authorized and
required in the fiscal year 2024 National Defense
Authorization Act (PL 118-31), was delivered to Congress in
June 2024.1A\22\ The strategy laid out five priorities
including engagement and relationship building, regional
security cooperation, economic assistance to combat Russian
and Chinese influences, energy and security, and democratic
resilience.\23\ As many know from drafted strategies, the
more specificity and direct resources directed at
implementing the strategy are imperative. But the status of
implementation is not clear. As we learned in our study
published earlier this year, Ukraine and many regional
neighbors consistently look to the U.S. for leadership and
guidance to understand policy objectives and goals in the
BSR. The U.S. has an opportunity to put forward pragmatic
policy to increase regional security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub.
L. No 118-31 1247, 137 Stat. 462-463(2023).
https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ31/PLAW-118publ31.pdf
\23\ Hearing on U.S. Black Sea Strategy: Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 118thCong. (2023) (Statement of
James O'Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs from 2023-2025)
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ac0fdbbe-cf96-dd04-
5958-6d40af5b63ef/102523--O%27Brien--Testimony.pdf
Alternatively, NATO does not have a Black Sea strategy.
There have been calls to examine what the alliance should
prioritize to increase the security of allies and partners
of the BSR. Any strategy should include a set of
recommendations to increase non-BSR allied presence in the
Black Sea. Working with Turkey, in line with the Montreux
Convention, and foreseeing a potential ceasefire and/or
negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia, those
discussions and planning can begin now.
U.S. and NATO Russia Strategies
Hand in glove to well drafted and resourced Black Sea
and Ukraine strategies is a U.S./Russia policy. It is time
to develop a comprehensive and clear strategy and
objectives related to the U.S. relationship with Russia.
Additionally, at the NATO Washington Summit in 2024, a
key aspect of the communique included the alliance to
``develop recommendations on NATO's strategic approach to
Russia.'' \24\ But at the 2025 Hague Summit, there was no
mention in the communique, and no strategy has been
delivered to the alliance.\25\ NATO work on these issues
and policies should continue.
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\24\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington Summit
Declaration, (Washington, DC: North AtlanticTreaty Organization, 2024),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official--texts--227678.htm
\25\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Hague Summit
Declaration, (The Hague: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2025),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official--texts--236705.htm
Channel U.S. leadership to take full advantage of momentum and
resources to enable Black Sea allies and partners to cohesively
and collaboratively work towards to achieving long term
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stability and prosperity. o
Utilize key programs and markers to strengthen the
region's defenses. There are many positive and substantial
new programs, initiatives, and funds for increasing
European security including NATO's 5% GDP on defense
spending commitment, regional defense plans, critical
capability targets, innovation programs and procurement
targets. The EU published a defence white paper,\26\ a
Black Sea Strategy, and established the ReArm Europe Plan/
Readiness 2030 program including Security Action for Europe
(SAFE) funding mechanism opportunities for production and
procurement for EU nations, with the intent of spending
over ?800 billion in the coming years on defense.\27\ But
there is concern the deluge of opportunities will result in
lack clarity, efficiency, and cohesion. U.S. leadership can
play a vital role in cohering programs across organizations
and capitals to streamline efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Strategic Communications, ``White Paper for European Defence--
Readiness 2030,'' (European Union External Action, March 2025)
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-for-european-
defencereadiness-2030--en
\27\ European Union, ``SAFE Security Action for Europe,'' (European
Union, July 2025)
https://defenceindustry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/
safe-security-action-europe--en
Black Sea NATO allies have an opportunity to align on
key security priorities in terms of capability and
capacity. Using the template of the Black Sea Mine
Countermeasures Task Group, NATO allies Romania, Bulgaria,
and Turkey should expand cooperation on regional security
challenges.\28\ The Task Group should seek to develop a
multi-year framework focused on common security goals
including domain awareness, information sharing, maritime
security, and training and exercising. This framework would
provide goals and objectives to use, in conjunction with,
security cooperation and assistance levers with NATO, the
EU, and the United States. It is an opportunity for the
NATO neighbors of the Black Sea to lead on executing the
region's security and speak and act with a common voice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Kate Tringham, ``MCM Black Sea Task Group starts operations,''
(Janes, July 2024)
https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/sea/mcm-black-
sea-task-group-starts-operations
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Conclusion
It is prudent for the US, NATO and other allies and partners to
seize the momentum of international focus on the security situation in
the BSR and deliver. Without a coherent, well-resourced strategy for
the Black Sea Region, the U.S. and NATO risk ceding strategic advantage
to Russia--allowing it to continue undermining Ukraine's sovereignty,
threatening regional allies and partners, and jeopardizing European
security and global commerce. Consistent support and partnership with
Black Sea allies and partners, a strong, pragmatic, well-defined, and
well-resourced Black Sea strategy anchored in clear policy objectives,
and sustained commitment will deny Putin and his global partners the
strategic leverage sought and ensure he cannot hold European security/
stability and the global economy at risk.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Ms. Sendak. I will start with
Dr. Starr.
I was reflecting on our former colleague, Senator McCain's,
famous comment he made in 2014 shortly, I believe, after Russia
invaded Crimea when he said, ``Russia is a gas station
masquerading as a country.'' When we look back on Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, it has become undeniable that energy
security and national security are intertwined. In fact, one
could argue energy security is national security, and that
Europe's reliance on Russian energy is both a regional security
as well as economic risk.
My question, Dr. Starr, is, do you believe that the
development of the Middle Corridor, as we saw what has occurred
now with that historic August 8 signing of the peace agreement
between Azerbaijan and Armenia when we had both President
Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan here in Washington, that
President Trump got that deal put together, do you see that as
a means to uncork the energy potential of the Caucasus and
Central Asia, and how that might change the landscape of
European energy flow for the better, especially on NATO's
eastern flank?
Dr. Starr. This is an Important issue that did not begin
yesterday. It has been more than a decade since the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline was opened. There was so much skepticism about that in
this country, that we organized a motorcycle run, from
Azerbaijan on the Caspian, all the way to Turkish Port of
Ceyhan in order to deliver the first oil from Central Asia to
Europe by motorcycle.
My point is this: It is possible to send energy from
Central Asia and the Caspian Region to Europe by land
corridors. However, it would be better to have backups and
multiple systems, including one that would cross the Black Sea.
But if the Black Sea is dominated by Russia, which has its own
energy interests, obviously that will not work. So, yes, the
so-called Middle Corridor is very important, but at the same
time, we cannot rely solely on the land route through the
Caucasus. We should also have the alternative of a sea route
across the Black Sea.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Dr. Starr, for your insights on
that. It is appreciated. Mr. Boyse, I want to continue on this
theme of energy security. In May of this year, Western States
of the Black Sea Region began construction of a Vertical Gas
Corridor as a means to push energy into starved parts of
Europe. Mr. Boyse, do you believe that U.S. allies in countries
like Romania would benefit from such a proposal, and could this
idea succeed where the Nabucco pipeline and other energy
projects have failed?
Mr. Boyse. That is a very important question because it
gets to the root of the question of how to diversify sources,
expand options, and increase energy security, so that the
countries of that region do not need to rely on Russian
sources--which brings all sorts of opportunities for malign
influence, which we have seen over the course of many, many
years.
Now, the main principle is that the more projects like this
the better because they bring more sources of energy. Romania
can contribute to this objective because it is blessed with
enormous resources--fossil fuels in the Black Sea and on land.
It is also a key corridor through which the resources from
those countries that are not blessed with those resources need
to go. This project has been long in the making, in the
conceptual stage. It goes back almost 10 years when it was
first a bright idea in some foresighted people's minds. It has
taken quite a long time for it to get off the ground.
It is about time that it is happening. It will be a great
resource when it finally starts to produce the sorts of diverse
supplies that countries of the BSR region need--that Ukraine
needs, that Moldova needs, that Hungary needs, that Slovakia
needs. And so, we should welcome this and support it in every
way we can.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Boyse. Ranking Member
Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms.
Sendak, we have seen both the capability and the limitations of
Russian military force in Ukraine, and I mentioned intelligence
estimates are that this will likely be some form of a stalemate
for a long period of time.
Thus, Russia is going to be more reliant on non-military
means, as they always have been, to try to undermine support
for Ukraine and to undermine pro-Western governments. And we
see all of the myriad ways that Russia uses, you know, funding
for corrupt politicians, misinformation campaigns, just
outright intimidation in order to get what it wants, and yet,
as I mentioned in my opening testimony, this administration has
effectively shuttered many of the tools that we use to fight
Russian asymmetric warfare techniques.
The Trump administration has slashed funding for pro-
democracy programs in the Black Sea Region, which are run by
NDI and IRI. As I mentioned, it shut down the Global Engagement
Center, which chased down a lot of Russian propaganda in and
around the Black Sea Region. It has withdrawn from working
groups with European countries to expose and counter anti-
Western and anti-U.S. Russian-backed disinformation in the
Black Sea Region.
Is there any way to support democracies--pro-Western
democracies in the Black Sea if the United States is not
actively engaged in trying to counter the non-military ways
that Russia seeks to gain influence and undermine governments
that are pro--are supportive of the West and supportive of a
democratic future?
Ms. Sendak. Thank you, Senator Murphy. You know, it is an
excellent question, I think, that one that the United States
has tried to tackle for many years on how do we address this
hybrid threat in a very holistic and tactical way. We have seen
successes in some respects and, I would say, a lot of failures.
We play reaction mode a lot when it comes to these things, and
as you mentioned and I mentioned in my opening testimony,
Russia is constantly testing the waters to see what they can
get away with.
I would say holistic support and assistance for these
democracies is really important, and understanding it is not
just about mill-to-mill conversations or relationships. It is
not just about civilian. It is not just about one sector. It is
about all sectors, and I think we can see that in Ukraine.
Prior to the Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, we saw a
majority of programs that we helped Ukraine with really not
necessarily even being military, right? You know, standing up
agencies, understanding budget processes, really weedsy things,
so they understood capacity building and how to do this. I
think it is very important that U.S. leadership is here.
The Black Sea Region is a nexus of many organizations and
alliances, and the U.S. has an opportunity to lead that from
various venues and various streams of effort to really have a
holistic perspective. So, yes, sir, I agree that a holistic
approach to these problems is necessary.
Senator Murphy. I would point to our support for
independent media in Moldova. I know this becomes a fraught
political issue, you know, support for countering propaganda
overseas because a lot of conservatives worry that that is
going to prejudice certain types of speech as propaganda. But
in Moldova, there is really no way to have a fact-based
narrative without there being some support for independent
truth telling because Russia commands so much of that space,
and so I appreciate that answer.
Mr. Boyse, I wanted to sort of stay on this thread of how
we use non-military funds to support our allies in the Black
Sea, and I agree with Senator Daines that energy independence
is a key goal for the region. And it was always curious to me
that in the wake of the early invasion of Ukraine by Russian
proxies, we spent $4 billion on something called the European
Reassurance Initiative, but it was, basically, all bread-and-
butter military programming. Had we spent maybe $1 billion of
that $4 billion helping Eastern Europe, Europe, and the Black
Sea become energy independent of Russia, we might not be in the
position that we are today.
And so, I always find it curious that--you know, I agree
with Senator Daines that energy security is national security,
and I guess my question is, should we be considering putting
sort of hard U.S. national security dollars into regional
energy independence projects? Should we start to fund energy
independence in the same way that we fund military support for
the region? A lot more projects could get done there if the
United States was willing to put some muscle behind it.
Mr. Boyse. That is a question, Senator Murphy, that is near
and dear to my heart because I was the Sherpa for the Three
Seas Initiative during most of the Trump administration, and we
were actually making a fair amount of progress on the principle
you mentioned--and energy is one of the three pillars.
And much of the investment did, in fact, go into the Three
Seas Investment Fund, a lot of it into the energy pillar. That
initiative has a lot more potential than has been realized, and
I hope the Trump administration takes it up again because there
is a lot of goodness there, a lot of interest on the part of
our allies in the region, the members of the Three Seas world.
As you say, taxpayer dollars are available for this through the
DFC.
So to the extent that the USG can get this going again,
there would be a lot of receptivity in the Three Seas
countries. Many of the countries in the BSR region have been
the beneficiaries of U.S. investment via the DFC and via the
Three Seas Investment Fund. There is so much more potential
there.
The investment needs are enormous. The capital markets are
also available for this, because a lot of the investment that
is going into the Neptun Deep Field, for example, in offshore
Romania, and has been going into the pipelines, and has been
going into offshore wind farms and onshore wind farms, and
would go into investment in Bulgarian EEZ as well, not to
mention Turkey, could come from the private sector. There is a
considerable financial resources available in the capital
markets, too, because those projects will all be profitable.
This also raises the question of freedom of navigation
because the peaceful nature of the Black Sea could be affected
by--and the investments in infrastructure that will help these
countries become more energy secure--could be impacted
negatively if Russia's war against Ukraine ends in an
unsatisfactory manner.
In other words, if Putin ends this war on his terms, it
could negatively affect energy investments in the Black Sea and
energy security. For example, a U.S. firm, Black Sea Oil & Gas,
has been exploiting resources in Romanian waters, working with
Romanian partners for a number of years. Their executives have
talked about what it is like to be drilling in the Black Sea
and then to be buzzed by Russian planes or to have Russian
ships not far from their platforms.
And so, you can imagine when the vast energy resources that
are in Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish, and Ukrainian waters--much
of that has been taken over by Russia--that when this enormous
potential in the maritime domain is dominated by Russia and
this threat exists, firms are less likely to invest or it
becomes much more expensive, or it becomes much more risky.
And so, it is important that the maritime domain remains
peaceful and stable, so that the vast energy needs in Europe
can be supplied in part by the countries on the Black Sea--in
addition to the other ways the USG, for example, could support.
Thank you.
Senator Daines. I want to shift gears for a moment and talk
about maritime security and, specifically, the Bosphorus. I
know every time you fly in and out of Istanbul, if you are
transiting or stopping there, you are coming in the final
approach, you just look at all the ships, cargo, and the
containers there that are backed up going in and through there,
that very important part of the world.
I think most estimates suggests it is about 6 percent of
global trade transits through the Bosphorus. It is an economic
conduit, obviously, facilitating energy, agriculture, raw
minerals, and the economic disruptions caused by the War in
Ukraine impact truly the whole of the globe. It is kind of
their Strait of Hormuz, pinch point, certainly, for the world.
My question for everybody, I would like each of you maybe
to answer this, is, how do we work with our allies to invest in
maritime security and to ensure that Russia or other
adversaries do not stifle navigation and trade? Dr. Starr, I
will start with you, but I am going to ask the whole panel to
give some thought to that question. Dr. Starr?
Dr. Starr. It is a worthy question. The reality at the
moment is that the Black Sea is closed because Russia has
imposed a no-sail zone that covers the entire Sea except for a
very narrow corridor along the Rumanian. This control has been
cracked but not broken. How do you do this? Rather than give
you a slick answer, let me instead suggest you do not do it by
a bunch of bilateral deals or by a bunch of bilateral
consultations.
There exists no Black Sea council that we could work with.
Instead, we are trying to make a series of bilateral deals. In
a sense, we divide and Russia conquers. What is needed is a
more regional approach. I have also suggested expanding the
Black Sea concept to include the Caucasus, to include Moldova
and Ukraine, which are not yet members of NATO. Expand the
group, and deal with this as a group problem that needs a group
solution because, country by country, you cannot solve this
Rubik's Cube, hence----
Senator Daines. Thank you for that insight.
Dr. Starr [continuing]. Excuse me. Hence, the need for a
Black Sea council.
Senator Daines. Well, it is--thinking about the Caucasus,
too, in terms of Georgia has----
Dr. Starr. Added to them.
Senator Daines [continuing]. Oceanfront property there on
the Black Sea, absolutely. Ms. Sendak, your thoughts.
Ms. Sendak. Thank you so much, and tagging along to Dr.
Starr's comments, you know, it is really critical. We have seen
Ukraine be so successful in the Black Sea in terms of fighting
back against Russia's Black Sea Fleet, down 30 percent,
pushback off of Crimea, which is a huge success, but exactly to
your point, how do we open this up consistently to commerce and
economics?
This is why I think a great suggestion is broadening what
the NATO allies on the Black Sea can do. I do believe NATO
should be talking now about how to start opening up the Black
Sea to non-Black Sea allies. I think that is a really important
step in a series of discussions that NATO should be having now,
of course, in light of Turkey and the Montreux Convention.
But I would say the opportunities for Romania, Bulgaria,
and Turkey to come together, agree on a list of items to push
forward in a leadership position at the alliance, and really
come at this from a position of this is our neighborhood, we
are going to take these things on, much like what we have seen
in the Baltic Sea.
I think what we have seen from our Baltic allies is the
ability to speak with one voice on threat and speak with one
voice about how they would like to see the security of their
region look, and I think the opportunity is there for our NATO
allies in the Black Sea to do the same. And that leadership
should have the ripple effect that we might be seeking in terms
of stability on the sea.
Senator Daines. Ms. Sendak, you brought up Turkey, and I
think, when you look at the map, nobody has more square footage
than Turkey in terms of front of--friends on the--on the Black
Sea.
Your thoughts on Turkey?
Ms. Sendak. Yes. Well, you know, we have seen them pivot to
a little bit more concentration on the Black Sea, which I think
is a very positive step, and I see them having, obviously, a
huge leadership role in the Black Sea. Given the Bosphorus,
given the Montreux Convention, letting people in and out and
ships in and out, it is a critical, critical role.
And I think the more that we can incorporate--I think Dr.
Starr mentioned in his opening statement the more we can
incorporate Turkey's role in this, in a leadership position
with their other allies, I think, is absolutely critical. They
are mentioned frequently in the EU Black Sea Strategy, knowing
full well that their buy-in and leadership is absolutely
critical to make any of this happen.
Senator Daines. Thanks, Ms. Sendak. Mr. Boyse.
Mr. Boyse. So, there is some activity already ongoing, but
first hats off to the Ukrainian military for keeping the Black
Sea relatively, or at least partly open, because the Russian
Black Sea Fleet is pretty much bottled up and unable to operate
freely, even if it is able to put at risk a lot ship traffic,
maritime traffic. The fact that there is still commerce going
on can be attributed, in large part, to them as well as to our
Turkish allies who have helped to keep trade routes open.
A fair amount of activity has been going on for a number of
months with the NATO Mine Measures Group that includes Turkey,
Romania, and Bulgaria, that is trying to remove mines in the
Black Sea. Nobody knows how many mines there are actually, but
they threaten freedom of navigation because they raise
insurance rates and they make it much more risky to ply the
waters commercially.
This effort, which is a great start, needs more attention
because there there are so many mines in the Black Sea. Some
people talk about 400, some estimates are in the thousands.
Nobody quite knows, but they wash up on shores and the Mine
Measures Group finds them every so often. That is a very useful
way of trying to keep these trade routes open and to support
freedom of navigation.
Some of this also has to do with domain awareness and
pushing back on intrusions. Russia has boarded commercial
vessels in Bulgarian waters. I do not know if you want to call
it piracy, but it is that, essentially. In cases like this with
Russia testing and probing and pushing and engaging in illegal
behavior according to maritime law, there needs to be a
response. It cannot be ignored.
As long as NATO member-States do not react or do not impose
some costs on Russia for behavior like this, that affects the
freedom of navigation in a body of water that should be free
and open. Russia will continue to do it. And so, reciprocity or
pushing back in ways that demonstrate that this is not
acceptable will have more effect on Russian behavior than other
more diplomatic ways.
Senator Daines. Before I turn it back to Ranking Member
Murphy, Dr. Starr, I can just tell you have got something else
you want to say. You were scribbling some notes here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Daines. Did you want--did you want to add anymore
because you led off on this round-robin. Do you have something
else you want to add to it?
Dr. Starr. Thank you very much.
Senator Daines. It looks like you got something else you
want to say.
Dr. Starr. I thank you. I was thinking about the comments
you made, and I think we all agree about the absolute
centrality of energy, oil, and gas, and crucial minerals, and
so on. But if we only attend to them, we will not get to where
we want to go. Senator Murphy has asked: What else do we need
to do? Well, look what we are dealing with. We are dealing with
the--many countries whose long-term fate is absolutely not
clear at this point, of course Ukraine.
In Moldova, look at the situation there. Positive steps
have been taken very recently. We will see. Georgia, my
goodness, what a--what a complex mess that is at the moment.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, well, they have recently taken very
significant steps, but the issue is not clear there either, and
I am--I am not even going to dwell on all of Central Asia,
which is a region that is of much greater importance to us than
merely energy--and to the West than merely energy and
resources.
It is important because this is the--a new zone of
independent and sovereign States that are doing remarkably
well. After shuffling around for a generation or so after the
collapse of the USSR, their post-colonial recovery has been
remarkable, very impressive.
Now, the question is, are we going to do the things that
are needed to enable them to continue that kind of progress
toward relatively open societies, relatively participatory,
with business--normal business relations with an increasing
number of American firms? Are we going to advocate that and do
what is necessary to develop it further, or are we going to
just sit on the back--as observers and focus only on energy and
resources?
I think we have got to do both, and that is a key to the
Black Sea, because by focusing on these impressive countries--
Moldova, my goodness, look what they just have been through.
Ukraine, none--there is no need to discuss their heroism. This
is--look how--look how Romania has emerged as a--as a regional
leader. There are real developments, complex tendencies within
Turkey today, but some very promising ones, too.
I think we have to keep in mind that not just the immediate
concern over energy, but especially what is going to be the
fate of these regions. And my assertion here and answer to your
needling me a little bit, which I appreciate, my assertion is
that I think we cannot do this on a country-by-country basis.
We have to define a new region and institutionalize it in a way
that makes sense to us.
Senator Daines. Dr. Starr, thank you for those comments.
Appreciate it. I completely agree with the geopolitical
importance of that part of the map of the world as you just
articulated.
Ranking Member Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.
Ms. Sendak, this is 2025, not 1955. Europe is in a position
to defend itself in a way that it was not when we made our
initial commitment through NATO. I believe in that NATO treaty,
I believe in Article 5, but I also think it is absolutely time
for the members of NATO on the other side of the Atlantic to
take more responsibility for their collective defense. At the
same time, this is an incredibly fraught moment, I mean, the
moment we are literally sitting in today as jets are flying
over the heads of our European partners, as drones are being
flown into Romanian airspace, into Polish airspace. And yet, we
are hearing reports that the Trump administration is
considering withdrawing some of our troop presence from
Romania, the subject of today's hearing, and from Poland.
Again, I do not necessarily believe in a world where the
United States permanently has to have 60,000, 70,000, 100,000
troops in Europe, but at this moment, like right now, it would
seem to be a curious time to send a signal that we are pulling
out as drones and jets are flying in from Russia. What is your
sense of the signal we would be sending to Putin if, in the
next 30 days, we got an announcement from the Trump
administration that they were pulling troops out of some of
these frontline States?
Ms. Sendak. Thank you for the question, Senator Murphy.
Obviously, U.S. presence in Europe has been tantamount to
ensuring the security over the past 75 years. I had the
privilege of working on the House Armed Services Committee
several years ago at the start of 2015, where we were spending
money on the European Reassurance Initiative, as you pointed
out, then became European Deterrence Initiative, where we
flooded the zone with pre-positioned equipment, rotational
forces, training and exercises, which we are still doing today,
which is completely and utterly necessary to increase
deterrence value.
I agree with you completely. I think Europe has received
the message and our NATO allies have received the message that
they need to increase their capabilities and capacity, and they
are doing that. But we are at a very critical juncture where
that has not happened completely yet, and none of us have
exactly what we need in a potential conflict.
I think as we look at this, U.S. presence is absolutely
crucial, not just from the sense of what do we want to do in
Europe, but that is power projection for ourselves. We are not
just in Europe to train and exercise. We are there to be part
of an alliance, we are there to ensure security and stability,
and it has far reaches past the Black Sea, past the Caucasus
into Central Asia, et cetera. So, I think it is absolutely
critical that the U.S. remains a strong presence on the
European continent.
Senator Murphy. I have one final question. I will pose it
to you, Dr. Starr. I think one of the most extraordinary
directives that has come out of this State Department is a
prohibition on our embassies opining on the fairness of
elections. So, our ambassadors have been told, even if you
think that it is a rigged election, do not say it.
That seems to be an invitation for a country like Russia to
come in and play games because they are just not going to be
called out on their provocations, on their corruption. I think
that is extraordinary and, I think, very damaging to the United
States' reputation, our power around the world, and our aligned
democracies.
You sort of teased the question of what is happening in
Georgia today. This is a country that had made great progress
that was, you know, a fraught, but working democracy with
balance on both sides, and today we have a ruling party in
Georgia that has reversed the progress on European integration,
has moved dramatically backward away from democratic norms.
There have been huge protests, and yet they still have
pushed forward laws that, you know, suggest this country is
sliding into something very, very different than a democracy.
There is a headline out of Georgia that reads, ``As USAID Dies,
Many of Georgia's `Vibrant' Civil Society Organizations Face
Extinction.'' Just like it would be a really bad moment right
now for the United States to pull military support from a
region of the world that is having Russian military incursions
on a weekly basis, it seems like a really bad time for the
United States to be pulling support for civil society and pro-
democracy groups in Georgia while there is still an open
question as to whether Georgian democracy survives. What is
your recommendation on what this administration should be doing
to try to push back against this really troubling trend line in
the country of Georgia?
Dr. Starr. Well, first, hats off to the Georgians for what
they have accomplished over the decades since independence. It
has not been an easy path. Remember, they were invaded by Putin
in 2008. We did next to nothing, and, therefore, our authority
there, it was qualified by that neglect, just as our authority
in Ukraine was qualified by our failure to do anything after
Putin stole Ukraine 2014.
So, in general, though, I--it seems to me that we can be a
little bit more optimistic than your question implies with
regard to Georgia. Why do I say that? Because Putin is not a
long termer. It is over. Exactly when and how it will be over,
it is over. He does not have the resources. He does not have
the manpower. He does not--he does not have the exports that he
did have, and he has a society that is deeply, deeply
alienated, not by the war, but by the economic hardship that is
now felt by everyone outside of the two major cities. He is
going to be out of there sooner than we think, and the minute
that happens, Mr. Ivanishvili, even though he has moved his
money out of Russia, he is out, and the whole situation in
Georgia will change.
I think we should be concentrating on what is going on in
Russia. I do agree with you that we served--we accomplished a
lot through our support for various democratic institutions
during that period. I also have to admit, having been an
election observer several times in Central Asia, that there
were--there have been cases where official--officially
sponsored observers by the U.S. have actually missed the--
missed the reality and distorted things, which is widely known
locally.
So, I am for moderation on that--not elimination, but
moderation--but concentrating on the dominant issue throughout
the region, and that is, what is going to follow Putin in
Russia. If it is more of the same or worse, we should be
planning for it. If it is a dramatic change for the better, as
occurred after the disastrous Russian defeat in the Crimean War
in the 19th century--disastrous--that produced an age of
reform. That is when they emancipated 90 million serfs before
we freed slaves 2 years before Lincoln.
That is when they created a new legal system. I am not
saying that is going to happen, but we have to consider all
post-Putin possibilities because they are going to determine
the validity of what we propose and do now.
Senator Murphy. Well, it is certainly true that throughout
history, it is the overextension of Russian military power that
has led to collapse of Russian regimes. It is probably also
true that it has been generally a bad bet to bet on Russian
enlightenment following those moments of leadership change, but
I think it is an important caution.
We were told forever, for instance, that, you know, Assad
was weak, it was just a matter of time. It seemed to be a
fool's errand, and then all of a sudden, overnight he was gone,
and maybe we did not spend enough time planning for that moment
because we just did not believe that it was true. And so, it
is, I think, wise counsel for us to think about how you would
manage a post-Putin Russia, and maybe an opportunity for this
committee to engage in important inquiry and a little bit of
trolling at the same time.
Senator Daines. Noted there.
[Laughter.]
Senator Daines. OK. Well, thank you. A sincere thank you to
a great back-and-forth and dialog on some very complicated
issues in a complicated part of the world. A sincere thank you
to all of our witnesses for attending today and providing us
with the benefit of your testimony.
For the information of members, the record will remain open
until the close of business tomorrow, October 1. We ask the
witness to respond as promptly as possible. Your response will
also be made a part of the record.
Senator Daines. With the thanks of this committee, the
hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]