[Senate Hearing 119-298]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-298
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF
MR. ELBRIDGE A. COLBY TO BE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-908 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________
Page
march 4, 2025
To Consider the Nomination of Mr. Elbridge A. Colby to be Under 1
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Member Statements
Wicker, Senator Roger F.......................................... 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 4
Witness Statements
Colby, Elbridge A................................................ 9
Questions and Responses........................................ 59
Questions for the Record....................................... 103
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 131
Biographical Sketch............................................ 132
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 133
Signature Page................................................. 155
(iii)
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF
MR. ELBRIDGE A. COLBY TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2025
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger
Wicker (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Rick Scott,
Tuberville, Mullin, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Reed,
Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren,
Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Chairman Wicker. The hearing will come to order. Thank you
all for being here.
This morning, the Committee meets to consider the
nomination of Mr. Elbridge Colby to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. I want to thank Mr. Colby for his
willingness to serve again. I want to thank his wife, Susana,
and their children for being here today.
It also says a lot that Mr. Colby will be introduced today
by two distinguished friends, Vice President JD Vance and
Senator Banks. We are informed that the Vice President is in
traffic, and so after consulting to my right and left, we will
proceed, again, because there are time constraints. When the
Vice President arrives, I think he will be arriving just in
time.
So proceeding on, if confirmed, Mr. Colby would oversee the
developments of policy and strategy for the Department of
Defense (DOD). He would assume these responsibilities during
the most dangerous security environment since World War II.
The deepening military cooperation between China, Russia,
Iran, and North Korea represents a complex and far-reaching set
of threats. These threats demand a generational investment to
revitalize America's military strength. They demand rapid
Pentagon reform, and they demand a fresh look at strategies
needed to achieve our national security objectives.
The American people need to understand what is at stake. We
should help the country appreciate the risks imposed to our way
of life. Beijing is leading an emerging alliance of countries
with one clear objective, to use their economic and military
power to tear down the United States and impose their will on
global affairs. The new axis of aggressors is a greater menace
than we have faced in decades.
Under Xi Jinping's leadership, the Chinese Communist Party
has undertaken one of the largest and most aggressive military
buildups in history. Their speed has been astounding. In just a
few short years, China has built more nuclear intercontinental
ballistic missiles than the United States has in decades. They
have tested orbital bombardment weapons and unveiled what may
be the world's first sixth-generation fighter aircraft. China
possesses a shipbuilding capacity over 230 times that of the
United States, over 230 times. That is almost inconceivable.
Over 3 years ago, Vladimir Putin launched the first
invasion of a European country since World War II. He has
barraged the Ukrainian people with constant missile and drone
attacks. The Kremlin has developed a variety of new weapons
capabilities, including nuclear-armed satellites. Meanwhile,
Russia actively provides enriched uranium to China to support
Beijing's nuclear buildup. Putin has also been suspected of
aiding North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
Moving on to North Korea, the nuclear arsenal there
continues to advance unchecked. Kim Jong-un has been aiding
Russia's war machine as it terrorizes Europe. Pyongyang's
missiles could soon be capable of overwhelming our defenses,
North Korea's, especially if reports of Russian assistance are
accurate.
In the Middle East, Israel has successfully crippled Iran's
proxies in the region, but these setbacks may spur Tehran to
take the final step to build a nuclear weapon, permanently
altering the balance of power in that region.
Few really understand how this axis of aggressors is
working to make Americans less safe. If confirmed, I hope Mr.
Colby can help Secretary Hegseth makes sure the public sees
these threats for what they are. During Secretary Hegseth's
hearing I spoke about the importance of building a motivated
and highly competent team of professionals at the Pentagon. In
this regard, Mr. Colby is certainly qualified for the role to
which President Trump has nominated him.
For more than 2 decades, he has worked on defense policy.
Mr. Colby previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. In that role,
Mr. Colby played a pivotal role in the formulation of the 2018
National Defense Strategy, the first real strategy in years.
His leadership was crucial in helping the United States
articulate the need for a new defense posture, one focused on
strategic competition with China and Russia and the overdue
modernization of our military.
Mr. Colby and I have been ringing the same bell on military
unpreparedness for years, particularly as it relates to China.
This Committee would echo exhortations on defense policy in the
Western Pacific. We should make Taiwan a porcupine, and Taipei
is sprinting in that direction. We should build a larger United
States military footprint in East Asia, and we should
accelerate the most important weapons programs to deter China.
President Trump has made it clear that he intends to
rebuild the military and reform the Pentagon. He campaigned on
peace through strength. We all want to keep America safe and
prosperous. To secure that peace will enable a golden age for
America. But we do not now have the strength that can guarantee
us the peace.
Given the threat environment facing us, I strongly believe
that we cannot simply pivot our attention and resources from
one threat to another. That is an approach the Obama
administration tried, and it did fail. We must be focused and
strategic, but we need to be clear. Beijing sees its fight
against America as a global fight. Beijing is not pivoting
between theaters or among theaters. Significant American
withdrawal in Europe, Africa, South America, or the Middle East
will allow the Chinese Communist Party to overcome us
strategically, even if we are able to prevent military conflict
in East Asia in the near term.
In the past few weeks, President Trump has killed five top
al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] terrorists.
Good for him. He has green-lit a more aggressive campaign
against the Houthis and promised to support Israel to the hilt.
All these policies are in line with the President's desire for
lasting peace and prosperity in the United States, and, Mr.
Colby, I am sure that is your desire too.
Now, Mr. Colby, your views on each theater have seemingly
evolved since 2018, and I am sure there will be discussions
about that that are worth exploring. It goes without saying
that the elephant in this hearing room today is the recent
developments with regard to Ukraine and Russia and this
Administration. I was disappointed and dismayed as I watched
the televised meeting involving the President of the United
States and President Zelensky. I was distressed that the White
House meeting ended without the signing of the minerals
agreement, which was there to be signed, as I understand it.
This was followed by a television appearance by President
Zelensky and then a visit to some of our friends in Europe
where there is much concern about the failure of that agreement
to be signed. It was also followed that weekend by Mr. Putin's
continued barrage of attacking apartments, civilian targets,
and other areas in Ukraine, not a good weekend for peace in
Ukraine or world peace. The President is trying to get a peace
deal in Ukraine, and I certainly hope we will be able to get
this back on the rails.
I would like to hear your views on the potential there.
Your views on President Trump's crystal-clear Iran policy seem
to have hardened considerably, yet your views on Taiwan's
importance to the United States seems to have softened
considerably. I hope we can clarify those views today. Your
views on the relevance of nuclear weapons in the next decade
remain unclear to me. I would appreciate your comments on each
of those issues.
Mr. Colby, you have spoken frequently to audiences who are
skeptical of the idea that U.S. peace and prosperity requires
us to wield U.S. power abroad. I am grateful that you have led
those discussions, discussions that U.S. foreign policy
professionals do not like having. I expect your points on the
limits of U.S. power remain nuanced and complimentary to the
President's peace-through-strength agenda, and it will be
crystal clear that you will speak for the President in this
regard.
If you are focused on finding innovative ways to blend
America's comparative advantages in this global fight against
Chinese communists, I strongly believe you will be a boon to
the President and to the United States of America. I would like
to hear your strategic vision for the next 4 years. I would
like to hear your comments on the plans I have released for
rebuilding and reforming the military.
In confirming Secretary Hegseth, we charged him with
focusing on four guiding principles as he assumed office,
lethality, efficiency, speed, and accountability. I also
appreciate the easy access that he and I have had in
conversations with each other since his confirmation. As Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would like to know how you
plan to execute in these four areas to support President
Trump's peace-through-strength agenda.
Thank you very much for being here. We look forward to your
testimony.
I now recognize Ranking Member Reed for his opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, congratulations on your nomination, and welcome
to today's hearing. I would also like to recognize your wife,
Susana, and sons, Orlando and Thomas, and your parents,
siblings, and family members with us today. I would also, in
anticipation of his arrival, like to welcome the Vice President
and certainly my colleague, Senator Banks. Thank you.
Mr. Colby, you have been nominated to be the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, or the USDP. The USDP serves
as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and plays a
critical role in developing long-term strategic policies of the
Department. If confirmed, you would lead defense policy at a
consequential time. There is a common understanding that the
future of our national security is tied significantly to our
competition with China. This competition is occurring across
every field of national power--military, economic, political,
technological, and more--and across every region of the world.
Mr. Colby, as you have written extensively, America's
success in this competition will depend on our credibility in
the eyes of our allies and our adversaries. If our allies in
the Indo-Pacific perceive us to be untrustworthy or unreliable,
they will hesitate to stand with us when we need them. If China
believes that we can be worn down through cajoling or bullying,
they will take bold risks.
I am deeply concerned that the Trump administration is
surrendering our credibility at this very moment. For 3 years,
the United States has stood with Ukraine and with our NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies in the face of
Vladimir Putin's unprovoked, bloody assault on Ukraine. Indeed,
for the better part of a century, we have stood against
Russia's aggression and been the global standard-bearer of
democracy. But now, after barely a month in office, President
Trump has attacked this legacy and signaled he would rather
align the United States with Vladimir Putin than our democratic
allies. Make no mistake, China is watching.
We should be proud that the United States has led a
formidable group of nations to support Ukraine and defend
democracy on the world stage. However, President Trump seems
eager to strike a deal with Vladimir Putin at any cost, even
conceding our most valuable points of leverage before reaching
the negotiating table. His recent claim that Ukraine, not
Russia, started this war is offensive, and his attacks against
President Zelensky are badly misguided. Frankly, the spectacle
in the Oval Office last week was a failure of American
leadership. President Zelensky and the people of Ukraine are
fighting for their very lives, and to suggest that they are
ungrateful for American aid is absurd.
Many of my colleagues and I, including those here today,
have traveled to Ukraine many times and seen firsthand the
death and destruction wrought by Vladimir Putin against
innocent people. To deride Ukraine or our allies is a mistake
that only benefits Putin. Just last night, President Trump
cutoff all military aid to Ukraine. Make no mistake, his
callous decision will only endanger innocent Ukrainians and
encourage Russia to escalate its attacks. The United States is
paying with money; the Ukrainians are paying with their lives.
The Administration's actions are doing great harm to
America's standing in the world, showing anyone who is paying
attention that the United States can no longer be trusted.
President Xi is certainly taking notice.
Mr. Colby, you have argued against United States support
for Ukraine and called for steep reductions to America's role
in Europe. I ask you to explain these views and how, if
confirmed, you would work to repair America's standing with our
allies, as well as our competitive position with respect to our
adversaries.
The Department of Defense has long built its strategy
around the idea of winning in an armed conflict and deterring
China through military dominance. That is no longer enough. The
game has changed, and our capacity for outright victory through
military strength should not be our only measure of success.
The Defense Department needs to better understand China's
strategy for increasing its capabilities and influence,
including in the so-called gray zone, below the threshold of
traditional armed conflict. We must also develop new tools for
competition and integrate our activities with those of our
allies and partners.
Mr. Colby, you have written and spoken extensively about
these concepts. You are lead author of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy and have played an important role in defense
policy through your previous positions in the Department and
had a number of thinktanks. I would ask for your views on how
the Department of Defense should pursue competition and
deterrence with China, especially as it relates to the United
States' relationship with Taiwan and our network of allies in
the region. I would also like to know your priorities for the
forthcoming round of defense policy reviews, including the next
National Defense Strategy.
You have also argued that the United States must rigorously
prioritize our efforts on great power competition with China,
to include withdrawing forces from other theaters. I agree that
we should be thoughtful and disciplined about how we use the
military. That is why I am skeptical of the President's
deployment of thousands of troops to the southern border and
Guantanamo Bay. Border security and immigration enforcement are
critical to our national security, but these current missions
are dubious at best. The Department estimates that it will
spend $1 billion to $2 billion for unplanned border missions
this year, even as illegal migrant encounters are at the lowest
level since August 2020. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has assessed these missions in recent years and found,
quote, ``Separating units in order to assign a portion of them
to the southwest border mission was a consistent trend in
degrading readiness ratings.''
Mr. Colby, I have serious doubts about these missions. I
would like to know what role you believe military forces should
play in border security and whether the Defense Department
should be involved in enforcing immigration policies that fall
in the purview of the Department of Homeland Security and
essentially law enforcement operations which posse comitatus
circumscribes dramatically for the military.
Finally, you will need to reconcile your views with the
current, longstanding bipartisan approach of the United States
to the Middle East. The region remains extremely unstable after
more than a year of violence between Israel, Hamas, Iran, and
its proxies, and the fall of the Assad regime. Mr. Colby, you
have advocated for a much more limited role in the region and
suggested that the United States should be willing to tolerate
a nuclear-armed Iran. I hope you will address your views on
these issues and how you would work to advance United States
national security interests in the Middle East.
If confirmed, you will lead at a challenging moment. All of
our potential adversaries, including China, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea, are seeking ways to undermine our interest and
supplant our leadership. I would ask for your plans on how the
Department can pursue every available opportunity to advance
our national interest. I certainly look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
Before we proceed, guests and Members, including the Chair,
are sternly admonished to silence all phones and electronic
devices.
Mr. Vice President, I see that you have arrived and you are
next on our list. Thank you very much for joining us this
morning to introduce your friend and the nominee. I now turn to
you for your comments. Thank you so much.
Vice President Vance. Great. Thank you, Chairman Wicker,
and thanks to the Ranking Member, Senator Reed, and thanks to
all my friends from across the aisle who permit this brief
intrusion into what was otherwise, I am sure, a very
distinguished and interesting conversation. But I wanted to be
here because I thought it was important to tell you all about
my friend Bridge Colby and why I think he is important to the
President's defense policy and important to what the President
is trying to accomplish with national security.
So, first, I think Bridge, more than any person I have ever
spoken to, appreciates that military power, national security
influence is downstream of economic power. As we have seen in
so many of the conflicts that we have engaged ourselves in over
the last 30 or 40 years, we cannot fight wars unless our troops
have the ammunition they need. We cannot defend our own
national security unless we have the tank shells, the artillery
shells, and increasingly, the drones and other advanced weapon
systems that are necessary to actually fight battles when, God
forbid, those battles are necessary to fight. I think Bridge
has been particularly aware of and worried about the
degradation of our defense industrial base and how we must
rebuild it if we want to preserve our own national security.
I have had many conversations with Bridge before I was
United States Senator, certainly before I was the Vice
President of the United States where, in so many ways, Bridge
predicted what we would be talking about 4 years down the road,
5 years down the road, 10 years down the road. He saw around
corners that very few other people were seeing around. That
doesn't mean he is always right about every issue or that you
will agree with him on every issue, and I say that to both the
Democrats and the Republicans on the Committee.
But I think that he has the type of perspective that we
need so desperately in the Department of Defense. I think that
his role at the Department of Defense will be incredibly
important in seeing around the corners of the next 5 years and
the next 10 years. That is one of the most important reasons
why I think we should support his nomination at this great
Committee, but obviously, support his confirmation in the U.S.
Senate.
Let me say a couple of other things about Bridge, and then
I will let you guys get on with the Committee hearing. First of
all, Bridge is a person of incredible integrity and intellect.
His educational credentials are extraordinary. But to my
Democratic friends, I think you will also find he is a person
who can actually work across the aisle. If you look at his long
career in defense policy, he has said things that has, you
know, frankly, alienated Democrats and Republicans. He has also
said things that I think both Democrats and Republicans would
agree with.
He obviously is a conservative. He obviously is the nominee
of President Trump, and we nominated him because we think he is
going to do a great job. But I think you will find that he is
the kind of guy that you can engage in meaningful conversation,
whatever your agreement or disagreement with his views is.
Again, that is one of the things that we need to bring to the
Department of Defense.
Bridge is a good guy, and I said this in the only other
confirmation hearing that I actually introduced the guest,
Secretary Lutnick. You need good people in government. You need
people who are going to tell you the truth, who are going to
look you in the eye, who are going to disagree, sometimes
amicably, of course, but actually be willing to look you in the
eye and have an important conversation, who you can trust to
tell you what they actually think, agree or disagree, and that
is the kind of person that Bridge is.
He is a great family man. He comes from a life of service,
but also a family of service going back many generations, and
he is the kind of guy that we need working on policy at the
senior levels at the Department of Defense, and of course, that
is why the President nominated him.
The final thing that I want to say about Bridge is so much
of this question of rebuilding the industrial base--and I think
it is one of the few areas of genuine bipartisan agreement. We
may not always agree exactly how to do it, but I think
everybody pretty much agrees that we have to build the
industrial base in the United States that can support the
national security policy of the next generation. Whether you
have a Democrat or a Republican President 20 years from now,
you need to ensure that the troops who are under the command of
that Commander in Chief actually have the weapons systems
necessary to support themselves and to accomplish the mission.
That is not a simple matter of throwing money at the
problem. That is not a simple matter of saying we need to buy
more weapons. It also goes deeply into questions of
procurement. How are we buying those weapons? How are we
engaging with the technologists of the 21st century? Because we
are never going to beat China in a war of population. They
have, what, 1.3, 1.4 billion people, and we have got just north
of 300 million. But what we can do is actually have the kind of
technology that gives our troops and gives our people the
advantage over the long haul, and that means not just buying
more weapons. That means being smart about how we buy weapons
in a way that enhances our technological edge and ensures that
upstarts, not just the big five incumbents, but upstarts can
participate in the process of procurement and of giving our
troops the weapons systems that they need.
So I think that we need to think deeply about these
questions. I think that President Trump and the Department of
Defense, Secretary Hegseth on down are thinking deeply about
these questions. Bridge Colby is an important part not just of
thinking about these questions, but also accomplishing
important policy.
So with all respect to all of you, and knowing that all of
you will make up your own minds, I highly encourage you to give
Bridge Colby your stamp of approval. He is a good guy, he is a
smart guy, and he will do a good job for the United States of
America.
Thank you all for having me.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Vice
President. We appreciate you being here, and I know you are
busy, but we certainly would be delighted to have you stay
around. Thank you so much.
Senator Banks----
Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker.--can you top that?
Senator Banks. It is hard to follow our good friend.
Chairman Wicker. You are recognized, sir.
Senator Banks. Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
Reed, fellow Members of the most important Committee in the
entire Congress, the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is
good to be with all of you today to introduce my friend
Elbridge Colby, the President's choice to be the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon.
I have known Elbridge Colby, or Bridge, for a very long
time. I got to know him in the first Trump term, but he became
an advisor to me when I served on the House Armed Services
Committee, and even more importantly, he became deeply involved
in the Republican Study Committee that I chaired, the largest
caucus on Capitol Hill in the House, helping us to understand
the world, how to talk about it, what to do about the complex
issues around the world.
The threats that we face around the world are increasingly
sophisticated, but I am confident that with Bridge in charge of
developing and implementing our defense strategy, America will
be wholly prepared. Bridge already knows his way around the
Pentagon from his time as a senior official in OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] policy in the first Trump term, the
very office, by the way, that we are considering his nomination
for today. He is eminently qualified for this role.
While in OSD, he co-led and was the key architect of the
development of President Trump's 2018 National Defense
Strategy. After 2 decades of prioritizing wars in the Middle
East, the National Defense Strategy under Bridge and the first
Trump administration rightly refocused the United States
military on great power competition with China and maintaining
American superiority in the Pacific. Bridge has been a leader
in courageously stating this truth: America's focus must be on
the military threat from communist China, and the United States
and our allies are running out of time to act on it.
Bridge has written numerous reports and articles on foreign
policy and defense, as well as his widely studied book, The
Strategy of Denial, which I will admit is dry but incredibly
substantive. I recommend that every Member of this Committee
read his book. I believe his answers to your question today
will underline his expertise, his unique qualifications for
this role and this position. He will make an excellent Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and I look forward to working
with all of you as fellow Members of this Committee to swiftly
confirm his nomination and get him on the job. You won't be
disappointed.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is an honor to be with all of
you today.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much, Senator Banks.
You are welcome to resume your seat or to stay there at the
desk. But thank you very much, and again, our thanks to our
Vice President.
Mr. Colby, you are now recognized for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ELBRIDGE A. COLBY, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished
MEmbers of the Armed Services Committee, it is an exceptional
personal honor to appear before you today to be considered for
the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I would
like to begin by expressing my deep gratitude to President
Trump for nominating me for this role. I am committed to
implementing his vision of a defense and foreign policy of
putting Americans' interests first and of peace through
strength. I am deeply honored by the President's confidence in
me.
Thank you in particular to Vice President Vance for his
exceptionally kind introduction and his confidence. I am
profoundly honored by his support and presence here today.
Thank you very much to Senator Jim Banks for his incredibly
generous introduction. I am deeply honored as well.
I would also like to express my great gratitude to
Secretary of Defense Hegseth for his support and confidence.
I would also like to thank the members of this Committee
for their consideration. I very much appreciated my engagement
with you and your staffs over the last weeks and have learned a
great deal. If confirmed, I would look forward to deepening
this engagement.
Finally, I would like especially to express my personal
thanks to my family for their love and support, especially to
my wife, Susana, and our sons, Orlando and Thomas, seated
behind me. I would also like to thank my parents, Jonathan and
Susan, as well as other family members and friends present here
today, as well as the family and friends who are not here but
have supported me in this process and throughout my life and
career.
Members of this Committee, with your permission, I will
keep my opening remarks brief.
The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a
role that comes with genuinely profound and grave
responsibilities, and my nomination comes at a time, as this
Committee has eloquently laid out, of deep peril for our
country. Peace and the protection of American interests in the
world cannot be assumed. There is a real risk of major war, and
we cannot afford to lose one. I recognize these realities in my
bones. It is my great hope that we can get through the coming
years peacefully with strength in ways that put us and our
alliances on a stronger and more sustainable footing. If
confirmed, I would do all in my power to make it so.
I know some of you will have different views on important
issues, but I can assure you of several things--that I am
deeply committed to a foreign and defense policy that
realistically protects and advances all Americans' security,
freedoms, and prosperity; that I am willing and ready to engage
with those who disagree with me and adapt my views based on
persuasive arguments and the facts; that I value our alliances
deeply, even as I think they must be adapted; and that I love
our great country and will put its interests first and
foremost.
If confirmed, I pledge to strive with every fiber to meet
the grave responsibilities of this important office with
judgment, commitment, and determination. I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elbridge A. Colby follows:]
Prepared Statement by Elbridge A. Colby
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the
Armed Services Committee:
It is an exceptional personal honor to appear before you today to
be considered for the position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
I would like to begin by expressing my deep gratitude to President
Trump for nominating me for this role. I am committed to implementing
his vision of a defense and foreign policy of putting Americans'
interests first and of peace through strength. I am deeply honored by
the President's confidence in me.
I would also like to express my great gratitude to Vice President
Vance and Secretary of Defense Hegseth for their support and
confidence.
I would like also to thank the Members of this Committee for their
consideration. I have very much appreciated my engagement with you and
your staffs over the last weeks, and have learned a great deal. If
confirmed, I look forward to deepening this engagement. Thank you in
particular to Senator Banks for his very kind introduction--I am
honored.
Finally, I would like especially to express my personal thanks to
my family for their love and support--especially to my wife Susana and
our sons Orlando and Thomas, seated behind me. I would also like to
thank my parents Jonathan and Susan as well as other family members
present here today, as well as the family and friends who are not here
but have supported me in this process and throughout my life and
career.
Members of this Committee: With your permission, I will keep my
opening remarks brief.
The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a role
that comes with genuinely profound and grave responsibilities. And my
nomination comes at a time, as this Committee has eloquently laid out,
of deep peril for our country. Peace and the protection of American
interests in the world cannot be assumed. There is a real risk of major
war, and we cannot afford to lose one. I recognize these realities in
my bones.
It is my great hope that we can get through the coming years
peacefully, with strength, in ways that put us and our alliances on a
stronger and more sustainable footing. If confirmed, I would do all in
my power to make it so.
I know some of you will have different views on important issues.
But I can assure you of several things: that I am deeply committed to a
foreign and defense policy that realistically protects and advances all
Americans' security, freedoms, and prosperity; that I am willing and
ready to engage with those who disagree with me, and adapt my views
based on persuasive arguments and the facts; that I value our alliances
deeply, even as I think they must be adapted; and that I love our great
country and will put its interests first and foremost.
If confirmed, I pledge to strive with every fiber to meet the grave
responsibilities of this important office with judgment, commitment,
and determination.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. At this point, I am
required to ask you a number of questions, which we ask all
nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Colby. I have, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Colby. I have not, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
Subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Mr.
Colby, do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
this Committee when requested?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide records,
documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner
when requested by this Committee, its Subcommittees, or other
appropriate Committees of Congress, and to consult with the
requester regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial on your part in providing such records?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Mr. Colby. I will, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Colby. I will, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Colby. They will, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much.
Now, we are going to begin a round questions limited to 5
minutes per Member, and I am going to hold myself as Chair to
that 5 minutes also.
So at this point, let me begin by asking about a couple of
policy advisors that are already in place. One of your
advisors, if confirmed, would be Mr. Michael Dimino. You did
not choose Mr. Dimino for that----
Mr. Colby. Senator, no, I was not the hiring person----
Chairman Wicker. He said recently, quote, ``There are no
vital or existential United States interests in the Middle
East,'' unquote. Mr. Colby, to your understanding, does that
reflect the President's policy in the Middle East?
Mr. Colby. Senator, no, I think that the President has made
clear that we do have really important interests in the Middle
East.
Chairman Wicker. Does Mr. Dimino's policy pronouncement
reflect your own views?
Mr. Colby. Senator, no, he does not speak for me, and I
think I have a number of views that differ materially from his
from what I understand just in public reporting.
Chairman Wicker. Another policy advisor is Mr. Andrew
Byers. He is an advisor on southeast Asia. He believes that
thinking about Communist China through the lens of deterrence
is wrong. He thinks maybe we should give up what he calls,
quote, ``belligerent'' policies toward China and see if they
will reciprocate. He apparently thinks pressing Beijing on
trade is a bad idea. So, Mr. Colby, does that reflect President
Trump's policy on China in your view?
Mr. Colby. It does not, Senator, and I would say that it
does not reflect mine. I mean, as I think Senator Banks and the
Vice President kindly mentioned, I wrote a book really focused
on the lens of deterrence. Of course, as the Vice President I
think rightly mentioned, we also need to be thinking about the
economic dimension, and, of course, the Administration is
already taking measures in that direction. Again, I am not
intimately familiar with his work, but it seems like a quite
different perspective than my own.
Chairman Wicker. I do understand that you have made no
determination as to whether Mr. Dimino and/or Mr. Byers will be
retained in those positions?
Mr. Colby. Sir, as part of not presuming, my understanding
is that I should not be even sort of thinking in that way.
Senator, what I would say is that, if confirmed, obviously, I
would be only one person in a chain, including, of course, the
Secretary of Defense, the Presidential personnel office, and
ultimately, the President, the Vice President, and so forth.
But what I would commit to you is that anybody in my
organization, if I am confirmed, should be in line with the
President's agenda, including the issues that you mentioned.
Chairman Wicker. Very well.
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Mr. Colby, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, I have appreciated what I view as your clear
articulation of the core United States interest in Taiwan,
which are too infrequently discussed in the public here in
America. As you wrote in American Compass last year, quote,
``Nothing that could happen abroad is more plausibly and
gravely threatening to Americans than China invading Taiwan,''
unquote. Your 2022 article at Stanford has about as good a one-
paragraph summary of our interest in Taiwan as I have seen, yet
in November of last year, some people believe your position may
have taken a marked turn as you wrote, quote, ``America has a
strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans could
survive without it.''
Mr. Colby, I will let you respond to that. But
specifically, can the United States enjoy a golden age for
America with increasing prosperity for our citizens in this
century if we fail to deter China and Taiwan, or worse yet,
lose that war?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. Losing Taiwan, Taiwan's
fall would be a disaster for American interests. The underlying
logic behind my position is that the military balance vis-a-vis
China, as you, sir, and your fellow Committee Members have
amply and eloquently pointed out, has deteriorated
dramatically. What I have been trying to shoot a signal flare
over is that it is vital for us to focus and enable our own
forces for an effective and reasonable defense of Taiwan, and
for the Taiwanese, as well as the Japanese, to do more.
So my position in terms of the value of Taiwan is
consistent, but what I am very fearful of, Senator--and I think
this is agreed across Administrations of both parties--is that,
you know, the military balance has declined. So I am trying to
avoid a situation in which, because we are not adequately
prepared, we get in a situation--the analogy I like to use is
Winston Churchill in 1940 wanting to send Spitfires and
Hurricanes to the Battle of France, but Marshall Dowding
saying, if we do that, we are not going to be prepared to be
able to defend the Home Islands. That is sort of an extreme
example, but that is what we are----
Chairman Wicker. How soon will it----
Mr. Colby.--trying to avoid.
Chairman Wicker.--take us to get prepared?
Mr. Colby. Essentially, my No. 1, or one of my very top
priorities, if confirmed, to try to get us prepared as quickly
as possible, and then over the medium and longer term as well,
Senator.
Chairman Wicker. You and I are absolutely united on that.
Mr. Colby. Great.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, you have advocated reduction in support for
Ukraine, which you characterize as a distraction from Taiwan.
Yet former CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director Bill
Burns, one of the most astute commentators about Russia, former
Ambassador, CIA Director, stated that no one is watching United
States support for Ukraine more closely than Chinese leaders,
and, quote, ``One of the surest ways to rekindle Chinese
perceptions of American fecklessness and stoke Chinese
aggressiveness would be to abandon support for Ukraine.'' So
what message are the President's actions sending?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I would say a couple things. One,
my arguments about Ukraine have been based on the need for
strategic prioritization. I don't contest the fact that the
Chinese are looking at what we are doing in Ukraine at all. But
fundamentally, Senator, in my view--and I think it should be of
particular interest to this Committee, sir--is that we have to
have the military capabilities in Asia or relevant to Asia to
be able to conduct a local defense of Taiwan at a cost and
level of risk that the American people are prepared to
tolerate. That has been my main focus.
My aspiration, if I would put another and to kind of build
on what the Vice President was saying, a longer-term top
priority for me, if confirmed, would be to revivify our defense
industrial base so that we are no longer in a position where
our defense industrial base cannot produce at levels where we
can resource in multiple theaters at the level that we need.
That is where we want to get back to.
Senator Reed. Well, I don't think there is a dispute about
reinvigorating the industrial base. I think, though, there is,
from astute personalities like Bill Burns, the fear that we are
sending dramatically the wrong lesson. Indeed, on November 2023
you stated, quote, ``Invasion of the Ukraine is an evil act by
the Russians, and I morally support the Ukrainian defense.'' Do
you still agree with that statement?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I stand by my record, but at this
point, I think there is a very delicate diplomatic process
going on where the President is rightfully trying to
resuscitate the peace process, and I don't think it would be
appropriate for me to weigh in on the specific case----
Senator Reed. Well, the President indicated the Russians
invaded Ukraine, which is completely erroneous, and that
Zelensky is a dictator, which is, I think, also erroneous. We
are in an awkward situation now. He is cutting every sort of
tool we have, and that is not the way to negotiate. I don't
think that was in The Art of the Deal. So I think we are in a
very serious situation.
Let me change topics for a moment. General Mattis, who I
respect immensely as former Secretary of Defense and as a
marine, stated, ``If you don't fund the State Department fully,
then I need to buy more ammunition,'' which raises the question
of the wisdom of eviscerating the USAID [United States Agency
for International Development]. In many places in the world--
and you know this--that is the only American presence. That is
the counterpoint to Chinese incursions all across the globe,
and now we have put them out of business. It has been indicated
that this will cause millions of unnecessary deaths,
particularly the children and women, and it seems to be
undercutting our power in the world, our soft power. Your
thoughts?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I think it is certainly very
important to have an effective and efficient diplomatic arm,
the State Department, as well as a development arm, and I would
certainly support that. It would not be within my purview,
obviously, a number of the issues that you are raising, if
confirmed, but I certainly support a tight interaction and
integration with the other arms of national power, especially
in an era as our--you know, as we said in Secretary Mattis'
defense strategy where we are no longer in a kind of unipolar
militarily dominant situation.
Senator Reed. With respect to NATO, I mean, one of the
fallouts from our Ukrainian decisions over the last few days is
that our European allies feel essentially abandoned, that the
NATO alliance is as fragile as it has ever been. As we all
recognize, NATO was the key since 1949 to our ability to
stabilize the world and to promote a democratic and economic
agenda that favored the West, and that is in danger now.
The President, in his last term, was insisting on 2 percent
or everybody at NATO--now it is more--almost like a landlord
saying, I am raising the rent unless you do something,
something, something. Do you believe the NATO alliance has made
us stronger and that if it is jeopardized, we will be in
serious trouble?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I believe that the NATO alliance has
been an exceptionally successful alliance, but I think if we
are going to sustain it, it needs to move in the direction that
President Trump is leading it in and where I think the
Europeans are finally moving. If you look at Chancellor Merz,
who is coming in in Germany, or President Macron or Prime
Minister Starmer, they are not only spending more--2 percent is
manifestly inadequate. General Cavoli has said that. Many
others have said that. They need to see real combat
capabilities. The conversation has materially improved in
recent months and over the last few years where we can get NATO
into a more balanced fashion. Senator, I believe that that is
much more consistent with the model of NATO that existed during
the cold war, rather than the post-cold war model, which is too
heavily lopsided in American responsibility, and it needs to
change to be sustained.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby. Thanks.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Reed. Mr. Colby,
welcome.
Mr. Colby. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Welcome to you----
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Fischer.--and your family and friends.
In your answers to the Committee's advanced policy
questions, you stated that, quote, ``U.S. nuclear forces
underpin our entire deterrence and defense posture,'' end
quote, and that, quote, ``Ensuring we retain a modern, capable,
and effective nuclear deterrent should be our top priority,''
end quote. I agree with those statements. Nuclear deterrence
must be the foundation for any defense strategy.
However, this foundation is threatened because of decades
of underinvestment and poor management. I am confident this
Administration can correct the course of our modernization
programs, both through adequate resourcing and by approving our
acquisition strategies for Sentinel, Columbia, and B-21.
Mr. Colby, if confirmed, will you commit to working with
this Committee to fully modernize all aspects of our nuclear
triad and continuing the work of the first Trump administration
to rebuild our Nation's most important military capabilities?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Russia has nearly completed
their modernization of all of their nuclear forces, and China
is modernizing, and they are growing their arsenal at a
breathtaking speed, yet the combination of an industrial base
that we continually worry about in this country and overly
complicated acquisition policies, it holds us back from keeping
pace. You have talked about that. The Vice President talked
about that in his introduction to you as well. If confirmed,
what policies would you recommend to increase the overall
capacity of that industrial base?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I think actually a number of the
things that the Vice President has spoken about and the
President, which is that a broader reindustrialization, in my
view, is necessary to fix a lot of the defense industrial base
issues, not just with the nuclear forces, as critical as they
are, but also with the broader conventional forces as well.
Which is to say--and I know this Committee has drawn attention
to this problem--that despite the investment of money, often
the results are less than people would like to see, for
instance, because of workforce issues.
So, if confirmed, I wouldn't approach the problem with
saying I have all of the particular policy ideas set, and I am
going to--you know, in terms of improving the industrial
production. But what I would see my role as making very clear
that revamping and restoring a really healthy and robust
defense industrial base is absolutely a national priority.
What I have said as a private commentator, but I believe as
a public official, if confirmed, is that we kind of need a
national mobilization of our defense industrial base. We need
to be able to get better results, and it seems to me that is
something that could get wide agreement.
Senator Fischer. Do you have in mind any acquisition
policies that you would revamp at this point in time, that you
would recommend changing or even eliminating?
Mr. Colby. Senator, at this point, I wouldn't have any
specific ones. I know a lot of those would be under the purview
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and other,
you know, the Service Secretaries and so forth. I would be
delighted to dive into that issue further and give you a more
concrete answer, but, again, I would see my role, if confirmed
as the USDP, to kind of drive the overall strategic direction
that we need to get better results out of our defense
industrial base.
Senator Fischer. Should we utilize the Defense Production
Act in order to move forward?
Mr. Colby. I think that absolutely would make--and
deregulation in general at that level, I think all options
should be on the table, including things that seem pretty
dramatic because I think, as the Chairman rightly said, we live
in a very dramatic situation and world.
Senator Fischer. The Department is also modernizing our
NC3, which the Strategic Forces Subcommittee calls the fourth
leg of our triad. If confirmed, will you ensure that this
effort receives the necessary attention and the resources that
it needs?
Mr. Colby. Yes, I will.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Would you prioritize it, along
with our triad, as the top priority of the Department?
Mr. Colby. Certainly. I mean, I think command and control
is absolutely essential, and when we are living in a world of
much more capable cyber capabilities, not to mention missile
threats, not just the traditional strategic strike threats, but
also a range of different threats that are evolving very
quickly, we have to absolutely pay really critical attention to
NC3.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Colby.
Mr. Colby. Thank you.
Senator Fischer.
[Presiding.] Senator Gillibrand, you are recognized.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you for appearing here. Thank you for bringing your
family. This is a very significant role you are undertaking
that takes enormous amounts of responsibility and thoughtful
judgment.
I want to talk about the threats we are facing from around
the globe. We have continued to see cyber threats from Russia.
We had solar winds. We had the Colonial Pipeline compromise. We
had the 2016 effort to undermine our electoral infrastructure.
It was reported last week that Secretary Hegseth ordered a halt
on Cyber Comm's offensive operations against Russia. We have
not heard anything from Russia that they are similarly
disarming. What advice will you give to President Trump with
regard to how to keep the United States safe from Russian
attacks through cyber and other means?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I haven't seen the actual document, so
I only have what I am going on based on public reporting, but
my recommendation would be that we should maintain the highest
level of cyber vigilance and capability vis-a-vis Russia, as
well as others like China.
Senator Gillibrand. Would you unilaterally disarm and not
use offensive operations?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I don't know exactly what is going on.
I couldn't comment about what is going on, but generally, I
think these reciprocal steps in the sort of logic of arms
control--or, excuse me, steps should be reciprocated credibly.
Senator Gillibrand. Correct. Would you consider Russia to
be postured as an adversary or as an ally?
Mr. Colby. From a military point of view, from a defense
point of view, Senator, as I put it in my responses to the
advanced policy questions, Russia presents a significant
military threat to Europe, and they are a significant military
threat to the Homeland as well. I think from a defense point of
view, we need to regard that in a very clear-eyed way.
At the same time, as an overall strategy, I think that can
support and be compatible with an effort to diminish the
potential for direct confrontation with Russia in the same way
with China as well.
Senator Gillibrand. Who started the war in Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. Senator, as I said earlier, I think this is a
very delicate diplomatic time. I have spoken about this in the
past. I would hate to be in a situation of disrupting or
inhibiting progress on peace. I think the President and the
Vice President have been very clear that words matter, and I
don't think it is appropriate for me to be commenting on these
delicate topics.
Senator Gillibrand. Given that you won't make a public
statement with regard to it, will you tell this Committee that
you will advise President Trump on the truth of all matters?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I absolutely would commit to you
that I would tell the truth in the conduct of my duties, if
confirmed.
Senator Gillibrand. With regard to China, you are aware of
Volt Typhoon, you are aware of Salt Typhoon, you are aware of
Flax Typhoon. Do you agree that China poses a cyber threat to
the United States and has prepositioned cyber threats around
the United States to be able to use them, should and when it
needs to, in any conflict with regard to Taiwan?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I should say that my information is
based on public reporting, but based on what you are saying,
that is consistent with my understanding, and so I would agree
with your assessment.
Senator Gillibrand. What advice will you give to President
Trump with regard to how to posture appropriately to protect
against incursions by China to the United States' national
security?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, this is something that I would
want to dive much more deeply in. Cyber is obviously an area
where a lot of the information is classified, and I have not
had access to that in some time, certainly not on the cyber
issue. What I would say, Senator--and I talked about this in my
responses to the advanced policy questions, is I would bring my
background in the area of deterrence and these kinds of areas,
denial and so forth, to bring an integrated approach that
includes things like resilience, defenses, but also cyber
offensive operations and capabilities, intelligence gathering,
and so forth. My understanding is there has been good work on
this in previous years that can be built on, but there could be
some sensible policy changes that are on the table that could
be worth taking. Again, I don't know enough to say
specifically, though, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. I would be interested in what sensible
policy changes you are interested in. I am highly concerned
that, should China decide to invade Taiwan, that we haven't
done enough cyber defense domestically to prevent the type of
chaos that these types of attacks have already created, whether
it is Salt Typhoon or Volt Typhoon or Flax Typhoon. Every
single one of them is designed to create enormous chaos,
instability, and would create decisionmaking that would be, at
a minimum, challenging and chaotic.
Mr. Colby. Senator, I fully share your concerns based on
what I am seeing. Not only would it cause chaos, but it could
specifically inhibit or, you know, break down U.S. military
operations, so I share your alarm. I just have not, you know,
read into a lot of the real specifics.
Senator Gillibrand. I would like to work with you on what
your plan will be for cybersecurity for both incursions from
Russia, from China going forward.
Then my last statement is, can you just speak briefly about
your view with regard to Iran and the threat they pose to the
United States and our allies?
Mr. Colby. I would welcome working with you on cyber. Just
briefly, I will say that Iran does pose a very severe threat to
the United States and our allies, especially our key ally,
Israel. I think I will have a chance to elaborate on that,
given the time situation.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Colby, welcome. Let's talk about the
threat of a nuclear Iran. I have some concerns about what you
have said in the past, namely, that if we had to choose between
hoping to contain a nuclear Iran and preventing Iran with
military force from getting nukes that we should tolerate a
nuclear Iran and try to contain it. For instance, you have
written that, quote, ``Containing a nuclear Iran is an
eminently plausible and practical objective.'' You have
approvingly cited the view that, quote, ``The only thing worse
than the prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons would
be the consequences of using force to try to stop them.''
That is certainly not my view, but more importantly, it is
not President Trump's policy. He has said for more than a
decade that Iran cannot be allowed to get new nuclear weapons.
He declared in a national security Presidential memorandum last
month that a nuclear Iran, quote, ``poses an existential
danger'' to the United States and can never be allowed to
acquire or develop nuclear weapons. In your written answers to
the Committee's advanced questions, you now seem to echo
President Trump's policy. You wrote, for example, ``The United
States should deny Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.'' So it
seems that we all agree that Iran cannot be allowed to get
nukes. The question is how to stop them.
Let me be clear up front on a couple points. First, I think
everyone would welcome a diplomatic deal in which Iran
completely turns over its nuclear program, as Libya did in
2003; and second, I don't think anyone here advocates for
invading and occupying Iran for a decade to stop its nuclear
program. I certainly don't. But here is the question. Diplomacy
fails, Iran is racing to a bomb. We have a choice. Tolerate a
nuclear Iran and hope to contain it; use military force to stop
Iran from going nuclear. In that case, will you commit to
providing the President with credible, realistic military
options to stop Iran from going nuclear?
Mr. Colby. I do commit to that, Senator.
Senator Cotton. To be more precise, those credible and
realistic options are more than simply saying we can give
Israel some bombs, and they can take care of it.
Mr. Colby. Yes, I agree with you, Senator.
Senator Cotton. It is well known that Israel lacks certain
military capabilities that we have such as aerial refueling
tankers and heavy bombers with deep penetrating ordinance. Do
you believe that at least one option for the President to
consider how to stop Iran from going nuclear should be to use
our tankers and our bombers, whether in tandem with Israel or
in the lead?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I wouldn't want to get ahead of the
President on specific decisions, but I think those are the
kinds of things that should be absolutely part of the
discussion. If I were confirmed, those would certainly be the
kinds of things that I would raise for the consideration of the
Secretary and ultimately the President.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. And to be clear about why this
is so important to us, to the United States, not just to Israel
or our Arab friends, why President Trump says a nuclear Iran is
an existential danger to us, you agree that it is an
existential danger, not just a severe danger, as you said in
response to Senator Gillibrand, or a significant one, as you
said in your written answers?
Mr. Colby. Yes, a nuclear-armed Iran, especially, Senator,
given, as we have discussed, that they have looked into or we
know they have worked on ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile] range capabilities and other kinds of capabilities
that would pose an existential threat to----
Senator Cotton. Correct.
Mr. Colby.--the United States.
Senator Cotton. So they have a space launch program, which
is flimsy cover for an intercontinental missile program, that
could be used to hit us here in Washington, in Little Rock, or
elsewhere in the continental United States. It is an immediate
threat to Israel and our Arab friends, but it is a threat in
the not-too-distant future, probably in just a couple of years,
to the United States.
Mr. Colby. Senator, I don't have access to the intelligence
information, but that sounds very consistent to me.
Senator Cotton. Do you agree that providing President Trump
with those credible military options is actually one way to
increase leverage to have an airtight diplomatic deal and----
Mr. Colby. Yes, I do agree.
Senator Cotton.--that a lack of military options would make
it harder to get a deal?
Mr. Colby. I do. I agree with that.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I want to turn briefly to
Taiwan. You have said here today and in your past writings that
Taiwan is a critical matter for us. You wrote in 2016 that you
thought we should give explicit security guarantees to Taiwan,
reversing a decades-old policy of strategic ambiguity. You
opined in the same way in 2020 in response to a hearing in the
House of Representatives. Over the past couple years, you have
started to say, as Senator Wicker pointed out earlier, that
Taiwan is a vital interest, but it is not an existential
interest to us, or it is not essential to us. It seems that you
have changed your thoughts somewhat in the last couple years.
That is not, I suspect, because of Taiwan's defense spending,
which, though still inadequate, I agree has been trending
upward for 7 straight years. So could you explain to us why in
the last few years your views seem to have softened somewhat
about the defense of Taiwan?
Mr. Colby. Absolutely, Senator. I have always said that
Taiwan is very important to the United States, but, as you
said, it is not an existential interest. It is very important
the core American interest is in denying China regional
hegemony. What has changed, Senator, as we discussed, is the
dramatic deterioration in the military balance. So if I could
use the Churchill example again, it is different to engage in a
futile and overly costly effort that would destroy our
military. I know you have written very eloquently about this
danger in your recent book.
The other point that I would say, Senator, is that I
believe that we actually have implicitly--our relationship and
our commitment to Taiwan is largely implicit or indirect or
customary. We actually have specified our commitment through
things like the designation of Taiwan as the pacing scenario
for the Department. So my view that the combination of the
greater threat from China and the lack of preparedness on our
part, I have a different assessment with respect, Senator,
about Taiwan's efforts. I think, actually, as a proportion of
GDP [gross domestic product], it is well below 3 percent. I
agree with President Trump that they should be more like 10
percent or at least something in that ballpark, really focused
on their defense, so we need to properly incentivize them. So
together, that means that my focus has been, again, with the
shooting-the-flare metaphor I used earlier, Senator, to get
Taiwan motivated to avoid precipitating a conflict that is not
necessary with Beijing and giving us time and space to be able
to try to rectify this problem because that is my goal,
Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Colby, to you and your family. I ask the
following two initial questions with relevance to fitness to
serve. So I will ask you, since you became a legal adult, have
you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed
any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual
nature?
Mr. Colby. I have not, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Colby. I have not, Senator.
Senator Hirono. I think it is interesting that you would
not say whether Russia invaded Ukraine and saying that this is
a complicated kind of a situation right now. But, you know, I
think I also heard you say that you would give the President
your best advice, regardless of what you think he might want to
hear. So I am going to ask you a simple question relating to
whether Russian military forces invaded Ukraine in February
2022. Did Russian forces cross the border and invade Ukraine,
yes or no?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, you are describing a factual
reality that is demonstrably true.
Senator Hirono. Yes, so that would mean that Ukraine
invaded--I am sorry, Russia invaded Ukraine, so that was a
question that you would not answer. I think that is pretty
important because we care about what Xi Jinping thinks about
what this President does and thinks, and if Xi Jinping thinks
that we have a President who does not separate fact from
fiction such as who invaded Ukraine, I would think that maybe
President Xi has some conclusions that he would draw maybe
having to do with, as our Ranking Member said, United States
fecklessness.
I also think that one of the reasons that our NATO allies
are increasing their spending on military is that they do not
think that they have a particularly stable partner in the U.S.,
and therefore, they better look to their own interests because
they can no longer rely on the U.S. I think that is a very bad
situation for the United States to be in, especially as we
identify China as a pacing threat and also whatever Russia is
thinking along these lines. Clearly, they think that they now
have a friend in the President.
I don't think that helps us vis-a-vis our strength
regarding Russia, regarding China. In fact, I think that we are
placing ourselves in a very weakened position with regard to
how we are viewed by our adversaries--that would be China, as
well as Russia--and our allies, like not a good situation to be
in. We need a President who can separate fact from fiction.
Let me move on. Since the Administration has identified
China as a pacing threat and the importance of INDOPACOM to
face that threat, would you agree with that?
Mr. Colby. Yes, I think the Department has identified China
as the pacing threat, as I understand----
Senator Hirono. So----
Mr. Colby.--from the previous Administration.
Senator Hirono. But INDOPACOM provided Congress with an $11
billion unfunded priorities list, and this says to me that
there is a misalignment of our funding decisions and strategy
if we consider INDOPACOM to be a priority, and yet you have
INDOPACOM putting forward an $11 billion unfunded priorities.
What would you do to decrease the unfunded priorities and align
our strategy and the importance of INDOPACOM with the resources
that it gets? And would you agree that maybe we should provide
INDOPACOM with more direct input into the Department's
budgeting and resourcing priorities----
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, what I would like to say is----
Senator Hirono.--process?
Mr. Colby.--if I may, and I think this is exactly the kind
of baseline reality that I think so much of my strategic
argumentation proceeds from. A lot of what I am saying is that
many of us in the public debate and so forth are acting as if
we can do everything, but the reality is that there is an $11
billion unfunded priority list from INDOPACOM. Realistically, I
bet the real deficit is even higher, given that that is just
what came out.
So, Senator, if confirmed, I would make it an absolute
priority, given the priority that China must get across
Administrations. I think this is now a matter of strategic
consensus to try to not only drive that down, but to, you know,
reform the Department and reprioritize it to actually go
through and carry out the strategic shift that has been talked
about in some ways since probably Bob Work was Deputy Secretary
of Defense at the end of the Obama administration.
Senator Hirono. So would you agree that INDOPACOM, that
command should be provided with more direct input into the
Department's budgeting and resourcing process?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I don't have enough information to say
specifically, organizationally, where I would fall on that, but
certainly, that perspective needs to get, I would say, an
elevated perspective.
Senator Hirono. I hope so because an $11 billion unfunded
priority, that is the largest unfunded----
Mr. Colby. Indeed.
Senator Hirono.--priority list of any of our combatant
commands.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, and let me observe, Mr. Colby,
that I have been somewhat critical of the COCOMs that have not
come forward with realistic unfunded requirements, and so I
appreciate the exchange which you and Senator Hirono just had.
Our next member is Senator Rounds. You are recognized.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, first of all, I really appreciated the time that
I spent with you in my office. I appreciated your comments and
thoughts. To your family, thank you for allowing him to
participate in this. It is going to mean a lot of time away,
but it is the right thing to do.
Mr. Colby, there is always an opportunity to look ahead and
to see long term what our needs are going to be in this
country, particularly with the defense of our Nation. Now that
we recognize five different domains--air, land, sea, space, and
cyber space--we also recognize that new ways of defending our
country are needed as well. Space-based assets are one of those
in which, as the President has indicated, he would love to have
a Golden Dome over our country or over the communities within
our country. I don't think that is farfetched, and in fact, I
think it is something that we have really got to consider.
Today, we have systems along our coastlines that protect many
of our cities. Hawaii, as an example, is protected with
destroyers that have radar capabilities and so forth.
If the President were to be successful in creating an Iron
Dome or a Golden Dome, he not only needs space-based assets,
but he also needs land-based assets as well that require the
use of certain parts of the spectrum for radar purposes. This
Committee would be shocked if I didn't bring this up with
someone in front of us today that is going to have something to
say about the use of this spectrum in the future. We talked
about this in my office. Forcing the Department of Defense, as
some people have suggested, to vacate any portion of the 3.1 to
3.45 gigahertz band of the spectrum would have severe
consequences on our warfighting capabilities, including
homeland defense missions, and force protection for our
deployed forces. It is also that part of the spectrum that any
land-based system would use to identify incoming weapons using
radar.
If confirmed, will you advocate for protecting the
Department of Defense's warfighting systems that require
spectrum to function optimally, including the radars that will
make President Trump's Golden Dome possible?
Mr. Colby. I will, Senator.
Senator Rounds. If confirmed, will you speak candidly with
Congress on the effects of any spectrum-related policies
entertained by the interagency that may have an effect on the
Department of Defense's capabilities to use those portions of
the spectrum that they currently control?
Mr. Colby. I will, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Sir, also, in my office,
you have--and I considered very courageously--you have called
for the genuine focus on countering China as the principal
threat to the United States and providing the commensurate
resources to INDOPACOM. In my office, we discussed the fact
that in the event the United States and China engage in
hostilities, adversaries like Russia and Iran will seek to
press their own advantage in Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere.
It is for that purpose of the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] currently requires a review to see whether
or not we are actually capable and what our needs are to
actually be able to sustain a war on more than one front. I am
convinced that if we have a war on one front, we are going to
have a war on two fronts. Can you talk about what your thoughts
are on that and whether or not, in your role as a planner, you
have to be able to respond to adversaries on more than one
front?
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you, Senator. I really appreciate
that, and I fully agree with your fear. I know the Chairman and
others have made this a real concern, and I applaud the
Committee's focus on this point. We have to have a multifront
or multi-war strategy, even though the reality is that the
force planning construct of the 2022 National Defense Strategy
is not a 3-war military or something. I think it is a one-and-
change if I could speak informally.
So that is a real problem because not only do I think that
other hostile actors could act opportunistically, I think there
is a very good chance that, for instance, if China wanted to
take the cosmic roll of the dice, as Harold Brown put it, that
they would induce their other partners with whom they are now
much more closely collaborating to also go at the same time,
perhaps even before to draw us away, so we have to have a
strategy for that.
I think our own strategy is to revamp our defense
industrial base, the readiness, the President's very
appropriate and justified desire to restore our military
strength, more capable allies. So I have a different view than
Senator Hirono. I think that what is happening in Europe is
actually very positive that the Europeans are saying we need to
do more for our own defense. I think people now, having dealt
with the Europeans ad nauseam for many years on this kind of
thing, I think there is finally an acceptance that there really
needs----
Senator Rounds. But let me----
Mr. Colby.--more to be done.
Senator Rounds. My time will run out, but I want to make
something very clear on this.
Mr. Colby. Sure.
Senator Rounds. If we are expecting that our European
allies are going to be able to defend us in the case of having
a war on two fronts, I don't think we can do that. I think they
can help us, but I think we have to be in a position to respond
to that. Would you agree?
Mr. Colby. I think we have to be able to defend ourselves,
obviously, without relying on anybody else, Senator, for sure.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Colby, who instigated the war in Gaza.
Mr. Colby. Well, the October 7, the barbaric attacks
against Israel were the precipitating factor.
Senator Kaine. By Hamas?
Mr. Colby. By Hamas, yes----
Senator Kaine. So----
Mr. Colby.--backed by Iran.
Senator Kaine.--there is a delicate cease-fire negotiation
going on right now, but you didn't have any trouble saying who
was the instigator of the attack. You----
Mr. Colby. I would look at that differently, Senator, but--
--
Senator Kaine. You equivocated about the Russian----
Chairman Wicker. If I could stop both of my friends. There
has been some talking over, and our stenographer is having
trouble. So----
Mr. Colby. Sorry, excuse me.
Chairman Wicker.--if we could avoid that?
Mr. Colby. Pardon me, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Yes. You were introduced as a truth teller
by the Vice President. That is a really important thing. My
point is, if you are willing to say the truth about the Hamas
invasion of Israel, I hope you wouldn't be equivocal about the
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Let me ask you about two particular topics. In your
advanced policy questions on page 47 and 48 you were asked a
question about transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). I
am curious about this. TCOs, including those transporting
fentanyl, pose a direct threat to Americans. I believe this is
a very important matter for the U.S. Government to address. The
United States should do so in ways that are practical, results-
oriented, and sustainable. In light of this, the lead
organizations are likely normally to be non-DOD. You then went
on to say that DOD plays an important role. Talk a little bit
about the way you see the effort against TCOs, the lead role of
non-DOD, and the supporting role of DOD.
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. I know this is a special
focus of yours, so this is something I would want to learn more
about, but I am, you know, very conscious that--and this gets
to some of the sort of back-and-forth in other contexts, that
military force is not a panacea. It is critical. It needs to be
part of the President's menu of options, and in certain cases,
it is absolutely necessary and can solve a problem. But things
like transnational criminal organizations that are--you know,
crime has been with us since we got out of the jungles or
whatever. It is going to be there, but we can reduce it.
I think a big part of that is going to be, obviously,
integration with the diplomatic arms, with capable partners who
are willing and able to do more, for instance, in places like
Latin America and other places as well. So I see DOD--I think
it is important for the Department to be more aware and active
in those conversations. My impression somewhat from within the
Department, but often from the outside, is that that is
considered to be sort of out of the Department's purview. I
think it is important that the Department be there, not
necessarily always saying everything is to be solved with a
hammer, but to be part of that conversation.
I will say I think the kind of people who are being
populated in the senior levels of the State Department and
elsewhere, the National Security Council, I would believe I
could have a very good conversation and integration and
collaboration along those lines, as well as Congress on these
issues.
Senator Kaine. And I think when you talk to the SOUTHCOM
leadership, they are going to really emphasize that a lot of
non-DOD assets are very important in this fight.
I want to ask you a question about AUKUS. Because I am on
Foreign Relations and Armed Services, I have been pretty
involved in the AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, United
States] framework. Pillar 1 also is pretty heavily invested in
Virginia. You did a tweet in August where you said ``AUKUS, in
principle, it is a great idea, but I have been very skeptical
in practice. I remain skeptical, agnostic, as I put it, but
more inclined based on new information I have gleaned. It would
be crazy to have fewer SSNs Virginia-class in the right place
and time.'' Talk a little bit about your perspective on AUKUS,
you know, the promise of the concept, and if there is practical
skepticality, what that is.
Mr. Colby. Yes. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate
that. And this is another area, as I mentioned my opening
statement, where new facts arise. I mean, my perspective is
fundamentally, I would say, realistic or pragmatic and kind of
data-driven if you want, adaptive based on new facts. You know,
the idea of empowering our Australian--in some sense, perhaps
our closest ally in the world. They have been with us even in
our less advisable wars is the way I put it. It is a great idea
for them to have attack submarines.
But the problem is, is that we are, as Secretary Rubio has
said and others, there is a very real threat of a conflict in
the coming years, God forbid, you know, along the first island
chain. Our attack submarines, as you know well, Senator, are
absolutely essential for making the defense of Taiwan or
otherwise a viable and practical option, to my conversation
with Senator Cotton.
So if we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient
number and sufficient speed, then great. But if we can't, that
becomes a very difficult problem because we don't want our
servicemen and women to be in a weaker position and more
vulnerable, and, God forbid, worse because they are not in the
right place in the right time.
My perspective, and what I have told the Australians and
also the Brits, is, if confirmed or before, I think it should
be the policy of the United States Government to do everything
we can to make this work. Again, as we talked about in your
office, Senator, this is getting back to restoring our defense
industrial capacity so that we don't have to face these awful
choices but rather can be in a position where we can produce
not only for ourselves, but for our allies.
Senator Kaine. So having more capacity, even if it is a
joint capacity, is a good thing. We just have to be careful as
we try to produce an Australian capacity that we don't end up
in a time period where we are sort of less than we would
otherwise be. Is that----
Mr. Colby. Precisely, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good morning to you, Mr. Colby, and I want to welcome your
family as well. Thank you for joining us today. I do appreciate
your ongoing service and commitment to our Department of
Defense.
For years, I have been calling out the waste, fraud, and
abuse that we have had at the Pentagon to ensure that our
taxpayer dollars are used to support our warfighters and
protecting our Nation. The Department of Defense, which
controls the largest portion of our discretionary budget in the
Federal Government, has never once passed a full financial
audit. The failure erodes public trust and prevents efficient
use of taxpayer dollars for critical defense priorities.
So, Mr. Colby, what policies will you put into place to
ensure that the DOD passes an audit, as the law requires, by
2028?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, thank you very much, and thanks
for your kind words for my family, as well as the other
Senators.
I absolutely would regard it as a priority, if confirmed,
to make sure that the policies are in place to encourage
efficiency and compliance with a Federal audit. I agree with
you, Senator. I mean, for the amount of money that we are
spending, we should be getting better results, and I am
confident--and of course, your leadership in the DOGE
[Department of Government Efficiency] Caucus and so forth, this
is a real potential where we could get much better results and
have a better defense industrial base kind of situation, better
readiness for our forces.
So I would certainly commit--I don't have a specific
recommendation at this point, but I am most welcome hearing
your thoughts and your team's thoughts about how to do that----
Senator Ernst. Well, thank you----
Mr. Colby.--in consultation with----
Senator Ernst.--and I truly look forward to working with
you on that issue as well.
Let's go to the Middle East. I know there has been a lot of
discussion already this morning about the Middle East and
Central Command. The signing of the Abraham Accords during the
first Trump administration, significant achievement. It was
monumental. It was a strategic breakthrough for the region. I
have worked to expand this agreement through legislation in
previous defense bills. We have focused on enhanced integration
with our partners, which could be--the examples that we have
had, air and missile defense, artificial intelligence
capabilities, and maritime cooperation to counter Iran. So what
are your thoughts in expanding the Abraham Accords, and how can
we accomplish that?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. I think the Abraham
Accords were a triumph of President Trump's first term, and I
am very hopeful that they can be built on in this term. I think
they are an example of where diplomacy that isn't expected and
maybe kind of unorthodox in certain ways can nonetheless come
about. I think it offers part of the solution to dealing with
Iran's regional hegemonic aspirations, its use of proxies, and
so forth, although it is not exclusively so.
But, if confirmed, from a defense point of view, this is an
area where there is a lot that can be done to buildup the
capabilities of those like the Emiratis, the Saudis with their
reforms, obviously consistent with Israel's qualitative
military edge and so forth. But I am a really big fan of the
Abraham Accords and the model, and, if confirmed, I would put a
lot of sort of shoulder into it.
Senator Ernst. Wonderful, and you mentioned the Emiratis,
but also the Saudis as well. So thoughts on normalization, how
we could assist with that with the kingdom?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I am not fully briefed on exactly
where things are. I think the more we can promote and encourage
normalization--I assume you mean between Riyadh and Jerusalem--
I think that would be a huge coup. I have seen reporting on
that in the press. I don't know where things stand. Again, that
is an area where quiet diplomacy is probably the most
effective. But certainly, I think that would be an incredible
thing. If I were confirmed, I would support efforts in that
direction.
Senator Ernst. I do too. I think that would lend to
additional stability across the Middle East by the addition of
that normalization between Jerusalem and Riyadh.
So as we discussed during our in-office meeting, I have
been working a very long time to combat sexual assault in our
military. Secretary Hegseth committed to appointing a senior
official to ensure a focus on sexual assault prevention within
the Department of Defense. So, Mr. Colby, if confirmed, will
you work with me on this appointment to ensure focused
leadership on this critical issue? Will you commit to providing
Congress with regular updates on the progress made in this
area?
Mr. Colby. I will, Senator.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate just being
straightforward on that. Thank you.
So, again, just in remaining time, and I know my dear
friend from Alaska will talk a little bit more about NATO, but
talking about how relationships matter around the globe just in
the remaining time, just give me your stance on America
remaining engaged on the world stage.
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator, I think America should remain
engaged on the world stage, and a lot of what I am trying to
argue for is a way to do that, and I think it is sustainable
with the threats that we face and the national resources we
have and our long-term interests.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, Mr. Colby. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
Chairman Wicker. Mr. Colby, I think I am going to ask you
to enlarge on that on the record. So at this point, I think
that be helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Colby. I am committed to developing a defense strategy
that will serve Americans' interests in a more dangerous world.
Engagement abroad is critical, but I also believe that this
engagement must be more realistic, clear-eyed, and disciplined
than it too often has been in the years since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. As this Committee has ably laid out, our
country and our allies face the risk of multi-front war. Yet
our military is not ready or sized, nor our defense industry
capable of sustaining, multi-front war. This is a recipe for
disaster.
The answer to this predicament is not ``come home,
America.'' That is because American security, freedom, and
prosperity are connected to the world beyond our borders, and
there are real and profound threats to those core interests.
But those threats are not all the same in scale, urgency, and
significance, nor must we act alone to address all of them.
Indeed, if we try to act alone too much and do not prioritize
among those threats, we risk not only overextension but,
because we will be too weak in the decisive places,
catastrophic defeat.
Accordingly, I believe we must be realistic and prioritize
in line with the President's America First and peace through
strength approach. This is common sense: Rebuild our own
defense industrial base, restore our military's readiness,
induce and enable our allies and partners to do their part.
Together this offers a strong long-term solution. The problem
is that our threats are, in defense planning terms, in the here
and now.
How should we deal with this painful quandary?
I believe there is a consensus on the broad outlines of the
Nation's defense strategy. My understanding is that the
Department has, across both the first Trump and Biden terms,
largely settled on a defense strategy prioritizing the
challenge posed by China while inducing greater allied
participation to help address military shortfalls both vis-`-
vis China in the Asia-Pacific as well as in other theaters
against other potential opponents, particularly Russia, Iran,
North Korea, and terrorists. There is also agreement on the
broad outlines of the need to restore our defense industrial
base and that of our allies. Finally, there is broad agreement
that we need to better secure our homeland and our Nation's
territorial integrity.
If confirmed as USD(P), my primary focus would on putting
that strategy into effect, precisely because that strategic
consensus has remained largely theoretical rather than a
reality. Indeed, the Trump Administration is entering office
with the country facing a major ``Lippmann Gap'': a perilous
mismatch between what we have been trying to achieve in the
world, on the one hand, and the resources and political will we
have to match those aspirations on the other.
Allowing this to go on is a recipe for disaster because, as
this Committee has so ably laid out, we and our allies face the
potential for multi-front conflict in the coming years, yet we
are not as prepared as we should be for such an eventuality.
Admiral Paparo recently emphasized that China's preparations
for war are becoming disturbingly realistic, and that is only a
piece of China's broader preparations for conflict. War with
China is certainly not inevitable, but it is very possible, and
it would be disastrous for U.S. interests--with the only thing
worse than it happening being our losing such a war. At the
same time, Russia's military is, as General Cavoli and others
have indicated, battle-hardened and larger than where it stood
in 2022. Iran poses a grave threat to our key ally Israel and
our interests in the Middle East. North Korea is advancing on
its nuclear and missile programs. And we must not neglect the
ever-present threat of terrorism. Even worse, these potential
opponents are increasingly collaborating.
Yet this takes place in a situation in which the previous
Administration has made clear that the United States does not
have the ability to fight multiple major wars at the same time.
This is a simple fact and one with which we are now forced to
reckon.
To reinforce my earlier point, the answer to this quandary
in my view is not withdrawal or isolationism. To the contrary.
Rather, the answer is the realistic, peace through strength,
America First agenda that President Trump and his team,
including Secretary Hegseth, have laid out. To my
understanding, this involves:
Rebuilding our military's readiness and
capabilities;
Restoring our defense industrial base;
Encouraging and where necessary pressing our
allies to step up to take more responsibility for their own
defense; and
Engaging with our potential adversaries to avoid
unnecessary conflict, exploit wedges where possible, and enable
a peace through strength outcome.
The problem is that some of these measures will take--at
best--many years to pan out, while the threat we face is here
and now. As a result, scarcity will persist in key regards with
respect to U.S. forces and supporting industry. For this
reason, it is a strategic deduction that the United States must
prioritize, based on the urgency of the threats we face and the
importance of the interests at stake. It is widely agreed that
China is the most formidable challenger to the United States.
At the same time, the previous Secretary of the Air Force said
last fall not only that China was preparing for war, but that
he judged the People's Liberation Army would say it is ready by
2027. As Secretary Rubio clearly and rightly stated in his
confirmation hearing, there is a real chance of a Chinese
attack on Taiwan in the coming years. This is the glaring
reality we must face--even as we must also urgently strengthen
our Nation's homeland defenses, not just against China and
other State threats, but against illegal migration, narcotics
flows, and other persistent threats to the very heart of our
Nation.
To return to the question, then, the major strategic
challenges I would face, if confirmed, would be:
How to address and prioritize the China threat in
the near term given that the joint force and the defense
industrial base are not as ready as we would like, nor are our
allies' forces or industries;
How to do this while robustly strengthening U.S.
homeland defenses and dealing effectively with persistent
threats in other important theaters like the Middle East and
Europe, including by working with our allies there to take a
more leading role in their own security; and
How to revamp the defense industrial base to
attain much better results for our and our allies' forces.
In summary, I believe this is actually the best--indeed the
only--way for us to sustain the international approach our
country has pursued in various forms since the Second World
War. We must, in my view, dispense with the heady ``end of
history'' ambitions of the post-1989 era and return to the
hard-nosed, realistic, and strategic approach we pursued during
the cold war. I believe this approach, fully in line with
President Trump's common sense vision, offers a way through
this very dangerous era.
Senator King, Senator Warren beat you here, so she gets to
go first. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. No, Senator King.
Chairman Wicker. Okay. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you. Mr. Colby, the Vice President
characterized you as a truth teller, someone who would tell the
truth to power, and yet, today, you have not told truth of who
started the war in Ukraine. I will give you one more chance.
Who started the war in Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I would tell the truth. I don't
think I am saying anything that is untrue, but I also think it
is important to be discreet and say things at the appropriate
time and place. I certainly can----
Senator King. The problem is, you tell us you are going to
tell truth to power. The most obvious truth is that Russia
invaded Ukraine. Everybody in the world knows that, and you
won't say it here today because it appears that you don't want
to offend the President. But that is the whole point of the
Vice President's testimony, that you would say truth to power,
but you won't do it here today on the record. This is an
obvious truth. It reminds me of the old country song, who you
are going to believe, me or your own lying eyes?
Mr. Colby. Well----
Senator King. We all saw it.
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, the way I see it, sir, is that
diplomacy, especially a very delicate period where I am
personally hoping that things very much, get back on track and
head toward peace----
Senator King. But shouldn't diplomacy be based on the
truth? Well, you have made your nonpoint, I suppose.
Let's talk about terrorism. Deterrence doesn't work with
terrorism. That is one of the problems, and I am afraid this
country has taken its eye off of terrorism. You talk about
China, others have talked about the Middle East, but terrorism
is a consistent threat. ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria-Khorasan] is trying to make a comeback in Syria. The al
Qaeda is active in Afghanistan and other places. But deterrence
doesn't work. They don't have a capital city to blow up. They
don't care about dying. Intelligence is our best defense
against terrorism, and yet we are seeing the greatest loss of
jobs, of firings in the CIA in something like 50 years. Talk to
me about how do we deal with the threat of terrorism when we
are cutting our intelligence capacity?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I very much agree with you about
the enduring threat of terrorism. In fact, when I wrote my
book, I did the defense strategy with others back in 2017,
2018. This is something I was very much thinking of. In fact, a
little personal, I mean, I was walking with my two sons, who
obviously don't remember this, but on the last 9/11 and
conveying to them how vividly I remember that. So that is not
something that I take for granted, and we do have transnational
jihadi terrorism.
So I think this absolutely does--and my argument would be--
and if confirmed, I would ensure, to the extent it was in my
power, that preventing terrorist attacks against Americans and
our allies, where possible, should be an enduring role of the
American military. Obviously, that is a critical part of
intelligence as well.
Senator King. But as I have thought about this for many
years, intelligence is really the best defense. Deterrence
doesn't work, as I said, and yet we are eviscerating our
intelligence capability as we are sitting here today.
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I couldn't speak intelligently. I
am just reading the news reports about what exactly is going on
in terms of at the CIA and others, but I have confidence that
Director Ratcliffe and others are making things more efficient,
more focused, more lethal. I know they are trying to make--in
fact, as far as I understand, try to encourage case officers
and others to go into more dangerous assignments precisely to
prevent such an outcome.
Senator King. I hope you are right. Just a note on Taiwan,
to me, one of the critical questions is, how much is Taiwan
committed to its own defense? It is disturbing to me that in
recent months the Parliament of Taiwan has moved to cut their
defense budget. How are we to be expected to think about
sending Americans into harm's way on behalf of an entity that
doesn't seem all that interested in protecting itself? Are you
disturbed by that move in the Taiwanese Parliament?
Mr. Colby. I am profoundly disturbed, Senator, and I think
the question that you are raising is one that I have heard not
only Democrats but Republicans raise, often in private.
Secretary Mattis, who was mentioned earlier, said, we can't
care more about your defense than you can. So this is where I
think--I have been trying in my communication and my
recommendations for policy vis-a-vis Taiwan to try to induce
them in whatever way possible to become, say, more like South
Korea. So it is a very plausible model with a much more serious
military because not only do I not think it is fair to
Americans to ask Americans and our servicemen and women to
suffer if our allies are not pulling their weight, but also
that it won't even be viable.
Senator King. One more truth-to-power question. Last week,
the United States ceased supporting the restoration and
protection of the electric grid in Ukraine, which the Russians
have continuously targeted. Yesterday, the Administration
announced its cutoff of military aid to Ukraine. Do you believe
that those two things together, undermining the security of
Ukraine in this critical moment, are good ideas?
Mr. Colby. Senator, as I said, I think the critical thing
at this point is for advance in the peace process, and for us,
including Kyiv, to cooperate. I think there is an opportunity--
--
Senator King. You are all about policy. I am asking, do you
think the cutoff of aid to Ukraine yesterday is good policy?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I am only seeing the reports
recently, but I think we need to get--I think the President has
a plan for us to end this war and a sustainable model for a
secure and sovereign Ukraine and a Europe that can be more
defensible, and I think that is the route that we should all
take.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much.
Senator Sullivan, you are next.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, good to see you and your family. Thank you to
your family for serving. I know your father has served his
country very admirably as well, so thank you, all of you.
I want to just make a point. Four years ago, when the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy was testifying at his
confirmation hearing, President Biden's Under Secretary, he
said that one of his top priorities was to, quote, ``stamp out
systemic racism within the ranks,'' unquote. My view is that
began the woke assault on the military. Do you believe our
military is systemically racist, Mr. Colby?
Mr. Colby. I do not, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Will you work with this Committee and
Secretary Hegseth to stamp out the remaining remnants of the
woke assault that we spent 4 years dealing with under Biden and
his Under Secretary of Policy and everybody else?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I commit to you to work and support
Secretary Hegseth, if confirmed, to restore a focus on
lethality, readiness, and meritocracy, and these kinds of
values that----
Senator Sullivan. Good. I think----
Mr. Colby.--you advocate.
Senator Sullivan.--that is the right focus, and our
military is not systemically racist, despite what the last
Administration told everybody.
Alliances, I am glad to see in your short, brief, but
powerful opening statement you talked about the power of
alliances. Do you agree that our alliances throughout the world
are a source of American power and strength?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator. I think they need to be, as I
said, adapted and made more sustainable, and that is the
approach that I would take, fixing rather than dumping is my
approach.
Senator Sullivan. The Ambassador for NATO is having his
confirmation hearing right now as we speak downstairs and
upstairs or somewhere in the Foreign Relations Committee. That
is Matt Whitaker. He has testified already this morning. He is
a strong supporter of the NATO alliance. Are you a strong
supporter of the NATO alliance and getting them to get to 2
percent or 3 percent certainly, but you still think that is a
useful, important alliance for the United States?
Mr. Colby. I do. Again, Senator, I very much believe in
NATO, but I believe it has to--I think the phrase is it has to
adapt to--things must change to stay the same, basically, the
logic being, they have got to be able to--it has got to
actually go back, in my view, to something closer to what it
was in the cold war. I like to point out the West German
military in 1988, 2/3 the size of current Germany, had 12
active divisions. The Germans----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Colby.--can't put a single division together now. It is
not tenable, and so I think we are seeing progress. Now the
question is how do we manage this dangerous period of
transition?
Senator Sullivan. I agree with all that, but it is worth
reforming because it does provide power----
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Sullivan.--and strength to United States.
Mr. Colby. Yes, I think the NATO alliance is important and
have a great interest----
Senator Sullivan. Let me reinforce Senator Cotton's
important line of questions this morning, and I appreciate
those. Just to be clear, your suggestions in previous writings,
you had a Wall Street Journal editorial that was highlighting
those today that we could tolerate Iran with a nuclear weapon,
a suggestion, is no longer your view, correct?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, if I could elaborate on this----
Senator Sullivan. I would just be real quick on this.
Mr. Colby. Yes, but I believe we should not allow Iran to
have a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I would believe that it is
my responsibility to provide credible, good military----
Senator Sullivan. That is your personal view because a lot
of times you can say, well, the President----
Mr. Colby. That is my view.
Senator Sullivan.--said it----
Mr. Colby. That is my own view.
Senator Sullivan.--so that is kind of my----
Mr. Colby. But----
Senator Sullivan.--but you don't really believe it, but
you----
Mr. Colby. If I could----
Senator Sullivan. But you believe that, right----
Mr. Colby. I believe that.
Senator Sullivan.--personally?
Mr. Colby. Yes, and, Senator, if I could----
Senator Sullivan. It is important, by the way, that it is
your personal----
Mr. Colby. I agree.
Senator Sullivan.--view.
Mr. Colby. No, I--and what I was saying--first of all, I
have been in the policy debate a long time. Not everything I
said I would say. The----
Senator Sullivan. I get that. You are a public
intellectual. You can't be held to----
Mr. Colby. But not anymore. Obviously, I am up for a public
job of great public responsibility, so I understand that. But
also, I would say a lot of what I was arguing against at the
time of these conversations 15 years ago, a lot of the
opponents I felt had a casual or in some cases even flippant
attitude toward the employment of military force----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Colby.--and that is a lot of what I was arguing
against. Was my wording always appropriate? Was my precise
framing always appropriate? No, but I think the throughput----
Senator Sullivan. But Iran with a nuclear weapon is----
Mr. Colby. Is not----
Senator Sullivan.--is an existential threat----
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Sullivan.--to the United States.
Mr. Colby. I think that we now have the leadership, with
the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and ultimately, the
President, who understand that we need to be militarily strong,
but also understand the downside risks of the employment and
military force needs to be rational.
Senator Sullivan. Do you fully support the President's
return to maximum pressure?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator, yes.
Senator Sullivan. Let me talk on--real quick. I only got 40
seconds left. Your 2018 National Security Strategy I thought
was excellent. Well done. The rebalance to focus on great power
competition, very important, but also there is an element of
deterrence in that that is still important. You have written in
your excellent book, Strategy of Denial, that we need to
provide a credible deterrent in the Taiwan Strait to prevent
China from achieving regional hegemony.
But on deterrence itself, here is my question, is
deterrence divisible for the United States? What I mean by that
is when people say, well, we can let bad guys, Putin, roll in
Europe, Iran roll in the Middle East, but we are going to be
strong in the Taiwan Strait. Is deterrence divisible in that
way? I think it is not. Just look at Joe Biden, Afghanistan,
holy cow, that was a disaster. Guess what happened? I predicted
this. Every bad guy in the world was like, hey, I am making my
move. Putin probably would not have even invaded Ukraine had it
not been for Afghanistan, same with Hamas and Iran with Israel.
So we have got to rebalance, but is deterrence divisible?
Because I think that is where you and I might have a little
disagreement and get into the danger zone there.
Mr. Colby. I think----
Senator Sullivan. Because I don't think it is, but what do
you think?
Mr. Colby. I think, Senator, that things are definitely
interconnected. But what I will say--and I recognize I am over
time--is that it is really important--I can't remember who said
it, but you have got to have this right stuff in the right
place at the right time, and we need to make sure that we have
got that. So we have got to do both of these things. We have to
pay attention to the political credibility issues and how we
are perceived. But at the end of the day, as you know well,
given your distinguished military service, Senator, we need to
have the right stuff in the right place at the right time to
have the right effect. As I think Douglas MacArthur famously
said, the two most infamous words in military history are ``too
late,'' right? I think that that side of the equation is what I
am driving toward, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you----
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker.--very much, Mr. Colby. Now, a vote has
begun. This hearing will continue, and members, if they will,
may just run to vote and then come back. The Ranking Member has
gone to vote now.
Senator Kelly, you are recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, great
seeing you and your family here.
In introducing you, Vice President Vance said the
following, and this is a quote. ``You need good people in
government. You need people who are going to tell the truth,
who are going to look you in the eye, who are going to
disagree, sometimes amicably, but actually be willing to look
you in the eye and have an important conversation, who you can
trust to tell you what they actually think, agree or disagree,
and that is the kind of person that Bridge is.''
On his larger point, I agree strongly. In any business or
organization or team, you need people willing to speak their
mind. It is especially important in this role, where you would
be setting the policy of the Department of Defense at a very
dangerous time. So I have got a couple simple questions for
you. Are there Russian troops fighting in Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator.
Senator Kelly. Thank you. I really appreciate your being
straightforward. Is it easier or harder for the United States
to shift its focus more toward the Pacific if Putin is
successful in Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think it is certainly a critical factor.
I mean, there are other factors that we talked about, but I
think it would be better if there is a peace and a secure and
sovereign Ukraine and a NATO that is more capable of defending
itself. That would make things easier, for sure, Senator.
Senator Kelly. If Putin is perceived as being successful,
and if he comes out of this feeling that this worked out in his
favor, do you think that puts other European countries at risk?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think it is clear that European
countries need to take more responsibility for their own
security, and I think that is already happening, and we
actually want to encourage that. I mean, this is, again, where
I have a somewhat different view than Senator Hirono. I think
the dynamics that are going on where European leaders are now
saying, hey, we are going to actually do a lot more, that is
actually something that we should encourage and enable. I would
say a new approach that I would advocate for and that I have
been advocating for, if confirmed, would be to enable work with
Europeans and work with the positive trajectory that they are
on now to give them more capability to do so.
Senator Kelly. That is one side of the risk calculation.
That is just one side. The other side is Putin and how he
feels. My concern is if we set the conditions here where he
feels a year, 3, 5 years from now that this was worthwhile for
him, he gained territory, maybe Ukraine is not a member of
NATO, that that puts our European allies at risk, regardless of
the steps that they take now. I have spoken to leadership in
Baltic nations, in Poland, in Finland, and this is a concern of
theirs as well.
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, what I would say, and I think
consistent with what the President, Secretary of State, and
others have said, is that we should, you know, really emphasis
on the verify. It can trust, but definitely verify. I don't
think we should take anything for granted. I think the
Europeans and our own military reforms going forward should
make sure that President Putin or whoever's in charge in the
Kremlin doesn't see it as advantageous to test the boundaries
of our security perimeter.
Senator Kelly. Do you view Putin as a war criminal?
Mr. Colby. Senator, that is the kind of thing that I just
don't want to--I don't think it is appropriate for me, and, as
I said, these words are very important as the President--I
don't think I am the right person to be commenting on this one
way or the other. There are factual matters, obviously, I can
comment on that are not--but I think at this point, my,
honestly, personal interest is in making sure that I don't do
anything that would disrupt the resumption of a move toward
peace----
Senator Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Colby.--that I think would benefit Ukraine.
Senator Kelly. Do you believe there were war crimes
committed in Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. Senator, again, I mean, others from--you know,
certainly, I don't think it is appropriate for me to be
commenting on these more delicate issues.
Senator Kelly. Can you explain how negotiations are harmed
if we State something that is self-evident? How does that harm
negotiations?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I think in all negotiations,
there is often time and place you can have something in a
private conversation that is much different. I think we should
be clear-eyed and understanding about what is going on and be
frank with the Russians and others. But I think having that in
public is a very different--I mean, for instance, the One China
policy, I think we have touched on it. There are certain things
that we understand that are delicate----
Senator Kelly. You mentioned in public, so----
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Kelly.--you don't think it is a good idea to
negotiate things in public?
Mr. Colby. I generally think that these things should be,
you know, conducted behind closed doors in the appropriate
forum. Sometimes it might be in public, but I think that is not
something that I am driving the train on, nor would I--I am
being considered for a job then----
Senator Kelly. I agree with you. I don't think we should
negotiate in public. That did not happen last week.
Mr. Colby. Well, my understanding is that was that the
President and the Vice President's point was that, exactly
that, so----
Senator Kelly. Well, on another subject here, where at
DOD--DOD is focused on providing--and I know I am out of time,
Mr. Chairman, but we talked about asymmetric advantage in my
office in the INDOPACOM AOR [United States Indo-Pacific Command
Area of Responsibility]. It is important we maintain, in my
view, an asymmetric advantage. I hope you take a very close
look at NGAD [Next Generation Air Dominance] as we move
forward, assuming you are confirmed for this role.
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Senator. I would welcome that. I
would certainly commit to taking a closer look at that.
Senator Kelly. Thank you.
Senator Cotton.
[Presiding.] Welcome back and recognize the fast-recovering
and apparently hard-headed Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. I haven't recovered fully, but thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Colby, for being here. To your family,
congratulations. Thank you for stepping in the gap again.
By the way, just to prove that I get along well with my
Democratic friends, I agree with Senator Kelly and his point
about NGAD. I think it needs to be a high priority. Air
dominance needs to be a high priority for our Air Force.
However, I also sense and understand your frustration,
although I must say you have done marvelously in answering
their attempts to get you to say something that may upset the
delicate balance right now going on between the various players
in this hopefully--hopefully--negotiation to peace in Ukraine.
You are so much younger than me, but at least you are a
student of history. Ronald Reagan was the first President I was
able to vote for, and I believe he referred to communism in
very negative terms, and in fact, called the Soviet Union an
evil empire. I also sort of recall that he once referred to
Mikhail Gorbachev as his friend. It must be easier to negotiate
with a friend than it is with an evil empire, just a point I am
trying to make, historically. Granted, not every situation is
the same. These are not identical. The human beings in this
matter are not the same, but I think the process is similar,
and so I applaud your diplomacy in this room today.
Speaking of age, literally the year I was born, the first
intercontinental ballistic missile was invented, and 2 years
later, the first one was installed at Minot, North Dakota, the
Minuteman I. The Minuteman III came along after some time, and,
of course, we also have 70-year-old B-52 bombers. Both of those
vehicles, of course, carry nuclear warheads, and Minot Air
Force Base contains and protects the large majority of nuclear
material in our arsenal.
So I have literally watched nuclear deterrence work up
close and personal and have very much appreciated in my career
in Congress, in the U.S. Senate, getting to know not just the
processes, not just the systems, the very old systems every bit
as old as I am, but also the airmen that protect them, that fly
them, that operate them, really rather remarkable.
I want to drill down with that a little bit with what you
were visiting with, of course, Senator Fischer about and maybe
even get even more specific in the sense that particularly the
land-based deterrent, the Sentinel, has had some challenges. We
don't do this very often, obviously, like every 60 or 70 years,
and so we find ourselves in a crunch financially with regard to
Sentinel. Will you commit--I mean, just commit today that you
will advise the President and Congress, but especially the
President, that we really do need to have that deterrence that
has worked so well, so well for so long that not a single ICBM
with a nuclear warhead has had to be fired.
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator. Thanks very much, and I do commit
to advising the support for the ICBM and the triad and the
land-based leg and the Sentinel program as well. Obviously,
there are concerns about the health of program, so, if
confirmed, that would be a priority, working alongside A&S [Air
and Space] and other--Secretary of the Air Force to try to get
that thing back on track, but certainly, you have my
commitment.
Senator Cramer. As long as we are on the issue of the Air
Force, many Administrations, recent Administrations, have been
shedding, it seems, the responsibility of the Air Force to
provide good ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance[ , airborne ISR. Lately, of course, the advent
of Space Force, which I strongly support, has provided another
layer of ISR. However, airborne ISR remains, in my view, very
important. COCOMs tell us all the time how important it is, and
yet we are seeing what I believe is an escalation of shedding
ISR by the United States Air Force, particularly modern ISR. I
would just ask what your level of commitment is to provide--and
first of all, how important you feel airborne ISR is to the Air
Force and to the COCOMs and your level of commitment is
overseen.
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. Thanks very much. As we
discussed in your office, Senator, I think that airborne ISR is
very important, especially, you know, for its own reasons, but
also because we cannot solely rely on the space-based layer.
I would also just say, Senator, if I could--and it is
really nice to see you, and I hope your recovery goes very
well; thank you for being here today--is, I believe, President
Reagan, when he went to Moscow and he was asked about the evil
empire during the period when he was engaging with President
Gorbachev, and he kind of demurred. You know, he said something
like, well, I wouldn't put it that way at this time. So I think
that shows, actually, President Reagan is a great example of
having a clear moral vision, but also understanding that there
is a place and time for everything and being able to move and
adapt to take advantage of new circumstances.
Senator Cotton. Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Mr. Colby, good to see you, and congratulations on your
nomination. It was good spending time with you in my office
discussing a variety of issues. One of the things we talked
about was how Detroit is a major contributor to the Allied war
effort now, but famously back in World War II, producing tanks,
antiaircraft guns, and other weapons, nicknamed the ``Arsenal
of Democracy'' by President Franklin Roosevelt. I think you
described it as the ``Detroit deterrent,'' so I liked that
saying.
Your previous work on the National Defense Strategy
emphasized shipbuilding dominance, and you stated improving the
industrial base was going to be one of your top priorities, if
confirmed. We both share the same goal, to expand the
industrial base, not just in Michigan, but around the country,
although my focus, of course, is in Michigan. So my question
for you, sir is, if confirmed, what policies or initiatives
would you lead to mobilize the national military industrial
base? We have to outproduce our adversaries, and this is going
to be critical. But how would you prioritize that and
specifically how?
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you very much, Senator, and I really
appreciated our discussion as well, so appreciate the kind
words. I absolutely share your conviction on this in an attempt
to move it forward. Obviously, a lot of the responsibility for
these issues would be in places like the service secretaries
and acquisition and sustainment and so forth.
I would see my role--and I would really welcome hearing
more from you and your staff, Senator, on this topic--is really
driving at a national level from the Department on down.
Obviously, if you look at the statutory responsibilities of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, it is things like the
National Defense Strategy, which should be the primary guidance
for the Department, as well as dealing with the interagency. I
think that is a very important platform and basis to engage
both within and outside the Department to drive what I would
think of as really a national mobilization of our defense
industrial base as part of a broader reindustrialization effort
because it is not going to work if it is just the defense
industrial base and try to restore some of that Detroit
deterrent.
Senator Peters. Great. Wonderful. Mr. Colby, there are
proposals for a space-based Iron Dome for America, and that has
gained certainly traction in some political circles, despite
what are known technical challenges, certainly cost concerns as
well. As you know, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM both face some real
operational challenges now, including domain awareness gaps,
critical infrastructure protection, and a whole host of
challenges. So my question for you is, how do you evaluate the
feasibility of such an Iron Dome concept for defending the
entire U.S. Homeland, given the competing operational
challenges that both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM currently face?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. I understand where you
are coming from. I believe and having spent a lot of time
studying the history of kind of missile defense capabilities, I
think those are very valid questions. I fully support the
President's EO [Executive Order] and the Golden Dome approach
in large part because I think the range and scale and type and
sophistication of missile and other unmanned threats to the
Homeland is growing, and so we need to keep pace with that.
One of the reasons, again, we are sort of--you know, the
Keynes line ``facts change,'' so, you know, my recommendations
change--is I think some of the technology breakthroughs that we
have seen in things like drones and unmanned systems, as well
as in artificial intelligence (AI) and related fields could
really drive down the cost curve and offer up technology
capabilities, or technology solutions and results that would
give us a much better bang for our buck if you will. Now, a lot
of that would be in places like R&E [research and engineering]
and other places. But I think that is a very reasonable basis
to move forward and not just kind of pie-in-the-sky thinking.
Senator Peters. As you know, the Air Force has requested
billions of dollars to research and build a collaborative
combat aircraft (CCA), which, as you know, are the unmanned
powered aircraft controlled by very advanced AI systems that
can complete missions on their own or be deployed in
combination with human-piloted fighters. These autonomous
aircraft are probably particularly crucial when we think about
the Indo-Pacific and the vast range that that encompasses. My
question for you is, if confirmed, how do you see CCAs being
utilized and integrated into INDOPACOM? Is that the place where
they would have probably the most use?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. I mean, unfortunately, my
knowledge of this is really from reading the defense press and
on the outside, so I don't feel I have the basis to give you a
really informed answer. But I would say that I think we do need
to see unmanned systems operating alongside manned systems in
an integrated fashion with other unmanned systems as part of
the operational concepts for the future, especially in places
like the Pacific, given not only the long ranges but the scale
and density and sophistication of Chinese integrated air
defenses.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very, very much. Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Sure. Mr. Colby, congratulations first on
your nomination and thanks for being here. Thank you for taking
the opportunity to meet with me. You know, you made a
commitment when we met that you are going to do everything you
can to enact President Trump's agenda, standing with our
allies, including Israel, and bringing peace back through
strength. So as we talked about--and I represent Florida. I
have got a big Jewish population, very pro-Israel population in
my State. After 4 years of President Biden's complete
abandonment of Israel and appeasement of dangerous regimes in
Iran, China, and more, I thank God we have President Trump back
in the White House, the most pro-Israel President in our
Nation's history. President Trump has already made clear that,
as long as he is President, Iran will never be allowed to have
a nuclear weapon. I have been encouraged by the decisive
actions he has taken so far to restore maximum pressure on
Iran.
I have heard concerns, as you know, from my constituents,
so can you talk about your previous comments on Iran and your
commitment to supporting Israel and supporting the President's
agenda?
Mr. Colby. Sure. Thank you very much, Senator. As you said,
I am honored to be nominated by President Trump. I would be
honored to serve in his Administration, if confirmed. I believe
he has the right ``America first, peace through strength''
perspective. He is an excellent negotiator, and I think he is
putting together a great team, and if confirmed, I would be
honored to serve among them.
I believe I have a very strong record, more than strong,
airtight record on support for Israel, which I have referred to
as a model ally. I think it is a key interest of the United
States, and its security has obviously taken a huge body blow
as a result of the Hamas attacks and the concurrent attacks or
subsequent attacks from Iran and its proxies and so forth. I
have publicly stood with Israel. I believe it is important to
have the memorandum of understanding and so forth that we stand
behind Israel, not only politically, but financially and, you
know, wherever possible and as part of our overall strategy,
militarily and so forth.
On the issue of Iran, I have made clear that my position--
personal position, as Senator Sullivan rightly underlines--is
that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon. We should deny Iran
to have a nuclear weapon, and that if confirmed, it would be my
personal responsibility, which in my duty to present the
President with very good, plausible options that are credible
options that are consistent--and I should stress with the
President's overall approach, of course, which is to try to
have a trust-but-verify negotiated agreement or something like
it. But you have got to have the hammer there available.
What I would say, Senator--and I was discussing with
Senator Sullivan a little bit--is the way that I would look at
the overall kind of arc of my thinking, if you will permit me,
is to say really the thrust of my thinking and advocacy over
the years and my strategic approach has been we have got to get
the ends, ways, and means together. We got to have something
close to--I think what President Trump was talking about, very
similar, we were talking about President Reagan, to the
Weinberger Doctrine. You need to be strong to get peace, but if
we are going to put American forces into action, we are going
to have a clear goal. It is going to have an exit strategy that
is plausible. That doesn't mean inaction, but that is the kind
of thing.
A lot of my advocacy and commentary, especially as a kind
of public intellectual if you will, was pushing back against a
lot of people who, frankly, I would say, were quite cavalier
about the employment of military force. I think, to your point,
Senator, with President Trump's leadership, with the Vice
President, with Secretary of Defense Hegseth, we have a team
that understands strength for sure, that understands the role
of negotiation, but also understands that it is important--the
downside risks of the use of military force and the importance
of not being cavalier about employing our men and women in
uniform.
Senator Rick Scott: Thank you.
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rick Scott: The prior Administration withheld and
slowed down the delivery of bombs to Israel and the joint
direct attack munition kits to convert those bombs into
precision-guided munitions. In this role, I think, would you
just go on and commit that you agree that we should reverse the
former Administration's anti-Israel policies and correct any
bureaucratic holdups that are delaying any United States arms
to Israel?
Mr. Colby. I agree, Senator, and what I have said, and what
I would say here again, is, if confirmed, I would advocate
removing kind of the bear hug, which is to say Israel is a
model ally in the sense that it is a capable and willing ally
that isn't asking us to fight all its own fights. It basically
wants the ability and capability and backing to go out and take
care of business.
I think a very effective example of that ends/ways/means
model is exactly Israel's actions against Hezbollah and Iran
itself a few months ago, which I think were very, very
effective, and they left us in a better position. Obviously,
they didn't solve the problem of Hezbollah in Iran. I think the
Israelis are realists like we should be, which is to say, the
threat doesn't just go away, but they put themselves and us in
a better position by the intelligent and robust application of
military force in a politically smart way.
Senator Rick Scott: The last one is a real easy question.
Do you agree that the government of China has made the decision
to become our adversary?
Mr. Colby. Yes, absolutely. I think that is correct,
Senator.
Senator Rick Scott: Thanks.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Scott. Mr. Colby, in
the context of your answer, what is the bear hug?
Mr. Colby. My understanding of the bear hug, from what I
have been reading, is like a hovering kind of control over
Israel's decisions that some people advocate, which is saying,
you know, we are going to pick and choose exactly what you can
and can't do.
My view that I think is consistent with the President's
view, if I may say, Senator, is that we should be looking for
allies who are able, but also willing to do things more
autonomously and take action. I think, in the case of, for
instance, Hezbollah, again, just relying on public reporting, I
am not sure how much, you know, we in the United States even
really knew about it, but it was very effective, and I think it
ended up being more in our interests.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that explanation.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations on your nomination, Mr. Colby.
So United States does not target innocent civilians, and
not only because that is what is right, it is also that is what
is effective. General Stanley McChrystal coined the term
``insurgent math''--you may remember hearing about this--
meaning that for every civilian you kill, you create 10 new
enemies. U.S. Air strikes killed as many as 48,000 civilians
between 2001 and 2021. You can do the math on that.
Now, most people know that killing civilians is wrong and
should be rare, and when it has happened, our troops file
reports. But too often, those reports don't actually receive a
response from anyone, and we don't learn how to avoid future
accidents that result in civilian deaths. That is why Congress
passed several reforms into law to reduce civilian harm and to
improve our guidance for our servicemembers, including
establishing the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence. This
center helps make military operations more effective, and it
also supports troops in preventing and responding to civilian
harm.
So let me ask you, Mr. Colby, if confirmed, will you
oversee implementation of these reforms? Do you agree that
preventing civilian deaths enhances U.S. national security,
including reducing risks to our own troops?
Mr. Colby. I do agree with that, Senator.
Senator Warren. Good. I am glad to hear that. It is very
important.
This isn't a partisan issue. During the first Trump
administration, the Pentagon grew concerned about the number of
civilian deaths resulting from operations that were in place to
try to defeat ISIS, and it launched a study. Secretaries of
Defense Mattis and Esper and Austin all took steps to reduce
civilian harm across the Administrations. Today, the Center of
Excellence helps commanders sharpen their campaign plans so
they can make smarter decisions about strikes that they need to
deploy.
So, Mr. Colby, do you agree that commanders can make better
decisions in the field when they are equipped with training on
how to avoid civilian casualties?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator.
Senator Warren. Good. I am glad to hear that.
Following the laws of war helps set us apart from
terrorists and from adversaries like Russia, which has targeted
civilians in Ukraine. American troops also rely on Judge
Advocate General's Corps for legal advice. Senator Graham, who
himself was a JAG rightly called the JAGs the conscience of the
military. Mr. Colby, do you think it is important that
commanders have legal advice that they can count on and trust?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator.
Senator Warren. Secretary Hegseth's outspoken disregard for
the rules of war endangers U.S. troops, and his firing of the
top military lawyers in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force
last month, and his plans to reduce the rank of JAG leadership
from a 3-star role to a 2-star role are deeply concerning. If
confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, your views
will send a message from the top about whether the laws of war
matter. I urge you to take this seriously. I appreciate your
answers today. If you want to expand on any of them, you are
welcome to do so.
Mr. Colby. Thank you, Senator. I have seen the reports in
the press, so I can't speak about it authoritatively. I trust
Secretary Hegseth's judgment. What I would say is that, if
confirmed, I certainly would take the laws of war very
seriously. It is something I have studied in the past, I have
thought about a great deal. It is part of the overall ends/
ways/means and the rational use of military power. Again, not
to be sanguine about it or blase, but to say that, you know,
observing the laws of war, understanding them in a reasonable
way that is consistent with combat effectiveness and military
effectiveness and achieving our goals and deterrence, I think
that is a very important part of the picture that I think is
part of the role of the USCP, if confirmed.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that, Mr. Colby. I think that
helps keep our warfighters safer, and I also think it helps
keep our Nation safer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator.
Now, we have Senator Tuberville, followed by Senator
Duckworth.
Senator Tuberville. Good morning, Mr. Colby, good to see
you and your family, and thank you for wanting to take on this
job. It is going to be very difficult, but we think you can
handle it.
Mr. Colby, you advocate for a strategy of denial in
military and geopolitical contexts. How does this concept
translate to Central and South American places like Panama and
the troubling amount of influence that China is starting to
have and has had in that area? By the way, they just announced
that one of our major corporations is purchasing both ports at
the Panama Canal, which is very good news.
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks very much, Senator. I think the
President's early initiatives on our hemisphere in places like
Panama are very encouraging. I think this is part of an overall
strategy both to secure our own interests directly, secure the
territorial integrity of our homeland from unchecked migration
and lethal fentanyl flows that are killing hundreds of
thousands of Americans, but also, as you said, Senator, to
ensure that China does not gain a foothold or beyond, a
dominant position in critical areas of Latin America, which I
think was happening. I think that is a big part of the strategy
now.
I think part of that is up to the military, but a lot of it
is part of the other agencies of government, the State
Department. I know former Ambassador to Mexico, Chris Landau,
Ambassador Chris Landau is going through his hearing
downstairs, I believe. He is up for the Deputy Secretary of
State. I think that is the kind of relationship between DOD and
State Department where you have a clear picture that we have
got to have a handle on our hemisphere. We are pursuing our own
strategies, and we are also empowering countries in the
hemisphere and in the region to contribute more through
development, through better governance themselves, through
alignment with the kind of commonsense approaches that I think
that we are following here that can result in better outcomes
for all of us.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, I think you will find the new
Administration, Panama is very receptive to us too. Once you
get in your position, you will find that out. I have been down
there several times, and they need help, as we need more access
to the canal, so thank you for that.
You know, in 2023 President Biden overrode President Trump.
The Department of Air Force and the findings of multiple
studies, including an Inspector General review and directed
that the headquarters of Space Command remain in Colorado
instead of moving to its selective location at Redstone Arsenal
in Huntsville, Alabama, my State. Mr. Colby, if confirmed, you
will be the senior DOD official in charge of space policy, as
well as strategy, plans, and capabilities for the entire
Department. Do you agree with me that, as a matter of policy,
it is in our Nation's best interest to make basing decisions on
merit and not on political agendas?
Mr. Colby. I do, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Colby, much of your work
is about prioritizing our defense policy toward deterring
aggression with China or pacing challenge. What do you make of
the progress made over the past few years by our adversaries
toward integrating with their militaries? I am talking about
since Ukraine, Russia have had their conflict, all the people
in the East basically are running to China. What are your
thoughts on that?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think it is really, really disturbing,
Senator. I think there has been this kind of--I think of it as
like a countercoalition, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea.
China is kind of the cornerstone of that coalition. It is by
far the largest economy. Their support has made the Russian war
effort in Ukraine sustainable. They are helping the Iranians.
The Iranians are helping them. The Russians are helping the
North Koreans.
So I think there is a couple of things to be done about
that. On the defense side, I think it is important for us to
work with our allies to kind of plug the gaps in our perimeter.
A lot of that is getting our forces in a better State of
readiness, putting them in the right place, getting our defense
industrial base back into good shape, robust defense funding,
and then getting our allies to step up. I think a big part of
this is we have some allies--Israel, I have mentioned--India,
South Korea, Poland. They are really pulling their weight. You
could add Finland up there is doing a pretty good job. But a
lot of the biggest economies in our Alliance Network really
aren't pulling their weight. They are starting now, so I think
there is a real opportunity to capitalize on that, because
together, we are much wealthier than this countercoalition, but
we have got to turn that into real military capability.
Senator Tuberville. Your quick thoughts on BRICS?
Mr. Colby. I think, you know, BRICS are sort of a
representation of the changing world dynamic. I think Secretary
Rubio put it very well. We are no longer in Charles
Krauthammer's unipolar world. We are in a world the United
States is still, I think, the strongest country out there, but
China's the biggest, most powerful rival we have faced in
probably 150 years, and other countries are making their
decisions. Obviously, Indians, who I think our relationship
there is golden going forward, and we should really deepen
that, and if confirmed, I would make a big priority of that.
They are part of it, so it is complicated, but people are going
to be moving around talking to--you know, the Saudis are
talking the Russians, and they are talking to us. That is very
common. That is how the world's going to be. That is the
reality of the world system as it is now, I think.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby,
welcome.
While I do not agree with many of your policy positions, I
do recognize that you are one of the most experienced and
knowledgeable nominees from this Administration to come before
this Committee, and I appreciated our conversation in my office
very much. It is clear to me that, unlike most Trump national
security nominees, you actually have been putting in the work
to become an expert in your field.
That said, expertise alone is not enough. Integrity,
adherence to the rule of law, and unwavering commitment to
uphold our democratic institutions are just as essential. So as
I do with every Trump administration candidate to come before
this Committee, I must ask, Mr. Colby, if President Trump or
Secretary Hegseth asked you to do something illegal, unethical,
or in direct violation of your oath to defend the Constitution,
would you refuse to obey?
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you very much, Senator, for the kind
words. I would say I contest the premise of the question. I
don't think the President or the Secretary would ask such a
question, but I am committed, I would absolutely not follow an
unconstitutional or unlawful order.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Colby--that was so easy.
Why can't the others do that? Thank you for saying that.
Mr. Colby, the global threat environment is more volatile
than it has been in decades. Russia's aggression, China's
growing assertiveness and challenges in the Indo-Pacific demand
clear-eyed leadership and a commitment to our alliances. Yet
rather than reaffirming America's leadership, this
Administration has actively undermined our allies, cast doubt
on our commitments to NATO, and, most disturbingly, cozied up
to the authoritarian adversaries like Russia. The credibility
of the United States as a reliable partner has been called into
question by our very own actions. Our President has refused to
acknowledge the reality that Russia's unprovoked war of
aggression in Ukraine has shattered global security norms, and
our recent gesture of support toward Russia are emboldening our
adversaries.
Mr. Colby, can you tell me if Russia invaded Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. Senator, as I said earlier, I don't want to
disrupt anything going on with commentary on a fraught matter
at a very delicate time. I am really committed to making sure
whatever I can do to--or not do anything that would hinder the
ability to get a peace process on track.
Senator Duckworth. Why does acknowledging whether or not
Russia invaded Ukraine, which is a known fact, affect the peace
process?
Mr. Colby. I think the President and the Vice President
have made clear that words matter in these times of delicate
diplomatic negotiations, along the lines, I think, of what
Senator Cramer was saying. It is not my place. I am here as a
nominee. I am not part of the conversation. I wouldn't want to
do anything to weigh in on this, especially at this very
sensitive time where, Senator, I hope things do get back on
track where we can have a move toward peace. I don't think it
is my place. I am not authorized to speak on this matter, as a
representative of the government. I am a nominee here.
Senator Duckworth. It is astounding to me that you can't
answer the question of whether or not Russia invaded Ukraine
when it is a known fact. That would be as if saying you don't
know whether or not Hitler invaded Poland. It is astounding to
me that you cannot answer that question.
After last Friday's shameful display in the Oval Office, it
is clear that Trump is in the middle of a capitulation, not a
negotiation. The wholesale refusal of this Administration's
officials and nominees to acknowledge the established fact of
Russia's illegal and immoral full-scale invasion of Ukraine out
of fealty to Trump and, ultimately, Vladimir Putin is one of
the most shocking and disturbing things I have seen in my life.
Let's move on. Mr. Colby, you have been a vocal advocate
for prioritizing the PRC as our greatest geopolitical
challenge, and we had a very good conversation about this. I
look forward to working with you on opposing our near-peer
adversary, often arguing that our strategic focus should shift
away from other regions, and you have said, you know, sometimes
we need to shift from Europe and the Middle East and really
focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Under this Administration, we have seen a surge in
deployment of Active Duty United States military personnel to
the southern border and Guantanamo Bay, not to counter an
active military threat, but instead to perform law enforcement
and accomplish logistical tasks that are typically handled by
civilian agencies. Mr. Colby, given your stated concerns about
the need to strengthen deterrence against the communist
Republic of China, do you believe diverting military assets to
perform domestic political theater at the border is an
effective use of our limited defense resources, or is it a
distraction from the real threats that we face?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, I wouldn't regard it as domestic
political theater to secure our border and to make sure that we
have territorial integrity, but, if confirmed, I would
certainly make it a real priority to make sure that those
rightful efforts to ensure our territorial integrity and secure
our border don't detract from our prioritizing the China
threat, which is the biggest kind of external, you know, State
threat that we face as a country.
Senator Duckworth. It is good to hear that. Thank you, Mr.
Colby.
Mr. Colby. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Wicker. I think that was a very helpful answer,
Mr. Colby.
Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Bridge, great to see
you. Congrats on your nomination. Great to see your family here
as well.
So, if confirmed, your influence on the National Defense
Strategy and planning guidance will shape the Department for
years to come. So in the past, I have highlighted through
section 908 of the 2025 NDAA the importance of special
operations forces (SOF) and the need for those strategic
documents to better reflect how the unique size, structure, and
posture of special operations forces enables them to both serve
as a preventer of conflict and if, God forbid, there is a
conflict, an enabler of it.
So how does SOF, or how does special operations forces fit
into your vision for our National Defense Strategy?
Mr. Colby. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. I do think
the special operations forces play a very important role not
only in the prevention of conflict--obviously, there are a lot
of things that can do, building partner capacity,
counterterrorism and so forth--but also, God forbid, in the
event of a major power war, SOF has multiple roles. It also is
a way, apropos of the discussion with Senator King, to keep an
eye on, you know, the ongoing terrorism threat. So I think SOF
plays a very important role in our overall military posture.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that. So how does regular
warfare fit into the strategy of denial in the context of China
or other adversaries?
Mr. Colby. Thanks, Senator. As discussed in my responses to
the advanced policy questions, that is something I have some
sort of broad thoughts about, about the ability to create
dilemmas for China in the event of conflict or before conflict
to deter it along, say, some of the secondary angles for China,
as well as building partner capacity and the potential, again,
God forbid, in the event of conflict, to create difficulties
and dilemmas for China directly in a military sense as well. So
I think those are some of the areas. That is an area I would
want to dive deeper into to give you a more informed answer, if
confirmed.
Senator Budd. In Strategy of Denial--I know that has come
up a lot today, and thanks again for the copy. It was one of
the first meetings I had in that early basement office in the
Senate when you came and saw me a few years ago. But you talk
about the importance of coalitions and maintaining a regional
balance of power. So if a coalition is too small, it lacks
influence. If it is too big, it may lack commitment from the
members. So what does an optimal coalition look like to
maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in
particular?
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you very much, Senator. You are very
kind. That is something, as you may recall, I discuss in my
book a lot. I think we actually are in pretty good shape in
terms of the formal security commitments. I mean, this is
apropos of my discussion with Senator Cotton, I think, and the
Chairman as well. You know, we have very strong alliances with
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines. I think we have
effectively a very strong security relationship with Taiwan. Of
course, Australia is very strong. Then I think we have a very
deepening and important relationship with India that is
directly proximate. I think we also could build effectively on
a partnership with Vietnam. Obviously, we have a long and kind
of fraught history of Vietnam. But the Vietnamese, say what you
will, they are committed to defending themselves, and they see,
I think, the challenge from China.
So I think those are some of the places where we can work.
I think if we can kind of hold the line at that way that, say,
would be an effective model going forward. Then, of course,
there are ways at the diplomatic level and political level to
use mechanisms like the Quad to, you know, build on that. But
from a defense point of view, I think the defense perimeter
along the first island chain is the one that makes the most
sense.
Senator Budd. Thank you. So given China's coercive
activities in the Indo-Pacific, do you see any states hedging,
and what can we do to minimize those states' concern about the
United States commitment to regional stability and security?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think that is a really important
question. I think, in a sense, you see hedging behavior all the
time. You see balancing behavior by countries. You know, take
Taiwan or Japan, for instance. Japan is, albeit far too slowly,
increasing its defense level of effort. It needs to go a lot
farther, a lot faster. But you also see some hedging behavior.
You see, you know, engagement with Beijing. I think all of the
countries are kind of, you know, sort of continually
reevaluating.
I think the most important thing that we can do is have
credible, capable military forces that are in the right place
at the right time, to my discussion with Senator Sullivan, to
be able to defeat a sustained and effective Chinese aggression
against a country within our security perimeter.
Senator Budd. So what are your thoughts on a NATO-like
alliance in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Colby. I am not theologically opposed to it, Senator,
but I have been skeptical. I was in Korea earlier last year,
and there is the trilateral with the United States, Japan, and
Korea. I think that is encouraging in some ways, but if we look
at South Korean political dynamics over the last 6 to 8 months,
it is not clear that that is going to be enduring.
I think there is a lot of spade work and political capital
that is put into a multilateral organization, whereas I think
something may be building up to have more multilateralization
in the region, but not the huge ambition of an Asia NATO,
especially because you have got Japan over here, India over
here, Australia down here. Their circumstances are quite
distinct.
Senator Budd. Thank you very much, Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Budd.
Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking
Member Reed, for holding this hearing. Thank you, Mr. Colby,
for meeting with me earlier and for your willingness to serve.
Before I begin my questions, I want to add my voice to
those of my colleagues to express my deep frustration with
Friday's shameful Oval Office performance, followed by the
President's decision last night to halt the delivery of United
States military assistance to Ukraine and their fight for their
country against a brutal dictator's invasion. I cannot believe
that the United States would side with dictators over
democracies, over our democratic partners and allies. We must
stand with Ukraine.
With that, I am going to move on to a different part of the
world, Iran, because we have to combat Iranian aggression. Iran
is the world's leading State sponsor of terrorism. It remains
the primary source of instability in the Middle East. It
endangers the world through its support of proxies and its
pursuit of developing a nuclear weapon. We know Hamas would not
have been able to carry out the October 7 terrorist attack in
Israel without Iranian support. We know this to be true. Across
the region, Iran also continues to work against American
interests and poses one of the greatest threats to United
States military personnel and those of our allies and partners.
So, Mr. Colby, like many of my colleagues, I worry that
limiting United States military involvement in the Middle East,
which you have advocated for in the past, could only allow Iran
to further grow its influence in the region. What are the risks
to United States national security and the security of the
broader region if Iran continues, as you may have advocated in
the past, to expand its reach unchecked? If we take our eye off
Iran, what happens?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks, Senator. Just to be clear, I have
always opposed Iran's hegemonic ambitions. I think, to the
contrary, my view has been how can we handle this situation,
again, if I could stress from the realistic predicate of where
our military is now. And if you look at the 2022 National----
Senator Rosen. Okay. So let me take you at that because,
over the last year, Iran has escalated targeting United States
vessels, personnel in the Gulf of Aden via the Houthis, Iran's
proxies. They have targeted United States Forces in Iraq and
Syria via its proxies for many years. So how are we going to
address the ongoing threat?
Mr. Colby. Well, I don't contest that Iran is a threat or a
malign regime in the slightest. I fully agree with you about
that. I think the intelligent application of our own
capabilities in the region, but also using and bolstering the
capabilities of our allies, especially our key ally Israel, but
also others in the region--I spoke with Senator Ernst about the
Abraham Accords model, the ability to bolster some of the Arab
states and other European partners that may have an important
interest, that this can be a broader thing. And of course,
Israel, to its credit, has significantly degraded Hezbollah's
capability, of course, Hamas' capability, but also Iran's
capability directly.
So my view, Senator, just to be very clear, is not that we
should ignore the Middle East or that we should totally get out
of the Middle East. I am baselining off the reality that I
think all of us, candidly, must baseline off of, which is that
we don't have a multi-war military. And you mentioned some of
the things that the Iranians have been doing. Well, Admiral
Paparo said the other day that the Chinese are, you know, now
basically in the business of conducting rehearsals, not even
exercises. And Frank Kendall, the Secretary of the Air Force,
said a couple months ago--the Biden administration, Secretary
of the Air Force--he said, not only are the Chinese on track to
get ready by 2027----
Senator Rosen. Well----
Mr. Colby.--but the PLA [People's Liberation Army] will say
it is ready by 2027.
Senator Rosen. Let's talk about China because I want to
learn about China's lessons from Ukraine. China has been
identified, of course, as you say, the pacing challenge for
Department of Defense across both the Trump and the Biden
administrations. As Ranking Member Reed has quoted former CIA
Director Burns, ``No one is watching United States support for
Ukraine more closely than Chinese leaders,'' and that
abandoning Ukraine, I am going to quote again, would be one of
the ``surest ways to rekindle Chinese perceptions of America's
fecklessness and stoke Chinese aggressiveness.''
So, Mr. Colby, after Friday's shameful performance in the
Oval Office, what message did President Trump and Vice
President Vance send to China regarding American resolve to
back democracies against brutal dictators? How does taking our
eye off the ball anywhere make us any less safe?
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator Rosen, I would point out that
Director Burns, who is a distinguished foreign policy
professional, has also said repeatedly that China was
continuing to plan to move toward the 2027 and that Xi Jinping
did have the intent to ultimately resolve the issue. So, you
know, Director Burns is obviously a foreign policy expert of
great distinction, but if you look at what he himself has
said----
Senator Rosen. Can I ask you a quick question?
Mr. Colby. Sure, yes.
Senator Rosen. Do you think that China, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea are working in concert against us to present this
multilateral challenge against us so that we----
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Rosen.--won't fight back? So how do you justify us
taking our eye----
Mr. Colby. Senator, if we----
Senator Rosen.--off the ball anywhere?
Mr. Colby. It is arithmetic, with respect, Senator. We
have----
Chairman Wicker. Right, first of all, your answer to that
question was yes, and now you are elaborating on that answer?
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. Again, I hear much slower than you two
talk. Okay.
Mr. Colby. My apologies. Would you like me to continue,
Senator?
Chairman Wicker. Yes, if you would elaborate on your
affirmative answer to that question.
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator, I do believe there is a
countercoalition that is working active. I know the Chairman,
you talked about this extensively. But again, the factual
predicate that I think we all must proceed from is that, as the
2022 National Defense Strategy said, we have a one-war military
and change. We don't have a military that is capable of
fighting four adversaries at the same time. I would like, in
theory, in principle, to have such a--but that is not the
reality. I believe, especially because the threat is so acute
and so realistic, and because of the very real possibility of
multifront war, we must have a realistic plan.
I feel a special obligation that, if confirmed, I must
deliver a strategy that actually deals with that. That is not
neglecting the Iran threat. That is not neglecting the military
threat that Russia poses, but it is a realistic plan to deal
with that. Part of that, of course, is greater defense
investment and revitalization of our defense industrial base,
but it is also making intelligent use of our allies, and in
particular in the case of Europe and countries like Japan and
Taiwan, pressing them to take greater responsibility, which
they can and must do.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, and thank you for
that elaboration which required us to take a little extra time.
Mr. Colby, I think you will acknowledge that is precisely the
situation that my Peace Through Strength plan attempts to
address and address beginning right now.
Mr. Colby. Senator, absolutely. I have had the pleasure of
reviewing it, and I think we are keying off exactly. I am a big
supporter of that kind of perspective of restoring American
strength, defense industrial might, and getting our allies to
do more, which it seems to me is also the perspective of the
President and the Secretary of Defense.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, and Senator Schmitt.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
give you more of an opportunity to elaborate as a fellow
realist. I think that there are a lot of hard truths that need
to be told. The fact is, we can't be everywhere all at once all
the time. That is the truth. So whether it is this Jacksonian
or Jeffersonian or prioritizer or realist, whatever you want to
call it, I think that this town has been in denial for a very
long time about a very fundamental issue of scarcity, right? So
we have to make decisions, and protecting the homeland,
focusing on China, those are our top two priorities.
That isn't to say there aren't other things that are of
concern, but our industrial base has been strained to a point
that it has not been, which is why there is really no daylight
on this Committee about sort of trying to reinvigorate that
industrial base. But I think this Wilsonian adventurism that
has defined post-cold war foreign policy has been a huge
distraction about what our core national interests are, and so
you have been really a leading advocate on that. But I want to
give you an opportunity to sort of expound on that.
In your hopefully new role here, could you elaborate on
what that prioritization, how that would play out, how you
think about these things? Because the truth is, if you have a
strained industrial base, if you are building things for a land
war in Europe, you might be neglecting long-range fires in the
Indo-Pacific, right? So how do you view all this?
Mr. Colby. Well, thanks very much, Senator, and obviously,
really an honor and a very similar perspective as yours. I
would say that I think--you know, and I talked about this in my
responses to my advanced policy questions, this so-called
Lippmann gap, named after the famous journalist Walter
Lippmann, who talked about, you know, the danger of a gap
between what you are aspiring to do and what you actually can
do. If you get that bluff called, that is catastrophe. I feel--
again, and I--forgive me for getting a little emotional about
it, but I feel we are at the precipice. I think the President
is exactly right, and Mr. Chairman, I think you are absolutely
right that we could be at the precipice, not only of a major
war, God forbid, with China itself, but by deduction of a
multi-front war, and we do not have the capacity.
I don't luxuriate in that limitation. I would like to get,
as you say, Senator, to a position--and we have spent a lot of
time in this hearing, and I spent a lot of time saying let's do
the things necessary, Mr. Chairman, as you have talked about,
to get us out of this situation not only for our own forces but
to supply our allies. What I have found a difficult challenge
is I feel there is a kind of recognition in one part of the
collective brain of the American system that this is a reality,
but the behavior hasn't actually adapted yet.
What I fear is if we don't have a realistic plan, the worst
could happen, and we could find ourselves in the worst possible
outcome like losing a war. That is why I mentioned it in my
opening statement because I think, God forbid, that is actually
plausible, and I want to avoid that at all costs.
By the way, I also don't want to abandon the Middle East. I
don't want a nuclear Iran. I don't want Russia to run roughshod
over Europe. I don't want North Korea to take over South Korea.
But if we know, as a factual, empirical matter, that we can't
do all those things in even remotely concurrent timelines,
don't we need to have a credible plan for how to do so? I think
part of that is greater resources, Mr. Chairman, as you have
advocated for and I think that, you know, in the
reconciliation, hopefully, that will be part of that
reindustrialization.
But also the secret sauce, I think, Senator Sullivan, as
you were saying, is our allies, and they can do more, and they
have done more. I mean, Japan is an incredibly wealthy economy.
I mean, Taiwan, look at the investments the President got for
TSMC [Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company] yesterday.
These are incredibly wealthy societies. Why are they not
spending at levels commensurate with the threat? I don't
understand.
Senator Schmitt. Well, and that level and the type of
spending matters too, right? When our European allies talk
about----
Mr. Colby. Exactly.
Senator Schmitt.--stepping up, it can't be for pensions.
Mr. Colby. Right, exactly.
Senator Schmitt. You know, and tough talk and percentages
of increase for GDP don't win wars, weapons do.
Mr. Colby. Precisely.
Senator Schmitt. The deindustrialization that has happened
in Europe--and most recently in Germany--has completely
kneecapped their ability to be a serious player on this, which
is concerning to me. I know it is concerning to you, right?
As it relates to the industrial base then--and we had Mr.
Feinberg here last week--I think that is a really important
confirmation. I think yours is as well. How do you see working
together----
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Schmitt.--with him? Because I agree, I am fully
supportive of the Chairman's initiative for the plussing up and
Peace through Strength, but practically speaking, then, how do
we get to a place where we are more nimble? How do we get to a
place?
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Schmitt. What are your views on this as far as
procurement goes? I know that is not specifically your job, but
it is related. It undergirds all of this, right----
Mr. Colby. Correct.
Senator Schmitt.--for us to be able to do it.
Mr. Colby. Well, thank you, Senator. I think actually the
complementarity--I have spent some time with Mr. Feinberg, and
I think we have a very natural complementarity. As I understand
it, he has really presented himself more as kind of the COO of
the Department to get better results, and I am more the policy
and strategy guy. I think that is a very natural
complementarity where there is obviously different expertise,
different experiences, so I would really welcome working with
him. Then, of course, the Secretary has his own set of
extraordinary--I would not say that mine are extraordinary, but
his set of extraordinary background and experiences and
expertise. So I think to me, if confirmed, I would be very
excited to work as part of that team that I think has a natural
complementarity.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Banks.
Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Colby, since we have started this hearing, a lot of
things have happened. I don't know if you are--you are not in a
position to follow the news. It is laughable to me to hear the
Democrats call the meeting in the Oval Office on Friday
shameful. I know I had to step out and go to a Veterans
Committee hearing. I had to go vote. But I am sure I missed a
lot of the rhetoric from my Democrat colleagues about the
terrible, shameful meeting in the Oval Office on Friday.
You might not be aware that 1 hour ago, President Zelensky
tweeted. He called the meeting on Friday ``regrettable.'' He
said, ``Ukraine wants peace, not forever wars.'' He thanked
President Trump and America for our support, even for the
Javelins that President Trump provided in the first Trump term
that kept Ukraine on its feet. But here is the kicker.
President Zelensky now said 1 hour ago, he is ready to come
back to America and sign the minerals deal. Is it possible here
that President Trump's unconventional approach is actually very
effective?
Mr. Colby. Yes, absolutely. I think the proof is in the
pudding, and I think that is a really encouraging thing to say.
I am delighted to hear the news that we are making progress.
Obviously, knock on wood. I also think it shows that, you know,
trusting President Trump and his kind of particular deputies
with this kind of high-level diplomacy is really important, and
it is not for me as a nominee to be spouting off and, you know,
potentially interrupting this kind of progress. It is very
encouraging. I know I speak for myself, but I am pretty
confident, you--I know, very confident, you too. You want peace
there. You want Europe and Ukraine to be in as good a position
as they possibly can be. So that is very encouraging.
Senator Banks. It seems like a pattern, though, with
President Trump.
Mr. Colby. Yes. Yes, I think so.
Senator Banks. It is Zelensky----
Mr. Colby. I mean, I think he is in----
Senator Banks.--it is Iran, it is----
Mr. Colby. Yes.
Senator Banks.--our other enemies abroad. It is the tariff
approach. It seems like President Trump's unconventional
approach is actually very effective.
Mr. Colby. I think it is very effective, and I think there
is a degree--I mean, he is a master negotiator. He is a
dealmaker. He understands leverage, and he is not going to be
calculable. I think one of the main critiques I think we
probably all have of the last Administration was that they were
highly calculable, and you could kind of measure it, and so the
Russians could kind of precisely calibrate it. After almost 3
years of conflict, things were going worse. I think with
President Trump, you have a very different dynamic. You don't
know what he is going to do, but you can get a deal with him.
This is, I think, the point about not having ad hominems is an
important part of this.
I don't think he misunderstands who Vladimir Putin is, to
the contrary, but I think he understands as part of a deal, a
good deal, a verifiable deal, a positive deal, and the same
logic would go with Iran and, God willing, he is able to
achieve that as well or make progress in that direction as
well. That would be the same approach I think he would take.
Senator Banks. I totally agree. I want to move on. Last
year, INDOPACOM admitted to Congress that it had the most
unfunded priorities in its history, $11 billion. One of
INDOPACOM's biggest shortfalls was missile defense. At the same
time, we have been giving Patriot missile defense systems to
Ukraine. We fired off hundreds of million-dollar missiles
shooting down $1,000 Houthi drones. How wise is it to burn
through our missile defense stocks in less important parts of
the world when INDOPACOM is so desperately short of those
weapons?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think--Senator, thanks--this is exactly
the problem I am pointing to. That is not to say that we
shouldn't be doing anything in Europe or the Middle East, to
the contrary, but it is to say if we all agree that China is
the top challenge and China is the most formidable threat, we
need to act like it because, especially given what Admiral
Paparo and others are saying and Bill Burns has been saying,
that we need to act like this could actually happen. I agree
with Secretary Rubio. There is a very real threat under
President Trump's--in the term that he has been elected to,
given the 2027 date, that, God forbid, a war could happen. I
agree that President Trump has said that China would not attack
Taiwan under his watch, and if confirmed, I would make it my
business, my particular business, to give him the military
strength to back that up, coupled with the negotiating ability,
Senator, that you just referred to.
Senator Banks. Yes. On that note, our Navy is not as big as
it needs to be. We especially don't have enough Navy ships in
the Pacific to counter China's rapidly growing fleet. Despite
that, President Biden decided to permanently deploy more Navy
ships in Europe to counter Russia, a nation which lost most of
its Black Sea fleet to a country without a navy. Mr. Colby,
should we be putting more vessels in Europe when we already
don't have enough in the Pacific?
Mr. Colby. Senator, I think we should be putting the
military capabilities, especially that are relevant in the
priority area--ships, submarines, missile defense assets have
to be focused on deterring a conflict over Taiwan, and if, God
forbid, it happens, giving our soldiers and sailors and airmen
and defenders and marines the best shot. I mean, that is
something I feel very deeply is I am not in uniform, but if
confirmed, it would be my job to make sure those who are in
uniform or who do stand in harm's way the best shot at winning
because the American military shouldn't get an unfair fight.
Senator Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, and thank you,
Senator Banks, for mentioning the really encouraging
developments that have taken place since this hearing began. I
am going to take the liberty of reading into the record the
exact statement of President Zelensky today. I quote, ``I would
like to reiterate Ukraine's commitment to peace. None of us
wants an endless war. Ukraine is ready to come to the
negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace
closer. Nobody wants peace more than Ukrainians. My team and I
stand ready to work under President Trump's strong leadership
to get a peace that lasts. We are ready to work fast to end the
war, and the first stages could be the release of prisoners and
truce in the sky''--could be--``ban on missiles, long-ranged
drones, bombs on energy and other civilian infrastructure, and
truce in the sea immediately, if Russia will do the same.
``Then we want to move very fast through all the stages and
to work with the U.S. to agree on a strong final deal. We
really do value how much America has done to help Ukraine
maintain its sovereignty and independence, and we remember the
moment when things changed when President Trump provided
Ukraine with Javelins. We are grateful for this.
``Our meeting in Washington at the White House on Friday
did not go the way it was supposed to be. It is regrettable
that it happened this way. It is time to make things right. We
would like future cooperation and communication to be
constructive.
``Regarding the agreement on minerals and security, Ukraine
is ready to sign it at any time in any convenient format. We
see this agreement as a step toward greater security and solid
security guarantees, and I truly hope it will work
effectively,'' end of quote.
I would then remind those within the sound of my voice and
those reading the record that our President, President Trump,
has said, ``The Government of the United States of America
supports Ukraine's efforts to obtain security guarantees needed
to establish lasting peace,'' to end the quote.
So let me just say this. I probably will not have an
opportunity to take to the floor today, but I hope this is a
day when we can refrain from some of the rhetoric that it is
tempting to make. I hope this is a day when Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives can take a deep breath
and hope that the excellent, hopeful signs that come from this
statement by President Zelensky come to fruition and come to
fruition quickly.
I have had fights with my roommates over time. We got over
it. I am even told sometimes there are family fights. It is
regrettable when they spill out into the front yard. But
friends get over it, friends decide to move on, and I think we
are seeing that process today. I hope to heaven that that is
the case. Since Senator Banks mentioned it, I took the liberty
of bringing it to the attention and to the record.
Now, Mr. Colby, Senator Sullivan wants to question you for
another half an hour. No, Senator Sullivan has a question or
two to tie down if you don't mind. I realize this has been a
long hearing for you and your family. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, I wanted to make sure when you
tell your kids that you went through this confirmation hearing,
that you said that it went through two rounds of tough
questioning, so this is the second round. So thank you for, Mr.
Chairman, indulging me.
I think you are doing a great job right now. You are
answering a lot of questions. Very quickly, the Wicker plan
that you have reviewed is outstanding. I am not just saying
that because that is our Chairman. You are hearing Senator
Banks and Senator Schmitt, many of us, Democrats as well like
that. Can you commit to work with this Committee on getting to
those kind of levels, the 3 to 5 percent of GDP that he puts
forward? It is an excellent plan on shipbuilding, on industrial
base, all the things we have talked about. I know that you have
got to go through the process, but just to fight for that. You
might lose, but, you know, we hear about 8 percent cuts. I have
talked to Secretary Hegseth. That is not what he is planning.
But we want to hear from the Pentagon officials that they
will fight for this because a lot of these choices that we are
having to make that you are eloquently talking about, they
become less difficult if we have a stronger industrial base and
stronger military.
Mr. Colby. Yes, Senator, I commit to advocating for the
higher defense levels that I think are consistent with, you
know, what our security dictates. Of course, what exactly that
would be, I can't say both because I don't know, but also it
wouldn't ultimately be up to me. But I think we are in a
situation where more robust levels of defense spending are
clearly in order.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Good. Let me go back to Taiwan very
briefly. I would agree--and you talked about it earlier--it is
the KMT--and it is the KMT, by the way. They control the
legislature. It is different from the President's party. They
are playing a dangerous game on their defense budget, and if
anyone from Taiwan is watching this hearing, they need to
realize they are playing a dangerous game, okay? Cutting
defense spending right now is not the right signal. We all
agree with that.
As you know, the Taiwan Relations Act requires the United
States to make weapons available to Taiwan for its defense.
Every Administration since 1979 has pledged to abide by that
and has. The Trump administration did a great job its first
term. If confirmed, will you work with us to make sure we are
going to turn the Taiwanese around, but that we will commit to
work with Taiwan and us to comply with the Taiwan Relations
Act?
Mr. Colby. Yes, certainly, Senator, and even more than
that, I would make it a special focus to accelerate and revamp
and focus those capabilities and expand those weapons transfers
and sales and so forth to assist Taiwan in its ability to
defend itself. So I have mentioned the pressure that we need to
put on Taiwan. I think you are absolutely right, Senator. But
we also need to do our part on the U.S. side to make----
Senator Sullivan. Yes.
Mr. Colby.--real capabilities available in a timely
fashion, which we----
Senator Sullivan. Get those----
Mr. Colby.--have not done a good job on.
Senator Sullivan. Get those weapons out there. I met with
the previous President. She had a great statement to me when I
talked about will, and she said, will is often a function of
training and capability. If you are stronger----
Mr. Colby. I agree with that.
Senator Sullivan.--and you have weapons, we have this giant
backlog, for example, of harpoons----
Mr. Colby. Right.
Senator Sullivan.--that we should be getting to the
Taiwanese. So I think that is an important point that she made.
Will is a function----
Chairman Wicker. Do you have a final question?
Senator Sullivan. The final question is the most important
of the whole hearing. We are talking about protecting the
Homeland, a lot of focus on the southern border, not always a
ton of focus on the northern border, my part of the world,
Alaska, the Arctic, the North Pacific. But I am sure you have
noticed, Mr. Colby, in the last couple years, we have had a
huge increase in the incursions of Russian ships, Russian Bear
bombers, Chinese strategic bombers doing joint patrols with
Russians, joint naval task force, all in the ADIZ and the EEZ
of America in the Arctic, in the North Pacific.
President Trump, after he got elected, said, we will,
quote, ``ensure Alaska gets even more defense investment as we
fully rebuild our military, especially as Russia and China are
making menacing moves in the Pacific.'' This is just an example
of how many--the NORTHCOM commander, the INDOPACOM commander
recently testified that they think they are going to see even
more of that. We had two Bear bomber incursions in 48 hours 2
weeks ago. Both NORTHCOM and INDOPACOM commander said it is
time to look at--not look at. They committed to reopening the
Navy base here at Adak, which is a very strategic base.
I would like your commitment to come to Alaska, come up
there with me, see all our great military up there, and work
with me on strengthening our northern border, in particular,
issues like infrastructure at Adak, which will provide our
forces the ability to respond to the attack on the northern
border, which doesn't get a lot of press.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Colby. Well, Senator, you are preaching to the choir on
this, and I would be privileged to come visit Alaska with you,
and I would be honored to do it----
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Mr. Colby.--if confirmed.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Colby. Good job.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
I would point out, Mr. Colby, that it is cold up there even
in the summertime, so bring your long johns.
This is one of the papers that I have produced. It is the
second one, ``Restoring Freedom's Forge.'' I hope you will
agree that the best way to begin immediately getting enough
submarines to have in the Pacific and doing so efficiently and
using more modern techniques is to explore this very type of
innovation.
Mr. Colby. I do agree, Senator, yes.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. This concludes
today's hearing. I would like to thank our witness for his
testimony, and thanks to the family. The restrooms are right
down the hall.
For the information of members, questions for the record
will be due to the Committee within 2 business days at the
conclusion of the hearing. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Elbridge A. Colby by
Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties and qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))?
Answer. My understanding of the duties and functions of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) are based on the U.S. code and
custom. Statutorily, the USD(P) is responsible, under the direction of
the Secretary of Defense, for directing and supervising:
The development and promulgation of the National Defense
Strategy and any other Departmental strategic documents;
Representing the Department in the development of the
National Security Strategy, and ensuring the integration of the
Department's activities and plans with the National Security Strategy;
The development and promulgation of policy guidance for
campaign, contingency, and operational plans, and for their review for
alignment with Departmental and national policy objectives and
criteria;
The development and promulgation of policy guidance for
global force posture;
The development and promulgation of the Defense Planning
Guidance to guide the formulation of program and budget requests by the
Department;
The Department's activities and policies regarding export
controls;
The Department's policy, program planning, and execution,
and allocation and use of resource for the Department's activities for
combating terrorism; and
In coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, for developing
planning scenarios to assess the Joint Force's capabilities and
readiness and to develop and conduct assessments of progress toward
meeting specific objectives the Joint Force should be ready to achieve.
In terms of activities, my understanding of the duties and
functions of the USD(P) are to serve as the principal advisor to and
lieutenant of the Secretary of Defense on matters of strategy, defense
and foreign policy, and alignment of the Department's activities with
national strategy and other elements of national power. Within the
Department, that means representing the strategy and policy perspective
throughout the Department's activities. Outside of the Department, it
is to serve as the principal representative of the Department below the
Secretary himself to the interagency process, the Congress, and foreign
governments on matters of strategy and policy.
More broadly, the purpose of the USD(P) and its predecessor roles,
in my understanding, is to ensure that the United States has the right
defense strategy; that that strategy is reflected in the joint force's
plans, posture, structure, and activities; and that that strategy
integrates effectively and logically with the Nation's overall
strategy, with the activities and strategies of our allies, and with
the threats we face. In a nutshell, the role of the USD(P) is to ensure
that the United States follows the tried and true maxim that war and
force should be the instrument, and sound policy and strategy the
guiding framework. In an era of great power rivalry and the potential
for great power war, this function once more takes on profound
importance.
Question. If confirmed, what additional duties and responsibilities
do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. I am not aware of any additional duties and
responsibilities that would be prescribed by the Secretary, but I would
be prepared to assume additional ones that are compatible with
effectively meeting the core responsibilities and duties of the
position.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you for this position?
Answer. I believe my background is well-suited for the position of
USD(P). I have worked my entire career on national security, defense,
and foreign policy issues, and have devoted my career to thinking
through what I believe are the most important questions facing our
Nation's defense.
In terms of experience, I have spent approximately 6 years in full-
time government employment. Most recently I served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018,
leading the development and rollout of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy. I have also served as a staff member on multiple commissions
and participated actively in the national and international debates on
U.S. and allied security, including testifying before Congress on a
number of occasions. I believe I also have the intellectual preparation
for the role, having written and spoken extensively at home and abroad
on precisely the topics in the purview of the USD(P), including in my
book The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power
Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021). I have abundant experience
engaging with personnel and constituencies relevant to the role,
preparing me for the Departmental, interagency, and congressional
engagement elements of the position. I have traveled and engaged
widely, preparing me for the international aspects of the job. Finally,
I have also held a security clearance for effectively my entire adult
life, testifying to my trustworthiness and commitment.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. I have always worked best with partners and believe in
empowering and enabling subordinates to contribute to the shared
mission. During the development of the 2018 NDS, for instance, I worked
very closely with my deputy, Jim Mitre, who was instrumental in the
success of that effort. I would bring that mindset to this position.
The particular duties and responsibilities I would assign to the
Deputy USD(P) would, naturally, depend on the individual selected. My
understanding is that no nominee has yet been announced, so I cannot
say for sure how I would do so. My inclination once a nominee has been
identified and confirmed, however, would be to ask that individual to
take the lead on a certain set of issues and management
responsibilities for which his or her expertise, experiences, and
interests are better-suited than my own.
Question. What are the major challenges you would expect to
confront if confirmed as the USD(P)?
Answer. I believe there is a consensus on the broad outlines of the
Nation's defense strategy. My understanding is that the Department has,
across both the first Trump and Biden terms, largely settled on a
defense strategy prioritizing the challenge posed by China while
inducing greater allied participation to help address military
shortfalls both vis-`-vis s Beijing as well as in other theaters
against other potential opponents, particularly Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and terrorists. There is also agreement on the broad outlines of
the need to restore our defense industrial base and that of our allies.
Finally, there is broad agreement that we need to better secure our
Homeland and our Nation's territorial integrity.
I believe the major challenges I would confront if confirmed as
USD(P) would be in attempting to put that strategy into effect,
precisely because that strategic consensus has remained largely
theoretical rather than a reality. Indeed, the Trump Administration is
entering office with the country facing a major ``Lippmann Gap'': a
perilous mismatch between what we have been trying to achieve in the
world, on the one hand, and the resources and political will we have to
match those aspirations on the other.
Allowing this to go on is a recipe for disaster because, as this
Committee has so ably laid out, we and our allies face the potential
for multi-front conflict in the coming years, yet we are not as
prepared as we should be for such an eventuality. Admiral Paparo
recently emphasized that China's preparations for war are becoming
disturbingly realistic, and that is only a piece of China's broader
preparations for conflict. War with Beijing is certainly not
inevitable, but it is very possible, and it would be disastrous for
U.S. interests--with the only thing worse than it happening being our
losing such a war. At the same time, Russia's military is, as General
Cavoli and others have indicated, battle-hardened and larger than where
it stood in 2022. Iran poses a grave threat to our key ally Israel and
our interests in the Middle East. North Korea is advancing on its
nuclear and missile programs. And we must not neglect the ever-present
threat of terrorism. Even worse, these potential opponents are
increasingly collaborating.
Yet this takes place in a situation in which the previous
administration has made clear that the United States does not have the
ability to fight multiple major wars at the same time. This is a simple
fact and one with which we are now forced to reckon.
To be clear, the answer to this quandary in my view is not
withdrawal or isolationism. To the contrary. Rather, the answer is the
realistic, peace through strength, America First agenda that President
Trump and his team, including Secretary Hegseth, have laid out. To my
understanding, this involves:
Rebuilding our military's readiness and capabilities;
Restoring our defense industrial base;
Encouraging and where necessary pressing our allies to
step up to take more responsibility for their own defense; and
Engaging with our potential adversaries to avoid
unnecessary conflict, exploit wedges where possible, and enable a peace
through strength outcome.
The problem is that some of these measures will take--at best--many
years to pan out, while the threat we face is here and now. As a
result, scarcity will persist in key regards with respect to U.S.
forces and supporting industry. For this reason, it is a strategic
deduction that the United States must prioritize, based on the urgency
of the threats we face and the importance of the interests at stake. It
is widely agreed that China is the most formidable challenger to the
United States. At the same time, the previous Secretary of the Air
Force said last fall not only that China was preparing for war, but
that he judged the People's Liberation Army would say it is ready by
2027. As Secretary Rubio clearly and rightly stated in his confirmation
hearing, there is a real chance of a Chinese attack on Taiwan in the
coming years. This is the glaring reality we must face--even as we must
also urgently strengthen our Nation's Homeland defenses, not just
against China and other State threats, but against illegal migration,
narcotics flows, and other persistent threats to the very heart of our
Nation.
To return to the question, then, the major strategic challenges I
would face, if confirmed, would be:
How to address and prioritize the China threat in the
near term given that the joint force and the defense industrial base
are not as ready as we would like, nor are our allies' forces or
industries;
How to do this while robustly strengthening U.S. Homeland
defenses and dealing effectively with persistent threats in other
important theaters like the Middle East and Europe, including by
working with our allies there to take a more leading role in their own
security; and
How to revamp the defense industrial base to attain much
better results for our and our allies' forces.
I believe the organizational challenges I would face would be
downstream of these strategic challenges. Based on my own experience
and observation, I know that not all organizations within the
Department or in the U.S. Government, let alone among our allies, have
internalized the need to take the steps to make this strategic shift a
reality. I therefore believe a major part of the role, if confirmed,
would be helping to implement the strategic shift it is widely agreed
that the Department needs to make, both within the Department itself
and in dealings with the interagency and allies.
Question. If confirmed, what would your policy priorities be, and
what areas of policy do you think have not been adequately emphasized
or addressed by the Department of Defense (DOD)?
Answer. I am committed to the President's America First and peace
through strength agenda. I believe Secretary Hegseth's focus on the
challenge posed by China and securing our territorial integrity are
rightly the priorities for the Department. At the same time, the United
States should deny Iran gaining a nuclear weapon and be prepared to
support our NATO allies and South Korea.
My primary concern with the Department in recent years has not been
the formal strategy, which I view as rightly focused on China, but
rather the implementation of that strategy. I believe the main problem
the Department has faced is not the strategy, but the ability and
resolve to follow that strategy through. Making that strategic shift a
reality would, if confirmed, be my main focus.
Question. How would you characterize your views regarding the
appropriate posture of stationing of U.S. Armed Forces overseas and
their use in overseas operations?
Answer. I believe U.S. forces should be postured, stationed, and
employed abroad in furtherance of our national strategy designed to
benefit Americans' security, freedoms, and prosperity. Given the
importance of preventing a hostile or potentially hostile State from
gaining hegemony over a key area of the world and undermining those
American interests, as well as threats such as terrorism, overseas
basing and presence are critical. They should, however, be continually
reevaluated to ensure the United States is optimally posturing U.S.
forces in the event of conflict, ensuring allies adequately invest in
their own security, and do not create costs beyond their benefits.
I regard such evaluation as a critical part of the role of the
USD(P).
conflicts of interest
Question. Federal ethics laws, to include 10 U.S.C. Sec. 208,
prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they,
or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain
relationships, have a financial interest.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any
potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties,
family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as
influencing your decisionmaking?
Answer. I do.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that
if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from
participating in any relevant decisions regarding that specific matter?
Answer. I do.
Question. Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to
decisionmaking on the merits and exclusively in the public interest,
without regard to private gain or personal benefit?
Answer. I do.
civilian control of the military
Question. What are your personal views on the principle of civilian
control of the military?
Answer. I believe civilian control of the military is absolutely
critical. The United States is a constitutional republic, and civilian
control of the military is rightly an essential part of our republican
system. I believe one of the core functions of the USD(P) is to make
that civilian control and oversight a reality.
To be clear, it is not the place of civilians to dictate to the
military. Rather, the right model, especially in a world of great power
rivalry, is a respectful, engaged, and expert discussion and debate.
The purpose is to ensure that the conduct of defense and war is an
instrument of national policy, and thus democratically accountable,
while ensuring our military is the very best it can be by respecting
its proper sphere and professional ethos.
Question. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, what specific actions would you take in preparing guidance for
and reviewing contingency plans?
Answer. If confirmed, I would actively focus on deep and
thoroughgoing reviews of operational and contingency plans. As I stated
above, plans for war are not merely a military matter. Of course, they
must be that at their core--our forces must be prepared to win. But
those plans must be consistent with our national interests and
strategy, and that is the role of civilian officials to ensure. I would
see my role as USD(P), if confirmed, as ensuring that linkage is tight,
consistent with President Trump and the Secretary's agenda.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the
Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. I believe I have the right experience, attitude, and
commitment to do precisely this. I have profound respect for the
military, I know my own limits, and I am open to debate and learning.
At the same time, though, I have deep background and thinking on
defense strategy and policy and our foreign policy, more broadly, and
understand the military and its role. I would bring this active, open,
and focused perspective to ensure proper civilian control and the
alignment of our defense policy, strategy, posture, plans, and the like
with our national interests and strategy.
Question. Aside from civilian control of the military via the
executive branch, please describe the extent to which you believe
Congress plays a role in furthering civilian control of our military?
Answer. Congress plays an essential role in civilian control of the
military. Congress is a source of legitimacy for all confirmed
officials, who have been confirmed by democratically elected
representatives. More specifically, Congress has made clear its
emphasis on the importance of civilian control of the military and is a
vital partner in ensuring that remains the case.
Question. Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 authorized an increase in the number
of personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
``sunsetted'' the reduction of funding mandated in section 346 of the
fiscal year 2016 NDAA. What has the Department done to use these
additional flexibilities to increase the number of civilian billets in
OSD? In your view, would an increase in the number of personnel
assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(OUSD(P)) enhance civilian control of the military? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the staffing
situation in OSD(P). If confirmed, I would carefully review the
staffing situation in OSD(P) and make recommendations to ensure it is
able to conduct its role effectively, including supporting civilian
control of the military.
strategy and force design
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy outlines that the
United States faces a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the
continued threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. The
congressional NDS Commission recently testified that China, Russia,
Iran, and North Korea have formed malign partnerships, supporting each
other's military aggression and illegal wars.
What is your assessment of the military threat posed by the
People's Republic of China?
Answer. The military threat posed by China is the most serious and
pressing for the United States. Indeed, both the 2018 and 2022 National
Defense Strategies stated that the People's Republic of China poses the
most significant challenge for the U.S. Department of Defense. As
discussed previously, this is a matter of bipartisan agreement.
Nor is China solely a long-term threat, even though it is surely
that too. Rather, the Chinese military threat has arrived. The most
pressing scenario for the Department would be a rapid attempt by China
to seize Taiwan by force. While war is not inevitable and it would be
my goal, if confirmed, to prevent it while protecting American and
allied interests, there is strong reason to think it is very possible,
including President Xi Jinping's stated goal of annexing Taiwan, his
directive to the People's Liberation Army to be ready for such an
operation by 2027, and China's broadscale modernization and buildup of
capabilities tailor-made to hold the Joint Force at risk, among many
other factors.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
the Russian Federation?
Answer. The Russian military poses a serious threat to Eastern
Europe, including NATO members. Its nuclear, missile, and other
asymmetric capabilities also pose a direct military threat to the
United States and the rest of NATO, among other allies.
Despite the war in Ukraine and sanctions, the Russian military
remains a serious threat and in some respects that threat is increasing
vis-a-vis Europe.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
collusion among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea?
Answer. A ``counter coalition'' of China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea has formed and become more cohesive in recent years. These states
are supporting and enabling each other in ways that are mutually
advantageous. Even worse, this growing collaboration presents a much
more serious threat of multi-front war. This is especially problematic
because the United States does not have a military sized to fight
multiple major wars, and too many of our allies are inadequately
prepared. This is a key challenge I would focus on addressing if
confirmed as USD(P).
Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
DOD has been unable to leverage, or has leveraged only in part, since
the NDS was published in 2022? If so, how would correct this situation,
if confirmed?
Answer. While I understand that the 2022 NDS was largely consistent
with the 2018 version from President Trump's first term, my assessment
is that the strategy's emphasis on prioritization was not implemented.
I think a key challenge I would face, if confirmed, is turning
prioritization from an aspiration into a reality consistent with
President Trump's peace through strength and America First agenda and
the priorities Secretary Hegseth has already rightly laid out.
Question. The 2022 NDS identified defending the Homeland as the top
defense priority.
In your view, is the Department making investments in Homeland
defense that are consistent with this being a top priority? What
additional investments do you believe are necessary to protect the
Homeland?
Answer. Defense of the U.S. Homeland is critical and a core mission
of the armed forces. Any defense strategy putting the American people
first must include defense of the Homeland.
This includes threats from nuclear and conventionally armed
missiles, drones, aircraft, and other vectors. The President's Golden
Dome initiative is an essential, flagship way to ensure our Homeland is
well-defended. This combines both ongoing and legacy capabilities as
well as disruptive new capabilities and technologies. We should
aggressively pursue them with the vision of ensuring an effective
defense of the American Homeland.
At the same time, we must secure our border and halt the unchecked
flow of deadly drugs like fentanyl. The Armed Forces can and should
play an important role in ensuring our borders are secure and we can
effectively combat the scourge of drugs that kill more than 100,000
Americans every year.
Question. n your view, to what extent should the Department
anticipate being called on to support civil authorities in the event of
a war with a strategic competitor? What investments and planning do you
believe the Department should be undertaking to prepare for such a
scenario?
Answer. Defense support to civil authorities is a vital part of
such preparations, and if deterrence fails, defending against and
recovering from attacks on the U.S. Homeland. DOD's mission is to
defend the Homeland and to project power to fight and win the Nation's
wars. War with a peer or near-peer competitor would have serious and
direct impact on the Homeland, including kinetic and non-kinetic
attacks on military bases, dual-use infrastructure, and civilian
targets in the U.S. Homeland. Building resilience at all levels--
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial--is a vital whole-of-
government approach to strengthen domestic entities, which will enable
the defense of the Homeland and the effective prosecution of the war.
For these reasons, the Department should be actively preparing for
such contingencies and working to prepare for such engagement with and
support to civil authorities.
Question. Looking forward, what types of resource shortfalls, if
any, are likely to hamper the Department's execution of the 2022 NDS
and other national defense priorities, in your view? How would you
address or mitigate these shortfalls, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would regard the development and
promulgation of a new NDS as a cardinal responsibility. With the
blessing of the President and the Secretary, this would guide our
national defense priorities.
While I cannot say what such an NDS would say, Secretary Hegseth's
stated priorities already give us clear and sound vectors, including
China, the Homeland, and a refocus on lethality. If confirmed, I would
see my role as ensuring the Department has the robust funding needed to
resource such a strategy, while at the same time ensuring the strategy
is not one characterized by ``pie in the sky'' aspirations.
Question. The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) reached
similar conclusions to the NDS Commission regarding the threats facing
the United States, now and in the coming decades. To address these
threats, the SPC recommended that U.S. defense strategy should prepare
to effectively deter, and if necessary, defeat, simultaneous Russian
and Chinese conventional aggression in two geographically separate
theaters. Do you agree with the conclusions and recommendations of the
SPC regarding overall force sizing?
Answer. It is clear that the United States faces the very real
potential of multi-front aggression. The central focus of U.S. defense
strategy and planning must be to prepare for such conflicts, precisely
to deter them.
Such preparations must be clear-eyed and realistic, however, taking
stock of the existing size and structure of our armed forces, the
limitations of our existing defense industrial base, the capabilities
of our allies and adversaries, and the likely timelines for addressing
our shortfalls. A realistic strategy of prioritization focused on China
while working closely with allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East,
such as Secretary Hegseth has laid out, would allow us to meet this
exceptionally dangerous moment.
Question. The 2023 SPC concluded that the U.S. should expedite its
ongoing nuclear force modernization activities, modify its strategic
nuclear force structure to account for the rapid growth of China's
nuclear forces and the unprecedented need to deter two nuclear-armed
peer adversaries, and urgently develop additional theater range nuclear
options. Do you agree with the recommendations of the SPC regarding
U.S. nuclear forces?
Answer. It is crucial for the United States never to be subject to
nuclear blackmail or coercion, let alone attack. We therefore
absolutely need a nuclear force able to deter more than one nuclear
power. What precisely that entails in light of the State of our
industrial base, the needs of our conventional forces, allied
capabilities, and other salient factors, would be a primary focus for
me, if confirmed as USD(P).
Question. In mandating changes to the process and form of the
National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
National Military Strategy, Congress intended that these documents,
through the Defense Planning Guidance, would more rigorously drive
program planning of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and
Combatant Commands. If confirmed, how would you ensure consistency
between the guiding strategies of the Department and its allocation of
resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I would see it as a central focus of my
tenure to ensure that our strategic documents are keyed to the national
interest in service of our broader international strategy, realistic,
and rigorous, and that they are thoroughly, logically, and practically
carried through in subordinate documents and--critically--actually
implemented.
Use of Military Force
Question. If confirmed, how would you define your role in making
recommendations to the President on the use of military force?
Answer. My understanding is that the USD(P) plays a crucial role in
recommendations to the President on the use of military force, through
the Secretary of Defense. The USD(P) is the official principally tasked
with guiding and overseeing development of military options that the
President can use to defend the Nation's interests, in line with our
overall foreign policy strategy, including by ensuring any proposed use
of military force is clearly and rationally tied to feasible and
reasonable political objectives. If confirmed, I would see my role as
providing that crucial perspective in this process.
Question. What factors would you consider, if confirmed, in
determining which forces of other nations are eligible for collective
self-defense by U.S. forces, and under what conditions?
Answer. I would need to study this question more carefully to
provide a more definitive answer.
Question. That said, factors I would regard as material for such a
determination would include: the geopolitical, military, and other
interests of the United States as affected both by the attacked and
attacking parties; U.S. treaty and other commitments; and international
reactions to both the attack itself and U.S. reactions; among other
factors.
What limitations, if any, would you seek to impose on the provision
of collective self-defense by U.S. Forces?
Answer. I would need to study this question more carefully to
provide a more definitive answer.
That said, I believe in the importance of collective defense as
part of overall U.S. strategy, rigorously weighed, applied, and
apportioned according to the national interests, our interests in
upholding our differentiated credibility, and other factors. That said,
U.S. forces should only be committed to conflict for compelling
purposes and with clear objectives along the lines laid out in the
Weinberger/Powell Doctrine. This would apply to collective defense
operations as to any others.
civilian harm mitigation
Question. In August 2022 the Secretary of Defense issued the
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP), which
included a detailed set of objectives and initiatives to ``improve its
approach to mitigating and responding to civilian harm, protecting U.S.
national security, and confronting the complex challenges of the modern
security environment.''
What is your view on the importance of civilian harm mitigation and
response efforts?
Answer. I believe it is in the U.S. national interest, as well as
morally right, to seek to reduce civilian harm to the degree possible.
While I am not deeply familiar with the CHMR-AP, I value efforts to
apply this perspective in ways consistent with military effectiveness
and deterrence. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
this effort.
Question. How, in your view, do such efforts relate to operational
effectiveness and strategic success?
Answer. I believe it is in the U.S. national interest, as well as
morally right, to seek to reduce civilian harm to the degree possible.
Organizations that help the Department do this in ways consistent with
military effectiveness and deterrence are therefore helpful and to be
welcomed. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this
program and seeing how it can be leveraged.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress made by the
Department to implement the CHMR-AP to date? What areas do you believe
require greater attention or resources to achieve the desired outcomes?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to be briefed on this but,
if confirmed, look forward to learning more about and providing an
assessment of its effectiveness and areas for potential improvement.
Question. What role do you believe public transparency plays with
respect to accounting for and responding to allegations of civilian
casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. Public transparency plays an important role in the
Department's response to civilian harm. I have been advised that the
Department maintains a public-facing webpage where unclassified and
releasable DOD policies, reports, and other information related to
civilian harm can be readily accessed. Maintaining public transparency
through accurate reports and assessments is both valuable in and of
itself but also bolsters trust in the U.S. military and provides a
mechanism for accountability, which is to be welcomed.
Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense has achieved a
sufficient level of transparency on such matters? If not, what
additional steps do you believe are necessary?
Answer. I have no reason for concern at this stage, but I have not
been briefed on this matter. If confirmed, I would look forward to
assessing the matter to ensure there is sufficient transparency
properly balanced with military necessity.
Readiness
Question. In your view, how do the readiness challenges facing the
DOD today and over the next 10 years impact the Department's
requirements for force structure investments?
Answer. The problem of balancing the demands of the near term and
the medium to longer-term is one of the toughest challenges the
Department faces. Due to the possibility of major war, and even
simultaneous major conflicts, we are simply not in a position to ``take
a knee'' to invest only for the longer term. We need our forces to be
ready now, next year, and over the longer term.
If confirmed as USD(P), I would see my role as ensuring that the
Department's readiness and force development efforts are designed to
achieve both near and longer-term warfighting readiness goals. This is
an area where the USD(P) must take an active role--both to ensure that
the demands of the near-term do not consume the long-term, but also
vice versa.
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance force structure and
readiness demands, particularly with respect to rotational forces in
the U.S. Indo-Pacific, European, and Central Command areas of
responsibility (AOR), against the imperative to modernize or
restructure current forces to meet NDS requirements?
Answer. I would approach these questions with the above
perspective. I would also look to scrutinize operations to ensure the
Department is focused on maximizing warfighting readiness against key
priorities like deterring China and defending the Homeland.
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
components across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and
training to execute operational plans?
Answer. I have not had the access to provide an informed answer to
this question. But coming to an assessment would be an early priority
for me, if confirmed.
Global Force Posture
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the current
U.S. global defense posture, particularly as it relates to stationing
U.S. military forces overseas, and where would you look to increase or
decrease U.S. force posture overseas given current international
security dynamics?
Answer. I believe the current U.S. global defense posture is
inadequate to the legacy foreign policy we have been pursuing--hence my
``Lippmann Gap'' reference above. I believe President Trump's America
First agenda sets a far more rational and realistic policy while
remaining resolutely engaged in the international sphere in a way that
puts Americans interests first but also dovetails with the interests of
our allies. I believe we can adjust our defense posture to back up the
President's agenda, thus closing the perilous ``Lippman Gap.'' I would
see it as a primary responsibility of mine, if confirmed, to help do
just that.
Question. In your view, in the event of a major conflict with a
strategic competitor such as China or Russia, what component of DOD
would be responsible for real time management of the resulting impacts
and necessary adjustments to global force posture?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to provide a clear answer
to that question, but I believe Policy would play a very important role
in such a context.
Question. In your view, are DOD Components adequately resourced and
structured to react at the speed of relevance?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the resourcing of
the Department, including the Military Departments, to ensure they are
appropriately resourced and structured. If confirmed, I will support
the Department receiving the resources necessary to secure the
President's vision of peace through strength and the strategy needed to
attain it.
Question. The United States has traditionally been a maritime
power, and its large Navy has helped ensure open and free navigation of
the world's oceans by all nations. This freedom of navigation has
protected trade and greatly contributed to the stability of the world
economy and the prosperity of the American people. However, the Navy is
currently nearly 100 hulls short of its current 381 ship requirement,
with no plan to meet even the current need before the 2040's.
What is your perspective on the credibility of U.S. power
projection capabilities and our ability to promote stability in
critical regions, particularly in comparison to China's rapidly growing
fleet?
Answer. I believe the rapid growth of the Chinese Navy in
comparison to the challenges facing our own is a source of deep
concern. I also believe the growth of China's Navy portends not only a
direct challenge in the Western Pacific but, if China is successful in
dominating in that region, a global power projection to impose
Beijing's will well beyond its own shores. It is critical that the
United States reverse this exceptionally dangerous decline in the
maritime and overall military balance vis-a-vis China, especially with
respect to the Western Pacific.
Question. If the United States is unable to field a Navy capable of
countering the likes of China or Russia, or even consistently counter
piracy along the major energy trade routes in the Red Sea and off the
Horn of Africa, how do you see this affecting American influence
globally? Do you think this could drive countries to look to our
adversaries as security guarantors and partners of choice in the
future?
Answer. I believe if China is able to secure military dominance
first in the Pacific and then beyond, that key countries and regions of
the world would turn to Beijing and our interests would be severely
undermined.
Question. If confirmed, how would you mitigate the impacts of this
reduced capacity, or how will you work with the Secretary of the Navy
and other DOD officials to expand Navy fleet size?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work avidly with the Secretary of the
Navy and other DOD officials to help reverse this problem, including by
providing more focus for demands on the naval operations and revamping
the defense industrial base.
Question. In your view, what role do forward-stationed forces play
in implementing the NDS and what is the proper balance between forward-
stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces in executing our
defense strategy?
Answer. I believe this is a matter of degree, but I believe forward
deployed and stationed forces play a critical role, especially in a
denial defense along the first island chain. Such forces are present in
operationally relevant timelines, provide a strong local defense that
is difficult and painful to dislodge, and bolster allied confidence in
our resolve.
Question. As the world's preeminent Air Force for much of the past
century, the U.S. has long depended on the ability to reliably project
combat power and support rapid logistics across the globe The previous
Secretary of the Air Force stated that the U.S. Air Force is too small
and too old to perform the missions it has been assigned. Do you agree
with this assessment? If so, what are the implications for U.S.
national security if the Air Force is unable to perform such missions
effectively in the future?
Answer. The Air Force plays an essential role in American national
and defense strategy. It seems beyond dispute that the Air Force is, as
former Secretary Kendall put it, too small and old. I believe it is
imperative for the Nation to have an Air Force able to play its
essential role in key missions such as nuclear deterrence, China, and
defending the Homeland.
If confirmed, I would work avidly with the Secretary of the Air
Force and other DOD officials to revivify and modernize the Air Force,
including by revamping the defense industrial base.
Alliances and Partnerships
Question. The 2022 NDS stressed that mutually beneficial alliances
and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition with,
deterrence of, and potential conflict against long term strategic
competitors.
What is your view of the continuing strength of our current
alliances, relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners
have in the willingness of the U.S. to meet its obligations? If
confirmed, how would you enhance that trust?
Answer. I believe alliances are key. But, as President Trump
rightly emphasizes, we must put our alliances on a more realistic and
businesslike foundation. For too long there has been profound
imbalances between what America does and what too many of our allies do
(with noble exceptions like Israel, Poland, and South Korea). This
cannot go on, both because of the growth of our potential opponents'
military power and because of the valid perceptions of unfairness by
Americans.
I believe the best way to sustain our alliances for the near term
and in the long haul is to re-baseline them, putting them on a much
more equitable footing. In this model, our allies do more, and we look
more to their perspectives as well. I believe this is a return to our
successful alliance policy in the cold war, when we made a huge focus
of ensuring allies did their part.
If confirmed, I would regard promoting this approach and helping
our allies adapt to it as central to my responsibilities. My experience
dealing with allies in and out of government I believe prepares me well
for this role.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant
commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
Answer. I am not in a position at this stage to give specific
recommendations. If confirmed, I would make this a priority as part of
the various key reviews I would lead in the first year or so of my
tenure.
Question. Industrial and technological integration between alliance
members and international partners are critical to ensuring
interoperability and economies of scale when modernizing and
maintaining combat forces.
Based on your experience, do you have any recommendations for how
DOD can leverage foreign military sales and industrial base integration
as a tool to improve our own military systems, as well as improve our
ability to fight by, with, and through our allies and partners?
Answer. I believe this is a very important issue. Developing our
own defense industrial base and that of our allies is a win-win. Our
alliance system is much stronger than the counter-coalition we face.
But our industrial base is not in good enough shape on its own to
provide the military resources for it. If confirmed, I would make it a
priority to figure out how we can better leverage FMS and industrial
base integration for this purpose.
Question. Authorities to conduct research and cooperative
development are vested in the offices of the Under Secretaries for
Acquisition & Sustainment, as well as Research & Engineering. How would
you propose improving coordination and synchronization to better
leverage their authorities and technical expertise to support Policy's
role in negotiating and executing agreements?
Answer. Policy coordination with A&S and R&E is essential for the
success of the Department as a whole. While I do not have specific
recommendations at this stage, I would strive, if confirmed, to ensure
such cooperation.
Question. What are your views of the reforms underway within the
security cooperation workforce and the Defense Security Cooperation
University?
Answer. I do not presently have a view on this topic, given that I
have not been briefed on it, but would be happy to provide one if
confirmed and once I am able to take such briefings.
national security investment & defense industry
Investment
Question. Multiple independent commissions, including congressional
commissions on the National Defense Strategy, Reforms to the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), and the Strategic Posture
of the United States have highlighted that U.S. defense investments are
inadequate for addressing the international security threats facing the
United States. These conclusions have been echoed by many Members of
Congress. In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the National
Defense Strategy recommended that Congress provide real growth for
defense spending, at an annual average rate of three to 5 percent above
inflation.
Do you agree that sustained real growth in the defense budget of at
least 3 to 5 percent is necessary to meet global security challenges
without incurring significant additional risk?
Answer. I have supported and do support robust defense spending
that allows us to meet our national defense strategy. If confirmed, I
will advocate for the robust defense spending needed to implement the
NDS that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth promulgate.
Question. If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the
adequacy of the defense budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I would prioritize the development of a new
National Defense Strategy and assess required resources against our
ability to meet the President's strategic goals, especially first and
foremost defending the Homeland and deterring China.
Question. Many observers assert that the only way to force DOD
leaders to make the ``hard choices'' to divest of lower priority or
underperforming programs, is to constrain the Department fiscally. Do
you believe that this approach leads to more effective and efficient
decisionmaking by DOD leaders?
Answer. I do not. I believe we have run this experiment, and it did
not lead to such results. A more efficient DOD is very much to be
welcomed, but I do not think a ``starvation diet'' is the most
effective or prudent way to pursue it.
Question. The PPBE process has remained fundamentally unchanged
since its inception more than half a century ago. The congressionally
appointed Commission on PPBE Reform released its final report in March
2024, and Congress has directed DOD to establish a cross-functional
team to oversee the implementation of the Commission's recommendations.
What changes would you make, if any, to the PPBE process to improve
both resourcing decisions within DOD and information flow about those
decisions to the Congress?
Answer. I believe this is a very important commission whose work
should be closely studied and considered for implementation. Before
providing any recommendations, I would need to investigate the matter
more carefully, if confirmed, once I am able to be briefed and better
understand the ``lay of the land'' within the Department.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to implement the
recommendations of the Commission, and how would you work with Congress
to ensure success?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to implement the recommendations
of the Commission that are consistent with the President and
Secretary's priorities and the improved functioning of the Department.
Question. How would you propose the Department expedite the
identification, integration and day-to-day use of modern data analysis
tools and techniques to help the Department make more timely and
adaptive data-informed decisionmaking that are aligned to the various
planning and risk management processes in the Department?
Answer. Such tools are highly useful in the contemporary context.
If confirmed, I would seek to adapt them to the Department's processes
wherever advisable.
Question. Former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated, ``If you don't
fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.''
What are your views on the role of the State Department and other
non-DOD departments and agencies in achieving U.S. national security
objectives?
Answer. The State Department and other non-DoD departments and
agencies play crucial roles in U.S. national security policy. If
confirmed, I would work closely with my colleagues across the
government to implement the President's America First and peace through
strength agenda.
Question. Do you believe non-DOD departments and agencies have been
sufficiently resourced to appropriately contribute to U.S. national
security objectives?
Answer. I am not able to provide an informed opinion regarding the
resourcing of non-DoD organizations.
Defense Innovation
Question. U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared. Our competitors are engaging in aggressive military
modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified 14
key areas in which investment to develop next generation operational
capabilities is imperative: hypersonics; integrated network system of
systems; directed energy; advanced computing and software; human-
machine interfaces; integrated sensing and cyber; space; quantum
science; microelectronics; trusted AI and autonomy; renewable energy
generation and storage; future generation wireless technology; advanced
materials; and biotechnology. Much of the innovation in critical
technologies suitable for national defense purposes is occurring
outside of the traditional defense industry.
How should Policy be working with others in DOD, like the USD(R&E)
and USD(A&S), to understand and coordinate the technical direction for
those critical technology areas with the overarching policy goals and
strategies being developed and executed by the USD(Policy)?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD has not leveraged the
full potential of our industrial and innovation bases to deliver
military capabilities at the pace and scale necessary to meet Secretary
Hegseth's defense priorities. If confirmed, I would work with
stakeholders from across the Department to advocate for the rapid
development and fielding of defense capabilities in alignment with the
Secretary's strategic guidance and policy priorities.
Question. In your view, what technologies do you see as having the
greatest military impact in the future? Do you believe the Department
of Defense is effectively developing this technology in comparison to
our adversaries?
Answer. Exploiting technology is crucial for our military's success
and thus for peace through strength. While I am not in a position to
provide a definitive assessment on these questions at this stage, if
confirmed I would regard promoting this line of effort as a critical
part of my role and would be happy to engage further on the topic.
nuclear
Nuclear Policy and Force Modernization
Question. United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our
Nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have
deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with
systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must
be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of Defense
that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and that
modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national security
priority?
Answer. I do. U.S. nuclear forces underpin our entire deterrence
and defense posture. I agree that nuclear deterrence should remain
DOD's top priority mission and that ensuring we retain a modern,
capable, and effective nuclear deterrent should be our top priority.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and
North Korea have expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force
capabilities? In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. I agree with Secretary Hegseth's assessment that China,
Russia, and North Korea have significantly expanded and modernized
their nuclear force capabilities. These improvements, which include
advances in warheads, delivery systems, and command and control
systems, pose an increasingly severe threat to the United States and
its allies and partners.
Question. Do you believe our current deterrence policy and force
structure effectively accounts for two near peer nuclear competitors?
If not, do you believe the U.S. will require additional capabilities, a
numerically larger force than exists today, or a combination of both?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to assess the adequacy of
our current nuclear deterrent. I do, however, believe that our
strategic forces must be able to deter multiple nuclear-armed powers,
especially the most capable ones. Determining what that requires and
what changes that entails in our strategy, modernization plans, and
posture would be top priorities for me, if confirmed.
Question. What is your assessment of our regional and extended
deterrent capabilities in Europe and Asia and our allies views on them?
Answer. I believe it is very important that the United States have
nuclear options below the strategic level. My understanding is that our
forces in this area have shrunk and atrophied considerably since the
end of the cold war. If confirmed, I would seek to understand what gaps
we might have in this area and determine how best to remedy them.
Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based
nuclear delivery platforms is consistent with an effective deterrent
posture in an era of great power competition with Russia and China?
Answer. I do.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to support full funding for
efforts to comprehensively modernize the Nation's nuclear deterrent
forces, including supplemental capabilities like the sea-launched
cruise missile, and accelerate such programs wherever possible?
Answer. I do commit to advocating, if confirmed, for fully funding
efforts to modernize our nuclear forces, while also meeting the other
top priorities for the Department, especially a conventional denial
defense force vis-a-vis China and defending the Homeland.
Question. Successive Nuclear Posture Reviews have concluded that
the adoption of a nuclear ``No First Use'' (NFU) policy by the United
States is not advisable. Do you believe a NFU policy would be
appropriate for the United States, and what do you believe would be the
implications of such a policy on the credibility of U.S. extended
deterrence commitments to our allies?
Answer. I do not believe an NFU policy would be advisable, and
would advocate against one, if confirmed.
Question. A core tenet of U.S. nuclear strategy since the cold war
has been that only the President of the United States can authorize or
terminate the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. This principle is based on
preserving civilian control of military forces and ensuring that the
United States maintains the ability to respond in a timely manner to
strategic attacks. However, there have been periodic calls to revise
this policy in order to constrain Presidential authority to direct the
employment of nuclear weapons. Do you believe the president should be
the sole authority for authorizing and terminating the use of U.S.
nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC)
Question. By statute, the USD(P) is a member of the Nuclear Weapons
Council. In your view, what are the most significant issues the Council
should take up in the coming years?
Answer. While I do not have access to this information, my
impression is that the principal challenges are simultaneously fielding
a modern nuclear triad and sustaining legacy nuclear forces while also
rebuilding the cold war-era nuclear weapons infrastructure into a
responsive and resilient enterprise. If confirmed, I would look forward
to working with the other members of the NWC to address these
challenges.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to fully participating in
NWC matters and personally attending meetings?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to Policy's ongoing active
involvement in the NWC and ensuring it has top level attention.
The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the Nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear
weapons, which are established through the interagency NWC. NNSA's
principal challenge over the next 20 years is to rebuild the cold war-
era U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure into a responsive and resilient
enterprise.
Question. Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's
capabilities to design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear
weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes, I support the recapitalization and revitalization of
NNSA infrastructure for improved and accelerated design, manufacture,
and sustainment of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Question. Do you support continued collaboration with the United
Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the other
members of the NWC and the interagency to ensure that annual budgets
adequately support the modernization and sustainment of the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. I do.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act
restructured the existing Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs into the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense
Policy and Programs. Congress took this action to cut through
bureaucratic stovepipes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
designate a single official as the principal civilian staff assistant
responsible for nuclear policies, programs, and operations.
If confirmed, will you commit to expeditiously implementing this
reform and working with the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Sustainment to ensure resources, personnel, and policies are
reallocated and revised to support the standup of the Assistant
Secretary?
Answer. I am committed to working with stakeholders in the
Department to establish the new structure consistent with statutory
authority. If confirmed, I would work with OSD colleagues to keep
Congress informed on the status of DOD's efforts and would welcome
insights and inputs from Members.
Arms Control
Question. Arms control, when effective and verifiable, has been a
valuable tool for managing competition and international security
concerns. In contrast, unverifiable arms control regimes observed by
only one party can generate instability.
Do you believe that further reductions should be taken only within
the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreement with Russia,
China and other nuclear-armed powers?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control when it is in
U.S. interests to do so. Specifically, DOD should seek arms control
agreements that enhance U.S. security, are stabilizing, and are
verifiable.
Question. What are your views on the military significance of
Russian tactical nuclear forces not covered by the New START Treaty and
whether arms control measures can adequately address them?
Answer. Russian tactical nuclear weapons pose a serious challenge
to NATO security and potentially give Moscow significant advantages in
a limited war. Future arms control engagements with Moscow, if they are
initiated, should take these forces into careful and serious account.
Question. The first Trump administration considered an overall cap
on the number of nuclear warheads between the U.S. and Russia rather
than platform specific limitations.
What are your views on this approach? How does China's nuclear
expansion affect this approach?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control when it is in
U.S. interests to do so. I believe any future nuclear arms control
effort must fully account for China's dramatic nuclear expansion.
Question. What is your current assessment of the New START Treaty
and the likelihood of any follow-on nuclear arms control treaties with
either Russia or China?
Answer. My understanding is that both sides have ceased
implementation of the New START Treaty's verification mechanisms, and
the United States is unable to confirm that Russia is abiding by all of
the Treaty's limits. I believe the United States should be open to arms
control with Russia and China if such measures genuinely promote U.S.
interests and security and those of our allies. I am not in a position
at this stage to assess the likelihood of such measures with Moscow
and/or Beijing.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, space, or
conventional power projection capabilities in order to obtain an
agreement with Russia or China on nuclear weapons reductions?
Answer. While I believe it is imprudent to rule anything out in
considering negotiations, I am highly skeptical about such potential
constraints on U.S. forces. My sense is that arms control has been most
successful from the U.S. point of view when focused on nuclear forces.
space
Question. China and Russia are training and equipping their
military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold
U.S. and allied space operations and activities at risk, even as they
push for international agreements on the non-weaponization of space.
In your view, how would you characterize the strategic environment
as it pertains to the space domain?
Answer. Space is vital for U.S. military operations. China, in
particular, as well as Russia have become far more active and capable
in space. Enabling U.S. military operations in, from, and through space
in the face of these challenges thus must be a top priority for the
Department.
Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to counter
adversary activities in space?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue, and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
U.S. national security space satellites? To commercial space systems
owned by U.S. companies?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question, but I believe Chinese and Russian and
counterspace capabilities are the most formidable dangers.
Question. The DOD is increasingly reliant on commercial space
systems which can become enemy combatants in a time of conflict.
Do you have concerns about over-reliance on commercial systems
supporting DOD operations, especially in a time of conflict who may
find it in the companies best commercial interest to cease support to
the Department?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question, I see it as an important issue, and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. What are the Department's responsibilities in defense of
U.S commercial assets in space, especially those the DOD is employing
in a time of conflict?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue, and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Do you believe the Department should offer indemnity to
commercial companies supporting DOD operations?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue, and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. If confirmed, would you support the development of
offensive and defensive space control capabilities to counter threats
against such assets?
Answer. Yes, and I would advocate for such capabilities.
Question. Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the
availability of sufficient frequency spectrum that is becoming
increasingly scarce. If confirmed, how would you work with the Military
Departments and Services, the Joint Staff, and other DOD Components to
ensure that the Department's frequency spectrum requirements are
accounted for and protected in interagency discussions about potential
spectrum auctions?
Answer. Access to spectrum is essential to mission effectiveness
and vital to our national security. Spectrum is the cornerstone of
success in all warfighting domains and, if confirmed, I would always
advocate for the requirements of the Joint Force. If confirmed, I would
collaborate with Department senior leadership and interagency
stakeholders to ensure DOD's continued ability to carry out its
critical national security missions.
electronic warfare
Question. Advances by Russia and China in electronic warfare,
particularly in tactical warfighting scenarios, have highlighted Recent
attention has been given Department-wide to the importance of
electronic warfare, given its use in Ukraine and the importance which
China and Russia has placed on it as a tactical warfighting element.
What are your views on this matter?
Answer. Electronic warfare is a critical part of modern warfare.
Although I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer to
this important question, I see it as an important issue, and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer once I have been
briefed on the matter.
Cyber Policy and Authorities
Question. What do you see as the primary cyber policy challenges
for the Department and what suggestions do you have for addressing
them?
Answer. My understanding is that China poses the most significant
cyber threat to the Department and to the Nation in cyberspace. Other
nation-states, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea, also present
cyber threats.
I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer to this
important question of how to meet these cyber challenges, but I see it
as an important issue, and I would, if confirmed, be prepared to
provide a fuller answer.
Question. As pertaining to cyber policies and governance, what is
your understanding of the USD(P)'s relationship with:
The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command
Answer. My understanding is that the Commander of U.S. Cyber
Command is responsible for the planning and execution of military
cyberspace missions, serving as the cyberspace operations joint force
provider and joint force trainer. If confirmed, I would look forward to
working closely with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command on all policy
issues affecting the Command's ability to achieve national security
objectives.
Question. The DOD Chief Information Officer
Answer. My understanding is that the DOD Chief Information Officer
(DoD CIO) is the principal staff assistant and senior advisor to the
Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for information
technology (IT) and spectrum. If confirmed, I would intend to foster a
close relationship with the DOD CIO to strengthen governance of
information systems, information technology, spectrum matters,
networking, information assurance, cybersecurity, communicates, and
cyber capability architectures of the Department.
Question. The Military Service Principal Cyber Advisors
Answer. My understanding of the role of the Military Service
Principal Cyber Advisors (PCA) is to address cyber readiness,
capabilities, budget, and strategy for their respective services. If
confirmed, I would plan to work closely with the Service PCAs, through
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (ASD(CP)) in his or
her role as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, on
developing and implementing policies and strategies to synchronize
these efforts across the Department of Defense.
Question. The Director for the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
Answer. My understanding is that the Defense Cyber Crime Center
(DC3) is a Federal Cyber Center, and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy oversees the Department of Defense's role as the Sector Risk
Management Agency for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Both roles
share responsibility for defense critical infrastructure protection
matters. If confirmed, I would ensure that we are fully aligned in
efforts to protect the DIB from malicious cyber activity.
Question. The Director of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) at DHS
Answer. My understanding is that the DOD's relationship with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is essential to ensuring the
cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure systems. If confirmed, I
would ensure a constructive relationship with DHS that encourages
expanded coordination and communication between the Departments. I
would also ensure DOD is postured to address requests for assistance
from DHS and other Federal civilian agencies.
Question. The National Cyber Director
Answer. My understanding is that the National Cyber Director is the
principal advisor to the President on cybersecurity policy and strategy
and leads whole-of-government coordination of programs and policies to
improve the cybersecurity posture of the United States, increase
information and communications technology security, understand and
deter malicious cyber activity, and advance diplomatic and other
efforts to develop norms and international consensus around responsible
State behavior in cyberspace, among other matters. If confirmed, I
would look forward to working with the Office of the National Cyber
Director to achieve the President's cybersecurity objectives and build
an enduring advantage for the Nation in cyberspace.
Question. The Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA created the position of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy to elevate the
visibility and advocacy of cyber issues, including within the Policy
bureaucracy.
What are your views on the position and what role will it have in
the policy priorities within your office?
Answer. My understanding is that the ASD(CP) is the senior official
responsible for overall supervision of DOD policy for cyber issues as
specified in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 138 and serves concurrently as the
Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense as described in 10
U.S.C. Sec. 392a. The ASD(CP) oversees two subordinate offices: the
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy
(DASD Cyber Policy) and the Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor
(OPCA).
I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer to this
important question as to this office's role in the policy priorities in
OSD(P), but I see it as an important issue, and I would, if confirmed,
be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Do you believe that position is adequately resourced and
staffed to meet its responsibilities, especially in comparison to the
resources and staffing of other assistant secretary positions within
your purview?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue, and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. What is your understanding of how the authorities for the
ASD for Cyber Policy are deconflicted with the information assurance
responsibilities in the DOD CIO office?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue, and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Do you have any specific priorities that you intend to
have them take the lead on?
Answer. At this stage, I do not. If confirmed, I would work closely
with the DOD CIO, through the ASD(CP), to ensure the Department is
postured to implement the President's priorities in cyberspace.
Question. Given the difficulty in anticipating and defending
against cyber attacks, many suggest that the Department of Defense
should rely more on a policy of deterrence to protect its and the
Nation's critical systems.
Do you believe that deterrence is possible in cyberspace?
Answer. I do. As in other domains, deterrence can be made more
effective through a combination of denial, resilience, credible threats
of retaliation, third party pressure, and other measures. Although not
foolproof, I believe this is a fruitful area for policy development and
implementation.
Question. Do you believe that the escalation dynamics in cyber
differs significantly from our nuclear or other conventional conflict
escalation dynamics?
Answer. I believe that the fundamentals of escalation and
deterrence are, broadly speaking, similar across domains, but naturally
the practical nature of escalation and deterrence in a domain like
cyber is quite distinct from the nuclear and conventional military
domains.
Question. What do you see as the policy, authority or technical
limitations potentially impeding our cyberspace deterrence policy?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I believe the Department needs to have the
authorities to ensure it can defend the Nation and the joint force. If
confirmed, I would look to enable and promote our ability to deter and,
as necessary, act effectively and resolutely in cyberspace.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's current
capabilities, policies, doctrine, and authorities allow for effective
cyber deterrence? If not, what steps should DOD take to address any
shortfalls?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. What are your views on deterrence relationships across
domains, and do you believe State actors perceive cross domain threats
as credible?
Answer. I believe deterrence across domains is certainly possible,
though often more difficult. The most effective deterrent threats tend
to be closely linked to the form and location of the provocation,
although in the past we have effectively employed cross-domain
deterrence. It is important that we ensure are threats are credible but
also that we not unduly limit our ability to deter.
Question. In your view, is the current scale and frequency of cyber
attacks on the Department and on the Nation tolerable?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question, but I see it as an important issue and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer. That said,
I believe cyber-attacks against the United States are of grave concern,
and I would regard it as a critical part of my role, if confirmed, to
improve our Nation's defenses and deterrent against them.
In September 2023, DOD released its 2023 Cyber Strategy. The
strategy charges DOD to persistently engage malicious cyber actors and
other malign threats to U.S. interests in cyberspace.
Question. What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission
Force in defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what
ways is this role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law
enforcement communities?
Answer. Although I am not currently in a position to give an
informed answer to this important question, I see it as an important
issue and I would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller
answer.
That said, I understand that DOD partners with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies to protect against and respond to cyberattacks
against the Nation. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) is primarily charged
with defending forward while DHS and law enforcement are lead for
Homeland security with DOD support.
If confirmed, I would review the status of the Cyber Mission Force
and ensure that DOD is appropriately postured and resourced to support
DHS and law enforcement when requested to protect the Nation from
cyberattacks.
I understand DOD and the CMF's priorities are defending against
cyber threats with strategic or military implications. This includes
threats to the defense industrial base, nuclear command and control,
and the ability to project U.S. power globally. Effective national
cybersecurity clearly demands close partnership between DOD and other
entities, and I would be committed to fostering this collaboration if I
am confirmed.
Question. Based on your experience, what do you see as areas where
the structure and training of the Cyber Mission Force should evolve to
meet emerging cyber threats?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Are there elements missing from our current approach for
offensive and defensive cyber operations that you would recommend we
pursue?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question, but I see it as an important issue and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer. That said,
I believe it is critical for the United States to have robust,
effective, and second-to-none offensive and defense cyber capabilities
and, if confirmed, would focus on ensuring this is the case.
Question. If confirmed, what role should DOD and the Cyber Mission
Force have in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
conducted via social media?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
That said, I believe it is vital for DOD to focus on its core
missions of defending the Nation and the joint force.
I also believe the experience of recent years should make us very
skeptical of governmental efforts to engage on social media with the
purpose of foreign influence. This has disturbing implications in
recent years, and I believe it is important for DOD to zealously guard
against any activities that would undermine or infringe on Americans'
rights, liberties, or free expression.
Question. What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force have in
anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on U.S. commercial
entities?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Do you consider the recent breaches in telecommunications
infrastructure involving Salt Typhoon to be an ``act of war'' or an
espionage operation that falls within de facto norms? In your view,
does the nature and scope of this intrusion operation merit a stronger
or more visible response?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer. If confirmed, I
would support the Department's efforts to work with Federal law
enforcement agencies to review the extent and ramifications of the Salt
Typhoon compromise and generate effective and robust response options
and to prevent future such intrusions.
Question. What do you conclude from cyber-attacks carried out by
Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon about the State of our cyber defenses?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
That said, I am greatly concerned about the public reporting on
Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon. If confirmed, I would work with other
elements of DOD and other agencies to ensure we are better defended
against such disturbing intrusions.
Question. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S.
Cyber Command should be dual-hatted? What are the benefits or
disadvantages of this arrangement, in your view? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. I understand that the dual-hat relationship places the same
individual in charge of the National Security Agency (NSA) and
CYBERCOM. If confirmed, I would support continued consultations with
Congress and DOD leadership on this important issue and work to ensure
DOD is appropriately structured to meet the Nation's requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
improve cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce? How would you
empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD
cybersecurity?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question, but I see it as an important issue and I
would, if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. If confirmed, what how do you plan to work with the
Military Service Principal Cyber Advisors and CIOs in the coordination
of cyber policy and the many cyber initiatives across the DOD?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. The NDAA for fiscal year 2021 established the position of
National Cyber Director (NCD) to improve coordination and integration
across the government in developing cyberspace strategy, policy, plans,
and resource allocation.
What is your understanding of how DOD has been supporting the
National Cyber Director?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Do you have suggestions for how you might improve the
relationship with the NCD if confirmed?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. Cyber notifications from the Department for sensitive
cyber military operations, as required by law, have become increasingly
vague and do not provide enough information for the committee to
perform adequate oversight of these operations.
If confirmed, what would you do to improve these cyber operations
notifications?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer. That said, I am
committed to ensuring Congress has the information it needs to conduct
adequate oversight.
Question. Are there steps other than improving the written
notifications that you would take, if confirmed, to help Congress
perform oversight of these critical operations?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
Question. What is your understanding of the process for how the
Department might respond to a request for Defense Support to Civilian
Authorities (DSCA) when it comes to cyber incident?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give an informed answer
to this important question. I see it as an important issue and I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to provide a fuller answer.
integrated air & missile defense
Question. Rapidly growing Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and
Iranian missile arsenals are outpacing United States' capabilities for
defeating these threats to the Homeland, allies, and U.S. forces
abroad.
If confirmed as USD(P), what would be your priorities for U.S.
missile defense capabilities for the Homeland?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority would be to deliver on the
President's Executive Order issued on January 27, 2025, calling for the
development and fielding of a next generation missile defense shield
for America. My objective would be to ensure that Homeland missile
defenses place the burden of escalation upon the adversary, thereby
strengthening deterrence and providing greater security for the
American people.
Question. In your view, are the roles and responsibilities for
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) appropriately assigned across
the Military Services and Defense Agencies?
Answer. This is an important issue, and I would, if confirmed, work
with all stakeholders to ensure that the roles, responsibilities, and
authorities for IAMD are assigned to the right Services and agencies. I
support the President's initiative, as outlined in the Executive Order
issued on January 27, to review the relevant authorities and
organization of the Department to develop and deploy capabilities with
necessary speed to develop and deploy a next-generation missile defense
shield.
Question. Current U.S. missile defense policy is focused on
deterring North Korea and Iran while reserving our nuclear deterrent
against missile threats from Russia and China. However, there are
growing calls to reevaluate this policy given the changes in the global
threat environment, including the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission,
which recommended construction of a Homeland integrated air and missile
defense architecture.
What are your views on this policy, especially in light of Russia's
recent statements and actions in Ukraine, as well as China's and North
Korea's ongoing expansion of their respective nuclear and missile
forces?
Answer. Improving U.S. Homeland missile defense systems is vital to
countering growing rogue State threats from countries like North Korea.
The United States must also, however, account for the growth of
advanced Chinese and Russian nuclear and missile arsenals. The
President's Executive Order 14186 establishes clear policy for the
United States to defend the U.S. Homeland, its citizens, and its
critical infrastructure, against foreign aerial attack from any source.
I fully support this policy shift.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Military Services
make the investments required to fulfill their IAMD responsibilities,
including for base defense? How would you ensure effective integration
of the Services' current capabilities, as well as of the capabilities
each is separately developing?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with stakeholders throughout the
Department to ensure that the roles and responsibilities for IAMD and
base defense are assigned to the right Services and agencies in
accordance with the Administration's Executive Order issued on January
27, 2025.
Question. Over the past several years, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of unmanned aerial systems operating, both
lawfully and unlawfully, in U.S. airspace domestically and over
American military installations overseas.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the Department
appropriately prioritizes and resources detection and defeat
capabilities for UAS that pose a threat to U.S. military assets?
Answer. I am aware that the Department recently published a Counter
Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UXS) strategy. If confirmed, I would work
to ensure policy guidance prioritizes giving commanders the critical
information, resourcing, and capabilities they need to defend critical
military assets against evolving UAS threats.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with Congress
and the interagency to better clarify U.S. Government roles and
responsibilities for detecting, tracking, and if necessary, defeating,
UAS within U.S. airspace?
Answer. Yes.
china & the indo-pacific
China
Question. The 2022 NDS describes the People's Republic of China
(PRC) as ``the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S.
national security'' and states ``The PRC seeks to undermine U.S.
alliances and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific region, and
leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and
the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and military
footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interest.''
How would you characterize the current overall U.S. relationship
with China?
Answer. I agree that China is ``the most comprehensive and serious
challenge to U.S. national security.'' Conflict with China is not
inevitable, but it is very possible. It must be the top priority of the
Department to address this challenge, with the goal of achieving and
sustaining peace through strength.
China has embarked on an historic military buildup based on its
enormous economy, which includes the world's largest industrial base.
It is preparing for confrontation with the United States. The locus of
such a war, should it happen, would be the Western Pacific. China is
attempting to build an economy that minimizes its exposure to and
maximizes its leverage over the outside world. Beijing's goals appear
to be regional hegemony in Asia first, and then global preeminence,
supplanting the United States, with devastating ramifications for
Americans. This is the nature of the profound challenge.
At the same time, China has deep interests in avoiding war with the
United States. Such a war would be extraordinarily risky and costly for
China and could be catastrophic. President Trump is pursuing the right
approach to Beijing, which is a combination of peace--an openness to
dialog and negotiations, cabining the rivalry rather than unnecessarily
intensifying it, and the like--and strength--restoring and focusing our
military on deterring China and strengthening our economy, including by
diminishing China's leverage over it.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's rapid
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program?
Answer. I believe China is preparing for war with the United States
in order to have the option to forcibly eject the United States first
from the Western Pacific/East Asia region and, from that position of
strength, to establish China's global preeminence. This is not a dead-
set objective, in my view, but one that Beijing would pursue if it
could attain it at a reasonable cost.
It is the job of DOD to persuade China that such an effort would
fail, making war much less likely because Beijing would see it is
futile.
Question. What are the strategic implications of the rapid
modernization of Chinese nuclear weapons that are set to potentially
triple by 2030, and what approach should the United States take to
address those implications, in your view?
Answer. China's nuclear breakout, coupled with its massive
conventional military buildup and its efforts to make itself
economically self-reliant, are profoundly worrying. If China could
establish strategic deterrence vis-a-vis the United States while
establishing conventional dominance in the Western Pacific, it could
attain hegemony over Asia. From there, it could effectively challenge
America to establish its global dominance. China's nuclear forces are a
crucial part of that strategy.
The United States must respond by modernizing its own nuclear
forces, focusing and advancing its conventional forces for a first
island chain denial defense, and strongly press its allies--especially
Japan and Taiwan--to dramatically increase their defenses.
Question. Is the current posture of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific
region sufficient to effectively deter aggression by the PRC? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. I am not currently in a position to give a definitive
answer to this important question. I am very concerned, however, that
there are solid reasons to worry that the answer is no.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make that would implement the NDS and improve the military
balance in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Restoring our military edge for a denial defense along the
first island chain must be the top priority for U.S. and Asian allied
conventional forces. I am not in a position to say what particular
investments are needed for this. But I would stress that we cannot have
a single-threaded solution to the problem of China's military
challenge. It will take a variety of types of forces, concepts,
locations, posture, etc. to effectively deter and, if necessary, give
the President credible options to defeat a Chinese assault in the first
island chain.
Question. In your view, what are the key areas in which each
Military Service must improve in order to provide the necessary
capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in a potential
conflict with China?
Answer. I am not in a position to say what particular investments
are needed for this. But I would stress that we cannot have a single-
threaded solution to the problem of China's military challenge. It will
take a variety of types of forces, concepts, locations, posture, etc.
to effectively deter and, if necessary, give the President credible
options to defeat a Chinese assault in the first island chain.
Question. What is your assessment of the current State of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations?
Answer. I am not in a position to answer this question. I can,
however, express my skepticism as to the materiality of such relations,
given that Sino-U.S. rivalry is rooted in geopolitical factors and, in
both China and the United States, the top authorities are civilians.
Question. What do you believe should be the objectives of U.S.-
China military-to-military dialog? What are the limitations on this
kind of dialog?
Answer. Please see the response to the previous question.
Question. In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
erosion of U.S. advantages?
Answer. Based on public sources, I am concerned about the erosion
of U.S. technology advantages more or less across the board. I am of
the view that we should not underestimate China's abilities in the
technology area or otherwise.
Question. Should the United States revisit or change its ``one
China'' policy, in your view?
Answer. The President has made clear his agenda of America First
and peace through strength. The ``one China'' policy, in my view, is
perfectly satisfactory for those purposes. Changing that policy risks
dramatically intensifying the already very dangerous rivalry with China
for negligible benefits to Americans.
Question. What should the United States do, both unilaterally, and
in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing
challenge posed by China in the South China and East China Seas?
Answer. The most important thing the United States and its allies
can do is ensure they have sufficient military forces to conduct a
denial defense against a Chinese assault against one of our allies. If
we do this, then Beijing's attempts to expand its influence and
dominate its neighbors will be resistible. If we do not, they will not.
Other elements of national power will be important, but this--military
power--is the crucial foundation.
Question. What is your current assessment of the risk of a critical
logistics failure in any conflict with China?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question but believe it is a very concerning possibility.
Question. What is your assessment of China's increasing military
presence overseas, including its base in Djibouti and other
infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean?
Answer. I believe China is very likely to seek to expand its
military presence overseas in pursuit of an ability to secure its
international trade and ultimately establish hegemony over Asia and
pursue preeminence globally. Beijing has sought basing locations not
only in its region, but increasingly around the world. China poses
ultimately a global challenge, but the nub of the military problem is
in the Western Pacific. If the United States and its allies can check
Beijing's military power projection there, then China's broader
presence can be advantageously managed. If the Western Pacific and Asia
fall under China's control, however, then China is likely to be in a
very strong position to expand its dominating influence much farther.
Question. What non-military activities and resources do you believe
are necessary to effectively address the challenge posed by China? Do
you believe these current activities are sufficient?
Answer. Non-military efforts are critical to meeting the China
challenge. Diplomacy, economics, trade, and many other tools of
statecraft all play crucial roles. Our military response is
foundational and central, it is not exclusive. Ideally, if we get the
military balance right in the Western Pacific, it will recede in
importance.
The ability of U.S. ground forces to hold at risk adversary ships
and aircraft; intercept missiles aimed at our ships, airfields, ports
and other fixed facilities; and provide electronic warfare and
communications support for our air and naval forces could enable the
United States to present adversaries with our own ``anti-access/area
denial'' (A2/AD) challenge.
Question. What should be the role of ground forces in creating an
A2/AD challenge for adversaries within the First Island Chain in the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. I believe ground forces play a very important role in a
denial defense in the Asia-Pacific. Ground forces are difficult to
dislodge, can present effective and different military capabilities,
interact closely with local allies and partners, and present other
advantages. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the
Secretaries of the Army and Navy and other DOD officials to encourage
and enable the Army and Marine Corps to move in this direction.
Question. Do you believe the current ground force posture in
INDOPACOM is adequate? If not, what would you recommend to bolster it?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would make a point of assessing and
engaging on it.
Question. Do you support the Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI), including the realignment of some U.S. Marines from Okinawa to
Guam and the buildup of facilities at other locations?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would make a point of assessing and
engaging on it.
Question. As Chinese aggression and nuclear capabilities both
increase, do you assess that we have adequate military and national
security crisis communication channels with senior Chinese leadership
to avoid or at least mitigate the threat of rapid strategic escalation?
Answer. My understanding is that the United States and China have
functional crisis communications channels, including the Department of
Defense's Defense Telephone Link for communications with the PLA.
Whether and when senior leaders in China would use these channels
during a crisis is not, however, clear. It is important that China
joins the United States in initiating and responding to requests for
calls in a timely manner to mitigate and avoid the threat of rapid
escalation.
Guam & Oceania
Question. What is your understanding of the importance of Guam in a
U.S. response to contingencies in the Western Pacific and to U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command operations generally?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide a detailed answer, but my
understanding is that Guam's role in U.S. military operations in the
Western Pacific is crucial for these purposes on multiple levels.
Question. What is your understanding of the State of U.S. military
infrastructure, facilities, and defensive capabilities on Guam?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would make it a priority to assess and
engage on this issue.
Question. Do you agree that it is critical for infrastructure on
Guam to be constructed in a resilient manner so that the U.S. military
can utilize Guam as a power projection platform in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. cooperative efforts
across Oceania, and do you believe such efforts are important to long
term competition with China in the region?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question, but I do believe engaging with Oceania is critical for U.S.
military operations in the Pacific as well as the broader strategic
competition with China.
Taiwan
Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship
between China and Taiwan, and how can the U.S. help prevent
miscalculation on either side?
Answer. I believe there is an increasing threat of a Chinese
assault on Taiwan. Beijing is committed to unification with Taiwan for
multiple reasons and appears to be resolutely pursuing the ability to
forcibly seize the island.
If confirmed, I would see it as a cardinal responsibility to ensure
the success of President Trump's policy that China will not attack
Taiwan during his tenure. To do this, America must prioritize a denial
defense of Taiwan and focus its military assets and resources on that
objective. Meantime, Taiwan and Japan in particular must dramatically
upgrade their defenses for such a scenario. At the same time, the
United States should stick to its ``one China'' policy while seeking to
engage Beijing from a position of strength, as President Trump has
already done by reaching out to President Xi Jinping.
Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
Taiwan Strait? What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S.
military assistance to Taiwan? Do you think Taiwan is making
appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities and if not, what
changes would you recommend?
Answer. The military balance has deteriorated dramatically from
Taiwan's perspective. Accordingly, Taiwan should be dramatically
increasing its defense capabilities focused on denying an invasion and
riding out a blockade. Taiwan, however, is not doing nearly enough of
this. As President Trump has made clear, Taiwan must do much more for
its own defense, and focus its efforts on capabilities laser-focused on
a denial defense. This is essential for enabling a potential American
intervention on Taiwan's behalf.
Question. Some have argued that the United States should explicitly
State that we would respond militarily to any Chinese use of force
against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your view, what
would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change?
Answer. I believe the costs of explicitly committing to Taiwan's
defense outweigh its benefits. Current U.S. policy, including the
Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and decades of statements and
activities, makes clear the deep interests the United States has in
Taiwan's security. The Department has already rightly specified Taiwan
as the ``pacing scenario'' for the joint force. Together, this
indicates a very strong interest in Taiwan's autonomy. Taiwan falling
to aggressive Chinese action would constitute a severe blow to American
interests.
At the same time, going further than the current declaratory policy
poses serious risks on a number of fronts, with limited benefits. Such
a move could inflame relations with Beijing, and even offer a pretext
for military action. It also risks sending a signal of approval for
Taiwan's laggardly efforts on its defense, with dire implications for
our collective efforts to rapidly strengthen deterrence and reduce
operational risk to U.S. forces.
Ultimately, I would see my role, if confirmed, as providing the
President and the Secretary with the best military options to back up
the policy of deterring and, if necessary, denying an attack on Taiwan
at a reasonable level of cost and risk for the American people.
Ultimately this would be a Presidential decision.
Japan
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with Japan?
Answer. Japan is a vital ally for the United States. It is the
largest economy in our alliance network and critically positioned along
the first island chain.
Military-to-military relations appear solid, but I believe need to
be much further deepened, moving toward a model of integration along
the lines of what exists with the South Korean military. Fortunately,
there is momentum to build on from the efforts of the last few years
under the previous Administration and Japan's own worsening threat
perception.
Question. In late 2022, Japan signaled a significant change in its
defense posture with the release of a new National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.
In your view, how can the United States best support Japan's
defense transformation in line with its strategic documents?
Answer. Japan's strategic shift is critical and most welcome, but
it is inadequate. Japan is moving toward spending approximately 2
percent of GDP on defense by 2027. This is manifestly inadequate. As
the President has rightly said, allies need to spend far more on their
own defense, especially those that are most acutely threatened. The
President has suggested that Taiwan spend 10 percent and that European
NATO spend 5 percent. In that context, it makes little sense for Japan,
which is directly threatened by China and North Korea, to spend only 2
percent.
Japan should be spending at least 3 percent of GDP on defense as
soon as possible and accelerating the revamp of its military to focus
on a denial defense of its own archipelago and collective defense in
its region.
The best way for the United States to support this shift is to make
these priorities and urgency clear to Tokyo in a constructive but
pressing fashion.
Question. Do you support the efforts by the United States and Japan
to establish a modernized command-and-control structure, to include an
improved U.S. Forces Japan?
Answer. I do, and I believe it should be accelerated and deepened.
Japan must take a much more active and expanded role in its own defense
and collective defense in the Western Pacific.
Question. Do you agree that the Department of Defense should move
as fast as possible to establish a new command-and-control structure
with Japan, considering its strategic importance as a capable ally in
the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Yes.
The Korean Peninsula
Question. How would you describe the value to U.S. national
security interests of the U.S. Republic of Korea alliance?
Answer. The United States-ROK alliance is critical for U.S.
interests, and a foundation stone of the U.S. geopolitical position in
Asia.
It is important that this critical alliance continue to be updated
to reflect the broader geopolitical and military circumstances the
United States and the ROK face.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by North
Korea to regional and global stability?
Answer. North Korea poses a severe direct military threat to South
Korea on multiple levels. It also poses a direct nuclear, missile, and
unconventional threat to the United States, Japan, and other allies.
Question. Do you believe the transfer of wartime operational
control from the U.S. to the Republic of Korea should be conditions-
based? If so, and if confirmed, what conditions would you recommend
that the Secretary of Defense delineate as the threshold for transfer
of control?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to review this delicate issue
carefully. On the whole, however, I believe that President Trump's
vision of foreign policy involves empowering capable and willing allies
like South Korea, and thus I support efforts to bolster South Korea's
role in the alliance.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's missile
capabilities, including through trilateral cooperation between the
United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review this important issue and make
recommendations based on that, particularly building on the President's
missile defense initiative.
Question. What are your views on the value of U.S. extended
deterrence assurances to the Republic of Korea in deterring Chinese and
North Korean aggression, and in helping prevent further proliferation?
Answer. I believe the U.S.-ROK alliance is critical and that
together we face a severe threat from North Korea. We must ensure the
strategic posture deterring and defending on our behalf and South
Korea's is credible and stout. Consistent with the President and
Secretary's approach around the world, I believe we need to be clear-
eyed, frank, and realistic with our allies about the nature of the
threats we face and the allocation of responsibilities among ourselves,
in the service of ensuring our alliances are best defended and
strategically sustainable. If confirmed, I would review this matter
carefully and approach this question in that spirit.
Question. If the Chinese and North Korean nuclear arsenals continue
to expand in quantity and capability, do you believe the U.S. should
explore additional options for expanding strategic cooperation with the
Republic of Korea.
Answer. Yes, I believe we should do so presently, given that both
China and North Korea are dramatically increasing their nuclear
arsenals.
Australia
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with Australia?
Answer. My understanding is that it is excellent.
Australia is a core U.S. ally. It has the right strategic approach
as reflected in its strategic documents. The main concern the United
States should press with Australia, consistent with the President's
approach, is higher defense spending. Australia is currently well below
the 3 percent level advocated for NATO by NATO Secretary General Rutte,
and Canberra faces a far more powerful challenge in China.
Question. In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States announced the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS)
partnership with the objective of helping Australia to acquire a fleet
of nuclear-powered submarines and increasing collaboration on a range
of advanced technology initiatives.
What are your views of the AUKUS partnership?
Answer. As Secretary Hegseth has said, maintaining deterrence in
the Indo-Pacific region is not a mission the United States can achieve
on our own. Interoperable allies and partners are critical to our
forward posture, military capabilities, and combined efforts. AUKUS is
a model of the type of cooperation we need to meet the challenges of
the 21st century.
I have expressed concerns, as I understand, shared by many on this
Committee, regarding U.S. attack submarine force structure and
production rates. I believe we must increase U.S. attack submarine
production to meet U.S. military requirements in the Indo-Pacific
region--to ensure our servicemen and women are as well-armed as
possible in the event of war--as well as to meet our obligations under
AUKUS Pillar I. If confirmed, I would look forward to learning in more
detail about the efforts the Navy is leading to improve submarine
construction and sustainment rates and the steps all three involved
countries are taking to meet important milestones in the coming years.
I also agree with Secretary Hegseth that AUKUS is a model for how
we should engage with our closest allies and partners when it comes to
technology cooperation, scaling production, and integrating our
industrial bases.
Question. In your view, are there improvements, clarifications, or
enhancements that need to be made to effectively implement the AUKUS
partnership as intended?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to learning in greater
detail the progress that has been made under AUKUS and commit that I
would work avidly to remove red tape and knock down barriers so that
our cooperation and integration can move forward expeditiously. I
commit to working closely with Congress to ensure we have the
authorities and resources required.
The Philippines
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with the Philippines?
Answer. The U.S. alliance with the Philippines is critical. My
understanding is that the military-to-military relationship with Manila
is strong and continuing to improve.
Question. In your view, are there opportunities to improve our
military-to-military cooperation with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, particularly as it relates to issues in the South China
Sea?
Answer. I understand that our military-to-military cooperation with
the Armed Forces of the Philippines continues to deepen, especially as
the Philippines undertakes an ambitious 15-year military modernization
program. If confirmed, I would work to identify new avenues of
cooperation with Manila.
India
Question. What is your assessment of our military-to-military
relationship with India?
Answer. The U.S. deepening partnership with India is of profound
importance. If confirmed, I would strive to accelerate and expand this
critical partnership. As part of this, I would seek to deepen military-
to-military ties.
Question. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ``Quad'' between
the United States, Japan, India, and Australia is designed to uphold
the international rules-based order, ensure freedom of navigation,
promote democratic values, improve information sharing, and enhance
technological collaboration. What are your views on the Quad and, in
your view, how can it be more effectively utilized as a multilateral
platform for addressing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region?
Answer. I think the Quad is very useful and important, and would,
if confirmed, seek to expand and elevate its efforts.
russia, nato, & europe
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
Question. Since 2014 the NDAA has authorized billions of dollars
each year under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).
In your view, how have EDI investments improved U.S. and allied
capability and capacity to deter Russian aggression in the European
theater?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the allocation of resources
across the different theaters and recommend investments that best
protect U.S. interests, deter conflict, and leverage the investments of
our allies to provide for their own defense.
Question. Do you believe continued, robust funding for programs
under each of EDI's five lines of effort is required to achieve U.S.
national security objectives, including implementation of the NDS, in
Europe?
Answer. It is my understanding that the EDI's lines of effort--
increased presence, exercises and training, enhanced prepositioning,
improved infrastructure, and building partner capacity--have
contributed to the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in EUCOM,
of NATO allies, and of regional partners. If confirmed, I would review
the resource requirements necessary to achieve our national security
objectives in Europe in light of our global strategic and defense
priorities as indicated by President Trump and Secretary Hegseth.
Question. What is your understanding of the mechanisms by which the
Department measures progress and evaluates the return on the
investments under EDI and its five lines of effort?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would investigate and engage on this issue.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Question. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests
is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty, especially Article 5?
Answer. I believe NATO is of profound importance to the United
States. America's Article 5 commitment is of special importance in this
context, and I believe the United States should take that commitment
with grave seriousness.
At the same time, it is absolutely essential that the European
allies and Canada actually step up and live up to their own Article 3
and other commitments. NATO at its inception was never meant to be such
a lopsided arrangement, with the United States doing most of the
spending and providing even more of the high-end combat power. Nor was
this the case during the cold war when the Western European allies
fielded very impressive and large militaries. This is neither fair to
Americans, nor sustainable, given the threats America faces in other
theaters, the force construct of the U.S. armed forces, and the
bipartisan consensus here that China must be the priority. Moreover,
Europe with its very large economies can do much more and is already,
in large part thanks to President Trump's leadership, moving to do so.
In my view, this is precisely the way to sustain NATO for the long-
haul: Much greater responsibility by Europe for its own self-defense,
with America continuing to play a very important role in the Alliance.
If confirmed, I would advocate for this approach, seeking to work
closely with European and Canadian allies to manage this transition to
a more balanced Alliance while ensuring deterrence and defense
capabilities across time.
Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance and what do you perceive to be the greatest
challenges in meeting those objectives?
Answer. NATO is and should refocus on being a military alliance to
defend the member states in the Euro-Atlantic area. The greatest
challenge to meeting those objectives is the combination of the
recovery of the now battle-hardened Russian military while too much of
Europe (with noble exceptions like Poland and Finland) have not used
the time to rearm to levels close to what they fielded in the cold war,
even as China poses a grave and near-term threat to U.S. and allied
interests in the Pacific.
Question. What are your views on the importance of Article 10 of
the North Atlantic Treaty which states any ``European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area''?
Answer. Article 10 outlines the conditions European States must
meet to be considered for NATO membership, which requires unanimous
consent of all 32 Allies. In my view, any consideration of expanded
membership must be evaluated through the lens of the strategic
interests of the United States, measuring the benefits of any such
admission against the costs and risks of doing so.
Question. In December 2020, NATO reaffirmed the Allies'
longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance.'' Do you believe this principle
requires the United States to continue to deploy nuclear weapons in
NATO countries?
Answer. I support the principle and believe U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe play a key role in extended deterrence.
Question. Do you believe the existing NATO nuclear force posture
should be reexamined given Russia's reported deployment of tactical
weapons into Belarus?
Answer. These reports are concerning and should be carefully
considered in light of what I believe should be continual reevaluations
of NATO's force posture, including its nuclear force posture.
Question. If confirmed, how will you encourage NATO Allies to
continue to maintain the positive trajectory on defense spending?
Answer. In line with the President's approach, through clarity of
message backed by actions consistent with that message. I have spent
countless hours in recent years communicating to Europeans in writing,
in person, and online the reality of our strategic and defense
situation and what it means for them. In a word, the reality of our
situation and the recovery of Russian military power means that
European Allies must take primary responsibility for defense of the
continent. That begins with increasing defense spending. 2 percent is
only a modest start. As President Trump has said and European leaders
now readily admit, it is not enough. Increasing European and Canadian
defense spending to 5 percent is urgently needed. Also critical is
expanding our defense industrial base capacity on both sides of the
Atlantic. Moreover, we must look not only at spending inputs, as
important as those are, but real military capability outputs. Europe
must field real and large-scale combat capabilities as quickly as
possible. They can do this--the West German military of 1988 is one
clear example. Now rhetoric must become reality. I believe this is the
way to sustain NATO over the long haul and ensure European security.
Question. In your view, how important is it to align the defense
efforts of the European Union (EU) and NATO?
Answer. I believe the United States should be open to a greater EU
role in European defense. First, the EU will have to be involved in any
increased spending on defense as well as efforts to revamp Europe's
defense industrial base. Second, if America is rightly insisting on
higher defense spending by Europe, it is only fair for us to be more
flexible about the modalities by which Europe does so. Although I do
not have specific recommendations on this front, this would be the
spirit in which I would approach the matter, if confirmed.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of integrated air
and missile defense capabilities and the capacity to defend critical
assets in the EUCOM theater? If not, what are the areas of highest
risk?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would make it a priority to assess and
engage on this issue in light of our global defense requirements in
this critical area.
Russia
Question. In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities most deter
Russia and mitigate the Russian threat to NATO Allies and partners?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand the Department of Defense has begun conducting a
global force posture review to assess the effectiveness of existing
missions and forces assigned to EUCOM. If confirmed, I would actively
lead this effort, including addressing this question.
Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
shortfalls in current U.S. posture which affect the U.S. ability to
achieve U.S. national security objectives in Europe?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand the Department of Defense has begun conducting a
global force posture review to assess the effectiveness of existing
missions and forces assigned to EUCOM. If confirmed, I would actively
lead this effort, including addressing this question.
Question. What aspects of U.S. and NATO force posture do you assess
as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand the Department of Defense has begun conducting a
global force posture review to assess the effectiveness of existing
missions and forces assigned to EUCOM. If confirmed, I would actively
lead this effort, including addressing this question.
Question. What more should DOD do to counter Russian malign
influence in Europe?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand the Department of Defense has begun conducting a
global force posture review to assess the effectiveness of existing
missions and forces assigned to EUCOM. If confirmed, I would actively
lead this effort, including addressing this question.
Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
critical infrastructure in EUCOM? What are the areas of highest risk?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand the Department of Defense has begun conducting a
global force posture review to assess the effectiveness of existing
missions and forces assigned to EUCOM. If confirmed, I would actively
lead this effort, including addressing this question.
Question. At the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC, the NATO Heads
of State and Government issued a declaration identifying China as a
``decisive enabler of Russia's war against Ukraine'' and calling out
China's malicious hybrid, cyber, and space activities and nuclear
advancements.
What is your view of the current State of Russia-China relations,
particularly the ``no limits partnership'' on political, economic, and
military cooperation?
Answer. I believe the Sino-Russian partnership is now deep and has
many features of an alliance.
Question. How in your view, does this relationship impact U.S.
national security interests in Europe and around the globe?
Answer. The effect of this partnership, especially in concert with
their joint deepened relations with Tehran and Pyongyang, is very
dangerous.
In particular, this heightens the risk of simultaneous aggression
against the United States and its allies. Military conflict spurred by
one of these actors could be used deliberately or as an opportunity for
another to attack a U.S. ally or allies if they believe U.S. and allied
forces are tied down and resources significantly depleted.
Prioritization of deterring China, as enshrined in both the 2018 and
2022 NDS, must go from a statement to a reality as the top strategic
objective for the United States, making European leadership in
deterring Russia in Europe more vital than ever. This is how we cannot
only strengthen the NATO alliance but ensure that the United States and
our allies are collectively postured to deter effectively or, if
necessary, prevail in conflict in multiple theaters simultaneously.
Ukraine
Question. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale,
unprovoked, and illegal invasion of Ukraine.
How do you assess the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine and in
your opinion what role should the Department of Defense play going
forward?
Answer. The war in Ukraine appears, from public reports including
reports on U.S. Government assessments, to have been trending in
Russia's favor for some time.
President Trump has made it a priority to end the war in Ukraine as
quickly as possible, and I support that effort. If confirmed, I would
help ensure that the Department of Defense supports the President and
his team in pursuing that goal.
Question. In your view, what would be the implications for European
security and for U.S. national security interests if Russia were to
prevail in Ukraine?
Answer. Russia remains a serious military threat to U.S. and
European security, and thus credible deterrence remains a strategic
imperative. As President Trump has repeatedly emphasized, it is vitally
important that our European Allies take the lead in providing security
assistance to Ukraine and deterring further Russian aggression,
including by rapidly increasing their own defense spending and
production.
Question. Do you believe it is important for the United States to
continue providing security assistance to Ukraine, including
potentially after the conclusion of the war, as a means to help Ukraine
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and deter future
Russian aggression?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the President, the Secretary,
and the Administration team in seeking to forge a sustainable end to
the war in Ukraine.
I believe it is important for Ukraine to be well-armed to support
its self-defense, even after the war is concluded. As the President and
Secretary have made clear, the United States has already contributed a
very great deal to Ukraine's defense, and the United States has urgent
and major priorities elsewhere, especially the threat from China and
securing our own territorial integrity. In light of this, the solution,
as the President has rightly emphasized, is for Europe to lead on these
efforts. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to advance this
overall approach.
transnational criminal organizations
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are engaged in a
wide variety of illicit activities, including money laundering, human
trafficking, illicit financial flows, illegal trade in natural
resources and wildlife, and trade in illegal drugs, precursors and
weapons. These activities reach not only the entirety of the Western
Hemisphere, but increasingly throughout the world. In your assessment,
how has the threat to the United States from transnational criminal
organizations evolved?
I believe transnational criminal organizations, including those
transporting fentanyl, pose a direct threat to Americans. I believe
this is a very important matter for the U.S. Government to address. The
United States should do so in ways that are practical, results-
oriented, and sustainable. In light of this, the lead organizations are
likely normally to be non-DoD. That said, DOD can and should play an
important role. If confirmed, I would actively support efforts to
reduce the threat posed by such groups, including fentanyl traffickers
and the cartels.
Arctic
Question. What, in your view, are U.S. defense interests in the
Arctic region?
Answer. Our primary defense interest in the Arctic is to secure the
U.S. Homeland. The Arctic region encompasses the northern approaches to
North America, and our footprint in Alaska enables vital early warning
and missile defense infrastructure. The Arctic is an important region
for U.S. power projection to the Indo-Pacific region and to Europe as
well, and the region includes significant maritime chokepoints, such as
the Bering Strait, which is becoming more economically and militarily
relevant.
Question. What threat, if any, do Russian and Chinese activities in
the Arctic pose to U.S. security interests?
Answer. The Arctic region has transformed into a venue for
strategic competition, with adversaries showing increasing appetite to
challenge the United States in ways that could place the U.S. Homeland
at risk. The CCP is attempting to strengthen its access and influence
in the Arctic through a range of diplomatic, economic, and military
activities, including a robust scientific research program with likely
civil-military applications. In addition to China, Russia continues to
focus on the Arctic region, including basing some of its strategic
nuclear forces there. Russia is modernizing its Arctic military
infrastructure, investing in weapons systems and new sensor
capabilities, and increasing its exercises in the region. Of particular
concern is the growing operational cooperation between China and Russia
in the vicinity of Alaska, as illustrated by the joint People's
Liberation Army Air Force and Russian Air Force bomber patrol operating
in the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone in July 2024.
Question. How can the U.S. best leverage and enable our partners in
the Arctic to counter Russian and Chinese malign activities in the
region?
Answer. I believe we should focus our allies' efforts on areas
where their interests and capabilities are naturally strong, rather
than try to induce everyone to act everywhere as if their interests are
all the same. The Arctic includes the territory of six NATO Allies:
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. These allies, as
well as others like the United Kingdom, have the interests and will to
act in the Arctic. Thus, I would urge these allies to bolster their
capacities to act in the region, alongside our own efforts.
Question. Does the Department of Defense have the appropriate
capabilities, relationships, and assets to meet its goals in the
Arctic? If not, what changes would you propose to better position DOD
to support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in the
Arctic?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand the Department of Defense has begun conducting a
global force posture review. If confirmed, I would actively lead this
effort, including addressing this important question.
Defense Support to Civilian Authorities
Question. Civil authorities may request DOD support for domestic
disasters and certain counter-drug operations as well as in managing
the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass
destruction.
In your view, are the procedures by which other Federal, State, and
Local agencies request DOD support efficient and effective?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand that the procedures by which DOD receives
requests from civil authorities, or qualifying entities, allows for
appropriate coordination of the request across DOD. DOD should
encourage its partners to, where possible, work with DOD in advance of
a formal request to ensure clarity of requirements and use of
appropriate legal authorities.
Question. In your view, are DOD procedures for evaluating and
approving the provision of support requested by a civil authority
efficient, effective, and timely?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. I understand that the procedures by which DOD receives and
reviews requests from civil authorities, or qualifying entities, allows
for efficient, effective, and timely review of the request to ensure
that such support is in the national interest, the use of appropriate
legal authorities, that support can be adequately resourced, and assess
impacts to military readiness. DOD should encourage its partners to,
where possible, work with DOD in advance of a formal request to define
requirements and ensure that DOD efforts are complementary to civil
authorities.
Question. What is your understanding of the factors that are
considered in determining whether DOD will provide support to a civil
authority?
Answer. My understanding is that requests for Defense Support of
Civil Authorities are evaluated based on: legality (compliance with the
law); lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD
forces); risk (safety of DOD forces); cost (including the source of
funding and the effect on the DOD budget); appropriateness (whether
providing the requested support is in the interest of the Department);
and readiness (the impact on DOD's ability to perform other primary
missions).
Question. What types of assistance in this context are
inappropriate, in your view?
Answer. In my view an inappropriate request would be one that would
violate the Constitution, U.S. law, or be likely to result in such a
situation.
Question. What role do you believe that DOD should play in
addressing security at the southwest border? What aspects of the
current DOD role at the southwest border could be improved?
Answer. Border security is national security. In general, DOD's
role in the execution of this mission is to provide support to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead Federal agency for
immigration enforcement. DOD can provide support to DHS when requested,
appropriate, lawful, and approved by the Secretary of Defense. DOD has
unique military capabilities that can enhance overall situational
awareness and contribute to full operational control of the southern
border. Additionally, in Executive Order 14167, the President
established that it is the ``policy of the United States to ensure that
the Armed Forces of the United States prioritize the protection of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States along our
national borders.'' I support this policy.
Question. In your view, to what extent should the Department
anticipate being called on to support civil authorities in the event of
a war with a peer competitor? What investments and planning do you
believe the Department should be undertaking to prepare for such a
scenario?
Answer. Defense support to civil authorities is a vital part of
such preparations, and if deterrence fails, defending against and
recovering from attacks on the U.S. Homeland. DOD's mission is to
defend the Homeland and to project power to fight and win the Nation's
wars. War with a peer or near-peer competitor would have serious and
direct impact on the Homeland, including kinetic and non-kinetic
attacks on military bases, dual-use infrastructure, and civilian
targets in the U.S. Homeland. Building resilience at all levels--
Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial--is a vital whole-of-
government approach to strengthen domestic entities, which will enable
the defense of the Homeland and the effective prosecution of the war.
For these reasons, the Department should be actively preparing for
such contingencies and working to prepare for such engagement with and
support to civil authorities.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
President to deter Russian and Chinese influence in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department is actively
working to address this issue, consistent with national policy and
other requirements on the Joint Force.
Question. Do you believe these influences threaten hemispheric
security and prosperity?
Answer. Yes, I do believe that the influences of China, Russia, and
Cuba threaten security and prosperity in this hemisphere.
Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by Section 1045 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18, 2020).
Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be
subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment
related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the
Army Field Manual.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD detainee
operations and interrogations comply strictly with these standards?
Answer. Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S.
Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or
approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not
authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. If confirmed, I
would be fully engaged in addressing all matters regarding DOD policy
and guidance on DOD detention operations, as outlined for the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy in DOD Directive 2310.1E. I would also
support the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in
addressing interrogation matters, including interrogation matters that
relate to detainee treatment.
Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
facility at Guantanamo?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the continued operations of
the detention facility at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As the
Department's only long-term detention facility for law of war
detainees, I would also ensure the continued safe, humane, and legal
care and treatment of detainees through Joint Task Force--Guantanamo
(JTF-GTMO).
Question. Executive Order 13567 established the Periodic Review
Board (PRB) Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force
process.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to address the
cases of detainees already recommended by a PRB for transfer from
Guantanamo to another nation?
Answer. As I understand it, there are three detainees remaining at
Guantanamo who have been designated as transfer eligible through the
PRB process. The authority to transfer a detainee from Guantanamo to
his home country or a third country rests with the Secretary of
Defense, but also depends on the State Department working through
diplomatic efforts to obtain the appropriate security and humane
treatment assurances before the transfer can occur. If confirmed, I
would follow this Administration's policy guidance on transferring
eligible detainees out of Guantanamo.
Question. Will you commit to notifying Congress if a decision is
made to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo before any such transfer
occurs?
Answer. If confirmed, the Department would continue to notify
Congress as required.
Question. In your view, what standard of care should govern the
physical and mental health services provided to detainees at
Guantanamo, particularly as the detainee population ages?
Answer. Law and Department policy (e.g., DOD Instruction 2310.08,
Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations) require the provision
of physical and mental health care of individuals detained at
Guantanamo that meets applicable standards of care. If confirmed, I
would work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to ensure that the Department provides such care as the
detainee population ages, consistent with applicable law.
Question. If confirmed, would you ever advise the President to
transfer new detainees to Guantanamo, and if so, under what criteria?
Answer. The decision to transfer a detainee to the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is first initiated by the Combatant
Commander to the Secretary of Defense using the Global Screening
Criteria approved by the Secretary of Defense in May 2018. Should a
Combatant Commander request to send someone to Guantanamo, I would
consult with other administration officials to determine policy
regarding the transfer of a detainee to Guantanamo.
Question. What are your views on the objectives and outcomes of the
Department's Military Commission process?
Answer. The Military Commissions process provides standards and
processes for trials of alien unprivileged enemy belligerents for
violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by military
commission.
If confirmed, to the extent possible, I would work with the Office
of Military Commissions to ensure that policy is not an impediment to
thorough and speedy justice for those responsible for the 9/11 attacks
and other terrorist attacks.
Counternarcotics Activities
Question. DOD serves as lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing
toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD expends nearly $1
billion to build the counternarcotics capacity of U.S. Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies and certain foreign governments.
What changes, if any, should be made to DOD's counternarcotics strategy
and supporting activities?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. That said, the flow of drugs, including fentanyl, poses a
concrete and dire threat to Americans. If confirmed, I would look
forward to assessing DOD's counternarcotics activities and determining
where we can improve on and adapt these efforts.
Question. Corruption and the absence of the rule of law enable the
transnational criminal organizations' narcotics trade that contributes
to the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
In your view, what should be DOD's role in countering the flow of
narcotics to nations other than the United States?
Answer. DoD's primary focus should be on the flow of drugs headed
to the United States. Some drug-trafficking organizations, however,
have an increasingly global reach. Working with partners to combat drug
trafficking can help degrade those drug-trafficking organizations
responsible for illicit drug flow into the United States.
Question. To what extent do you view our allies and partners in the
region as partners in countering counternarcotics and other illicit
activities?
Answer. The United States shares a common interest in reducing the
threat to security and stability posed by illicit trafficking and has a
long history of working with partners in the region. I view this
continued cooperation as essential to countering drug trafficking and
other illicit activities. If confirmed, I would work with other
departments and agencies to ensure that DOD efforts are well-integrated
as part of a broader, rational, practical, and sustainable strategy for
reducing the threat drug flows pose to Americans.
Question. How, if at all, should U.S. security assistance be scoped
to address factors at the root of counternarcotics trafficking, in your
opinion?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would assess and engage on it.
Venezuela
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Venezuela and to what degree is the illegitimate Maduro regime
dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?
Answer. The current situation in Venezuela is very concerning, with
the potential to cause further direct challenges to American interests,
including through large-scale, unchecked migration. I support the
Administration's outreach and policies to address this challenge.
Question. How would you assess Venezuelan relations with China,
Cuba, Iran, and Russia vis-`-vis the national interests of the United
States?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. But Venezuelan and other regional actors link with China,
Cuba, Iran, and Russia are very concerning. I believe President Trump
and his team have moved quickly to counter this through a whole-of-
government refocus on our Hemisphere and, if confirmed, would work
actively to support this.
Colombia
Question. Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to
make significant gains against paramilitary forces in Colombia.
Additionally, Colombia has become a security exporter in the region due
to its advances in capabilities and professionalism.
What are your views regarding: (1) the current military and
political situation in Colombia; and (2) the effectiveness and
sustainability of ongoing DOD programs in Colombia?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question. My understanding is that the U.S.-Colombia bilateral defense
relationship is strong, and that DOD has a strong presence in Colombia.
Question. Does the Department require any additional capabilities
or legal authorities in Colombia, given developments in disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question but, if confirmed, would assess and engage on this important
issue.
Question. Are there lessons to be learned from Plan Colombia that
may be useful in addressing security and governance challenges
elsewhere in the region and beyond?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to identify such lessons and
apply them elsewhere.
Cuba
Question. What is your assessment of Cuba's activities and
objectives in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. I am concerned about Cuba's role and influence in the
Western Hemisphere, especially as it faces a dire socioeconomic
situation created by the Cuban regime. Cuba has longstanding
partnerships with China and Russia that threaten U.S. national
security. Cuba has also facilitated and supported Nicolas Maduro's
regime in Venezuela. Cuba's close proximity to the United States makes
these relationships especially concerning.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend
modifications to the security relationship between the United States
and Cuba?
Answer. I would not advocate for such modifications absent
fundamental change in Havana's orientation to a posture far more
aligned with American interests.
middle east & southwest asia
Question. To what extent does achieving U.S. national security
interests in the Middle East require a continuous U.S. military
presence there, in your view? In your opinion, is the current U.S.
force presence in the Middle East appropriately sized? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department maintains the
capability to surge forces anywhere in the world if needed during a
crisis. As a result, the Department is able to execute multiple
missions in the Middle East--to include deterring Iran and its proxies.
I understand that the Department is in the process of reviewing
global U.S. force posture to reassess the optimal level of forces
assigned to CENTCOM in order to achieve regional and national defense
strategy goals given the evolving geostrategic environment. If
confirmed, I would support this reassessment and advise the Secretary
on the force posture necessary to achieve the President's national
security objectives.
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with U.S. regional and European partners to counter threats emanating
from and affecting the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The United States collaborates effectively with multiple
allies and partners in the region as well as European allies to counter
threats emanating from within the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, I would
seek increased opportunities to enable regional partners to counter
terrorist groups and defend their sovereign territories. Our partners
can, and must, do their part. If confirmed, I would also look to
increase cooperation with regional and European partners in countering
the Iranian Threat Network and the Iranian missile and UAV threat.
Joint missions, security cooperation, missile defense integration, and
capacity building are effective mechanisms for strengthening the
ability of our allies and partners to counter threats within the AOR.
Question. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power
competition? How should DOD consider countering Russia and China in the
Middle East, in your view? Do you believe there are other elements of
national power and policy tools might be useful?
Answer. Given its size, economic resources, centrality in Eurasia,
and other factors, the Middle East is relevant to great power
competition.
The United States can counter Chinese and Russian involvement in
the region through strong partnerships with our allies and partners
across a full spectrum of activities, to include security assistance,
regional integration efforts, and military cooperation through
training, exercises, and other activities.
Israel
Question. In your opinion, what are U.S. national security
objectives in Israel?
Answer. Israel is a key U.S. ally, and the U.S.-Israel alliance is
of great importance to the United States. Indeed, Israel is a model
ally for the United States in its self-reliance, independence, and
fortitude. Enabling Israel's security and ability to defend itself is
thus a key U.S. national security objective.
My understanding is that the Department of Defense supports
Israel's security by helping facilitate security assistance to Israel,
extensive military cooperation through CENTCOM channels, and through
coordination with the Israelis to help secure the release of hostages
held by Hamas, including American citizens.
Question. In your opinion, what should DOD's role be in supporting
Israeli efforts to degrade and defeat Hamas?
Answer. Hamas's horrific and unprovoked attack on Israel on October
7, 2023, killed more than 1,200 innocent people, including 46
Americans. The United States should support Israel by providing the
security assistance that Israel needs to defeat Hamas and never again
allow a Hamas-style attack on Israel. I support measures by the Trump
Administration to bolster support to Israel, including through the
release of the shipment of 2,000 lb. bombs previously paused. If
confirmed, I would build on these efforts to help bolster U.S. support
for Israel and its ability to defend itself and ensure its security.
Question. In your opinion, should U.S. activities in Israel be in
support of the pursuit of a two-State solution?
Answer. U.S. activities in Israel should be in support of U.S.
interests: namely, the defense and security of our model ally Israel
and the re-establishment of deterrence in the region. President Trump
is a master dealmaker, and I believe his vision presents the best
opportunity for a lasting peace in this context. If confirmed, I would
support such efforts.
Syria and Iraq
Question. What is your understanding of current U.S. strategy and
objectives in Syria? How have those objectives changed, if at all, in
light of the recent fall of the Assad regime?
Answer. I understand the Department's primary objective in Syria is
to prevent credible external terrorist plots against the Homeland by
supporting the enduring defeat of ISIS. If confirmed, I would work to
review our objectives in light of the fall of the Assad regime.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in supporting a
peaceful democratic transition in Syria? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The President has stated his position that the United
States should not get involved in the political affairs of Syria. If
confirmed, I would support this policy. The U.S. military rightly
remains focused on the defeat of ISIS and other threats to the
Homeland.
Question. From a DOD perspective, what must be done to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS? What non-military efforts are needed for the
enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. I understand that the U.S. military supports the enduring
defeat of ISIS through counterterrorism operations and by enabling key
ally and partner militaries to assume the burden for addressing
terrorist threats within their own countries. More broadly, the
enduring defeat of ISIS also requires efforts across whole of
government channels, to include intelligence and law enforcement.
Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in countering ISIS and al
Qaeda?
Answer. These partners have historically played a critical role in
our efforts to counter ISIS and al Qaeda. If confirmed, I would seek
the appropriate briefings on the current role of these forces to ensure
a full-picture assessment and determination on the future of U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
Question. In your view, should U.S. troop levels in Syria be tied
to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so, what
conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the President
on future troop levels in Syria?
Answer. The deployment of U.S. troops in any foreign country should
always be tied to specific objectives and conditions, and, if
confirmed, I would guide any potential recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense about force deployments by this principle.
Question. In September, the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission
announced the transition of the global coalition to defeat ISIS to a
bilateral security relationship with the Government of Iraq. However,
many of the details of such a transition are still being negotiated
with the Iraqi Government.
In your view, what should the guiding principles for DOD's presence
in Iraq moving forward?
Answer. The deployment of U.S. troops in any foreign country should
be continually assessed based on changing objectives and conditions on
the ground. If confirmed, I would support a thorough analysis along
these lines prior to making a recommendation to the Secretary.
Question. Do you assess that U.S. forces should remain in Iraq
beyond next September? Why or why not?
Answer. The Coalition operations to defeat ISIS have succeeded in
the mission to reduce the threat of ISIS in Iraq. As the United States
and Iraq agreed in September 2024, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE is
scheduled to wind down operations inside Iraq by September 2025. If
confirmed, I would ensure that the implications of the agreement
between the U.S. and Iraq are considered in the global force posture
review.
Iran
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the U.S.
national security interests with respect to Iran? What is the role of
the U.S. military in this strategy?
Answer. I fully support the President's National Security
Presidential Memorandum on Iran, which establishes that: 1) Iran should
be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; 2)
Iran's terrorist network should be neutralized; and 3) Iran's
aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and
conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered. The U.S.
military, alongside other elements of national power such as sanctions
and the capabilities of allies such as Israel, play a critical role in
this strategy.
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran and its proxy groups?
Answer. Iran poses a significant threat to the security of the
United States and its allies and partners. Last year, Iran launched two
unprecedented major missile and drone barrages against Israel from
Iranian territory. In addition to Iran's conventional military, Tehran
also leverages proxy forces to launch kinetic attacks and advance their
interests across the Middle East. These forces threaten both U.S.
forces and those of our partners. Iran also continues to inch closer to
gaining a nuclear weapons capability, which the President has rightly
insisted must not happen.
Question. Do you believe it remains in the national security
interest of the United States to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon?
Answer. I do believe it is in the U.S. interest to deny Iran a
nuclear weapon. Iran with a nuclear weapon would be far more dangerous,
and it is clearly in our interests and those of our allies to prevent
that from happening. The President has rightly been clear the United
States will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. As part of this,
the President has expressed his readiness to negotiate an agreement
with Iran that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. I support
the President's policy approach and believe he has the negotiating
prowess to achieve this goal, producing a much better agreement than
the flawed JCPOA. As part of this, the Department's role is to ensure
that the President is armed with the best possible military options to
deny Iran a nuclear weapon. If confirmed, I would regard it as my
responsibility to ensure that the Secretary and the President have the
best possible military options for this purpose.
Question. Are U.S. military forces and capabilities currently
deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if necessary,
respond to threats posed by Iran?
Answer. I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this
question.
That said, my understanding is that the Department maintains the
capability to surge forces anywhere in the world if needed during a
crisis. As a result, DOD is able to execute multiple missions in the
Middle East--to include deterring Iran and its proxies. The Department
is in the process of reviewing the global U.S. force posture to
reassess the optimal force posture for CENTCOM to achieve our national
defense strategy goals given the evolving geostrategic environment.
Question. In your opinion, can Iran be sufficiently deterred
through military force alone?
Answer. I believe non-military efforts play a crucial role in
addressing the threat posed by Iran. I support the President's stated
intent to address Iran's malign activity through non-military tools,
including economic pressure and diplomacy. At the same time, it is the
Department of Defense's role to ensure the President is armed with the
best possible military options. If confirmed, I would work to ensure
the President has the best military options to consider in order to
counter Iran's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons and/or conduct other
aggressive actions.
Question. How do you view military cooperation between Iran and
Russia? In your opinion, has this partnership affected Middle Eastern
regional security?
Answer. My understanding is that there is growing military
cooperation between Iran and Russia. Iran continues to provide Russia
with uncrewed aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles in exchange for a
range of Russian support. Russia's support to Iran's space program is
particularly concerning, because it could enable Iran to improve its
long-range ballistic missile capabilities and eventually threaten the
U.S. Homeland. There is also potential Russian provision of advanced
weapons to Iran, such as fighter aircraft and air defenses systems.
Should this Russian support continue, it will substantially improve
Iran's capabilities to attack U.S. personnel and U.S. partners across
the region, consequently driving U.S. partners to pursue acquisition of
advanced capabilities to ensure their own defense.
Yemen
Question. What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?
Answer. The primary national security interest in Yemen is ensuring
that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
ISIS cannot conduct attacks against the U.S. Homeland. Additionally,
Houthi maritime and aerial attacks enabled by Iran's support continue
to threaten the territorial defense of Israel and our Gulf partners and
freedom of navigation through a critical waterway. If confirmed, I
would work to advance the President's policy to cooperate with our
regional partners to degrade the Houthi's capabilities and operations,
deprive it of resources, and end its attacks on U.S. personnel and
civilians, U.S. partners, and maritime shipping in the Red Sea.
Question. If confirmed, how would you adjust or augment the current
strategy to be more effective to deter and counter Houthi attacks in
the Red Sea?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department supports
the President's policy, as outlined in his executive order on the
Houthis, to ``cooperate with regional partners to eliminate the
Houthis' military capabilities and operations, deprive it of resources,
and thereby end its attack on U.S. personnel and civilians, U.S.
partners, and maritime shipping in the Red Sea.'' This will require a
whole-of-government effort involving multiple departments and agencies
to place additional pressure on the Houthis.
If confirmed, I would support the Department in reviewing U.S.
military options to ensure they are resource-informed and meet the
President's intent, should the direct military action. It is the
Department's job to ensure the President is armed with the best
possible military options.
Lebanon
Question. What is your understanding of current U.S national
security objectives in Lebanon?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department's current
objectives are to strengthen Lebanon's sovereignty by building its
capabilities to counter internal and terrorist threats and combat
corruption. Through these capacity building efforts, the United States
can reduce regional tensions, improve Israel's security along its
northern border, and further degrade Iran's influence in Lebanon.
With the election of President Aoun, Lebanon has formed it's most
pro-Western, anti-Lebanese Hizballah government in recent memory. There
appears to be an historic opportunity to ensure that Lebanon is no
longer a home to terrorists who seek to threaten U.S. and partner
forces in the region.
Question. While there has been a cease-fire established between
Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon continues to be at risk of becoming a
failed State. What role, if any, should the Department play in
increasing stability in Lebanon?
Answer. Building the capability and credibility of Lebanese
institutions to be the sole guarantor of Lebanese sovereignty is one
pathway to prevent Lebanon from becoming a failed State. If confirmed,
I would seek appropriate briefings to further assess and evaluate the
role the Department can play to ensure U.S. interests are fulfilled
with regards to Lebanon.
Question. If confirmed, would you support providing additional
equipment and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces to help improve
stability and security in Lebanon?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be open to such support if and as in
line with security assistance priorities in the Middle East and beyond.
Egypt
Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
Egypt and the U.S.-Egypt security relationship?
Answer. My understanding is that Egypt faces several security
challenges. Despite the challenges, the United States should expect a
better return on its significant investment from our security
relationship and encourage Egypt to be more active in addressing
instability in its near abroad, particularly Gaza. It is critical that
U.S.-Egypt security cooperation advances U.S. interests in the region.
Question. What role does the Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO) play in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty? Should the U.S.
maintain its military deployment to the MFO? What would be the risks of
reducing this commitment?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter carefully.
Question. In your view, should the United States continue to
provide defense articles and services purchased by the Egyptian
military using U.S. Foreign Military Financing funds?
Answer. Egypt is an important U.S. ally, due to its strategic
geography astride the Suez Canal, its role as a leading Arab nation,
and the historic ties of our longstanding relationship. U.S. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) plays an important role in strengthening the
strategic partnership with Egypt and supporting Egypt's legitimate
defense needs. That said, U.S. support to Egypt should be evaluated in
the context of our overall defense priorities, especially the pressing
threat posed by China and the need to secure our interests in our own
hemisphere.
Question. What is your assessment of Egypt's deepening ties with
Russia? Where do U.S. and Russian interests converge in Egypt? Where do
they diverge?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter carefully.
South Asia
Question. In your opinion, what are U.S. national security
objectives in Afghanistan, and what is your understanding of the
current strategy to achieve them?
Answer. Ensuring terrorism that threatens the U.S. Homeland does
not emanate from Afghanistan is an essential national interest. I
understand that ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) maintains the intent and
capability to strike outside of its traditional area of operations in
Afghanistan and is committed to enabling attacks within the United
States. I further understand that DOD conducts Operation ENDURING
SENTINEL to identify potential attack plotting by terrorist groups in
Afghanistan that wish to do the United States harm and to prevent them.
If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of Defense to assess
whether this strategy is effective and how it might be adapted.
Question. In your view, is the United States properly postured to
counter ISIS-Khorasan and al Qaeda and related groups in Afghanistan?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would investigate and engage on this
important matter.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to U.S. relations with Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan remains an important relationship for the United
States. I am not aware of any significant changes that are needed at
this stage but would be prepared to learn more and engage on this
important matter.
Question. In your view, what tools and options are available to the
United States to ensure that Pakistan is not used as a sanctuary for
militants and violent extremist organizations (VEOs)?
Answer. The President has made it clear that his highest priority
is to ensure the safety and security of the United States and the
American people. If confirmed, I would prioritize ensuring that the
United States is able to protect Americans against threats emanating
from Pakistan or elsewhere.
Africa
Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
required to compete for the vast majority of its U.S. forces in the
global force management process.
What should be the primary objectives of the DOD specifically, and
the United States more broadly, in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department has two primary
objectives in the AFRICOM AOR. The first is to degrade terrorist
groups' ability to strike the U.S. Homeland and U.S. facilities and
persons abroad. The February 1 and February 15, 2025, strikes against
ISIS in Somalia are key examples of DOD pursuing this objective under
this Administration. The second objective is to counter China's
attempts to co-opt African governments in ways that undermine U.S.
strategic interests. These seem to be reasonable objectives to me at
this stage.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. counterterrorism
strategies in the AFRICOM AOR, particularly those in East Africa, North
Africa, and the Sahel? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you
propose to these strategies?
Answer. My understanding is that the current U.S. counterterrorism
strategy in the AFRICOM AOR is to disrupt violent extremist
organizations and other emerging threats, with continued focus on ISIS
and al-Qaeda, especially those groups with the intent and capability of
posing a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland or U.S. personnel.
The Department rightly prioritizes working by, with, and through
allies and regional partners to disrupt and degrade terrorist threats.
If confirmed, I would seek to build on this approach.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
Russia and China in Africa? In what areas, if any, are these objectives
in conflict with U.S. and partner objectives?
Answer. China and Russia have both deepened engagement in Africa.
China has sought to bolster relationships with African countries and
their militaries and where possible, create dependencies through
increased investment in Africa. China has looked to gain African
countries' support for its global policy objectives. Russia uses
irregular means to assert influence in Africa, including through
paramilitary deployments, seeking to create dependencies on Russian
military assets.
Many of these activities are not in line with U.S. and partners'
objectives in Africa.
Question. What should be DOD's role and objectives in countering
Russian and Chinese activities and objectives in Africa?
Answer. I agree with the broad U.S. objectives specified above and
believe DOD's role is largely a supporting one in Africa, with the main
line of effort being other departments and agencies as well as
activities by allies and partners.
special operations, counter-terrorism, & trans-national threats
Question. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2017, successive NDAAs have
empowered the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to serve as a ``service secretary-
like'' civilian official for special operations forces. Among other
reforms, the law defines the administrative chain of command for
USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense
for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special
operations forces.
What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
implementing the ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities of the
ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. I am aware of the efforts to institutionalize the service
secretary-like responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Secretariat
for Special Operations. I understand the criticality of the civilian
role in cultivating partnerships and shaping strategic initiatives and
policies in alignment with the national defense objectives to ensure
SOF are most effectively and efficiently organized, trained, equipped,
and resourced. I look forward to conducting a thorough assessment of
the progress in implementing this civilian-military partnership for the
SOF enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to fully implementing
these reforms?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would fully implement these reforms. I
would also ensure these reforms translate into tangible improvements in
how the Department oversees and supports special operations forces.
Irregular Warfare
Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often do not
rise to the threshold of traditional armed conflict, commonly referred
to as irregular warfare or ``gray zone operations.''
What is your understanding of the role and relative importance of
irregular warfare in supporting DOD's strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives?
Answer. My understanding is that irregular warfare (IW) is critical
for the Department's mission to deter adversaries and ensure our
Nation's security. IW provides valuable flexible options for countering
adversaries, combating terrorism, and stabilizing volatile regions.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities to ensure
that DOD is appropriately organized, trained, resourced, and has
sufficient authorities to effectively conduct irregular warfare?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. What is your assessment of the use of irregular warfare
by China, Russia, Iran, and other adversarial states to undermine the
national security interests of the United States and those of our
allies and partners?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. What more do you think DOD should be doing to integrate
irregular warfare concepts and forces into our operational planning for
major regional contingencies? How can irregular warfare contribute to
traditional approaches for great power competition?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Special Operations Authorities
Question. Section 127e of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes U.S.
special operations forces to provide support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and
individuals supporting or facilitating military operations for the
purpose of combatting terrorism. Section 127d of title 10, U.S. Code,
similarly authorizes U.S. special operations forces to provide support
to forces or individuals supporting or facilitating irregular warfare
operations.
What is your assessment of the national security utility of each of
these authorities in the current strategic environment?
Answer. I believe these authorities are very helpful for the United
States in bolstering ally and partner capacity and delivering higher
``bang for the buck'' for Americans.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply to the
evaluation of proposals for the use of each of these authorities, with
a view to mitigating the risks associated with the conduct of
counterterrorism and irregular warfare activities below the level of
traditional armed conflict?
Answer. I would first note that these authorities do not provide
DOD with any operational authority, and therefore it is my
understanding that DOD does not use these authorities to support
partner force operations against a group that DOD has not been granted
the authority to conduct operations against itself.
It is my understanding that there is a very deliberate process that
the Department uses for approval of any 127d and 127e program that
includes collaboration by experts across the department and substantial
civilian oversight, and that these processes are carefully defined
within policy and U.S. Special Operations Command doctrine to ensure
risks are managed and activities do not lead to unmanageable escalation
dynamics. If confirmed, I would maintain these rigorous standards for
127d and 127e programs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that
recipients of support under these authorities are appropriately vetted
to protect against potential human rights and counterintelligence
concerns?
Answer. It is my understanding that all prospective recipients of
support under these authorities must be screened prior to receiving any
material or financial support, and that recipients undergo a continuous
vetting process after their initial screening as well. Screening and
vetting are intended to identify and mitigate force protection threats,
affiliation to foreign intelligence services or other groups that pose
a risk to force or mission and identify individuals whose past and
present relationships or conduct are unsuitable for supporting U.S.
operations, such as past participation in gross violations of human
rights or violations of the law of war. I would continue these
measures, if confirmed.
Violent Extremist Organizations
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. interests
posed by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates and
adherents? Which group, in your view, presents the greatest threat to
the United States?
Answer. Despite significant and continuous U.S. efforts to degrade
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, both continue to pose a threat to U.S.
interests around the globe. My understanding is that the U.S.
intelligence community assesses that ISIS poses the greater near-term
threat to the United States.
If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department retains an abiding
focus on the threats posed by either group or their affiliates and
adherents, especially their ability to threaten the U.S. Homeland.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in supporting it?
What metrics would you apply to measure the effectiveness of the
strategy?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review this very important matter
and focus on ensuring U.S. counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in
it are effective and sustainable.
Question. Should the Department focus principally on terrorist
organizations that pose a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland? If so,
how would you mitigate risk posed by other terrorist groups that have
such intent but currently lack the capability to do so?
Answer. I believe that focusing on countering direct threats to the
United States makes sense. Through cooperation with our partners and
allies we will ensure emerging terrorist threats are tracked and
countered. At the same, it also makes sense to maintain a set of
indications and warning to understand how terrorist threats are
evolving so that we are not caught off guard in the future.
Military Operations in the Information Environment
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to conduct
effective military operations in the information environment to defend
U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out by State
and non-State actors?
Answer. Information is a critical part of the ``battlespace.'' The
United States must be appropriately and effectively postured to act
there for clear military advantage purposes.
If confirmed, I would review the matter further and be prepared to
engage on it.
Question. In your view, does DOD have sufficient authorities and
resources to conduct these operations effectively? If not, what
additional authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. The DOD's organizational structure and approach to
Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) has not changed
significantly in nearly 25 years and was largely based on legacy
psychological warfare approaches that go back to the cold war. Do you
foresee any need to revisit the organization, doctrine, training and
tools for OIE to integrate the lessons we are seeing from our
adversaries?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. In your view, are DOD approaches for tools and training
in OIE keeping pace with what we are seeing from our adversaries, in
particular with regards to new tools like generative artificial
intelligence, use of publicly available or commercially available data,
and sentiment analysis tools?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. In your view, are DOD's OIE appropriately integrated with
other similar U.S. Government organizations and activities?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. Do you have suggestions for how to strengthen those
relationships and capabilities across the interagency?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
department of defense role in election security
Question. In September 2019, at the annual National Cybersecurity
Summit, then Secretary of Defense Esper noted that ``our adversaries
will continue to target our democratic processes'', the Pentagon had
``developed our capabilities and increased our capacity to allow us to
detect, locate, and exploit threats in the cyber domain'', and that
``influence operations are at a scope and scale never before
imagined.'' In that same speech, Secretary Esper declared election
security ``an enduring mission for the Department of Defense.''
What do you see as the Department's continued role in election
security?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review this important matter and
be prepared to engage on it.
Question. Do you agree that there is a continuing threat to our
democratic processes from foreign malign influence operations?
Answer. I believe there are clearly foreign actors and adversaries
that seek to target the United States and its democratic processes.
Question. Do you envision election security as an enduring mission
for the Department? If so, how would OUSD(P) best support the mission
of defending our democratic processes from interference by Russia and
other foreign adversaries?
Answer. I believe DOD can play an important role in deterring and,
as necessary, responding to attempts to subvert our democratic
processes. That said, I believe we should be very deliberate on this
front, zealously preventing national security resources and
capabilities from being used in ways that affect our own domestic
processes. The point is to have robust and free speech, and free and
fair elections.
Question. Do you assess that DOD actions to date are supporting a
whole of government approach to foreign adversaries that seek to
interfere in our elections? If not, are there additional policy steps
that you believe the Department of Defense should take to enhance
deterrence of foreign election interference? How would the actions you
list, if any, support whole of government efforts?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
counter threat finance
Question. What should be the Department's role in counter-threat
finance activities?
Answer. I believe the Department can play an important, albeit
supporting, role in counter-threat finance activities.
Question. In your view, should the Department expand its support to
other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
threat finance activities? If so, how?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
defense security cooperation
Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Department
of Defense within the interagency on efforts to build the capabilities
of foreign security forces?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department approaches national
security problem sets with a focus on U.S. military forces. As such,
DOD approaches efforts to build the capabilities of foreign security
forces in the context of enabling those partners to take on roles and
operations that also support U.S. national security objectives. DOD's
building partner capacity efforts include significant interagency
coordination, but it ultimately rightly focuses on the benefit to U.S.
national security interests.
Question. What is your assessment of the current level of
coordination between the Department of Defense and Department of State
on security cooperation?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. In your view, what should be the primary objectives of
Department of Defense security sector assistance activities? What
changes, if any, would you recommend to the Department's current
approach to building the capabilities of foreign security forces?
Answer. The Department should ensure that its security cooperation
and assistance activities further national security objectives, either
by enabling foreign security forces to work with the United States on
operations or by allowing those forces to take on operations while U.S.
forces focus on other priorities.
Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
resourced to execute security sector assistance effectively, and do you
believe the OUSD(P) is organized and empowered to fulfill its oversight
and resource allocation responsibilities under 10 U.S.C. 382? If not,
what changes would you make or direct, if confirmed?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review the matter and be prepared
to engage on it.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the
Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)? On what
issues would you expect to consult with the Director?
Answer. My understanding is that the DSCA is a field activity under
the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy (USD(P)). As such, a close relationship between the USD(P)
and the Director of DSCA is important to ensure alignment between
policy direction and execution, and if confirmed I would anticipate
working closely with the DSCA Director to ensure that coherence
continues.
base realignment and closure (brac)
Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
less money than originally estimated.
Do you believe that another BRAC round is needed? If so, what
changes to law and implementation policy would you recommend to improve
on the outcomes of the 2005 BRAC process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would explore all options to enhance the
Department's ability to restore lethality. I would commit to working
with Congress, who would ultimately need to authorize another BRAC, on
this issue.
If you are confirmed, and were Congress to authorize another BRAC
round, how would you set priorities for infrastructure reduction and
consolidation across DOD?
I believe that the Department needs to ensure that its
infrastructure portfolio is appropriately sized and utilized. If
confirmed, I would commit to reducing the amount of excess
infrastructure and ensure the Department's infrastructure aligns with
mission requirements. If Congress were to authorize a future BRAC, I
would ensure the priorities for infrastructure reduction and
consolidation would align with Secretary of Defense's priorities of
rebuilding the military by matching threats to capabilities and
reestablishing deterrence by defending our Homeland.
military & civilian personnel
Active and Reserve Component End Strength
Question. The Active Military is smaller today than at any other
point since the start of World War II. Since 2020, the active force has
shrunk by over 60,000 personnel.
Do you believe military end strength should increase? If yes, where
do you believe that growth should occur?
Answer. My view is that military end strength should be based on
what is necessary to support the Nation's defense strategy as laid out
in the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I would look forward to
developing that Strategy with the Secretary's guidance and determining
what the appropriate end strength is based on that.
What aggregate active end strength do you believe is necessary to
meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the 2022 NDS and
associated operational plans?
Answer. The aggregate active end strength should be based on the
requirements in the National Defense Strategy and associated
operational plans. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with
the Secretary in building the next National Defense Strategy, and I
would work to determine what that number is and to ensure the
Department meets that target.
Role of the Reserve Component
Question. Historically, the Reserve components have been positioned
as a strategic reserve to be used in the event of significant armed
conflict involving the United States. In the post-9/11 era, reserve
forces have been used more extensively to support both contingency
operations and ongoing military requirements in a garrison environment.
Today, in addition to being an operational reserve, members of the
Reserve component are used continuously as a part-time workforce for
the Department of Defense to perform its ongoing training and to meet
readiness requirements.
In your view, should the Reserve components serve as a part-time
workforce, an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or some
combination of those?
Answer. Secretary Hegseth is committed to restoring lethality in
our fighting force and supporting President Trump's agenda to build
peace through strength. The Reserve components are a vital component of
the total force. If confirmed, I would ensure the nature of the Reserve
components are considered as a part of the holistic department strategy
to achieve peace through strength.
Question. In light of your answer, do the Reserve components
require increased levels of full-time support and oversight by the
Active component, including improved equipment, increased training,
adequate compensation and reimbursement, effective career management,
balanced Professional Military Education requirements, and higher
levels of overall resourcing for readiness going forward?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to assess
Reserve Component roles, resources, training, and levels to ensure the
Total Force is organized, manned, trained and equipped to best meet our
national security objectives.
Question. In your view, what legislative reforms should be made in
order to facilitate easier transitions for members of all components
between active and reserve status?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to determine
what reforms are necessary to ensure the Total Force can attract and
retain the talent necessary to meet our national security objectives.
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO)
Question. Since the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
military services continue to operate at a historically high OPTEMPO,
which senior civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense
have deemed ``unsustainable.'' What is your plan to adjust OPTEMPO in
the Armed Forces to ensure that servicemembers and their families are
healthy, fit, adequately rested, and have a sustainable lifestyle so
that they are prepared for a potential future major conflict?
Answer. Despite the end of large-scale U.S. troop deployments to
Iraq and the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, I understand that
the military's operational tempo remains high. If confirmed, I would
work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Military Service Chiefs to ensure that the
Department is sending the right forces to accomplish national
objectives and to refine our deployments, rotations, and domestic
training to ensure that our OPTEMPO is sustainable. We must continue to
maximize readiness for any future conflict while simultaneously
avoiding exhausting the force.
Recruiting and Retention
Question. The 2024 National Defense Strategy Commission stated that
``The DOD workforce and the all-volunteer force provide an unmatched
advantage. However, recruiting failures have shrunk the force and raise
serious questions about the all-volunteer force in peacetime, let alone
in major combat.'' In addition, DOD studies indicate that only about 23
percent of today's youth population is eligible for military service,
and only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards are
interested in serving.
Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of
American youth eligible, qualified for, and interested in serving in
the Armed Forces poses an existential threat to national security?
Answer. Yes, I do. If confirmed, I would look forward to working
with the Secretary to help the Department address this significant
challenge.
Question. In your opinion, why are so few individuals in the 17-24
age range eligible for service, and what can be done to increase the
pool of individuals qualified for, and interested in military service?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review this important matter and
be prepared to engage on it.
Question. What programs, policies, or tools does the Department
need to increase the propensity to serve of today's youth?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review this important matter and
be prepared to engage on it.
Question. If required to choose between maintaining high
recruitment and retention standards and achieving authorized end
strength levels, which would be more important, in your view?
Answer. President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have made it clear
that the Department must recruit the most capable individuals and
ensure every servicemember meets the high standards to serve and defend
this Nation. As the Secretary has eloquently laid out, the Department
should not lower its standards, but rather should inspire young
Americans to strive to meet those standards.
Question. Do you believe the total military compensation system,
including deferred and non-cash benefits, is adequate to recruit and
retain the number of highly qualified individuals needed for military
service?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review this important matter and
be prepared to engage on it.
Question. Do you believe the Armed Forces recruits and retains a
diverse workforce, representative of the nation?
Answer. It is a matter of strength and pride for our Nation that
servicemembers come from all walks of life across America to be part of
a unified team, and in my view the Department is right to welcome those
who meet its high standards. The Secretary has rightly made it clear
that those high standards should be the same for all, regardless of
race, sex or ethnicity, in keeping with the best traditions of the
American military.
Question. Do you believe it is important that servicemembers
possess the ability, including that acquired through training, to work
effectively with fellow servicemembers from different geographic areas,
backgrounds, education, and experience to maximize the effectiveness of
the Armed Forces?
Answer. Yes. Throughout America's history, the military has been a
leading force in building strong teams out of young Americans from
across our country. As Secretary Hegseth has made clear, the unity of
our military is its strength.
Assignment Policies for Women in the Service
Question. Since 2015, all military occupations and units have been
open to the assignment of any servicemember who can meet the
occupational standards, including women. Do you believe in the
fundamental principle that any person, regardless of gender, who meets
occupational standards for a particular job should be afforded the
opportunity to compete for and perform the job?
Answer. My view is that every servicemember, regardless of sex, who
can meet objective occupational and readiness standards for a career
field should have the opportunity to compete for jobs in that field.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
for victims and hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual
assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
servicemembers aged 17 to 24, remains too high.
Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources, including the
DOD Restricted (Confidential) Reporting Policy, that DOD and the
Military Services have put in place to prevent and respond to sexual
assault, and to protect servicemembers who report sexual assault from
retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. Sexual assault harms our warfighters and our military
readiness. It has no place in the military. I know the Department has
committed significant resources and undertaken numerous efforts to
address sexual assault. If I am confirmed, I intend to learn more about
the specifics of these efforts to continue to help rid the force of
this criminal behavior.
Question. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, you would recommend additional authority from Congress to
improve the Department's programs to prevent sexual harassment and
sexual assaults?
Answer. Given both the Department's and Congress' ongoing efforts,
it is my impression that significant authority already exists to
further these initiatives. I commit to learning more, if confirmed,
about the authorities that exist and, if necessary, I would work with
this body to recommend any necessary changes.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you
establish for yourself in DOD's program of preventing and responding to
both sexual harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that our policies,
programs, and resources are as strong as possible to eliminate sexual
assault and other behaviors that are not only criminal and dangerous
but also undermine our servicemembers' ability to perform their
missions and undercut cohesion and trust. We must have ready, lethal
warfighters who can deploy and fight as a cohesive unit.
Question. In your view, why hasn't the Department been more
successful in preventing sexual assaults?
Answer. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this question. If confirmed, I would review this important matter and
be prepared to engage on it.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner without delay? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees, and their
respective staffs with records and other information within their
oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
innovation cooperation in the middle east
1. Senator Ernst. Mr. Colby, for this year's National Defense
Authorization Act, I am considering legislation to support the Defense
Innovation Unit and the wider Department of Defense (DOD) innovation
community's efforts to engage with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
allies and partners to foster cooperation on efforts related to defense
innovation, including the development and acquisition of innovative
technologies from CENTCOM allies and partners. Would you commit to
working with me to create this legislation?
Mr. Colby. I do commit to working with Senator Ernst, if confirmed,
on this initiative to address this critically important set of issues.
2. Senator Ernst. Mr. Colby, would you commit to support the DOD's
efforts to foster defense innovation cooperation with our allies and
partners in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), including Israel,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Colby. I do commit to working, if confirmed, to supporting
DOD's critical efforts to foster such defense innovation cooperation
with our Allies and partners in CENTCOM.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
policy directorate concerns
3. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, having a number of different
policymakers with differing viewpoints in the policy directorate of the
Pentagon can foster a healthy intellectual environment, but it is
important that those viewpoints generally align with those of the
President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) that those policymakers
serve. As Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth said in his message to the
force on January 25, 2025, ``the President gave [DOD] a clear mission:
achieve peace through strength.'' Secretary Hegseth set out to do this
in three ways: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military,
and reestablishing deterrence.
Mr. Colby. I am concerned that the viewpoints held by Mr. Michael
Dimino IV, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle
East, are not in congruence with the SECDEF or the President's
strategic outlook--particularly in the part of the world he will be
advising you about.
Some of Mr. Dimino's past comments that concern me include:
In a February 2024 webinar, Mr. Dimino said that ``there
are no vital or existential U.S. interests'' in the Middle East. He
went on to say that we are countering Iran only ``at the behest of the
Israelis and the Saudis.''
In an article written for the site Responsible Statecraft
in January 2024, Mr. Dimino suggested that the United States should
solve the problem of Houthi militants attacking shipping in the Red Sea
by either ``passing the buck to China'' (i.e. by asking the People's
Republic of China (PRC) to secure the trade rout) or by sending more
humanitarian aid to Gaza to entice the Houthis to stop firing on U.S.
vessels
In response to an article by Newsweek in October 2024
about the ballistic missile attack on Israel days before, Mr. Dimino
said our Israeli allies are ``pushing to change the facts on the ground
as much as they can,'' and that the attack by over 180 ballistic
missiles was ``fairly moderate,'' given the string of Israeli
operations for which it was intended.
The above statements by the primary policymaker in Trump's Pentagon
dealing with the Middle East are not in congruence with President Trump
or Secretary Hegseth's stated goals of ``peace through strength'' or
``reestablishing deterrence''. President Trump designated the Houthis
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization just days into his Presidency. Mr.
Dimino seems to want to reason with the Houthis, or worse yet, let Xi
Jinping dominate one of the world's most important commercial
waterways. These statements bow down to the Chinese Communist Party and
the Ayatollah at a moment when we need to project strength.
Do you agree with me that Mr. Dimino's comments cited above do not
support President Trump's stated goal of ``peace through strength'' and
the Secretary of Defense's goal of ``reestablishing deterrence''?
While I cannot, as a nominee, presume to speak for President Trump
or his Administration, the above cited comments do not align with my
own approach.
4. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, if you agree that Mr. Dimino's
statements run counter to U.S. interests and the President's goals,
then you will recommend he be removed from his position, if confirmed?
Mr. Colby. As a nominee, I am not in a position to make personnel
decisions one way or the other. If confirmed as Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USDP), I would not be in a position to make
unilateral decisions on personnel, even within the organization I
oversee. Such appointments are ultimately up to the President and the
Secretary of Defense.
That said, I do commit to ensuring, if confirmed, that everyone in
the organization I oversee, especially senior political appointees,
acts in line with the President's agenda and comports themselves with
appropriate sobriety, integrity, and competence. In the event I
determine that an individual or individuals are not meeting that
standard, I commit to effectively addressing it with the proper
authorities, including the Secretary of Defense.
5. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, in a 2023 report by your think
tank, The Marathon Initiative, entitled ``Resourcing the Strategy of
Denial'', Austin Dahmer, who is now Performing the Duties of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities,
laid out three separate scenarios to re-prioritize the military
services' task organization given different defense budgets. The three
scenarios presented were a ``steady state'' or currently programmed
appropriations environment, a mandated 10 percent topline cut, and a
9.5 percent budget increase across the Future Years Defense Program
(FYDP).
Under the scenario where current appropriations levels are
maintained, Mr. Dahmer suggested the U.S. Army should cut 2x Active
Component Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), 2x National Guard
Component SBCTs, 1x Active Component Infantry Brigade Combat Team
(IBCT), 5x National Guard IBCTs, and 2x National Guard Aviation
Brigades. In addition, it would reduce AH-64, H-60, and M-1 upgrades,
reduce European Defense Initiative funding, and reduce rotational
deployments overseas. This amounts to a total reduction of 12x Active
or National Guard BCTs across the Army or approximately 50,000 troops.
This level of cutting under a current funding scenario is
comparable to the massive force cuts under the Obama administration in
2015 where the Army contemplated cutting between 30,000-40,000 troops
during sequestration. While the report demonstrates that a drastic
increase in defense spending is overall good for the military and
results in less cuts--a viewpoint I share--I am concerned that such
drastic cuts to Army manpower are being suggested under a ``current
spending'' scenario. The Army has spent decades trying to avoid another
``Task Force Smith''--alluding, of course, to an infamous Army
battalion destroyed in the Korean War because it was undermanned,
undertrained, and underequipped--and I am concerned such drastic cuts
under current spending would raise that specter again.
Do you believe that cutting 12x BCTs from the United States Army
during a period of increased pressure from dictators around the world
would be a prudent move if spending levels remain current?
Mr. Colby. I do not.
As I have argued consistently for many years, I believe the United
States Army plays a very important role in a denial defense in the
Asia-Pacific. My argument has been and continues to be that the Army
should transform to optimally contribute to this priority mission for
the Department of Defense and the Joint Force.
For instance, I would respectfully draw your attention to this 2022
speech in which I laid out my perspective on this issue.
AUSA LANPAC Symposium--Panel Discussion: Strategic Environment--
Preparedness to Meet Future Challenges,'' Association of the United
States Army, May 17, 2022, available at: https://www.dvidshub.net/
video/843642/ausa-lanpac-symposium-panel-discussion-strategic-
environment-preparedness-meet-future-challenges.
6. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, do you agree that cutting 12x BCTs
from the United States Army under current spending levels would go
against the President's stated goals of ``peace through strength'' and
Secretary Hegseth's goal of ``reestablishing deterrence''?
Mr. Colby. I do.
alaska
7. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, in a 2018 interview, then Secretary
of the Navy Richard Spencer said that the Navy ``need[s] to have on-sea
presence [in the Arctic] now that we have a blue water Arctic more
times than not.'' He additionally pushed the Navy to look at
``warm[ing] up Adak again,'' not only for additional training but also
for naval sea and air facilities as well as bulk fuel capability. When
Chinese and Russian naval vessels and air assets enter the Alaska
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), aircraft and ships must often travel long distances, which
stretch sustainment and make it more difficult to keep a constant
presence in the region where our adversaries are located. Will you
commit to reviewing our Arctic posture and specifically pushing for a
naval base and bulk fuel facilities at Adak Island to increase presence
in the Arctic?
Mr. Colby. I do commit to carefully reviewing our Arctic posture,
with a special focus on the potential importance of Adak Island and
what could be productively done there in line with Department
priorities on the Asia-Pacific, protecting the homeland, and the
Arctic.
8. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, Alaska is the only U.S. State in
the Arctic region. What strategic advantages do you see in having
multiple ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S.
Navy ships?
Mr. Colby. I believe Alaska offers immense strategic advantages for
the United States, not only in the Arctic but in the North Pacific as
well as in providing far greater strategic depth for domain awareness,
warning, and homeland defense. Part of these advantages is having
multiple ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska for refueling as
well refitting, rearming, other logistics requirements, and strategic
depth for a layered defense.
9. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, in Alaska, we have seen joint
Russian-Chinese air and naval exercises off our shores, incursions into
our ADIZ and EEZ, and a Chinese spy balloon floating over our
communities. In your opinion, what capabilities must advance to improve
multi-domain awareness in Alaska to respond to and be a persistent
presence in the Arctic, while Russia and China have developed
capabilities to hold our Homeland at risk?
Mr. Colby. I do not presently have the information to provide an
informed answer to this question. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing
this important issue to make recommendations to address the problem and
I would welcome engagement with Senator Sullivan and his staff to
develop such recommendations.
10. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, Alaska's importance as a strategic
place is not only due to its location but because it forms the ``Three
Pillars of Military Might'': 1) acting as the cornerstone of missile
defense by housing the majority of the Nation's ground based nuclear
interceptors and many of the Nation's advanced radars; 2) by providing
a strategic platform for expeditionary forces including the 11th
Airborne Division (Arctic); and 3) being a hub for air combat power
where the largest concentration of fifth generation fighters in the
world are located. Will you commit to visiting the State of Alaska to
understand the unique capabilities our State brings to deterrence?
Mr. Colby. I do commit to visiting Alaska, if confirmed.
11. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, last year, DOD released a new
Arctic Strategy. While the strategy was a step in the right direction,
it took a ``monitor and respond'' approach to dealing with our
adversaries that our force posture and infrastructure are ill-equipped
to execute. Will you commit to reviewing the U.S. Arctic strategy
during your tenure and revising the ``monitor and respond'' approach to
something more forward-looking and pre-emptive of our adversaries'
advances?
Mr. Colby. I do commit to reviewing the DOD Arctic Strategy with a
more forward-looking and forward-leaning approach in mind.
12. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, President Trump recently said,
``We will ensure Alaska gets even more defense investment as we fully
rebuild our military, especially as Russia and China are making
menacing moves in the Pacific.'' Currently the military footprint in my
State is absent Navy or Marine Corps units, and the Forces that we do
have are relegated to the interior of Alaska and must sortie over a
thousands of miles to respond to the constant probing at our Northern
Border. Will you commit to evaluating our force posture in the Northern
Pacific and, if necessary, reopen the bases at Adak and Galena in order
to give our commanders the tools to respond effectively to
authoritarian aggression?
Mr. Colby. I do commit, if confirmed, to carefully reviewing DOD's
force posture in Alaska, including the potential for reopening bases at
Adak and Galena, including as part of DOD's overall review force
posture review.
defense acquisition reform
13. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, in my view, one of the most
important findings of the report of the Commission on Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Reform involved how defense
budgeting and acquisition have become increasingly hard to execute when
the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy--the
latter of which you are in charge of producing--do not arrive on time.
Furthermore, the National Defense Strategy for 2022 was found to be
outdated for the fights we've seen in the last few years and the rise
of Russia and China as a potential block. If confirmed, will you work
with National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to deliver a National Defense
Strategy on time that provides a focus for the department as it plans
for procurement and training?
Mr. Colby. I do commit, if confirmed, to delivering in a timely
fashion a clear-eyed, realistic, and directive National Defense
Strategy, under the Secretary of Defense's supervision, that
appropriately lays out the defense approach and broad actions needed to
address the threats to American interests. For a strategy to be useful,
it must reflect the realities we face, present a clear and credible
path to addressing them, and be sharp and directive. I believe the 2018
National Defense Strategy (NDS) I had the honor of working on under
President Trump reflected these attributes, and I fully commit to
ensuring that the NDS for President Trump's second term--in a much more
dangerous situation--does as well.
I also commit to working closely, if confirmed, with the National
Security Advisor and the National Security Council staff on the
National Security Strategy (NSS) to ensure, to the extent I am able,
that the NSS also reflects these attributes and in particular
appropriately incorporates the defense strategy perspective.
critical minerals, national environmental policy act, and energy
14. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, during his term, President Joe
Biden passed 70 executive orders that restricted Alaska's ability to
extract its own natural resources despite an acute need for them on
both commercial and national security grounds. These executive orders
have slowed down or completely hindered resource extraction and
critical infrastructure projects important not just to the State but to
the Nation as a whole. On the first day of his presidency, January 20,
2025, President Trump signed an executive order entitled ``Unleashing
Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential''. The order in part reads as
follows:
``Section 3 Specific Agency Actions
a. The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including
but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of
Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful
authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps
to:
(i) rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions
from any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and
any other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy
set forth in section 2 of this order, including but not limited to
agency actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20,
2021, and January 20, 2025; and
(ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG potential,
including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and export
infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due
consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated
with such development . . .
Section 3(d) in addition to the actions outlined in subsection
(a) of this section, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, shall render all
assistance requested by the Governor of Alaska to facilitate the
clearing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, consistent
with applicable law. All such requests for assistance shall be
transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy for approval prior to
initiation.
Section 3(e) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works, under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, shall
immediately review, revise, or rescind any agency action that may in
any way hinder, slow or otherwise delay any critical project in the
State of Alaska.''
Alaska's energy reserves should be factored into any holistic
national defense strategy, whether we are guiding stockpile
requirements or oil reserves. Do you commit to taking our country's own
naturally occurring energy reserves--including those in Alaska--into
account as you develop our National Defense Strategy and outline the
ways and means we can use these reserves to our advantage in a peer
conflict?
Mr. Colby. I do.
15. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, a number of important military
construction (MILCON) projects are held up by overly burdensome
environmental regulations. My home State of Alaska is particularly hard
hit by these regulations as the building season is very short and the
costs to build there are extremely high. Will you commit to reviewing
environmental regulations put in place by DOD to accelerate the pace of
environmental reviews for critical MILCON projects and to let Congress
know how it can help?
Mr. Colby. I do.
16. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, one of the results of President
Biden's energy policies and the ``lock up'' of my State through his
executive orders is an energy emergency affecting our national security
that is unfolding on some Alaska bases. I spoke to Secretary Hegseth
recently about this issue and explained to him that there has been a
number of instances where commanders of bases like Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) in Anchorage had to tell servicemembers and
their families to turn-down their heat, unplug personal property, and
turn-off certain critical systems that sustain the base. This was done
to preserve electricity and avoid brown-outs in the region. Would U.S.
national security be enhanced if there was a reliable source of clean-
burning Alaskan natural gas available to supply the energy needs of
these bases?
Mr. Colby. It would.
golden dome for america
17. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, Alaska is strategic not only for
its geographic location but also because of its concentration of over
100 fifth generation fighters (the highest concentration in the world)
as well as it being home to the 11th Airborne Division, the Nation's
preeminent Arctic combat unit. If a war occurred in the U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) AOR, forces in Alaska would almost
certainly be part of that fight and therefore would also be potentially
targeted in their home bases. Do you believe that President Trump's
``Golden Dome for America'' should include Alaska as a critical site to
be defended from missile attack given the facts stated above?
Mr. Colby. I do.
budget
18. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, since World War II, U.S. defense
spending has only dropped below 3 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) four times. Right now we are barely spending over that threshold
and the Services are paying the heavy price for it in readiness.
Senator Wicker's ``Peace Through Strength'' Act seeks to increase
defense spending from 3 percent to 5 percent over time. Do you believe
that any National Defense Strategy that meets the President's stated
goal of ``peace through strength'' will require us to raise defense
spending for high priority projects like shipbuilding, industrial base
improvement, Golden Dome, etc. and to what level do you think we need
to raise spending (express your answer as a percentage of GDP)?
Mr. Colby. While I cannot speak for the Administration and Congress
on what level of defense spending will be provided, I believe that the
United States requires robust additional levels of defense spending to
meet the profoundly dangerous situation in which we find ourselves.
Such needed additional funding will not remove the need for clear
strategic prioritization, hard choices, and far greater effort by
Allies, but will enable us to achieve a successful peace through
strength policy.
shipbuilding
19. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the previous Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV) conducted a comprehensive review of all naval shipbuilding
programs and found significant delays of 1-3 years across all current
naval vessel constructions, including the Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine. This is despite Columbia being the Navy's top
priority since 2013. What do you see as the impacts, particularly to
our country's preserved second strike capability, if Columbia is
allowed to continue to fail?
Mr. Colby. The nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of our defense
posture, and the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) leg is our most
survivable part of our Triad. A delay in the arrival of new Columbia-
class SSBNs would therefore constitute a severe strategic risk,
especially if it resulted in gaps in adequate survivable coverage by
our SSBN force.
20. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States (AUKUS) initiative seeks to advance Australia's
submarine capabilities while enhancing the U.S. shipbuilding industrial
base with their own investment. What do you see as the role of AUKUS in
strengthening the anti-hegemonic coalition in the Western Pacific?
Mr. Colby. I believe the AUKUS initiative is a promising one,
including not only its Pillar I but also Pillar II.
It will be absolutely essential, however, for the U.S. submarine
industrial base to achieve much better results for the commendable end
goal of AUKUS Pillar I to be realized. The United States cannot afford
to weaken its own submarine forces in a period of maximum danger in
which there is a real risk of conflict with China in the near to
medium-term and in which the U.S. submarine force is already undergoing
a ``bathtub'' due to procurement decisions in the past and deficiencies
in our defense industrial base. As this Committee has rightly pointed
out, current trends are very worrying.
If confirmed, this issue would receive my special attention to
ensure a productive outcome.
21. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, what is your view on expanding the
authorities for overseas preventive maintenance on U.S.-based ships in
support of strategic requirements?
Mr. Colby. I understand from news reporting that President Trump
may be shortly issuing an executive order to revitalize our
shipbuilding industry. I believe this is a critical national priority
and would, if confirmed, look to the President's guidance on this
topic. Within the bounds of that guidance, I would be receptive to such
arrangements, consistent with our strategic requirements and the need
for us to revitalize our own indigenous shipbuilding and ship-
maintenance capabilities.
22. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, in your view, what role should our
allies play in revitalizing American shipbuilding and rebuilding our
Navy?
Mr. Colby. I understand from news reporting that President Trump
may be shortly issuing an executive order to revitalize our
shipbuilding industry. I believe this is a critical national priority
and would, if confirmed, look to the President's guidance on this
topic. Within the bounds of that guidance, I would be receptive to such
arrangements, consistent with our strategic requirements and the need
for us to revitalize our own indigenous shipbuilding and ship-
maintenance capabilities.
23. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the Navy is only currently capable
of producing 1.2-1.3 Virginia-class attack submarines, well short of
the capacity it would need to supply submarines to Australia on time.
What is likely to be the effect to the anti-hegemonic coalition if
these submarines are not delivered on time?
Mr. Colby. Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are a vital
part of any credible military strategy for a denial defense along the
first island chain, and thus of the utmost national importance. The
fact that our SSN production remains so low, despite the laudable
efforts of this Committee to rectify the problem, constitutes a
national emergency. The United States simply must have enough attack
submarines available for a denial defense along the first island chain
to be feasible. Accordingly, I believe that the United States should be
prepared to conduct a national mobilization, consistent with what
President Trump has called for for many years, to improve our defense
industrial base's ability to produce submarines, their munitions,
maintain those submarines, and conduct other key related tasks.
korea
24. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the American military presence on
the Korean Peninsula has helped keep the peace there since 1953. For
many years, the clearest sign of that commitment is a bottom line
presence of 28,500 American troops as well as a robust schedule of
combined United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) exercises that ensures
we ready to ``fight tonight'' to maintain the peace. In demonstration
of South Korea's own commitment to the alliance, it paid 90 percent of
the $11 billion cost of building a new base for U.S. Forces at Camp
Humphries. Do you recognize the value of the U.S.-Korean alliance and
the American commitment to our allies in Seoul?
Mr. Colby. I fully recognize the value of our critical alliance
with Seoul. Because I believe our alliance is so important and the
threat from North Korea and China so pointed, I believe we must adapt
our alliance with South Korea to meet the strategic realities we and
Seoul face together. Fortunately, I believe Seoul is a model ally in
key respects, including its level of defense spending and effort and
its willingness to take on greater responsibility in the alliance
relationship. I believe this should allow for a successful adaptation
of our critical alliance.
iranian threat and the red sea
25. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, Iran's advancement of its nuclear
program, the regime's support for global terrorist proxy networks, and
Iranian malign activities directly targeting U.S. interests and allies
constitute a top national security threat for the United States. How
should the Department of Defense balance an effective response to these
threats with the stated policy of the incoming administration of
``ending wars,'' avoiding further regional escalation, and reducing
American military commitments in the Middle East?
Mr. Colby. As I discussed in my hearing, I believe this is one of
the key ``pain points'' the United States faces today. The simple
reality is that President Trump has inherited a depleted military and
atrophied defense industrial base, with a formal force structure
codified in the 2022 NDS that does not provide for the ability to fight
multiple major wars on even roughly concurrent timelines. These are the
facts with which any credible, serious defense strategy must grapple.
Doing so does not require or suggest abandoning important regions
like the Middle East. To the contrary, the only way for us to sustain
our interests in multiple theaters in the light of these daunting
circumstances is to be clear-eyed, realistic, and hard-nosed, and thus
to prioritize our own efforts, while at the same time enabling and
where necessary heavily pressing our Allies to do more. Fortunately, we
can already see the outlines of a successful policy along these lines
in the opening weeks of the Trump Administration.
If confirmed, this overall problem would occupy my attention as a
top priority. In general terms, my approach to meeting the challenge
would be to prioritize our scarce military resources in the near-term
against the most dangerous and significant threats, above all China and
threats against the homeland, while seeking a major national effort to
revitalize our defense industrial base consistent with the
Administration's efforts to reindustrialize America, obtaining
additional resources to restore the Joint Force's readiness, and
enabling and pressing Allies to substantially step up their efforts for
their own and collective defense. As I said to Senator Rosen in the
hearing, I believe this is the only practical way to meet the demands
of a world in which multi-theater war is a very real possibly.
This all said, if confirmed I would most welcome engagement with
and learning from Senators, their staffs, and others on this daunting
and central set of problems.
26. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, how should the United States
leverage and strengthen cooperation with our Arab partners in the
Middle East to protect America's interests and allies, including
Israel, against attacks by Iran and its proxies?
Mr. Colby. I believe augmentation of our cooperation with our Arab
partners is a critical part of denying Iran's regional ambitions and
promoting the security of our partners and of our key ally Israel. I
believe the Abraham Accords offer a superb basis for this, and I would,
if confirmed, seek to help build on this approach to promote
collaboration among our Allies and partners in the Middle East. At the
same time, I believe we should facilitate the ability of our Middle
Eastern partners to buildup their own defenses and take more
responsibility for their own security and for that of their region.
27. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, what, if any, concessions should
the United States make to expand regional defense networks against the
Iranian axis?
Mr. Colby. I do not believe the United States needs to make any
concessions to Iran to expand our regional defense networks.
Separately, I believe the United States should be prepared to work
more actively and flexibly with our regional Allies and partners,
including through finding ways to empower and strengthen them.
28. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the Houthis, with intelligence
from Iranian navy spy ships, have launched dozens of drones and
missiles to sink U.S. Navy and commercial ships in the Red Sea. Will
you commit to respond and defend our ships from attack, and if
necessary, to destroy the assets responsible including Iranian navy
warships that are threatening or trying to kill U.S. sailors and
marines in the Red Sea?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring U.S. ships are
effectively defended from attack, including through having the proper
authorities to do so and operating within sensible strategies to ensure
they are only placed in harm's way with the ability to robustly and
effectively defend themselves. I am also prepared, if confirmed, to
review and, as advisable, present options for more effective responses
to these attacks than our approach has resulted in to date, including
but not limited to striking at Iranian warships.
As a general matter, I believe a cardinal duty of the USDP is to
ensure that American forces are placed in harm's way only with a clear
plan for success, a reasonable chance of attaining that goal, and the
will and means to back that plan up. Sometimes this means greater
caution and constraint, but often it means more forward-leaning and
decisive actions. The goal should be to protect Americans, including
American Service members.
united states-israel security cooperation
29. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, what is your perspective on the
nature and terms of United States-Israel security cooperation and
American military assistance to Israel given the turmoil in the Middle
East?
Mr. Colby. I believe U.S.-Israel security cooperation is very
important and, if confirmed, I commit to support and advance it,
including through renewal of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with
our key ally Israel.
30. Mr. Colby, do you believe it is in America's interest to expand
the United States-Israel security relationship and strengthen Israel's
independent defense capabilities?
Mr. Colby. I do.
31. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the next 10-year security
assistance Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Israel and the
United States will take effect at the beginning of 2029 and will be
negotiated and signed under the Trump administration. Do you support
maintaining or increasing the levels of funding secured in the previous
MOU during the Obama administration?
Mr. Colby. I do support increasing the level of funding in the next
MOU with Israel.
32. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, the Office of the U.S. Security
Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority was established
under the Republican Bush administration in 2005 and is widely regarded
by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Central Command as crucial to
preventing terrorist threats against Israelis. What is your view on the
U.S. role in ensuring successful security coordination between the IDF
and Palestinian security forces to safeguard Israeli lives?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that the Office of the United States
Security Coordinator (USSC) is a way the Department of Defense assists
the Department of State in efforts to support Israel. I do not
presently have sufficient information to provide an informed assessment
of the Coordinator's role and efficacy, but support efforts along these
lines. If confirmed, I would investigate this matter further and would
be prepared to provide such an assessment, upon request.
planning for simultaneous major conflicts
33. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, during the Reagan administration,
the U.S. strategy (and by extension budget and procurement profile)
reflected planning for a fight in two major theaters (with the
possibility of smaller regional conflicts sometimes referred to as
``brush fires''). While you have spent much of your academic focus on
what the United States is able to produce and support to ``fight
tonight'', what do you think should be the aspirational goal of the
United States in planning for major wars and smaller conflicts?
Mr. Colby. My focus in my work both in Government and outside has
been to optimally position the United States to achieve its goals of
peace through strength and the advancement and protection of Americans'
interests both today and in the future.
I believe the United States should, with much greater effort by its
allies, be able to handle multiple simultaneous conflicts. This is the
only prudent planning assumption, especially given the increasingly
grave risk of multi-front war with the counter-coalition we face, given
the staggering buildup of Chinese military power, Russia's rejuvenated
military capacity, the advancing threat of North Korea, Iran's ongoing
belligerent activities and nuclear program, and the ongoing threat of
terrorism.
In this context, I believe the U.S. priority and focus should be on
the most powerful and consequential State among this counter-coalition:
China in the Asia-Pacific, while we maintain a strong and secure
nuclear deterrent and homeland defense capabilities against multiple
potential foes and the abilities to prevent terrorist attacks against
America. At the same time, we should work hard to bolster allied
capabilities to take more responsibility for their own defense and,
wherever possible with this prioritization, we should be prepared to
aid in their defense. I believe this is the strategy most consistent
with the President's America First and peace through strength policies,
as well as common sense.
As an aspirational goal, as the United States resuscitates its
defense industrial base and restores the readiness of its forces, the
Department of Defense should shape its forces to meet these three goals
first and foremost but also to materially contribute, especially in
high payoff ways, to concurrently helping to deter and if necessary
addressing conflicts alongside better-armed allies in Europe, the
Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula.
34. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Colby, do you believe that the DOD's
strategy should drive how we spend, how we recruit, how much we
procure, and how we train or do you believe that how we are currently
resourced and what our industrial base and society can support now
should drive strategy? Support your answer with examples.
Mr. Colby. I believe our national defense strategy should be based
on the protection and advancement of Americans' interests. This means
the appropriate level of national defense spending should vary
depending on the threats to those interests, and today the threats to
our interests are clearly rising. As a result, I support robust
additional defense spending.
At the same time, as the Vice President rightly pointed out in the
hearing, the root of our national defense lies in our economic strength
and productivity. America has never been a Sparta, nor is that
consistent with our national traditions or values. Rather, at our best
we could out-produce our adversaries, with our Detroit Deterrent and
Arsenal of Democracy, and out-advance them, with our Manhattan Project
and our Second Offset Strategy. Accordingly, even as we raise defense
spending, it is even more important to ensure that our Nation has the
industrial and economic might to produce rapidly at scale, make and
exploit technological advances, and do so at a reasonable cost. This is
not where we are today, and this constitutes a major problem.
As a result, if confirmed, I would make a special effort to
advocate for revitalizing our industrial and technological base to
ensure we get much better ``bang for our buck'' so that we ensure our
defense dollars go as far as possible in an era of greater threats but
also, as the President has reminded us, significant debt.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Scott
australia, the united kingdom, and the united states
35. Senator Scott. Mr. Colby, do you agree with Secretary Hegseth's
remarks during his press conference with Australian Deputy Prime
Minister Richard Marles on February 7, 2025, that AUKUS [Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States trilateral security partnership]
enhances the ability of the United States in the subterranean space,
and that the President is supportive of AUKUS, and recognizes its
importance to the U.S. defense industrial base?
Mr. Colby. I believe the AUKUS initiative is a promising one,
including not only its Pillar I but also Pillar II. A well-armed and
well-funded Australian military, including SSNs, is very much in the
American interest.
It will be absolutely essential, however, for the U.S. submarine
industrial base to achieve much greater results for the commendable end
goal of AUKUS Pillar I to be realized. The United States cannot afford
to weaken its own submarine forces in a period of maximum danger in
which there is a real risk of conflict with China in the near to
medium-term and in which the U.S. submarine force is already undergoing
a ``bathtub'' due to procurement decisions in the past and deficiencies
in our defense industrial base. As this Committee has rightly pointed
out, current trends are very worrying.
If confirmed, this issue would receive my special attention to
ensure a productive outcome.
36. Senator Scott. Mr. Colby, as you know the United States has
received the first contribution from Australia of $500 million to the
U.S. submarine industrial base. Do you support continued investment in
the U.S. submarine industrial base?
Mr. Colby. I am aware and greatly appreciate Australian
contributions to the U.S. submarine industrial base. I do support such
continued investments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
homeland defense
37. Senator Budd. Mr. Colby, President Trump has taken significant
action to keep Americans safe, particularly through the President's
Golden Dome initiative. From a policy perspective, what are the next
items to accomplish to ensure the defense of our Nation?
Mr. Colby. I believe the Golden Dome initiative offers an excellent
path and framework for dramatically augmenting our homeland defenses in
a time in which the missile and other aerial threats to America have
grown dramatically. I have not had the briefings or access to provide
an informed answer as to the best next steps to advance this goal. If
confirmed, however, I commit to making this a priority and would
welcome discussions with Senator Budd and his staff on this.
chemical and biological weapons preparedness
38. Senator Budd. Mr. Colby, the 2022 National Defense Strategy
identifies the threat of chemical and biological warfare and
necessitates that the Joint Force be prepared to prevail in a
contaminated environment. What is your assessment of the threat that
chemical and biological weapons pose to the United States today,
particularly from People's Republic of China (PRC), and how do you view
the role of the Department in countering these threats?
Mr. Colby. I believe chemical and biological weapons can pose a
very serious threat to the United States, its forces, and our allies. I
have not had the briefings or access to provide an informed assessment
of the PRC threat on this front, but, if confirmed, would make it a
point to investigate and to provide an assessment upon request.
The role of DOD is essential and central in deterring and, if
necessary, responding to chemical and biological attack.
united states-israel cooperative programs
39. Senator Budd. Mr. Colby, the United States and Israel have
collaborated on a variety of defense programs, including U.S.-Israel
Missile Defense, U.S.-Israel Emerging Technology, Counter-Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) and Counter Tunneling Programs. What is your
assessment of these programs and, if confirmed, do you commit to
support U.S.-Israel defense programs?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment of current U.S.-Israel collaboration. If confirmed,
however, I would make it a point to investigate and to provide an
assessment upon request.
I do commit to strongly supporting and indeed advancing such
collaboration.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
cost value proposition of the national guard
40. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, in your book ``Strategy of
Denial'', you recognized three components of the U.S. Armed Forces: ``
. . . the nuclear arsenal, conventional forces, and the military
counterterrorism enterprise.'' You went on to say, ``The great bulk of
U.S. defense effort and resources go to the conventional forces, which
are the primary mechanism for American deterrent and defense
activities.'' The Secretary of Defense's recent statement of priorities
for the 2026 ``Budget Relook'' included, as the top three priorities,
(1) urgently act to revive the warrior ethos, rebuild our military,
reestablish deterrence, (2) resource the fighting force we need, and
(3) cease unnecessary spending. As your book concludes, the aim of our
defense is peace. While at peace, the National Guard provides 20
percent of Joint Force Combat Power with only 4 percent of the
Department's budget. At the same time, the National Guard has
demonstrated throughout our history, and continues today, that when
called on, they can be employed quickly, effectively, and in some
cases, more effectively in the urgent roles requiring combat forces.
Mr. Colby. Considering the combination of those priorities, what
are your thoughts on increasing the proportion of National Guard combat
forces related to their Active Duty counterparts (Army and Air Force),
recognizing that these three priorities can be, at least in part,
addressed by the highly trained, highly ready National Guard Forces
that currently provide 20 percent of Joint Force power at 4 percent of
the budget?
I have not had the briefings or access to provide an informed
assessment on the relative proportion of National Guard combat forces
related to their Active Duty counterparts. I know, however, that the
Army and Air National Guard are critical components of the Total Force
that will continue to make meaningful contributions to the defense of
our Nation, both at home and abroad.
If confirmed, however, I would work closely with the Secretary and
Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness to determine the
appropriate proportion of the National Guard as part of the Total Force
as we build a new National Defense Strategy to achieve peace through
strength.
modernizing the air national guard--rand findings and transitions
41. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, the challenge of transitioning
the Air Force's Reserve Component to newer platforms has been
highlighted in recent analysis. In fact, a 2024 RAND study titled
``Active and Reserve Component Force Mix Considerations'', commissioned
by the Air Force to align itself with the current National Defense
Strategy, found the Reserve Component (Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve) found that operating and support costs per aircraft for the
Reserve Component is significantly (30-40 percent) less than the Active
Component. It also found that the Reserve Component currently retains
more experienced personnel than the Active Force and warned that if
those seasoned airmen aren't moved onto fifth-generation platforms,
their expertise could be lost. Given this, how will your policies
facilitate the Air Guard's modernization?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on this matter. I do, however, recognize the
importance of the Air Guard. If confirmed, I would make it a point to
investigate and to provide an assessment upon request.
42. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, for example, as we divest
fourth-generation fighters, will you ensure experienced Guard F-16 and
A-10 pilots have pathways into F-35s, KC-46 tankers, or other advanced
flying platforms so we retain their skills?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on this matter. I do, however, recognize the
importance of the Air Guard and retaining experienced pilots. If
confirmed, I would make it a point to investigate and to provide an
assessment upon request.
43. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, what investments or policy
changes (training pipelines, unit conversions, etc.) are needed to
concurrently retire legacy aircraft and stand-up new systems in the
Guard without a gap in readiness?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on this matter. I do, however, recognize the
importance of the Air Guard and ensuring its readiness. If confirmed, I
would make it a point to investigate and to provide an assessment upon
request.
44. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, how will you address the
inherent tension between rapid modernization and the risk of near-term
capability shortfalls or pilot attrition during the transition?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on this matter. I do, however, recognize the
importance of the Air Guard and ensuring its readiness. If confirmed, I
would make it a point to investigate and to provide an assessment upon
request.
45. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, studies like the RAND study
mentioned above have demonstrated that in garrison, Reserve Component
units are far more economical that Active units. In fact, Headquarters
Air Force A-5/8 analysis recently yielded an estimated $511 million
across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) by simply swapping
ownership of the current KC-135 unit at Fairchild Air Force Base in
Washington State from Active to National Guard ownership (from classic
to active association). In this case, the National Guard Forces would
command, maintain, train and execute mission with many Active Duty
airmen still associated utilizing aircraft and facilities at a far
reduced cost. This construct further demonstrates the value the Reserve
Component can provide to our Nation. If confirmed, would your policies
seek to compel examination of similar unit ownership, especially among
our Air Force's most modern platforms like KC-46?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on this matter. I do, however, recognize the
importance of the Air Guard and ensuring its readiness. If confirmed, I
would make it a point to investigate and to provide an assessment upon
request.
national guards place in greater force
46. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Colby, one way of viewing the National
Guard as a valuable deterrent military asset is by its standing in the
Nation, existing in over 2,600 communities every day of every year,
430,000 Americans at home where they serve, working, shopping, with
families, representing all of those communities in everyday service,
just as it was 250 years ago at the Concord Bridge, in the World Wars
of last century, and even the Global War on Terrorism throughout this
century. How do you view these unique forces as a deterrent to our foes
and a fighting force we need?
Mr. Colby. I believe the National Guard plays a very important role
not only in our military and its warfighting effectiveness but as part
of our national fabric and history. Our military is not and has never
been a purely professional force but rather has always rested on the
ability to call upon the Nation at large. The National Guard represents
this critical link.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
cuts to foreign aid and impact on the indo-pacific
47. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, I am very concerned about how this
Administration's nearly blanket freeze on foreign aid and dismantling
of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) will
affect our standing with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Our
national defense strategy correctly identifies the important asymmetric
advantage our allies and partners provide us to deter Chinese
aggression and maintain stability in the region. Do you agree that
freezing foreign aid funding and cutting personnel endangers our
strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on the Administration's reform of foreign aid, but
support efforts to ensure that our foreign aid is tightly and clearly
tied to advancing Americans' interests.
48. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, China is eager to fill the void we
are leaving. Do we risk ceding U.S. influence in the region, including
our position as ``partner of choice'', by abandoning our allies and
foreign aid commitments?
Mr. Colby. I do not believe we are abandoning our allies. As with
so much in our foreign policy, I believe it is important that we re-
baseline and update our international engagements precisely to make
sure they are in line with Americans' concrete interests and thus
sustainable. I believe we will be in a better position to compete with
China on this revamped, refreshed basis rather than simply pursuing
many of the policies we had pursued in the past.
rebuilding the defense industrial base
49. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, in your advance policy answers, you
broadly identify the critical national security importance of restoring
our defense industrial base to build more submarines, ships, and
critical munitions. Unfortunately, you provide few specifics--please
identify three policy initiatives or plans you intend to implement to
address this issue.
Mr. Colby. As I have not been in Government nor had access to the
best information on this vital topic, I am not in a position to give an
informed answer to this question. If confirmed, however, I would make
it a special priority to help drive the revamping of our defense
industrial base and would be prepared, upon request, to provide a list
of such initiatives once I have had the chance to be properly briefed
and informed.
commitment to australia, the united kingdom, and the united states
partnership
50. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, you previously had significant
reservations about the AUKUS partnership. More recently, your views
seemed to have changed, which is reflected in your response to
questions from the Committee where you called AUKUS ``a model of the
type of cooperation we need to meet the challenges of the 21st
century.'' The AUKUS partnership is extremely important to deterrence
in the Indo-Pacific--I'd like you to clarify for this Committee where
you stand on this issue.
Mr. Colby. I believe the AUKUS initiative is a promising one,
including not only its Pillar I but also Pillar II. A well-armed and
well-funded Australian military, including SSNs, is very much in the
American interest.
It will be absolutely essential, however, for the U.S. submarine
industrial base to achieve much greater results for the commendable end
goal of AUKUS Pillar I to be realized. The United States cannot afford
to weaken its own submarine forces in a period of maximum danger in
which there is a real risk of conflict with China in the near to
medium-term and in which the U.S. submarine force is already undergoing
a ``bathtub'' due to procurement decisions in the past and deficiencies
in our defense industrial base. As this Committee has rightly pointed
out, current trends are very worrying.
If confirmed, this issue would receive my special attention to
ensure a productive outcome.
Allow me to stress that my focus here is on ensuring that we--
Americans and our allies--have the strongest, most realistic deterrent
force ready both in the long-term but also, crucially, in the nearer
and medium-term. China might move against Taiwan in the near term, as
Secretary Rubio rightly said in his confirmation hearing. America
simply must have the right forces in the right place at the right time
to deter and, if necessary, address such a contingency. I believe that
is the only responsible policy, lest our servicemen and women be put in
harm's way without the best possible weaponry. I believe putting
Americans first requires that we give our servicemen and women the
absolutely best armaments--ideally to deter war but, if necessary, to
enable them to prevail in one at as low a cost as possible.
short and long-term readiness
51. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, one of your duties as Under
Secretary for Policy (USD(P)) will be developing planning scenarios to
evaluate the Joint Force's capabilities and readiness, which will
include conducting assessments of progress and balancing the need for
near-and longer-term warfighting readiness goals. How do you plan to
address the difficult problem of ensuring our Forces are prepared now
for a potential major war while also confronting the need to invest and
prepare for a future fight?
Mr. Colby. This is one of the key strategic tensions that I would
seek to address, if confirmed, in the National Defense Strategy and
other key strategic documents. The simple fact is that we are no longer
in a period of safety but rather one of great danger. Accordingly, our
forces must be ready both now and over the longer-term. This poses a
serious strategic challenge given the atrophying of our defense
industrial base and the historically low readiness of our armed forces
that President Trump has inherited.
missile defense executive order assessment
52. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, the President's recent missile
defense Executive Order (EO) tasks U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
with providing ``an updated assessment of the strategic missile threat
to the Homeland.'' You will also have a part in implementing the
President's EO, if confirmed. I remain concerned about the viability of
the DOD's strategy to defend Hawaii from missile threats. Will you
commit to include Hawaii in any updates to the United States' missile
defense system?
Mr. Colby. I do so commit.
civilian personnel cuts
53. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, if confirmed as Under Secretary for
Policy, you will oversee a component with a high concentration of
civilian personnel. This Administration is targeting civilian
probationary employees, many of whom fill critical positions in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy. DOD has not conducted
the required analysis to assess the readiness impact of these cuts.
What specific policies or oversight will you implement to ensure that
critical personnel are not dismissed arbitrarily?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment on the Administration's workforce optimization
initiatives. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that our workforce
optimization initiatives maximize the Department's efficiency and
effectiveness considering the fiscal constraints our Nation faces.
54. Senator Hirono. Mr. Colby, given that many probationary
employees often represent the next generation of DOD leadership, how
will you ensure these cuts do not disproportionately undermine Policy's
ability to retain and develop young talent?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the briefings or access to provide an
informed assessment of the Administration's workforce optimization
initiatives. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that our workforce
optimization initiatives are designed to maximize the Department's
efficiency and effectiveness considering the fiscal constraints our
Nation faces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
ethics
55. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, please provide a list of all your
clients at American Global Strategies, Gerson Lehrman Group,
TechSource, Telemus Group, Renaissance Macro, Virtu, Capstone DC, and
Global Precision Research LLC, and the years during which you consulted
for them.
Mr. Colby. I take my ethics and disclosure requirements seriously.
Accordingly, please refer to the Public Financial Disclosure Report
(OGE 278e) dated January 15, 2025 that I filed in conjunction with my
nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
56. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to recuse from all particular matters involving your former
clients and employers for 4 years while at DOD?
Mr. Colby. My ethics agreement and existing laws and policies would
require me, if confirmed and appointed, to recuse myself for a period
of 2 years from participating personally and substantially in any
particular matter involving specific parties in which I know that a
former employer is a party or represents a party, and for 1 year for
matters involving a former client, unless I am first authorized to
participate by the appropriate ethics official. If confirmed, I would
ensure that I have a robust screening process in place to help
implement these recusals. I can pledge to you that I would be mindful
of not only the legal requirements that govern my conduct, but also of
the need to ensure that the public has no good reason to question my
impartiality, and I would consult with the Department's ethics
officials should such issues arise.
57. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to divest from investments in any companies with DOD contracts?
Mr. Colby. My ethics agreement signed on January 31, 2025, sets
forth my divesture requirements, if confirmed. I would, if confirmed,
follow my obligations scrupulously.
58. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, you have between $100,000 and
$250,000 invested in the communications technology company Syniverse
Technologies, Inc., which is positioning itself to increase its work
with Federal agencies. If Syniverse has or seeks a DOD contract, will
you divest from your Syniverse holdings?
Please see my response to the previous question.
59. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to not seeking any employment with or compensation from a
defense contractor, including through serving on a board, as a
consultant, or as a lobbyist, for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would abide by the extensive Federal
post-government employment ethics and procurement integrity laws, as
well as the terms of my ethics agreement. These provisions set forth
comprehensive restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation from
defense contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal
Government on behalf of any future employers and clients. If confirmed,
I commit to carrying out the responsibilities of my office and I would
seek any post-government employment only in full compliance with the
applicable ethics rules.
60. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to not engaging in any lobbying activities, including ``behind-
the-scenes'' shadow lobbying, focused on DOD or any of its components
for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Please see my response to the previous question.
61. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, during your nomination process, did
anyone on the Trump campaign, transition team, or other closely related
entity approach you about your loyalty to President Trump?
Mr. Colby. I am committed to maintaining the confidentiality of my
conversations with you, other elected officials, and other policymakers
and their advisors absent legal obligations to the contrary.
62. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you were approached about your
loyalty to President Trump, did you sign a loyalty pledge or other
similar oath? If so, please provide a copy of the text of that pledge
or oath.
Mr. Colby. I am committed to maintaining the confidentiality of my
conversations with you, other elected officials, and other policymakers
and their advisors absent legal obligations to the contrary.
63. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you were approached about your
loyalty to President Trump, did you make any verbal representations of
loyalty? If so, please describe this representation.
Mr. Colby. I am committed to maintaining the confidentiality of my
conversations with you, other elected officials, and other policymakers
and their advisors absent legal obligations to the contrary.
64. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, in November 2024, the New York Times
and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top adviser to
President Trump, allegedly requested payment from prospective political
appointees to promote their candidacies for top positions within the
Administration. Did you discuss the possibility of joining the
Administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Mr. Colby. No.
65. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you did discuss the possibility
of joining the Administration with Mr. Epshteyn, did Mr. Epshteyn seek
payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a position within the
Administration?
Mr. Colby. No.
66. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, at any time, did lawyers for
President Trump or members of President Trump's team approach you
regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above? If so, please
explain the information that they provided you, including copies of
documents, what was discussed during any calls, and any other
information pertaining to this interaction.
Mr. Colby. No.
67. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your view of former Pentagon
officials becoming defense industry lobbyists?
Mr. Colby. It is important that the public maintains trust in the
Department of Defense and senior leaders. I commit to abiding by the
robust set of existing ethics rules and obligations to which I would be
subject, if confirmed. These are designed to protect the public
interest and public confidence in government.
congressional oversight and transparency
68. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your understanding of the
role of the Department of Defense Inspector General?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that the role of the Inspector
General is to advise the Secretary of Defense regarding waste, fraud,
and abuse at the Department of Defense.
69. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, will you ensure your staff complies
with any Inspector General deadlines established for requested
communications, providing witnesses, providing documents, and that
those witnesses will be protected from reprisal for their testimony?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would ensure both compliance with Office
of the Inspector General deadlines and protection of witnesses against
retaliation for testimony.
70. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are not able to comply with
any Inspector General requests and deadlines, will you notify the
Republican and Democratic members of the committee regarding the basis
for any good faith delay or denial?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would work with the Office of the
Inspector General to comply with requests in a timely manner. I would
defer to that office to keep Congress updated regarding its reviews.
71. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, will you commit to refusing to follow
illegal orders from any individual, including the President?
Mr. Colby. I do not believe that the President or Secretary of
Defense would issue an unlawful order.
If confirmed, I would follow the law and the Constitution of the
United States.
72. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, will you commit to testify before
Congress if you are called upon by Congress to provide a deposition or
if you are issued a subpoena?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would work to accommodate congressional
oversight--to include depositions if subpoenaed.
73. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, will you commit to providing
information or documents to Congress if you are requested to do so or
issued a subpoena?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would work to accommodate congressional
oversight--to include providing information and documents when
requested by Congress or when subpoenaed.
74. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, will you commit to following current
DOD precedent for responding to information requests, briefings, and
other inquiries from Congress, including the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees and their minority members?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would work to accommodate congressional
oversight--to include information requests, briefings, and other
inquiries by members of the Committee on Armed Services of both
chambers of Congress.
75. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if confirmed, will you commit to
posting your official calendar monthly?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I commit to complying with Freedom of
Information Act, which covers all agency records to include my official
calendar.
76. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you think DOD has an over
classification problem? If so, can you commit to providing this
committee an estimate of the number or percentage of DOD documents that
are overclassified?
Mr. Colby. Properly classifying sensitive information is essential
for national security. That said, overclassification is a real problem.
Information that does not meet the standards for classification should
not be classified. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting the
Secretary in ensuring proper classification and would work with my
intelligence community counterparts to modernize requirements for
safeguarding national security information and releasing information as
promptly as possible that does not meet these criteria.
77. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, to the best of your knowledge, are
DOD components identifying records for proactive posting in compliance
with the Freedom of Information Act? If not, how would you ensure that
they do so to comply with public records law?
Mr. Colby. I am not in a position to offer an informed assessment
of DOD's compliance with the Freedom of Information Act.
If confirmed, I would ensure compliance within OSD(P) with the
Freedom of Information Act.
78. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if confirmed, do you think the DOD
should pursue strategic technology to support automated
declassification?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would support leveraging technological
solutions (to include artificial intelligence) to increase the speed,
accuracy, and consistency of declassification reviews.
project 2025
79. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you discussed Project 2025 with
any officials associated with the Trump campaign, the Trump transition
team, or other members of the Trump administration? If so, please
explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom you
discussed it.
Mr. Colby. I am committed to maintaining the confidentiality of my
conversations with you, other elected officials, and other policymakers
and their advisors absent legal obligations to the contrary.
80. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you discussed Project 2025 with
any officials associated with the Heritage Foundation? If so, please
explain what you discussed, when you discussed it, and with whom you
discussed it.
Mr. Colby. I am committed to maintaining the confidentiality of my
conversations with you, other elected officials, and other policymakers
and their advisors absent legal obligations to the contrary.
foreign influence
81. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, your 278 form notes that you
received an honorarium to speak for Japanese experts and business
people in 2024. What was the subject of your remarks? Please provide a
copy if available.
Mr. Colby. The topic of my remarks was the geopolitical situation,
especially in Asia, as part of a Bank of America Asia conference. I
spoke extemporaneously but the remarks were consistent with my
available public commentary.
82. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, your 278 form notes that you
received an honorarium to speak to a Finnish business delegation in
2024. What was the subject of your remarks? Please provide a copy if
available.
Mr. Colby. The topic of my remarks was the geopolitical situation,
especially relevant to Europe and Finland, to a visiting Finnish
delegation of businesspeople. I spoke extemporaneously but the remarks
were consistent with my available public commentary.
83. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, your 278 form notes that you
received an honorarium to speak to the American Chamber of Commerce in
Australia. What was the subject of your remarks? Please provide a copy
if available.
Mr. Colby. The topic of my remarks was the geopolitical situation,
especially in the Asia-Pacific, to the American Chamber of Commerce in
Australia (virtually). I spoke extemporaneously but the remarks were
consistent with my available public commentary.
84. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, your 278 form notes that you
received an honorarium from Sibelco to give a speech at Vrije
Universiteit Brussel. What was the subject of your remarks? Please
provide a copy if available.
Mr. Colby. The topic of my remarks was the geopolitical situation,
especially relevant to Europe, to a university audience. I spoke
extemporaneously but the remarks were consistent with my available
public commentary.
85. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, your 278 form notes that you
received an honorarium from to speak to a Canadian delegation organized
by the Business Council of Canada. What was the subject of your
remarks? Please provide a copy if available.
Mr. Colby. The topic of my remarks was the geopolitical situation,
especially relevant to Canada, to a visiting Canadian delegation of
businesspeople. I spoke extemporaneously but the remarks were
consistent with my available public commentary.
86. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you received any additional
payments from a foreign government or entity controlled by a foreign
government within the past 5 years?
Mr. Colby. Please refer to the Public Financial Disclosure Report
(OGE Form 278e) dated January 15, 2025 that I filed in connection with
my nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. That report
provides responsive information from January 1, 2023 to January 15,
2025.
87. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you communicated with any
additional foreign governments or entities controlled by foreign
governments within the past 5 years?
Mr. Colby. Yes, I have had extensive contacts with foreign
governments and entities as part of my work in the foreign policy
field.
88. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, please disclose any communications
or payments you have had with representatives of any foreign government
or entity controlled by a foreign government within the past 5 years
and describe the nature of the communication.
Mr. Colby. Please refer to the Public Financial Disclosure Report
(OGE Form 278e) dated January 15, 2025 that I filed in connection with
my nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. That report
provides responsive information from January 1, 2023 to January 15,
2025.
I note that I also disclosed relevant such engagements as part of
both my background investigation process.
sexual assault and harassment
89. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the most recent DOD statistics found
that about 29,000 Active Duty troops--which accounts for 6.8 percent of
female servicemembers and 1.3 percent of male servicemembers--
experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2023. A Brown University study
estimates that the actual rates are two to four times higher. How do
you plan to address and reduce sexual assault and sexual harassment in
DOD?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would work hard in concert with other
responsible officials to address and reduce sexual assault and
harassment in DOD.
90. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, how do you plan to support and
protect servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors who come
forward with reports of sexual assault and sexual harassment?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would work hard in concert with other
responsible officials to address and reduce sexual assault and
harassment in DOD, including to support and protect those who come
forward with such reports.
agreements
91. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you, in any professional or
personal capacity, signed or agreed to sign a non-disclosure agreement,
confidentiality agreement, confidential disclosure agreement,
proprietary information agreement, non-disparagement agreement, and/or
secrecy agreement and for what reasons did you do so?
Mr. Colby. As is standard practice for many businesses and
organizations, I have signed agreements and contracts with employers
and other organizations with which I have engaged. All such engagements
have been in accordance with my legal and ethical obligations.
I have disclosed covered engagements as part of my OGE-278e and
background investigation processes.
92. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you, in any professional or
personal capacity, agreed to pay, paid, or receive payment or services
in conjunction with any of the aforementioned instances?
Mr. Colby. As is standard practice for many businesses and
organizations, I have signed agreements and contracts with employers
and other organizations with which I have engaged. All such engagements
have been in accordance with my legal and ethical obligations.
I have disclosed covered engagements as part of my OGE-278e and
background investigation processes.
93. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you have in any professional or
personal capacity, agreed to pay, paid, or receive payment or services
in conjunction with any of the aforementioned instances, please provide
a breakdown of the amount(s) agreed to pay, paid, or received and an
explanation of services rendered and include a timeline of when any of
these agreements, payments, or services rendered occurred.
Mr. Colby. As is standard practice for many businesses and
organizations, I have signed agreements and contracts with employers
and other organizations with which I have engaged. All such engagements
have been in accordance with my legal and ethical obligations.
I have disclosed covered engagements as part of my OGE-278e and
background investigation processes.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
94. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that servicemembers,
civilians, grantees, and contractors should be protected from any form
of retaliation for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual
assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern
that they wish to raise?
Mr. Colby. Yes. I believe that persons who report allegations of
wrongdoing should be protected from retaliation.
95. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, have you ever retaliated any
individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual assault or
harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern that they wish
to raise?
Mr. Colby. No, I have not.
96. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, will you commit to protecting
whistleblowers and how will you do so?
Mr. Colby. I do. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department
of Defense provides all the protections to which whistleblowers are
entitled under law and policy.
domestic deployments of u.s. military
97. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, in which circumstances do you
believe that the Insurrection Act should be used?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that the authority to invoke the
Insurrection Act is vested in the President, and the Act identifies the
criteria under which the President may invoke the Act. These are the
circumstances in which I believe it would be appropriate to invoke the
Act.
98. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that the Insurrection
Act should be used only as a ``last resort''?
Mr. Colby. My belief is that invocation of the Insurrection Act
should not be undertaken lightly, but rather made only in suitably
severe circumstances.
99. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that military forces
should be deployed to respond to civil unrest only in situations where
State and local authorities are overwhelmed?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that, as specified in law and borne
out by decades of practice, the President may invoke the Insurrection
Act upon the request of a state; when State or local law enforcement
are unable, fail, or refuse to protect certain rights; or where
conditions otherwise make it impracticable to enforce the law.
100. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that the parties
best positioned to determine whether State and local authorities are
overwhelmed are those authorities? If not, why not?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that, under the law, the ultimate
responsibility for invoking the Insurrection Act rests with the
President. Needless to say, I believe the views of relevant State and
local authorities should receive careful and serious consideration in
any such determination.
101. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if confirmed, would you support
using the military for immigration enforcement, including for mass
deportations, despite the military's lack of relevant training and the
harm it would almost certainly do to military readiness?
Mr. Colby. I believe there is no more solemn responsibility than
protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United
States along our national borders. The protection of a nation's
territorial integrity and national boundaries is paramount for its
security.
The Armed Forces of the United States have played a long and well-
established role in securing our borders against threats of invasion,
against unlawful forays by foreign nationals into the United States,
and against other transnational criminal activities that violate our
laws and threaten the peace, harmony, and tranquility of the Nation.
These threats have taken a variety of forms over our Nation's history,
but the Armed Forces have consistently played an integral role in
protecting the sovereignty of the United States.
Threats against our Nation's sovereignty continue today, and it is
essential that the Armed Forces staunchly continue to participate in
the defense of our territorial integrity and sovereignty. The President
has declared that a National Emergency currently exists along the
southern border of the United States. Unchecked unlawful mass migration
and the unimpeded flow of opiates across our borders continue to
endanger the safety and security of the American people and encourage
further lawlessness.
In light of this, I support the use of the armed forces to assist
in sealing the borders and maintaining the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and security of the United States.
In doing so, I believe it is essential that the Department conduct
these efforts in ways that are consistent with other critical missions
of the Armed Forces, especially deterring China, sustaining the nuclear
deterrent, and preventing terrorist attacks.
impoundment control act
102. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, on January 27, 2025, President
Trump's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memo calling for
all Federal financial assistance programs (excluding ``assistance
provided directly to individuals'') to be suspended. Do you agree with
OMB's decision to issue this memo?
Mr. Colby. I support the President's efforts to streamline the
Federal Government and ensure that it is carrying out Federal programs
in an efficient and economical manner. This is vital given the fiscal
constraints our country is facing that the President has pointed out,
and thus to making our national security policies and organizations
sustainably effective.
That said, I am not aware of the how this memorandum has been
interpreted and applied among the relevant executive branch agencies,
including DOD. Therefore, I am not in a position to provide an informed
assessment of the matter. If confirmed, however, I would look forward
to learning more and helping to facilitate solutions that reflect the
President's and the Secretary of Defense's priorities and are
consistent with the law.
103. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that the Secretary
of Defense or the Under Secretary of Policy has the legal authority to
block the disbursement of funds appropriated by Congress?
Mr. Colby. I fully acknowledge and respect Congress' constitutional
role in appropriating funds to be carried out by the executive branch
for designated purposes.
I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities consistent
with the Constitution and the law. I would ensure that my actions and
advice to the Secretary of Defense on this matter are informed by the
Administration's legal positions and advice from the Department's
General Counsel's office.
104. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your understanding of the
Impoundment Control Act?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that Congress passed the Impoundment
Control Act in 1974. This Act provides a framework for handling
circumstances in which the President seeks to defer or cancel execution
of appropriated funds.
I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities consistent
with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all others. I
would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of Defense on
this matter are informed by the Administration's legal positions and
advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
105. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you commit to following the
Impoundment Control Act?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all
others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of
Defense on this matter are informed by the Administration's legal
positions and advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
106. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you commit to notifying the
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, including the majority and
minority, if you are asked not to follow the Impoundment Control Act or
not to expend the money that Congress appropriates or authorizes?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all
others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of
Defense on this matter are informed by the Administration's legal
positions and advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
107. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the Constitution's Spending Clause
(Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1) and Appropriations Clause (Art. I, Sec. 9,
cl. 7) give Congress, not the Executive, power of the purse. The
Supreme Court has unanimously upheld this power. Do you believe that
impoundments are constitutional?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all
others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of
Defense on this matter are informed by the Administration's legal
positions and advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
108. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the funding levels in
appropriations bills passed into law are not targets or ceilings;
instead, they are amounts the executive branch must spend, unless
stated otherwise. Congress could--if it wanted the President to have
discretion--write those amounts as ceilings. Do you agree?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all
others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of
Defense on this matter are informed by the Administration's legal
positions and advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
109. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your understanding of the
requirements for DOD to obligate funding that Congress authorizes and
appropriates, in accordance with the time period that Congress deems it
to do so?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all
others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of
Defense on this matter are informed by the Administration's legal
positions and advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
110. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you commit to expending the
money that Congress appropriates and authorizes?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law on this matter as on all
others. I would ensure that my actions and advice to the Secretary of
Defense on this matter are informed by the Administration's legal
positions and advice from the Department's General Counsel's office.
111. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you commit to following and
implementing the annual National Defense Authorization Act passed into
law?
Mr. Colby. I commit, if confirmed, to executing my responsibilities
consistent with the Constitution and the law, including the National
Defense Authorization Act.
civilian harm
112. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you agree that one difference
between the United States and its potential adversaries is the greater
value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human life and
liberty at home and abroad?
Mr. Colby. I do.
113. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your understanding of title
10 U.S.C. section 184, which established the Civilian Protection Center
of Excellence?
Mr. Colby. I understand that section 184 requires DOD to operate
the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence as a focal point for
matters relating to civilian harm, spells out its purpose and use, and
requires an annual report.
114. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the U.S. military has spent many
years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate civilian
harm without sacrificing lethality--including through the development
of DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first Trump
administration, which I commend. These efforts received bipartisan
support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the U.S.
military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars, warfighters
needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent civilian harm,
uphold U.S. values, and prevent moral injury and psychological trauma
that too often comes with deadly mistakes. The Civilian Protection
Center of Excellence (CPCOE), which provides direct support to
operational combatant commands on civilian harm issues, has been
enshrined in U.S. law via the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. If confirmed as Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, will you commit to continued DOD leadership on
civilian harm issues, including housing and resourcing the CPCOE?
Mr. Colby. As I discussed in the hearing, I believe it is both
morally right and in the U.S. national interest to reduce civilian harm
consistent with deterrence and our military effectiveness. Accordingly,
I do commit, if confirmed, to working to reduce civilian harm wherever
possible, consistent with the demands of deterrence and military
effectiveness.
115. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you understand to be your
roles and responsibilities regarding civilian harm mitigation and
response?
Mr. Colby. I believe the USDP can play an important role in driving
policy and highlighting the importance of this set of issues, in
consultation and collaboration with other senior Departmental leaders.
116. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you understand to be the
importance of mitigating civilian harm in military operations?
Mr. Colby. I believe it is both morally right and in the U.S.
national interest to reduce civilian harm consistent with deterrence,
our military effectiveness, and the rapid and successful conclusion of
our Nation's wars. It is consistent with our national values and
traditions to conduct wars in as just a fashion as possible. Moreover,
from a strategic point of view, reducing civilian harm is, as a general
matter, likely to serve our national objectives by limiting hostility
to our efforts and generating public support for them, both at home and
abroad.
117. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to supporting and protecting the Civilian Protection Center of
Excellence?
Mr. Colby. I am not currently in a position to provide an informed
assessment on the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence. That said,
if confirmed, I commit to reviewing this office and its important work,
with a goal of ensuring that the perspective I laid out above is
effectively represented.
118. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, according to press reports, the
Department of Defense is taking steps to gut operations that are
focused on reducing civilian harm through the Civilian Harm Mitigation
and Response (CHMR). This includes instructing the CPCOE leadership
``that the Pentagon was moving forward with plans to halt all civilian
harm mitigation work, including winding down the center, rescinding
Biden administration directives and firing or reassigning nearly 170
personnel who advise military leaders on limiting noncombatant
casualties.'' Do you support these efforts?
Mr. Colby. I am not aware of any such efforts nor do I have
specific information about them. Accordingly, I am not in a position to
comment on any such efforts.
119. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to reversing the Administration's efforts to dismantle and halt
civilian harm mitigation work?
Mr. Colby. I am not aware of any such efforts nor do I have
specific information about them. Accordingly, I am not in a position to
comment on any such efforts.
120. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed, how will you
ensure that DOD minimizes civilian harm in U.S. military and joint
operations, including if the Administration's efforts to dismantle and
halt civilian harm mitigation are not stopped or reversed?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would in my own counsel and policy
advocacy promote the reduction of civilian harm consistent with
deterrence and military effectiveness and success, would encourage
others to advocate along similar lines, and would ensure that such
perspectives had an institutional basis to be effective in presenting
them.
121. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if the Civilian Protection Center
of Excellence is moved out of the Army, how will you oversee the Army's
compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 184 and the Civilian Harm
Mitigation Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Mr. Colby. I am not privy to any Department of Defense plans for
realigning the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CPCoE), but my
understanding of Section 184 is that it requires the Secretary of
Defense to operate the CPCoE but does not require that the CPCoE be
organized under the Department of the Army. I also understand that
there is a CHMR Steering Committee that provides executive leadership,
oversight, and guidance on Department-wide CHMR efforts. That Steering
Committee is co-chaired by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
the Undersecretary of Defense for the Comptroller, and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I would look
forward to working with the other co-chairs on these issues.
122. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, how will you prevent and mitigate
civilian harm?
Mr. Colby. If confirmed, I would promote the reduction of civilian
harm consistent with deterrence and military effectiveness and success,
would encourage others to advocate along similar lines, and would
ensure that such perspectives had an institutional basis to be
effective in presenting them.
123. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, will you commit to supporting and
implementing the CHMR-AP?
Mr. Colby. I am not in a position to provide an informed assessment
of the CHMR-AP, but commit, if confirmed, in my own counsel and policy
advocacy to promote the reduction of civilian harm consistent with
deterrence and military effectiveness and success, to encourage others
to advocate along similar lines, and to ensure that such perspectives
have an institutional basis to be effective in presenting them.
124. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that our troops are
at higher risk for retribution as the number of civilian deaths from
U.S. military operations or U.S.-led military operations increases?
Mr. Colby. American security rests on the ability and will to use
military power. This is a simple fact in a dangerous world.
At the same time, the experience of the last generation has
reinforced the truth that such employment can also create more problems
and dangers than it solves. One important way this can happen is with
civilian deaths caused by U.S. military operations. Therefore, while it
is essential that our military be able to act first and foremost with
the goal of Americans' security and thus of effectiveness, it is
likewise essential that such actions be correlated with a clear,
reasonable, and defensible goal, and that they be conducted in ways
that reduce the harm to innocent civilians to the degree possible and
consistent with those criteria.
acquisition reform and the defense industrial base
125. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe giving the Services
access to the technical data rights needed to repair their own
equipment could advance military readiness?
Mr. Colby. In my opinion, the Department must procure the necessary
data and associated rights to allow for the repair of its own
equipment. If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to better understand and
improve the Department's internal policies regarding the acquisition of
technical data rights and the impact on readiness.
126. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe giving the Services
access to the technical data rights needed to repair their own
equipment could help reduce the military's repair and sustainment
costs?
Mr. Colby. I do believe it could have this effect. Therefore, if
confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment to better understand and improve the
Department's internal policies regarding the acquisition of technical
data rights, accompanying license rights, and the impact on repair and
sustainment costs.
127. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, how will you ensure servicemembers
who are stationed abroad can timely and cost-effectively repair
equipment that is damaged, especially in a contested logistics
environment?
Mr. Colby. I do not presently have enough information to provide an
informed assessment on this important matter. If confirmed, I would
make a point to investigate it and would be prepared to provide
recommendations upon request.
128. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as USD(P),
will you commit to including clauses to ensure DOD has fair and
reasonable access to applicable technical in acquisition contracts that
DOD enters into?
Mr. Colby. I share this perspective. Accordingly, if confirmed, I
would work with my colleagues in the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to better understand and
improve the Department's current policies and practices regarding
right-to-repair and technical data rights within acquisition contracts.
I would advocate for such an approach as the Department explores how
best to leverage rights-to-repair and technical data rights in
acquisition contracts to enhance competition, control costs, and foster
innovation within the defense industrial base.
129. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as USD(P),
will you commit to ensuring contractors abide by contractual
obligations to deliver or allow DOD to access technical data rights?
Mr. Colby. Yes. If confirmed, I would support the Department's
acquisition officials in their efforts to receive the contractually
required data and license rights associated with that data and, when
appropriate, any enforcement actions they must take.
130. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as USD(P),
will you commit to assessing and reporting the cost of not having
right-to-repair/technical data rights for the military's equipment, the
results of which assessment you would make public for review by
Congress and the Department of Government Efficiency?
Mr. Colby. Any such assessment would be in the purview of the
USD(A&S). If confirmed, I would support efforts by the Department to
review the cost and readiness impacts of not having rights-to-repair
and technical data rights.
131. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you see as the role of
competition in strengthening the defense industrial base?
Mr. Colby. I believe competition is essential in strengthening our
defense industrial base. We need a vigorous, healthy, and active
competitive landscape to produce the right weaponry and other
capabilities at scale and rapidly, not only for ourselves but for our
allies and partners. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to work
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
encourage the Department to leverage its authorities, tools, programs,
and initiatives to foster a more competitive defense industrial base.
132. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you understand DOD's role
to be in analyzing proposed acquisitions and mergers?
Mr. Colby. My understanding is that the Department has an important
role in ensuring that the defense industrial base is resilient,
capable, and competitive. As I understand it, the Department supports
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) in
evaluating defense-related mergers and acquisitions.
I believe the Department should actively press its case for a more
competitive defense industrial base, and, if confirmed, would
personally advocate for such results.
133. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you think there is excessive
consolidation in the defense industrial base? If yes, do you think it
harms national security, and what should DOD do to address this issue?
Mr. Colby. I believe the Nation was far better off when we had
dozens of actively competing defense enterprise in the defense
industrial base. The reasons for this consolidation are complex and
contested as to their origins, but I believe it should be the
Department's policy to restore more competition in the DIB. If
confirmed, I would advocate for such a result.
134. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what tools does DOD have to address
price gouging, wasteful spending, and fraud by defense contractors?
Mr. Colby. I do not have sufficient information to provide an
informed assessment on this important matter. If confirmed, I would
support efforts to address them.
135. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe current DOD and
governmentwide contracting rules favor prime defense contractors at the
expense of new market entrants or smaller competitors?
Mr. Colby. I do not have sufficient information to provide an
informed assessment on this important matter. If confirmed, I would
support efforts to ensure all enterprises are treated fairly, with a
focus on delivering capabilities at scale and rapidly from a diverse
and competitive array of enterprises.
136. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe DOD contractors
should be able to access, use, or own government data for commercial,
non-DOD purposes?
Mr. Colby. I do not have sufficient information to provide an
informed assessment on this important matter.
137. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe DOD should strive to
adopt a modular, open systems approach wherever possible?
Mr. Colby. I have not had the opportunity to explore this issue in
depth, but my sense is that the Department should strive to adopt a
modular, open systems approach (MOSA) in the development of new
capabilities wherever possible, so it can achieve higher efficiency and
greater adaptability while fostering a culture of innovation. My
understanding is that the benefits of MOSA designs include the ability
to add, remove, or replace components throughout the life cycle of a
system, providing opportunities for enhanced performance, and
innovation. These benefits could apply to both hardware and software
systems.
138. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is the role of independent
cost analysis for informing DOD decisionmaking?
Mr. Colby. Independent cost analysis is very important in informing
DOD decisionmaking. While I support robust additional defense spending,
DOD decisions must take cost into account, especially in an era in
which we face multiple threats, above all from China, and our national
fiscal situation is challenging.
139. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you see as the role of
research and development in advancing DOD's national security
objectives?
Mr. Colby. Research and development (R&D) is critical to advancing
the Department's national security objectives. In an era of rapidly
evolving threats and technological advancements, R&D serves as the
engine powering the U.S. military's ability to maintain its
technological edge and address daunting security challenges. If
confirmed, I would work avidly to promote our R&D efforts in advancing
our national security objectives.
140. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you think DOD should assess the
success of a research and development tax credit or research and
development tax deduction based on whether it led to companies
increasing investments in research and development?
Mr. Colby. I am not in a position to provide an informed answer to
this important question. If confirmed, I would make a point of
investigating it and would be prepared to provide one upon request.
managing the federal workforce
141. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the Trump administration has
removed a number of probationary employees across the Federal
Government. Many of these probationary employees were recently promoted
or hired to fulfill urgently needed gaps in U.S. capabilities. Why
should Congress provide DOD expedited or additional hiring authorities
if they will be disregarded without any public justification or
consultation with Congress?
Mr. Colby. I do not have any non-public information regarding
decisions or policies about probationary employees in DOD. As a result,
I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this question. If
confirmed, however, I would advocate for responsible stewardship of the
personnel authorities granted by Congress and on building and
sustaining a capable and efficient workforce for the Department.
142. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, press reports indicate DOD has
paused four trainings, including harassment prevention and No Fear Act
training. Do you support harassment prevention training?
Mr. Colby. I do not have any non-public information regarding this
matter. As a result, I am not in a position to give an informed
assessment of these reports. If confirmed, I would be prepared to
investigate this question and provide an answer upon request.
143. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you support the firing of
probationary employees and if so, do you think there should be any
exceptions and on what basis?
Mr. Colby. I do not have any non-public information regarding
decisions or policies about probationary employees in DOD. As a result,
I am not in a position to give an informed answer to this question. If
confirmed, however, I would advocate for responsible stewardship of all
personnel authorities and workforce optimization initiatives granted by
Congress and on building and sustaining a capable and efficient
workforce for the Department.
144. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, how will DOD ensure that any
reductions in force preserve military preparedness and national
security?
Mr. Colby. I do not have any non-public information regarding
decisions or policies about reductions in force in DOD. As a result, I
am not in a position to give an informed answer to this question. If
confirmed, however, I would advocate for personnel policies and
workforce optimization initiatives that promote military preparedness
and national security.
judge advocates general
145. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your understanding of the
role of the Judge Advocates General (JAG)?
Mr. Colby. I understand that the Judge Advocates General provide
independent legal advice to the leadership of their respective Military
Departments.
146. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what is your understanding of the
importance of the JAG Corps providing independent, apolitical advice?
Mr. Colby. I think it is important that commanders have expert
legal advice. It is my understanding that Judge Advocates in the field,
in support of their Services or at joint commands, have a
responsibility to provide independent legal advice to military
commanders.
147. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, if you are confirmed as USD(P), do
you commit to protecting the independence and apolitical nature of the
JAG Corps?
Mr. Colby. The Judge Advocates General report to, and primarily
advise the leadership of their respective Military Departments. I
understand that the Judge Advocates General provide independent legal
advice and that under the law no officer or employee of DOD may
interfere with that. If confirmed, I would follow the applicable laws
on this.
nuclear weapons policy
148. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the Sentinel program has a cost
overrun of 81 percent, resulting in a Nunn-McCurdy Breach. Do you agree
with the continuation of this program?
Mr. Colby. I do. I believe an ICBM leg of the Triad is very
important.
149. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, the continuing expense of trillions
of dollars on nuclear weapons cuts into other priorities of the
Department of Defense, such as deterring China. Do you support not
centering nuclear weapons in our defense policy to save money and make
us all safer?
Mr. Colby. I do not. I believe the nuclear deterrent remains
essential and indeed more so in an era of such greatened danger.
150. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, please provide information on the
types of consulting services that you provided for Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.
Mr. Colby. I provided expertise on strategic and nuclear deterrence
issues to LLNL including as part of their seminar and conference
series'.
151. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you support resuming nuclear
weapon life testing?
Mr. Colby. Based on my understanding of our current capabilities, I
do not believe a resumption of nuclear weapon live testing is necessary
or would be advisable at this time.
ukraine and russia policy
152. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you consider to be the role
of offensive cyber operations in advancing U.S. national security?
Mr. Colby. Offensive cyber operations are critical both for
deterrence, in providing a credible form of retaliation, as well as in
wartime, in ensuring effective warfighting capabilities.
153. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, under what conditions should DOD
suspend offensive cyber operations?
Mr. Colby. I have not been briefed or informed to provide an
informed answer to this question. If confirmed, I would be prepared to
investigate this question and provide an answer upon request.
154. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what do you consider to be the role
of sharing intelligence information with allies to advance U.S.
national security?
Mr. Colby. Sharing intelligence information with allies can be and
is often highly valuable in advancing U.S. national security
objectives, although it must be weighed against other factors such as
the protection of sources and methods, diplomatic strategy, and
military effectiveness.
155. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, under what conditions should DOD or
the Intelligence Community suspend sharing intelligence information?
Mr. Colby. Sharing intelligence information with allies can be and
is often highly valuable in advancing U.S. national security
objectives, but it must be weighed against other factors such as the
protection of sources and methods, diplomatic strategy, and military
effectiveness.
156. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you support President Trump
cutting off aid to Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. I have not been briefed or informed to provide an
informed answer to this question. If confirmed, I would be prepared to
investigate this question and provide an answer upon request.
That said, I support the President's effort to bring the tragic war
in Ukraine to an end, as well as the diplomacy needed to accomplish
that objective.
157. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, did Russia begin the war in
Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is not to
disrupt any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
158. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, did Russia illegally invade
Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is to avoid
disrupting any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
159. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you condemn Russia's abduction
of Ukrainian children?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is to avoid
disrupting any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
160. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you support ensuring that
Ukraine is at the table for any negotiations regarding the war between
Russia and Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is to avoid
disrupting any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
161. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, what war crimes has Russia
committed against Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is to avoid
disrupting any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
162. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you condemn these war crimes?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is to avoid
disrupting any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
163. Senator Warren. Mr. Colby, do you believe that Russia should
immediately withdraw Russian forces from Ukraine?
Mr. Colby. As I indicated in my hearing, I do not believe it is
advisable, prudent, or appropriate for me to weigh in on this fraught
matter in a time of great diplomatic sensitivity. My goal is to avoid
disrupting any moves toward peace.
I should add that it is the norm in delicate negotiations not only
in government but also in the private sector to avoid commenting on
sensitive matters at such junctures.
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Elbridge A. Colby, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Elbridge A. Colby
Education:
Harvard College
- 1998 to 2002
- AB, History, magna cum laude
Yale Law School
- 2006 to 2009
- JD
Employment Record:
The Marathon Initiative
- Co-founder and Principal
- Washington, DC
- July 2019 to Present
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Director of the Defense Program
- Washington, DC
- August 2018 to July 2019
U.S. Department of Defense
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development
- Washington, DC
- May 2017 to July 2018
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow
- Washington, DC
- January 2014 to May 2017
CNA (Center for Naval Analyses)
- Principal Analyst
- Alexandria, VA
- September 2010 to December 2013
U.S. Department of Defense
- Policy Advisor (as IPA detailee from Yale University)
- Washington, DC and Geneva Switzerland
- September 2009 to August 2010
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
- Washington, D.C. area
- June 2005 to 8June 2006
President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Staff Member
- Crystal City, VA
- 8June 2004 to 8June 2005
Central Intelligence Agency
- Trainee
- McLean, VA
- 8September 2003 to 8June 2004
U.S. Department of State
- Special Assistant, Acting Political Officer, and Governance
Officer (detailed to Coalition Provisional Authority)
- Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq
- 8June 2002 to 8September 2003
Honors and Awards:
U.S. Department of Defense
- Distinguished Public Service Medal (for work on 2018
National Defense Strategy)
- Exceptional Public Service Medal (for work on 2010 New START
Treaty)
U.S. Department of State
- Superior Honor Award (for service with Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq)
- Meritorious Honor Awards (2, for work on budget and resource
strategy issues)
Harvard College
- John Harvard Scholar, 2000-1; Harvard College Scholar, 1998
to 2000, 2001 to 2002.
------
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Elbridge
A. Colby in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Answer all questions and provide all
requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional
sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the
Questionnaire and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the
continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an
answer of ``yes'', ``no'', or ``not applicable'' is appropriate.
questionnaire, part a
Note: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be
made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the
hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also
available to the public.
biographical information to be made public
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Elbridge A. Colby
2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
3. Date of nomination:
January 20, 2025
4. Education: List names of secondary and higher education
institutions attended, type of school (vocational, technical, trade
school, college, university, military college, correspondence,
distance, extension, and on-line), dates attended, degree received, and
date degree granted.
Yale Law School
- JD
- 2006 to 2009
Harvard College
- AB
- 1998 to 2002
Groton School
- 1994 to 1998
5. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. If
the employment activity was military duty, show each change of military
duty station as separate period of employment):
The Marathon Initiative
- Principal and co-Founder
- Washington, DC and remote
- 2019 to Present. (NB: The Marathon Initiative incubated as a
program within the Center for European Policy Analysis from 2019-2020,
becoming fully independent in 2020.)
Center for a New American Security
- Director of the Defense Program
- Washington, DC
- 2018 to 2019
U.S. Department of Defense
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development
- Washington, DC
- 2017 to 2018
Center for a New American Security
- Robert M. Gates Fellow/Senior Fellow
- Washington, DC
- 2014 to 2017
I also held part-time, consultancy, or adjunct status in addition
to my above employment with the following organizations during this
period:
2021 to Present: Senior Advisor, American Global
Strategies
2022 to Present: Senior Policy Advisor, TechSource,
Inc.
2021 to Present: Consultant/Advisor, Telemus Group
2018 to 2021: Senior Advisor, WestExec Advisors
2009 to 2017 and 2019-Present: Consultant, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Global Security Directorate
2013 to 2017: Senior Advisor, CNA
2013 to 2017: Consultant, Institute for Defense
Analyses.
2016 to 2017 (and 2006-2009): Adjunct staff member,
RAND Corporation.
2015: Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia
University's School of International and Public Affairs (New York, NY)
6. Have you ever received approval, pursuant to section 908 of
title 37, United States Code, to accept civil employment (and
compensation for that employment), payment for speeches, travel, meals,
lodging, registration fees, or a non-cash award from a foreign
government?
No.
I served as an unpaid Special Government Employee for the
Department of Defense (Defense Science Board and Threat Reduction
Advisory Committee) and the Department of State (Under Secretary of
State from Political Affairs) during the period 2019-2021. During that
period, I participated in foreign government-sponsored substantive
trips to South Korea (2019) and Taiwan (2020), the latter organized by
the Wilson Center. I received rulings from both the Departments of
Defense and State ethics legal officers ruling those trips as permitted
under ethics/emoluments rules. I would be happy to provide records of
those judgments to the Committee.
7. Government experience: (List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in response to question
5, above):
Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, advisor
to 2019 Summer Study (unpaid).
Department of Defense, Threat Reduction Advisory
Committee, advisor to 2019 study on future of U.S. nuclear deterrent
(unpaid).
Department of State, Special Government Employee
Consultant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 2019 to
2021 (unpaid).
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Policy Advisor to the Secretary for the New START negotiating
team, 2009 to 2010.
2008 to 2009: Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States, Expert Advisor.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, 2005 to 2006.
President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Staff
Member, 2004 to 2005.
Central Intelligence Agency, Trainee, 2003 to 2004.
Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad Governorate
and Governance Team, 2003.
Department of State, Office of Israeli and Palestinian
Affairs, 2003.
Department of State, Bureau of Resource Management,
Special Assistant, 2002 to 2003.
8. Business relationships: (List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational or other institution)
American Global Strategies, Senior Advisor, 2021 to
Present.
TechSource, Inc, 2022 to Present.
Telemus, 2021 to Present.
Consultant, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
2019 to Present (and 2009 to 2017).
Advisory Committee member, Krach Institute for
Technology Diplomacy, Purdue University.
Trustee, The Jonathan E. Colby 2009 Long-Term Trust.
(Resigned January 16, 2025)
Trustee, The Susan H. Colby 2010 Long-Term Trust.
(Resigned January 16, 2025)
Trustee, The Jonathan and Susan Colby 2007 Survivorship
Insurance Trust. (Resigned January 16, 2025)
Jonathan E. Colby 1993 Insurance Trust. (Resigned
January 16, 2025)
For my book dealings, including translations, I am represented by
Brandt and Hochman Literary Agents in New York City.
9. Memberships: (List all current memberships and offices that you
hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held
in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations)
Member, The Council on Foreign Relations
Member, The Metropolitan Club, Washington, DC
Member, The Brook Club, New York, NY (Previously member
of Board of Governors, 2010-2017)
Member, The Chevy Chase Club, Chevy Chase, MD
Member, The Pilgrims of the United States, New York, NY
Member, The Society of the Cincinnati, New Hampshire
Chapter
Previously:
Member, International Institute of Strategic Studies,
2004-2024
Member, Porcellian Club, Harvard College, 1998 to 2002
(Vice President, 2001-2002)
Member, Elizabethan Club, Yale University, 82007 to
2009
Member, Shabtai, Yale University, 82007 to 2009
Member, Yale Law School Association Executive
Committee, 2016 to 2019
David Rockefeller Fellow, The Trilateral Commission,
2014 to 2016
10. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) If you have ever been a candidate for, or have been elected or
appointed to a political office, list the name of the office(s);
whether you were a candidate/elected/appointed; the year(s) during
which you were a candidate, or in which the election was held or the
appointment was made; and the term of office (if applicable):
Not applicable.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in, and services rendered
to, all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years:
Member, Republican Party in Washington, DC.
(c) Itemize all individual political contributions of $100 or more
to any, campaign organization, political party, political action
committee, or similar entity for the past 5 years. List each individual
contribution (not the total amount contributed to the person or entity)
over this period:
I have reviewed my own records as well as online sources and
identified the following donations since January 2020:
$250 to Winred (Donald J. Trump National Committee
Joint Fundraising Committee) on July 14, 2024
$100 to Winred (Bernie Moreno) on April 27, 2024
$250 to Josh Hawley for Senate on January 24, 2024
$1,000 to Trump Save America Joint Fundraising
Committee on January 23, 2024
$900 to Never Surrender, Inc. on January 23, 2024
$100 to Winred (Riley Moore) on October 27, 2023
$1,000 to Jim Banks for Senate on June 12, 2023
$250 to Waging Peace (Mike Gallagher) on June 6, 2023
$520.51 to Restore Our Nation on May 24, 2023
$50 to Winred (Team Joni Ernst and Herschel Walker) on
December 1, 2022
$100 to Winred (Joni Ernst) on November 12, 2022
$50 to Win red (Eric Schmitt) on November 10, 2022
$50 to Winred (Kari Lake for Governor) on November 5,
2022
$50 to Winred (Dan Bolduc) on November 5, 2022
$100 to Winred (Mike Lee) on July 29, 2022
$250 to Winred (Ron Desantis for Governor) on July 8,
2022
$250 to Blake Masters for Senate on July 7, 2022
$50 for Matthew Foldi for Congress on June 23, 2022
$100 to Winred (Adam Laxalt) on June 8, 2022
$250 to Alex Gray for Senate on June 2, 2022
$100 to Winred (Marco Rubio) on March 17, 2022
$100 to Winred (John Cornyn) on March 17, 2022
$500 to Alex Gray for Senate on March 8, 2022
$100 to Winred (Blake Masters) on July 27, 2021
$500 to JD Vance for Senate on May 27, 2021
$250 to Champion American Values on May 23, 2021
$500 to Friends of Ron Desantis on May 6, 2021
$50 to Winred (Jim Banks) on March 1, 2021
$250 to Mike Gallagher for Wisconsin on February 23,
2021
$100 to Winred (Kelly Loeffler) on November 9, 2020
$100 to Winred (David Perdue) on November 7, 2020
$100 to Winred (Dan Sullivan) on September 29, 2020
$100 to Winred (Bill Hagerty) on August 3, 2020
$250 to Mike Gallagher for Wisconsin on June 8, 2020
$500 to Donald J. Trump for President on April 23, 2020
11. Honors and Awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special
recognition received for outstanding service or achievements):
U.S. Department of Defense, Medal for Distinguished
Public Service, 2019 (for work on the 2018 National Defense Strategy).
U.S. Department of Defense, Medal for Exceptional
Public Service, 2010 (for work on New START).
U.S. Department of State Superior Honor Award, 2003
(for service with the State Department in Iraq).
U.S. Department of State Meritorious Honor Awards, 2002
and 2003 (for work in Resource Management).
U.S.-Japan Foundation Leaders Program, 2010 to 2011.
Atlantik-Brucke German-American Young Leaders
Conference, 2009.
Yale Law School Public Interest Fellow, 2009 to 2010.
Harvard College awards: John Harvard Scholar, 2000 to
2001; Harvard College Scholar, 1998 to 2000, 2001 to 2002.
12. Published writings (List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written or for which you served as co-author or editor, including
articles and blogs published on the internet):
Based upon review of my publications, my own records, online
sources, and memory, I have assembled the following list of
publications. Given that I have been active in public discussion for
almost two decades, I have made my best effort to be as comprehensive
as possible.
Please see Attachment A.
13. Speeches (Provide the Committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years--of which you have
copies--in which you addressed matters relevant to the position to
which you have been nominated).
Based upon review of my speeches, my own records, online sources,
and memory, I have assembled the following list of speeches. Given that
I have been active in public discussion for almost two decades, I have
made my best effort to be as comprehensive as possible.
Please see Attachment B.
commitments in furtherance of congressional oversight
NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch. A simple ``yes'' or ``no'' response is appropriate.
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and
testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate
Committees of Congress?
I do.
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its
subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their
respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely?
I do.
16. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its
subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their
respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in
providing testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents
and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?
I do.
17. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its
subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their
respective staffs, apprised of new information that materially impacts
the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records--including
documents and electronic communications, and other information you or
your organization previously provided?
I do.
18. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request to provide this
Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information
within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee
request?
I do.
19. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to,
and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from
individual Senators who are Members of this Committee?
I do.
20. Do you agree if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members
of your organization protect from retaliation any military member,
federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or
communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other
appropriate committee of Congress?
I do.
future employment relationships
21. If you are confirmed by the Senate, will you sever all business
connections with your present employers, business firms, business
associations, and business organizations?
I will.
22. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service
with the government? If so, explain.
I do not.
attachment a: published writings
Books
The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of
Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021).
- Translations: Mandarin Chinese on Taiwan (Ministry of
National Defense, 2022); Polish, (PISM, 2023); Korean (ParkYoung,
September 30, 2023); Japanese (Nikkei, 2023).
Asia First: A New U.S. Defense Strategy [English
translation of Japanese title--book is in Japanese only] (Bunshun
Shinso, 2024).
Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (U.S.
Army War College Press, 2013), co-editor of the volume.
Articles
``The U.S. and Taiwan Must Change Course,'' The Wall
Street Journal, September 2, 2024.
``Only One Priority Makes Sense for American Foreign
Policy,'' American Compass, June 25, 2024.
``America must face reality and prioritise China over
Europe,'' Financial Times, May 23, 2024.
``Taiwan must get serious on defense,'' Taipei Times,
May 11, 2024.
``It Will Be Decided Here,'' Hoover Digest, Spring
2024.
``U.S. Hawks Must Finally Get Real About China,'' Time,
February 20, 2024.
``Taiwans Zukunft betrifft die Schweiz,'' Schweizer
Monat, November 1, 2023.
``World Events Are Not Going America's Way,'' The
Spectator, September 18, 2023.
``How We Can Help Ukraine While Genuinely Prioritizing
Asia,'' Time, July 14, 2023.
``The Threat of A US-China War Requires A US-Israel
Reset,'' The Times of Israel, July 4, 2023.
``Why US Needs A More Adaptive Diplomacy With India,''
The Economic Times, June 22, 2023.
``To avert war with China, the U.S. must prioritize
Taiwan over Ukraine,'' Washington Post, May 18, 2023 (with Alex Velez-
Green).
``China's Military Buildup Show Its Ambitions Go Well
Beyond Taiwan,'' Nikkei Asia, April 7, 2023.
``The Correct Conservative Approach to Ukraine Shifts
the Focus to China,'' Time, March 21, 2023.
``In Iraq, Foreseeable Costs Outweighed Likely
Benefits,'' National Review, March 16, 2023.
``The real and acute threat of a Sino-US conflict over
Taiwan,'' Hindustan Times, March 11, 2023.
``A Strategy of Denial for the Western Pacific,''
Proceedings--U.S. Naval Institute, February 28, 2023.
``How America can Save Taiwan,'' UnHerd, November 9,
2022.
``Why Protecting Taiwan Really Matters to the U.S.,''
Time, October 11, 2022.
``The Morality of a Strategy of Denial,'' First Things,
September 9, 2022.
``Europe's Emerging Vulnerability: A Secure Europe
Needs Greater German Defense Efforts,'' Internationale Politik, August
29, 2022.
``Elbridge Colby: War with China or Russia increasingly
plausible but Canada isn't ready,'' National Post (Canada), August 25,
2022.
``America's Industrial Base Isn't Ready for War With
China,'' The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2022 (with Alexander B.
Gray).
``America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan,'' Foreign
Affairs, August 10, 2022.
``China, Not Russia, Still Poses the Greatest Challenge
to U.S. Security,'' The National Interest, July 1, 2022.
``Biden's All-Hat National Defense,'' National Review,
April 28, 2022 (with Andrew Krepinevich).
``More Spending Alone Won't Fix the Pentagon's Biggest
Problem,'' Time, March 28, 2022.
``Japan should follow Germany's lead on Ukraine,''
Nikkei Asia, March 1, 2022.
``The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our
Priority,'' Time, February 19, 2022.
``Germany ahead,'' Suddeutsche Zeitung, February 19,
2022.
``Ukraine Is a Distraction From Taiwan,'' The Wall
Street Journal, February 13, 2022 (with Oriana Mastro).
``Building a 'strategy of denial' to thwart China,''
Hindustan Times, January 22, 2022.
``A Coalition Will Blunt Beijing's Ambition,'' The
Australian, December 30, 2021.
``The United States Should Defend Taiwan,'' National
Review, December 2, 2021.
``After Hegemony,'' American Compass, November 19,
2021.
``How America can defend Taiwan,'' The Spectator,
November 13, 2021.
``The Fight for Taiwan Could Come Soon,'' The Wall
Street Journal, October 27, 2021.
``Germany at the crossroads--an active defense and
alliance policy is overdue,'' SIRIUS--Journal for Strategic Analysis,
August 26, 2021.
``Japan must disavow pacifism and embrace collective
defense,'' Nikkei Asia, June 18, 2021 (with Jennifer Lind).
``Asia is US Priority: Europe Has to be Ready to Defend
Itself Alone,'' Klub Jagiellofnski, May 9, 2021 .
``Interests, Not Values, Should Guide America's China
Strategy,'' The National Interest, April 25, 2021.
``The State of (Deterrence by) Denial,'' War on the
Rocks, March 22, 2021 (with Walter Slocombe).
``Biden's Global, Muscular Liberalism is an
Indefensible Foreign Policy in 2021,'' The Washington Post, March 21,
2021.
``Japan Must Urgently Increase Defense Spending,''
Nikkei Asia, March 18, 2021.
``For the Philippines, sticking with America is a
better, safe play,'' Manila Standard, March 7, 2021 (with Dennis
Blair).
``We Must Prepare for Military Threats from North Korea
And China,'' Hankook llbo, February 19, 2021.
``America Can Defend Taiwan,'' Wall Street Journal,
January 26, 2021.
``Two Possible Futures: An outlook on EU-US
relations,'' Koerber Stiftung, December 16, 2020.
``Why The Pentagon Should Focus On Taiwan,'' War on the
Rocks, October 7, 2020 (with Jim Mitre).
``A New Bargain,'' Internationale Politik, October 1,
2020.
``A View from the United States: Unwilling to Let `the
End of History' Go,'' Munich Security Conference report, October 1,
2020.
``How to Trim the Defense Budget Without Harming U.S.
Security,'' Foreign Policy, September 30, 2020 (with Mackenzie Eaglen
and Roger Zakheim).
``The Ideology Delusion: America's Competition With
China Is Not About Doctrine,'' Foreign Affairs, September 4, 2020 (with
Robert Kaplan).
``Europe belongs on Washington's Side,'' Internationale
Politik, September 1, 2020.
``Containing China Will Be Complicated,'' Wall Street
Journal, May 7, 2020 (with Wess Mitchell).
``U.S. Needs 'Denial Defense' to Thwart Chinese Action
in Taiwan,'' Asahi Shimbun, December 27, 2019 (interview).
``The Age of Great-Power Competition,'' Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2020 issue (with A. Wess Mitchell).
``A Republican Foreign Policy,'' National Review,
December 22, 2019 issue.
``How the United States Could Lose a Great Power War,''
Foreign Policy (online), October 29, 2019 (with David Ochmanek).
``Don't Let Iran Distract from China,'' The Wall Street
Journal, September 24, 2019.
``INF Treaty Defenders Raise the Risk of Nuclear War,''
The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2019 (with Congressman Mike
Gallagher).
``US Eyes Southeast Asia Ties to Check China's
Ambitions,'' The New Straits Times, June 13, 2019.
``How to Win America's Next War,'' Foreign Policy,
Spring 2019 issue.
``U.S. Helps Those Who Help Themselves,'' Taipei Times,
May 4, 2019.
``Deutschland muss mehr in die Verteidigung stecken''
(``Germany Needs to be More Involved in Defense''), Die Zeit (online),
April 30, 2019.
``Eine Landnahme durch Moskau verhindern'' (``Respond
to INF Collapse with Blunt Layer, Not Repeat of Euromissiles''),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 3, 2019 (with Walter Slocombe).
``Is the Pentagon Truly Committed to the National
Defense Strategy?'' Defense One, March 12, 2019 (with James N. Miller,
Jr.).
``Take India's Side, America,'' The Wall Street
Journal, March 12, 2019.
``If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War: A
Strategy for the New Great-Power Rivalry,'' Foreign Affairs, November/
December 2018 issue.
``Against the Great Powers: Reflections on Balancing
Nuclear and Conventional Power,'' The Texas National Security Review,
November 2018 issue.
``The INF Treaty Hamstrings the U.S. Trump is Right to
Leave It,'' The Washington Post, October 23, 2018.
``The Pentagon Must Modernize Before It's Too Late,''
The Washington Post, September 17, 2018 (with Robert Work).
``Why America Must Overhaul its Military,'' The
National Interest (online), October 19, 2016 (with Jerry Hendrix and
Paul Scharre).
``Nuclear Weapons Aren't Just For the Worst Case
Scenario,'' Foreign Policy (online), August 4, 2016.
``The Future of Alliance,'' The National Interest,
July/August 2016 (with Jim Thomas).
``Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger: Presence in a
Warfighting Defense Strategy,'' Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2016 (with
Jonathan Solomon).
``What Happens if the Pope Rejects 'Just War' Theory?''
The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 9, 2016.
``U.S. 'Ambiguity' on Taiwan is Dangerous,'' The Wall
Street Journal, May 23, 2016 (with Walter Slocombe).
``For Peace With Russia, Prepare for War in Europe:
NATO and Conventional Deterrence,'' War on the Rocks, April 20, 2016
(with Jonathan Solomon).
``How the U.S. and China Can Talk Each Other Out of a
Nuclear Arms Race,'' Defense One, April 18, 2016.
``The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S.-Russian
Relationship,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace White Paper,
February 26, 2016.
``U.S. Needs to Prepare for Space War,'' DefenseNews,
February 23, 2016.
``Facing Russia: Conventional Defense and Deterrence in
Europe,'' Survival, December 2015/January 2016 (with Jonathan Solomon).
``Preparing for Limited War,'' The National Interest,
November/December 2015.
``Making Waves in the South China Sea,'' China File,
October 28, 2015.
``Terrible But Justified,'' Global Asia, September 26,
2015.
``Changing Tides in South China Sea,'' The Wall Street
Journal (Asia), August 26, 2015 (with Evan Montgomery).
``Step Up to Step Down: The United States, NATO, and
Dissuading Russian Aggression,'' Foreign Affairs, August 13, 2015.
``NATO Needs a Nuclear Strategy Update,'' The Wall
Street Journal (Europe), May 27, 2015.
``The Foreign Policy Essay: A Nuclear Asia?'' Lawfare,
February 15, 2015.
``Ash Carter Has One Shot to Keep the Pentagon's
Technology Edge,'' Defense One, February 3, 2015 (with Shawn Brimley).
``Rhetoric and Reality in the State of the Union
Address,'' War on the Rocks, January 21, 2015.
``Asia Goes Nuclear,'' The National Interest, January/
February 2015.
``America Must Not Neglect Its Nukes,'' The New York
Times, November 25, 2014.
``Smart Hawks,'' National Review, November 20, 2014
(with Eric Sayers).
``Realism Returns,'' National Review (cover story),
November 17, 2014.
``A Republican Congress is Good News for Asia,'' The
Wall Street Journal (Asia), November 13, 2014.
``Our Unrealist President,'' National Review (cover
story), September 22, 2014.
``Have We Hit Peak America: The Sources of U.S. Power
and the Path to National Renaissance,'' Foreign Policy (cover story),
July/August 2014 (with Paul Lettow).
``The Real Trouble with Russia,'' Foreign Affairs,
April 7, 2014.
``We're Losing Our Military Edge Over China. Here's How
to Get It Back.'' The National Interest, March 27, 2014 (with
Congressman Randy Forbes).
``Choose Geopolitics Over Nonproliferation,'' The
National Interest, February 28, 2014.
``Pushing Back on China: A Rational Approach,'' ASP/
Strategist, February 13, 2014.
``Time to Escalate? Should the U.S. Make China
Uncomfortable,'' ChinaFi/e, January 21, 2014 (with Ely Ratner).
``It's Not About Trust,'' Foreign Policy, January 30,
2014.
``Roiling the Waters,'' Foreign Policy, January 2014
(with Ely Ratner).
``Why We Must Spy on Our Allies,'' The National
Interest, December 4, 2013.
``The War Over Future War: Repelling a Ground Assault
on AirSea Battle,'' War on the Rocks, November 27, 2013.
``The Role of an Air Sea Battle-Centric Posture in
Strategic Reassurance,'' Small Wars Journal, November 7, 2013
(interview with Octavian Manea).
``Can We Save Taiwan?'' The National Interest (online),
October 2013.
``Beyond Treaties: Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook
paper, October 2012 (with James Acton).
``Don't Sweat AirSea Battle'' and ``The War Over the
War With China,'' The National Interest, July 31 and August 15, 2013
(debate with T.X. Hammes).
``Cyberwar and the Nuclear Option,'' The National
Interest, June 24, 2013.
``Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters,'' Politico, April
23, 2013.
``Nuclear Weapons: Something We Can All Agree On,'' The
Hill, May 24, 2012 (with James Acton).
``Putting the American Nonproliferation Debate in
Perspective,'' Global Strategy Forum, May 2012.
``Why Not to Attack Iran,'' The National Interest,
January 11, 2012 (with Austin Long).
``The William Colby We Knew,'' The Washington Post
(letter to the Editors), December 2, 2011 (with Jonathan E. Colby).