[Senate Hearing 119-295]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-295
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF STEPHEN
A. FEINBERG TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 25, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http: // www.govinfo.gov
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, INDIANA MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
february 25, 2025
Page
To Consider the Nomination of Stephen A. Feinberg to be Deputy 1
Secretary of Defense.
Members Statements
Wicker, Senator Roger............................................ 1
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 2
Witness Statements
Feinberg, Stephen A., to be Deputy Secretary of Defense.......... 6
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 52
Questions for the Record....................................... 98
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 134
Biographical Sketch............................................ 135
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 136
Signature Page................................................. 142
(iii)
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION OF
STEPHEN A. FEINBERG TO BE DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2025
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Mullin, Budd, Schmitt,
Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Chairman Wicker. The Committee will come to order. I thank
our guest for being here. We are here this morning to consider
the nomination of Stephen Feinberg, who has been nominated to
be Deputy Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, Mr. Feinberg would join the Department of
Defense (DOD) during the most dangerous security environment
since World War II. He would oversee the operations of the
Department as it faces an emerging Axis of Aggressors. This
dangerous coalition, which is characterized by military
cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea,
presents a complex and far-reaching set of threats. Make no
mistake: our enemies do not want a 21st century defined by
peace and prosperity for the American people. Mr. Feinberg
would be a crucial part of the team tasked with meeting those
threats.
Unfortunately, the defense investments we have made during
the cold war have long since evaporated. Defense spending is
near record lows as a percentage of our gross domestic product
(GDP), and all aspects of our military forces are now in dire
need of repair or replacement.
Our Navy, once the envy of all seafaring nations, is now
too small and too old to meet the growing demands of our
combatant commanders. Our nuclear forces used to be the most
robust and effective on the planet. Now they are decades older
than their intended service lives. Our Air Force continues to
shrink. We have yet to figure out how to scale innovative
weapons into mass production. We have a $200 billion backlog in
basic maintenance that leaves our troops living and working in
substandard conditions--$200 billion just dealing with living
and working conditions, and I could go on.
Clearly, there are many things that need fixing at the
Department of Defense. Fortunately, Mr. Feinberg has spent his
entire career fixing things. I believe he will make a very fine
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Feinberg ran a highly successful, large organization
for 3 decades, making him eminently qualified to run the
Pentagon effectively. He brings extensive experience at the
intersection of international economics and national security.
Mr. Feinberg is remarkably attuned to the scope and scale of
the challenges we face, as well as the opportunities we might
exploit. His work on national defense is significant, and has
ranged from Subic Bay acquisition to counter-Huawei efforts,
and from spectrum sharing to hypersonic testing.
Unlike the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy does not often
make high-profile policy speeches or travel around the world to
engage with allies and adversaries. I do not expect to see much
of Mr. Feinberg in the news if he is confirmed. But make no
mistake: the Pentagon cannot function without a capable deputy.
In many ways, the deputy runs the day-to-day operations of
the Department--driving the budget process, managing the
principal staff assistance, and ensuring the Secretary of
Defense is provided with data-driven and thoughtful options.
In Mr. Feinberg, President Trump has found a deputy who
combines cutting-edge private sector skills with a thorough
understanding of U.S. national security interests and the
Department of Defense.
Today, we will hear Mr. Feinberg's views on issues facing
the Department of Defense. I look forward to his thoughts on my
proposals. Last year, I released a report entitled ``21st
Century Peace Through Strength.'' I hope this can serve as a
blueprint to reinvigorate and rebuild our military.
Additionally, I released a Pentagon reform and innovation
plan called ``Restoring Freedom's Forge: American Innovation
Unleashed.'' I hope it brings much-needed reforms and
fundamentally changes the way the Department does business. We
must cut red tape and get better weapons to our troops faster,
all while maximizing taxpayer dollars.
I thank Mr. Feinberg and his family and his friends for
being here today. I believe he has a lot to offer as the
Department of Defense directs its focus to lethality,
efficiency, speed, and accountability.
I now recognize my friend and Ranking Member Reed for any
opening remarks he would like to deliver.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Feinberg, congratulations on your nomination and welcome to
today's hearing. I would also like to recognize your wife,
Gisella, and your family that are here today. Also, welcome,
Bill Hagerty. Senator, thank you. You will be introducing Mr.
Feinberg.
Mr. Feinberg, you have been nominated to be Deputy
Secretary of Defense. Traditionally, the Deputy handles the
day-to-day operations of the Department, with a primary focus
on managing the workforce and budget processes. The Deputy
keeps the trains running on time. But also serves as the
Department's main troubleshooter for high-priority problems or
decisions. This, in turn, allows the Secretary to focus on
policy, strategy, and relationships abroad.
However, I am concerned that the Deputy's primary roles,
workforce and budget management, have already been undermined
by the chaotic actions we have seen over the past week. Last
Tuesday, Secretary Hegseth ordered the Defense Department
leadership to submit plans to slash spending by 8 percent
annually. He suggested that these cuts would be covered largely
by canceling DEI [diversity, equity, and inclusion] and climate
change programs. But I would note that these programs combined
account for barely 0.1 percent of the annual budget. The cuts
will go much, much deeper to systems, and you will be part of
that process.
In addition, after pressure from DOGE [Department of
Government Efficiency], Mr. Hegseth announced a plan to fire
5,400 Defense Department probationary employees beginning this
week, and eventually to 5 to 8 percent of the entire workforce,
as many as 75,000 workers across the country.
Let me make one point clear. The United States' greatest
national security assets is not its ships, the aircraft,
weapons, or technology. Our greatest security asset is our
people. We have the most professional and dedicated defense
workforce in the world to complement the greatest and most
lethal fighting force in the world. The men and women who serve
our military, both in uniform and as civilians, are among the
most skilled and valuable professionals in the country, and
they serve in the Department of Defense not because it is a
lucrative or easy career. They do so because they care about
the mission and protecting their fellow citizens. In a word,
they are patriots. The are not opponents; they are patriots.
That is why I am so disturbed by the Trump administration's
apparent animosity toward that. Arbitrarily firing tens of
thousands of workers and slashing the defense budget will not
create efficiency in our military. It will cripple it.
This Committee has always advocated for cutting wasteful
spending at the Department of Defense, but tough budget
decisions should be based on facts and analysis, not reckless
layoffs. Such actions will harm our economy and industrial base
and will be felt in every State, not just inside the Pentagon.
Defense civilians work in communities around the country, at
shipyards, military bases, depots, manufacturing sites,
schools, and research centers.
Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed you will be responsible
for managing the fallout from these budget and personnel cuts.
At a time when we face unprecedented threats from China,
Russia, and other adversaries, you will need to find a way to
balance these reductions while also ensuring the Department has
the resources it needs to achieve current missions and invest
in modern technology. You will need the expertise of these
civilians who now are in the fear of losing their jobs, without
cause, or you will have to rely on contractors or military
personnel to fill their cover work, which in the past has
proved only to degrade readiness and drive up costs. I hope you
will explain to this Committee how you intend to resolve these
contradictory demands while ensuring the Department of Defense
accomplishes its mission.
Finally, I feel compelled to take a moment to addresses the
firings of senior military leaders this weekend. I am deeply
troubled that these firings appear to be part of a broader
campaign by President Trump and Secretary Hegseth to politicize
the military. I salute General CQ Brown, Admiral Lisa
Franchetti, General James Slife, and General Jennifer Short for
their outstanding service. Each of them have had brilliant
careers and have led with great courage, honor, and
distinction. We all owe them a debt of gratitude for their
service and sacrifice.
However, the timing of these dismissals and the lack of any
explanation for why risks politicizing the military and sending
a chilling message to the ranks that political loyalty to
President Trump supersedes loyalty to the Constitution.
Mr. Feinberg, these actions will also cause issues for you,
if confirmed, because the Deputy Secretary of Defense works
closely with the Vice Chiefs of the Joint Staff and the
Services, most of whom are now either relieved of duty or
covering two jobs. This will make it difficult for you to get
the focus and time needed from these officers to address the
difficult problems facing the Department.
I am most alarmed, however, by Secretary Hegseth's
dismissal of the Judge Advocate Generals of the Armed Forces.
These officers, known as TJAGs, are among the most senior
uniformed lawyers in the military, strictly apolitical, and
they have a fundamental role in ensuring that balanced, lawful
counsel is part of any military policy discussion. The TJAGs
provide legal oversight that spans military justice,
operational law, administrative compliance, and U.S. compliance
with the law of armed conflict. We expect the TJAGs to always
provide their best military advice, regardless of politics.
These firings, along with the firings of the inspectors
generals, should alarm everyone about the President's
commitment to the rule of law, especially for the military.
Laws, rules, and regulations are of utmost importance in an
institution with an enormous budget and a lethal mission. If
adherence to the law becomes option, the job of the Deputy
Secretary becomes infinitely more difficult.
Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, you may be one of the most
important advocates for our military servicemembers and defense
civilians within the Department of Defense. I hope you
understand the responsibilities that come with your position,
and that you will commit to speaking truth to power for the
sake of our security. I hope you will also give us your
assurances that you will communicate regularly and be
transparent with this Committee. A close bipartisan
relationship has always been the hallmark of this Committee in
dealing with the Department of Defense.
Thank you for stepping forward to lead at a critical time
for our Nation, and I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Reed. We are now joined
by our distinguished colleague and friend, Senator Hagerty, of
Tennessee, who will make introductory remarks for our nominee.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Wicker and Ranking
Member Reed. I want to let you know how much I appreciate you
holding this important nomination hearing today.
It is a real privilege for me to introduce my good friend,
Steve Feinberg. Steve is President Trump's nominee to be our
Deputy Secretary of Defense. During the first Trump
administration, from 2018 to 2021, Steve chaired the
President's Intelligence Advisory Board. There he brought a
fresh perspective and provided expert advice on a range of
challenge that confronted U.S. national security.
Before his nomination, Steve was co-CEO [Chief Executive
Officer] and Chief Investment Officer of Cerberus Capital
Management, a global investment firm that he co-founded in
1992, and today manages some $68 billion of capital. At
Cerberus, Steve spent 34 years investing in, fixing, and
operating a variety of businesses, including those related to
national defense and the U.S. intelligence community.
Steve is a patriot with a great heart. One of the many
things that sets Steve apart is his strategic vision and his
willingness and desire to invest in ways that not only create
and grow value for his investors but also advance U.S. national
security interests.
I want to quickly share a powerful story based on my own
personal experience with Steve's leadership. When I served as
United States Ambassador to Japan, I discovered that two
Chinese firms were attempting to acquire the bankrupt Hanjin
shipyard at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Subic Bay had
previously served as a United States naval base, with a
deepwater shipyard that is quite strategically located on the
South China Sea.
For various reasons, the International Development Finance
Corporation and other parts of the U.S. Government were not in
a position to engage nor to help us solve this problem. So I
engaged with top officials in the Trump administration and the
governments of Japan and the Philippines, as well as with top
actors in the private sector, and in specific, with Steve
Feinberg and Cerberus.
Working together, we assembled an ad hoc, public-private
solution to this problem and thwarted China's effort to acquire
this very strategic port. Thanks to leadership from the Trump
administration and Steve Feinberg and his team, we succeeded.
Today Hanjin shipyard is known as Agila Subic shipyard, and it
is own by American investors.
As a result, U.S. and allied firms have a joint presence
there. For example, HAD Hyundai, a South Korean firm, will
build and maintain vessels at the shipyard, and SubCom, a U.S.-
based undersea cable firm, is advancing projects in the region
from that location. United States Military and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines also have a significant presence there now.
If Steven's team had not stepped up to solve the problem,
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today would likely possess a
vital piece of strategic infrastructure in the South China Sea,
and the threats to the security of the United States and our
partners would be enormous as a result.
At Cerberus, Steve also worked hard on another issue that I
dealt with firsthand as United States Ambassador to Japan, and
that is helping the United States and our partners counter
China's threat in 5G telecommunications by investing in
commercial alternatives to Huawei and other Chinese telecom
companies. Here again, Steve recognized a strategic challenge
to the United States and sought to counter and minimize the
influence and access that China could gain from control over
spectrum and telecommunications infrastructure.
On that note, I want to commend the Committee for its
strong support of the Defense Department's efforts to
accelerate adoption of 5G and ORAN technologies in order to
provide strategic advantages to the warfighter, including by
directing the Pentagon to establish a Secretary of Defense 5G
cross-functional team to accomplish this objective.
We could not have addressed these problems without Steve
Feinberg, an outsider with a fresh perspective, who, at the
same time, knows how to work on the inside while bringing
innovation and ingenuity to the table. Steve, if confirmed,
will do an outstanding job as the Pentagon's second-highest-
ranking civilian official.
Steve understands the mission. He will leverage his
leadership, his strategic thinking, his deep knowledge, his
decades of experience, and his vast professional network, as
well as his willingness to listen and learn, and his
decisiveness to improve the Defense Department. Just as he did
at Cerberus for the past 34 years, Steve will work his heart
out every day at the Department of Defense. He will ensure that
the building, its management, its operations, and its programs
run better and more efficiently, and he will focus on the
Department's goal of providing decisive, strategic operational
and tactical advances to the warfighter.
Steve Feinberg is the right man for this job. I look
forward to his testimony today and to working with my
colleagues to advance his nomination as quickly as possible.
Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Hagerty. We
would love to have you stay with us all morning, but perhaps
you have other engagements. So feel free to go, and you have
our thanks.
Mr. Feinberg, welcome, and you are now recognized for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. FEINBERG TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you, Senator Hagerty. Your words are
too kind. I very much appreciate it. I would like to thank
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Senator Reed, and all the
distinguished Senators on the Committee for this opportunity to
speak in front of you today. It is a real honor. I would like
to thank the President of the United States, President Trump,
for his nomination, giving me this great opportunity to serve
our great Nation.
While the United States has all types of threats today,
from North Korea to Russia to Iran, by far our biggest threat
and most challenging is China. China is the first nation we
have ever competed with that has both a great economy and a
great military. China's entire private sector is fully
committed in supporting that military development, and as such,
they effectively have unlimited funding. China is incredibly
determined, they feel a great sense of urgency, and they are
fully dedicated to becoming the strongest nation in the world
and having dominance over the United States.
This is coming at a time when the United States has
significant shortages in both our national security, many areas
from weaknesses to shortages to problems. Chairman Wicker
outlined so many of these in his opening remarks. We have
shortages, obviously, in shipbuilding, nuclear modernization,
aircraft development, cyber defense, hypersonics, counter-
space, defending our satellites, counter-drones, defending
against drone attacks, and so forth. There are so many more.
Our workforce is challenged. Fabrication and batteries, two
major areas of our industry, we are relying on China for.
So a lot of big challenges that we have to face, and it is
all coming at a time when our budget is challenged, when all
the services do not have enough money to meet all our current
and future needs.
However, there is some good news here, is DOD, Pentagon,
there is great opportunity to improve our cost structure, our
efficiency, our operations, to really save a lot of money, that
could be plowed into mission. We do not have great financial
accountability, financial metrics, poor systems, awful lot of
low-hanging fruit there, so we can improve our cost structure.
This is in my wheelhouse, hopefully. I spent a career
helping organizations improve, and after doing it for so many
years, I have certainly made my share of mistakes, but I
certainly believe I understand and I think I can add some value
there.
There are great people in the Pentagon, great people, and
there is so much to work with. At any time when you are trying
to improve operations and efficiency and do better, there are
going to be changes. Those changes could be initially
difficult, but with the right leadership, the right focus there
are so many people at the Pentagon that want to do better at
our Department of Defense and will work incredibly hard to do
that. We will find the top people. We will give them autonomy,
flexibility to do things, but of course we will hold them
accountable.
As Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board
under President Trump in the first administration, it was clear
that we had some of these deficiencies. Five years later, I
think things have only gotten worse. In our DOD companies,
which we have bought over the years, certainly we were
insiders, but I also have an outside perspective to bring. I
think that is a good combination.
Not meaning to be too negative, but we really need to plug
these shortages, focus on our priorities, get rid of legacy
programs, be very disciplined, and while, at the same time,
focusing on the economics. If we do that, given America's great
innovative capabilities and entrepreneurship, we will defeat
China. If we do not, our very national security is at risk.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if I could
introduce my family, if that is okay.
Chairman Wicker. Please do, yes. We would love to get to
know them better.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you. Well, I am fortunate to have
behind me my nephew, Jovan Diaz, who is currently a major in
Special Forces, Green Beret, served multiple tours in Iraq and
Afghanistan. His brother, Eric Diaz, retired, former officer,
served multiple tours in Iraq and Central America. My brother-
in-law, Joe Swallow, former marine. My godson here today, Moses
Franco, former marine NCO, and, of course, my brother-in-law,
Fred Sanchez, who is not in the military but sort of like it.
He spent nearly 27 years, New York Police.
My dad, who is too ill to be here today, is going to be 99.
He served in the South Pacific. I believe he is watching. All
my uncles, may they rest in peace, all served in World War II.
None of this would be possible without my wife of almost 39
years, Gisella, and my three daughters, Madeline, Gillian and
Lisa----
Chairman Wicker. I am glad you finally got around to them.
Mr. Feinberg. I'm sorry?
Chairman Wicker. Just a quip.
Mr. Feinberg. My son-in-law, also who works at Cerberus
today, buying companies that help America, which is a big part
of our business.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feinberg follows:]
Prepared Statement by Stephen A. Feinberg
Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the committee, I am honored to appear before you today as President
Donald Trump's nominee to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I would
like to explicitly thank President Trump for the confidence and trust
he has placed in me.
I would also like to acknowledge my family. Thank you for your
continued support.
My father, who will be 99 years old this year, served in the
Pacific during World War II and my uncle in Normandy. They instilled in
me a desire to serve and a devotion to the prosperity of the United
States. While I will never come close to the contribution they and so
many others in uniform have made to this great Nation, if confirmed, I
pledge to do my best every day to serve in a manner worthy of their
sacrifices.
Our Nation faces an urgent challenge from China and an increasingly
complex array of threats as we witness deepening ties between China,
Russia, Iran, and North Korea. China's military continues to expand
exponentially, and they become more emboldened and aggressive each day.
Additionally, China effectively has a budget much larger than ours when
you count the financial support their private sector provides. Their
progress is disturbing, and their commitment is absolute. War is not
inevitable, but strength is our path to peace. Simply, if we do not do
more to counter the Chinese threat, our national security is at risk.
Our uniformed men and women, supported by Department of Defense
(DOD) civilians at all levels, must be the most lethal fighting force
in the world. This means being the best equipped, most modern, best
trained, and best led military in the world, without question.
For too many years, the DOD has been plagued by mismanagement and
inefficiency. From an outsider's perspective, overly bureaucratic
processes, poor fiscal responsibility, and a lack of accountability has
led to cost overruns, outdated infrastructure, and ineffective weapons
platforms and capabilities. DOD's business failures continue to put our
national security, and our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
guardians at risk.
For over 30 years, I have led organizational assessments,
implemented complex reforms, and driven operational improvements with
significant experience in the defense sector. If confirmed as Deputy
Secretary, I will leverage my knowledge of strategy development,
business operations, and risk management and work in collaboration with
this Committee and Congress, across the executive branch, with our
industrial base, technology sectors, and private investment to help
this Administration achieve its defense policy goals.
Under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth, the United States
military must be stronger and more lethal than it has ever been. If
confirmed, my priorities as Deputy Secretary will be: (1) meet mission
requirements; (2) improve the DOD's financial and economic stewardship;
(3) plug the increasing number of shortages and gaps in our military
and operational capabilities that threaten our national security; and
(4) cultivate the current and next generation of leaders.
My primary focus will be on enhancing the most critical mission
capabilities needed to fight and win any war. We must adapt and scale
our capabilities and address critical shortages in areas such as
shipbuilding and munitions. We must invest smartly in advanced
technologies and ensure our supply chains are more secure and
resilient. We must take advantage of autonomy in all domains, and the
modernization of our nuclear triad and other core capabilities is
essential. There are unfortunately dozens of critical areas we must
address.
This will require greater efficiency in managing the DOD's budget,
streamlining the acquisition of key capabilities, implementing
effective auditing and accountability measures, and improving other
core business functions. Simply put, we must decrease costs, reduce
waste, increase competition, and successfully execute the programs we
initiate. If confirmed, I will review the full set of recommendations
from the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform
Commission and I will hold leaders across DOD accountable for achieving
financial statement audit outcomes. Such a clear commitment to
financial integrity will maximize the impact of our resources while
upholding the trust of the American people.
The strength of our military is built on the quality of our people.
Our military will prioritize meritocracy and cultivate the leaders and
both recruit and retain the talent we need--from both the public and
private sectors--to implement the President's vision and Secretary's
priorities.
I am committed to strengthening the mission capabilities, financial
stewardship, and leadership development across DOD. Leveraging the full
potential of our national strength, we can decisively defeat any threat
to national security and enable a lasting peace.
I am eager to continue to work with this Committee to ensure that
our military remains the strongest--and most lethal--in the world. I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Wicker. Well, thank you very, very much for that
testimony. We now have some standard questions that are
required of civilian nominees, so I ask you simply to answer
with yes or no.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Chairman Wicker. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
Subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee, when requested?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Do you agree to provide records,
documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner
when requested by this Committee, its Subcommittees, or other
appropriate committees of Congress, and to consult with the
requestor regarding the basis for any good faith delay or
denial in providing such records?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. I assume there will be no bad faith delay.
Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines
established by this Committee for the production of reports,
records, and other information, including timely responding to
hearing questions for the record?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. There may be, indeed, undoubtedly will be
some questions for the record.
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much for those answers.
Now, you really have answered something that we are all
interested in. We are not where we need to be, and we are
facing two nuclear near-peer adversaries, and, for example, our
shipbuilding. according to your testimony, is nowhere near
where it should be.
There are people who say we do not have the industrial
capacity, so what is the answer to that?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, Senator, it is a tough problem. Our
supply chain is definitely weak. Our workforce needs to be
improved. But a big piece of improving our supply chain is
working more closely with our private sector. We have companies
that can get us where our needs are, where our shortages are,
and we need to work more closely with them. We need people
inside of Government, that understand their issues, understand
what drives their boards, what drives the pressure they get
from shareholders. That kind of knowledge will enable us to try
to find and work with more private sector companies who would
be willing to get into this space.
We certainly have the manufacturing capability to meet the
shortages in our supply chain. We have just got to encourage
those companies to do it.
Chairman Wicker. Okay, and we probably will want you to
enlarge on that on the record.
We are at 3 percent of GDP now. Is a percentage of GDP an
accurate measure? I have been advocating for 5 percent. Why do
people talk about a percentage of GDP?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I think historically our military
spending has been at a higher percentage of GDP, and of course,
more funds would help us in a very difficult period. But my
humble opinion, my job as Deputy, if I am fortunate enough to
be confirmed, would be work with whatever the funding the
Senate and the House gives me, and I will do my best with that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Feinberg. Increasing the capacity of the shipbuilding and ship
repair industrial base is critical. We need to expand our combatant,
submarine, and auxiliary fleets to meet our requirements in INDOPACOM
and across the globe. If confirmed, I look forward to understanding the
Navy's progress on its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program
(SIOP), Submarine Industrial Base investments in production capacity,
workforce expansion and retention, and supporting efforts to accelerate
capacity and capability growth. I also look forward to addressing this
issue wholistically and working with the Department of the Navy, other
U.S. Government agencies, state and local governments, and industrial
base partners on a whole of Government and Nation approach.
Chairman Wicker. Well, I think we took a real good step
Thursday night, early into early hours Friday morning. You
mentioned in terms of doing the sorts of things that I
mentioned in my FORGED Act, in my paper, about restoring
freedoms forge. You mentioned there is some low-hanging fruit.
There is discussion about the 8 percent request that went out
from the new Administration. I can tell you you are going to be
very thoughtful about this, but discuss, if you will, the
extent of this low-hanging fruit and to what extent do you
think we can get started on that in this fiscal year.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, Senator, thank you. For example, in our
program requirements, they are very rigid, gold-plated,
expensive. We can get the job done with a simplification of
many of those requirements. Then often, as the program starts,
the requirements get changed, and then the industry has to then
make changes, which really drive costs up. There are all types
of things we can talk about regarding that.
I will say, on the cut, and obviously I have not been
involved in any of the conversations, but I do believe that
part of the plan should be, and will be, a lot of that money
they are talking about saving will be reallocated inside DOD to
mission priorities.
Chairman Wicker. Of course. Absolutely.
Well, let me briefly ask you. This Committee has been
supportive of the Office of Strategic Capital and the idea of
leveraging comparative advantages in private capital. Do you
support the OSC and do you believe we need to significantly
grow the Office of Strategic Capital?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I would agree, but I think they also
need to move faster. Right now it is a great concept. It can
really help. But funding has to come quicker, with a faster,
less bureaucratic process, and it is very key for us to address
that or else that office will not be successful. But if we move
at the speed of urgency, given our threats, that could be a
great asset for us.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that commitment to the speed
of urgency. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Mr. Feinberg, for your testimony. You have already
highlighted one of your major issues. That is building a budget
and managing resources in which the threat environment is
accelerating, and we still have current crises and commitments
we must make. With this 8 percent cut, that is very deep. You
go after the low-hanging fruit and then you have got a lot more
work to do, I perceive.
Can you tell us how you are you are going to approach this
problem?
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you, Senator. I think that when you
look at DOD today you do not have good systems, good
understanding of our cost structure, you do not have the right
financial metrics. So much is possible if you put in those
types of capabilities into the Department.
I think that in most cases that I have seen, in businesses
that there is the need to do better, we always are able to find
more cuts than we would have expected, without hurting mission.
Of course, all of these cuts can be reappropriated to the
things we really need.
I do not think the idea is just to slash. The idea is to
reallocate from things we do not need, which, for example,
could be legacy systems that are not valuable in the fight
anymore, to things we do need.
Senator Reed. But reallocation, does that get you an 8
percent reduction, if you take X money and put X money
someplace else?
Mr. Feinberg. I'm sorry, Senator?
Senator Reed. Reallocation. If you take X dollars from one
account and put it in another account, how do you cut 8 percent
of the DOD budget?
Mr. Feinberg. My understanding of what I thought those cuts
were is that we would have an ability to put it into the
mission in ways that we cannot today. But if that is not
available, if confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I think that there
is so much there we can get at without cutting into the bone,
and a lot of it is systems, capabilities, reporting,
transparency. There is so much you can do when you do that.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Over the weekend, the Secretary
announced that 5,400 probationary employees would be dismissed,
and it apparently was not done with any analysis. It was just
preemptive, and you have run companies. Have you ever walked in
and fired thousands of people without any analysis of the cost
or benefits?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I believe that every person is
significant, and these cuts are always hard. But I believe that
most of the cuts that we will see will be from people that want
to retire, people who would like to resign early. You know,
obviously there are over 900,000 civilians in DOD.
While you can never not take one person seriously, in these
kinds of reorganizations there is always turnover, and without
some turnover you cannot become an efficient organization.
Senator Reed. Another topic is, I mentioned in my
statement, Secretary Hegseth fired essentially all the TJAGs of
the military services. One of his rationales is, quote,
``removing blockades to what is going to happen.'' In usual
terms, those blockades are called laws, so I believe Secretary
Hegseth has just shown, again, his contempt for the law.
Do you commit to following the rule of law in your job?
Mr. Feinberg. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Reed. Federal law states clearly that no DOD
employee may interfere with the provisions of independent
advice by TJAGs, military service leadership, and by JAG
officers to commanders. Do you commit to respecting their
independence?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Reed. Also instructing others to do so?
Mr. Feinberg. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. Relatedly, do you commit to the independence
of DOD and other agencies' inspectors general?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Feinberg. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, it was already mentioned in
your opening remarks and in your exchange with Senator Wicker
the importance of revitalizing our defense industry. One
important tool the Department has is the Defense Production
Act, going back decades. But unfortunately it has frequently
struggled to effectively use the Defense Production Act. The
previous Administration used it for non-critical needs like so-
called green energy.
What are your thoughts on how we could reform the Defense
Production Act and use it more effectively to jumpstart our
defense industry?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, Senator, thank you. It is a great tool
for us. I think we have to combine some of our top people at
the Pentagon with private sector capability and look at the
kind of things that we really need, with urgency, speed, of
course, a lot of due diligence, but not crushing due diligence,
which takes us 6 months, a year, a year and a half, which often
happens in those kinds of programs. We have got to go faster.
We have got to realize the threat. We have got to put the right
people who can go faster.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I agree,
and especially when you get to the subcomponent level in
industry, there are a lot of challenges with supply, and the
Defense Production Act was passed decades ago out of
recognition that when we are in a crisis, as I think we face
now around the world, the defense industry simply has to come
first when it comes to certain critical components or supply
chain challenges.
You identified China as the most serious threat we face,
certainly the most serious long-term threat we face. I
completely agree with that. I am curious about your thoughts on
what are the key acquisition programs underway right now, or
that might soon be underway, that you think we would need in a
conflict in the Western Pacific, obviously a conflict most
likely to happen if Communist China decided to go for the
jugular in Taiwan.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, clearly we need to develop autonomy,
autonomy in significant numbers with a centralized command,
effectively brain. We have to make the right decision on
whether we need to build the next generation of aircraft, or we
can rely on autonomy. Of course, we have got to improve our
shipbuilding. China is very strong there. Our nuclear
capabilities, we have to upgrade them, and we have to develop
hypersonics. We cannot allow the Chinese to be faster than us,
both in their weaponry and aircraft, and so many more, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Yes, thank you. I agree on all of those.
One question or issue that you mentioned in there is whether we
have a manned, sixth-generation fighter. I know that you have
not been on the job yet, you have not gotten all the briefings
that we have had on the Committee. Do you have any preliminary
thoughts on the need for a manned fighter?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, that is a controversial issue, Senator,
that are used on both sides. I want to get in there, if I am
fortunate enough to be confirmed, look at all the classified
information, and ultimately that decision could be made by the
Secretary or the President even, and see if I can add some
value to it.
Senator Cotton. Sure, and as we discussed, I hope that we
can move along promptly, and you can get the same information
the Committee has. It is a decision that needs to be made soon,
but it is not imminent, in a matter of days. I mean, there are
several weeks left, I believe, before the decision needs to be
made.
Any thoughts on munitions? Obviously, munitions are
complicated these days, but they are still not a stealth
bomber, they are not an aircraft carrier. We do need to
increase basic rates of production on these. It is not
reinventing the wheel. It is just making more of the same
stuff. Any thoughts on how we can accelerate production rates
in private industry?
Mr. Feinberg. It is a tough problems. A lot of times in
ammunition you need ammunition machines, effectively, to help
build it, and those are in short supply.
You know, my hope is, if I am confirmed, that for each of
these shortages, get in there, look at the specific facts, go
over it in detail, understand the weaknesses, and come up with
a detailed operating plan. In my humble opinion, often, in the
past, maybe some of the senior civilian leadership in the
Pentagon may be not as deep into the detail of these. Every
operating entity has all sorts of detail you have got to get
into.
I do not know yet, but I think there are a lot of companies
we can attract to help us with this problem. It is not rocket
science, munitions, and there is an ability to expand.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Thank you, and thanks to your family,
your very large, extended family, and their record of service
to our Nation and the military and in law enforcement, and also
thanks to your father who is watching today, part of the
Greatest Generation, along with your uncles. It is a great
American story that reflects the story of so many other of our
military families.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you for your service, Senator. I
appreciate it.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator
Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Feinberg, congratulations on your
nomination and welcome to all of your family. Thank you for
your willingness to serve.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Chairman Wicker and you, yourself, in your
opening statement, made the point that we have been
underinvesting in our defense in order to ensure the national
security of this country. So I am a little confused about the
strategy that, on the one hand, we have the Administration
talking about cutting 8 percent across the board, primarily.
There are about 17 areas exempt from those cuts, but those do
not include any manned aircraft, so no fighter jets, no
tankers, excludes military construction for the Indo-Pacific
area.
On the one hand we are talking about cutting 8 percent for
5 years, and on the other hand we have upped the budget by $150
billion, based on what the Senate voted to do on Thursday.
Help me understand what the strategy is here, and why, on
the one hand--I can understand, as you pointed out and I think
you are absolutely correct, that being strategic and thoughtful
about how we become more efficient is really important. But
across-the-board cuts do not do that. So how is this making us
more secure, based on upping the budget on the one hand and
cutting it on the other?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, obviously I do not have the detail on
where these cuts are going to go. But there is always
significant opportunities of things we do not need when you
really get into the detail. In my humble opinion, if I am able
to get through confirmation, I think I can add value to that
discussion and try to ensure that we make the right cuts. I do
trust the Secretary's judgment on where he wants to go.
But there is a real opportunity to make the right cuts, and
it has to be done thoughtfully, to your point. But I do not
think the exact nature of these cuts have yet been determined,
so I think there is an opportunity to apply them correctly.
Senator Shaheen. Perhaps the nature of the cuts have not
been determined, but the layoffs have already started. One of
the places where layoffs have been proposed is with our public
shipyards. We have the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard that New
Hampshire and Maine share. It is the oldest continuously
operating shipyard in the country. It has the best on-time
record in terms of maintenance. It maintains our nuclear attack
submarines, and I guess I would raise real concerns about
whether it makes sense to cut our workforce when those attack
submarines are one of the real advantages we have over China.
Would you agree with me that we need to look long and hard
before we start talking about cutting a workforce that
maintains our nuclear attack submarines and gets them out on
time and on budget?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, Senator. Again, I have not seen the
detail of this, but if I am able to get in the job I will look
at it super carefully and try to ensure that we make the right
cuts that will not cut into mission.
Senator Shaheen. Senator Reed talked about his concerns
about the firing of some of the top generals at the Pentagon,
and I share that concern. I appreciate that the President can
put in whoever he wants, but get rid of the years of experience
and expertise so quickly seems to me to be short-sighted. But
the question that I have for you is, if you are confirmed as
Deputy Secretary of Defense, would you support military
officers providing the Committee their best military advice on
issues, even if that advice differs from the Trump
administration, or President Trump's views?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, as Deputy I believe I am an execution
person, and I do not think it is my place to, make decisions on
what our top military officers communicate. But I would support
an honest, transparent conversation at all times, and I am
confident in President Trump's strategies, and I think that the
military will work well with him and support the
Administration's goals.
Senator Shaheen. Well, certainly and honest and transparent
conversation is important to ensure we have the best military
advice, which should be based on military capability and not
based on politics.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator
Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr.
Feinberg, both to you and to your family today, and thank you
for putting yourself forward in these times to serve your
country.
Historically, nuclear deterrence has been the highest
priority mission of the Department of Defense. Our triad
protects the United States every single day from the only true
existential threat that we face, and nuclear weapons guarantee
our sovereignty. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe that nuclear
deterrence should be the Department's highest priority mission?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. It is one of our very top priorities.
Senator Fischer. Is it the highest priority, sir?
Mr. Feinberg. It might be. If I am able to get in there and
look at all the classified data and all our problems, I could
certainly answer more directly. But there is nothing that could
be more important than our nuclear modernization.
Senator Fischer. Today, for the first time in history, we
face two peer competitors when it comes to our nuclear posture
that we have. We have a current force posture that was designed
in 2010, when the threat environment looked different, before
Russia and China modernized, before they expanded their own
arsenals. So I look forward to being able to have conversations
with you in the future on the importance of making that,
continuing to make that the Department and our Nation's highest
priority. Mr. Feinberg----
Mr. Feinberg. Senator, I was thinking, one of the reasons
why I hesitated on if it is the most important is clearly
modernization is key. We also need hypersonics, you know,
because if our enemy can carry nuclear capability on things
faster than ours, it is a big problem. So I think it is a
coordinated effort.
Senator Fischer. It is all part of the problem that we have
when we have those peer adversaries threatening this country
every single day.
If confirmed, would you work with the Secretary to make
sure that these modernization programs continue, and continue
as best they can on schedule, and if opportunities present
themselves to accelerate those programs would you be supportive
of that, as well, and work with the Secretary on that?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Mr. Feinberg, given your
experience in the private sector, if confirmed, how would you
foster greater innovation inside the Department, and what can
the Department do to make itself more attractive to private
sector companies in developing that innovation?
Mr. Feinberg. Well right now, with the way our programs
work, it is very rigid, gold-plated, endless rules, and the big
defense contractors have an advantage just based on how
contracts work, bids and proposals. The process is cumbersome,
and often they win simply because they are better at it. So if
we can simplify that process, make it fairer, not be as
inflexible, that will promote competition, so competing
companies can worry more about capabilities than the process.
I also think that the cost of our very tough, rigid
requirements sometimes is too gold-plated, which makes
companies without as much capital unwilling to take the kind of
risk. Some of that risk is unnecessary in development.
So a lot we can do by getting into the program detail, line
by line.
Senator Fischer. Good.
Mr. Feinberg. My view is that the Deputy has to go program
by program, line by line, not hand it off to somebody else.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Good. Mr. Feinberg, there are
currently efforts underway to force the Department of Defense
to vacate critical bands of spectrum, including the lower 3
band and the 7-8 gigahertz band. This would mean that the
Department would not be allowed to operate radar systems or
satellite systems that allow our warfighters to detect, to
discriminate, track, and shoot incoming missiles and enemy
targets. I adamantly believe that forcing national security
systems to vacate these bands would be detrimental to national
security. It would degrade our missile defense capabilities
when we should be aggressively pursuing an Iron Dome for
America. That would be off the table if these were vacated.
However, I also understand that sharing these bands with
commercial entities may be possible. This would potentially
allow DOD systems to operate and coexist with commercial
systems in the same exact bands without forcing us to lose
these capabilities.
Do you believe the Department of Defense must have
meaningful co-leadership role in interagency determinations
about the future of Federal spectrum? Should DOD be at the
table to be involved in those decisions?
Mr. Feinberg. I totally agree. We need spectrum to defend
our country. We also need commercial use of it to develop the
technology to be able to defend our country. The best solution
is sharing, but we have to get it right, make sure sharing can
be done without risk. That needs to get tested, and until that
is clear that it can be done without risk, we must protect
DOD's spectrum position.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. It must be clear that it can be
done without risk. Correct?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Feinberg,
welcome to you and your family.
I ask the following two initial questions of all nominees
before any of my committees, to address the fitness to serve.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement relating to this kind of conduct?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Senator Hirono. Now, the DOD will need to cut some 8
percent off its budget, and again, we wonder how that happens
when, at the same time, other parts of the budget is being
increased. But a lot of these cuts, I think, will come from the
workforce, which I think we acknowledge is a critical part of
our readiness.
So here we see that some 5,400 people have already been, or
will soon be let go from DOD, and these are people who are on
probationary status. These are not people getting ready to
retire. In fact, across the many departments, people on
probation are being let go, 1,000 in DOJ [Department of
Justice], 250 in SBA [Small Business Administration]. So these
are cuts that are happening across the board, not based on any
analysis of impact. There are some 55,000 people on probation
within the DOD, and I think the expectation is that many of
them will be also let go. There are some 350 people on
probationary status at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, and so
these are critical people in our shipyards, as also mentioned
by my colleague, Senator Shaheen.
Since all these cuts are being made without any kind of
analysis, don't you have a concern that these cuts will have an
impact on readiness?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, most of the substantial cuts that they
are talking about are yet to happen.
Senator Hirono. As I mentioned, though, they are happening
to those in the probationary status. These are people who just
got hired, who are just being trained to serve.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. I have spent a career in restricting
companies and dealing with these workforce issues. If I can get
through confirmation I do think I can add some real value
working with the Secretary, of course, in the process to do
that properly, fairly, with the right people.
Every organization goes through some turnover when you have
really needs to improve. Initially it is difficult, but the top
people will step up, and it can be ultimately improving the
culture.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, as I mentioned, these are not
based on any kind of analysis that you would normally do in the
civilian sector, which you are very familiar with. I hardly
think that in your business you would just start getting rid of
people across the board, especially new hires who presumably
went through the process of vetting.
Now regarding the concerns about the purging of senior
military officers, I too have the concern. Let me just ask you
a series of questions that I expect either a yes or no answer.
Do you believe it is important that senior military
officers be able to provide their best military advice,
regardless of politics and without fear of reprisal?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Hirono. Do you believe that it is important that
uniformed JAG officers feel free to provide their best legal
advice on the fair administration of military justice and
compliance with the law of armed conflict?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Hirono. Do you believe in the independence of the
inspectors general to root out fraud, waste, and abuse?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Hirono. We are concerned about similar cuts to
USAID [United States Agency for International Development], and
we are talking about thousands of people who were providing
services to not just very important to our own country, but
obviously to our allies. Mr. Feinberg, do you agree that
gutting USAID funding and personnel endangers our interests
around the globe, especially in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not know. I do not have all the facts
and knowledge of that USAID and what the considerations were in
making those decisions. But I do trust the Secretary and the
President's judgment on that.
Senator Hirono. Wouldn't you say that if you were a
country, including island nations, who receive USAID funds,
this kind of cut would be shocking and would have negative
impacts on their economy and their people?
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. I would say the answer has to be yes. Thank
you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Feinberg,
first of all, thank you for the opportunity to visit beforehand
in my office. I enjoyed that discussion. I want to also thank
your family for their service to our country and also thank you
for taking the time to leave the private sector and to come in
and to offer your expertise.
The time that you spent at Cerberus Capital and the fact
that you have looked at a number of different defense-related
businesses in the past really does help with regard to how we
make changes at the Pentagon level.
I want to start just by clarifying one thing. When we talk
about an 8 percent cut, we are talking about prioritizing,
which is the bottom 8 percent that they think, or that they
want leaders within the Pentagon to identify as perhaps being
reapportionable to other more important portions. Is that your
understanding as well, sir?
Mr. Feinberg. It is.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Your background has also given
you some insight, even before getting classified briefings,
with regard to spectrum, and I want to spend some time on that
once again. I think this is one of the most important issues
that faces the Department of Defense right now, and that is
spectrum sharing, which you are familiar with because actually
one of the companies which you had invested in actually looked
at spectrum sharing and the need for that. So that is the
reason why I want to go through this a little bit.
Senator Fischer did an excellent job of laying out the real
serious threat to our national security should we lose the
ability to use radar, which is located in the 3.1 to 3.45
gigahertz of the spectrum. I do not want to get real deep
technically, but basically that is the most advanced radars we
have. You indicated hypersonics was an important part of the
discussion right now. Those weapon systems, you are aware that
we detect them using this portion of the spectrum. Are you
familiar with that, sir?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. If the Department of Defense was forced to
either give it up, or because of interference have a less
likely chance of identifying that, it would make those systems
less reliable. Would you agree with that, sir?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Right now, in Hawaii, it is defended by
destroyers that carry this portion of it that provides the
radar defenses. The Secretary of the Navy, or the Navy has
indicated, in multiple testimoneys before this Committee, that
there is a cost should they have to either make significant
changes or lose that part of the spectrum or replace it
elsewhere. At $250 billion for the Navy alone to replace it
over a period of perhaps 20 years. Are you familiar with that,
sir?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I am.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Right now, we need to find a solution
that allows for further development of spectrum by our
commercial sectors, but at the same time, we cannot lose or
force the Department of Defense to give this portion up, or our
Nation is at risk. Would you agree with that, sir?
Mr. Feinberg. I do agree.
Senator Rounds. Today, if we look at the President's new
idea, and I fully support him in this. President Trump has
issued what I believe is a game-changing executive order (EO),
directing the Department of Defense to develop and build an
Iron Dome missile defense shield for America. I think some
people called it the ``golden dome.'' This dome for America
would not be possible if the Department of Defense has to
vacate some or all of the lower 3 band and other crucial
portions of the spectrum.
In fact, as Senator Fischer noted last week, Iron Dome for
America will need even more radars than we currently have, and
those systems cannot function properly if there is too much
noise, which includes development of 5G by the commercial
sectors, that noise on the spectrum, where they are operating.
If confirmed, will you protect the Department of Defense's
spectrum so that the President's Iron Dome for America can be
built and function optimally?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. Look, your background, you
are a finance guy. You invested in a company that looks at
spectrum sharing. Can you share a little bit of the expertise
that you picked up with regard to spectrum sharing and the
availability of it, if we are allowed the time to actually get
it developed and prove it to be functional?
Chairman Wicker. About 30 seconds worth of that, sir.
Mr. Feinberg. Okay, there are two ways. One is managed
spectrum share, which we have to improve significantly to
ensure it can be done safely and still protect our country. But
I think we can do that over time. It has to be tested.
The other is simultaneous share, and that is what DOD
really would love, and that is early in its stage, it has to be
tested, but it does provide great promise in terms of solving
these problems. We have got to really test it and make it sure
it works.
Senator Rounds. But it is a path forward, but it has to be
tested.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
Mr. Feinberg, for being here today. I want to thank your
family, as well, for their service.
Let's start with our defense budget auditability, okay. We
spoke about this in my office. I have been long committed to
cutting unnecessary spending in Washington, DC, and the
Pentagon is no exception to this. The DOD, which controls the
largest discretionary budget in the Federal Government has
never passed a full financial audit. This failure continues to
erode our public trust, and it prevents the efficient use of
taxpayer dollars for critical defense priorities.
Mr. Feinberg, what specific measures will you implement to
ensure the DOD finally passes an audit, as our law requires?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. It is super important. We have got to
have financial accountability. I guess I was told we have 480
systems at DOD. I am not sure of the exact number, but
obviously we have got to consolidate systems. We have got to
bring in the right help to work closely with the Pentagon to be
able to clarify and make simpler our financial process.
If confirmed, I can get in there and look at the specific
details. We have done this, historically, in so many companies.
Generally when a company has a problem, they often have
financial issues.
I cannot say exactly, but it is all achievable. Financial
audits are very achievable. We will get it done.
Senator Ernst. Yes, and that is why I am trusting that your
background and expertise can make this possible. We know that
there are many private organizations and businesses that are of
a similar scale to the Pentagon, maybe not quite as large. But
they successfully undergo rigorous financial audits all the
time. This is possible. But I do believe you are heading on the
right thing when you talk about structural changes, the siloing
of information within the Department. That needs to change for
auditability.
Are there also cultural changes that would be necessary at
the Pentagon to make sure that there is financial
accountability?
Mr. Feinberg. For sure, it has to be a priority. We have to
recognize the importance of it. Because not only it is about,
as you said, getting an audit done. It is about being able to
understand our finances, understand our cost structure. I do
not believe, in the Department of Defense, any of our leaders
fully understand our cost structure, and at one hit of a button
to say, like most of our CEOs say this is what this costs, this
is what that is, this is where we are spending money. That
specificity is simple, but it is key.
It has to be a priority. Not that easy to do quickly, to
change all the different systems in a way that does not make
things worse. It has to be done carefully. We need a great
controller at DOD, one that has great private sector
experience. But we also need a great deputy for him that
understands the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] and all
the issues that relate to Government.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you. Another issue, very quickly,
is making sure that we are streamlining the acquisition
process. Procurement is a mess at the DOD, and anyone familiar
with the Pentagon understands that the current acquisition
process is very sluggish. It is burdened by a lot of
bureaucracy, and obviously everyone is prone to cost overruns.
Mr. Feinberg, what steps will you take to accelerate the
transition of AI [artificial intelligence] and other emerging
technologies from research and development to actual
operational deployment?
Mr. Feinberg. AI is an overused word in this sense. Most of
it is just high-end data analytics. Of course, there is some of
use of AI, but it is developing.
The key, I think, to success, is having the operators
partner with the technologists, and they really have to work
together. Often the technologists are, you know, we know it
all, and other times the operators are, hey, don't bother me
with this, I'm busy.
Both sides have to accept that partnership. Technologists
have to accept the operators' knowledge is essential in
developing better data analytics and AI, and the technologists
have to work closely, and the operators have to understand the
value and the benefit. Part is culture. Every company that is
successful at that integration has that partnership.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you so much, Mr. Feinberg.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator
Ernst. Senator Kaine has slipped in under the wire.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Congratulations to the
nominee. I am still huffing and puffing from racing from
another meeting. But I really appreciated the meeting that we
had in my office. I think you have sort of a nontraditional
skill set to bring to this nomination, but for reasons I may
get into with my questions and that we discussed in the office,
I think some nontraditional skills are sort of necessary right
now in some of the matters you discussed in your opening
statement.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Before I ask you a question I just want to
tell my colleagues, I had a whirlwind weekend. We were on the
floor until 5 a.m. Friday on the reconciliation bill, and then
I flew to Finland. I just spent the weekend with the Virginia
Army Guard and the Karelia Brigade, which is one of the three
brigades of the Finnish Army, doing a joint training exercise
in snow-covered birch forests in southern Finland. It was a
fascinating 48 hours on the ground with a great NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally.
I met with the President, the Foreign Minister, the
Department of Defense Secretary of the shipbuilding industry.
Finland is a great ally and a great friend, and it is important
to hear what your friends say.
I came back with some thoughts. We have got to remember
1938, a desire on behalf of the Prime Minister of England to
declare peace in our time. He was able to achieve it and
declare peace in our time, but it was a disaster because the
peace of appeasing a bully was a catastrophe.
In 1975, in Helsinki, 50 years ago this summer, we entered
into the Helsinki Accords to create stability in Europe, and
the then-Soviet Union pledged to respect the sovereign
integrity of every other nation. In fact, all the signators to
the accords did. That is worthy of celebration after 50 years,
and revitalizing.
In 1995, we created the OSCE [Organization for Security and
Co-Operation in Europe] coming out of the Helsinki Accords, to
essentially do the same thing.
Five years ago this week, President Trump negotiated a deal
with the Taliban, leaving the government of Afghanistan out of
the deal, and we were able to declare peace in our time. But
the decision to omit Afghan participation in that peace deal
turned into a catastrophe, and the inspector general that did
the after-assessment, after August 2021, indicated that cutting
the Afghans out led to such a feeling of abandonment that that
was one of the critical factors in that going wrong.
Even if you forget all the history, just remember what your
parents told you when you were going to school, the first time
you complained about a bully. They said, ``You have got to
stand up to a bully, or a bully will keep bullying you, and
others.''
Yesterday, in the meetings in Helsinki, it was the third
anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and a
resolution as offered at the UN [United Nations] General
Assembly containing this phrase: ``The full-scale invasion of
Ukraine by the Russian Federation has persisted for 3 years.''
That phrase, saying that it was an invasion by the Russian
Federation, led the United States of America to vote no. The
resolution failed. The United States voted no, along with
Russia, Nicaragua, North Korea.
It was sobering to be in Helsinki with this new NATO ally,
who joined NATO and is exercising with Virginia troops, and
have the United States unwilling--unwilling--to vote for
something because it placed the blame for the invasion on the
Russian Federation. We have a President who will not clearly
say it. We have a Secretary of Defense who will not clearly say
it. We have too many people who will not speak the truth. This
was a Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the highest levels of our
Government right now we have folks who will not speak the
truth, and they will stand with Russia and Nicaragua and North
Korea rather than standing with allies.
It is important that we not let these things just pass by
unremarked upon. This is the first Armed Services hearing we
have had since the third anniversary, and I just felt like I
wanted to put it on the record. Would you agree with me, Mr.
Feinberg? You talked about the competition with China and what
it is going to take for us to succeed. Would you agree with me
that in that competition, a robust network of allies is one of
the great assets that the United States has, and we should work
to maintain it?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. I think our allies are very important,
but our relationships with them need to be fair to America and
in our interests.
Senator Kaine. I would never suggest otherwise.
Mr. Feinberg. Of course, Senator. Also, as Deputy,
execution would be my job, and making diplomatic policy and
relationship decisions would be more of a job of the Secretary
and, of course, the President.
Senator Kaine. I really will want your help, and we talked
at length about shipbuilding. We are putting more money in,
year after year, and then let's put more money in is not
getting us the result that we need. I think you have a skill
set, again, that is a little bit nontraditional, but we are not
going to be able to solve our production woes just by this
Committee voting for greater appropriations. If we do not have
some changemakers, we are not going to get to where we need to
get, and I look forward to continuing that discussion.
With that, Mr. President, I yield. I would like to ask that
the U.N. General Assembly resolution that I referred to, that
the U.S. voted against and caused it to fail, I would like to
ask that it be entered into the record.
Chairman Wicker. Reserving the right to object, I was told
the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly.
Senator Kaine. There was a resolution adopted. The one that
I read that put the onus on Russia was defeated. One that
removed it, the Security Council did approve it, although the
U.S. abstained.
Chairman Wicker. If it is all right, let's put both of them
in the record, for clarity.
Senator Kaine. No worries.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Take a deep breath.
Perhaps Senator Scott would like to pass. Senator Mullin.
Senator Mullin. Now that is a gentleman there. Thank you,
sir.
Chairman Wicker. Who are you speaking of? I am just
kidding.
Senator Mullin. Both. I want to take some time here,
because it was not where I was planning to go, but I just
cannot allow my colleagues on the other side to just spew 100
percent mistruths constantly, and then play into the fear of
the American people.
I am just going to start, first of all, with national
security issues. National security issue one is our national
debt, and our national debt is now costing us more to just pay
interest than we spend on our military. That is a huge national
security risk.
So at what point do we start making cuts? People want to
start talking about cutting 5,400 jobs out of the DOD as a
whole when they have 950,000 employees, and we are talking
about less than 0.5 percent of the workforce, where do we start
cutting? We are spending trillions of dollars with agencies
that are not unfunded, and you are going to tell me we do not
have the ability to cut some employees when underneath the
Biden administration it was bloated, and there is not room to
cut? When a company is going underwater you do have to take a
look at the workforce. I do not want to suggest that our
country is going underwater, but if we continue this path, we
will.
I commend President Trump and those that he has put in
place to actually make hard cuts. Making cuts are difficult. It
is tough. But when are we supposed to start if we do not start
now? The previous Administration was not willing to do that.
Then, as the Senator that just asked questions, wanted to
bring up the Afghanistan withdrawal? Brother, that is very
close to me. That hits home, and you are going to lay the
withdrawal on President Trump and say it was his fault? The
disastrous withdrawal came 100 percent from the Biden
administration, and American lives were left behind, and they
are still dying because of it. Americans' lives were lost
during the withdrawal, and you are going to sit there with a
straight face and try to say that it was President Trump's
fault, when the Biden administration, and all of know this
because we were briefed on this, that the Biden administration
threw out the entire withdrawal plan that the Trump
administration had, and decided to go their own way, and man,
wasn't that great.
Then we are going to start talking about President Trump
not calling a bully out, like Putin? Did we forget what
happened in 2017, when Trump 100 percent told Russia to stay
out of Syria, not to be involved, especially with the bombing
of Hassad's own people? When they did, President Trump, within
30 minutes, took out the airfield that they operated out of,
destroyed it, and then took back the airspace, and we had the
airspace in Syria all the way up until Biden took office, and
we gave it back to Putin.
Or stand up to a bully, do we want to go back to Israel and
Hamas, and discuss the way the Biden administration handled
that, and the way they refused to call Hamas a terrorist
organization, and the Houthis a terrorist organization, and
Iran a terrorist organization? You are going to sit there with
a straight face and actually say that about President Trump.
Are you joking me?
Are we serious saying that President Trump is not willing
to stand up to a bully when underneath his Administration was
the only time that Russia did not advance into Ukraine, because
they did it underneath Obama when they took Crimea, and they
did it underneath Biden because they did not respect him
because of the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, and
every expert will tell you that.
So where is it that we are coming up with this, other than
just plain fear? All I want to do is just stroke fear into the
American people and try to divide something between us and the
President. Because the President is bringing back hostages. He
also brought back a hostage that Biden left behind, and he did
not give up one thing to Russia, including a guy that was
highly, highly considered a threat to the world. What was his
name, anybody? What was his nickname? No, not Soleimani. Dr.
Death, that we decided to trade for. I am sure you guys thought
that was a good trade.
Guys, give me a break. We are trying to advance America's
agenda and do what is best for this country, and the American
people agree with the direction we are going.
So, sir, sorry about going on a rant here, because I
actually did want to get into your business and the direction
that you can take our defense industry. But that could not go
without answers.
You and I have already had a conversation, and we will
continue our conversation, and I look forward to working with
you. With that, I yield back.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, you have been nominated to be
Secretary of Defense in charge of DOD's $850 billion budget.
Your main qualification is that you have built one of the
world's largest private equity companies. You have spent your
entire career honing the private equity tools that used to
hollow out our businesses, from department stores to veterinary
practices, and presumably those are the skills that you would
bring to the Department of Defense.
I just want to look at how that has worked. Let's start
with how you treat people. In Massachusetts, in 2010, your
private equity firm bought six nonprofit hospitals, turned them
into for-profit hospitals, called Steward. Ten years later, you
cashed out, having made a profit a little shy of a billion
dollars, and leaving behind a hospital system that was
staggered under a load of debt, and 4 years later, collapsed
into bankruptcy.
Now, Mr. Feinberg, when we met in my office you told me
that your private equity outfit made an average 23 percent
annual return each year that you owned your hospitals. If
Steward nurses had gotten the same 23 percent salary increases
that your investors effectively got every year, do you know how
much they would be paid at the time you sold off your
hospitals?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I do know that in 2010, the hospitals
were going under, and we were----
Senator Warren. I am sorry, Mr. Feinberg, we have very
limited time here and I actually want to spend it on your
qualifications to do this job, and it is about how you treat
people. The average nurse in the Steward hospitals at the time
you bought them made $85,120. At a 23 percent annual raise, how
much money would they be making right now?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not going to do the math, but----
Senator Warren. Okay. I will do the math for you.
Mr. Feinberg.--but what I could tell you----
Senator Warren. Eight hundred twenty-nine thousand, eight
hundred twenty-eight dollars. Now, of course, the nurses did
not do that well. During that same period of time, Carney
Hospital, one of the hospitals you bought in Massachusetts,
raised nurses' salaries about 1.5 percent a year, and that was
the best increase across the Steward hospitals that you were
running.
Mr. Feinberg. That is incorrect.
Senator Warren. In other words, you seem to think that when
it is time to reorganize a business, that equity should get
about 15 times as much return on their investment as the people
who actually do the work.
Let's take a look at the second issue, and that is
maintaining critical functions.
Mr. Feinberg. Senator, would you like me to respond to
Steward----
Senator Warren. We need to make progress at the Department
of Defense----
Mr. Feinberg.--because a lot of inaccurate statements.
Senator Warren. But we also----
Chairman Wicker. Mr. Feinberg, she is entitled to make a
speech.
Mr. Feinberg. I apologize.
Chairman Wicker. She is entitled to go on and on.
Senator Warren. Now let's go back to Steward hospitals. Did
you cut fat or did you cut vital functions?
Now, Mr. Feinberg, the town of Quincy used to have a full
medical center, with primary and specialty care, a surgery
department, an urgent care department, and a VA clinic. That
was its basic function. After your private equity company
finished with it, what was left?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, when we exited the investment in 2020,
the company was doing well.
Senator Warren. I am asking, what was left of the Quincy
hospital?
Chairman Wicker. Now, Senator, he is trying to answer a
question.
Senator Warren. That is what I am asking.
Chairman Wicker. You finally stopped for a breath. Do you
intend to let him at least have maybe 20, 30 seconds to answer
a question?
Senator Warren. Can I have my time back?
Chairman Wicker. Yes. I said you are entitled to make a
speech. But you stopped with a question mark, and he started to
try to answer the question.
Senator Warren. All right. What is the answer to the
question? What was left of the Quincy hospital? That was my
question.
Mr. Feinberg. Lots happened after we exited, and there has
been mismanagement.
Senator Warren. My question, what was left when you exited?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not certain that that changed.
Senator Warren. It was an emergency room and nothing more.
Mr. Feinberg. But, but, we took those hospitals from
collapse, in 2010, and we were going to shut it down, as the
10th-largest employer of Massachusetts. We turned them around,
fixed them, grew them, had a tremendous amount of success,
worked closely with the Governor, and the problems at Steward
happened after we exited the investment.
Senator Warren. I am asking about questions as you exited
and during the period of time you ran it.
Now, of course, a hospital is supposed to provide good
quality care, and that takes qualified nurses and other
staffers. Mr. Feinberg, for the hospitals that did not close
down, during the time you ran it, do you know how many unsafe
staffing complaints were filed?
Mr. Feinberg. I do know the vast majority of problems
happened after we left, and by the way, our nurses were among
the highest paid in the country.
Senator Warren. Is that a no, that you do not know how
much----
Mr. Feinberg. I do not know.
Senator Warren.--how many unsafe staffing complaints were
filed? Well, let me tell you. There were over 1,000 filed. That
is five times the normal rate in Massachusetts.
Mr. Feinberg. What year was that?
Senator Warren. This is the years that you were in control.
So the two hospitals----
Chairman Wicker. Senator Warren, perhaps you would like to
take another round.
Senator Warren. No. I would like to just finish. I just
have a quote.
Chairman Wicker. Your time has expired, Senator. Your time
has expired.
Senator Warren. I spent a great deal of that time listening
to the Chairman tell me how I have to conduct my questions.
Chairman Wicker. Your time has expired. The Senator's time
has expired.
Senator Warren. No. Could I just close----
Chairman Wicker. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Warren.--could I just close, Mr. Chairman? I would
just like to say why I care about this issue.
Senator Sullivan. I have a----
Chairman Wicker. Your time has expired. She can have
another round.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, thank you for your service,
and I appreciated our meetings over the last several months.
Let me just begin. The Ranking Member mentioned the
apolitical military. Secretary Hegseth, in his confirmation
hearing, said that the professional uniformed military, quote,
``must remain patriotically apolitical and stridently
constitutional.'' That is the Secretary's statement. I agree
with that. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. This is a unique and important attribute
of our U.S. military that makes our country very strong and our
military very strong. Do you agree with that, as well?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question that I raised
in Secretary Hegseth's hearing. He got the question, I asked
him, right, about when Billy Mitchell, the father of the U.S.
Air Force, testified in front of this Committee in the mid-
1930's, calling a Alaska the most strategic place in the world.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Feinberg. I agree it is one of the most strategic
places in the world.
Senator Sullivan. All right. Well, maybe I will not support
your nomination. I am kidding. It is not Greenland, though.
Let's make that----
In all seriousness, we have a lot going on in Alaska. We
have had Russian, Chinese, Asia's incursions, naval incursions.
It is a real active place. The Lower 48 media does not cover
it. We had two incursions just last week by Russian air
bombers.
Will you commit to come to Alaska with me, if confirmed, to
see our great military up there and just how strategic it is?
Mr. Feinberg. I will.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask on shipbuilding. We are in a
crisis. The Biden administration focused more on climate change
than shipbuilding. The congressional Research Service, which is
our research service here in the Congress, their experts said
we are in the worst crisis in shipbuilding in over 40 years.
The Chinese are building a giant navy. It is already bigger
than ours. By 2030, I think it is going to be over 420 ships.
It will be about 120, 130 times bigger, in terms of ships, 120,
130 ships bigger than our Navy.
We could spend two hearings on shipbuilding. But can you
give me a sense. You have done this kind of thing, where you
have turned around a real big problem in the private sector.
This is a huge private sector and government challenge. Give me
a couple of big ideas. My team and I have put together a big
shipbuilding plan. So has the Chairman. This is a bipartisan
issue, by the way. Senator Kelly is very focused on this. Our
National Security Advisor now, Mike Waltz, is very focused on
this. There are a lot of good ideas there. But give me a couple
of key elements of how we turn this around.
I mentioned this to President Trump. Republicans actually
have a history of this. Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet.
President Reagan's 600-ship Navy. This should be a priority,
and I think it is, of the President, the Secretary of the Navy.
But we are going to need your experience to do this. What are
some big ideas you have on this?
Mr. Feinberg. You know, talent is everything, people. HR
[human resources] is hard, and trying to get the right people.
Even the best leaders will have failures. But I think we need
to work very closely with the PPO and the administration and
find really strong manufacturing, private leaders who
understand process workforce, who have done this before, and
really drive talent into the struggling shipyards. They could
partner with a lot of our great people in the Pentagon and DOD,
to help improve.
This is an operational turnaround. It is about people. It
is about talent. There are plenty of leaders in America that
have done this. We have just got to get them on the home team,
there, and all in.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I think this Committee wants to
work with you on this. It is really important issue. It is a
bipartisan issue. It is a critical issue.
Let me ask one final question, Mr. Feinberg. The President
has declared a national energy emergency. Unfortunately, the
last Administration did not recognize the strategic assets of
our country, especially my State. The Biden administration
issued 70 executive orders to shut down Alaska. President
Trump, on day one, issued this executive order on unleashing
Alaska's extraordinary resource potential. I talked to
Secretary Hegseth about this over the weekend.
Can you commit to me--the Secretary of Defense is mentioned
in this EO, and many others--to work with me
and this Committee on unleashing our critical mineral
potential, natural gas potential, military bases, buying
natural gas in Alaska. This is a key component of the
President's strategy. It is going to make our country stronger,
and it is far cry from what we just experienced under the Biden
administration----
Chairman Wicker. Will you make that----
Senator Sullivan.--to shut down critical minerals.
Chairman Wicker. Will you make that commitment, Mr.
Feinberg?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I will.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator
Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
your willingness to serve, Mr. Feinberg, and welcome to the
Committee.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. As you know, 5,000 probationary
employees have been fired. The plan apparently is to cut
another 75,000 Department of Defense civilian employees. You
would agree with me that civilian employees often perform a
very critical role for the Department of Defense.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I do.
Senator Blumenthal. Many of these layoffs, in fact, will
undercut our national security. I have just come from a hearing
of the Veterans Affairs Committee, a join House/Senate. I am
the Ranking Member on the Veterans Affairs Committee. Many of
them are deeply concerned about their jobs in the VA and the
Department of Defense.
The position you have been nominated to fill oversees the
entirety of the workforce and the civilian workforce at the
DOD. My question is really simple. What do you have to say to
the veterans at the Department of Defense whom Elon Musk is
firing?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, we certainly have a cost problem, and
addressing cost problems are difficult. Sometimes we have to
make change to help an organization do better in the future. It
has to be done thoughtfully. So I would say to those veterans,
we have got to make our Department of Defense stronger. The
majority of cuts are coming. If I am able to get confirmed----
Senator Blumenthal. What I hear you saying, sir,
essentially we do not need you. You are expendable. Your life
of service is meaningless, and the job you are doing now is
going to be road kill.
Mr. Feinberg. Sir, I----
Senator Blumenthal. That is the message that is being sent
to these veterans. So I would simply urge you to take into
account that these Department of Defense civilian employees
were once wearing a uniform.
Mr. Feinberg. I totally understand, and it is something
that has to be done the right way. All of these people are
super important. But every organization has turnover, has to
make change, and if you do not make change you can end up in a
much worse position. So we cannot endlessly expand the force.
We have to sometimes make change.
Senator Blumenthal. You know, from your--and I apologize
for----
Mr. Feinberg. I apologize.
Senator Blumenthal.--interrupting, but as you know, my time
is limited.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. You know, from all of your experience
in the private sector that you just cannot take a meat ax. You
have to use a scalpel in determining who is necessary and not.
Eliminating waste does not mean you lay waste to the Department
of Defense.
Let me move on to another topic, if I may. The United
States military is the best-trained and most effective fighting
force the world has ever seen. We depend on our Armed Forces to
protect us from hostile foreign powers. But unlike in countries
where autocratic leaders deploy their military against their
own people, the United States military is not a weapon to be
used against Americans. Domestic deployment of Federal Armed
Forces is legally authorized under very narrow circumstances,
and only in the most extreme emergency scenarios.
Would you agree with me that any use of the American
military against American people should be an absolute last
resort?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. I welcome that statement, because the
Administration has implied, in fact, explicitly said that it
may use the American military for mass deportations,
suppressing protests, responding to crime in cities and urban
areas. I hope those statements prove to be untrue and
exaggerations. But I welcome your statement.
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I do have faith that President Trump
will follow the law and do that appropriately.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, more than faith will be required.
I think you will need to stand up and speak out, and, if
necessary, resign if you are asked to do something that you
feel is illegal or immoral.
Mr. Feinberg. I do not believe President Trump will ever
ask me to break the law.
Senator Blumenthal. That is what we have heard, again and
again and again, and history, I think, is a fair warning to us
about what we can expect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
Scott, you have been most patient.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman. Well, Mr. Feinberg, you
are going to do a great job. You have got a great background.
You believe in transparency. You believe in accountability. You
are going to bring a breath of fresh air because you know in
the private sector you have got to get results by holding
people accountable but give them specific tasks to get done,
and you are going to do a great job.
In the last 6 years, we have passed a significant amount of
legislation through the National Defense Authorization Act to
hold China accountable, whether it is we do not buy Chinese
drones in our military and our Federal Government, we do not
buy LIDAR [Laser Identification Detection and Ranging]
technology, we stopped buying Chinese garlic that is made in
sewer water in commissaries, we hopefully are starting the
process of not buying Chinese drugs for our military. How
important is it to our fighting men and women that we do not
rely on Communist China, who has decided to be our adversary,
for anything in time of war?
Mr. Feinberg. I am sorry, Senator?
Senator Scott. How important is it to completely decouple
from China from the standpoint of what our military is doing?
Mr. Feinberg. It is very important and very difficult, but
we have got to do it with urgency.
Senator Scott. So do you think we ought to be buying
Chinese computers for our military?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Senator Scott. Do you think we ought to be buying Chinese
medicines for our military?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Senator Scott. What about Chinese chips? How about Chinese
telephones?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Senator Scott. Can you name anything that is made in China
that we ought to just go full force and be buying for our
military?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, there are some completely commoditized,
basic products that would not put our national security in
jeopardy, but it is certainly a difficult problem.
Senator Scott. Yes. So the audits. You have invested in a
lot of companies. Did you ever do an audit?
Mr. Feinberg. Did I ever do an audit personally?
Senator Scott. Yes, no, but are you companies audited?
Mr. Feinberg. All of them are.
Senator Scott. Yes, and if the auditor gave you some points
that you had to get fixed by the next audit, did you do it?
Mr. Feinberg. You better fix it by that audit.
Senator Scott. Yes, and if not, what would you do?
Mr. Feinberg. If you don't have an audit, it's a big
problem.
Senator Scott. Yes. So would you keep the CFO?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
Senator Scott. No. So our military does their own audit,
and I think the Marines are the only ones that have completed
an audit. So what do you think ought to happen to change the
attitude with regard to audits of our Department of Defense?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, we have got to make it a priority, but
in making audit a priority it will also help us on all types of
understanding of financial metrics, our cost structure, our
capabilities.
One thing that I observed is that while we have had some
great, obviously, civilian leadership in the Pentagon, in my
humble opinion at times some of the people in the operational
execution jobs are not involved in detail. We are going to set
up a war room, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, and we
are going to go over every program, every cost, line by line,
with an army of people, until it is done 24/7. We are going to
understand where our costs are, why we do not have our audit,
where the financial problems are, and then we are going to come
up with a plan to fix it. But it has to be done line by line.
It is a big task. It is a big war room. I think the Pentagon
will support it, and I think the people will be excited to see
it, as well.
Senator Scott. So in your private sector, as you made
investments, a lot of times did you have to make tough
decisions other people would not make? Was it as simple as
that, they just would not make the decision to look at how
things were being spent, or programs that did not work, or
things like that?
Mr. Feinberg. We had to make tough decisions all the time,
and not everyone is right. But if you are afraid to act, the
problem is worse.
Senator Scott. Right. So are you optimistic that you will
be able to have a positive impact on getting military in a
position that we are the most lethal fighting force out there?
Mr. Feinberg. The Secretary has made that a big priority,
and I think we can absolutely make great strides toward it.
Senator Scott. So let's assume you serve for 4 years. What
would you like to say you accomplished at the end of those 4
years?
Mr. Feinberg. Basically that I have helped the Secretary
and the President improve DOD, preferably in total anonymity,
and I will fade off into the sunset, some better performance,
that hopefully I had some small role in.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Total anonymity is
something all of us seek but none of us achieve.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator King. I understand your impulse.
I apologize for not being here. I was at a Veterans
Affairs Committee on the House side, and I know there has
been a great deal of discussion about the potential cuts in the
workforce. What I am interested in is the discussion of 8
percent. That is 70,000 people. What I am interested in, of you
as a manager, how do you intend to go about that, because the
cuts that have been occurring throughout the Federal Government
so far have not been very thoughtful. For all probationary
people, for example, that is not a terribly rational way to
make these decisions. There may be great people who are
probationary.
So what would the process be whereby you reduce the
Department of Defense workforce by 70,000 people?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. Most of the cuts that are potentially--
that might happen going forward have not yet been made, and
hopefully, if I am fortunate enough to get through, I think
that I can be helpful in the analysis, study, the
considerations----
Senator King. You are the chief operating officer. You
should not be helpful. You are in charge of this process.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator King. I would like to know the process you intend
to follow.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. Well, I do not know what role the
Secretary would want me to play, but assuming I am in charge of
that, we would look at the exact detail of people, who is doing
what, what jobs contribute what, what do we need, what do we
not need. Study it carefully, and really come up with a
concrete, specific, granular plan before we would have final--
--
Senator King. So firing all probationary employees would
not be how you would go about it. Is that correct?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I was not involved in that. I do not
know the detail, so not fair for me to say.
Senator King. No, but you can comment on the rationality of
firing all probationary employees, some of whom maybe have been
in the Department for 10 years and just got promoted and are
there for a probationary. Others may be the best person the
Department has ever hired but they have only been there for a
year. Do you think it is a rational process to simply
arbitrarily fire all probationary employees?
Mr. Feinberg. You know, I do not know how it was done. I do
not know the considerations.
Senator King. No, I am asking you not how it was done, but
I am asking you if that approach is a rational way to reduce a
workforce, fire everybody that has been hired in the last
couple of years. Is that a good management practice? Is that
what you would have done at Cerberus?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I will say that we have over 900,000
civilian employees----
Senator King. Right.
Mr. Feinberg.--so while every person counts and is, of
course, very important, there is going to be some change that
the numbers are more significant.
Senator King. That is not my question. There has been a
stated goal of reducing the workforce by 8 percent. That is
70,000 people.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator King. You are the chief operating officer.
Presumably, you will be in charge of the process of reducing
the workforce by 70,000 people. I want to know how you are
going to do it, and one of my questions is, are you going to
use the arbitrary yardstick of probationary employees? Yes or
no.
Mr. Feinberg. I do not know the considerations or the
detail on what was thought before that cut. What I can tell you
is, if I am in there, we will carefully look at the cuts,
balance and weigh what we need and what we do not, be careful
not to cut into mission, and do it in a granular, bottoms-up,
person-by-person detailed way.
Senator King. So does that answer, I mean, you are not
going to cut all probationary employees arbitrarily? Is that a
no to that question? It sounded like it. This is a pretty
straightforward question. Are you going to fire all
probationary employees first, to get to the 70,000? Yes or no.
Mr. Feinberg. I have to look at the detail. I do not know
yet. I do not think, and I do not know the considerations that
were thought through before that cut, those cuts were made.
Senator King. Okay. You are a smart guy.
Mr. Feinberg. I just do not know.
Senator King. You know what I am asking. I do not
understand why you cannot tell me yes or no, whether this is
going to be one of the tools you use to reduce the workforce.
Let me change the subject. There is a lot of discussion
around here about reinvigorating the defense industrial base.
Any thoughts on how we actually do that? I have heard that
phrase a thousand times. I have never heard anybody say exactly
how we go about it.
Mr. Feinberg. I think we need to bring in new companies. We
have great manufacturing capabilities in the United States. For
example, if we were to call up General Motors or Ford, and say,
``We need you in our defense base.'' Find ways under OTA
[Office of Technology Assessment] or sole source where we can
give new companies, especially the ones that scale and can
operate. So much is talked about venture.
It is far more important, in my opinion, in scale and
operations, are larger businesses. They are at a disadvantage
competing with the big defense companies. They are not in the
bids and proposals of contracting area. There are a lot of
restrictions, a lot of tough things to get in there. We have
got to make it easier for them. Maybe not the most competitive
answer on the surface, but it will lead to much more
competitive in the future.
I would go to a big manufacturing company, give them a shot
on new programs that we think their capabilities can meet it,
and let them figure out a way, under FAR, to give them a shot
without a wide-scale competition with all our big defense
companies, which, by the way, are too consolidated.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. As a matter of fact, Senator King and Mr.
Feinberg, it is fact that General Mills actually used to be in
the defense manufacturing business, so good point there.
Senator Schmitt, you are recognized.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you
again, Mr. Feinberg. I actually think of all the confirmation
hearings that we are going to do, some of which get a lot more
publicity than this one, I do not know if this is on C-SPAN. I
do not know if it is being covered by anyone else. Based on
your testimony earlier about being in obscurity, I am sure you
are hoping it is not on any channel, I guess.
But I think this is actually one of the most important jobs
in the entirety of the Federal Government, because I sit here,
in bipartisan unison, we talk a lot about how we absolutely
have to have procurement reform, and I think it is a huge waste
for some of my Democratic colleagues to be railing away on this
temper tantrum about DOGE, when they could be asking the
questions that we have been told, you know, forever, that are
actually top of mind, which is sort of with 14 seconds left my
friend from Maine asked about how you actually get this kind of
procurement reform.
So I would like to drill down just a little bit on that.
You have talked about introducing more competition. That is
certainly, I think, part of it. One thing specifically that I
have heard from a lot of Missouri-based suppliers are these
TINA requirements, and having this certified cost or pricing
data for these relatively small or medium-sized businesses
really is a barrier to entry for the work.
Will you support sort of trying to figure out how we can do
better there so you actually have the requirements that are not
so burdensome that you can actually have new entrants into the
system, or they can actually more competitively bid?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I am not familiar with that piece, but I
understand the concept, and I will make sure I look at it and
act on it appropriately.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. I think that part of the reason why
your job is so important is that so much of this is going to be
a cultural shift that is difficult in an organization the size
of the Department of Defense.
But this kind of mindset of spending what is allocated, how
do you get to a place where we are actually maximizing the
benefit of every dollar?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, first if we can prioritize it on the
most important missions, which is hard and takes time, legacy
spending, and really do it with discipline on what we really
need. Then focus on how to be efficient and cut costs in our
program management and on our operations.
Senator Schmitt. I know that there has been a lot of
advancements. I am sure you have seen this in the private
sector, and by the way, I want to thank you. You have gotten a
lot of criticism for being successful in the private sector,
and I want to thank you for your divesting a lot to come take
this position and share your expertise on behalf of the
American people, to make our defense structure and the Pentagon
the weapon systems the best they can be to protect Americans.
So thank you for that.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you.
Senator Schmitt. There has been a lot of changes and a lot
of innovation as it relates to AI and automation and real-time
data analytics that have not found their way to the Pentagon.
How do you go about improving that culture within DOD? What
have you done before that you think you can bring to the
Pentagon?
Mr. Feinberg. You know, I remember when our supermarket
company, Albertson's--I should say what used to be the
company--we went to the CEO and we said, ``Boy, we've got
Amazon in the grocery business. We've got all these guys using
technology.'' I remember the CEO said to me, ``I don't need any
of that stuff. I have been doing this''--really good CEO--
``I've been doing this my whole life. Leave me alone.''
Unfortunately, change is so important and you have got to
be ahead of it. So it is a challenge going into departments
that have done things a long time a certain way, and trying to
make change, and being forceful about it. There certainly needs
to be a partnership, I said earlier, with technology people to
understanding the importance of operational, the operational
people on the ground. You will find the best people, depending
on who want this change and will embrace it, and those we are
going to let run with it, give them autonomy, and let them
drive it.
Senator Schmitt. Well, one of the things, I think, that has
been talked a lot about, which I agree with, is moving toward
high-tech weapons systems that can be mass produced, like
drones that are able to swarm. But I do think that we have got
to be able to do both, which is one of the reasons why the next
generation air defense program is really, really important. I
think that those advancements are good, and they may be the
future. We have talked about this a little bit in my office.
The two places where we have absolute advantage over the
CCP is our nuclear subs and our bomber and fighter fleets, the
air superiority we have and the underwater superiority that we
have. I know that you committed in my office that we would work
together on that, to make sure that in addition to introducing
some of the new high-tech systems that are available that we
are not going to abandon the superiority we have in the skies.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Feinberg, thank
you for your willingness to serve in this very important role.
I want to followup to some of the comments the Senator from
Oklahoma, Senator Mullin, made earlier in response to Senator
Kaine calling out Putin as a bully and this Administration's
unwillingness to State the obvious. Senator Mullin said that
Senator Kaine was spewing 100 percent mistruths constantly,
essentially calling him a liar. He was referring specifically
to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. In response, Senator
Mullin mentioned Assad, Israel, Hamas, Houthis, Iran, hostages,
and Dr. Death. I am pretty sure he did not mention Putin by
name. I think the appropriate response would be to say that
Putin was, in fact, a bully, but he did not say that. I think
it is instructive that he would not even mention Vladimir Putin
by name.
Putin is a bully, and I am not hearing that from this
Administration. I do hear it from some people on the other side
of the aisle, and I appreciate that. More people need to get
off the sidelines on this issue. I think it is clear to many of
us that Donald Trump blew up the Western alliance this past
week, 80 years of an alliance, gone. It is disturbing.
Mr. Feinberg, earlier you said execution would be your job,
and it is part of the job, but I do not think it is all of the
job. You are going to often find yourself in the room. When
things like, as an example, the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] a
few days ago said, when asked whether or not Russia invaded
Ukraine, he said, ``It's complicated.'' It is not complicated.
Russia did, in fact, invade our ally, Ukraine.
So, Mr. Feinberg, would you agree that you have a role
beyond just execution in offering some advice when you hear
things that are just fundamentally inaccurate?
Mr. Feinberg. I do think the Deputy should, at times, give
his view on policy, for sure. I think it should be behind
closed doors and not in public. I think it is important for the
Deputy to understand that he, regardless of what his opinion
may or may not be, that ultimately the Secretary and the
President will decide what the policies are, and it is
important to execute it.
Senator Kelly. That is fair. That is good to hear. Mr.
Feinberg, did Russia invade Ukraine?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, going to my behind closed doors
statement a second ago, I will just say this.
Senator Kelly. They moved tanks and troops and armored
personnel carriers across the Ukrainian border. It is a pretty
simple question.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. Well, here is how, if I may----
Senator Kelly. If you would ask the Chairman of this
Committee if Russia invaded Ukraine, I am pretty sure--the
Republican Chairman--I am pretty sure I would know the answer.
Mr. Feinberg. I got you. However, there is a very tense
negotiation going on now. It is important for America's
interests. I do not have----
Senator Kelly. Mr. Feinberg, we have got to live in the
real world here.
Mr. Feinberg. But I do not----
Senator Kelly. I mean, things happen, and it is obviously
to the rest of the world. I think it is obvious to Europe right
now that we just blew up an alliance, and for us not to be able
to say an obvious fact, it does not help a negotiation.
Mr. Feinberg. Well, what I was trying to say, Senator, is I
do not think some person who is not informed on this, not
involved in discussions, should make statements public that
could undermine what the President and the Secretary's intent
is. I do have confidence that President Trump is very strong at
negotiation, has a plan, and that he will find a good outcome
for America.
Senator Kelly. Mr. Feinberg, people that are good at
negotiations do not give up their two strongest negotiating
points before the negotiation starts, which was membership in
NATO and land that was taken away from the Ukrainians. So I do
not agree with that, that he is a good negotiator. He actually,
this week, has been a pretty bad negotiator. I want to make
sure----
Mr. Feinberg. Actually, President Trump, his policy has
always been peace through strength, and he is very cunning on
how he proceeds and how he approaches these. He is the first
person to ever bring Russia to the table, where we are close,
potentially, to a settlement. So I would like to see how it
works out. I have confidence it will work out favorable to
America.
Senator Kelly. Well, I do not share your optimism here.
Mr. Feinberg. Understood.
Senator Kelly. I mean, we went into a negotiation giving up
the two biggest points, and that is very troubling, and at the
same time, in the same week, we blew up an 80-year alliance.
Some of my Republican colleagues have a hard time even stating
the obvious, that Russia did, in fact, invade Ukraine 3 years
ago. Mr. Feinberg, I know you pay attention to the news, and I
imagine if I asked you this question 3 years ago I am pretty
sure I know what the answer would be. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Kelly. I recognize
myself.
Mr. Feinberg, thank you for being here. Thank you to your
family, those who are watching, your father, and for your
family's years of service. I appreciate their introduction.
I was disappointed to hear earlier that some of my
colleagues characterized your background in the private sector
as negative. I think that is disappointing. I have got a
different perspective, a positive perspective on that. There
was a time in this country when business leaders were applauded
for their patriotism and their contribution to our country's
efforts to win World War II. Mr. Feinberg, if your father is
tuned in at this point in the hearing I want to thank him
personally, and his generation.
Mr. Feinberg. I appreciate it.
Chairman Wicker. They also helped us in the cold war. But
to reform the DOD, I think we need someone who can work
alongside the Secretary, harnessing the American spirit to
ensure the United States outpaces our adversaries, someone who
knows how to reform organizations, improve outputs, harness
innovations. So not only, Mr. Feinberg, do you have extensive
background investing in sectors critical to national security,
but you also served on the President's Intelligence Advisory
Board. So thank you for that.
In this position you had a front-row seat to the threats
that our country faces. So Mr. Feinberg, can you discuss how
your business background and service on the Intelligence
Advisory Board makes you well suited to serve as the Deputy
Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, it was an interesting job. It did not
have a lot of ability to act, but we did a tremendous amount of
analytics. Every department, all the areas of DOD, all the
intelligence agencies, Homeland, FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], even, at times, Treasury and Commerce, when
they affected national security, we got briefings from all of
them. I took over 3,000 briefings. Fortunate to have on that
board General Mike Hagee, who was former Commandant of the
Marine Corps, as well as Charlie Allen, who was an intelligence
legend. I guess he retired from CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency] at 75.
So we had a real good group of people I was fortunate
enough to learn from, and all these problems and shortages and
issues were laid out for us. So it was an incredibly
educational job, very frightening, and I think that laid the
groundwork. You know, as a DOD intelligence contractor we have
had a lot of classified contracts, but this was so much
broader, and in some ways it was as broad of an education as
you can get.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that, and again, thank you
for your service on that board.
How can the military better harness American ingenuity and
innovation to get emerging technologies into the hands of the
warfighter faster?
Mr. Feinberg. You know, the Government does not truly
understand the private sector, and the private sector does not
understand the Government, okay. Our companies, I wish they
were more patriotic. They should be all in always helping us,
but they are not. I wish they could understand that there are
certain rules in government that are not made by the existing
sitting people in government but they are just there, that they
have to work by. I would love to get our private sector to be
more flexible.
But I do think it is people that really understand the
private sector, that understand how the boards think, how the
general counsel thinks, what the legal impediments, the
regulatory impediments are. We need to bring them into DOD,
have them lead in these conversations with our private sector.
The big tech companies have done great things for America.
They can do an awful lot more. We have to understand them, what
drives them, and go to them with those thoughts, and I hope
they will also be more flexible. There is a world of
opportunity for our private sector, like China is doing, way
better than us. So it is a big area we need to get at.
Chairman Wicker. Thanks for that. Another issue. You know
that the PPBE process, or the planning, programming, budgeting,
and execution reform project--we talked about that in the
office. Will you commit to implementing PPBE Reform Commission
recommendation endorsed by the Department?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. So if confirmed, do you commit
to frequently updating Congress on your plan for the Replicator
initiative and counter-UAVs at large?
Mr. Feinberg. I do.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you for that. That is an important
initiative. Senator Schmitt mentioned that earlier in regard to
the swarming technology and Replicator, so very important
program. I hope you will pay significant attention to that.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you again. Senator Slotkin.
Senator Slotkin. Thank you. Thank you for being here, Mr.
Feinberg. It was good to talk to you in my office. I think
there were a lot of things that we can agree on--acquisition
reform. If someone can crack that code we would be so much
safer and so much better off vis-`-vis China. Getting China out
of our supply chains for national security reasons. So I think
there are a lot of things where I appreciated your views.
My questions, as again I previewed in our conversation, are
just about you managing the Pentagon and managing this huge
enterprise, and particularly in you serving as the chief
operating officer of one of the biggest institutions in the
world, and allowing others outside the Pentagon to access
sensitive information.
I am a CIA officer, so I am putting these pieces together
in what we have seen, and I just have to say that we know that
DOGE is going into departments and agencies, collecting data.
We know that they are using AI-supported software, access
through the Microsoft Cloud to amalgamate that data. We know
that they are feeding sensitive information into that system
where they go, and that that information can be manipulated,
swept up in cyberattacks, leaked. It is personnel information.
It is sensitive information about our national security
architecture. We know that DOGE has reportedly brought in their
own servers, particularly into OPM, in order to handle this
data.
Mr. Hegseth has said that he welcomes DOGE into the
Pentagon. We know that they have started to look at places like
CIA because they just sent an unclassified email with CIA
recent hire names in an unclassified space. As a former CIA
officer, you just blew the cover of someone who was going to
risk their life abroad to protect our country.
So my question to you is what are you going to do when they
come to you and they ask for that data? Will you give DOGE
access to sensitive classified and personnel data of uniformed
military bases and locations across the world?
Mr. Feinberg. Yean, I mean, as Deputy, if I make it there,
we have to follow the laws, and we cannot allow classified data
that is not legal to be in other people's hands, to move. So we
will look at the laws closely. We will make sure that transfer,
if it happens, is done by the appropriate ways. Now, of course,
the President can decide what is classified and what is not,
and he can declassify. So, of course, always subject to what
the President wants to do and his wishes. However, I think it
is our job to look at this carefully and make sure it is done
properly.
Senator Slotkin. So separate from classified information,
although you have stated that the President can just declassify
things, will you give access to DOGE to sensitive personnel
information about our uniformed military and families,
particularly living abroad?
Mr. Feinberg. Make sure that all the necessary laws and
regulations are met.
Senator Slotkin. I just think, maybe it is because I come
from the national security world, do you know how appetizing it
is for our adversaries to have this data? Do you know how
appetizing it is for them to understand how to get at a
uniformed officer living in a dangerous place? It is not, for
me, actually a political issue. It is quite literally an issue
of safety and security, and as someone who has served abroad,
this is, to me, an issue of major vulnerability.
Mr. Feinberg. Senator, I will say, to your point, that in
my past I have had compartmentalized programs and access for a
long time, so I understand the issue completely, and I
understand your concerns, and I will look at it closely.
Senator Slotkin. I just think that, I do not doubt your
interest, but again, these are the conversations that are going
to happen in the dead of night, when no one here in our
Committee is watching. You are going to get a call at 7 p.m.
that a bunch of 25-year-olds, who have never seen classified
data in their life, who do not understand what personnel and
base data could do in the hand of our adversaries, are going to
get a hold of that. They are going to come to you, and you are
going to have to press the button. All I have to say is we are
counting on your, and our national security is counting on you
to push back, have a spine, and say no.
Mr. Feinberg. I understand the issue.
Senator Slotkin. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Slotkin. Senator
Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Feinberg,
congratulations on your nomination to serve as the Deputy
Secretary, and certainly I am happy we had a chance to meet in
my office and talk about a variety of issues, including some of
my concerns and focus areas for the Department of Defense. I
enjoyed learning about your priorities for DOD moving forward,
as well.
During our meeting you mentioned AI modernization and
strengthening signals intelligence, in particular, as some of
your top priorities. We certainly both share the same concerns
about China's technological abilities and PRC-sponsored cyber
actors that are really engaging against us on an ongoing,
regular basis.
So my question for you, sir, is if confirmed, what policies
or initiatives would you change or initiative to ensure the DOD
stays at the tip of the spear for signals intelligence, and
two, how will you ensure the continued focus on our foreign
adversaries like the PRC?
Mr. Feinberg. Signal intelligence is an interesting point.
I think there is significant risk in our ability to continue
being successful in that collection, that is probably a better
conversation for us to have in a SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility]. But I think that is an incredibly
important issue that has to be very carefully addressed.
On the PRC side, I am sorry, Senator, what was your
question? I apologize.
Senator Peters. Just how do we stay focused on them,
particularly with signals intelligence.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. I mean, it is a key collection tool. Our
methods and means and capabilities are good, but there is risk,
both from technology point of view as well as how we approach
it. Tough to talk about in a public forum. It is something I do
have a fair amount of knowledge on, and I would love to talk to
you in a different setting.
Senator Peters. Okay. Well, I would love to followup with
you on that, because I do believe it is critical, and I know it
is a priority for you.
Mr. Feinberg. Absolutely.
Senator Peters. We want to make sure that we have the
resources and the knowledge necessary to deploy effectively.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, and collection for us, especially on
foreign technologies and knowing where they stand is super
important to know what we have to spend. If we do not have
that, we are going to spend everywhere.
Senator Peters. Absolutely. So specifically artificial
intelligence is at the top of that list, as well. My question
for you is what policies or initiative would you believe will
lead us to ensure that our warfighting capabilities are
developed, not only for lethality, which is critically
important, but also deployed responsibly, lawfully, and with
appropriate safeguards for monitoring the procedures being used
by these weapon systems.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. How you use AI is a tough balance, tough
problem, because on one hand if you do not have effectively the
authorities to use it, we will not be as lethal. But then using
these authorities, at times, creates those kinds of problems.
Boy, that is a tough one. We have got to carefully look at it
in detail. For example, we are very strong on offensive cyber,
which is a great capability. Not as good on defense. What
should those offensive cyber capabilities, because that is a
great asset of ours.
I look forward to working with you and other Senators on
that right balance, and I think those conversations are best in
a SCIF.
Senator Peters. Very good. Another topic for us in the
future, if confirmed.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. Currently the Air Force is programmed to
lose about 1,000 planes without replacement. This will further
exacerbate the Air Force's current State of being the oldest,
smallest, and least ready perhaps in it history. Aviation
leaders are characterizing this move as, quote, a ``death
spiral,'' and commented that no enemy has done so much to harm
the Air Force than the impact of arbitrary spending reductions.
Yet crude aircraft were not exempt from Secretary Hegseth's
directive to scrub 8 percent from nonlethal programs. Luckily,
corps readiness as a defense industrial base were protected
areas in that cut. But I think it sends a conflicting message
on the future of the Air Force fighter planes and missions.
So my question for you, sir, is if confirmed, you will be
charged with executing Secretary Hegseth's priorities and
helping him align the Total Force toward the country's national
security objectives. Can you help give this Committee some
reassurance that the leaders at OSD understand the need to
continue investment in next-generation tactical fighters so
that we can improve readiness and, in the process, surpass our
adversaries.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, it is a really tough question. Some
believe that we can go straight to full autonomous systems, we
do not need a next-generation fighter, and we could use the F-
35 updated to meet, you know, as a strategy. Others feel we
really need the next-generation fighter, despite its expense
and difficulty.
I do not have the classified briefings, nor would I have
the classified briefings on China's J-20, which I think is an
important consideration in that. But I do pledge to you that if
confirmed, I will get right in the middle of those facts.
Ultimately, that might be the Secretary's or the President's
decision, but I look forward to working with you on that.
Senator Peters. But you plan to dive in and offer concrete
suggestions?
Mr. Feinberg. Absolutely, in my opinion what I think we
should do.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Sheehy. [Presiding.] I got a promotion. I have got
the gavel now. Thanks for serving the country yet again, and
being willing to do this. It is an incredibly important role,
so thanks for taking it on, and for your family because I know
it is a big sacrifice for them.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you for your service.
Senator Sheehy. Would you run your business like they run
the DOD right now?
Mr. Feinberg. No, but I have had my bad days, too.
Senator Sheehy. Yes, I think we all have. Well, first off,
our nuclear triad was designed and built in the 1950s and
1960s, and it is definitely suffering from I would call antique
equipment. What are your thoughts on how we can upgrade that
and make sure it is ready for a 21st century adversary?
Mr. Feinberg. Oh, boy, it is super important and tough one.
We are way behind. We are way over costs. We are way late. I
think we have got to bring the best manufacturing and
operational people in America onsite, have a heavy recruitment
so you can work with some of the great people in the Pentagon
to understand it and really have an enormous, detailed,
programmatic focus, operationally, line by line, what are we
going to do, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, in detail.
I do not have an immediate answer other than let's get the
right people on the ground. Let's go at it and look at it with
incredible urgency, put a plan together, and start getting at
it.
Senator Sheehy. I think one of the most important aspects
your role is going to be, the overhaul of our acquisition
system. I know it has been talked about ad nauseum today. But I
think very specifically there are products and capabilities
that exist on the shelf that could be bought commercially, that
have been developed at risk by private companies. I think one
of the biggest errors we have made in the last half century in
the American defense acquisition process is the Government is
paying to develop technologies based on specifications that are
often times based on past conflicts, and those specifications
lag battlefield need. By the time that equipment is fielded it
is either obsolete or just does not work in the first place.
So I would be curious, how do you intend to reform the
acquisition system, and are you going to be able to heavily
focus on commercially acquiring capabilities that already exist
and commercially acquiring technology that is on the shelf
already?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, there is a lot of opportunity and all
the different commercial capabilities. But some of the program
restrictions, requirements make it impossible for companies to
compete with larger defense companies who do not have that
capability. They end up being a sub, and they get stuffed as a
sub.
I think DOD really has to look past the prime contractor,
look into what the subs are doing, and take an active role in
that relationship, and not rely on the big contractors to run
these programs simply because they won the overall general
contracting bid.
We have got to get into the programs, the detail of each
program. What are our most important programs? What are we
missing? Why are we behind costs? What technologies does the
sub have that should be promoted, moved forward? As a
contractor, I got caught in the Valley of Death all the time--
better technology, no interest to the larger company to use it,
does not help them, not profitable. I think DOD can get in the
middle of that, to a degree. Not on everything. But there are a
lot of opportunities to spur the innovation and capabilities of
smaller companies, and we have got to do it.
Senator Sheehy. Looks like I have been demoted again. So
our defense acquisition paradigm is very focused on engineering
the highest quality technology and building it oftentimes in a
vacuum, to the highest engineering specifications. That has led
to a lot of high quality stuff, but oftentimes not a lot of
quantity. Our Navy is the smallest it has ever been in modern
history. Our Air Force, as we heard, is short on aircraft.
There is a quality all its own in quantity. The ability to
produce vast quantities to sustain a conflict and sustain
supplying our warfighters has a quality all its own. I think
the concept that quantity in and of itself creates quality, by
iteration and by constant fielding in a very close customer
feedback loop, because in this case the customer is not the
procurement officer. Our customer is the lance corporal or the
sergeant or the captain on the front line, fighting that enemy.
I think we have to reorient the DOD back to the fact that their
customer is not the contract officer. It is not the procurement
executive. It is not the PEO that is organizing. The customer
is the warfighter.
In the small time remaining I would love to hear your
thoughts, how do we return our ability to produce quantity
quickly, and how do we ensure that what we are producing is
what the warfighter actually needs?
Mr. Feinberg. I totally agree, and we better do this
urgently because developing autonomous capabilities, we are
going to need mass quantities of drones with a central brain.
If we do not achieve that, our national security is at risk.
So you have seen it from the private sector. I keep saying
it, and I apologize for repeating it, requirements are gold-
plated, rigid, inflexible. If a great technology or a great
capability is out there, and that company does not put in a
perfectly compliant bid, gets thrown out, versus a compliant
bid, which may not meet the technical needs, let some of the
program officers who are really good, let them run with it,
give them a little more autonomy. Let them make some decisions
on what is best for our country. Loosen up the requirement.
Make it more based on mission than technical. Less gold-plated,
quicker, more nimble. Let's look at what requirements we need
up front. The Deputy better get into those requirements of the
big programs in detail and not delegate that out to everybody
else. It all starts with requirements.
Senator Sheehy. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, Senator
Sheehy. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am looking at
a Fox News article dated February 24, 2022, and it features Fox
New commentator Pete Hegseth, and the headline is, ``Russia
invades Ukraine in largest European attack since World War
II.'' Can you tell me if Russia invaded Ukraine, Mr. Feinberg?
I mean, Mr. Hegseth said it.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I understand.
Senator Duckworth. It is easy. Yes or no. Did they invade
Ukraine?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not feel that I should publicly comment
in the middle of a tense negotiation when I am not privy to the
facts, to undermine what potentially----
Senator Duckworth. You are not privy to the fact whether or
not Russia invaded Ukraine and started a war that has lasted
for 3 years?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not privy to the details of what is
going on in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, what
the sensitivities are, what the President is trying to
accomplish. So I would be afraid to speak out of turn and
undermine that. I do have confidence that the President is very
skillful at this, and he will find the right way to help the
United States. He is the first guy that brought Russia to the
table to even begin a conversation, and I----
Senator Duckworth. The President is kneeling down to
Vladimir Putin. I cannot believe the commander in chief of the
greatest military on the face of the Earth, in my lifetime, is
bowing down to Russia. Let me just change the topic.
Mr. Feinberg. I do not----
Senator Duckworth. First I would like to echo my colleagues
in reinforcing my gratitude for the outstanding service of
General Brown, Admiral Franchetti, and the other dedicated
leaders who have been unfairly relieved in Trump and Hegseth's
political motivated purge of senior DOD leadership.
Let me emphasize, this is not normal. The President does
not typically replace nonpartisan generals and flag officers
with his preferred choices. In fact, a President seeking to
install loyalists among those who are supposed to give him the
best military advice is highly concerning and dangerous, both
to the good order and discipline of the uniformed services and
to the country as a whole.
Mr. Feinberg, we had a productive conversation the last
time we met, and I actually enjoyed it very much, and I
appreciate your frankness during that conversation. I would
like to reiterate my expectations for you, should you be
confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Given the udder lack
of qualifications of Secretary Hegseth, who himself admitted he
was going to hire people smarter than himself to help run the
Department, you will be the brains behind his leadership and
lack of experience. You will be solely responsible for managing
the budget and day-to-day operations of the DOD.
So it is imperative that you demonstrate to this Committee
and to the American people your ability to provide the
stability, expertise, and leadership necessary to ensure that
Secretary Hegseth does not run the Department aground with
indiscriminate budget cuts and unprecedented politically
motivated and deeply damaging purges of highly qualified senior
DOD leadership.
Mr. Feinberg, I have asked this of every nominee before
this Committee, including yourself in my offices. If President
Trump or Secretary Hegseth asked you to do something illegal,
will you refuse to obey an illegal order?
Mr. Feinberg. I won't obey an illegal order, and I do not
believe either the Secretary or the President will ask me to do
that.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Should you observe misconduct
that is unbecoming or unlawful, will you report it?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Like I said earlier, you are
it. You are second in command. The responsibility of an
executive officer in the military is not only to execute their
commander's vision but to be a voice for his staff and manage
the ins and outs of his command. Mr. Hegseth will not manage
the minutiae--you will.
Mr. Feinberg, I would like to know what are you going to do
if the Secretary of Defense orders the pausing of a program
critical to the readiness of the services?
Mr. Feinberg. I am sorry, Senator. Orders what?
Senator Duckworth. A pausing of a program that is critical
to the readiness of our military services.
Mr. Feinberg. Obviously, I work for the Secretary of
Defense. If he does something that I think is a real problem, I
will tell him. I will give him my view. Ultimately, I will
follow the chain of command and execute what he wants, as long
as it is lawful. I do think that he will make good decisions.
By the way, Senator, I also hope that I can hire, we can
hire, if confirmed, a ton of people, a heck of a lot smarter
than yours truly. It is great to bring in talent.
Senator Duckworth. It does not take a lot to be smarter
than the Secretary of Defense or be more qualified. That is a
low bar, indeed.
Many of our recent nominees have been talking about
hypotheticals, and I am glad that you are talking about some of
the decisions that are being made. Mr. Hegseth has already
shown a willingness to make some bad decisions. I mean, he
ordered DOD to hastily propose an 8 percent, across-the-board
cuts to the budget while exempting non-mission-essential
expenses like the DOD's activities on the southwest border.
Mr. Feinberg, the DOD is not a place where we can afford to
make mistakes. Are you going to allow an inexperienced team of
software company interns to look at our most critical defense
programs and make decisions that may impact our national
security? Who is going to be at the wheel?
Mr. Feinberg. I am sorry. You said----
Senator Duckworth. Are you going to DOGE in there and start
making cuts?
Mr. Feinberg. So at DOD, and the Secretary said this, we
are responsible for our own people. We are responsible for our
actions and policies. DOD is in charge of itself. So no, DOGE
is not in charge of DOD. We are looking forward to working with
Elon Musk. He has great expertise and talent. He has great
understanding of so many different things in DOD. He will
provide counsel and advice. We are looking forward to hearing
that.
But in the end, DOD is accountable to itself, must make its
own decisions for its people and its policies. Unless, of
course, the President says, ``I want you guys to do this or
that,'' and then, of course, we are going to do it.
Senator Duckworth. Unless it is illegal.
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator
Banks.
Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Feinberg, thank
you for your incredible sacrifice that you are willing to make
for our country and serving in this role.
There is already good news. President Trump asked Secretary
Hegseth and yourself and others to go to the Pentagon and shake
it up, make the Pentagon focused on the warfighter and
preparing to fight and win wars instead of focusing on itself,
the large bureaucratic blob that just day-to-day feeds itself
rather than the mission of what the Pentagon should be doing.
The good news is that after 4 years of a historic
recruitment crisis, the worst recruitment crisis in over 50
years of an all-volunteer force, the Army has already reported,
since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States,
those recruitment numbers have shot through the roof. What do
you make of that?
Mr. Feinberg. Well, I guess it does show there is a spirit,
that morale may be improving, based on the President's
leadership and what he has said to the American people.
Hopefully if we can pursue sound policies and execution and
making some changes to improve DOD, that will increase morale
more, that is what I have seen in the private sector, and we
will have an even greater recruitment drive in the future.
Senator Banks. Yes, I think that was well put. Lots of good
signs across the board, early signs of us succeeding in a big
way on recruitment.
One of the areas that I am concerned about, though, we
talked about this in my office, China is beating us in a lot of
areas, and one area is in hypersonics. Four years ago they
launched a hypersonic ballistic missile. It orbited the full
Earth, entered the Earth's atmosphere, narrowly missed its
target. We did not know about it until it reentered our Earth's
atmosphere.
We still have yet to launch a hypersonic missile of our
own. As we talked about in my office, Purdue University, Notre
Dame, in Indiana, Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center, on the
front lines of hypersonics research and development. How
important is more investment in hypersonics to the United
States?
Mr. Feinberg. Huge problem. We are underinvested. It is
essential for our national security. I do not understand the
thought process in the last Administration, which did not have
it at high importance. Again, I am not the person to be sitting
and making policies. My job would be to execute development,
faster development, with reasonable cost, and quickly, of
hypersonic capability.
But, at the same time, I mean, if you are totally reliant
on your nuclear capabilities, because tactically you are
slower, but you do not have hypersonics, that is a diplomatic
nightmare. From a nuclear perspective, if the enemy is faster
than you, boy, that is a problem. So we have got to get on
that.
Senator Banks. Yes, a big problem. You will be tasked with,
as Secretary Hegseth's Deputy, with shaking up the acquisition
system at the Pentagon. Have you put a lot of thought into
that? I mean, your background is so perfect to go there and
change the way acquisitions are done at the Pentagon. Have you
given it some early thoughts about what you are going to do on
day one to change it?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. You know, a lot of thoughts, and have
worked with a lot of DOD companies closely with the Pentagon,
so we have a decent knowledge of what is going on and how to
improve it.
Senator Banks. Good. You are incredibly qualified for this
role. I look forward to working with you and partnering with
you and Secretary Hegseth and others to make our military as
strong as it can possibly be. Your background is perfect for
the role. You have my full support. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Feinberg. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you. Are there further questions? If
not, let me just say, I think we have seen a display of super
competence and intelligence and capability today, and I feel
very, very good about the role that you will fill, Mr.
Feinberg.
Today's hearing is concluded. I want to thank our witnesses
for their testimony, and for the information of members,
questions for the record will be due to the Committee within 2
business days of the conclusion of the hearing. We are now
adjourned.
Mr. Feinberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Reed.
[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Stephen A. Feinberg by
Chairman Wicker prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
duties and qualifications
Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S. Code emphasizes that the
Deputy Secretary must be ``highly qualified for the position by reason
of background and experience, including appropriate management
experience.''
What background, expertise, and experience do you possess that
qualify you to serve as Deputy Secretary of Defense?
Answer. For the last 33 years, I have built my firm, Cerberus
Capital Management. Our main focus is buying underperforming assets and
companies and then working to drive operational and financial
improvements. We take on hard complex problems that require significant
operational and financial expertise. We have a large portfolio of over
$65 billion and have employed our turnaround strategies in hundreds of
investments. Taking on these types of tough challenges is difficult,
has significant risks, and is not a perfect science. So, people in our
business will have some failures, as we have had, but overall, our
track record has been very good over a long period of time.
I believe this operational background gives me valuable experience
necessary as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Our Department of Defense
faces very significant operational problems, delays, and cost overruns
in building ships, submarines, and aircraft, modernizing our nuclear
infrastructure, and developing a wide variety of military capabilities.
I have spent a career attacking these types of problems in the
companies and assets we have managed. Additionally, the Department of
Defense has very significant financial problems. It has poor financial
systems, struggles with understanding its cost structure, is unable to
achieve transparent and consistent financial reporting, and has great
difficulty in making accurate forward financial projections. These are
exactly the types of financial problems that I have attacked in the
companies and assets we have operated.
I served as Chair of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board in
the first Trump Administration. This board was effectively an
analytical organization that studied in great depth both intelligence
and U.S. national security shortages and problems and then provided
advice to the White House on potential remedies. The board had a very
strong team, including General Mike Hagee, former Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and Charles Allen, a legendary 50-year veteran of the
CIA. I took over 3,000 briefs during my chairmanship from all of the
intelligence agencies, most parts of DOD, Homeland Security, Commerce,
FBI, and most other parts of the U.S. Government that play a role in
national security. This very broad exposure to our national security
problems gives me a good sense of mission weaknesses and priorities in
DOD. That knowledge is essential for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
At Cerberus, we have bought dozens of companies involved in
national security, many of which worked for DOD. So, I have significant
experience with the Pentagon as a contractor and understand how it
functions and is organized. This practical, hands-on knowledge helps me
understand both the strengths and weaknesses of DOD and is invaluable
for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Question. Specifically, what is your experience in the management
of large, complex organizations?
Answer. At Cerberus, we currently own and have owned in the past
over three decades, in whole or in part, large complex companies and
assets in large complex structures. For example, today, one of our
holdings is Albertsons supermarkets, which is a national chain with
over 2,200 stores, 275,000 employees, and over $70 billion in revenue.
Today, we are one of the largest holders of non-performing loans in the
world, with a portfolio containing hundreds of thousands of assets and
a large complex multinational servicing operator managing the loans.
There are countless examples, past and present, that demonstrate
one of our core skill sets at Cerberus is managing large complex
organizations. A key to Cerberus's success over many decades has always
been our large multifaceted operational teams who drive the day-to-day
management of our companies and assets.
Question. If confirmed, and given your observations and experience,
what innovative ideas would you consider implementing with regard to
the structure and operations of the DOD?
Answer. As a DOD contractor over the past two decades, I have
developed numerous ideas that should be considered. If confirmed, I
will go very deep in due diligence to ensure these ideas are sound and
determine if they should be pursued. Of course, the Secretary of
Defense would have to support any implementation of these new concepts.
One idea would be to change how our DOD program requirements are
structured, working with the JROC. I believe our program requirements
need to be far less rigid, far less gold-plated, much easier to
achieve, less costly, and much quicker to meet. We also need to stop
changing the requirements once we set them. This is essential to be
able to not only meet our program demands but also to meet them on
time. This also enables us to have a much more nimble and agile
acquisition capability that would also attract new entrants and promote
more competition. This is not easy to achieve, but it can be done
effectively.
Another idea would be to effectively sponsor some of our best
private sector manufacturing companies to help them get into DOD. As we
know, we have too few fully capable product providers at DOD as there
has been way too much consolidation and too much concentration among
the big major defense players. This reliance on a few companies leaves
DOD very exposed. We have great manufacturing companies in the United
States who are excellent in developing and scaling capabilities who
aren't working with DOD today. There are creative ways under the FAR to
provide sole-source non-competitive opportunities for these large
companies to motivate them and make it possible for them to enter the
defense industry. Often these types of companies, despite their great
capabilities, are not conversant in DOD process or practices and
requirements and competing with our big defense majors is very
difficult. Being creative to give them help and a big jumpstart in non-
traditional ways may be frowned upon because this is a departure from
traditional competition-based acquisition policy. But it can be done
legally and is very necessary to bring a much bigger part of our large
industrial base into the defense industry. We have seen this in the
past during wartime, and this is so important today due to a dearth of
large manufacturing companies who know how to scale who are currently
servicing DOD.
These are a couple of the dozens of ideas I have developed that
need to be carefully looked at and determined if they are possible.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and what are your plans to address each challenge?
Answer. The biggest and most urgent challenge is to find a way to
meet our mission needs within a finite budget. We have so many gaps in
our national security capabilities and shortages in essential areas
today that put our Nation in a troublesome, risky position. We must
urgently prioritize the most important gaps and shortages and fix this
problem. We can achieve that, but it starts with leadership. We must be
realistic and transparent about these issues and, with great urgency,
put the necessary plans in place and execute them.
What makes this more difficult is the fact that our most capable
and toughest competition is the Chinese, who get funded not only by
their budget but also by their private sector, which often effectively
works for the government. So, the Chinese have better funding and an
all-in national commitment to becoming the most powerful and dominant
nation in the world. Closing all our gaps is very difficult because
China will keep moving the goalposts on us.
On top of all that, the United States has significant budget
constraints and currently doesn't have the necessary money to fix our
current weaknesses and compete effectively with China.
This is a very tough problem, but there are ways to attack it. We
must manage our own finances at DOD better to ensure we are getting the
maximum out of the dollars we have. We have to run the department much
more efficiently by cutting significant costs from unnecessary
departments inside DOD and from legacy programs still funded by DOD. We
have to develop much better systems and financial metrics to attack our
efficiency problems. There are significant dollars to be found through
better operations and decisionmaking.
Another big piece of the solution is getting far more help from our
private sector. We have the greatest private sector in the world, and
they can help us close the funding gap and the capability shortages. To
get the private sector more involved, we must focus on how to approach
the relationship. We need private sector people in government who fully
understand how our best private companies operate, what their legal and
regulatory issues are, what their shareholder issues are, how their
Board of Directors will respond to the government, and what it takes to
get their help and partnership. Finally, we need to understand what
issues and impediments the general counsels will bring and how we can
solve them. Yes, our private sector companies should be more patriotic
and easier to work with all the time. But that's not reality, and
through significant private sector expertise inside DOD, we can really
start driving great partnerships with the private sector.
Of course, there are so many other big challenges for the deputy to
involve themselves with, but progress in the above areas will go a long
way.
Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S. Code, provides that the
Deputy Secretary of Defense shall perform such duties and exercise such
powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. Except as expressly
proscribed by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense,
the Deputy Secretary has full power and authority to act for the
Secretary of Defense on any and all matters.
What do you perceive to be the duties and powers of the Deputy
Secretary most critical to the national defense?
Answer. The Deputy Secretary will perform duties and exercise
powers as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Historically the
Deputy Secretary has the primary responsible of managing the day-to-day
activities and management of the Pentagon, to include decisionmaking
related to budget and resourcing, acquisition, and research and
engineering. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary assumes the duties of
the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is unable to do so.
Question. What other duties and/or powers would you expect the
Secretary of Defense to prescribe for you, if confirmed?
Answer. In his hearing, Secretary Hegseth stated his intent to
designate the Deputy Secretary to manage the day-to-day activities
regarding budget and resourcing, acquisition, research and engineering,
and overall management of the Pentagon. If confirmed, I will ensure the
Department prioritizes fiscal accountability, efficiency and lethality
in accordance with President Trump's direction to achieve Peace through
Strength, and Secretary Hegseth's priorities of reviving the warrior
ethos; rebuilding our military by matching threats to capabilities; and
reestablishing deterrence by defending our Homeland.
conflicts of interest
Question. Federal ethics laws, to include 10 U.S.C. Sec. 208,
prohibit government employees from participating in matters where they,
or certain family members or organizations with which they have certain
relationships, have a financial interest.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to disclose any
potential conflicts of interest, including investments, business ties,
family relationships, or other connections that could be perceived as
influencing your decisionmaking?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, that
if a conflict of interest arises, you will recuse yourself from
participating in any relevant decisions regarding that specific matter?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit, without qualification, if confirmed, to
decisionmaking on the merits and exclusively in the public interest,
without regard to private gain or personal benefit?
Answer. Yes.
civilian control of the military
Question. What are your personal views on the principle of civilian
control of the military?
Answer. Civilian control of the military is a foundational
principle in democratic governance, ensuring elected officials maintain
control and authority over armed forces. This principle prevents
military leaders from exerting undue influence on political decisions,
which in turn safeguards democratic institutions and civil liberties.
I also believe that civilian oversight is meant to foster
transparency and public trust. It emphasizes accountability, because
military actions must align with the elected government's policies and
priorities. By maintaining a clear separation between military and
political realms, this principle promotes stability, and ultimately it
ensures that military power is used responsibly.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as the Deputy Secretary of Defense epitomizes the
fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces
embedded in the United States Constitution and other laws?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that decisionmaking in the
Department of Defense is in accordance with the United States
Constitution and applicable laws and aligned with elected officials'
policies and national interests. The Deputy Secretary reinforces the
principle of civilian control by integrating civilian perspectives into
budgetary and acquisition processes and ultimately ensuring that
military capabilities are developed and funded in a way that reflects
democratic governance and public accountability.
2022 national defense strategy (nds)
Question. The 2022 NDS outlines that the United States faces a
rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continued threat from rogue
regimes and global terrorism. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the NDS
Commission testified in July 2024 that China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea have formed an ``axis of aggressors'' supporting each other's
military aggression and illegal wars.
What is your assessment of the military threat posed by the
People's Republic of China?
Answer. Both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies pinpoint
the People's Republic of China as posing the most significant challenge
for the United States Department of Defense. The most threatening
scenario facing the Department is a sudden PRC attempt to seize Taiwan
by force. A successful invasion of Taiwan could severely damage U.S.
trade, alliances, and global influence.
Xi Jinping's stated goal of annexing Taiwan, his directive to the
Chinese military to be ready for such an operation by 2027, and China's
significant and ongoing buildup of capabilities designed to hold the
Joint Force at risk suggest that China poses a significant and growing
threat across the near, medium, and long term.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
Russia?
Answer. The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies both
recognize Russia as a threat to the United States and Europe, and
Russia also destabilizes several other regions around the world.
Despite facing international sanctions since 2014, which were further
strengthened during the first Trump Administration, Russia has
maintained a capable military, developed strategic capabilities, and
increased production of crucial military equipment.
Of particular concern is Russia's expansion of its nuclear arsenal,
posing a threat to the United States Homeland, as well as its tactical
nuclear weapons, which threaten its European and Asian neighbors.
Russia also presents challenges in cyberspace, information warfare,
undersea warfare, space, and the Arctic.
Question. What is your assessment of the military threat posed by
collusion among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea?
Answer. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korean cooperation in
Ukraine, and in other regions of the world, suggest a common interest
in weakening United States influence and alliances globally.
These countries share technology and sell military equipment
amongst themselves, circumventing or muting the impact of sanctions.
This collaboration allows them to develop their military capabilities,
fund operations, and challenge U.S. interests. Examples include the
transfer of drones between Iran and Russia, Chinese purchases of
Iranian oil, and North Korean special forces fighting alongside Russian
troops in Ukraine.
Question. Are there significant opportunities that, in your view,
DOD has been unable to leverage, or has leveraged only in part, since
the NDS was published in 2022? If so, how would you correct this
situation, if confirmed?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Defense has
not fully utilized the potential of our industrial and innovation bases
to deliver necessary military capabilities efficiently and at the
required pace. While there have been efforts to develop numerous,
dispersed, and expendable capabilities quickly, a shift in mindset is
crucial.
The DOD's focus needs to move away from expensive, overly
sophisticated platforms that take years to develop and are difficult to
replace, toward embracing rapid innovation and scalable production. If
confirmed, I will prioritize working to streamline the requirements and
acquisition process.
Question. In mandating changes to the process and form of the
National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the
National Military Strategy, Congress intended that these documents,
through the Defense Planning Guidance, would more rigorously drive
program planning of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and
Combatant Commands.
If confirmed, how would you ensure consistency between the guiding
strategies of the Department and its allocation of resources?
Answer. Timely issuance of the Secretary's strategic guidance to
the Department, including through the National Defense Strategy and the
Defense Planning Guidance, ensures that strategy is the driving force
behind all of the Department's resourcing decisions, and that U.S.
strategic priorities are infused throughout the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution cycle. If confirmed, I will support the
Secretary in the development of this guidance and in overseeing its
implementation across the Department.
dod readiness
Question. The United States now faces two near-peer competitors in
an aggressively militaristic China and revanchist Russia.
In your view, how do the readiness challenges facing the DOD today
and over the next 10 years impact the Department's requirements for
force structure investments?
Answer. Readiness is a multi-dimensional challenge that involves
tradeoffs between near-term and long-term priorities. Certain readiness
spending can increase our ability to maintain current operations but
spending to maintain high readiness in the present has a high
depreciation rate. If we do not expect to ``fight tonight,'' readiness
dollars might better be spent on long-term force structure and
modernization investments to ensure that we are ready for the advanced
challenges we may face in 5-7 years.
If confirmed, I will ensure that short-term readiness investments
are tailored to maintain a ready, deterrent force, but ensure that we
do not cannibalize our ability to modernize the joint force for the
future fight. I would direct the Military Departments and Services to
do a line-by-line review investments in mobility, logistics,
maintenance, and sustainment capabilities, as well as to understand
where increased ally and partner cooperation can enable us to optimize
our forward posture.
Question. If confirmed, how would you balance force structure and
readiness demands, particularly with respect to rotational forces in
the United States Indo-Pacific and Central Command areas of
responsibility (AOR), against the imperative to modernize or
restructure current forces to meet NDS requirements?
Answer. Continuous rotation of troops into AORs ensures that
forward forces are always at a high level of readiness. However,
constant rotation also imposes costs upon the Services as they balance
spending on readiness against spending on modernization. Given the
strategic environment, we must maintain high readiness in the Indo-
Pacific, and, if confirmed, I intend to carefully review which forces
are deployed forward.
Additionally, arrangements with Allies and partners can reduce the
readiness impact on forward forces. If confirmed, I will review the
force posture in CENTCOM to ensure that we have the right force mix
available and ready both in the AOR and over the horizon for the
dynamic situation in the region.
Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, how would
you prioritize the needs for continued readiness, force structure, and
modernization?
Answer. Balancing readiness, force structure, and modernization is
a constant challenge for the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I
would work to ensure first that investments in these three categories
are focused on warfighting and lethality to enhance the credibility of
our deterrent. We should be prioritizing resource allocation against
the most significant threats and particularly directed toward the
Department's plans to deal with those threats.
Question. How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD
components across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and
training to execute operational plans in support of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. I do not have access to classified briefs on operational
plans and cannot accurately assess current readiness levels, but I
understand that the Joint Force is organized, trained, and equipped to
execute operational plans and achieve our national objectives.
If confirmed, I will work with my staff, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders to review our operational
plans and our current states of readiness across these domains to
ensure that our forces can credibly fight and win our Nation's wars. I
believe it is critically important that our joint force maintains its
position as the most capable, lethal force in the world.
national security budget
Question. In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the National
Defense Strategy recommended that Congress provide real growth for
defense spending, at an annual average rate of three to 5 percent above
inflation.
Do you agree that sustained real growth in the defense budget is
necessary to achieve the aims of the current NDS without incurring
significant additional risk?
Answer. Achieving peace through strength requires investment and
sacrifice as a Nation. We must make the right investments to rebuild
our military, ensuring it remains the strongest and most lethal in the
world to deter adversaries considering actions that would be
detrimental to American interests.
Question. Many observers assert that the only way to force DOD
leaders to make the ``hard choices'' to divest of lower priority or
underperforming programs, is to constrain the Department fiscally.
If confirmed, by what standards would you measure the adequacy of
the defense budget?
Answer. I will measure the adequacy of our budget by its ability to
match threats to capabilities and reestablish deterrence by defending
the Homeland. If confirmed, I expect to lead a thorough review of
Defense Department spending, incorporating bottom-up and top-down
reviews to ensure that the President's priorities are funded within the
guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget.
If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to
improve efficiency and increase readiness by rapidly fielding
innovative technologies, reviving our defense industrial base,
reforming our acquisitions process, and passing a financial audit.
Question. Do you believe that this approach leads to more effective
and efficient decisionmaking by DOD leaders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Secretary of Defense
is presented with the most robust and accurate data to support the
President's Budget Request. The Department must operate within the
constraints set by Congress, but will actively seek areas for lawful
reduction and realignment to meet the Secretary's priorities for force
readiness and lethality. If confirmed, I will embrace fiscal restraint
as an opportunity to reduce wasteful spending and prioritize the most
effective programs and systems.
Question. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) process has remained fundamentally unchanged since its inception
more than half a century ago.
Do you believe the PPBE process results in the proper allocation of
resources according to the strategic priorities at the Department of
Defense?
Answer. The current geopolitical landscape demands speed and
agility. The current PPBE process was designed for a postindustrial
age. Today, we are in an age of rapidly changing technology where
technology is obsolete almost as soon as it is developed.
Not having yet been a part of the PPBE process inside the
Department, I looked through the Commission on PPBE Reform's Final
Report from March 2024 and the Department's PPBE Reform Implementation
Plan that was released recently in January by the former Administration
so that I could learn more about the process of PPBE, how that unfolds
inside DOD, and what reform efforts are currently underway. If
confirmed, I look forward to implementing applicable recommendations.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that allocation processes
align resources to President's Trump strategic priorities, delivering
capabilities that advance the goals of the Department, and closing gaps
through the rapid fielding of emerging technologies.
Question. What changes would you make, if any, to the PPBE process
to improve both resourcing decisions within DOD and information flow
about those decisions to the Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with OSD staff
principals to determine needed changes to the process to ensure we have
the strongest tie between strategy and resources to support the
Administration's priorities, while ensuring open communication between
the Department and Congress.
Question. The congressionally appointed Commission on PPBE Reform
released its final report in March 2024, and Congress has directed the
DOD to establish a cross-functional team to oversee the implementation
of the Commission's recommendations.
If confirmed, what would you do to implement the recommendations of
the Commission, and how would you work with Congress to ensure success?
Answer. I understand that the former Deputy Secretary of Defense
signed a PPBE Reform Implementation Report that was made publicly
available in January 2025, which provides an overview of the
Commission's recommendations the previous Administration wanted to
support.
I have read that as well as the PPBE Reform Commission's Final
Report from March 2024 and concur with many of its ideas to streamline
the PPBE process and provide additional flexibilities to the Department
of Defense while maintaining the appropriate level of congressional
involvement.
If confirmed, I look forward to understanding the efforts underway
in the Department, and working with my staff principals and Congress to
determine how those proposed reforms could improve the process, while
also pursuing other improvements to ensure DOD maximizes it allocated
resources to support our Defense priorities.
Question. Former Secretary of Defense Mattis stated, ``If you don't
fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.''
What are your views on the role of the State Department and other
non-DOD departments and agencies in achieving U.S. national security
objectives?
Answer. DOD will need to work with multiple U.S. Government
departments and agencies to advance national security priorities.
Diplomacy and economic and trade policy play important roles in
achieving our objectives. If confirmed, I would coordinate with my
colleagues across the Government to ensure resources collectively
support the national security objectives outlined by the President and
Secretary of Defense.
Question. Do you believe non-DOD departments and agencies have been
sufficiently resourced to appropriately contribute to U.S. national
security objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review other agencies
resourcing and provide recommendations to OMB.
vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff often partner to lead the Department in
addressing emergent issues and policy challenges that require the
integration of civilian and military expertise and perspective.
If confirmed, how would you structure your relationship with the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. A strong, productive relationship between the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff is critical to ensure we bring
the most lethal capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. If
confirmed, I will count on the Vice Chairman to provide me the best
military advice and faithfully represent the independent voice of the
warfighter.
Question. If confirmed, how would you allocate particular
responsibilities to the Vice Chairman and yourself as co-chairs of the
Deputy's Management Action Group?
Answer. My understanding is the Deputy's Management Action Group
[DMAG] is the key forum for making the difficult but necessary
resourcing recommendations and associated risk calculations that enable
the Secretary to realize the President's vision of Peace through
Strength.
If confirmed, I will use this body to provide the Administration's
guidance in our national defense and security and solicit from the
pertinent Department leadership how they will enact that guidance and
hear their concerns. As the body's co-chair, the Vice Chairman provides
an indispensable, independent warfighter's perspective within DMAG
deliberations.
Question. In your view, how could the Deputy's Management Action
Group be more effective in ensuring that DOD issues with resource,
management, and broad strategic and/or policy implications are
addressed in a manner that aligns with the Secretary of Defense's
priorities, planning and programming schedule? Please explain your
answer.
Answer. As the Department's principal governance forum for
management actions including planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution (PPBE), and strategic and policy guidance, the DMAG is
critically important. If confirmed, I will consult with the DMAG's co-
chair, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Secretary's Principal Staff Assistants to drive and assess compliance
with the President's and Secretary's priorities, foster alignment on
cross-cutting issues, threat assessments and trends, vulnerabilities,
and strategic matters and evaluate resource and policy implications.
Question. If confirmed, what, if any, recommendations would you
make to revise or refine the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
process?
Answer. If confirmed, modernizing and preparing the Department for
future contingencies will rank among my top priorities. The
warfighter's independent role in developing effective and interoperable
capabilities is vital. I am also aware of the multifaceted approach to
requirements, acquisition, and programming reform being championed by
Chairman Wicker and Secretary Hegseth to accelerate delivery of
capabilities to the warfighter.
If confirmed, I pledge to expeditiously reform how the Department
attains capability through the entire Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBE), Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) which includes many elements, including the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and Defense Acquisition System
(DAS) processes.
alliances and partnerships
Question. The 2022 NDS stresses that mutually beneficial alliances
and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition with,
deterrence of, and potential conflict against long-term strategic
competitors.
What is your view of the strength of our current alliances,
relationships, and partnerships, and the trust our partners have in the
willingness of the U.S. to meet its obligations? If confirmed, how
would you enhance that trust?
Answer. The United States boasts a formidable network of alliances
and partnerships, providing an unparalleled strategic edge through
collective defense with our Allies and partners. We must remain
committed to fostering balanced relationships, recognizing that strong
alliances require mutual contributions to thrive. Encouraging increased
defense spending and shared responsibility from our Allies and partners
is crucial to ensure fairness and sustainability. By fostering long-
term cooperation and consistent support, we can empower our Allies and
partners, bolster their capabilities, and strengthen the foundation of
mutual trust.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships in each combatant
commander's geographic AOR for long-term strategic competition?
Answer. I have not been briefed on classified material, but I
understand the challenge we face is not confined to one region or one
area of expertise. Every Combatant Command, whether focused on a
specific geographic area or a specialized military function, plays a
crucial role in maintaining our advantage. This will be achieved
through ongoing strategic planning, security cooperation, military
diplomacy, and other initiatives. If confirmed, I welcome the
opportunity to dive into the details and my focus will be on achieving
the objectives laid out in the National Defense Strategy.
Question. Industrial and technological integration between alliance
members and international partners are critical to ensuring
interoperability and economies of scale when modernizing and
maintaining combat forces.
Based on your experience, do you have any recommendations for how
DOD can leverage foreign military sales and industrial base integration
as a tool to improve our own military systems, as well as improve our
ability to fight by, with and through our allies and partners?
Answer. I have not been briefed on specific details, but I
understand DOD has taken steps to allow for more seamless integration
and interoperability with allied technology. Leveraging Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) to enable our Allies and partners to procure
interoperable and complementary capabilities improves our ability to
fight by, with, and through our Allies and partners. This
interoperability is enhanced through joint training and exercises.
Additionally, FMS can support our broader acquisition strategy by
driving down unit costs for both the United States and our Allies and
partners, enabling us to collectively deliver more advanced
capabilities than if a program was not designed for export. Industrial
base integration can also improve military systems and the production
of platforms and materiel, enabling us to bring in allied technology
and expertise as well as allied production capacity.
If confirmed, I will collaborate closely with the Under Secretaries
of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment and Policy to identify and
investigate opportunities to craft acquisition and allied and partner
force development strategies to leverage their expertise and capitalize
on economies of scale.
united states africa command (africom)
Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
required to compete for the vast majority of its United States Forces
in the global force management process.
What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
Campaign Plan, the NDS, and other emergency requirements?
Answer. It is my understanding that USAFRICOM has fewer allocated
and assigned forces than most other Combatant Commands and competes for
capabilities when it faces an emerging requirement. If confirmed, I
look forward to supporting review of our global force posture to
reassess whether existing missions and forces assigned to USAFRICOM are
sufficient to achieve our goals given the competitive geostrategic
environment.
Question. Are there any changes you would implement to the
allocation or assignment of forces to AFRICOM, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting review of our
global posture to assess whether existing missions and forces assigned
to USAFRICOM are sufficient to achieve our national defense strategy
goals given the competitive geostrategic environment.
Question. What should be the primary objectives of the DOD
specifically, and the United States more broadly, in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has two primary
objectives in the USAFRICOM AOR. The first is to degrade terrorist
groups' ability to strike the United States. The second objective is to
counter China's attempts to co-opt African governments in ways that
undermine United States strategic interests. There is not a military-
only solution to these major challenges. I recognize that to achieve
progress toward those two main objectives we must devise whole-of-
government strategies, coordinating DOD resources with the entire
interagency and Allies to address a variety of issues affecting Africa.
Additionally, the Department must increase its work with Allies in the
AOR to build operational independence so that our regional partners can
undertake missions on their own.
Question. What is your assessment of United States counterterrorism
strategies in the AFRICOM AOR? If confirmed, what changes, if any,
would you propose to these strategies?
Answer. My understanding is that the current United States
counterterrorism strategy in the USAFRICOM AOR is to disrupt violent
terrorist organizations, with continued focus on ISIS and al Qaeda
affiliate groups, especially those with the intent and capability of
posing a direct threat to the United States Homeland, U.S. personnel
and facilities, or vital U.S. national interests.
I understand the Department prioritizes working by, with, and
through Allies and regional partners to disrupt and degrade terrorist
threats. If confirmed, I will look for ways to further improve on our
efforts to cooperate with and strengthen Allies and regional partners
as we pursue our shared counterterrorism interests.
Question. What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of
Russia and China in Africa? In what areas, if any, do these oppose
United States and partner objectives?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia have both
deepened their engagement in Africa. The PRC has sought to bolster
relationships with African countries and their militaries and increase
investment in Africa, and where possible create dependencies. The PRC
has looked to gain African countries' support for its global policy
objectives. Conversely, Russia uses irregular means to assert influence
in Africa, including through paramilitary deployments, seeking to
create dependencies on Russian military assets.
My understanding is that many of these activities are not in line
with United States and partners' shared objectives for stability and
security. For example, the PRC's lending practices create economic risk
for African countries. Russian private military companies and
paramilitary forces have contributed to instability within Africa. Both
use engagement in Africa in ways that prioritize their own gain.
united states central command (centcom)
Question. In your opinion, what are the key United States national
security interests in the Middle East? Please explain your answer.
Answer. In my opinion, the key United States national security
interests in the Middle East are: 1) preventing, deterring, and
disrupting credible terrorist threats to the United States Homeland, 2)
ensuring the free flow of goods and trade 3) acting as a security
enabler and integrator for our partners and Allies, 4) preventing Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and 5) ensuring the defense of Israel.
It is my understanding that counterterrorism remains a high
priority national security interest in the CENTCOM AOR. Many of the
terrorist groups that have either the intent or capability to strike
the United States Homeland or United States personnel have their
ideological, financial, or operational base originating in the Middle
East, as we have seen in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
The United States has strong partners in the Middle East with whom
we have shared interests, long-standing cooperation, and substantial
economic and technological trade ties. The Department has a number of
mechanisms through which we can provide security cooperation, Foreign
Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, joint training and
exercises, and forward presence to strengthen the ability to disrupt
and defeat shared threats.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of Defense stands
ready to support the President's National Security Presidential
Memorandum on Iran.
Question. In your opinion, to what extent does achieving United
States national security interests in the Middle East require a
continuous United States military presence, and in your view is the
current United States Force presence appropriately sized? Please
explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department maintains the
capability to surge forces anywhere in the world if needed during a
crisis. As a result, United States Forces are able to execute multiple
missions in the Middle East--to include deterring Iran and its proxies.
If confirmed, I will work with OSD components, the Joint Staff, and
the combatant commanders to review the global U.S. Force posture and
reassess the optimal level of forces assigned to CENTCOM in order to
achieve our regional and national defense strategy goals, given the
evolving geostrategic environment.
Question. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing
with U.S. partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the
CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The United States collaborates effectively with multiple
Allies and partners in the region as well as European Allies to counter
threats emanating from within the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed, I would
seek increased opportunities to enable regional partners to counter
terrorist groups and defend their sovereign territories. Our partners
can, and must, do their part.
If confirmed, I would also look to increase cooperation with
regional and European partners in countering the Iranian Threat Network
and the Iranian missile and UAV threat. Joint missions, security
cooperation, missile defense integration, and capacity building are
effective mechanisms for strengthening the ability of our Allies and
partners to counter threats within the AOR.
Question. What threat does Chinese and Russian involvement in the
Middle East pose to United States operations and interests and to what
extent does a continuous United States presence counter their
involvement? In your view, what other policy tools might be useful in
this regard?
Answer. China is working to expand its influence and presence in
the Middle East, increase PRC-origin defense sales, and put its thumb
on the scales of the global energy markets. China's efforts to expand
their technological and defense cooperation in the region have the
potential to put at risk sensitive United States technology and our
national security. The Department must be vigilant to ensure these
activities neither pose a counterintelligence risk to United States
Forces or operations nor undermine United States security partnerships.
Russian involvement in the region has had negative implications for
United States interests in the region, two examples being Russia's
strategic partnership with Iran and previous support for the Assad
regime. Russia is on its back foot in the region after the fall of the
Assad regime, but we must remain vigilant on this front.
The United States can counter negative PRC and Russian involvement
in the region through strong partnerships and empowerment of our Allies
and partners across a full spectrum of activities, to include security
assistance, regional integration efforts, and military cooperation
through training, exercises and other activities.
Iran
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
United States national security interests with respect to Iran? What is
the role of the United States Military in this strategy?
Answer. The Department of Defense must stand ready to support the
President's National Security Presidential Memorandum on Iran, which
establishes that: 1) Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and
intercontinental ballistic missiles; 2) Iran's terrorist network should
be neutralized; and 3) Iran's aggressive development of missiles, as
well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should
be countered.
Question. What is your assessment of the current military threat
posed by Iran? What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iranian
proxy groups?
Answer. Iran poses a significant threat to the security of the
United States and its Allies and partners. Last year, Iran launched two
major missile and drone strikes against Israel from Iranian territory.
In addition to Iran's conventional military, Tehran also leverages
proxy forces to launch kinetic attacks and advance their interests
across the Middle East. These forces threaten both United States
Forces, as well as those of our partners. Iran also continues to inch
closer to gaining a nuclear weapons capability, which is unacceptable.
Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would threaten United States
interests and partner security, provide Iran a shield behind which they
could engage in more aggressive proxy activities, and increase the risk
of nuclear accidents or miscalculation.
Question. In your view, are United States Military Forces and
capabilities currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter
and, if necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department maintains the
capability to surge forces anywhere in the world if needed during a
crisis. As a result, United States Forces are able to execute multiple
missions in the Middle East--to include deterring Iran and its proxies.
It is my understanding that the Department is in the process of
reviewing the global U.S. Force posture to reassess the optimal force
posture for CENTCOM to achieve our national defense strategy goals,
given the evolving geostrategic environment.
Question. In your opinion, can Iran be sufficiently deterred
through military force alone? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I believe the Department must continue to support the
President's stated intent to address Iran's malign activity through
non-military tools, including economic pressure and diplomacy. At the
same time, it is the Department of Defense's role to ensure the
President is armed with the best possible military options. The
Department must remain prepared to present the President with options
to deter Iran's malign activity and respond militarily if directed.
Israel
Question. In your opinion, what are United States national security
objectives in Israel?
Answer. Strongly supporting Israel's ability to defend itself is a
key United States national security objective. It is my understanding
that the Department of Defense supports Israel's security by helping
facilitate security assistance to Israel, extensive military
cooperation through CENTCOM channels, and through coordination with the
Israelis to help secure the release of hostages held by Hamas, to
include American citizens.
Question. In your opinion, what should DOD's role be in supporting
Israeli efforts to degrade and defeat Hamas?
Answer. Hamas's horrific and unprovoked attack on Israel on October
7, 2023, killed over 1,200 innocent people, including 46 Americans. The
United States should support Israel by providing the security equipment
and munitions that Israel needs to defeat Hamas and never again allow a
Hamas-style attack on Israel.
Syria and Iraq
Question. What is your understanding of current United States
strategy and objectives in Syria? How have those objectives changed, if
at all, in light of the recent fall of the Assad regime?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department's primary
objective in Syria is to support the enduring defeat of ISIS. If
confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to review our objectives in
the region in light of the fall of the Assad regime.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in supporting a
peaceful democratic transition in Syria? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The President has stated his position that the United
States should not get involved in the political affairs of Syria. If
confirmed, I will support the orders from the Commander-in-Chief. The
United States military remains focused on the defeat of ISIS and other
threats to the Homeland. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
Department continues to work with interagency partners to ensure
alignment and support on goals outside of the Department's direct
jurisdiction.
Question. From a DOD perspective, what must be done to ensure the
enduring defeat of ISIS? What non-military efforts are needed for the
enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. Ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS requires a whole-of-
government effort. The United States military's role in the region
supports whole-of-government counterproliferation strategies, defense
of United States personnel and bases in the region, defense of Israel,
deterrence of regional conflict, and counterterrorism operations.
United States military counterterrorism operations rely on the
intelligence community to maintain awareness of ISIS' goals and
activities as they adapt to the current environment. Diplomatic efforts
are also necessary to push those countries whose citizens are living in
displaced persons camps and detention facilities in Syria to repatriate
their citizens.
Question. What do you perceive to be the role of the Syrian
Democratic Forces and Iraqi Security Forces in countering ISIS and al
Qaeda?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department has worked with the
SDF for years to help counter terrorist elements in eastern Syria.
These partners have historically played a critical role in our efforts
to counter ISIS and al Qaeda. If confirmed, I will seek classified and
unclassified briefings on the current role of these forces.
Question. In your view, should United States troop levels in Syria
be tied to the achievement of certain conditions on the ground? If so,
what conditions would you factor into your recommendation to the
President on future troop levels in Syria?
Answer. The deployment of United States troops in any foreign
country should always be tied to specific objectives and conditions,
and this principle would guide any of my potential recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense about troop deployments to any country.
Question. What is your understanding of the current United States
national security objectives in Iraq?
Answer. It is my understanding that current DOD objectives in Iraq
support the enduring defeat of ISIS and other violent extremist
organizations through a strategic partnership with the Government of
Iraq.
Question. In September, the United States-Iraq Higher Military
Commission announced the transition of the global coalition to defeat
ISIS to a bilateral security relationship with the Government of Iraq.
However, many of the details of such a transition are still being
negotiated with the Iraqi Government.
In your view, what should the guiding principles for DOD's presence
in Iraq moving forward? Do you assess that United States Forces should
remain in Iraq beyond next September? Why or why not?
Answer. The deployment of United States troops in any foreign
country should always be reassessed continually based on changing
objectives and conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I would support
a thorough analysis along these lines prior to making a recommendation
to the Secretary.
South Asia
Question. In your opinion, what are United States national security
objectives in Afghanistan, and what is your understanding of the
current strategy to achieve them?
Answer. The United States has a vital national interest in ensuring
terrorism that threatens the United States Homeland does not emanate
from Afghanistan. It is my understanding that the Department's role in
pursuing this objective is executed through Operation ENDURING SENTINEL
(OES), the Afghanistan counterterrorism mission. The Defense
Intelligence Agency has publicly reported to Congress, via the DOD
Inspector General's quarterly report on OES, that ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-
K) maintains the intent and capability to strike outside of its
traditional area of operations in South Asia and is probably committed
to enabling attacks within the United States.
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and our Allies to
assess whether this strategy is effective and sufficiently resourced.
Question. In your view, is the United States properly postured to
counter ISIS-Khorasan and al Qaeda and related groups in Afghanistan?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to understand more clearly our
posture and support the Secretary on any changes that would be
necessary to achieve our national objectives to counter ISIS-Khorasan,
al Qaeda and other related groups in Afghanistan.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to United States relations with Pakistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense's
global posture review. I understand that this review will reassess
whether existing missions and the forces assigned to CENTCOM can meet
our needs.
Question. In your view, what tools and options are available to the
United States to ensure that Pakistan is not used as a sanctuary for
militants and violent extremist organizations (VEOs)?
Answer. The President has made it clear that his highest priority
is to ensure the safety and security of the United States and the
American people. If confirmed, I will seek briefings on sanctuaries for
militants and violent extremist organizations and the threats they pose
to the safety and security of the United States and the American
people.
united states european command (eucom)
Implementation of the 2022 NDS
Question. Do you believe the deterrent posture in Europe is
sufficient to support the 2022 NDS and deter further Russian aggression
in Europe?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing our global
posture to assess whether existing missions and forces assigned to
EUCOM are sufficient to achieve our national defense strategy goals
given the competitive geostrategic environment.
Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
shortfalls in current United States posture that affect the United
States ability to carry out the EUCOM Theater Campaign Plan?
Answer. It is my understanding that the EUCOM Commander designs the
Theater Campaign Plan based on NDS priorities and the forces made
available through the Global Force Management process, and that
campaign plan is expected to be executable with those forces. If
confirmed, I look forward to reviewing our global posture to assess
whether existing missions and forces assigned to EUCOM are sufficient
to achieve our national defense strategy goals given the competitive
geostrategic environment.
Question. In your assessment, does the United States have
sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend
critical infrastructure in EUCOM? If not, what are the areas of highest
risk?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support a global force posture review
by the Secretary to reassess whether existing missions and forces
assigned to EUCOM are sufficient to achieve our national defense
strategy goals given the competitive geostrategic environment.
Question. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make
to other United States capabilities or force posture in Europe to
execute the NDS more effectively?
Answer. If confirmed, once a global force posture review is
conducted and a new NDS is released, I would recommend that the
Secretary direct the Department to align forces with the findings of
both reviews and any other relevant direction from the Commander in
Chief.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
Question. Since establishment of the EDI in 2014, the NDAA has
authorized billions of dollars each year for EDI investments to support
stability and security, and to deter Russian aggression.
In your view, has EDI improved United States and allied capability
and capacity to deter Russian aggression in the European theater?
Answer. EDI investments since 2014 did not deter Russia's further
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. If confirmed, I would support a
review of the allocation of resources across the different theaters of
conflict and recommend investments that best protect United States
interests, deter conflict, and leverage the investments of our Allies
to provide for their own defense.
Question. Do you believe continued, robust dedicated funding for
programs under EDI's five lines of effort is required to support
implementation of the NDS in Europe?
Answer. It is my understanding that the EDI's lines of effort--
increased presence, exercises and training, enhanced prepositioning,
improved infrastructure, and building partner capacity--have bolstered
the capabilities and readiness of United States Forces in EUCOM, of
NATO Allies, and of regional partners. If confirmed, with the
Secretary, I would review the resource requirements necessary to
achieve our national security objectives in Europe, with an eye toward
increasing European Allied capabilities and leadership.
NATO Alliance
Question. In your view, how important to United States strategic
interests is the United States commitment to its obligations under the
North Atlantic Treaty, especially Article 5?
Answer. The United States has demonstrated over decades the
strength of its commitment to collective security, both in maintaining
the world's most lethal military force and in deploying U.S. Forces to
maintain deterrence and defeat threats to our collective security.
If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that our NATO Allies
demonstrate that their commitment to the Washington Treaty be as strong
as ours. While the United States remains committed to NATO, it is time
for more European security leadership for the defense of Europe.
Question. What do you view as the essential strategic objectives of
the NATO Alliance and what do you perceive to be the greatest
challenges in meeting those objectives?
Answer. The strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance remain to
prevent large-scale conflict in Europe, deter nuclear and non-nuclear
aggression, and defeat threats to member states should deterrence fail.
Question. NATO has long-held the position that, ``as long as
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your
view, do you believe this principle requires the United States to
continue to deploy nuclear weapons in NATO countries?
Answer. NATO's status as a nuclear alliance serves to deter
conflict and coercion against the alliance. It is my understanding that
the United States has maintained nuclear weapons in NATO countries for
several decades and is a foundational tenant of the collective nature
of the alliance. At a time when the NATO Alliance faces nuclear saber-
rattling from Russia, the presence of United States nuclear weapons
serves as an important political, strategic, and military link between
America and its European Allies.
Question. The dual-hatted position of the Commander of EUCOM as
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) allows United States
and Allied forces to be highly integrated in Europe. Similar dual-hat
responsibilities have been integrated to other senior United States
Commanders, including Commander of United States Air Forces Europe and
Africa as Commander NATO Allied Air Command (AIRCOM)--and Commander
United States Army Europe and Africa as NATO Allied Land Command
Commander.
What is your assessment of the benefits of these dual-hatted
structures to allied cohesion and integration?
Answer. It is my understanding that dual hatting of these roles can
be an effective way to integrate disparate organizations and, in some
cases, a more efficient use of current resources. If confirmed, with
the Secretary, I would review dual-hatted structures to understand if
they serve our national security interests.
Russia
Question. In your view, is Russia a threat to the United States and
its allies?
Answer. There is no question that Putin is willing to use military
force to accomplish his geopolitical agenda. The United States should
actively deter Russia from acting against vital United States
interests.
Question. In your view, which EUCOM and NATO activities most deter
Russia and mitigate the Russian threat to NATO Allies and partners?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support a global force posture review
to assess the effectiveness of existing missions and forces assigned to
EUCOM, and whether they are sufficient to achieve our national defense
strategy goals given the competitive geostrategic environment.
Question. What aspects of United States and NATO force posture do
you assess as having the most significant deterrent effect on Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, upon completion of the global force posture
review, I would support the Secretary in making recommendations to the
President regarding our future deterrent posture in Europe.
Question. In your view, what should DOD do to counter Russian
malign influence in Europe?
Answer. Countering malign influence requires a whole-of-government
approach, performed in concert with Allies and partners, that goes
beyond conventional military operations. If confirmed, I would support
a broader interagency effort to counter malign influence as part of an
integrated national level Russia strategy.
Ukraine
Question. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale,
unprovoked, and illegal invasion of Ukraine.
How do you assess the trajectory of the conflict and the role that
the Department of Defense should play?
Answer. President Trump has made it a priority to end the war as
quickly as possible. If confirmed, I will help ensure that DOD supports
the President's negotiating team in pursuing that goal.
Question. Do you believe it is important for the United States to
continue providing security assistance to Ukraine, including
potentially after the conclusion of the war, as a means to help Ukraine
deter and defeat Russian aggression?
Answer. President Trump has stated that all options, including the
provision of additional United States security assistance to Ukraine,
are on the table as part of negotiations. If confirmed, I will ensure
that the Department of Defense is prepared to support the development
of a wide range of options for the President and his team to consider
as part of negotiations with Russia and Ukraine.
Question. What do you see as the role of United States and allied/
partner security assistance in building the capabilities and capacity
of Ukraine to meet its military requirements to defend its sovereignty
and territorial integrity in the short, medium, and long-term?
Answer. The President and Secretary of Defense have made it clear
to our European NATO Allies that they must take the lead in supporting
Ukraine. If confirmed, I would support the Secretary's efforts to press
European Allies and partners to increase their security assistance
commitments to Ukraine and advance the President's efforts to negotiate
a durable peace.
united states indo-pacific command (indo-pacom) and china
Question. Is the current United States Force posture in the Indo-
Pacific region sufficient to support the NDS? How would you propose to
restructure United States security posture in the Indo-Pacific to
counter Chinese aggression, if confirmed? Please explain your answer.
Answer. We must accelerate efforts to enhance United States Force
posture and increase operational capabilities in the Indo-Pacific
region, given China's accelerated military modernization and the urgent
need to reestablish deterrence. If confirmed, I will focus on
prioritizing efforts that reestablish deterrence vis-a-vis the PRC.
Question. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD
could make to implement the NDS and improve the military balance in the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage stakeholders across the
Department to urgently advance the Administration's goal of
reestablishing deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. This will include
working both within the Department and with Congress to determine
whether there is appropriate funding for strengthening our posture in
the region, and whether the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is sufficient
to achieve our aims.
Question. Do you believe that continued, dedicated funding for the
Pacific Deterrence Initiative is required to support implementation of
the NDS in the Indo-Pacific? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to ensure
there is sufficient funding for strengthening our posture and
reestablishing deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, I would
work with all other relevant stakeholders across the Department to
determine whether the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is sufficient to
achieve our military goals in the Indo-Pacific region.
Question. Congress mandated the establishment of the Joint Force
Headquarters at INDOPACOM. What is your view of INDOPACOM's progress in
establishing the Joint Force Headquarters? What are the requirements
for the Joint Force Headquarters at INDOPACOM to fully execute its
function?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to review the
status and requirements of establishing a Joint Force Headquarters.
Question. Can you describe the strategic and operational importance
of Guam to executing INDOPACOM's plans and operations in the region?
Can you describe the State of military infrastructure and facilities on
Guam in the wake of Typhoon Mawar? Do you agree that it is critical for
Guam to be reconstructed in a resilient manner so that the United
States Military can utilize Guam as a power projection platform in the
Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Typhoon Mawar, which struck Guam on May 24, 2023, caused
extensive damage to military and commercial infrastructure across the
island. I understand that the damage affected Andersen Air Force Base,
Naval Base Guam, and Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz, and now requires
significant repairs due to high winds and sustained rainfall.
While not fully apprised of the details, I understand that Congress
appropriated $3.7 billion in supplemental funding for recovery efforts,
and that the restoration process is ongoing.
The strategic importance of Guam necessitates a rapid and resilient
approach to reconstruction. The island serves as a key power projection
platform for the United States Forces in the Indo-Pacific region and
hosts significant Air Force and Navy capabilities that support
operations across the area. Ensuring the continued functionality of
Guam's military assets is vital to maintaining United States influence
and deterrence in the region.
If confirmed, I will ensure the reconstruction effort not only
restores Guam but also enhances the resilience of DOD operations to
future all-hazard risks. This effort could include the use of advanced
engineering practices, changes in the generation and distribution of
energy, and collaboration with the government of Guam.
Question. Do you support the efforts by the United States and Japan
to establish a modernized command-and-control structure, to include an
improved United States Forces Japan? Do you agree that the Department
of Defense should move as fast as possible to establish a new command-
and-control structure with Japan, considering its strategic importance
as a capable ally in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. Japan is a critical ally in the Indo-Pacific region, and we
must work together to strengthen our deterrent posture in the Indo-
Pacific region, including through developing joint warfighting
capabilities and enhancing interoperability. If confirmed, I will
consider the best command-and-control structure for United States
Forces in Japan to enable close coordination within our Alliance.
China
Question. The 2022 NDS describes the People's Republic of China
(PRC) as ``the most comprehensive and serious challenge to United
States national security'' and states ``The PRC seeks to undermine
United States alliances and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
region, and leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic
influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and
military footprint, to coerce its neighbors and threaten their
interest.''
How would you characterize the current United States relationship
with China?
Answer. As expressed in the 2018 NDS and 2022 NDS, China is our
pacing threat. I agree that China is ``the most comprehensive and
serious challenge to United States national security.'' Through a
historic military buildup, China has developed capabilities for the
specific purpose of being able to exercise military power in the Indo-
Pacific region and deny the ability of the United States to project
power into the region. If confirmed, I will work with urgency to
strengthen our force posture in the Indo-Pacific region to deter PRC
aggression.
Question. What is your assessment of the current State of United
States-China military-to-military relations? What do you believe should
be the objectives of United States-China military-to-military dialog?
What are the limitations on this kind of dialog?
Answer. United States-China military-to-military engagements are
important channels to reduce risk and manage crisis. However, China
seizes upon these important dialogs as leverage by offering or
canceling senior-level engagements to reward or punish United States
behavior in hopes of compelling changes in United States policy.
United States military-to-military dialog with China should focus
on clarifying United States policy and correcting China's
misperceptions to minimize the risk of unintended escalation in a
crisis. These dialogs should be conducted on a selective basis to
minimize the chance they are used for political leverage.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program? In what technology areas are you most concerned about the
erosion of United States advantages?
Answer. The People's Republic of China has for decades made
strategic investments in its military capabilities to exercise military
power in the Indo-Pacific region and deny the ability of the United
States to project power into the region. These investments have been
made across all warfare domains and in capabilities symmetrical to
those possessed by the United States--air power, aircraft carriers,
submarines, missiles, nuclear weapons, and space-based capabilities--as
well as asymmetric and next-generation capabilities that they hope will
offset our conventional advantages.
If confirmed, I will review relevant classified and unclassified
material to fully understand China's military advances.
Taiwan
Question. How do you assess the current military balance across the
Taiwan Strait? What do you believe should be the priorities for United
States Military assistance to Taiwan? Do you think Taiwan is making
appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities and if not, what
changes would you recommend?
Answer. China's military modernization over the last several
decades has been executed with a focus of being capable of taking
Taiwan by force if necessary and resisting a potential United States
intervention. While it has made some progress, Taiwan still needs to
significantly increase its defense spending and prioritize the
acquisition of asymmetric capabilities. If confirmed, I will support
the provision of critical United States support for Taiwan,
particularly assistance that provides asymmetric capabilities that
align with a crisis scenario, and pressure Taiwan to urgently increase
its defense spending and accelerate reforms.
Question. Some have argued that the United States should explicitly
State that we would respond militarily to any Chinese use of force
against Taiwan as a means to deter such actions. In your view, what
would be the benefits and risks of such a policy change?
Answer. The United States presently maintains its longstanding
commitments as outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act, Three Communiques,
and the Six Assurances. If confirmed, I will review our current posture
with the Secretary of Defense.
The Korean Peninsula
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by North
Korea to regional and global stability?
Answer. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) poses a
clear threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula, in the Indo-Pacific
region, and across the globe. It remains intensely focused on expanding
its illicit nuclear weapons program and improving its ballistic and
cruise missile programs, while expanding its malign cyber activities.
The DPRK's longstanding chemical and biological weapons capabilities
remain a threat. Its recent deployment of combat forces to Russia is
also of concern. DPRK capabilities pose a particular threat to the
safety and security of United States Allies that host U.S Forces in the
region. If confirmed, I will review the latest classified and
unclassified briefings on the DPRK threat.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD should
take to improve United States and allied defenses against North Korea's
nuclear and missile capabilities?
Answer. Improving missile defense systems, especially for the
United States Homeland, will be important to countering the growing
DPRK threat. We must also seek to stem the growth of DPRK nuclear and
missile arsenals. If confirmed, I will review classified and
unclassified materials and advise the Secretary if additional steps
need to be taken.
Question. Do you agree that landmines have played a critical role
in deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula? Do you support
continuing efforts by DOD to modernize related terrain shaping
capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the Commander of United
States Forces Korea and look forward to working with the Committee to
address any concerns.
India
Question. If confirmed, how would you enhance the overall defense
relationship between the United States and India? What priorities would
you establish?
Answer. As President Trump reaffirmed, the United States-India
partnership is anchored by a deepening convergence in our strategic
interests. Our defense partnership has seen transformative growth
through military exercises, defense sales, and strategic dialog. If
confirmed, I would continue to bolster our defense partnership with
India through operational coordination, information sharing, and
defense industrial and technology cooperation.
united states northern command (northcom)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Question. Civil authorities may request DOD support for domestic
disasters and certain counter-drug operations as well as in managing
the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass
destruction.
In your view, are the procedures by which Federal, State, and Local
agencies request DOD support efficient, effective, and timely?
Answer. I understand that the procedures by which DOD receives
requests from civil authorities, or qualifying entities, allows for
appropriate coordination of the request across DOD. DOD should
encourage its partners to, where possible, work with DOD in advance of
a formal request to ensure clarity of requirements use of appropriate
legal authorities.
Question. What factors should be considered in determining whether
DOD will provide support to a civil authority?
Answer. I understand that all requests for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities are evaluated based on: Legality (compliance with the law);
Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces);
Risk (safety of DOD forces); Cost (including the source of funding and
the effect on the DOD budget); Appropriateness (whether providing the
requested support is in the interest of the Department); and Readiness
(the impact on DOD's ability to perform other primary missions).
transnational criminal organizations
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are engaged in a
diversity of illicit activities, including money laundering, human
trafficking illicit financial flows, illegal trade in natural resources
and wildlife, and trade in illegal drugs, precursors and weapons. These
activities reach not only the entirety of the Western Hemisphere, but
increasingly throughout the world.
In your assessment, how has the threat to the United States from
transnational criminal organizations evolved?
Answer. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are responsible
for record levels of violence in Mexico and throughout the region. In
recent years, regional TCOs have expanded their sources of revenue and
leveraged new technology such as drones and artificial intelligence,
almost certainly to increase their resilience. This has allowed
regional TCOs to amass levels of power that directly threaten local
citizens, regional governments, and the United States.
I strongly support the Administration's whole of government
approach, including robust Department of Defense involvement, to
appropriately prioritize the threat posed by TCOs. The recent
designation of six cartels and two transnational gangs as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations will help counter TCOs by limiting their
financial resources.
If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense in
prioritizing this threat, consult with Congress, and make a final
recommendation for the way ahead. Regardless of the outcome, we must
continue to ensure safety of the Homeland.
united states southern command (southcom)
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to the
President to deter Russian, Cuban, and Chinese influence in the
SOUTHCOM AOR?
Answer. The influence and activities of the People's Republic of
China (PRC), Russia, and Cuba in the SOUTHCOM AOR are undermining
United States interests in the region, exploiting critical
infrastructure, and threatening hemispheric security. The President and
the Secretary have committed to finding ways for the Department of
Defense to more actively confront these challenges.
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and the Commander of
SOUTHCOM to review and recommend additional actions that the Secretary
may take to support United States national security objectives and
defend the Homeland, in coordination with other executive branch
departments and agencies and with partner countries.
Question. Do you believe these influences threaten hemispheric
security and prosperity?
Answer. The malign influence of adversaries, including Russia,
Cuba, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), in the Western
Hemisphere threatens our Homeland. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD is
acting on the President's direction to support United States national
security objectives and defend the Homeland.
Detainee Treatment and Guantanamo Bay Naval Station
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector
Operations, issued in September 2006 and DOD Directive 2310.01E,
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and
required by Section 1045 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2016?
Answer. Yes. I support the standards for detainee treatment in the
Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September
2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program, dated August
19, 2014 (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 18, 2020).
Individuals in the custody or control of the United States Government
may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any
treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and
listed in the Army Field Manual.
Question. What are your views on the continued use of the detention
facility at Guantanamo?
Answer. Guantanamo Bay is the Department's only long-term detention
facility for law of war detainees. If confirmed, I will support the
continued operations of the detention facility at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including the provision of additional detention
space for high-priority criminal aliens, unless a suitable replacement
can be identified. I will also ensure the continued safe, humane, and
legal care and treatment of detainees through Joint Task Force--
Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
Counternarcotics Activities
Question. DOD serves as lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing
toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD expends nearly $1
billion to build the counternarcotics capacity of United States
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and certain foreign
governments.
What changes, if any, should be made to DOD's counternarcotics
strategy and supporting activities?
Answer. The Department needs to ensure it is maximizing its
resources and authorities in support of U.S. and foreign law
enforcement agencies. The Department should continue to assess how it
can best leverage intelligence assets and other capabilities to support
these partners' efforts to disrupt and degrade drug-trafficking
organizations at their source.
If confirmed, I look forward to receiving classified and
unclassified briefings on DOD's counternarcotics strategy and work
through any updates that would be needed.
Question. Corruption and the absence of the rule of law enable the
transnational criminal organizations' narcotics trade that contributes
to the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
In your view, what should be DOD's role in countering the flow of
narcotics to nations other than the United States?
Answer. The primary focus should be on the flow of drugs headed to
the United States. However, some drug-trafficking organizations have an
increasingly global reach. Working with partners to combat drug
trafficking can help degrade those drug-trafficking organizations
responsible for illicit drug flow into the United States.
Question. How, if at all, should U.S. security assistance be scoped
to address factors at the root of counternarcotics trafficking, in your
opinion?
Answer. We should assist partner nations in developing capabilities
that respond to their specific security challenges. Focusing our
limited resources on those countries that are major drug-producing or
transit countries creates stability in those countries, improves
security within their regions, and makes it less likely that drug-
trafficking networks can thrive.
Venezuela
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Venezuela and to what degree is the illegitimate Maduro regime
dependent on support from external actors like Russia, Cuba, and China?
Answer. I am very concerned about the situation in Venezuela and
its potential to create instability across the region. If confirmed,
with the Secretary, I will work to ensure the Department is adequately
resourcing efforts to deter or defend against any steps Venezuela might
take to threaten United States interests, including by supporting
United States Government-wide efforts to strengthen United States
border security and repatriate illegal migrants.
Question. How would you assess Venezuelan relations with China,
Cuba, Iran, and Russia vis-a-vis the national interests of the United
States?
Answer. United States national security is threatened by the malign
activities of Cuba, Iran, the PRC, and Russia, all of whom provide
Maduro and his representatives with essential financial and military
support. Venezuela's increasing ties with Iran and its reliance on the
PRC and Russia for military equipment are deeply concerning. Venezuela
regularly sends its personnel to the PRC for training and professional
military education. Russia also periodically conducts port calls and
naval visits to Venezuela and has flown nuclear-capable bombers to
Venezuela.
united states space force and united states space command (spacecom)
Question. The United States is increasingly dependent on space,
both economically and militarily. Our great power competitors are
making concerted efforts to leap ahead of U.S. technology and impact
U.S. freedom of action in the space warfighting domain. The Space
Force, within the Department of the Air Force, and a unified Space
Command, deal with the contested domain of space, upon which the
terrestrial forces of the United States and peer competitors are highly
reliant for support.
In your view, does the current NDS accurately assess the strategic
environment as it pertains to the domain of space? If confirmed, what
changes would you make to the NDS regarding the space domain?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the current classified National
Defense Strategy, so I cannot accurately assess the strategic
environment as it pertains to space. However, if confirmed, with the
Secretary, I will ensure the next NDS prioritizes a secure space
environment for civilian, commercial, and international partners as
part of a broader U.S. space initiative, while also guaranteeing
essential capabilities for our military forces.
Question. In your view, what will ``great power competition'' look
like in space and to what extent do you view China's and Russia's
activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to
United States national security interests?
Answer. Space plays a critical role in American security,
prosperity, and way of life. The PRC and Russia are investing in space
capabilities designed to deny our freedom of action and undermine our
strategic advantages. If confirmed, I would ensure that the United
States pursues a robust space architecture, with a mix of kinetic and
non-kinetic capabilities across all domains to protect and defend the
Joint Force from hostile uses of space.
Question. Are there other nation-states or actors operating in
space that you perceive as a risk to the United States, or as cause for
concern? Please explain your answer.
Answer. The space domain continues to become much more contested.
In addition to the PRC and Russia, both North Korea and Iran are
expanding their space programs and advancing their ballistic missile
capabilities. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary's efforts to
assure Joint Force access to space and to counter hostile uses of
space.
Question. How would you assess current DOD readiness to implement
the 2022 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain
of space?
Answer. I have not been briefed on the current classified National
Defense Strategy, so I cannot discuss its assessment of space or our
current preparedness in that domain. If confirmed, I will make certain
that the updated strategy adequately addresses space as a crucial area
of military operations.
Question. What do you perceive as the most significant threats to
our national security space satellites and commercial space systems
owned by U.S. companies?
Answer. The PRC and Russia are developing and fielding counterspace
weapons aimed at denying United States advantages in space. If
confirmed, I will work with the United States Space Force, United
States Space Command, and relevant intelligence agencies and commercial
partners to understand the threats to our space systems and restore our
deterrence.
Question. Do you support the development of offensive space systems
to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
Answer. I believe the United States must develop and maintain a
range of kinetic, non-kinetic, space-based, and ground-based space
capabilities in order to protect and defend the Joint Force against
threats in and from all domains.
Question. Do you support the development of defensive space systems
to counter threats in the space warfighting domain?
Answer. I believe the United States must develop and maintain a
range of kinetic, non-kinetic, space-based, and ground-based space
capabilities in order to protect and defend the Joint Force against
threats in and from all domains.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that commercial
technology is appropriately incorporated into SPACECOM mission
execution at acceptable risk levels?
Answer. To remain competitive, the Department must harness the
ingenuity, adaptability, and affordability offered by the United States
commercial space sector. If confirmed, I will prioritize the review of
Department policies to understand where greater collaboration may be
achieved.
cybersecurity and united states cyber command (cybercom)
Question. In September 2023, DOD released its 2023 Cyber Strategy.
The strategy charges DOD to persistently engage malicious cyber actors
and other malign threats to United States interests in cyberspace.
What role do you envision for DOD and the Cyber Mission Force in
defending the Nation from an attack in cyberspace? In what ways is this
role distinct from those of the Homeland security and law enforcement
communities?
Answer. DOD's role in defending the Nation from an attack in
cyberspace continues to evolve. I understand that DOD partners with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies to protect against and respond to cyber-
attacks against the Nation. The Cyber Mission Force (CMF) is primarily
charged with defending forward, conducting defense cyber operations
abroad, while DHS and law enforcement are lead for Homeland security
with DOD in support.
If confirmed, I would review the status of the Cyber Mission Force
and ensure that DOD is postured appropriately, in partnership with DHS
and law enforcement, to protect the Nation from cyber-attacks.
While agencies like DHS and FBI focus on civilian infrastructure
and criminal investigations, DOD and the CMF's priority should be
defending against cyber threats with strategic or military
implications. This includes threats to the defense industrial base,
nuclear command and control, and the ability to project power globally.
Effective national cybersecurity demands close partnership between DOD
and other entities, and I am committed to fostering this collaboration
if I am confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, what role should DOD and the Cyber Mission
Force have in combating foreign influence operations, especially those
conducted via social media?
Answer. It is my understanding that the published summary of the
2023 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy does not address the role
that DOD and the Cyber Mission Force should have in combatting foreign
influence operations. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to
prioritize DOD's role in defending the Homeland from cyberspace
threats.
Question. What role should DOD and the Cyber Mission Force have in
anticipating, preventing, or responding to attacks on United States
commercial entities?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD defends forward by
disrupting foreign cyber threats before they can attack United States
critical infrastructure; supports requests for assistance from Federal
civilian agencies or the private sector through appropriate channels;
and enables U.S. commercial entities by providing better insights
against foreign malicious cyber threats.
Question. Do you believe that the National Security Agency and
United States Cyber Command should be dual-hatted? What are the
``pros'' and ``cons'' of this arrangement, in your view? Please explain
your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding the question of the ``dual hat''
leadership arrangement was adjudicated by the previous Secretary of
Defense and Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the
arrangement was retained. However, I believe critical relationships
such as these should be periodically re-evaluated, and, if confirmed,
we will do so.
Proponents of the ``dual hat'' structure cite operational
effectiveness and efficiency, faster decisionmaking, fewer levels of
bureaucracy, and lower cost as the National Security Agency and U.S.
Cyber Command share many headquarters' functions. Critics of the ``dual
hat'' cite the concentration of authority in one military commander and
the associated challenges of proper oversight. They believe that ending
the ``dual hat'' relationship and the appointment of a civilian
director at NSA would increase oversight and would allow the leaders of
each to concentrate more on the primary mission of their respective
organizations.
If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense in resolving
these debates, consult with Congress, and make a final recommendation
for the way ahead. Regardless of the outcome, we will continue to
ensure mission success of both organizations.
Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you take to
improve cybersecurity culture across the DOD workforce? How would you
empower and hold key leaders accountable for improvements in DOD
cybersecurity?
It is my understanding that while cyberspace operations are the
responsibility of a relatively small number of cyber professionals,
cyber risk is a challenge that should be shared across the defense
enterprise. DOD pledged to take action to foster a culture of
cybersecurity and cyber awareness. DOD also stated that it would
establish an expectation that senior military and civilian leaders
possess a baseline fluency in cybersecurity issues, and it committed to
developing, funding, and implementing technical curricula across
various levels of professional military and civilian education,
emphasizing General Officer and Senior Executive Service leadership
courses.
If confirmed, I would assess the effectiveness of these efforts and
seek to remedy weaknesses and build on successes.
Question. at characteristics of a cyberattack would constitute an
``act of war''? Do you consider the recent breaches in
telecommunications infrastructure involving Salt Typhoon to be an ``act
of war or an espionage operation that falls within de facto norms? In
your view, does the nature and scope of this intrusion operation merit
a strong and tangible response? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the President and the
Secretary in their assessments of whether a specific cyber-attack by a
foreign entity constitutes an act of war. Where a cyber-attack on the
United States causes significant physical damage, disrupts critical
national infrastructure, targets the civilian population, or is carried
out with the clear intention to inflict substantial harm on a Nation's
economic or military capabilities, there would be a strong argument
that such an attack could be viewed as an act of war.
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the
interagency community of interest to review the extent and
ramifications of the Salt Typhoon compromise and potential response
options.
Question. What do you conclude from cyber-attacks carried out by
Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon about the State of our cyber defenses?
Answer. I am aware of the general nature of the Volt Typhoon and
Salt Typhoon attacks, but I have not been briefed on classified
details. To the extent that cyber actors affiliated with the People's
Republic of China (PRC) can compromise United States networks, that is
certainly a national security concern and would suggest that United
States networks currently lack sufficient cybersecurity safeguards. The
United States should possess the ability to protect its critical
networks from malicious cyber intrusions. If confirmed, I will work
within DOD and with interagency partners to determine how best to work
with industry to improve cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and
provide necessary government responses to adversary activity, as
appropriate.
Question. Based on your experience, what do you see as areas where
the structure and training of the Cyber Mission Force should evolve to
meet emerging cyber threats?
Answer. I believe that the Cyber Mission Force could benefit
greatly from better access to, and assistance from, top technical
talent with experience working at private sector technology companies.
I applaud recent experiments by organizations like the Defense
Innovation Unit to develop solutions to facilitate placing such
individuals in military reserve status, allowing them to put their
technical skills and knowledge to work in support of U.S. national
security.
Question. In your view, are there elements missing from our current
approach for offensive and defensive cyber operations that you would
recommend we pursue?
Answer. I think DOD should do a much better job of enlisting the
talent and expertise of patriotic and talented Americans working at
private sector technology companies to upgrade and enhance its
capabilities and skills. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary
of Defense to review our Nation's current classified offensive and
defensive cyber operations capabilities and will work with Congress on
any recommended solutions.
Question. How would you characterize our deterrent posture when it
comes to cyber effects?
Answer. It is my understanding from public reporting that our Cyber
Forces have significant capabilities, but the current deterrent posture
of the United States with respect to cyber requires further review. I
also understand that the 2023 Defense Cyber Strategy emphasizes that
military cyber capabilities are most effective when they are combined
with other tools of national power. If confirmed, I look forward to
receiving classified briefings on this topic to gain a greater
understanding of our current cyber deterrent posture and available
alternatives to strengthen that posture.
united states special operations command (socom)
Question. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, successive NDAAs have
empowered the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to serve as a ``service secretary-
like'' civilian official for special operations forces. Among other
reforms, the law defines the administrative chain of command for
USSOCOM as running through the ASD(SOLIC) to the Secretary of Defense
for issues impacting the readiness and organization of special
operations forces.
What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
implementing the ``service secretary-like'' responsibilities of the
ASD(SOLIC)?
Answer. I am aware of the efforts to institutionalize the service
secretary-like responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Secretariat
for Special Operations. I understand the criticality of the civilian
role in ensuring special operations forces (SOF) are most effectively
and efficiently organized, trained, equipped, and resourced. I look
forward to conducting a thorough assessment of the progress in
implementing this critical civilian-military partnership for the SOF
enterprise.
Question. If confirmed, would you commit to fully implementing
these reforms?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would fully implement these reforms. I
would also ensure these reforms translate into tangible improvements in
how we oversee and support special operations forces.
Question. In your view, does the ASD(SOLIC) require additional
authorities and resources, including additional civilian personnel, to
administer oversight of special operations forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to conducting a thorough
assessment of current authorities and resources to assure this office
has the resources, civilian personnel and authorities it needs to
provide effective oversight of special operations forces.
irregular warfare
Question. The Joint Staff's Joint Publication-1 defines ``Irregular
warfare'' as a form of warfare where states and nonState actors
campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect,
non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.
What is your understanding of the role and relative importance of
irregular warfare in supporting DOD's strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives?
Answer. It is my understanding that Irregular Warfare (IW) is
critical for the Department's mission to deter adversaries and ensure
our Nation's security. IW provides flexible options for countering
adversaries, combating terrorism, and stabilizing volatile regions.
Unlike traditional warfare, IW leverages indirect, asymmetric
approaches like working through foreign partners, shaping narratives,
and disrupting enemy networks. This is essential in today's security
environment as State and non-State actors increasingly employ tactics
blending conventional and irregular means. As DOD advances its
understanding and the implementation of IW into its core activities, it
is imperative that it considers the role functions such as logistics
and medical care will play in the accomplishment of its objectives. IW
requires a concerted effort across the entire Joint Enterprise--not
just Special Operations Forces.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities to ensure
that DOD is appropriately organized, trained, resourced, and has
sufficient authorities to effectively conduct irregular warfare?
Answer. It is my understanding that Irregular Warfare provides a
cost-effective and asymmetrical way for our Nation to gain advantages
throughout the spectrum of competition and in advance of crisis or
conflict. I am committed to ensuring that irregular warfare lines of
effort receive sufficient resourcing and that our special operations
forces continue to be well-trained and equipped.
If confirmed, I will prioritize: 1) establishing and maintaining
intelligence dominance, 2) building resiliency, 3) growing our
international and inter-organizational alliances and partnerships, 4)
suppressing adversary networks, and 5) building agile IW policies and
organizations throughout the DOD components.
Question. What is your assessment of the use of irregular warfare
by China, Russia, Iran, and other adversarial states to undermine the
national security interests of the United States and those of our
allies and partners?
Answer. It is clear from media reports that the People's Republic
of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran challenge us daily, including
through ``political warfare'' by using their ``benign'' instruments of
national power in a warlike fashion to undermine our national security
interests. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will work
with Congress to ensure we have the necessary authorities to address
these threats and coordinate with other Federal agencies (e.g., DHS,
State, Commerce, Treasury) to reverse this paradigm. We will counter
our adversaries' irregular warfare efforts and hold them accountable.
Counterterrorism
Question. What is your assessment of the threat to United States
interests posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates
and adherents? Which group, in your view, presents the greatest threat
to the United States?
Answer. It is my understanding that despite significant and
continuous United States efforts to degrade al Qaeda and the Islamic
State, both continue to pose a threat to United States interests around
the globe. Though the significant degradation of the Islamic State
appears to indicate that al Qaeda currently possesses a greater
capability to threaten United States interests, the United States must
carefully monitor the impact of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria
on the Islamic State's ability to reconstitute.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department does not lose sight
of the threats posed by either group or their affiliates and adherents,
including their ability to threaten the United States Homeland.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and DOD's role in supporting it?
What metrics would you apply to measure the effectiveness of the
strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense in
countering terrorism. Countering terrorism is a complex challenge that
requires a whole-of-government approach to be effective, and DOD has a
key role to play in that fight. We rely on the intelligence community
to maintain awareness of the terrorist threats facing the United
States. I believe that focusing on countering direct threats to the
United States and Americans abroad, while maintaining a capability to
develop indications and warnings of how the threat is evolving so that
we aren't caught off guard in the future, will effectively balance our
resource commitment to this important effort.
military operations in the information environment
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to conduct
effective military operations in the information environment to defend
U.S. interests against malign influence activities carried out by State
and non-State actors?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD has made recent progress in
improving the effectiveness of its operations in the information
environment and defending against malign influence, though more work
needs to be done. DOD's Strategy for Operations in the Environment in
2023 was an important first step.
I also understand that there are important efforts underway to
fully implement oversight and policy authorities provided to the
Secretary of Defense's designated Principal Information Operations
Advisor (PIOA) in 10 U.S.C. 397. These efforts include strengthening
the role of the PIOA-chaired Strategic Information Oversight Board so
that the Department can better assess and improve how it is postured to
shape the information environment to gain and maintain the U.S.
military advantage. Department-level integration and civilian oversight
are critical to improving DOD's operations in the information
environment.
If confirmed, I will assess opportunities to use the role of
Principal Information Operations Advisor to further improve DOD's
effectiveness in the information environment and our ability to defend
against malign influence.
Question. Does DOD have sufficient authorities and resources to
conduct these operations effectively? If not, what additional
authorities and resources would you request, if confirmed?
Answer. I appreciate the support from Congress to ensure DOD
maintains the appropriate authorities and resources for operations in
the information environment.
If confirmed, I will review DOD's current authorities and resources
to determine if any changes are necessary.
Question. The DOD's organizational structure and approach to
Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) has not changed
significantly in nearly 25 years, and was largely based on legacy
psychological warfare approaches that go back to the cold war. Do you
foresee any need to revisit the organization, doctrine, training and
tools for OIE to integrate the lessons we are seeing from our
adversaries?
Answer. The information environment has changed considerably in the
last 25 years. Technological developments have lowered the barrier for
entry, easing the ability of adversary State and non-State actors to
spread propaganda to support their ends.
If confirmed, I will review DOD's current organization, doctrine,
training and tools to determine if any changes are necessary.
Question. In your view, are DOD approaches for tools and training
in OIE keeping pace with what we are seeing from our adversaries, in
particular with regards to new tools like generative artificial
intelligence, use of publicly available or commercially available data,
and sentiment analysis tools?
Answer. The employment of emerging technology is an essential area
of focus. I understand that DOD has struggled to fully leverage the
rapidly developing commercial technology that is driving the evolution
of our global information environment.
If confirmed, I will review DOD's current use of technology in the
information environment, determine what changes are necessary, and
explore ways to accelerate the adoption of tools and training to
support the DOD information advantage.
Question. In your experience, where do you see dependencies in
DOD's approach to OIE on interagency partners, and do you have
suggestions for how to strengthen those relationships and capabilities?
Answer. The global information environment affects everyone. DOD
must work with interagency partners when and where appropriate to
ensure synchronization and coordination of U.S. messaging.
If confirmed, I will review DOD's current approach to working with
interagency partners to ensure they are as productive as possible.
united states strategic command
Nuclear Policy
Question. United States nuclear forces are the bedrock of our
Nation's defense, underpin our most critical alliances, and have
deterred nuclear aggression and great power conflict for more than 70
years. Unfortunately, long deferred investments have left us with
systems nearing the end of their useful lives. These capabilities must
be updated to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent.
What is your understanding of how Russia, China, and North Korea
have expanded and/or modernized their nuclear force capabilities? In
your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing threat to the
United States and its allies?
Answer. I agree with Secretary Hegseth's assessment that China,
Russia, and North Korea have significantly expanded and modernized
their nuclear force capabilities. These improvements, which include
advances in warheads, delivery systems, and command and control
systems, pose an increasing threat to the United States and its Allies.
China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at extraordinary speed. For
example, China has rapidly increased its total number of nuclear
warheads, developed new missile silos for solid-fuel intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), expanded the dual-capable DF-26
intermediate range ballistic missile force, and refitted Type 094
ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3 submarine-
launched ballistic missile. Russia has developed new advanced nuclear
weapons like the Sarmat ICBM, Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, and
Kinzhal hypersonic missile. North Korea is expanding its nuclear
stockpile and improving miniaturization of warheads and road mobile
launch systems.
Our adversaries continue to test their delivery systems and make
improvements. Russia and North Korea have announced modification of
their nuclear warfighting doctrines. This change by the Russians,
combined with improved nuclear force capabilities has increased the
potential for employment of tactical nuclear weapons in support of
conventional operations in Ukraine.
Question. Do you agree with the assessment of past Secretaries of
Defense that nuclear deterrence is DOD's highest priority mission and
that modernizing our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national
security priority?
Answer. Nuclear deterrence is a central and critical foundation of
our Nation's strategy, and modernization of nuclear forces is a top
priority to counter near-peer nuclear states, and rogue regimes who
seek to expand their influence through the development of nuclear
capabilities.
Question. Do you agree that a triad of land, air, and sea based
nuclear delivery platforms is consistent with an effective deterrent
posture in an era of great power competition with Russia and China?
Answer. The three legs of the triad together provide mutually
supporting attributes which best maintain strategic stability. It is
critical to maintain and field a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
triad.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, including delivery systems, weapons, command and control
systems, and infrastructure?
Answer. It is critical to maintain and modernize all three legs of
the triad--ICBMs, submarines, and bombers.
Question. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary's review of
the programs of record to ensure it is sufficient to meet the
deterrence challenges of the future and mitigate risks during the
transition from legacy to modernized systems. As needed, I will direct
appropriate adjustments to the programs and make recommendations to the
President and the Secretary.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to support full funding for
efforts to comprehensively modernize the Nation's nuclear deterrent
forces and accelerate programs wherever possible?
Answer. I agree nuclear deterrence should remain the top priority
of DOD. Maintaining full funding for a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent is much less expensive than fighting a war that we
are unable to deter.
If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Secretary of Defense
in any review of the programs of record to ensure they are sufficient
to support full modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, direct
appropriate adjustments to the programs, and make recommendations to
the President.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD and the
National Nuclear Security Administration continue the investments and
senior leader attention needed to modernize our nuclear deterrent and
avoid age-driven unilateral disarmament?
Answer. As Secretary Hegseth said, the partnership with NNSA is one
of DOD's highest priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with them to accelerate production to provide critical nuclear weapons
and components to our modernized nuclear delivery platforms and forces,
including Columbia Class Submarines, B-21 bombers, and Sentinel ICBMs.
Question. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review supported the development
of the submarine launched cruise missile for regional deterrence
stating that ``in the near-term, the United States will modify a small
number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in
the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile (SLCM).'' Congress has supported the authorization and funding
associated with this endeavor.
If confirmed, will you support the recommendation of the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review?
Answer. I understand that DOD and the Navy are complying with the
FY24 NDAA requirement to establish and develop a Sea-Launched Nuclear
Capable Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) program. If confirmed, I will review
the SLCM-N program, and will work with others in the Department,
Congress, and our industry partners to implement the law and ensure we
have a program that delivers the capabilities needed to maintain
credible deterrence in the evolving security environment.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC)
Question. The NNSA is responsible for maintaining the Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile and meeting military requirements for nuclear
weapons, which are established through the interagency NWC. NNSA's
principal challenge over the next 20 years is to rebuild the cold war-
era U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure into a responsive and resilient
enterprise.
Do you support the recapitalization of the NNSA's capabilities to
design, manufacture, and sustain an effective nuclear weapons
stockpile?
Answer. I support the recapitalization and revitalization of NNSA
infrastructure for improved and accelerated design, manufacture, and
sustainment of the nuclear weapons stockpile to move faster and be more
responsive to warfighter and strategic requirements. I will work with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment, the
Deputy Secretary of Energy, the NNSA Administrator, the Director of the
Office of Management & Budget, and other agency stakeholders to strike
the right balance of cost, schedule, and performance for our nuclear
modernization programs among the full range of our defense investments.
Question. Do you support continued collaboration with the United
Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent?
Answer. Yes. The UK is a vital partner and our closest collaborator
in nuclear security and deterrence.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense relative to the NWC's and NNSA's responsibility
for maintaining the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile? How would you
execute your duties vis-a-vis this role, if confirmed?
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense supports the Secretary of
Defense to deliver warfighter weapons requirements through the NWC to
the NNSA, which is resourced and responsible for modernizing and
maintaining the safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Secretary Hegseth, the
Secretary of Energy, and the NNSA Administrator to meet the Nation's
requirements.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Deputy
Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the NNSA, and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that annual budgets
adequately support the modernization and sustainment of the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Nuclear deterrence is the top priority for DOD. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Deputy Secretary of
Energy, the Administrator of the NNSA, the Director of the Office of
Management & Budget, and other agency stakeholders to support the
mission.
Arms Control
Question. Arms control, when effective and verifiable, has been a
valuable tool for managing competition and international security
concerns. In contrast, unverifiable arms control regimes observed by
only one party can generate great instability.
Do you believe that further reductions should be taken only within
the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreement with Russia,
China and other nuclear-armed powers?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control when it is in
U.S. interests to do so. Specifically, we should seek arms control
agreements that enhance U.S. security and are verifiable. Currently
neither PRC nor most Russian nuclear forces are constrained in any
meaningful way by arms control agreements. Both the PRC and Russia have
rebuffed United States efforts to engage in meaningful risk reduction
talks since 2020. The most effective thing the Department of Defense
can do to prepare itself for any future dialog on arms control is to
build a modern nuclear triad that deters conflict and assures United
States partners and Allies.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should consider
accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional
power projection capabilities in order to obtain an agreement with
Russia or China on nuclear weapons reductions?
Answer. I do not believe we should limit United States options in
any future negotiation with Russia or the PRC by prematurely imposing
limitations, but instead remain open to all negotiable conditions that
maximize our ability to protect United States interests and defend the
Nation, deter our adversaries, and assure our Allies and partners.
Missile Defense
Question. Rapidly growing Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and
Iranian missile arsenals are outpacing United States' capabilities for
defeating these threats to the Homeland, allies, and United States
Forces abroad.
If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, what would be your
priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the Homeland?
Answer. If confirmed, my priority will be to deliver on the
President's Executive Order 14186 issued on January 27 calling for the
development and fielding of a next generation missile defense shield
for America.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The CTR Program historically focused on accounting for,
securing, and eliminating cold war era weapons of mass destruction and
materials in the states of the former Soviet Union. As part of its
expansion to other countries, the CTR Program includes biological
weapons and capabilities as well as biological surveillance and early
warning and encouraging the development of capabilities to reduce
proliferation threats.
In your view, how could coordination of the CTR Program across U.S.
Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts (i.e., the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State
Department) be improved?
Answer. The DOD CTR Program, like other programs that support
partner capabilities, needs a careful and thorough review and a cost-
benefit analysis to ensure its activities fully support its core
counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mission. Like all DOD
programs, the CTR Program should directly contribute to a lethal and
effective fighting force and advance the Nation's priorities as
established in the National Defense Strategy.
If confirmed, I will make clear my expectation--across the
Department and for all programs, including the DOD CTR Program--that we
need to work to maintain and improve coordination across the Federal
Government. Regular engagement is invaluable to align resources and
ensure efficiency.
air force issues
Question. It has been stated the Air Force is too small and too old
to do what the Nation asks of it.
Do you agree with this statement?
Answer. The Air Force fleet is the oldest and smallest in the
history of the Air Force, and my understanding is that the analysis
indicates that to counter the pacing threat we need to invest in a
family of medium-and long-range penetrating airframes coupled with
modern munitions, human-machine teaming, and a hardened warfighting
network. I believe the Air Force has made meaningful steps in that
direction, but while there has been progress toward modernizing the
force, the tension between near term readiness and readiness for the
future fight remains a challenge due to fiscal realities.
Additionally, I do believe the requirements of the Air Force exceed
its capacity to fulfill them. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Department of the Air Force (DAF) leadership and Congress to
fully understand and address these challenges.
Question. If confirmed, where do you see the greatest risk in
capability and capacity for the Air Force and what actions would you
take or direct to mitigate those risks?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of Air Force
(DAF) accepted risk in modernization accounts to fund minimum-essential
readiness in foundational accounts. Meanwhile, our strategic
competitors are fielding their advanced platforms and developing
systems that target our vulnerabilities. If confirmed, I commit to
working with Congress to address DAF risks and deter our most
consequential competitors.
Question. The Air Force is on record as needing to purchase a
minimum of 72 fighter aircraft per year to maintain requisite force
structure. In your opinion, what is the optimum mix of 4th and 5th
generation aircraft required to meet the threat outlined in the 2022
NDS?
Answer. I believe our fighter inventory must increase and,
consequently, the Air Force needs a mix of 4th and 5th generation
aircraft to balance capability and affordability. I have not received
any classified briefings on this subject, but, if confirmed, I will
work with the Joint Staff, combatant commands and the Air Force to
assess the current capability and underlying combat air requirements.
Question. What are your views on continuing development and
fielding of the Next Generation Air Dominance program, the Air Force's
sixth generation fighter?
Answer. I have not received classified briefings on this subject,
but, if confirmed, I look forward to doing a full review of the details
and status of the NGAD program, to include the findings of the Air
Force's recent analysis of the mission relevance of the NGAD.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with Department leadership
and Congress to develop a balanced and affordable plan to grow the
tactical fighter aircraft fleet that is prepared to win against a peer
adversary.
Question. The follow-on modernization of the F-35 is slated to
bring key warfighting capabilities to the Air Force, but the schedule
and budget of this modernization program remain in flux.
Are you confident in the affordability and executability of the
Department's plan for Block 4 Continuous Capability Development and
Delivery (C2D2)?
Answer. It is my understanding the F-35 Program requires continued
investment in Block 4 modernization to retain a tactical advantage
against key competitors and to enable Combatant Commanders to achieve
success in a future high-end fight.
If confirmed, I will review the details and status of F-35
modernization, including the acquisition strategy for Block 4, to
achieve a balance of cost and timely delivery of required capabilities
to the warfighter.
Question. Given the importance of extending the range of U.S.
aircraft, what do you believe to be the overall tanker requirement for
the Air Force and at what rate and on what schedule must the Air Force
procure KC-46 to be able to meet that requirement?
Answer. The tanker fleet is a core element of our overall military
strength. It is essential to U.S. power projection, Homeland Defense,
strategic deterrence, global strike, rapid global mobility, and
coordinated Joint Force and coalition efforts. I recognize the
Department of the Air Force needs a total aircraft inventory that gives
them the needed flexibility to manage tanker resources as dictated by
the environment while investing in the necessary modernization to meet
warfighting demands in the future. If confirmed, I commit to working
with the Joint Staff, the Air Force, and Congress to review tanker
fleet requirements and procurement strategy to maintain a competitive
edge in a highly contested environment.
Question. Do you agree with the Air Force approach of divesting
aircraft-based command and control and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities now and shifting reliance to space-based
capabilities in the future? Please explain your answer.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of the Air Force
(DAF) is divesting components of its airborne command and control (C2)
and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) fleets to
transition to more advanced and survivable capabilities in both
domains. When combined, air and space-based capabilities provide a
flexible and complimentary force to defend America and prevail in any
conflict. If confirmed, I look forward to better assessing the
capabilities needed in both the air and space domains.
army issues
Army Modernization Priorities
Question. The Army is in the midst of a major modernization period
focusing on six modernization priorities: long range precision fires,
next generation combat vehicle, future vertical lift, air and missile
defense, network and soldier lethality. The Army is also establishing a
path for more continuous upgrades to rapidly evolving technologies
under its Transformation in Contact initiative.
In your view, what are the most critical Army modernization
priorities, particularly in the context of countering multiple
simultaneous global threats?
Answer. Building peace through strength will require that the Army
modernize to address the threats facing our Nation today and into the
future. I understand that the Army's Transformation in Contact
initiative prioritizes efforts such as Next Generation Command and
Control and Long-Range Precision Fires. If confirmed, I commit to
working with the Army, and all the Services, to guarantee that we
deliver the American people a warfighting force which will create peace
through strength.
Question. How would you evaluate the importance of Army efforts in
the Indo-Pacific, including the Army's activation of Multi-Domain Task
Forces, to conduct cross-domain operations in support of the Joint
Force?
Answer. Achieving peace through strength will require DOD to
provide the right mix of capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and across
the globe. I understand that the Army's Multi-Domain Task Forces bring
critical cross-domain capabilities to the Force. If confirmed, I commit
to working with the Army, and all the Services, to guarantee that we
deliver the American people a warfighting force which will create peace
through strength.
Army Preparedness for the Pacific
Question. Army prepositioned stocks remain a cornerstone of the
Army ability to project power. Army leaders have publicly supported
expanding land-based equipment packages in the Indo-Pacific region to
reduce transit times and avoid logistical delays.
What are your thoughts of the value of land-basing versus
maintaining stocks afloat?
Answer. While I am outside the Department, I do not have the
information to fully evaluate the right mix of afloat and land-based
stocks. However, I understand that, in many cases, land-based equipment
may be cheaper to maintain, more responsive to the point of need and
less vulnerable to peer and near-peer adversaries than equipment sets
afloat. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Army, and all the
Services, to guarantee that we deliver the American people a
warfighting force which will create peace through strength.
Question. What additional capabilities should be prepositioned in
INDOPACOM?
Answer. While I am outside the Department, I do not have sufficient
information to identify additional capabilities which must be
prepositioned in INDOPACOM. However, if confirmed, I will commit to
working with the Army, and all the Services, to make sure that America
has the right capabilities to deliver peace through strength.
Question. Army watercraft are a discreet but important tool to
facilitate contested operations in a maritime environment. A decision
in 2018 and since reversed resulted in significant delay in maintaining
and modernizing the Army's watercraft fleet.
How would you prioritize capabilities like Army watercraft
readiness, that are critical to intratheater logistics in a contested
environment?
Answer. The Army is critical to providing the intratheater
logistics that will be necessary to win in a contested environment. If
confirmed, I commit to working with the Army, and all the Services, to
prioritize the efforts which will guarantee intratheater mobility and
achieve peace through strength.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
Question. In your view, are the roles and responsibilities for Army
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) appropriately assigned across
the defense services and agencies?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) system involves stakeholders across the Department of
Defense. Army IAMD is a critical part of our defense approach, and
President Trump recognizes the importance of IAMD through his Iron Dome
for America Executive Order. If confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of Defense and across the Department to insure IAMD
responsibilities are assigned in a manner that best supports mission
success.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the Military Services
make the investments required to fulfill their IAMD responsibilities,
including for base defense? How would you ensure effective integration
of the Services' current capabilities, as well as of the capabilities
each is separately developing?
Answer. It is my understanding the IAMD system is a complex
architecture that involves collaboration with other defense agencies
and services, which contribute their own sensors and data into the
overall system. While I am outside the Department, I do not have access
to the information necessary to fully evaluate the whole system but, if
confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to fully integrate our
capabilities and to insure execution of President Trump's Executive
Order on Iron Dome for America.
Question. The Army serves as the Department's executive agent for
the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO), and has
made progress demonstrating, testing, and advancing effective counter
small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS) capabilities for the Joint
Force.
If confirmed, would you support continuation of the JCO effort? How
would you prioritize and focus efforts across DOD to counter larger
UAS?
Answer. Rebuilding lethality requires effective counter small
unmanned aerial systems capabilities. While I am outside the
Department, I do not have sufficient information to evaluate the JCO
and its place in a cross-Department effort. If confirmed, I will work
with Department leaders, and with Congress, to ensure the warfighters
have the necessary tools and technologies to counter UAS and protect
our assets at home and abroad.
navy and marine corps issues
Recapitalizing the Fleet
Question. Despite the Navy's stated requirement for at least 381
ships, it is currently operating with approximately 296 battle force
ships.
Do you consider the Fiscal Year 2025 shipbuilding plan, which
reaches the policy goal of 355 ships only in 2038, to be acceptable?
How would you accelerate the number of ships delivered to the United
States Navy?
Answer. I have read the Navy's FY25 shipbuilding plan, which
outlines its perspective on the future battle force with a timeline to
achieve a 355 ship Navy in 2038 given current workforce and industrial
base capability and capacity. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Navy, USD(A&S), Congress, and industry to continue ongoing efforts
directed on improving productivity and workforce development, as well
as developing new initiatives focused on the shipbuilding supply chain,
that could open windows of opportunity to accelerate shipbuilding
profiles.
Question. The Navy's fiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan will
significantly reduce the number of battle force ships and vertical
launch systems over the course of the next 5 years.
How would you mitigate the impacts of this reduced capacity, or how
would you plan to retain or grow the Navy's capacity?
Answer. I understand the number of the Navy's vertical launch
systems is expected to decrease based on the FY25 shipbuilding plan. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Navy to better understand
current fleet capabilities, and how extensions of DDG 51 FLT I ships
and the delivery of DDG 51 FLT III ships and SSNs with Vertical Payload
Modules, will meet the Navy's needs.
Nuclear Submarines
Question. Navy leaders have testified that the Columbia-class
program, the Department of the Navy's top acquisition priority, will
require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions
of other programs in the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or
outside funding is not provided.
What would you do to ensure the Navy and industry reaches the two
Virginia-class and one Columbia-class submarine goal per year
requirement by 2028 while keeping other Navy priorities on track?
Answer. A robust shipbuilding industrial base is critical to
producing the ships our Navy and Nation requires. If confirmed, I will
work closely with Navy and industry to prioritize efficient investment
in the shipbuilding industrial base while minimizing impacts to other
Navy priorities. This will include developing the skilled workforce and
updating the critical infrastructure necessary to achieve the two
Virginia-class and one Columbia-class per year construction goal.
Additionally, I will work with the Navy and USD(A&S) to refine
acquisition and contract strategies, ensuring that these strategies
incentivize our industry partners to delivery these vessels on time and
at budget.
Hybrid Fleet
Question. In Navigation Plan 2024, the Chief of Naval Operations
made ``scale robotic and autonomous systems to integrate more platforms
at speed'' a top priority.
Do you support the transition to a hybrid fleet of manned and
unmanned vessels, and if so, what would you do to achieve a successful
transition?
Answer. Yes. I support the transition to a hybrid fleet of manned
and unmanned vessels. This evolution is crucial for increasing our
capacity and augmenting our operational forces with new/novel
technologies that will provide both lethal and non-lethal capabilities.
If confirmed, I will prioritize our efforts across our Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel,
and Facilities (DOTMLPF) and advocate for changes that will capitalize
on the pace of which technology is changing while ensuring robust
cybersecurity measures to safeguard all of our capabilities.
If confirmed, I will advocate for the creation of a Hybrid
ecosystem alongside our Allies and partners in order to test our
doctrine and sustainment requirements necessary to ensure seamless
integration and maximize ``scaling'' of maritime capability.
Additionally, I would advocate for interoperability standards and
foster collaboration with industry. By focusing on these areas, we can
create a resilient and adaptive naval force capable of meeting future
challenges effectively.
Military Sealift Command
Question. DOD announced that it will retire 17 logistics and
support vessels due to a lack of civilian mariners.
What should DOD and the Navy do to increase the availability of
civilian mariners? In your view, would there be opportunities to work
with other agencies to ensure that DOD can meet its logistical
requirements?
Answer. I understand that DOD and the Navy are working with the
Military Sealift Command to expand outreach efforts to improve the
civilian mariner talent pipeline. In my opinion, engagements with State
maritime academies will likely strengthen partnerships that will
increase the number of maritime academy graduates into the civilian
mariner population. Additionally, collaboration with the maritime
industry to identify talent management best practices and efforts to
expand compensation incentives may improve the retention of civilian
mariners.
Naval Aviation
Question. What are your views on the current status of the naval
aviation enterprise?
Answer. In my opinion, the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) faces
opportunities and challenges as it seeks to innovate, adapt to new
strategic priorities, and navigate fiscal constraints. Naval aviation
is central to modern naval operations and U.S. Navy's integrated
contributions to U.S. Joint war fighting capability. Naval aviation
continues to evolve, though, as it seeks to counter peer threats like
China, which seeks to directly confront the advantage our Navy and
naval aviation provide by fielding advanced anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities.
Emphasizing and investing in long-range precision strike,
coordinated, flexible responses, and ensuring carrier air wings remain
lethal and effective in contested environments will maintain the Navy's
strategic dominance across the globe. To face challenges in aircraft
readiness, it is imperative that the Navy continue to balance a
sustainable, readiness-focused fleet with the procurement of newer
platforms. Additionally, retaining skilled aviators and maintainers
amid high operational tempos and resourcing challenges, with effective
training and readiness, must remain a focus.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Navy's fighter
fleet is able to modernize to meet the Chinese threat?
Answer. The future carrier air wing (CVW) must harness a
revitalized aviation/weapons industrial base to be more lethal,
networked, and autonomous in its role to provide critical battlespace
awareness, sea control, long-ranged fires, and air superiority for the
Joint Force. We need to ensure that it integrates advanced sensors, can
employ advanced weapons capabilities, and has the ability to operate in
increasingly contested environments.
It is my understanding that the Navy is coordinating with U.S.
Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force in tri-service development of
collaborative combat aircraft--or ``CCA''--that will be additive
unmanned and autonomous capability to our manned fighter fleet,
increasing the mass and complexity that our adversaries will face if
they choose to confront us in combat.
If confirmed, I will work with the OSD staff, Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and Navy to assess relevant threats and review
combat capabilities to ensure they meet operational needs.
Marine Corps Modernization
Question. The Marine Corps modernization efforts center on a
reorientation toward amphibious warfare and improved integration with
the naval force. Capability development and experimentation focus on
contested maritime operations.
What is your understanding of the Force Design plans of the Marine
Corps?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Marine Corps Force Design
is an overarching plan to deter and win against the pacing threat
through innovative formations, equipment, and operating concepts. I
understand the Marine Corps has made significant progress modernizing
over the past four and a half years, and this ongoing modernization
effort was self-funded by the Marine Corps by making hard choices to
divest legacy systems and invest in systems which provide an asymmetric
advantage.
Question. If confirmed, what changes to the Marine Corps or to
support from the joint forces would you recommend?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Marine Corps has undergone
transformational change over the last 5 years, optimizing force
structure while remaining expeditionary, efficient, and lethal. The
relevance of Marine Corps formations against the pacing challenge
remains a measure of effectiveness, and their modernization efforts
ensure the Commandant continues to provide ready forces that meet
Combatant Commander requirements.
If confirmed, I will work with the OSD staff, Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and Department of Navy leadership to ensure the
Marine Corps can sustain power projection while maintaining the
flexibility to respond to evolving threats.
Question. The Marine Corps also serves as one of the Nation's
primary reaction forces, particularly in response to noncombatant
evacuation operations and natural disasters.
Are you comfortable with the Marine Corps' current preparedness to
execute these missions? Please explain your answer.
Answer. I understand the Marine Corps maintains a high State of
readiness for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and disaster
relief missions, emphasizing the critical role of logistics. General
Eric M. Smith, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, has highlighted the
importance of a continuous presence of ARG/MEUs sortieing forward from
both United States coasts and Japan. This strategic positioning ensures
rapid response capabilities, as crises requiring evacuations or
immediate assistance can arise unpredictably. The Marine Corps
commitment to balancing crisis response with modernization efforts
further enhances its logistical preparedness.
By integrating naval mobility and maintaining forward-deployed
units, the Marine Corps ensures it can effectively support a range of
missions, from humanitarian assistance to full-scale combat operations.
Overall, the Marine Corps' forward posture and naval integration
capabilities enable it to respond swiftly and effectively to a range of
military operations.
reform of dod business operations and decision-making processes
Digital Modernization
Question. The Department expends significant resources on
information technology and related services, yet remains highly reliant
on slow legacy systems and enterprise infrastructure, and on personnel
intensive workarounds for critical operating functions such as
personnel, financial management, logistics, and acquisition. Not
surprisingly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, DOD struggled to enable the
total force to work remotely in a persistent and secure fashion,
incurring health and safety risks that should not have been necessary
had the Department not repeatedly deferred investments in digital
modernization initiatives.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to prioritize and resource
digital modernization initiatives such as secure enterprise-wide cloud,
teamwork, and collaboration tools, as well as senior leader decision
support initiatives like advanced analytic capabilities (ADVANA)?
Answer. Digital modernization is critical to ensure our warfighters
maintain decision advantage, to improve workforce productivity, and to
spend tax dollars responsibly as demonstrated by a clean Department-
wide audit. If confirmed, I will make digital transformation a
priority.
To drive progress on these issues, I will leverage the authorities
and resources of the Department, including those of the Chief Digital
and Artificial Intelligence Officer and the Chief Information Officer,
to accelerate the appropriate use of industry software and data
management best practices to reduce technical debt and meet the
Department's priorities in command and control, enterprise analytics,
financial management, and workforce productivity. From my time in the
private sector, I have seen such best practices for digital
transformation and, if confirmed, will be committed to applying these
practices in the Department to meet our priority objectives.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure a broader use of
modern management tools and systems that you would seek to implement at
the Department of Defense, if confirmed?
Answer. The Department's adoption of modern management tools and
systems is essential to meet the President's priorities for a clean
Department-wide audit, greater management efficiency, and more lethal
warfighting effects. If confirmed, I would accelerate data-driven
decisionmaking and outcome-based performance management in DOD, and
mandate the enhancement, interoperability, and broader use of tools,
like the Advancing Analytics (Advana) enterprise data and analytics
platform, to inform senior leader decisionmaking.
If confirmed, I would also use best of breed commercial
technologies, implement best practices for software development, and
mandate data sharing to ensure DOD systems can share data with those
who require its insights. In addition, I would ensure DOD is fully
capitalizing on the benefits of artificial intelligence to advance the
Department's priorities, such as the audit. Finally, if confirmed, I
would drive performance targets and monitor progress through the
Department's Strategic Management Plan (SMP), ensuring that our work
here is transparent to our Nation's taxpayers.
Management reform
Question. The Department of Defense is one of the most complex
organizations in the Federal Government. To help with oversight and
management, Congress has mandated tools including the Strategic
Management Plan and the defense management framework codified in title
10, U.S. Code, 125a. In addition, the FY2025 NDAA formally established
the position of the Performance Improvement Officer to help the
Department with forward-looking business transformation efforts.
Based on your experience, how do you recommend using these tools to
improve management discipline in the Department to gain greater
efficiency and effectiveness from DOD initiatives?
Answer. I have recognized throughout my decades of experience in
the private sector that management discipline is crucial for improving
a business's efficiency and effectiveness. This is done by establishing
clear expectations and requirements, enforcing standards, and promoting
accountability.
If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to leverage the tools
Congress provided to cut unnecessary bureaucracy and streamline
processes, which will ultimately make the military stronger and more
lethal.
Question. Do you have recommendations for effectively managing DOD
operations?
Answer. I understand the U.S. Congress has provided the Department
with tools to improve DOD's management discipline in and across the
defense enterprise (including as recently as December 2024). If
confirmed, I look forward to understanding and applying all available
tools to improve DOD's management discipline, including through the
responsibilities given to the DOD Performance Improvement Officer
(PIO).
Transparency and accountability are essential to improve management
discipline in the Department, or anywhere else. These will be
priorities, if confirmed. In my experience, data-informed analytics can
improve the alignment of strategy to resources; and help track critical
resource execution in large organizations. I will look for ways to
drive improved performance through processes, resource execution, and
accountability. We owe our warfighters efficient and effective resource
alignment for key programs and results-driven processes.
Question. DOD must respond to warfighting needs and unexpected
contingency operations, A policy that works well in a peacetime
environment may be ill-suited to the exigencies of warfighting.
Based on your experience, how do you consider and evaluate the
tradeoffs between efficiency and warfighting necessity, and how do you
anticipate integrating that into DOD decisionmaking processes?
Answer. The Secretary has said the ultimate test for everything in
the Department of Defense is lethality. If confirmed, my priority will
be to meet the President's vision and Secretary's direction to ensure
we deliver the American people a warfighting force which will create
peace through strength. Increased efficiency and accountability are
core elements to make sure visions are achieved.
Question. What role do you see the Deputy's Management Action Group
(DMAG) in supporting your management processes? Do you have any
recommendations for how the DMAG can be leveraged differently than how
it has been used in the past?
Answer. My view is that the Department can and should produce both
efficiency and necessary warfighting capabilities. Warfighting
effectiveness evaluations will be critical to understanding how much
capability to pursue. The priority level of a mission and the level of
threat to that mission will also be important factors in tradeoff
decisions. If confirmed, I will require that decisionmaking processes
appropriately consider risk and do so with strong analytic foundations.
If confirmed, I intend to use any management forum to drive
outcomes for the country and to ensure that I have a full understanding
of the risks that should be considered in any decision brought to the
forum, and I look forward to using such forums to rapidly advance DOD's
warfighting effectiveness and make its business processes more
efficient.
dod auditability
Question. Since 1995, DOD's financial management has been on the
Government Accountability Office's High-Risk List, identified as
vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Over the past
several years, DOD undertook a department-wide financial audit, despite
not being audit-ready, and has made significant progress toward
auditability. The Department is now targeting December 31, 2028 to
achieve an unmodified or clean opinion.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to maintain the significant
momentum achieved in auditability over the past several years at the
Department of Defense?
Answer. The December 31, 2028, clean audit opinion deadline, set in
law, means DOD has less than four fiscal years remaining to earn an
unmodified opinion. Secretary Hegseth has already deemed audit as a
priority. If confirmed, one of my first actions will be to ensure
existing audit roadmaps and remediation priorities still make sense
toward achieving accelerated audit progress. Whether they are
sufficient or need to be adjusted, if confirmed, I would commit myself
to rigorous oversight of those efforts to drive significant and
continuous progress to ensure everyone who spends a dollar in DOD
contributes to our clean audit requirement. All resource owners, not
just the financial management community, must be held accountable for
swift, meaningful progress toward this goal.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take or
direct to achieve better outcomes than have past initiatives intended
to improve DOD auditability?
Answer. In line with what the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), Congress, and other auditors have observed, I believe much of
DOD's audit roadblocks stem from its own complexities, one of which is
the burdensome number of outdated, unauditable, disparate financial,
logistics, and contract writing systems that hinder rapid
decisionmaking across the Department. Systems stove piping has led to
too many business and financial systems. These should be consolidated
so that processes are simplified, internal controls improved, and data
standardized, all leading to auditability. If confirmed, I would
rapidly speed up the shutdown of legacy systems that only serve niche
requirements, while leveraging cutting-edge technology to increase
efficiencies, accountability and the ability for DOD to achieve a clean
audit opinion. This is the sure way to facilitate audit remediation,
save money, bring greater cybersecurity, implement single source data
for enhanced decisionmaking, and move the audit needle.
Question. How does the DOD audit contribute to operational
readiness, in your view?
Answer. Many naively believe audit is a backroom function, but that
couldn't be further from the truth. To pass an audit, you must account
for everything you own or owe--whether billets, bullets, bases, pay,
planes, and ships--and be able to explain the resource's location, its
condition, and its value. In fiscal year 2024, DOD owned $4.1 trillion
in assets and held $4.3 trillion in liabilities. That is an amazing
amount of resources and responsibility, all of which exists to ensure
the defense of our Nation. The by-products of audit--accountability,
strengthened controls, common data pictures, clean single source data,
and better analytic tools--naturally lead our commanders and leaders to
better insights and decisionmaking. That is how audit is an enabler to
increasing operational readiness.
Question. Achieving a clean financial audit is massive undertaking
for the Department. Do you have recommendations for how to improve that
process to make it less costly and more efficient?
Answer. I am very respectful of auditor independence, but I don't
believe the burden of audit is all on the auditee. Auditors and other
stakeholders also bear responsibility to ensure audits are conducted
efficiently and effectively. For example, the DOD OIG is DOD's overall
financial statement auditor, but both it and the GAO ought to be
ensuring their own independently conducted program audits build toward
a comprehensive portfolio of audits that together lead to comprehensive
insight. Like those being audited, auditors need to ensure everything
they do is adding value to the overall effort to get DOD audited. They
need to make sure there is no redundancy between audits, that
information sought can't be obtained through more efficient means or
from what's already been provided, and that timelines can expand and
contract to get DOD's complex audit areas fully vetted. They expanded
the timeline for the Marine Corps audit and it was a success. More
importantly, auditors should be funded to have the capacity to fully
audit. Likewise, we need to be thinking about technology changes that
will make audit less manual, and more automated in ways that make sense
and give confidence in test results.
Question. In your view, are there lessons that can be learned
beyond the goal of a clean audit opinion? Based on your experience, do
you anticipate operationalizing any intermediate lessons from the audit
into the DOD's overall management reform objectives?
Answer. In my view, audit should never only be about the opinion.
Rather, leaders should view audits as enduring opportunities to
constantly seek improvements. Use the audit to pinpoint areas for
enhancement and then do just that. Use the audit to build, leverage,
and expand analytic tools and grow workforce capability and capacity. I
understand that DOD audit needs were really the genesis for ADVANA, its
central data repository that now tracks and supports everything from
war efforts to humanitarian relief. The same goes for using the audit
to force modern technology, such as implementing AI warehousing and AI
budget formulation. Likewise, set the tone-from-the-top and then do
what you say you're going to do. This is exactly what the Marine Corps
did to get its first clean opinion. It's also what Secretary Hegseth is
doing--setting the tone-from-the-top by vocally making audit a priority
with urgency and applying this urgency to a mandate for reform.
acquisition management
Acquisition Reform
Question. Recent NDAAs have enacted sweeping reforms to the
Department's acquisition process, including introducing new acquisition
flexibilities and delegating significant acquisition authority to the
Services.
In your view, has the Department successfully adopted the
flexibilities provided in the Adaptive Acquisition Framework? If not,
what would you do to improve the adoption of rapid acquisition
procedures to bring innovation into the Department?
Answer. Congress has given the Department of Defense authorities
and flexibility to acquire capabilities at speed and scale through the
Adaptive Acquisition Framework. If confirmed, I will work with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the
Military Departments to ensure the Department of Defense is effectively
utilizing these authorities to support our warfighters. If I identify
that the Department needs to do more to use these authorities, then I
will work to make sure that the Department implements these reforms and
fully leverages all authorities provided by Congress.
Question. How would you seek to balance the need to rapidly acquire
and field innovative systems while ensuring acquisition programs stay
on budget and schedule?
Answer. Our warfighters need the best capabilities to deter and
defeat our adversaries in conflict. It is my understanding that
Congress has given the Department the authorities to acquire and field
innovative capabilities at speed and scale. If confirmed, I will work
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and
other Department stakeholders to ensure we are providing proper
oversight of acquisition programs, so they are staying on budget and
schedule.
Question. Civilian control of the acquisition system has been a
cornerstone of the post-World War Two acquisition system. What are your
personal views on the principle of civilian control of the defense
acquisition system?
Answer. A strong acquisition workforce is needed to ensure our
warfighters are getting the best systems at speed and scale. Strong
civilian leadership is needed to support the workforce in delivering
the capabilities to the warfighters. If confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of Defense to lead the Department and civilian experts to
ensure the acquisition workforce is a good steward of taxpayer dollars
and delivering the best capabilities to deter and defeat our
adversaries.
Requirements
Question. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act
required the Joint Staff to take a clean-sheet approach to the
requirements process and the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense
Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to establish an
advisory panel on reforming the requirements process.
What recommendations would you make to the requirements process to
make it more adaptive to changes in threats and technologies?
Answer. Too often, DOD creates inflexible and gold-plated
requirements. Our warfighting requirements are and should be at the
center of how the Department drives and shapes capability development.
If confirmed, I will work to fully implement the direction from the
FY2025 NDAA and establish an advisory panel on reforming the
requirements process in coordination with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department's entire acquisition process,
including requirements, resourcing, and procurement, needs to focus on
solving warfighting problems and delivering the capabilities they need
to be the most lethal and effective force. The Department needs a
process that embraces strategic thinking, focuses on warfighting needs,
and unleashes our warfighting potential.
Question. What role do you see for the Joint Staff versus the
military services in the requirements process?
Answer. The Joint Staff has provided leadership and collaboration
in partnership with the military services and the combatant commands in
the development and validation of military requirements within the
current system. The Joint Staff also has analytical capacity utilizing
data and support from the military services that will need to be relied
upon to improve our processes and shape the future of the Joint Force.
It is my expectation that this partnership will continue with
appropriate civilian input.
Defense Industrial Base
Question.In recent years, Congress, industry, and DOD have
increasingly expressed concerns about the health of the defense
industrial base and its ability to reliably meet defense needs. The
FY2021 NDAA sought to address these issues, in part, by establishing an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy. In 2022, the
Department of Defense released the National Defense Industrial Strategy
(NDIS), and in 2024 the NDIS Implementation Plan was published. In your
view, does the published NDIS and NDIS-Implementation Plan address the
most significant challenges facing the defense industrial base? How
would you address these challenges any differently, if confirmed?
Answer. I understand that the National Defense Industrial Strategy
and its implementation plan have been designed to address the top
industrial base challenges collectively identified across DOD,
Congress, and Industry. If confirmed, I will be committed to addressing
these challenges to our Defense Industrial Base and adapting as we
manage new threats, Presidential orders, and updated industry inputs. I
will work across the Department to ensure that we resource these
priorities, with a focus on delivering expanded capability and capacity
to accelerate deliveries to the warfighter.
Question. What steps should the Department take to increase the
overall production capacity of the defense industrial base?
Answer. Increasing the overall production capacity of the defense
and organic industrial base is paramount as we reduce our reliance on
adversarial nations and increase our domestic supply chain resilience.
I understand that the NDIS lays out mechanisms to increase production
capacity, including incentivizing industry by investing in extra
capacity, and broadening the supplier base by investing in new
production methods. If confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to
strengthen our industrial base and support the warfighter.
Question. What steps should the Department take--on its own or as
part of a whole-of-government approach--to increase domestic and allied
industrial capacity and reduce reliance on suppliers in China?
Answer. Reducing reliance on adversarial nations, particularly PRC
sources, is a critical effort to achieving peace through strength.
Proactively developing, growing, and sustaining multiple and redundant
production lines across U.S. and allied sources is imperative for the
United States to ensure necessary production capability and capacity
while mitigating exposure to supply disruptions. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment to prioritize efforts to reduce our reliance on suppliers
from China, or any other adversaries.
Question. Given the need to ensure fair competition within the
defense industrial base, how would you ensure your dealings with the
defense industrial base are free from potential conflicts of interest?
Answer. I am committed to the highest ethical standards and, if
confirmed, I will retain no investments which may lead to a potential
conflict of interest.
test and evaluation
Question. A natural tension exists between the goals of major
defense acquisition programs to reduce cost and accelerate schedule and
the need to ensure performance meets requirements and specifications--
the objective of the test and evaluation function.
If confirmed, how would you approach your relationship with the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, particularly in light of the
independence and direct reporting relationships and responsibilities
accorded the Director in law?
Answer. If confirmed, I would promote early and frequent
communication and coordination between DOT&E and other DOD entities to
mitigate and eliminate natural tensions. I would enforce resolution of
disagreements through evidence-based analysis and prioritization of our
warfighters and their ability to achieve desired effects.
DOT&E's mission, as directed by law, is to report on weapon system
performance (effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and when
necessary, lethality) based on independent analysis of collected data
in operationally representative test. If confirmed, I pledge to
rigorously maintain DOT&E's independence and ability to execute their
mission because DOD decisions and warfighter optimization of their
systems depend on DOT&E reports on weapon system performance.
Question. The Major Range and Test Facilities Base (MRTFB) and
DOD's associated test and evaluation infrastructure are critical
national assets. In recent years it has become clear that digital
engineering and digital modeling and simulation tools and
infrastructure will be critical to achieving the Department's
objectives for optimizing existing legacy weapons systems and
facilitating the delivery of modern software-defined capabilities.
Are you satisfied with DOD's test and evaluation capabilities,
including the test and evaluation workforces and infrastructure of the
Military Services? Please explain your answer. If not, how would you
address shortfalls in the test and evaluation enterprise, if confirmed?
Answer. The MRTFB, including its associated test and evaluation
(T&E) infrastructure and workforce, is critical for our Nation to
deliver weapons systems that give our warfighters a decisive advantage
in any confrontation. Since I am not yet confirmed, I cannot fully
evaluate the effectiveness of the test and evaluation infrastructure.
If confirmed, I will review the gaps in the Department's T&E
capabilities, including the T&E workforces and infrastructure, to
ensure DOD has the digital and software expertise needed to optimize
existing legacy weapon systems and deliver modern software-defined
capabilities.
Question. Based on your experience, how do you see artificial
intelligence (AI), digital twin technology and model based systems
engineering (MBSE) approaches improving both test and evaluations
approaches, and supporting improved acquisition outcomes?
Answer. It's my understanding that AI, digital twin technology, and
MBSE significantly enhance the Department's T&E approaches and
decisionmaking. Advancements in these technologies lead to faster
product development and reduced costs, ultimately supporting improved
acquisition decisions and outcomes, even into sustainment.
Question. In your view, how can industry provided data be better
leveraged with government furnished test data? Do you believe current
data standards are sufficient for current needs, as well as the needs
for emerging technologies like AI, digital twin and MBSE?
Answer. It is important for the Government to partner with industry
to better serve the warfighters and I understand that the Department is
focusing on efforts to standardize data across government and industry,
establish data sharing agreements, and fielding interoperable systems
that can easily integrate data from different sources. The Department's
efforts in this area must continue to evolve to harness developments in
private industry and, if confirmed, I will support all efforts which
will make our Department more capable of supporting the warfighter.
defense security cooperation
Question. What should be the primary objectives of Department of
Defense security sector assistance activities, in your view?
Answer. DOD security cooperation programs can provide Allies and
partners with military equipment, services, and training to support the
U.S. national security objectives and meet partner capability
requirements identified by the Combatant Commanders. If security
cooperation programs do not support or meet the requirements of the
U.S. national security strategy, these programs should not be funded.
Question. Is the Department of Defense appropriately organized and
resourced to execute security sector assistance effectively? If not,
what changes would you make or direct, if confirmed?
Answer. I understand that many stakeholders, including many in
Congress, believe that the current timelines to deliver critical
capabilities to our Allies and partners are far too lengthy. If
confirmed, I will work with partners, including this Congress to make
the process as timely and effective as possible at advancing the
interests of the United States and our Allies.
base realignment and closure (brac)
Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
less money than originally estimated.
Do you believe that another BRAC round is needed? If so, what
changes to law and implementation policy would you recommend to improve
on the outcomes of the 2005 BRAC process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to enhance the
Department's ability to restore lethality, including whether a request
for BRAC authority may be warranted to optimize the Department's
installations footprint. If the Secretary of Defense and President were
to determine a BRAC is appropriate, we will work with Congress to
identify and implement process improvements.
Question. If you are confirmed, and were Congress to authorize
another BRAC round, how would you set priorities for infrastructure
reduction and consolidation across DOD?
Answer. The Department needs to ensure that its infrastructure
portfolio is appropriately sized and utilized. If confirmed, I would
commit to reducing the amount of excess infrastructure and ensure the
Department's infrastructure aligns with mission requirements. If
Congress were to authorize a future BRAC, I would ensure the priorities
for infrastructure reduction and consolidation would align with
Secretary of Defense's priorities of rebuilding the military by
matching threats to capabilities and reestablishing deterrence by
defending our Homeland.
operational energy and energy resilience
Question. The Department defines operational energy as the energy
required for training, moving, and sustaining military forces and
weapons platforms for military operations, including the energy used by
tactical power systems, generators, and weapons platforms. As early as
2004, then-General Mattis testified before Congress that DOD must
``unleash us from the tether of fuel'' if U.S. Forces are to sustain
momentum and retain freedom of maneuver. He cautioned that ``units
would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their
dependence on fuel'' and resupply efforts ``made us vulnerable in ways
that would be exploited by the enemy.'' Today, DOD energy requirements
are projected to increase significantly due to technological advances
in weapons systems and distributed operations over longer operating
distances.
If confirmed, what would you do to harness innovations in
operational energy and link them with emerging joint operational
concepts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that sustaining the energy
needs of our forces in contested environments is prioritized across
operations, planning, and capability development. I will ensure that
the incorporation of operational energy innovations is done in a manner
that enhances operational effectiveness and extends our operational
reach. We will also consider changes in our tactics, techniques, and
procedures, assess and mitigate risks to the energy supportability of
our operational plans, and include appropriate operational risks and
logistics constraints in the development of new capabilities.
Question. How can DOD acquisition systems better address
requirements related to the use of energy in military platforms? In
your view, should energy supportability be a key performance parameter
in the requirements process?
Answer. The energy key performance parameter, which is required by
statute, is critical to ensure that energy supportability is
appropriately considered during the requirements development process.
Reducing the energy demand of our operational capabilities and
improving their posture in terms of energy supportability reduces risks
created by fuel logistics and ensures maximum lethality. If confirmed,
I will ensure that the development of capability requirements is based
on a robust analysis of energy supportability risks and that
acquisition decisionmaking accounts for energy supportability and
emerging technologies throughout program lifecycles.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. United States superiority in key areas of innovation is
decreasing or has disappeared. Our competitors are engaging in
aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development.
DOD has identified 14 key areas in which investment to develop next
generation operational capabilities is imperative: hypersonics;
integrated network system of systems; directed energy; advanced
computing and software; human-machine interfaces; integrated sensing
and cyber; space; quantum science; microelectronics; trusted AI and
autonomy; renewable energy generation and storage; future generation
wireless technology; advanced materials; and biotechnology. Much of the
innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national
defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense
industry.
If confirmed, would you make any changes or adjustments in current
DOD modernization priorities?
Answer. DOD should always be surveying the technology landscape and
updating investments and priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure the
DOD research and engineering ecosystem is responsive and that it
addresses critical threats, capabilities, and opportunities.
Question. What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to DOD's development of these
key technologies?
Answer. There are unique challenges associated with different types
of technology development. Some may be organizational and cultural.
Some technologies face more basic scientific or physics challenges. It
is my understanding that limited access to test assets or aging test
infrastructure, as well as failures to prioritize certain technology
areas are all challenges DOD faces in technology development. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department evaluates each of these
challenges within their unique context and attempts to resolve them in
the most appropriate manner.
Question. What is your understanding of the mechanisms in DOD that
the science and technology community uses to coordinate, integration,
and reduce unwarranted duplication across the S&T enterprise?
I understand that the USD(R&E) is required by statute to
``designate Senior Officials for Critical Technology Areas supportive
of the National Defense Strategy.'' These individuals execute statutory
mandates to coordinate research and engineering investments, integrate
technologies, and align budgets to promote technology transition and
delivery. These Senior Officials are also explicitly directed by
statute to advise the USD(R&E) of unwanted or inefficient technology
duplication, areas of misalignment, or lack of coordination.
Moreover, I understand that the S&T community and the executives
responsible for management and oversight of the Department's S&T
resources have established an S&T Executive Committee and Communities
of Interest in the interest of ensuring increased coordination and
integration of efforts amongst the S&T community and consequently
reducing unwanted duplication across the S&T enterprise.
If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing and evaluating the DOD's
processes to identify any opportunities for improvement and reform.
Question. In your view are the Department's investments in these
technologies appropriately focused, integrated, and synchronized across
all Military Departments and Agencies?
Answer. Since I have not been confirmed, I do not have access to
the detail necessary to reach a firm conclusion about these
investments. However, if confirmed, I will prioritize the review of the
Department's investments in future technologies to ensure that the
Department's investments are aligned with national security needs.
Question. Based on your experience, are there enduring technology
areas that might not be considered emerging, such as energetic
materials or corrosion control, that DOD should remain focused on as
categories outside of the modernization priorities?
Answer. The DOD should constantly review and update its
modernization priorities to ensure it is responsive to the needs of the
warfighter and is addressing critical threats, capabilities, and
opportunities. For example, outside of the 14 Critical Technology
Areas, the OUSD(R&E) also focuses on research in munitions; energetics;
alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities; counter-
unmanned systems; nuclear modernization; autonomous systems; and
advanced materials. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department
allocates its resources in an appropriate manner to address the threats
from our adversaries.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to strengthen
National Security Industrial Base and National Security Innovation Base
systems and processes to ensure that critical information is protected
from foreign economic and industrial espionage?
Answer. I understand that the Department has multiple authorities
to preemptively protect our economic and national security interests,
especially in an era of intense competition with China.
If confirmed, I will work with DOD, and Interagency partners, to
ensure DOD undertakes whatever steps necessary to safeguard the
technologies, capabilities, and critical information necessary to
defend the Homeland, and equip our warfighters with the most lethal,
advanced, and exquisite capabilities--free of foreign influence and
industrial espionage.
Question. In your view, how can DOD balance the openness of the S&T
enterprise, while still protecting the most sensitive research from
nefarious exploitation by our adversaries?
Answer. I believe that DOD can balance openness and protection
through a risk-based approach that integrates security without stifling
innovation. I understand that the current approach includes targeted
protection, strengthening the due diligence of DOD partnerships, proper
consideration of control or classification of information, and
counterintelligence to detect and mitigate threats in real time. If
confirmed, I will work to promote research security by providing tight
protections around DOD's most sensitive work and ensuring adequate
protections for less sensitive fundamental research.
Deputy's Innovation Steering Group
Question. The current Deputy Secretary of Defense established the
Deputy's Innovation Steering Group (DISG) to help improve coordination
of innovation efforts across the Department and to break down process
barriers. It has been the main forum for coordination and selection of
projects to be funded under Replicator, as well as prototyping
activities under Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER).
What do you see as the role of the Deputy in fostering innovation
in the Department? In your view, how should that role be deconflicted
with the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Defense for
Research and Engineering?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advance a focused and agile culture of
innovation within the Department. It is imperative that we make sure
that we have the right innovation that we can scale and get to the
warfighter. My role will be to ensure the Department has the tools and
resources needed to advance this vision and that these efforts are
integrated and focused on the right Warfighting challenges.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the DISG? Are there elements that you might want to
save, adapt or discard if you are confirmed?
Answer. My understanding is that the Deputy's Innovation Steering
Group (DISG), co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is designed to rapidly evaluate,
identify, and execute innovative solutions for key operational problems
facing the Joint Force. The DISG focuses on critical joint operational
gaps that need fielded capabilities more quickly than the Department's
current acquisitions process is able to provide. If confirmed as the
Deputy Secretary, I will carefully evaluate the DISG, and all other
processes, to make sure that we can remove barriers to innovation and
fielding critical capabilities at scale.
Question. The Defense Innovation Unit was elevated to a principal
staff assistant (PSA) for the Secretary and the Deputy. If confirmed,
how might you leverage that role to better support the Department's
innovation activities?
Answer. The Department needs to source and field capabilities from
the commercial industry more quickly and at greater scale. In key
technology areas like software, commercial industry has rapidly
adjusted their development timelines to meet a fast-changing market,
while DOD is still struggling to reframe its acquisition process from a
hardware-centric to a software-centric approach. Since I am not yet
confirmed, I cannot specifically identify the best ways to leverage
DIU's capabilities but, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing DOD's
efforts to harness our industry against threats, revitalize our defense
industrial base, and scale and rapidly field emerging technologies.
Replicator
Question. Under Deputy Secretary Hicks, DOD established the
Replicator effort to focus the Department's energy and resources on the
highest priority needs.
What is your view on the Replicator program?
Answer. The Department must do more to deliver capabilities for
warfighters, at scale, on the most critical operational problems. My
understanding is that the Replicator initiative has focused on two
critical areas: Replicator-1 is focused on delivering thousands of all-
domain attritable autonomous systems to INDOPACOM to counter the pacing
threat posed by the People's Republic of China, and Replicator-2 is
focusing on countering the threat posed by small unmanned aerial
systems to our most critical installations and force concentrations.
Both of these operational problems remain pressing challenges and, if
confirmed, I will continue to ensure the Department focuses on
delivering innovative capabilities to warfighters in line with the
Secretary's priorities of rebuilding our military and reestablishing
deterrence.
Question. In your view, is a separate process like Replicator
needed within DOD to address the most pressing investment areas or
should the existing acquisition and management process be sufficient to
address urgent needs?
Answer. It is my understanding the Replicator program tailors the
rapid acquisition pathway to ensure rapid acquisition and deployment
for items urgently needed to react to an enemy threat or respond to
significant and urgent safety situations. I believe the Department must
utilize all of the authorities available to acquire capabilities to
meet the most pressing and urgent needs, to include the capabilities
being accelerated through Replicator. If confirmed, I will work with
the appropriate stakeholders to review the value of initiatives like
Replicator.
7rivate Equity and Venture Capital
Question. In 2023, the Department established the Office of
Strategic Capital to give DOD the capability to issue loans and loan
guarantees to complement and supplement traditional grants and funding
for innovative technologies. This has opened up new avenues for other
means to support small and nontraditional defense companies in more
cost-effective ways.
In your view, how do financial instruments, like loans, private
equity and venture capital, fit into the DOD tool box to support
innovation and technology development for national security purposes?
Answer. Capital markets are a major source of strength for the
United States in the global competition for technological advantage.
DOD can leverage that advantage through financial instruments like
loans and loan guarantees, which have been used as part of proven
strategies to attract and scale private capital in support of national
security priorities, including the development of critical
technologies, their components, and the ability to grow and scale
production.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve understanding of
these tools, and in turn, improve their use alongside traditional
funding mechanisms?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work through DOD and with other
United States Government agencies, Congress, the private sector, and
other key stakeholders to highlight the efficacy and impact of these
tools and support their use to address U.S. national security
priorities. To that end, I would support entities like the Office of
Strategic Capital and leverage fora such as the Strategic Capital
Advisory Council, the forthcoming National Security Capital Forum, and
the interagency process to engage and coordinate with stakeholders on
opportunities to use attract and scale capital to further DOD's
mission.
Question. Based on your experience in the private sector, do you
have any recommendations or suggestions in leveraging private equity
and venture capital, if confirmed?
Answer. Based on my experience in the private sector, I believe
that private equity and venture capital can bring significant resources
to bear in support of U.S. national security priorities and can offer
insight into market dynamics, opportunities, and risks that affect
DOD's mission. If confirmed, I would engage representatives from
venture capital and private equity alongside other stakeholders.
Question. How would you characterize the threat from adversarial
capital from hostile actors like China to our national security
industrial base?
Answer. Adversarial capital, particularly from China, poses a
significant threat to the National Security Industrial Base by enabling
intellectual property theft, supply chain infiltration, and strategic
influence over critical technologies vital to our military advantage.
If confirmed, I will review Department and Interagency efforts to
address adversarial capital and I will work with the appropriate
authorities, including this body, to protect against adversarial
capital and cyber intrusions.
Question. Do you have any recommendations on how DOD should be
structured to address these issues of economic competition, especially
when it comes to adversarial attempts to gain strategic facilities or
technologies that might be used against us?
Answer. It is imperative that the Department is postured to address
strategic competition with China in all aspects which could undermine
American warfighting advantages. If confirmed, I will work with
stakeholders across DOD to review our structure and resourcing to
determine whether changes are necessary.
military talent management
Question. In your judgment, how effective is the military at
identifying, promoting, and rewarding top performers?
Answer. My experience in the private sector has highlighted the
critical need to identify and reward top talent within an organization
and, in my career, I have worked with multiple highly talented serving
and former Service Members. If confirmed, I look forward to examining
how the Department identifies, promotes and rewards individuals based
on their merits and, if I identify changes which will improve
performance, then I commit to working with the necessary authorities,
including this body, to make our Service Members more lethal and
effective.
Question. Similarly, how effective is the military at identifying
and removing underperforming or counterproductive servicemembers?
Answer. Managing an effective organization does, at times, require
removing underperforming team members. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Services at the direction of the Secretary to ensure
the Department has the right people in the right positions, and that
personnel decisions are based solely on merit.
Question. What should be done to improve military talent
management?
Answer. Talent management is a key component to any successful
organization, and the Department of Defense is no different. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Services at the direction
of the Secretary to ensure the Department effectively attracts,
recruits, develops and retains the talent necessary to build and
sustain a lethal fighting force.
assignment policies for women in the service
Question. Since 2015, all military occupations and units have been
open to the assignment of any servicemember who can meet the
occupational standards, including women.
Do you believe in the fundamental principle that any person,
regardless of gender, who meets occupational standards for a particular
job should be afforded the opportunity to compete for and perform the
job?
Answer. My view is that every servicemember, regardless of sex, who
can meet objective occupational and readiness standards for a career
field should have the opportunity to compete for jobs in that field.
service of openly gay and lesbian servicemembers
Question. Since the repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' (DADT) in
2010, gay and lesbian members of the Armed Forces have served in the
United States military without having to conceal or lie about their
sexual orientation. According to RAND, approximately 6 percent of the
force identify as gay or lesbian. Successive chiefs of service in
administrations of both political parties have noted that repeal of
DADT did not create any significant challenges opponents foresaw.
Do you believe repeal of DADT has created challenges for the
military? If yes, please provide a detailed explanation.
Answer. Our servicemembers are focused first and foremost on being
the most ready, lethal force in the world. The repeal of DADT has
allowed all Americans--who can meet the military's high standards to
maintain readiness--to serve our country. That's the way it should be.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
for victims and hold assailants accountable, the prevalence of sexual
assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female
servicemembers aged 17 to 24, remains too high.
Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources, including the
DOD Restricted (Confidential) Reporting Policy, that DOD and the
Military Services have put in place to prevent and respond to sexual
assault, and to protect servicemembers who report sexual assault from
retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?
Answer. Sexual assault harms our warfighters and our military
readiness. It has no place in the military. I know the Department has
committed significant resources and undertaken numerous efforts to
address sexual assault. If I am confirmed, I intend to learn more about
the specifics of these efforts as we continue to rid the force of this
criminal behavior.
Question. If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, you
would recommend additional authority from Congress to improve the
Department's programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assaults?
Answer. Given both the Department's and Congress' ongoing efforts,
it is my impression that significant authority already exists to
further these initiatives. If confirmed, I commit to learning more
about the authorities that exist and, if necessary, I will work with
this body to make any necessary changes.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you
establish for yourself in DOD's program of preventing and responding to
both sexual harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our policies,
programs, and resources are as strong as possible to eliminate sexual
assault and other behaviors that distract our servicemembers from the
mission and undercut cohesion and trust. We must have ready, lethal
warfighters who can deploy and fight as a cohesive unit.
active and reserve component end strength
Question. The Active military is smaller today than at any other
point since the start of World War II. Since 2020, the Active Force has
shrunk by over 60,000 personnel.
Do you believe military end strength should increase? If yes, where
do you believe that growth should occur?
Answer. Military end strength should be based on what is necessary
to support the National Defense Strategy. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with the Secretary to determine what that number is and to
ensure the Department meets that target.
Question. What aggregate active end strength do you believe is
necessary to meet the demands placed on the Military Services by the
2022 NDS and associated operational plans?
Answer. The aggregate Active end strength should be based on the
requirements in the National Defense Strategy and associated
operational plans. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Secretary as he builds the next National Defense Strategy, and I will
work to ensure that we build a force which can achieve to determine
what that number is and to ensure the Department meets that target.
role of the reserve component
Question. Historically, the Reserve components have been positioned
as a strategic reserve to be used in the event of significant armed
conflict involving the United States. In the post-9/11 era, reserve
forces have been used more extensively to support both contingency
operations and ongoing military requirements in a garrison environment.
Today, in addition to being an operational reserve, members of the
Reserve component are used continuously as a part-time workforce for
the Department of Defense to perform its ongoing training and to meet
readiness requirements.
In your view, should the Reserve components serve as a part-time
workforce, an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or some
combination of those? In light of your answer, do the Reserve
components require increased levels of full-time support and oversight
by the Active component, including improved equipment, increased
training, adequate compensation and reimbursement, effective career
management, balanced Professional Military Education requirements, and
higher levels of overall resourcing for readiness going forward?
Answer. This Secretary is committed to restoring lethality in our
fighting force and supporting President Trump's agenda to build peace
through strength. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to
assess Reserve Component roles, resources, training, and levels to
ensure the Total Force is organized, manned, trained and equipped to
best meet our national security objectives.
Question. In your view, what legislative reforms should be made in
order to facilitate easier transitions for members of all components
between active and reserve status?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to determine
what reforms are necessary to ensure the Total Force can attract and
retain the talent necessary to meet our national security objectives.
operational tempo (optempo)
Question. Since the end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
military services continue to operate at a historically high OPTEMPO,
which senior civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense
have deemed ``unsustainable.''
What is your plan to adjust OPTEMPO in the Armed Forces to ensure
that servicemembers and their families are healthy, fit, adequately
rested, and have a sustainable lifestyle so that they are prepared for
a potential future major conflict?
Answer. Despite the end of large-scale United States troop
deployments to Iraq and the United States military presence in
Afghanistan, I understand that the military's operational tempo remains
high. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, the Secretaries of the Military Departments,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Military Service Chiefs
to ensure that we are sending the right forces to accomplish our
Nation's objectives and to refine our deployments, rotations, and
domestic training to ensure that our OPTEMPO is sustainable. We must
continue to maximize readiness for any future conflict while
simultaneously avoiding exhausting our Force.
recruiting and retention
Question. The 2024 National Defense Strategy Commission stated that
``The DOD workforce and the all-volunteer force provide an unmatched
advantage. However, recruiting failures have shrunk the force and raise
serious questions about the all-volunteer force in peacetime, let alone
in major combat.'' In addition, DOD studies indicate that only about 23
percent of today's youth population is eligible for military service,
and only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards are
interested in serving.
Do you agree with the premise that the shortage in the number of
American youth eligible, qualified for, and interested in serving in
the Armed Forces poses an existential threat to national security?
Answer. Yes, I do. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Secretary to help the Department address this significant challenge.
Question. In your opinion, why are so few individuals in the 17-24
age range eligible for service, and what can be done to increase the
pool of individuals qualified for, and interested in military service?
Answer. I understand that many individuals in this age group are
disqualified from military service due to medical conditions, including
mental health concerns, obesity, and diabetes. The recent executive
order establishing the ``President's Make America Healthy Again
Commission'' will improve this situation over time by aggressively
combating the critical health challenges facing our citizens. If
confirmed, I will support the Secretary in ensuring that the Department
has the right standards and incentivizes young people to serve.
Question. What programs, policies, or tools does the Department
need to increase the propensity to serve of today's youth?
Answer. I understand that the propensity of young Americans to
serve has long been in decline. I expect the President's actions in his
first weeks in office and the Secretary's commitment to a reinvigorated
warrior culture to increase the interest of young people in serving in
our Nation's military. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the
Secretary in finding ways to continue to increase the propensity to
serve of today's youth.
Question. If required to choose between maintaining high
recruitment and retention standards and achieving authorized end
strength levels, which would be more important, in your view?
Answer. President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have made it clear
that the Department must recruit the most capable individuals and
ensure every servicemember meets the high standards to serve and defend
this Nation. The Department should not lower its standards, but rather
should inspire young Americans to strive to meet those standards.
Question. Do you believe the total military compensation system,
including deferred and non-cash benefits, is adequate to recruit and
retain the number of highly qualified individuals needed for military
service?
Answer. The Department must ensure that it provides a compensation
package sufficient to attract young Americans. It also needs to
effectively communicate the benefits, including non-monetary benefits,
of service to those young people.
Question. Do you believe the Armed Forces recruits and retains a
diverse workforce, representative of the nation?
Answer. Servicemembers come from all across America to be part of a
unified team, and the Department should welcome all who meet its high
standards. The Secretary has made it clear that those high standards
will be the same for all, regardless of race, gender or ethnicity.
Question. Do you believe it is important that servicemembers
possess the ability, including that acquired through training, to work
effectively with fellow servicemembers from different geographic areas,
backgrounds, education, and experience to maximize the effectiveness of
the Armed Forces?
Answer. Yes. Throughout America's history, the military has been a
leading force in building strong teams out of young Americans from
across our country. As Secretary Hegseth has made clear, the unity of
our military is its strength.
military quality of life and family readiness
Question. Military quality of life and military family readiness
are critical factors in the recruitment and retention of
servicemembers. Military families want access to high quality education
for their children, and to high quality health care and childcare
services on military installations and in local communities. Military
spouses seek education and employment opportunities, and military
families benefit from modern morale, welfare and recreation (MWR)
services.
If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you make
a priority?
Answer. I fully support quality of life and MWR programs that
reinforce a resilient and ready force, both at home stations and in
deployed environments. These essential programs include commissaries,
spouse education and employment support, high quality childcare, mental
health counseling services, and fitness opportunities, build and
sustain warfighter and family readiness.
If confirmed, I will support the efficient use of resources to
ensure our warfighters and military families have access to the quality
of life they deserve. Quality of life programs are vital to retaining
our talented servicemembers and their families, restoring the warrior
ethos, and rebuilding the strongest, most lethal military in the world.
Question. The Committee often hears that Active component military
families have difficulty obtaining child care both on base and off
base. Acknowledging that there is a nation-wide shortage of qualified
child care providers, the unique circumstances around military life
require stable and reliable childcare options in any economic or labor
environment.
What are your innovative ideas for increasing the availability of
accessible, high-quality childcare, at an appropriate cost, for
military families?
Answer. Access to proximate and quality childcare is critical for
our servicemembers and their families. If confirmed, I will fully
support the Department's efforts to partner with Congress, States, and
local leaders to attract and retain the best available childcare
professionals and expand childcare availability in our Child
Development Centers.
non-deployable servicemembers
Question. The Department has published DODI 1332.45, Retention
Determinations for Non-Deployable Servicemembers.
Do you agree that servicemembers who are non-deployable for more
than 12 consecutive months should be subject either to separation from
service or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary that servicemembers who are non-
deployable for 12 consecutive months or more should be reviewed for
separation or a medical disability evaluation as appropriate.
military health system
Question. The Military Health System (MHS) is one of the Nation's
largest medical systems. Its threefold mission includes: 1) Ensuring
military personnel are healthy enough to perform their assigned tasks;
2) Ensuring military medical personnel are trained and ready to provide
medical care to support operating forces around world; and 3) Provide a
medical benefit to over 9.5 billion beneficiaries.
In your judgment, how should the Department of Defense balance the
sometimes-competing demands of the MHS mission?
Answer. I don't think that these missions are in competition with
each other, and are in fact, complementary. As I understand it, the
principal mission of the Military Health System is to ensure the force
is ready, and our medical teams are ready--wherever in the world we may
need to go.
The decision that the Department leadership must make to carry out
this mission in the most efficient manner is this: what care should be
delivered in military medical treatment facilities and what care should
it purchase from the private sector? It's a complex framework for
decisionmaking--and requires consideration for where military forces
are training and operating from, regardless of the medical capabilities
in the local communities. DOD must resource the Military Health System,
including where we place our military and civilian manpower, to most
effectively provide health care and generate medical forces.
And make no mistake--I will ensure our servicemembers and their
families have the finest care available, wherever it is provided.
Question. The MHS was recently reorganized to increase focus on
combat casualty care while maintain robust health care for authorized
beneficiaries. The Department of Defense requested over $60 billion for
MHS in fiscal year 2025, which is $10 billion more than the enacted MHS
budget from fiscal year 2021. Despite this increase, the MHS remains
underfunded in certain key areas.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the MHS is
capable of caring for our combat wounded personnel as well as providing
quality medical care to authorized beneficiaries?
Answer. Military medicine is one part of a no fail mission. We owe
it to the men and women who serve this country to provide the highest
quality, lifesaving health care both on the battlefield and at home. We
will not cut any corners when it comes to this mission.
If confirmed, I will carefully look at our military medical budget,
and ensure we are requesting appropriations and using those funds in an
efficient way that best supports this mission, to include unfunded
requirements that demand attention, as Secretary Hegseth has pledged. I
will establish clear and precise resourcing priorities and strict
controls to show good faith and transparency when requesting an
increase in appropriations, as well as emphasizing efficiency in
operations. Finally, I will also look to compare Military Health System
performance and costs against other leading health systems in the
United States.
I also recognize that health care is expensive--and DOD is not
insulated from health care cost growth, whether that's due to the cost
of prescription drugs, new technology, or the need to operate in
medically remote locations. I will ask our medical leaders to seek
opportunities to be better purchasers of health care services and to
find economies of scale and other efficiencies.
Question. What should be done to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the Military Health System?
Answer. As an investor with a great deal of experience in the
private sector, I will bring a strong focus on mission and efficiency
to the Department. Since I have not been confirmed, I do not know the
details, but I can assure that you I will work with our Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to determine the best ways to
raise effectiveness and efficiency within the Military Health System.
department of defense (dod) civilian workforce
Question. DOD is the Federal Government's largest employer of
civilian personnel. The vast majority of DOD civilian personnel
policies comport with requirements set forth in title 5 of the U.S.
Code, concerning the Federal civilian workforce generally, and
corresponding regulations under the purview of the Office of Personnel
Management. This has over the years, it has provided numerous
extraordinary hiring and management authorities tailored to specific
segments of the DOD civilian workforce to meet unique DOD workforce
requirements.
In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing the
Department in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian
workforce?
Answer. The Department has great people working for it and I am
committed to making sure that the Department continues to have the best
people. Throughout my career, I have focused on getting the right
people into the right jobs and in structuring organizations to use
their people effectively. If I am confirmed, I will review the
effectiveness of the numerous personnel management authorities and
systems and explore greater efficiencies. The Department must make
every effort to do this well in order to recruit and retain highly
skilled professionals that contribute to the Department's mission and
goals.
Question. Do you advocate the creation of a new ``title 10'' DOD
civilian workforce and a concomitant body of title 10 personnel
authorities applicable only to the DOD civilian workforce? If so, how
should these new authorities improve on title 5, in your view?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on making sure that the
Department has the best people and I am aware this proposal could
provide a unique opportunity to design a personnel system specifically
tailored to the Department's mission, potentially surpassing the
prescriptive limitations of Title 5. If confirmed, I will work with the
Congress to carefully evaluate this and any other reform which can
better equip the Department to address evolving national security
challenges.
Question. What recommendations do you have to improve DOD's
management of its civilian workforce?
Answer. I have extensive business experience in finding great
people and restricting organizations to use their people well. If
confirmed, I will work with Congress to identify ways to strengthen our
civilian talent management efforts and implement modernized hiring
practices that enhance workforce efficiency. The civilian workforce is
a key part of the DOD team, and the Department must efficiently recruit
and retain highly skilled civilian team members who contribute to the
Department's core missions.
Question. Do you believe DOD's civilian workforce is part of the
``total force'' and operates as an indispensable force multiplier for
the armed forces?
Answer. DOD civilian employees are integral to the lethality and
readiness of the Force. For example, the tens of thousands of civilian
employees working in depots and arsenals ensure equipment readiness,
support mobilization and contingency operations, and enhance
operational capability by maintaining/upgrading military equipment to
ensure the fighting force has the tools necessary to accomplish the
mission.
defense department and the intelligence community collaboration
Question. Since September 11, 2001, collaboration--both analytical
and operational--between the Defense Department and the Intelligence
Community has grown increasingly close. On one hand, seamless
collaboration is vital to effective and rapid responses to non-
traditional threats, and bringing together the strengths of the full
spectrum of defense and intelligence capabilities can generate more
effective solutions to complex problems. On the other hand, without
effective management and oversight, such collaboration risks blurring
distinct agency missions, authorities, and funding, as well as creating
redundant lines of effort.
In your view, are there aspects of the current relationship between
the Department and the Intelligence Community that should be re-
examined or modified?
Answer. DOD-Intelligence collaboration is vital to national
security and so believe that it is vital to be always improving
collaboration. From my time and experience chairing the President's
Intelligence Advisory Board, I believe intelligence priorities,
resource management, and information sharing are some of the most
critical areas for collaboration. From what I can tell from outside the
Department, coordination and collaboration with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the broader IC has
improved, but we can do better. If confirmed, I will support the
Secretary in working closely with the DNI to ensure the IC is fully
supporting the DOD's priorities and that DOD's intelligence elements
are also responsive to the ODNI's requirements.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner without delay? Please answer with a simple
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes
or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees, and their
respective staffs with records and other information within their
oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer with a simple yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
------
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
shrinking air force
1. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, our Air Force has shrunk from
4,321 total fighter aircraft in 1989, to 2,024 fighter aircraft today.
After you apply mission capable rates, only 724 aircraft are mission
capable for war. How will a continued divestment of airframes impact
the Air Force's ability to project air power as tasked by the Key West
Agreement of 1947?
Mr. Feinberg. The role of the Air Force in any future fight is
increasing, yet our Air Force is currently the oldest and smallest it
has been in its history. My understanding is that the Department of the
Air Force (DAF) is transitioning to a smaller, but more capable, force
focused on long-range kill chains. Ultimately, I believe we must be
able to project power for our deterrence and homeland defense with a
mixture of stand-off and stand-in, and asymmetric capabilities. We need
to invest in a family of medium-and long-range penetrating airframes
coupled with modern munitions, human-machine teaming, and a hardened
warfighting network.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the DAF and this
Congress to ensure that short-term readiness investments are tailored
to maintain a ready deterrent force, but that we do not cannibalize our
ability to modernize the joint force for the future fight.
recapitalization
2. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, the average age of our fighter
fleet is 30.3 years old. Our fleet needs new aircraft. How do you plan
to recapitalize the Air Force fleet and improve our mission capable
rates both to meet current mission taskings and to build a force
required for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) fight?
Mr. Feinberg. Maintaining legacy force structure while
simultaneously pursuing modernization has forced reductions in
procurement and readiness accounts. Divesting legacy weapon systems
that are no longer reliable, or suitable to address the pacing threat
can free resources for future capabilities and higher near-term
readiness priority investments.
If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Staff, combatant commands,
and the Air Force to assess the current capability and underlying
requirements, and I look forward to working with Congress and the DAF
to continue modernization efforts to improve readiness and extend the
life of weapons systems where practical, while procuring modernized
capabilities that can compete in a high-end conflict.
legacy spending
3. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, you referenced budget cuts to
legacy spending during your testimony and prioritizing funding for
primary missions. What investments are required in the Department of
Defense to meet the National Defense Strategy?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I would prioritize a top to bottom
review of legacy DOD spending to understand what missions this spending
supports. I anticipate the next National Defense Strategy will continue
to prioritize China as a pacing threat and have a renewed focus on
defending the homeland to align with the President's America First
policy.
I would want to understand the effectiveness of legacy spending
profiles in achieving those two DOD missions, and any others
prioritized in the National Defense Strategy, so that I can ensure
Defense spending focuses on the most cost-effective approaches and
capabilities.
two front war
4. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, adversaries in U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) could take advantage of a fight in the INDOPACOM
theater and commence a two-front war against America and its allies. Do
you believe the Department of Defense (DOD) should invest for a two-
front war?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand that countries like China, Iran, Russia,
and North Korea are aligning on issues of common interest in a manner
that suggests a cooperative approach to undermining U.S. influence and
our alliances. Concerningly, a conflict between any one of these actors
and the United States may create an opportunity for a second actor in a
different theater to pursue its own interests.
While I have not been briefed on our current classified assessments
of adversary alignment, if confirmed, I will make it a priority to work
with the intelligence community, the Joint Staff, the Services, and
civilian leadership, to understand both the threat posed by adversary
alignment, as well as the implications of this alignment for the
Department in general, and on Joint Force sizing and shaping in
particular.
5. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, will this require additional
funding for the Department of Defense?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with DOD components,
Military Services, Joint Staff, and combatant commands to thoroughly
understand the current capability and underlying requirements. I will
also prioritize a line-by-line review of DOD spending to understand
what missions this spending supports.
Along with these reviews, I will also leverage intelligence and
collect views from civilian and military experts to understand the
potential threats and approaches for managing those threats to assess
potential funding implications.
drones
6. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, as evidenced in Ukraine, drones
alone are not that decisive advantage to break out of a stalemate.
Given that, what role do you believe drones and artificial intelligence
(AI) have in our military?
Mr. Feinberg. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that the
integration of emerging technologies such as drones and artificial
intelligence (AI) will shape the future of warfighting and thus are
essential tools for preserving the Joint Force's technological
advantage over adversaries. I understand that rapid fielding of
emerging technologies to enhance the lethality of our warfighters and
reestablish deterrence is a key concern for the Secretary of Defense.
If confirmed, I will cooperate with stakeholders across the
Department to ensure that warfighters can employ emerging technologies
such as drones and AI to complement the full array of the Joint Force's
capabilities. I also recognize that the Department can utilize AI for a
range of use cases, from warfighting to business processes. If
confirmed, I am committed to exploring how drones and AI can be used to
quickly and responsibly respond to evolving threats and assure
lethality in the face of changing battlefield conditions.
munitions
7. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, long lead item, critical munitions
like the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile (JASSM), and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) are
required in the INDOPACOM fight. What other munitions do you consider
critical for the INDOPACOM fight?
Mr. Feinberg. Having a ready stockpile of munitions to deter and
defeat in the Indo-Pacific is paramount to our success. The munitions
that will enhance our lethality span the munitions capability portfolio
including long-range precision strike packages, maritime strike, air to
air, and missile defense. These capabilities include innovative, mass-
produced weapons, hypersonic missiles, and a backbone of proven
precision guided munitions.
If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to work across
the Joint Force, combatant commands, and Services to develop
requirements on a yearly basis in alignment with strategy and
prioritize the implementation of these munitions.
8. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, what additional authorities from
Congress do you believe you need to cut through bureaucratic red-tape
and grow our production capabilities for critical munitions?
Mr. Feinberg. Critical munitions are vital for deterring and
defeating our adversaries. The Department must continue to seek
authorization and appropriations from Congress in support of multi-year
procurement efforts, including advanced procurement of long-lead items.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on developing
more flexible authorities to ensure that we can surge weapons
production and rebuild our military. Additionally, I will review the
slate of existing authorities to determine whether there are additional
authorities that the Department could leverage, and I will communicate
back to the Congress, as appropriate.
america's strengths
9. Senator Cotton. Mr. Feinberg, what are America's key advantages
we should leverage in a contest with China?
Mr. Feinberg. The United States has the strongest military in the
history of the world. We will build on that advantageous position, by
reviving the warrior ethos inside the Department, expanding and
enhancing our capabilities, and standing by our Allies in the face of
aggression by Communist China.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
diagnostic testing technology
10. Senator Rounds. Mr. Feinberg, almost 3 years ago the Department
of Defense (DOD) estimated that the inability to detect and isolate
electronic faults resulted in over 383,000 non-mission capable days
each year and over $5.5 billion in non-value-added sustainment costs.
In response to this readiness and sustainment challenge, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) proposed funding for the purchase of a
readily available, effective, and proven technology to address this
issue. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) fully supports this
technology, and the fiscal year 2024 defense appropriation included
$35.2 million for it. My concern is that under the previous
administration, the Army has, instead of acquiring this readily
available, proven, and extremely cost-effective technology despite its
powerful support from OSD and SASC, decided to continue to only study
the issue. Meanwhile, the Navy has outright resisted acquisition of the
technology. If confirmed, would you commit to following up with me on
this technology?
Mr. Feinberg. While I have not been briefed on the specific details
of the Department's electronic faults efforts, I understand the
importance of pursuing new technology to solve mission-critical
sustainment challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
you and the Services on this issue.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
navy medical research command virology research
11. Senator Ernst. Mr. Feinberg, the Navy Medical Research Command
has funded and conducted research and surveillance in foreign locations
such as Laos, Singapore, and Malaysia, including funding Laos bat virus
research. Congress passed a law asking DOD to report on research labs
in China and other foreign countries (section 252 of Public Law 118-
31). The Office of Inspector General's (OIG) June 18, 2024 report, in
response to that law, noted:
Mr. Feinberg. ``(U) Navy officials from the Office of Naval
Research and Naval Medical Research Command did not respond with a
completed questionnaire but provided a statement confirming they were
unable to identify any research or experiments during the period under
review that could have reasonably resulted in funds provided to the
People's Republic of China and associated affiliates for research
activities, or any foreign countries, for the enhancement of pathogens
of pandemic potential'' (emphasis added).
Some of the OIG questions the Navy did not answer, include the
funding amount and details surrounding the study of pathogens in China
or other foreign countries and the purposes for those studies. Those
questions still warrant answers.
We have had difficulty getting responses from the previous
administration on many issues of concern, including information on the
DOD's involvement in bat research. Will you commit to ensuring full
transparency and cooperation with congressional oversight, especially
regarding the Navy's pandemic pathogen and bat virus research?
If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring transparency and
cooperation with congressional oversight. I will make sure that the
Department's research and development efforts are addressing the
highest priorities, as determined by the President and the Secretary of
Defense. I also commit to examining DOD's involvement in pandemic
pathogen and bat virus research and related activities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
alaska
12. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, in a 2018 interview, then
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, said that the Navy ``need[s] to
have on-sea presence [in the Arctic] now that we have a blue water
Arctic more times than not.'' He additionally pushed the Navy to look
at ``warm[ing] up Adak again,'' not only for additional training but
also for naval sea and air facilities as well as bulk fuel capability.
When Chinese and Russian naval vessels and air assets enter the Alaska
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), aircraft and ships must often travel long distances, which
stretch sustainment and make it more difficult to keep a constant
presence in the region where our adversaries are located. Will you
commit to reviewing our Arctic posture and specifically pushing for a
naval base and bulk fuel facilities at Adak Island to increase presence
in the Arctic?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Joint
Force's posture globally--including in Alaska and the broader Arctic
region--and the infrastructure necessary to support the Joint Force's
global mission.
13. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, Alaska is the only U.S. State
in the Arctic region. What advantages do you see in having multiple
ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S. Navy
ships?
Mr. Feinberg. Maintaining U.S. presence in the Arctic is key to
restoring deterrence and ensuring defense of the homeland. Military at-
sea refueling and commercial refueling arrangements enable nimble U.S.
operations, heightening our maneuverability and operational readiness.
The capabilities afforded by these refueling arrangements are
supplemented by commercial ports like the Port of Alaska in Anchorage,
which DOD has designated as a U.S. Commercial Strategic Seaport. If
confirmed, I look forward to evaluating capability gaps in Alaska and
the Arctic more broadly to ensure that the Joint Force has the posture
and infrastructure it needs to fulfill its mission there.
14. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, in Alaska, we have seen joint
Russian-Chinese air and naval exercises off our shores, incursions into
our ADIZ and EEZ, and a Chinese spy balloon floating over our
communities. In your opinion, what capabilities must advance to improve
multi-domain awareness in Alaska to respond to and be a persistent
presence in the Arctic, while Russia and China have developed
capabilities to hold our Homeland at risk?
Mr. Feinberg. Alaska plays an indispensable role in defending our
homeland, and I support efforts to improve our capabilities to monitor
the Arctic region across all domains. Ongoing efforts--undertaken in
partnership with Canada--to modernize NORAD and enhance the binational
command's ability to detect and monitor evolving threats are key to
this this.
If confirmed, I look forward to exploring additional ground-and
space-based sensors to further improve our sight picture in the region.
Today, communicating in the Arctic can be a major hindrance to
operating in the region, so examining enhancements to our
communications and data architecture in the region, especially space-
based communications, will be imperative to executing DOD's mission.
15. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, Alaska's importance as a
strategic place is not only due to its location but because it forms
the ``Three Pillars of Military Might'': 1) it acts as the cornerstone
of missile defense by housing the majority of the Nation's ground based
nuclear interceptors and many of the Nation's advanced radars; 2) by
providing a strategic platform for expeditionary forces including the
11th Airborne Division (Arctic); and 3) being a hub for Air Combat
Power where the largest concentration of fifth generation fighters in
the world is located. Will you commit to visiting Alaska to understand
the unique capabilities our State brings to deterrence?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and
visiting Alaska to understand the unique capabilities Alaska brings to
deterrence.
defense acquisition reform
16. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, last year, Congress received
the report of the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution (PPBE) Reform--a comprehensive report that outlined issues
with the Department of Defense's defense acquisition system. I plan to
lead efforts to cut bureaucracy and speed up innovation in the Pentagon
and defense technology sector and I believe the recommendations in this
report are a crucial step in doing so. Many of the reforms in that
report do not need congressional legislation to execute but rather can
be enacted by the Department of Defense and you as Deputy Secretary of
Defense, if confirmed. Will you commit to review the findings of that
report and direct a Pentagon working group to begin implementation of
the reform measures it outlined?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. I understand that under the previous
Administration, the Department committed to implementing some of the
recommendations made by the Commission on PPBE Reform. If confirmed, I
look forward to further evaluating the Commission's findings and
recommendations and to better understanding and shaping the
Department's ongoing efforts in response.
I also recognize that many of the PPBE reform efforts may not
require legislation to implement and acknowledge the importance of open
communication between the Department and Congress. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with Congress and keeping you informed on these
matters.
17. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, I am working with the Pentagon
and through legislation to lead efforts that help innovative defense
startups avoid the ``Valley of Death'' which results in long-
procurement timelines and shuttered defense firms. Will you commit to
work with me to fix this issue and to get feedback from non-traditional
defense technology leaders and scholars to reform the Pentagon's
processes?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. The Department needs to source and field
capabilities from non-traditional vendors, including innovative
startups and commercial industry, more quickly and at greater scale. In
key technology areas like software, commercial industry has rapidly
adjusted their development timelines to meet a fast-changing market,
while DOD is still struggling to reframe its acquisition process from a
hardware-centric to a software-centric approach. If confirmed, I will
seek out feedback from non-traditional defense technology leaders and
actively pursue new ideas and innovative approaches to deliver
solutions to our warfighters more quickly.
18. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to reviewing
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) as
outlined in the PPBE Reform Commission report and provide Congress with
updates as to the regulations that need to be removed or amended to
speed up acquisition?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I am committed to streamlining and
accelerating the acquisition process, recognizing its critical role in
equipping our warfighters with the capabilities they need to maintain
our national security. I am committed to thoroughly reviewing the DFARS
through the lens of speed and efficiency, taking into account the
Commission's findings. This review will be conducted with a sense of
urgency, and, if confirmed, I commit to ensuring transparency,
accountability, and cooperation with congressional oversight.
19. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, in my view, one of the most
important findings of the PPBE commission report involved reviewing
defense technology portfolios and budget line items to align them with
capabilities and provide agile budgeting flexibility by consolidating
budget line items. Do you agree that this idea will give the Pentagon
more agility to identify and execute important programs at scale that
are needed by the warfighter?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I am committed to further evaluating
the findings and recommendations of the Commission on PPBE Reform and
to working with Congress to improve the flexibility in the defense
budgeting processes, which will include focusing on the consolidation
of budget line items.
20. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, one of the most successful
programs in the Pentagon the last several years has been the Space
Development Agency (SDA), which has significantly reduced the time it
takes to get satellite sensor systems into orbit cheaply and at scale.
However, I am growing concerned that this program is going to be pulled
into the slower Pentagon Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS), and potentially lose its technological edge. Will you
commit to reviewing this program and helping Congress protect its
current organizational configuration to enable scalable satellite
launches?
Mr. Feinberg. I agree that we must preserve the factors that have
made the Space Development Agency (SDA) innovative and their
established record of using a spiral development strategy to deliver
new capabilities to meet documented Joint warfighter needs at scale, on
time, and within cost margins. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing how
the lessons learned from SDA's successes can inform the NDAA-directed
``clean sheet'' review of the JCIDS process and to developing a way
ahead that preserves SDA's ability to rapidly deliver necessary,
integrated capabilities for the Joint Force.
21. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, the Replicator Initiative
started by your predecessor seems to be trending positively overall
with certain exquisite capabilities already acquired. The goal is to
scale these capabilities this year. If the Replicator Initiative is
successful, there will likely be several lessons learned from it about
the procurement process. How do you plan to incorporate lessons learned
from Replicator into the rest of the DOD procurement process?
Mr. Feinberg. My understanding is that the Replicator Initiative,
through a whole of Department approach, has been able to accelerate
processes that normally take the Department years to complete into only
months. In partnership with the Vice Chairman and DOD components, if
confirmed, I will work to identify Replicator's best practices. I
believe it is important to continue pushing for the adoption and
institutionalization of processes and practices that accelerate the
delivery of capabilities to our warfighters.
critical minerals, national environmental policy act, and energy
22. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, during his term, President Joe
Biden passed 70 executive orders that restricted Alaska's ability to
extract its own natural resources despite an acute need for them on
both commercial and national security grounds. These executive orders
have slowed down or completely hindered resource extraction and
critical infrastructure projects important not just to the State but to
the Nation as a whole. On the first day of his presidency, January 20,
2025, President Trump signed an executive order entitled Unleashing
Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. The order in part reads as
follows:
``Section 3 Specific Agency Actions
a. The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including
but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of
Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful
authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps
to:
(i) rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions
from any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and
any other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy
set forth in section 2 of this order, including but not limited to
agency actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20,
2021, and January 20, 2025; and
(ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG potential,
including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and export
infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due
consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated
with such development . . .
Section 3(d) in addition to the actions outlined in subsection (a)
of this section, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, shall render all
assistance requested by the Governor of Alaska to facilitate the
clearing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, consistent
with applicable law. All such requests for assistance shall be
transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy for approval prior to
initiation.
Section 3(e) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, shall immediately
review, revise, or rescind any agency action that may in any way
hinder, slow or otherwise delay any critical project in the State of
Alaska.''
Will you commit fully to the intent of the President's executive
order referenced above where the Department of the Army and the U.S
Army Corps of Engineers will play a vital role?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure I get a briefing from the
Department of the Army on the scope and details of this initiate and
ensure that the Department appropriately implements the President's
Executive Order.
23. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, a number of important military
construction (MILCON) projects are held up by overly burdensome
environmental regulations. My home State of Alaska is particularly hard
hit by these regulations as the building season is very short and the
costs to build there extremely high. Will you commit to reviewing
environmental regulations put in place by DOD to accelerate the pace of
environmental reviews for critical MILCON projects and to let Congress
know how it can help?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will evaluate DOD and Military
Department National Environmental Policy Act regulations to streamline
and accelerate the pace of environmental reviews for critical MILCON
projects. I also commit to working with Congress to support the
Department's ability to rebuild our military expeditiously.
24. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, one of the results of President
Biden's energy policies and the ``lock up'' of my State through his
executive orders is an energy emergency affecting our national security
that is unfolding on some Alaska bases. I spoke to Secretary Hegseth
recently about this issue and explained to him that there has been a
number of instances where commanders of bases like Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) in Anchorage had to tell servicemembers and
their families to turn-down their heat, unplug personal property, and
turn-off certain critical systems that sustain the base. This was done
to preserve electricity and avoid brown-outs in the region. Would U.S.
national security be enhanced if there was a reliable source of clean-
burning Alaskan natural gas available to supply the energy needs of
these bases?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure a thorough evaluation of
energy resilience at our installations in Alaska and prioritize actions
to mitigate shortfalls. While I cannot speak to the specifics of
natural gas within the context of the national security paradigm yet, I
understand the Department is evaluating actions that support the
President's Executive Orders and, if confirmed, I would ensure the
inclusion of natural gas is also evaluated as part of energy resilience
of DOD installations.
25. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to working with
the State of Alaska and me to secure a reliable source of energy for
Alaska military bases?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
State of Alaska, and you, to enhance the energy resilience of DOD
installations.
golden dome for america
26. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, Billy Mitchell, the Father of
the U.S. Air Force once said, ``I believe . . . whoever controls Alaska
controls the world. I think it is the most strategic place in the
world.'' No other State but Alaska is strategically located to provide
such a high level of Homeland Defense. At Fort Greely, the 49th Missile
Defense Battalion provides our Nation's first line of defense, tasked
to defend against the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile
attack, command of 40 of the Nation's 44 ballistic missile
interceptors, and reception of data from the nearby Long Range
Discrimination Radar (LRDR). Fort Greely will soon house the new Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI) missiles, but the program for this system
has stalled due to high cost overruns and manufacturing delays. The NGI
will be an essential part of our national ballistic missile system.
Will you commit to reviewing the NGI program, if confirmed, and keep
Congress informed of what resources are required to field the missile
on time?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with the Missile Defense
Agency, other DOD components, and the Military Services to advance our
Nation's homeland missile defense capabilities--to include the Next
Generation Interceptor (NGI) program--in order to deliver on the
President's vision and Executive Order for homeland defense. The NGI
program is a top priority and I commit to working with the Congress to
ensure it is resourced for success.
27. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, Alaska is strategic not only
for its geographic location but also because of its concentration of
over 100 fifth generation fighters (the highest concentration in the
world) as well as it being home to the 11th Airborne Division, the
Nation's preeminent Arctic combat unit. If a war occurred in the
INDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR), forces in Alaska would almost
certainly be part of that fight and therefore would also be potentially
targeted in their home bases. Do you believe that President Trump's
``Golden Dome for America'' should include Alaska as a critical site to
be defended from missile attack given the facts stated above?
Mr. Feinberg. I fully support President Trump's Executive Order to
create a Golden Dome for America. The need for a next-generation
missile defense shield to protect Americans could not be more urgent,
and it aligns with one of the top priorities the Secretary has set for
the Defense Department: the need to reestablish deterrence capabilities
to protect our U.S. homeland borders and skies against foreign coercion
and aggression. All Americans deserve a similar degree of protection
against the catastrophic missile threats of our potential adversaries.
In its development of defensive architectures, the Department will
consider all key and potentially key locations, including Alaska, to
ensure we meet the intent of the executive order and secure the Nation.
budget
28. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Feinberg, since World War II, U.S.
defense spending has only dropped below 3 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) four times. Right now we are barely spending over that
threshold and the services are paying the heavy price for it in
readiness. Senator Wicker's ``Peace Through Strength'' Act seeks to
increase defense spending from 3 percent to 5 percent over time. Do you
commit to protect and help raise defense spending for high priority
projects like shipbuilding, industrial base improvement, Golden Dome,
etc.?
Mr. Feinberg. I commit to protect defense spending for high
priority projects, including shipbuilding, industrial base
improvements, and Golden Dome for America, if confirmed. I will also
focus on ending wasteful spending and ensuring that all the funds
Congress provides to the Department of Defense are wisely spent to
address the President's priorities and provide our warfighters with the
tools they need to keep our country safe.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
the replicator initiative
29. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Feinberg, the Secretary of Defense
recently outlined 17 critical investment areas, including unmanned
systems, which should be exempt from budget cuts within the Department
of Defense. The Replicator Initiative represents a significant
investment in this domain. If confirmed, can you commit to working to
ensure the continuity of the Replicator Initiative and working to
exempt it from any budget cuts?
Mr. Feinberg. The Department must do more to deliver capabilities
for warfighters, at scale, on the most critical operational problems.
My understanding is that the Replicator initiative has focused on two
critical areas: Replicator-1 is focused on delivering thousands of all-
domain attritable autonomous systems to INDOPACOM to counter the pacing
threat posed by China; and Replicator-2 is focusing on countering the
threat posed by small unmanned aerial systems to our most critical
installations and force concentrations. Both of these operational
problems remain pressing challenges and, if confirmed, I will continue
to ensure the Department focuses on and prioritizes the budget for
delivering innovative capabilities to warfighters in line with the
President's policies and the Secretary's priorities of rebuilding our
military and reestablishing deterrence.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
unmanned aerial vehicles
30. Senator Budd. Mr. Feinberg, your predecessor focused on the
Replicator initiative, led by the Defense Innovation Unit, to rapidly
field thousands of unmanned and autonomous systems. Do you believe this
initiative to be a success?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with DOD components,
Military Services, Joint Staff, and combatant commands to thoroughly
understand the current capability and underlying requirements
associated with the Replicator initiative. I will also prioritize a
line-by-line review of DOD spending to understand what missions this
spending supports. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department focuses
on delivering innovative capabilities to warfighters in line with the
President's policies and the Secretary's priorities of rebuilding our
military and reestablishing deterrence.
artificial intelligence
31. Senator Budd. Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, how would you plan to
ensure that leading edge AI capabilities continue to be prioritized
across the military services' intelligence programs, such as Project
Maven?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Chief Digital
and Artificial Intelligence Officer, the combatant commands, and
Military Departments as well as the Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, to appropriately prioritize leading-edge AI capabilities
that can bring increased lethality or efficiency in operations. We will
continue to mature and expand the operationalization of key efforts,
such as Project Maven, to improve the accuracy, speed, and precision of
intelligence support across the full range of DOD missions.
32. Senator Budd. Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, can you commit to
ensuring that we are not only acquiring but scaling effective leading
edge AI capabilities across the Department of Defense when feasible?
Mr. Feinberg. I will prioritize the Department's efforts to rapidly
deliver leading edge AI capabilities at scale, if confirmed. When
solutions demonstrate high return on investment in pilots and
experiments, it is important to quickly integrate them into both user
workflows and the broader architecture. Scalability has historically
been a challenge in DOD, but I will focus on creating the right
collaborations between industry, users, and program offices to develop
and implement transition plans that allow the entire force to
effectively scale and sustain the gains leading edge AI can bring to
the Department.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
critical minerals
33. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Feinberg, China has gained an outsized
control of the mining and refinement of rare earth minerals that are
crucial to almost all aspects of American manufacturing and defense
technologies. What steps do you and the administration of President
Donald Trump feel can and should be taken by the Defense Department,
directly and through procurement, to better develop domestic sources of
critical materials for national and economic security and reduce our
dependency on foreign supplies?
Mr. Feinberg. The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) faces
challenges from China's presence in, or control over, crucial aspects
of our strategic and critical materials supply chains that are not just
limited to rare earths but also includes a significant number of
critical minerals such as graphite, arsenic, tantalum, and others
required by the defense industrial base. Additionally, there are
challenges primarily in processing the raw material through each stage
of the mineral value chain--from exploratory drilling through
manufacturing. It is my understanding that the Department has worked
with industry to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities throughout our
critical mineral supply chains, and the Department has invested heavily
to strategically revitalize critical capabilities in domestic mining,
recycling, and processing industries in order to establish both short-
and long-term solutions.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department expands these
efforts and utilizes all available authorities, such as purchase
commitments, to secure and stabilize domestic supply chains and
eliminate our reliance on China. I also understand the importance of
stockpiling as a buffer in case of a national emergency, and, if
confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department has the necessary
robust National Defense Stockpile, not only as an effective insurance
policy against disruption, but also as a deterrent against adversarial
activity.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace, and security
34. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Feinberg, during our office call we
discussed the Women Peace and Security (WPS) law and its implementation
at DOD. It mandates that women be included in all aspects of our
national security, including conflict resolution and peace
negotiations. How does security cooperation under WPS provide an
operational and a strategic advantage to the United States and our
allies?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing DOD's
implementation of the WPS law to fully understand how it provides an
operational and strategic advantage to the United States and our
Allies. I am committed to working with you on this important
initiative.
35. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Feinberg, how do these programs contribute
to deterring the People's Republic of China, preventing trafficking of
women and girls at the border and countering violent extremism?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing DOD's
implementation of the WPS law to fully understand how it contributes to
deterring the People's Republic of China. I am committed to working
with you on this important initiative.
36. Senator Shaheen. Mr. Feinberg, can you commit to protecting
these programs at DOD, and keeping in touch with me about its
implementation?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will support the ongoing review of
all assistance programs and assess DOD's ongoing implementation of the
2017 WPS Act. If confirmed, I commit to transparency and look forward
to working with Congress on these efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
department of government efficiency at the department of defense
37. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, according to Associated Press
reporting, two senior United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) security officials were dismissed for trying to
prevent Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) from unlawfully
accessing classified information in restricted areas. This alarming
development shows a dangerous disregard for security protocols. With
DOGE teams now at the Department of Defense, I am very concerned this
pattern could threaten national security. As the DOD's chief operating
and management officer, will you ensure that DOD civilians and security
personnel are not punished for protecting classified and sensitive
information from unauthorized access?
Mr. Feinberg. I am unaware of the reporting that is referenced in
your question. I am committed to protecting Department of Defense (DoD)
sensitive and classified information. I understand that the President
maintains ultimate authority over controlled and classified information
access within and across the executive branch and this authority as
been exercised for the last sixty years through a series of Executive
Orders.
If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense in
implementing Presidential directives and ensuring appropriate access to
DOD information aligns with the Administration's priorities. I will
also ensure that all DOD personnel are empowered and equipped to
fulfill the essential missions of enabling access to and safeguarding
sensitive and classified information in accordance with all applicable
Presidential direction, information security laws, regulations, and DOD
policies.
replicator initiative
38. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, the Replicator Initiative has
accelerated the rapid acquisition and fielding of low-cost, autonomous
drones at scale to address warfighter needs in the Indo-Pacific and
bolster deterrence. If confirmed, will you continue to support the
Replicator initiative?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with DOD components,
Military Services, Joint Staff, and combatant commands to thoroughly
understand the current capability and underlying requirements
associated with the Replicator initiative. I will also prioritize a
line-by-line review of DOD spending to understand what missions this
spending supports. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department focuses
on delivering innovative capabilities to warfighters in line with the
President's policies and the Secretary's priorities of rebuilding our
military and reestablishing deterrence.
39. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, what is your plan to build on the
progress of programs like Replicator that focus on scaling the
capabilities our military needs to deter Chinese aggression in the
Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Feinberg. My understanding is that the Replicator Initiative,
through a whole of Department approach, has been able to accelerate
processes that normally take the Department years to complete into only
months. In partnership with the Vice Chairman and DOD components, if
confirmed, I will work to identify Replicator's best practices. I
believe it is important to continue pushing for the adoption and
institutionalization of processes and practices that accelerate the
delivery of capabilities to our warfighters.
united states indo-pacific command unfunded priorities list
40. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, successive administrations have
identified China as the pacing threat and the Indo-Pacific as the
priority theater. However, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
provided Congress with $11 billion dollars in unfunded priorities in
fiscal year 2025. The list included missile defense systems, electronic
warfare and autonomous capabilities, and critical innovation programs.
This was the largest unfunded list of any combatant command. If
confirmed, how will you ensure INDOPACOM's requirements are being met
to address the pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will carry out Secretary Hegseth's
crystal-clear direction that we are going to stand strong with our
Allies and partners to deter aggression by Communist China in the Indo-
Pacific. As he stated to Ukraine Defense Contact Group on February 12,
2025, ``The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the
Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing
tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.''
41. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, are you open to reforms that
would give INDOPACOM more of a say in the budgeting process?
Mr. Feinberg. While it is my understanding that the Combatant
Commands have full representation in each of the Department's planning,
programming, and budgeting forums including the Deputy's Management
Action Group (DMAG), I commit, if confirmed, to maintaining open lines
of communications with the INDOPACOM Commander to ensure I always
receive his best military advice--including on the budget.
whole-of-department acquisition reform
42. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, your predecessor leveraged the
position of Deputy Secretary of Defense to accelerate acquisition
reform and consolidate innovation initiatives across the Department.
What whole-of-department reforms would you implement to streamline
acquisition processes and deliver critical capabilities faster?
Mr. Feinberg. It is my understanding the Department has undertaken
a series of acquisition reform initiatives to deliver capabilities to
the warfighter faster, to include adoption of the Adaptive Acquisition
Framework and greater utilization of newer methodologies such as other
transaction authorities and commercial solutions openings.
Additionally, acquisition reform must include reviewing the current
processes surrounding requirements, PPBE reform recommendations, and
industry weaknesses. If confirmed, I will review the effectiveness of
current initiatives and consider options to further refine and improve
the Department's acquisition efforts.
43. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, as China seeks to undermine U.S.
security in the Indo-Pacific, how will you tailor reforms to impact
capabilities needed in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility?
Mr. Feinberg. China's pursuit of military modernization and its
increasingly assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific pose a direct
challenge to U.S. security and the regional balance of power. To
effectively counter this threat, I am committed to pursuing acquisition
reforms to deliver the capabilities needed in the Indo-Pacific Area of
Responsibility (AOR) with unprecedented speed and agility. I will
prioritize the development and acquisition of capabilities specifically
designed to address the operational challenges posed by China in the
Indo-Pacific, such as resilient networking, and advanced intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. If confirmed, I will
ensure acquisition decisions consider the need to support a distributed
force posture in the Indo-Pacific, in turn enabling us to operate
effectively across vast distances and challenging environments.
bolstering deterrence in the indo-pacific
44. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, in your opening statement, you
acknowledge the immense challenge China poses as they expand their
military and become ``more emboldened and aggressive each day.'' What
specific policies or actions are you planning to bolster deterrence in
the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Feinberg. As the President has directed, the United States will
ensure Peace through Strength. To meet the challenges posed by China
will require significant and persistent investments in how we resource
the joint force. That will require improvements in our defense
industrial base and the Department's acquisition process, as well as
intangibles such as how rapidly we are able to field new technologies.
In addition, the Department's non-military activities must serve its
laser focus on readiness, lethality, and warfighting.
allies and partners
45. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, our strong network of allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific is one of our greatest advantages and a
key part of our National Defense Strategy. Maintaining these important
relationships requires adequate budgeting for joint and multilateral
exercises and training, which bolsters military readiness and
deterrence. Given the constrained fiscal environment, how do you plan
to prioritize service campaign funding for multilateral exercises and
training in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will carry out Secretary Hegseth's
direction that we are going to stand strong with our Allies and
partners to deter aggression by Communist China in the Indo-Pacific.
Multilateral exercises and training with our partners in the Indo-
Pacific are a high priority as they are among the most visible and
effective ways to demonstrate our resolve.
probationary employees
46. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, the Department of Defense has
stated it is ``re-evaluating the probationary workforce'' and plans to
terminate approximately 5,400 probationary employees. Given that
probationary workers are often younger professionals or those filling
mission-critical technical roles, these cuts could have long-term
implications for DOD's talent pipeline and operational readiness. Given
that many probationary employees often represent the next generation of
DOD leadership, how will you ensure these cuts do not
disproportionately undermine the Department's ability to retain and
develop young talent?
Mr. Feinberg. Every person is important, and reorganizing is always
hard. It is important that the Department gets this right. If
confirmed, I will assess the potential impact of workforce reductions
on DOD's talent pipeline to ensure that decisions align with mission
readiness and long-term talent development, while also meeting the
President's goals for reshaping the Government's workforce.
47. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, many probationary employees serve
in highly technical or hard-to-fill positions critical to mission
success. What specific measures will you implement to prevent the loss
of expertise in these areas?
Mr. Feinberg. Civilian employees play a vital role in supporting
DOD, many serving in highly technical roles. If confirmed, I will
evaluate the Department's approach to workforce reductions to ensure it
retains critical technical expertise central to accomplishing the
Department's objectives.
48. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, given the national security
importance of building a strong civilian talent pipeline, will you
commit to preserving pathway programs and hiring authorities to ensure
young professionals continue to enter and advance within the DOD
workforce?
Mr. Feinberg. It is critical that the Department continue to
attract talented young professionals in the future. If confirmed, I
will review DOD's workforce development strategies and authorities and
its efforts to maintain a strong pipeline of young professionals in
mission-critical areas.
other transaction authorities and sole source contracts
49. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, in your hearing, you stated that
you plan to enhance the Department's use of Other Transaction
Authorities (OTAs) and sole-source contracts to better support
opportunities for small businesses to scale within DOD. What specific
next steps will you take to implement this strategy, and how will you
ensure these efforts translate into tangible opportunities for small
businesses?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will engage with DOD Components to
enhance the effective use of OTAs, and where applicable using the
statutory authority for follow-on production contracts to attract small
businesses and non-traditional defense contractors to support expansion
of the defense industrial base. We will promote these strategies by
ensuring the acquisition workforce is aware and informed through
policy, guidance, and training to incentivize appropriate use of this
strategy to help achieve DOD small business goals.
department of defense program review initiative
50. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, during your hearing, you stated
that if confirmed, you and your team would be conducting ``line-by-
line'' reviews of DOD programs. Can you provide specific details on the
scope, criteria, and timeline for these reviews?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, one of my first priorities will be a
line-by-line review of DOD budget programs, with a focus on identifying
efficiencies and to address potential fraud, waste, and abuse that
arises when executing the largest discretionary budget in Federal
Government. I will also leverage my position as the Co-chair of the
Deputy's Management Action Group to make sure programs are aligned with
the President's policies and the Secretary's priorities.
51. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, additionally, what mechanisms
will you put in place to ensure regular updates to Congress on your
findings and any resulting policy or budgetary changes?
Mr. Feinberg. It important that Congress and DOD have reliable,
useful, and timely financial information--and this can't happen without
a trusting and transparent relationship. If confirmed, I promise to
work closely with the Comptroller and Congress to make sure everyone is
informed about DOD's financial needs, priorities, and potential issues.
Defense programs often involve long development timelines and
significant financial commitments, and regular communication enables
Congress to understand these long-term plans and provide stable
funding.
defense innovation unit restructuring
52. Senator Hirono. Mr. Feinberg, recent reports suggest that the
Pentagon is considering restructuring and potentially consolidating the
Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Office (CDAO), the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO),
and other technology-focused entities. If this initiative moves
forward, will you commit to regularly engaging with Congress and
providing timely updates on the restructuring process, including its
impact on ongoing programs, workforce, and mission effectiveness?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will examine the current structure to
best determine how to align efforts to achieve maximum effect and
efficiency. My focus will be on ensuring the Department can accelerate
the delivery of the most lethal, advanced technologies and capabilities
to the warfighters. I also recognize the importance of a transparent
relationship between the Department and Congress, and, if confirmed, I
look forward to working with Congress on the matter.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
agreements
53. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, have you, in any professional or
personal capacity, signed or agreed to sign a non-disclosure agreement,
confidentiality agreement, confidential disclosure agreement,
proprietary information agreement, non-disparagement agreement, and/or
secrecy agreement and for what reasons did you do so?
Mr. Feinberg. Over the course of my more than 30-year career in
investing, I may have signed agreements relating to non-disclosure,
proprietary information or confidentiality/secrecy matters from time to
time for the purposes of obtaining information necessary to evaluate a
potential investment. I do not recall signing agreements relating to
non-disparagement although such clauses may have been contained within
larger agreements that I may have signed in connection with an
investment or in connection with ordinary course Cerberus personnel
matters.
54. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, have you, in any professional or
personal capacity, agreed to pay, paid, or receive payment or services
in conjunction with any of the aforementioned instances?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not recall any such payments although it is
possible that in connection with signing such an agreement in
connection with due diligence on a potential investment Cerberus (but
not me personally) may have received a payment for expense
reimbursement relating to the conduct of such due diligence.
55. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you have in any professional
or personal capacity, agreed to pay, paid, or receive payment or
services in conjunction with any of the aforementioned instances,
please provide a breakdown of the amount(s) agreed to pay, paid, or
received and an explanation of services rendered and include a timeline
of when any of these agreements, payments, or services rendered
occurred.
Mr. Feinberg. Given my role as CEO, the lengthy time span of my
career, and my extremely limited personal involvement in this level of
business matters, I cannot provide such a list. I can confirm that to
the best of my knowledge neither I nor Cerberus have ever made or
received any such payments in connection with any matter relating to a
crime, an alleged crime, a securities law violation, a regulatory or
similar matter.
retaliation and protecting whistleblowers
56. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe that
servicemembers, civilians, grantees, and contractors should be
protected from any form of retaliation for coming forward about an
illegal order, sexual assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or
any other concern that they wish to raise?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. I believe persons who report allegations of
wrongdoing, such as sexual assault, should be protected from
retaliation.
57. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, have you ever retaliated against
any individual for coming forward about an illegal order, sexual
assault or harassment, negligence, misconduct, or any other concern
that they wish to raise?
Mr. Feinberg. No, I have not.
58. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed as Deputy
Secretary of Defense, will you commit to protecting whistleblowers?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to the protection of
whistleblowers.
59. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you protect
whistleblowers?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
provides all the protections to which whistleblowers are entitled under
law.
civilian harm
60. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you agree that one difference
between the United States and its potential adversaries is the greater
value that the U.S. Government puts on protecting human life and
liberty at home and abroad?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I do.
61. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what is your understanding of
title 10 U.S.C. section 184, which established the Civilian Protection
Center of Excellence?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand the Section 184 requires DOD to
establish the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP CoE).
62. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, the U.S. military has spent many
years working to improve its ability to prevent and mitigate civilian
harm without sacrificing lethality--including through the development
of the DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm under the first Trump
administration, which I commend. These efforts received bipartisan
support from Congress and grew out of a recognition from the U.S.
military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars, warfighters
needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent civilian harm,
uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and psychological
trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. The Army has played a
critical role in these efforts by serving as the joint proponent for
civilian harm mitigation and response (CHMR) and housing the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence (CPCOE), which provides direct support
to operational combatant commands on civilian harm issues. The CPCOE
has also been enshrined in U.S. law via the James M. Inhofe National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023. If confirmed as
Deputy Secretary of Defense, will you commit to continued Army
leadership on civilian harm issues, including housing and resourcing
the CPCOE?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Secretary of the Army to ensure that the Department does its part to
prevent and mitigate civilian harm, including with respect to the CPOE.
63. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what do you understand to be your
roles and responsibilities regarding civilian harm mitigation and
response?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other
Department leaders to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in a manner
that advances American interests, consistent with relevant statutory
obligations.
64. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what do you understand to be the
importance of mitigating civilian harm in military operations?
Mr. Feinberg. High rates of civilian harm in previous conflicts
have led to limitations on U.S. freedom of action and allowed
adversaries to recruit insurgents, putting our troops at risk.
65. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to supporting and
protecting the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other
Department leaders to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in a manner
that advances American interests, consistent with relevant statutory
obligations.
66. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you prevent and mitigate
civilian harm?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other
Department leaders to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in a manner
that advances American interests, consistent with relevant statutory
obligations.
67. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to supporting and
implementing the Civilian Harm Mitigation Response and Action plan
(CHMR-AP)?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand that the CHMR-AP is in its final year of
implementation. If confirmed, I will continue evaluate DOD policies
that prevent and mitigate civilian harm.
68. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe that our troops
are at higher risk for retribution as the number of civilian deaths
from U.S. military operations or U.S.-led military operations
increases?
Mr. Feinberg. High rates of civilian harm in previous conflicts
have led to limitations on U.S. freedom of action and allowed
adversaries to recruit insurgents, putting our troops at risk.
blast overpressure
69. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to protecting
servicemembers from blast overpressure and increase their options for
seeking care after being exposed?
Mr. Feinberg. Protecting our servicemembers, maintaining their
health and readiness, and ensuring they have access to the health care
they need will always be a priority, if confirmed.
70. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what steps will you take to
protect servicemembers from blast overpressure and increase their
options for seeking care after being exposed?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I look forward to learning about the
Department's efforts to establish world-class traumatic brain injury
(TBI) specialty clinics and comprehensive interdisciplinary centers of
excellence for TBI and brain health, available to all servicemembers
diagnosed with brain injury or related illness. My understanding is
that these centers are already providing innovative, interdisciplinary
care.
71. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how do you plan to work with the
Department of Veterans Affairs to make sure that servicemembers,
veterans, and their families are aware of the risks of blast
overpressure and traumatic brain injury?
Mr. Feinberg. It is vital that the entire military community
recognizes the seriousness of brain injuries and has the knowledge
needed to prevent exposure, identify symptoms, and access the required
treatment for traumatic brain injury. If confirmed, I commit to
strengthening the collaboration between DOD and Department of Veterans
Affairs and will continue to support the Military Health System's
awareness efforts that have helped servicemembers, retirees, and their
families recognize symptoms and seek appropriate care.
72. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you support establishing logs
for soldiers on blast overpressure exposure and traumatic brain injury?
Mr. Feinberg. I support tracking individual exposure to ensure that
the servicemembers' health and well-being remains a top priority for
the Department.
73. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you support requiring
neurocognitive assessments of soldiers annually, before they begin
training to establish a baseline, and before they leave the military to
determine when their change in cognitive health over time?
Mr. Feinberg. I recognize the importance of tracking cognitive
health over the course of servicemembers' careers. My understanding is
the Department has taken steps to establish baseline testing for all
accessing servicemembers, and, if confirmed, I will meet with experts
in the Department to understand the Department's efforts to establish a
DOD-wide cognitive monitoring program.
74. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you address the links
between blast overpressure exposure and increased risks of suicide?
Mr. Feinberg. The Department should continue to study the
connection between blast exposure and mental health to best treat our
servicemembers. If confirmed, I will meet with experts at the
Department to understand the Department's efforts to establish a DOD-
wide cognitive monitoring program so that cognitive health can be
assessed and enhanced throughout the lifecycle of the Warfighter and
mitigate the effects of Blast Overpressure.
75. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you support addressing the
risks of blast overpressure to servicemembers through the swift
implementation of sections 721 through section 725 of the Fiscal Year
2025 NDAA?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work to understand how the
Department is complying with congressional requirements, particularly
on such vital issues. It is my understanding that DOD has already
initiated efforts to implement the provisions, and, if confirmed, I
will closely monitor implementation of all requirements.
right-to-repair
76. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe giving the
Department of Defense access to the technical data rights needed to
repair its own equipment could advance the Department of Defense's
readiness?
Mr. Feinberg. The Department of Defense should procure the
necessary data and associated license rights to enable repair of its
own equipment. If confirmed, I will direct a review of the Department's
internal policies regarding the acquisition of technical data rights
and the impact on readiness.
77. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe giving the
Department of Defense access to the technical data rights needed to
repair its own equipment could help reduce the Department of Defense's
repair and sustainment costs?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will direct a review of the
Department's internal policies regarding the acquisition of technical
data rights and the impact on repair and sustainment costs.
78. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you ensure
servicemembers who are stationed abroad can timely and cost-effectively
repair equipment that is damaged, especially in a contested logistics
environment?
Mr. Feinberg. Secretary Hegseth has called for the Department to
rebuild our military by matching threats to capabilities. Critical
elements of this effort are reviving our defense industrial base and
leveraging ally and partner capabilities around the globe. While I do
not yet know the specifics, I understand the Department has been
exploring multiple efforts to leverage the repair infrastructure of
Allies and partners in critical theaters in addition to fostering the
U.S. industrial base to optimize and sustain U.S. capabilities more
quickly. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about specific
efforts to ensure that our capabilities can be sustained at the speed
of relevance to strengthen deterrence and ensure lethality.
79. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed as Deputy
Secretary of Defense, will you commit to including right-to-repair/
technical data rights clauses in acquisition contracts that the
Department of Defense enters into?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I am committed to carefully reviewing
the Department's current policies and practices regarding right-to-
repair and the acquisition of the necessary data and data technical
data rights under acquisition contracts. The Department must explore
how best to leverage right-to-repair and technical data rights to
enhance control costs and competition. My goal, if confirmed, is to
ensure our acquisition strategies effectively support the warfighter
while promoting a healthy and robust industrial base.
80. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed as Deputy
Secretary of Defense, will you commit to ensuring contractors deliver
technical data rights to the Department of Defense when their contract
requires or allows it?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that the
Department's acquisition officials track assiduously the delivery of
the data that our contractors are contractually required to deliver and
ensure that our officials take appropriate enforcement actions if the
data is not provided.
81. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed as Deputy
Secretary of Defense, will you commit to understanding the cost of not
having the right-to-repair/technical data rights for the Department of
Defense's equipment through an assessment, the results of which you
would make public for review by Congress and the Department of
Government Efficiency?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will direct a review on the cost and
readiness impacts of not having rights-to-repair and technical data
rights.
ligado networks
82. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how much did Cerberus invest in
Ligado Networks?
Mr. Feinberg. Cerberus invested a total of over $1.2 billion in
various Ligado debt and equity during its ownership, including debt and
equity securities that were sold in the market from time to time over
the full duration of Cerberus' investment.
83. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, when did Cerberus begin investing
in Ligado Networks?
Mr. Feinberg. January 2015.
84. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, is Cerberus Ligado's largest
creditor?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
85. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, does Cerberus have a path to own
Ligado in future years?
Mr. Feinberg. It is my understanding that based upon preliminary
agreements with stakeholders in Ligado's pending chapter 11 case, it is
contemplated that all of Ligado's pre-petition funded debt (except
certain amounts repaid or ``rolled up'' through Ligado's debtor-in--
possession facility approved by the Bankruptcy Court) will be converted
to equity and existing equity interests will be retained, all in their
relative order of priority. Consequently, if a plan of reorganization
is approved on this basis, funds and accounts managed by Cerberus would
own non-controlling equity interests in Ligado post-bankruptcy capital
structure. If a plan is not approved and consummated, and Ligado's
assets are liquidated, then Cerberus would simply receive its pro rata
share of proceeds and no longer own any interests in Ligado.
86. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, Ligado is currently engaged in a
lawsuit with the Department of Defense over claims that the company
received for payments related to Ligado's rights to spectrum space.
Will Cerberus benefit or be made whole on its investment if the
Department of Defense settles the lawsuit and pays Ligado $4 billion or
more?
Mr. Feinberg. As a creditor of Ligado, Cerberus would most likely
receive some portion of the settlement proceeds. Neither Cerberus nor
other creditors would be made whole on their investments with a
settlement of $4 billion.
87. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe DOD has engaged in
regulatory obstruction regarding L-band spectrum access?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have sufficient information or facts to form
an opinion, and I do not understand what is meant by ``regulatory
obstruction.'' As I understand it, the current lawsuit is in its early
phases and no discovery has been conducted as to DOD's actions relating
to Ligado.
88. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you believe DOD's actions
regarding spectrum access have financially harmed Ligado or Cerberus?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have sufficient information or facts to form
an opinion, and I do not understand what is meant by ``regulatory
obstruction.'' As I understand it, the current lawsuit is in its early
phases and no discovery has been conducted as to DOD's actions relating
to Ligado.
89. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, my colleague, Senator Deb
Fischer, recently said ``DOD losing access to its spectrum bans
entirely, which is what vacating or clearing spectrum means, comes with
huge risks and will end up costing us more. Replacing national security
systems, if that is even possible, would cost hundreds of billions of
dollars, and we all know it would take decades to be able to finish.''
Do you agree or disagree with this statement?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand the importance of spectrum to our
military and to achieving the objectives of the President and the
Secretary of Defense. I agree that loss of military access to an entire
band will carry significant risk, including cost. The details depend on
which bands and which missions are at issue. This requires assessments
of operational impact and identification of comparable spectrum to
which systems will relocate, as required by law. I strongly believe we
need spectrum to defend our country.
I also acknowledge commercial use of spectrum is needed to develop
the technologies that will defend our country. To me, sharing is the
best solution; however, we have to make sure that sharing can be
achieved without risk to national security and homeland defense
capabilities.
90. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, my colleague Senator Mike Rounds
has said that he will oppose any spectrum action that includes the 3.1-
3.45 GHz segment, currently used by the Defense Department. Where do
you stand on this issue?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand the importance of spectrum to our
military and to achieving the objectives of the President and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to receiving further
briefings on this topic and will work to ensure the Department has the
spectrum access necessary to achieve national security and homeland
defense objectives.
91. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to recusing
yourself from any involvement in the lawsuit Ligado has brought against
the Department of Defense?
Mr. Feinberg. My Ethics Agreement and existing laws and policies
set forth my recusal requirements. I will ensure that I have a robust
screening process in place to help implement these recusals. I can
pledge to you that I will be mindful of not only the legal requirements
that govern my conduct, but also of the need to ensure that the public
has no reason to question my impartiality, and I will consult with the
Department's ethics officials should such issues arise.
92. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how did you divest from your
interest in Ligado?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, consistent with my Ethics Agreement, I
will divest all of my interests in Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.,
which will include any interest in Ligado.
93. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you recuse yourself from any
matters impacting Ligado?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, consistent with my Ethics Agreement, I
will divest all of my interests in Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.,
which will include any interest in Ligado.
94. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you recuse yourself from
spectrum decisions?
Mr. Feinberg. My Ethics Agreement and existing laws and policies
set forth my recusal requirements. I will ensure that I have a robust
screening process in place to help implement these recusals. I can
pledge to you that I will be mindful of not only the legal requirements
that govern my conduct, but also of the need to ensure that the public
has no reason to question my impartiality, and I will consult with the
Department's ethics officials should such issues arise.
managing the federal workforce
95. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, the Trump administration has
removed a number of probationary employees across the Federal
Government. Many of these probationary employees were recently promoted
or hired to fulfill urgently needed gaps in U.S. capabilities. Why
should Congress provide the Department of Defense expedited or
additional hiring authorities if they will be disregarded without any
public justification or consultation with Congress?
Mr. Feinberg. The Department benefits from flexibility in
accomplishing its mission. If confirmed, I will work with DOD
components and the Military Services to assess the gaps in U.S.
capabilities and review DOD's legal authorities for workforce
management to ensure decisions align with mission readiness and mission
success, while also meeting the President's goals for reshaping the
Government's workforce.
96. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, press reports indicate DOD has
paused four trainings, including harassment prevention and No Fear Act
training. Do you support harassment prevention training?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes, I support harassment prevention training.
Harassing behaviors have no place in our military and undercut the
cohesion and unity we need in our Total Force to achieve our critical
defense missions.
97. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what is your understanding of the
purpose of Federal whistleblower protection laws?
Mr. Feinberg. Whistleblowers perform an important service by
reporting what they reasonably believe to be evidence of waste, fraud,
and abuse. Whistleblower protection laws exist to ensure that
whistleblowers may report freely concerning issues of fraud, waste, and
abuse without fear of retaliation and/or reprisal.
98. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, have you ever been accused of
retaliating against a whistleblower?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
99. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum called ``Guidance on Agency RIF
[reduction in force] and Reorganization Plans Requested by Implementing
The President's `Department of Government Efficiency' Workforce
Optimization Initiative'' on February 26, 2025. The memo outlines
phases for which agencies will submit agency reductions in force and
reorganization plans. Is the Department of Defense required to comply
with this OMB memo?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure I get a briefing on the
scope of the OMB memo and ensure that the Department appropriately
implements the underlying Executive Order.
100. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if the Department of Defense is
not required to comply with the OMB memo, has the Department been given
a similar directive by anyone in the Administration or within the
Department's leadership?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not aware of similar directives the Department
may have received. If confirmed, I will ensure I get a briefing on
Department efforts concerning workforce reductions.
101. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will the Department of
Defense ensure that any reductions in force preserve military
preparedness and national security?
Mr. Feinberg. Civilian employees have a vital role in support of
warfighter readiness. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department
takes a deliberate approach to any workforce shaping decisions to
strengthen the Department's ability to support the National Defense
Strategy.
102. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will the Department of Defense
conduct a review pursuant to title 10 USC section 129a?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will fully support conducting an
appropriate analysis prior to any reductions of DOD's civilian
workforce.
103. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will the Department of
Defense ensure transparency and inform Congress about the findings of
the review conducted pursuant to title 10 USC section 129a?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with the Department's
Legislative Affairs team to determine the best method to communicate
information and facilitate transparency.
rule of law
104. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, Secretary of Defense Peter
Hegseth said he removed the Judge Advocate Generals (JAG) for the Army,
Navy, and Air Force so they would not ``be roadblocks to anything that
happens.'' What do you understand to be the role of Judge Advocate
Generals for commanders and the military?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand that the Judge Advocates General provide
independent legal advice to the leadership of their respective Military
Departments and that Judge Advocates in the field, in support of their
Services or at joint commands, also have a responsibility to provide
independent legal advice to military commanders.
105. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what will you do if you receive
legal advice that an action you would like to take or are being asked
to take is illegal?
Mr. Feinberg. I will follow the law and the Constitution of the
United States.
106. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you refuse to take an action
that you have been advised is illegal and learn that someone else in
the Department took action, will you inform the Committee?
Mr. Feinberg. While I do not anticipate such a situation, if it
were to arise, I would follow the law and the Constitution of the
United States, supported by the advice provided to me by DOD General
Counsel and the Department of Justice. I would address such
circumstances with my legal counsel and leadership chain so that the
Department may take all appropriate actions.
107. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, in your hearing you said you
would commit to respecting the independence of the Judge Advocate
Generals. What measures will you put in place to ensure JAG officers
can provide independent advice without influence or fear of reprisal?
Mr. Feinberg. The Judge Advocates General report to and primarily
advise the leadership of their respective Military Departments and
Services. I understand that the Judge Advocates General provide
independent legal advice, and that under the law no officer or employee
of DOD may interfere with that. I expect the leadership of our Military
Departments and Services will fully comply with the law in this regard
as well in all things. If confirmed, I will be clear with my
expectation that we fully comply with the law in executing the
important mission of the Department of Defense.
defense reform
108. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, in your advance policy questions
you said ``we need to understand what issues and impediments the
general counsels will bring and how we can solve them.'' What issues
and impediments do you anticipate general counsels raising?
Mr. Feinberg. Differing lexicons between the Department of Defense
and the private sector can lead to miscommunication, which in turn
complicates collaboration, private sector business practices, and the
Department's mission. Over the past three decades working in the
private sector, I have experience working with general counsels and the
Department on such things as compliance with Federal regulations,
cybersecurity requirements, intellectual property protection, and
adherence to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). If confirmed, I
will work to improve communication and overall collaboration between
the Department and the private sector, while ensuring all actions
remain in compliance with necessary policies and law.
hypersonics
109. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, in your hearing you said
``[your] job would be to execute development--faster development with
reasonable cost, and quickly, of hypersonic capability.'' What
mission(s) would you assign hypersonic weapons to take on?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not briefed on internal DOD analysis on this
issue, but expect that hypersonic weapons are a critical element of the
future mix of offensive U.S. capabilities and that they should be able
to credibly threaten and, if necessary, defeat heavily defended and
time-critical targets. If confirmed, I will work with the appropriate
Department of Defense Components to assess the appropriate missions for
hypersonic weapons.
110. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, would hypersonics replace any
current U.S. military capabilities?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not briefed on internal DOD analysis on this
issue, but I expect that hypersonics are a critical part of the mix of
capabilities necessary for the Joint Force to deter, and if necessary,
prevail in future conflicts. If confirmed, I will work with the
appropriate DOD Components to assess how hypersonics fit within the mix
of U.S. offensive capabilities.
111. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what do you expect the cost of
developing U.S. military hypersonic capability will be?
Mr. Feinberg. I have not been briefed on classified information,
but my understanding is that the Department of Defense has already
invested significant resources in the development and near-term
deployment of various hypersonic systems. If confirmed, I will
determine the most cost-effective hypersonic capabilities to pursue and
ensure that what we pursue is developed in an efficient manner.
112. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you commit to conducting a
study and releasing a report on the cost-benefit analysis of developing
hypersonic capabilities to ensure any U.S. military hypersonic
development is ``reasonable''?
Mr. Feinberg. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) on a cost-benefit
analysis of developing hypersonic capabilities, and subsequently, I
look forward to working with Congress on this matter, to include
releasing associated report(s).
113. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will fielding hypersonic
weapons affect the posture of the United States, its allies, and near-
peer competitors?
Mr. Feinberg. Fielding U.S. hypersonic weapons may allow the United
States greater flexibility in the posture of its forces. If confirmed,
I look forward to supporting review of our global force posture, to
include assessing how future hypersonic weapons may impact how we align
forces to achieve our goals given the competitive geostrategic
environment.
114. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what measures will you take to
ensure transparency and multilateral arms control agreements are in
place to mitigate risks associated with hypersonic capabilities?
Mr. Feinberg. The United States should pursue transparency and arms
control agreements when it is in U.S. interests to do so and when such
agreements enhance U.S. security. However, progress in arms control is
not an end in itself and depends on the participation of partners
willing to abide by their commitments. I do not believe we should limit
U.S. options in any future negotiation by prematurely imposing or
presuming limitations to U.S. capabilities. Instead, we should remain
open to negotiable conditions that maximize our ability to protect U.S.
interests and defend the Nation, deter our adversaries, and assure our
Allies and partners.
mismanagement
115. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, please list all the Cerberus-
owned companies that have declared bankruptcy.
Mr. Feinberg. Over more than thirty years Cerberus has invested in
thousands of companies across its various funds and investment
platforms. It is extremely difficult to list every company or entity in
which Cerberus has ever made an investment that has been the subject of
a bankruptcy case over the last thirty years. My best estimate would be
less than 1 percent (1 percent) of all Cerberus-owned companies went
bankrupt over the last 10 years.
116. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, Cerberus touts its
``operationally oriented'' approach to investing, which includes heavy
involvement in the operations of the companies it owns. What percentage
of Cerberus-owned companies went bankrupt over the last 10 years?
Mr. Feinberg. Over more than thirty years Cerberus has invested in
thousands of companies across its various funds and investment
platforms. It is extremely difficult to list every company or entity in
which Cerberus has ever made an investment that has been the subject of
a bankruptcy case over the last thirty years. My best estimate would be
less than 1 percent (1 percent) of all Cerberus-owned companies went
bankrupt over the last 10 years.
117. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if Cerberus has ``functional
experts'' to ``create stronger and more competitive businesses,'' why
have so many Cerberus-owned companies failed?
Mr. Feinberg. Cerberus' investment model typically seeks to help
companies experiencing financial and/or operational distress or
significant headwinds through financial and operational improvements.
Cerberus' investments have served as a lifeline to many companies
facing difficult circumstances. Filing for bankruptcy is a rare outcome
but given the nature of the business of investing in distressed
companies for over three decades, there have been a small number of
instances where filing for bankruptcy protection was necessary due to
market, industry, and/or company-specific issues.
While no track record spanning more than three decades will produce
a 100 percent success rate, Cerberus is proud of its success in
stabilizing, improving, and creating value for hundreds of American
businesses, hundreds of thousands of workers, and the communities and
other stakeholders served by these businesses.
118. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, why did Chrysler have to file
for bankruptcy?
Mr. Feinberg. During Cerberus' investment in Chrysler, the world's
economies and markets were rocked by the Global Financial Crisis. This
steep recession hit the automotive industry especially hard and
introduced insurmountable headwinds and disruptions to the sector,
necessitating Chrysler's bankruptcy proceedings.
When Cerberus acquired Chrysler from Daimler in May 2007, the
company was in shambles having been starved for capital and technology
by Daimler in favor of Mercedes for years. Cerberus put together a
world-class operating team led by Robert Nardelli (formerly a deputy of
Jack Welch at General Electric) and an exceptional team of automotive
industry veterans. The new operating team was very successful in
turning Chrysler from loss-making to profitable in a short period of
time, saving billions in costs and initiating best-in-class operating
and manufacturing protocols. Unfortunately, the Global Financial
Crisis, which began around the time of the acquisition, accelerated at
a pace unseen in decades, hitting the automotive industry particularly
hard. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis own data, from
2007 to 2009 new vehicle sales fell nearly 40 percent in the United
States alone. Auto manufacturing is a high fixed-cost business with
heavy reliance on union labor. No business with such embedded fixed
costs can survive, or restructure around, a sudden 40 percent+
reduction in its revenue, and Chrysler was no exception. Despite the
best efforts of the management team, operating costs simply could not
realistically adjust fast enough and deep enough to allow Chrysler to
weather the multi-year collapse of auto sales. Cerberus, together with
the Chrysler management team, worked rigorously with the U.S.
Government, the lenders, and the unions to implement a comprehensive
rescue plan for the automaker during this unprecedented and
catastrophic collapse of sales for all automakers.
Ultimately, Cerberus partnered with the U.S. Government to help
save the company and made material concessions to ensure the continuity
of Chrysler, with the preservation of as many jobs as possible (both at
Chrysler and the myriad suppliers and vendors who relied on Chrysler),
to secure its ability to once again become a leading U.S. auto maker.
119. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what management decisions did
Cerberus recommend to Chrysler leadership as a part of Cerberus'
``operationally oriented'' approach to investing?
Mr. Feinberg. During Cerberus' investment in Chrysler, the world's
economies and markets were rocked by the Global Financial Crisis. This
steep recession hit the automotive industry especially hard and
introduced insurmountable headwinds and disruptions to the sector,
necessitating Chrysler's bankruptcy proceedings.
When Cerberus acquired Chrysler from Daimler in May 2007, the
company was in shambles having been starved for capital and technology
by Daimler in favor of Mercedes for years. Cerberus put together a
world-class operating team led by Robert Nardelli (formerly a deputy of
Jack Welch at General Electric) and an exceptional team of automotive
industry veterans. The new operating team was very successful in
turning Chrysler from loss-making to profitable in a short period of
time, saving billions in costs and initiating best-in-class operating
and manufacturing protocols. Unfortunately, the Global Financial
Crisis, which began around the time of the acquisition, accelerated at
a pace unseen in decades, hitting the automotive industry particularly
hard. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis own data, from
2007 to 2009 new vehicle sales fell nearly 40 percent in the United
States alone. Auto manufacturing is a high fixed-cost business with
heavy reliance on union labor. No business with such embedded fixed
costs can survive, or restructure around, a sudden 40 percent+
reduction in its revenue, and Chrysler was no exception. Despite the
best efforts of the management team, operating costs simply could not
realistically adjust fast enough and deep enough to allow Chrysler to
weather the multi-year collapse of auto sales. Cerberus, together with
the Chrysler management team, worked rigorously with the U.S.
Government, the lenders, and the unions to implement a comprehensive
rescue plan for the automaker during this unprecedented and
catastrophic collapse of sales for all automakers.
Ultimately, Cerberus partnered with the U.S. Government to help
save the company and made material concessions to ensure the continuity
of Chrysler, with the preservation of as many jobs as possible (both at
Chrysler and the myriad suppliers and vendors who relied on Chrysler),
to secure its ability to once again become a leading U.S. auto maker.
120. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, why did Steward have to file for
bankruptcy?
Mr. Feinberg. The investment by Cerberus in Steward Healthcare in
2010 rescued and restored critical community hospitals in
Massachusetts. The efforts of Cerberus and the Steward management team
ensured continued access to healthcare for communities, protected more
than 10,000 jobs, and secured the pensions of 13,000 current and former
employees. Over the next decade, Cerberus supported Steward's
investment of approximately $900 million into facilities, technology,
and personnel, as well as quantifiable improvements in the quality of
care.
At the time Cerberus' ownership concluded in 2020, Steward had
transformed into a nationally recognized Accountable Care Organization
with substantial liquidity and, to the best of our knowledge, in
compliance with all of its financial covenants. Steward ended 2020
(more than 6 months after Cerberus' ownership concluded) with access to
more than $650 million of total liquidity, including more than $400
million of cash on its balance sheet. Cerberus did not have any input
or control of Steward's management or operations, or any direct
knowledge of Steward's performance and management decisions, following
the conclusion of its controlling ownership in 2020.
I respectfully refer also to what Steward noted in its first-day
filings with the United States Bankruptcy Court regarding how it was
negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in patient and
insurance revenue declining by 25 percent. Further details about the
company's reasons for its bankruptcy filing in 2024 are outlined in its
public bankruptcy case filings.
Cerberus has been fully cooperative and transparent with elected
officials, Government regulators, and the public in providing
information relating to its investment in the Steward hospital system.
The full context of Cerberus' investment in Steward was provided to
Senator Warren in our February 2024 letter, detailing the rescue,
revitalization, financial health, improvement of patient care, and
financial results of Steward during Cerberus' 10-year ownership.
Additional material information was also provided to the U.S. Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions in a letter dated
September 2024.
121. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what management decisions did
Cerberus recommend to Steward leadership as a part of Cerberus'
``operationally oriented'' approach to investing?
Mr. Feinberg. The investment by Cerberus in Steward Healthcare in
2010 rescued and restored critical community hospitals in
Massachusetts. The efforts of Cerberus and the Steward management team
ensured continued access to healthcare for communities, protected more
than 10,000 jobs, and secured the pensions of 13,000 current and former
employees. Over the next decade, Cerberus supported Steward's
investment of approximately $900 million into facilities, technology,
and personnel, as well as quantifiable improvements in the quality of
care.
At the time Cerberus' ownership concluded in 2020, Steward had
transformed into a nationally recognized Accountable Care Organization
with substantial liquidity and, to the best of our knowledge, in
compliance with all of its financial covenants. Steward ended 2020
(more than 6 months after Cerberus' ownership concluded) with access to
more than $650 million of total liquidity, including more than $400
million of cash on its balance sheet. Cerberus did not have any input
or control of Steward's management or operations, or any direct
knowledge of Steward's performance and management decisions, following
the conclusion of its controlling ownership in 2020.
I respectfully refer also to what Steward noted in its first-day
filings with the United States Bankruptcy Court regarding how it was
negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in patient and
insurance revenue declining by 25 percent. Further details about the
company's reasons for its bankruptcy filing in 2024 are outlined in its
public bankruptcy case filings.
Cerberus has been fully cooperative and transparent with elected
officials, Government regulators, and the public in providing
information relating to its investment in the Steward hospital system.
The full context of Cerberus' investment in Steward was provided to
Senator Warren in our February 2024 letter, detailing the rescue,
revitalization, financial health, improvement of patient care, and
financial results of Steward during Cerberus' 10-year ownership.
Additional material information was also provided to the U.S. Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions in a letter dated
September 2024.
122. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how much in total profits,
including dividends and all other compensation or payouts, did Cerberus
earn from its investments in Steward/Caritas Christi?
Mr. Feinberg. Please refer to the letter Cerberus sent to the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions in September
2024, which transparently discloses the capital Cerberus prudently
invested in Steward. The proceeds of such invested capital belonged
overwhelmingly to, and inured to the benefits of, Cerberus' investors,
which include, among others, millions of teachers, firefighters,
police, municipal workers, universities, and endowments.
123. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how much in total income,
including dividends and all other compensation, did you earn as a
result of Cerberus's investments in Steward/Caritas Christi?
Mr. Feinberg. Pooled investment platforms such as the Cerberus
funds and accounts earn incentive fees on a pooled/aggregate basis and
are paid to the investment manager only after all capital and a
preferred return are paid to investors. Consequently, the earning and
allocation of incentive fees depends upon the timing in the lifecycle
of a particular fund in which the investment is realized and cannot be
attributed directly to any single investment.
124. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, why did Remington Outdoor
Company have to file for bankruptcy?
Mr. Feinberg. In 2006, funds and accounts managed by Cerberus
acquired Bushmaster Firearms Co. and made subsequent add-on
acquisitions that were later consolidated under the Remington Outdoor
Company (``Remington'') umbrella. For generations, gun manufacturers
have focused on hunting and sport shooting enthusiasts within the
broader outdoor sporting industry, which also includes fishing,
camping, etc. Cerberus' investment thesis was to create a leading
outdoor enthusiast business consisting of historic brands that could
benefit from operational and financial expertise. Remington
successfully pursued this strategy for many years through acquisitions,
vertical integration, product development and operational improvements.
Many of the companies acquired were poorly managed and experiencing
significant difficulties due to outdated manufacturing facilities and
other operating inefficiencies. Cerberus supported a multitude of
strategic investments, operational improvements and product development
that led to significant efficiencies and profits growing more than
five-fold.
The company operated at all times during Cerberus' ownership with a
prudent and reasonable amount of debt, which was, as a multiple of
earnings before income taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA),
far below industry averages for private equity-owned businesses.
In 2012, following the tragedy at Sandy Hook, Cerberus immediately
condemned the senseless, criminal act of horrific violence and
announced that it would use best efforts to divest Remington from its
portfolio. A premier financial advisor was retained to conduct a broad
sale process, but no bidders were able to offer an executable
transaction. In 2015, after concluding this exhaustive sale process,
Cerberus placed Remington into a special purpose vehicle and offered
investors the ability to sell their stakes in the company or remain
invested. A significant percentage of investors chose to remain
invested in the company.
During the Obama administration, industry-wide demand was pulled
forward due to concerns regarding the safety and protection of Second
Amendment rights. In response, Remington and other manufacturers
produced additional inventory on an accelerated basis. As the Trump
Administration took over, concerns about the industry and Second
Amendment erosion abated, leading to an industry-wide precipitous
decline in sales and the liquidation of inventory at below-cost prices.
In 2018, a chapter 11 filing was deemed necessary to secure the
company's financial position and allow the continuation of its
business. In May 2018, Remington emerged from chapter 11 after
successfully implementing its plan of reorganization. As a result of
the bankruptcy, Cerberus ceded its ownership to the company's lenders
and concluded its ownership of Remington. Subsequently, under the
ownership of its lenders, Remington filed a second bankruptcy case and
was eventually sold.
125. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what management decisions did
Cerberus recommend to Remington leadership as a part of Cerberus'
``operationally oriented'' approach to investing?
Mr. Feinberg. In 2006, funds and accounts managed by Cerberus
acquired Bushmaster Firearms Co. and made subsequent add-on
acquisitions that were later consolidated under the Remington Outdoor
Company (``Remington'') umbrella. For generations, gun manufacturers
have focused on hunting and sport shooting enthusiasts within the
broader outdoor sporting industry, which also includes fishing,
camping, etc. Cerberus' investment thesis was to create a leading
outdoor enthusiast business consisting of historic brands that could
benefit from operational and financial expertise. Remington
successfully pursued this strategy for many years through acquisitions,
vertical integration, product development and operational improvements.
Many of the companies acquired were poorly managed and experiencing
significant difficulties due to outdated manufacturing facilities and
other operating inefficiencies. Cerberus supported a multitude of
strategic investments, operational improvements and product development
that led to significant efficiencies and profits growing more than
five-fold.
The company operated at all times during Cerberus' ownership with a
prudent and reasonable amount of debt, which was, as a multiple of
earnings before income taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA),
far below industry averages for private equity-owned businesses.
In 2012, following the tragedy at Sandy Hook, Cerberus immediately
condemned the senseless, criminal act of horrific violence and
announced that it would use best efforts to divest Remington from its
portfolio. A premier financial advisor was retained to conduct a broad
sale process, but no bidders were able to offer an executable
transaction. In 2015, after concluding this exhaustive sale process,
Cerberus placed Remington into a special purpose vehicle and offered
investors the ability to sell their stakes in the company or remain
invested. A significant percentage of investors chose to remain
invested in the company.
During the Obama administration, industry-wide demand was pulled
forward due to concerns regarding the safety and protection of Second
Amendment rights. In response, Remington and other manufacturers
produced additional inventory on an accelerated basis. As the Trump
Administration took over, concerns about the industry and Second
Amendment erosion abated, leading to an industry-wide precipitous
decline in sales and the liquidation of inventory at below-cost prices.
In 2018, a chapter 11 filing was deemed necessary to secure the
company's financial position and allow the continuation of its
business. In May 2018, Remington emerged from chapter 11 after
successfully implementing its plan of reorganization. As a result of
the bankruptcy, Cerberus ceded its ownership to the company's lenders
and concluded its ownership of Remington. Subsequently, under the
ownership of its lenders, Remington filed a second bankruptcy case and
was eventually sold.
revolving door and cerberus conflicts of interest
126. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, please provide a list of all
companies in which Cerberus has held investments at any point from 2015
to present that contract or have contracted with DOD or serve as a
subcontractor for DOD contractors. For each of these companies, please
provide the following information:
Mr. Feinberg.
for each DOD contractor or subcontractor that Cerberus
has owned or invested in, please provide the time periods in which
Cerberus owned or invested in the company.
for each DOD contractor or subcontractor that Cerberus
has owned or invested in, please provide the value of the DOD contracts
or subcontracts with DOD contractors with the company, for each
calendar year that Cerberus owned or invested in the company.
Please refer to the Public Financial Disclosure Report (OGE Form
278e) dated February 8, 2025, that I filed in connection with my
nomination as Deputy Defense Secretary. As a consequence of the scope
and volume of Cerberus' investment platforms, I made the determination
to fully divest to comply with OGE guidelines, avoid any potential
conflicts of interest, and ensure compliance with applicable law and
policy.
0127. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you fully divest from your
direct and indirect ownership of Cerberus, any independent Cerberus
funds, or any companies Cerberus is invested in while you are in
office?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, consistent with my Ethics Agreement, I
will divest all of my interests in Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
and related Cerberus entities, which are disclosed in detail in the
agreement, including, but not limited to, my equity interest, carried
interest, incentive fees/allocations, and capital commitments.
128. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, who or what organization will
buy and/or manage your ownership stake in Cerberus while you are in
office?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, consistent with my Ethics Agreement, I
will divest all of my interests in Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
and related Cerberus entities. Such divestiture may include a gift to
one or more irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of my adult
children, in which neither my wife nor I have any financial interest,
and/or for the benefit of one or more public charities. I will not be
the trustee for any of these trusts. The trustees of these trusts will
be solely responsible for their administration, including any
distributions either to my children or to charity.
129. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will your ownership of Cerberus
be transferred into a trust?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, consistent with my Ethics Agreement, I
will divest all of my interests in Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
and related Cerberus entities. Such divestiture may include a gift to
one or more irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of my adult
children, in which neither my wife nor I have any financial interest,
and/or for the benefit of one or more public charities. I will not be
the trustee for any of these trusts. The trustees of these trusts will
be solely responsible for their administration, including any
distributions either to my children or to charity.
130. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will your children have any type
of ownership, access, or benefit from that trust?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, consistent with my Ethics Agreement, I
will divest all of my interests in Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.
and related Cerberus entities. Such divestiture may include a gift to
one or more irrevocable trusts established for the benefit of my adult
children, in which neither my wife nor I have any financial interest,
and/or for the benefit of one or more public charities. I will not be
the trustee for any of these trusts. The trustees of these trusts will
be solely responsible for their administration, including any
distributions either to my children or to charity.
131. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, will you commit to
not receiving any benefit from Cerberus, any independent Cerberus
funds, or any companies Cerberus is invested in for 4 years after
leaving DOD?
Mr. Feinberg. I will abide by the extensive post-Government
employment ethics rules required by Federal law as well as the terms of
my Ethics Agreement. These provisions set forth comprehensive
restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation from defense
contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal Government on
behalf of any future employers and clients. I believe that these
existing rules are appropriate and sufficient to protect the public
interest. If confirmed, I will carry out the responsibilities of my
office honorably, and I will seek any post-Government employment in
full compliance with the applicable ethics rules.
132. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, will you recuse
yourself while at DOD from matters that involve former companies you or
Cerberus have owned or invested in?
Mr. Feinberg. My Ethics Agreement and existing laws and policies
will require me, if confirmed and appointed, to recuse myself for a
period of 2 years from participating personally and substantially in
any particular matter involving specific parties in which I know that a
former employer is a party or represents a party, unless I am first
authorized to participate by the appropriate ethics official. I will
ensure that I have a robust screening process in place to help
implement these recusals. I can pledge to you that I will be mindful of
not only the legal requirements that govern my conduct, but also of the
need to ensure that the public has no reason to question my
impartiality, and I will consult with the Department's ethics officials
should such issues arise.
133. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, will you commit to
not working for defense contractors or entities that invest in defense
contractors for 4 years after leaving DOD?
Mr. Feinberg. I will abide by the extensive post-Government
employment ethics rules required by Federal law as well as the terms of
my Ethics Agreement. These provisions set forth comprehensive
restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation from defense
contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal Government on
behalf of any future employers and clients. I believe that these
existing rules are appropriate and sufficient to protect the public
interest. If confirmed, I will carry out the responsibilities of my
office honorably, and I will seek any post-Government employment in
full compliance with the applicable ethics rules.
134. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if confirmed, will you commit to
not working for a defense contractor or any entity that invests in a
defense contractor for 10 years after leaving DOD?
Mr. Feinberg. I will abide by the extensive post-Government
employment ethics rules required by Federal law as well as the terms of
my Ethics Agreement. These provisions set forth comprehensive
restrictions relating to acceptance of compensation from defense
contractors, as well as communicating back to the Federal Government on
behalf of any future employers and clients. I believe that these
existing rules are appropriate and sufficient to protect the public
interest. If confirmed, I will carry out the responsibilities of my
office honorably, and I will seek any post-Government employment in
full compliance with the applicable ethics rules.
135. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did you use any of the
information you gained as a member of the President's Intelligence
Advisory Board to inform Cerberus's investments?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
136. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, which investments?
Mr. Feinberg. I did not use any information I gained as a member of
the President's Intelligence Advisory Board to inform Cerberus's
investments.
137. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, were the moves by Cerberus to
acquire the Subic Bay shipyard informed in any way by information you
obtained as a member of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board
during President Trump's first term?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
138. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did you have any conversation
with President Trump about a cabinet position before you donated to his
Presidential campaign?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
139. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did you ask to be considered for
a position in President Trump's administration in return for your
donations to Trump's campaign?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
140. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did you ever give payments to
any person or entity in exchange for using their influence to promote
your candidacy for a Presidential nomination from President Trump?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
141. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, in November 2024, the New York
Times and other news outlets reported that Boris Epshteyn, a top
adviser to President-elect Trump, allegedly requested payment from
prospective political appointees to promote their candidacies for top
positions within the Administration. Did you discuss the possibility of
joining the Administration with Mr. Epshteyn at any time?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
142. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, did Mr. Epshteyn seek
payment from you for promoting your candidacy for a position within the
Administration?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
143. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, at any time, did lawyers for
President Trump approach you regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations
cited above?
Mr. Feinberg. No.
144. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, please explain.
Mr. Feinberg. At no time did lawyers for President Trump approach
me regarding Mr. Epshteyn and the allegations cited above.
145. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, please provide a summary of any
payments made by any presumptive or potential nominee for a
Presidential appointment to you or your agents or associates, or any
entity owned or controlled by Boris Epshteyn or his agents or
associates.
Mr. Feinberg. There were none.
engagement with the department of government efficiency
146. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you work with the
Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to combat price gouging by
DOD contractors?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have specific knowledge of DOGE's role
relating to the Department of Defense, so I cannot say how I would work
with them as a hypothetical.
147. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you direct or advise that
DOGE investigate how to improve transparency in contracting with DOD?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have specific knowledge of DOGE's role
relating to the Department of Defense, so I cannot tell say how I would
work with them as a hypothetical.
148. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you direct or advise that
DOGE investigate how to improve DOD's ability to get contractors to
provide cost and pricing data to ensure DOD is not paying excessive
amounts for a good or service?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have specific knowledge of DOGE's role
relating to the Department of Defense, so I cannot tell say how I would
work with them as a hypothetical.
149. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to ensuring DOGE
does not gain access to DOD or contractor data that could create a
conflict of interest for the head of DOGE, Elon Musk, who has an
interest in DOD contracts?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand the serious responsibility to safeguard
sensitive information and prevent conflicts of interest. Access to DOD
and contractor data is granted on a need-to-know basis, determined by
strict security protocols, statute, and regulations. If confirmed, I
will ensure the Department remains committed to maintaining the highest
standards of data security and ethical conduct.
150. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you ensure DOGE does
not gain access to DOD or contractor data that could create a conflict
of interest for Elon Musk, who has an interest in DOD Contracts?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand the serious responsibility to safeguard
sensitive information and prevent conflicts of interest. Access to DOD
and contractor data is granted on a need-to-know basis, determined by
strict security protocols, statute, and regulations. If confirmed, I
will ensure the Department remains committed to maintaining the highest
standards of data security and ethical conduct.
outsourcing
151. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you agree that private
security contractors can undermine the mission of U.S. servicemembers?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will review the Department's policies
on private security contractors and ascertain whether they undermine
DOD missions. Based on my current understanding, I believe that private
contractors have an important role in supporting the mission of U.S.
servicemembers, as has been the case for many years. It is well
established and documented by people in the highest levels of the
United States military that contractors can, and do, support missions
in a variety of critical ways and are used extensively across military
branches and operations because of their proven effectiveness.
152. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, do you agree that private
security contractors have undermined the mission of U.S. servicemembers
in places like Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will review whether the Department's
policies on private security contractors undermined the mission in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
153. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, when would you consider using a
private security contractor over U.S. servicemembers?
Mr. Feinberg. As a private citizen, I would be speculating.
However, if confirmed, I will have a better understanding on how the
Department makes decisions on contracting private security contractors.
154. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did you reassure the Trump
administration that there would be accountability and transparency when
you offered to have DynCorp take a bigger role in Afghanistan?
Mr. Feinberg. No such discussions ever occurred.
155. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed to be
Deputy Secretary, will you commit to bolstering the transparency and
accountability of private security contractors?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure all DOD expenditures are
transparent and accountable to the American taxpayer.
156. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, since being given an E grade
from Transparency International, what have you changed at DynCorp to
limit your company's susceptibility to corruption?
Mr. Feinberg. An important clarification is that Cerberus does not
currently own DynCorp and has not had any involvement with the company
since it concluded its ownership in 2020. It is also important to note
that military contracting is a very competitive space. Companies
operate with very thin profit margins in places where their employees,
many of whom are military veterans, risk their lives to support the men
and women of the U.S. military. This was the case at DynCorp. During
Cerberus' ownership, the company supported the U.S. military in many
intense conflict areas. During Cerberus' ownership of DynCorp, 84 brave
employees who worked side-by-side with American servicemembers lost
their lives, and that is something that should always be remembered.
I am not familiar with the report you reference from ``Transparency
International'', so I cannot comment. However, accountability and
transparency were always paramount during Cerberus' investment in
DynCorp. During Cerberus' ownership, the company developed and
implemented a robust global compliance framework consisting of new and
updated policies, procedures, training, monitoring, and reporting. A
culture of compliance was instituted globally and enforced through a
variety of mandatory policies. DynCorp maintained a commitment to
compliance worldwide (visas, business licenses, tax, labor laws, anti-
corruption, CTIPS, procurement integrity, etc.) and operated
transparently throughout Cerberus' ownership.
violations of human rights
157. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, four Saudis killed journalist
Jamal Khashoggi on October 2, 2018. Reports have indicated that these
murderers were trained by Cerberus's Tier 1 Group. Did you receive any
warning or notice that these individuals were a risk or of concern in
any way before Khashoggi's killing?
Mr. Feinberg. Tier 1 Group (``T1G'') is a company owned by funds
and accounts managed by affiliates of Cerberus. It was originally
formed in 2006 to provide training to U.S. Department of Defense forces
as they prepared for overseas deployment and contingency operations.
T1G has worked transparently with the U.S. Department of State across
three Administrations to provide professional services to the United
States and allied nations. The U.S. Department of State, in
collaboration with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, is the vetting
authority for both the programs offered by T1G and all foreign
personnel trained by T1G under export licenses issued by the
Department.
It is factual that certain individuals from the Saudi Royal Guard
who were alleged to have participated in the tragic killing of
journalist Jamaal Khashoggi did attend a training at T1G's facilities.
Each of the individuals had been cleared by, and received visas
from, the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States for
training at T1G's facilities, in a program also approved by the
Department of State. Media reports accurately confirmed that the
training was conducted under a State Department license. The training
in question was for defensive-only skills relating to protecting a VIP/
senior official and was completely unrelated to, and long prior to this
heinous event.
T1G confirmed that it was in full compliance with all laws and
regulations regarding the training provided to the Saudi Royal Guard.
T1G and Cerberus stood firmly with the U.S. Government, the American
people, and the international community in condemning the horrific
murder of Mr. Khashoggi. Following that terrible event, T1G ceased all
contracts with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
158. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, when did you receive
notice?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
159. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, who gave you notice?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
160. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did Tier 1 Group flag the four
Saudis who killed Khashoggi for the company's leadership while they
were training at Tier 1 Group facilities?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
161. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, when did Tier 1 Group
flag the four members?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
162. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, did you notify a
Government agency?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
163. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, when did you notify the
agency?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
164. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, which agency did you
notify?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
165. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how did you receive notice that
four members of the group that murdered Khashoggi were trained by Tier
1 Group?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above. As I
recall, I learned about this from reports in the media.
166. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, when did you receive notice that
four members of the group that murdered Khashoggi were trained by Tier
1 Group?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
167. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, who provided you notice that
four members of the group that murdered Khashoggi were trained by Tier
1 Group?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
168. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did you change any policies at
Tier 1 Group to address the fact that Khashoggi's killers were trained
by your company?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above. After a
review by the T1G board of directors, it was determined that the
company had followed all relevant rules and regulations, and no policy
changes were required. A decision was made by T1G, however, to refrain
from any further engagements with the KDA or its personnel.
169. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did the State Department ask
Tier 1 Group to change any policies to address the fact that
Khashoggi's killers were trained by your company?
Mr. Feinberg. Please see response to question 157 above.
170. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if you are confirmed as Deputy
Secretary, how will you ensure the Department upholds the rule of law?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure that
the Department upholds the rule of law. I would favor the promulgation
of policies reinforcing the central importance of legal compliance,
appropriate consultation with legal counsel in decisionmaking, training
the workforce on legal standards, and demanding transparency and
accountability whenever violations occur.
defrauding the federal government
171. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what policies did you have in
place to ensure DynCorp did not participate in overcharging the U.S.
Government while you owned the company?
Mr. Feinberg. During Cerberus' ownership of DynCorp, the company
developed and implemented a robust global compliance framework
consisting of new and updated policies, procedures, training,
monitoring, and reporting. A culture of compliance was instituted
globally and enforced through a variety of mandatory policies. During
Cerberus' ownership period, DynCorp was not exposed to any criminal
charges and won or favorably resolved most of the civil cases against
the company, the majority of which were initiated before Cerberus'
acquisition. In addition, all False Claims Act matters, with the
exception of one, were brought by relators and not by the Government or
regulators. The Department of Justice generally refrained from
intervening in such cases and then, following defense by DynCorp, most
cases were dropped without any payment or settlement by DynCorp. During
the time that Cerberus owned DynCorp, it did not pay any money to
settle any False Claim Act cases and obtained many outright dismissals,
emphasizing that the cases lacked merit.
172. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you ensure defense
contractors are not overcharging the Department when contracting with
it?
Mr. Feinberg. It is vital that contractors--particularly those that
are operating in a sole-source environment providing defense-specific
products--are transparent with DOD. Defense acquisition professionals
are often deprived of access to the contractor cost data that would
indicate price gouging. Consequently, my understanding is that systems
are hamstrung in comparing unit prices over time at the prime and
subcontract level, which makes it challenging to identify where bad
behaviors may be present.
173. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you strengthen acquisition
law to ensure the Department receives cost or pricing data when a
contract is awarded through a bidding process with only one bidder?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with Congress as necessary
to strengthen laws. The ability to collect cost and pricing data is, in
large part, a function of statutory authorities and requirement, not
DOD regulation. Competition is only effective at controlling price when
it actually exists. If competition or a competitive commercial
marketplace do not exist, the Department needs cost and pricing data to
ensure it is getting fair prices.
174. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you strengthen acquisition
law to ensure the Department receives cost or pricing data when a
contractor does not provide any commercial sales basis to establish the
reasonableness of an item's commercial status, cost, or price?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with Congress as necessary
to strengthen laws and support reform to assure that DOD receives cost
and pricing data when there is no competitive market. Absent the
competition that shapes price commercially and absent direct
competition, cost and pricing data are necessary.
175. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you ensure the Department
receives technical data rights without having to pay more when
contracts already allow or require the contractor to provide the data
to the Department?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that the
Department's acquisition officials receive the data and associated
rights that our contractors are contractually required to deliver and
ensure that our officials take appropriate actions if the data and
rights are not provided.
176. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you ensure that any
contracts with the Department in the future will require contractors to
provide technical data rights that allow servicemembers to repair
equipment when in austere or contested logistics environments?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will direct a review of our existing
data and associated rights contractual requirements, to understand the
impact on both cost and readiness.
177. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what is your broader strategy to
prevent contractor corruption?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively with the
Department of Justice to assure that lessons learned are disseminated
accordingly and to aggressively deter and, if necessary, address
corruption in the form of procurement fraud.
178. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you implement acquisition
reforms to keep DOD's budget under control and prevent taxpayer
gouging?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed I will support the acquisition workforce
and the Defense Contract Audit Agency to complete the due diligence
that is required to prevent taxpayer gouging on the Department's
contracts.
179. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, what acquisition reforms
would you want to advance?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary
for Acquisition and Sustainment to understand the effectiveness of the
reforms that have recently been put into place, such as the Adaptive
Acquisition Framework. In my view, effective reforms are those that
enable the acquisition workforce to timely deliver the lethal
capability our warfighters demand.
federal workforce
180. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will you use your position
as Deputy Secretary to strengthen the civilian workforce at DOD?
Mr. Feinberg. I believe DOD cannot operate effectively without a
dedicated and skilled civilian workforce, and it needs to have the
right people with the right skills in the right positions. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that DOD maintains a capable, agile
civilian workforce that supports the Department's mission and strategic
objectives.
181. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) email offering employees a so-called buyout exempts
``those in positions related to immigration enforcement and national
security, and those in any other positions specifically excluded by
your employing agency.'' Will you commit to ensuring all DOD employees
are exempt from this offer?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the Deferred Resignation Program
(DRP). If confirmed, I would support exemptions to the DRP as needed to
avoid negative impacts to the Department's critical missions and
national security priorities.
182. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if DOD employees are not exempt,
will the decision on whether or not to accept employees' resignations
include an assessment of how the loss of the employee in that role
would impact DOD capabilities?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the Deferred Resignation Program
(DRP), but I believe that the Department should seek exemptions to the
DRP as needed to avoid negative impacts to the Department's critical
missions and national security priorities.
183. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, how will you make the
assessment? Please detail all the factors you would consider.
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with DOD leadership to
determine the best method to assess which civilian personnel should be
exempt from the DRP program based on impact to DOD capabilities.
184. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if resignations are accepted,
will those positions be backfilled with private sector contractors to
fulfill the employees' duties?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
that workforce decisions align with DOD fiscal responsibilities, legal
requirements, and workforce management principles to maximize mission
effectiveness.
185. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, what is the estimated
cost for having to backfill those roles?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
the Department's workforce and resources are best aligned against
mission critical warfighting and readiness functions, while also
ensuring the Department takes the necessary steps to reshape the
workforce in order to meet the President's priorities.
186. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how will DOD continue to vet and
award contracts if a significant portion of DOD's contracting officials
accept the offer?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
that workforce decisions align with DOD fiscal responsibilities, legal
requirements, and workforce management principles to maximize mission
effectiveness.
187. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what impact will these types of
resignations have on DOD contracting?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
that workforce decisions align with DOD fiscal responsibilities, legal
requirements, and workforce management principles to maximize mission
effectiveness.
188. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what impact will these types of
resignations have on oversight of DOD contracting?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
that workforce decisions align with DOD fiscal responsibilities, legal
requirements, and workforce management principles to maximize mission
effectiveness.
189. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what will be the cost of
retraining contract officials?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
that workforce decisions align with DOD fiscal responsibilities, legal
requirements, and workforce management principles to maximize mission
effectiveness.
190. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what will be the timeline for
refilling the contracting workforce after these types of resignations?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will ensure
that workforce decisions align with DOD fiscal responsibilities, legal
requirements, and workforce management principles to maximize mission
effectiveness.
191. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if DOD accepts these buyout
resignations, when will DOD provide Congress a comprehensive report on
employees who have accepted the buyout offer, which should include at
least how many employees, which type of employees, and a strategy to
fill the critical positions moving forward?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP. If confirmed, I will
determine the status of that program and ensure that the Department
provides timely and accurate information to Congress on workforce
reductions and strategies for maintaining critical capabilities.
192. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did DOD apply the national
security exemption mentioned in the resignation offer to DOD civilian
employees?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP.
193. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if not, why are DOD civilian
employees not receiving this exemption?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information about the
Department's current approach to the DRP and am not aware of how the
Department manages exemptions from the DRP.
194. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, does DOD currently have the
appropriate funding to pay for the resignation agreements?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will review resignation agreements
and ensure the Department appropriately funds such arrangements.
195. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, please provide details on what
funding DOD is using to fulfill these resignation agreements.
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with the Comptroller to
ensure resignation agreements are funded out of the proper account.
196. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, what protections are in place to
ensure employees will receive their benefits?
Mr. Feinberg. The Department must ensure that it provides employees
benefits to which they are entitled in accordance with applicable laws
and regulations. If confirmed, I will fully support doing so.
197. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, does DOD plan to hire new
civilian employees between now and September 2025?
Mr. Feinberg. I am not aware of the Department's current civilian
workforce management plans. If confirmed, I will review DOD's hiring
plans to ensure they align with workforce optimization objectives.
198. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, please provide details on
what funding DOD is using to pay for those hires.
Mr. Feinberg. I am not aware of the Department's current civilian
workforce management plans. If confirmed, I will work with the
Comptroller and assess DOD's funding sources to ensure compliance with
appropriations and budgetary guidance, as appropriate.
199. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, has DOD ensured it has followed
and continues to follow OPM's Reduction of Force policies?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have non-public information concerning the
Department's workforce shaping plans. If confirmed, I will ensure that
DOD adheres to all applicable laws and regulations.
200. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will DOD ensure it provides the
benefits to employees required by OPM's Reduction of Force policies?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have any non-public information concerning
the Department's actions with respect to Reduction of Force policies.
If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD adheres to all applicable
workforce reduction policies.
201. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, does DOD's assessment of its
return-to-office policies find there is enough space to accommodate the
workforce required to return to the office?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will review DOD's return-to-office
policies and the space available for its workforce.
202. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, did DOD have to acquire, or will
it need to acquire, any new space to fulfill its return-to-office
policy?
Mr. Feinberg. I have not been involved in Department discussions
regarding space requirements. If confirmed, I will review DOD's
facility needs to support its workforce.
203. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, if so, how much did or will
adding new space cost?
Mr. Feinberg. I do not have non-public information concerning
whether the Department requires additional space. If confirmed, I will
assess the issue and ensure that the Department executes its mission in
an efficient and fiscally responsible way.
204. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to ensuring that
any Federal civilian employee at DOD will be given notice and reason
for having their employment terminated?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure that any Department
personnel actions, including any terminations and associated
notifications, comply with applicable laws and regulations.
205. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to ensuring
probationary employees at DOD will be given notice and reason if their
employment will be terminated?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will ensure that any Department
personnel actions, including any terminations and associated
notifications, comply with applicable laws and regulations.
206. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how do you plan to grow a modern
workforce with skills in science, technology, engineering, and math
(STEM) and AI at DOD?
Mr. Feinberg. Providing Americans with the defense and security
they deserve is contingent upon having the highest-skilled workforce in
the world--both uniformed and civilian. If confirmed, I will pursue a
data driven and technology enabled strategy to ensure we recruit,
develop, and retain the talent we need, with a particular emphasis on
mission-critical areas like STEM and A.I.
207. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, how do you plan to improve
morale after the Administration's tactics to push the civilian
workforce to resign?
Mr. Feinberg. Civilian employees are a vital component of DOD's
force structure. If confirmed, I will assess and monitor workforce
morale, and as necessary, implement strategies to enhance engagement
and retention.
208. Senator Warren. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to ensuring the
Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) does not gain access to
sensitive or personal information about Department of Defense civilian
employees or military personnel?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I will work with the appropriate
officials in the Department to ensure that sensitive or personal
information about DOD civilian employees and military personnel is
appropriately safeguarded and accessed in accordance with law, policy
and regulations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
childcare for military families
209. Senator Rosen. Mr. Feinberg, to build a resilient military
force, it's crucial to meet the needs of servicemembers' families. An
acute challenge for military families in Nevada and across the country
is accessing affordable, high-quality childcare. DOD's ``In-Home Child
Care Fee Assistance Pilot Program'' was launched to help provide in-
home child care solutions for servicemembers in regions with
exceptionally high demand. The pilot program was expanded to include
Las Vegas. However, I have been told by airmen in my State that the
program has so much red tape and cumbersome requirements that it is
essentially unavailable to many Nevada military families who
desperately need this service. If confirmed, how will you approach
fixing this problem in order to provide more accessible childcare
options for military families, particularly for those who work outside
of normal business hours supporting 24-hour operations?
Mr. Feinberg. I understand that our servicemembers rely on
essential programs like childcare to help them meet the needs of their
families. Family readiness is a key component to mission readiness,
allowing our servicemembers to focus on their jobs with the knowledge
that their families have the support they need. The In-Home Child Care
Fee Assistance Pilot Program (Child Care in Your Home) and other fee
assistance programs are important to meeting the needs of military
families, as many servicemembers have nonstandard hours and frequently
travel for training or deployment. If confirmed, I will prioritize
streamlining processes and procedures for servicemembers to access
quality, affordable childcare.
mental health
210. Senator Rosen. Mr. Feinberg, mental health challenges in the
military--including post-traumatic stress (PTS) and suicide--remain a
critical concern for servicemembers, veterans, and their families.
Despite ongoing efforts, the military continues to face barriers in
providing timely and effective mental health support to those in need.
If confirmed, what specific initiatives will you implement to improve
access to mental health care, address PTS, and reduce the rates of
suicide among servicemembers, both during and after their service?
Mr. Feinberg. The health and readiness of our servicemembers, to
include their mental health, will be a top priority for me. The
Military Health System should continue to expand access to mental
health care through new modalities like tele-behavioral health and by
bolstering the mental health workforce.
If confirmed, I will look to strengthen partnerships with the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to ensure continuity of care for
mental health needs like Post Traumatic Stress or suicide risk factors.
I believe the inTransition program, which helps bridge clinical care
between DOD and VA, must also be improved, and I will seek to continue
implementation of actions directed in response to the 2023 Suicide
Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee report.
211. Senator Rosen. Mr. Feinberg, what proactive measures do you
plan to take to ensure servicemembers' mental health issues are
identified and addressed early, before they escalate to crises like
suicide?
Mr. Feinberg. I am supportive of DOD's proactive approach to
suicide prevention and mental health, which includes primary
prevention, identification of suicide risk and protective factors, and
treatment of mental health conditions. My understanding is DOD policy
requires that all servicemembers are annually screened with a mental
health assessment designed to identify psychological health concerns
including suicide risk that may require referral for additional care
and treatment.
If confirmed, I will ensure compliance with this policy and
continue implementation of the actions directed in response to the 2023
Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee report.
rebuilding trust
212. Senator Rosen. Mr. Feinberg, the first Trump administration
disregarded Congress' direction and diverted billions of dollars of
military construction funds--readiness investments in our force--to put
toward unrelated, non-military projects that Congress had not
authorized or funded. This has resulted in lost trust and is why
Congress does not grant the Department more funding flexibility as it
used to. Do you ascribe to that same disregard of Congress' Article One
authority to determine priorities for investing in our troops and our
national security?
Mr. Feinberg. I fully commit to uphold the U.S. Constitution in
executing the duties and responsibilities of my position.
213. Senator Rosen. Mr. Feinberg, what is your plan to restore
trust between Congress and the Department?
Mr. Feinberg. I recognize the importance of trust and open
communication between the Department of Defense and Congress. If
confirmed, I am committed to enhancing transparency, improving
communication, and actively engaging with Members and congressional
committees.
214. Senator Rosen. Mr. Feinberg, will you commit to protecting
congressionally appropriated funds from being misused again if directed
to do so by President Trump, particularly when doing so can undermine
our force readiness?
Mr. Feinberg. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that all funds the
Congress provides to the Department of Defense are spent wisely and in
accordance with the law.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Stephen A. Feinberg
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Stephen A. Feinberg, which
was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mr. Stephen A.
Feinberg in connection with his nomination follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The nominee responded to Parts B-F of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
------
[The nomination of Mr. Stephen A. Feinberg was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Wicker on March 11, 2025, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 14, 2025.]
[all]