[Senate Hearing 119-280]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-280
OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD
TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 29, 2026
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
62-707 WASHINGTON : 2026
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.)
TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN CORNYN, Texas ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
JERRY MORAN, Kansas MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JON OSSOFF, Georgia
TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
TED BUDD, North Carolina
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
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Ryan Tully, Staff Director
William Wu, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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JANUARY 29, 2026
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas........................... 1
Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia....................... 2
WITNESSES
LTG Joshua M. Rudd, Nominee to be Director of the National
Security Agency................................................ 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 27
Additional Pre-Hearing Questions................................. 41
Post-Hearing Questions........................................... 70
OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2026
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room SD-106, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom
Cotton, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cotton (presiding), Warner, Gillibrand,
Rounds, Budd, Young, Kelly, King, Collins, Lankford, Wyden,
Ossoff, and Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT BY HON. TOM COTTON,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Chairman Cotton. I want to begin by welcoming you all to
our hearing to consider the nomination of Lieutenant General
Joshua M. Rudd to be the director of the National Security
Agency. General Rudd has already endured a lengthy confirmation
hearing at the Armed Services Committee where he was warmly
received. I'm sure he's excited to be back testifying in front
of Congress yet again.
I do want to note for the audience that we welcome your
attendance to observe the hearing today, but Vice Chairman
Warner and I agree that we will not tolerate any disruptions.
Anyone who disrupts the hearing will be removed from the
hearing room and could face potential further sanctions to
include being barred from the Capitol grounds.
As I mentioned, General Rudd has previously testified for
his nomination at the Armed Services Committee. Our committee
has sequential referral, our goal for this hearing is to
consider the nominee's qualifications and give members ample
opportunity for thoughtful deliberation. General Rudd has
already provided substantive written responses to dozens of
questions from this committee.
Today members will be able to ask additional follow-up
questions and hear from the nominee directly. Our members are
familiar with General Rudd from their visits to PACOM and also
from his previous testimony to our committee in closed session
where he was also warmly received. I want to take this
opportunity to once again thank General Rudd for his lifetime
of service and answering the call once again.
And also, I would like to recognize his wife Ansley, his
daughter Hayden, his son-in-law, JT, who are joining us today;
welcome. As well as his mom who is watching from South Carolina
and his younger daughter, Hollis, who is watching virtually.
She was at the Armed Services Committee. I guess she thought
better of a repeat performance.
On behalf of this committee, thank you all for your support
through this process and for your husband and your dad's
decades of military service. General Rudd is a Special Forces
officer who currently serves as the deputy commander of the
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. In addition to various special
operations and interagency task force assignments, General Rudd
has commanded at the platoon, troop, company, squadron, group
and combatant command functional component levels.
Among his previous assignments, General Rudd has served as
chief of staff for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, commander of
Special Operations Command Pacific, and deputy commanding
general for operations for the 25th Infantry Division. If
confirmed as director of the National Security Agency, General
Rudd will be asked to serve as the head of the NSA and as
commander of the U.S. Cyber Command. With this in mind, I look
forward to hearing from you about how your wide ranging
experience equips and prepares you to fulfill this dual hatted
role and assume the enormous responsibility of protecting
Americans and our homeland from harm. Again, I want to thank
you, General Rudd, for your many years of service to our nation
and for your willingness to continue serving our country in
this new role.
I now recognize our distinguished vice chairman for his
remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And,
General Rudd, it's good to see you again and it's great to meet
your wife and daughter and son-in-law. Um, again thank you for
making time to meet with me the other day. We all know that NSA
has been without a Senate-confirmed director for over nine
months. Given the sustained pace of cyberattacks against the
United States by our adversaries, the complexity of maintaining
the world's premier system and the sheer volume of intelligence
requirements from combatant commanders, I'm eager to provide
the tens of thousands of employees at NSA with steady permanent
confirmed leadership.
However, as I told you when we last met, I have a few
priorities and I'll need your commitment on them if you want to
earn my vote. First and foremost, I remain deeply concerned
about the politically motivated firings of career civilian and
military leaders across our national security enterprise. That
includes the firing of your predecessor, General Tim Haugh.
I worry about the message these firings send that political
loyalty is valued over competence. That message risks chilling
the ICs' willingness to speak truth to power or even to produce
vital intelligence that may conflict with preferred talking
points or messaging of the day. So, as we discussed the first
time, and I will ask you this in--in my questioning, I just--
the IC--if the IC is unwilling to tell policymakers what they
need to hear and not just what they want to hear, America is
less safe.
So, I will need your commitment that you will always be
candid with policymakers, and nothing in your background
reflects that you wouldn't be, but that you will always be
transparent with Congress and you'll foster a culture at NSA
that prizes candor and transparency; including standing up for
your workforce if they are unfairly targeted.
Second, as we discussed, I strongly support NSA's
traditional SIGINT message, but I also believe there are areas
where NSA can and should play a bigger role. One of those areas
is technology; that means leveraging existing technologies to
make NSA more effective, and it means better targeting our
adversaries advances in technologies that weaken American
security.
In this endeavor, I hope NSA will lean into strong
relationships. Within the U.S. government, for example, we
talked about some of the cross-pollination with the Department
of Commerce, with the private sector and with allies and
partners abroad, which brings me to another priority,
strengthening alliances and partnerships.
NSA has deep and long standing SIGINT relationships across
the world, especially with our Five Eyes partners, but I
suspect that many of our partners are feeling confused and even
abandoned. That confusion is driven by tariffs imposed on our
close trading partners, by open talk of a military action
against a NATO ally and by a defense strategy that walks back
our commitments in Europe and the Pacific.
As members of this committee know well, our allies and
partners provide critical intelligence that complements our
own, and when these relationships are jeopardized, again,
America is less safe. Finally, I want to briefly focus on
election security. I have often noted, and I know all the
members of this committee appreciate it, that it was the
credit--to the credit of President Trump during his first term
that we built a robust infrastructure to identify adversary
attempts to interfere in U.S. elections, to inform the public,
and to disrupt and dismantle adversary infrastructure such as
troll farms--troll farms.
And as you know, the NSA and prior leadership played
extraordinarily important role in all of those activities. So,
it is ironic and highly unfortunate that in this term President
Trump and his team have literally dismantled that
infrastructure they built. While at the same time, senior
officials, including the person responsible for leading our
nation's intelligence community, appear willing to blur the
line between intelligence and domestic political activity.
There are only two explanations for why the Director of
National Intelligence decided yesterday to show up at a federal
raid tied to the president's obsession with relitigating the
2020 election. First, she believes there is a legitimate
foreign intelligence nexus, in which case she has violated her
legal obligation to keep this intelligence community and
committees fully and completely informed.
Or, she is simply attempting to inject the nonpartisan
intelligence community into a domestic political stunt designed
to legitimize conspiracy theories that undermine our democracy.
Either scenario represents a serious breach of trust and a
dereliction of duty to the solemn office, which she holds. So,
I'll be looking to you among others to ensure that we defeat
real adversary efforts to mess with our elections and to help
ensure that the intelligence community never allows itself to
be used to advance political narratives instead of protecting
domestic institutions. There are, of course, other issues and I
know we had a robust discussion about Section 702, which is
going to need reauthorization. I look forward to discussing
those--these, issues and many others and working with you as I
expect you will be confirmed.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Look forward to the
presentation.
Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. General
Rudd, before we move to your opening remarks, the committee has
a series of standard questions we posed to each nominee that
require a simple yes or no answer for the record. Although if
the answer is no, there will probably be need for explanation,
which is the equivalent of your instructor stomping his foot in
an Army study review.
So, here we go. One, do you agree to appear before the
committee here and in other venues when invited?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. If confirmed--two, if confirmed, do you
agree to send officials from your office to appear before the
committee and designated staff when invited?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Three, do you agree to provide documents
or any other materials requested by the committee in order for
it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Four, will you ensure that your office and
your staff provide such material to the committee when
requested?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Five, do you agree to inform and fully
brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this
Committee of Intelligence activities and covert actions rather
than only the chairman and vice chairman?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Thank you, General Rudd. We'll now proceed
to your opening statement, after which we'll go to members by
seniority at the gavel for five minutes each. General Rudd, the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, NOMINEE TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Lt. General Rudd. Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner,
and distinguished members of the committee, I'm deeply honored
and humbled to appear before you today as the nominee for
director of National Security Agency, chief Central Security
Service and commander U.S. Cyber Command. I want to thank
President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, the chairman and the chief
of staff of the Army for the nomination and their trust in me
to lead this critical national security role.
I would like to acknowledge my family in attendance. First
of all, Ansley, my wife, best friend and partner in this
journey for the last 35 years. Our daughter Hayden, who works
on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation is also here along with our son-in-law, JT, who
is a data scientist and AI engineer.
Our other daughter Hollis, who lives in Texas, couldn't be
here, but I know she is watching, along with our extended
family in South Carolina. Each of you have--each of you have
made profound sacrifices that have been instrumental in my life
of service. You have positively impacted our military, their
families and civilian communities, and I am eternally grateful
for your unwavering support.
My career has also been shaped by the remarkable men and
women with whom I've served. I'm particularly indebted to the
noncommissioned officer corps whose leadership and
professionalism have inspired me for the past three plus
decades. And we must always remember and honor our nation's
fallen and their families who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
My path in the Army has been unconventional, starting as a
logistician before I transferred to Special Forces. This
background has given me a unique operational lens. I spent over
25 years leading our nation's special operations missions,
integrating high consequence capabilities, which has given me a
deep practical understanding on how to use intelligence to
drive operational success, while ensuring the protection of our
most critical sources and methods.
These leadership roles involve pioneering highly technical
solutions through close collaboration with American industry
and ensuring these complex multi-domain systems were seamlessly
woven into--into operations. My last six and a half years in
the Indo-Pacific have made clear that we are witnessing a surge
in adversarial activity.
These complex threats are amplified by low cost, widespread
proliferation of disruptive technologies including AI, cyber
capabilities and autonomous systems, which place advanced
capabilities in the hands of a broader range of actors. Today's
threats are no longer distant. They are immediate challenges to
our critical infrastructure and democracy.
However, through a growing ecosystem of trusted partners in
industry and academia, we are developing, experimenting and
rapidly improving solutions to address these challenges head
on. This relentless pursuit of excellence is central to my
personal and professional ethos and it respects--it reflects
the spirit of American innovation.
A critical asymmetric advantage that ensures we remain
ahead of dynamic adversarial threats. As a leader, consumer,
enabler, generator and integrator of NSA and cyber command
capabilities, my focus has been on defending the homeland,
deterring adversaries and strengthening partnerships by
delivering credible technologically advanced capabilities in
all domains.
If confirmed, I am prepared to lead these organizations as
an integrated and essential team dedicated to increasing the
speed and agility of our support for the nation's toughest
challenges while cultivating and retaining a uniquely qualified
workforce. Central to this will be the delivery of accurate and
timely intelligence, advice and options always conducted with
frequent transparent communication with Congress and absolute
fidelity to our Constitution.
With this committee's support, my focus will be to lead the
NSA in its vital foreign intelligence mission driven by the
pursuit of innovation with a commitment to unbiased objective
analysis. Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you
today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you closely
and I look forward to your questions.
[The written statement of the witness follows:]
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Chairman Cotton. General, you have an extensive career as a
special forces operator. You've deployed numerous times on
combat operations in the Middle East and the Pacific. During
that career, we've seen cyber play an increasing role in
special forces operations. Could you give us a flavor of how
you've used or supported cyber operations throughout your
career and what lessons you've learned from that?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the--the vast amount
of joint combined and interagency leadership roles that I've
had the privilege to fulfill throughout my career, especially
in combat operations, has generated an experience that is rich
and replete with examples where I've worked closely with the
interagency.
Again, the--the most recent example that I can share on
that one was the, you know, committee briefing that we had
previously with one of our agency partners. Um, so, a rich
experience of--of working collaboratively across interagency.
But more specifically to NSA and Cyber Command throughout--
through out my career, the--the foreign intelligence capability
and the mission set of the NSA has informed and certainly
enhanced and enabled the mission outcomes in a variety of
mission sets.
Equally paired is experience with Cyber Command and cyber
capabilities. They work hand-in-hand, they work best when
they're integrated across the joint force and in all domains.
And increasingly when we think about and talk about deterrence,
there's opportunity to couple what DOD is doing with the whole
of government.
Chairman Cotton. Thank you. As I mentioned at the outset
and you alluded to, this is technically two jobs, NSA director
and the commander at Cyber Command. How have you thought about
balancing the roles of those two jobs and ensuring that both
missions are executed effectively?
Lt. General Rudd. So, Mr. Chairman, I think I would draw
upon my experience right now at USINDOPACOM as an opportunity
to learn and highlight the responsibility of INDOPACOM, not
only geographically is vast, but its pans the entirety of the
joint force. It has over 300,000 assigned forces. So, as--to
your point, two--two giant organizations that I would be
responsible, if confirmed for this, I think the scale in the
size of it are manageable.
What I would hope to do, if confirmed, is ensure that the
unique capabilities, the unique authorities that both of these
organizations bring to bear are fully integrated both within
support and interdependence of each other's missions, but then
in support of the warfighter and providing the best option to
our decision makers.
Chairman Cotton. CYBERCOM is significantly smaller than
NSA. Have you developed any thoughts yet on how that
organization might need to grow or change to ensure the
missions are balanced?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of my priorities,
if confirmed for this, would be scale across both
organizations, not only in the workforce, but also in the
capabilities, the technologies and how we enhance that. But my
understanding is there is a deliberate approach in, in, in
effect right now under CYBERCOM 2.0 to man, train and equip the
cyber force.
Certainly, if confirmed, I would like to understand how
that's being implemented, are there ways to accelerate it and
then provide best advice on how to do that.
Chairman Cotton. As the vice chairman noted in his opening
remarks, FISA Title VII specifically Section 702, expires in
less than three months unless Congress reauthorizes it. Section
702 explicitly--explicitly applies to foreign nationals on
foreign territory. Can you talk to us about how critical
Section 702 is for the NSA's mission and how detrimental it
would be if the authority expired?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, or Mr. Chairman, from an
operational perspective as you highlight, that foreign
intelligence mission focuses on non-U.S. persons outside the
U.S. As--you know, throughout my career and my firsthand
experience as a consumer of that intelligence and enabler to
those capabilities, it's indispensable.
I know it's been critical to mission outcomes. Its force
protection of our men and women in harm's way, and I know it
saved lives, uh, here in the homeland.
Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again,
general, enjoyed our conversation and I'm going to ask you a
couple of questions, which, uh, you can simply answer, yes or
no as well. Uh, I have great faith that you will answer, yes,
but I want to make sure we get these on the record. First, do I
have your commitment that if you're confirmed that you will
stand up for your workforce if they are unfairly targeted?
Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, you do.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. Do you have--do I have
your commitment, and this is one of the things I'm
extraordinarily concerned about. You know, the ICs got to speak
truth to power and so, do I have your commitment you will
always be candid with policymakers, even if you have to tell
them something they don't want to hear?
Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, I will, and you do
have my commitment.
Vice Chairman Warner. I think your record reflects that.
One of the things, and again I touched on this in my opening
statement, where the Director of National Intelligence is
suddenly appearing, uh, at a FBI raid around elections from
frankly 2020, which I have no idea what she was doing there.
But I am concerned that we've seen much of the election
security infrastructure that was put in place extraordinarily
well by the first Trump administration, where, again, the NSA
played a critical role, be dismantled and there's no less
threat from foreign adversaries about trying to mess with our
elections.
So, do I have your commitment that if confirmed that the
NSA will continue to prioritize information sharing on threats
to U.S. elections, on foreign threats to U.S. elections?
Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, you do. The electoral
process is fundamental to our values, our way of life. And
throughout my entire career, I've been committed to upholding
those and protecting those. I think anything that poses a
threat to the electoral process needs to be taken seriously.
And if confirmed, Mr. Vice Chairman, I commit to working
with the executive and the legislative on this.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. Because, again, the NSA
and particularly in the 2018 through 2020 cycle played a very
important role. This is something we've not talked about, but
we all know AI has enormous potential, um, and both DOD and the
intelligence community is looking to take advantage of those AI
capabilities. But we also know that there's a number of AI
tools that still have a tendency to hallucinate and, um, with
that tendency, sometimes it poses major security risks.
I've been concerned that Secretary of Defense Hegseth has
um--starting to unleash AI both across classified and
unclassified networks, including models such as xAI's Grok
model, which has got, again, more of a history of hallucination
than most. If confirmed, will you ensure that appropriate
policies are in place to stand, safeguard, DOD and NSA's
critical mission and that while we use these AI tools that
there are appropriate safeguards?
Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, this is a critical
area of competition and I know INDOPACOM is relying heavily on
the adoption of AI, and I suspect, and expect, that CYBERCOM
and NSA are as well. In fact, I know they are. My understanding
and really the approach that we've taken with the adoption of
these technologies is while they are absolutely imperative to
advancing our skill set as joint warfighters enabling us
decision superiority.
We will never abdicate our responsibility to maintain those
guardrails. The guardrail is the human on the loop or in the
loop in terms of what those technologies are providing, what
they're producing and then how we apply them. So, you have my
commitment. Thank you Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. I look forward to working
with you on that. Finally, and I know, and this was in, over at
SASC. I think in your testimony, you noted, North Korea's heavy
reliance on cryptocurrency. I'm in the midst of, looking around
the table, I don't think any of my colleagues are as deeply
involved in trying to make sure we've got some rules of the
road around market structure for crypto.
I think it's going to be an incredibly important part of
our financial system going forward, but boy, it is complicated.
So, do you believe that the federal government needs to do more
across the interagency to track, disrupt and abate foreign
malign actors access to these digital ecosystems?
Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, that's something that
I would have to take a closer look at. Certainly, we're looking
at it from an INDOPACOM lens on what it means for national
security and implications. But, Mr. Vice Chairman, if
confirmed, I commit to looking at----
Vice Chairman Warner. My time's up but I just want to make
the comment that you--crypto has great possibilities, it's not
going away. But boy, oh boy, there are some national security
implications around this that we have to get, right.
So, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want
to follow up on a discussion that we had in our meeting and it
relates to some degree to questions that have already been
raised. I have been greatly concerned about cybersecurity
issues affecting all branches of government, the private sector
and our critical infrastructure.
Ransomware attacks and Salt Typhoon intrusions continue at
an alarming rate. However, when it comes to the federal
government's defensive and offensive capabilities, we seem to
be stove piped. There's a cyber czar, FBI's involved, CISA,
your predecessor, have all used terms like team effort,
collaboration, coordination, and yet there appears to be no
lead.
And yet we see these ongoing attacks that get ever worse.
In fact, just last month, another Salt Typhoon intrusion was
detected against staff of the House of Representatives. So, we
need to stop Salt Typhoon intrusions. We need to secure our
critical Infrastructure from being taken over by hostile
actors.
We've seen in the state of Maine hospital data being hacked
with some of the most sensitive data possible. What can we do
to detect, cease and get ahead of these cyber intrusions?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, again, I appreciate the
opportunity to meet and thanks for the time. On this particular
topic, first and foremost, it's aggressive vigilance. We have
to understand what the threats are, where they emanate from and
then what are the options of capabilities that can be applied.
And then to your point about the various entities across the
government that have responsibility for this, my experience
says continuous collaboration coordination, unity of effort is
what makes us most effective in that, and if confirmed for this
role, I would pledge to be a part of that.
Senator Collins. Do you see yourself as the lead in trying
to combat this ever increasing threat?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I see us as a lead from
the department and from the military aspect, certainly on the
cyber capability piece of this question. Um, I don't know that
we've been designated the lead for this effort.
Senator Collins. I think that's part of the problem, that
we do need a designated lead. Let me switch to another issue.
We understand that the Department of Defense has prioritized
the effective adoption of artificial intelligence to secure
American military AI dominance. My understanding is that this
is meant to help drive efficiencies and improve decision
making.
The adoption of these technologies, however, is not without
risk. It has the potential to introduce significant cyber risk
if the AI systems themselves are not properly protected and
managed. As the incoming director of NSA and Cyber Command, how
will you bridge that gap between the adoption of AI and AI
security?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think that's a
critically important topic and with any new technology, there's
always risk. But what I see in this particular technology is an
imperative that we adopt it, apply it, understand it. And to
your point, how do you secure it? I know there's efforts going
on right now within NSA around AI security that extends through
collaboration and Intel driven recommendations to commercial
partners.
And certainly we have to make sure that we protect that.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, we have
talked in the past about this question of cyber and one of the
huge gaps in our cyber policy in this country is the lack of
any cyber deterrent. Our adversaries pay no price for their
attacks; whether it goes back to the Sony hack or the recent,
Volt and Salt Typhoon.
Do you believe that it would be important for us to
establish a deterrent strategy that our adversaries would be
aware of and would color their decision making as to whether or
not to launch an attack, a cyberattack, against this country?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, thanks for the opportunity to
meet, and I appreciate the opportunity to revisit this topic.
The short answer is yes, I do.
Senator King. I appreciate that and I think that's very
important and I hope you'll work with NSA and CYBERCOM to
develop that capacity because otherwise we can never patch our
way out of this problem. The adversaries are going to continue
to evolve. And at some point, we have to make them have second
thoughts about whether to attack this country in cyberspace.
Second question, I just want to reiterate your conversation
with the--with the vice chairman. It's so important that our
intelligence community provide candid, clear, unvarnished,
nonpolitical advice to policymakers, uh, because otherwise, we
have--we can have real catastrophes involving our national
security.
So, I just want to reiterate that you answered the
question, yes. You're committed to that. It's somewhat easy to
answer that question here, it's going to be a little harder in
practice if you're sitting in the Oval Office or in some other
setting that is inherently intimidating. Uh, but I want you to
reiterate your commitment.
Straight talk, straight advice and the facts to the
policymaker, is that correct?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I am committed to that, as I
have been throughout the entirety of my career. I pride myself
on a leader who has always been candid and given best advice
even if it wasn't popular.
Senator King. Thank you. Final area. In your work in
INDOPACOM, I know you came to realize the value of the allies
that we have in the Pacific. In my work on this committee and
the Armed Services Committee, I've come to realize our
asymmetric advantage in the world is allies. China has
customers, we have allies.
Russia doesn't have much in the way of customers or allies.
But it's so important to maintain those relationships;
particularly in the intelligence community. Talk to me a little
bit about the Five Eyes and how important it is to maintain
that intelligence sharing enterprise and particularly to--to be
sure that there's a trusting relationship so that we will have
the maximum advantage of the--of the ability of our--of our
allies to work with us in order to protect the national
security of this country.
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I've had the incredible fortune
throughout my career to serve alongside with and through allies
and partners. I think our strategic documents identify clearly
the importance of that and the emphasis that--that we put on
that. The Five Eyes in particular some of my closest colleagues
in professional relationships are within that community and
certainly rely upon them.
As--as it relates to INDOPACOM, it's a--it's a daily
effort. We have embedded liaison officers from throughout our
allies and partners within the region and it's a consistent
engagement. We operate together, we exercise together, we train
together and that's part of our strategic approach to
delivering deterrence.
Senator King. It's true, is it not, that allies are a
tremendous force multiplier for our ability to have our
policies respected and have our national security protected?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I think that's a--that's a great
way to characterize it.
Senator King. Thank you. I'll leave it at that.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you, General. Thank
you. Thank you for your decades of service already to the
nation and for stepping up into this role. It's a tough role.
We'll have lots of conversations in the days ahead, but they
won't be in open settings like this. So, I think it would be
helpful just for you to be able to articulate, what do you see
as the principal threats that NSA needs to be focused in on? As
you look around the globe and the issues that are out there in
this open setting, what would you see as some of the principal
threats?
Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, thanks, Senator. The--I--you know,
my assessment aligns with our national security strategy and
national defense strategy and how we articulate the priorities.
Um, certainly from where I sit at USINDOPACOM day in and day
out, China, Russia, North Korea, those are all critical threats
that we pay attention to varying degrees of, uh, how we
characterize those and how we prioritize those.
But I think it's pretty clear that those two state actors;
certainly Iran continues to pose concern and threat to the
nation. Um, I would couple alongside with that, violent
extremists will be an infinite problem and I think increasingly
narcotics and narco terrorists.
Senator Lankford. Okay, thank you. I want to follow up on
Senator King's question to you as well. I have a similar
question dealing with how we prepare for a response and a
deterrent. You would have the unique responsibility of
preparing a portfolio for the president if we have a
cyberattack to be able to handle the president, here are the
options.
Then he has to obviously make the decisions on that, but
you'll have the role of actually handing that to him and saying
here's a set of options. So, my question to you is, what do you
plan to do to be able to prepare that set of options? What are
your boundaries and limitations for the options that you would
hand to any president?
And to say these are--these are the options that you have
that fall within legal bounds, but that also are an effective
deterrent.
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think it speaks to what
I would--how I would frame my priorities if confirmed for this
and the initial approach. Obviously, making an assessment of
where the organizations are at. But the first priority is
speed. Second one is scale, the next one is innovation and then
integration. We've got to move as fast as we can to ensure that
we've got the right technologies, the right capabilities and
able to generate multiple options.
We need to be able to scale those options and not only just
scaling within the size of the workforce as we--as we
mentioned, relative to Cyber Command size, certainly there's an
approach by the department to, uh, address that. But I think
increasingly, we look at other partnerships as a means to
scale.
Innovation, as I highlighted in my opening comments, that
is an asymmetric advantage. And that is something we, as the
United States, do better than anybody. So, we have to continue
to harness innovation. As a leader, I would empower the
workforce to explore, test, try, fail and figure out what's
working.
And then ultimately, those capabilities and options have
got to be integrated. They've got to be integrated across the
joint force, they've got to be integrated in all domains and
increasingly those options should be provided that enable us to
integrate and pair those with other elements of national power.
Senator Lankford. OK, it's helpful. You've been a consumer
of some of the intelligence information that's come across your
desk and trying to be able to prepare for operations. I'm a
consumer of intelligence documents as well. I have noticed over
the past 10 years among some of our agencies that the documents
and the analysis has gotten safer and safer and safer in the
way that it's written.
Sometimes I read some analysis and I read it twice and
think this doesn't say a thing. This is supposed to be telling
me something, and I can't tell what this is trying to tell me
because it's written so safe in it. One of the challenges that
I would have before you is that NSA and with your analysts and
folks as they're gathering SIGINT, to be able to make sure that
the documents that are written and the reports that are done
just say it bluntly. And that there is a sense of permission to
say it frankly even at times and to not have a perception of
being safe. I don't know if you've experienced some of the same
things as you've read some of the intelligence documents in the
past and some of the information reports, but I would encourage
you to say it, frank, instead of safe, when it comes out of
your analysts.
You don't have to respond to that one way or the other on
it because you'll have to be able to read it. One last question
that I had is a follow up on what the chairman was saying on
702. I think what I'm looking for, for anything is clarifying
for the American people, the protections that have been put in
place in statute to protect the American people that no one is
spying on them, but also making it clear that this is an
essential authority that we have to have to protect the safety
of the Nation.
I'm looking for not just someone who will stand up and say,
yes, we need that, but someone who will be an advocate for 702
to be able to explain it to people that need to hear it and to
be able to articulate how the American people are actually
protected by 702. Is that you?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, if confirmed, certainly I would
do everything I can to provide the best advice as we look to
reauthorize or extend this, this critical authority.
Senator Lankford. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General,
enjoyed talking with you and I think you know that one of the
key issues for me in this position is basically adhering to
what Ben Franklin was talking about, who said anybody who gives
up their liberty to have security doesn't deserve either. And
that's what we talked about, and I want to, as we talked about,
get into some more, kind of specifics, not to like pin you down
or something, but to get a sense of where you're actually
headed on striking that balance that I think is so essential.
So, the administration, a number of months ago, secretly
decided that its agents can break into homes without a judicial
warrant. Basically, they said the Fourth Amendment doesn't
matter anymore. So, here's the question a little bit broader
than I talked about with you yesterday so we can see if we can
find some common ground.
And that is, General, if you are directed to target people
in the United States for surveillance, will you insist that
there be a judicial warrant? And I would like to have a yes or
no answer to this, and happy to have some context.
Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, Senator, I--again, I appreciate the
opportunity to speak with you yesterday. Um, certainly this
speaks--this question speaks to the mission of NSA and the
authorities that it has been given. What I can tell you,
Senator, is that if confirmed, I will absolutely commit to
executing the foreign intelligence mission of the NSA in
accordance with the authorities that it's been given and within
all applicable laws.
Senator Wyden. That respectfully though doesn't get close
to what I'm talking about. I mean, that is about as vague as
anything I've heard on--on the subject and, uh, it seems to me
that unfamiliarity with basic constitutional rights is not
something that can be accepted in this position. It's so,
crucial and I continue to believe that what I described you as
not mutually exclusive.
I think smart policies give you security and liberty, not
so smart policies give you less of both. So, would you like to
take another crack at perhaps telling me a little bit? As I
said in the office, I'm interested in hearing, in your words,
how you might deal with one of these issues. Not to spell it
out in text and the like, but to get a sense of how you would
strike this extraordinarily important issue in a sensible way.
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, as again, as we discussed,
I have utmost respect and commitment to the civil liberties
that are outlined in the Constitution. I've sworn an oath
several times throughout my career to uphold that Department.
Senator Wyden. Let's move on so we can get some more
questions. Do you believe that U.S. person searches of Section
702 collection should require a warrant except in emergencies,
which has been largely the position of those who would like to
find some common ground as we go forward? We would say, look,
if somebody says this is a four alarm crisis for the country,
they can get the information they need and come back and settle
up later, which strikes me again as a constructive step. So,
what are your thoughts with respect to saying that you should
have a warrant except in emergencies?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, that's--that's a topic
that I'd need to look into and get a better understanding to
give you a more fulsome and complete answer on that one. Again,
what I would highlight though is supreme confidence that the
men and women of the NSA are committed to protecting civil
liberties and privacy of American citizens.
Senator Wyden. Let me go a little bit further on the
Greenland issue then you've gone today. Donald Trump's threat
to invade Greenland is just one of many ways, in my view, we
would damage NATO. You talked about the importance of
intelligence relations and intelligence relationships. How
concerned are you that these relationships could be damaged by
the current tensions that we are talking about now with
Greenland?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, the alliances and partnerships
that we rely on to execute our missions are absolutely
critical.
Senator Wyden. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General Rudd,
first of all, thanks for your service to our country. I've
appreciated our--our discussions already in armed services and
then in my office as well. And I look--I have just--I look
forward to supporting your nomination. But I thought this was
an opportunity in a public discussion, different than what we
normally do within a classified situation in which we can kind
of share with the American people some of the concerns and some
of the directions that we really have to go in order to, number
one, gather good data to make good decisions, but also how we
protect the American public from adversaries that have some
pretty decent offensive cyber weapons systems that they're not
afraid to deploy.
It--if we could for just a minute, let's talk a little bit
about artificial intelligence and the need to be able to deploy
it. I think some folks in--in the United States today have
thought that, you know, if we have concerns about this, this
new thing about being able to make decisions very, very
quickly, which is what artificial intelligence allow sand to
look at a lot of different data, uh, what happens if we were to
simply say, you know what, we're just going to take our time in
terms of deploying artificial intelligence in our, uh, data
gathering, uh, or in our weapons systems.
Does that stop an adversary in any way, shape or form from
integrating artificial intelligence as quickly as they can?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, it wouldn't. And I think this is
an area of--of competition that we have to accelerate in.
It's--it's a critical capability that its adoption and
integration into our joint warfighting functions and our
intelligence collection has got to be adopted. That is what
will enable us to maintain our advantage in all these--all
these categories.
Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that in any
warfighting situation, speed can make the difference between a
life and death situation?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's certainly my experience.
Senator Rounds. So, you've been around the horn a little
bit. You've been with young men and women that have been in
harm's way. Would it be fair to say that if we deploy our tools
faster than the bad guys can at a strategic level and we
provide assistance to our young men and women in uniform at a
faster pace, uh, and give them more information more quickly
than what an adversary can, that we save lives?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would agree with that. And
again, the examples you give are, uh, very personal to me. I
understand what it means to, uh, command forces in harm's way
and what it means to make decisions quickly so that we protect
our forces. But I would offer increasingly this is a strategic
advantage, our decision making, our speed and our ability to
outthink and outmaneuver the enemy before there's conflict is
critically important as well, senator.
Senator Rounds. I'm going to bring this down now to a
little bit more direct level, and we've talked a lot about 702
and about the need, and I fully support the continuation of 702
operations. A huge amount of the data that we're able to
collect overseas, uh, to be able to give our war fighting teams
an advantage is because of what we collect using 702. I know
there's always a concern that we not collect any information on
U.S. citizens.
But can you talk a little bit about what it means to a
young man or a woman who is on the front lines and the ability
for us to be able to know in advance what a bad guy is going to
be doing near or around their areas and how critical it is that
we take advantage of those opportunities to collect that data
and not tie the hands of those individuals that collect it?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would again offer my personal
experience as a warfighter where I know that authority has
enabled NSA to provide timely foreign intelligence to the
warfighter that has saved lives.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me go one step further now
with regard to artificial intelligence. We've got to be able to
collect as much data as we can as quickly as we can. And yet in
order to do that, we can't simply rely on what we call
government sources. We've got to be able to work with the
private sector. A huge amount of the data that's collected,
that's out there right now in terms of being able to make AI
work even faster at the cutting edge is coming from private
sector initiatives.u
Can you talk a little bit about how important it is to be
able to integrate the private sector into our systems to make
us faster than the adversaries?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, it seems reasonable that that
would naturally accelerate and enable scale. What I would also
highlight is that as we do that, again, the same respect and
safeguards for civil liberties and private data need to be
adhered to.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, just like
Senator Rounds, I wanted to talk about AI and FISA 702. I got
one other topic. Just want to start by saying that I have
legislation with Senator Warner and Cornyn and Lankford called
the ENABLE IC Act, which is going to get these--get us moving
faster on this.
And also an advanced AI Security Readiness Act which is
going to help with something you talked about General Rudd, uh,
the private sector more involved here. So, I think we all agree
that we need to move faster and innovate more and the world is
moving credibly fast, especially with AI, and these tools that
are being developed and these novel methodologies are
incredible, but they also come with a lot of risk, especially
when we're talking about a highly classified work environment.
Uh, and highly classified data. So, can you talk a little
bit in more detail about how you're going to approach
integrating AI and other tech tools into NSA systems that we
currently have while guarding against the risk?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would--I would offer on risk,
the first way that we mitigate risk is to understand it. Where
are the risks? Where do they exist? And then what do we need to
do to ensure that we are continuously assessing that we've
provided a solution to that. Within the realm of AI, obviously,
the data is a key part of this, but then also equally
important, a layer of cybersecurity around that.
So, how do you ensure that the data is authoritative? How
do you ensure that it's feeding the right models? But equally
important, coupled with that is the ability to protect that
data. My understanding is that NSA has that responsibility.
They're executing it very well. And certainly, Senator, if
confirmed, it would be a high priority of mine to ensure that
we continue to do so.
Senator Kelly. And, General, also, you know, one priority I
think you're going to need to put somewhere near the top of the
list, and I know, um, one of my colleagues brought up the
election threat issue, but certainly AI being used by our
adversaries against us in an election is going to be I think
here in 2026 is going to be more significant than what we've
ever seen before and certainly in 2028. On the FISA 702
question, um, we're going to have to have to reauthorize it
here pretty soon, just a few months.
Um, I don't think the public understands what this is. I
mean we're talking about something, I mean an acronym with a
number and a letter after it and it just seems something
that's, you know, out of reach for most people. Can you try to
explain here in just about 30 seconds or so, why this should
matter to the average American?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, in as plain as language as I can
put it is, first and foremost, it is the collection of foreign
intelligence against non-U.S. persons who are located out the
United States--outside of the United States. And again, what
I've experienced in in my career is that this provides the
warfighter, the decision maker, the ability to have critical
insight into threats that enables decision making.
And again, we've talked about speed. Critical to speed is--
is a deep understanding.
Senator Kelly. But for a family, hardworking American
family, not--and they shouldn't have to pay much attention to
this, how does it affect them? Like what are the consequences
to them and their children let's say a few months from now if
we did not reauthorize 702?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, again in my experience,
it's quite simply, it saves lives.
Senator Kelly. Save lives, could it--could we be
potentially talking about their lives, the lives of their
family members, friends, coworkers?
Lt. General Rudd. Again, Senator, the lives of men and
women in harm's way, but also threats to the--to the homeland,
the United States. I would put that in the category of saving
lives.
Senator Kelly. Yeah, and I agree with you, and I--and I
think that is a key part of this. This is a--an authority that
the intelligence community has, but the reason it has it is it
keeps Americans safer. Not just the IC, not just DOD, not
people that are regularly in harm's way, it results in safety
for the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Budd.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, thank you for
your years of service. I enjoyed our conversation in the office
a week or two ago. You know, we talked a lot about this morning
and in that conversation in the office about the many hats of
this role and you certainly had the experience to do that, but
I understand that in a peacetime.
But let's say there's a--an invasion by China to Taiwan,
um, and it's no longer peacetime, but it's a period of
conflict. How do you balance the roles in a situation like that
as best you can see it?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, it's a continuous
assessment of the situation and where the balance lies between
the two organizations and the capabilities that each brings to
bear. Certainly on one side, you need deep insight into the
threat, into the adversary, to understand. And then on the
other side, you need to be able to deliver capabilities and
options that would change the course even before conflict but
if in conflict, certainly there's capability to bring to bear.
There's obviously a constant awareness and understanding of
that. But I think the current construct puts us in a position
that enables unity, of command unity, of effort to make
decisions and over those two rapidly.
Senator Budd. Thank you, general. You know, we've talked
about your years of service and certainly a unique pathway to
get to this point. So, congratulations for that. But, you know,
this is a highly technical civilian organization at NSA, which
it's different than a lot of what you've done before. Uh, tell
us how you want to, and you think you will be adapting your
military leadership experience to lead an organization like
this?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator. The, uh--first of all, if
confirmed, I look forward to this--this unique experience and
challenge, uh, gaining a deeper understanding and appreciation
of a largely civilian highly technical workforce. My career to-
date is not without those experiences and opportunities
perhaps, but this would definitely be a different one.
What I have always applied as a leadership principle to any
organization, but certainly ones that are different or have
different capabilities or different expertise, uh, is first a
willingness to get in and learn as much as I can. But connect,
connect with the workforce, connect on a personal level, get to
know them. Certainly, I'm not going to get to know every single
individual in the--in the agency, but get to understand their
culture. The second piece is what I just said, understand. And
in doing the connection and understanding with the workforce,
it enables a leader to best position themselves to empower, to
enable, and to really harness what their capability--their
incredible expertise is. And certainly if confirmed, I look
forward to applying that with this organization.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General. You know there's an
executive branch policy where the NSA is prohibited from
producing and disseminating finished intelligence. I found that
interesting. And yet the agency NSA has some of the best
cybersecurity expertise in all of the U.S. government. And it
does, in fact, produce products that look and read a lot like
finished intelligence.
So, is that a good policy?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, that's something that I
would want to take a look at and come back to you with a
recommendation on.
Senator Budd. That's my next question. So, you will commit
to looking at that to see if that policy needs to be modified?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, if confirmed, I'll look into it.
Senator Budd. Thank you. Um, you spent a lot of time in the
Indo-Pacific, where do you see opportunities to work with our--
our partners like Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, to build
capacity in countering--against cyber threats and, um, how
could we cooperate with them more?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, we're doing it on a daily basis.
Certainly there's opportunity to do more, but there's a very
deliberate approach in campaign plan to working with our allies
and partners. I think there's tremendous opportunity to do more
certainly on the cyber front, and if confirmed, I would look--I
would look forward to exploring those opportunities.
Senator Budd. Thank you, General.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For nearly a
decade, the intelligence community produced a steady stream of
relevant intelligence on foreign threats to U.S. elections
informing congressional policy makers. Will you commit to
continuing to produce and disseminate intelligence reporting
made available to Congress on foreign plans, intentions and
activity targeting U.S. elections?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, the electoral process is
fundamental to our democratic values and Americans writ large.
And I've committed throughout my career to serve to defend and
uphold those values. Any foreign threat to the electoral
process should be viewed as a national security concern. And,
Senator, if confirmed for this, I commit to working with
executive and legislative sides on this.
Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate that. In your responses to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, you suggested very similar
to that statement that U.S. election defense is currently
better positioned than in the past given efforts with
interagency partners which allows for the rapid sharing of
threat intelligence. Under this administration, however, key
elements of that interagency process have been entirely
eliminated, as in the case of the FBI's Foreign Influence Task
Force, or been paralyzed from funding cuts and rollbacks of
information sharing duties.
Do you believe that there's still an effective interagency
for you to engage with?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, if confirmed for this
role, I would look forward to being part of whatever the
construct exists. Certainly, again, throughout my career, I've
seen--I've seen and I've been a part of a number of interagency
efforts. So, if confirmed, I look forward to being part of
this.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Several years ago I led the
creation of the DOD Cyber Service Academy Scholarship program,
which creates a cleared and trained workforce pipeline. These
are for nonmilitary roles appropriate for NSA, CIA and other
civilian positions. Since then, I've worked with my colleagues
to continue to improve this program and expand the number of
scholarships.
What value do you see in this type of program and how would
increasing the number of scholarships benefit NSA's work? If
confirmed, do I have your commitment to work with me on this
project?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I'd certainly like to learn more
about this. But I--the way you describe this concept certainly
seems like a--an avenue that could be explored to enhance and
expand the scale of the workforce, certainly an opportunity to
generate talent for the workforce. And so, Senator, if
confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this.
Senator Gillibrand. Yeah, and when we created it, it has up
to 1,000 slots a year, but we have not done a good job in
telling our high schools around the country that these
scholarships are available. And so, we have not had sufficient
applications. In the last few years it's been in the hundreds,
not in the thousands. And so, all slots are not being filled.
Um, we've also worked to get more schools signed up.
There's over 600 schools across the country that have signed up
for this ROTC type program as long as they have the curriculum
that our security and intelligence teams need across the DOD
and across the Intel Community. So, I would like your
commitment also to work with us in making sure high school
students around the country know about this and that all your
services know that they can find great graduates through this
program.
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, again, I look forward to
learning as much as I can about this and supporting it as able.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Last year, DNI Gabbard fired
over 100 intelligence officers deemed to be misusing the chat
platform hosted by the NSA on Intelink. These officers were
alleged to have misused these systems, in some cases with valid
allegations of inappropriate conduct and others potential for
discriminatory reasons.
You've answered to many of the members on this panel about
your review and judgment with regard to the use of AI platforms
on NSA systems. What is your perspective on making sure these
systems are not misused to harass or target other service
members or intelligence personnel?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that concern.
Certainly the responsibility of any leader of any organization
is to safeguard the workforce and ensure that there's
compliance within how we use the tools and systems to
accomplish the mission. And if confirmed for this role, I would
pledge to continue that.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Young.
Senator Young. General Rudd, good to see you again. I
enjoyed our visit in the office, appreciate your answers to my
many questions. You noted in your committee questionnaire
before this hearing that one of your priorities for improving
NSA's coordination with the rest of the IC will rely on
fostering interagency training, exercises and experimentation.
Can you unpack this for the committee, please?
Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think the way that we
build connective tissue through organizations, not only within
the department, but to the point of the question within the
interagency, is through repetitions and sets, you know, whether
it be training, training exercises, tabletop exercises. Those
are ways that we exercise the muscle, the connective tissue, of
organizations and enhance the way we work together.
Senator Young. Thank you. You also noted in your
questionnaire a desire to leverage commercial innovation. We
hear about this a lot. We need to hear about this. But beyond
the obvious role for the commercial tech sector to play in
making NSA more effective, more cutting edge, can you speak to
how you might seek to increase opportunities for outside
experts to come in to lead on emerging tech or economic
competition to enhance your analytical capabilities?
Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, I think that's a critically
important effort and certainly we need to look at every
opportunity to expand our expertise. Again, CYBERCOM and NSA
have tremendous expertise, talent, probably the best in the
world at what they do and we have to continuously find those
opportunities where we learn, enhance, never be complacent that
what we're doing is sufficient, especially in--in the world of
technology that's moving so fast.
And so much of the commercial sectors moving out at a very
fast pace.
Senator Young. General, can you describe the role you see
for NSA in helping shepherd safe and effective U.S. government
and IC artificial intelligence technologies, especially through
the AI Security Center?
Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, thanks, Senator. That's the example
I was going to mention, the effort underway that uses Intel
driven understanding to make recommendations and solutions to
enhance the security around AI, not only within the department,
the organization, but with our commercial partners where
applicable as well.
Senator Young. Will you commit to working with this
committee and identifying any shortfalls, whether it's of
resources, authorities or prioritization for NSA and the ICs
development and use of AI?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator the--the role of any commander,
leader, director is certainly to identify what those are. And
if confirmed, I do commit to that.
Senator Young. OK. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Ossoff.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, thank
you for your career of service to the United States and
congratulations on your nomination to this important post.
Before I engage with you, I just want to note for the committee
that my constituents in Georgia, and I think much of the
American public, are quite reasonably alarmed and asking
questions after the Director of National Intelligence was
spotted bizarrely and personally lurking in an FBI evidence
truck in Fulton County, Georgia yesterday.
And so, I encourage all of us on a bipartisan basis to
pursue the facts as swiftly as possible to understand whether
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is straying
far outside of its lane. At unrelated--I regret to share my
observation that the president at this point is clearly using
federal law enforcement in order to pursue personal vendettas.
That has nothing to do with you and your career to-date, nor is
it something for which I hold you accountable or would expect
you to explain, but it is a well-known fact, and it quite
reasonably, given the immense surveillance capabilities of the
National Security Agency, raises the concern that there might
be some abuse of the NSA's authorities.
And so, my question for you is that if there is some
alteration or withdrawal of current prohibitions,
administrative prohibitions, on surveillance targeting
Americans, for example, in Executive Order 1233, PPD-28, USSID
18 or otherwise, will you promptly inform this committee with
our oversight responsibilities of such a change?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I will pledge, if confirmed, to
ensure that the NSA executes its mission within the authorities
and all applicable laws and that I will execute the duties of
this position that enables this committee to exercise its
oversight responsibilities.
Senator Ossoff. General, I appreciate the answer and I want
you to think a little bit more deeply about the question and
consult with your team and follow-up with more precision for
the record. Because the challenge I'm identifying is that you
may be asked to do things that are manifestly unethical and
improper, but following some alteration of present
administrative policy, may indeed be lawful.
And this committee needs to know if such administrative
policies, which currently protect American civil liberties but
are not in statute, are changed. And my view would be that
under existing law, anyone in the seat that you hope to hold
would have a statutory obligation to inform this committee of
any such change.
So, I hope to get some more detail beyond boilerplate on
that for the record. You will also be taking this post,
General, if confirmed. So, can I get a commitment that you will
respond with a more fulsome answer for the record please,
general?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I look forward to looking into
that topic and responding to you.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. If confirmed, you'll take this
post after a series of events that suggest a crisis for
information security and operational security practices in the
federal government. You had the Secretary of Defense
inadvertently text strike details to a national political
reporter, including time over target for U.S. aircrews before
those U.S. aircrews had launched into hostile enemy airspace.
Multiple major news outlets were reportedly aware of the
imminent raid targeting Maduro in Venezuela before the raid was
executed. This week, here's a headline from Politico, Trump's
acting cyber chief uploaded sensitive files into a public
version of ChatGPT. NSA has a crucial role supporting
information security, cryptographic integrity and best
practices across the federal government.
How will you and your role constructively address these
many failures and the broader problem of information security
failures in the federal government?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I recognize the critical role
that NSA plays in this space and certainly, if confirmed, I
pledge to ensure that it continues to execute its mission to
its fullest.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General.
Chairman Cotton. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Welcome, General, and congratulations on
your nomination and I appreciate the ability to talk to you,
although because of weather concerns, it was on the phone. But,
um, you obviously have a lengthy record of distinguished
service to our nation and I look forward to supporting your
nomination. In your current capacity as deputy commander of
INDOPACOM, do you occasionally have to talk to a lawyer or
maybe more than one lawyer?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, there is a very talented legal
team at USINDOPACOM.
Senator Cornyn. Yeah, it seems like a blessing or a curse,
just speaking as a recovering lawyer myself, but it seems like
you can't--you can't make a move without consulting legal
authorities. And so, do you happen to know how many lawyers are
at NSA CYBERCOM?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I don't know that.
Senator Cornyn. Yeah, it's a whole bunch, and they're very
talented.
Lt. General Rudd. I would guess there is and I would--I
would expect that they would be.
Senator Cornyn. Will you be consulting with them on issues
like, uh, let's say, 702, Section 702 FISA?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would expect to consult with
the legal experts at both CYBERCOM and NSA on a whole host of
issues to ensure, again, the execution of that mission set is
done within the authorities consistently and that we're never
outside the bounds of that.
Senator Cornyn. I have--I have no doubt about that. The
Judiciary Committee also has jurisdiction over the 702 issue.
But, um, I, like others, believe that it's absolutely--
absolutely essential authority, but there's a phenomenon in
Washington, DC, where, uh, certain narratives take root, which
have no basis in fact.
And, I just want to clarify a few things. First of all, one
of the reasons why 702 had come under suspicion is because of
its abuse in the case of Carter Page, but that was a Title I,
7--of 702, which is targeting an American citizen. In this
case, an alleged agent of a foreign power. That law is not
subject to any reauthorization.
It doesn't expire. But just in terms of 702, Title VII,
which is what, uh--so, what we're talking about. I know there's
a line of questioning by one of our--one of the panel talking
about targeting U.S. persons. You can't target a U.S. person
without a warrant, and that's under Title I not on--on under
Section 702. But you understand that, um, 702, Title VII, um,
is--uh, addresses only foreigners abroad.
Is that--is that your understanding? It's a foreign
intelligence surveillance.
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's my understanding that 702
is focused on foreign intelligence against non-U.S. persons
outside the United States.
Senator Cornyn. And it's an invaluable resource, correct?
Lt. General Rudd. In my experience it is, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. And I'm sure you, like all of us, are very
attuned to the balance between national security demands and
privacy of American citizens. But in this case, this is focused
solely on people overseas. So, there is no targeting of
American citizens, of course, unless you have a--unless you
have a warrant and you got to show up in front of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and prove that you are entitled
to that warrant.
But we're not talking about that here. But here again in
DC, it seems like the--whoever has the--that you have this
phenomenon of competing narratives, and I read a long time ago
that whoever has the best narrative wins in the debates here in
Washington, DC, whether or not they're based on facts.
Another issue that's come up, and let me just ask, and I
mean this with all due respect, you have an incredible record,
but you are not a lawyer by training, are you sir?
Lt. General Rudd. No, Senator, I'm not.
Senator Cornyn. You're unburdened by that--by that
credential. So, that's why you're going to be talking to your
lawyers before you make any decision. But there's also this
false narrative that lawfully collected intelligence that
somehow you ought to be able to you ought to have to go out and
get a search warrant in order to search what you've already
lawfully collected.
And of course, intelligence is prospective. Law enforcement
is retrospective based on trying to solve a crime. But do you
have a--are you prepared today, or would you like to give it
some thought and maybe we can engage further on whether or not
a warrant should be required to query lawfully collected
intelligence?
Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's certainly something I'd
like to take a deeper look at.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Cotton. Thank you, General Rudd, for your
testimony here today. For the benefit of members, and General
Rudd, it's my intention to hold a committee vote on your
nomination as soon as possible. Therefore, for planning
purposes, any senator who wishes to submit questions for the
record after today's hearing, please do so by noon tomorrow.
General Rudd, I trust that you'll be equally prompt with
your answers so we can move your nomination forward as quickly
as possible. Thank you all, the hearing is adjourned.
(Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 11:35 a.m.)
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