    [Senate Hearing 119-280]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-280

                          OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF
                       LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD
                             TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE
                            NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     of the

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION
                                   __________

                                JANUARY 29, 2026
                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

                   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoinfo.gov
                                    ______

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    62-707                    WASHINGTON : 2026

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               (Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.)

                         TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman
                    MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            JON OSSOFF, Georgia
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  MARK KELLY, Arizona
    TED BUDD, North Carolina

                      JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
                    CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio
                      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio

                                  ----------

                           Ryan Tully, Staff Director
                      William Wu, Minority Staff Director
                         Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                               JANUARY 29, 2026

                              OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas...........................     1
    Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia.......................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    LTG Joshua M. Rudd, Nominee to be Director of the National
      Security Agency................................................     4
        Prepared Statement...........................................     7

                             SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

    Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............    27
    Additional Pre-Hearing Questions.................................    41
    Post-Hearing Questions...........................................    70

     OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, TO BE
                    DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2026

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
    Room SD-106, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom
    Cotton, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Cotton (presiding), Warner, Gillibrand,
    Rounds, Budd, Young, Kelly, King, Collins, Lankford, Wyden,
    Ossoff, and Cornyn.

                 OPENING STATEMENT BY HON. TOM COTTON,
                      A U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS

        Chairman Cotton. I want to begin by welcoming you all to
    our hearing to consider the nomination of Lieutenant General
    Joshua M. Rudd to be the director of the National Security
    Agency. General Rudd has already endured a lengthy confirmation
    hearing at the Armed Services Committee where he was warmly
    received. I'm sure he's excited to be back testifying in front
    of Congress yet again.
        I do want to note for the audience that we welcome your
    attendance to observe the hearing today, but Vice Chairman
    Warner and I agree that we will not tolerate any disruptions.
    Anyone who disrupts the hearing will be removed from the
    hearing room and could face potential further sanctions to
    include being barred from the Capitol grounds.
        As I mentioned, General Rudd has previously testified for
    his nomination at the Armed Services Committee. Our committee
    has sequential referral, our goal for this hearing is to
    consider the nominee's qualifications and give members ample
    opportunity for thoughtful deliberation. General Rudd has
    already provided substantive written responses to dozens of
    questions from this committee.
        Today members will be able to ask additional follow-up
    questions and hear from the nominee directly. Our members are
    familiar with General Rudd from their visits to PACOM and also
    from his previous testimony to our committee in closed session
    where he was also warmly received. I want to take this
    opportunity to once again thank General Rudd for his lifetime
    of service and answering the call once again.
        And also, I would like to recognize his wife Ansley, his
    daughter Hayden, his son-in-law, JT, who are joining us today;
    welcome. As well as his mom who is watching from South Carolina
    and his younger daughter, Hollis, who is watching virtually.
    She was at the Armed Services Committee. I guess she thought
    better of a repeat performance.
        On behalf of this committee, thank you all for your support
    through this process and for your husband and your dad's
    decades of military service. General Rudd is a Special Forces
    officer who currently serves as the deputy commander of the
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. In addition to various special
    operations and interagency task force assignments, General Rudd
    has commanded at the platoon, troop, company, squadron, group
    and combatant command functional component levels.
        Among his previous assignments, General Rudd has served as
    chief of staff for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, commander of
    Special Operations Command Pacific, and deputy commanding
    general for operations for the 25th Infantry Division. If
    confirmed as director of the National Security Agency, General
    Rudd will be asked to serve as the head of the NSA and as
    commander of the U.S. Cyber Command. With this in mind, I look
    forward to hearing from you about how your wide ranging
    experience equips and prepares you to fulfill this dual hatted
    role and assume the enormous responsibility of protecting
    Americans and our homeland from harm. Again, I want to thank
    you, General Rudd, for your many years of service to our nation
    and for your willingness to continue serving our country in
    this new role.
        I now recognize our distinguished vice chairman for his
    remarks.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER,
                      A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

        Vice Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And,
    General Rudd, it's good to see you again and it's great to meet
    your wife and daughter and son-in-law. Um, again thank you for
    making time to meet with me the other day. We all know that NSA
    has been without a Senate-confirmed director for over nine
    months. Given the sustained pace of cyberattacks against the
    United States by our adversaries, the complexity of maintaining
    the world's premier system and the sheer volume of intelligence
    requirements from combatant commanders, I'm eager to provide
    the tens of thousands of employees at NSA with steady permanent
    confirmed leadership.
        However, as I told you when we last met, I have a few
    priorities and I'll need your commitment on them if you want to
    earn my vote. First and foremost, I remain deeply concerned
    about the politically motivated firings of career civilian and
    military leaders across our national security enterprise. That
    includes the firing of your predecessor, General Tim Haugh.
        I worry about the message these firings send that political
    loyalty is valued over competence. That message risks chilling
    the ICs' willingness to speak truth to power or even to produce
    vital intelligence that may conflict with preferred talking
    points or messaging of the day. So, as we discussed the first
    time, and I will ask you this in--in my questioning, I just--
    the IC--if the IC is unwilling to tell policymakers what they
    need to hear and not just what they want to hear, America is
    less safe.
        So, I will need your commitment that you will always be
    candid with policymakers, and nothing in your background
    reflects that you wouldn't be, but that you will always be
    transparent with Congress and you'll foster a culture at NSA
    that prizes candor and transparency; including standing up for
    your workforce if they are unfairly targeted.
        Second, as we discussed, I strongly support NSA's
    traditional SIGINT message, but I also believe there are areas
    where NSA can and should play a bigger role. One of those areas
    is technology; that means leveraging existing technologies to
    make NSA more effective, and it means better targeting our
    adversaries advances in technologies that weaken American
    security.
        In this endeavor, I hope NSA will lean into strong
    relationships. Within the U.S. government, for example, we
    talked about some of the cross-pollination with the Department
    of Commerce, with the private sector and with allies and
    partners abroad, which brings me to another priority,
    strengthening alliances and partnerships.
        NSA has deep and long standing SIGINT relationships across
    the world, especially with our Five Eyes partners, but I
    suspect that many of our partners are feeling confused and even
    abandoned. That confusion is driven by tariffs imposed on our
    close trading partners, by open talk of a military action
    against a NATO ally and by a defense strategy that walks back
    our commitments in Europe and the Pacific.
        As members of this committee know well, our allies and
    partners provide critical intelligence that complements our
    own, and when these relationships are jeopardized, again,
    America is less safe. Finally, I want to briefly focus on
    election security. I have often noted, and I know all the
    members of this committee appreciate it, that it was the
    credit--to the credit of President Trump during his first term
    that we built a robust infrastructure to identify adversary
    attempts to interfere in U.S. elections, to inform the public,
    and to disrupt and dismantle adversary infrastructure such as
    troll farms--troll farms.
        And as you know, the NSA and prior leadership played
    extraordinarily important role in all of those activities. So,
    it is ironic and highly unfortunate that in this term President
    Trump and his team have literally dismantled that
    infrastructure they built. While at the same time, senior
    officials, including the person responsible for leading our
    nation's intelligence community, appear willing to blur the
    line between intelligence and domestic political activity.
        There are only two explanations for why the Director of
    National Intelligence decided yesterday to show up at a federal
    raid tied to the president's obsession with relitigating the
    2020 election. First, she believes there is a legitimate
    foreign intelligence nexus, in which case she has violated her
    legal obligation to keep this intelligence community and
    committees fully and completely informed.
        Or, she is simply attempting to inject the nonpartisan
    intelligence community into a domestic political stunt designed
    to legitimize conspiracy theories that undermine our democracy.
    Either scenario represents a serious breach of trust and a
    dereliction of duty to the solemn office, which she holds. So,
    I'll be looking to you among others to ensure that we defeat
    real adversary efforts to mess with our elections and to help
    ensure that the intelligence community never allows itself to
    be used to advance political narratives instead of protecting
    domestic institutions. There are, of course, other issues and I
    know we had a robust discussion about Section 702, which is
    going to need reauthorization. I look forward to discussing
    those--these, issues and many others and working with you as I
    expect you will be confirmed.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Look forward to the
    presentation.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. General
    Rudd, before we move to your opening remarks, the committee has
    a series of standard questions we posed to each nominee that
    require a simple yes or no answer for the record. Although if
    the answer is no, there will probably be need for explanation,
    which is the equivalent of your instructor stomping his foot in
    an Army study review.
        So, here we go. One, do you agree to appear before the
    committee here and in other venues when invited?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. If confirmed--two, if confirmed, do you
    agree to send officials from your office to appear before the
    committee and designated staff when invited?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Three, do you agree to provide documents
    or any other materials requested by the committee in order for
    it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Four, will you ensure that your office and
    your staff provide such material to the committee when
    requested?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Five, do you agree to inform and fully
    brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this
    Committee of Intelligence activities and covert actions rather
    than only the chairman and vice chairman?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, General Rudd. We'll now proceed
    to your opening statement, after which we'll go to members by
    seniority at the gavel for five minutes each. General Rudd, the
    floor is yours.

     STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, NOMINEE TO BE
                DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

        Lt. General Rudd. Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner,
    and distinguished members of the committee, I'm deeply honored
    and humbled to appear before you today as the nominee for
    director of National Security Agency, chief Central Security
    Service and commander U.S. Cyber Command. I want to thank
    President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, the chairman and the chief
    of staff of the Army for the nomination and their trust in me
    to lead this critical national security role.
        I would like to acknowledge my family in attendance. First
    of all, Ansley, my wife, best friend and partner in this
    journey for the last 35 years. Our daughter Hayden, who works
    on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
    Transportation is also here along with our son-in-law, JT, who
    is a data scientist and AI engineer.
        Our other daughter Hollis, who lives in Texas, couldn't be
    here, but I know she is watching, along with our extended
    family in South Carolina. Each of you have--each of you have
    made profound sacrifices that have been instrumental in my life
    of service. You have positively impacted our military, their
    families and civilian communities, and I am eternally grateful
    for your unwavering support.
        My career has also been shaped by the remarkable men and
    women with whom I've served. I'm particularly indebted to the
    noncommissioned officer corps whose leadership and
    professionalism have inspired me for the past three plus
    decades. And we must always remember and honor our nation's
    fallen and their families who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
        My path in the Army has been unconventional, starting as a
    logistician before I transferred to Special Forces. This
    background has given me a unique operational lens. I spent over
    25 years leading our nation's special operations missions,
    integrating high consequence capabilities, which has given me a
    deep practical understanding on how to use intelligence to
    drive operational success, while ensuring the protection of our
    most critical sources and methods.
        These leadership roles involve pioneering highly technical
    solutions through close collaboration with American industry
    and ensuring these complex multi-domain systems were seamlessly
    woven into--into operations. My last six and a half years in
    the Indo-Pacific have made clear that we are witnessing a surge
    in adversarial activity.
        These complex threats are amplified by low cost, widespread
    proliferation of disruptive technologies including AI, cyber
    capabilities and autonomous systems, which place advanced
    capabilities in the hands of a broader range of actors. Today's
    threats are no longer distant. They are immediate challenges to
    our critical infrastructure and democracy.
        However, through a growing ecosystem of trusted partners in
    industry and academia, we are developing, experimenting and
    rapidly improving solutions to address these challenges head
    on. This relentless pursuit of excellence is central to my
    personal and professional ethos and it respects--it reflects
    the spirit of American innovation.
        A critical asymmetric advantage that ensures we remain
    ahead of dynamic adversarial threats. As a leader, consumer,
    enabler, generator and integrator of NSA and cyber command
    capabilities, my focus has been on defending the homeland,
    deterring adversaries and strengthening partnerships by
    delivering credible technologically advanced capabilities in
    all domains.
        If confirmed, I am prepared to lead these organizations as
    an integrated and essential team dedicated to increasing the
    speed and agility of our support for the nation's toughest
    challenges while cultivating and retaining a uniquely qualified
    workforce. Central to this will be the delivery of accurate and
    timely intelligence, advice and options always conducted with
    frequent transparent communication with Congress and absolute
    fidelity to our Constitution.
        With this committee's support, my focus will be to lead the
    NSA in its vital foreign intelligence mission driven by the
    pursuit of innovation with a commitment to unbiased objective
    analysis. Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you
    today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you closely
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The written statement of the witness follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Cotton. General, you have an extensive career as a
    special forces operator. You've deployed numerous times on
    combat operations in the Middle East and the Pacific. During
    that career, we've seen cyber play an increasing role in
    special forces operations. Could you give us a flavor of how
    you've used or supported cyber operations throughout your
    career and what lessons you've learned from that?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the--the vast amount
    of joint combined and interagency leadership roles that I've
    had the privilege to fulfill throughout my career, especially
    in combat operations, has generated an experience that is rich
    and replete with examples where I've worked closely with the
    interagency.
        Again, the--the most recent example that I can share on
    that one was the, you know, committee briefing that we had
    previously with one of our agency partners. Um, so, a rich
    experience of--of working collaboratively across interagency.
    But more specifically to NSA and Cyber Command throughout--
    through out my career, the--the foreign intelligence capability
    and the mission set of the NSA has informed and certainly
    enhanced and enabled the mission outcomes in a variety of
    mission sets.
        Equally paired is experience with Cyber Command and cyber
    capabilities. They work hand-in-hand, they work best when
    they're integrated across the joint force and in all domains.
    And increasingly when we think about and talk about deterrence,
    there's opportunity to couple what DOD is doing with the whole
    of government.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you. As I mentioned at the outset
    and you alluded to, this is technically two jobs, NSA director
    and the commander at Cyber Command. How have you thought about
    balancing the roles of those two jobs and ensuring that both
    missions are executed effectively?
        Lt. General Rudd. So, Mr. Chairman, I think I would draw
    upon my experience right now at USINDOPACOM as an opportunity
    to learn and highlight the responsibility of INDOPACOM, not
    only geographically is vast, but its pans the entirety of the
    joint force. It has over 300,000 assigned forces. So, as--to
    your point, two--two giant organizations that I would be
    responsible, if confirmed for this, I think the scale in the
    size of it are manageable.
        What I would hope to do, if confirmed, is ensure that the
    unique capabilities, the unique authorities that both of these
    organizations bring to bear are fully integrated both within
    support and interdependence of each other's missions, but then
    in support of the warfighter and providing the best option to
    our decision makers.
        Chairman Cotton. CYBERCOM is significantly smaller than
    NSA. Have you developed any thoughts yet on how that
    organization might need to grow or change to ensure the
    missions are balanced?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of my priorities,
    if confirmed for this, would be scale across both
    organizations, not only in the workforce, but also in the
    capabilities, the technologies and how we enhance that. But my
    understanding is there is a deliberate approach in, in, in
    effect right now under CYBERCOM 2.0 to man, train and equip the
    cyber force.
        Certainly, if confirmed, I would like to understand how
    that's being implemented, are there ways to accelerate it and
    then provide best advice on how to do that.
        Chairman Cotton. As the vice chairman noted in his opening
    remarks, FISA Title VII specifically Section 702, expires in
    less than three months unless Congress reauthorizes it. Section
    702 explicitly--explicitly applies to foreign nationals on
    foreign territory. Can you talk to us about how critical
    Section 702 is for the NSA's mission and how detrimental it
    would be if the authority expired?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, or Mr. Chairman, from an
    operational perspective as you highlight, that foreign
    intelligence mission focuses on non-U.S. persons outside the
    U.S. As--you know, throughout my career and my firsthand
    experience as a consumer of that intelligence and enabler to
    those capabilities, it's indispensable.
        I know it's been critical to mission outcomes. Its force
    protection of our men and women in harm's way, and I know it
    saved lives, uh, here in the homeland.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again,
    general, enjoyed our conversation and I'm going to ask you a
    couple of questions, which, uh, you can simply answer, yes or
    no as well. Uh, I have great faith that you will answer, yes,
    but I want to make sure we get these on the record. First, do I
    have your commitment that if you're confirmed that you will
    stand up for your workforce if they are unfairly targeted?
        Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, you do.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. Do you have--do I have
    your commitment, and this is one of the things I'm
    extraordinarily concerned about. You know, the ICs got to speak
    truth to power and so, do I have your commitment you will
    always be candid with policymakers, even if you have to tell
    them something they don't want to hear?
        Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, I will, and you do
    have my commitment.
        Vice Chairman Warner. I think your record reflects that.
    One of the things, and again I touched on this in my opening
    statement, where the Director of National Intelligence is
    suddenly appearing, uh, at a FBI raid around elections from
    frankly 2020, which I have no idea what she was doing there.
    But I am concerned that we've seen much of the election
    security infrastructure that was put in place extraordinarily
    well by the first Trump administration, where, again, the NSA
    played a critical role, be dismantled and there's no less
    threat from foreign adversaries about trying to mess with our
    elections.
        So, do I have your commitment that if confirmed that the
    NSA will continue to prioritize information sharing on threats
    to U.S. elections, on foreign threats to U.S. elections?
        Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, you do. The electoral
    process is fundamental to our values, our way of life. And
    throughout my entire career, I've been committed to upholding
    those and protecting those. I think anything that poses a
    threat to the electoral process needs to be taken seriously.
        And if confirmed, Mr. Vice Chairman, I commit to working
    with the executive and the legislative on this.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. Because, again, the NSA
    and particularly in the 2018 through 2020 cycle played a very
    important role. This is something we've not talked about, but
    we all know AI has enormous potential, um, and both DOD and the
    intelligence community is looking to take advantage of those AI
    capabilities. But we also know that there's a number of AI
    tools that still have a tendency to hallucinate and, um, with
    that tendency, sometimes it poses major security risks.
        I've been concerned that Secretary of Defense Hegseth has
    um--starting to unleash AI both across classified and
    unclassified networks, including models such as xAI's Grok
    model, which has got, again, more of a history of hallucination
    than most. If confirmed, will you ensure that appropriate
    policies are in place to stand, safeguard, DOD and NSA's
    critical mission and that while we use these AI tools that
    there are appropriate safeguards?
        Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, this is a critical
    area of competition and I know INDOPACOM is relying heavily on
    the adoption of AI, and I suspect, and expect, that CYBERCOM
    and NSA are as well. In fact, I know they are. My understanding
    and really the approach that we've taken with the adoption of
    these technologies is while they are absolutely imperative to
    advancing our skill set as joint warfighters enabling us
    decision superiority.
        We will never abdicate our responsibility to maintain those
    guardrails. The guardrail is the human on the loop or in the
    loop in terms of what those technologies are providing, what
    they're producing and then how we apply them. So, you have my
    commitment. Thank you Mr. Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. I look forward to working
    with you on that. Finally, and I know, and this was in, over at
    SASC. I think in your testimony, you noted, North Korea's heavy
    reliance on cryptocurrency. I'm in the midst of, looking around
    the table, I don't think any of my colleagues are as deeply
    involved in trying to make sure we've got some rules of the
    road around market structure for crypto.
        I think it's going to be an incredibly important part of
    our financial system going forward, but boy, it is complicated.
    So, do you believe that the federal government needs to do more
    across the interagency to track, disrupt and abate foreign
    malign actors access to these digital ecosystems?
        Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, that's something that
    I would have to take a closer look at. Certainly, we're looking
    at it from an INDOPACOM lens on what it means for national
    security and implications. But, Mr. Vice Chairman, if
    confirmed, I commit to looking at----
        Vice Chairman Warner. My time's up but I just want to make
    the comment that you--crypto has great possibilities, it's not
    going away. But boy, oh boy, there are some national security
    implications around this that we have to get, right.
        So, thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want
    to follow up on a discussion that we had in our meeting and it
    relates to some degree to questions that have already been
    raised. I have been greatly concerned about cybersecurity
    issues affecting all branches of government, the private sector
    and our critical infrastructure.
        Ransomware attacks and Salt Typhoon intrusions continue at
    an alarming rate. However, when it comes to the federal
    government's defensive and offensive capabilities, we seem to
    be stove piped. There's a cyber czar, FBI's involved, CISA,
    your predecessor, have all used terms like team effort,
    collaboration, coordination, and yet there appears to be no
    lead.
        And yet we see these ongoing attacks that get ever worse.
    In fact, just last month, another Salt Typhoon intrusion was
    detected against staff of the House of Representatives. So, we
    need to stop Salt Typhoon intrusions. We need to secure our
    critical Infrastructure from being taken over by hostile
    actors.
        We've seen in the state of Maine hospital data being hacked
    with some of the most sensitive data possible. What can we do
    to detect, cease and get ahead of these cyber intrusions?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, again, I appreciate the
    opportunity to meet and thanks for the time. On this particular
    topic, first and foremost, it's aggressive vigilance. We have
    to understand what the threats are, where they emanate from and
    then what are the options of capabilities that can be applied.
    And then to your point about the various entities across the
    government that have responsibility for this, my experience
    says continuous collaboration coordination, unity of effort is
    what makes us most effective in that, and if confirmed for this
    role, I would pledge to be a part of that.
        Senator Collins. Do you see yourself as the lead in trying
    to combat this ever increasing threat?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I see us as a lead from
    the department and from the military aspect, certainly on the
    cyber capability piece of this question. Um, I don't know that
    we've been designated the lead for this effort.
        Senator Collins. I think that's part of the problem, that
    we do need a designated lead. Let me switch to another issue.
    We understand that the Department of Defense has prioritized
    the effective adoption of artificial intelligence to secure
    American military AI dominance. My understanding is that this
    is meant to help drive efficiencies and improve decision
    making.
        The adoption of these technologies, however, is not without
    risk. It has the potential to introduce significant cyber risk
    if the AI systems themselves are not properly protected and
    managed. As the incoming director of NSA and Cyber Command, how
    will you bridge that gap between the adoption of AI and AI
    security?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think that's a
    critically important topic and with any new technology, there's
    always risk. But what I see in this particular technology is an
    imperative that we adopt it, apply it, understand it. And to
    your point, how do you secure it? I know there's efforts going
    on right now within NSA around AI security that extends through
    collaboration and Intel driven recommendations to commercial
    partners.
        And certainly we have to make sure that we protect that.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, we have
    talked in the past about this question of cyber and one of the
    huge gaps in our cyber policy in this country is the lack of
    any cyber deterrent. Our adversaries pay no price for their
    attacks; whether it goes back to the Sony hack or the recent,
    Volt and Salt Typhoon.
        Do you believe that it would be important for us to
    establish a deterrent strategy that our adversaries would be
    aware of and would color their decision making as to whether or
    not to launch an attack, a cyberattack, against this country?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, thanks for the opportunity to
    meet, and I appreciate the opportunity to revisit this topic.
    The short answer is yes, I do.
        Senator King. I appreciate that and I think that's very
    important and I hope you'll work with NSA and CYBERCOM to
    develop that capacity because otherwise we can never patch our
    way out of this problem. The adversaries are going to continue
    to evolve. And at some point, we have to make them have second
    thoughts about whether to attack this country in cyberspace.
        Second question, I just want to reiterate your conversation
    with the--with the vice chairman. It's so important that our
    intelligence community provide candid, clear, unvarnished,
    nonpolitical advice to policymakers, uh, because otherwise, we
    have--we can have real catastrophes involving our national
    security.
        So, I just want to reiterate that you answered the
    question, yes. You're committed to that. It's somewhat easy to
    answer that question here, it's going to be a little harder in
    practice if you're sitting in the Oval Office or in some other
    setting that is inherently intimidating. Uh, but I want you to
    reiterate your commitment.
        Straight talk, straight advice and the facts to the
    policymaker, is that correct?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I am committed to that, as I
    have been throughout the entirety of my career. I pride myself
    on a leader who has always been candid and given best advice
    even if it wasn't popular.
        Senator King. Thank you. Final area. In your work in
    INDOPACOM, I know you came to realize the value of the allies
    that we have in the Pacific. In my work on this committee and
    the Armed Services Committee, I've come to realize our
    asymmetric advantage in the world is allies. China has
    customers, we have allies.
        Russia doesn't have much in the way of customers or allies.
    But it's so important to maintain those relationships;
    particularly in the intelligence community. Talk to me a little
    bit about the Five Eyes and how important it is to maintain
    that intelligence sharing enterprise and particularly to--to be
    sure that there's a trusting relationship so that we will have
    the maximum advantage of the--of the ability of our--of our
    allies to work with us in order to protect the national
    security of this country.
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I've had the incredible fortune
    throughout my career to serve alongside with and through allies
    and partners. I think our strategic documents identify clearly
    the importance of that and the emphasis that--that we put on
    that. The Five Eyes in particular some of my closest colleagues
    in professional relationships are within that community and
    certainly rely upon them.
        As--as it relates to INDOPACOM, it's a--it's a daily
    effort. We have embedded liaison officers from throughout our
    allies and partners within the region and it's a consistent
    engagement. We operate together, we exercise together, we train
    together and that's part of our strategic approach to
    delivering deterrence.
        Senator King. It's true, is it not, that allies are a
    tremendous force multiplier for our ability to have our
    policies respected and have our national security protected?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I think that's a--that's a great
    way to characterize it.
        Senator King. Thank you. I'll leave it at that.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Lankford.
        Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you, General. Thank
    you. Thank you for your decades of service already to the
    nation and for stepping up into this role. It's a tough role.
    We'll have lots of conversations in the days ahead, but they
    won't be in open settings like this. So, I think it would be
    helpful just for you to be able to articulate, what do you see
    as the principal threats that NSA needs to be focused in on? As
    you look around the globe and the issues that are out there in
    this open setting, what would you see as some of the principal
    threats?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, thanks, Senator. The--I--you know,
    my assessment aligns with our national security strategy and
    national defense strategy and how we articulate the priorities.
    Um, certainly from where I sit at USINDOPACOM day in and day
    out, China, Russia, North Korea, those are all critical threats
    that we pay attention to varying degrees of, uh, how we
    characterize those and how we prioritize those.
        But I think it's pretty clear that those two state actors;
    certainly Iran continues to pose concern and threat to the
    nation. Um, I would couple alongside with that, violent
    extremists will be an infinite problem and I think increasingly
    narcotics and narco terrorists.
        Senator Lankford. Okay, thank you. I want to follow up on
    Senator King's question to you as well. I have a similar
    question dealing with how we prepare for a response and a
    deterrent. You would have the unique responsibility of
    preparing a portfolio for the president if we have a
    cyberattack to be able to handle the president, here are the
    options.
        Then he has to obviously make the decisions on that, but
    you'll have the role of actually handing that to him and saying
    here's a set of options. So, my question to you is, what do you
    plan to do to be able to prepare that set of options? What are
    your boundaries and limitations for the options that you would
    hand to any president?
        And to say these are--these are the options that you have
    that fall within legal bounds, but that also are an effective
    deterrent.
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think it speaks to what
    I would--how I would frame my priorities if confirmed for this
    and the initial approach. Obviously, making an assessment of
    where the organizations are at. But the first priority is
    speed. Second one is scale, the next one is innovation and then
    integration. We've got to move as fast as we can to ensure that
    we've got the right technologies, the right capabilities and
    able to generate multiple options.
        We need to be able to scale those options and not only just
    scaling within the size of the workforce as we--as we
    mentioned, relative to Cyber Command size, certainly there's an
    approach by the department to, uh, address that. But I think
    increasingly, we look at other partnerships as a means to
    scale.
        Innovation, as I highlighted in my opening comments, that
    is an asymmetric advantage. And that is something we, as the
    United States, do better than anybody. So, we have to continue
    to harness innovation. As a leader, I would empower the
    workforce to explore, test, try, fail and figure out what's
    working.
        And then ultimately, those capabilities and options have
    got to be integrated. They've got to be integrated across the
    joint force, they've got to be integrated in all domains and
    increasingly those options should be provided that enable us to
    integrate and pair those with other elements of national power.
        Senator Lankford. OK, it's helpful. You've been a consumer
    of some of the intelligence information that's come across your
    desk and trying to be able to prepare for operations. I'm a
    consumer of intelligence documents as well. I have noticed over
    the past 10 years among some of our agencies that the documents
    and the analysis has gotten safer and safer and safer in the
    way that it's written.
        Sometimes I read some analysis and I read it twice and
    think this doesn't say a thing. This is supposed to be telling
    me something, and I can't tell what this is trying to tell me
    because it's written so safe in it. One of the challenges that
    I would have before you is that NSA and with your analysts and
    folks as they're gathering SIGINT, to be able to make sure that
    the documents that are written and the reports that are done
    just say it bluntly. And that there is a sense of permission to
    say it frankly even at times and to not have a perception of
    being safe. I don't know if you've experienced some of the same
    things as you've read some of the intelligence documents in the
    past and some of the information reports, but I would encourage
    you to say it, frank, instead of safe, when it comes out of
    your analysts.
        You don't have to respond to that one way or the other on
    it because you'll have to be able to read it. One last question
    that I had is a follow up on what the chairman was saying on
    702. I think what I'm looking for, for anything is clarifying
    for the American people, the protections that have been put in
    place in statute to protect the American people that no one is
    spying on them, but also making it clear that this is an
    essential authority that we have to have to protect the safety
    of the Nation.
        I'm looking for not just someone who will stand up and say,
    yes, we need that, but someone who will be an advocate for 702
    to be able to explain it to people that need to hear it and to
    be able to articulate how the American people are actually
    protected by 702. Is that you?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, if confirmed, certainly I would
    do everything I can to provide the best advice as we look to
    reauthorize or extend this, this critical authority.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Wyden.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General,
    enjoyed talking with you and I think you know that one of the
    key issues for me in this position is basically adhering to
    what Ben Franklin was talking about, who said anybody who gives
    up their liberty to have security doesn't deserve either. And
    that's what we talked about, and I want to, as we talked about,
    get into some more, kind of specifics, not to like pin you down
    or something, but to get a sense of where you're actually
    headed on striking that balance that I think is so essential.
        So, the administration, a number of months ago, secretly
    decided that its agents can break into homes without a judicial
    warrant. Basically, they said the Fourth Amendment doesn't
    matter anymore. So, here's the question a little bit broader
    than I talked about with you yesterday so we can see if we can
    find some common ground.
        And that is, General, if you are directed to target people
    in the United States for surveillance, will you insist that
    there be a judicial warrant? And I would like to have a yes or
    no answer to this, and happy to have some context.
        Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, Senator, I--again, I appreciate the
    opportunity to speak with you yesterday. Um, certainly this
    speaks--this question speaks to the mission of NSA and the
    authorities that it has been given. What I can tell you,
    Senator, is that if confirmed, I will absolutely commit to
    executing the foreign intelligence mission of the NSA in
    accordance with the authorities that it's been given and within
    all applicable laws.
        Senator Wyden. That respectfully though doesn't get close
    to what I'm talking about. I mean, that is about as vague as
    anything I've heard on--on the subject and, uh, it seems to me
    that unfamiliarity with basic constitutional rights is not
    something that can be accepted in this position. It's so,
    crucial and I continue to believe that what I described you as
    not mutually exclusive.
        I think smart policies give you security and liberty, not
    so smart policies give you less of both. So, would you like to
    take another crack at perhaps telling me a little bit? As I
    said in the office, I'm interested in hearing, in your words,
    how you might deal with one of these issues. Not to spell it
    out in text and the like, but to get a sense of how you would
    strike this extraordinarily important issue in a sensible way.
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, as again, as we discussed,
    I have utmost respect and commitment to the civil liberties
    that are outlined in the Constitution. I've sworn an oath
    several times throughout my career to uphold that Department.
        Senator Wyden. Let's move on so we can get some more
    questions. Do you believe that U.S. person searches of Section
    702 collection should require a warrant except in emergencies,
    which has been largely the position of those who would like to
    find some common ground as we go forward? We would say, look,
    if somebody says this is a four alarm crisis for the country,
    they can get the information they need and come back and settle
    up later, which strikes me again as a constructive step. So,
    what are your thoughts with respect to saying that you should
    have a warrant except in emergencies?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, that's--that's a topic
    that I'd need to look into and get a better understanding to
    give you a more fulsome and complete answer on that one. Again,
    what I would highlight though is supreme confidence that the
    men and women of the NSA are committed to protecting civil
    liberties and privacy of American citizens.
        Senator Wyden. Let me go a little bit further on the
    Greenland issue then you've gone today. Donald Trump's threat
    to invade Greenland is just one of many ways, in my view, we
    would damage NATO. You talked about the importance of
    intelligence relations and intelligence relationships. How
    concerned are you that these relationships could be damaged by
    the current tensions that we are talking about now with
    Greenland?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, the alliances and partnerships
    that we rely on to execute our missions are absolutely
    critical.
        Senator Wyden. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General Rudd,
    first of all, thanks for your service to our country. I've
    appreciated our--our discussions already in armed services and
    then in my office as well. And I look--I have just--I look
    forward to supporting your nomination. But I thought this was
    an opportunity in a public discussion, different than what we
    normally do within a classified situation in which we can kind
    of share with the American people some of the concerns and some
    of the directions that we really have to go in order to, number
    one, gather good data to make good decisions, but also how we
    protect the American public from adversaries that have some
    pretty decent offensive cyber weapons systems that they're not
    afraid to deploy.
        It--if we could for just a minute, let's talk a little bit
    about artificial intelligence and the need to be able to deploy
    it. I think some folks in--in the United States today have
    thought that, you know, if we have concerns about this, this
    new thing about being able to make decisions very, very
    quickly, which is what artificial intelligence allow sand to
    look at a lot of different data, uh, what happens if we were to
    simply say, you know what, we're just going to take our time in
    terms of deploying artificial intelligence in our, uh, data
    gathering, uh, or in our weapons systems.
        Does that stop an adversary in any way, shape or form from
    integrating artificial intelligence as quickly as they can?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, it wouldn't. And I think this is
    an area of--of competition that we have to accelerate in.
    It's--it's a critical capability that its adoption and
    integration into our joint warfighting functions and our
    intelligence collection has got to be adopted. That is what
    will enable us to maintain our advantage in all these--all
    these categories.
        Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that in any
    warfighting situation, speed can make the difference between a
    life and death situation?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's certainly my experience.
        Senator Rounds. So, you've been around the horn a little
    bit. You've been with young men and women that have been in
    harm's way. Would it be fair to say that if we deploy our tools
    faster than the bad guys can at a strategic level and we
    provide assistance to our young men and women in uniform at a
    faster pace, uh, and give them more information more quickly
    than what an adversary can, that we save lives?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would agree with that. And
    again, the examples you give are, uh, very personal to me. I
    understand what it means to, uh, command forces in harm's way
    and what it means to make decisions quickly so that we protect
    our forces. But I would offer increasingly this is a strategic
    advantage, our decision making, our speed and our ability to
    outthink and outmaneuver the enemy before there's conflict is
    critically important as well, senator.
        Senator Rounds. I'm going to bring this down now to a
    little bit more direct level, and we've talked a lot about 702
    and about the need, and I fully support the continuation of 702
    operations. A huge amount of the data that we're able to
    collect overseas, uh, to be able to give our war fighting teams
    an advantage is because of what we collect using 702. I know
    there's always a concern that we not collect any information on
    U.S. citizens.
        But can you talk a little bit about what it means to a
    young man or a woman who is on the front lines and the ability
    for us to be able to know in advance what a bad guy is going to
    be doing near or around their areas and how critical it is that
    we take advantage of those opportunities to collect that data
    and not tie the hands of those individuals that collect it?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would again offer my personal
    experience as a warfighter where I know that authority has
    enabled NSA to provide timely foreign intelligence to the
    warfighter that has saved lives.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me go one step further now
    with regard to artificial intelligence. We've got to be able to
    collect as much data as we can as quickly as we can. And yet in
    order to do that, we can't simply rely on what we call
    government sources. We've got to be able to work with the
    private sector. A huge amount of the data that's collected,
    that's out there right now in terms of being able to make AI
    work even faster at the cutting edge is coming from private
    sector initiatives.u
        Can you talk a little bit about how important it is to be
    able to integrate the private sector into our systems to make
    us faster than the adversaries?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, it seems reasonable that that
    would naturally accelerate and enable scale. What I would also
    highlight is that as we do that, again, the same respect and
    safeguards for civil liberties and private data need to be
    adhered to.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, just like
    Senator Rounds, I wanted to talk about AI and FISA 702. I got
    one other topic. Just want to start by saying that I have
    legislation with Senator Warner and Cornyn and Lankford called
    the ENABLE IC Act, which is going to get these--get us moving
    faster on this.
        And also an advanced AI Security Readiness Act which is
    going to help with something you talked about General Rudd, uh,
    the private sector more involved here. So, I think we all agree
    that we need to move faster and innovate more and the world is
    moving credibly fast, especially with AI, and these tools that
    are being developed and these novel methodologies are
    incredible, but they also come with a lot of risk, especially
    when we're talking about a highly classified work environment.
        Uh, and highly classified data. So, can you talk a little
    bit in more detail about how you're going to approach
    integrating AI and other tech tools into NSA systems that we
    currently have while guarding against the risk?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would--I would offer on risk,
    the first way that we mitigate risk is to understand it. Where
    are the risks? Where do they exist? And then what do we need to
    do to ensure that we are continuously assessing that we've
    provided a solution to that. Within the realm of AI, obviously,
    the data is a key part of this, but then also equally
    important, a layer of cybersecurity around that.
        So, how do you ensure that the data is authoritative? How
    do you ensure that it's feeding the right models? But equally
    important, coupled with that is the ability to protect that
    data. My understanding is that NSA has that responsibility.
    They're executing it very well. And certainly, Senator, if
    confirmed, it would be a high priority of mine to ensure that
    we continue to do so.
        Senator Kelly. And, General, also, you know, one priority I
    think you're going to need to put somewhere near the top of the
    list, and I know, um, one of my colleagues brought up the
    election threat issue, but certainly AI being used by our
    adversaries against us in an election is going to be I think
    here in 2026 is going to be more significant than what we've
    ever seen before and certainly in 2028. On the FISA 702
    question, um, we're going to have to have to reauthorize it
    here pretty soon, just a few months.
        Um, I don't think the public understands what this is. I
    mean we're talking about something, I mean an acronym with a
    number and a letter after it and it just seems something
    that's, you know, out of reach for most people. Can you try to
    explain here in just about 30 seconds or so, why this should
    matter to the average American?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, in as plain as language as I can
    put it is, first and foremost, it is the collection of foreign
    intelligence against non-U.S. persons who are located out the
    United States--outside of the United States. And again, what
    I've experienced in in my career is that this provides the
    warfighter, the decision maker, the ability to have critical
    insight into threats that enables decision making.
        And again, we've talked about speed. Critical to speed is--
    is a deep understanding.
        Senator Kelly. But for a family, hardworking American
    family, not--and they shouldn't have to pay much attention to
    this, how does it affect them? Like what are the consequences
    to them and their children let's say a few months from now if
    we did not reauthorize 702?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, again in my experience,
    it's quite simply, it saves lives.
        Senator Kelly. Save lives, could it--could we be
    potentially talking about their lives, the lives of their
    family members, friends, coworkers?
        Lt. General Rudd. Again, Senator, the lives of men and
    women in harm's way, but also threats to the--to the homeland,
    the United States. I would put that in the category of saving
    lives.
        Senator Kelly. Yeah, and I agree with you, and I--and I
    think that is a key part of this. This is a--an authority that
    the intelligence community has, but the reason it has it is it
    keeps Americans safer. Not just the IC, not just DOD, not
    people that are regularly in harm's way, it results in safety
    for the American people.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Budd.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, thank you for
    your years of service. I enjoyed our conversation in the office
    a week or two ago. You know, we talked a lot about this morning
    and in that conversation in the office about the many hats of
    this role and you certainly had the experience to do that, but
    I understand that in a peacetime.
        But let's say there's a--an invasion by China to Taiwan,
    um, and it's no longer peacetime, but it's a period of
    conflict. How do you balance the roles in a situation like that
    as best you can see it?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, it's a continuous
    assessment of the situation and where the balance lies between
    the two organizations and the capabilities that each brings to
    bear. Certainly on one side, you need deep insight into the
    threat, into the adversary, to understand. And then on the
    other side, you need to be able to deliver capabilities and
    options that would change the course even before conflict but
    if in conflict, certainly there's capability to bring to bear.
        There's obviously a constant awareness and understanding of
    that. But I think the current construct puts us in a position
    that enables unity, of command unity, of effort to make
    decisions and over those two rapidly.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, general. You know, we've talked
    about your years of service and certainly a unique pathway to
    get to this point. So, congratulations for that. But, you know,
    this is a highly technical civilian organization at NSA, which
    it's different than a lot of what you've done before. Uh, tell
    us how you want to, and you think you will be adapting your
    military leadership experience to lead an organization like
    this?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator. The, uh--first of all, if
    confirmed, I look forward to this--this unique experience and
    challenge, uh, gaining a deeper understanding and appreciation
    of a largely civilian highly technical workforce. My career to-
    date is not without those experiences and opportunities
    perhaps, but this would definitely be a different one.
        What I have always applied as a leadership principle to any
    organization, but certainly ones that are different or have
    different capabilities or different expertise, uh, is first a
    willingness to get in and learn as much as I can. But connect,
    connect with the workforce, connect on a personal level, get to
    know them. Certainly, I'm not going to get to know every single
    individual in the--in the agency, but get to understand their
    culture. The second piece is what I just said, understand. And
    in doing the connection and understanding with the workforce,
    it enables a leader to best position themselves to empower, to
    enable, and to really harness what their capability--their
    incredible expertise is. And certainly if confirmed, I look
    forward to applying that with this organization.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, General. You know there's an
    executive branch policy where the NSA is prohibited from
    producing and disseminating finished intelligence. I found that
    interesting. And yet the agency NSA has some of the best
    cybersecurity expertise in all of the U.S. government. And it
    does, in fact, produce products that look and read a lot like
    finished intelligence.
        So, is that a good policy?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, that's something that I
    would want to take a look at and come back to you with a
    recommendation on.
        Senator Budd. That's my next question. So, you will commit
    to looking at that to see if that policy needs to be modified?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, if confirmed, I'll look into it.
        Senator Budd. Thank you. Um, you spent a lot of time in the
    Indo-Pacific, where do you see opportunities to work with our--
    our partners like Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, to build
    capacity in countering--against cyber threats and, um, how
    could we cooperate with them more?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, we're doing it on a daily basis.
    Certainly there's opportunity to do more, but there's a very
    deliberate approach in campaign plan to working with our allies
    and partners. I think there's tremendous opportunity to do more
    certainly on the cyber front, and if confirmed, I would look--I
    would look forward to exploring those opportunities.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For nearly a
    decade, the intelligence community produced a steady stream of
    relevant intelligence on foreign threats to U.S. elections
    informing congressional policy makers. Will you commit to
    continuing to produce and disseminate intelligence reporting
    made available to Congress on foreign plans, intentions and
    activity targeting U.S. elections?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, the electoral process is
    fundamental to our democratic values and Americans writ large.
    And I've committed throughout my career to serve to defend and
    uphold those values. Any foreign threat to the electoral
    process should be viewed as a national security concern. And,
    Senator, if confirmed for this, I commit to working with
    executive and legislative sides on this.
        Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate that. In your responses to
    the Senate Armed Services Committee, you suggested very similar
    to that statement that U.S. election defense is currently
    better positioned than in the past given efforts with
    interagency partners which allows for the rapid sharing of
    threat intelligence. Under this administration, however, key
    elements of that interagency process have been entirely
    eliminated, as in the case of the FBI's Foreign Influence Task
    Force, or been paralyzed from funding cuts and rollbacks of
    information sharing duties.
        Do you believe that there's still an effective interagency
    for you to engage with?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, if confirmed for this
    role, I would look forward to being part of whatever the
    construct exists. Certainly, again, throughout my career, I've
    seen--I've seen and I've been a part of a number of interagency
    efforts. So, if confirmed, I look forward to being part of
    this.
        Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Several years ago I led the
    creation of the DOD Cyber Service Academy Scholarship program,
    which creates a cleared and trained workforce pipeline. These
    are for nonmilitary roles appropriate for NSA, CIA and other
    civilian positions. Since then, I've worked with my colleagues
    to continue to improve this program and expand the number of
    scholarships.
        What value do you see in this type of program and how would
    increasing the number of scholarships benefit NSA's work? If
    confirmed, do I have your commitment to work with me on this
    project?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I'd certainly like to learn more
    about this. But I--the way you describe this concept certainly
    seems like a--an avenue that could be explored to enhance and
    expand the scale of the workforce, certainly an opportunity to
    generate talent for the workforce. And so, Senator, if
    confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this.
        Senator Gillibrand. Yeah, and when we created it, it has up
    to 1,000 slots a year, but we have not done a good job in
    telling our high schools around the country that these
    scholarships are available. And so, we have not had sufficient
    applications. In the last few years it's been in the hundreds,
    not in the thousands. And so, all slots are not being filled.
        Um, we've also worked to get more schools signed up.
    There's over 600 schools across the country that have signed up
    for this ROTC type program as long as they have the curriculum
    that our security and intelligence teams need across the DOD
    and across the Intel Community. So, I would like your
    commitment also to work with us in making sure high school
    students around the country know about this and that all your
    services know that they can find great graduates through this
    program.
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, again, I look forward to
    learning as much as I can about this and supporting it as able.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Last year, DNI Gabbard fired
    over 100 intelligence officers deemed to be misusing the chat
    platform hosted by the NSA on Intelink. These officers were
    alleged to have misused these systems, in some cases with valid
    allegations of inappropriate conduct and others potential for
    discriminatory reasons.
        You've answered to many of the members on this panel about
    your review and judgment with regard to the use of AI platforms
    on NSA systems. What is your perspective on making sure these
    systems are not misused to harass or target other service
    members or intelligence personnel?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that concern.
    Certainly the responsibility of any leader of any organization
    is to safeguard the workforce and ensure that there's
    compliance within how we use the tools and systems to
    accomplish the mission. And if confirmed for this role, I would
    pledge to continue that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Young.
        Senator Young. General Rudd, good to see you again. I
    enjoyed our visit in the office, appreciate your answers to my
    many questions. You noted in your committee questionnaire
    before this hearing that one of your priorities for improving
    NSA's coordination with the rest of the IC will rely on
    fostering interagency training, exercises and experimentation.
        Can you unpack this for the committee, please?
        Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think the way that we
    build connective tissue through organizations, not only within
    the department, but to the point of the question within the
    interagency, is through repetitions and sets, you know, whether
    it be training, training exercises, tabletop exercises. Those
    are ways that we exercise the muscle, the connective tissue, of
    organizations and enhance the way we work together.
        Senator Young. Thank you. You also noted in your
    questionnaire a desire to leverage commercial innovation. We
    hear about this a lot. We need to hear about this. But beyond
    the obvious role for the commercial tech sector to play in
    making NSA more effective, more cutting edge, can you speak to
    how you might seek to increase opportunities for outside
    experts to come in to lead on emerging tech or economic
    competition to enhance your analytical capabilities?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, I think that's a critically
    important effort and certainly we need to look at every
    opportunity to expand our expertise. Again, CYBERCOM and NSA
    have tremendous expertise, talent, probably the best in the
    world at what they do and we have to continuously find those
    opportunities where we learn, enhance, never be complacent that
    what we're doing is sufficient, especially in--in the world of
    technology that's moving so fast.
        And so much of the commercial sectors moving out at a very
    fast pace.
        Senator Young. General, can you describe the role you see
    for NSA in helping shepherd safe and effective U.S. government
    and IC artificial intelligence technologies, especially through
    the AI Security Center?
        Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, thanks, Senator. That's the example
    I was going to mention, the effort underway that uses Intel
    driven understanding to make recommendations and solutions to
    enhance the security around AI, not only within the department,
    the organization, but with our commercial partners where
    applicable as well.
        Senator Young. Will you commit to working with this
    committee and identifying any shortfalls, whether it's of
    resources, authorities or prioritization for NSA and the ICs
    development and use of AI?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator the--the role of any commander,
    leader, director is certainly to identify what those are. And
    if confirmed, I do commit to that.
        Senator Young. OK. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Ossoff.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, thank
    you for your career of service to the United States and
    congratulations on your nomination to this important post.
    Before I engage with you, I just want to note for the committee
    that my constituents in Georgia, and I think much of the
    American public, are quite reasonably alarmed and asking
    questions after the Director of National Intelligence was
    spotted bizarrely and personally lurking in an FBI evidence
    truck in Fulton County, Georgia yesterday.
        And so, I encourage all of us on a bipartisan basis to
    pursue the facts as swiftly as possible to understand whether
    the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is straying
    far outside of its lane. At unrelated--I regret to share my
    observation that the president at this point is clearly using
    federal law enforcement in order to pursue personal vendettas.
    That has nothing to do with you and your career to-date, nor is
    it something for which I hold you accountable or would expect
    you to explain, but it is a well-known fact, and it quite
    reasonably, given the immense surveillance capabilities of the
    National Security Agency, raises the concern that there might
    be some abuse of the NSA's authorities.
        And so, my question for you is that if there is some
    alteration or withdrawal of current prohibitions,
    administrative prohibitions, on surveillance targeting
    Americans, for example, in Executive Order 1233, PPD-28, USSID
    18 or otherwise, will you promptly inform this committee with
    our oversight responsibilities of such a change?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I will pledge, if confirmed, to
    ensure that the NSA executes its mission within the authorities
    and all applicable laws and that I will execute the duties of
    this position that enables this committee to exercise its
    oversight responsibilities.
        Senator Ossoff. General, I appreciate the answer and I want
    you to think a little bit more deeply about the question and
    consult with your team and follow-up with more precision for
    the record. Because the challenge I'm identifying is that you
    may be asked to do things that are manifestly unethical and
    improper, but following some alteration of present
    administrative policy, may indeed be lawful.
        And this committee needs to know if such administrative
    policies, which currently protect American civil liberties but
    are not in statute, are changed. And my view would be that
    under existing law, anyone in the seat that you hope to hold
    would have a statutory obligation to inform this committee of
    any such change.
        So, I hope to get some more detail beyond boilerplate on
    that for the record. You will also be taking this post,
    General, if confirmed. So, can I get a commitment that you will
    respond with a more fulsome answer for the record please,
    general?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I look forward to looking into
    that topic and responding to you.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you. If confirmed, you'll take this
    post after a series of events that suggest a crisis for
    information security and operational security practices in the
    federal government. You had the Secretary of Defense
    inadvertently text strike details to a national political
    reporter, including time over target for U.S. aircrews before
    those U.S. aircrews had launched into hostile enemy airspace.
        Multiple major news outlets were reportedly aware of the
    imminent raid targeting Maduro in Venezuela before the raid was
    executed. This week, here's a headline from Politico, Trump's
    acting cyber chief uploaded sensitive files into a public
    version of ChatGPT. NSA has a crucial role supporting
    information security, cryptographic integrity and best
    practices across the federal government.
        How will you and your role constructively address these
    many failures and the broader problem of information security
    failures in the federal government?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I recognize the critical role
    that NSA plays in this space and certainly, if confirmed, I
    pledge to ensure that it continues to execute its mission to
    its fullest.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Cotton. Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Welcome, General, and congratulations on
    your nomination and I appreciate the ability to talk to you,
    although because of weather concerns, it was on the phone. But,
    um, you obviously have a lengthy record of distinguished
    service to our nation and I look forward to supporting your
    nomination. In your current capacity as deputy commander of
    INDOPACOM, do you occasionally have to talk to a lawyer or
    maybe more than one lawyer?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, there is a very talented legal
    team at USINDOPACOM.
        Senator Cornyn. Yeah, it seems like a blessing or a curse,
    just speaking as a recovering lawyer myself, but it seems like
    you can't--you can't make a move without consulting legal
    authorities. And so, do you happen to know how many lawyers are
    at NSA CYBERCOM?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I don't know that.
        Senator Cornyn. Yeah, it's a whole bunch, and they're very
    talented.
        Lt. General Rudd. I would guess there is and I would--I
    would expect that they would be.
        Senator Cornyn. Will you be consulting with them on issues
    like, uh, let's say, 702, Section 702 FISA?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would expect to consult with
    the legal experts at both CYBERCOM and NSA on a whole host of
    issues to ensure, again, the execution of that mission set is
    done within the authorities consistently and that we're never
    outside the bounds of that.
        Senator Cornyn. I have--I have no doubt about that. The
    Judiciary Committee also has jurisdiction over the 702 issue.
    But, um, I, like others, believe that it's absolutely--
    absolutely essential authority, but there's a phenomenon in
    Washington, DC, where, uh, certain narratives take root, which
    have no basis in fact.
        And, I just want to clarify a few things. First of all, one
    of the reasons why 702 had come under suspicion is because of
    its abuse in the case of Carter Page, but that was a Title I,
    7--of 702, which is targeting an American citizen. In this
    case, an alleged agent of a foreign power. That law is not
    subject to any reauthorization.
        It doesn't expire. But just in terms of 702, Title VII,
    which is what, uh--so, what we're talking about. I know there's
    a line of questioning by one of our--one of the panel talking
    about targeting U.S. persons. You can't target a U.S. person
    without a warrant, and that's under Title I not on--on under
    Section 702. But you understand that, um, 702, Title VII, um,
    is--uh, addresses only foreigners abroad.
        Is that--is that your understanding? It's a foreign
    intelligence surveillance.
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's my understanding that 702
    is focused on foreign intelligence against non-U.S. persons
    outside the United States.
        Senator Cornyn. And it's an invaluable resource, correct?
        Lt. General Rudd. In my experience it is, Senator.
        Senator Cornyn. And I'm sure you, like all of us, are very
    attuned to the balance between national security demands and
    privacy of American citizens. But in this case, this is focused
    solely on people overseas. So, there is no targeting of
    American citizens, of course, unless you have a--unless you
    have a warrant and you got to show up in front of the Foreign
    Intelligence Surveillance Court and prove that you are entitled
    to that warrant.
        But we're not talking about that here. But here again in
    DC, it seems like the--whoever has the--that you have this
    phenomenon of competing narratives, and I read a long time ago
    that whoever has the best narrative wins in the debates here in
    Washington, DC, whether or not they're based on facts.
        Another issue that's come up, and let me just ask, and I
    mean this with all due respect, you have an incredible record,
    but you are not a lawyer by training, are you sir?
        Lt. General Rudd. No, Senator, I'm not.
        Senator Cornyn. You're unburdened by that--by that
    credential. So, that's why you're going to be talking to your
    lawyers before you make any decision. But there's also this
    false narrative that lawfully collected intelligence that
    somehow you ought to be able to you ought to have to go out and
    get a search warrant in order to search what you've already
    lawfully collected.
        And of course, intelligence is prospective. Law enforcement
    is retrospective based on trying to solve a crime. But do you
    have a--are you prepared today, or would you like to give it
    some thought and maybe we can engage further on whether or not
    a warrant should be required to query lawfully collected
    intelligence?
        Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's certainly something I'd
    like to take a deeper look at.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Cotton. Thank you, General Rudd, for your
    testimony here today. For the benefit of members, and General
    Rudd, it's my intention to hold a committee vote on your
    nomination as soon as possible. Therefore, for planning
    purposes, any senator who wishes to submit questions for the
    record after today's hearing, please do so by noon tomorrow.
        General Rudd, I trust that you'll be equally prompt with
    your answers so we can move your nomination forward as quickly
    as possible. Thank you all, the hearing is adjourned.
        (Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 11:35 a.m.)

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