[Senate Hearing 119-75, Part 8]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 8
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2296
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 8
CYBERSECURITY
__________
APRIL 9, 2025
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 8
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2296
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 8
CYBERSECURITY
__________
APRIL 9, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-986 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
________
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota, Chairman
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JONI ERNST, Iowa KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TED BUDD, North Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
________
April 9, 2025
Page
United States Cyber Command...................................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Mike Rounds................................. 1
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 2
Statement of Senator Jacky Rosen................................. 3
Witness Statements
Hartman, Lieutenant General William J., USA Acting Commander, 4
United States Cyber Command/Acting Director, National Security
Agency/Acting Chief, Central Security Service.
Questions for the Record......................................... 34
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2025
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:40 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Mike Rounds
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Rounds, Rosen, King,
and Reed.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS
Senator Rounds. Good afternoon. I'd like to express my
gratitude to Lieutenant General Hartman for his attendance at
today's hearing.
Before I proceed any further, I want to acknowledge the
incredible momentum set by General Haugh and the strategic
transformation needed to meet the evolving threats of today and
the emerging challenges of tomorrow in cyberspace. General
Haugh was a strong leader with a deep knowledge of the art and
science of cyber warfare, hard earned over three decades of
service to our country.
Men and women capable of leading the National Security
Agency and the United States Cyber Command are in short supply.
Such leaders require years of experience to develop with
deliberate and dedicated career focus. To put it more directly,
we do not have enough of these types of leaders, and a loss of
any one of them without strong justification is disappointing.
The departure of General Haugh is a loss for our Nation, but
will be a tremendous gain for any private or public entity
where he decides to lend his expertise and leadership. I wish
him Godspeed.
That said, as our adversaries watch this hearing, it will
be clear, that no matter the scenario, our cyber mission forces
are ready. Lieutenant General Hartman's presence is more than
just an annual congressional activity. His presence is more
than just a general annual congressional activity. It shows the
strength and resiliency of the cyber mission force. It is a
testament to how much this command has matured since its
inception in 2009, and the steadfast nature of our military,
civilian and uniformed, to step up and fight when the Nation
needs them.
It also reflects the absolute importance of the dual hat
arrangement, in the face of unexpected change there remains
tight integration of cyber and intelligence operations, thanks
to alignment under a single leader. Such an arrangement remains
paramount in future decisions of General Haugh's formal
successor.
I have had the pleasure of working with Lieutenant General
Hartman in his prior role as Deputy Commander of the United
States Cyber Command, and I am confident in his ability to lead
these organizations through this transition, maintaining the
combat capability of a force that operates in an environment of
constant change. He is one of the few, with a strong
understanding of this domain, built over decades of experience.
The importance of the cyber domain cannot be overstated.
Our adversaries understand the dynamic and permeable nature of
cyberspace and have clearly demonstrated their intent to
exploit it to their advantage. General Hartman, as we discussed
in detail during our closed session, the threats our Nation
faces in the cyber domain have only intensified since we last
convened for an update from United States Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM) a year ago.
The detection of additional Chinese advanced persistent
threat groups throughout the past year has reinforced both the
determination of our adversaries to own this domain, and their
technical capability to do so. With the release of the Chinese
generative artificial intelligence, large language model or
DeepSeek-R1, earlier this year, competitive advantage will now
be measured in weeks and months, not years. Our cyber mission
force must be ready with training, technology, and operational
structure to deter and defend against this new reality.
I have been encouraged by the work the command has
conducted on CYBERCOM 2.0 in collaboration with the services
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for cyber policy. I want
to hear what policy changes are needed to realize the vision
behind this effort. While I understand the implementation plan
has not been delivered to Congress, our adversaries are not
waiting for our process to conclude.
I look forward to hearing more from you about the efforts
underway to implement CYBERCOM 2.0 and how you intend to make
sure the force is maturing, to conduct persistent engagement in
this competitive environment.
I will now recognize Ranking Member Reed, from the full
Committee, at Senator Rosen's request, for opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you Senator Rosen. I just want to take a moment to recognize
General Haugh for his 35 years of dedicated service to this
country and to the United States Air Force.
His sudden and inexplicable firing is disrespectful to his
service, but also disrespectful to every military member in or
out of uniform, and an indication that their service and
sacrifice is in no way respected by this Administration. The
callous nature of the decision, the result of a meeting with a
partisan conspiracy theorist, not on any kind of informed or
experienced judgment, puts our security at grave risk and
cannot be tolerated or continued.
We salute a dedicated American for his service and
sacrifice and his family for standing with him and wish him
well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. Ranking Member Rosen.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACKY ROSEN
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Rounds, and thank you
Ranking Member Reed. Of course, this is such an important
hearing, and I appreciate General Hartman, our meetings that we
had yesterday and your team, all of your service, your
commitment to the mission and on the success, because that
means that we're all kept safe.
You're also here on very short notice, as we've all been
talking about, and we appreciate that as well, and so, I look
forward to continuing our conversations and our continued
partnership to ensure that success.
Like my colleagues, I want to begin by addressing a matter
of significant concern, the sudden and inexplicable firing of
General Haugh, a trusted and dedicated Air Force officer for
over 34 years, a true patriot. His abrupt and unjustified
removal was conducted in the dead of night, with absolutely no
consultation with Congress, the full committee, or this
Subcommittee.
According to press reports, it was at the request of a
private individual outside of the government, outside the chain
of command, who has a long record of pedaling in vicious
conspiracy theories. This action compromises CYBERCOM and the
National Security Agency (NSA) ability to keep Americans safe.
United States faces major cyber threats from foreign
adversaries, China, Russia, Iran, near daily cyber-attacks and
our critical infrastructure. At the same time, we are engaged
in ongoing operations against multiple threats across the
globe, from Russian aggression against Ukraine to Iranian
backed proxies in the Middle East and North Africa.
Given the dangers facing the United States and our troops,
it is inexplicable and unconscionable that the President would,
at the mere request of an online provocateur, remove the leader
of CYBERCOM, completely without cause and in doing so, risk
undermining vital intelligence operations.
Moreover, General Haugh has been a trusted leader. His
experience and expertise have been crucial in guiding and
shaping the efforts of U.S. Cyber Command and our overall
national defense posture. At a time when our adversaries are
constantly evolving their cyber capabilities, whether it's from
State actors like Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, or non-
State actors with nefarious intent, leadership continuity and
clear vision are more critical than ever.
Cybersecurity and cyber operations are not and cannot be a
partisan issue. It is a national security imperative, and the
threat environment as we all know, continues to intensify every
single day. We must maintain experienced leadership to counter
the ever-evolving cyber challenges facing our country. As
Members of this Committee and the full committee, we must
demand clarity from the administration about the rationale for
this decision, and we must not rest until we have answers and
accountability from both President Trump and Secretary Hegseth.
This afternoon though, our focus will be on our Nation's
cyber capabilities and how Congress can help support the
critical work that CYBERCOM personnel do every single day. I
might say 24 hours a day, 24-7, 365.
I look forward to hearing from General Hartman and to
discussing how we can meet our Nation's challenge. Today, in
the future and over the course of this congress, again, I know
how much General Hartman you are invested in the mission of
CYBERCOM, how much you know about it, your experience, your
expertise and how invested you are in the ongoing success in
combating cyber threats going forward. I do look forward to
working with you on that. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Ranking Member Rosen, and with
that, Lieutenant General Hartman, welcome. Thank you for your
service. We thank your family as well for their sacrifice, and
there's a lot of things that you literally don't get an
opportunity to share with the American public because of the
type of responsibilities that you have. But today, you have an
opportunity to share with the American people and with this
committee a little bit about what you are doing. We welcome
your opening remarks at this time, sir.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM J. HARTMAN, USA ACTING
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND/ ACTING DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/ ACTING CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE
Lieutenant General Hartman. Good afternoon. Chairman Rounds
Ranking Member Rosen, thank you for your unwavering support and
for the honor of representing U.S. Cyber Command today.
I'm here to discuss the evolving strategic landscape and
our approach as we look forward to 2026. CYBERCOM's mission is
straightforward: We defend the Nation from cyber threats, we
protect the Department of Defense's Networks, and we support
the joint force. We are dedicated to ensuring the Department's
mission advantage, and providing options across the conflict
continuum to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
American people.
Achieving our assigned objectives in the mission set forth
by the President of ``Peace through strength'', requires a
force equipped with a strong warrior ethos and the lethality
necessary to meet our national objectives.
Deterrence is essential to our strategy. In cyberspace,
we're focused on maintaining a credible capability that
dissuades adversaries from targeting our critical
infrastructure. Cyberspace is a rapidly evolving domain
influenced by technological advancements, which necessitates a
close partnership with industry. As the environment changes,
CYBERCOM will adapt by swiftly developing and deploying new
capabilities. Our commitment is to lead from the front, staying
ahead of threats, through a proactive and agile approach.
Our people are our greatest asset, capturing our ethos, we
win with people. The dedicated professionals of CYBERCOM are at
the forefront, defending networks, encountering threats every
day. Their innovation and perseverance are essential to
maintaining our Nation's advantage in cyberspace.
But we're not alone in the fight. Our allies and partners
are crucial components of our collective defense. Key
collaborations like our partnership with the National Security
Agency, enhance our Nation's security by creating a unified
effort that surpasses the capabilities of our adversaries.
Moving forward in 2026, our focus is not only on
maintaining readiness, but also elevating the level of mastery
within our cyber forces. Our initiative, CYBERCOM 2.0 seeks to
overmatch our adversary's quantity with the quality of our
people, capabilities, and operations. Modernizing our force
design and rapidly integrating new technologies, are vital
components of our strategy here. Partnership with industry and
academia become indispensable, enabling us to stay at the
forefront of cybersecurity advancements.
Our adversaries are persistent and they are sophisticated.
State sponsored cyber actors from China, Iran, North Korea, and
Russia, pose significant threats to our critical infrastructure
and military systems. China is the most persistent threat while
Russia has gained significant capabilities through their
ongoing operations.
To counter these threats, CYBERCOM develops robust
deterrent strategies, ensuring that any attempt to undermine
our security will face an overwhelming response. An essential
part of our future strategy includes the accelerated
integration of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence
offers unparalleled speed and precision in cyberspace
operations, making it a key enabler for anticipating and
countering emerging threats.
By expanding Artificial Intelligence (AI) across our
operations, we will strengthen our deterrence posture and
maintain superiority in the cyber domain. True excellence in AI
requires a world class workforce. Through initiatives like
CYBERCOM 2.0, CYBERCOM will continue to collaborate with the
Department to develop, pilot, and implement new tools and
opportunities to invest in our workforce. A world class
workforce requires world class training, facilities, and
capabilities to excel and thrive. With the support and
assistance, we received from the Department and from Congress,
CYBERCOM is well positioned to achieve these world class
results.
Our work is far from finished, but with your continued
partnership, I'm confident we'll succeed in defending our
Nation. CYBERCOM is prepared to rise to the challenge,
outpacing our adversaries, securing our interests, and
protecting our future.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Hartman
follows:]
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Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Hartman. I'll begin. In
the wake of the various persistent cyber threats originating
from the People's Republic of China over the last 2 years, it
is my firm conclusion that the importance of the dual hat is as
important today as it has ever been.
Given these events, how has the dual hat arrangement
between USCYBERCOM and NSA evolved to address the emerging
threats from our adversaries?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator, thank you for your
question. The relationship between CYBERCOM and NSA continues
to evolve so that we really achieve two key objectives. The
first is that we see and understand what our adversary is
doing. The second piece of that is that, we enable CYBERCOM or
other elements of the U.S. Government in order to operate, in
order to defend our critical infrastructure, our key networks
and the Department of Defense Information Network.
The ability for us to execute those operations clearly,
understanding that we have to act, but that we also have to
protect things like intelligent sources and methods, is
fundamentally important to the dual hat. From my standpoint--
and Senator, I've been sitting on the campus of the National
Security Agency in CYBERCOM for most of the last 15 years, I've
continued to see this partnership evolve, and our ability to
execute increasingly more precise operations is fundamentally
because the dual hat allows me, in my current capacity, to move
with the speed and agility of unity of effort that is required,
but it also forces leaders across the organization to
collaborate, to do the hard work and to provide the best
options for the national security of the country.
That's what I believe is the importance of the dual hat,
and that is really where I believe we've evolved to.
Senator Rounds. Recognizing that this is an open setting
and we can't get into specifics. I think another item, not only
the dual hat, has been successful, but also the NSPM 13
[National Security Presidential Memorandum 13], which was
incorporated under President Trump in his first term, I
believe, has been very successful in the process.
The determining of when you can do your offensive cyber
operations in an efficient manner, and making sure that all
parties involved are appropriately apprised, but there is a
decision process in place. Can you talk a little bit about the
successes in terms of just the magnitude of the successes that
you have seen achieved since the creation of the National
Security Policy Memorandum 13 by President Trump in his first
term?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Thank you, Senator Rounds for
the question. NSPM 13 is a repeatable, sustainable, agile
process that is recognized across the Department of Defense and
across the interagency that allows us to move at the speed and
agility that's required, based on our intelligence, based on
operational requirements, and it has increased our ability to
execute cyber operations tenfold.
Senator Rounds. Excellent. Thank you. This is just to give
the American public some sense of what happens when you do the
dual hat, and you also have the ability to make the decisions
and to move quickly, how quickly we can actually accommodate
our need for offensive cyber operations. Thank you for that
information.
Lieutenant General Hartman, in the commands testimony last
year, General Haugh previewed the CYBERCOM 2.0 initiative, to
focus on delivering a bold step forward in the future of the
Cyber Mission Force. What is the status of this effort and what
are the major recommendations of this plan?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Chairman Rounds, thanks for the
question. As you're well aware, one of the impetuses for
CYBERCOM 2.0 was Section 1533 of last year's National Defense
Authorization Act. Based on that, we put together a planning
team and really studied hundreds of different references over
the last year, and studied different force presentation models.
We briefed the recommendations of CYBER COM 2.0 to the last
administration and the Secretary of Defense approved it. We
briefed this to the new Secretary of Defense who asked us to
work the implementation strategy that we were previously
working on a 6-month timeline down to 45 days.
So, we brought an operational planning team together, or
really what we called a cross-functional team. Over the last 45
days, we've submitted a series of recommendations that we have
concurrence, generally from across the services and across the
Department, which honestly is pretty extraordinary in a 45-day
time period, for us to get that level of consensus.
Those recommendations are really built around how do we
improve talent management in the force? How do we improve
advanced training in the force? and how do we improve our
ability to innovate and bring new capabilities to the force at
the scale and speed that we need to compete with our
adversaries there.
That seems relatively simple. It's about 80 pages; we've
delivered it to the Department. The Department is going through
a very reasonable process and we're pending the results of that
feedback from the Department chairman.
Senator Rounds. Thank you General. Ranking Member Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you. I want to talk a little bit
maybe about policy challenges. So, as we continue to evolve and
develop our cyber capabilities to address the emerging threats,
it's clear that there's a number of challenges, both within the
Department of Defense and across agencies that can impede
everybody's progress.
I'd like to ask you about these obstacles and how they
impact CYBERCOM's efforts to stay ahead of the growing cyber
threat landscape. So, we know that you have many challenges,
but based on CYBERCOM's plan for development, could you speak
to some of the key policy obstacles that remain challenges for
your operations, both within the Department of Defense and in
the broader interagency context?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator Rosen, thanks for the
question. First, I just want to highlight that I think we have
made significant progress. You know, one of the things we have
discussed previously is the ability for us to support critical
infrastructure that is off Department of Defense Information
Network (DODIN), but critical to the Department's mission.
We do appreciate the support from Congress in giving us the
Federal labs authority that has allowed us to execute
cooperative research agreements. I know that we've talked about
Guam being a key component of this, and, you know, I, I'm happy
to report that we have executed six different craters over the
last 6 months with a number of very important critical
infrastructure organizations in Guam. Our assessment is we have
reduced the threat that those organizations face by about 25
percent.
That has been really key for us. We continue to work to
better integrate the Reserve component into our operations to
help secure critical infrastructure. It is an area where we
think we need both an improvement from a policy standpoint, but
we also need improvement from an appropriation standpoint, so
we're able to better leverage the Reserve component force in
order to support some of these critical mission sets.
Senator Rosen. So, could you elaborate a little further
maybe, with the primary sticking points what would hinder that
coordination effectiveness, expansion of our cyber
capabilities? Are you taking some steps there or how can we
help as we begin to think about what those policy and
appropriations needs might be?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator Rosen, thanks for the
question. I think on the defense of critical infrastructure,
there continues to be a key role that a number of different
organizations will take. I don't believe the Department will
necessarily be the lead, but you know, there are
recommendations that we will bring to the committee to how we
might better work with organizations like the Department of
Homeland Security, certainly organizations like the National
Guard Bureau and we do believe that there are some policy
recommendations that will work through the process that will be
beneficial.
I didn't talk about the United States Coast Guard. The
United States Coast Guard has been a key partnership over the
last 12 months. We have signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Coast Guard. So, as a Coast Guard executes operations
under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) authorities, we
do have the ability to support their operations, in a case
where they have an authority, but they don't have the capacity.
Certainly, as we look at the security of port facilities,
critical infrastructure that supports port facilities, that is
what we think is a very important MOU [Memorandum of
Understanding].
At the same time, if we have a CYBERCOM mission, we're
operating on a facility that is specifically suited to the
expertise the Coast Guard brings, they also have the ability to
reinforce our operations. I do think we've made progress. I
think there are additional policy recommendations. Senator, I
look forward to working with the committee in order to provide
those recommendations.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to talk a little bit about
cyber workforce, because you can't do any of this without
maintaining a robust cyber workforce. Our defense posture
depends on it, we have to be sure that they're capable, that
they're equipped, that they're trained, like you're talking
about, these are our challenges to constantly be training,
working on the mission, because the threats are ever evolving.
The cyber domain is incredibly dynamic and achieving mastery
it's just crucial, and it isn't done overnight.
So what steps are you taking in CYBERCOM to make sure that
we're keeping our personnel ahead of the curve? Talk to me
about the workforce cuts and the hiring freeze and how that's
impacting your ability to meet the mission.
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator Rosen, thanks. First of
all, I would like to highlight that over the last year, we've
had a number of things that have significantly impacted how
we're managing particularly our civilian workforce.
The first is the Cyber Excepted Service (CES). The ability
to hire under CES has reduced the lag time by 45 percent, from
over a year to less than 6 months now, in order to bring
civilian personnel on board, that has been impactful. We went
through a transition from what we call a Combatant Command
Support Agency, from the Department of the Air Force to the
Department of the Army. I'm in the army, but I'm not saying one
is better than the other. But the transition, you know, did
provide a little bit of friction as we work from one service to
the other.
We transitioned to the army last June and that has improved
sort of a repeatable process to bring the civilians on board.
Then there have been things like the 4092 authorizations from
Congress, that have been important and allowed us to hire
really, really high-end talent. So, I think we are on a glide
path.
The current hiring freeze has impacted our ability to bring
new hires into the force. We'll continue to work with the
Department on the way ahead for that. We have, however, not
been impacted by any cuts. We have been able to go back to the
Department and get an exemption.
It is important because, as I think you're aware, Senator,
we're only a little over 50 percent man with our civilian force
but It's because those authorizations have all come really in
the last year and a half. So, we do think it's important to get
the civilian hiring freeze moved, and we do think it's
important to be able to rapidly bring talent into the force.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. General, I have just one other question. In
early 2024, Congress received a briefing on the commands AI
roadmap as required by the fiscal year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act. Given the release of the Chinese generative
AI model, DeepSeek-R1, what steps has the command taken to
accelerate delivery of the capabilities and milestones in this
roadmap? What is needed to make certain that we will be
successful in this acceleration?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Chairman Rounds, thanks so much
for the question, and so over a year ago, we produced again,
based on a congressional requirement, so thanks, our AI roadmap
that laid out a plan for the next 5 years. Very close
partnership with NSA, and their artificial intelligence
experts. A little over a year ago, we decided that we had a
really good plan from a staff standpoint, but where CYBERCOM
could add value, was in operationalizing these capabilities.
So, we took the majority of the staff portion of that AI
task force, and we moved it to the Cyber National Mission
Force. We went out and hired some additional AI talent, really
focused on 90-day pilot projects that we could evaluate, and if
successful, we could scale across the force. If they weren't
successful or didn't meet a need that we would then focus our
efforts elsewhere.
Over the last 12 months, we have executed artificial
intelligence pilots to secure the DODIN, right? This is at the
edge of the DODIN network, this is across network devices and
it's at our end points. It has been very successful, and it is
where we're moving to in the future.
We have integrated large language models into our ``hunt
forward'' kits. We have integrated large language models into
our offensive capabilities. We have partnered very closely with
DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], under
Project Constellation and continue to transition capabilities,
mostly based on artificial intelligence to the force.
Additionally, Senator, we have and will continue to work
with the Department on long-term resourcing that ensures we
maintain advantage over China and any other adversary. I will
say, we were all--paid close attention to, and we're alarmed by
the DeepSeek model, right, But the United States of America
builds the best software in the world, all right. We believe
working with private industry, working across the government,
that unique advantage in building the best software in the
world, will allow us to stay ahead of the Chinese.
Senator Rounds. Thank you General. Ranking Member Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to build a little bit on
Senator Round's AI question, because we look to the future of
cybersecurity. How else do we need, besides artificial
intelligence, how do we need to adapt our training and
development pipeline to ensure that our human workforce
achieves mastery in the cyber domain?
Additionally, with the increasing demands on our personnel
and the nature of the cyber operations, how else can we perhaps
leverage industry or commercial training opportunities to
supplement the more specific on-net training that takes place
in a classified environment?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator, thanks for the
question. You know, we've talked about CYBERCOM 2.0 and one of
the big ideas in CYBERCOM 2.0 is advanced training. right?
Right now, CYBERCOM is very fortunate and the services have
done a very good job in order to present a C2 [Command and
Control] force. The first time in the history of the command
over the last year, we've reached C2, which means manned 80
percent in the aggregate and trained it to 70 percent.
But as we look at things like artificial intelligence, and
cloud computing, and data scientists, and other advanced
capabilities, we do think that the model we've laid out in
CYBERCOM 2.0 is really where we need to go. It's my role with
service-like authorities and as a joint force trainer, to take
servicemembers and civilians that are presented to us by the
services, and take them from that basic level and make them
masters, and that is masters in data science, that's masters in
cloud computing, that's masters in artificial intelligence.
Then immediately take those lessons and feed them back, not
only into the training base from the services, but also into
our operational organization. That is really the best way that
we think we can get after the training part of this. We are
also working very closely with private industry, the creator
authority that the committee has given us, also allows us to
execute creators within private industry. We continue to work
very closely with UARCs [University Affiliated Research
Centers] and FFRDCs [Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers], who provide us access to really high-end, really
responsive talent, particularly as it relates to artificial
intelligence and machine learning.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, and I do believe we have another
Member that is just arriving, and I would simply ask Senator
King, are you ready with questions?
Senator King. I'm always ready.
Senator Rosen. I was going to say I knew how he would
answer that. He's always ready.
Senator Rounds. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you very much General for being here
today. I take it my colleagues have talked, I'm sorry. I was at
a hearing upstairs in the Intelligence Committee and it was an
open hearing, so I can even tell you about it. But in any case,
I understand that my colleagues have talked a lot about the
firing of General Haugh and how unfortunate that was, so I
don't need to plow that ground.
One of the issues that I'm principally concerned with in
cyber, is that we have no deterrent. Our strategy in all of our
other military and national security approaches is based upon
deterrence, except in cyber, where we continually are attacked,
as we were salt typhoon for example, going all the way back to
Sony, nothing ever happens to the adversary. My belief is, that
until we start to impose costs and they understand that there
will be costs, these attacks are going to continue, they're
cheap, and there's really no consequences.
If you're sitting in the Kremlin and somebody said, let's
interfere with the next election in the United States, your
answer would be, why not? It's not going to really cost us
anything, and they don't respond, we're not in at any risk. Do
you agree with me that we need to have a more stronger
retaliatory capacity, No. 1, and demonstrate the will to use
it? Otherwise, these attacks are simply going to continue.
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator, thanks for your
question. It's good to see you again.
Senator King. Yes, sir.
Lieutenant General Hartman. So, Senator, we certainly agree
that we need to continue to improve our capability in order to
deter and respond to attacks. I will tell you that from our
standpoint, there is certain activity that adversaries to
include China, will always continue to conduct. We got to focus
on the most credible capabilities to deter operations that
significantly impact the national security.
Just like you, I am aware of salt typhoon and volt typhoon,
and while we're certainly concerned about that, and we will
certainly develop a broad range of options to deal with that, I
will tell you that the fact that we are able to see and observe
that activity, and we are able to work with industry partners
in order to build defenses against that activity, is something
that provides us some advantage vis-a-vis adversaries like the
Chinese.
I assure you, we are dedicated to developing options in
order to counter that. I would be more than happy to work with
your staff in a different setting to provide you some details.
Senator King. Well, I understand that you have capacity and
you have capabilities. We demonstrated that in 2018 with the
hunt forward, defend forward, that General Nakasone initiated.
So, I understand we have the capacity. My problem is we don't
have a doctrine. We don't have--a deterrence doesn't work
unless the other side knows about it. Dr. Strangelove, why
didn't you tell us about the doomsday machine? Well, the
Premier like surprises.
A deterrent isn't a deterrent: It takes two things, three
things, capacity-which we have, will-which we apparently don't
have and knowledge of the adversary that--we have those two
things, and that they're being held at risk.
So, I'm not questioning the capabilities. What I'm
questioning is, here we are with salt typhoon, you know, two or
three, 6 months ago nothing's happened, no response, no. You
know, like I said, we haven't even responded to the Sony
attack, and that was 10 or 15 years ago. There's never a price
to be paid by our adversaries. Until we develop that theory, it
seems to the concept of deterrence, and let them know that
they're at risk, they're going to keep doing what they're
doing.
I understand defending and working with our private sector
partners, that's all good. But you can't patch your way out of
this. There's got to be, I believe, a credible deterrent that
the adversaries understand, that if they attack us in
cyberspace, they will pay a price. It doesn't necessarily have
to be in cyberspace. It may be some other kind of harm that
puts them at risk.
But the point is, until we start to develop that doctrine
and let our adversaries know, it's just going to keep
happening.
Lieutenant General Hartman. So, Senator, I acknowledge your
concern. Again, I look forward to working with the committee,
with the Department and I do think we could provide you some
more information in a closed session.
Senator King. Well, I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator King. I do have one last
question for you, General and then I will allow Ranking Member
Rosen a final question as well.
Last year, the Defense Science Board briefed Congress on
the status of the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture or JCWA.
How is this command addressing the Defense Science Board's
concerns about excessive bureaucracy, and length the
acquisition timelines, that prevent cutting edge cyber
technologies from being integrated into the Joint Cyber
Warfighting Architecture, before they become obsolete?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Chairman Rounds, thanks for
your question. In the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,
CYBERCOM was given a number of things, we put it under the
banner of service like authorities. One of those was
acquisition authorities. The other piece was enhanced budget
control.
Under those authorities, we have consolidated our efforts
as it relates to JCWA, and we are fielding relevant, agile, and
not obsolete capabilities, that are positioning us to execute
our UCP [Unified Command Plan] mission to defend the Nation, as
well as to support key geographic commanders like Admiral
Paparo and United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
We have a plan to take the six programs that are part of
JCWA, that have currently been developed by the services, and
to bring those underneath our program executive office, really
focused on offensive, defensive and enterprise level
operations, and it's working senator and I look forward to
providing you and the committee additional updates on that.
Senator Rounds. Excellent. Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I actually have a compound last
question. So, I want a clarification on some terms that we use
on about the PRC [People's Republic of China]. So, could you
explain for the layman what ``living off the land'' tactics are
and why it's important from a cyber defense perspective? The
compound part of the question is, and finally, what do you
really want us to know that we haven't asked you today. We know
you've had just a short time to prepare for this, but maybe
we'll give you that final word there too.
Lieutenant General Hartman. Hey, thanks, Senator Rosen. So,
living off the land, you know, really describes when an
adversary gains access to your network and then uses legitimate
user credentials and legitimate user behavior in order to live
in your network, in a way that makes it really hard to detect
them using a standard antivirus or alert-based program.
Senator Rosen. So secretly living in the basement, I
suppose then, right?
[Laughter.]
Lieutenant General Hartman. It makes it really difficult
because it's the behavior that you've got to detect. But look,
we do know how to do that. We have gained a significant amount
of knowledge. Artificial intelligence is going to help us,
working with private industry is going to help us. And we're
dedicated to continue to get after that problem.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. And then I think Senator King
had one more question?
Lieutenant General Hartman. I didn't answer the second part
of her question.
Senator Rounds. Oh, I apologize. Go ahead.
Lieutenant General Hartman. So, I think the thing that I
would most like the Committee to take away is, Congress and the
Department have given us authorities, right? They've given us
Service-like authorities. They've given us control of the
resources that apply to the ? one, so the Cyber Mission Force
and the headquarters that employ them. We've been given
acquisition authorities, we've been given joint force trainer
authorities, and all those things are enabling us to evolve the
command in a way that better enables us to compete with China
or any other adversary. It is working. Okay.
There are things that slow down the process: continuing
resolutions slow down the process, hiring freezes slow down the
process, transitions between one combatant command support
agency and the other, slow down the process. But we have a
plan, we're executing it, and it's all about the ecosystem that
we have to build that provides precise intelligence to really
smart capability developers, that then field it to a force that
has been trained and operationally aligned to receive that
capability.
We're doing it with DARPA, we're doing it with the S&T
community. We're doing it with the communities across our
services that have significant investments in cyber
capabilities. We're doing it based on operational requirements
of geographic combatant commanders like INDOPACOM, and based on
CYBERCOM requirements to defend the Nation.
So that's really the message I have here, those
authorities, those resources, they're relatively new, but they
are allowing us to really increase our ability to really get
after all the things that we've talked about here.
Senator Rosen. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. Senator King.
Senator King. I realize this isn't exactly in your lane,
but it's certainly close. You talked in your prior answer about
the work with the private sector and alerting them to the
threats and to what was going on, and that's very important.
But the principal agency that actually has performed that
function as an interface between the Federal Government and the
private sector, is CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency].
My concern is that we've seen reports of cuts at CISA up to
90 percent. I believe 40 percent may be the latest number. and
I think they've eliminated the office that interfaced with
State election officials, that enabled them to share threat
data and information and protections with State election
officials to keep our election safe and secure.
I am just puzzled, at a time of heightened cyber threat,
that we are essentially unilaterally disarming one of the most
important tools that we have to protect ourselves in
cyberspace. Do you have any views on the dismantling of CISA?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Senator King, thanks for the
question. To be honest, I do not understand what the actual
decisions are for any reduction or reorganization as it relates
to CISA. I will tell you that we continue to talk to CISA
leadership, and we continue to share information with CISA
leadership as it relates to threats that are relevant to their
mission for defenses in the United States.
Senator King. Well, Mr. Chairman, I realize that again,
this isn't his land, but this Subcommittee's dealing with the
issue of cyber, and CISA is one of our most important tools to
deal with that and they've been very effective. Having worked
with some Members of the private sector that have worked with
CISA, it took years to build a trusting relationship between
this government agency and these companies, as well as the
State election officials.
I remember when that initiative first started, and those
State election officials were very reluctant to interface with
this Federal Agency. But they became very--I wouldn't say
dependent, but they became very engaged with CISA in the last
several elections and to basically dismantle that capability, I
think is very dangerous for national security at a time of
heightened cyber-attack. We're under attack right now, and to
be unilaterally disarming and disabling what amounts to a
carrier fleet, I think is very damaging to the security of the
country. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. I think Your concern is noted, Senator.
With that, I want to thank General Hartman for coming in on
short notice and participating in this Subcommittee hearing.
This does conclude the open portion of today's cybersecurity
subcommittee hearing.
I'd like to once again, thank our witness, Lieutenant
General Hartman, for his testimony. For the information of
Members, questions for the record will be due to the Committee
within two business days of the conclusion of the hearing, and
with that, Senator, any final remarks?
Senator Rosen. No. Thank you for coming.
Senator Rounds. And with that, then this Subcommittee
hearing is adjourned.
Lieutenant General Hartman. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking
Member.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
offensive cyber strategy
1. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, what actions can
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) take as part of an offensive strategy to
deter cyberattacks by China on our critical infrastructure?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
2. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, what offensive
actions can CYBERCOM take in response to new attacks on our critical
infrastructure?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
3. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, do you have the
necessary authorities to conduct these operations?
Lieutenant General Hartman. USCYBERCOM has a variety of authorities
that enable the Command to conduct Cyber Operations that may deter
Chinese attacks on Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).
These authorities include those contained in statutes and as authorized
by the President. Existing authorities may be leveraged to conduct
cyber operations for the specific purpose of deterring Chinese attacks
on CIKR.
4. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, is the Department of
Defense (DOD) able to effectively leverage the most innovative
technologies for offensive cyber operations, and, if not, what needs to
be done?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
critical infrastructure
5. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, what are key trends
in cyberattacks on our critical infrastructure in the past year?
Lieutenant General Hartman. In 2024, we observed an increase in
criminal cyber activity in response to the conflicts in the Ukraine and
Gaza. Ransomware attacks, some possibly linked to State actors, persist
as a major threat to United States critical infrastructure. Incidents
related to ransomware increased by approximately 9 percent from
2023.\1\ According to FBI reporting, U.S. critical infrastructure
companies (i.e. energy, manufacturing, healthcare and finance)
experienced more cyber threats than any other sector in the past
year.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ FBI;2024--IC3Report; 23 APR 2025;(U) Federal Bureau of
Investigation Internet Crime Report 2024; https://www.ic3.gov/
Annua1Report/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf; Classification of extracted
information is U; Overall classification is U.
\2\ FBI; 2024--IC3Report; 23 APR 2025; (U) Federal Bureau of
Investigation Internet Crime Report 2024; https://www.ic3.gov/
Annua1Report!Reports/2024_1C3Report.pdf; Classification of extracted
information is U; Overall classification is U.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State actors continued to target common vulnerabilities in outdated
hardware and software, with over 25 percent of vulnerabilities
exploited within 24 hours of disclosure.\3\ Despite the relative
increase in ransomware threats against U.S. critical infrastructure,
the average ransom payment decreased by almost 33 percent worldwide,
suggesting efforts from the U.S. and global law-enforcement operations
very likely contributed to the decrease in profitability for ransomware
operations, according to cybersecurity and open source reporting.\4\\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ New Article;15 April 25; 159 CVE's Exploited in Q1 of 2025;
https://thehackemews.com/2025/04/159-cves-exploited-in-q1- 2025-
283.html; Classification of extracted information is U; Overall
classification is U.
\4\ Article,Mandiant; 25-10005992; 10 FEB 2025; (U) Ransomware
Payments Declined in 2024 Despite Massive Well-Known Hack;
Classification of extracted information is U; Overall classification is
U.
\5\ Article,Recorded Future; 5 FEB 2025; https://
www.therecord.media/ransomware-payments-drop-2024-chainalysis-report;
(U) Ransomware Payments Drop for First Time in Years Following Law
Enforcement Disruptions; Classification of extracted information is U;
Overall classification is U.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to classification, please refer to the classified annex/or the
remainder of this response.
6. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, do you think DOD
needs more cyber-related information sharing with Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and other agencies?
Lieutenant General Hartman. DOD would benefit from more cyber-
related information sharing across the government and with private
industry, and vice-versa. Malicious cyber actors rarely target a single
sector of the United States. The techniques tactics and procedures
(TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) used against government and
commercial entities are almost certainly relevant to all parties.
Cyber-related information sharing between CISA and DOD exists, but
authorities and information sharing agreements between military and
government entities are bespoke and vary between agencies.
Standardizing cyber-related information sharing across all Government
and military entities would provide a more complete picture of
adversary campaigns across the cyber spectrum. The result would be
shared situational awareness for critical infrastructure, which would
enable greater burden sharing and efficient response across the whole
of government for cyber defense.
Due to classification, please refer to the classified annex/or the
remainder of this response.
7. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, how would CYBERCOM's
plans to partner with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) help us
defend and deter cyberattacks from China?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
u.s. cyber command capabilities
8. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, I'm concerned that
CYBERCOM should be able to offer more significant combat power to the
joint force. What are the biggest limitations to capability
development?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
9. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, what have been some
of your greatest challenges when partnering with the private sector or
academia to leverage the most innovative cyber capabilities and how can
Congress help alleviate these challenges?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Navigating the complexities of the
Defense Acquisition process is a challenge. For example, in our ongoing
collaboration with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), we are working to
unify the DODIN Hunt Kit and the CNMF Hunt Forward Kit under a common
platform-the Joint Cyber Hunt Kit (JCHK). This effort involves
leveraging multiple Research (IO US. C Sec. 2371) and Prototype (IO
US. C. Sec. 2371b) Other Transaction (OT) awards to engage with
industry partners in a nimble and collaborative manner. While the OT
authority provides some flexibility, challenges remain in aligning
government and industry timelines and ensuring sustained funding to
support rapid innovation.
Another significant challenge is integrating cutting-edge
technologies from non-traditional and non-Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
companies into military operations. For instance, our strategic
partnership with In-Q-Tel (IQT), a private, independent, and non-profit
organization funded by the US. Intelligence Community, allows us to
bridge the gap between venture capital companies, commercial startups,
and government partners. Through this partnership, we can efficiently
deliver critical technologies to the Cyber Mission Force (CMF).
However, the rapid innovation cycles of private sector startups are
often at odds with the deliberate pace of government acquisition
processes. Additionally, small, non-traditional companies frequently
struggle with navigating the complexities of the defense sector,
including strict regulatory and security requirements that can slow the
adoption of innovative technologies.
USCYBERCOM also leverages Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs) to conduct joint research and development with
Federal Labs and non-Federal entities. CRADAs enable us to combine
resources and collaborate with partners on cyber capability research.
The Software Acquisition Pathway empowers USCYBERCOM to rapidly
acquire, develop, and deploy innovative software solutions, leveraging
key partnerships with academia and the private sector. This agile
approach accelerates the delivery of critical capabilities, enabling
USCYBERCOM to stay ahead of evolving cyber threats and improve
operational effectiveness. By fostering innovation and ensuring a more
resilient and responsive cyber posture, these collaborations bring
cutting-edge research and commercial expertise to bear on our Nation's
toughest cyber challenges. This streamlined process allows them to
experiment with emerging solutions, adapt to evolving threats, and
maintain a technological edge. Your continued support for the Software
Acquisition Pathway ensures USCYBERCOM, in partnerships with leading
experts, has the tools needed to defend the Nation in the cyber
battlespace.
artificial intelligence
10. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, what are the most
promising artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled cyber capabilities you
are aware of and have you seen adversaries deploying these technologies
against our Nation's critical infrastructure?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex/or this response.
11. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, how do you assess
China's AI-enabled cyber capabilities?
Lieutenant General Hartman. USCYBERCOM assesses that AI is a pillar
of China's military modernization strategy, which pursues the concept
of ``intelligent-ized warfare.''
Due to classification, please refer to the classified annex for the
remainder of this response.
12. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, have you shifted
your strategy and investments following the release of DeepSeek?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
13. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, as the DOD starts
to increasingly use AI and partner with vendors that use AI, how is DOD
ensuring a secure AI environment both at the Department and among
partners in the Defense Industrial Base?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
14. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, are there tools to
automate or streamline compliance with cybersecurity requirement?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Current investment plans for AI
adaption are not focused on resourcing non-operational usage, though
tools to automate or streamline compliance are being evaluated. There
are commercially available automated penetration testing tools.
post-quantum security
15. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, as we look forward
to developments in the quantum computing field, what are we doing to
advance quantum-resistant methods to protect the Department of Defense
Information Network (DODIN)?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
16. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, do you have the
necessary expertise and resources to accomplish this?
Lieutenant General Hartman. USCYBERCOM will leverage the expertise
resident in the NSA. NSA is responsible for cryptology for the
Department of Defense, and as such they provide quantum-resistant
methods for the Department.
technical personnel
17. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, can greater
automation or the use of AI-enabled tools help close the cybersecurity
skills gap?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Greater automation and AI-enabled tools
are essential to closing the cybersecurity skills gap; this is a
capability we are deliberately building toward. At USCYBERCOM, we've
outlined a strategic vision to integrate AI to enhance operator
effectiveness, streamline cyber workflows, and expand the impact of our
existing workforce.
While technologies such as AI-enabled copilots, agentic assistants,
and low/no-code development platforms are not yet fielded, we plan to
begin deploying them across mission areas in FY26 and beyond. These
tools are intended to allow less experienced personnel to contribute
more rapidly while taking on high value tasks to ease our reliance on
hard to fill technical and institutional roles.
Due to classification, please refer to the classified annex for the
remainder of this response.
maven smart system
18. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Hartman, I understand that
CJADC2 [Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control] and AI
capabilities significantly enhance a commander's decision making and
operational advantages. Have you utilized the Maven Smart System to
achieve these benefits in your missions? If so, how?
Lieutenant General Hartman. Due to classification, please refer to
the classified annex for this response.
[all]