[Senate Hearing 119-75, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2296
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
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MARCH 26; MAY 13, 20, 2025
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-985 WASHINGTON : 2026
=====================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
�
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, INDIANA MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN
�
� John P. Keast, Staff Director
� Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
march 26, 2025
Page
United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command.. 1
Members Statements
Fischer, Statement of Senator Deb................................ 1
King, Statement of Senator Angus S., Jr.......................... 3
Wicker, Statement of Senator Roger............................... 4
Reed, Statement of Senator Jack.................................. 5
Witness Statements
Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF, Commander, United States 5
Strategic Command, Department of The Air Force.
Whiting, General Stephen N., USSF, Commander of United States 34
Space Command, Department of The Air Force.
Questions for the Record......................................... 69
may 13, 2025
Page
Department of Defense Missile Defense Activities................. 77
Members Statements
Fischer, Statement of Senator Deb................................ 77
King, Statement of Senator Angus S., Jr.......................... 78
Witness Statements
Yaffe, Andrea, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 79
Defense for Space Policy, Department of Defense.
Guillot, General Gregory M., USAF, Commander, United States 84
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Collins, Lieutenant General Heath A., USAF, Director, Missile 93
Defense Agency.
Rasch, Lieutenant General Robert A., USA, Executive Officer, Guam 101
Defense System Joint Program Office.
Questions for the Record......................................... 113
(iii)
may 20, 2025
Page
Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and 131
Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs.
Members Statements
Fischer, Statement of Senator Deb................................ 131
King, Statement of Senator Angus S., Jr.......................... 132
Witness Statements
McConnell, James J., Acting Principal Deputy Administrator....... 133
Jarrell, Roger A., II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 134
Environmental Management.
Houston, Admiral William J., USN, Director, Naval Nuclear 135
Propulsion Program.
Vann, Dr. Brandi C., Performing the Duties of the Assistant 145
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs.
Hoagland, David A., Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense 146
Programs.
Bussiere, General Thomas A., USAF Commander...................... 158
Wolfe, Johnny R., Jr., USN Director for Strategic Systems 169
Programs.
Questions for the Record......................................... 185
(iv)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2025
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Fischer, Cotton, Wicker, Rounds,
Tuberville, Banks, King, Reed, and Kelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning, everyone.
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive
testimony on the posture of the United States Strategic Command
and the United States Space Command. I want to begin by
thanking our witnesses, General Cotton from COM, and General
Whiting from SPACECOM.
General Cotton, this is likely one of the last times you
will be speaking before our Committee. You have always been
open and forthright with this Committee, and I want to thank
you for your service and dedication as you approach your final
year as Commander of STRATCOM.
Today we face a threat environment more dangerous than we
have seen since the Second World War. For the first time in
history, the United States faces two adversary nuclear powers,
in Russia and China. Russia has nearly completed modernizing
its nuclear triad, and continues to expand and improve their
tactical nuclear forces. China, meanwhile, which used to be
considered a lesser-included case, is expanding its own arsenal
at a breathtaking pace. China now has more ICBM launchers than
the United States, and is expected at least to triple its
stockpile by 2035. I would also note that China has outpaced
every previous estimate that we have made.
General Cotton, as you well know, this is an extremely
important time for STRATCOM. Each leg of our triad is
undergoing a generational modernization. This includes the
Columbia-class submarine to replace the Ohio-class; the B-21
bomber to replace the B-1 and B-2 bombers; and the Sentinel
ICBM, to replace the Minuteman III.
Given the ages of the legacy programs, it is essential that
these modernization efforts be prioritized and properly
resourced to ensure we have capabilities fielded in time to
meet the growing threat. While it is the responsibility of the
services to get these programs back on schedule, it is STRATCOM
who must mitigate risks associated with any delays. I look
forward to hearing more in the closed session about your plans
to do so.
Additionally, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile, or SLCM, remains a critical program to deter our
adversaries from believing they can use tactical nuclear
weapons. I look forward to hearing from you, General Cotton, on
your work with the Navy on SLCM.
I would be remiss if I did not also underscore the
importance of NC3, what Senator King and I refer to as the
fourth leg of the triad. NC3 underpins all aspects of nuclear
deterrence. General Cotton, I appreciate the focus that you
have given NC3 modernization during your time in command, and I
will be eager to receive an update on the implementation of the
NC3 roadmap.
General Whiting, the space domain is now, as you point out
in your opening statement, a highly contested strategic
environment. China and Russia possess growing counter-space
capabilities that hold United States space assets at risk.
Russia is developing the capability to place a nuclear weapon
on orbit, while China is investing in maneuverable satellites
that could target our satellites. These are just the threats
that we can discuss in this open setting.
While I look forward to a more robust discussion on how we
need to address these threats in a classified session, I am
eager to hear from you during this open session on your
priorities for fiscal year 2026, and how we can leverage
emerging technologies to field more dynamic space-based
systems. I am also eager to hear an update on how SPACECOM is
working with the other combatant commands, the services, and
the intelligence community to ensure that we are developing the
right capabilities, sharing information with warfighters in
real time, and that the services and interagency partners are
integrated appropriately.
I will make one final point before I turn it over to
Senator King for his opening statement. Both of your combatant
commands rely on access to critical electromagnetic spectrum to
carry out your missions. As we know, there are efforts underway
to force DOD to vacate portions of those spectrum bands. Such
an outcome would be detrimental to U.S. national security and
result in significant costs, as various DOD equities are forced
to invest the resources to redesign, procure, and field new
systems to operate in different spectrum bands, if that is even
feasible.
General Whiting and General Cotton, I look forward to
hearing from both of you on the importance of spectrum to your
missions. Before any decisions are made on whether to auction
off DOD spectrum, the American people deserve to understand the
risks there would be to national security.
Again, thank you both for appearing before us today. I look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator King, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.
Senator King. Thank you, Senator Fischer. I want to first
thank both of you for your service and for the incredible work
that you have done, both in managing the assets that are in
your purview but also in thinking about how to move forward.
This is a posture hearing. It is really a status report. It
is a combination of a status report, where are we now but where
do we need to be, and what do we need in the way of resources
in order to get there.
General Cotton, deterrence is the keystone of our entire
defense strategy. We often forget that. We get lost in counting
tanks or airplanes or Navy ships. But the whole idea of all of
these resources is that they never be used, that they be such a
terrifying prospect for a potential adversary that they will
never be used. And in fact, deterrence had worked in the
nuclear area for 75, 80 years. So that is really what we need
to talk about today.
Modernization the triad, which we are in the middle of
right now, is an expensive proposition. But to shortchange that
process, in my view, would be disastrously short-sighted. So I
hope to hear where we are on modernization with parts of the
triad, but also where we need to be, what necessary authorities
there are that we need to be talking about, and also necessary
funding. I refer to nuclear modernization as the pig in the
budgetary python. It is, unfortunately, just by history, we are
having to do all three legs at once, and that is a very
expensive proposition, but it is something that we have to do
in order to maintain the deterrence strategy that has protected
this country for so long.
In terms of the space assets, of course, it is no news to
anybody that space was an uncontested domain 20 years ago. Ten
years ago, it began to be contested, and today it is highly
contested. So, General, we have really got to be understanding
the status, where we are, particularly when we are talking
about a potential conflict with China, which would involve the
vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and naval power, and how that
will be subject to space assets and how we can protect
ourselves in a time of potential conflict. Of course, we all
hope that conflict can be avoided. That brings me back to
deterrence.
So I think the important message that I have is that
decisions we make here today, and over the next 6 months, will
have profound impacts in the future. And that is what is so
important about what we are talking about today. I can think of
no two more important people right now in thinking about how to
posture this country in order to maintain deterrence and the
security of the American people.
So I thank you for being here, I look forward to your
questions, and now I think it is time to turn it over to the
Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. We are joined
today by Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed, and I would
ask each of them to give an opening statement if they so desire
at this time. Chairman Wicker.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to
thank the Chair and Senator King for working together as a team
for years on this topic. I think it should be clear to people
listening that there is no space between them. They are
approaching this in a bipartisan manner. They understand how
important it is. And yes, Senator King is correct. We are
talking about preventing. We are talking about being strong
enough to prevent a nuclear war, and nothing could be more
important. And yes, it is going to be expensive, but there is
no question about it, we are going to have to spend the money
as wisely and efficiently as we can to get the job done.
I want to thank Senator [sic] Cotton for his service and
wish him well as he prepares to transition into private life,
and thank you, General Whiting, for being here.
I am going to put my statement in the record and just say
that today I hope to understand how you are managing the risks
of critical military capabilities that are both too old and too
few to truly meet the threats of today, much less those of
tomorrow.
Second, how to understand better the roles of your commands
evolving as the new Administration develops updated strategies
and guidance, and then hear your thoughts on areas where you
believe this Committee can help improve the effectiveness of
our strategic deterrent and space posture.
With that I will ask unanimous consent to include my
statement in the record, and yield back.
Senator Fischer. Without objection.
[The prepared opening statement of Senator Roger Wicker
follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement by Senator Roger Wicker
Thank you, Senator Fischer.
I would like to start by expressing my appreciation to Senator
Fischer and Senator King for their leadership of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee over these past several years. Their close collaboration
is a testament to what we can accomplish when we work together in a
bipartisan manner on the most severe threats to our Nation.
As the commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command,
you gentlemen represent both our first and last lines of defense. Our
nuclear forces have formed the foundation of our national security
since the end of the Second World War and have deterred major wars for
over seventy years. Our space-based capabilities are our eyes and ears
around the globe and form the communications backbone for U.S. military
operations, including missile defense, worldwide.
We are all very aware of the growing military cooperation between
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This collaboration presents a
complex and far-reaching set of threats that demands a generational
investment to rebuild and revitalize America's military strength.
Unfortunately, the rise of these new challengers could not come at
a worse time. The defense investments we made during the cold war have
long since expired. Defense spending is near record lows as a
percentage of our economy, and all aspects of our military forces are
now in dire need of repair or replacement. This neglect is no more
evident in the very military capabilities you General Cotton, and you
General Whiting, are expected to bring to bear every hour of every day.
In your testimony today, I would like to understand how you are
managing the risk of critical military capabilities that are both too
old and too few to truly meet the threats of today, much less those of
tomorrow. I would also like to better understand how you see the roles
of your commands evolving as the new administration develops updated
strategies and guidance for the joint force. Finally, I would like to
hear your thoughts on areas where you believe this committee can help
improve the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent and space posture.
Chairman Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member
Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Welcome,
gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. I want to commend
General Cotton for his 39 years of service to the country and
to the Air Force, and I wish you and your wife, Marsha, the
very best in your retirement. General Whiting, thank you for
joining us this morning also.
General Cotton, there are reports that indicate that the
Administration is considering removing the dual-hatted role the
Commander of U.S. European Command currently holds as the NATO
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR. The SACEUR position
was created, in part, to ensure that our nuclear weapons, and
hence our nuclear umbrella provided to our NATO allies under
Article 5, was always kept under the control of the United
States. Indeed, the release codes for our nuclear weapons which
are carried by NATO planes come from the President through
SACEUR to unlock the weapons. If the U.S. walks away from this
position, we are lessening the protection of our extended
nuclear deterrent to our allies, and I believe we are harming
U.S. national security and global security.
For over 6 decades, the United States nuclear umbrella has
provided an iron-clad guarantee to deter the Soviet Union and
now Russia, and it has been successful.
I am also concerned about the signal it may send to our
Asian allies, especially South Korea, who also relies on the
credibility of our nuclear umbrella.
These are difficult issues, and I hope in the course of the
questioning we can get more details from you about that.
Again, thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Reed, and now I would
like to have our opening statements from the panel. General
Cotton, would you go first, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Cotton. Good morning, Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking
Member King, Chairman Wicker, and Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished Members of this Committee. It is an honor for
Sergeant Major Kramer and I to be here, alongside General
Whiting and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons, and a privilege to
continue representing the servicemembers, civilians, and
families of United States Strategic Command.
I would like to thank this Committee and Congress for its
continued support in providing us with the resources required
to execute our assigned missions. Above all else, I extend my
gratitude to the American people for their enduring support of
the military.
In my third and final year of serving as STRATCOM Commander
it has been the most rewarding experience of my 39-year career.
I have submitted my 2025 posture statement for the record.
I will begin by assuring you that the Nation's nuclear
forces, which are foundational to our national security, are
safe, secure, effective, and credible. As I speak, STRATCOM and
its components are deterring our adversaries and stand ready to
respond decisively, whether underground, in the air, or beneath
the seas, should deterrence fail.
Our mission has never been more important. Today the United
States, its allies and partners are confronted with a
deteriorating security environment. The Chinese Communist Party
is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces into a fully functional
triad, with more than 600 nuclear warheads, and counting.
Russia has modernized the majority of its nuclear arsenal.
North Korea continues with its unlawful and destabilizing
programs in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles, and Iran continues to pursue uranium
enrichment.
Additionally, the tools of war are changing, from novel
missile systems to counter-U.S. space capabilities, from
cyberattacks against critical infrastructure to competition in
the electromagnetic spectrum. These are rapidly developing
threat vectors across multiple domains and regions, to include
the Arctic.
To effectively deter our adversaries across the spectrum of
threats requires sustained legacy triad systems and urgently
completing the multigenerational, decades-long modernization of
all three legs of the nuclear deterrent and its critical NC3
systems.
No portfolio is in need of recapitalization more than a
nuclear portfolio, and the modernization I am advocating for
requires continued, uninterrupted funding and an industrial
base capable of steady and continuous production. Commitment to
modernization will ensure that U.S. strategic weapons continue
to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, and allow
us to achieve national objectives if deterrence fails.
Thank you again for your support and focus on our mission,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Anthony J. Cotton
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General Cotton. General
Whiting.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, COMMANDER OF
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Whiting. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King,
Chairman Wicker, and Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for your support and the opportunity to
represent the warfighters of U.S. Space Command. It is truly an
honor to testify alongside my friend, General Cotton, once
again, and to discuss our vital role in achieving peace through
strength.
At U.S. Space Command our guiding principle is clear. To
secure peace, we must be well-prepared for conflict in space,
and if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. U.S. Space
Command is upholding this principle in the face of operational
threats, which continue to expand at a breathtaking pace, and
which are being fielded deliberately to challenge the United
States, the American way of life, and hold the Joint Force at
risk. These novel and unprecedented developments include
China's robust counter-space weapons and space-enabled kill
chains, Russia's reported pursuit of an on-orbit nuclear anti-
satellite weapon, and wide-ranging ballistic cruise and
hypersonic missile threats.
Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains
advantages in space thanks to the unified mission focus of our
superb joint warfighters, our unmatched commercial space
sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and
partnership. Our foremost advantage, and the cornerstone of
U.S. Space Command, are our officer, enlisted, and civilian
personnel. No other nation can match our team's understanding
of the complexities of space and the requirements to
effectively operate in the most challenging area of
responsibility. Our military has the best-trained, most capable
space warfighting force in the world, and they stand dedicated
to fight for America.
Since my last testimony, U.S. Space Command published our
new campaign plan, integrating and synchronizing the Command's
operations, activities, and investments with the Joint Force
and the interagency, leaving no doubts to our opponents that we
are stronger, more capable, and ready to counter any threat.
Over the past year, U.S. Space Command's commercial
integration cell grew to 17 commercial mission partners,
enhancing our threat information sharing at classified levels
and improving our crisis action planning.
We also expanded Multinational Force Operation OLYMPIC
DEFENDER to seven nations, with the addition of Germany,
France, and New Zealand. This growth further strengthens
partnerships and enables our allies to share the burden of
collective space security.
That said, these advantages, and our ability to deter
potential adversaries, cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence
in space is consistent with other domains. It requires a keen
understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring
against; credible, acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on
those who attack us; and resilient architectures to dissuade
attack by making any effort futile.
Accordingly, U.S. Space Command is fully integrated into,
and contributing to, the Department of Defense's implementation
of the President's executive order to establish a Golden Dome
for American missile defense shield.
U.S. Space Command appreciates Congress' significant
support of numerous critical space superiority programs and in
the recent fiscal year 2025 appropriations law. Looking forward
to fiscal year 2026 and beyond, U.S. Space Command requires
stable funding as well as effective and efficient acquisition
programs, delivering advanced space capabilities to enable a
balanced space deterrence force structure.
Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires,
enhanced battle space awareness, and integrated command and
control capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the
Homeland and protect and enable the Joint Force. The Unified
Command Plan directs U.S. Space Command to protect and defend
U.S., and as directed, allied and commercial space capabilities
through necessary offensive and defensive space operations.
Like other combatant commands, we require combat-credible
kinetic and non-kinetic means to deter and counter adversary
actions.
By investing in space superiority capabilities we send a
clear message: the United States has the advantage, and we
remain committed that space will be safe, secure, and stable.
We are ready to repel all challengers, and any attempt to turn
space into a battle field will fail.
Although many challenges lie ahead, the future of space
holds tremendous promise for America, if we actively and
thoughtfully protect it. I am grateful for Congress' support to
U.S. Space Command and continued investment to advance
America's strength in space. Your continued backing not only
ensures that U.S. Space Command protects our interests in space
today but also protects that future which is coming.
Madam Chairwoman, I have submitted my posture statement for
the record, and I look forward and the Subcommittee's
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Whiting follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General Whiting. We will begin
with 5-minute rounds of questions.
I strongly believe that the Bipartisan Strategic Posture
Commission's 2023 report should be required reading for
everybody in the Department of Defense. It clearly articulates
the threats that we face, and it concludes, rightfully
concludes, that we are woefully underprepared.
Based on the recommendations of that report, last year's
NDAA directed the Department to develop a deterrence strategy
that would pace this projected threat. This strategy must also
include an assessment of the amount and type of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems necessary to implement that strategy.
General Cotton, can you tell me how the development of this
strategy is coming along?
General Cotton. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. If you recall,
when I first took over as the Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, one of the first thing we did was we instituted a
nuclear recapitalization and transition cross-functional team
to do exactly that, because one of the things we wanted to
assure ourselves was did we have the capacity and capability
and posture correct. That was in alignment with the study and
the Commission's report, and it pretty much mirrored everything
that was said in the Commission.
Since that time, what we have done is looked at the options
that are available on all three legs of the triad. We are
currently sufficient--currently--but in order to maintain
sufficiency as we continue to have legacy systems online before
the new systems come on board, there are some options within
all three legs of the triad to increase capacity and
capability.
Senator Fischer. General Cotton, you recently said that the
Air Force should procure at least 145 B-21 bombers. From your
position, as STRATCOM Commander, can you share with us why you
assess that that should be the new procurement floor?
General Cotton. Yes, Senator. When we first looked at the
numbers of what would be required for the next generation of
bombers to replace the B-1 and the B-2, that was a different
geopolitical environment. We actually started a study in 2020,
to ensure that our numbers were correct in regard to what we
wanted to see the B-21 fleet look like.
At that point, the conversation from the Department would
be a minimum of 100 B-21s should be procured, as we looked to
see what the environment brought to bear. The other number that
we would always talk about would be the 145 number, which would
bring the total of the bomber force for the United States and
allies--because the bomber force represents all the bombers for
the Western world--would be about 220, and that would include
the B-21s as well as the modified B-52J models that would come
out.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, as you know, this
Committee, on a bipartisan basis, strongly supports SLCM, the
nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, and a program of
record was included in our fiscal year 2024 NDAA. In your view
as STRATCOM Commander, will SLCM-N address a capability gap?
General Cotton. It will, ma'am, and what it does for us is
twofold. It gives the President a broader range of options, and
I think that is my role and my job as a combatant commander is
to present a broad range of capability and options for the
President. It also provides--it is a regional tool that can be
used, as well. So we can actually benefit from our geographic
combatant commanders, which they support the idea of SLCM-N, as
well, because from a regional perspective, it can hold
adversaries at risk.
Senator Fischer. Yes or no. Do you see opportunities to
speed up that program?
General Cotton. I would hope so, Madam Chairwoman, and the
reason is I know that there is a program of record that has
been established in the Department of the Navy. I would love to
see some acceleration from that team to see what we can do to
get the assets a little quicker and move it to the left.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Whiting, I want to get
one question in for you at this point, as well. Every service
relies on your assets that are based in space. I do not think
that gets enough attention. Are you coordinating with the other
combatant commands and also with the services, with the
intelligence community, to make sure that these assets under
your command are going to be integrated appropriately?
General Whiting. Madam Chairwoman, absolutely. In fact, I
have a liaison element that I have assigned to each of the
other combatant commands. So there is a liaison element from
U.S. Space Command that sits inside of U.S. STRATCOM as well as
all the other combatant commands to persistently do that type
of coordination, to make sure that our operational plans are
advancing together, that our real-time operations are
considering each other's capabilities.
We do that with our intelligence community, as well,
primarily through the National Reconnaissance Office. Again, we
have an exchange of liaison officers and operational centers
that work together. Then with the services, at the Joint
Headquarters I have not only components from each of the
services assigned to me but I have personnel from all of those
services, which keep us tightly linked with their future plans,
as well.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. A couple of
preliminary questions about staff. Both of you mentioned in
your testimony that you rely upon not only military personnel
but civilians. My question to each of you is, are you under any
orders or have orders come down, or have you already started to
implement, or has somebody started to implement reductions in
force--firings, people who have taken, I call it the early
retirement option? General Cotton what is the status of your
civilian workforce?
General Cotton. Well, our civilian workforce, we are about
65 percent civilian in the headquarters, but that does not
count for the 41,000 that make up the componencies that work
under my charge.
Right now, Senator, very small amount of folks that took
the early retirement activities, but the option for them to do
so still exists. But right now we are not seeing an effect. The
numbers are pretty small.
Senator King. No firings?
General Cotton. We have not fired anyone.
Senator King. Are you under any orders to reduce that staff
by any certain percentage?
General Cotton. We are looking for the efficiencies piece,
but right now it is all voluntary. Like I said, from our
perspective, from STRATCOM, the numbers have been very, very
small.
Senator King. Are you subject to a hiring freeze?
General Cotton. I am.
Senator King. So those people who are leaving, you are not
allowed to replace. Is that correct?
General Cotton. Well, we have an opportunity to get a
waiver approved because of our mission set, and if there is a
requirement for us to do a waiver to see if we can get someone
through the hiring freeze, we can process that.
Senator King. General Whiting, same set of questions.
General Whiting. Senator, my answers are almost identical
to General Cotton's. About 60 percent of my headquarters staff
is Government civilians. We have had a small number who have
volunteered for the deferred retirement program. We are under
no orders to fire anyone. We are aware that we need to look for
efficiencies, as General Cotton discussed. We also are under a
hiring freeze, and we have the opportunity for critical
positions to ask for exemptions to that.
Senator King. Thank you. General Whiting, I was interested.
You mentioned, I think it is called the Artemist Accords, which
is clearly based upon allies. I am concerned that we seem to be
in a process of alienating our allies. Talk to me about the
importance of the Artemist Accords in order to carry out your
mission.
General Whiting. Senator, the Artemis Accords are overseen
by NASA and the Department of State, and that is a civil
exploratory set of agreements about shared principles in space
between countries. On the military side, I have a named
operation called Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER, which includes
seven countries, which is the United States plus the Five Eyes
Nations, Germany, and France, where we cooperate in space
together to understand what is happening there.
Senator King. Those relationships with other countries are
important to the execution of your mission. Is that correct?
General Whiting. They are, Senator.
Senator King. A question that I have not been able to get a
clear answer on is what is the concept of the Golden Dome? In
other words, would it be 1,000 THAAD batteries, or is it
conventional missile defense? Is it directed energy? What is
the underlying concept of Golden Dome other than to protect the
Homeland, which is certainly a worthy goal?
General Whiting. Senator, the Department right now has been
going through a series of meetings and working groups to define
what that architecture will look like. But in the executive
order it lays out that the President is asking the Department
to develop a series of capabilities that will protect against
these new, modernized threats like hypersonics, maneuvering
vehicles, that put the Homeland at risk.
So I think it will be a layered system that will have to
account for all of those threats, at multiple phases of the
lifecycle of the missile.
Senator King. Well, that is the mission. I understand. But
I take it we are some distance away from the operational
concept of what it will consist of.
A very specific question. Both of you rely heavily on
Kwajalein Atoll for training and testing purposes. My
understanding is the infrastructure there is woefully
inadequate. Can you speak to an effort to try to upgrade that
infrastructure so that atoll can continue to be an important
part of our Strategic Deterrence Initiative?
General Whiting. Senator, Kwajalein Atoll is very important
for our space mission. I visited there last summer. There are
five sensors there that support our mission. We have advocated,
with the Department of the Army, for investments there, to make
sure that the infrastructure can support those missions, and,
in fact, my combatant command is in the process right now of
defining exactly what the support requirements are that we need
there, so we can put those into our next O plan, to make sure
the Army understands exactly what requirements we need. But
that is a very important location for us.
If you can just keep the Committee informed of that, of
what the need is, whether it is authorities or funding, it
could be an important part of our ongoing deliberations. Thank
you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
you are recognized.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all,
General Whiting and General Cotton, I want to thank you both
for your service to our country and for the role that you play
in keeping our country safe.
General Whiting, I will begin with you, and I am going to
have the same question for General Cotton, as well. How
important is it that the use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
in particular areas of the lower 3 GHz band and the 7-8 GHz
band of the spectrum, be maintained by the Department of
Defense? I have asked this of over 24 separate uniformed
officers over the last 2 years, and the answer has been
consistent. But I wanted to hear it from both of you again
today, in terms of the need to have that access for the defense
of our country.
Would you, General Whiting, explain, at least, or confirm
clearly the need for the Department of Defense to maintain its
ability to use that unimpeded, in that particular range of the
spectrum, please?
General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. I
totally agree that those two bands are very important to our
mission, in fact, vital. The lower three, or that 3 GHz region,
is an area where we have radars and sensors which allow us to
detect, track, and engage targets through all weather, and we
have a number of capabilities there like the SPY-1 and SPY-6
radars, which are on Navy ships, that can support our mission;
the long-range detection radar in Alaska, which is critical for
missile defense; the Space Fence and the future Deep Space
Advanced Radar concept.
Then in the higher bands that you discussed, the 7 and 8
GHz, that is vital for SATCOM and special missions that we
execute there, and we could not do our global wide-band
satellite communication mission without that spectrum, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Whiting. General Cotton,
same questions.
General Cotton. Senator, I would echo exactly what my dear
friend said in regard to the lower bands. If we loose the
ability for early detection, that takes away decision space for
decision leaders and decisionmakers in regard to being able to
execute operational plans. So when we talk about what it
affects in regard to ISR, it is going to be incredibly
important.
In the higher bands, part of my UCP is global reach through
global strike. The bomber force, as an example, has the ability
to traverse all over the world. SATCOM communications are going
to be vital for those weapon systems today and in the future.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General. Also, General Cotton,
you have mentioned it a little bit already, but with the B-21,
there was the decision about we are acquiring 100 of them
currently, the number has been debated. Should it be 145?
should it be more than that? I have appreciated your indication
that you have come around to approximately 145.
Can we talk a little bit about this, I mean, this is the
next generation. This is the six-generation aircraft, this
platform that is there. Can you talk a little bit, in this open
discussion, but I think the American public need to understand
just what a platform this is and what it is capable of doing,
and once again, in this unclassified environment.
General Cotton. Thank you for that, Senator. When we talk
about stealth, there are actually only two platforms on the
face of the Earth that has all-stealth capability, and that is
the current B-2 Spirit and its next-generation replacement, the
B-21. There is no other all-aspect stealth aircraft on the face
of the planet. The B-2 is the only one, and the B-21 just will
dwarf its capabilities with the advanced technologies that it
has.
It will be the predominant bomber for the United States Air
Force moving forward, as we move to a two-bomber fleet, which
will only be the B-21 and the B-52 and the modified version of
that, the B-52J.
So it is incredibly important. It is incredibly lethal,
with a stand-in and stand-out capability. So that is why I am a
big proponent on constant production that far exceeds 100, to
the 145 number, to get us to about 220 with those two
platforms.
Senator Rounds. I noted that you have had a view that
indicated the need to accelerate the B-21 production. Can you
explain just a little bit about why we need to accelerate that
production?
General Cotton. Sir, as we start to see the legacy systems
start to divest, that the fleet has, the Air Force fleet, the
B-1s and the B-2s, in particular, I want to make sure that we
do not see a large bathtub in the ability of operational
platforms that are available to be used.
Senator Rounds. We have worn our current weapons platforms
out.
General Cotton. We do.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Reed,
you are recognized.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Chairman. General Cotton, as
I indicated in my opening remarks, there was an issue regarding
the separation of the dual-hatting of the U.S. European
Commander, SACEUR. What is your military opinion of the effects
this could have, possibly weakening the extended deterrence of
your force, affecting your force structure in other ways, and
also the potential to accelerate nuclear proliferation? I would
note that the front page of the Wall Street Journal has an
article titled, ``Wary Europe Eyes Own Nuclear Force.'' Could
you comment, please?
General Cotton. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed. I think the
relationship that I have as far as my operational plans with
General Cavoli, both as the EUCOM Commander and as SACEUR, to
your point in your opening, is incredibly important in the
execution of operational plans for me, even, in STRATCOM.
As you know, I have a relationship with the United Kingdom.
I have a relationship with SACEUR in the relationship of what
the DCA aircraft bring to bear, to be able to hold the
adversary at risk, and that is done through the lens of
currently General Cavoli with the SACEUR hat. That would change
a little bit if that commander was not a U.S. commander, in the
relationship that I would have.
Now, the relationship that I have with my allies and
partners, especially my European allies and partners, is still
steadfast, whether it be with the United Kingdom, whether it be
with France, or whether it be with the other NATO nations.
Senator Reed. Thank you. General Cotton, one other
question. The Air Force has proposed a reorganization, which I
understand has been put on hold until the new Secretary is
confirmed, that would cede much of the operational control of
heavy bombers away from Air Force Global Strike Command to new
composite wings out of Air Combat Command. In response to this,
Section 1631 of the 2025 NDAA stopped this until a report is
submitted. It has not yet been received.
How concerned are you about this reorganization impacting
your nuclear deterrence mission?
General Cotton. Senator Reed, today I have one belly button
in the Department of the Air Force that presents two legs of
the triad, and 68 percent of the NC3 capability, to me, as my
component, and that is the Commander Air Force Global Strike
Command. So as a four-star, the Commander of Air Force Global
Strike Command has oversight and has the subject matter experts
in the nuclear deterrent field, and he owns the bomber leg, as
well as the ICBM leg.
You know, all I ask of the United States Air Force is to
ensure that when I have force presentation that I can still
look to one person that can give me the answers to readiness,
give me the answers to where we are acquisition strategies,
gives me the answers to where we are on manpower and help that
they might need. Today, I only have to look to Barksdale Air
Force Base and talk to the Commander of Global Strike to get
that answer.
Senator Reed. Thank you. General Whiting, are you concerned
about becoming overly reliant upon commercial providers for too
many of the Department's missions into space? Do we draw a
line? Do we ensure that this is a competitive situation?
General Whiting. Senator Reed, I think the principle we
need to apply is balance. For those things that we can go to
commercial industry for, we should absolutely leverage that.
U.S. commercial space industry is a massive advantage for this
Nation, and it is an advantage that has widened over the last
several years, and I think will continue to widen.
But there are certain missions where we absolutely need to
design and build for ourselves our own capabilities. For
example, the space capabilities we provide to support General
Cotton for nuclear command and control for SATCOM, those are
not capabilities that are easily replicable in the commercial
market. So we need to design those for purpose-built reason so
we can assure to General Cotton, to the Secretary, and to the
President that they can talk to their nuclear forces when
required.
So I think it is a matter of balance, and we need to apply
that lens to each mission, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for
your service. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator
Tuberville, you are recognized.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning,
men. General Cotton, thanks for your service. Thirty-nine
years. I retired after 40 years of coaching. After the first
week I was sitting around the house, reading the paper,
drinking coffee, and my wife said, ``You ain't been here in 40
years. Get you a damn job.'' So here I am today. So don't think
you are going to go home and fish and play golf. But thank you
for your service.
Gentlemen, in 2024, the Navy eliminated the lead Columbia-
class submarine, said it could not be delivered for 12 to 16
months late. GAO also reported that late delivery of the lead
submarine could jeopardize its planned availability for
operations in 2030, and delays of the class could impact
planned transition from Ohio-class submarines.
If Columbia-class submarines are not available, General,
what plans have we taken in that regard to fill the gap?
General Cotton. Thank you for that question, Senator
Tuberville, and you are right. Right now we are anticipating a
12-to 16-month delay for the first Columbia-class.
What is going to be incredibly important, and I say this
constantly, is how do we continue to fortify our legacy systems
until we do that. So what the Navy is doing is a project called
PIRA, and that is the Pre-Inactivation Restricted
Availability--that is what that acronym stands for--in which
they will look at up to five boats and figure out which of the
five boats they might be able to modernize or do some extended
life work to, to make it so we do not lose anything from our
legacy systems to counter the delay and create a bathtub in our
capabilities on the submarine force.
Senator Tuberville. What is the cost of that? That cost has
got to be astronomical, though, right, if we are running late
and we have to fill in a gap with that. I mean, have we looked
at that, and do we have the funding?
General Cotton. Well, you know, I do not have the numbers
before me in regard to what the Navy is doing for the cost of
PIRA. I can get that to you. We can probably talk about that
and I will have it by closed session. But I think bottom line
in that regard, we need to ensure that we keep that capability
alive and well. I need to make sure that the tubes that are
available on the SSBNs remain the tubes that are available on
SSBNs, even if there is a slip to the new system that is
supposed to replace it.
So I am trying to make it so we prevent a catastrophic
failure in regards of creating a bathtub, in all three legs of
the triad, to ensure that does not happen.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, and again, thank you for
your service.
General Whiting, U.S. Space Command's role in missile
defense, planning and operational support for Guam, how
critical is that? Obviously you have been given that task.
Where do we stand on that?
General Whiting. Senator, Guam is a vital location for many
of our national defense needs, including for space. Through our
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense we do provide that planning and operational support
that you highlight. We are regularly working with INDOPACOM as
well as the Missile Defense Agency, the Army, and the Navy to
develop that architecture that is being delivered to defend
Guam against the missile threats we now see, primarily from
China.
Senator Tuberville. Yes, thank you. We are doing a lot of
work in Guam. Obviously, an AEGIS system being put on the
island as a first line of defense.
Let me ask you, too, about the Golden Dome. The President
gave us obviously that referendum that he wants to protect our
country with some kind of Golden Dome. Do you have a certain
group that works with that within Space Command, or is the
entire Space Command working on this together? How does that
work?
General Whiting. Sir, it is a whole-of-command effort
support a whole-of-Department of Defense effort. So it is
certainly within my command, that subordinate command, the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense has a leading role as well as my J8 Resourcing and
Requirements Division. In fact, that J8 Division, we have
partnered with NORTHCOM and General Guillot there to co-write
requirements document for the Golden Dome for America, and we
will be delivering that over the next few months to the
Department of Defense.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Recently President Trump put
me on the Board of Visitors for Air Force Academy. I look
forward to coming out and visiting with you all and possibly
seeing some of your work. So thanks to both of you for your
service. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
Cotton, you are recognized.
Senator Cotton. General Whiting, I want to return to
Senator Reed's line of questioning about commercial space
launch and any kind of risk it might pose us. You called the
commercial space industry a, quote, ``massive advantage.'' I
assume you are saying it is a massive advantage against our
chief adversaries in this domain, China and Russia?
General Whiting. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Can you give us a sense of scale of how big
the--well, first off, commercial space launch, to be precise
here we are talking about ULA, the United Launch Alliance and
SpaceX. Correct?
General Whiting. That has been the providers and now Blue
Origin has recently demonstrated New Glenn. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. So can you give us a sense of scale of just
how massive an advantage we have over, say, China because of
ULA and SpaceX?
General Whiting. Yes, Senator, and while I do not have the
numbers I can qualitatively describe those. If you go back
probably 5 to 10 years, the number of launches we were
executing compared to those in China or Russia looked very
similar. But over time, the U.S. has massively increased the
number of launches, and that equates to what we call ``mass to
orbit.'' So that means we are able to put more satellites on
orbit, whether for commercial or government purposes, and those
are getting cheaper and cheaper per pound, which also gives us
more opportunities to leverage space for various missions.
Senator Cotton. So you said 5 to 10 years ago we had
roughly equal space launch capacity as China and Russia, but
now we have substantially exceeded them, right?
General Whiting. Correct. Yes, Senator.
Senator Cotton. What has been the driver over the last 5 to
10 years of that substantial increase? Is it ULA or is it
SpaceX?
General Whiting. Predominantly SpaceX. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. So if it wasn't for SpaceX, we might be in
this position where we still are at near equivalence to China
and Russia in space launch.
General Whiting. They certainly have been innovative and
rapidly changed that market. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. General Cotton, you have
testified in the past, as have your predecessors, that China
has undertaken a breathtaking buildup of its nuclear arsenal.
It used to have what is called ``minimal deterrence,'' a
nuclear arsenal just sufficient for a second strike. Obviously
now it is moving on to first strike capabilities, whatever its
rhetoric is. I think the Department estimates that has doubled
its nuclear arsenal since Xi Jinping took power. It is
projected to double again by the end of this decade, and maybe
even double again by the middle of the next decade.
Could you explain the kind of advantage this might provide
China, not just in the nuclear balance of power but also in a
conventional conflict, say if China decided to go for the
jugular in Taiwan?
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Nice seeing you.
I think when we put in perspective where we were just left of
probably 2018, and we saw it as a nascent threat, and the
breakout that my predecessor announced, you are right. What it
does in changing the calculus in our strategy is now we must be
prepared for two nuclear peers instead of one. I would garner
to say, Senator, included in that is two nuclear peers that
have a transactional relationship that has blossomed over the
last couple of years, as well.
So as we look at the capabilities that we are seeing in all
three legs, you are absolutely right. Having an H-6N with long-
range strike capability is not a regional hegemon weapon
system. Having land-based ICBMs is not a regional hegemon
weapon system. Building out their submarine force and having
hypersonic weapons that are dual-use capable and FOB'd is not
necessarily seen as a regional hegemon weapon system. So it
makes us look at things a little differently, and our strategy
has changed to compensate for that.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I will close on a couple of
points. I have made them before. You have agreed with them
before. I would love to hear your agreement one more time. Some
people say about our nuclear weapons that we spend way too much
money on weapons we never use. I respond to them that we
actually do not spend that much money on them. We may be
spending some money modernizing them now, compared to our total
defense expenditures. But more importantly we have used our
nuclear weapons every single day, going back 80 years this
August, to prevent the kind of war that the world saw twice in
20 years.
Do you agree with that, General Cotton?
General Cotton. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you. I want to finally add my note of
agreement, with our fantastic Chairwoman, Senator Fischer, on
what she said about the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile, also known as SLCM-N. The program held on by a thread
throughout the Biden era, thanks to congressional support, and
I am glad that you acknowledge how important it is, and that if
anything, we need to do everything possible to accelerate that
capability.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly,
you are recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Cotton,
General Whiting, thank you for being here. I want to first
touch on Golden Dome, and then I want to save some time for
SLCM.
I agree nuclear deterrence keeps us safe, and General
Cotton, you mentioned two nuclear peers. One of my biggest
concerns is the third one, which is the DPRK. I think it is
fair to say that most of the time, with our nuclear peers, we
are dealing with rational actors. We hope that is the case.
That is the thing, part of nuclear deterrence, that they will
act rationally.
I am not so sure that is the case with the DPRK, and they
are building more nuclear weapons. They are working on other
systems to deliver them, and they can now range into the United
States. I believe that is our view as a Nation.
So can you talk a little bit about Golden Dome, and my
concern with this is that it could potentially, even though I
am not against the idea of a system that can protect the entire
United States from incoming ballistic missiles, nuclear armed.
At the same time, this could accelerate a growing number. Our
adversaries' response to having a missile defense system could
be to build more nuclear weapons, and if one or two get
through, that is too many. Right now we do have a defensive
system to protect us from a rogue actor in launching one ICBM,
and my understanding is--and if you could share a little bit,
General Cotton, about how effective that system is with the
interceptors we have in Alaska and in California.
So could you provide an estimate of how much this would
cost and what enhanced capability we would get out of this. Do
you feel we can build a system that is not penetrable?
General Cotton. Well, thank you, Senator Kelly. I do not
want to get out of my lane because NORTHCOM, General Guillot,
is the one that is undertaking that role. My responsibility,
from Golden Dome, is twofold in accordance with the EO, and
mine is to make sure that I can assure that a second strike
capability for the United States remains, and how do we ensure
that.
As far as the reliability of the ground-based interceptors
piece, once again I do not own that platform. That platform
belongs to NORTHCOM, and that is probably best for General
Guillot to answer that.
I do believe, and we heard my colleague talk about the
layered approach that is kind of the essence of Golden Dome for
America. I think that is the answer and the key on how that
system can be deliverable, moving forward.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. Thank you, General. I
do agree. I think it is something we need to look into, and we
need to look at a cost-benefit analysis of this and also
consider how it would potentially change the nuclear deterrence
posture of not only us but China and Russia.
On SLCM-N, I know it was brought up here also, General. One
of my concerns here, one of the things that makes us stand out
is our submarine force, especially the attack submarines are
incredibly effective. To integrate a tactical nuclear missile
into a Virginia-class sub would take modifications that are
significant, and you would have to put the security system that
we have in effect for nuclear weapons. My problem, I think,
that I have with this is in the Western Pacific this is a
capability. Our attack submarine force is incredibly capable,
and I think this would be somewhat disruptive. I think that
needs to be a consideration before we go down the road of
significant modifications to these systems.
If you could just comment briefly on that.
General Cotton. Senator, I think from my perspective a lot
of those are TTPs that the Department of the Navy had, and I
think they need to pull those out of the cupboard and look to
see what those TPPs where when we had TLAM-Ns. I do not know if
it would be disruptive, especially now that what we are seeing,
especially in the INDOPACOM theater in regard to our allies and
partners' ability of letting us have dual-use, nuclear-capable
things arrive on their shores, the fact that I can now have B-
52s flying to Japan, where I did not before, and on the Korean
Peninsula. I think there is work to be done, but I think it can
be accomplished.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Banks,
you are recognized.
Senator Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to
both of you for being here today. General Cotton, thank you for
your service. You are a hero. What you have done over the last
3 years is remarkable, and it has been an honor to work with
you on the House Armed Services Committee and now again on the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
As we have talked about before, SLCM-N is meant to deter
China and would be launched from attack submarines. SLCM-N is
needed to help address capability and escalation management
gaps stemming from the rapid growth of China and Russia's
theater-range nuclear systems.
General, do you agree with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
that validated the need for SLCM-Ns, and if so, what does this
need to still stand?
General Cotton. I do agree, Senator, and thank you for the
comments that you made. What was said in 2018 still holds true
today, I think even more so. When I talk about being able to
give a geographic combatant commander the ability to also hold
an adversary in their region at risk, you can now see that what
you are seeing in this weapon system is more than just a
strategic weapon. It now can be a regional weapon and a
regional deterrence, as well, for my fellow combatant
commanders that hold the regions of responsibility.
Senator Banks. What do we need to do to remain committed to
it?
General Cotton. The program of record has been established.
We just need to make sure we continue to pump the well, to
ensure that they move out. As the Chairwoman said, if we can
get things to the left, I would gladly accept being able to get
the articles quicker than later.
Senator Banks. Got it. Fiscal year 2024 NDAA directed the
Navy and the NNSA to develop and deploy an operational SLCM-N
no later than 2034. Do you believe that we should still have
SLCM-N no later than 2034?
General Cotton. I would love to move that to the left,
Senator.
Senator Banks. Got it. General Whiting, the President's
Executive Order to establish the Golden Dome for America
stresses the need for both weapons to shoot down enemy missiles
and the satellites to track them. The EO called for the, quote,
``acceleration of the deployment of the hypersonic and
ballistic tracking sensor layer.''
If we are going to have an effective Golden Dome for the
U.S. Homeland, how important is it that we expand our fleet of
ballistic and hypersonic missile tracking satellites and space-
based sensors?
General Whiting. Thank you for the question, Senator. For
the modern threats that we need to track, we will only be able
to do that from space, and we need to be able to maintain
custody of those threats, not only when they are in the boost
phase, when the rockets are burning very hot and we can track
them with our infrared satellites, but then also when they are
coasting, so that we can, again, maintain custody to engage at
the various layers. So it is absolutely vital, Senator.
Senator Banks. Do you agree with President Trump that we
need to rapidly accelerate HBTSS so that we can have the
sensors in space that we need to target incoming threats?
General Whiting. I do, Senator. Those threats are real
today, those more advanced threats, and our current systems are
optimized against traditional ballistic missiles, not against
the variants that we are seeing fielded today.
Senator Banks. General Cotton, China leads the world in
hypersonics and has hundreds of long-range hypersonic missiles.
As you know, China shocked the world 4 years ago when its
hypersonic vehicle orbited the entire Earth before landing. The
United States has still not fielded a functional hypersonic
weapon. Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane is a proven leader
in hypersonics, as you and I have talked about many times
before. How important is increased investment in hypersonics if
we are going to regain our military edge over China?
General Cotton. Senator, it is very important, and the work
that I have seen done by Crane has been extraordinary for the
Department of the Navy. I think investments, but actually
production, and getting them to the warfighter so they can be
implemented and put in our arsenal.
Senator Banks. Got it, and finally, while we are replacing
most of our nuclear arsenal in the next decade or two, we are
keeping the B-52 bombers around well into mid-century. How
critical is the B-52 program if we are going to keep those
planes in the skies for decades to come?
General Cotton. Incredibly important for us, sir. As I
mentioned, Senator, we are going to move to a two-platform
bomber force for the United States of America. It will be the
B-21 and a B-52J. It is incredibly important that we get those
75 birds and modify them with their replacement of their
engines, their radars, and----
Senator Banks. I have got 10 seconds. Can you talk about
the advantages of the new B-52 engines over the old engines?
General Cotton. Yes. The Rolls-Royce engines that are right
there, being worked in Indiana, gives us incredible increase in
range and speed and durability.
Senator Banks. Thank you. My time has expired.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Banks. Senator King and
I would like a second round before we had to classified, and I
would like to followup on some of Senator Banks' comments about
Golden Dome and space-based sensors.
General Whiting, what would be the impacts to the mission
effectiveness of SPACECOM were the government to auction off
spectrum currently utilized by the Department? Could Golden
Dome even take place?
General Whiting. Ma'am, we could not execute Golden Dome
without full access to those two spectrums that we discussed
earlier, the lower 3 and then the 7 and 8 GHz. We use that
lower 3 band, again, through so many of our radars, to be able
to track from the ground, and then the 7 and 8 GHz band is so
important for our communications and other special missions. I
can only see those requirements getting bigger for those
spectrums as Golden Dome delivers.
Senator Fischer. If it was auctioned off, and if it was
vacated by the Department, what is the timeframe, not to
mention the cost. What is the timeframe in research,
development for those new sensors to be even located in another
spectrum that would not have the capability that the current
spectrum has to even accomplish that. Ten years? Twenty years?
General Whiting. Madam Chairwoman, I do not have a timeline
because I think our focus has been not on vacating that but
figuring out if there is a way to share that spectrum through
dynamic spectrum sharing, and I understand there are
technologies there that may make that available. The Department
has done some studies on that and laid out a series of
conditions that would need to be met if dynamic spectrum
sharing can occur, and I endorse that those conditions must be
met if we are going to figure out a way to share that spectrum
with commercial industry.
Senator Fischer. Can dynamic sharing take place now?
General Whiting. Ma'am, I am told the technology is close
to being ready. I do not know if it is actually ready today,
but I would want to verify that, certainly.
Senator Fischer. You would need to test.
General Whiting. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.
Senator Fischer. General Cotton, same question to you. If
the government were to auction off spectrum currently utilized
by the Department, how would STRATCOM's mission effectiveness
be impacted?
General Cotton. It would be impacted, Madam Chair, because
what would happen is, to the point that was made by General
Whiting, you know, we count on understanding what the threat
looks like, being able to see that threat before it actually
comes--we call that ``left of launch'' type of activities--as
well as what we are talking about in the higher bands on what
is the capacity and capability of my three legs to be able to
utilize SATCOM, et cetera. It would absolutely affect us.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Sir. Senator King.
Senator King. Two things. I just wanted to followup on the
discussion of hypersonics. I believe that we have missed two
critical strategic technologies and are woefully behind,
hypersonics and directed energy. These are things that we
should have seen coming, and now we are playing catch up. I
just want to emphasize not only do we need a hypersonic weapon
for deterrent possibilities, but we need hypersonic defense.
Those aircraft carriers in the Pacific are sitting ducks for
hypersonic missiles coming at them 4,000 to 5,000 miles an
hour, 100 feet above the surface of the ocean.
So, hypersonic defense is something I think we need to
invest in, as well as the development of a hypersonic offensive
capacity in order, again, to provide a deterrent. General
Cotton, would you agree?
General Cotton. I do agree with that statement, Senator.
Senator King. The other thing that I wanted to mention, it
has sort of become conventional wisdom here that we are going
from one near-peer adversary to two. I believe we are going
from one near-peer adversary to three and a half because of, as
I think you touched upon this, the growing cooperation between
China and Russia. Then you put in Iran, which has also become a
contributor to Russia's war machine, as well as North Korea,
which is also contributing to Russia's efforts in Ukraine.
I think we need to think strategically, not two near-peer
adversaries, but the potential of two near-peer adversaries who
are working together. That creates its own strategic
challenges. General Cotton, what are your thoughts on that?
General Cotton. Senator, you are absolutely right and that
is what we are actually doing at STRATCOM today. When we look
at, and you are right, I call them third-party influencers.
What I mean by that and to your point, I would add, one, that I
think is a little different nuance, that is the new
relationship that we are seeing that is happening between
Russia and the DPRK. So, we are talking about DPRK. We are
talking about Iran. We are talking about China, as well as the
Russian Federation.
Senator King. I think we have to assume that in a time of
serious conflict it would not be just with one or the other. It
could well and probably would involve all four of those powers
that you have mentioned.
General Cotton. That is why I call them the third-party
influencers because what they could do is they can be a
distraction from the main effort that could be launched by any
one of those that we had mentioned.
Senator King. General Whiting, your thoughts on that new
strategic reality?
General Whiting. Senator, we watch those same four
countries that General Cotton just mentioned, and their
bilateral relationships with each other, and we see
increasingly that space is becoming an area where countries
with more sophisticated space knowledge, like Russia or China,
appear to be willing to tradeoff that space knowledge for
something that they want in return, whether that is armaments
or some other political agreement. So we are very concerned
with that and watching how they are cooperating on space.
Senator King. I just think that this new relationship needs
to be part of our strategic thinking going forward, to inform
things like the Nuclear Posture Review and also the fundamental
defense strategy.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you again for your
service, and I appreciate having been able to work with you.
You are still at it. He is the guy that is leaving. We are
going to miss you, General. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. We have him for a while yet.
With that we will adjourn the open session of this hearing
and reconvene down in classified in order to have our
classified briefing from you gentlemen. Thank you very much.
This section of the hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
golden dome
1. Senator Warren. General Cotton, what is United States Strategic
Command's (STRATCOM) estimate or range for the cost of deploying the
Iron Dome of America/Golden Dome (Golden Dome) or a similar system
across the entire United States? Please describe your methodology for
the estimate or the source.
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding the cost of deploying Golden Dome and the
methodology for estimating this cost.
2. Senator Warren. General Cotton, if Congress does not provide
significantly more funding, what specific programs would need to be cut
or scaled back to fund such a deployment and ensure programs were not
duplicative?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding programmatic decisions.
3. Senator Warren. General Cotton, given that the Israeli Iron Dome
is designed to intercept slow, short-range threats, what is the
technical plan to adapt that system into one that can counter more
advanced missile threats possessed by America's adversaries?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding technical plans to adapt Golden Dome to
counter advanced missile threats.
4. Senator Warren. General Cotton, how much would such adaptations
cost?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding cost estimates for technical plans to
adapt Golden Dome to counter advanced missile threats.
5. Senator Warren. General Cotton, what timeline would be required
to field an operational system for the Golden Dome?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding the timeline required to field Golden
Dome.
6. Senator Warren. General Cotton, in the 1990's, it was determined
that space-based missile defense (SDI/``Star Wars'') was too
technically challenging and prohibitively expensive. What are the
greatest technological risks now for pursuing a similar program?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding technical risks to pursuing Golden Dome.
7. Senator Warren. General Cotton, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin and former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Lisa Porter,
who both served during the first Trump administration, contend that the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is not structured to lead an effort of
this magnitude. Do you agree with their assessment?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding whether MDA is structured appropriately.
8. Senator Warren. General Cotton, Griffin and Porter contend that
the Golden Dome program management should not be performed within any
existing agency. Do you agree, and if so, should a new agency be
created to manage this program?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort.
Therefore, defer to OSD for information regarding program management
efforts for Golden Dome.
9. Senator Warren. General Cotton, do you believe the Golden Dome
would require an entirely new approach to command and control?
General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
OSD for information regarding command and control requirements for
Golden Dome.
nuclear modernization
10. Senator Warren. General Cotton, given the costs of deploying
and maintaining a new nuclear cruise missile, should this program take
precedence over investments in conventional capabilities like
shipbuilding that could achieve similar deterrent effects?
General Cotton. Defer to OSD for determination of investment
priority for the Department. The Nation's investments for defense
should be an integrated and carefully balanced portfolio of nuclear and
non-nuclear/conventional capabilities.
The deterrence and assurance effects of capabilities like a Nuclear
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) and other theater nuclear
capabilities are qualitatively different than those of both
conventional capabilities and the existing capabilities of the
strategic nuclear triad. Investments in SLCM-N and other theater
nuclear capabilities are needed to supplement our portfolio and enhance
the ability of the Joint Force to deter adversaries, assure allies and
partners, and provide integrated options for achieving objectives and
managing escalation by providing flexibility to the President.
The need for the SLCM-N does not negate the need for conventional
capabilities. A robust set of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is
vital to successfully concluding conflicts while managing escalation.
The demand for tankers, ships, and conventional prompt global strike
weapons across Combatant Commands continues to grow. USSTRATCOM
continues to advocate for rapid development and fielding of advanced
conventional capabilities and is expanding efforts toward Conventional
Nuclear Integration (CNI). The integrated employment of non-kinetic
capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum), combined
with conventional and nuclear operations, must be considered through
all phases from competition to conflict.
11. Senator Warren. General Cotton, has STRATCOM evaluated the
operational effects that a new nuclear-armed cruise missile would have
on the conventional mission?
General Cotton. Defer to OSD for an evaluation of operational
effects a new nuclear-armed cruise missile would have on the
conventional mission. The Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United
States requires integration of non-nuclear capabilities into nuclear
planning. In partnership with seven other Combatant Commands, the Joint
Staff, Army, Air Force, and Navy, USSTRATCOM continues to expand
efforts toward Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) with a 2-year
Joint CNI Test to develop a concept of operations to update the process
for developing CNI options during competition. This effort will further
inform both conventional and nuclear requirements processes to support
CNI operational requirements and ensure the United States is postured
effectively.
12. Senator Warren. General Cotton, how long could Minuteman III
ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), the current ground-based
leg of the nuclear triad, stay operational?
General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force for specifics on MMIII
sustainment efforts; however, the legacy MMIII ICBM will remain
critical to my deterrence and assurance objectives until replaced by
the Sentinel. I remain confident the Air Force, with the continued
support of Congress, can adequately sustain the MMIII until replaced by
the Sentinel program.
13. Senator Warren. General Cotton, if the Air Force plans to
extend Minuteman III to 2050, would the Air Force and lead contractor
Northrop Grumman Corp. benefit from additional time to better plan and
manage the Sentinel program?
General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force for specifics on Sentinel
timing; however, USSTRATCOM will incur additional operational risk the
longer MMIII is deployed.
program requirements and oversight
14. Senator Warren. General Cotton and General Whiting, do you
agree that any new major defense program should receive an independent
cost estimate before Congress funds the program?
General Cotton. Defer to OSD on independent cost estimates for
major defense programs. As a Combatant Commander, I expect weapon
systems to be delivered ready and capable of providing options to the
President.
General Whiting. Cost estimates play a crucial role in the
decisionmaking process for major defense programs, ensuring responsible
fiscal stewardship and strategic planning. Independent cost estimates
provide valuable insight into potential program costs and risks, but I
also recognize the expertise and assessments provided by the Services
and would add that integrated Independent Technical & Cost Estimates
with qualified space professionals are important for space systems. It
is important to consider all available cost evaluations to ensure
comprehensive and informed budgetary decisions that best serve national
security priorities.
15. Senator Warren. General Cotton and General Whiting, do you
agree that a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate of a major
defense program would help inform decisionmakers at DOD (Department of
Defense) and in Congress on whether a program is worth pursuing?
General Cotton. Defer to OSD on a Congressional Budget Office cost
estimate for major defense programs. As a Combatant Commander, I expect
weapon systems to be delivered ready and capable of providing options
to the President.
General Whiting. We recognize the value of thorough cost
assessments in driving informed decisionmaking for major defense
programs. Congressional Budget Office cost estimates can provide
additional insight that contributes to better acquisition outcomes,
ultimately supporting the development of the combatant command
capabilities our forces rely upon. At the same time, we acknowledge the
expertise and evaluations conducted by the Services, especially for
space systems in which accurate cost estimates must be informed with
technical input from space experts. A comprehensive approach that
incorporates multiple perspectives ensures well-rounded fiscal and
strategic planning to meet national defense objectives.
16. Senator Warren. General Cotton and General Whiting, how does
independent technical expertise in areas such as nuclear and space
science benefit your command?
General Cotton. Nuclear technical expertise is critical to
supporting USSTRATCOM's Unified Command Plan responsibilities.
Independent nuclear technical expertise is vital to ensuring the
Nation's nuclear capabilities remain safe, secure, effective, and
credible.
General Whiting. Independent technical expertise provides U.S.
Space Command (USSPACECOM) the opportunity to review and comment on the
strengths and weaknesses of relevant capabilities through the lens of
Combatant Command responsibilities articulated in the Unified Command
Plan. This expertise also enables a holistic assessment of capabilities
across all Services and agencies, facilitating the integration of
emergent capabilities into wargames, exercises, and modeling. For
example, USSPACECOM leveraged John Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory on a Nuclear Electric Propulsion / Nuclear Thermal
Propulsion space study that included the National Laboratories and DOD
Laboratories to inform plans, define quality requirements, and develop
concepts to increase the Command's lethality and provide decision
flexibility.
arms control
17. Senator Warren. General Cotton, the U.S. and Russia are no
longer engaged in arms control negotiations, and New START (Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty) is set to expire in 2026. What specific risks
does STRATCOM foresee if the U.S. enters a world without legally
binding arms control agreements?
General Cotton. Absent New START or a similar agreement, Russia
would be unconstrained to expand its strategic nuclear forces,
potentially adding to its already large arsenal that includes theater-
range non-strategic nuclear systems and novel weapons platforms. This,
along with the expanding Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities
and increasing collusion between all three states, exacerbates
deterrence challenges and the potential risks of simultaneous or
sequential conflict with nuclear-armed states.
18. Senator Warren. General Cotton, given the historical success of
arms control in reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing arms races, do
you believe STRATCOM should be focusing on expanding nuclear
capabilities rather than strengthening diplomatic engagement with
adversaries?
General Cotton. The USSTRATCOM mission is to deter strategic attack
through a safe, secure, effective, and credible global combat
capability and, when directed, is ready to prevail in conflict. The
President assigned USSTRATCOM the responsibilities for strategic
deterrence; nuclear operations; nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) enterprise operations; joint electromagnetic
spectrum operations; global strike; and missile threat assessment which
together, underpin national security. As such, the command is focusing
on modernizing nuclear capabilities (including all three legs of the
triad and NC3) while sustaining legacy nuclear systems.
Defer to the State Department on strengthening diplomatic
engagements. However, I support verifiable arms control efforts that
advance U.S., Allied, and partner security. I stand by to provide my
best military advice if asked.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jackie Rosen
nuclear testing
19. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, Nevada has played a critical
role in nuclear weapons development, but often at a high cost. From
1951 to 1992, 928 nuclear weapons were detonated in Nevada, causing
people and land to be exposed to toxic levels of radiation. That is one
of the reasons why I strongly support the mission of the Nevada
National Security Site and the Stockpile Stewardship Program,
predominantly at the Principle Underground Laboratory for Subcritical
Experimentation (PULSE)--an underground laboratory where scientists
conduct subcritical experiments to verify the reliability, safety, and
effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile. PULSE is undergoing a major
construction project that will soon host the most capable weapons
radiographic systems in the world. For decades, the national laboratory
directors in their annual stockpile reports say that returning to
explosive nuclear testing is unnecessary, with over 1,000 subcritical
experiments and robust computer modeling providing the data to support
those positions. Do you agree with these data informed assessments that
it is unnecessary for the United States to resume explosive nuclear
testing?
General Cotton. At this time, there are no identified issues
requiring a return to nuclear underground testing. However, the Nation
needs to preserve this capability should the need arise.
20. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, given the ongoing advancements
in artificial intelligence (AI) for weapons design, the production of
new pits to replace aging ones, and the modernization of PULSE at the
Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), how do you assess these
initiatives in providing greater certainty about warhead performance,
even for new designs, as compared to our current stockpile stewardship?
General Cotton. Defer to the weapons design experts at our national
laboratories to provide specifics regarding increases in certainty from
ongoing advancements. The Nation must continue to develop and field
state-of-the-art non-nuclear test, modeling, simulation and
manufacturing capabilities and tools to maintain confidence in our
aging stockpile and modernize for the future.
21. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, what is your assessment of how a
resumption of U.S. nuclear testing would be interpreted by other
nuclear states, particularly Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, and
India?
General Cotton. There are too many variables to accurately assess
how other nations would interpret or respond if the United States were
to resume nuclear testing. The scale, type, location, and timing of a
test, as well as how the United States were to communicate the
intention or rationale of the test, all have the potential to cause
significantly different interpretations or responses. While the
circumstances of U.S. testing could be interpreted by nuclear states as
justification for restarting their own nuclear test programs, they
could also be the impetus for increased calls for an international
moratorium or other restrictions on further nuclear testing.
22. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, do you assess that this would
increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation?
General Cotton. I cannot speculate about other nations' sovereign
decisions, which are made based on their own interests and perceptions
of the geopolitical environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
golden dome
23. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, the Administration is currently
pursuing a Golden Dome--which is supposedly analogous to Israel's Iron
Dome. To me, this is comparing Apples to Oranges. Stopping ballistic
missiles is a different problem set than stopping rockets and mortars.
While I don't oppose the idea of a Golden Dome, the cost benefit
analysis must make sense before pursuing an astronomically expensive
project. General Whiting, SPACECOM (Space Command) is responsible for
missile defense operations, which means you would play a critical role
in the creation of a Golden Dome. Can you provide an overview on our
current missile defense capabilities, and if you were directed to
implement a golden dome strategy, can you provide an estimate as to how
much that would cost and what enhanced capabilities we would be after?
General Whiting. The current missile defense enterprise is an
integrated, layered architecture designed to provide multiple
opportunities to detect and defeat incoming threats before they can
reach their targets. Our current missile defense capability is divided
into three primary areas: interceptors, sensors, and command and
control systems. The Unified Command Plan directs USSPACECOM to provide
``operational planning and support to trans-regional missile defense''
and to operate ground-based and space-based sensors to provide missile
warning and missile tracking. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and
the other regional combatant commands are responsible for operating the
interceptors using command and control systems provided by the Missile
Defense Agency.
Pending final direction on Golden Dome implementation, a more
comprehensive layered defense approach is needed, which will require
investments currently being factored into the President's Budget for
fiscal year 2026, development and deployment of capabilities to defeat
missile attacks prior to launch; boost-phase and perhaps midcourse
intercept from space; non-kinetics; fully integrated command and
control, as well as foundational sensor capabilities. USSPACECOM has
been actively advocating for several enhanced capabilities that align
with the President's Executive Order, such as the custody layer of the
Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture and space-based interceptors
capable of boost-phase intercept. As Golden Dome's architecture is
still pre-decisional, and USSPACECOM's role is to define requirements
as opposed to acquiring systems, I refer questions related to
acquisitions and costs to the DOD.
space infrastructure
24. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, as we continue to advance our
capabilities in space, it's clear that space dominance is about much
more than just ensuring we can access space. It's about ensuring we
have the freedom to operate in space--protecting our assets and
maintaining our strategic advantage in an increasingly contested
environment. Our space infrastructure needs to be resilient, adaptive,
and capable of evolving in response to emerging threats. This includes
the ability to not only evade adversarial actions but also reposition,
repair, and refit assets in orbit to ensure continuous functionality.
General Whiting, given these priorities, I'd like to hear your thoughts
on the Space Force's philosophy regarding these capabilities, and what
plans you have in place to ensure that the U.S. remains capable of
maintaining a strong, flexible, and secure presence in space.
General Whiting. Space dominance is not just about access--it's
about maintaining the freedom to maneuver, defending our assets, and
preserving our strategic advantage in an increasingly contested domain.
Achieving this requires a robust operational framework that ensures
resilience and continuity. Recognizing these challenges, USSPACECOM is
prioritizing the ability to deploy, regenerate, and reconstitute at
scale across all levels of conflict. Therefore, we require a
combination of responsive launch capabilities, maneuverability, and in-
domain logistics to be provided by the Services to guarantee
uninterrupted space effects throughout the duration of a conflict.
To support the Services' responsibility, we are leveraging
structured processes that ensure our priorities align with strategic
objectives. Through the Integrated Priority List process, we continue
to emphasize a balanced mix of Service-developed capabilities.
Recognizing our budget resources are finite and must be shrewdly
allocated, I would like to highlight the increasing importance of
investing in sustained space maneuver to secure our long-term strategic
advantage.
nuclear triad
25. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, I share the concerns a lot of
folks have about the current modernization efforts of our Nuclear
Triad. The Sentinel program faced a cost overrun that resulted in a
Nunn-McCurdy violation. You recently stated we need to acquire 145 B-21
raiders, with the current programmed 100 being the bare minimum for
readiness. Finally, you stated in an interview that we need to build a
greater number of Columbia class ballistic missile submarines If
everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. Where do you see the
greatest need for modernization in our nuclear triad?
General Cotton. All triad modernization programs of record (PORs)
are vital to maintaining nuclear deterrence. For a number of reasons,
the Nation chose to delay nuclear modernization over the past several
decades and our legacy systems are now well past their intended lives.
Each leg of the nuclear triad must be modernized concurrently to ensure
we retain a creditable deterrent. Additionally, our legacy triad
capabilities must be sustained until the PORs deliver USSTRATCOM
warfighting capabilities. USSTRATCOM will continue to accumulate
operational risk until all PORs fully deliver.
26. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, while we continue efforts to
modernize our nuclear triad, how is STRATCOM strategically deterring
our adversaries and ensuring our current arsenal remains relevant?
General Cotton. The nuclear triad remains safe, secure, effective,
and credible and ready to execute the mission. USSTRATCOM provides
tailored strategies to effectively deter across a spectrum of
adversaries, threats, and conflict, and backstop our extended
deterrence commitments.
All elements of the triad undergo rigorous inspections and follow
consistent testing regimes to ensure existing capabilities remain safe,
secure, effective, and credible.
Furthermore, USSTRATCOM continues to assess capacity, capability,
and the forces required to support our tailored deterrence strategies
to ensure the current arsenal remains relevant.
spacecom and industry partners
27. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, last year I discussed with your
predecessor how SpaceX and Starlink temporarily discontinued services
of their platforms during the conflict in Ukraine after they took issue
with the `weaponization' of their technologies. SPACECOM was working on
an initiative to ensure we wouldn't lose commercial capabilities during
crisis or conflict. Can you provide an update on what steps you have
taken to ensure we don't lose critical access to commercial
capabilities during crisis or conflict?
General Whiting. DOD's 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy
describes how DOD will ensure access to commercial solutions across the
spectrum of conflict: ``The Department will use contracts and other
agreements as the formal mechanisms to ensure access to commercial
solutions across the spectrum of conflict and mission areas. Contracts
and other agreements will address the cyber, data, and supply chain
security requirements that commercial entities will need to meet to
work with the Department. As necessary, contracts will enable
prioritization of Department requirements and capability needs over
other commercial clients in specific situations.''
USSPACECOM supports the DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy
by establishing the security conditions for integration, mitigating
risk to commercial space actors inherent in supporting national
security space operations. The Strategy states that: ``In appropriate
circumstances, the use of military force to protect and defend
commercial assets could be directed.'' USSPACECOM stands ready to
protect and defend commercial assets from aggression in the space
domain if directed to do so. USSPACECOM also mitigates risk to
commercial space actors through sharing of threat information. In 2024,
our Commercial Integration Cell, which enables sharing of classified
threat information with the space companies the U.S. Government most
relies on for space services, expanded to 17 commercial mission
partners.
We recognize that the DOD must maximize the gains from our
innovative commercial partners, while avoiding dependencies that limit
decision space. We will continue to seek ways to protect and ensure
access to critical capabilities throughout all phases of conflict.
28. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, the complexity and scale of
warfare has expanded exponentially over the past decade--how is
SPACECOM postured to leverage and capitalize on industry initiatives?
How can we ensure critical capabilities get into the hands of the
warfighter while the technology is still relevant?
General Whiting. On January 6, 2025, USSPACECOM published our
Experimentation Strategy to explore and promote utilization of emerging
space domain technologies and innovate in support of all our vital
missions, including deterrence. As a part of this drive for a culture
of innovation, we also updated the Command's Commercial Integration
Strategy, which captures how we will leverage industry initiatives.
Through this strategy, we identify and advocate for promising
technologies; incorporate and operationalize commercial partners and
their capabilities into training and operations; and implement
information sharing and protection of commercial capabilities when
directed. The ongoing execution of this strategy includes the
Commercial Integration Cell and Joint Commercial Operations Cell, as
well as our integration of commercial quick reaction capabilities
through our own initiatives and via the Services. Inserting these
systems into planning, wargaming, and exercising is essential to give
our warfighters the opportunity to determine effective and efficient
employment before a crisis or conflict.
hypersonic weapons
29. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, as you know, our adversaries
continue to develop advanced weapons and capabilities to try to erode
our competitive edge. Systems like hypersonic weapons add new
complexity and danger to strategic deterrence. In your prepared
statement, you referenced the danger posed by nuclear armed hypersonic
weapons. The speed and unpredictable flight paths make hypersonic
weapons more difficult to detect, track, and can reduce your margin for
error and response time. Can you talk about the risks adversary
hypersonics pose to your mission of strategic deterrence?
General Cotton. On January 6, 2025, USSPACECOM published our
Experimentation Strategy to explore and promote utilization of emerging
space domain technologies and innovate in support of all our vital
missions, including deterrence. As a part of this drive for a culture
of innovation, we also updated the Command's Commercial Integration
Strategy, which captures how we will leverage industry initiatives.
Through this strategy, we identify and advocate for promising
technologies; incorporate and operationalize commercial partners and
their capabilities into training and operations; and implement
information sharing and protection of commercial capabilities when
directed. The ongoing execution of this strategy includes the
Commercial Integration Cell and Joint Commercial Operations Cell, as
well as our integration of commercial quick reaction capabilities
through our own initiatives and via the Services. Inserting these
systems into planning, wargaming, and exercising is essential to give
our warfighters the opportunity to determine effective and efficient
employment before a crisis or conflict.
30. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, do you think hypersonics are a
key aspect of our strategic modernization efforts?
General Cotton. Yes, hypersonic weapons will provide a highly
responsive, long-range, non-nuclear capability for distant, defended,
and/or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied
access, or not preferred. These weapon systems will provide senior
leaders with additional credible strike options to influence all stages
of conflict without crossing the nuclear threshold.
31. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, SPACECOM is responsible for
missile defense, what is SPACECOM doing to ensure we develop the needed
technology to detect and respond to hypersonic threats with the
required speed?
General Whiting. Under the current Unified Command Plan, USSPACECOM
is responsible for transregional missile defense planning, operations
support, and sensor management. We work closely with USNORTHCOM, U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command, and other regional Combatant Commands, who are
responsible for missile defense operations employing systems supplied
by the Missile Defense Agency.
To effectively address the hypersonic threat, we are advancing
operational concepts through the Golden Dome effort, advocating that
the Services provide key technologies that stay ahead of emerging
threats. Additionally, USSPACECOM is collaborating with USNORTHCOM to
develop an Initial Capabilities Document for Golden Dome, identifying
essential requirements to track and respond to hypersonic threats with
the necessary speed and precision.
Through our requirements processes, we continue to advocate for the
accelerated integration of enhanced capabilities, including Hypersonic
and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, the custody layer within the
Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, space-based interceptors
for boost-phase engagement, pre-launch and boost-phase missile defeat
capabilities, and advancements in non-kinetic defense measures. These
efforts align with the President's Executive Order on Golden Dome for
America, ensuring our missile defense architecture remains agile and
responsive to the evolving threat landscape.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES IN REVIEW OF THE
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2025
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:45 p.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (Chairwoman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Tuberville,
King, and Kelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. I call this hearing to order. I would like
to thank the witnesses for being here today.
This Subcommittee has long worked on a bipartisan basis to
strengthen and improve our national integrated air and missile
defense architecture. Our adversaries continue to improve and
diversify their ability to hold the Homeland at risk, including
through ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. I remain
deeply concerned that the status quo will not suffice in the
coming decades, and I look forward to hearing from each of our
witnesses about their work on the Department's various missile
defense activities.
General Guillot, as the Commander of United States Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) you are ultimately responsible for the
defense of our Homeland. I look forward to hearing how NORTHCOM
is working to enhance domain awareness to provide a common
picture of the operational environment.
Ms. Yaffe, as you stated in your written testimony, missile
defense and the space domain are intrinsically linked. I look
forward to hearing your views on the evolution of missile
defense and how space-based systems can continue to play an
important role going forward.
Lieutenant General Collins, I understand the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) will retain its key role in developing,
testing, and integrating many of the technologies that comprise
our missile defense system, and I look forward to hearing how
we can expect to expand on these efforts in the coming fiscal
year.
Finally, I would like to welcome Lieutenant General Rasch,
in his capacity as the Executive Officer of the Guam Defense
System Joint Program Office. I look forward to hearing from you
about the progress being made to expand and improve the
integrated air and missile defense of Guam, which will protect
over 160,000 American citizens living on Guam.
I understand that we are still waiting for details of the
fiscal year 2026 President's Budget Request to be released, and
that the President is in the final stages of making key
decisions about the Golden Dome system. While this means that
follow-on conversations will be necessary once the
Administration provides us those details, I still expect a
robust conversation this afternoon on the future of missile
defense. Thank you again.
Senator King, would you like to make some opening remarks
please.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Madam Co-Chair. Can I
say that?
Senator Fischer. Yes.
Senator King. Thank you. This Subcommittee does work very
strongly on a bipartisan basis. We look forward to your
testimony. Very important hearing today with regard to a very
important subject.
Ms. Yaffe, I don't expect you to answer these questions now
but I am giving you a preview. One of the questions is, in
light of the multiplicity of threats now, whether it is
standoff cruise missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), sea-launched missiles, space-based weapons, is missile
defense feasible? In other words, is it technologically
feasible if we face a serious attack from an adversary that has
not several dozen missiles but several thousand.
Mr. Guillot--or General, I am sorry--one of the questions I
am interested in is the importance of sensors. This discussion
is often about missiles, but it is also about knowing what is
going on, and particularly in your AOR I think there are some
serious questions that bear discussion about our situational
awareness.
Finally, General Collins, I am interested in what is Golden
Dome. In other words, what is the plan? What does it consist
of? I did a little artificial intelligence (AI) research this
morning and found out Israel is exactly the same size as New
Jersey. So having a missile defense system in a limited space,
also that defends against pretty small caliber munitions from
the terrorists in the region, obviously more serious from Iran,
but whether that concept can be transferred to the continental
United States is a question I will be interested in.
So I look forward to all of your testimony. Very important
hearing, and I appreciate all the work that you do and the
service you provide to the country.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
Now I would like to begin with statements from each member.
Who is going first at this point? Ms. Yaffe?
STATEMENT OF ANDREA YAFFE, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Yaffe. Thank you. I am happy to start out to provide
the policy perspective.
Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
on the Department of Defense's missile defense posture, on
behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am grateful
to appear alongside my distinguished colleagues.
Missile defenses are a vital element of our strategic force
posture, both as a means of deterrence as well as defending the
U.S. Homeland and security interests abroad. As we see nearly
every day in conflicts across the world, offensive missile
capabilities are now a central feature of modern warfare and
routinely deployed to coerce and intimidate opponents, inflict
tactical damage, and carry out strategic campaigns.
Our adversaries are investing in the next generation of
offensive capabilities to hold the United States Homeland at
risk, coerce our allies and partners, and threaten our deployed
forces.
To counter these growing threats we need next-generation
missile defeat and missile defense architectures that can
complement our existing nuclear and conventional offensive
capabilities. The President has mandated that the United States
will develop and field a next-generation missile defense shield
to provide for the common defense of our citizens and the
Nation and deter, defend against, and defeat any foreign aerial
attack on the Homeland. We will also guarantee our secure
second strike capability. This broad mission set is the task
before us today.
Missile threats pose a substantial and growing risk to the
American people, U.S. national interests, and our allies and
partners. The growing cooperation and potential for more
coordinated action among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran
is reflecting a shared interest in undermining United States
interests globally.
We also see these countries working together to advance
their respective interests. Russia has provided technical and
economic assistance to North Korea and Iran in return for
thousands of munitions, attack drones, and ballistic missiles.
Russia has employed North Korean missiles in Ukraine, resulting
in improvements in their accuracy and destructive capability.
Department of Defense (DOD) must content with adversaries
possessing a range of sophisticated technologies, including
advanced cruise and ballistic missiles and maneuverable
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), as well as lower-tier threats
like unmanned aircraft systems from both State and non-State
actors. These capabilities continue to evolve and include a
wide range of platforms, speeds, distances, and attack vectors
that are easily concealed and evasive.
This is where the value of missile defense, a core
component of deterrence by denial, comes in. Robust missile
defense capabilities raise the threshold for conflict and
introduce uncertainty and complexity into attack planning,
thereby undermining an adversary's confidence that an attack
will be successful. The greater the cumulative challenges for
an adversary, the greater the likelihood of avoiding an attack
in the first place. If deterrence fails and an attack does
occur, missile defenses limit the damage and assure the means
of effective responses.
Moreover, missile defenses provide time and space for the
President to decide how to respond most effectively. The
financial outlays of missile defense and missile defeat today
more than offset the exponentially greater costs that would be
incurred by the lack of defenses in a potential conflict
tomorrow.
Missile defense systems also contribute to deterrence by
reinforcing our diplomatic and security posture while
reassuring allies and partners. Should deterrence fail, the
United States, our allies, and partners would need robust
missile defense and defeat options, not only to defend and
protect our interests but also to manage escalation.
Integration with our allies and partners improves our all-
domain awareness, redundancy, and shot deconfliction. The
deterrence by denial contributions to missile defense continue
to serve as a complement to the cost imposition strategies
offered by our conventional and nuclear forces. Together they
give our decisionmakers time and credible options to deter
aggression, assure lethality, protect the American people from
harm, and respond to attacks if deterrence fails.
The Department of Defense remains committed to making the
necessary investments in our strategic posture to deter our
adversaries and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.
The missile defense and defeat mission requires sufficient and
consistent funding and support.
Thank you for your dedication to our mission and our
servicemembers and for the opportunity to testify to you today
alongside my colleagues. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yaffe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Andrea Yaffe
introduction
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of
the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify on the Department
of Defense's missile defense posture. I am grateful to appear alongside
my distinguished colleagues. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)
for Space Policy is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy on all missile defense and defeat activities. It is
my privilege and honor to oversee this office pending the nomination
and confirmation of a new ASD for Space Policy. For this testimony, I
will review how air and missile threats have evolved over the last year
and provide an update on our missile defense policy, strategy, and
programs to meet these challenges.
Missile defenses are a vital element of our strategic force
posture, both as a means of deterrence as well as defending the U.S.
Homeland and security interests abroad. As we see nearly every day in
conflicts across the world, offensive missile capabilities are now a
central feature of modern warfare. China, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran now routinely deploy
advanced missile systems to coerce and intimidate opponents, inflict
tactical damage, and carry-out strategic campaigns.
Our adversaries are investing in the next generation of offensive
capabilities to hold the United States Homeland at risk, coerce our
allies and partners, and threaten our deployed forces. China, Russia,
and the DPRK, are fielding more advanced missiles with greater ranges
and in larger numbers to provide the means for strategic-level attack
against the Homeland, including nuclear and conventional options. These
adversaries are rapidly modernizing, expanding, and diversifying their
missile forces, incorporating technological advances into warheads,
delivery systems of all types, and supporting command and control
systems. Iran, meanwhile, has the capability to strike targets
throughout the Middle East and continues to arm its proxies in the
region. The President's Golden Dome for America Executive Order
underscores this point: ``The threat of attack by ballistic,
hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial attacks,
remains the most catastrophic threat facing the United States.''
To counter these growing threats, we need next generation missile
defeat and missile defense architectures that can complement our
existing nuclear and conventional offensive capabilities. The President
has mandated that the United States will develop and field a next
generation missile defense shield to provide for the common defense of
our citizens and the Nation, and deter, defend against, and defeat any
foreign aerial attack on the Homeland. We will also guarantee our
secure second-strike capability. This broad mission set is the task
before us today.
Missile defense and the space domain are intrinsically linked as
key elements of the necessary solution. Proliferated space-based
sensors offer an optimal perspective for missile warning and tracking,
and efforts in the space domain will be critical for the future
technological growth of missile defense. The other essential
requirement for countering missile attacks is to develop and deploy
capabilities to defeat them prior to launch.
security environment
Missile threats pose a substantial and growing risk to the American
people, U.S. national interests, and our allies and partners. The
growing cooperation and potential for more coordinated action among
China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran is displaying a shared interest in
undermining United States interests globally.
China
China is modernizing its missile forces to enhance its strategic
deterrence capabilities and to deter and counter third-party
intervention in regional conflicts. Today, China maintains a diverse
arsenal of intercontinental-range forces, theater-range road-mobile
ballistic missile systems, strategic hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)
capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and sea-launched ballistic
missile submarines that can hold the United States and our allies and
partners at risk. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at
extraordinary speed, developing a nuclear triad of land-based and sea-
based missiles and a nuclear-capable strategic bomber. The United
States Intelligence Community assesses that China will have more than
1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, many of which will be
deployed at higher readiness levels. We remain very concerned about the
lack of transparency from China regarding these developments.
China is also developing more survivable intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) to improve its nuclear-capable missile forces. Its
ICBM arsenal currently consists of approximately 400 missiles,
including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching unitary and
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. China's development
of advanced nuclear delivery systems, such as a strategic HGV and a
fractional orbital bombardment system, creates new challenges for
deterrence.
China views the possession of advanced conventional missile systems
as a means to coerce neighbors and subvert U.S. efforts in the region.
China possesses a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched,
short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
and ground-launched cruise missiles to enable long-range precision
strikes within the First and Second Island Chains. This includes
conventionally armed anti-ship ballistic missile variants and multi-
role missiles for targeting aircraft carriers and other ships in the
Western Pacific.
Beijing is also developing and testing more advanced theater-range
missiles, including capabilities and methods to counter adversary
ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. This includes the DF-17 and
longer-ranged DF-27 that have HGV payloads designed to evade early
warning radars and associated defenses. More alarmingly, China is
exploring the development of conventionally armed intercontinental
range missile systems. If developed and fielded, these capabilities
would enable China to strike all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and United States territories with conventional missiles. The
introduction of intercontinental conventional capabilities has the
potential to introduce uncertainty regarding whether an attack has a
conventional or nuclear payload, thereby risking escalation to a
nuclear exchange. In addition to missile development, China is making
significant advancements in Command, Control, Computing,
Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
Targeting (C5ISRT) capabilities, such as a space-enabled targeting
network, as well as counter C5ISRT capabilities, such as ground-based
and space-based counterspace weapons, to strengthen their kill webs,
enable the successful delivery of their long-range precision weapons,
and, ultimately, hold U.S. and allied and partner forces at risk.
Russia
Russia continues to field ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic
missiles and is using these systems extensively in Ukraine. It has
employed air-launched, ground-launched, and sea-launched systems, some
of which could also deliver a nuclear warhead. In addition, Russia is
pursuing novel and destabilizing nuclear systems that are additive to
its existing capabilities, and are designed to hold the United States
Homeland, allies, and partners at risk.
Additionally, the direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles and on-
orbit counterspace capabilities being developed by China and Russia
threaten the space-based sensors critical for our early warning and
missile defense architecture. These threats underscore the need to
create a shared international understanding what constitutes
responsible operational rules for safety and stability in space.
DPRK and Iran
The DPRK and Iran also have missile capabilities that threaten our
territory, forces, and allies. The DPRK continues to develop its ICBM
forces with frequent long-range tests of new systems, including the
test last October of a new, more powerful solid-fueled missile capable
of reaching most of the continental United States. The DPRK's
conventional missile forces, including short and medium-range ballistic
missiles, and cruise missiles, remain a substantial threat to the
DPRK's neighbors and to U.S. territory and forces in the region.
Iran possesses the largest missile program in the Middle East and
twice demonstrated its willingness and ability to use this force last
year with coordinated air and ballistic missile strikes of more than a
thousand kilometers against Israel. Iran also remains the world's
biggest proliferator of ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned
aircraft attack systems and related technologies to State and non-State
entities. The recipients of Iran's support include Hamas in Gaza, the
Houthis in Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Like Iran, these groups
have demonstrated a willingness to use these weapons--whether against
Israel or commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
Adversary Cooperation
We also see these countries working together to advance their
respective interests. Russia has provided technical and economic
assistance to the DPRK and Iran in return for thousands of munitions,
attack drones, and ballistic missiles. Russia has employed DPRK
missiles in Ukraine, resulting in improvements in their accuracy and
destructive capability. The significant growth in the DPRK-Russia
strategic partnership merits close attention because the two countries
increasingly share resources, knowledge, and technology to bolster and
expand their air and missile forces.
Adversary Missile Defense Capabilities
China and Russia possess the largest integrated air and missile
defense forces in the world, dedicated to protecting their respective
homelands and forces from air and missile attack. China is modernizing
its ballistic missile defense capabilities, fielding the indigenous CH-
AB-02 (HQ-19) and developing kinetic-kill vehicle technology to field a
mid-course interceptor. This mid-course interceptor will form the upper
layer of a multi-tiered missile defense. China tested a land-based,
mid-course interceptor on February 4, 2021. Russia, meanwhile, has
maintained a missile defense system to defend Moscow since the 1970's.
It currently consists of about 68 nuclear-armed interceptors. Russia is
also developing the S-500, which has some capability against ballistic
missiles, and operates other credible air and missile defenses to
defend critical assets and fielded forces.
missile defense strategy and posture
DOD must contend with adversaries possessing a range of
sophisticated technologies, including advanced cruise and ballistic
missiles and maneuverable HGVs, as well as lower-tier threats, like
unmanned aircraft system (UAS), from both State and non-State actors.
These capabilities continue to evolve and include a wide range of
platforms, speeds, distances, and attack vectors that are easily
concealed and evasive.
This is where the value of missile defense--a core component of
deterrence-by-denial--comes in. Robust missile defense capabilities
raise the threshold for conflict and introduce uncertainty and
complexity into attack planning, thereby undermining an adversary's
confidence that an attack will be successful. The greater the
cumulative challenges for an adversary, the greater the likelihood of
avoiding an attack in the first place. If deterrence fails and an
attack does occur, missile defenses limit the damage and assure the
means of effective responses. Moreover, missile defenses provide time
and space for the President to decide how to respond most effectively.
The financial outlays of missile defense and missile defeat today more
than offset the exponentially greater cost that would be incurred by
the lack of defenses in a potential conflict tomorrow. This premise is
at the core of the Golden Dome executive order.
Missile defense systems also contribute to deterrence by
reinforcing our diplomatic and security posture while reassuring allies
and partners. Should deterrence fail, the United States, our allies,
and partners would need robust missile defense and defeat options not
only to defend and protect our interests, but also to manage
escalation. Integration with our allies and partners improves our all-
domain awareness, redundancy, and shot deconfliction, and we are
working to overcome barriers to data and cost sharing.
Last year, we witnessed this scenario unfold on multiple occasions.
Iran's large-scale ballistic, cruise missile, and UAS attack against
Israel in April and follow-on massive ballistic missile attack in
October 2024 represented one of the largest concentrated barrages ever
conducted by any nation. The successful coalition missile defense and
missile defeat responses against both attacks created opportunities for
strategic pause, allowing Israel to calibrate its next moves rather
than rush into a counterattack with potential unintended escalation.
The deterrence by denial contributions to missile defense continue
to serve as a complement to the cost imposition strategies offered by
our conventional and nuclear forces. Together they give our
decisionmakers time and credible options to deter aggression, assure
lethality, and protect the American people from harm and respond to
attacks if deterrence fails.
Space-based capabilities and assurance of nuclear second-strike
capabilities are also part of the direction for a Golden Dome for
America. The executive order calls for the ground-breaking development
and deployment of a next generation missile defense shield capable of
protecting the American people against a catastrophic missile attack.
Golden Dome is a top priority for the Department and will include the
development of cutting-edge domain awareness systems, kinetic and non-
kinetic missile defeat capabilities in the space and cyberspace
domains, and advanced command, control, and battle management systems
to integrate and augment traditional U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Burden sharing with allies and partners is also a priority in the
missile defense arena. Japan's co-development of the Glide Phase
Interceptor with us is a prime example, as is their acquisition of
Aegis system equipped vessels and SM-6 interceptors. Data sharing in
the Indo-Pacific region is also a crucial initiative, with efforts
already in place with Japan and South Korea, and discussions underway
with Australia as well. Meanwhile, we are co-developing the Arrow 4 and
co-producing Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow 3 BMD systems with
Israel, and Saudi Arabia is acquiring seven THAAD batteries. Closer, to
home, Canada is acquiring over-the-horizon radars that will be helpful
for the defense of North America. Finally, in Europe, Germany, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland are acquiring Patriot
batteries and interceptors. These allied investments are a start, but
not sufficient to meet the growing threats that we collectively face
today. As the Secretary has stated many times, greater burden-sharing
is required, and we continue to emphasize this point in our discussions
with our allies and partners.
conclusion
The Department of Defense remains committed to making the necessary
investments in our strategic posture to deter our adversaries and, if
deterrence fails, prevail in conflict. The missile defense and defeat
mission requires sufficient and consistent funding and support. Thank
you for your dedication to our mission and our servicemembers, and for
the opportunity to testify to you today alongside my distinguished
colleagues. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. General Guillot,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND
General Guillot. Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
holding this important hearing. North American Aerospace
Defense Command and United States Northern Command have
critical roles in defending The Homeland from missile attack,
and your support remains vital to our success.
I would like to start by recognizing the tremendous work
being done by Lieutenant General Collins, Acting Principle
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Yaffe, and
Lieutenant General Rasch. Northern American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) and NORTHCOM are fortunate to have such
committed partners in our shared no-fail mission.
Defending the United States from missile threats remains a
top command priority. That mission is more important than ever
as global competitors continue their rapid development and
fielding of advanced missile capabilities and delivery
platforms along with increased cooperation and technology
sharing.
To counter these growing challenges, NORAD and NORTHCOM
rely on realistic planning, on-time investments based on
specific threats, and forward-looking policies that ensure the
command's ability to detect, track, and defeat potential
threats in all domains.
To ensure our ability to defend against missile attacks,
NORAD and NORTHCOM require a layered, domain awareness network,
from seabed to space, to detect and track threats to North
America. That sensing network is vital to today's ballistic and
cruise missile defense missions and to the Golden Dome concept
because we can't defeat what we can't see.
Alongside improved domain awareness we must also improve
our capability and capacity to defeat advanced missile threats.
The Next-Generation Interceptor is vital to countering North
Korea's growing ICBM capability, and innovation investment in
advanced defeat mechanisms, which could include directed energy
and boost-phase intercept will be crucial against cruise
missiles, hypersonics, and other advanced threats.
There are significant challenges ahead of us, but NORAD and
NORTHCOM stand ready to deter aggression and defeat threats to
our Nation.
Again, thank to this Subcommittee and my fellow witnesses
for your continued support, and I look forward to your
questions. We have the watch.
[The prepared statement of General Guillot follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Gregory M. Guillot
Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members
of the Sub-Committee: I am honored to appear today and to represent the
men and women of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Both commands continue to
defend North America through what is arguably the most complicated and
rapidly evolving operational environment we have seen. The USNORTHCOM
and NORAD operational environment remains diverse and dynamic, ranging
from persistent competitor activity in the vicinity of North America to
major natural disasters that have impacted millions of Americans. I am
proud to report that the service members and civilian Federal employees
at the heart of every USNORTHCOM and NORAD endeavor have risen to each
challenge as they stand their unending watch over our homelands.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands linked by history,
collaboration, and a shared commitment to defending North America.
USNORTHCOM was established in 2002 as the U.S. geographic combatant
command responsible for homeland defense, security cooperation with
allies and partners in the command's area of responsibility, and
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the continental United
States and Alaska. USNORTHCOM is responsible for defending the United
States--to include Hawaii and Alaska--from ballistic missile attacks,
while the Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated by the Unified
Command Plan as the Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic
Capabilities. Finally, in accordance with Presidential Executive Orders
issued on 20 January, 2025, USNORTHCOM is rapidly integrating requested
military personnel and assets to support the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs & Border Protection (USCBP) along the
southern border, employing unique military capabilities in all domains,
and developing plans for establishing territorial integrity along the
southern border. USNORTHCOM's current mission in support of USCBP is to
seal the borders and repel all forms of invasion including mass
migration, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and
other criminal activities.
Established in 1958 to counter the threat of Soviet long-range
bombers, NORAD is the bi-national United States and Canadian command
responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
warning for North America. For nearly 67 years, the United States and
Canadian personnel assigned to NORAD have worked side-by-side in a
shared commitment to continental defense. Forged through operational
experience and a common vision, NORAD consistently demonstrates world-
class professional standards while executing its critical defense
mission 24 hours a day. Today, NORAD remains the world's only bi-
national command, safeguarding the United States and Canada while
routinely demonstrating seamless interoperability and operational
excellence that our competitors can only hope to match.
Together, USNORTHCOM and NORAD's experience, expertise, and
dedication to homeland defense are more critical today than ever.
Following years of steady investment, our strategic competitors have
the means to overcome U.S. advantages provided by our favorable
geography and advanced technology. Today, our competitors have the
capability and capacity to threaten all of North America with a range
of advanced nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic systems while
employing disruptive grey-zone, cyber, and information operations
against the United States and our international partners. As part of
that effort, competitors have formed strategic relationships that
increase their collective ability to challenge U.S. and allied
interests around the world with growing disregard of international
norms or the sovereignty of nations that challenge their expansionist
ambitions. Meanwhile, unprecedented flows of illicit drugs and human
traffic across the U.S. southern border have created a crisis that
undermines national security and the safety of citizens and communities
across the country.
The dynamic operational environment and evolving threats to North
America require USNORTHCOM and NORAD to execute new missions on a
moment's notice without sacrificing ongoing operations and future
planning. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fortunate to draw upon decades of
shared history and lessons learned to shape the commands' plans and
operations, and defending the homelands in the coming years will
require forward thinking, advanced capabilities, and a professional
workforce with the experience and technical knowledge necessary to
plan, resource, and execute the commands' crucial missions in
tremendously demanding conditions.
The Homeland defense enterprise will continue to rely on realistic
planning, targeted investment, and forward-looking policies that ensure
the Commands' ability to detect, track, and defeat potential threats in
all domains. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working in close synchronization
with each of the commands' interagency, international, and DOD partners
to improve shared all-domain awareness, interoperability, and the
defeat mechanisms required for a layered all-domain defense capable of
deterring and defeating a wide range of threats to critical
infrastructure, force projection capability, and our citizens.
As competitor ambitions and capabilities grow, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
remain committed to improving all-domain awareness, reinforcing our
vital network of allies and partners, and fostering a workforce of
skilled and dedicated civilian and military professionals. Each of
these focus areas are critical to ensuring the homeland defense
enterprise remains ready to deter and defeat any threat to our nations
today and well into the future, and both commands have made significant
strides in building the capabilities, networks, and people needed to
execute their vital missions.
threats to north america
The global security environment is growing increasingly volatile,
characterized by intensifying competition among major powers and
mounting threats to the rules-based international order. Among the
myriad developments that are reshaping the strategic environment, three
trends are of particular concern to NORAD and USNORTHCOM due to their
immediate implications for our Homeland Defense mission.
First, the likelihood of a direct conflict between the United
States and one of its four principal adversaries is increasing. While
the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran each seek to avoid armed
conflict with the United States, their perception of Western decline
fosters a growing willingness to challenge the United States on the
global stage and increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis. As
Russia's brutal and misguided invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth
year, there remain several plausible pathways by which the war could
escalate into a direct military conflict with the United States.
Similarly, the conflict ignited by Hamas' October 2023 attack on Israel
has expanded to encompass much of the Middle East and threatens to
embroil the United States in a direct military conflict with Iran and
its proxies.
Meanwhile, simmering tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China
Sea carry a persistent risk of escalation into armed conflict between
China and the United States, with consequences that could span a
generation. Finally, Kim Jong Un's public abandonment of peaceful
reunification as a national goal and growing assertiveness on the
global stage risks sparking renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula
after more than seven decades of uneasy Armistice.
Second, strategic cooperation between and among our four principal
adversaries has grown substantially since the beginning of the Ukraine
War, increasing the risk that war with one adversary could quickly
expand into war with an enemy coalition. To date, each of these
relationships has remained mostly transactional, and none has advanced
to the level of a formal military alliance. Nonetheless, these
countries' shared perceptions of the West as a global destabilizing
force could form the foundation of a wartime partnership. At the center
of this concerning dynamic is a rapidly evolving relationship between
the United States' two most capable adversaries.
Despite decades of mutual mistrust, Beijing and Moscow seem
determined to advance their strategic partnership and military
cooperation to counter what they perceive as a persistent United States
threat to their core security interests. Catalyzed by the onset of a
major war, this nascent military cooperation could quickly expand into
coordinated military operations that complicate U.S. and allied
planning and advance each adversary's ability to threaten North
America. We saw glimpses of this enhanced military cooperation last
summer when Chinese bomber aircraft deployed to a Russian Arctic
airbase and flew a combined patrol with Russian heavy bombers over the
Bering Sea.
Such ``access transfer'' accelerates and extends China's ability to
threaten North America in the air domain and raises the specter of
coordinated military operations in the event of a strategic conflict.
Separately, North Korea's willingness to risk its own troops in support
of Russia's war in Ukraine demonstrates the lengths to which these
partners are willing to go to advance their strategic positions and
defy the Western-led international order. It also raises concerning
questions about the quid pro quo that Moscow may offer in return,
potentially including expertise that could accelerate Pyongyang's
development of advanced strategic weapons.
Third, each of our adversaries is advancing its ability--and, in
some cases, rehearsing its plans--to threaten North America in multiple
domains and from multiple vectors, increasing the likelihood that an
armed conflict would include direct strikes on the Homeland. The PRC is
expanding its ability to hold portions of North America at risk with
conventionally armed weapons, providing Beijing a strike option against
our Homeland that is above its demonstrated robust cyberattack
capabilities but below its threshold for nuclear use. Last July,
Chinese surface combatants deployed to the Bering Sea for the fourth
straight year and operated within cruise missile range of critical
infrastructure throughout Alaska. Since 2023, China has launched two
hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-powered guided-missile
submarines (SSGN), which in the coming years could provide Beijing a
clandestine land-attack option against critical infrastructure in
Alaska and the U.S. West Coast. In November, China incorporated air-
refuellable H-6N medium bombers into a Sino-Russian combined bomber
patrol, marking the first long-range use of a platform that will extend
the PLA Air Force's strike range to include portions of Alaska even
without basing or overflight permissions from the Russians. Finally,
China may be exploring the development of conventionally armed ICBMs
that could allow Beijing to strike targets in Alaska and the
continental United States without crossing the nuclear threshold.
Meanwhile, China is advancing the quantity and sophistication of
its North America-threatening nuclear deliver platforms. Chinese
missile developers are probably developing nuclear-armed ICBMs equipped
with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) or the ability to fly a
fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) trajectory that approaches
North America from the south rather than the traditional northerly
vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed. Such
systems, if fielded, would erode strategic stability by degrading our
ability to provide granular and actionable warning of an inbound
attack.
Despite the degradation of its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine,
Russia has enhanced its already formidable capability to threaten North
America with conventionally armed air-and sea-based cruise missiles.
Three years of strike operations into Ukraine have provided valuable
operational experience to Russian aircrews and naval forces. In the
last year, Russia's heavy bomber fleet has resumed its pre-war pace of
strategic deterrence patrols--including multiple flights along the
North American coastline--while simultaneously intensifying its strike
operations into Ukraine. In the maritime domain, the Russian submarine
force conducted its first port call in Cuba since the cold war and
further integrated advanced Severodvinsk-class SSGNs into the Russian
Pacific Fleet, portending regular--and potentially concurrent--patrols
by cruise missile-capable submarines off North America's Atlantic and
Pacific coasts.
In the nuclear domain, Russia fielded the world's first HGV-
equipped ICBM over 5 years ago and continues to develop and test other
novel nuclear delivery systems, like the FOBS-capable Sarmat heavy
ICBM, the Poseidon transoceanic torpedo, and the Burevestnik nuclear-
propelled cruise missile. If fielded, these advanced weapons will
severely challenge our ability to detect and characterize an inbound
attack and determine an appropriate response during a conflict.
North Korea continues to defy the international nonproliferation
regime and advance its strategic weapons program. Kim Jong Un's newest
ICBM--the Hwasong-19 he first tested last October--probably can deliver
a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America while minimizing
our ability to provide pre-launch warning due to the shortened launch
preparation timelines afforded by its solid-propellant design. Regime
rhetoric surrounding the new ICBM suggests Kim is eager to transition
his strategic weapons program from research and development to serial
production and fielding, a process that could rapidly expand North
Korea's inventory and narrow my confidence in USNORTHCOM's ballistic
missile defense capacity in the coming years.
Finally, Iran retains the capability to strike the United States in
the cyber domain and through its asymmetric and proxy operations.
Meanwhile, Iran's burgeoning nuclear energy and space launch programs
provide a viable pathway for developing a North America-threatening
ICBM should its leaders determine that they need a more forceful means
of challenging the United States.
Separately, we face a variety of non-traditional threats that could
disrupt critical services in the Homeland and degrade NORAD and
USNORTHCOM's ability to carry out our no-fail missions. Key among these
is a spate of activity over the past year involving small uncrewed
aircraft systems (sUAS) operating over sensitive DOD installations and
other Defense Critical Infrastructure. While much of this activity may
be attributable to hobbyists, peer adversaries clearly have incentive
to collect intelligence on these installations, and our law enforcement
partners have uncovered evidence of a foreign intelligence nexus in
some of these incidents.
Meanwhile, our principal adversaries are concentrating their
increasingly sophisticated offensive cyberoperations on U.S. defense
and civilian infrastructure. Over the last year, Russian-affiliated
cyber actors have conducted attacks on water supply, wastewater,
hydroelectric, and energy facilities in the United States, while PRC-
sponsored cyber actors have positioned themselves on IT networks in
multiple United States sectors, potentially enabling them to rapidly
transition to disruptive attacks in the event of a crisis or conflict.
Finally, I remain highly concerned by threats presented by non-
State actors. USNORTHCOM assesses the threat of a foreign terrorist
attack in North America is at the highest level in at least 5 years, as
the Israel-Hamas conflict has motivated foreign terrorist organizations
to rejuvenate their attack planning against the United States. These
groups have also redoubled their propaganda efforts in the last 18
months to inspire lone-wolf terrorists to pursue attacks within the
Homeland, as seen with the deadly January 1st 2025 attack in New
Orleans.
Separately, transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico
continue to threaten United States sovereignty and territorial
integrity through the production and trafficking of fentanyl and other
dangerous drugs and the facilitation of unlawful mass migration toward
the U.S. southern border. Drug-related violence has escalated in recent
years as rival cartels fight for control of lucrative drug and human
trafficking routes and demonstrate a growing willingness to directly
engage Mexican security forces, increasing the risk of spillover
violence into the United States.
defending the homeland
Homeland defense remains USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top priority and
essential task. Strategic competitors continue their rapid testing and
fielding of precision weapons systems capable of striking targets well
into the U.S and Canadian interior. As those threats increase,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are tasked with defending critical defense
infrastructure in the Homeland from attack in order to preserve U.S.
Force projection capability and mitigating risks to vital
transportation, energy, and manufacturing hubs. Addressing threats from
long-range missiles, cyberattacks, and unmanned aerial systems requires
close coordination and collaboration with a host of interagency,
international, and DOD partners, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are ideally
situated to serve as the synchronizer and integrator for that crucial
whole-of-government enterprise.
Over the course of the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
expanded on already robust efforts to improve the capability of the
Joint Force and the interagency community to defend key sites--from
military installations to civilian transportation and energy nodes--
from attack. That effort is making significant progress thanks in large
part to the expertise, cooperation, and commitment of our DOD and
interagency partners. As this critical effort moves forward, success
will depend on collaboration across the interagency community, as well
as on developing the forward-looking capabilities and policies
necessary to ensure a seamless and well-coordinated defensive
enterprise that accounts for the unique requirements of conducting
defensive operations inside the United States and Canada.
In the event of combat operations or attacks against the United
States, USNORTHCOM will have a role in protecting DOD installations--
along with airports, seaports, rail networks, and highway
infrastructure necessary to project forces into overseas geographic
combatant commands--from both kinetic and cyber threats. USNORTHCOM is
actively engaged with the whole-of-government enterprise involved in
this nationwide effort to refine the plans and deployable, low-
collateral capabilities required to mitigate the wide range of threats
to these key sites inside the United States.
Protecting Territorial Integrity
Following the January 20, 2025 Presidential declaration of a
national emergency on the U.S. southern border, USNORTHCOM was assigned
amplified responsibilities for maintaining the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the United States. In accordance with Presidential
Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately
deployed 1,800 military personnel, aircraft, and equipment to the
southern border to reinforce existing Federal military personnel,
aircraft, and equipment to the southern border to reinforce existing
Federal military personnel, aircraft, and equipment to the southern
border to reinforce existing Federal military personnel, aircraft, and
equipment to the southern border to reinforce existing Federal border
security operations in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(USCBP). Meanwhile, the command is preparing a Commander's estimate and
a detailed contingency plan (CONPLAN), in accordance with Presidential
Executive Orders and Department directives, toprovide steady-state
border security in accordance with the pending update to the Unified
Campaign Plan (UCP) directed by the President. USNORTHCOM's priority is
to meet the requirement and intent of these directives, and the
command's actions and plans reflect the urgency associated with the
President's emergency declaration.
Defending Against Air and Missile Threats
The DPRK continues to test increasingly capable ICBMs, while Russia
and the PRC have steadily expanded their stockpiles of highly capable
long-range land-attack cruise missiles and the fleets of the delivery
platforms that launch them. The risks to the homeland posed by nuclear-
armed ICBMs are clear, while advanced PRC and Russian cruise missiles
are difficult to detect and can carry both nuclear and conventional
payloads. All of these weapons can be launched against the United
States and Canada in an effort to degrade the infrastructure enabling
United States military force projection, inflict economic harm, and
weaken public support for U.S. intervention in overseas conflicts.
As air and missile threats to the homeland will continue to mount,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking immediate actions to implement the
January 27, 2025 Executive Order directing the building of a Missile
Defense Shield for North America. USNORTHCOM and NORAD envision this
defensive system of systems as three overlapping defensive domes that
will provide a continental all-domain awareness network directly linked
to tailored defensive systems capable of defeating threats ranging from
high-altitude ballistic missiles to lower-flying air-breathing threats,
including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. These systems
threaten all of North America, and the commands are working closely
with Canadian allies to ensure a fully integrated approach to
continental defense.
As the foundational dome, improved domain awareness from the
seafloor to space remains the most critical priority for deterring and
defeating missile threats to the Homeland. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
working closely with the U.S. Air Force, which has been tasked as the
executive agent for air-and cruise-missile defense of the homeland to
identify potential solutions to domain awareness challenges. It is
vital that the domain awareness network provide the ability to detect,
discriminate, and deliver crucial real-time information and a single
common operational picture to leaders at all appropriate levels.
Command modernization initiatives, including the establishment of a
layered system of sensors such as space-based Airborne Moving Target
Indicator (AMTI), Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR), the E-7 Wedgetail, and
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), remain critical to
continental defense in order to detect, track, and prosecute adversary
submarines, aircraft and surface vessels, as well as inbound missiles.
In the next tier, USNORTHCOM will continue to defend the United
States--to include Alaska and Hawaii--attacks from ballistic missiles
as well as emerging threat systems. In the near-term, the current
United States ground-based midcourse defense system has a long record
of success and remains fully capable of defending against a potential
DPRK missile attack. However the DPRK's demonstration of larger and
more capable ICBM technology will require a corresponding increase in
United States BMD capability beyond planned inventories. The on-time
fielding of the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) remains a major
USNORTHCOM priority, and I am working closely with the Missile Defense
Agency and the Department to ensure that program remains on track.
Looking forward, the United States and Canada must develop the
capability to detect, track, and defeat emerging adversary systems, to
include ICBMs armed with multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs), hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and fractional
orbital bombardment systems (FOBS).
The final tier will defend against air-breathing threats, to
include unmanned aerial systems, threat aircraft, advanced land-attack
cruise missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles designed to challenge
U.S. Homeland defense systems from lower altitudes. To ensure
effectiveness, the three nodes must be resilient, interconnected, and
tailored to defeat specific threats, and developing these defenses and
associated policy guidance that reflect the complex strategic
environment and the reality of a homeland at risk will be critical in
the coming years. I have every confidence in our collective ability to
overcome these challenges and remain fully committed to collaboration
with the Department, international allies, industry partners, and this
Committee in pursuit of that critical goal.
operation noble eagle (one)
While some of the capabilities required for comprehensive air and
missile defense of the homeland remain in development, Operation NOBLE
EAGLE (ONE) and NORAD's aerospace control mission have secured North
American airspace for decades, adapting constantly to ever-evolving
threats including Russian--and now PRC--bombers, violent extremist
threats to civilian aviation, and advanced cruise missiles launched
from the air and sea. NORAD's ability to adapt to and outpace emerging
challenges is a cornerstone of the command's longstanding reputation as
a pillar of continental defense.
The threats to North American airspace have steadily grown more
complex, and now include a spectrum of competitor capabilities that
range from modernized long-range bombers and hypersonic cruise missiles
down to small unmanned systems that can fit into a backpack. While two
decades of whole-of-government response have reduced the threat of
terrorist threats to civil aircraft, NORAD maintains the ability to
deter and defeat nation-State threats from every avenue of approach to
North America while safeguarding national leaders from aerial threats,
both in the National Capital Region and around the country.
Given the evolving security environment and robust mitigation
efforts carried out by interagency partners, NORAD, in cooperation with
the Department and the National Guard Bureau, will make specific
changes to ``just in case'' aerospace control alert forces (ACA-1) this
year and is conducting ongoing analysis of ``just in time'' flexible
response capabilities (ACA-2). Such adjustments will allow NORAD to
optimize protection of prioritized Defense Critical Infrastructure
while maintaining adequate national response capability in support of
civilian air traffic. In turn, the Air Force and the Air National Guard
will be able to generate greater readiness against high-end threats
though enhanced campaigning and training while remaining available to
NORAD when indications and warning triggers are met.
I am grateful to the Committee for your support for these key
USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities, as we work to identify effective and
affordable capabilities that will meet this important challenge now and
well into the future. The same can be said of our Canadian partners, as
the Government of Canada has committed to fielding long-range sensors
and weapons system to deter and defeat potential air, sea, and missile
threats in the approaches to North America. Integration and
collaboration with Canada--through NORAD and in broader continental
defense initiatives--will grow even more necessary as our competitor
field greater numbers of increasingly advanced long-range cruise
missiles.
Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems
There is perhaps no better example of the rapidly evolving
strategic environment than the emergence of small unmanned aerial
systems (sUAS) as a threat to infrastructure and personnel in the
homeland. The availability and utility of small drones has grown
exponentially over the last decade, and some have repeatedly employed
these systems for illicit purposes. While U.S. and coalition forces
overseas have faced the threat of weaponized unmanned systems for
years, small drones have emerged as a significant risk to
infrastructure and safety in the United States in a relatively short
period of time. The widespread availability of small drones, coupled
with a complicated regulatory structure and limitations on UAS
countermeasures based on concerns for flight safety and privacy, has
created significant vulnerabilities that have been exploited by known
and unknown actors.
There have been multiple incursions by UAS over military
installations in the United States over the past year. To mitigate the
potential threats to safety and security presented by UAS overflight of
DOD facilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in close coordination with the
military Services and DOD, resourced equipment and analytic tools to
installation commanders to assist with detection, tracking, and
mitigation of potential UAS threats. In November 2024, then-Secretary
of Defense Austin directed USNORTHCOM to serve as the synchronizer,
integrator, and/or coordinator of domestic counter-small UAS (C-sUAS)
activities within the continental United States and Alaska for DOD and,
when requested and approved, for the interagency. USNORTHCOM will play
a critical role in an enduring whole-of-government effort to protect
people, infrastructure, aircraft, and facilities from malign sUAS
incursions. This effort will require investment in robust and evolving
mitigation technologies suitable for use in the United States,
alignment with interagency and industry partners, and policy and
statutory changes that balance safety, privacy, and defensive
requirements.
In October 2024, USNORTHCOM and NORAD were proud to host
Demonstration FALCON PEAK 25.1, which brought together DOD,
interagency, and industry partners seeking to demonstrate counter-sUAS
sensors and defeat mechanisms. Thanks to extraordinary support from the
U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division, 10th Special Forces Group
(Airborne), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Colorado
National Guard, and many others, demonstration participants tracked and
engaged live sUAS targets in complex, realistic scenarios over a number
of days and nights within military Special Use Airspace. The
demonstration provided important insights that the Commands and our
partners will continue to build on, including during FALCON PEAK 25.2,
which will include a larger slate of vendors, participants, and systems
in August 2025, meeting FY25 National Defense Authorization Act
direction.
In recognition of the sUAS threat and the Commands' increased
responsibilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted resources and
personnel to establish a C-UAS operations branch within our
headquarters. This Committee has long been aware of the potential
threat presented by sUAS, and I would like to extend my appreciation
for your ongoing support for C-UAS research and acquisitions. That
support will remain critical as success in the homeland C-sUAS mission
will depend on improved C-UAS technology, interagency collaboration,
and corresponding authorities and resourcing for the mission to defend
against this significant risk to safety and security.
Cyber Domain Roles and Responses
Threats to civil and military infrastructure are a direct and
constant concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While not directly
responsible for the defense of non-USNORTHCOM networks, cyberattacks
against United States and Canadian infrastructure carry the potential
to negatively impact DOD force projection and could require significant
defense support to civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of a
damaging cyberattack against transportation, energy, or economic
networks.
Any direct action against the United States by a major competitor
would almost certainly involve cyberattacks against strategic North
American infrastructure, and USNORTHCOM collaborates daily with U.S.
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
any number of other intergovernmental partners to deter, defend, and--
if necessary--respond to cyberattacks.
Defense Operations in the Arctic
Defending North America is inherently linked to the ability of the
Joint Force to operate effectively across the entire USNORTHCOM area of
responsibility--to include the Arctic. Russia is expanding its
capability and capacity to conduct military operations in the Arctic,
seeking to control access to northern sea lanes and threaten North
America from the northern approaches. In 2024, Russian and PRC aircraft
and surface vessels conducted joint patrols in the Bering Sea, while
the PRC repeatedly deployed dual-purpose vessels into the Arctic as
part of a longstanding effort to expand the ability of the People's
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct multi-domain operations in the
high north.
Arctic responsibilities are shared across multiple geographic and
functional combatant commands, and as competition in the region
increases, safeguarding Arctic access and freedom of maneuver will
depend on Joint Force Arctic operational capabilities and build on the
already strong ties between Arctic partners. USNORTHCOM places enormous
value on the ability to conduct operations and exercises in the high
north and to execute assigned missions in coordination with fellow
combatant commands.
The annual ARCTIC EDGE exercise is a key example of a USNORTHCOM
event that evaluates combatant command planning, communications, and
operational oversight while simultaneously providing warfighters and
enablers with valuable operational experience as they test the people,
equipment, and logistics trains needed to execute their missions in
remote and austere locations. Regular exercises and real-world
operations in the Arctic remain critically important and generate
valuable lessons learned for participants from the combatant command
and components headquarters down to the operational and tactical
levels. Effective operations in the Arctic require specialized training
and equipment under the best of conditions, and there is no substitute
for real-world experience in the region. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will
continue to advocate for designated Arctic units that are specifically
trained and equipped to execute their assigned missions in all
conditions.
As inter-reliance between allies and partners grows increasingly
vital to ensuring a secure and open Arctic, USNORTHCOM and NORAD gain
strength and capability from our military partnerships. In particular,
the Canadian Armed Forces' expertise in Arctic operations and the
Government of Canada's longstanding commitment to Arctic security are
of enormous value to continental defense. Canada's Arctic Foreign
Policy (CAFP), announced in December 2024, clearly recognizes the
significance of Russia-PRC collaboration in the Arctic as well as the
vast importance of the North American Arctic to both the United States
and Canada.
This policy will directly support NORAD through international
diplomatic engagement and a series of important Canadian defense
investments that will strengthen shared continental defense
capabilities. The extraordinary value of the United States-Canadian
defense relationship has proven itself time and again over the course
of six decades, and I have every confidence that the the strategic
vision and commitment to North American defense articulated in the
CAFP, when resourced, will pay dividends for the defense of North
America for many years to come.
security cooperation with regional partners
USNORTHCOM's regional security cooperation relationships remain a
critical element of the command's missions. USNORTHCOM's military
partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas enhance our own
homeland defense while building the capacity of those partners to
operate and communicate with United States Forces. Those relationships
are vital to countering competitor influence and presence in the
Western Hemisphere while improving intelligence sharing, border
security, and domain awareness.
Decades of information sharing, combined exercises, and routine
direct engagement between USNORTHCOM senior leaders and our Canadian,
Mexican, and Bahamian military counterparts has brought North American
defense cooperation to a historic high point. The bilateral and
multilateral ties between our militaries will be of critical importance
over the next 18 months as the United States, Mexico, and Canada
prepare to host the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2026. USNORTHCOM's
capacity to synchronize interagency and international partners will be
crucial to ensuring the safety and security of this quadrennial global
tournament. That work--which will involve dozens of military,
intelligence community, and law-enforcement partners from all three
host nations--is already well underway and will grow in scope and scale
through the end of the competition.
In the meantime, USNORTHCOM's routine engagements and exercises
with our regional partners have produced operational capability with
direct benefits for the defense of North America. In 2024, as a Russian
Navy surface action group (SAG) transited the Atlantic Ocean,
USNORTHCOM, NORAD, the Canadian Armed Forces, United States European
Command, and United States Southern Command maintained constant common
situational awareness of the SAG's location, while executing seamless
operations across multiple international and combatant command
boundaries. The execution of this mission was the direct result of the
close ties between USNORTHCOM and our international and cross-command
partners and demonstrated a degree of commonality and interoperability
that our competitors are years from being able to match.
Building our partners' ability to operate with U.S. Forces has led
directly to improved regional domain awareness, information sharing,
and cooperation against shared security challenges, especially given
the efforts of peer competitors to gain influence with the United
States' nearest neighbors. USNORTHCOM's dedicated efforts to support
our partners' defense requirements over the years have played an
important role in maintaining the United States as the clear partner of
choice while simultaneously improving our partners' capability and
capacity for addressing internal security challenges. USNORTHCOM
remains committed to these essential relationships.
defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
USNORTHCOM's support to civilian Federal agencies in times of need
stands as the command's most visible mission to American citizens.
Operating in support of a lead Federal agency, USNORTHCOM leverages the
command's expertise in planning, synchronization, and operations to
prepare for, assess, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.
In 2024, USNORTHCOM provided air assets and ground forces to fight
major wildfires in the western United States, to include the recent
fires in Los Angeles; delivered relief to Americans in need following
major hurricanes and flooding along the Atlantic coast; supported
Federal law enforcement in securing National Special Security Events
(NSSE); reinforced Federal counter-drug efforts, and augmented USCBP
border operations.
USNORTHCOM is proud to support each Federal partner, and delivering
relief to American citizens exercises the same planning, operations,
and communications mechanisms required to conduct homeland defense
operations during periods of crisis and conflict. Drawing on the
Command's expertise, specialized capabilities, and robust interagency
networks, USNORTHCOM supports the vital missions of U.S. Federal law
enforcement partners as they safeguard U.S. borders and citizens by
leveraging the command's specialized intelligence collection
capabilities abroad.
Those capabilities also allow USNORTHCOM to play an increasing role
in illuminating the illicit networks used by criminal cartels to move
money, human traffic, and illegal drugs. The narcotics smuggled into
the United States by transnational criminal organizations are directly
responsible for tens of thousands of deaths each year, and USNORTHCOM
welcomes the opportunity to assist partners in reducing the flow of
illicit drugs into the United States.
In the aftermath of the catastrophic flooding that struck eastern
North Carolina in October 2024, USNORTHCOM supported the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with ground forces and aviation
assets for search and rescue, delivery of relief supplies, route
clearance, and other key missions that directly assisted residents of
the affected areas. I want to specifically recognize the extraordinary
response of leaders and Soldiers from the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne
Corps, to include units from the 101st Airborne Division and the 82d
Airborne Division. Thanks to their readiness, skill, and devotion to
their mission, every USNORTHCOM request for forces was executed well
ahead of required timelines and enabled an extraordinary response to a
historic disaster. While there were certainly lessons learned for an
even more effective response in future contingencies, I am extremely
proud of the work done by USNORTHCOM, U.S. Army North and the deployed
U.S. Army units whose incredible efforts helped so many Americans in
need.
A similar level of support from across the Department enabled
USNORTHCOM to augment U.S. Secret Service (USSS) protection of the
major Presidential and vice-Presidential candidates during the last
several months of the 2024 Presidential campaign. In response to a USSS
request for assistance following the attempted assassination of
President Trump, USNORTHCOM, in concert with the Joint Staff and the
military Services, provided explosive ordinance technicians, military
working dog teams, and rotary-wing assets to ensure the safety and
security of the candidates at nearly 200 locations. Successfully
deploying dozens of highly specialized security teams to hundreds of
event sites was a testament to the professional planners and operators
involved with the mission, and I am proud of USNORTHCOM's support for
this critical effort.
conclusion
I am honored and privileged to lead the men and women of USNORTHCOM
and NORAD. I thank our service members and civilian employees for their
efforts while executing our noble mission of defending the United
States and Canada as both commands continue to expand our bi-national,
whole-of-government, continental approach to homeland defense. I
appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring our service
members remain ready to defend our homeland now and in the future, and
I look forward to continued collaboration with all of our critical
partners in defending our great nations.
We Have the Watch
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. General Collins,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HEATH A. COLLINS, USAF,
DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
General Collins. Thank you, ma'am. Good afternoon, Chair
Fischer, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to talk about the
Missile Defense Agency portfolio.
MDA is moving quickly to provide effective defenses against
a dangerous missile threat to defend the U.S. Homeland, our
deployed forces, and our allies and friends. The agency is
transforming itself, its enterprise, and its industry base in
order to develop and deliver capabilities to the warfighter, at
scale and speed.
As we move with urgency to deliver the next-generation
missile defense system, we intend to leverage the performance
efficiencies found at integrated layered defenses. We also will
continue to integrate and improve the space domain to support a
missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and
adaptable, to known and unanticipated threats.
MDA's focus is on the improvement and sustainment of U.S.
Homeland and regional defenses. We are enhancing the
performance and capability of the fielded, Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system along with development and testing of
the Next-Generation Interceptor. We are working with the Navy
to improve the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability
and enhance hypersonic defenses, and with the Army to make
investments in the future development of the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense system, THAAD.
Together in support of the Nation's missile defense
enterprise and Golden Dome for America, MDA remains focused on
delivering advanced, reliable, and resilient capabilities on
accelerated timelines to meet the warfighter's needs.
I greatly appreciate your continued support for MDA and for
the missile defense mission, and I look forward to answering
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins
Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
discuss the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) portfolio.
MDA is moving fast to provide effective defenses for the protection
of the U.S. Homeland, deployed forces, and our allies and friends. We
are focused on delivering advanced, reliable, resilient capabilities on
accelerated timelines to meet Warfighter needs. Today, MDA is
transforming itself, its enterprise, and its industry base to employ
modern digital frameworks, models, and tools that improve decision
advantage in order to field capabilities to the Warfighter at speed and
scale. MDA is also engaging non-traditional companies with their
innovative tools and approaches to tackle complex design and
integration challenges. These efforts will reduce lead times and
increasing transparency, agility, and efficiency to enable the MDA
workforce to focus on delivering next generation missile defense
capabilities.
Over the past decade, adversaries have significantly advanced their
ability to strike the homeland and field more sophisticated long-range
weapons, including new ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.
China is at varying stages of developing nuclear-armed Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), orbital
weapons, and even conventionally armed long-range missiles designed to
strike the Continental United States (CONUS) without crossing the
nuclear threshold. Russia has improved its already formidable
capability to threaten CONUS and recently fielded the world's first
HGV-equipped ICBM. Moscow continues to develop and test other novel
nuclear delivery platforms like the Sarmat heavy ICBM and the
Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile. Russian bombers and naval
combatants have resumed deterrence patrols that place their cruise
missiles in range of the homeland. North Korea is advancing its
strategic weapons program. In October 2024, Pyongyang tested the new
Hwasong-19 ICBM that can probably deliver a nuclear payload to points
across North America. Iran is growing its nuclear and space launch
programs to provide a viable pathway for developing a nuclear-armed
ICBM, should Tehran decide to do so.
layering and integration critical to system performance
Layering defenses is critical to improving the performance of any
missile defense system. A network of geographically dispersed sensors
and diverse weapon systems allows the system to engage inbound threats
at varying times in the missile's flight to improve overall defense
effectiveness. There are system performance benefits to having
engagement capabilities in different geographic domains and the ability
to layer engagements, to include increasing the probability of a
successful intercept.
An examination of the defense of Israel from real world missile
attacks over the past 17 months provides a look at the performance
efficiencies integrated layered defenses make possible. In 2024, Iran
conducted two large-scale aerial and missile attacks on Israel. Israeli
missile defenses and the United States Missile Defense System
demonstrated combat-proven interoperability by detecting, tracking, and
engaging the most complex, dense, and stressing ballistic missile
attacks in history, saving countless Israeli and American lives. These
same United States and Israeli assets have successfully defended Israel
against dozens of missiles launched from Yemen by the Houthis.
Working together with Israeli missile defense systems, Aegis BMD
and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) have performed
exceptionally well, contributing to the highly successful protection of
Israel as well as United States and international military forces and
the civilian population. Aegis BMD demonstrated operational capability
outside its design requirements. Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IA and
Block IB missiles demonstrated high reliability and excess capabilities
in these operations. SM-6 missiles fired in Sea-Based Terminal mode
demonstrated high reliability and effectiveness. We have been working
closely during this period with the Navy to deliver missile software
upgrades and Aegis weapon system upgrades to improve defenses.
Additionally, the U.S. Army deployed THAAD to Israel in October 2024
and has since conducted the first U.S. engagement with the weapon
system. The system has performed very well with regional partners in
defensive operations demonstrating the maturity, reliability, and
effectiveness of the THAAD system, fully integrated and layered with
the Israeli missile defense systems. During these operations, we
learned much about the effectiveness of our sensors, weapons, command
and control systems and the tactics, techniques and procedures to
employ them effectively, validating the need for layered missile
defenses. The exo-and endo-atmospheric layers across multiple systems
proved vital in reducing the engagement burden on lower tier systems,
prevented damage to critical defended assets, and ultimately saved
lives.
A missile defense system is only as effective as its ability to
command and control all integrated elements. The Command and Control,
Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system proved its value in
integrating real-world combat operations. C2BMC provides global
communications, command and control and is a force multiplier that
brings different sensors and shooters together so that systems not
designed to work together can share data and engage threats they
otherwise would not have been able to see. In the Middle East, C2BMC
enabled remote engagements by both Aegis and Israeli systems,
correlated and combined overhead and terrestrial sensor data, extended
engagement ranges far beyond internal weapon system radars resulting in
improved system level performance.
As part of a future layered defense construct within the Missile
Defense System, we will buildupon C2BMC to deploy a more scalable,
operational open architecture to increase data processing capabilities,
improve missile defense system performance, and enable situational
awareness for senior commanders and battle management and command and
control for operational warfighters throughout a mass raid situation.
C2BMC will also expand the existing, globally deployed network to
integrate more sensors and shooters and provide secure, physical
communication data links for all new sites.
There is a growing Warfighter demand for enhanced joint force
capabilities to combat threats across the continuum of air, cruise,
ballistic and hypersonic missiles. MDA, as the Integrated Air and
Missile Defense (IAMD) Technical Authority, is engineering and
prototyping the Joint Tactical Integrated Fire Control (JTIFC)
architecture focusing on multi-domain, cross-Service kill chains,
enabling true ``right sensor, right shooter'' capability to counter
emerging threats. JTIFC enhances integrated fire control capabilities
across the Services and agencies by essentially ``connecting'' existing
sensors, command and control systems, and weapons at the tactical
level.
JTIFC efforts include MDA's Joint Track Management Capability
(JTMC) Bridge, which is designed to connect Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force weapons, sensors, and fire control networks into a Joint
Integrated Fire Control Network. The JTMC Bridge is on a path to field
with the Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), Navy Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC), and Air Force Tactical Operations Center--
Light (TOC-L) Programs of Record in 2027 to 2028.
This JTIFC architecture has been demonstrated at multiple Combatant
Command and Service exercises, to include the successful intercept of a
cruise missile during Army Flight Test 6 in 2021. Recurring Service
exercises include the Army's annual Project Convergence (Capstone 5
upcoming), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's biennial Valiant Shield and
Operation Sling Stone, and U.S. Northern Command's Northern Edge.
Future JTIFC capabilities to be engineered and planned for delivery to
the Services' programs include the fusion of combat identification
features from all sensors, force level engagement coordination, and
distributed electronic protection capabilities. The Guam Defense System
builds on the JTIFC core architecture and future capabilities, ensuring
joint weapons and sensors are integrated for layered area defense.
Recognizing that a more effective force is integrated and interoperable
with allies and partners, JTIFC can enable cross-Nation kill chains in
support of evolving warfighting concepts and security partnerships.
space is vital to future missile defense
We must continue to integrate and leverage the space domain as we
sharpen our focus today to develop and deliver the next generation
missile defense system. The exploitation of space supports a missile
defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and adaptable to
known and unanticipated threats. The proximity, persistence, and
precision of space-based missile defense assets offers a truly
transformative capability.
To ensure rapid gap coverage, MDA has developed prototypes designed
with Warfighter capabilities in mind. The MDA Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) program, for example, is helping to close
the gap by supporting detection and tracking of hypersonic weapons and
providing multi-domain support to the Overhead Persistent Infrared
(OPIR) enterprise architecture. HBTSS, which provides fire control
quality data to support engagements, is proving to be a critical
element of our future hypersonic kill chain. Currently, HBTSS has
collected over half a million images, to include data collected from
test targets, targets of opportunity, and real-world events.
Additionally, the HBTSS program has made remarkable development
achievements. It implemented a new enterprise ground system in just 36
months; rapidly designed and built two satellites within 36 months;
conducted the first accelerated National Security Space Launch within
12 months in collaboration with the Space Force; and participated in
its first test within 119 days of launch. MDA will continue to grow its
collaboration with the Space Force to develop and deliver this vital
capability to the future Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture.
Following an extremely successful HBTSS program, we are pursuing
the same approach in developing the Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS)
to perform birth-to-death tracking and discrimination of in-flight
ballistic missiles and their payload objects. MDA will launch a DSS
prototype satellite in 2029, followed by on-orbit test and
demonstration of DSS capabilities to inform future space-based
architecture and design requirements. The DSS prototype will
demonstrate the technology required to track ballistic missiles from
space birth to death while discriminating lethal objects from non-
lethal objects, with the final operational DSS system design to be
decided by the Space Force. MDA will expand the demonstration of
critical DSS capabilities to provide the United States an interim
capability to defend against ballistic and other advanced missile
threats from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries.
Finally, President Trump's January 27, 2025 Executive Order
highlighted the need to develop cutting-edge, next generation, kinetic
and non-kinetic capabilities that will include a focus on the
development of space-based interceptors (SBI) capable of boost phase
defense. A space engagement layer would complement land-and sea-based
defenses. MDA stands ready to work closely with the Space Force and
other stakeholders on the development and delivery of the SBI
architecture. From a missile defense architect and developer
perspective, a space-based missile defense layer would offer numerous
benefits, including a persistent on-call global presence, which would
reduce the risks associated with hostile missiles launched with little
or no notice from different regions around the world.
leveraging advanced technologies for future capabilities
MDA is rapidly developing, demonstrating, and transitioning
disruptive missile defeat capabilities to deter, degrade, and destroy
adversary threats. MDA is using the rapid development of prototypes to
develop and demonstrate disruptive, ``game-changing'' capabilities,
with incremental capability off-ramps to the Warfighter. We recently
unveiled a new framework to streamline the acquisition of missile
defense technologies. One significant part of this framework is the use
of a Multiple Authority Announcement (MAA), which consolidates a broad
range of procurement authorities and methods, such as Other
Transactions, Commercial Solution Openings, Procurement for
Experimental Purposes, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements,
grants, and research and development agreements. The MAA, which was
released last month, is an acquisition approach gear toward reaching
non-traditional defense contractors. However, it does not prevent
traditional defense contractors from participating when they have
solutions that could potentially meet the Government's needs. The MAA
seeks responses from a broad set of innovative technology companies to
develop capabilities that allow MDA to better manage complex design and
integration challenges and accelerate critical decisionmaking. The
combination of a competitive environment with simplified procurement
processes and continued leverage of MDA's unique acquisition
authorities will strengthen our ability to accelerate overall timelines
and deliver operational capability to the Warfighter.
The Agency is developing a multi-layered defensive architecture to
counter hypersonic threats in defense of the homeland. This
architecture leverages advanced sensors for early warning,
identification, and persistent tracking of hypersonic threats. MDA is
analyzing several initiatives to address these threats, including:
enhancing persistent tracking of unpredictable targets, improving
communication systems, adapting fire control strategies, and developing
new kinetic interceptors with exceptional agility in extreme
aerothermal environments. Additionally, MDA is exploring non-kinetic
solutions and payloads to effectively neutralize hypersonic threats.
MDA is collaborating across the DOD Special Projects enterprise to
synergize resources and leverage residual missile defense capabilities.
Our advanced Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis laboratory provides
element-and component-level performance assessment up to mission-level
analysis at all levels of classification. The lab is on a growth path
to federate the models across the DOD, providing an integrated approach
to missile defeat.
MDA is prioritizing the integration of Directed Energy (DE) systems
into the Missile Defense System, which would reduce the burden on
kinetic interceptors and augment existing capabilities. In 2024, the
Directed Energy Independent Assessment Team recommended MDA reestablish
efforts to develop and deploy DE systems. MDA also initiated work on a
phased, long-range detect and track rapid prototype, coupled with a
kill laser. Conceptually, a High Energy Laser can thin out the number
of objects in an attack, lower the cost per kill, and provide a nearly
unlimited magazine. MDA is on a path to demonstrate progressively
higher High Energy Laser power levels, with incremental capability off-
ramps to Service partners on the path to an objective capability. MDA
also supports a joint DOD effort to determine the effectiveness of High
Energy Laser weapon systems against a series of dynamic targets. In
2024-2025, the Probability of Weapons Effectiveness Experiment
successfully engaged and negated a series of dynamic targets in
crossing and head-on profiles. Finally, High Energy Laser for Regional
Airborne Defense (HELRAD) explores the application space for state-of-
the-art directed energy systems as they apply to future MDA
architectures, identifying opportunities for MDA's future DE programs.
MDA will continue to partner across the DOD and Intelligence Community
to ensure a seamless left-through-right-of-launch integration effort in
defeating missile threats.
homeland defense
For homeland defense, MDA continues to improve performance of the
fielded Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which recently
celebrated its 20 year anniversary of 24/7 defense of the homeland. In
2025, we will deploy capability to increase battle-space via a change
to the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) that enables firing only two of
the three solid rocket motors along with discrimination improvements to
improve overall system performance against more complex threats with
countermeasures. Additionally, MDA is continuing development and
testing of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is the future
replacement for the GBI fleet. The NGI's modular design will facilitate
upgrades to address evolving threats and provide a substantial increase
in firepower given the multiple kill vehicles on board. Additionally,
NGI will provide a reduced cost-per-kill through its increased
efficiency, reliability, and availability, providing greater magazine
depth.
We received authority to proceed into the Product Development Phase
with the NGI program in September 2024 and have enjoyed many successes
thus far in this new phase of development. However, there are some
challenges we are addressing given the complexity of the NGI weapon
system. Beyond the expected design challenges, we have experienced
unanticipated programmatic, technical, and producibility challenges
that are driving increases to the estimated development and deployment
schedule. The earlier-than-planned down-select in April 2024 had a
significant impact on NGI's supply chain. Upon learning of the early
down-select, NGI suppliers moved quickly to limit fiscal exposure and,
in some instances, stopped development work on critical NGI components
while waiting for the final down-select decision. The combination of
these supply chain impacts along with post-COVID-induced inflation have
adversely impacted the program. In addition, we have experienced
significant development and manufacturing challenges with the solid
rocket motor cases to be used in qualification testing. Solid rocket
motors are on the critical path to executing the first flight test of
the NGI. These development and supply chain challenges required us to
develop a comprehensive NGI re-plan schedule. The result is key
milestones have shifted to the right.
Despite these challenges, the NGI program continues to move forward
while still enforcing technical rigor and a ``fly before you buy''
approach to deliver this critically important capability. The NGI
program will execute an All Up Round Critical Design Review in first
quarter fiscal year 2027 on the way to completing two rigorous flight
tests in fiscal year 2029. This will provide USNORTHCOM with an
opportunity to declare an Initial Operational Capability no later than
fiscal year 2030. To demonstrate confidence and to reduce program risk,
MDA is exploring options for a flight test demonstration in 2028.
Concurrent with NGI development, MDA is upgrading the legacy
fielded homeland defense system ground components supporting the GBI
fleet to ensure seamless NGI compatibility to address the evolving
threat. The ground weapon system monitors the health and status of
interceptors, conducts pre-launch activities, performs engagement
planning, tasks interceptors at launch, provides in-flight updates to
the interceptor, and ensures communication connectivity between all of
the launch sites and ground-based sensors. We have synchronized the
ground weapon system development schedule with the NGI re-plan
schedule. Together, these two programs have an executable path forward
to provide USNORTHCOM with improved capability and capacity against the
2030+ advanced peer, near-peer, and rogue nation threats.
From a sensor perspective, MDA added Long Range Discrimination
Radar (LRDR) for Space Domain Awareness in December 2024. LRDR is
currently preparing for an operational flight test, Flight Test Other
(FTX)-26a, in the third quarter of fiscal year 2025. LRDR will use an
updated software build to improve discrimination performance against
additional threats while adding hypersonic defense tracking capability.
MDA is partnering with Space Force, USNORTHCOM, and U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM) to accelerate fielding these LRDR capability improvements.
MDA plans to complete the LRDR transition and transfer process with the
Space Force in 2025.
Finally, we will deliver a new C2BMC capability to USNORTHCOM and
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in summer 2025, including
faster user interface responsiveness and improvements allowing
USNORTHCOM to receive GMD real-time fire control options, improving
USNORTHCOM Commander decision-space timing. In fiscal year 2026, we
plan to upgrade space track processing timelines, improving defense
against large raids and reporting on hypersonic threats to potential
missile defense shooters.
regional defense
Globally deployed sea-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
are critical to the Nation's defense of our deployed forces, allies,
and partners against a wide variety of short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range missile threats. MDA continues to design
improvements to the Aegis BMD capability, improving Sea Based Terminal
(SBT) defense, advancing weapon system and missile reliability, and
enhancing Aegis BMD engagement capacity and lethality. We will continue
to develop Aegis BMD weapon system software to enhance functionality
and leverage more-capable radars and National Technical Means.
Aegis Baseline 9.2.4 (with BMD 5.1.5) is still on track to meet
certification in third quarter fiscal year 2025. Once certified, this
baseline is expected to deploy to 14 U.S. Navy ships. BMD 5.1.5 adds
capability for Sea-Based Terminal Increment 3, increased ballistic and
hypersonic threat space, expanded hypersonic tracking and Link 16
reporting, enhanced space domain awareness, and discrimination
architecture improvements. MDA is on track to meet our SM-3 Blk IB and
IIA deliveries for FY2025, having completed 54 new production
deliveries and 35 recertifications across all variants.
MDA has received supplemental funding in both fiscal year 2024 and
fiscal year 2025 to procure replacement missiles for those expended in
combat operations, as well as an increase in fiscal year 2025 funding
to continue production of SM-3 Block IB missiles. MDA is proactively
working to minimize and mitigate expected SM-3 Block IB production gaps
while the Prime contractor works to complete its proposal in support of
a synergy buy. With fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 funds, MDA is
moving forward to award this contract for procurement of SM-3 Block IB
missiles by the end of calendar year 2025.
MDA is committed to developing a layered defense against rapidly
evolving threats, with a particular focus on countering regional
hypersonic missiles. Today, Aegis BMD ships are equipped with SBT
capability, which is tested, certified, and deployed, including an
initial defensive capability against hypersonic threats. MDA has been
working closely with the Navy to develop field and upgrade SBT defenses
to counter advanced threats. With the successful Flight Test Aegis
Weapon System (FTM)-32 in March 2024 and the FTX-40 successful
demonstration this past March, we moved another step closer to making
SBT Increment 3 an operational capability, improving our capability
against some hypersonic threats.
The Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) development program represents a
key element in defeating the rapidly evolving hypersonic threat of the
layered defense strategy. GPI will expand the area defensible against
these threats and account for expected future developments by our
adversaries. Developing and fielding GPI capability is essential to
countering not only the hypersonic threats we face today but also those
anticipated in 2035 and beyond. MDA's plan for GPI development meets a
critical need for the warfighter and can be leveraged to deliver this
capability in defense of the homeland and can be accelerated with
adequate resources. Additionally, we are seeking a layered approach
with other kinetic and non-kinetic effects to accelerate the defeat of
the hypersonic threat as part of the MDA Hypersonic Defense Task Force.
In May 2024, MDA and Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD) signed a
formal Cooperative Development arrangement to jointly develop and
mature the GPI. This strategic collaboration leverages Japan's world-
class expertise in key missile components, particularly in advanced
propulsion and aerodynamic control technologies. Cooperative
development of the GPI will deliver a critical capability to counter
threats in the USINDOPACOM region for both Japan and the United States.
As mentioned last year, previous Department priorities and funding
decisions drove MDA to move forward with carrying out the prototype
project with a single interceptor developer in September 2024, opposed
to two, in contrast to our approved acquisition strategy. As a result,
the program schedule moved right to 2035 and the overall programmatic
risk is high. MDA is working diligently with our partner, Japan, and
our industry partner to shore up the program and look for any
opportunities to accelerate and burn down risk as soon as possible. In
addition to GPI interceptor development, MDA continues to develop
enhancements to the mature and capable Aegis Weapon System. These
software-only enhancements will enable seamless integration of the GPI
interceptor by leveraging existing Aegis capability to engage and kill
threats based on remote sensor data.
The Department is continuing development of a missile defense
capability for the defense of Guam against diverse missile threats. In
collaboration with the Navy, we are supporting the Army as they execute
the USINDOPACOM requirement for a layered missile defense capability on
Guam against simultaneous raids of cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and
hypersonic glide threats. MDA successfully conducted a live intercept
in December 2024 of a ballistic missile target, marking the first BMD
intercept test event executed from Guam. With Flight Test Experiment
Aegis Weapon System (FEM)-02, the initial Aegis Guam System integrated
with the new AN/TPY-6 radar and Vertical Launching System fired a SM-3
Block IIA, which intercepted an air-launched MRBM target off the coast
of Guam. The AN/TPY-6 radar tracked the target shortly after launch to
intercept in the first end-to-end tracking use of the radar during a
live ballistic missile flight test.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System has a
proven track record of defeating incoming threats and serves as a vital
component of our Nation's layered Missile Defense System. The THAAD
Weapon System is a globally transportable, ground-based missile defense
weapon system that is highly effective against short-, medium-and
intermediate-range missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in
the terminal phase of flight. MDA supports and sustains THAAD batteries
in CONUS as well as in the USINDOPACOM and U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) Areas of Responsibility.
Through the end of second quarter fiscal year 2025, in conjunction
with the Army, MDA completed fielding of the global THAAD System Build
4.0 (TH 4.0) to five of seven batteries. The capabilities include
enabling remote launch and enhancing integration of Patriot Missile
Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors within a THAAD battery. These
capabilities provide an increase in the defended area and greater
engagement opportunities by allowing the Patriot MSE interceptors to
leverage the highly effective THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar. Also, with close
coordination to better support Commander USCENTCOM, MDA significantly
reduced time required to provide warfighters a quick-look analysis
following a THAAD Weapon System real-world event.
Starting this quarter, MDA will begin delivering THAAD Battery 8,
the first U.S. battery with THAAD Configuration 3.1 hardware and THAAD
System Build 5.0 (TH 5.0) software. Configuration 3.1 is the largest
hardware upgrade to-date modifying over 190 components to address
obsolescence and increase cybersecurity to improve weapon system
performance. System-level testing will start at the end of fiscal year
2025. THAAD Battery 8 will execute a series of rigorous test events and
demonstrations culminating in Flight Test THAAD Weapon system (FTT)-26
in fiscal year 2027 and supporting the Army's fielding process. MDA
plans to begin upgrade on the first of seven U.S. Batteries to
Configuration 3.1 in the 2027 timeframe.
MDA will leverage the recently awarded THAAD Evolutionary
Development Task Order to continue developing the weapon system and
deliver enhanced capabilities to the Warfighter within a more agile and
responsive development process. THAAD System Build 6.0 (TH 6.0) and
Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) THAAD Integration (ITI), while
experiencing a delayed start due to the incremental continuing
resolutions and reduction in the appropriation, will be developed
within this agile process. TH 6.0 provides initial capability against
non-ballistic threats and increased threat engagement space.
The Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2
(AN/TPY-2) is a highly transportable multi-functional, high-resolution,
phased-array ground-based X-Band sensor that is highly effective at
acquiring targets in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. AN/TPY-
2 can be deployed in forward-based mode (FBM) or terminal mode (TM)
configurations for THAAD fire control and engagement operations. FBM
radars provide detection close to the threat origin as well as target
acquisition and discrimination to the C2BMC interface to support
external shooters to include: GBI, Aegis, THAAD, Patriot, and
international systems. Currently AN/TPY-2 is deployed in both modes
supporting operations in the USINDOPACOM, U.S. European Command, and
USCENTCOM areas of responsibility.
allies and partners
Close collaboration with our Allies and partners is critical for
addressing today's security challenges. MDA actively and closely
engages with multiple partners across the globe to build capability and
interoperability against shared missile threats.
Asia/Pacific. MDA uses Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to deliver the
SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA interceptors to Japan and provide the
weapon system components and associated software for two Japanese-built
Aegis System Equipped Vessels, which will be fielded with the solid-
State SPY-7 radar and an Aegis Weapon System. The first tactical SPY-7
(V)1 radar array has been installed at the Production Test Center in
Moorestown, NJ, and has successfully tracked satellites and aircraft.
Production of the remaining radar hardware is on track to support full
system light-off by the end of fiscal year 2025. MDA is also providing
technical assistance to Australia to support its development of a Joint
Air Battle Management System that will integrate Australia's air and
missile defenses and enable interoperability with United States and
other allied IAMD capabilities. MDA conducts cooperative research and
development projects and studies with Japan, Republic of Korea, and
Australia.
Middle East. MDA continues to foster a strong, long-standing
partnership with the Israel Missile Defense Organization. MDA provides
$500 million per year for engineering, development, co-production,
testing, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System, the David's Sling
Weapon System, and co-production for the Iron Dome Defense System. MDA
is also executing fiscal year 2024 $5.2 billion Israel Security
Supplemental Funding for additional procurement of Iron Dome Defense
System, David's Sling Weapon System, and Iron Beam defense systems to
counter short-range rocket threats. Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome
proved their immense value in Operation Swords of Iron and allow Israel
to maintain their qualitative military edge against their adversaries.
As a key participant in the development and negotiation of the
supplemental Exchange of Letters, MDA's required U.S. workshare worth
$2.750 billion will be brought back to the U.S. industrial base.
In support of our global partners, MDA is currently in production
of seven THAAD batteries, including interceptors, for the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA) FMS case. One battery has been emplaced in Saudi
Arabia, and the second is scheduled for shipment later this year. THAAD
KSA battery equipment and interceptor production deliveries will
continue through fiscal year 2027. MDA also continues to support and
provide additional capabilities via FMS to the two THAAD batteries of
the United Arab Emirates. UAE was the first nation to employ fielded
THAAD batteries during attacks from Iranian proxies. Working
multilaterally with the Gulf Cooperation Council, MDA is defining
recommendations for an integrated air and missile early warning
architecture of sensors and command and control for the Arabian Gulf
region.
Europe and North America. MDA has a number of ongoing cooperative
research and development projects and studies with the Netherlands,
Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. MDA also works closely with
NATO by providing subject-matter expertise to the NATO Communication
and Information Agency for the continuous testing and interoperability
of BMD systems. Last year, MDA and Canada began a study to examine
potential architectures to increase missile defense capabilities of
North America. This is the first cooperative project between MDA and
Canada in 17 years.
laser focus on the warfighter
None of the Agency's many efforts would be possible without
continuous collaboration with the Warfighter. To that end, MDA has
intensified strategic engagement with the Combatant Commands, Services,
and the Joint Staff. Our Missile Defense Board of Director meetings
continue to serve as the premiere senior level forums to coordinate
missile defense programs and issues with the Lead Military Departments.
MDA goes to great lengths to involve the Warfighter early on during the
technology development and product development phases to address
requirements. We also support Lead Military Department efforts to plan
for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,
Facilities and Policy factors. Once the capability is fielded, close
collaboration with the Services and Combatant Commands is essential to
sustain and, as required, enhance that capability throughout its
service life. Additionally, we back this up with real-time technical
support, as demonstrated during recent real-world operations. Ensuring
the Combatant Commanders and Services have what they need to fight and
win will always be my top priority.
conclusion
Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, Members of the
Subcommittee, the Missile Defense Agency is committed to attracting and
building the strong, skilled workforce we need to develop and deliver
this Nation's next generation missile defense system. I would like to
recognize and thank the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces at
home and abroad and who operate the Missile Defense System with the
support of our dedicated civilian and contractor workforce. I greatly
appreciate your continued support for MDA and the missile defense
mission, and I look forward to answering the committee's questions.
Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. General Rasch,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT A. RASCH, USA, EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, GUAM DEFENSE SYSTEM JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE
General Rasch. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Fischer,
Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members of this
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the criticality of defending the island of
Guam. On behalf of the Army Senior Leadership, we thank you for
your continued support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, guardians, civilians, and their families.
Guam is an indispensable part of the Homeland, and its
defense is not only essential to the security of the United
States but is also a strong deterrence to the ever-evolving
complex threats we face. The fiscal year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to
designate a senior official to oversee the missile defense of
Guam. In February 2024, as directed by the Under Secretary of
Defense, Acquisition and Sustainment, the Guam Defense System
Joint Program Office, JPO, was established at the Army Rapid
Capability and Critical Technologies Office. Beyond the
Department's investments in Guam's defense, the Under Secretary
of the Navy is the appointed lead senior defense official for
all other DOD efforts in Guam.
The Joint Program Office is charged with synchronizing the
development, testing, fielding, and sustainment of the Guam
Defense System components and the integration of the
corresponding command and control systems resulting in the
development of a Joint Integrated Battle Manager, and this
Battle Manager will allow current service and agency-owned
components to behave as an integrated and unified system.
The Joint Program Office works closely with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Guam
Synchronization Oversight Council, and leadership across the
services and the Missile Defense Agency to build and sustain an
architecture capable of defending Guam against a multitude of
complex air and missile defense threats.
Together, the Department is working diligently and with
urgency to secure the initial capability increment in 2027.
This will provide capability well beyond the currently employed
THAAD battery as part of Task Force Talon. Your continued
support ensures that we remain capable of fighting for and from
Guam, meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you about
this critical mission and the joint commitment to the defense
of Guam. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Rasch follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Robert A. Rasch
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and Members of this
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the criticality of defending the island of Guam. On behalf
of the Army Senior Leadership, we thank you for your continued support
of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, Civilians, and
their Families.
Guam is an indispensable part of the United States, and we are
moving with haste to ensure we have the capabilities necessary to
defend the island from ever-evolving complex threats. In addition to
being part of the homeland, a robust defense of Guam provides a strong
deterrence and preserves combat power and Joint Force projection if
conflict arises.
Pursuant to the Fiscal Year (FY) 23 National Defense Authorization
Act, the Secretary of Defense designated the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) as the Senior Defense
Official responsible for the missile defense of Guam. In February 2024,
as directed by the USD(A&S), the Guam Defense System Joint Program
Office (GDS JPO) was established at the Army Rapid Capability and
Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO).
guam defense system architecture and background
The JPO is charged with synchronizing the development, testing,
fielding and sustainment of the Guam Defense System components and the
integration of the corresponding command and control (C2) systems
resulting in the development of a Joint Integrated Battle Manager
(JIBM). The JIBM will allow current service and agency--owned
components to behave as an integrated and unified system. The GDS
effort includes the synchronization of over 20 prototype efforts and
programs of record across three services and the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA). Because of that, the JPO does not control resourcing for Service
and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs contributing to the GDS
architecture. The JPO is the materiel developer for GDS at the systems
level and is responsible for providing GDS system-level architectural
baselines and Guam-specific technical requirements. The JPO synthesizes
the integrated system-level cost, schedule, performance, and risk
posture of the GDS, providing senior Department of Defense (DOD) and
congressional stakeholders with the necessary information to make
informed investment and priority decisions to ensure success.
The DOD's investments in Guam extend beyond the GDS. In January
2024, the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed the Under Secretary of
the Navy as the Lead Senior Defense Official for the DOD's efforts in
Guam. Through the Guam Synchronization Oversight Council, a forum that
includes senior leaders from across the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the services, the Under Secretary of the Navy ensures
visibility on key issues, synchronizes military construction efforts,
and serves as the Department's primary liaison to the government of
Guam.
The JPO works closely with the USD(A&S), the Guam Synchronization
Oversight Council, and leadership across the services and the MDA to
build and sustain an architecture capable of defending Guam against a
multitude of complex air and missile defense threats. Together, the
Department is working diligently and with urgency to secure the initial
capability increment in 2027-2028, beyond the currently employed the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Battery in Task Force
Talon. To this end, the JPO is leading the Department's efforts to
synchronize and integrate GDS capabilities across several capability
domains (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, facilities, and policy) with a specific focus on
creating doctrine to fight as an integrated, digitized Joint Force for
the Integrated Air and Missile Defense fight. We are working across the
enterprise to finalize the organizational structure and path to certify
the Guam Command Center, and have also been tasked to create a common
understanding across the DOD on the status of GDS and identify risks/
gaps to provide mitigation recommendations to the Commander, U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) through a routine series of updates.
The JPO was approved by the USD(A&S) to pursue a hybrid acquisition
strategy in which the synchronization of integrated air and missile
defense components' deliveries will be managed as a Middle Tier
Acquisition for Rapid Fielding and the Joint Integrated Battle Manager
will be developed using the software pathway. The JIBM will provide an
integrated command and control layer over proven systems from across
the Services such as Aegis, Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
Command System (IBCS), Command and Control Battle Management
Communications (C2BMC), and Tactical Operations Center--Light (TOC-L)
enabling efficient responses to threats without duplication. This
integration layer will provide artificial intelligence-optimization
algorithms and decision management aids to enhance performance of the
joint system against the scale and complexity of the threat. The use of
the software acquisition pathway provides flexibility to rapidly design
and deliver an open system that will have the ability to be replicated
or scaled quickly to other Areas of Operation. This will benefit not
only USINDOPACOM, but any Combatant Command providing Commanders with
the capability needed to fight and win.
Similarly, as the Department refines its plans for the Golden Dome
of America, the investment in the GDS may play a pivotal role informing
this strategy. During a recent visit to Guam, the Secretary of Defense
emphasized the importance of this approach, stating that 'the Guam
Defense System is a model for the Golden Dome.' This alignment
underscores the critical role that Guam's defense architecture and
command and control integration will play in shaping future U.S.
defense initiatives, setting a standard for how we approach and
implement integrated defense systems across the Nation. Critical
components to the joint architecture that might be shared by both Guam
and Golden Dome include MDA's Joint Track Management Capability bridge
as a functional joint engagement coordination baseline, joint
electronic protection attributes to add resiliency to our sensor
network, non-kinetic threat engagement capabilities to preserve high
value kinetic interceptors, the integration of the Army's IAMD Battle
Command System with MDA's THAAD system to support joint force
employment flexibility and the Joint Integrated Battle Management
capability that integrates the service and agency C2 systems.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to speak with you today
about this critical mission and the joint commitment to the defense of
Guam. Your continued support ensures that we remain capable of fighting
for and from Guam, meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General Resch, and thank you
all for your opening statements.
We don't have too many of us here today so we may have more
than one round of questions. I will begin the first round.
General Guillot, I have appreciated our past conversations
about the need for increased domain awareness, for we cannot
shoot what we cannot see. As we look toward Golden Dome and the
future of missile defense, what additional improvements need to
be made with respect to domain awareness?
General Guillot. Madam Chair, I think that what I call the
domain awareness layer of Golden Dome is the most critical that
we need to have first, for the reasons that you just mentioned.
Any chance of using advanced interceptors or defeat
capabilities would not be possible if we can't detect and track
these threats.
I think that it is a seabed-to-space approach. We need to
have undersea sensors to detect submarines that can now get
closer to North America than they could before, based on
improved stealthiness of those ships. Then a ground layer that
can see much further out because of the advanced standoff
weapons that our adversaries can now employ. We need an air
layer, like the E-7, to close the kill chain with fighter
aircrafts or surface-to-air systems, and then a space layer.
The space layer would both track airborne moving targets or
aircraft, but also systems like Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking
Space Sensor (HBTSS) that could track hypersonics, as well as
the warning capability that we need to detect the launches to
begin with.
Senator Fischer. Is there anything you can tell us in this
setting about Golden Dome and the options that may be available
on the sensors and the radar systems that would be used?
General Guillot. Madam Chair, I don't know what the Golden
Dome will look like, but I suspect that it would be able to use
a lot of the systems that are already in place and currently in
development, which would give us a full capability in probably
something closer to zero to 5 years, as opposed to something,
you know, a decade out into the future. A couple of those
systems would be the HBTSS that I just mentioned for the
hypersonics, space-based Airborne Moving Target Indication
(AMTI), which we have a number of prototype systems on orbit
now, over-the-horizon radars which are also operational in, not
in the United States, but elsewhere. For instance, the E-7
which many other countries operate.
Senator Fischer. So given that, how much risk would Golden
Dome incur if the Department was forced to vacate the lower 3
Gigahertz (GHz) or a portion of the 7-8 GHz spectrum that it
now has?
General Guillot. Madam Chair, it is my assessment that we
would assume an extraordinarily high level of risk if we lose
control of those portions of the spectrum. Many of the systems
that we rely on every day today, much less in the future, for
Homeland defense, reside in that spectrum range.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Collins, can you
provide us with an update on the Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor, or the HBTSS system?
General Collins. Yes, Madam Chair, thank you. So, the
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor is a prototype
program that MDA pursued to prove out the technology such that
from space we could close the kill chain on a hypersonic
weapon. The focus of that was to prove out that the space
system could have the accuracy, the track quality, and get that
data into the command-and-control system fast enough to be able
to close that fire control loop.
Those two systems, launched in February of last year, have
gone through two test bed launches where we had a test bed
target launch fly a hypersonic profile, and we have collected
data from the sensors during that. So far, we have proven out
the timeliness, latency of the fire control loop with those
systems, as well as the sensitivity of those systems to close
the loop. We are going back with some algorithm updates into
the payload to improve on the track quality. But we see that
closing as well.
It has been a very successful prototype program, and all
along, we have worked in parallel with the Space Force and
Space Development Agency. They now have our HBTSS-like
requirements as part of their proliferated warfighting space
architecture. In the tranches to come in the follow-on years
they will slowly be building up an operational hypersonic
tracking layer for us.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Perhaps in another setting we
can talk about a more definitive timeline when that would be
available. Thank you.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. The nature of my
questions may appear to be critical. I am certainly in favor of
defending the Homeland against missile attack. No question. My
fundamental question is, is it feasible, given today's
technology and also the cost involved. I will quote Lincoln:
``Your critic is your best friend,'' so take it in that spirit.
For example, Ms. Yaffe, you mentioned deterrence by denial.
Is that really viable today, deterrence by denial? Can we
realistically say that we could deny a substantial missile
attack from Russia or China, or heaven forbid, both?
Ms. Yaffe. Senator----
Senator King. I am a great believer in deterrence. I am
just not sure deterrence by denial is realistic in this
setting. Convince me.
Ms. Yaffe. Senator, thank you for the question. This is
meant to be an integrated air and missile defense system that
is intended to send a message to the adversary that they may
not achieve their objectives. What we want to do is place the
burden of escalation on the adversary and demonstrate that it
will be harder for them to achieve their objectives in an
attack.
Right now, as you are well aware, we do not have a homeland
missile defense system that is intended to guard against
adversary threats beyond North Korea or rogue State actor
threats. Meanwhile, the threats themselves have been expanding
significantly, with Russia and China pursuing a breadth of
capability----
Senator King. Well, that is my point. We have developed a
Missile Defense Agency essentially to defend against North
Korea and Iran and perhaps a rogue, not China and Russia. Now
we are talking about an accelerating Chinese pursuit of this
capability. Russia already has the largest nuclear stockpile in
the world.
What level of scaling up would it take to have a missile
defense system capable of providing any realistic deterrent to
China and Russia?
Ms. Yaffe. Sir, this is not an answer that will be
deliverable overnight. However, what the President has done is
challenged us to actually look at what an integrated air and
missile defense system of the Homeland would look like, which
is not something we----
Senator King. What does that mean? Is that 1,000 THAAD
batteries around cities?
Ms. Yaffe. Sir, I can't weigh in on what the specific
architecture would look like. I can't get ahead of what the
architecture decision will be that will come out, I think, with
the budget. However, it is intended to leverage new
technologies to get ahead--we have got, certainly, the lift in
the executive order--but to leverage some new technologies both
to accelerate the deployment of the HBTSS on the hypersonic
side, also to leverage non-kinetics. I know that you are
interested in directed energy to see what directed energy might
be able to help with, to help us change the cost curve.
But it should be a mix of new technologies that we might be
able to demonstrate in the next 4 or 5 years, along with----
Senator King. What is the assumption----
Ms. Yaffe.--legacy systems.
Senator King. General Collins, what is the assumption of
how many Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) would have to be
launched to knock out one North Korean ICBM?
General Collins. Sir, that would be a classified number. We
would have to wait until the closed session to answer that.
Senator King. All right. Well, General Guillot, you
mentioned seabed. Isn't that a critical area where we need
better sensors, better knowledge, and particularly in your Area
of Responsibility (AOR), in the Northwest?
General Guillot. Senator, absolutely. It is critical, the
seabed. Detection and awareness of the seabed and the undersea
environment are critical to homeland defense.
Senator King. The Russians are, in fact, significantly
building up their military infrastructure on their shore of the
Arctic Ocean. Is that correct?
General Guillot. That is correct, Senator.
Senator King. So that is an area where we have to have
better visibility, and also to the west, as the balloon
incident told us.
General Guillot. Yes, sir. All true.
Senator King. You mentioned directed energy. The reason for
my question, General Collins--and I understand in classified--
but those interceptors are about $60 million a copy. I can
understand maybe that is a reasonable number if you are talking
about a limited capacity of North Korea or Iran, but if you are
talking about between now it is 300, up to 1,000 missiles in
China, I don't know how many, several thousand, from Russia,
the economics don't work. How do you feel about the potential
of directed energy, which is about 75 cents a shot once it is
installed?
General Collins. Yes, sir. We are certainly interested in
pursuing directed energy from a missile defense perspective. At
this point in time, we are years away from having a capability
that would be able to have an effect against an
intercontinental ballistic missile. So for the near future we
will still very much rely on the layered approaches that we
have today for ballistic missile defense.
Senator King. Define layered approach. You have used that
term several times.
General Collins. Yes, sir. We look to be able to take
multiple engagements on any missile as it is coming in. So in a
perfect world we would try to intercept and take out the
missile when it is still coming out of the ground and being
launched from the enemy territory. That is the boost phase.
While it is in space it is midcourse phase, and then as it is
coming back into the atmosphere it is the terminal phase.
Today we very much focus on the midcourse for engagements.
We would certainly look to be able to try to bring technology
to bear that we could get into the boost phase preferred, but
then we may also have capabilities, an underlayer of
capability, that could be brought to bear to then have a second
shot or a second engagement capability while it is in terminal.
So the layers of defense, or defense in depth, is what I
refer to when I mention layered missile defense.
Senator King. I think the prior administration lowered the
directed energy budget by a half over the past 4 or 5 years. I
think that was a terrible strategic mistake. I hope this
Administration will remedy that, because you mentioned it is
going to be years. One way to make it months instead of years
is to devote more resources to the research and development of
that capability, which it seems to me is clearly the technology
of the future in this field.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator
Tuberville.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Sounds like a guessing game
to me, a lot of things that are going to happen, and of course,
I don't know how many missiles could reach our mainland that
they have right now, but obviously space is going to decide a
lot of that, with missiles coming from space in the near
future.
But that being said, General, how are we doing on Guam? We
got the Aegis system started, what, about 3 years ago, maybe a
little less? How are you doing? Getting better?
General Rasch. Senator, getting better. Lots of teamwork
across the services and with Missile Defense Agency, and my hat
goes off to General Collins and his team who really led the
Department of Defense in early implementation, all the legwork
for laying the ground efforts for the military construction
that occurred there.
MDA demonstrated this last year early Aegis Guam capability
with a flight test that was executed there, very successfully.
That work was really the starting point. That equipment has
stayed onsite. It offers a credible deterrence against
potential adversaries, while the Army then does its planning to
come in, in the 2027 timeframe, with the next, what we call
tranche one of capability for Guam.
It is a lot of consensus building. It is a lot of teamwork
across the Department of Defense. This is the Homeland, so, in
in several ways, we are learning a lot of lessons that we
believe can also apply to the Golden Dome team as they continue
that mission set. But very optimistic that the Army is going to
meet its mission, that will have a credible capability on
island in the timeframe we lay out.
Senator Tuberville. Have we decided who is going to operate
it?
General Rasch. Well, that decision, as we build out the
overall command and control capability, the C2 for the defense
of Guam would typically fall to the Air Force to conduct that
overall coordination. But it will be manned jointly as we have
both Navy systems, Air Force systems, Army systems on the
ground. We will have, you know, servicemen and women from all
of those services operating it typically under an Air Force
leadership who will then report to the combatant commander,
Admiral Paparo.
Senator Tuberville. Does that include Reserve, National
Guard?
General Rasch. Sir, it absolutely can. Even with the small
footprint the Army has had on island today with the Task Force
Talon, which is the THAAD battery, we have relied heavily on
the Guam National Guard who provides a security force for that
unit that is operating away from a typical Army base. A great
job of those soldiers, supporting that mission truly defending
the Homeland. Within the Army, there is talk about potentially
expanding that mission set for the Guard members on Guam. It is
still under discussion, so I can't get ahead of those decisions
as they play out. But I believe all things are on the table at
this point.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. I know it is a long process,
a long process. I mean, how many years do you think we have got
left to be fully operational?
General Rasch. Senator, I believe we will be improving this
capability forever, and defense never rests because offensive
threat never rests. So, we will continually evolve. The point
of our effort is to try to get as much capability as soon as
possible, and capability isn't just a thing. It is not just,
you know, a launcher. It is not just a radar. It is not even
just a command and control. It is soldiers, you know, airmen,
you know, all the folks actually manning this equipment,
ensuring they are properly trained. It is ensuring that we have
the proper sustainment tail on island to support it, that we
can sustain it not just for a day, but for years in time. So,
we will be at this for a while.
Senator Tuberville. It is like defending a different
offense every week, if you are a football coach. You have got
to change, don't you?
General Rasch. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Collins, thank you
for the footprint you have in my State of Alabama at Redstone
Arsenal. We are proud of all the work you are doing. How much
of MDA's effort and investment in Golden Dome do you expect to
take place in Huntsville? Do you expect to request any
additional resources for maintenance or buildings or anything
like that in the future?
General Collins. Well, Sir, Missile Defense Agency is
really proud of being part of the Tennessee Valley and that
Redstone Arsenal. Certainly, a large contingent of our
workforce is at Redstone Arsenal, and as well as many of our
industry partners are in that area, as well.
I can't give you an exact percentage, but certainly the
engineers, the program managers, the contracting officers, the
entire workforce of Missile Defense Agency and the associated
industry members are going to be very busy and very devoted to
making any of the parts of Golden Dome real.
Senator Tuberville. You are building things right now too,
right? You have got things under construction, I think the last
time I was there.
General Collins. Yes, sir. We are doing them. We are in the
middle of a ground test facility infrastructure update, which
is a fairly large renovation and construction project that is
going on. That is going on right now, to help get us ready for
the ground test infrastructure we need to support next gen
missile defense. As we start digesting and dissolving the
Golden Dome requirements, there may be additional requirements
that we need to make sure we are ready to go.
Senator Tuberville. I got one more question, if we got time
here. General Collins, I want to ask you about our space-based
sensors, which is an absolutely critical component of any
effort to develop the next-generation missile defense
capability. Last year, the U.S. put a new hypersonic and
ballistic tracking space sensor satellite in orbit. Do we have
any plans, either as part of the Golden Dome architecture or
independently, to expand that capability?
General Collins. Yes, sir. We, as well, believe that a very
effective and resilient space layer is going to be critical to
the future missile defense requirements of the Homeland as well
as our deployed forces. We rely on space assets today as part
of our kill chain for initial tip-off, and we will continue to
do that.
The Space Force, Space Development Agency, will
operationalize the HBTSS capability. The relationship we have
with Space Force is we may prototype technology that is
required and prove it out for missile defense. The Space Force
will operationalize that capability as we move forward, and
HBTSS will be foundational. That type of technology will be
foundational to hypersonic missile defense in the future. We
are working on future prototyping space sensor capabilities, in
particular, discriminating space sensor to help improve
ballistic missile defense in the future as well. We will
prototype and Space Force will operationalize. Space will be
very key to protecting the Homeland and our deployed forces in
the future. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
General Rasch, when you look at the defense that Guam is
going require, you and I, earlier today, we had a conversation
about that and the importance of integrating those systems--
Army, Navy, MDA.
My Co-Chair talked about directed energy and how important
the uses of that could be, and it would be a lot cheaper. But,
can you compare the systems that we need to integrate for the
defense of Guam specifically, and some of the challenges that
we face looking at directed energy and the capabilities it has
in some more adverse conditions that are out there, maybe not
always ready, and the different options it provides you and
your soldiers with as you look toward defending that island?
General Rasch. Madam Chair, absolutely, and thank you for
the question. As we spoke earlier, the new thing that we are
doing for Guam is not just putting the individual material
systems and programs on island, but really taking the first
step at integrating the command and control functions. So Air
Force has a system, Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Light. The
Navy has their Aegis system, which will be Aegis Guam. Missile
Defense Agency has Command, Control, Battle, Managment
Communications (C2BMC), and the Army has the Integrated Air
Missile Defense Battle Command System, IBCS. These are four
separate systems that loosely interoperate now, but we believe
that is not good enough in the long term. So we are integrating
these with a layer of decision support on top of the Joint
Integrated Battle Manager.
This capability will leverage a lot of the work that
Missile Defense Agency has done to date in that single
integrated air picture arena, of getting a common air picture
with those systems, and then providing a layer of decision aids
on top, so that the decisionmaking, who has got a hard decision
to make on a potential threat, can actually do fire direction
to the appropriate system that actually has a killing
capability.
So that is the new work that we are doing for Guam from a
command and control or fire control perspective.
With regards to directed energy, as General Collins said,
the technology is evolving, and the Army, I know, has invested
a lot in ground systems from a directed energy perspective. We
have deployed several of those systems overseas to get
continued operational assessment. For the defense of Guam there
is the potential, as those technologies continue to evolve, to
be integrated in as part of this architecture.
Realizing, though, that directed energy is not a panacea.
As you pointed out, there are days, good days and bad days, for
lasers. Weather can affect their lethality. It can affect the
range. So, as we continue to learn about this technology and
what its capability is, we also have to ensure that we
integrate the atmospherics at the time. You know, as you get
closer to the Earth the air is dirtier. Windy days create dust,
which can reflect or refract the light. Moisture can do the
same thing, if it is raining.
So having a mix of capabilities, and that the soldiers that
are operating that integrated system understand basically how
good the laser is today. The ranges of those directed energy
systems are not out at the ranges of our more exquisite and
expensive missile systems are.
So we have to build that trust with the soldiers, that if
they let a threat getting closer, to allow directed energy to
be the effector, that it is going to work. So that is something
that the Army, I know, was working at lower powers,
necessarily, than we would put on Guam, but starting down that
venture now, and we are looking forward to seeing where that
technology takes us.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
Senator Kelly, you are recognized.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Collins, so
last year Missile Defense Agency proposed termination of the
Standard Misile-3 (SM-3), and months after that termination
recommendation that missile was used in defense of Israel
against ballistic missiles. So based on the recent combat
experience with the SM-3, and I am not sure exactly what the
number of rounds that were fired, but what is the current plan
for the SM-3 going forward? Has that plan been reevaluated?
General Collins. Thanks, Senator, for that question.
Certainly in last year's hearing we certainly talked about the
decision, the fiscal decision that was made to terminate the
SM-3 Block 1B line. Since that, you are very right, it has been
a workhorse in the Eastern Mediterranean, protecting the
citizens of the State of Israel.
As we now are planning with the increased focus on missile
defense of the Homeland and missile defense in general, the
future decision space within the SM-3 program is being re-
looked at, as part of the deliberations for Golden Dome, and,
as well, with the President's budget that is in development.
What I would also, though, say is through a number of
supplementals we do appreciate the support that has come
through supplemental funding that has come back to replenish
the SM-3 1B lots that were expended in the Eastern Med, and we
will continue to track that very closely with both the Block 1B
and the Block 2A's, moving forward.
Senator Kelly. Do you know how many rounds were fired, SM-3
rounds?
General Collins. I do not have the latest but it is in the
dozens.
Senator Kelly. The SM-3 line has not been shut down at all,
so it sounds like, in fact, the rate of production has
increased.
General Collins. The rate of production is still
continuing. We still have fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025
plus the supplemental funding that still will go on contract
before the end of this year. So that line will still remain
open for years into the future. It takes a few years from
beginning to end to get those rounds out.
The funding decisions, though, are here and now, to make
sure that we continue to keep that line open and viable as we
move forward.
Senator Kelly. Go back to last year when the decision was
made to terminate production of SM-3. What was the plan for the
follow-on missile that would perform the duties of the SM-3?
General Collins. Sir, there was not a plan set forward on a
replacement for the SM-3 1B. It was to rely more on the Block
2A line, which is a larger, more expensive missile, but the
quantity production rates were lower for that missile. But that
was the decision.
Senator Kelly. General Rasch, I appreciate all the work you
and your team have done on the Guam defense system. I am
interested in hearing any lessons from Guam Defense that can be
applied to Golden Dome as we come up with a plan. I know the
study has been, well, the timeline for the 60-day study is
complete. But anything that informed that study from Guam
Defense?
General Rasch. Senator, thank you for your question, and
absolutely lessons learned. Guam, being part of the Homeland,
provides a lot of the same challenges that we will have here at
Continental United States (CONUS). Interagency cooperation and
coordination will be required. We have certainly learned that
on Guam, so it is not just a DOD venture. It is bringing in the
whole-of-government as far as site locations, environmentals,
everything that we have to do there. We have certainly shared
that across with the teammates as they are thinking about the
Golden Dome, the Golden Dome challenge.
The other area that I believe is significant is the
integration of our command and control systems. Our services
have typically fought the air missile defense threat as
stovepipes, and so our work to do that level of integration,
for at least the land piece of those systems, from the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency, to start
the integration of that, absolutely should be a model, or at
least a starting point for how we take on the bigger challenge
of developing and air missile defense capability across the
entire continental U.S.
Senator Kelly. Ms. Yaffe, on the 60-day study, I know the
report has gone to the White House. I don't know if the
President has signed off on it yet. It doesn't sound like it.
But I want to just hear, if you can speak to what kind of
preliminary activities have been accomplished and anything you
can say about what you have discovered in the 60-day study.
Ms. Yaffe. Sir, thank you. I think I can say broadly, as
you know, this executive order really challenged the Department
to take this integrated approach in a really unprecedented way
that would require the breaking down of silos to be successful.
When it came into the building, our office, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, joining with Joint Staff to bring
together all of the stakeholders and start working on different
design options, we matured them to a place where the technical
experts took over and really refined them into a few different
options to bring to the Secretary.
My understanding is the Secretary of Defense and other
Department leaders have engaged with the President, and the
hope is that there will be an announcement soon, certainly tied
with the budget. There was a breadth of options looked at that
tied the new and potential ways to accelerate developmental
capabilities to get some demonstrations with the existing
capabilities, so that we can have an integrated, layered
system.
Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator King you
are recognized.
Senator King. General Rasch, I am very interested in Guam
as a test bed, which has been discussed repeatedly in this
hearing. My question is, how much has the development of
missile defense infrastructure on Guam cost?
General Rasch. Senator, that is a good question, and
obviously one that gets a lot of interest because there tends
to be a conflating of different costs to support overall the
island of Guam. Obviously still recovering from a horrible
typhoon a few years ago. There are dollars that the DOD is
investing in fixing things that were damaged.
Senator King. No, I understand that. But can the defense
piece that you have discussed here today, be isolated and
identified? Somebody must know what it has cost.
General Rasch. Yes, Senator, it can, and we have estimated
that at about an $8 billion investment. Not new investment but
really it is the cost of the systems that the services were
building already that will now be located at Guam,
approximately $8 billion across all of the services when you
look through the overall cost of the individual components.
Senator King. I find that concerning because I just did a
calculation here, 779 cities in the United States with more
than 50,000 people. In fact, Guam is half the size of San
Antonio. So if we are talking about providing the level of
defense that we have on Guam for our citizens in our country,
we are talking about an awful lot of money. I can't do the math
in my head, but 800 times $6 billion is a pretty astronomical
cost.
Again, as you can tell, I am skeptical. I want to be proven
wrong. I look forward to future hearings and discussions and
seeing how Golden Dome evolves. The question is, is it the best
place to put our money, or should we be developing our
deterrent capability and accelerating the reconstruction of the
Triad as a more effective deterrent than one that looks like it
has some technical and financial questions.
But I think the next time we have this hearing we probably
will have some more answers about what Golden Dome actually
looks like. Don't get me wrong, I am all for protecting the
Homeland. It is just a question of how much will it cost
relative to other defense needs and how effective can it be
technologically, given the development of things like
hypersonics, maneuverable missiles that, as you know, General
Guillot, are below the level of traditional sensors and much
more difficult to intercept.
I look forward to continuing this discussion, and certainly
I hope, Madam Chair, that as soon as Golden Dome is more
formulated we can have a hearing to discuss its components.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. I agree with you.
I believe Golden Dome is part of the mix and the options that
are out there as we look at the defense of our Homeland, and
specifically in the Indo-Pacific with Guam, as well. We have
heard from a number of our panelists at posture hearings but
also in classified briefings that the Administration has
followed previous administrations in putting the top priority
on our Triad, on modernization, on making sure that the
President will have options there, as well.
So I look forward to seeing, with you, how Golden Dome is
going to be able to fit in the mix, along with hypersonics and
many other options that are going to be available in the
future.
With that I thank the panel for being here today. Senator
King and I need to get down and vote. But we thank all of you
for your dedication, for the time you give us here in the
Senate, and on this Subcommittee especially, and the
information you provide us. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:34 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
required resources
1. Senator Cotton. General Collins, will you be advocating for a
significantly bigger budget to effectively implement Golden Dome?
Lieutenant General Collins. Beginning with fiscal year 2026
President's Budget requestfor fiscal year , the Missile Defense Agency
future budget requests will include the requisite funding to
effectively support the implementation and integration of the Golden
Dome architecture.
golden dome diplomacy
2. Senator Cotton. General Collins, how will the Golden Dome
architecture provide a stabilizing force between the United States and
its adversaries, by providing the freedom of maneuver to respond to an
attack?
Lieutenant General Collins. The Golden Dome architecture provides a
stabilizing force between the United States and its adversaries by
presenting a formidable missile defense system. It is in response to
years of adversaries' developing advanced capabilities to threaten our
security and the increasingly unstable situation that they have
created. Robust defenses raise the stakes for adversaries and introduce
significant uncertainty and complexity into their attack planning,
ultimately undermining their confidence in a successful outcome.
Combined with the United States' enhanced ability to deter through
punishment, missile defenses disincentivize, and reduce the likelihood
of, a contemplated armed attack on the United States.
Should deterrence fail, a robust national missile defense system
would limit the damage inflicted on the United States' population,
infrastructure, and retaliatory capabilities. This, in turn, would
afford the President more time and flexibility in decisionmaking,
safeguard offensive options from destruction, and potentially
facilitate de-escalation. If the Golden Dome architecture is not
developed to address advancing missile threats, U.S. options during
crisis escalation could be significantly curtailed.
golden dome magazine requirements
3. Senator Cotton. General Collins, how much is successful
intercept of advanced threats a function of capabilities versus arsenal
size, and how do you balance that?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Banks
space sensors
4. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, President Trump has made the
implementation of a Golden Dome missile defense system a priority. The
need for a defense system with the ability to neutralize the threat of
ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles is essential to national
security. How can Congress help revitalize the defense industrial base
and its supply chain to help accelerate and deploy a Space-Based Sensor
Layer for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor
5. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, the President's Executive Order (EO)
directs the acceleration of the deployment of Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor. With the likelihood of the Department of Defense
operating under a continuing resolution (CR) throughout the entirety of
the calendar year, how will this affect the timing of Golden Dome
initiatives?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
acquisition policy--lead agency
6. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, as we look to accelerate the
implementation of the Golden Dome, which specific agency of the
Department intends to lead the acquisition process?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
7. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, if no single agency will lead the
process, what aspects of the process does the Department plan to be led
by which agencies?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
missile defense of hawaii
8. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, the President's recent missile
defense Executive Order tasks you with providing ``an updated
assessment of the strategic missile threat to the Homeland''. I remain
concerned about the viability of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
strategy to defend Hawaii from missile threats. Will you commit to
include the missile defense of Hawaii as part of your assessment?
General Guillot. Yes, in coordination with USINDOPACOM, I will
include missile defense of Hawaii in my assessment.
missile defense resourcing
9. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, our adversaries are investing
heavily in advanced air and missile systems that threaten the United
States and require increased investments in missile defense
capabilities. How is United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
coordinating with United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to
ensure the missile defense of Hawaii?
General Guillot. USNORTHCOM is responsible for the Ballistic
Missile Defense of Hawaii and routinely conducts exercises to ensure a
high level of proficiency. We also have well-established processes with
USINDOPACOM to share information on potential threats and our Ballistic
Missile Defense posture.
10. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, will you commit to working
with my office to ensure that Hawaii is protected as part of the
implementation of the Golden Dome EO and additional architecture?
General Guillot. Yes, I commit to ensuring Hawaii is protected as
part of the Golden Dome Executive Order.
11. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, between January 20 and April
8, the U.S. military flew 46 flights that carried migrants on military
aircraft. These flights lasted 802.5 hours, at a cost of approximately
$21,087,300, according to information provided in response to
congressional Requests for Information. As the operational leader for
the border mission, how is NORTHCOM's expanded border security and
mission impacting resourcing for the missile defense?
General Guillot. I am not aware of the border mission having any
impact on missile defense resourcing. Both missions are priorities for
the Department of Defense, and NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not anticipate
one mission competing for funding with the other.
ground-based sensors
12. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Collins, how is the
Department integrating commercial ground-based sensors in the Golden
Dome architecture and leveraging the Joint Global Hypersonic
Operational Sensor Tasking program sponsored by the Missile Defense
Agency to identify promising commercial sensors that could augment the
current integrated air and missile defense architecture?
Lieutenant General Collins. [Deleted.]
engagement with non-traditional companies
13. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Collins, how is the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) improving communication and transparency with non-
traditional companies as part of the Golden Dome program?
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA is prioritizing a greater focus
on research and development with nontraditional defense contractors.
MDA will work directly with the Director of GDA on efforts in which
communication and transparency will be critical to rapidly developing
missile defense technologies and capabilities.
engagement with allies and partners on missile defense
14. Senator Hirono. Ms. Yaffe, how are you increasing engagement
with allies and partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, on missile
defense?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
15. Senator Hirono. Ms. Yaffe, what type of cross-DOD and
interagency coordination is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(USD(P)) pursuing and leading to this end?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
missile defense of hawaii
16. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Collins, will you commit to
working with my office to ensure that Hawaii is protected as part of
the implementation of the Golden Dome EO and additional architecture?
Lieutenant General Collins. I am committed to protecting the
homeland, which includes Hawaii. In coordination with the Director of
GDA, I will work with your office on matters related to implementing
GDA.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
golden dome
17. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is DOD's estimate or range
for the cost of deploying the so-called ``Golden Dome'' or a similar
system across the entire United States? Please describe your
methodology for the estimate or the source.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. The Administration recently announced a potential
cost of $175 billion for Golden Dome for America over a period of 3
years. The Department of Defense closely coordinated with the Services
and the Missile Defense Agency to develop cost estimates, and I defer
to the Department regarding the methodology for this estimate.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
18. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, please describe the process the
DOD will use to estimate the costs of Golden Dome.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are primarily responsible for
establishing operational requirements for executing the commands'
assigned missions. The recently established Direct Reporting Program
Manager, in coordination with the Services and Missile Defense Agency,
will lead the process for estimating costs.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
19. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, please describe the process the
DOD will use to provide program justification for Golden Dome.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are primarily responsible for
establishing operational requirements for executing the commands'
assigned missions. I would defer to the Department regarding the
Department's processes for program justification.
Lieutenant General Collins. There will be primary programs aligned
to the DRPM of GDA as well as GDA contributing to programs existing in
other services portfolios. Many MDA programs will be a primary resource
for executing the GDA program and this differentiation will be outlined
in PB27 budget documentation.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
20. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, please describe the process the
DOD will use to assess and determine the technological feasibility of
Golden Dome.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are primarily responsible for
establishing operational requirements utilizing an Initial Capabilities
Document. The recently established Direct Reporting Program Manager, in
coordination with the Services and Missile Defense Agency, will lead
the process for estimating technological feasibility.
Lieutenant General Collins. Twenty years of advancements in U.S.
missile defense technology, as well as recent successful deployments to
protect allies and partners, have demonstrated the technological
feasibility of our systems. Building on these successes, GDA will
require next-gen investments and integration across the DoW components
to realize the full GDA architecture.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
21. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, would DOD cut, delay, or reduce
the scope of any existing missile defense programs that may duplicate
Golden Dome capabilities? Please describe which existing programs could
be considered duplicative and whether they would be cut, delayed, or
reduced in scope.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not identified
duplicative capabilities requiring cuts, delays, or reduction in scope.
In fact, the commands have advocated for earlier operationalization of
identified capabilities to meet operational requirements. NORAD and
USNORTHCOM will continue to work with the Golden Dome Direct Reporting
Program Manager to support the Department's effort in delivering a
capable and cost-effective defense system.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates. In
this capacity, he will identify the contributing programs for inclusion
within the system-of-systems GDA architecture.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
22. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, given that the Israeli Iron Dome
is designed to intercept slow, short-range threats, is there a
technical plan to adapt that system into one that can counter more
advanced missile threats possessed by the United States's adversaries?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Israel's Iron Dome is just one system within
Israel's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) network. Similarly,
Golden Dome for America (GDA) will also be an IAMD network designed to
counter the entire spectrum of current and evolving air and missile
threats. It is imperative to have comprehensive domain awareness and
integration within and across the layers of the GDA architecture to
protect a larger area against more advanced threats. Unfortunately, the
scope and scale of threats GDA must defend against is likely to make a
direct adaptation of Israel's IAMD network, including Iron Dome,
infeasible.
Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA will use a system-of-systems
approach leveraging new and existing U.S. missile defense capabilities
to detect and defend against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise
missiles, as well as other next-generation aerial threats from peer,
near-peer, and rogue adversaries.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
23. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, how much would such adaptations
cost?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are responsible for
establishing operational requirements for Golden Dome. While I defer to
the Department regarding estimated costs, and the adaptation of Israeli
systems is likely infeasible, the commands will continue to work with
the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager to support the
Department's effort in delivering a capable and cost-effective defense
system.
Lieutenant General Collins. he Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
24. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is the estimated timeline
to field an operational system for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. The President's has directed the Department to
deliver a capability within 3 years, and NORAD and USNORTHCOM are
supporting the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and the
Services efforts to meet that directive.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future program schedules.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
25. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, how confident are you that an
operational system for Golden Dome could be fielded within 5 years?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I am quite confident that 5 years is an achievable
timeline. USNORTHCOM and NORAD currently operate the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system and the National Capital Region Integrated Air
Defense System, both of which will integrate with additional Golden
Dome capabilities, and additional capabilities are available now and
ready for operational use when funded. Other capabilities require some
technical development but have a viable path for delivery within 5
years, within the directed timeline.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future program schedules.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
26. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, are you aware of any analysis of
alternatives or similar studies completed or underway for the Golden
Dome program? Please provide any completed analyses and estimated
timelines for competing analyses underway.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes. In collaboration with the Missile Defense
Agency and the Services, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have supported past
studies and analysis, including Air and Cruise Missile Defense of the
Homeland, layered homeland defense, and ballistic missile defense
sensor architecture. The Department is leveraging those analyses to
help inform the Golden Dome for America (GDA) architecture development
and is continuing to conduct analysis in support of the GDA
architecture and its cost. I would defer to the Department regarding
the release of those analyses and timelines for those currently
underway.
Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA architecture is being built on
a foundation of over 40 years of development and fielding of U.S.
missile defenses and recent successful demonstrations of missile
defense capabilities protecting allies and partners. In the near term,
the fiscal year 2025 reconciliation package has identified resources
that would buttress this existing foundation with additional studies
and analysis.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
27. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, in the 1990's, it was determined
that space-based missile defense (SDI or ``Star Wars'') was too
technically challenging and prohibitively expensive. What are the
greatest technological challenges facing a Golden Dome system?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I believe the key technological challenges for a
Golden Dome for America system include integrating multiple defense
layers (such as radars, interceptors, and directed energy) across vast
geographical areas; handling the high cost of interceptors versus
relatively inexpensive threat systems such as UAVs; and ensuring
resilience against cyberattacks and electronic warfare. The system is
also likely to require advanced AI for real-time target discrimination
and coordination, as well as the need to overcome environmental
limitations such as weather effects on directed energy weapons and
power requirements for continuous operations. With that said, many of
the NORAD and USNORTHCOM requirements for homeland defense, including
increased all-domain awareness, are currently available and could be
integrated into existing defense networks within a zero-to-three-year
timeframe.
Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA will use a system-of-systems
approach that leverages new and existing U.S. missile defense
capabilities to deter and defend against ballistic, hypersonic, and
advanced cruise missile, and other next-generation aerial threats from
peer, near-peer, and non-State adversaries. Large-scale integration and
next-gen capability investment across the DoW will be required to
successfully develop and deploy GDA.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
28. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Collins and Lieutenant Gen
Rasch, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Michael Griffin and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering Lisa Porter, who both served during the first
Trump administration, contend that the MDA is not structured to lead an
effort of Golden Dome's magnitude. Do you agree with their assessment?
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
schedules. MDA was identified as the systems-of-systems engineering and
global test execution lead for the integrated GDA architecture.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
29. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, former officials Michael Griffin
and Lisa Porter also contend that the Golden Dome program management
should not be performed within any existing agency. Do you agree, and
if so, should a new agency be created to manage this program?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. While I respectfully defer to the Department on
matters of policy, NORAD and USNORTHCOM are committed to working
closely with the Direct Reporting Program Manager and other partners to
define requirements for Golden Dome capabilities in support of homeland
defense.
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA will work directly with the
Director of GDA to manage GDA.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
30. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do you believe Golden Dome would
require an entirely new approach to command and control?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. The increased scope and scale of the air and
missile defense mission will place a greater emphasis on timely and
seamless command and control integration across geographic regions,
mission areas, the Interagency, and with Allies and Partners. I do not
believe this would represent an entirely new approach to command and
control. The Department has considered this more expansive approach in
the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, as well as the work
being done for the defense of Guam. NORAD and USNORTHCOM, along with
all of our partners, will leverage these efforts to the greatest extent
possible in the command and control approach to Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future architectures.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
31. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, is there a possibility that
adversaries who see the U.S. investment in a Golden Dome begin to adapt
their offensive forces in response?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes, U.S. adversaries are likely to adapt their
offensive forces in response to the U.S. Golden Dome initiative in an
attempt to ensure their ability to hold the U.S. Homeland at risk.
Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA is required because peer and
near-peer competitors of the United States have been advancing their
offensive capabilities for decades in order to hold us at risk and/or
prevail during armed conflict.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
32. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, have DOD or U.S. intelligence
agencies assessed how our potential adversaries are likely to respond
to the development and deployment of Golden Dome? If so, please
summarize what the DOD or intelligence agencies found to be the likely
reaction to the Golden Dome options.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes, the National Intelligence Council published a
Top Secret-level assessment of China's and Russia's likely reactions to
the United States Golden Dome initiative on March 12, 2025. The
product, serial number NICM 2025-07785-A, was coordinated with multiple
DOD agencies and commands--including NORAD and USNORTHCOM.
Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA is required because peer and
near-peer competitors of the United States have been advancing their
offensive capabilities for decades in order to hold us at risk and/or
prevail during armed conflict.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
33. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, if DOD does not have an
assessment of how potential adversaries would respond, when will DOD
conduct one?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Multiple DOD agencies and commands--including
NORAD and USNORTHCOM--coordinated on and concurred with the National
Intelligence Council's March 12, 2025 assessment of China's and
Russia's likely reactions to the United States Golden Dome initiative
(NICM 2025-07785-A). In addition, the Secret-level version of the
Defense Intelligence Agency's February 19, 2025 assessment on
``Strategic Missile Threats to the U.S. Homeland'' (DIA--F--25I85-C)
contains a similar assessment of our adversaries' likely reactions.
Lieutenant General Collins. I defer to my colleagues in the
Intelligence Community when an assessment should be conducted. When it
is, MDA will participate as requested and appropriate.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
34. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, once DOD has an assessment of
how potential adversaries would respond, will you commit to sharing
those results with the Senate Armed Services Committee?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. The National Intelligence Council's Top Secret-
level assessment of China's and Russia's likely reactions to the United
States Golden Dome initiative (NICM 2025-07785-A, published March 12,
2025) is available on CIA's ``WIRe'' website. The Secret-level version
of the Defense Intelligence Agency's February 19, 2025 assessment on
Strategic Missile Threats to the U.S. Homeland (DIA--F--25I85-C)
contains a similar assessment of our adversaries' likely reactions
(beginning on page 31) and is available on DIA's ``Source'' website.
Additionally, I commit to sharing my perspective on how USNORTHCOM
intends to counter the threat.
Lieutenant General Collins. I will share my views on the
assessment's implications for MDA's efforts on missile defense
capability development.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
35. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do the architecture options and
cost estimates provided by the DOD to the President take into
consideration the need to respond to the likely reactions of potential
adversaries to each option?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. While I defer to the Department regarding its
development of cost estimates, NORAD and USNORTHCOM are certainly
considering current and future threats in developing requirements for
the Golden Dome architecture.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
36. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, how much does DOD estimate a missile
from Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, and any other potential
adversary costs to produce?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
37. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General Collins, and
Lieutenant General Rasch, how much more expensive is a U.S. interceptor
for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) (whether the existing
ground-based interceptor, the sea-based SM-3 Block IIA, or the future
Next-Generation Interceptor) compared to Chinese or Russian ICBMs,
roughly?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I would respectfully defer to the intelligence
community for information regarding the cost of adversary weapons
systems. However, NORAD and USNORTHCOM are well aware of the need to
pursue lower-cost defensive capabilities and remain ahead of the ``cost
curve'' as competitor capability and capacity increases.
Lieutenant General Collins. The cost of defensive interceptors is
greater than the cost of adversary ICBMs. The cost of allowing a
nuclear weapon to detonate in a population center, however, would be
hundreds of thousands of fatalities and hundreds of billions of dollars
of damage. The existing GBIs' cost is on the order of $100 million per
round (including cost of the recent Service Life Extension Program).
Next Generation Interceptors are estimated to cost on the order of $140
million per round, and SM-3 Block IIA are on the order of $25 million
per round.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Missile Defense Agency.
38. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, DOD's 2024 Annual Report on
Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of
China states at several points that China ``may be exploring
development of conventionally armed intercontinental range missile
systems''. General Guillot has testified before the House that China
may be developing a conventionally armed ICBM. Why would the existing
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, designed to defend against the
North Korean ICBM threat, not be sufficient for addressing this Chinese
conventionally armed ICBM problem?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. The current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system
was designed and deployed to defend against ICBM threats from rogue
nations such as North Korea. China's advanced long-range missiles
create geometry, capability, and capacity challenges that North Korean
missiles do not match. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are working with the
Department to ensure that the capabilities of the Golden Dome,
including the Next Generation Interceptor, are able to defend against
the full spectrum of current and future intelligence-assessed threats.
Lieutenant General Collins. The missile defense system can engage
and destroy a limited number of nuclear or conventional ICBMs launched
from China but would become depleted when faced with a quantity of
adversary ICBMs larger than that of North Korea.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Missile Defense Agency.
39. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, did the DOD assess how each
architecture option provided to the president for Golden Dome is
compatible with the president's stated goal of seeking
``denuclearization'' agreements with Russia and China? If so, please
describe what the Department's conclusion was about the effect Golden
Dome would have on this Presidential priority.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy regarding the Department's
assessments. NORAD and USNORTHCOM, along with USSPACECOM, the Missile
Defense Agency, the Services, and other stakeholders, provided input
and advice to the Department throughout the development of the Golden
Dome for America architecture and remain fully aligned with the
Department's approach to defending the Homeland.
Lieutenant General Collins. Consistent with one of the President's
stated policy goals for pursuing GDA, our missile defenses will help to
ensure our Nation's second-strike capability, thus diminishing an
adversary's perceived benefit of using nuclear weapons to attack the
United States. Decreasing the utility of nuclear weapons can put us on
a path toward denuclearization.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
40. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) recently estimated that it would cost between $160 and $540
billion to deploy and maintain for 20 years a boost-phase interceptor
constellation that would protect the United States from the North
Korean threat of a decade ago. The CBO warns, however, that costs of a
program relevant to today would likely be higher. Do you still believe
boost-phase intercept is the most cost-effective way to utilize space-
based interceptors?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department and U.S.
Space Command regarding the costs related to space-based capabilities.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by
NORTHCOM.
41. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, in the defense portion of the
reconciliation bill, the majority has proposed to appropriate $25
billion for Golden Dome missile defense programs. Because some of these
programs, notably the $5.6 billion proposal for a space-based intercept
capability, are entirely new concepts, it is not clear that a large
influx of research, development, test, and evaluation funding in the
first fiscal year would be appropriate. What are DOD's plans for
allocating the reconciliation funds, if they materialize, over the next
4 years?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department regarding
budgetary decisions. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are responsible for
establishing operational requirements and support the Golden Dome
Direct Reporting Program Manager, the Services, and the Department as
they assess resource allocation for Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
42. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, when do you expect to have an
independent cost estimate for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Historically, obtaining an independent cost
estimate (ICE) for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) typically
takes between 6 to 12 months, though the timeline can vary depending on
the program's complexity and maturity. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will
continue to work with the Department to support a timely ICE.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
Defense Program Oversight
43. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do you agree that generally any
new major defense program should receive an independent cost estimate
before Congress funds the program?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes. Independent cost estimates are essential for
ensuring new major defense programs are financially viable and
accountable. They provide a robust foundation to make informed funding
decisions, promote transparency, prevent waste, and help ensure
taxpayer money is spent wisely on defense priorities. Without them,
there is a heightened risk of moving forward with programs with
unrealistic cost expectations, leading to future financial challenges.
Lieutenant General Collins. Major defense programs should receive
an independent cost estimate before Congress funds the program,
contingent on the severity and timeline of the threat the program is
addressing.
Lieutenant General Rasch. I believe that communication with
congressional stakeholders is a critical piece to the success of
defense programs. In the case of the Guam Defense System, as new major
defense program, joint cost estimates were created in coordination with
OSD CAPE. In addition, OSD CAPE completed an independent assessment of
the GDS total cost and integrated master schedule.
44. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do you agree that a
Congressional Budget Office cost estimate of a major defense program
would help inform decisionmakers at DOD and in Congress on whether a
program is worth pursuing?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes, a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate
of a major defense program is helpful for decisionmakers at both the
DOD and in Congress. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will support the Department
in its effort to appropriately inform decisionmakers both internally
and in Congress as they determine which programs are worth pursuing.
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The Department of Defense often utilizes
independent entities in the development of programs and to support
milestone decisions.
45. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, how does independent technical
expertise in areas such as nuclear and space science benefit your
office?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Independent technical expertise in nuclear and
space science is indispensable for enhancing homeland defense. It
provides objective analysis, advanced technology development, and risk
mitigation strategies to help ensure the U.S. remains prepared for
emerging threats in both the nuclear and space domains. From missile
defense and space security to nuclear deterrence and threat
assessments, this expertise supports the development of comprehensive,
resilient, and effective defense strategies to protect the U.S.
Homeland.
Lieutenant General Collins. The independent technical expertise
provides another perspective to our organic agency nuclear and space
science expertise. The independent team is able to leverage their
knowledge of supporting programs outside of MDA offices and provide our
team insight into how other entities address similar issues.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO utilizes independent experts
at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab and MITRE to support
modeling and simulation and systems engineering for both exo-
atmospheric and endo-atmospheric missile engagements.
46. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, Acting Assistant Secretary Yaffe
stated in the hearing that the President still has to make some
decisions on the missile defense architecture and that the architecture
will be released along with the DOD budget. Will a report on the final
missile defense architecture be released by DOD or any other government
agency? If so, please describe what level of classification the report
will be released at and whether there will be an unclassified summary.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department on the
release of DOD-level reporting. NORAD and USNORTHCOM execute the
missile defense missions but are not directly involved in authoring or
releasing potential reports on future architecture, but both commands
are ready to provide support, expertise, and advice as additional
guidance becomes available.
Lieutenant General Collins. If a report is directed by Congress,
DoW will be responsible for releasing the final product. The
classification of the product will be as required.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
47. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will you commit to voluntarily
complying with information requests and deadlines set by the DOD
Inspector General or your service-specific Inspector General on Golden
Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes, I will comply with any Inspector General
requests received regarding Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
Lieutenant General Rasch. Yes.
48. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will you commit to voluntarily
complying with information requests and deadlines set by the Government
Accountability Office on Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes, I will comply with Government Accountability
Office requests received regarding Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
Lieutenant General Rasch. Yes.
49. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will you commit to voluntarily
complying with information and testimony requests by Congress on Golden
Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. Yes, I will comply with requests for information
and testimony by Congress regarding Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
Lieutenant General Rasch. Yes.
50. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, has an Inspector General or the
Government Accountability Office reached out to your offices about
Golden Dome? If so, please describe the nature of that outreach.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. No, NORAD and USNORTHCOM has not been contacted by
an Inspector General or the Government Accountability Office regarding
Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. No.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not received requests or
communications from the Inspector General or Government Accountability
Office on Golden Dome. The Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
golden dome conflicts of interest
51. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, which private sector entities
has DOD consulted regarding the Golden Dome program? Please provide a
complete list of all outside entities consulted.
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department regarding
private-sector consulting it may have conducted.
Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA Office is responsible for all
information concerning the Department of War's activities on Golden
Dome.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not consulted industry or
outside entity engagements regarding Golden Dome as the JPO is not
directly involved in the development of GDA.
52. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what role, if any, has SpaceX,
Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed Martin, L3Harris, or any of the company's
officers or representatives had in developing or advising on
requirements for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM (N&NC) establish operational
requirements based on our assigned missions. While industry can present
capability options to address those requirements, the commands are in
support of the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager, the
Services, and Missile Defense Agency as the organizations tasked with
determining the best capabilities to meet requirements. NORAD and
USNORTHCOM do not have any visibility on the role, if any, defense
contractors have in developing or advising on Golden Dome requirements.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not participated in
engagements or conversations with SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed
Martin, or L3 Harris regarding Golden Dome as the JPO is not directly
involved in the development of GDA.
53. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what information have your
offices received from SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed Martin,
L3Harris, or any of the company's officers or representatives regarding
Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have received briefings from
Anduril, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, while other companies are
scheduled to present on either the Golden Dome for America (GDA) writ
large or various components in support of the GDA.
Lieutenant General Collins. The listed companies responded to MDA's
GDA RFI last spring. DOW and MDA routinely receive unsolicited
proposals from companies with ideas for new capabilities.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO is not a direct part of
Golden Dome and has not discussed GDA's development with industry
partners.
54. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, has there been any formal or
informal involvement in the process of developing requirements for
Golden Dome or awarding Golden Dome contracts by Elon Musk, or by
individuals working for or on behalf of SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir,
Lockheed Martin, or L3Harris, or any Government Department of
Efficiency affiliated employees?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. While N&NC have no acquisition authority for the
GDA, we have and will continue to work with the GDA Direct Reporting
Program Manager, the Services, and Missile Defense Agency to determine
the best capabilities to meet requirements.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not participated in
engagements or conversations whether formal or informal with SpaceX,
Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed Martin, or L3 Harris regarding Golden Dome
as the JPO is not directly involved in the development of GDA.
55. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, has your office or any DOD
office you are aware of been consulted by or in discussion with Elon
Musk or any of his representatives regarding the Golden Dome program?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not discussed Golden
Dome development with Mr. Musk or his representatives.
Lieutenant General Collins. No.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not participated in
engagements with Mr. Musk or anyone acting on his behalf.
56. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, according to press reports, DOD
is considering a ``subscription model'' to acquire SpaceX services.
What cost analysis has DOD performed related to its consideration of
this model?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department regarding
acquisitions and related cost analysis. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are not
involved in specific acquisition approaches.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO does not currently have plans
to acquire SpaceX services.
57. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, to the extent that DOD has
performed the cost analyses mentioned in the question above, what have
they shown?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as NORAD
and USNORTHCOM are not involved in this decision.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO does not currently have plans
to acquire SpaceX services and as such no cost analysis for that
procurement have been conducted.
58. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, according to press reports a
subscription model could cause DOD to be ``locked into a subscription
and lose control over its ongoing development and pricing.'' What are
the long-term cost risks of a subscription model?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as NORAD
and USNORTHCOM are not involved in this decision.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. Neither the GDS JPO nor the Rapid
Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) utilize
subscription models for our programs.
59. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is DOD's intellectual
property rights strategy for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as NORAD
and USNORTHCOM do not have a role in determining intellectual property
rights strategies related to Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. The DOD Instruction 5010.44 requires
DoW programs to have an intellectual property (IP) strategy. For GDA
efforts, the Director of GDA is required to manage a robust IP strategy
to identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters
(e.g., technical data and computer software deliverables, patented
technologies, and license rights) from the inception of a program and
updated throughout entire product life cycle--initially as part of the
acquisition strategy, and during the operations and support phase as
part of the life-cycle sustainment plan.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
60. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will the DOD provide an
assessment of the cost and readiness risks associated with a
``subscription-based'' model for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department as NORAD
and USNORTHCOM are not involved in determining costs or risks
associated with this reported model.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
61. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is the cost estimate for
the ``subscription-based'' model for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department as I have
not been made aware of the DOD cost estimate for a ``subscription-
based'' model.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
62. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, which companies are most likely
to benefit from an accelerated timeline for Golden Dome?
Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in Committee files.
General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as I do
not have specific information about contracts related to Golden Dome.
Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
architecture options.
Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
in the development of GDA.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
sm-3 ib
63. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, fiscal year 2024
funding and supplemental dollars for SM-3 IB were available nearly 12
months ago. When did MDA re-engage the prime contractor for missile
production?
Lieutenant General Collins. On December 29, 2022, the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a
combined SM-3 Block (Blk) IB/SM-3 Blk IIA fiscal year (FY) 2023-2025
procurement contract. On July 11, 2023, the prime contractor submitted
their initial proposal to MDA, but it was not fully compliant.
Following termination of new production in the fiscal year 2025
President's Budget request, initial expenditure of Blk IA/IB missiles
in combat, and the receipt of supplemental funding to replace those
missiles, MDA provided the prime contractor with an updated All-Up
Round (AUR) Blk IB procurement RFP on August 16, 2024. In that RFP, MDA
requested pricing for a minimum quantity of 10 AURs and a maximum
quantity of 78 AURs. Since that time, we have remained engaged with the
prime contractor to identify and mitigate production gaps and to
accelerate the proposal and award timeline.
64. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, extended delays in
contracting have implications for the industrial base of any program.
MDA recently stated that the SM-3 IB suppliers are in production. Are
all SM-3 IB suppliers currently in production?
Lieutenant General Collins. No. The fiscal year 2019-2023 Multiyear
Procurement (MYP) contract for SM-3 Blk IB remains in progress, with
final deliveries planned for August 2026. Several suppliers have
already delivered their components in support of the MYP contract. Many
of these suppliers also deliver the same or similar components to other
Department of War programs and maintain a current production line.
65. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, did any SM-3 IB
suppliers fall out of qualification during the period of program
termination?
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA is aware that production has
been completed for several suppliers on the prior contract, and they
will require restart and possibly requalification. We have worked with
the prime contractor to award two Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCA).
These UCAs will allow the SM-3 Blk IB supplier base to begin material
procurement and assembly in advance of the fully definitized contract,
using fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 funds. We anticipate
awarding that contract by the end of this calendar year. MDA will
complete a risk-based evaluation of the requalification process,
balancing cost, delivery timeline, and technical risk, to determine if
they can apply extensions or waivers on a case-by-case basis.
66. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, if so, what are the
costs and schedule delays caused to the program by these delays and
qualification lapses?
Lieutenant General Collins. The costs associated with production
gaps have been estimated by the prime contractor to be as high as $180
million. The cost estimates included assumptions about requalification
requirements that may be reduced following case-by-case evaluation of
requalification requirements. Requalification of production lines is
not currently driving the production schedule. The primary schedule
driver for production is an obsolescence effort with a resulting 33-
month gap in deliveries between the current multiyear procurement
contract and the follow-on fiscal year 2024/2025 contract. MDA and the
prime contractor are working to reduce the timeline for the
obsolescence effort and bring delivery schedule to the left.
67. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is the
production restart cost associated with the continuation of the SM-3 IB
program?
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA does not expect any explicit
production restart costs other than those associated with supplier
requalification and/or obsolescence efforts, as discussed above.
68. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what are the Non-
Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs associated with the termination?
Lieutenant General Collins. The prime contractor's Not-To-Exceed
estimate for the NRE associated with AUR procurement is $180 million.
The government anticipates the final NRE costs will be lower but is
dependent upon the final proposal and subject to negotiation of final
cost.
69. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what percentage of
the NRE could have been mitigated with a 2025 Undefinitized Contract
Action (UCA) award?
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA has awarded two UCAs in support
of SM-3 Blk IB production. The first was for MK 72 Boosters, MK 104
Dual Thrust Rocket Motors, and Integrated Detector Assemblies and was
awarded in February 2025. The second UCA was for up to 55 AURs awarded
in May 2025. Definitization of these UCAs is planned by the end of this
calendar year. MDA will not be able to estimate the percentage of NRE
that will be mitigated by the use of these UCAs until after the
contract is definitized. The use of UCAs did give the prime contractor
the ability to begin production activities approximately 9 months
earlier than would otherwise have been possible.
70. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is the MDA plan
to utilize UCA awards for the SM-3IB program in the future?
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA awarded two Undefinitized
Contract Actions (UCA) to support fiscal year 2024/2025 SM-3 Blk IB
procurement. MDA awarded the first UCA in February 2025, for MK 72
Boosters, MK 104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motors, and Integrated Detector
Assemblies. MDA awarded the second UCA in May 2025, for up to 55 All-Up
Rounds (AUR). MDA plans to definitize these UCAs by the end of this
calendar year. These UCAs will mitigate production gap risk and enable
AUR delivery earlier. In the future, MDA will continue to evaluate the
risks and benefits of using UCAs to accelerate outcomes and reduce Non-
recurring Engineering (NRE) costs for SM-3 procurement.
71. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the Committee is
aware that the decision to terminate led the prime contractor to turn
off significant advance company funding for the program that would have
bridged fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2024. How many missiles does
the NRE value equate to at planned unit costs for fiscal year 2024/
2025?
Lieutenant General Collins. The prime contractor has estimated the
NRE cost at $180 million. Pending the final negotiated and definitized
AUR per unit cost, this NRE cost equates to approximately 10 AURs.
72. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is the MDA's
plan to accelerate production and lower costs using Long Lead
procurement, instead of relying on industry funding, in order to recoup
schedule loss?
Lieutenant General Collins. The SM-3 program cannot utilize Advance
Procurement (Long Lead-time Items) as defined in Department of War
Financial Management Regulations (FMR) because no component, part, or
material lead times exceed the life of the appropriation (FMR Vol 2A
Chapter 1 section 2.2.3.3). SM-3 will utilize Economic Order Quantity
in conjunction with future Multi-year Procurements (FMR Vol 2A Chapter
1 section 2.2.3.4). MDA awarded two UCAs to replace industry funding,
which will allow the prime contractor and its suppliers to begin
material procurement and assembly. These UCAs should allow MDA to
recoup approximately 9 months compared to traditional contracting
processes. An obsolescence issue, not covered under the UCAs, drives
the first delivery of AURs. MDA awarded a separate contract action for
that effort in June 2025. MDA and the prime contractor will work with
the supplier to accelerate that effort and bring first delivery
forward.
73. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, MDA's termination
decision also interrupted planned improvements to add capability and
address obsolescence. How are those costs being addressed in the fiscal
year 2024/2025 contract?
Lieutenant General Collins. The fiscal year 2024/2025 contract will
not address added capability. As a result of the Department's decision
to terminate, MDA is making several life-of-type buys for obsolete
components to support the maximum quantity of AURs (78) specified in
the Request for Proposal. These obsolescence mitigation efforts have
been ongoing in parallel with the prime contractor's production
contract proposal efforts. A separate contract covers obsolescence
mitigation, and the AUR unit cost does not reflect it.
74. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the committee notes
that the Director indicated that the SM-3 IB program will continue in
production ``for years into the future'' during his testimony before
the committee. How many SM-3 IB missiles does MDA intend to request in
fiscal year 2026?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
75. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, how many missiles
annually will MDA request across the future years defense program
(FYDP)?
Lieutenant General Collins. The fiscal year 2026 President's Budget
request does not include additional procurement of SM-3 Blk IB missiles
but does include procurement of 12 SM-3 Blk IIA missiles. The fiscal
year 2026 President's Budget request only includes fiscal year 2026
procurement, not FYDP.
76. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the Director noted
that there was no plan with the termination of SM-3 IB to fill the
mission set and suggested the plan was to fill that mission set with
SM-3 IIA. What are the distinct missions that both missiles do that are
not common?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
77. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what mission sets
does MDA give up with the termination of SM-3 IB and a planned reliance
on SM-3 IIA?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
78. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the Director noted
that there was no plan with the termination of SM-3 IB to fill the
mission set and suggested the plan was to fill that mission set with
SM-3 IIA. Are there distinct missions that both missiles do that are
not common?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
79. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what mission sets
what MDA giving up with the termination of SM-3 IB and a planned
reliance on SM-3 IIA?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
80. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, MDA did not request
additional SM-3 IIAs in fiscal year 2025. What is the outlook for SM-3
IIA across the FYDP?
Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
81. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is MDA's plan
for annual production?
Lieutenant General Collins. The fiscal year 2026 President's Budget
request does not include additional SM-3 Blk IB procurement but does
include procurement of 12 SM-3 Blk IIA missiles.
82. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, has MDA revisited
inventory requirements for SM-3 IB and SM-3 IIA? Please provide the
latest inventory requirements and current inventories.
Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA monitors the Navy Munitions
Requirements Process (NMRP) for the SM-3 Blk IA/IB and SM-3 Blk IIA.
The NMRP serves as the only formal capacity requirement for SM-3
missiles and accounts for new procurement, sustainment
(recertification/repair/increased service life), operational
expenditures, flight test expenditures, demilitarization, and unplanned
losses. The NMRP is classified and updated annually and establishes the
program's acquisition objective. The classified SM-3 Block IA/IB and
IIA total munitions requirement numbers have been sent via other means.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 20, 2025
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:46 p.m. in room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb Fischer
(Chairwoman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Fischer, Rounds, King,
and Kelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. Welcome. The hearing will come to order.
Welcome to our distinguished witnesses. Thank you for appearing
before us today, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
This Subcommittee frequently hears about the threats that we
will face in the coming years. We know that Russia and China
are modernizing and diversifying their nuclear forces. We know
that these nations have a No Limits partnership and are working
together more closely than we ever anticipated, and we know
that our modernization efforts have slipped.
There are many reasons for these delays, but this afternoon
I want to hear from our witnesses about what the Department of
Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) are doing to move
forward with nuclear modernization. Today we welcome two panels
of witnesses. On our first panel, we have Mr. James J.
McConnell, and Mr. Roger Jarrell. Did I say that correctly?
Jarrell, from the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) and Admiral William Houston from the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program.
On our second panel, we have Mr. David Hoagland from NNSA,
General Thomas Bussiere from Air Force Global Strike Command,
and Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe from the Navy Strategic Systems
Programs. We also have Dr. Brandy Vann, who is performing the
duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs.
The Subcommittee was instrumental in creating that position
in section 1621 of last year's, National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA). We did so because we observed a lack of cleared
leadership within the office of the Secretary of Defense for
the nuclear enterprise. I understand the implementation plan
for Section 1621 has yet to be submitted to Congress. This
delay does not instill confidence that the department is taking
these reforms with the seriousness they deserve.
Before I turn it over to Senator King, I do want to
congratulate NNSA on completing the first production unit of
the new B61-13 nuclear bomb, which provides the President with
additional options to go after harder targets. I look forward
to hearing more about how NNSA was able to achieve this so
quickly, and what opportunities exist to take lessons learned
from manufacturing the B61-13 and apply them to other
production lines.
Senator King, you are recognized for any remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING JR.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it's
important to emphasize at the beginning of this hearing why
nuclear weapons. Why is it that we have this focus on your
production of nuclear weapons and also on our strategic
delivery platforms? It's because of deterrence. The whole idea
of nuclear weapons is to never have to use them, and they will
never have to be used as long as our adversaries are convinced
that if they use nuclear weapons first, they will pay a
terrible and unacceptable price.
So I think it's important that we remember the fundamental
purpose of this whole enterprise, which is to make this country
safer and to avoid the use of these unthinkable weapons. Every
year, or probably every 12 months or so, I speak at the launch
of a new destroyer at Bath Iron Works in Maine, and my remarks
always have a similar theme, which is we're building these
ships in the hopes that they will never have to be used in
conflict, because having them there, having the capability that
you're responsible for developing is what keeps this country
safe and avoids the unthinkable, which is a nuclear
confrontation.
I am concerned, and I'm sure we will examine these
questions in during the course of the hearing with issues of
staffing whether it's at Hanford or at the National Labs or in
NNSA generally because we can't solve these problems, we can't
meet the demands that are being placed upon you without the
people.
I'm worried that we've lost in the past few months some
pretty important people, some very capable people, and I want
to be sure that the expertise that those people carried with
them is being transferred to new staff coming on, and that
we're adequately staffing various departments and bureaus in
order to be sure that we can meet the demands. We're now well
into the modernization of the nuclear triad with missiles with
the bomber, with the new Columbia class submarine, but they
have to have the weapons in order to make them the effective
deterrent, and that's where NNSA comes in.
So I'm looking forward to the hearing, and I hope you will
address issues of staffing and adequacy of staffing because I
am concerned that that could hobble our ability to meet the
very high level of demand that we have in the Nuclear
Modernization Project. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Now I look
forward to hearing the opening statements from our first
members of the panel. Mr. McConnell, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF JAMES J. McCONNELL, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR
Mr. McConnell. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide an update on the Department of Energy's National
Nuclear Security Administration. With the support of the
administration in Congress, the NNSA is executing its vital
National Security missions, which cannot be accomplished
anywhere else in the U.S. Government.
Not since the cold war have we had seven simultaneous
weapon programs in the program of record, and not since the
Manhattan Project have we so fundamentally overhauled our
infrastructure. Within these monumental tasks, I'm proud to
report on some of NNSA's accomplishments. NNSA is
simultaneously delivering major stockpile modernization
programs that cover all three legs of the nuclear triad,
introducing new capabilities for the President to strengthen
deterrence.
Noticeably, the first war reserve plutonium pit for the
W87-1 warhead was produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory in
October. Last December, the B61-12 Life extension program,
which improved the B61's safety, security, and reliability
completed its last production unit. Additionally, NNSA achieved
the first production unit for the B61-13 just yesterday, almost
a year ahead of schedule.
Alongside stockpile modernization efforts, NNSA must design
new materials for future stockpile needs, certify components,
and assess the stockpiles condition annually. Our world class
science and technology capabilities ensure that our stockpile
is safe, secure, reliable, and effective without underground
nuclear explosive testing.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory recently installed
El Capitan, our first exascale computer system for national
security. It has been benchmarked as the world's fastest
supercomputer and is running full 3D nuclear weapons
simulations in support of stockpile stewardship activities.
Infrastructure modernization across the enterprise is
required to meet today's needs and provide enduring, flexible,
and resilient capabilities. To this end, the enterprise
blueprint aligns timely delivery of specialized infrastructure
with mission demands over the next 25 years. We are making
progress on large and small-scale projects. The uranium
processing facility is now over 70 percent complete with
operations plan to begin in 2032.
Reestablishing the capability to produce new plutonium pits
remains a priority, and we continue to make progress at the Los
Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project and the Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility. The Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation Program is another key element of our national
deterrent and helps to keep nuclear and radiological threats as
far from the U.S. Homeland as possible.
As the share of nuclear power in the global energy mix
grows, NNSA facilitates the global deployment of U.S. developed
nuclear reactors that incorporate the highest standards of
nuclear safeguards, security, and proliferation resistance.
This work would not be possible without the dedicated
professionals of the Federal and contractor workforce.
We are grateful for Congress's continued support. Thank
you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. McConnell. Mr. Jarrell,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF ROGER A. JARRELL II, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Mr. Jarrell. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
Members of the Subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you
today.
The Environmental Management (EM) program was born out of
the Manhattan Project, a monumental effort that helped end
World War II and win the cold war. Today, EM is entrusted with
the largest environmental cleanup effort in the world. Enabled
by significant investments from Congress, EM is leveraging the
best of American industry to achieve our mission safely and
effectively. The budget request reflects the Trump
administration's strong commitment to the EM mission and what
it brings to the American people.
With treatment capabilities in place, addressing
radioactive tank waste safely, effectively, and efficiently is
a top priority for EM. Key demolitions are advancing, including
at West Valley, where the last major building is set to come
down next month. In Nevada, we're on track to complete legacy
cleanup over the next 5 years. In addressing legacy waste of
the past, EM is helping launch a golden era of American energy
driving innovation and enabling national security missions of
the future.
This is vividly on display in Tennessee. Transformational
progress there is unleashing commercial nuclear power and
supporting modernization of NNSA's Y12 complex, and the Oak
Ridge National Lab. Management responsibilities for the
Savannah River site have been successfully transferred to NNSA.
In Idaho, our team is helping with key demolitions for naval
reactors, and this spring we completed key infrastructure
upgrades at WIP, so the facility can support Department of
Energy (DOE) missions for years to come.
As we execute our mission, we're looking forward to ways to
deliver cleanup commitments more efficiently without
sacrificing safety or effectiveness. Just last month, we
completed the 2000-gallon test bed initiative. It's a tool
that's helping us look at options with the potential to address
Hanford tank waste sooner, safer, and at less cost to the
American taxpayers.
I thank the Subcommittee for this longstanding support of
our program. I look forward to working with you and to answer
your questions. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Adam Houston, welcome.
It's good to see you again.
Admiral Houston. It's great seeing you too, Chair Fischer.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. HOUSTON, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVAL
NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM
Admiral Houston. Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
Your support for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
enables my team to design, operate, and maintain the world's
preeminent force of submarines and aircraft carriers that
routinely carry out high priority national security missions
around the world. Through decades of investment in research and
development, Naval Reactors has delivered the advanced
technology that assures the U.S. Navy's current dominance. Our
talented and dedicated people, peerless technology, and state-
of-art facilities, give us the ability to operate our nuclear
fleet wherever and whenever we choose.
To continue as the greatest naval force on the planet, we
must continue to invest if we want to sustain our advantage.
This year, Naval Reactors will prioritize three key areas and
two priority projects. First, our most important resource, our
people. The people within the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Enterprise are essential to the management and oversight of the
important work we perform for our Nation.
Second, we'll continue to focus on research and development
of technologies that support our current and future fleets to
reduce overall costs, shorten construction timelines, and add
capability to the fleet. Finally, we'll continue to execute
efforts that modernize and sustain critical infrastructure
throughout our aging Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE)
laboratories.
I'm seeking your continued support for two national
priority projects. The first is the continued development of
the reactor plant for the Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine, directly supporting the Navy's number one
acquisition priority. The second project is continued
construction of the Navy Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho,
which enables long-term reliable processing of spent fuel from
the Navy's nuclear fleet.
We continue to experience challenges with this project, but
I've been to the site multiple times in the last year, and
progress is visible. In closing, your strong enduring support
enables the Naval reactors to succeed and continue to excel
over 76 years beyond the early days of Admiral Rickover. I
respectfully urge your continued support across our efforts
this year. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral William Houston
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Statement of Admiral William Houston
Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss Naval Reactors. Your continued, strong support for the
mission of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program enables the United
States' nuclear Navy to maintain and expand the maritime dominance our
Nation has secured for many decades.
Naval Reactors continues to embody the foundational principles and
standards of excellence set forth by Admiral Rickover over 76 years
ago. Within my role, I routinely interact with our experts across the
naval nuclear enterprise, directly supervise our dedicated laboratories
and related work at our nuclear capable shipyards, and ensure safe and
effective execution of the Program's cradle-to-grave responsibilities.
As part of my annual appearance before the subcommittee, I want to
assure you that the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is well positioned
for the challenges ahead. On any given day, our Naval Reactors team is
providing continuous support for a globally deployed force while
maintaining an eye on future requirements and ensuring our position as
the world's premier fighting force.
Naval Reactors' congressional support and the trust of the American
people has been steady throughout our 76+ years of service. That
support has positioned us well, but we will not rest on our existing
reputation or processes, as the world continues to change around us.
Naval Reactors must outpace that change in all aspects of naval nuclear
propulsion and the Program is committed to maximizing the resources
provided by the American people to make that happen.
As part of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program's responsibilities,
we train every nuclear operator that serves onboard our nuclear-powered
ships. I have interviewed hundreds of officer candidates in my first
year as the Director and I am routinely impressed with the young,
talented and energetic candidates who sit across from me. When I talk
with commanding officers returning from deployment, there is a
consistent message that the propulsion plants are performing very well
and are highly reliable. It is the combination of willing, capable
experts and the finest technology in the world that sets the framework
for the future of naval nuclear propulsion.
I have established three pillars for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
program to focus on in the year ahead: our mission, our people, and our
foundation. Our mission centers on ensuring the nuclear powered Navy is
increasingly ready to fight today. That fight could include not only
traditional weapons and combat systems, but also a hybrid mix of new,
ambiguous threats. Our nuclear Navy must be ready to respond.
``People, not organizations, get things done,'' at Naval Reactors,
and throughout the naval nuclear enterprise, we live this mantra on a
daily basis. Our flat organizational construct enables and encourages
seamless connections with our Fleet Sailors, public and private
shipyards, the Navy and Department of Energy civilian workforce, and
our Naval Nuclear Laboratory subject matter experts. As I will outline
later in this testimony, our cadre of highly trained, educated and
experienced professionals is keeping the US Navy ahead of competitors.
Together, our people build and maintain the nuclear Navy, operate our
dedicated research laboratories, train operators, utilize our nuclear
infrastructure to support the Fleet, and ensure safe disposition of our
spent naval nuclear fuel. Your partnership and leadership, together
with the Department of Energy and the Navy is needed now, more than
ever, as we design, manufacture and deliver warfighting ships that will
power our fleet and protect the national security of the United States
for the rest of this century and beyond.
Finally, Naval Reactors must solidify and reinforce our existing
foundation, including the logistical frameworks we rely on to design,
build, maintain and dispose of the nuclear powered fleet. While our
continued success relies heavily on that foundation, we must keep an
eye on the horizon. Through advanced development of cutting-edge
technology, new materials and innovative designs, we continue to
shepherd the naval nuclear industrial base while maintaining our high
standards and delivering new capabilities.
Looking forward, we are increasingly aware of our adversaries'
ambitions and the nature of new threats to our national defense both
above and below the sea. Our actions today in executing cradle-to-grave
responsibility for naval nuclear propulsion will impact the security
and prosperity of our Nation for generations and our supremacy cannot
be taken for granted. Naval Reactors will ensure our mission, people
and foundation can efficiently meet the challenges the Nation has
entrusted us with.
naval reactors overview
This Committee's support has enabled Naval Reactors to continue to
power maritime dominance and preserve our record of safely operating
and maintaining our ships, while protecting personnel, the public and
the environment. We accomplish this through sharply focused regulatory
oversight of all aspects of the Program, documented in annual
performance reports available via the Department of Energy webpage.
Your support has been essential to the design, development, production,
and proving out of manufacturability of the Columbia-class propulsion
plant, ongoing construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility
in Idaho, and recent resumption of training at our prototype research
and training reactor at the Kesselring Site in New York. In the last
year, we have made substantial progress with construction and assembly
of Columbia-class life-of-ship cores which are in serial production,
with the second and third ship cores currently being built.
We will continue to meet current and near-term commitments, but we
are constantly investing and planning for the future of naval nuclear
propulsion. For example, Naval Reactors remains engaged with DOE and
NNSA leadership to ensure a future uranium enrichment capability will
support national security requirements, including naval nuclear
propulsion, into the next century. Through the support of Congress, we
continue to develop and pursue advanced technologies and recapitalize
infrastructure across all four of our Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites.
The Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho includes the Expended Core
Facility (ECF), which provides the capability to manage and examine
spent naval nuclear fuel, and materials irradiated in the Advanced Test
Reactor. The ECF is over 60 years old, and Naval Reactors is
transitioning its capabilities in stages, starting with spent fuel
management, which will take place within the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
Facility by the early 2030's. Naval Reactors is also beginning crucial
design and scoping work on the second infrastructure project that will
transition spent naval nuclear fuel examinations out of the ECF. As a
continuation of our phased approach, a future irradiation testing
capability will be vital to the Naval Reactors program into the next
century.
major projects
Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
number one acquisition priority. Research, development, and design for
the Columbia-class SSBN began in fiscal year 2010 and construction
started in fiscal year 2021. The Navy-funded electric drive propulsion
system for the Columbia-class is revolutionary. To date, lead ship
reactor plant components have been delivered on schedule and the
reactor core remains on track to support lead ship delivery. Naval
Reactors will continue reactor plant design, fabrication, and safety
analysis work required for lead ship reactor testing. Additionally,
Naval Reactors recently commenced testing of the lead ship electric
drive propulsion system at the compatibility test facility (CTF) in
Philadelphia, PA.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
Construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility at the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho is progressing. The Naval Spent Fuel
Handling Facility is essential to management and disposition of naval
spent nuclear fuel in support of aircraft carrier and submarine fleet
operations. Near-term milestones include erection of structural steel
for the main process building, construction of the reinforced concrete
spent fuel pools, and procurement and installation of the process and
utility systems required for operations. I want to encourage Members
and staff to visit the site to view this project's scale and progress
to date. As the visible progress and constant activity at the site get
us closer to the finish, Naval Reactors remains committed to keeping
the committee informed of progress on this complex and large-scale
infrastructure project.
Naval Examination Acquisition Project (NEAP)
The Naval Examination Acquisition Project (NEAP) is the second
major project at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. NEAP will
recapitalize and transition the existing reactor core examinations
capability out of the aging ECF. These core examinations allow
scientists and engineers to compare actual fleet operation-measured
reactor core performance data, to performance predicted by models and
testing programs during development and production of the core. These
examinations provide vital data to validate, improve, and deliver, safe
and unrestricted operations throughout the multi-decade lifespans US
Navy reactor cores are designed to operate. Without examining actual
spent fuel, current fleet operations may be restricted or limited when
issues arise, with conservatism maintained to protect the crew, the
core and the environment. The Program will move forward on the several-
year detailed design phase to prepare for NEAP construction to support
these examinations. We are incorporating lessons learned from the Spent
Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project and are engaged with NNSA and
DOE on timing and sequence of planned infrastructure projects at the
Idaho National Laboratory. I look forward to providing an update in the
coming years as we come through the complex design phase for this
essential facility.
technical base
In addition to the three priority projects discussed above, Naval
Reactors maintains a world-class, high-performing workforce across the
naval nuclear propulsion technical base. Our workforce provides
sustained, uninterrupted support of the cradle-to-grave operations of
our Nuclear Navy, and on-call assistance for hundreds of operational
requests on an annual basis. The Program's technical base includes a
foundation of specialists at our dedicated facilities and laboratories
that provide a human-in-the loop, utilizing cutting edge equipment
related to nuclear materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulics
testing, acoustics, electronics, software development, and systems
integration, to conduct our work.
The Naval Reactors technical base not only supports the fleet
operating today, it sets the foundations for our Navy to retain and
expand our technological advantages over competitors. Specifically, the
technical base: 1) receives daily emergent requests and feedback from
our globally deployed nuclear fleet, 2) executes cutting-edge
technology research and development in support of improving today's
nuclear fleet and delivering a more capable and lethal future fleet,
and 3) modernizes critical dedicated infrastructure and equipment while
safely and efficiently addressing the Program's legacy environmental
liabilities.
Recruiting, promoting and retaining top talent in our government
civilian and contract workforce is critical to our ability to fulfill
and mature our mission amidst a wide array of challenges and new
demands. The broad range of talent in our organization is in high
demand from all areas of our economy, but many choose to stay with the
Program because we are directly supporting national defense. We remain
focused on attracting and retaining a well-trained, highly qualified
workforce and continue to work with our laboratories, private
shipyards, Navy, and DOE leadership to stay competitive in this
aggressive talent market within the nuclear enterprise.
Program Direction
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will utilize Federal employees
to supervise, set direction for, and effectively manage operations at
our Headquarters in Washington D.C. and field offices in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Idaho.
Supporting several classes of nuclear-powered ships whose lifetimes
can extend over half a century requires staffing continuity and
longevity, and that workforce possesses the deep technical knowledge to
execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave responsibilities. The
combination of increasingly complex systems, new and innovative
research, and evolving and expanding vulnerabilities are informing our
human capital strategy to develop and mature generational expertise.
Recruiting, training, and retaining the Naval Reactors workforce is a
fundamental enabler of all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, and
assures the power to propel our submarines and aircraft carriers and
their systems.
In concert with our ongoing focus on research and development, we
continue to identify new approaches to attract the Nation's top talent
and retain the skilled workforce to meet the critical requirements of
naval nuclear propulsion.
Research and Development of Naval Reactors (NRD)
Naval Reactors Development (NRD) is focused on safely and
effectively delivering competitive advantage in all that we do.
Technology investment today will increase capability, reduce costs,
shorten lead times, and tighten construction spans for current and
future nuclear powered warships.
Our first priority is today's fleet of nuclear powered submarines
and aircraft carriers. Our laboratories and resident experts directly
respond to hundreds of operational requests and technical evaluations
annually. They assess and respond to emergent issues, keep our ships
mission-ready, safe to operate, and deployable anywhere, any time. The
unique nature of military operations has a significant portion of our
nuclear powered ships at sea and globally deployed all day, every day.
Their propulsion and power systems are required to remain online at all
times. That does not happen without critical support, years of
technical expertise, and a ready technical laboratory infrastructure.
Naval Reactors has reinvigorated advanced technology development
for the next generation of nuclear powered ships and submarines. We are
pursuing advanced reactor core and fuel systems, manufacturing methods
and inspection techniques, next-generation propulsion plant equipment,
instrumentation and control systems and sensors, and asymmetrical
applications of technologies. These advancements take time to
materialize and be proven, but in response to today's strategic
environment, we are executing with a higher sense of urgency to
simultaneously shorten development timelines, lower acquisition and
lifecycle costs, and improve adaptability. I invite you to visit our
facilities with your staffs, talk with our naval nuclear propulsion
experts and enhance your understanding of how we are delivering this
capability.
Operations, Facilities and Infrastructure
Our operations, facilities and infrastructure support a wide
spectrum of Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave related work and
recapitalization projects at multiple Naval Nuclear Laboratory
facilities and infrastructure systems. Many of the Program's required
facilities have supported the Program since its inception under Admiral
Rickover, over 76 years ago.
Decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) facilities that date back
to the early 1950's, including some no longer in use, is also part of
our facilities and infrastructure plan. We have approximately $6B in
environmental liabilities requiring D&D efforts. A significant portion
of this estimate includes the cost to remediate and demolish the
inactive facilities and infrastructure at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory
sites, which were essential to earlier propulsion plants on now-retired
classes of submarine and surface ships.
We continue to retire these liabilities in an environmentally
responsible and cost-effective manner. Our established partnership with
the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM)
leverages their experience in efficient, safe, and cost-effective
remediation of environmental liabilities. DOE-EM is working on all four
of our sites, including D&D of the S1W prototype that supported
development of the USS Nautilus (SSN 571), which will complete
dismantlement later this year.
conclusion
Over 76 years of maritime dominance does not guarantee we will
continue to lead, and every day, there are active challenges to our
maritime position. Naval nuclear propulsion remains an incredible but
unforgiving technology, we harness it with a constant focus on safe
operation across the cradle-to-grave responsibilities the Nation
entrusts to Naval Reactors. We are balancing investment in today's
fleet with future fleet requirements, while delivering unflinching
naval nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy. I appreciate the strong
support of Congress for this program.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. The committee will now
start our first round of questioning, 5-minute round, please.
Mr. McConnell, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I
commend NNSA's workforce for their dedication and speed in
delivering the first production unit of the B61-13. In this
setting, are there any lessons learned from the production of
the B61-13 that can be applied to other production lines?
Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator. Most definitely there
are. The clear collaboration and alignment between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and NNSA
from the beginning in the initiation of the B61-13 concept
allowed us to move promptly into a design and approval process,
which allowed for maximum use of the production capabilities
that had been established for the B61-12 and allow us to very
efficiently and effectively transition from the last production
unit of the B61-12 into the first production unit of the B61-
13, using very similar production and equipment components.
So that ability to maximize efficiency and minimize the
transition time and to add another capability to the President
and the war fighters to address, as you had said in your
opening remarks, harder and larger targets with the B61-13
allowed us to fill a need in our deterrence and address that
very quickly.
Senator Fischer. Do you see any other opportunities where
we can increase and accelerate the weapons production?
Mr. McConnell. So NNSA has for quite a while had a program
to enhance stockpile responsiveness, which is a across the
board effort to identify opportunities to improve the
efficiency of everything from design, through design for
manufacturing, through production, production certification,
and rate production through this effort that's been underway
for, as I said years now.
At the same time, we're looking to do more accelerated
capabilities and create an office that would allow us to be
even more focused on identifying new and novel ways to bring
options to the President and the war fighters to address
ongoing and new needs.
Senator Fischer. Last October, you released your enterprise
blueprint and that outlined the plans for recapitalizing major
infrastructure projects over the next 25 years, and that
includes how it will replace facilities that date back to the
Manhattan Project. I appreciate the level of thought that went
into those plans, including the careful sequencing to ensure
that new facilities come online as they're needed so it can
support the production of our nuclear weapons.
Can you provide us with an update about the ongoing capital
assets projects?
Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
continued attention and awareness to our enterprise blueprint
and the opportunity that it represents.
Senator Fischer. I find it very exciting, the opportunity
it presents. I hope it's followed.
Mr. McConnell. Very much so. We have laid out a very--as
you indicated, a very thoughtful and careful and not extreme
list of key facilities that are necessary over the next 25
years to produce a agile and responsive and resilient nuclear
security enterprise that is fit for the challenges that we will
face. It is time-phased to make sure that we bring the
facilities on in order that they're needed to produce the
actual products that we deliver to the Department of Defense.
So there is a logic and a sequencing to it.
Nonetheless, it is a fairly large group of things to be
done. Thankfully the President's budget is strongly supportive
of nuclear modernization, and we are off to a very good start
to execute the facilities that are in the first earliest phase
of that time sequenced enterprise blueprint.
Senator Fischer. In your opening comments, sir, you in
passing--I felt it was in passing, you mentioned Savannah
River. Can you provide us with an update on Savannah River and
the plutonium processing facility there?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, so a couple different things. My
colleague discussed that we have transitioned the site itself
from an Office of Environmental Management focused site to NNSA
as the landlord for the entire site in recognition of our long
and continuing and growing need for operations at Savannah
River, not the least of which is the Savannah River Plutonium
Production Facility. That facility is well underway under
design.
We look forward to achieving the 90 percent design
threshold, a key threshold for us for having significant
understanding of the expectations, requirements, and design
details of the facility in calendar year 2026. There are other
things going on in parallel. We need the facility. We also need
the talented people to man the facility and for example, our
welding certification facility is up and running, and so now we
are putting students through in order to be able to have
talented and capable skilled craft in the numbers we need with
the certifications we need to execute the mission as soon as
the facility itself is ready.
Senator Fischer. Are you comfortable with the schedule
you're on?
Mr. McConnell. We need to do everything fast. Time is our
most significant figure of merit. It is a very complicated,
large, and difficult facility to construct. We are on a good
timeframe. We are making progress to meet our expected
milestones. But major, one-of-a-kind high hazard nuclear
facilities like these are always difficult to manage and I
would always like to have more margin.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Senator King, you are
recognized.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. McConnell, I
think one of the most underappreciated risks that this country
faces is the danger of terrorists getting ahold of nuclear
materials. My frustration is that I can't find where in the
whole Federal enterprise, somebody's in charge of thinking
about that. So I'm going to start with you. All of our
attention is to our near peer adversaries, and I understand
that, but if nuclear materials and rudimentary explosive device
fell into the hands of a terrorist group, deterrence doesn't
work.
They don't have a capital city to destroy. They don't care
about dying, and the damage on a nuclear device in a tramp
steamer headed into the port of New York would be incalculable.
Talk to me about proliferation and how we keep our own
materials safe, but how can we think about this in a broader
sense, for example, developing technology to sense nuclear
materials in a place where they shouldn't be.
Mr. McConnell. Thank you for the question, Senator. Your
question in your opening remarks, you talked about the
deterrent with a T, the safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
deterrent that we are responsible for. We are also responsible
for many other aspects of deterrence with a C, including our
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and the Office of
Counter-Terrorism Counterproliferation.
Senator King. Is that within NNSA?
Mr. McConnell. Those are within NNSA. They are a senate
confirmed Presidential appointee at the same rank and the same
position as our deputy administrator for defense programs. The
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation mission includes the efforts
to figure out how to frustrate and prevent risks posed by non-
State actors. You're absolutely right, sir. The non-State
actors are not deterred in the same way as the State actors
are. We have a integrated system between Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, and the Counter-Terrorism
Counterproliferation folks with the support of the scientists
and engineers and capabilities of the defense programs part.
Senator King. I would hope also the intelligence community.
Mr. McConnell. The intelligence community and our
Department of Energy Intelligence group to prevent, counter,
and respond to those threats. Our approach is to make sure that
it is extremely difficult, virtually impossible for those non-
State actors to get access to the material and the technology
that is necessary to create a device and to make the penalty
they pay for attempting to acquire that material or that
knowledge very high and to make sure that our ability to detect
and to counter and prevent any efforts are successful so that
we can maintain safety and security and provide that deterrence
as far from the U.S. shores as possible.
Senator King. I agree and I appreciate that. I just hope
this will maintain a high level of focus because, as I say, I
think it's a somewhat underappreciated risk when we're talking
about national security. I view this as one of the most serious
that we face. Let me talk for a moment about staffing. As you
know, there was a 16 percent cut initially, and people came
back. Now, I think we're talking about an 8 percent cut in the
staffing of NNSA. But my impression is you were understaffed to
start with.
Has any cost benefit analysis been made about what the cost
to the enterprise is of losing people versus the fairly limited
savings from the salary involved?
Mr. McConnell. I'm not aware that we've done an analysis in
that parameter space. We have evaluated the risk to our mission
of the recent reductions in staff and have found them
acceptable for now and in the short term to continue to achieve
our mission.
Senator King. That strikes me as implausible, given the
level of the demands being placed upon the agency at this
particular moment in time where we're modernizing, we're
developing new weapons, we're trying to get back into the pit
business. Downsizing in that situation doesn't strike me as a
logical management move.
Mr. McConnell. We believe we are acceptably managing the
risk of the status quo. Our mission is increasing over time and
the speed by which our mission is increasing is also getting
more rapid. It is important as we go forward with the
enterprise blueprint, with the program of record, with all of
the work in front of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, that as our output requirements and mission
requirements increase, that our ability to meet those mission
requirements and outputs are commensurate.
We are never going to be able to buy our way to success and
there's, there's limits to that. So a fundamental part of our
ability to achieve----
Senator King. I might suggest there's something between
buying your way to success and staff cuts that diminish the
ability of the enterprise to meet its goals.
Mr. McConnell. I agree, Senator, and we are going to need
to make sure that our resources are adequate. We're also going
to continuously need to look for those productivity and
efficiency enhancements that will fundamentally allow us to
unlock additional output and achieve the mission that the
Nation and the Department of Defense and the President expect
of us.
Senator King. Thank you. I'll have some followup questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
you are recognized.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all,
gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. Mr.
McConnell, China and Russia are significantly expanding their
nuclear arsenals. How is the NNSA adjusting its stockpile
stewardship and modernization priorities to maintain a credible
deterrence against both near peer competitors simultaneously?
How does the growing parody between Chinese and U.S. nuclear
arsenals impact the ability of the U.S. to maintain that
nuclear deterrence?
Just to throw in just a third one here, just for the heck
of it, as the combined nuclear arsenals of Russia and China
begin to eclipse that of the United States in terms of numbers
of warheads, will that increase the likelihood or decrease the
interest of our partners or unaligned nations seeking their own
nuclear deterrent?
So basically, how are we stacking up against our
adversaries? What are we doing to stay ahead? What's that going
to do to the stability in the rest of the world?
Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator. As I indicated earlier,
we are currently engaged in seven weapon modernization programs
at the same time. This is the most active and the highest
number of weapons systems we've been producing or working on
developing at one time since the height of the cold war. That
is reflective of the requirements that we get from the
President, the strategic command, and the Nuclear Weapons
Council. We are very successful up to this point in delivering.
We have delivered the B61-12, the B61-13, we're on track with
the W88, which is to achieve first production unit relatively
soon.
We're continuing with the other weapon systems, W87, W80-4,
all of those programs represent our increased focus on the
ability to ensure that the President and the war fighters have
the options they need to respond to the geopolitical realities
we are in. That is not to say that we're at or trying to get to
parody, certainly not parody with the combined capabilities of
the Chinese and the Russians, that we can deter and provide the
deterrence with a flexible, effective, efficient, and reliable
suite of options in our deterrence, which is what we're working
on.
That combined with our dedicated efforts to improve the
physical condition of the security enterprise, both its
production capabilities and its science capabilities that are
essential to be able to design, certify, and assess the
stockpile gives us and continues to give us the edge and the
confidence that we need to provide deterrence, both for
ourselves and in somewhat into your last point is also the
extended deterrent that we provide to our allies and our other
friendly nations.
We are rising to the challenge, but the challenge keeps
rising also. We will continue on that path.
Senator Rounds. Out of curiosity, because we're talking
about lots of demand for it, and along with fuel for our
carriers and our submarines, where are we getting our uranium?
Can we talk about that in this open setting?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, to a certain extent. So we need uranium
for many different uses. We need unencumbered uranium in order
to run reactors to produce tritium. We need highly enriched
uranium to fuel the Admiral's reactors for our nuclear fleet of
submarines and aircraft.
Senator Rounds. No question about the need. My question is
in this open setting, and I'm not sure if we can do it or not,
but where are we getting it from?
Mr. McConnell. So we have enough material on hand for the
near term for both unencumbered fuel for production uses and
for the Navy. But we are going to need eventually to create a
domestic enrichment capability, and that the Department of
Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration are
currently on a two-pronged effort to do that. We have an
activity going on with Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Energy (BWXT)
to produce the Domestic Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge
Experiment, DOUCE, it's much easier as an acronym. Then we have
the AC 100 also.
Senator Rounds. I didn't do a very good job of asking it
maybe. Where are we getting our uranium from? Can we talk about
that in here?
Mr. McConnell. Perhaps----
Senator Rounds. Admiral Houston?
Mr. McConnell. Phone a friend.
Admiral Houston. Yes, Senator. We're getting it from
existing stockpiles. We haven't produced highly enriched
uranium since 1992. For my program, which is the primary user,
because I actually expend that highly enriched uranium because
I'm using it in my reactors. We are good into the 2050's for
that. But we are watching, we will need an enrichment
capability, just like the weapons complex will need an
enrichment capability. That's part of the enterprise blueprint
that's outlined by NNSA to develop that enrichment capability.
Senator Rounds. So the enrichment capabilities that we will
need, we know it, we've got till 2050, but between now and then
we should be talking about it.
Admiral Houston. Absolutely, Senator, and that's going to
be due to the difficulty and standing up that capability----
Senator Rounds. That's not a 5-year plan either, is it?
Admiral Houston. It is not. It is a long-term plan across
there, and it's laid out in the NNSA blueprint, sir.
Senator Rounds. Excellent. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds. For our next
rounds of round of questions, I would ask that we just ask one
question since we have a second panel coming up. Mr. McConnell,
you're getting a work over today. Can you provide us with an
update on--no, I want to ask you this one.
How are you working to ensure that Los Alamos can meet the
demand for pits until Savannah River can do that rate
production?
Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator. As I indicated, we've
hit a major milestone in producing the first diamond stamped
war reserve, W87-1hit at Los Alamos in October of last year. We
are now actively working on the project, which will allow us to
achieve rate production of at least 30 pits per year at Los
Alamos. We call it 30 base.
That project is executing right now to deliver
approximately 2028, and then we will followup with additional
work to improve the reliability of our ability to deliver. So a
more reliable production rate at 30 pits per year, which will
take us into the early 2030's. What that work means
specifically is we need to move old equipment out of the space
to create D and D we call it. It's another thing that EM does
quite a lot of, in order to create white space that we can then
move new work spaces, new glove boxes and capabilities in.
Senator Fischer. Are you speaking specifically about Los
Alamos here?
Mr. McConnell. Yes, all of that happens in PF4.
Senator Fischer. And how that ties in then to what happens
at Savannah River.
Mr. McConnell. Right. So by 2028, we get to the 30 pit per
year capability at Los Alamos. In parallel at Savannah River,
at the Savannah River Plutonium Production Facility, SRPPF, as
they indicated, we're working to mature the design to get to 90
percent design in calendar year 2026, which will then allow us
to move on to construction and production of the plant by 2032
to get to initial production and then rate production of at
least 50 pits per year at Savannah River in that timeframe.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator King.
Senator King. Mr. Jarrell, I'm going to give you a question
for the record so it doesn't count as my one question. If you
could supply the Committee with an analysis of your staffing
levels. I know you've lost some key people at Hanford. But for
the record, not now, but if you could give me some background
on that.
Senator King. Admiral, my question is, is Naval Reactors on
track with the Columbia Construction Project? In other words,
when the submarines are ready, will the new reactors be ready?
Admiral Houston. Senator King, absolutely. My reactor for
District of Columbia is ready. It's just waiting to be shipped
when Electric Boat wants it. We don't ship it early just due to
security requirements.
Senator King. Of course.
Admiral Houston. The second reactor core is 75 percent
complete. Now, we don't have issues with that. Our heavy plant
equipment we are on schedule to meet required in yard dates so
that steam generators, pressurizers, reactor cooling pumps. Our
largest component, which I've mentioned before that had the
most concern for us was the turbine generator. That turbine
generator is at Electric Boat right now. It's being outfitted,
completely tested. Our turbine generator has been tested and
it's being packaged for shipment from the vendor across
country, and it is not the critical path on delivery of
District of Columbia. So we are within the timeframe on that.
Senator Fischer. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. I will pass.
Senator Fischer. Okay. With that, I would like to thank our
first panel for being here today and providing us with
information. You may get other questions for the record, and I
would ask that you return those within 2 weeks. Thank you. If
we could have the second panel.
Welcome to our members of panel two. We appreciate you
being here today. If you are ready, we will take your opening
statements. Let's begin with Dr. Vann, please?
STATEMENT OF DR. BRANDI C. VANN, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Dr. Vann Yes, ma'am. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member
King, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here before you today regarding our
nuclear forces.
As President Trump and Secretary of Defense, Hegseth have
stated, the United States will achieve peace through strength
by rebuilding our military and reestablishing deterrence.
Nuclear weapons provide a unique deterrence effect that no
other element of our U.S. military power can replace, and our
Nation must continue to field a flexible and modern nuclear
deterrent. These capabilities are critical to the continued
safety and security of our American people, our allies, and
partners, both now and in the future.
The Department continues to prioritize nuclear
modernization and sustainment of the three legs of the triad
and our nuclear command control and communications, as well as
all the supplemental capabilities to the program of record.
Additionally, the department supports the efforts of Department
of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to
recapitalize, sustain, and operate the nuclear enterprise. The
United States must deliver the nuclear modernization program of
record while continuing to sustain our legacy systems to avoid
a deterrence shortfall and mitigate risk.
To that end, the President's top line budget request for
the Department of Defense does include a prioritization of our
nuclear modernization and sustainment efforts. The Department
of Defense remains staunchly committed to the viability of the
United States nuclear deterrent in response to an unprecedented
security environment with multiple nuclear challengers who have
not followed our lead as a responsible nuclear power.
DOD is acutely aware of the significant challenges that we
face and recognizes that urgent action is required. In response
to this evolved threat landscape, the department and the
Nuclear Weapons Council continue to make the necessary policy
changes and implement necessary actions to address what we
acknowledge is a program of record that is necessary but maybe
insufficient for the realities of the security environment that
we will face.
We recognize that we must be flexible, efficient, and
adaptable to the evolving geopolitical landscape in order to
defend the Homeland and provide options to the Secretary and
the President that bolster deterrence. I want to close by
acknowledging the creation of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Policy and Programs referred to in the department as
the ASDNDCBD, who will be at the forefront of the DOD's efforts
to sustain and modernize this nuclear deterrent. This position
will serve as a key point of accountability to Secretary
Hegseth and to Congress on this critical national security
mission.
Finally, thank you to this Committee for your longstanding
bipartisan support to our nuclear deterrent mission and to the
dedicated professionals across our nuclear enterprise, as well
as my colleagues here at the table who work diligently every
day to execute this highest priority defense mission. Thank
you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Dr. Vann. Mr. Hoagland,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. HOAGLAND, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Hoagland. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
King, and members of the committee, I'm grateful for the
opportunity to represent the men and women of the NNSA today.
It is an honor to describe the extraordinary range of
activities being executed across our nuclear enterprise.
NNSA performs national security functions that exist
nowhere else in the U.S. Government. Among these
responsibilities is to ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile, which has been the cornerstone
of America's defense for more than 75 years. The foundation of
our mission is our workforce, the cadre of scientists,
engineers, technicians, Federal agents, and others at NNSA and
across our enterprise who provide exceptional expertise to our
nuclear deterrent.
Although this mission has spanned decades, we are now
performing it in a strategic environment that grows more
challenging with each passing year. The United States must
simultaneously deter multiple nuclear armed adversaries whose
own nuclear capabilities continue to advance. To ensure the
dependability of our deterrence, NNSA is now modernizing both
the legacy stockpile as well as the scientific and the
production infrastructure upon which it depends.
NNSA is presently executing seven major stockpile
modernization programs covering all three legs of the nuclear
triad. One recent addition to this program of record, which has
been discussed, the B 61-13 observed a key milestone this month
when we completed the first production unit of the new bomb
fully 1 year ahead of schedule. This acceleration was achieved
by implementing several technical and programmatic innovations
to optimize production in an approach we hope to apply to
future modernization efforts.
NNSA has also established a program for the Nuclear Armed
Sea launched cruise missile, which will provide the Navy with
considerable new options to deter China in the Indo-Pacific.
Work is on schedule for the W 80-4 warhead, the warhead for the
Air Force's long-range standoff missile, and beyond these
current programs, NNSA is also pursuing two formal studies to
meet requirements for hard and deeply buried target defeat and
next generation reentry capabilities.
Underlying both our stockpile modernization programs and
the development of future capabilities is the infrastructure of
the weapons complex. As the committee is acutely aware, both
our production plans and the facilities used to design,
certify, and assess the stockpile are urgently in need of
recapitalization. Even as we maintain and operate legacy
facilities, we're prioritizing infrastructure investments to
align with mission needs over the next quarter century through
the enterprise blueprint.
In particular, NNSA is advancing multiple large
construction projects to provide the strategic materials needed
for the deterrent, including plutonium, uranium, lithium,
tritium, and high explosives. Successfully meeting NSA's
objectives and in turn ensuring the dependability of the
Nation's strategic deterrent, consistent investment. I
appreciate Congress's unwavering support of the deterrence
mission, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. James McConnell and
Mr. Dave Hoagland follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Mr. James McConnell and Mr. Dave Hoagland
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the
Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). NNSA appreciates the Subcommittee's ongoing support.
NNSA performs national defense and public safety and security
missions that exist nowhere else in the U.S. Government. In addition to
maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and powering the Navy's nuclear
fleet, NNSA is responsible for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
to foreign states and terrorists and responding to life-threatening
nuclear emergencies. Over the last year, NNSA continued to deliver
modernized nuclear weapons to the Department of Defense (DoD) while
sustaining stockpile systems and minimizing or securing nuclear and
radioactive materials around the globe to stop threats as far from the
U.S. Homeland as possible. This work is being carried out every day by
the dedicated and highly talented women and men across the nuclear
security enterprise's Federal and contractor workforce.
NNSA is executing these missions against the backdrop of an
increasingly complex and volatile international environment that
presents significant, often overlapping, challenges. China represents a
unique threat as it rapidly modernizes and expands its nuclear arsenal
while continuing to be an economic peer. At the same time, Russia
maintains the world's largest nuclear arsenal, continues to expand its
capabilities, and has revised its nuclear use doctrine, expanding the
set of circumstances under which it may launch a nuclear attack. The
need to deter Russia and China simultaneously presents a new deterrence
challenge distinct from the cold war and presents a possible future
where the U.S. must counter two nuclear peers.
We are also witnessing growing threats from regional actors like
Iran and North Korea. Iran continues to take steps to reduce the amount
of time it would take to produce a nuclear weapon. North Korea is
committed to developing long-range, nuclear-armed missiles capable of
posing a direct threat to the United States, its allies, and critical
assets across the Indo-Pacific region.
Finally, we are seeing growing levels of military and economic
cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, including
technology sharing. As the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community noted, ``These primarily bilateral
relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have
strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten
and harm the United States, as well as improved their resilience
against U.S. and Western efforts to constrain or deter their
activities.''
In this challenging strategic environment, the U.S. nuclear
stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective. However, we
recognize that deterrence is not static; new and modern capabilities
and options for the President are necessary to not only maintain but
strengthen deterrence.
NNSA is also challenged by aged and fragile infrastructure across
the nuclear security enterprise. It is becoming more challenging to
reliably meet deterrence needs in decades-old production facilities and
science and technology infrastructure. NNSA is working to maintain
existing facilities to meet current stockpile demands while
simultaneously investing in modern infrastructure.
Considering the compounding challenges facing the enterprise, I am
proud to report on some of NNSA's recent accomplishments. In a major
milestone, the first war reserve (WR) diamond-stamped plutonium pit for
the W87-1 warhead was produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
last October, reestablishing a previously dormant manufacturing
capability essential for our enduring stockpile. Last year, NNSA
completed the Last Production Unit (LPU) of the B61-12 Life Extension
Program (LEP). The successful execution of this program saw the
consolidation of multiple B61 variants with updated non-nuclear
components and improved safety, reliability, and accuracy metrics that
will extend its service life for at least another 20 years. By taking
advantage of existing B61 production lines, NNSA now anticipates
producing the first B61-13 almost a year ahead of schedule.
The unmatched scientific capabilities we use every day to design,
certify, and assess our stockpile have made further groundbreaking
advances, which are foundational to our confidence in the nuclear
deterrent. Last year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory installed
El Capitan, our first exascale computing system for national security.
With the capability to perform 2.79 quintillion calculations per second
at peak performance, it has been benchmarked as the world's fastest
supercomputer and is currently running classified, full 3D nuclear
weapon simulations in support of nuclear stockpile stewardship
activities. Additionally, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) has now
repeated its seminal 2022 fusion ignition breakthrough numerous times
and continues to see increased yields and net energy gains. On April 7,
NIF achieved a record fusion energy yield of 8.6+MJ, demonstrating the
first gain greater than 4 times. Fusion ignition provides unparalleled
insights into the exceptionally high pressures and temperatures present
inside a nuclear explosion. The ability to successfully replicate
ignition at higher yields and greater net energy gains improves our
ability to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile.
Over the past year, NNSA has also achieved significant
accomplishments across the full range of its nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and emergency response activities, significantly
contributing to U.S. security by eliminating or mitigating nuclear
security threats before they affect the Homeland, our interests
overseas, or our allies. NNSA has worked to improve the United States'
space-based nuclear detection capability in partnership with U.S. Space
Force through the delivery of Global Burst Detector III payloads. These
sensors are integrated into satellites in support of the nuclear
warfighting mission and treaty verification. Additionally, NNSA has
replaced or is in the process of replacing almost 90 percent of the
cesium-based blood irradiators in the United States with devices that
do not use radioactive sources, permanently reducing the risk of a
``dirty bomb'' attack on American soil.
NNSA's Naval Reactors program continues to ensure the U.S. Navy's
competitive warfighting edge and secure the sea-based leg of the
nuclear triad with unmatched submarine technology. The reactor for the
new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines and reactor designs for
the next generation of fast-attack submarines are in progress. The S8G
Prototype reactor at the Kesselring Site completed its refueling
overhaul last July, providing an additional 20 years of training,
research, and development opportunities. The Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project at the Naval Reactors Facility also continues
to progress, and with the near-term award of the last major
construction subcontract, the Project retires a significant amount of
risk and will be entirely in execution mode through completion. The
project has completed its heavily reinforced concrete foundations,
continued erecting structural steel for the main process building, and
started construction of the spent fuel pools.
Finally, to help plan the modernization and recapitalization of
NNSA's aged and fragile infrastructure, NNSA published its Enterprise
Blueprint which outlines a 25-year plan to align the construction of
specialized infrastructure with demands across the nuclear stockpile,
global security, and naval nuclear propulsion missions. The United
States can no longer rely on decades-old production facilities and
science and technology infrastructure to meet deterrence needs. The
nuclear security enterprise must re-establish eliminated capabilities;
replace buildings that are failing; and meet modern safety, security
and environmental standards. While the Enterprise Blueprint provides a
roadmap to modernize and recapitalize NNSA's specialized
infrastructure, we recognize that as an enterprise we must reliably
deliver projects on time and within cost parameters if we are to
successfully deliver a modern infrastructure capable of delivering a
modern stockpile for our Nation's defense.
These accomplishments demonstrate NNSA's determination to fulfill
our national security missions while remaining clear-eyed about the
scale of the work ahead. We intend to move forward with urgency and
precision.
weapons activities
NNSA's Weapons Activities portfolio covers activities including
stockpile management; production modernization; stockpile research,
technology, and engineering; infrastructure and operations; defense
nuclear security; secure transportation; and information management and
cybersecurity.
Stockpile Management
Stockpile Major Modernization
NNSA is executing an expanded program of record to meet extant and
emerging DOD requirements. We are delivering seven major stockpile
modernization programs which are at different stages of design,
engineering, and production simultaneously. The modernization programs
cover all three legs of the nuclear triad and introduce new options and
capabilities for the President.
In December 2024, NNSA achieved the LPU for the B61-12 LEP just 3
years after the announcement of the First Production Unit (FPU) in
fiscal year 2022. In fiscal year 2026, the program will transition to
Stockpile Sustainment.
NNSA is also building the B61-13, which strengthens deterrence and
assurance by providing the President with additional options against
certain harder and large-area military targets. The program will be in
Phase 6.6, (Full-Scale Production). Appropriated funds in fiscal year
2024 for the B61-13, allowed NNSA to leverage active B61-12 production
capabilities. NNSA appreciates the support from Congress to authorize
and appropriate these funds in fiscal year 2024. This has improved
efficiency and enabled NNSA to quickly meet an emerging DOD need. NNSA
plans for a system level FPU in fiscal year 25, significantly ahead of
our previous fiscal year 2026 timeline.
The W88 Alt 370 Program will remain in Phase 6.6 (Full-Scale
Production) and is scheduled to reach LPU in the final quarter of
fiscal year 2025. The W88 warhead has been deployed in the stockpile
for more than 30 years. The W88 Alt 370 modernizes the arming, fuzing,
and firing subsystem; improves surety; and replaces the conventional
high explosive and associated materials.
The W80-4 LEP will remain in Phase 6.4, (Production Engineering),
and reached a major milestone with reacceptance of the WR plutonium
pit. The program has also reached FPU for multiple components. It
remains on track for system FPU in fiscal year 2027, aligned with the
Long-Range Standoff Weapon and the Air Force's schedule for initial
operational capability.
In accordance with Section 1640 of the fiscal year 2024 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), NNSA and DOD added the Nuclear-Armed
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) to the program of record. The
program entered a tailored Phase process which combined Phase 6.2
(Feasibility Study and Option Down-Select) and 6.2a (Design Definition
and Cost Study) in June 2024. In January 2025, NNSA's SLCM-N Federal
program office down-selected the warhead to the W80 family and
continues to coordinate with DOD as missile options are evaluated.
The W87-1 Modification Program is currently in Phase 6.3
(Development Engineering). The program is replacing the W78 warhead,
currently one of the oldest in the stockpile. It will be the first
weapon to receive newly manufactured plutonium pits. This program took
a critical step forward last year when the first WR plutonium pit for
the W87-1 was diamond stamped at LANL. NNSA continues to closely
coordinate with the Air Force's Sentinel Program, and the FPU for the
W87-1 is scheduled to be delivered in the early 2030's.
The W93 program will be in Phase 2a, (Design Definition and Cost
Study), with efforts focused on ascertaining the cost and schedule
associated with development and production of the W93/Mk7. The W93 will
meet DOD requirements to enhance operational effectiveness of the U.S.
ballistic missile submarine force. The W93 program is being undertaken
in parallel with the UK A21/Mk7 or Astraea warhead program, continuing
coordination through the U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement.
Stockpile Sustainment and Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD)
Stockpile Sustainment supports maintenance, sustainment, and
surveillance activities to ensure the existing U.S. nuclear deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective. Stockpile Sustainment directly
executes maintenance, limited life component exchanges, minor
alterations, surveillance, assessment, surety studies and capability
improvements, management activities, and support of weapons until they
are dismantled for all enduring weapons systems in the stockpile. WDD
also provides material and components from dismantled weapons for reuse
in the current and modern stockpile and provides for safe and secure
dismantlement of nuclear weapons, components, and critical materials
for the stockpile, production modernization, and other stakeholders
across the nuclear security enterprise.
Production Operations (PO) and Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA)
PO provides the unique foundation for site-specific, production-
enabling capabilities to execute weapons production, including process
improvements and investments focused on increased efficiency of
production performance. Scope covers recruitment and development of
skilled labor required for nuclear weapon systems capabilities that
enable individual weapon production and are not specific to one
material stream. PO also provides production equipment maintenance and
calibration services for manufacturing operations to meet DOD WR
requirements. In addition to these activities, NEA prevents, detects,
and mitigates potential consequences of subversion across the
enterprise, both to the stockpile and to the associated capabilities to
design, produce, and test nuclear weapons.
Production Modernization
The production modernization program re-establishes and modernizes
the manufacturing capabilities for nuclear weapons that degraded or
were eliminated after the cold war. This includes modernization of
unique materials production capabilities across the enterprise
including plutonium, uranium, lithium, high explosives, tritium, non-
nuclear components, weapons assembly/disassembly and special materials.
All of these materials and capabilities require modern infrastructure
to ensure reliable production capabilities at required capacities.
Plutonium Pit Production
NNSA's highest production modernization priority is re-establishing
the ability to produce new plutonium pits at scale, a capability that
has been absent since Rocky Flats ceased operations in 1989. Although
the W87-1 and W93 programs are setting the pace and quantity for pit
production now, NNSA's long-term stewardship of the nuclear stockpile,
including future weapons systems, will require newly produced pits. We
recognize, fundamentally, that as long as nuclear weapons exist, we
will need a pit production capability. To achieve the requisite pits
per year (ppy) necessary for current and future stockpile needs, NNSA
is pursuing a two-site strategy at LANL and the Savannah River Site
(SRS). The two-site strategy is a key component of NNSA's development
of a modern nuclear security enterprise, with an emphasis on
flexibility and resilience.
NNSA's pit production plan includes a redesign and refurbishment of
plutonium facilities at LANL to support a production capacity of no
fewer than 30 ppy while simultaneously increasing the production of WR
qualified pits for the W87-1. This work achieved a major breakthrough
when the first diamond stamped WR plutonium pit for the W87-1 was
produced last year. We anticipate Los Alamos achieving the capability
to produce 30 ppy by 2028, with increased manufacturing rate confidence
as additional equipment is installed into the early 2030's. In the
coming year, NNSA is planning to conduct engineering evaluations for
Los Alamos pit production in concert with increased equipment
purchases, installation activities, and removal of legacy equipment in
pursuit of rate production. Our ability to execute work on the pit
production line while producing qualified plutonium pits for the W87-1
is a testament to our adaptability as an organization and the urgency
around reconstituting this vital capability.
NNSA is also making progress on the Savannah River Plutonium
Processing Facility (SRPPF) to establish the capacity to produce at
least 50 ppy. The SRPPF Main Process Building is on track to reach 90
percent design completion in calendar year 2026 and NNSA aims to
establish a cost and schedule baseline for the project in fiscal year
2026. Demolition and removal of equipment and commodities from the
interior of the Main Process Building at SRPPF was completed in 2024
with over 2,500 gross tons of material sent offsite for recycling. We
have also completed design in areas such as road construction and other
required site preparations to accelerate the start of construction.
As NNSA ramps up efforts to bring on the workforce necessary to
operate SRPFF, SRS is also bringing new facilities online that will be
essential for training specialized machinists and operators, such as
the Machining Training Center, established last year. Once SRPPF
construction is finished, NNSA will introduce nuclear material and
begin the manufacturing process for pits and reach rate production as
soon as possible. We recognize the aggressiveness of SRPPF's schedule
and appreciate congressional support for construction and long-lead
procurements.
NNSA expects to make progress on the final design of the overall
SRPPF project and the beginning of construction of the High-Fidelity
Training Center, Main Process Building and the Operations Center. These
subprojects are being pursued in parallel with ongoing execution of
long-lead procurement such as production equipment, gloveboxes, and
bulk material.
Uranium
Alongside pit production, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at
the Y-12 National Security Complex is a top infrastructure
modernization priority. Current uranium processing is carried out in
Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era facility well past its design
life. By contrast, UPF will relocate casting, special oxide production,
and salvage and accountability capabilities into a new, modern, more
efficient, and safe facility. The construction of the overall UPF
project is now over 70 percent complete. We expect construction to be
finished in 2027 with transition to operations to complete no later
than 2032. The current UPF cost estimate is $10.35B. While UPF is under
construction, NNSA continues to maintain legacy facilities to produce
weapons components.
Along with UPF, NNSA is advancing its development of one or more
gas centrifuge technologies for domestic uranium enrichment. Our
nearest-term priority is to produce unobligated low-enriched uranium
(LEU) to fuel tritium production. Over the long-term, we will need to
produce unobligated highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program. For almost 10 years, NNSA's efforts have been
focused on research and development at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to
advance the Domestic Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Experiment (DUECE)
gas centrifuge technology. This past August, NNSA contracted with BWXT-
Nuclear Fuel Services to conduct a year-long engineering study that
will help us plan our acquisition approach for a pilot plant using the
DEUCE technology. The next step will be to contract for the design and
licensing to deploy this pilot plant at the beginning of fiscal year
2026.
To reduce risk to meeting domestic uranium enrichment program
objectives, NNSA is also exploring the feasibility of a second
centrifuge technology, the AC100. This past December, NNSA released a
Request for Information for industry input on an AC100 deployment that
would provide a limited early production capability and demonstrate one
of the available centrifuge technologies. NNSA is on track to contract
for an AC100 project execution plan at the beginning of fiscal year
2026.
Lithium
Lithium handling, packaging, and processing are key capabilities in
the nuclear weapon production mission. NNSA requires specialized,
weapon-specific forms of lithium for the production of nuclear weapon
components. NNSA currently processes lithium in Building 9204-02 at the
Y-12 National Security Complex, which is 82 years old and suffers from
structural degradation. In 2023, NNSA broke ground on the Lithium
Processing Facility (LPF). NNSA will ensure the continuity of critical
lithium processing capabilities during the transition to LPF.
Tritium
Tritium gas, a critical component of nuclear weapons systems,
decays over time and must be continually replenished to maintain
stockpile effectiveness. NNSA produces tritium by irradiating Tritium
Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) at two Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) reactors before transferring them to SRS for
extraction, purification, and loading into gas transfer system
reservoirs, or for other national security needs. During this past
year, NNSA, in coordination with the TVA, pursued and received Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval to increase the per-reactor
operating cycle maximum TPBAR limit from 1,792 to 2,496. This
represents a 39 percent increase in TPBARs and by extension, a similar
increase to the Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) reactor site tritium production
capacity. The increase will enhance programmatic flexibility and
capacity to meet demand fluctuations or recover from a potential
realization of programmatic risks. NNSA continues to support an
increasingly reliable, resilient, and flexible tritium supply chain to
meet the growing nuclear security enterprise mission.
High Explosives and Energetics
NNSA is currently working on two major construction projects that
support our high explosives capability. The High Explosives Science and
Engineering (HESE) facility at the Pantex Plant will consolidate 15
aging facilities into three new, more efficient ones to conduct
science, technology, engineering, and production activities. We
anticipate HESE completion in 2028. Additionally, at Pantex, the High
Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production Facility (HESFP) will
replace 11 deteriorating World War II-era formulation facilities and
establish an in-house high explosives manufacturing capability. NNSA is
working to achieve the operational start date for HESFP as required by
the fiscal year 2024 NDAA. While NNSA executes these major capital
projects within the complex, we are also working closely with partners
in DOD to establish main charge insensitive high explosives production
at Holston Army Ammunition Plant, and with the Naval Surface Warfare
Center Indian Head Division for HE formulation. Additionally, to ensure
a sufficient supply of critical FK-800 binder needed to manufacture
these high explosives, NNSA successfully contracted with 3M to procure
up to 32,000 pounds of remaining FK-800 supply, which is anticipated to
be delivered by the end of fiscal year 2025. NNSA is also formulating
new insensitive high explosives to replace existing formulas that use
FK-800.
Non-Nuclear Components
The overwhelming majority of a nuclear weapons package consists of
highly specialized non-nuclear components. NNSA designs most of the
non-nuclear components at Sandia National Laboratories and produces
them at the Kansas City National Security Campus. The need to execute
seven weapon modernization programs simultaneously presents a
production capacity challenge at Kansas City, as the current
manufacturing complex was designed for a requirement of one weapons
system in development and one system in production. Changes in the
program of record have resulted in a significantly increased need for
non-nuclear components, and therefore a doubling of the workforce since
2014. To meet expanded production, facility, and workforce needs, NNSA
launched the Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation (KCNExT),
a multi-phase real eState acquisition approach, allowing the
utilization of each phase immediately upon completion while
construction continues elsewhere. NNSA broke ground on Phase One last
year and a Topping Out Ceremony for Phase One occurred in February.
In addition, all weapons require trusted, warhead strategic
radiation hardened microelectronics (WSRH). These can only be designed
and manufactured at the Sandia National Laboratories' Microsystem
Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) complex. Strategic
radiation hardened microelectronics are essential components of a
nuclear weapon's arming, fuzing, and firing system, which provides the
signals that initiate the nuclear explosive chain. Production of WSRH
components at MESA is considered high risk due to high downtime rates
of old equipment that is no longer supported by the manufacturer.
stockpile research, technology, and engineering (srt&e)
The SRT&E program provides the foundation for science-based
stockpile decisions; delivers advanced capabilities to support DOD
requirements and counter emerging threats; and innovates across the
nuclear security enterprise to improve productivity, efficiency, and
responsiveness. For more than 30 years, NNSA's unrivaled scientific
enterprise has provided the decisive edge to maintain confidence in the
stockpile without the need for explosive testing. Thanks to the
tireless work of a generation of scientists and engineers, we now have
a better understanding of a nuclear weapon than at any time in the
atomic era.
Within SRT&E, the Advanced Simulation and Computing program
supports the subject matter experts, integrated design codes and other
physics and engineering models, along with the enabling infrastructure
represented by El Capitan and other computational systems. These
capabilities provide unprecedented modeling and simulations essential
for certifying the nuclear stockpile and also provide support for
NNSA's nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions.
As Secretary Wright has said, AI is the next Manhattan Project.
NNSA is taking decisive action to leverage advantages offered by AI. We
believe this technology can be applied to every aspect of our nuclear
deterrent mission, accelerating the time needed to solve some of the
Nation's toughest science challenges. That is why NNSA is already
starting to harness our premier computing power to support AI to
analyze diagnostic data, optimize experimental designs, and improve our
facility operations. NNSA will not only use AI to support the critical
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) with data those who created the
program did not know was possible, but will also use it to provide
valuable insights into the potential for AI to advance similar non-NNSA
defense missions and assess our adversaries' military activities.
The Inertial Confinement Fusion program gives NNSA experimental
access to extreme temperature and pressure regimes characteristic of
nuclear weapons explosions to support design, certification, and
assessment of the nuclear stockpile. While commercial fusion energy
facilities are being designed and built, LLNL's NIF remains the only
location on Earth capable of achieving fusion ignition. NIF's ability
to repeatably provide multi-megajoule fusion yields allows stockpile
scientists to test the survivability of U.S. stockpile systems when
exposed to hostile environments, improve the predictive capability of
NNSA's simulations, develop high-fidelity diagnostics and advanced
experimental platforms, and better understand the outputs of nuclear
explosions. As modernization decisions will be reliant on the
certification of new materials, components and systems not previously
fielded in the stockpile, the capability to generate fusion yield in
the laboratory is a critical tool that is unique to the U.S. nuclear
complex.
The Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation program develops
agile, affordable, assured, and responsive technologies and
capabilities for nuclear stockpile sustainment and modernization. This
action accelerates the nuclear weapons lifecycle by rapidly developing,
building and testing prototypes through ground and flight test
demonstrations. The Engineering and Integrated Assessments program
ensures system-informed survivability in present and future stockpile-
to-target sequences and ensures a responsive nuclear deterrent through
collaborative partnerships, proactive integration, disruptive
innovation, and assessments. NNSA is supporting two Phase 1 system
studies for early exploration of concept assessments for hard and
deeply buried target defeat and non-ballistic reentry systems in
response to Nuclear Weapons Council requests for joint studies of
future weapon and nuclear security enterprise capabilities. NNSA will
continue to support our DOD partners and harness the creative and
dynamic capabilities of our labs, plants, and sites to rapidly address
the shifting threat environment.
A critical infrastructure investment to support the design,
certification, and assessment of the current and future stockpile, NNSA
is constructing the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments
(ECSE). The current focus is on the expansion and construction efforts
at the Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation
(PULSE) at the Nevada National Security Site. ECSE includes development
of the Z-Pinch Experimental Underground System (ZEUS) and Advanced
Sources Detectors (ASD) Scorpius instruments. Experiments with these
tools at PULSE will allow NNSA to conduct system-level plutonium aging
experiments by the end of the decade, providing an important capability
to assess system designs. Importantly, they will support certification
of the W80-4, W87-1, and W93 programs.
infrastructure and operations
As NNSA's workload increases in response to the global threat
environment, the enterprise urgently requires modernized
infrastructure. A significant portion of NNSA's critical facilities is
operating beyond its 40-year life span while other capabilities must be
reestablished. Recapitalizing and restoring these capabilities is
critical for on-time delivery of the weapons modernization program of
record.
While new facilities are under construction, NNSA must continue to
maintain and operate in legacy facilities to enable weapons
modernization at an increased pace as well as meet global nuclear
security requirements, including counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, and nuclear emergency response. As noted
previously, the need to operate legacy facilities while also
constructing new ones places additional financial and workforce strain
on NNSA and requires our adaptability and flexibility.
The Enterprise Blueprint issued last year is the plan for
surmounting this challenge. It provides a roadmap for the next quarter-
century of NNSA programmatic construction to carefully manage the
overlapping requirements of weapons delivery schedules, legacy facility
maintenance, and new facility construction by employing new approaches
to improve performance in delivering projects. Even so, we are clear-
eyed that reform must come from within, and NNSA must keep costs and
schedules within appropriate levels as part of our responsibility to
Congress and the American people.
Infrastructure modernization goes beyond the construction of new
facilities. It also delivers modern capabilities and efficient
technologies that take advantage of revolutions in production over
previous decades while promoting higher safety and security standards
for our workforce and the communities in which we operate. The overall
aim of our infrastructure modernization effort is to make the nuclear
security enterprise scalable and flexible to meet non-linear mission
demand over the coming decades.
secure transportation
NNSA's Secure Transportation program includes the Mobile Guardian
Transporter (MGT) acquisition program, leading-edge communication
systems and recruitment, retention, and training for our highly
qualified Federal Agents. MGT is the next generation secure trailer
system and with our highly qualified Federal agents, will ensure the
safety and security of existing and planned cargoes, meet nuclear
explosive safety standards, and protect the public. Due to the rigorous
screening and training required for these Federal agents, maintaining a
steady cadence of Federal Agent Training Courses is essential, and NNSA
appreciates support for continuing to onboard new agents.
The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program, which provides this
capability, has a record of 100 percent safe and secure shipments
without compromise, loss of components, or release of radiological
material.
defense nuclear security
Defense Nuclear Security provides protection for NNSA personnel,
facilities, weapons, and materials from a full spectrum of threats
ranging from minor security incidents to acts of terrorism in a rapidly
evolving technology threat landscape.
As NNSA's overall mission set continues to grow, NNSA is enhancing
security capabilities through the acquisition and employment of
innovative physical security technology to improve risk mitigation and
promote more efficient security operations. Additional personnel,
larger facility footprints, and larger quantities of sensitive
materials require additional shifts and potential return to 24/7
operations at some locations. Furthermore, rapidly evolving technology
presents novel security challenges that require novel solutions.
One of the most complex and rapidly evolving security threats NNSA
faces is from drones and other uncrewed aircraft systems. NNSA is
making substantial investments in next-generation counter-uncrewed
aircraft systems (CUAS) while updating hardware and software of current
platforms. In partnership with Idaho National Laboratory, NNSA is using
the lab's dedicated CUAS range to conduct testing and evaluation of
future-generation CUAS acquisitions, assisting security planners in
identifying future generation solutions to improve NNSA's existing CUAS
platforms.
Information Technology and Cybersecurity
NNSA faces a growing array of IT and cybersecurity challenges and
is responding through strategic modernization of its IT and
cybersecurity environments to include more resilient and flexible
capabilities. These investments focus on enterprise-scale cybersecurity
infrastructure, operational technology security, Nuclear Enterprise
Assurance requirements, zero trust architectures, and commercial cloud-
based technologies for both classified and unclassified networks.
Additional investments include integrated communications and innovative
collaboration services. These actions are geared toward making NNSA
systems more secure in an increasingly digital world.
NNSA continues to invest in its digital transformation and digital
engineering efforts. In July 2024, NNSA launched Enterprise Secure
Network (ESN) Hub, a centralized classified computing environment that
will connect partners and collaborators across the enterprise in new
ways, increasing productivity while keeping our work secure. For the
first time, NNSA mission personnel can access a common enterprise-wide
computing infrastructure from secure locations across the enterprise at
any time. This effort is just one part of NNSA's broader digital
transformation initiative that will streamline and optimize efficiency
across the enterprise through new tools and revised work processes.
defense nuclear nonproliferation
The work conducted under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation creates a
multilayered defense to prevent, counter, and respond to the threat of
nuclear and radiological terrorism, as well as the threat of hostile
countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This work makes America safer by
both protecting American citizens and interests overseas and keeping
threats as far from the U.S. Homeland as possible. These activities are
a powerful and necessary component of strategic deterrence.
NNSA's nonproliferation programs also facilitate the global
deployment of U.S.-developed nuclear reactors that incorporate the
highest standards of nuclear safeguards, security, and proliferation
resistance. NNSA's work in this area is a ``win-win'' that helps
unleash the American nuclear renaissance while also keeping America
safe from the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
Material Management and Minimization
The Office of Material Management and Minimization works to prevent
hostile State or non-State actors from acquiring weapons-usable
material for use in an improvised radiological or nuclear device by
eliminating it or replacing it with less attractive material.
NNSA is successfully executing a recovery project for high-assay
low-enriched uranium (HALEU). This activity removes unusable scrap
HALEU materials from Y-12's aging 9212 facility and processes it into
an oxide form. Once produced, the material is being provided to DOE's
Office of Nuclear Energy to support advanced reactor demonstrations. In
addition to the benefits to industry, this project will support a more
efficient transition to UPF. To date, NNSA has produced over 300 kg of
oxide and is on track to produce more over the next 2 years.
NNSA also works with partners in the United States and with
countries around the world to convert research reactors and medical
isotope productionsites away from HEU to LEU or HALEU. These
conversions allow for critical research and business activities to
continue while eliminating the associated proliferation risk. Most
recently, NNSA's partnership with Japan achieved the conversion of the
first of two reactor cores at Kyoto University's Critical Assembly from
HEU to HALEU. This marks the 110th research reactor or medical isotope
facility that NNSA has helped convert to a proliferation resistant fuel
or otherwise verified as shutdown.
Additionally, NNSA works with partner countries around the world to
eliminate excess inventories of HEU and plutonium. To date, NNSA has
eliminated over 7,345 kg of HEU and plutonium, the material equivalent
of several hundred nuclear weapons.
Global Material Security
The Office of Global Material Security makes America safer by
working in the United States and internationally to secure and prevent
the smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials that could be used
in an attack against the United States or its interests.
Global Material Security also works with U.S. industry to advance
U.S. competitiveness, prosperity, and security. The program currently
works with nine U.S. advanced reactor vendors on security by design to
increase global competitiveness and exportability. It also supports the
development of groundbreaking technologies to replace radioactive
materials, such as cesium-137 and cobalt-60 across a broad spectrum of
medical, agricultural, and industrial applications. This includes a
congressional mandate to eliminate all cesium-137 blood irradiators in
the United States by 2027. To date, NNSA has eliminated 400 such
devices. Eliminating these materials ensures that they can never be
used in a radiological device that poses a threat to the United States,
its citizens, or interests. Global Material Security also deploys
American radiation detection equipment in countries around the world to
build partner-country capacity to stop radiological and nuclear
smuggling. This forward-leaning approach disrupts illicit smuggling
supply chains and halts threats before they can reach the Homeland.
Nonproliferation and Arms Control
Dating back to the Eisenhower Administration, it has been U.S.
policy to support the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Today,
that growth is larger than at any point in history. In 2023, there were
more than 410 nuclear reactors in operation across 30 countries. Today,
more than 40 countries are considering expanding their civilian nuclear
fleets or adopting nuclear power. Many of these countries are nuclear
newcomers who lack the sophisticated technical experience and
safeguards regime to ensure the safe use and operation of these power
plants and their material. China and Russia also dominate the field of
nuclear reactor construction. Of the 52 reactors that have started
construction since 2017, 48 are of either Chinese or Russian design.
To balance longstanding U.S. support for expanded nuclear power use
and the potential known and unknown proliferation risks associated with
that expansion, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control program
undertakes a wide array of activities, including building the capacity
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Member States to
implement international nuclear safeguards; strengthening domestic and
global capacity to detect and prevent illicit transfers of prohibited
materials, equipment, and technology; provide technical assistance to
the Department of State on the negotiation and implementation of
nuclear cooperation agreements and implement the nuclear export control
regulations at 10 CFR Part 810, under which the Secretary of Energy
authorizes U.S. companies to export unclassified nuclear technology and
assistance.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development directly
contributes to nuclear security by developing U.S. capabilities to
detect and characterize global nuclear security threats, specifically
foreign nuclear material production and weapons development activities,
movement, and illicit diversion of special nuclear materials and global
nuclear detonations. Irrespective of existing arms control agreements,
these capabilities provide the U.S. with the ability to independently
detect and verify foreign nuclear weapons development and activities
around the world and in outer space.
Current programmatic focus is on the production of nuclear
detonation detection satellite payloads in line with the schedule
established with the U.S. Space Force; continued development of
technical approaches, including remote sensing and AI, to drive early
detection of nuclear proliferation; and ongoing infrastructure
recapitalization activities to meet future mission objectives and
anticipate threats through demonstration and validation in
representative environments.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
The CTCP program counters nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation and responds to any nuclear or radiological threat,
incident, or accident worldwide. CTCP acts in an expanded
counterterrorism and counterproliferation environment given the growing
use and reach of nuclear and radiological material, potential risks
inherent in emerging technologies like AI that lower the barrier to
access nuclear technical expertise, and the nuclear emergency response
implications of a deteriorating global security environment. CTCP
harnesses DOE's decades of experience with nuclear weapons and
materials, directs it toward understanding substantial and unresolved
scientific challenges associated with nuclear threats posed by any
adversary, and maintains the capability to respond to those threats in
fulfilment of key national security and public safety missions.
To effectively respond to nuclear emergencies worldwide, CTCP is
responsible for the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), an
organization of on-call technical specialists trained and equipped to
respond to nuclear threats, incidents, and accidents anywhere on Earth.
NEST maintains a vast array of capabilities to detect, assess, defeat
and attribute the provenance of loose nuclear material or improvised
nuclear devices; safely resolve any accidents involving a U.S. nuclear
weapon and mitigate impacts to public health and safety during a
radiological or nuclear emergency of any scale. NEST executed 27
unclassified emergency response operations in 2024 and continues this
steady operational tempo in 2025 while maintaining 24/7/365 readiness
to respond. NNSA was proud to celebrate NEST's 50th anniversary last
September, a reflection on half a century of critical, often unseen,
work keeping the United States citizens and our interests around the
world safe.
CTCP also engages in extensive training and coordination with
local, State, and Federal partners to prepare them for a potential
nuclear or radiological emergency. These partners have repeatedly and
successfully worked alongside NEST for the protection of large-scale
national events, including Presidential inaugurations, Super Bowls and
the Olympics. CTCP also partners with the FBI to sustain advanced
counter-WMD capabilities in 14 major U.S. cities and is building an
enhanced baseline capability in each FBI field office to conduct
initial counter-WMD operations.
In addition, CTCP assesses emergency response gaps and works to
address these through building capable partnerships with State and
local communities and international allies so they can counter and
respond to radiological and nuclear incidents, accidents and terror
threats. These domestic partnerships strengthen and exercise local
response coordination. Internationally, NNSA is a leader in nuclear and
radiological emergency response. CTCP works to build partnerships
capable of countering threats before they reach the Homeland, and,
should an incident occur, mitigating impacts to public health and
safety to preserve American safety, security, and economic interests.
CTCP also retains extensive nuclear forensic capabilities, which
deter a malign State and non-State actors from carrying out a nuclear
terror attack. To maintain this deterrent, CTCP is focused on
strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to ensure decisionmakers
receive timely assessments that support attribution in the event of a
nuclear incident. As with other nonproliferation, counterterrorism and
emergency management activities, robust forensics serves as a key
complement to our nuclear weapons deterrent, reinforcing the certainty
of an American response to any nuclear attack.
naval reactors
The Naval Reactors portfolio supports NNSA's close partnership with
the U.S. Navy in support of the nuclear fleet. Naval Reactors is
advancing naval nuclear propulsion capabilities to keep the U.S. Navy
on the cutting edge of warfighting capability, maintaining the assured
second-strike capability of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, and
building the next generation of naval nuclear propulsion infrastructure
for continued operational success. Last year NNSA celebrated the75th
anniversary of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and its
unprecedented record of technological innovation and success.
Naval Reactors is currently working on four major initiatives:
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine reactor systems development;
development of future advanced submarine technology to support next
generation designs; continued progress on base technology development;
and infrastructure recapitalization at program sites, including
decontamination and decommissioning efforts leading to a reduction in
long-term program liabilities.
These infrastructure efforts include constructing the Naval Spent
Fuel Handling Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho to
recapitalize the capabilities for naval spent nuclear fuel handling
that exist in the over-60-year-old Expended Core Facility.
Finally, Naval Reactors continues to support the Australia-United
Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership through reimbursable work
with Australia and the U.K. NNSA will continue its collaboration with
the Departments of State and Defense to advance the goals of the
enhanced trilateral security partnership.
federal salaries and expenses
NNSA's Federal workforce executes the essential government
functions of the agency including mission program management, project
management, budget development, contract management, and effective
oversight of its management and operating contractors.
NNSA's mission is accomplished through the hard work and innovative
spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to public service. NNSA
is a lean organization that will continue to identify efficiencies to
provide an agile and efficient organization to meet evolving mission
needs.
conclusion
These are unprecedented times for the nuclear security enterprise.
Not since the cold war have we had seven simultaneous weapons programs
in the program of record, and not since the Manhattan Project have we
so fundamentally overhauled our infrastructure. Never have we tried to
undertake both these tasks at the same time, in an already turbulent
international environment. We appreciate Congress' continuous support
for our mission priorities. NNSA is committed to delivering modernized
weapons on time and at pace to the DOD, safeguarding nuclear materials
globally, creating the next generation of naval nuclear propulsion
technology, and doing it all while modernizing our infrastructure.
There is much work to be done, but I am confident in our ability to
succeed. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Hoagland. General Bussiere,
welcome. Good to see you.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. BUSSIERE, USAF COMMANDER
General Bussiere. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Fischer,
Ranking Member King, Members of the distinguished Committee. I
have the honor of representing the men and women of Air Force
Global Strike Command and to be providing you an update today
on our mission, our airmen, our ongoing modernization efforts,
and the challenges of sustaining our legacy weapon systems.
I'd like to thank Congress for your continued support for
not only our Nation's defense, but for the Air Force's nuclear
deterrence and long-range strike missions. My full statement
has been submitted for the record. The Air Force Global Strike
team has the privilege of executing our Nation's strategic
nuclear deterrence and conventional long-range strike missions.
My top priority remains maintaining a viable legacy force while
modernizing and taking care of our airmen and their families.
Modernization efforts include the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) leg, the B21, the B52 J model, the MH-
139 Gray Wolf helicopter, the Survival Airborne Operations
Center, our Weapons Generation facility upgrades, our long-
range standoff weapons, and the nuclear command and control and
communications architecture. This Committee recognizes the
serious nuclear threats to our Nation. We face the challenge of
deterring two major nuclear powers, China and Russia, who
possess both modern and diverse arsenals. Additionally, North
Korea poses an escalating threat, and there is the potential of
a nuclear armed Iran.
This dangerous and unprecedented security environment is
further complicated by the increased coordination among these
U.S. rivals. This underscores the importance of fielding a
flexible and modern nuclear force to effectively deter them.
While Global Strike Command leads the charge in sustaining
current forces in deploying future long-range strike weapon
systems, we do recognize this is the bedrock of our military
strength. It's the foundation of our Nation's defense and
essential for assuring our allies and partners.
Equally important to a viable and effective nuclear
deterrence is our ability to effectively conduct conventional
long-range strike missions. We remain focused on sustaining and
modernizing our conventional bombers and fielding improved
long-range strike capabilities to provide the Nation with a
full range of deterrence options. Through it all, our Striker
airmen remain our greatest strength, their dedication,
innovation, resilience, make it all possible.
But the world is an uncertain place. We must remain
vigilant and continue to invest in our airmen and their
families and provide them with the resources, training, and
support they need to get the job done we're asking them to do.
The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise is in a critical phase of
transition. There is no operational margin remaining and our
resources continue to be stretched, impacting the readiness and
well-being of our dedicated airmen. Today I request your
continued support as we confront these pressing challenges
while upholding our Nation's security. Thank you. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Bussiere follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Thomas A. Bussiere
introduction
Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) provides strategic
deterrence and long-range strike capabilities anytime, anywhere as
directed by the President, and the Commander, United States Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM). As a cornerstone of our Interim National Defense
Strategy, AFGSC sustains current forces while simultaneously
integrating future long-range strike weapon systems. This past August
marked the 15th anniversary of AFGSC's establishment, a testament to
our vital role as the central force provider for the Air Force's
strategic responsibilities, but our command is younger than our weapon
systems. The B-2A and B-1B are over 30 years old, and the B-52H just
had its 72d birthday. The Minuteman III missile (MMIII) is 55 years old
and the overall intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) weapon system
is even older. The nuclear, command, control, and communications
systems (NC3) is built on cold war-era architecture. As AFGSC
transitions legacy systems to new technologies, we must achieve balance
between critical sustainment of aging systems and continued funding for
essential replacements such as the B-21 bomber and the Sentinel ICBM.
AFGSC demonstrates dedication to the Nation's credible deterrent
through continuous global engagement. Strengthening deterrence requires
a force that is demonstrably lethal, always ready, and operates with
shared national security objectives. In 2024, AFGSC planned and
executed 33 Bomber Task Force (BTF) events, encompassing 267 days of
deployed bomber operations across multiple geographic commands. AFGSC
executed more bomber task missions in the last 12 months than the last
20 years combined. The demand signal for BTFs to showcase American
airpower, empower allies and partners, and give adversaries pause is
significant, and will likely only increase in the future. The 24/7
vigilance of our ICBM force marks 55 years of unyielding resolve
afforded by the MMIII. The dedication to our operational tempo, coupled
with our focus on people, mission, modernization, and engagement,
enables AFGSC to maintain its strategic advantage in both the nuclear
and conventional realms.
However, AFGSC faces a watershed moment: there is no remaining
margin in our legacy fielded forces but the demand for these
capabilities has not waned. Arguably, AFGSC capabilities have never
been more important for our overall defense due to the modernization,
increasing capabilities, and diversification of the nuclear
capabilities of our adversaries. We must never forget the weight of our
responsibility in safeguarding national security. Sustaining our legacy
systems cannot be overlooked as all hands focus on the daunting
challenge of modernizing and recapitalizing all legs of the nuclear
triad. AFGSC needs continued support and on-time, stable funding to
equip our Airmen to compete effectively in this ever-changing and
challenging strategic environment.
global security environment
The United States and Allies and partners face one of the most
challenging threat environments since the cold war, as highlighted by
the need to simultaneously deter two major nuclear-armed adversaries
and a nuclear-armed rogue nation, the DPRK). China and Russia possess
advanced and diverse nuclear capabilities, demanding a complex and
multifaceted strategic approach. The Kremlin's deployment of nuclear
weapons to Belarus and its plans to aggressively expand its military
present new challenges to European security. Additionally, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has doubled down on
expanding nuclear capabilities, and the potential for Iran to develop
nuclear weapons remains a grave concern. In an unprecedented move, the
DPRK has deployed approximately 10,000 troops to support Russia's
efforts against Ukraine on the battlefield. Most alarming is the
deepening alignment amongst these nuclear-armed actors and the need to
be ready to defeat this new axis of aggressors.
As the Department's pacing threat, China continues to pursue an
unprecedented military buildup, including the expansion, modernization,
and diversification of its nuclear and conventional forces. China's
growing stockpile of deliverable air-, ground-, and sea-launched weapon
systems pose a challenge to current United States and allied missile
defense systems beyond the Second Island Chain. China remains on an
accelerated pace to possess 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by the
end of the decade, complicating the requirements for United States
deterrence globally. China's establishment of new silo fields and new
ICBMs will only increase the threat posed by the Chinese Communist
Party's (CCP). Consequently, China will possess new options for
coercive purposes before and during a crisis or conflict. China is also
rapidly modernizing air and sea conventional capabilities with next-
generation aircraft such as their stealth H-20 bomber and enhanced
naval strike weapons to keep United States and allied forces outside of
optimum employment parameters in a regional conflict.
China's nuclear force expansion is complemented by an increasing
industrial base capacity to create plutonium from fast-breeder
reactors. Of additional concern is China's deepening economic,
diplomatic, and military support to and alignment with Russia. China's
economic and diplomatic support is helping Russia sustain its war in
Ukraine. China and Russia are also expanding their defense cooperation
beyond Ukraine; for the first time last year, Chinese and Russian
bombers conducted a joint patrol in international airspace off the
coast of Alaska.
China's nuclear and conventional expansion efforts, in conjunction
with deepening growing ties to Russia, raise the risk to United States
and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite Russia's heavy
losses, it still maintains the world's largest nuclear stockpile with
modernized systems and a growing arsenal of novel asymmetric nuclear
weapons. Additionally, President Putin announced that Russia reserves
the right to use nuclear weapons against any country that poses a
critical threat, including from conventional weapons, to Russian or
Belarusian sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. Additionally,
President Putin stated the participation of, or support from, a nuclear
State conducting aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its
Allies from any non-nuclear State would be considered a joint attack.
While the DPRK is not an adversary on the same scale as China or
Russia, it still presents deterrence dilemmas for the United States and
our allies and partners. The DPRK poses a persistent threat and growing
danger to the United States Homeland and the Indo-Pacific region. The
DPRK continues to expand, diversify, and improve both conventional and
nuclear strike capabilities. The development of liquid and solid-fueled
missile systems will further complicate our ability to monitor and
react to ballistic missile threats. The DPRK has expanded partnerships
with both China and Russia, which provides political cover for Kim Jong
Un regime's continued nuclear weapons expansion. The DPRK and Russia
signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024, which
includes a mutual defense provision and highlights the deepening
strategic alignment between the countries, particularly in their
opposition to the United States and our allies. The agreement also
codified cooperation in areas such as trade, investment, and nuclear
energy. DPRK rhetoric also continues to become more confrontational as
the United States and the Republic of Korea conduct strategic exercises
and bring strategic assets into the theater. The situation remains
tense and any conflict on the Peninsula could involve multiple nuclear-
armed actors, thus raising the risk of escalation and nuclear
employment.
As of today, Iran does not possess a nuclear weapon and it remains
the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon
and ICBM capability; however, Iran is expanding its nuclear program in
concerning ways, to include producing highly enriched uranium. Iran
continues to enhance military capabilities, holding the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, and funds militia groups
as well as terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East. Iran
also continues to pursue destabilizing policies across the region,
providing material and lethal support to a range of U.S.-designated
terrorist organizations and militia groups. Iran's longstanding support
to Hamas enabled the October 7th terrorist attack against Israel.
Furthermore, Iran's continued support to the Houthis has enabled the
ongoing attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
and numerous attacks on U.S. forces across the region.
Most concerning are the increasing transactional relationships
between nuclear-armed adversaries. This axis of aggressors continues to
defy international law through technology exchanges, joint exercises,
and mutual support. China and Russia's ``strategic partnership''
features extensive military cooperation, with China supplying crucial
materials that bolsters Russia's defense industry. Iran provides Russia
with drones and missiles, while the DPRK has sent vast quantities of
arms, ammunition, and personnel. The continued cooperation raises the
possibility of a multi-front war, which necessitates a reassessment of
long-term defense strategies and escalation dynamics.
facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (fsrm)
The current Air Force Installation Infrastructure Action Plan
highlights a critical vulnerability for AFGSC, most notably aging
facilities and infrastructure coupled with consistent underinvestment
in power projection platforms. Installations are increasingly
susceptible to both adversarial threats and extreme weather
environments, posing an unacceptable risk to the Striker mission. All
of these concerns undermine global strike options for our Nation.
Weapons Generation Facilities and Weapon Storage Areas
In addition to modernization of weapon systems, the command
continues our long-term plan to recapitalize aging Weapon Storage Areas
(WSAs) with facilities known as Weapons Generation Facilities (WGFs).
These facilities fulfill a major security initiative for the command
and help ensure nuclear security by significantly reducing operational,
logistical, and munitions risk. The sequencing and timing of the WGF
recapitalization efforts are driven by operational requirements and
outdated WSA conditions. Of the seven planned, five are currently in
the fiscal year 2025-29 Future-Years Defense Program and four are under
construction. Of those under construction, two are bomber WGFs and two
are ICBM WGFs. The WGF at Dyess Air Force Base (AFB) is planned for
fiscal year 2028, and the design is scheduled to complete this fiscal
year. F.E. Warren AFB has seen the first completed WGF and is scheduled
to reach full operational capability (FOC) in early 2026. The timing
and sequencing of the modernization endeavor are critical to sustaining
credible deterrence while ensuring integration of and support to new
mission weapon systems.
Supply Chain and Flying Hour Program Challenges
Every weapon system that AFGSC provides must have a defense
industrial base robust enough to support the sustainment of operational
capabilities in order to maintain a credible deterrent against
adversaries. Current and future weapon systems cannot withstand any
further supply chain disruptions and must be funded to the maximum
extent possible to restore supply chain resiliency. The Air Force must
restore readiness and posture, so our platforms will be ready today and
for the future.
A critical shortage of parts is severely limiting the bomber
execution of the fleet flying hour program. The shortage, driven by
diminishing manufacturing sources, materiel shortages, long repair
times, and a shrinking industrial base, is reflected in the rising
Total Non-Mission Capable Supply rate, leading to increased downtime
and cannibalization of parts from other aircraft. Current support and
readiness spares packages are insufficient to meet operational demands.
This parts crisis directly impacts essential maintenance, hindering
both Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) and home-station work, reducing
operational flexibility.
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages issues,
the lack of vendor bids, and long lead times have resulted in delayed
delivery of required parts. These issues have negatively affected
Aircraft Availability (AA). Continued support of the Full-Scale Fatigue
Testing is imperative to keep the B-52H airframe in use since it has
surpassed its scheduled lifespan. Similarly, the Forward Intermediate
Fuselage replacement for any high hour airframes must be pursued to
maintain the current and future fleet size. We must continue to
modernize the B-52H avionics systems to ensure compatibility in joint
operations and global airspace.
The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) provides a
survivable command and control capability. The fleet is approaching
end-of-service life and faces sustainment challenges. The low density/
high demand dynamic of the platform prioritizes AA as the E-4B 's top
concern. Along with aircraft age, other factors include lengthening PDM
times, diminished manufacturing sources, and parts obsolescence.
Initiatives such as PDM flow optimization, KC-10 engine long-core
procurement and overhaul, and recovering unused 747-200 parts from a
NASA aircraft retirement action have shown some success toward
mitigating known sustainment issues.
The E-4B Program Office will also sustain and modernize mission
system capabilities until the replacement platform, the Survivable
Airborne Operations Center (SAOC), is operational. Current examples of
successful ongoing modernization programs include a Low Frequency
Transmit System, Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal and
Survivable Super High Frequency systems. Additionally, as the E-4B gets
closer to SAOC transition and subsequent end-of-life, AFGSC will
balance modernization efforts and AA.
operations
ICBM Operations
The modernization of the U.S. ICBM force is critical to maintaining
a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. ICBMs are the most
responsive leg of the U.S. nuclear triad providing rapid global strike
capability. The Sentinel program is a massive undertaking that is
pivotal to U.S. national security and represents the Air Force's most
critical recapitalization effort to date. The sheer size, scale, and
scope of this effort cannot be overstated as the entire system is being
rebuilt from the ground up. Even with its inherent complexities,
Sentinel remains essential to national security and there are no
alternatives to the program that provide acceptable capability to meet
joint requirements at less cost as certified by the Department of
Defense (DoD) to Congress in 2024. By enhancing the accuracy, security,
and reliability of the U.S. ICBM force, Sentinel will ensure the
effectiveness of this critical leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.
ICBM Modernization Roadmap
In 2024, the Sentinel program underwent a Nunn-McCurdy review to
address cost overruns exceeding 37 percent. The Department's final
Nunn-McCurdy estimate determined the cost increase to be 81 percent. In
response, AFGSC immediately initiated a comprehensive review of both
system requirements and Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The ongoing
process focused on refining system requirements, operational concepts,
and fostering collaboration between stakeholders to ensure a cost-
effective and successful modernization of the ICBM force.
RV Modernization: The ICBM warhead stockpile continues to fulfill
USSTRATCOM mission requirements beyond its planned lifespan. AFGSC
engages in efforts with DOD partners to produce fuse replacements for
the existing stockpile of Mk21s to support Sentinel initial operational
capability (IOC). This effort not only strengthens the industrial base
but also establishes a framework for future capabilities, ensuring the
land-based leg of the nuclear triad remains a robust and adaptable
strategic deterrent.
Collaborative Leadership for Sentinel Success
Unified Approach: AFGSC and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
(AFNWC) have formed a strong partnership to address Sentinel challenges
and accelerate ICBM modernization efforts. Leadership from both
organizations collaborate regularly through integrated partner teams,
General Officer Steering Groups, and Executive Steering Boards to
proactively resolve issues and ensure alignment.
Revalidated Requirements: Since July 2024, AFGSC has spearheaded an
effort to revalidate and recertify all Sentinel requirements to
maintain performance. The objective is to work toward a cost-effective
strategy for the program, expected to be refined by the end of the
year. All requirements were traced to source documentation for need and
military utility. The collaborative effort between AFGSC and AFNWC
assures the Sentinel program delivers a weapon system that meets all
strategic requirements.
Evolving Concept of Operations: The Sentinel CONOPS serves as a
critical communication tool, clearly articulating operational
requirements to both the acquisition community and contractors during
the design phase. The Weapon System Requirements and current CONOPS
were reviewed and signed in March 2025.
Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) Achievements
In October 2024, the Sentinel program transitioned from Program
Integration Offices to fully operational Task Force at F. E. Warren
AFB, Malmstrom AFB, and Vandenberg Space Force Base (SFB). Minot AFB is
progressing to establish its task force presence, marking a significant
milestone in the program's execution. Simultaneously, Sentinel support
facilities are undergoing preparations to accommodate Sentinel-assigned
personnel and equipment at these bases, ensuring a smooth transition
while safeguarding operational readiness of the MMIII weapon system.
Local engagements
The Director of ICBM Modernization continues to take a holistic
approach to Sentinel education and socialization by visiting the three
missile wings and engaging in dialog with community members. These
engagements offer an opportunity to address concerns from the local
population and leaders within the areas impacted by the Sentinel weapon
system. These conversations will continue with community town hall
meetings through 2025.
While many aspects of the Sentinel program are going right, we must
remain vigilant and fully committed to the unparalleled
recapitalization of a critical component of our national security.
Maintaining the MMIII weapon system while concurrently bringing
Sentinel online demands careful and sustained attention. The Sentinel
program is not just about modernization--it is about preserving peace
through strength.
security response forces
Our nuclear security teams, comprised of steadfast and highly
trained professionals, stand ready to defend our Nation's nuclear
arsenal. However, they face a rapidly evolving threat landscape that
requires constant adaptation and support. Our leaders are actively
addressing the complex challenges of organizing, training, and
equipping these defenders to meet current and emerging threats, from
countering unmanned aerial system (UAS) activity to operating in
extreme weather conditions at our bomber and missile bases. Their
crucial mission demands unwavering focus and investment as it remains
central to USSTRATCOM operational plans and national security.
To enhance the safety and lethality of our Security Forces, AFGSC
is modernizing its vehicle fleet. This modernization effort directly
addresses serious safety concerns surrounding the aging Up-Armored High
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAHMMWV), a platform
tragically linked to multiple fatal rollover accidents at AFGSC ICBM
wings, resulting in the loss of two defenders in 2023 and 2024. The
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a modern and improved tactical
vehicle providing better field of view, suspension systems, and modern
safety features compared to the currently employed UAHMMWV. I continue
to request congressional support to field AUVs to reduce the risk of
mishaps and unnecessary loss of life.
As AFGSC navigates these modernization efforts, the arrival of the
MH-139A Grey Wolf marks a positive step toward strengthening the
security posture of the ground-based nuclear deterrent. The MH-139A
provides greater speed, range, and carrying capacity above the current
UH-IN fleet. Following successful testing, the MH-139A is on track for
IOC in 2025, with full deployment across all ICBM bases by 2027.
As of February 2025, 13 MH-139A helicopters have been delivered--
seven to Malmstrom AFB, three to Maxwell AFB, and two are in retrofit
status for the environmental control system and radio. The current buy
profile procures 19 aircraft, 11 of which will field at Malmstrom AFB
and eight at Maxwell AFB by August 2025. The arrival of the MH-139 Grey
Wolf marks a decisive upgrade for AFGSC, bringing a more lethal
presence to the defense of the ground-based nuclear deterrent.
Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems
Since 2016, AFGSC, with crucial backing from USSTRATCOM, has made
strides in counter-unmanned aircraft technology to strengthen our
national deterrence. During 2024, two U.S. military bases experienced
security breaches involving UAS, raising concerns about this growing
threat. In August, multiple UAS conducted a week-long surveillance
operation over Plant 42 in California, potentially gathering
intelligence on classified projects. In November, a Chinese citizen was
apprehended for using a UAS to photograph Vandenberg SFB. These
incidents underscore the vulnerability of military installations to UAS
surveillance and the potential compromise of national security.
We must match our capabilities to the threats we face. The Joint
Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems C-sUAS Office and Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment lead the overall
DOD effort to combat current and future UAS threats, and United States
Northern Command is the synchronizer for Counter-UAS (c-UAS) efforts in
the Homeland. In recognition of this growing challenge, the Department
launched Replicator-2, a whole-of-department and interagency effort to
improve c-sUAS protection for critical assets, largely centered on the
Homeland (CONUS). AFGSC is actively contributing to these efforts as
well as leveraging internal innovation endeavors to seek solutions for
the specific challenges our forces face from UAS, especially as they
relate to operations in the ICBM missile fields and defense of our WSAs
and WGFs. As we modernize our nuclear capabilities over the coming
decade, we must also prioritize modernizing our defenses against UAS
threats.
bomber operations
The United States must maintain military superiority by integrating
new technologies while sustaining existing capabilities. AFGSC will
work with the Secretary of the Air Force's staff to obtain waivers of
the 5-year ``sunset'' prohibition on modernizing aircraft scheduled to
retire, (as codified in Section 2244a of Title 10) as doing so is
clearly in the national security interest of the United States.
Leveraging this statutory authority for the B-2A is essential to
maintaining long-range global strike nuclear deterrent capabilities
while completing modernization programs impacting all Air Force
bombers.
Nuclear Requirements and Conventional Long-Range Strike Mission
Conventional long-range strike capabilities are equally important
and must evolve to address emerging threats. AFGSC must maintain the
ability to hold any target at risk, anywhere in the world, at any time.
Our airmen routinely demonstrate this capability through CONUS-to-CONUS
missions and BTF deployments, reinforcing allied confidence and
deterring adversary aggression. The future of conventional long-range
strike will be shaped by a two-tiered approach. The B-21 Raider and its
family of systems will provide advanced stand-in capabilities by
leveraging next-generation stealth, sensing, and precision-strike
technology to penetrate contested environments. Simultaneously, the B-
52H, armed with the Standoff Attack Weapon, will deliver massed fires
from outside heavily defended areas. This integrated force will enable
AFGSC to generate a persistent, scalable, and lethal global strike
capability, ensuring dominance across the spectrum of conflict.
B-21 Raider
The B-21 is the most exquisite weapon system ever built. At its
core, the B-21 enhances deterrence by ensuring the United States can
hold any target worldwide at risk, even in contested regions protected
by sophisticated air defense systems. We are building on lessons
learned from the B-2A to give the B-21 a survivability edge in high-
threat environments. The B-21's ability to penetrate and persist in
hostile airspace makes it uniquely suited for both deterrence and, if
needed, decisive action.
Beyond its combat capability, the B-21's strategic value is
amplified by its role in a broader network of systems. This makes it
more than just a bomber--it is a force multiplier that enhances
situational awareness and joint operations. Its design also emphasizes
adaptability, with a modular structure and digital engineering that
allow rapid upgrades to counter new threats, ensuring relevance for
decades.
From the outset, the B-21 program has leaned forward and considered
sustainment while the design was in development. As a result of those
early considerations, the B-21 program is ahead of schedule on certain
portions such as technological data, product support, and material
readiness. Affordability, combined with easier maintenance due to
advancements in stealth coatings and manufacturing, supports a larger,
more sustainable fleet, which will be key for deterring adversaries who
might otherwise exploit any gaps a smaller force could create. We must
continue looking at how to right-size the bomber fleet to meet the
demands the Nation is asking of it.
The B-21's dual nuclear and conventional capabilities are critical
as competitors seek to challenge us by operating below nuclear
thresholds. As a result, the United States must also deter using
conventional weapons tailored to meet the needs and capabilities of the
B-21; if we lose the ability to deter malicious regional actions via a
combination of stand-in and standoff, nuclear, and conventional
effects, we play into adversary anti-access/area denial aspirations.
The B-21's fusion of stealth, versatility, scalability, and enduring
design strengthens U.S. deterrence, ensures credible response
capabilities, and offers cost-effective modernization for maintaining
tactical and strategic advantage in the 21st century. The success of
the B-21 Raider program is a testament to the unprecedented
collaboration among our military and civilian experts. The seamless
integration of operational, acquisition, and industry professionals--
specifically, the mighty Eighth Air Force, the Rapid Capabilities
Office, and Northrop Grumman--is the driving force behind this
program's remarkable progress. This synergistic partnership enables us
to develop and field the world's most advanced platform unrivaled in
its ability to project power globally at a time and place of our
choosing.
B-2A
The B-2A is the USAF's sole penetrating bomber, providing unmatched
stealth and strike capability, making it a cornerstone of both
conventional and nuclear deterrence. Targeted modernization in low
observable signature and supportability modifications, communications
upgrades, and weapons delivery ensures the B-2A maintains its lethal
edge through B-21 fielding. The Adaptable Communications Suite is
entering test and evaluation with efforts to accelerate fielding in
fiscal year 2026. The B-2A Displays Modernization Program is currently
in test and evaluation and is anticipated to enter the Production and
Deployment Phase (Milestone-C) in 4Qfiscal year 2025, alleviating the
second Mission Impaired Capability Awaiting Parts driver for the B-2A
fleet. These modernization efforts are essential to bridge the
capability gap until the B-21 reaches FOC.
B-1B
The B-1B platform remains a conventional force workhorse until the
B-21s are fully fielded. Time and again, B-1Bs have taken the lead in
combat, demonstrating their critical role in combat operations. This,
in addition to their enduring participation in the DOD's BTFs, is
designed to demonstrate that the United States can reach any target in
the world with minimal risk to its forces. The B-1B is currently
undergoing the most significant modernization program in its 30-year
history. Through the B-1 Embracing Agile Scheduling Team program, the
B-1B received a suite of accelerated upgrades, including enhanced
friend-or-foe identification, more secure communications, and improved
defensive systems. The program also introduced valuable new tools like
a modernized simulator and digital twin technology, enabling more
effective training and proactive maintenance. As both a proven combat
platform and a cornerstone of future deterrence strategies, the B-1B
will remain a vital asset for projecting American airpower well into
the 21st century.
B-52H
The B-52H Stratofortress remains the backbone of the USAF,
providing unmatched long-range strike capability and heavy payload
capacity for the past 70 years. Even today, the B-52H continues to
demonstrate its relevance in operations around the world. To ensure the
B-52H can continue to deliver this level of combat power for decades to
come, AFGSC is undertaking major modernization efforts for its aging B-
52H fleet, aiming to extend its service life beyond 2050. This includes
re-engining the bomber with Rolls-Royce Fl30 turbofans, upgrading its
radar to an Active Electronically Scanned Array system for improved
reliability and mission effectiveness, and procuring a new Weapon
System Trainer to simulate future B-52H configurations and
capabilities. The B-52H's modernization into the B-52J platform is not
just about upgrades--it is essential for viability of the bomber.
Even as we upgrade to the more lethal B-52J, global demand for BTFs
is surging, not subsiding. B-52H deployments showcase the importance
the United States places on assuring Allies and partners as the visible
presence of our bombers, airmen, and integrated operations provides a
critical deterrent against potential adversaries. This demand for a
strong, responsive bomber presence will only intensify in the coming
years, making our modernization efforts all the more urgent.
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
The Air Force is replacing its aging ALCM with the LRSO weapon,
which is being designed, developed, and deployed as a modern nuclear-
capable cruise missile. The LRSO program is progressing well, having
achieved a successful design review and currently undergoing flight
testing.
airborne operations center
AFGSC's NC3 architecture connects our Commander-in-Chief and
command authorities to forces around the globe, before and during
conflict. One component in this NC3 network is the NAOC, which is
always on alert to connect the President, Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior leaders.
The E-4B Program Office will sustain and modernize mission system
capabilities as necessary through the transition period until the
replacement platform is operational. The Sierra Nevada Corporation--
SAOC contract is progressing well. Three aircraft were received in
April 2025, and we are on track to receive an additional two in
September 2025. The Integrated Baseline Review was completed in October
2024 and the System Requirements Review and Digital Data Package
process are both on track. The SAOC program stands to mitigate all
issues within the current NAOC fleet as well as serve as a next-
generation aircraft that will be postured to directly support the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff well into the future.
This need for reliable command and control is met in part by the
newly activated 95th Wing, which brings together specialized units to
ensure seamless execution of strategic operations. The 95th Wing now
provides combatant commanders with assured command and control (C2)
over assigned forces through global command, control, and communication
capabilities. The wing organizes, trains, and equips the total force to
execute strategic requirements as set forth by commanders.
Operating under 8th Air Force and AFGSC, the 95th Wing incorporates
existing units from across different components of the Air Force. These
include the 595th Command and Control Group, the 253d Command and
Control Group; and the 610th Command and Control Squadron. This
integration forms a cohesive and powerful unit.
nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
AFGSC plays a critical role in ensuring robust NC3 capabilities. We
are responsible for the Strategic Readiness and effectiveness of our
Air Force's nuclear deterrent forces, which hinges on reliable NC3.
These efforts ensure vital NC3 systems are integrated into my portion
of our Nation's strategic nuclear enterprises.
Furthermore, AFGSC and the United States Space Force (USSF) have
critical interdependency when it comes to NC3. Space-based assets are
integral to NC3 by providing early warning of missile launches and
enabling swift decisionmaking and response options. Satellites provide
secure communication channels between national leaders and nuclear
forces, ensuring reliable transmission of orders and information.
Through coordinated efforts, AFGSC and USSF unlock amplified
capabilities that exponentially enhance the effectiveness and
resilience of the Nation's strategic deterrence. For example, AFGSC is
integrating the Advanced Extremely High Frequency system into our
ICBMs, bomber forces, and command posts. AFGSC is also advancing
efforts to enhance survivable beyond-line-of sight communications for
the bomber force, including the development of High-Speed Terminals.
Additionally, we continue reexamining legacy technologies through a
modern lens. Long established high-frequency waveforms are now
benefiting from digital software-defined radios, which enhance
performance and provide critical redundancy in the event of space-based
system failures. In the Very Low Frequency domain, we continue to
modernize our receivers with smaller, plug-and-play replacement
solutions that enable seamless upgrades while maintaining compliance
with cryptographic standards. Additionally, our Senior Leader Network
remains a vital asset, ensuring strategic decisionmakers in Washington
have reliable worldwide communications and services in times of crises.
NC3 is the cornerstone of America's deterrence posture. AFGSC
continues to leverage industry and academia to pursue next-generation
technologies including protected satellite communications for secure
connectivity, artificial intelligence (AI) powered cyber defense for
real-time threat detection and mitigation, and integrated multi-domain
command and control for faster, more adaptable agile decisionmaking.
Every day, AFGSC hones this strategic capability, ensuring that if
called upon, we will be ready.
airmen and families
The unwavering dedication of our Striker Airmen, who work
tirelessly 24/7, truly enables AFGSC to stand ready to face any
challenge or threat, even as our advanced weapons systems and
modernization efforts capture global attention.
Innovation
Maintaining our competitive edge demands a steadfast commitment to
innovation, a commitment embodied by our resourceful and dedicated
Airmen. STRIKEWERX, the Global Strike innovation hub, stands as a
testament to this commitment. Recognizing that our airmen are our
greatest asset, we have fostered an environment where ingenuity can
flourish. We connect Airmen with industry experts and academia,
sparking partnerships that drive rapid and impactful technological
improvements.
We continue to adapt and adopt inexpensive commercial sector
technologies, including improving bomber pilot training, modernizing
bomber crew alert communications, training for emergency situations
more realistically, and providing our security forces with more
effective technology as they secure our nuclear capability. Airman
ideas have produced tangible results, including operationally fielded
B-52H engine pod covers and deployable maintenance structures to
facilitate operations in frigid conditions at our northern bases. This
ability to rapidly translate innovative ideas into executable solutions
underscores AFGSC's dedication to equipping warfighters with leading-
edge technologies.
To combat recurring engine failures in B-52Hs at Minot AFB caused
by extreme cold, engineers developed a new engine inlet cover design
incorporating a heating duct. This initiative, culminating in the
``Strike Tank 2023'' project approved in October 2023, saw delivery of
testable prototypes by June 2024. These covers, offering full engine
encapsulation and a heating mechanism, proved so effective that 12 were
immediately procured for operational testing. By August 2024, the
success of the covers led to equipping the entire Minot B-52H fleet.
This proactive solution saves an estimated 7,500 maintenance hours per
year and prevents costly engine damage, showcasing a remarkable return
on investment in operational readiness.
In addition, we are empowering Airmen to harness the power of data
analytics and AI. The Command uses AI to project trends in operational
status and quickly address and identify problem areas. Our use of
centrally funded Air Force cloud platforms brings together enterprise
and Command data to inform the Commander's risk assessment. The Command
uses commercial AI/machine learning offerings within the USAF data
fabric to accelerate business processes. AFGSC is also one of the most
prolific users of robotic process automation tools in the USAF. By
providing access to cutting-edge tools and training, we enable Global
Strike Airmen to develop and leverage secure cloud-based applications
that streamline processes and maximize the efficiency and effectiveness
of our personnel.
Missile Community Cancer Study
The health and well-being of our Airmen and their families is a top
priority. This is why AFGSC teamed up with the USAF School of Aerospace
Medicine (USAFSAM) in 2023 to conduct a thorough investigation to
address concerns about a possible link between working on missile
fields and cancer. The Missile Cancer Community Study includes a
comprehensive environmental analysis. Over 2,400 samples are being
collected and analyzed in three phases across three Missile Wings and
Vandenberg SFB. With two rounds of sampling already completed, the
investigation revealed trace amounts of polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) exceeding the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommended
threshold on 4 out of 1205 total surface swipe samples. To ensure the
safety and well-being of our Airmen, Missile Alert Facilities with PCBs
above the EPA threshold were promptly and thoroughly cleaned. They have
since passed rigorous safety inspections and are now back in full
operation. Initial findings from phases IA and 1B of the epidemiologic
study have shown no increase in cancer rates among our Missile
Community compared to the non-Missile Community or the general U.S.
population. This includes data on 14 common cancers.
Additionally, Phase 1C did not identify a statistically significant
elevated mortality of these cancers in the Missile Community when
compared to the general U.S. population. While the initial phases of
our study have been reassuring, we are committed to gathering the most
comprehensive data possible. To that end, we are incorporating State
cancer registries into the second phase of our study to gain a complete
understanding of potential health risks within the Missile Community.
Phase 2, scheduled for completion by the end of 2025, will offer a more
complete and detailed analysis of cancer incidence within the Missile
Community. AFGSC is actively engaging with leading health organizations
such as the USAFSAM, the Defense Centers for Public Health, and
Veterans Affairs throughout this process. To ensure full transparency,
we hold quarterly town hall meetings, provide updates on a dedicated
webpage, and share findings with stakeholders to ensure our Airmen and
families are informed. We understand this is about more than just
data--it is about the health and peace of mind of our Airmen, their
families, and our veterans. We are unwavering in our commitment to
providing them with clear, accurate information and ensure complete
transparency throughout this process. They deserve nothing less.
Professional Military Education and Development
Building a culture of excellence and pride within AFGSC is key to
maintaining the warrior ethos and achieving mission success. My AFGSC
Force Development Division is committed to providing our personnel with
the knowledge, skills, and experiences necessary to excel and lead our
command with distinction.
AFGSC partners with Air University to modernize Professional
Military Education (PME), particularly Intermediate Developmental
Education (IDE). Our flagship effort is the School of Advanced Nuclear
Deterrence Studies at Air Command and Staff College, which develops
deterrence and assurance experts equipped to advise senior leaders
across the DOD. AFGSC also participated in the successful Agile
Learning pilot program, an IDE modernization initiative focused on
flexible, mission-relevant learning experiences. Building on this
success, AFGSC is committed to exploring the full potential of
innovative programs like Agile Learning. Beyond officer PME, AFGSC
provides high-quality professional development opportunities for
enlisted Airmen, including unique, mission-focused content incorporated
into Enlisted
Robust pre-command education is also critical. The Nuclear
Stewardship Executive Course provides Group and Wing Commanders and
their Senior Enlisted Leaders with a deep understanding of their
nuclear mission responsibilities. Our AFGSC Command Team Course unites
Squadron Commanders and their Senior Enlisted Leaders, forging a shared
understanding and purpose. Through this course, they gain the knowledge
and skills to lead their squadrons as one cohesive force, effectively
executing this critical mission. We continuously assess and refine our
pre-command education to ensure relevance and efficacy in preparing
commanders for the complexities of the nuclear enterprise.
In addition to education and training, AFGSC offers coveted
internships-including AFGSC Intern, Striker Trident, Striker Titan, and
Striker Trailblazer-providing exceptional officers, enlisted personnel,
and civilian Airmen with invaluable hands-on experience in the nuclear
enterprise. The Academic Partnerships in Nuclear Education program
collaborates with academic institutions to provide Airmen access to
advanced education in fields like defense and strategic studies,
nuclear deterrence, and engineering management.
These initiatives, alongside our Air Force Reserve Officer Training
Corps Summer Internship Program, are key to attracting and developing
top talent for AFGSC. By cultivating an environment where individuals
are recognized and rewarded based on their abilities, performance, and
contributions, we aim to attract the best and brightest. Upholding
rigorous standards for our Airmen is non-negotiable, as it directly
contributes to mission accomplishment and the long-term health of our
command.
To encourage individual drive, recognize excellence, and cultivate
a strong sense of pride within its ranks, AFGSC is exploring various
strategic initiatives focused on enhancing both talent management and
retention rates. The Personnel Division has launched a series of
``sprints'' to rapidly analyze data and assess recommendations that
will enhance transparency in the assignment process, as well as
incentivize AFGSC bases.
AFGSC is working on restoring recurring Career Field Health
Briefings and expanding the Commander's Nuclear Focus list to include
additional Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs). In line with improving
retention, AFGSC reevaluated Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)
multipliers based on recommendations from the RAND study and updating
related policies. The input from key AFSCs regarding SRB adjustments is
under review.
AFGSC addressed quality of life by introducing a one-time cold
weather pay incentive for Airmen stationed at northern tier locations
such as Malmstrom and Minot AFB, effective from 1 April 2024. In
addition, AFGSC with assistance from the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, instituted a civilian retention
incentive in order to retain top civilian talent. The 10 percent
monetary incentive is calculated as a percentage of the employee's rate
of basic pay.
These initiatives prioritize transparency, flexibility, and
competitive compensation to effectively align talent management with
the demanding requirements of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrence mission.
By investing in its Airmen, AFGSC reaffirms its commitment to its
workforce and strengthens America's fighting force.
Defense Health Agency
The current State of healthcare within AFGSC needs attention. The
Defense Health Agency (DHA) recently reorganized and established a
Personnel Reliability Program Tiger Team to address gaps that could
jeopardize the readiness of our Airmen and their families, particularly
with the impending B-21 bed-down at Ellsworth AFB. While the Tiger Team
addressed some concerns, the lack of a Surety Support Coordination Cell
highlights a lack of uniformity. Chronic underfunding and staffing
shortages across the Military Health System worsen our DHA's ability to
provide timely and quality care. This chronic instability, resulting in
hundreds vacant positions at MTFs on Air Force Bases, directly impacts
mission readiness and reduces access to care for military families.
conclusion
AFGSC stands at a watershed moment. The world is watching as we
simultaneously sustain aging cold war systems and usher in a new era of
strategic deterrence. We are modernizing at a significant pace while
ensuring legacy systems remain ready to answer the Nation's call. We
are tackling challenges head-on, including aging infrastructure, supply
chain disruptions, or the need to counter evolving threats like UAS.
Through it all, our greatest strength remains our Striker Airmen--the
heart and soul of AFGSC. Their dedication, innovation, and resilience
are the driving force behind our success. However, we cannot afford to
be complacent and must remain vigilant in the face of growing threats.
We must continue to invest in our people, ensuring they have the
resources, training, and support they need to carry out their critical
mission. With unwavering commitment to our mission and steadfast
congressional support, AFGSC will continue to deter aggression, assure
Allies, and safeguard our Nation's security, now and into the future.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Admiral Wolfe, good to
see you.
Admiral Wolfe. And good to see you.
Senator Fischer. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN DIRECTOR
FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Admiral Wolfe. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, it is an honor to
be here and a privilege to continue representing the
servicemembers, civilians, and families of the Navy Strategic
Systems Programs, SSP. I'd like to thank Congress for its
continued support in providing us with the resources required
to execute our assigned mission. I have submitted my posture
statement for the record.
I'll begin by assuring you that the Navy's nuclear forces,
the bedrock of our national security are safe, secure,
effective, and credible. As the Navy command that provides cost
effective, safe, and secure, sea-based strategic deterrent
solutions, SSP is entrusted to provide cradle to grave
lifecycle support to three critical programs.
The Trident II(D5) Strategic Weapons System, the Navy's
Conventional Prompt Strike Hypersonic program, and the Nuclear
Armed Sea Launch Cruise Missile, SLCM-N program. These are
three of the Nation's highest priority acquisition programs and
with your support, they ensure the Navy is delivering peace
through strength.
SSP ensures the highest levels of readiness and
modernization for the Trident Strategic Weapon System, which
underlies our national strategy to deter any adversary who
threatens United States, our allies, or our interest. As the
most survivable leg of the triad, the ballistic missile
submarine force represents a substantial portion of our
Nation's deployed nuclear warheads, providing an unyielding
foundation for assured response against any adversary.
The Navy strategic deterrent stands at a critical juncture.
To maintain our advantage in the face of evolving threats, we
must prioritize the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure
and industrial base. A strong domestic industrial base is the
foundation of a credible deterrent. Using resources authorized
by this committee, SSP is actively working to revitalize this
natural interest, ensuring the timely production and delivery
of critical strategic weapon system components while fostering
American jobs and technological superiority.
Our modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in
research and development. The critical skills for our workforce
and the facilities needed to produce, sustain, and certify our
strategic systems. Our infrastructure is also at an inflection
point. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-year
recapitalization windows as we enter into a once in a
generation transition of both the Trident Strategic Weapons
System and the Ballistic Missile Submarine Platform. In
accordance with the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, SSP has established
a SLCM-N program office and over the past year, we have focused
on conducting the assessments needed to deliver a weapon system
that meets war fighters' needs.
Executing this program requires a careful balancing of
resources to ensure existing critical Navy and Air Force
programs of record and our submarine fleet are not adversely
impacted. SSPs mission, strategic deterrence, is critical to
this Nation. It is the foundation of the National Defense
Strategy and is a top priority of the Department of Defense.
In order to accomplish all of all three national missions,
SSP relies on a relatively small number of trained, skilled
employees, and it is critical that my command is able to
appropriately staff its workforce with these highly specialized
technical experts. People are as foundational to our nuclear
deterrent as the strategic weapons themselves.
As the 14th Director of Strategic Systems programs, I have
absolute faith and confidence in the safety, security,
effectiveness, and credibility of our Nation's strategic
deterrent due to the proficiency and professionalism of the
dedicated service members and civilians who have made strategic
deterrence their life's work. With continued congressional
support and stable on-time funding, the Navy will continue to
effectively defend our Nation and preserve peace for future
generations.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
introduction
Strategic Systems Programs' (SSP) mission is to deter strategic
attack by providing credible and affordable nuclear and non-nuclear
capabilities to the Warfighter to underwrite the security of our
Nation. As the Navy command that provides cost-effective, safe, and
secure sea-based strategic deterrence solutions, the SSP team is
entrusted to provide cradle-to-grave lifecycle support to three
critical programs: the Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon System (SWS),
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonics, and the Nuclear-Armed
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) programs.
The U.S. nuclear triad's most survivable leg is provided by the
sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD). This force represents a
substantial portion of our Nation's deployed nuclear warheads,
providing an unyielding foundation for assured response against any
adversary. The SBSD encompasses a formidable network of assets: the
strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, the
Trident II SWS and its associated nuclear warheads, the Navy Nuclear
Command, Control, and Communications systems, and the crucial shore-
based maintenance and security infrastructure. Underpinning these
capabilities is a wide-ranging industrial base, ensuring the
sustainment and modernization of this vital deterrent for decades to
come.
maintaining unmatched strength and lethality
SSP's core mission supporting the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the safety and
security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the Navy; and
the design, development, production, and sustainment of the Navy's SWS.
We strive to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned by rigorous
self-assessment, to achieve the highest standards of performance and
integrity for personnel supporting the strategic deterrent mission. We
focus unrelentingly on our tremendous responsibility for the custody
and accountability of our Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of
SSP, our Sailors, our Marines, our Navy Masters at Arms, our Coast
Guardsmen, and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the
strategic deterrence mission, ready to respond to the emerging needs of
our Warfighter, and committed to protecting and safeguarding our
Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. Thank you to the
congressional defense committees for your unwavering and continuing
support for our critical mission.
The safety, security and reliability of the Navy's nuclear weapons
is SSP's highest priority. The SSP flight test program measures
performance and reliability of the SWS in order to ensure military
effectiveness. SSP has successfully conducted 193 flight tests of the
Trident II missile--the most recent of which occurred in April 2025.
Furthermore, the Navy strictly complies with the Nuclear Weapons Surety
Standard for all nuclear weapons in its custody and regularly evaluates
itself to ensure we are meeting those standards. The Trident II program
is safe, secure, and highly reliable.
ssp priorities: lethality, warfighting, homeland defense
SSP approaches our mission through the lens of our three main
priorities:
Lethality: SSP ensures the highest levels of readiness
and modernization for the Trident II (D5) SWS, providing critical
support to the U.S. national strategy to deter any adversary who
threatens the United States, our allies, or our interests.
Warfighting: Our unwavering focus on designing,
developing, and deploying the most advanced SLBM, SLCM-N, and
hypersonic technology ensures the U.S. Navy maintains its competitive
edge in an increasingly contested maritime domain.
Homeland Defense: As the most survivable leg of the
nuclear triad, the SBSD, under SSP's stewardship, stands constant,
providing an unshakeable deterrent against attack on our Homeland.
state of the program
Today's strategic nuclear triad benefits from the strategic
foresight and the decisions of those who have come before. Strategic
investment into a nuclear weapons support infrastructure promoted both
the safety and longevity of the SWS as well as the high levels of
security required for weapons of such importance. After seven decades
of use, the Navy must revitalize and build the capacity that will allow
this infrastructure to continue to meet Warfighter requirements in the
face of evolving threats. In addition to revitalizing legacy
infrastructure to sustain SWS shore operations, the Nuclear Enterprise,
and SSP in particular, must prioritize expanded and new infrastructure
to promote the safety, security, efficacy, and credibility of the SWS
through 2084. These investments will be made in weapon design and
development capacity, transportation and storage infrastructure,
technical operations, and nuclear weapons security facilities.
A minimum of 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each equipped with 16 missile
tubes, will replace the current fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each
equipped with 20 operational missile tubes (in accordance with the New
START Treaty). The continued demonstrated high performance of the SWS
will ensure the Columbia-class meets U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) direction to meet requirements derived from Presidential
guidance. A decrease in demonstrated performance could impact the
Navy's ability to meet USSTRATCOM requirements, which establish the
minimum force necessary to deter adversary attack against the Homeland
and to provide the President with an assured survivable second-strike
capability. For this reason, the Navy must maintain a robust Ohio-class
SSBN age management program to avoid a degradation in mission
capabilities in the transition as the Columbia-class SSBN prepares to
enter service.
The SBSD stands at a critical juncture. Decades of strategic
foresight have delivered an unparalleled capability; but to maintain
our advantage in the face of evolving threats, we must prioritize the
modernization of our nuclear infrastructure and industrial base. SSP
will continue to balance the following priorities as we move into a new
era of balancing sustainment and new programs:
Prioritizing Modernization: With their advanced
capabilities, the Columbia-class SSBN combined with its Trident SWS,
represent a generational leap forward in our undersea deterrent. With
improvements in the SSBN platform come upgrades to the SWS as well--
both the Trident missile and its warhead. SSP is fully committed to
ensuring a seamless transition from the Ohio-class SSBN, leveraging
existing infrastructure while modernizing the SWS to meet the demands
of the future.
Revitalizing the Industrial Base: A strong domestic
industrial base is the bedrock of a credible deterrent. SSP is actively
working to revitalize this vital national asset, ensuring the timely
production and delivery of critical SWS components while fostering
American jobs and technological superiority.
Confronting Emerging Threats: In light of the ever
evolving threat landscape, SSP is fully committed to investing in
strategic deterrence technologies, including SLCM-N and conventional
hypersonics, and strategies to protect our strategic assets from those
who seek to undermine our national security.
Balancing Systems Integration: SSP is the system
integrator for the SWS. This requires our civilian workforce with
critical knowledge of design, development, and sustainment to
collaborate with industry partners in support of nuclear modernization.
sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
ssbn
The 14 ship Ohio-class fleet remains the backbone of U.S. strategic
deterrence, carrying approximately 70 percent of the U.S.'s New START
Treaty-accountable deployed nuclear warheads in the form of the W76 and
W88 families of warheads. Originally designed for a 30-year service
life, the Ohio-class submarines were called upon to extend this service
to 42 years, supporting a delay in investment in the next generation of
SSBNs. To account for this extension in service life, SSP embarked on a
life extension program for the Trident II D5 missile to update
critical, aging missile electronics systems. SSP introduced the first
Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) program to the fleet in 2017 and
the missile will remain an effective and credible SWS into the 2040's--
supporting the Ohio-class submarine through end of service life and
serving as the initial SWS for the Columbia- and UK Dreadnought-class
SSBNs.
In parallel, SSP's program efforts and collaboration with the UK
through the Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended (PSA) and Mutual
Defense Agreement, as amended (MDA) support the UK's Continuous At Sea
Deterrent through Vanguard-class SSBN end of service life and the
transition to a Dreadnought-class SSBN fleet.
To meet these critical program responsibilities, SSP will sustain
our deployed systems and modernize for our new ones, ensuring that we
continue to keep the Navy's nuclear weapons safe and secure. We will
develop and protect our logistics supply chain. Through these measures,
SSP will continue to unlock new capabilities that the Warfighter can
leverage to enhance strategic deterrence and act decisively should
deterrence fail.
trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
The Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program is essential to
maintaining a credible SBSD through the life of the Columbia-class
SSBN. This program will:
Extend Service Life: D5LE2 will replace the D5 and D5LE
missiles to align with the Columbia-class, ensuring a credible at-sea
deterrent for decades to come.
Enhance Capabilities: Using a hybrid approach of
leveraging existing reliable technology and integrating cutting-edge
advancements, D5LE2 will have the flexibility to counter emerging
threats throughout its life.
Strengthen the Industrial Base: D5LE2 is a critical
driver in revitalizing our domestic industrial base, ensuring the
availability of critical components and supporting American jobs.
As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
Ohio-class SSBNs, we have assessed how we can ensure the SWS is
available throughout the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of
12 Columbia-class SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, and
beginning in fiscal year 2030, we will load current D5LE missiles on
Hulls 1 through 8 of Columbia-class SSBNs. Production of additional
D5LE missiles is not practical due to obsolete parts and the current
lack of a robust industrial base.
To meet inventory requirements and maintain a credible strategic
deterrent in the face of evolving threats, we will need to design,
engineer, produce, and deploy D5LE2 in time for strategic outload of
Columbia Hull 9. D5LE2 will be incorporated on all follow on Columbia-
class Hulls and later on Columbia-class Hulls 1-8 during their Extended
Refit Period from fiscal year 2039-49. D5LE2's architecture will ensure
the weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and survivability
while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by multiple nuclear
challengers until Columbia-class end of life.
D5LE2 is a hybrid of existing, cost-effective technology (e.g.,
solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
(e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture); it is structured to
maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance
while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
emerging needs and to maintain a credible SBSD.
industrial base and infrastructure
The Nation requires a modernized nuclear force and supporting
infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Unlike SLBM programs
of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit of a healthy defense
industrial base that was historically built on simultaneously
maintaining production and continuous development. Our modernization
needs cannot succeed without investing in research and development, the
critical skills in the workforce, and the facilities needed to produce,
sustain, and certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and
aerospace industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-hardened
electronics, strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket
motors--remains an important priority in conjunction with research and
development investment.
SSP has placed particular emphasis on the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
industry and its sub-tier suppliers. We appreciate the support of
Congress to allow for the continuous production of these vital
components. Over the past 15 years, the SRM industrial base waned
following the completion of the Space Shuttle missions, Minuteman III
re-graining, and disruption of the space launch market by new Liquid
Rocket Engine entrants. However, SRM demand is increasing due to
competing programs (CPS, Sentinel, Next Generation Interceptor) and
production rate increases for D5LE and D5LE2. In addition, the Trident
II D5 SRM production line is aging and requires modernization in order
to ensure production can continue well into the 2060's.
In short, full support of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving Initial
Fleet Introduction in 2039 and to embarking on a path that maintains an
SLBM deterrent capability through the service life of the Columbia-
class SSBNs. If the Nation does not continue to address these concerns,
no amount of money will be able to mitigate the risks realized if we do
not adequately prepare our industrial base.
In addition to SRMs, we also need a national capability to build
aeroshells, which protect the payload upon re-entry to the atmosphere.
The Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980's and
needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a
small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche
industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-
effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force and our
strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their
independent warhead program endeavors.
The program's infrastructure is also at an inflection point, as
existing facilities are reaching their 30-year recapitalization windows
as we enter into a once-in-a-generation transition of both the weapons
system and platform. The Navy relies on a limited footprint in Kings
Bay, Georgia, Bangor, Washington, and Florida's Space Coast to process
missiles and outfit the SSBNs. Maintaining and sustaining facilities is
critical to meeting USSTRATCOM and Fleet mission requirements, as well
as providing new capabilities through military construction. We will
make smart investments to address capability gaps, throughput
constraints, and design for surge capacity to address requirements
presented by new and emerging threats. Our Nation and the Navy will
continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization
of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and
flexible deterrent now and into the future.
As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and the Department of
Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA)
infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
needs of the Nation. We must have an effective, resilient, and
responsive plutonium pit production capability. This capability can
address age-related risks, support planned refurbishments, as well as
prepare for future uncertainty. Additionally, tritium, lithium, and
uranium, and high explosives and energetics, among other strategic
materials, are vital to ensuring the Navy can continue to meet its
strategic deterrent requirements.
Efforts to sustain and modernize deterrent industrial base and
infrastructure must continue. Our strategic forces underpin every
military operation around the world, and we cannot afford to delay
given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
warhead and reentry body activities
The Navy is also working in partnership with NNSA to refurbish our
existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in response to
USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment faced by the nuclear
enterprise continues to evolve, it is critical that the Navy designs,
develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the Warfighter.
Today, the Trident II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
of warhead families, the W76 and the W88. SSP is designing and
developing a new warhead system: the W93 warhead and Mk7 reentry body
system. It will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2 missiles
and, through the PSA and MDA, and the Mk7 reentry body will support the
UK's sovereign Replacement Warhead program.
W93/Mk7 will provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future
Warfighter needs. With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed
stockpile beginning in the 2040's, the W93/Mk7 will help address
production concerns in the Nuclear Enterprise and ensure an
uninterrupted at sea deterrent for the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad. In 2021, the Navy entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear
Weapons Lifecycle Process with NNSA for the W93. The Phase 1 effort
addressed evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization
requirements; improving operational effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and
mitigating technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-
based leg of the nuclear triad while simultaneously reinvigorating the
atrophied industrial base. In fiscal year 2022, the W93 program
received Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) authorization to enter Phase 2,
Feasibility Study and Design Options, which further refined and matured
the design of the W93/Mk7 program in a manner that provides an
affordable, credible, safe, and secure weapon to the Warfighter. This
marked the first time a nuclear weapons program had reached Phase 2
since the W88 which ended production in the 1990's. As of March 2025,
the W93/Mk7 program proceeded into Phase 2A. The W93/Mk7 will not
increase the size of the deployed stockpile and will not require
underground nuclear explosive testing. The Navy will work in close
coordination with the DOD, NNSA, NWC, and Congress as this effort
matures.
polaris sales agreement (psa) and mutual defense agreement (mda):
support to the united kingdom
Fundamental to U.S. strategic and extended deterrence policies is
the special relationship between the U.S. and the UK through the 1958
MDA and the 1963 PSA. Under the PSA, the U.S. sells the Trident II SWS
to the UK along with associated support, testing and training
equipment, and defense services. This sales agreement allows the U.S.
to procure the SWS, other equipment, and services for the UK on U.S.
contracts under the same terms and conditions as those for the United
States, allowing for increased economies of scale and sharing certain
costs and liabilities.
In particular, certain SWS equipment, including missiles, are
``mingled'' in common asset pools. Although the U.S. maintains these
mingled assets in the United States, the UK retains right to title for
mingled assets in the United States, and the United States transfers
title to the UK for deployment. The United States and the UK
proportionately share costs and liabilities to maintain (and eventually
dispose) of mingled assets throughout their lifecycles.
Under the MDA, the United States cooperates with the UK on the uses
of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. The PSA and MDA
agreements are complementary, and together enable the U.S. Navy to sell
SWS delivery system and reentry body equipment to the UK, as well as to
exchange controlled unclassified and classified information, including
atomic information, with the UK. This framework has ensured the U.S.
ability to support the UK with strategic capabilities to ensure a
robust, sovereign nuclear deterrent.
SSP's key responsibility associated with the Columbia-class program
is the integration of the SWS onto the new SSBNs. A critical aspect is
the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) that will support Trident II SWS
deployment on Columbia-class SSBNs and the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
The CMC represents the most recent example of the PSA partnership, in
which our nations established a cost-sharing arrangement to design,
develop, and produce common shipboard infrastructure that improves
comingling of Trident II D5 missile inventory and sets the stage to
improve maintenance system consistency across the two fleets.
SSP also supports the SSBN Program Executive Office as it oversees
U.S. industry's delivery of CMC components to both Navies for
installation into their new SSBNs. Full lead ship construction is in
progress along with delivery of SWS equipment to the UK in support of
construction and outfitting efforts under the authorities of the 1963
PSA.
As with the Columbia-class SSBNs, the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs
will initially carry the Trident II D5LE missile. The development of
the Mk7 reentry system to support the U.S. W93 warhead program is also
critical to the UK's independent development of a next generation
nuclear warhead and reentry system. Our nations are working separate
and sovereign nuclear warhead programs that will leverage the Mk7
reentry system. SSP will continue to nurture and safeguard this special
relationship with the UK as it contributes to ensuring peace through
strength with the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) today while
modernizing and building flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency into
the UK's future CASD.
sea-launched cruise missile, nuclear
Today, our deterrent force is challenged by adversaries' theater
nuclear capabilities for which we have limited response options and
against which we must invest now in capabilities to maintain deterrence
for the future. In the fiscal year 2024 NDAA (Public Law 118-31),
Congress directed establishment of a major defense acquisition program
for SLCM-N. SLCM-N is a flexible, credible, and survivable sea-based
regional deterrent capability designed to complement existing
capabilities and to expand Presidential options.
In accordance with the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, Navy established a
SLCM-N Program Office at SSP in March 2024. Over the past year, SSP has
focused on standing up this program office and conducting the
assessments needed to deliver a weapon system that meets Warfighter
needs. The SLCM-N program is focused on achieving a milestone decision
in fiscal year 2026 and continuing program assessments to buy down
technical and programmatic risk. Executing this program requires
careful balancing of resources to ensure existing critical Navy
programs of record are not adversely impacted.
Fiscal year 2024 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation funding
enabled the program to begin building the technical understanding and
programmatic underpinnings in support of a SLCM-N capability delivery
by fiscal year 2034. Over the last year, the SLCM-N program has focused
on understanding and determining the Weapon System's architectures.
SLCM-N development will span the missile system, fire control, launcher
system, platform integration, and warhead system integration as well as
development of applicable support equipment, telemetry and flight test
hardware, ashore infrastructure, and training material. The program
office has focused efforts on defining the system architecture that
integrates these elements, conducting systems engineering analysis to
inform key Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) decisions, and establishing
the acquisition framework that will enable successful program
execution.
The program has conducted assessments of early candidate airframe
options to understand the key technical challenges unique to developing
SLCM-N. Challenges identified include integration of a nuclear warhead
into a conventionally armed cruise missile design while meeting nuclear
surety requirements and marinizing a missile not originally designed
for underwater launch. In addition to these initial technical
assessments, the program researched potential alternate airframe and
component vendor options to understand the missile options that may
best meet requirements and provide the best path to Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) by fiscal year 2034. Beyond SLCM-N airframe
considerations, the Navy, in cooperation with NNSA, has worked to
assess available warhead options for selection of a warhead that meets
requirements.
The program has been equally focused on the integration of SLCM-N
into the Virginia-class submarine. As the SLCM-N shipboard architecture
matures, preliminary platform interfaces are being established,
shipboard environments defined, and fire control solutions that meet
nuclear surety requirements assessed. Over the last year, the SLCM-N
program has conducted numerous programmatic and engineering assessments
to help define and narrow the shipboard integration trade space and
enable MSA engineering decisions. The SLCM-N weapon system is being
designed and integrated with the intent to minimize impact to Virginia-
class readiness and operations.
In parallel with efforts to develop the missile system and
integrate it into the submarine, the program is working to develop the
supporting infrastructure needed to store, maintain, and deploy SLCM-N.
The weapon will be stored and loaded at the Strategic Weapon Facilities
(SWF) already used for the Trident II D5 SWS and will leverage a
combination of existing, modified, and new facilities at the SWFs.
Early studies are focused on developing a plan for the SWFs that
supports SLCM-N requirements while ensuring SWS programs of record are
not impacted.
The Navy is moving rapidly to complete the activities needed for a
successful milestone decision in fiscal year 2026. Consistent funding
resources are critical to the program's ability to deliver a system
with an IOC by fiscal year 2034. The ability to find and rapidly scale
the workforce that will develop SLCM-N is critical to mission success.
workforce
SSP's mission--strategic deterrence--is critical to this Nation. It
is the foundation of the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance
and is the top priority of the Secretary of Defense. Based on the
success of the Trident program, SSP has also been tasked with rapidly
developing and producing the Navy's first hypersonic weapon system,
CPS, along with the Army's long range hypersonic weapons system. At the
same time, SSP is currently developing the SLCM-N. This is a new
capability that required the organization to establish a new program
office, along with corresponding staff. Finally, I have Echelon I
command responsibilities for the personnel that execute regulatory
oversight of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission and technical
authority on Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons
systems, effort that provides a holistic Navy view of the no-fail
mission.
Because of our demonstrated success, and the importance of these
new programs, SSP's workforce has been growing and requires continued
growth. SSP must recruit, train, and retain some of the most sought-
after skills in the U.S. job market to support the breadth and
complexity of SSP's strategic deterrence mission. SSP requires a
workforce comprised of highly specialized, technical experts. Failing
to appropriately staff this command would be catastrophic to the Navy's
Fleet Ballistic Missile program, the Conventional Prompt Strike program
and the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile--Nuclear program.
History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's was
truly a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a
cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational
leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated
predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners alike--
responded to the national need with focused determination and propelled
the program forward with a vision. People are as fundamental to our
nuclear deterrent as the SWS itself. Today, SSP and its industry
partners are focused on inspiring, growing, and retaining a generation
of workforce that did not live through the darkest days of the cold
war. Connecting a new workforce to this fundamental global security
mission remains an important task shared among the entire nuclear
enterprise.
Our mission has grown significantly, while our workforce size has
not grown in the same proportion. Additionally, as the global threat
environment has changed and the operational tempo has increased, the
workforce is challenged to manage the increased strain on an already
aging deployed weapons system. In order to accomplish SSP's sustainment
and development missions, SSP must have trained, skilled employees on-
board and able to work independently.
The next decade is a time of great importance to successfully
accomplish concurrent development efforts, on top of the sustainment of
the aging D5/D5LE weapon system. SSP has spent the past several years
posturing its workforce, organizational structure, infrastructure,
culture, and technical capabilities to ensure optimal success for the
impending bow wave of critical development, testing, deployment, and
sustainment.
conclusion
Since the 1950's, our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has
been a critical component of our national security and must continue to
assure our allies and partners and deter potential adversaries well
into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible, and
strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the proper stewardship,
custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the
Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based strategic deterrent
capability is a vital national security requirement.
As the fourteenth Director at SSP, I have absolute faith and
confidence in the safety, security, effectiveness, and credibility of
our Navy's strategic deterrent due to the proficiency and
professionalism of the dedicated service members and civilians
committed to our mission. With continued congressional support and
stable, on-time funding, the Navy will continue to effectively defend
our Nation and preserve peace for future generations.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. We will begin our
first round of questions. Five-minute questions please. Admiral
Wolfe, I've appreciated our discussions on standing up the
SLCM-N. Can you update the Committee on the progress that the
Navy's made on that?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. Yes,
as I've said, we stood up our program office, we started to
look at what----
Senator Fischer. Do you found that to be helpful?
Admiral Wolfe. What to be helpful, ma'am?
Senator Fischer. That you've got the office stood up.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. What that is a lot--
--
Senator Fischer. Was that faster than you anticipated?
Admiral Wolfe. Excuse me, ma'am?
Senator Fischer. Was it quicker than you anticipated?
Admiral Wolfe. I wouldn't say it was quicker than
anticipated. We're still trying to ramp up to get the right
number of folks, but what that small group of people, since
we've stood that up, has been able to do in the last year,
we've been able to focus on what are the things that we need to
do to get to meeting the requirement of 2034, but as
importantly, it's allowed us to work with NNSA in partnership
to select a family of warheads.
It's allowed us to pulse industry and start to get ideas
and new ways of thinking into this system, so that we can
continue to meet all of the requirements. We've really started
to hone in on what are those concepts and how are we going to
integrate this system onto a platform that was never built to
carry nuclear weapons.
We've had many discussions with this Committee in the past
about how we're going to do that, and in the last years we've
worked with the fleet, we've also been able to get their ideas
to understand exactly how we can go about this without
impacting the larger SSN mission.
Senator Fischer. You have a 2034 timeline, what's the
greatest risk to that, do you think?
Admiral Wolfe. I think the greatest risk to the 2034
timeline again, is it goes back to that it's really
understanding how are we going to get this system integrated
into a platform that was never purpose built for that. It's
also to be able to do that in a way so that we don't deter from
the primary SSN mission. This will be a whole new
infrastructure that we have to stand up. Getting all of those
things in place, getting the weapons system done, but as
importantly, getting the fleet trained, getting all the things
that we need to do, that's going to be one of the challenging
parts of this.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Mr. Hoagland, can you provide
an update on NNSA's progress on the future warhead for SLCM-N?
Mr. Hoagland. Yes, Senator. Thank you. Paralleling Admiral
Wolfe's comments, we stood up a program office last summer.
Among the first responsibilities of that office. They ran a
very disciplined warhead selection process using over 30
metrics to grade and rank the suitable warheads for options. We
have selected and identified the W 80 family of warheads as
most suitable for this purpose, that this allows us to stay
ahead of the interface documents that we'll be pursuing the
engineering required and emphasis on staying very coupled to
the Navy during development with the platform into which that
warhead will go.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I appreciate the thoughtful
work that both NNSA and the Navy along with U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM) and the combatant commanders are doing to
assess the best way forward for this program. I appreciate the
close communication with this Subcommittee as design choices
are considered. So, thank you for that.
General Bussiere, the Air Force is responsible for many of
the components that comprise our NC3 system, including
delivering the new Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC)
aircraft. Can you provide us with an update on that program?
General Bussiere. So, Madam Chair, of the Survivable
Airborne Operations Center, the 747-8is that will replace the--
--
Senator Fischer. Oh, mic?
General Bussiere. Yes, it is.
Senator Fischer. Can you get a little closer?
General Bussiere. Yes.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Bussiere. So, the SAOC weapon system that's going
to replace the existing E-4B National Airborne Operations
Center is fairly nascent in its execution from the contract
award last year but going very well. So the primary contractor
has built facilities in Ohio and they purchased the original or
the initial buy of 7478is, and they're going through initial
processes of it.
We're also outlining the military construction to outfit
off Air Force base and I think most members of the Committee
are aware that we stood up the 95th Wing to take host of that
capability as well as others in that portfolio.
Senator Fischer. What can you share about the 95th wing
that was stood up? What are the operations of the unit? How are
they progressing it off it?
General Bussiere. So, they're literally, we just stood it
up a few months ago. Colonel Leaumont is the first commander as
most Committee Members are aware. He was the five 95th command
and control group commander, which is the group that previously
had the NAOC mission. He's standing up his command team
outfitting his organization and we're giving him the resources
to pull together.
I think most committee members are aware, when I first
wanted to stand up this wing, it was bringing together both
Active Duty, Guard, Reserve elements in the, in the in the
realm of communications and control in our special space into
the leadership oversight of one commander. We're very pleased
with its progress so far.
Senator Fischer. Good to hear. Thank you. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you. Admiral Wolfe, you used a term
I've never heard before, stable on time funding. What does that
mean?
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Let's hope that we can make that happen.
That's certainly the goal, and I understand how debilitating it
is to not have stable on time funding.
Dr. Vann, I just understand that you're leaving Federal
service shortly after 15 distinguished years, and I just wanted
to congratulate you and thank you for your extraordinary
service to the country. Let me start with a question for you
Dr. Vann. The prior organization that preceded where you are
now included chemical and biological defense and threat
reduction. I don't think that's in the new job description.
Where has that gone? Is that still being attended to somewhere?
Dr. Vann No, so it actually is still a part of the
implementation plan of the nuclear deterrent and chem/bio
defense policy and programs. So, it will be all pulled together
into an organization.
Senator King. It's going to stay in the current, the new
organization?
Dr. Vann That is the hope and the current plan based off of
the legislation.
Senator King. Mr. Hoagland, if you were listening to the
first panel, you won't be surprised by this question. You
mentioned the phrase, ``the foundation is our workforce.'' How
is your workforce? Do you have sufficient workforce? Did you
have to go through rifts and fork-in-the-road and people
leaving? Where are you compared with where the organization was
in terms of staffing on January 1st of this year?
Mr. Hoagland. Thank you, Senator King. We did recover. We
have brought back all the terminated employees that were lost
in February. The people I speak to and work with in NNSA, in
particular in the weapons activities portfolio, are here for
the mission. They're motivated by the mission. They recognize
the multi-generational inflection point we're experiencing in
the nuclear deterrent, and they're laser focused, and they're
delivering with some losses from the deferred resignation
program.
We undertook a process to identify critical needs, either
from those absences or because of emergent requirements in the
program, and we've shifted staff around to attend to the most
important needs, and we continue to deliver.
Senator King. Well, one of my questions is, is the hiring
freeze still in effect?
Mr. Hoagland. By and large, the hiring freeze is still in
effect.
Senator King. Well, that's what worries me is with people
are taking deferred whatever you call it, fork in the road
retirement, and the hiring freeze is in effect, you end up
with, could end up with some pretty important vacancies.
Mr. Hoagland. That's very true. With the Secretary's
support, we have exempted the hiring freeze for the Office of
Secure Transportation. We're very pleased to note that we've
been able to offer job opportunities and we are starting a new
class for Office of Secure Transportation this month to
continue the pipeline into that particular mission space.
Senator King. Thank you. General Bussiere, good to see you
again.
General Bussiere. Same here, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you for the service that you're
providing. We had some discussion in the Armed Services
Committee this morning about Air Force availability. Do you
have a figure for availability of your strike force? In other
words--well, you know what I mean. What's the percentage of
your force that's available at any given moment?
General Bussiere. From a bomber perspective, Senator?
Senator King. Correct.
General Bussiere. So, between the B1, B2, and B52 force, we
hover around the fifties for aircraft availability just because
of spare parts and the legacy weapon system sustainment.
Senator King. In terms of spare parts, one of the things
the committee is looking at is when we are acquiring new
platforms that we also acquire the intellectual property so
that we can make our own spare parts. I believe there should be
a 3D printer in every depot and on every naval ship. Right now,
is spare parts a bottleneck for you? Because to be honest, 50
percent availability the commercial aircraft is 98 percent
availability. They'd be long out of business if they had a 50
percent availability.
General Bussiere. It's not necessarily unique to the bomber
fleet, it's just it's----
Senator King. No, I understand that. That was the number we
had this morning for the Air Force generally.
General Bussiere. The bomber fleet is challenged by what we
call is legacy vendors that don't actually make the parts we
need. So that's a challenge for the acquisition community to
get those contracts put on order. As you know, the B52 is----
Senator King. Pretty old.
General Bussiere.--70 years plus old. The B2 is in its
thirties, the B1 is in its forties and fifties, depending on
the year the aircraft was made, and we're using them a lot. So
the demand signal for our bombers is at the highest level that
I've seen it in my career. While we're also challenged to get
the sustainment parts on the shelf for the legacy.
Senator King. I hope that could be a priority in terms of
sustainment and maintenance and maintaining a higher level of
availability that's a better deal for the taxpayers and it
makes sure service all the more lethal if it's available
General Bussiere. Without a doubt, and that's obviously the
reason why we're going to be fielding the B21 Raider platform
to replace the B1 and the B2 is because of the age and the
legacy fleet and modernizing the B52 H to the B52 J model.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. Once again, thank
you all for your service to our country. General Bussiere, the
B21 program is critical to the future bomber leg of the triad.
Based on what you know of the current and projected demand
commensurate to a great power competition paradigm with two
near peer nuclear adversaries, how many B21s do you believe
would be optimally needed to support U.S. war plans and
deterrence?
What do you think the key drivers are going to be with
regard to managing the procurement and sustainment right now,
based on what you're seeing and recognizing that, I think
there's a lot of us would like to see these B21s come on at a
higher rate than what they're currently planned for, but this
is probably one of the best examples of a system which is
working. It's on time, it's on budget.
Can you share with us a little bit about what you think the
needs are for this particular platform?
General Bussiere. Yes, Senator Rounds, very pleased with
the progress so far. The B21 Raider platform. As the committee
is aware, we've had first flight, we have one aircraft, T-One
is in testing, developmental testing out at Edwards Air Force
Base, and we have a classified number on the production line.
Ellsworth Air Force Base is the first installation, we'll field
the B21, and our construction projects to bed down that weapon
system are going very well also, as well as the repair of the
runway to field that capability.
As the Committee is aware, the program of record currently
is at least 100. The Air Force back in 2018 and 1919, I believe
testified before Congress that the right number at that time
potentially could be as high as 145. I understand General
Cotton testified to that effect this year. I support assessing
the increase of the production from 100 to 145. But I think the
real question for the department and for the Nation is what's
the right mix of long-range strike platforms versus other
strike platforms?
It's a reasonable question the Nation has asked several
times in the last year or two, and that there are ongoing
efforts, I believe, both on the Hill and in the Department of
Defense to assess what the correct number of long-range strike
platforms are in the Department of the Air Force.
Senator Rounds. I think part of that also goes back to what
exactly will the threat be. Part of what we're asking to be
developed based on the NDAA last year was a study anyway as to
how we handle two different theaters at the same time. Because
there's a general consensus out there that if we're going to
have a significant problem with one of our near peer
adversaries in one theater, very high probability that we'd
have a similar threat develop in a second theater. Thus,
putting the demand out there to be able to respond in both
locations with appropriate platforms.
I'm going to come over to Dr. Vann for just a second. Can
you share a little bit about the direction that you see the
approach taking? I know that you know, either we talk about a
new defense strategy we look at revising somehow our current
one. Can you share with us a little bit about the, the
direction that you see in terms of our strategic response and
what we can expect from the Administration?
Dr. Vann Sure. Yes, sir. Secretary Hegseth, of course,
approved an interim National Defense Strategic Guidance
classified document, which really goes into some details about
how the DOD is going to implement President Trump's peace
through strength kind of agenda. In there, there was some
discussion about the prioritizing, planning, resourcing
decisions that will be kind of entered into with a full
National Defense Strategy (NPS).
As you know, the NDS requires a review of our force size,
shape, posture considerations, and all of the detailed
prioritization of the threats, missions, and major investments.
We do anticipate an in-depth look in the NDS on our nuclear
strategy and our posture, especially in this kind of new
geopolitical environment. I would anticipate broadly nuclear
strategy and posture will be leveraging the work of things like
the Strategic Posture Commission's analysis, as well as some of
the updated information that we have about the geopolitical
threat environment.
Senator Rounds. Do you have a timeline?
Dr. Vann Sir, it is just begun and it is just underway. Our
policy colleagues are working on pulling that together as we
speak.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kelly.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. Admiral Wolfe, I
want to come back to the SLCM-N discussion. So you talked about
you stood up the program office, you are in the process of
looking through a family of warheads to figure out what the
warhead would be a pulsed industry. You've been working with
the fleet and you talked about how to integrate this needed
platform on a platform that wasn't designed for a nuclear
weapon.
You mentioned that we can't deter, and I think I wrote this
down as a quote, ``We can't deter from the primary SSN
mission.'' The primary Virginia-class submarine attack,
conventional attack mission. And that's my big concern here.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kelly. So, explain to me how do we do that and how
do we integrate a nuclear weapon into a Virginia-class sub
without impacting training, mission systems, security? I assume
we're going to have to have marines on board. Usually with
nuclear weapons, we provide a contingent, unless that is a
decision that does not apply in this case, we've got to store
these weapons.
So, my assumption, and I might be wrong, we would carry
fewer torpedoes. This could possibly change the ops tempo of
the submarine, because now we have different systems that we
have to maintain that are additional systems. We're going to be
limited in the ports we can go in, so maybe even maintenance
overseas and resupply could be impacted. I assume there's going
to be additional operator positions for the nuclear enterprise
on board. So what positions are we going to take away?
So, if you can go into a little bit about that and then
come back to how this doesn't deter from the primary
conventional mission.
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So, acknowledge all your concerns
we've talked about those in the past. So those are all the
things as we work with the fleet, we are looking at what are
the ways that we can architect the system to be able to do just
what you said. Certainly there's going to be--I would tell you
there's not going to be zero impact, but as we've worked with
the fleet, what we believe is, we can come up with the right
concepts of how do I train a crew that can deploy with this
weapon to do the things that it needs to do that doesn't
require the rest of the crew doing the missions they would
normally do.
Senator Kelly. Where do these people sleep?
Admiral Wolfe. So, we're going to work through that, sir.
It's not going to take a large number of folks once you get
that weapon on board. Just to address your, your concern about
marines in a submarine environment, we don't need marines. We
don't need that type. We know how to do that in different ways.
It's what we do on our Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear
(SSBN)s today. So we're going to take the best of all of those,
and we're going to figure out how we do that and integrate that
with a very small number of additional folks. I can tell you,
having done this a long time, it will be a small number of
folks that actually have to operate that particular system,
which will be different than all of the other systems that are
on board, so.
Senator Kelly. Madam Chair, let me be clear here. Here's my
concern. I understand we're going to try to do the best job we
can at this, but we have an incredibly capable platform in the
Virginia-class submarine.
Admiral Wolfe. We still will.
Senator Kelly. Well, we do now, and it's a conventional
platform----
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir.
Senator Kelly.--that the Chinese and the Russians pretty
much, but definitely the Chinese cannot compete with. I'm
concerned we come out of this and the likelihood that we have
to use the conventional part of this, of a Virginia class
submarine and a conflict with China is rather high, if we got
into a conflict. The probability that we would use the nuclear
systems aboard this submarine are actually rather low. So,
we're going to sacrifice the exquisite capability of this
platform, and it's going to become a little less capable. I
don't know how less capable. My concern is it could be
significant.
My other concern is, we've set $2 billion aside for the
development of this. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimates, the cost of SLCM-N and its war add at $10 billion
between 2023 and 2032 if the program began in 2024. That amount
does not cover pro production costs beyond 2032, nor does it
include any of the costs for integrating the weapon system into
the submarines, which I think is going to be substantial. I
mean, we're talking about billions of dollars.
Then we have the additional costs beyond that of, you know,
security and operations and weapon storage costs. So, I don't
think this thing has been fully thought out, but again, my
biggest concern about this, and I am not against having another
tactical nuclear option, I just think that the costs not only
the financial costs, but the cost to the conventional submarine
fleet, in my view, is too high.
I come from the aviation background, so it's kind of hard
for me to say that I think our conventional submarine force is
unmatched anywhere in the world. And it is something where we
have this substantial overmatch with the Chinese and I feel
we're putting it at risk. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kelly. General
Bussiere, I urge you to work closely with Secretary Meink and
also to be able to reach that next milestone that we have with
Sentinel. The longer we delay the decisions, the more budget
uncertainty that program's going to face. It's been determined
that that is a program that is priority and that this country
needs. Can you please describe the risks that we may incur if
Sentinel is not adequately funded in fiscal year 2026 budget?
General Bussiere. So, Madam Chair, I look forward to the
opportunity for our new Secretary of the Air Force Secretary
Meink to come visit Barksdale and get a complete update on all
our--at least two thirds of the Nation's nuclear triad from Air
Force Global Strike Command. As it relates to the Sentinel
Weapon System, I've said in several public forms that this July
will be the 55th anniversary of fielding the Minuteman III
capability, the 91st Missile Wing in Minot, North Dakota. 55
years ago.
So, the time for recapitalizing, the land leg of the triad,
quite frankly, was probably a decade or two decades ago. But
here we are today in 2025 and we're restructuring the Sentinel
Weapon System to be able to field that capability at a very
stressed time in our Nation's history. I agree with the
committee's position that the Sentinel Weapon system needs to
be funded sufficiently to get that program back on track and
field it as expeditiously as we can as a department. I'm
confident that our secretary will have the same position.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Admiral Wolfe, can you
provide an update on the Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2)
and the impact of the recent contract modification that took
place?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. So D5LE2, as you know, is the
replacement for the current system that we have. We've just
come through a recent review to know that we're starting to
understand the exact requirements, which dovetail from what we
actually have today. So we've come through that. That program
is on schedule it's on track and certainly the contract
modifications were to continue down that path so that we can
eventually get into our preliminary design review, our critical
design review with the goal of, right now the plan is to start
flight testing of that system in 2033.
We're challenging the team to pull that to the left to get
early learning. It's things we've gotten, what we've learned in
other programs, like hyper sonics, get that testing done as
quickly as you can. So the modifications you're referring to
are to start us down that path and get industry ramped up to
continue that development effort.
Senator Fischer. What do you see as the biggest threat to
being able to execute those timelines?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. It's kind of what I said in my
opening testimony. I think our biggest, I wouldn't say threat,
but the thing we're going to watch closely is how we ramp
industry back up in all of these modernization programs. Not
this one, but, you know, things like Rad-hard electronics,
solid rocket motors, all of those things which are very small,
industrial based. Again, with and as we're all trying to do
this at the same time, making sure we've got the industrial
capacity and capability to meet all of our program needs to
keep them on track.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Senator King, other
questions?
Senator King. Just a couple. Admiral Wolfe, you're working
with the British on the W 93. How is that collaboration going?
Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So I would tell you both programs,
they're being done in parallel. Obviously, the UK design is a
sovereign design, but as we work in parallel both us and NNSA
under the Mutual Defense Agreement, I think we have gotten to
the point where both teams are moving forward in parallel, the
right amount of data is being shared where it needs to be
shared. I would say the way that we're all three of our
organizations are working together is, is really good right
now.
Senator King. Final question, General Bussiere, how are you
doing on retaining pilots? That's been a problem with the
fighter pilots. Is it a similar problem with bomber pilots or
is that a different breed of cat?
General Bussiere. No, our rated management stressors are
pretty agnostic of the platform. So, we're experiencing similar
challenges in retaining. You know, historically when the
airlines are hiring, we have a retention problem, and when
they're not hiring, we don't. There's different dynamics that
affect a aviator's decision to stay in the Air Force. But we
have similar challenges in Air Force Global Strike Command.
Senator King. A couple of years ago Senator Cotton and I
had what amounted to a focus group with Young Air Force pilots
without the brass around. To sort of get from them some
information about their view of the retention issues and the
pilot shortage issues. It was very interesting. We expected
going into that meeting, it was going to be all about bonuses
and quality of life and housing and all those kinds of things.
What they shared with us almost universally was they want
to fly. What was pushing them toward the door were desk
assignments. These were people that joined the military and
they don't necessarily want to be a General, they want to fly
airplanes. I thought that was a very interesting insight that
came across to Tom Cotton and I very strongly, and I just
commend that to you for your thinking in terms of retention.
General Bussiere. Senator King, that's a universal aspect
of retention for aviators in the Department of the Air Force.
Across the board the department is aggressively trying to come
up with not only new ways for generating aviators through our
pilot pipeline, but also coming up with programs to convince
our aviators of staying in service to their nation in the Air
Force.
Senator King. Well, one way may be to have parallel tracks.
You're on the pilot track or you're on the officer track, and
it may be that some people choose to stay with flying as
opposed to moving up in the ranks. But I just wanted to share
that with you because the impression came through so
dramatically to us that this was one of the principle issues.
So, I just, again, wanted to share that insight.
General Bussiere. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Thank you to our
panel members today. Appreciate you being here and providing us
with important information. With that, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile
1. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, is there a need for Nuclear
Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) or a variant to field prior
to 2034?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Our deterrent forces are challenged by U.S.
adversaries' theater nuclear capabilities, for which we have limited
response options. SLCM-N is a theater nuclear system intended to expand
the President's options for responding to limited nuclear use and
strategic, non-nuclear attacks. The Navy is executing the SLCM-N
program to meet the requirement established by the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) of fiscal year 2024, as amended, to achieve a
SLCM-N initial operational capability (IOC) by September 30, 2034.
2. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, what is driving that need
for an earlier SLCM-N variant to field prior to 2034?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's SLCM-N program is executing to meet
the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA's requirement, as amended, to achieve IOC by
September 30, 2034. The program is working to effectively deliver the
required capability as soon as feasibly achievable.
3. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, you stated that SLCM-N
fielding by 2034 was on a ``very, very aggressive timeline''. Is the
SLCM-N program still on track to reach initial operating capability
(IOC) by 2034?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The SLCM-N program is executing to a schedule
based on the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA requirement, as amended, to reach
IOC by September 30, 2034 and the program is on track to meet that
schedule. The program's next major programmatic event is Milestone A in
fiscal year 2026, with Milestone B anticipated to occur in fiscal year
2029 and Milestone C anticipated in fiscal year 2032.
4. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, has the Navy given you a
requirement to demonstrate a SLCM-N capability earlier than IOC?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy is executing the SLCM-N program to the
congressionally mandated requirement to achieve IOC by September 30,
2034. The Navy has not levied a requirement to demonstrate a SLCM-N
capability earlier than the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA requirement.
5. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, will the Navy fiscal year
2026 budget request include early submarine platform funding to make a
submarine available sooner than required for IOC?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's fiscal year 2026 budget supports the
SLCM-N program's approach to submarine platform integration, including
funding that will be used to 1) develop and produce a prototype nuclear
fire control subsystem, 2) conduct submarine platform systems
modifications, and 3) begin development of SLCM-N engagement and
mission planning systems.
6. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, will the Navy fiscal year
2026 budget request for SLCM-N include the budget to develop an
additional missile sooner than the missile required for IOC?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's fiscal year 2026 budget supports the
program's approach to competitively design and prototype multiple
missile airframe options. The budget will be used to procure hardware
for early developmental testing, including early prototyping, ground
testing, and long-lead components for early flight testing.
7. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, has the Navy proposed any
legislative recommendations to Congress to allow for an earlier SLCM-N
deployment option?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy has not proposed any legislative
recommendations to Congress to alter the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA
requirement to achieve SLCM-N IOC by 2034.
8. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, for any alternative, earlier
systems being pursued, does this take resources from, or add any risks
to the original SLCM-N system?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. The DOD is committed to funding the SLCM-N
program to deploy a capability that meets program requirements to
achieve IOC by September 30, 2034. Any options to accelerate delivery
of a SLCM-N capability earlier than fiscal year 2034 will require
additional consideration.
9. Senator Cotton. Mr. Hoagland, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) established a Federal Program Office for SLCM-N
in July 2024. What progress has been made on the SLCM-N program since
July?
Mr. Hoagland. Since establishing a Federal program office for SLCM-
N in July 2024, NNSA has made significant progress on this program.
This includes developing selection criteria for the SLCM-N warhead,
down-selecting the warhead type in concert with the Navy, and
establishing a milestone-based schedule for development, testing, and
production of the weapon. NNSA continues to coordinate with DOD/Navy
partners as missile options are evaluated.
sentinel
10. Senator Cotton. Dr. Vann, what is the expected operational
capability date for Sentinel?
Dr. Vann. Mr. Drew Walter, Performing the Duties of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Policy and Programs, responded to questions on behalf of Dr.
Vann. Pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 14265, Modernizing Defense
Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base
(April 9, 2025), the Department of Defense is conducting a review of
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), and the Sentinel Program is
being reviewed as part of that effort. In parallel, the Sentinel
program continues its restructuring efforts, as required after the
Nunn-McCurdy certification, and has not yet reached a new Milestone B
approval. The expected initial operational capability will not be known
until the restructuring is complete and the program is approved for a
new Milestone B.
11. Senator Cotton. Dr. Vann, how do you assess the risk of
strategic deterrent requirements caused by current delays to the
Sentinel program?
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
U.S. nuclear forces remain sized and postured to support deterrence
objectives identified for the nuclear triad. Current projected delays
of Sentinel re-emphasize the importance of the Minuteman III (MMIII)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system. My team and I will continue
to work with General Bussiere and the Air Force to ensure MMIII remains
a safe, secure, viable, and effective facet of the nuclear triad as
long as it remains in the field.
The programmatic risk of a delayed fielding of Sentinel remains
under evaluation, and I remain confident in the U.S. nuclear
deterrent's ability to meet all objectives.
enriched uranium resupply
12. Senator Cotton. Admiral Houston, what is the most specific date
you can provide for when the NNSA will need a new supply of enriched
uranium to meet national security needs?
Admiral Houston. The amount of HEU currently allocated from the
existing Department of Energy (DOE) stockpile for Naval Reactors' use
is projected to last until the 2050's under the previous
administration's shipbuilding plan. Pending no major changes to either
future shipbuilding plans or to current HEU allocations, NNSA's current
schedule to have new HEU enrichment capabilities operating before 2050
will support uninterrupted Navy nuclear shipbuilding, inclusive of the
United States' commitment to deliver nuclear-powered submarines under
AUKUS. Any acceleration in shipbuilding plans or reallocation of
stockpiled HEU away from Naval Reactors will drive an earlier
enrichment need.
13. Senator Cotton. Admiral Houston, do you believe that the NNSA's
domestic uranium enrichment program can meet that date?
Admiral Houston. NNSA's program has so far met initial milestones
for testing and deployment of new enrichment capability, and my team is
following and supporting these efforts. To augment these efforts and
maximize margin to the Navy's need, my team is also engaged in DOE's
efforts to implement the President's Executive Order on Reinvigorating
the Nuclear Industrial Base, which includes actions to ensure a
domestic nuclear fuel cycle sufficient to meet civilian and defense
needs, if necessary.
14. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, given the growing nuclear
threats, do you think 80 plutonium pits per year will be enough to meet
deterrence requirements?
Mr. McConnell. NNSA has committed to producing no fewer than 80
plutonium pits per year as soon economically and technically possible,
with the goal of re-establishing the capability for steady-State rate
production of plutonium pits on the timelines required to meet DOD
requirements.
rapid acquisition
15. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, the NNSA's acquisition cycle to
modernize the weapons in our stockpile can take around 20 years. Do you
think there's a role for a rapid acquisition effort in the NNSA that is
dedicated to delivering capabilities faster by tailoring requirements
and prioritizing speed?
Mr. McConnell. NNSA is currently executing seven nuclear
modernization programs in the program of record while sustaining the
existing stockpile and recapitalizing the enterprise's industrial base.
Major modernization efforts often take at least a decade.
The evolving global security environment requires the nuclear
security enterprise, in coordination with DOD, to rapidly demonstrate
and potentially deploy new nuclear weapons with novel characteristics.
The enterprise is developing weapon concepts that fill emerging
deterrence gaps, producing systems at ``the speed-of-need'' while
minimizing impacts to the ongoing Program of Record (PoR).
NNSA believes the fastest and most efficient path to the rapid
demonstration of novel capabilities is through the use of existing
programmatic authorities. Today, NNSA is rapidly demonstrating
capabilities on a small scale through initiatives such as the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program (SRP). NNSA is modestly reorganizing this
program within the Office of Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) to accelerate execution. NNSA's Office of Stockpile
Modernization is also streamlining execution where possible to field
new weapons with service engagement and authorized acquisition
programs; however, the office does not need any additional programmatic
authorities. The B61-13 is the most recent example of rapidly fielding
a new capability.
Within current programmatic lines, NNSA is chartering a Nuclear
Deterrence Rapid Capability Team (ND RCT) to streamline oversight and
execution of rapid capability demonstration activities. ND RCT will
integrate efforts across several subprograms to support up to three
simultaneous projects that address identified capability gaps. As ND
RCT executes these projects, it will identify opportunities and future
activities necessary for full system development, production, and
accelerated fielding, as directed.
16. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, should we use the approach used
in W76-2 and the B61-13 programs, which delivered new capability in
years, not decades, to address some of our near-term deterrence
challenges?
Mr. McConnell. The W76-2 and B61-13 programs are recent examples of
NNSA using existing production lines to quickly adapt to a changing
threat environment and rapidly deliver additional capabilities to
address deterrence gaps. NNSA, in coordination with the Department of
Defense, will continue to evaluate opportunities to apply similar
approaches for future programs, however, these opportunities are rare.
Recognizing that the evolving geostrategic environment presents
challenges to the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA is chartering a
Nuclear Deterrence Rapid Capability Team using existing authorities to
address deterrence gaps identified with the Department of Defense.
personnel retention efforts
17. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, Fort Chaffee in Arkansas is home
to the Training Command for the NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation,
which transports nuclear weapons all around the country. What is your
plan to improve both recruiting and retention of our transport agents
trained here?
Mr. McConnell. The Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) Federal
Agents (FAs), also known as Nuclear Materials Couriers (NMCs),
safeguard nuclear weapons, weapon components, and Special Nuclear
Materials in transit throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
Recruitment and retention of our FAs remains a top priority for
NNSA. NNSA recently approved a 1-year extension of OST's 25 percent
recruitment incentive for NMCs. Since offering this incentive in April
2023, OST has increased Federal Agent class sizes. NNSA is actively
recruiting OST agents to ensure our mission is executed securely and we
continue to prioritize hiring for these critical positions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
enriched uranium supply
18. Senator Tuberville. Mr. McConnell, I have been a proponent of
thorium-based salt reactors for a long time, which is a promising
energy source technology that we invented and later abandoned, but that
China is known to be pursuing in our stead. Resuming the development of
this technology relies on the United States taking advantage of our
stockpile of Uranium-233--the largest inventory in the world--which the
Department of Energy has unfortunately identified for disposal. Can you
tell us the size and disposition of our remaining Uranium-233 inventory
today?
Mr. McConnell. Safely processing and disposing of the U-233
inventory at Oak Ridge remains one of the Department's highest cleanup
priorities. Disposing of the remaining U-233 will reduce the security
posture at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, enable the demolition of
legacy facilities, and significantly reduce security costs. The
Department has completed direct disposition of about half of the total
U-233 inventory at Oak Ridge. The remaining U-233 requires processing
and down-blending before disposal, and the Department has processed
approximately 40 percent of this material.
19. Senator Tuberville. Mr. McConnell, what is the Department's
latest plan for the material?
Mr. McConnell. The Department will continue to process and dispose
of the remaining U-233 at Oak Ridge, consistent with congressional
direction. Our approach is enabling the Department to process U-233 in
a cost-effective manner while also providing private industry with
isotopes for next-generation cancer treatments. There is no suitable
long-term storage solution for the U-233. If the Department were to
forgo processing and down-blending, the government would need to create
a suitable storage option, which would entail considerable time and
cost. This could also jeopardize financial and other support for the
disposition project and impact current contracts. Those impacts would
eliminate material for cancer treatments worldwide and further impact
the government financially.
20. Senator Tuberville. Mr. McConnell, what can you tell us about
thorium reactor technology and what advantage, military or otherwise,
might China gain over the United States if it goes unchallenged in its
pursuit of it?
Mr. McConnell. Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are a class of advanced
nuclear reactors under development that have the potential to
contribute to many U.S. energy policy objectives. While some MSR
designs might use a thorium-based fuel cycle, all current U.S.
commercial reactors use uranium and the U.S. infrastructure for nuclear
energy is built to support reactors that use uranium. There are two
naturally occurring fuel source options for nuclear reactors: uranium
and thorium. Both have been studied and developed in the past in the
United States as potential fuel materials for nuclear energy sources.
The choice of fuel material to be used in a nuclear reactor is made by
the developers of the commercial reactor, and some MSR developers are
designing concepts that could use thorium as fuel. With the absence of
an economic driver to establish such a commercial thorium fuel
infrastructure and with the current abundance of uranium, U.S.
Government investment in a thorium fuel cycle is not warranted at this
time. If a need for thorium fuel emerges in the future, this position
may be revisited. The use of thorium fuels also poses a proliferation
risk which would need to be mitigated to support their use in reactors.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
right-to-repair
21. Senator Warren. General Bussiere, you stated in the hearing
that between the B-1, B-2, and B-52, ``we hover around the 50's for
aircraft availability just because of spare parts and the legacy weapon
sustainment''. Does the Air Force own the intellectual property rights
needed to manufacture those spare parts itself?
General Bussiere. Each aircraft spare part is unique in what it
takes to manufacture or refurbish. The Air Force does not own rights to
every part the bombers need to operate. Many parts are sent back to the
Depots for refurbishment and other parts are re-manufactured after a
lengthy process of finding and funding a company that did not initially
build it.
22. Senator Warren. General Bussiere, if the Air Force were allowed
to manufacture the spare parts it needs or have the technical data
necessary to allow other companies to compete to manufacture those
required spare parts, could the bomber availability rate increase?
General Bussiere. These matters generally fall under the purview of
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). As such, Air Force Global Strike
Command (AFGSC) defers to AFMC on this inquiry.
23. Senator Warren. General Bussiere, how can the Air Force prevent
new weapon systems from following a similar path as the bombers, where
sustainment becomes a challenge due to legacy vendors who no longer
make needed spare parts?
General Bussiere. These matters generally fall under the purview of
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). As such, Air Force Global Strike
Command (AFGSC) defers to AFMC on this inquiry.
national nuclear security administration non-proliferation
24. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, the fiscal year
2025 continuing resolution shifted $185 million from the NNSA's Office
of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) to weapons programs,
threatening DNN's critical missions of securing nuclear materials
worldwide so they don't fall into the wrong hands, enhancing nuclear
detection capabilities, and strengthening arms control verification and
monitoring. Do you fully support these DNN missions?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
is fully committed to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation activities that
have the greatest impact on making America safer, stronger, and more
prosperous. Nonproliferation and nuclear deterrence are mutually
reinforcing for U.S. national security as the strategic threat
environment continues to evolve. DNN and Defense Programs (DP) work in
concert to ensure that NNSA carries out its mission. DNN leverages the
unique technical and scientific knowledge that underpins DP's Stockpile
Stewardship Program for a range of nonproliferation,
counterproliferation, and counterterrorism missions, from assessing
foreign weapons programs and potential terrorist devices to enhancing
security and safeguards for civil nuclear applications. Therefore,
increasing funding for DP benefits DNN activities and NNSA's mission.
Furthermore, DNN is revising its international engagement model to
include more cost-sharing with partners thereby reducing program costs.
25. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how important
is NNSA's role in the U.S. Government's non-proliferation work?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
plays a pivotal leadership role in the U.S. Government's nuclear
nonproliferation work, drawing on the unique capabilities of DOE's
national laboratories, plants, and sites. From designing space-based
sensors that detect nuclear explosions to removing weapons-usable
nuclear material from foreign countries and managing and maintaining
24/7/365 capabilities to respond to worldwide nuclear and radiological
threats, NNSA performs vital national security functions that do not
exist anywhere else in the U.S. Government.
26. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how does NNSA
plan to ensure that non-proliferation work does not fall behind at a
time of growing nuclear risks?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
is strongly committed to its nonproliferation mission. NNSA has a
proven record of responding nimbly to a changing global threat
environment, ranging from programs to secure nuclear materials after
the fall of the Soviet Union; to increased efforts to prevent nuclear
and radiological terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001; to
today's work to address nuclear and radiological threats in one of the
most challenging geopolitical environments that the United States has
ever faced.
To keep pace with today's threat environment, NNSA is evaluating
and leveraging emerging technologies including artificial intelligence,
developing advanced monitoring and verification capabilities, revising
our international engagement model to include more cost-sharing--
simultaneously reducing program costs and improving program
sustainability. Additionally, NNSA is committed to providing its
unparalleled expertise with nuclear topics to ensure any planning to
address growing nuclear risks is technically informed.
27. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what impact
will the current funding trajectory of DNN have on global nuclear
threat reduction programs, particularly those focused on radiological
material removal and illicit trafficking prevention?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: DNN
is reprioritizing its efforts to focus on activities that have the
greatest impact on making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
This includes activities that permanently eliminate radioactive sources
and that form partnerships in regions with the highest trafficking
risks. To increase efficiency, DNN also is looking to expand burden-
sharing with its partners, so that they bear more of the costs for
maintenance and sustainment of any support or equipment provided by
DNN.
28. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, the United States
and Russia are no longer engaged in arms control negotiations, and
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is set to expire in 2026. What specific
risks does your office foresee if the U.S. enters a world without
legally binding arms control agreements?
Mr. McConnell., Admiral Houston and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: The expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026--
absent any breakthroughs on arms control--will be the first time in
decades there is no bilateral international agreement to limit the size
of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. NNSA is preparing for
this nuclear environment, including through the development, testing,
and demonstration of applied monitoring and verification technologies.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. While the New START Treaty (NST) remains in
force, Strategic Systems Programs is committed to fully implementing
and complying with the Treaty, to include maintaining inspection
readiness of all NST-declared facilities, providing required
notifications of motor movements, and adhering to all other treaty
requirements.
I defer any questions about a world without legally binding arms
control agreements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (OUSD(P)).
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
The expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026--absent any
breakthroughs on arms control--will be the first time in decades there
is no bilateral international agreement to limit the size of United
States and Russian strategic nuclear forces.
DOD is preparing for this nuclear environment. Should the
circumstances for arms control and risk reduction negotiations emerge,
DOD stands ready to contribute to those efforts.
General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to discuss arms control
agreements.
national nuclear security administration modernization
29. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how is the NNSA
addressing workforce shortages at key sites?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: The
workforce at NNSA's laboratories, plants and sites is the
organization's most valuable asset. NNSA has successfully implemented
several initiatives to attract, recruit and retain employees for our
M&O workforces, including recognizing service credit across the nuclear
security enterprise to allow the movement of employees and introducing
special targeted funds, stipends and bonuses to retain employees where
attrition is high. The normalization of attrition to rates comparable
to or lower tha historical rates indicate that these retention efforts
have been effective.
30. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what are you
doing to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear scientists
and engineers?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: The
unique work within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
requires specialized skills in a broad array of technical fields, many
of which are in high demand within the private sector. The science,
technology, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities within the
nuclear security enterprise underpin NNSA's ability to conduct
stockpile stewardship, solve the technical challenges of verifying
treaty compliance, combat nuclear terrorism, detect and counter nuclear
proliferation, and guard against the threat posed by nuclear
technological surprises.
NNSA's ability to meet these national security missions depends
upon its ability to recruit, train, and retain its world-class
workforce. As part of the strategy to address future workforce needs,
NNSA has implemented multiple university programs to provide the next
generation of scientists with the opportunity to acquire the experience
and expertise needed to sustain the enterprise and provide valuable
basic and applied research in support of NNSA's missions.
31. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
employees have left in 2025?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: Since
the beginning of the fiscal year 2025 (October 1, 2024) through May 31,
2025, 148 employees in the Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) account,
45 employees in the Office of Secure Transportation, and 21 employees
in Naval Reactors have separated from NNSA. This includes four previous
Deferred Resignation Program participants who have since separated from
the agency and no longer receive salary and benefits.
32. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
employees do you expect will leave or accept offers to leave?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: While
130 employees across NNSA have elected to participate in the Office of
Personnel Management Deferred Resignation Program and will be resigning
or retiring in 2025, NNSA remains committed to upholding its critical
mission to protect America's national security.
33. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many years
of work experience did each NNSA employee who has left since 2025 have?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
employees who have departed since the beginning of 2025 possess varying
professional backgrounds. The average years of Federal Service of
employees who retired, resigned, or transferred to other Federal
agencies was 16.5 years.
34. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, do you have any
examples or data to indicate that the abrupt firing of parts of the
NNSA workforce earlier this year undermines your recruiting efforts?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: There
are no examples of data that indicate NNSA recruiting efforts have been
undermined. NNSA is actively hiring Nuclear Materials Couriers within
the Office of Secure Transportation and over 100 applications have been
received to date for each advertised location.
35. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
employees were fired at the request of the Department of Government
Efficiency this year?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: DOGE
did not direct the termination of employees at NNSA.
36. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
employees were asked to come back after they had been fired?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: Of
the 177 probationary employees initially terminated, all terminations
were rescinded.
37. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
employees returned after been asked to come back?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: Of
the 177 probationary employees initially terminated, all but three
elected to return.
38. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what were the
costs of this firing and rehiring?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
has not conducted an internal audit to determine the costs attributed
to these release and rehiring actions.
39. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what were the
effects of this firing and rehiring on the NNSA's work and mission?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
continues to deliver on its critical national security missions without
interruption.
40. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, with
constrained resources and multiple programs facing delays, what
criteria is the NNSA using to prioritize among competing modernization
efforts?
Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: For
stockpile modernization, NNSA executes the nuclear modernization
Program of Record (PoR), as directed by the President and authorized
and appropriated by Congress. Prioritization and sequencing of programs
across the PoR is coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council, of
which NNSA is a member.
41. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, given the costs of deploying
and maintaining a new nuclear cruise missile, should this program take
precedence over investments in conventional capabilities like
shipbuilding that could achieve similar deterrent effects?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
Department of Defense.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about investment strategy
to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management &
Comptroller.
General Bussiere. I defer to OSD for investment prioritization.
AFGSC remains committed to ensuring the readiness and effectiveness of
our Air Force's nuclear deterrent forces.
42. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, has your office evaluated the
operational effects that a new nuclear-armed cruise missile would have
on the conventional mission?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
Department of Defense.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about operational effects
of fielding SLCM-N to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
General Bussiere. The Air Force has operated nuclear-armed cruise
missiles alongside conventional munitions for decades. AFGSC
continuously evaluates the readiness of airmen to operate both nuclear
and conventional munitions.
43. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, how long could Minuteman III
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the current ground-based leg of
the nuclear triad, stay operational?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
Department of Defense.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about Minuteman III to
Air Force Global Strike Command.
General Bussiere. Modernizing the land-leg of the nuclear triad is
critical to maintaining a credible and effective nuclear deterrent.
AFGSC, in partnership with the AFNWC, will continue operating and
sustaining the Minuteman III weapon system to ensure that it remains
safe, secure, and effective until it is replaced by Sentinel.
44. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, if the Air Force plans to
extend Minuteman III to 2050, would the Air Force and lead contractor
Northrop Grumman Corporation benefit from additional time to better
plan and manage the Sentinel program?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
Department of Defense.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about Minuteman III to
Air Force Global Strike Command.
General Bussiere. Additional delays will hinder the modernization
of our capabilities and increase the risk of being unprepared for
future threats. Furthermore, the issue of Diminishing Manufacturing
Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) will continue to pose
considerable challenges, which are expected to worsen as the Minuteman
ages. AFGSC is actively collaborating with the Air Force Nuclear
Weapons Center (AFNWC) to ensure the Sentinel program is brought online
as soon as possible, while also maintaining the capabilities of the
Minuteman III.
45. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, President Trump and
Vice President Vance repeatedly indicated support for denuclearization
since taking office in January. Has the Administration or the
Department of Defense made denuclearization a priority for your work?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have reaffirmed the
importance of modernizing our nuclear triad. The decision to enter into
arms control negotiations rests with the President. NNSA stands ready
to support the negotiation and implementation of any such agreements
through our unique technical capabilities, especially as related to
monitoring and verification.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about nuclear strategy to
the OUSD(P).
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
Risk reduction efforts and arms control can contribute to U.S. security
by helping to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and inadvertent
escalation. Any such agreements must enhance U.S. security, be
stabilizing, and be verifiable. If the circumstances for arms control
negotiations can meet these factors in support of U.S. interests, the
Department stands ready to contribute to these efforts. As long as
nuclear weapons exist, and until the security environment becomes
conducive for disarmament, the Department will maintain a safe, secure,
and effective deterrent.
General Bussiere. The Administration has been clear about the
importance of mitigating the risk of nuclear conflict, including by
strengthening the U.S. deterrent. I defer to OSD to provide further
details on prioritization.
46. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, how is support for
denuclearization reflected in the budget request?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have reaffirmed the
importance of modernizing our nuclear triad. The decision to make
reductions to the U.S. nuclear stockpile rests with the President.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about nuclear strategy to
the OUSD(P).
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
Risk reduction efforts and arms control can contribute to U.S. security
by helping to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and inadvertent
escalation. Any such agreements must enhance U.S. security, be
stabilizing, and be verifiable. As long as nuclear weapons exist, and
until the security environment becomes conducive for disarmament, the
Department will maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. The
Department's budget request funds full scope modernization of U.S.
nuclear forces and NC3 capabilities, as well as modernization of the
defense industrial base and the Department of Energy's nuclear security
enterprise, which are critical to our ability to sustain our legacy
nuclear force and deliver a modern force in the coming decades.
General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to answer this question.
47. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, what steps are
being taken by your office to move toward denuclearization?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have reaffirmed the
importance of modernizing our nuclear triad. The decision to make
reductions to the U.S. nuclear stockpile rests with the President.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about nuclear strategy to
the OUSD(P).
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
Risk reduction efforts and arms control can contribute to U.S. security
by helping to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and inadvertent
escalation. Any such agreements must enhance U.S. security, be
stabilizing, and be verifiable. As long as nuclear weapons exist, and
until the security environment becomes conducive for disarmament, the
Department will maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. We
must continue to message to Russia and China that neither country will
be safer in an unconstrained environment--a position we repeatedly hear
from allies and partners in multilateral venues.
General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to answer this question.
48. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, there continue to
be numerous unanswered questions pertaining to operational impacts of
the SLCM-N, impacted U.S. military communities, and relationships with
allies such as Australia. How will the SLCM-N affect the conventional
mission of our attack submarines?
Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
Department of Defense.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about operational effects
to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
In accordance with section 1640 of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2024, as amended, the Department established
the SLCM-N program in March 2024. As the program progresses to
Milestone A, expected in fiscal year 2026, we will continue to actively
evaluate the SLCM-N impacts to U.S. military communities, conventional
missions, and allies.
General Bussiere. I defer to Navy or OSD to discuss impacts SLCM-N
could have on the conventional mission of attack submarines.
49. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Mr. Hoagland, and Mr. Jarrell,
what will the potential infrastructure investment be to house these new
missiles in communities that are currently not home to nuclear weapons?
Mr. McConnell, Mr. Hoagland, and Mr. Jarrell. On behalf of NNSA and
DOE-EM witnesses: As this is not in DOE-EM or NNSA's purview, DOE
defers to the Department of Defense.
50. Senator Warren. Admiral Houston, Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann,
and General Bussiere, how will this weapons system impact AUKUS
[Australia, United Kingdom, United States]?
Admiral Houston. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: As this is not in
NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the Department of Defense.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about AUKUS to the
OUSD(P).
Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
We continue to actively evaluate the SLCM-N impacts to U.S. military
communities, conventional missions, and allies. We are committed to
meeting congressional requirements for SLCM-N in a manner that is fully
consistent with our obligations to our AUKUS partners.
General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to discuss potential impacts.
[all]