    [Senate Hearing 119-75, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 7

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
                      APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
                      AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2296

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                           MARCH 26; MAY 13, 20, 2025

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                   ----------

                           U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-985                        WASHINGTON : 2026
    =====================================================================

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
    �
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JACK REED, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    JONI ERNST, Iowa			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, Florida			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	        GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TED BUDD, North Carolina		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri			JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JIM BANKS, INDIANA			MARK KELLY, Arizona
    TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA                  	ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN
    �

    �		   John P. Keast, Staff Director
    �		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
    _________________________________________________________________

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas		ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota	ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama	JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JIM BANKS, Indiana         	MARK KELLY, Arizona

                              (ii)

                           C O N T E N T S

    _________________________________________________________________

                                 march 26, 2025

                                                                       Page
    United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command..     1

                               Members Statements

    Fischer, Statement of Senator Deb................................     1

    King, Statement of Senator Angus S., Jr..........................     3

    Wicker, Statement of Senator Roger...............................     4

    Reed, Statement of Senator Jack..................................     5

                               Witness Statements

    Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF, Commander, United States            5
      Strategic Command, Department of The Air Force.

    Whiting, General Stephen N., USSF, Commander of United States        34
      Space Command, Department of The Air Force.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    69

                                  may 13, 2025

                                                                       Page
    Department of Defense Missile Defense Activities.................    77

                               Members Statements

    Fischer, Statement of Senator Deb................................    77

    King, Statement of Senator Angus S., Jr..........................    78

                               Witness Statements

    Yaffe, Andrea, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of        79
      Defense for Space Policy, Department of Defense.

    Guillot, General Gregory M., USAF, Commander, United States          84
      Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

    Collins, Lieutenant General Heath A., USAF, Director, Missile        93
      Defense Agency.

    Rasch, Lieutenant General Robert A., USA, Executive Officer, Guam   101
      Defense System Joint Program Office.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   113

                                     (iii)

                                  may 20, 2025

                                                                       Page
    Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and         131
      Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Programs.

                               Members Statements

    Fischer, Statement of Senator Deb................................   131

    King, Statement of Senator Angus S., Jr..........................   132

                               Witness Statements

    McConnell, James J., Acting Principal Deputy Administrator.......   133

    Jarrell, Roger A., II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for     134
      Environmental Management.

    Houston, Admiral William J., USN, Director, Naval Nuclear           135
      Propulsion Program.

    Vann, Dr. Brandi C., Performing the Duties of the Assistant         145
      Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
      Defense Programs.

    Hoagland, David A., Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense         146
      Programs.

    Bussiere, General Thomas A., USAF Commander......................   158

    Wolfe, Johnny R., Jr., USN Director for Strategic Systems           169
      Programs.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   185

                                      (iv)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2025

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Fischer, Cotton, Wicker, Rounds,
    Tuberville, Banks, King, Reed, and Kelly.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order. Good
    morning, everyone.
        The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive
    testimony on the posture of the United States Strategic Command
    and the United States Space Command. I want to begin by
    thanking our witnesses, General Cotton from COM, and General
    Whiting from SPACECOM.
        General Cotton, this is likely one of the last times you
    will be speaking before our Committee. You have always been
    open and forthright with this Committee, and I want to thank
    you for your service and dedication as you approach your final
    year as Commander of STRATCOM.
        Today we face a threat environment more dangerous than we
    have seen since the Second World War. For the first time in
    history, the United States faces two adversary nuclear powers,
    in Russia and China. Russia has nearly completed modernizing
    its nuclear triad, and continues to expand and improve their
    tactical nuclear forces. China, meanwhile, which used to be
    considered a lesser-included case, is expanding its own arsenal
    at a breathtaking pace. China now has more ICBM launchers than
    the United States, and is expected at least to triple its
    stockpile by 2035. I would also note that China has outpaced
    every previous estimate that we have made.
        General Cotton, as you well know, this is an extremely
    important time for STRATCOM. Each leg of our triad is
    undergoing a generational modernization. This includes the
    Columbia-class submarine to replace the Ohio-class; the B-21
    bomber to replace the B-1 and B-2 bombers; and the Sentinel
    ICBM, to replace the Minuteman III.
        Given the ages of the legacy programs, it is essential that
    these modernization efforts be prioritized and properly
    resourced to ensure we have capabilities fielded in time to
    meet the growing threat. While it is the responsibility of the
    services to get these programs back on schedule, it is STRATCOM
    who must mitigate risks associated with any delays. I look
    forward to hearing more in the closed session about your plans
    to do so.
        Additionally, the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
    missile, or SLCM, remains a critical program to deter our
    adversaries from believing they can use tactical nuclear
    weapons. I look forward to hearing from you, General Cotton, on
    your work with the Navy on SLCM.
        I would be remiss if I did not also underscore the
    importance of NC3, what Senator King and I refer to as the
    fourth leg of the triad. NC3 underpins all aspects of nuclear
    deterrence. General Cotton, I appreciate the focus that you
    have given NC3 modernization during your time in command, and I
    will be eager to receive an update on the implementation of the
    NC3 roadmap.
        General Whiting, the space domain is now, as you point out
    in your opening statement, a highly contested strategic
    environment. China and Russia possess growing counter-space
    capabilities that hold United States space assets at risk.
    Russia is developing the capability to place a nuclear weapon
    on orbit, while China is investing in maneuverable satellites
    that could target our satellites. These are just the threats
    that we can discuss in this open setting.
        While I look forward to a more robust discussion on how we
    need to address these threats in a classified session, I am
    eager to hear from you during this open session on your
    priorities for fiscal year 2026, and how we can leverage
    emerging technologies to field more dynamic space-based
    systems. I am also eager to hear an update on how SPACECOM is
    working with the other combatant commands, the services, and
    the intelligence community to ensure that we are developing the
    right capabilities, sharing information with warfighters in
    real time, and that the services and interagency partners are
    integrated appropriately.
        I will make one final point before I turn it over to
    Senator King for his opening statement. Both of your combatant
    commands rely on access to critical electromagnetic spectrum to
    carry out your missions. As we know, there are efforts underway
    to force DOD to vacate portions of those spectrum bands. Such
    an outcome would be detrimental to U.S. national security and
    result in significant costs, as various DOD equities are forced
    to invest the resources to redesign, procure, and field new
    systems to operate in different spectrum bands, if that is even
    feasible.
        General Whiting and General Cotton, I look forward to
    hearing from both of you on the importance of spectrum to your
    missions. Before any decisions are made on whether to auction
    off DOD spectrum, the American people deserve to understand the
    risks there would be to national security.
        Again, thank you both for appearing before us today. I look
    forward to hearing your testimony.
        Senator King, you are recognized.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

        Senator King. Thank you, Senator Fischer. I want to first
    thank both of you for your service and for the incredible work
    that you have done, both in managing the assets that are in
    your purview but also in thinking about how to move forward.
        This is a posture hearing. It is really a status report. It
    is a combination of a status report, where are we now but where
    do we need to be, and what do we need in the way of resources
    in order to get there.
        General Cotton, deterrence is the keystone of our entire
    defense strategy. We often forget that. We get lost in counting
    tanks or airplanes or Navy ships. But the whole idea of all of
    these resources is that they never be used, that they be such a
    terrifying prospect for a potential adversary that they will
    never be used. And in fact, deterrence had worked in the
    nuclear area for 75, 80 years. So that is really what we need
    to talk about today.
        Modernization the triad, which we are in the middle of
    right now, is an expensive proposition. But to shortchange that
    process, in my view, would be disastrously short-sighted. So I
    hope to hear where we are on modernization with parts of the
    triad, but also where we need to be, what necessary authorities
    there are that we need to be talking about, and also necessary
    funding. I refer to nuclear modernization as the pig in the
    budgetary python. It is, unfortunately, just by history, we are
    having to do all three legs at once, and that is a very
    expensive proposition, but it is something that we have to do
    in order to maintain the deterrence strategy that has protected
    this country for so long.
        In terms of the space assets, of course, it is no news to
    anybody that space was an uncontested domain 20 years ago. Ten
    years ago, it began to be contested, and today it is highly
    contested. So, General, we have really got to be understanding
    the status, where we are, particularly when we are talking
    about a potential conflict with China, which would involve the
    vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and naval power, and how that
    will be subject to space assets and how we can protect
    ourselves in a time of potential conflict. Of course, we all
    hope that conflict can be avoided. That brings me back to
    deterrence.
        So I think the important message that I have is that
    decisions we make here today, and over the next 6 months, will
    have profound impacts in the future. And that is what is so
    important about what we are talking about today. I can think of
    no two more important people right now in thinking about how to
    posture this country in order to maintain deterrence and the
    security of the American people.
        So I thank you for being here, I look forward to your
    questions, and now I think it is time to turn it over to the
    Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. We are joined
    today by Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed, and I would
    ask each of them to give an opening statement if they so desire
    at this time. Chairman Wicker.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER

        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to
    thank the Chair and Senator King for working together as a team
    for years on this topic. I think it should be clear to people
    listening that there is no space between them. They are
    approaching this in a bipartisan manner. They understand how
    important it is. And yes, Senator King is correct. We are
    talking about preventing. We are talking about being strong
    enough to prevent a nuclear war, and nothing could be more
    important. And yes, it is going to be expensive, but there is
    no question about it, we are going to have to spend the money
    as wisely and efficiently as we can to get the job done.
        I want to thank Senator [sic] Cotton for his service and
    wish him well as he prepares to transition into private life,
    and thank you, General Whiting, for being here.
        I am going to put my statement in the record and just say
    that today I hope to understand how you are managing the risks
    of critical military capabilities that are both too old and too
    few to truly meet the threats of today, much less those of
    tomorrow.
        Second, how to understand better the roles of your commands
    evolving as the new Administration develops updated strategies
    and guidance, and then hear your thoughts on areas where you
    believe this Committee can help improve the effectiveness of
    our strategic deterrent and space posture.
        With that I will ask unanimous consent to include my
    statement in the record, and yield back.
        Senator Fischer. Without objection.
        [The prepared opening statement of Senator Roger Wicker
    follows:]

               Prepared Opening Statement by Senator Roger Wicker
        Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        I would like to start by expressing my appreciation to Senator
    Fischer and Senator King for their leadership of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee over these past several years. Their close collaboration
    is a testament to what we can accomplish when we work together in a
    bipartisan manner on the most severe threats to our Nation.
        As the commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command,
    you gentlemen represent both our first and last lines of defense. Our
    nuclear forces have formed the foundation of our national security
    since the end of the Second World War and have deterred major wars for
    over seventy years. Our space-based capabilities are our eyes and ears
    around the globe and form the communications backbone for U.S. military
    operations, including missile defense, worldwide.
        We are all very aware of the growing military cooperation between
    China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This collaboration presents a
    complex and far-reaching set of threats that demands a generational
    investment to rebuild and revitalize America's military strength.
        Unfortunately, the rise of these new challengers could not come at
    a worse time. The defense investments we made during the cold war have
    long since expired. Defense spending is near record lows as a
    percentage of our economy, and all aspects of our military forces are
    now in dire need of repair or replacement. This neglect is no more
    evident in the very military capabilities you General Cotton, and you
    General Whiting, are expected to bring to bear every hour of every day.
        In your testimony today, I would like to understand how you are
    managing the risk of critical military capabilities that are both too
    old and too few to truly meet the threats of today, much less those of
    tomorrow. I would also like to better understand how you see the roles
    of your commands evolving as the new administration develops updated
    strategies and guidance for the joint force. Finally, I would like to
    hear your thoughts on areas where you believe this committee can help
    improve the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent and space posture.

        Chairman Wicker. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam
    Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member
    Reed.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Welcome,
    gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. I want to commend
    General Cotton for his 39 years of service to the country and
    to the Air Force, and I wish you and your wife, Marsha, the
    very best in your retirement. General Whiting, thank you for
    joining us this morning also.
        General Cotton, there are reports that indicate that the
    Administration is considering removing the dual-hatted role the
    Commander of U.S. European Command currently holds as the NATO
    Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or SACEUR. The SACEUR position
    was created, in part, to ensure that our nuclear weapons, and
    hence our nuclear umbrella provided to our NATO allies under
    Article 5, was always kept under the control of the United
    States. Indeed, the release codes for our nuclear weapons which
    are carried by NATO planes come from the President through
    SACEUR to unlock the weapons. If the U.S. walks away from this
    position, we are lessening the protection of our extended
    nuclear deterrent to our allies, and I believe we are harming
    U.S. national security and global security.
        For over 6 decades, the United States nuclear umbrella has
    provided an iron-clad guarantee to deter the Soviet Union and
    now Russia, and it has been successful.
        I am also concerned about the signal it may send to our
    Asian allies, especially South Korea, who also relies on the
    credibility of our nuclear umbrella.
        These are difficult issues, and I hope in the course of the
    questioning we can get more details from you about that.
        Again, thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Reed, and now I would
    like to have our opening statements from the panel. General
    Cotton, would you go first, please.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
         STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

        General Cotton. Good morning, Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking
    Member King, Chairman Wicker, and Ranking Member Reed, and
    distinguished Members of this Committee. It is an honor for
    Sergeant Major Kramer and I to be here, alongside General
    Whiting and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons, and a privilege to
    continue representing the servicemembers, civilians, and
    families of United States Strategic Command.
        I would like to thank this Committee and Congress for its
    continued support in providing us with the resources required
    to execute our assigned missions. Above all else, I extend my
    gratitude to the American people for their enduring support of
    the military.
        In my third and final year of serving as STRATCOM Commander
    it has been the most rewarding experience of my 39-year career.
    I have submitted my 2025 posture statement for the record.
        I will begin by assuring you that the Nation's nuclear
    forces, which are foundational to our national security, are
    safe, secure, effective, and credible. As I speak, STRATCOM and
    its components are deterring our adversaries and stand ready to
    respond decisively, whether underground, in the air, or beneath
    the seas, should deterrence fail.
        Our mission has never been more important. Today the United
    States, its allies and partners are confronted with a
    deteriorating security environment. The Chinese Communist Party
    is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces into a fully functional
    triad, with more than 600 nuclear warheads, and counting.
    Russia has modernized the majority of its nuclear arsenal.
    North Korea continues with its unlawful and destabilizing
    programs in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and
    ballistic missiles, and Iran continues to pursue uranium
    enrichment.
        Additionally, the tools of war are changing, from novel
    missile systems to counter-U.S. space capabilities, from
    cyberattacks against critical infrastructure to competition in
    the electromagnetic spectrum. These are rapidly developing
    threat vectors across multiple domains and regions, to include
    the Arctic.
        To effectively deter our adversaries across the spectrum of
    threats requires sustained legacy triad systems and urgently
    completing the multigenerational, decades-long modernization of
    all three legs of the nuclear deterrent and its critical NC3
    systems.
        No portfolio is in need of recapitalization more than a
    nuclear portfolio, and the modernization I am advocating for
    requires continued, uninterrupted funding and an industrial
    base capable of steady and continuous production. Commitment to
    modernization will ensure that U.S. strategic weapons continue
    to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, and allow
    us to achieve national objectives if deterrence fails.
        Thank you again for your support and focus on our mission,
    and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Anthony J. Cotton
    follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General Cotton. General
    Whiting.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, COMMANDER OF
        UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

        General Whiting. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King,
    Chairman Wicker, and Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for your support and the opportunity to
    represent the warfighters of U.S. Space Command. It is truly an
    honor to testify alongside my friend, General Cotton, once
    again, and to discuss our vital role in achieving peace through
    strength.
        At U.S. Space Command our guiding principle is clear. To
    secure peace, we must be well-prepared for conflict in space,
    and if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. U.S. Space
    Command is upholding this principle in the face of operational
    threats, which continue to expand at a breathtaking pace, and
    which are being fielded deliberately to challenge the United
    States, the American way of life, and hold the Joint Force at
    risk. These novel and unprecedented developments include
    China's robust counter-space weapons and space-enabled kill
    chains, Russia's reported pursuit of an on-orbit nuclear anti-
    satellite weapon, and wide-ranging ballistic cruise and
    hypersonic missile threats.
        Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains
    advantages in space thanks to the unified mission focus of our
    superb joint warfighters, our unmatched commercial space
    sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and
    partnership. Our foremost advantage, and the cornerstone of
    U.S. Space Command, are our officer, enlisted, and civilian
    personnel. No other nation can match our team's understanding
    of the complexities of space and the requirements to
    effectively operate in the most challenging area of
    responsibility. Our military has the best-trained, most capable
    space warfighting force in the world, and they stand dedicated
    to fight for America.
        Since my last testimony, U.S. Space Command published our
    new campaign plan, integrating and synchronizing the Command's
    operations, activities, and investments with the Joint Force
    and the interagency, leaving no doubts to our opponents that we
    are stronger, more capable, and ready to counter any threat.
        Over the past year, U.S. Space Command's commercial
    integration cell grew to 17 commercial mission partners,
    enhancing our threat information sharing at classified levels
    and improving our crisis action planning.
        We also expanded Multinational Force Operation OLYMPIC
    DEFENDER to seven nations, with the addition of Germany,
    France, and New Zealand. This growth further strengthens
    partnerships and enables our allies to share the burden of
    collective space security.
        That said, these advantages, and our ability to deter
    potential adversaries, cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence
    in space is consistent with other domains. It requires a keen
    understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring
    against; credible, acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on
    those who attack us; and resilient architectures to dissuade
    attack by making any effort futile.
        Accordingly, U.S. Space Command is fully integrated into,
    and contributing to, the Department of Defense's implementation
    of the President's executive order to establish a Golden Dome
    for American missile defense shield.
        U.S. Space Command appreciates Congress' significant
    support of numerous critical space superiority programs and in
    the recent fiscal year 2025 appropriations law. Looking forward
    to fiscal year 2026 and beyond, U.S. Space Command requires
    stable funding as well as effective and efficient acquisition
    programs, delivering advanced space capabilities to enable a
    balanced space deterrence force structure.
        Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires,
    enhanced battle space awareness, and integrated command and
    control capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the
    Homeland and protect and enable the Joint Force. The Unified
    Command Plan directs U.S. Space Command to protect and defend
    U.S., and as directed, allied and commercial space capabilities
    through necessary offensive and defensive space operations.
    Like other combatant commands, we require combat-credible
    kinetic and non-kinetic means to deter and counter adversary
    actions.
        By investing in space superiority capabilities we send a
    clear message: the United States has the advantage, and we
    remain committed that space will be safe, secure, and stable.
    We are ready to repel all challengers, and any attempt to turn
    space into a battle field will fail.
        Although many challenges lie ahead, the future of space
    holds tremendous promise for America, if we actively and
    thoughtfully protect it. I am grateful for Congress' support to
    U.S. Space Command and continued investment to advance
    America's strength in space. Your continued backing not only
    ensures that U.S. Space Command protects our interests in space
    today but also protects that future which is coming.
        Madam Chairwoman, I have submitted my posture statement for
    the record, and I look forward and the Subcommittee's
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Whiting follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General Whiting. We will begin
    with 5-minute rounds of questions.
        I strongly believe that the Bipartisan Strategic Posture
    Commission's 2023 report should be required reading for
    everybody in the Department of Defense. It clearly articulates
    the threats that we face, and it concludes, rightfully
    concludes, that we are woefully underprepared.
        Based on the recommendations of that report, last year's
    NDAA directed the Department to develop a deterrence strategy
    that would pace this projected threat. This strategy must also
    include an assessment of the amount and type of nuclear weapons
    and delivery systems necessary to implement that strategy.
        General Cotton, can you tell me how the development of this
    strategy is coming along?
        General Cotton. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. If you recall,
    when I first took over as the Commander of U.S. Strategic
    Command, one of the first thing we did was we instituted a
    nuclear recapitalization and transition cross-functional team
    to do exactly that, because one of the things we wanted to
    assure ourselves was did we have the capacity and capability
    and posture correct. That was in alignment with the study and
    the Commission's report, and it pretty much mirrored everything
    that was said in the Commission.
        Since that time, what we have done is looked at the options
    that are available on all three legs of the triad. We are
    currently sufficient--currently--but in order to maintain
    sufficiency as we continue to have legacy systems online before
    the new systems come on board, there are some options within
    all three legs of the triad to increase capacity and
    capability.
        Senator Fischer. General Cotton, you recently said that the
    Air Force should procure at least 145 B-21 bombers. From your
    position, as STRATCOM Commander, can you share with us why you
    assess that that should be the new procurement floor?
        General Cotton. Yes, Senator. When we first looked at the
    numbers of what would be required for the next generation of
    bombers to replace the B-1 and the B-2, that was a different
    geopolitical environment. We actually started a study in 2020,
    to ensure that our numbers were correct in regard to what we
    wanted to see the B-21 fleet look like.
        At that point, the conversation from the Department would
    be a minimum of 100 B-21s should be procured, as we looked to
    see what the environment brought to bear. The other number that
    we would always talk about would be the 145 number, which would
    bring the total of the bomber force for the United States and
    allies--because the bomber force represents all the bombers for
    the Western world--would be about 220, and that would include
    the B-21s as well as the modified B-52J models that would come
    out.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General, as you know, this
    Committee, on a bipartisan basis, strongly supports SLCM, the
    nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, and a program of
    record was included in our fiscal year 2024 NDAA. In your view
    as STRATCOM Commander, will SLCM-N address a capability gap?
        General Cotton. It will, ma'am, and what it does for us is
    twofold. It gives the President a broader range of options, and
    I think that is my role and my job as a combatant commander is
    to present a broad range of capability and options for the
    President. It also provides--it is a regional tool that can be
    used, as well. So we can actually benefit from our geographic
    combatant commanders, which they support the idea of SLCM-N, as
    well, because from a regional perspective, it can hold
    adversaries at risk.
        Senator Fischer. Yes or no. Do you see opportunities to
    speed up that program?
        General Cotton. I would hope so, Madam Chairwoman, and the
    reason is I know that there is a program of record that has
    been established in the Department of the Navy. I would love to
    see some acceleration from that team to see what we can do to
    get the assets a little quicker and move it to the left.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Whiting, I want to get
    one question in for you at this point, as well. Every service
    relies on your assets that are based in space. I do not think
    that gets enough attention. Are you coordinating with the other
    combatant commands and also with the services, with the
    intelligence community, to make sure that these assets under
    your command are going to be integrated appropriately?
        General Whiting. Madam Chairwoman, absolutely. In fact, I
    have a liaison element that I have assigned to each of the
    other combatant commands. So there is a liaison element from
    U.S. Space Command that sits inside of U.S. STRATCOM as well as
    all the other combatant commands to persistently do that type
    of coordination, to make sure that our operational plans are
    advancing together, that our real-time operations are
    considering each other's capabilities.
        We do that with our intelligence community, as well,
    primarily through the National Reconnaissance Office. Again, we
    have an exchange of liaison officers and operational centers
    that work together. Then with the services, at the Joint
    Headquarters I have not only components from each of the
    services assigned to me but I have personnel from all of those
    services, which keep us tightly linked with their future plans,
    as well.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. A couple of
    preliminary questions about staff. Both of you mentioned in
    your testimony that you rely upon not only military personnel
    but civilians. My question to each of you is, are you under any
    orders or have orders come down, or have you already started to
    implement, or has somebody started to implement reductions in
    force--firings, people who have taken, I call it the early
    retirement option? General Cotton what is the status of your
    civilian workforce?
        General Cotton. Well, our civilian workforce, we are about
    65 percent civilian in the headquarters, but that does not
    count for the 41,000 that make up the componencies that work
    under my charge.
        Right now, Senator, very small amount of folks that took
    the early retirement activities, but the option for them to do
    so still exists. But right now we are not seeing an effect. The
    numbers are pretty small.
        Senator King. No firings?
        General Cotton. We have not fired anyone.
        Senator King. Are you under any orders to reduce that staff
    by any certain percentage?
        General Cotton. We are looking for the efficiencies piece,
    but right now it is all voluntary. Like I said, from our
    perspective, from STRATCOM, the numbers have been very, very
    small.
        Senator King. Are you subject to a hiring freeze?
        General Cotton. I am.
        Senator King. So those people who are leaving, you are not
    allowed to replace. Is that correct?
        General Cotton. Well, we have an opportunity to get a
    waiver approved because of our mission set, and if there is a
    requirement for us to do a waiver to see if we can get someone
    through the hiring freeze, we can process that.
        Senator King. General Whiting, same set of questions.
        General Whiting. Senator, my answers are almost identical
    to General Cotton's. About 60 percent of my headquarters staff
    is Government civilians. We have had a small number who have
    volunteered for the deferred retirement program. We are under
    no orders to fire anyone. We are aware that we need to look for
    efficiencies, as General Cotton discussed. We also are under a
    hiring freeze, and we have the opportunity for critical
    positions to ask for exemptions to that.
        Senator King. Thank you. General Whiting, I was interested.
    You mentioned, I think it is called the Artemist Accords, which
    is clearly based upon allies. I am concerned that we seem to be
    in a process of alienating our allies. Talk to me about the
    importance of the Artemist Accords in order to carry out your
    mission.
        General Whiting. Senator, the Artemis Accords are overseen
    by NASA and the Department of State, and that is a civil
    exploratory set of agreements about shared principles in space
    between countries. On the military side, I have a named
    operation called Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER, which includes
    seven countries, which is the United States plus the Five Eyes
    Nations, Germany, and France, where we cooperate in space
    together to understand what is happening there.
        Senator King. Those relationships with other countries are
    important to the execution of your mission. Is that correct?
        General Whiting. They are, Senator.
        Senator King. A question that I have not been able to get a
    clear answer on is what is the concept of the Golden Dome? In
    other words, would it be 1,000 THAAD batteries, or is it
    conventional missile defense? Is it directed energy? What is
    the underlying concept of Golden Dome other than to protect the
    Homeland, which is certainly a worthy goal?
        General Whiting. Senator, the Department right now has been
    going through a series of meetings and working groups to define
    what that architecture will look like. But in the executive
    order it lays out that the President is asking the Department
    to develop a series of capabilities that will protect against
    these new, modernized threats like hypersonics, maneuvering
    vehicles, that put the Homeland at risk.
        So I think it will be a layered system that will have to
    account for all of those threats, at multiple phases of the
    lifecycle of the missile.
        Senator King. Well, that is the mission. I understand. But
    I take it we are some distance away from the operational
    concept of what it will consist of.
        A very specific question. Both of you rely heavily on
    Kwajalein Atoll for training and testing purposes. My
    understanding is the infrastructure there is woefully
    inadequate. Can you speak to an effort to try to upgrade that
    infrastructure so that atoll can continue to be an important
    part of our Strategic Deterrence Initiative?
        General Whiting. Senator, Kwajalein Atoll is very important
    for our space mission. I visited there last summer. There are
    five sensors there that support our mission. We have advocated,
    with the Department of the Army, for investments there, to make
    sure that the infrastructure can support those missions, and,
    in fact, my combatant command is in the process right now of
    defining exactly what the support requirements are that we need
    there, so we can put those into our next O plan, to make sure
    the Army understands exactly what requirements we need. But
    that is a very important location for us.
        If you can just keep the Committee informed of that, of
    what the need is, whether it is authorities or funding, it
    could be an important part of our ongoing deliberations. Thank
    you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
    you are recognized.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all,
    General Whiting and General Cotton, I want to thank you both
    for your service to our country and for the role that you play
    in keeping our country safe.
        General Whiting, I will begin with you, and I am going to
    have the same question for General Cotton, as well. How
    important is it that the use of the electromagnetic spectrum,
    in particular areas of the lower 3 GHz band and the 7-8 GHz
    band of the spectrum, be maintained by the Department of
    Defense? I have asked this of over 24 separate uniformed
    officers over the last 2 years, and the answer has been
    consistent. But I wanted to hear it from both of you again
    today, in terms of the need to have that access for the defense
    of our country.
        Would you, General Whiting, explain, at least, or confirm
    clearly the need for the Department of Defense to maintain its
    ability to use that unimpeded, in that particular range of the
    spectrum, please?
        General Whiting. Senator, thank you for the question. I
    totally agree that those two bands are very important to our
    mission, in fact, vital. The lower three, or that 3 GHz region,
    is an area where we have radars and sensors which allow us to
    detect, track, and engage targets through all weather, and we
    have a number of capabilities there like the SPY-1 and SPY-6
    radars, which are on Navy ships, that can support our mission;
    the long-range detection radar in Alaska, which is critical for
    missile defense; the Space Fence and the future Deep Space
    Advanced Radar concept.
        Then in the higher bands that you discussed, the 7 and 8
    GHz, that is vital for SATCOM and special missions that we
    execute there, and we could not do our global wide-band
    satellite communication mission without that spectrum, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Whiting. General Cotton,
    same questions.
        General Cotton. Senator, I would echo exactly what my dear
    friend said in regard to the lower bands. If we loose the
    ability for early detection, that takes away decision space for
    decision leaders and decisionmakers in regard to being able to
    execute operational plans. So when we talk about what it
    affects in regard to ISR, it is going to be incredibly
    important.
        In the higher bands, part of my UCP is global reach through
    global strike. The bomber force, as an example, has the ability
    to traverse all over the world. SATCOM communications are going
    to be vital for those weapon systems today and in the future.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, General. Also, General Cotton,
    you have mentioned it a little bit already, but with the B-21,
    there was the decision about we are acquiring 100 of them
    currently, the number has been debated. Should it be 145?
    should it be more than that? I have appreciated your indication
    that you have come around to approximately 145.
        Can we talk a little bit about this, I mean, this is the
    next generation. This is the six-generation aircraft, this
    platform that is there. Can you talk a little bit, in this open
    discussion, but I think the American public need to understand
    just what a platform this is and what it is capable of doing,
    and once again, in this unclassified environment.
        General Cotton. Thank you for that, Senator. When we talk
    about stealth, there are actually only two platforms on the
    face of the Earth that has all-stealth capability, and that is
    the current B-2 Spirit and its next-generation replacement, the
    B-21. There is no other all-aspect stealth aircraft on the face
    of the planet. The B-2 is the only one, and the B-21 just will
    dwarf its capabilities with the advanced technologies that it
    has.
        It will be the predominant bomber for the United States Air
    Force moving forward, as we move to a two-bomber fleet, which
    will only be the B-21 and the B-52 and the modified version of
    that, the B-52J.
        So it is incredibly important. It is incredibly lethal,
    with a stand-in and stand-out capability. So that is why I am a
    big proponent on constant production that far exceeds 100, to
    the 145 number, to get us to about 220 with those two
    platforms.
        Senator Rounds. I noted that you have had a view that
    indicated the need to accelerate the B-21 production. Can you
    explain just a little bit about why we need to accelerate that
    production?
        General Cotton. Sir, as we start to see the legacy systems
    start to divest, that the fleet has, the Air Force fleet, the
    B-1s and the B-2s, in particular, I want to make sure that we
    do not see a large bathtub in the ability of operational
    platforms that are available to be used.
        Senator Rounds. We have worn our current weapons platforms
    out.
        General Cotton. We do.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Reed,
    you are recognized.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Chairman. General Cotton, as
    I indicated in my opening remarks, there was an issue regarding
    the separation of the dual-hatting of the U.S. European
    Commander, SACEUR. What is your military opinion of the effects
    this could have, possibly weakening the extended deterrence of
    your force, affecting your force structure in other ways, and
    also the potential to accelerate nuclear proliferation? I would
    note that the front page of the Wall Street Journal has an
    article titled, ``Wary Europe Eyes Own Nuclear Force.'' Could
    you comment, please?
        General Cotton. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed. I think the
    relationship that I have as far as my operational plans with
    General Cavoli, both as the EUCOM Commander and as SACEUR, to
    your point in your opening, is incredibly important in the
    execution of operational plans for me, even, in STRATCOM.
        As you know, I have a relationship with the United Kingdom.
    I have a relationship with SACEUR in the relationship of what
    the DCA aircraft bring to bear, to be able to hold the
    adversary at risk, and that is done through the lens of
    currently General Cavoli with the SACEUR hat. That would change
    a little bit if that commander was not a U.S. commander, in the
    relationship that I would have.
        Now, the relationship that I have with my allies and
    partners, especially my European allies and partners, is still
    steadfast, whether it be with the United Kingdom, whether it be
    with France, or whether it be with the other NATO nations.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. General Cotton, one other
    question. The Air Force has proposed a reorganization, which I
    understand has been put on hold until the new Secretary is
    confirmed, that would cede much of the operational control of
    heavy bombers away from Air Force Global Strike Command to new
    composite wings out of Air Combat Command. In response to this,
    Section 1631 of the 2025 NDAA stopped this until a report is
    submitted. It has not yet been received.
        How concerned are you about this reorganization impacting
    your nuclear deterrence mission?
        General Cotton. Senator Reed, today I have one belly button
    in the Department of the Air Force that presents two legs of
    the triad, and 68 percent of the NC3 capability, to me, as my
    component, and that is the Commander Air Force Global Strike
    Command. So as a four-star, the Commander of Air Force Global
    Strike Command has oversight and has the subject matter experts
    in the nuclear deterrent field, and he owns the bomber leg, as
    well as the ICBM leg.
        You know, all I ask of the United States Air Force is to
    ensure that when I have force presentation that I can still
    look to one person that can give me the answers to readiness,
    give me the answers to where we are acquisition strategies,
    gives me the answers to where we are on manpower and help that
    they might need. Today, I only have to look to Barksdale Air
    Force Base and talk to the Commander of Global Strike to get
    that answer.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. General Whiting, are you concerned
    about becoming overly reliant upon commercial providers for too
    many of the Department's missions into space? Do we draw a
    line? Do we ensure that this is a competitive situation?
        General Whiting. Senator Reed, I think the principle we
    need to apply is balance. For those things that we can go to
    commercial industry for, we should absolutely leverage that.
    U.S. commercial space industry is a massive advantage for this
    Nation, and it is an advantage that has widened over the last
    several years, and I think will continue to widen.
        But there are certain missions where we absolutely need to
    design and build for ourselves our own capabilities. For
    example, the space capabilities we provide to support General
    Cotton for nuclear command and control for SATCOM, those are
    not capabilities that are easily replicable in the commercial
    market. So we need to design those for purpose-built reason so
    we can assure to General Cotton, to the Secretary, and to the
    President that they can talk to their nuclear forces when
    required.
        So I think it is a matter of balance, and we need to apply
    that lens to each mission, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for
    your service. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator
    Tuberville, you are recognized.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning,
    men. General Cotton, thanks for your service. Thirty-nine
    years. I retired after 40 years of coaching. After the first
    week I was sitting around the house, reading the paper,
    drinking coffee, and my wife said, ``You ain't been here in 40
    years. Get you a damn job.'' So here I am today. So don't think
    you are going to go home and fish and play golf. But thank you
    for your service.
        Gentlemen, in 2024, the Navy eliminated the lead Columbia-
    class submarine, said it could not be delivered for 12 to 16
    months late. GAO also reported that late delivery of the lead
    submarine could jeopardize its planned availability for
    operations in 2030, and delays of the class could impact
    planned transition from Ohio-class submarines.
        If Columbia-class submarines are not available, General,
    what plans have we taken in that regard to fill the gap?
        General Cotton. Thank you for that question, Senator
    Tuberville, and you are right. Right now we are anticipating a
    12-to 16-month delay for the first Columbia-class.
        What is going to be incredibly important, and I say this
    constantly, is how do we continue to fortify our legacy systems
    until we do that. So what the Navy is doing is a project called
    PIRA, and that is the Pre-Inactivation Restricted
    Availability--that is what that acronym stands for--in which
    they will look at up to five boats and figure out which of the
    five boats they might be able to modernize or do some extended
    life work to, to make it so we do not lose anything from our
    legacy systems to counter the delay and create a bathtub in our
    capabilities on the submarine force.
        Senator Tuberville. What is the cost of that? That cost has
    got to be astronomical, though, right, if we are running late
    and we have to fill in a gap with that. I mean, have we looked
    at that, and do we have the funding?
        General Cotton. Well, you know, I do not have the numbers
    before me in regard to what the Navy is doing for the cost of
    PIRA. I can get that to you. We can probably talk about that
    and I will have it by closed session. But I think bottom line
    in that regard, we need to ensure that we keep that capability
    alive and well. I need to make sure that the tubes that are
    available on the SSBNs remain the tubes that are available on
    SSBNs, even if there is a slip to the new system that is
    supposed to replace it.
        So I am trying to make it so we prevent a catastrophic
    failure in regards of creating a bathtub, in all three legs of
    the triad, to ensure that does not happen.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you, and again, thank you for
    your service.
        General Whiting, U.S. Space Command's role in missile
    defense, planning and operational support for Guam, how
    critical is that? Obviously you have been given that task.
    Where do we stand on that?
        General Whiting. Senator, Guam is a vital location for many
    of our national defense needs, including for space. Through our
    Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense we do provide that planning and operational support
    that you highlight. We are regularly working with INDOPACOM as
    well as the Missile Defense Agency, the Army, and the Navy to
    develop that architecture that is being delivered to defend
    Guam against the missile threats we now see, primarily from
    China.
        Senator Tuberville. Yes, thank you. We are doing a lot of
    work in Guam. Obviously, an AEGIS system being put on the
    island as a first line of defense.
        Let me ask you, too, about the Golden Dome. The President
    gave us obviously that referendum that he wants to protect our
    country with some kind of Golden Dome. Do you have a certain
    group that works with that within Space Command, or is the
    entire Space Command working on this together? How does that
    work?
        General Whiting. Sir, it is a whole-of-command effort
    support a whole-of-Department of Defense effort. So it is
    certainly within my command, that subordinate command, the
    Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense has a leading role as well as my J8 Resourcing and
    Requirements Division. In fact, that J8 Division, we have
    partnered with NORTHCOM and General Guillot there to co-write
    requirements document for the Golden Dome for America, and we
    will be delivering that over the next few months to the
    Department of Defense.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Recently President Trump put
    me on the Board of Visitors for Air Force Academy. I look
    forward to coming out and visiting with you all and possibly
    seeing some of your work. So thanks to both of you for your
    service. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Tuberville. Senator
    Cotton, you are recognized.
        Senator Cotton. General Whiting, I want to return to
    Senator Reed's line of questioning about commercial space
    launch and any kind of risk it might pose us. You called the
    commercial space industry a, quote, ``massive advantage.'' I
    assume you are saying it is a massive advantage against our
    chief adversaries in this domain, China and Russia?
        General Whiting. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Can you give us a sense of scale of how big
    the--well, first off, commercial space launch, to be precise
    here we are talking about ULA, the United Launch Alliance and
    SpaceX. Correct?
        General Whiting. That has been the providers and now Blue
    Origin has recently demonstrated New Glenn. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. So can you give us a sense of scale of just
    how massive an advantage we have over, say, China because of
    ULA and SpaceX?
        General Whiting. Yes, Senator, and while I do not have the
    numbers I can qualitatively describe those. If you go back
    probably 5 to 10 years, the number of launches we were
    executing compared to those in China or Russia looked very
    similar. But over time, the U.S. has massively increased the
    number of launches, and that equates to what we call ``mass to
    orbit.'' So that means we are able to put more satellites on
    orbit, whether for commercial or government purposes, and those
    are getting cheaper and cheaper per pound, which also gives us
    more opportunities to leverage space for various missions.
        Senator Cotton. So you said 5 to 10 years ago we had
    roughly equal space launch capacity as China and Russia, but
    now we have substantially exceeded them, right?
        General Whiting. Correct. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. What has been the driver over the last 5 to
    10 years of that substantial increase? Is it ULA or is it
    SpaceX?
        General Whiting. Predominantly SpaceX. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. So if it wasn't for SpaceX, we might be in
    this position where we still are at near equivalence to China
    and Russia in space launch.
        General Whiting. They certainly have been innovative and
    rapidly changed that market. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. General Cotton, you have
    testified in the past, as have your predecessors, that China
    has undertaken a breathtaking buildup of its nuclear arsenal.
    It used to have what is called ``minimal deterrence,'' a
    nuclear arsenal just sufficient for a second strike. Obviously
    now it is moving on to first strike capabilities, whatever its
    rhetoric is. I think the Department estimates that has doubled
    its nuclear arsenal since Xi Jinping took power. It is
    projected to double again by the end of this decade, and maybe
    even double again by the middle of the next decade.
        Could you explain the kind of advantage this might provide
    China, not just in the nuclear balance of power but also in a
    conventional conflict, say if China decided to go for the
    jugular in Taiwan?
        General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Nice seeing you.
    I think when we put in perspective where we were just left of
    probably 2018, and we saw it as a nascent threat, and the
    breakout that my predecessor announced, you are right. What it
    does in changing the calculus in our strategy is now we must be
    prepared for two nuclear peers instead of one. I would garner
    to say, Senator, included in that is two nuclear peers that
    have a transactional relationship that has blossomed over the
    last couple of years, as well.
        So as we look at the capabilities that we are seeing in all
    three legs, you are absolutely right. Having an H-6N with long-
    range strike capability is not a regional hegemon weapon
    system. Having land-based ICBMs is not a regional hegemon
    weapon system. Building out their submarine force and having
    hypersonic weapons that are dual-use capable and FOB'd is not
    necessarily seen as a regional hegemon weapon system. So it
    makes us look at things a little differently, and our strategy
    has changed to compensate for that.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I will close on a couple of
    points. I have made them before. You have agreed with them
    before. I would love to hear your agreement one more time. Some
    people say about our nuclear weapons that we spend way too much
    money on weapons we never use. I respond to them that we
    actually do not spend that much money on them. We may be
    spending some money modernizing them now, compared to our total
    defense expenditures. But more importantly we have used our
    nuclear weapons every single day, going back 80 years this
    August, to prevent the kind of war that the world saw twice in
    20 years.
        Do you agree with that, General Cotton?
        General Cotton. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. I want to finally add my note of
    agreement, with our fantastic Chairwoman, Senator Fischer, on
    what she said about the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
    missile, also known as SLCM-N. The program held on by a thread
    throughout the Biden era, thanks to congressional support, and
    I am glad that you acknowledge how important it is, and that if
    anything, we need to do everything possible to accelerate that
    capability.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly,
    you are recognized.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Cotton,
    General Whiting, thank you for being here. I want to first
    touch on Golden Dome, and then I want to save some time for
    SLCM.
        I agree nuclear deterrence keeps us safe, and General
    Cotton, you mentioned two nuclear peers. One of my biggest
    concerns is the third one, which is the DPRK. I think it is
    fair to say that most of the time, with our nuclear peers, we
    are dealing with rational actors. We hope that is the case.
    That is the thing, part of nuclear deterrence, that they will
    act rationally.
        I am not so sure that is the case with the DPRK, and they
    are building more nuclear weapons. They are working on other
    systems to deliver them, and they can now range into the United
    States. I believe that is our view as a Nation.
        So can you talk a little bit about Golden Dome, and my
    concern with this is that it could potentially, even though I
    am not against the idea of a system that can protect the entire
    United States from incoming ballistic missiles, nuclear armed.
    At the same time, this could accelerate a growing number. Our
    adversaries' response to having a missile defense system could
    be to build more nuclear weapons, and if one or two get
    through, that is too many. Right now we do have a defensive
    system to protect us from a rogue actor in launching one ICBM,
    and my understanding is--and if you could share a little bit,
    General Cotton, about how effective that system is with the
    interceptors we have in Alaska and in California.
        So could you provide an estimate of how much this would
    cost and what enhanced capability we would get out of this. Do
    you feel we can build a system that is not penetrable?
        General Cotton. Well, thank you, Senator Kelly. I do not
    want to get out of my lane because NORTHCOM, General Guillot,
    is the one that is undertaking that role. My responsibility,
    from Golden Dome, is twofold in accordance with the EO, and
    mine is to make sure that I can assure that a second strike
    capability for the United States remains, and how do we ensure
    that.
        As far as the reliability of the ground-based interceptors
    piece, once again I do not own that platform. That platform
    belongs to NORTHCOM, and that is probably best for General
    Guillot to answer that.
        I do believe, and we heard my colleague talk about the
    layered approach that is kind of the essence of Golden Dome for
    America. I think that is the answer and the key on how that
    system can be deliverable, moving forward.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. Thank you, General. I
    do agree. I think it is something we need to look into, and we
    need to look at a cost-benefit analysis of this and also
    consider how it would potentially change the nuclear deterrence
    posture of not only us but China and Russia.
        On SLCM-N, I know it was brought up here also, General. One
    of my concerns here, one of the things that makes us stand out
    is our submarine force, especially the attack submarines are
    incredibly effective. To integrate a tactical nuclear missile
    into a Virginia-class sub would take modifications that are
    significant, and you would have to put the security system that
    we have in effect for nuclear weapons. My problem, I think,
    that I have with this is in the Western Pacific this is a
    capability. Our attack submarine force is incredibly capable,
    and I think this would be somewhat disruptive. I think that
    needs to be a consideration before we go down the road of
    significant modifications to these systems.
        If you could just comment briefly on that.
        General Cotton. Senator, I think from my perspective a lot
    of those are TTPs that the Department of the Navy had, and I
    think they need to pull those out of the cupboard and look to
    see what those TPPs where when we had TLAM-Ns. I do not know if
    it would be disruptive, especially now that what we are seeing,
    especially in the INDOPACOM theater in regard to our allies and
    partners' ability of letting us have dual-use, nuclear-capable
    things arrive on their shores, the fact that I can now have B-
    52s flying to Japan, where I did not before, and on the Korean
    Peninsula. I think there is work to be done, but I think it can
    be accomplished.
        Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
    Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Banks,
    you are recognized.
        Senator Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to
    both of you for being here today. General Cotton, thank you for
    your service. You are a hero. What you have done over the last
    3 years is remarkable, and it has been an honor to work with
    you on the House Armed Services Committee and now again on the
    Senate Armed Services Committee.
        As we have talked about before, SLCM-N is meant to deter
    China and would be launched from attack submarines. SLCM-N is
    needed to help address capability and escalation management
    gaps stemming from the rapid growth of China and Russia's
    theater-range nuclear systems.
        General, do you agree with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    that validated the need for SLCM-Ns, and if so, what does this
    need to still stand?
        General Cotton. I do agree, Senator, and thank you for the
    comments that you made. What was said in 2018 still holds true
    today, I think even more so. When I talk about being able to
    give a geographic combatant commander the ability to also hold
    an adversary in their region at risk, you can now see that what
    you are seeing in this weapon system is more than just a
    strategic weapon. It now can be a regional weapon and a
    regional deterrence, as well, for my fellow combatant
    commanders that hold the regions of responsibility.
        Senator Banks. What do we need to do to remain committed to
    it?
        General Cotton. The program of record has been established.
    We just need to make sure we continue to pump the well, to
    ensure that they move out. As the Chairwoman said, if we can
    get things to the left, I would gladly accept being able to get
    the articles quicker than later.
        Senator Banks. Got it. Fiscal year 2024 NDAA directed the
    Navy and the NNSA to develop and deploy an operational SLCM-N
    no later than 2034. Do you believe that we should still have
    SLCM-N no later than 2034?
        General Cotton. I would love to move that to the left,
    Senator.
        Senator Banks. Got it. General Whiting, the President's
    Executive Order to establish the Golden Dome for America
    stresses the need for both weapons to shoot down enemy missiles
    and the satellites to track them. The EO called for the, quote,
    ``acceleration of the deployment of the hypersonic and
    ballistic tracking sensor layer.''
        If we are going to have an effective Golden Dome for the
    U.S. Homeland, how important is it that we expand our fleet of
    ballistic and hypersonic missile tracking satellites and space-
    based sensors?
        General Whiting. Thank you for the question, Senator. For
    the modern threats that we need to track, we will only be able
    to do that from space, and we need to be able to maintain
    custody of those threats, not only when they are in the boost
    phase, when the rockets are burning very hot and we can track
    them with our infrared satellites, but then also when they are
    coasting, so that we can, again, maintain custody to engage at
    the various layers. So it is absolutely vital, Senator.
        Senator Banks. Do you agree with President Trump that we
    need to rapidly accelerate HBTSS so that we can have the
    sensors in space that we need to target incoming threats?
        General Whiting. I do, Senator. Those threats are real
    today, those more advanced threats, and our current systems are
    optimized against traditional ballistic missiles, not against
    the variants that we are seeing fielded today.
        Senator Banks. General Cotton, China leads the world in
    hypersonics and has hundreds of long-range hypersonic missiles.
    As you know, China shocked the world 4 years ago when its
    hypersonic vehicle orbited the entire Earth before landing. The
    United States has still not fielded a functional hypersonic
    weapon. Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane is a proven leader
    in hypersonics, as you and I have talked about many times
    before. How important is increased investment in hypersonics if
    we are going to regain our military edge over China?
        General Cotton. Senator, it is very important, and the work
    that I have seen done by Crane has been extraordinary for the
    Department of the Navy. I think investments, but actually
    production, and getting them to the warfighter so they can be
    implemented and put in our arsenal.
        Senator Banks. Got it, and finally, while we are replacing
    most of our nuclear arsenal in the next decade or two, we are
    keeping the B-52 bombers around well into mid-century. How
    critical is the B-52 program if we are going to keep those
    planes in the skies for decades to come?
        General Cotton. Incredibly important for us, sir. As I
    mentioned, Senator, we are going to move to a two-platform
    bomber force for the United States of America. It will be the
    B-21 and a B-52J. It is incredibly important that we get those
    75 birds and modify them with their replacement of their
    engines, their radars, and----
        Senator Banks. I have got 10 seconds. Can you talk about
    the advantages of the new B-52 engines over the old engines?
        General Cotton. Yes. The Rolls-Royce engines that are right
    there, being worked in Indiana, gives us incredible increase in
    range and speed and durability.
        Senator Banks. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Banks. Senator King and
    I would like a second round before we had to classified, and I
    would like to followup on some of Senator Banks' comments about
    Golden Dome and space-based sensors.
        General Whiting, what would be the impacts to the mission
    effectiveness of SPACECOM were the government to auction off
    spectrum currently utilized by the Department? Could Golden
    Dome even take place?
        General Whiting. Ma'am, we could not execute Golden Dome
    without full access to those two spectrums that we discussed
    earlier, the lower 3 and then the 7 and 8 GHz. We use that
    lower 3 band, again, through so many of our radars, to be able
    to track from the ground, and then the 7 and 8 GHz band is so
    important for our communications and other special missions. I
    can only see those requirements getting bigger for those
    spectrums as Golden Dome delivers.
        Senator Fischer. If it was auctioned off, and if it was
    vacated by the Department, what is the timeframe, not to
    mention the cost. What is the timeframe in research,
    development for those new sensors to be even located in another
    spectrum that would not have the capability that the current
    spectrum has to even accomplish that. Ten years? Twenty years?
        General Whiting. Madam Chairwoman, I do not have a timeline
    because I think our focus has been not on vacating that but
    figuring out if there is a way to share that spectrum through
    dynamic spectrum sharing, and I understand there are
    technologies there that may make that available. The Department
    has done some studies on that and laid out a series of
    conditions that would need to be met if dynamic spectrum
    sharing can occur, and I endorse that those conditions must be
    met if we are going to figure out a way to share that spectrum
    with commercial industry.
        Senator Fischer. Can dynamic sharing take place now?
        General Whiting. Ma'am, I am told the technology is close
    to being ready. I do not know if it is actually ready today,
    but I would want to verify that, certainly.
        Senator Fischer. You would need to test.
        General Whiting. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.
        Senator Fischer. General Cotton, same question to you. If
    the government were to auction off spectrum currently utilized
    by the Department, how would STRATCOM's mission effectiveness
    be impacted?
        General Cotton. It would be impacted, Madam Chair, because
    what would happen is, to the point that was made by General
    Whiting, you know, we count on understanding what the threat
    looks like, being able to see that threat before it actually
    comes--we call that ``left of launch'' type of activities--as
    well as what we are talking about in the higher bands on what
    is the capacity and capability of my three legs to be able to
    utilize SATCOM, et cetera. It would absolutely affect us.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Sir. Senator King.
        Senator King. Two things. I just wanted to followup on the
    discussion of hypersonics. I believe that we have missed two
    critical strategic technologies and are woefully behind,
    hypersonics and directed energy. These are things that we
    should have seen coming, and now we are playing catch up. I
    just want to emphasize not only do we need a hypersonic weapon
    for deterrent possibilities, but we need hypersonic defense.
    Those aircraft carriers in the Pacific are sitting ducks for
    hypersonic missiles coming at them 4,000 to 5,000 miles an
    hour, 100 feet above the surface of the ocean.
        So, hypersonic defense is something I think we need to
    invest in, as well as the development of a hypersonic offensive
    capacity in order, again, to provide a deterrent. General
    Cotton, would you agree?
        General Cotton. I do agree with that statement, Senator.
        Senator King. The other thing that I wanted to mention, it
    has sort of become conventional wisdom here that we are going
    from one near-peer adversary to two. I believe we are going
    from one near-peer adversary to three and a half because of, as
    I think you touched upon this, the growing cooperation between
    China and Russia. Then you put in Iran, which has also become a
    contributor to Russia's war machine, as well as North Korea,
    which is also contributing to Russia's efforts in Ukraine.
        I think we need to think strategically, not two near-peer
    adversaries, but the potential of two near-peer adversaries who
    are working together. That creates its own strategic
    challenges. General Cotton, what are your thoughts on that?
        General Cotton. Senator, you are absolutely right and that
    is what we are actually doing at STRATCOM today. When we look
    at, and you are right, I call them third-party influencers.
    What I mean by that and to your point, I would add, one, that I
    think is a little different nuance, that is the new
    relationship that we are seeing that is happening between
    Russia and the DPRK. So, we are talking about DPRK. We are
    talking about Iran. We are talking about China, as well as the
    Russian Federation.
        Senator King. I think we have to assume that in a time of
    serious conflict it would not be just with one or the other. It
    could well and probably would involve all four of those powers
    that you have mentioned.
        General Cotton. That is why I call them the third-party
    influencers because what they could do is they can be a
    distraction from the main effort that could be launched by any
    one of those that we had mentioned.
        Senator King. General Whiting, your thoughts on that new
    strategic reality?
        General Whiting. Senator, we watch those same four
    countries that General Cotton just mentioned, and their
    bilateral relationships with each other, and we see
    increasingly that space is becoming an area where countries
    with more sophisticated space knowledge, like Russia or China,
    appear to be willing to tradeoff that space knowledge for
    something that they want in return, whether that is armaments
    or some other political agreement. So we are very concerned
    with that and watching how they are cooperating on space.
        Senator King. I just think that this new relationship needs
    to be part of our strategic thinking going forward, to inform
    things like the Nuclear Posture Review and also the fundamental
    defense strategy.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you again for your
    service, and I appreciate having been able to work with you.
    You are still at it. He is the guy that is leaving. We are
    going to miss you, General. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. We have him for a while yet.
        With that we will adjourn the open session of this hearing
    and reconvene down in classified in order to have our
    classified briefing from you gentlemen. Thank you very much.
        This section of the hearing is closed.
        [Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                  golden dome
        1. Senator Warren. General Cotton, what is United States Strategic
    Command's (STRATCOM) estimate or range for the cost of deploying the
    Iron Dome of America/Golden Dome (Golden Dome) or a similar system
    across the entire United States? Please describe your methodology for
    the estimate or the source.
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding the cost of deploying Golden Dome and the
    methodology for estimating this cost.

        2. Senator Warren. General Cotton, if Congress does not provide
    significantly more funding, what specific programs would need to be cut
    or scaled back to fund such a deployment and ensure programs were not
    duplicative?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding programmatic decisions.

        3. Senator Warren. General Cotton, given that the Israeli Iron Dome
    is designed to intercept slow, short-range threats, what is the
    technical plan to adapt that system into one that can counter more
    advanced missile threats possessed by America's adversaries?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding technical plans to adapt Golden Dome to
    counter advanced missile threats.

        4. Senator Warren. General Cotton, how much would such adaptations
    cost?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding cost estimates for technical plans to
    adapt Golden Dome to counter advanced missile threats.

        5. Senator Warren. General Cotton, what timeline would be required
    to field an operational system for the Golden Dome?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding the timeline required to field Golden
    Dome.

        6. Senator Warren. General Cotton, in the 1990's, it was determined
    that space-based missile defense (SDI/``Star Wars'') was too
    technically challenging and prohibitively expensive. What are the
    greatest technological risks now for pursuing a similar program?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding technical risks to pursuing Golden Dome.

        7. Senator Warren. General Cotton, former Under Secretary of
    Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin and former Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Lisa Porter,
    who both served during the first Trump administration, contend that the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is not structured to lead an effort of
    this magnitude. Do you agree with their assessment?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding whether MDA is structured appropriately.

        8. Senator Warren. General Cotton, Griffin and Porter contend that
    the Golden Dome program management should not be performed within any
    existing agency. Do you agree, and if so, should a new agency be
    created to manage this program?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort.
    Therefore, defer to OSD for information regarding program management
    efforts for Golden Dome.

        9. Senator Warren. General Cotton, do you believe the Golden Dome
    would require an entirely new approach to command and control?
        General Cotton. Although USSTRATCOM is directed to support the
    Golden Dome planning process, we are not leading this effort. Defer to
    OSD for information regarding command and control requirements for
    Golden Dome.
                             nuclear modernization
        10. Senator Warren. General Cotton, given the costs of deploying
    and maintaining a new nuclear cruise missile, should this program take
    precedence over investments in conventional capabilities like
    shipbuilding that could achieve similar deterrent effects?
        General Cotton. Defer to OSD for determination of investment
    priority for the Department. The Nation's investments for defense
    should be an integrated and carefully balanced portfolio of nuclear and
    non-nuclear/conventional capabilities.
        The deterrence and assurance effects of capabilities like a Nuclear
    Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) and other theater nuclear
    capabilities are qualitatively different than those of both
    conventional capabilities and the existing capabilities of the
    strategic nuclear triad. Investments in SLCM-N and other theater
    nuclear capabilities are needed to supplement our portfolio and enhance
    the ability of the Joint Force to deter adversaries, assure allies and
    partners, and provide integrated options for achieving objectives and
    managing escalation by providing flexibility to the President.
        The need for the SLCM-N does not negate the need for conventional
    capabilities. A robust set of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is
    vital to successfully concluding conflicts while managing escalation.
    The demand for tankers, ships, and conventional prompt global strike
    weapons across Combatant Commands continues to grow. USSTRATCOM
    continues to advocate for rapid development and fielding of advanced
    conventional capabilities and is expanding efforts toward Conventional
    Nuclear Integration (CNI). The integrated employment of non-kinetic
    capabilities (e.g., space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum), combined
    with conventional and nuclear operations, must be considered through
    all phases from competition to conflict.

        11. Senator Warren. General Cotton, has STRATCOM evaluated the
    operational effects that a new nuclear-armed cruise missile would have
    on the conventional mission?
        General Cotton. Defer to OSD for an evaluation of operational
    effects a new nuclear-armed cruise missile would have on the
    conventional mission. The Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United
    States requires integration of non-nuclear capabilities into nuclear
    planning. In partnership with seven other Combatant Commands, the Joint
    Staff, Army, Air Force, and Navy, USSTRATCOM continues to expand
    efforts toward Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) with a 2-year
    Joint CNI Test to develop a concept of operations to update the process
    for developing CNI options during competition. This effort will further
    inform both conventional and nuclear requirements processes to support
    CNI operational requirements and ensure the United States is postured
    effectively.

        12. Senator Warren. General Cotton, how long could Minuteman III
    ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), the current ground-based
    leg of the nuclear triad, stay operational?
        General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force for specifics on MMIII
    sustainment efforts; however, the legacy MMIII ICBM will remain
    critical to my deterrence and assurance objectives until replaced by
    the Sentinel. I remain confident the Air Force, with the continued
    support of Congress, can adequately sustain the MMIII until replaced by
    the Sentinel program.

        13. Senator Warren. General Cotton, if the Air Force plans to
    extend Minuteman III to 2050, would the Air Force and lead contractor
    Northrop Grumman Corp. benefit from additional time to better plan and
    manage the Sentinel program?
        General Cotton. Defer to the Air Force for specifics on Sentinel
    timing; however, USSTRATCOM will incur additional operational risk the
    longer MMIII is deployed.
                       program requirements and oversight
        14. Senator Warren. General Cotton and General Whiting, do you
    agree that any new major defense program should receive an independent
    cost estimate before Congress funds the program?
        General Cotton. Defer to OSD on independent cost estimates for
    major defense programs. As a Combatant Commander, I expect weapon
    systems to be delivered ready and capable of providing options to the
    President.
        General Whiting. Cost estimates play a crucial role in the
    decisionmaking process for major defense programs, ensuring responsible
    fiscal stewardship and strategic planning. Independent cost estimates
    provide valuable insight into potential program costs and risks, but I
    also recognize the expertise and assessments provided by the Services
    and would add that integrated Independent Technical & Cost Estimates
    with qualified space professionals are important for space systems. It
    is important to consider all available cost evaluations to ensure
    comprehensive and informed budgetary decisions that best serve national
    security priorities.

        15. Senator Warren. General Cotton and General Whiting, do you
    agree that a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate of a major
    defense program would help inform decisionmakers at DOD (Department of
    Defense) and in Congress on whether a program is worth pursuing?
        General Cotton. Defer to OSD on a Congressional Budget Office cost
    estimate for major defense programs. As a Combatant Commander, I expect
    weapon systems to be delivered ready and capable of providing options
    to the President.
        General Whiting. We recognize the value of thorough cost
    assessments in driving informed decisionmaking for major defense
    programs. Congressional Budget Office cost estimates can provide
    additional insight that contributes to better acquisition outcomes,
    ultimately supporting the development of the combatant command
    capabilities our forces rely upon. At the same time, we acknowledge the
    expertise and evaluations conducted by the Services, especially for
    space systems in which accurate cost estimates must be informed with
    technical input from space experts. A comprehensive approach that
    incorporates multiple perspectives ensures well-rounded fiscal and
    strategic planning to meet national defense objectives.

        16. Senator Warren. General Cotton and General Whiting, how does
    independent technical expertise in areas such as nuclear and space
    science benefit your command?
        General Cotton. Nuclear technical expertise is critical to
    supporting USSTRATCOM's Unified Command Plan responsibilities.
    Independent nuclear technical expertise is vital to ensuring the
    Nation's nuclear capabilities remain safe, secure, effective, and
    credible.
        General Whiting. Independent technical expertise provides U.S.
    Space Command (USSPACECOM) the opportunity to review and comment on the
    strengths and weaknesses of relevant capabilities through the lens of
    Combatant Command responsibilities articulated in the Unified Command
    Plan. This expertise also enables a holistic assessment of capabilities
    across all Services and agencies, facilitating the integration of
    emergent capabilities into wargames, exercises, and modeling. For
    example, USSPACECOM leveraged John Hopkins University Applied Physics
    Laboratory on a Nuclear Electric Propulsion / Nuclear Thermal
    Propulsion space study that included the National Laboratories and DOD
    Laboratories to inform plans, define quality requirements, and develop
    concepts to increase the Command's lethality and provide decision
    flexibility.
                                  arms control
        17. Senator Warren. General Cotton, the U.S. and Russia are no
    longer engaged in arms control negotiations, and New START (Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaty) is set to expire in 2026. What specific risks
    does STRATCOM foresee if the U.S. enters a world without legally
    binding arms control agreements?
        General Cotton. Absent New START or a similar agreement, Russia
    would be unconstrained to expand its strategic nuclear forces,
    potentially adding to its already large arsenal that includes theater-
    range non-strategic nuclear systems and novel weapons platforms. This,
    along with the expanding Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities
    and increasing collusion between all three states, exacerbates
    deterrence challenges and the potential risks of simultaneous or
    sequential conflict with nuclear-armed states.

        18. Senator Warren. General Cotton, given the historical success of
    arms control in reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing arms races, do
    you believe STRATCOM should be focusing on expanding nuclear
    capabilities rather than strengthening diplomatic engagement with
    adversaries?
        General Cotton. The USSTRATCOM mission is to deter strategic attack
    through a safe, secure, effective, and credible global combat
    capability and, when directed, is ready to prevail in conflict. The
    President assigned USSTRATCOM the responsibilities for strategic
    deterrence; nuclear operations; nuclear command, control, and
    communications (NC3) enterprise operations; joint electromagnetic
    spectrum operations; global strike; and missile threat assessment which
    together, underpin national security. As such, the command is focusing
    on modernizing nuclear capabilities (including all three legs of the
    triad and NC3) while sustaining legacy nuclear systems.
        Defer to the State Department on strengthening diplomatic
    engagements. However, I support verifiable arms control efforts that
    advance U.S., Allied, and partner security. I stand by to provide my
    best military advice if asked.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jackie Rosen
                                nuclear testing
        19. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, Nevada has played a critical
    role in nuclear weapons development, but often at a high cost. From
    1951 to 1992, 928 nuclear weapons were detonated in Nevada, causing
    people and land to be exposed to toxic levels of radiation. That is one
    of the reasons why I strongly support the mission of the Nevada
    National Security Site and the Stockpile Stewardship Program,
    predominantly at the Principle Underground Laboratory for Subcritical
    Experimentation (PULSE)--an underground laboratory where scientists
    conduct subcritical experiments to verify the reliability, safety, and
    effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile. PULSE is undergoing a major
    construction project that will soon host the most capable weapons
    radiographic systems in the world. For decades, the national laboratory
    directors in their annual stockpile reports say that returning to
    explosive nuclear testing is unnecessary, with over 1,000 subcritical
    experiments and robust computer modeling providing the data to support
    those positions. Do you agree with these data informed assessments that
    it is unnecessary for the United States to resume explosive nuclear
    testing?
        General Cotton. At this time, there are no identified issues
    requiring a return to nuclear underground testing. However, the Nation
    needs to preserve this capability should the need arise.

        20. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, given the ongoing advancements
    in artificial intelligence (AI) for weapons design, the production of
    new pits to replace aging ones, and the modernization of PULSE at the
    Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), how do you assess these
    initiatives in providing greater certainty about warhead performance,
    even for new designs, as compared to our current stockpile stewardship?
        General Cotton. Defer to the weapons design experts at our national
    laboratories to provide specifics regarding increases in certainty from
    ongoing advancements. The Nation must continue to develop and field
    state-of-the-art non-nuclear test, modeling, simulation and
    manufacturing capabilities and tools to maintain confidence in our
    aging stockpile and modernize for the future.

        21. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, what is your assessment of how a
    resumption of U.S. nuclear testing would be interpreted by other
    nuclear states, particularly Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, and
    India?
        General Cotton. There are too many variables to accurately assess
    how other nations would interpret or respond if the United States were
    to resume nuclear testing. The scale, type, location, and timing of a
    test, as well as how the United States were to communicate the
    intention or rationale of the test, all have the potential to cause
    significantly different interpretations or responses. While the
    circumstances of U.S. testing could be interpreted by nuclear states as
    justification for restarting their own nuclear test programs, they
    could also be the impetus for increased calls for an international
    moratorium or other restrictions on further nuclear testing.

        22. Senator Rosen. General Cotton, do you assess that this would
    increase the likelihood of nuclear proliferation?
        General Cotton. I cannot speculate about other nations' sovereign
    decisions, which are made based on their own interests and perceptions
    of the geopolitical environment.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
                                  golden dome
        23. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, the Administration is currently
    pursuing a Golden Dome--which is supposedly analogous to Israel's Iron
    Dome. To me, this is comparing Apples to Oranges. Stopping ballistic
    missiles is a different problem set than stopping rockets and mortars.
    While I don't oppose the idea of a Golden Dome, the cost benefit
    analysis must make sense before pursuing an astronomically expensive
    project. General Whiting, SPACECOM (Space Command) is responsible for
    missile defense operations, which means you would play a critical role
    in the creation of a Golden Dome. Can you provide an overview on our
    current missile defense capabilities, and if you were directed to
    implement a golden dome strategy, can you provide an estimate as to how
    much that would cost and what enhanced capabilities we would be after?
        General Whiting. The current missile defense enterprise is an
    integrated, layered architecture designed to provide multiple
    opportunities to detect and defeat incoming threats before they can
    reach their targets. Our current missile defense capability is divided
    into three primary areas: interceptors, sensors, and command and
    control systems. The Unified Command Plan directs USSPACECOM to provide
    ``operational planning and support to trans-regional missile defense''
    and to operate ground-based and space-based sensors to provide missile
    warning and missile tracking. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and
    the other regional combatant commands are responsible for operating the
    interceptors using command and control systems provided by the Missile
    Defense Agency.
        Pending final direction on Golden Dome implementation, a more
    comprehensive layered defense approach is needed, which will require
    investments currently being factored into the President's Budget for
    fiscal year 2026, development and deployment of capabilities to defeat
    missile attacks prior to launch; boost-phase and perhaps midcourse
    intercept from space; non-kinetics; fully integrated command and
    control, as well as foundational sensor capabilities. USSPACECOM has
    been actively advocating for several enhanced capabilities that align
    with the President's Executive Order, such as the custody layer of the
    Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture and space-based interceptors
    capable of boost-phase intercept. As Golden Dome's architecture is
    still pre-decisional, and USSPACECOM's role is to define requirements
    as opposed to acquiring systems, I refer questions related to
    acquisitions and costs to the DOD.
                              space infrastructure
        24. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, as we continue to advance our
    capabilities in space, it's clear that space dominance is about much
    more than just ensuring we can access space. It's about ensuring we
    have the freedom to operate in space--protecting our assets and
    maintaining our strategic advantage in an increasingly contested
    environment. Our space infrastructure needs to be resilient, adaptive,
    and capable of evolving in response to emerging threats. This includes
    the ability to not only evade adversarial actions but also reposition,
    repair, and refit assets in orbit to ensure continuous functionality.
    General Whiting, given these priorities, I'd like to hear your thoughts
    on the Space Force's philosophy regarding these capabilities, and what
    plans you have in place to ensure that the U.S. remains capable of
    maintaining a strong, flexible, and secure presence in space.
        General Whiting. Space dominance is not just about access--it's
    about maintaining the freedom to maneuver, defending our assets, and
    preserving our strategic advantage in an increasingly contested domain.
    Achieving this requires a robust operational framework that ensures
    resilience and continuity. Recognizing these challenges, USSPACECOM is
    prioritizing the ability to deploy, regenerate, and reconstitute at
    scale across all levels of conflict. Therefore, we require a
    combination of responsive launch capabilities, maneuverability, and in-
    domain logistics to be provided by the Services to guarantee
    uninterrupted space effects throughout the duration of a conflict.
        To support the Services' responsibility, we are leveraging
    structured processes that ensure our priorities align with strategic
    objectives. Through the Integrated Priority List process, we continue
    to emphasize a balanced mix of Service-developed capabilities.
    Recognizing our budget resources are finite and must be shrewdly
    allocated, I would like to highlight the increasing importance of
    investing in sustained space maneuver to secure our long-term strategic
    advantage.
                                 nuclear triad
        25. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, I share the concerns a lot of
    folks have about the current modernization efforts of our Nuclear
    Triad. The Sentinel program faced a cost overrun that resulted in a
    Nunn-McCurdy violation. You recently stated we need to acquire 145 B-21
    raiders, with the current programmed 100 being the bare minimum for
    readiness. Finally, you stated in an interview that we need to build a
    greater number of Columbia class ballistic missile submarines If
    everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. Where do you see the
    greatest need for modernization in our nuclear triad?
        General Cotton. All triad modernization programs of record (PORs)
    are vital to maintaining nuclear deterrence. For a number of reasons,
    the Nation chose to delay nuclear modernization over the past several
    decades and our legacy systems are now well past their intended lives.
    Each leg of the nuclear triad must be modernized concurrently to ensure
    we retain a creditable deterrent. Additionally, our legacy triad
    capabilities must be sustained until the PORs deliver USSTRATCOM
    warfighting capabilities. USSTRATCOM will continue to accumulate
    operational risk until all PORs fully deliver.

        26. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, while we continue efforts to
    modernize our nuclear triad, how is STRATCOM strategically deterring
    our adversaries and ensuring our current arsenal remains relevant?
        General Cotton. The nuclear triad remains safe, secure, effective,
    and credible and ready to execute the mission. USSTRATCOM provides
    tailored strategies to effectively deter across a spectrum of
    adversaries, threats, and conflict, and backstop our extended
    deterrence commitments.
        All elements of the triad undergo rigorous inspections and follow
    consistent testing regimes to ensure existing capabilities remain safe,
    secure, effective, and credible.
        Furthermore, USSTRATCOM continues to assess capacity, capability,
    and the forces required to support our tailored deterrence strategies
    to ensure the current arsenal remains relevant.
                         spacecom and industry partners
        27. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, last year I discussed with your
    predecessor how SpaceX and Starlink temporarily discontinued services
    of their platforms during the conflict in Ukraine after they took issue
    with the `weaponization' of their technologies. SPACECOM was working on
    an initiative to ensure we wouldn't lose commercial capabilities during
    crisis or conflict. Can you provide an update on what steps you have
    taken to ensure we don't lose critical access to commercial
    capabilities during crisis or conflict?
        General Whiting. DOD's 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy
    describes how DOD will ensure access to commercial solutions across the
    spectrum of conflict: ``The Department will use contracts and other
    agreements as the formal mechanisms to ensure access to commercial
    solutions across the spectrum of conflict and mission areas. Contracts
    and other agreements will address the cyber, data, and supply chain
    security requirements that commercial entities will need to meet to
    work with the Department. As necessary, contracts will enable
    prioritization of Department requirements and capability needs over
    other commercial clients in specific situations.''
        USSPACECOM supports the DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy
    by establishing the security conditions for integration, mitigating
    risk to commercial space actors inherent in supporting national
    security space operations. The Strategy states that: ``In appropriate
    circumstances, the use of military force to protect and defend
    commercial assets could be directed.'' USSPACECOM stands ready to
    protect and defend commercial assets from aggression in the space
    domain if directed to do so. USSPACECOM also mitigates risk to
    commercial space actors through sharing of threat information. In 2024,
    our Commercial Integration Cell, which enables sharing of classified
    threat information with the space companies the U.S. Government most
    relies on for space services, expanded to 17 commercial mission
    partners.
        We recognize that the DOD must maximize the gains from our
    innovative commercial partners, while avoiding dependencies that limit
    decision space. We will continue to seek ways to protect and ensure
    access to critical capabilities throughout all phases of conflict.

        28. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, the complexity and scale of
    warfare has expanded exponentially over the past decade--how is
    SPACECOM postured to leverage and capitalize on industry initiatives?
    How can we ensure critical capabilities get into the hands of the
    warfighter while the technology is still relevant?
        General Whiting. On January 6, 2025, USSPACECOM published our
    Experimentation Strategy to explore and promote utilization of emerging
    space domain technologies and innovate in support of all our vital
    missions, including deterrence. As a part of this drive for a culture
    of innovation, we also updated the Command's Commercial Integration
    Strategy, which captures how we will leverage industry initiatives.
    Through this strategy, we identify and advocate for promising
    technologies; incorporate and operationalize commercial partners and
    their capabilities into training and operations; and implement
    information sharing and protection of commercial capabilities when
    directed. The ongoing execution of this strategy includes the
    Commercial Integration Cell and Joint Commercial Operations Cell, as
    well as our integration of commercial quick reaction capabilities
    through our own initiatives and via the Services. Inserting these
    systems into planning, wargaming, and exercising is essential to give
    our warfighters the opportunity to determine effective and efficient
    employment before a crisis or conflict.
                               hypersonic weapons
        29. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, as you know, our adversaries
    continue to develop advanced weapons and capabilities to try to erode
    our competitive edge. Systems like hypersonic weapons add new
    complexity and danger to strategic deterrence. In your prepared
    statement, you referenced the danger posed by nuclear armed hypersonic
    weapons. The speed and unpredictable flight paths make hypersonic
    weapons more difficult to detect, track, and can reduce your margin for
    error and response time. Can you talk about the risks adversary
    hypersonics pose to your mission of strategic deterrence?
        General Cotton. On January 6, 2025, USSPACECOM published our
    Experimentation Strategy to explore and promote utilization of emerging
    space domain technologies and innovate in support of all our vital
    missions, including deterrence. As a part of this drive for a culture
    of innovation, we also updated the Command's Commercial Integration
    Strategy, which captures how we will leverage industry initiatives.
    Through this strategy, we identify and advocate for promising
    technologies; incorporate and operationalize commercial partners and
    their capabilities into training and operations; and implement
    information sharing and protection of commercial capabilities when
    directed. The ongoing execution of this strategy includes the
    Commercial Integration Cell and Joint Commercial Operations Cell, as
    well as our integration of commercial quick reaction capabilities
    through our own initiatives and via the Services. Inserting these
    systems into planning, wargaming, and exercising is essential to give
    our warfighters the opportunity to determine effective and efficient
    employment before a crisis or conflict.

        30. Senator Kelly. General Cotton, do you think hypersonics are a
    key aspect of our strategic modernization efforts?
        General Cotton. Yes, hypersonic weapons will provide a highly
    responsive, long-range, non-nuclear capability for distant, defended,
    and/or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied
    access, or not preferred. These weapon systems will provide senior
    leaders with additional credible strike options to influence all stages
    of conflict without crossing the nuclear threshold.

        31. Senator Kelly. General Whiting, SPACECOM is responsible for
    missile defense, what is SPACECOM doing to ensure we develop the needed
    technology to detect and respond to hypersonic threats with the
    required speed?
        General Whiting. Under the current Unified Command Plan, USSPACECOM
    is responsible for transregional missile defense planning, operations
    support, and sensor management. We work closely with USNORTHCOM, U.S.
    Indo-Pacific Command, and other regional Combatant Commands, who are
    responsible for missile defense operations employing systems supplied
    by the Missile Defense Agency.
        To effectively address the hypersonic threat, we are advancing
    operational concepts through the Golden Dome effort, advocating that
    the Services provide key technologies that stay ahead of emerging
    threats. Additionally, USSPACECOM is collaborating with USNORTHCOM to
    develop an Initial Capabilities Document for Golden Dome, identifying
    essential requirements to track and respond to hypersonic threats with
    the necessary speed and precision.
        Through our requirements processes, we continue to advocate for the
    accelerated integration of enhanced capabilities, including Hypersonic
    and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, the custody layer within the
    Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, space-based interceptors
    for boost-phase engagement, pre-launch and boost-phase missile defeat
    capabilities, and advancements in non-kinetic defense measures. These
    efforts align with the President's Executive Order on Golden Dome for
    America, ensuring our missile defense architecture remains agile and
    responsive to the evolving threat landscape.

                       THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE
                      DEFENSE ACTIVITIES IN REVIEW OF THE
                       DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR
             FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2025

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILE DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:45 p.m., in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (Chairwoman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Tuberville,
    King, and Kelly.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. I call this hearing to order. I would like
    to thank the witnesses for being here today.
        This Subcommittee has long worked on a bipartisan basis to
    strengthen and improve our national integrated air and missile
    defense architecture. Our adversaries continue to improve and
    diversify their ability to hold the Homeland at risk, including
    through ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. I remain
    deeply concerned that the status quo will not suffice in the
    coming decades, and I look forward to hearing from each of our
    witnesses about their work on the Department's various missile
    defense activities.
        General Guillot, as the Commander of United States Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM) you are ultimately responsible for the
    defense of our Homeland. I look forward to hearing how NORTHCOM
    is working to enhance domain awareness to provide a common
    picture of the operational environment.
        Ms. Yaffe, as you stated in your written testimony, missile
    defense and the space domain are intrinsically linked. I look
    forward to hearing your views on the evolution of missile
    defense and how space-based systems can continue to play an
    important role going forward.
        Lieutenant General Collins, I understand the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) will retain its key role in developing,
    testing, and integrating many of the technologies that comprise
    our missile defense system, and I look forward to hearing how
    we can expect to expand on these efforts in the coming fiscal
    year.
        Finally, I would like to welcome Lieutenant General Rasch,
    in his capacity as the Executive Officer of the Guam Defense
    System Joint Program Office. I look forward to hearing from you
    about the progress being made to expand and improve the
    integrated air and missile defense of Guam, which will protect
    over 160,000 American citizens living on Guam.
        I understand that we are still waiting for details of the
    fiscal year 2026 President's Budget Request to be released, and
    that the President is in the final stages of making key
    decisions about the Golden Dome system. While this means that
    follow-on conversations will be necessary once the
    Administration provides us those details, I still expect a
    robust conversation this afternoon on the future of missile
    defense. Thank you again.
        Senator King, would you like to make some opening remarks
    please.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

        Senator King. Thank you very much, Madam Co-Chair. Can I
    say that?
        Senator Fischer. Yes.
        Senator King. Thank you. This Subcommittee does work very
    strongly on a bipartisan basis. We look forward to your
    testimony. Very important hearing today with regard to a very
    important subject.
        Ms. Yaffe, I don't expect you to answer these questions now
    but I am giving you a preview. One of the questions is, in
    light of the multiplicity of threats now, whether it is
    standoff cruise missiles, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
    (ICBMs), sea-launched missiles, space-based weapons, is missile
    defense feasible? In other words, is it technologically
    feasible if we face a serious attack from an adversary that has
    not several dozen missiles but several thousand.
        Mr. Guillot--or General, I am sorry--one of the questions I
    am interested in is the importance of sensors. This discussion
    is often about missiles, but it is also about knowing what is
    going on, and particularly in your AOR I think there are some
    serious questions that bear discussion about our situational
    awareness.
        Finally, General Collins, I am interested in what is Golden
    Dome. In other words, what is the plan? What does it consist
    of? I did a little artificial intelligence (AI) research this
    morning and found out Israel is exactly the same size as New
    Jersey. So having a missile defense system in a limited space,
    also that defends against pretty small caliber munitions from
    the terrorists in the region, obviously more serious from Iran,
    but whether that concept can be transferred to the continental
    United States is a question I will be interested in.
        So I look forward to all of your testimony. Very important
    hearing, and I appreciate all the work that you do and the
    service you provide to the country.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
        Now I would like to begin with statements from each member.
    Who is going first at this point? Ms. Yaffe?

     STATEMENT OF ANDREA YAFFE, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Yaffe. Thank you. I am happy to start out to provide
    the policy perspective.
        Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
    on the Department of Defense's missile defense posture, on
    behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I am grateful
    to appear alongside my distinguished colleagues.
        Missile defenses are a vital element of our strategic force
    posture, both as a means of deterrence as well as defending the
    U.S. Homeland and security interests abroad. As we see nearly
    every day in conflicts across the world, offensive missile
    capabilities are now a central feature of modern warfare and
    routinely deployed to coerce and intimidate opponents, inflict
    tactical damage, and carry out strategic campaigns.
        Our adversaries are investing in the next generation of
    offensive capabilities to hold the United States Homeland at
    risk, coerce our allies and partners, and threaten our deployed
    forces.
        To counter these growing threats we need next-generation
    missile defeat and missile defense architectures that can
    complement our existing nuclear and conventional offensive
    capabilities. The President has mandated that the United States
    will develop and field a next-generation missile defense shield
    to provide for the common defense of our citizens and the
    Nation and deter, defend against, and defeat any foreign aerial
    attack on the Homeland. We will also guarantee our secure
    second strike capability. This broad mission set is the task
    before us today.
        Missile threats pose a substantial and growing risk to the
    American people, U.S. national interests, and our allies and
    partners. The growing cooperation and potential for more
    coordinated action among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran
    is reflecting a shared interest in undermining United States
    interests globally.
        We also see these countries working together to advance
    their respective interests. Russia has provided technical and
    economic assistance to North Korea and Iran in return for
    thousands of munitions, attack drones, and ballistic missiles.
    Russia has employed North Korean missiles in Ukraine, resulting
    in improvements in their accuracy and destructive capability.
        Department of Defense (DOD) must content with adversaries
    possessing a range of sophisticated technologies, including
    advanced cruise and ballistic missiles and maneuverable
    Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), as well as lower-tier threats
    like unmanned aircraft systems from both State and non-State
    actors. These capabilities continue to evolve and include a
    wide range of platforms, speeds, distances, and attack vectors
    that are easily concealed and evasive.
        This is where the value of missile defense, a core
    component of deterrence by denial, comes in. Robust missile
    defense capabilities raise the threshold for conflict and
    introduce uncertainty and complexity into attack planning,
    thereby undermining an adversary's confidence that an attack
    will be successful. The greater the cumulative challenges for
    an adversary, the greater the likelihood of avoiding an attack
    in the first place. If deterrence fails and an attack does
    occur, missile defenses limit the damage and assure the means
    of effective responses.
        Moreover, missile defenses provide time and space for the
    President to decide how to respond most effectively. The
    financial outlays of missile defense and missile defeat today
    more than offset the exponentially greater costs that would be
    incurred by the lack of defenses in a potential conflict
    tomorrow.
        Missile defense systems also contribute to deterrence by
    reinforcing our diplomatic and security posture while
    reassuring allies and partners. Should deterrence fail, the
    United States, our allies, and partners would need robust
    missile defense and defeat options, not only to defend and
    protect our interests but also to manage escalation.
    Integration with our allies and partners improves our all-
    domain awareness, redundancy, and shot deconfliction. The
    deterrence by denial contributions to missile defense continue
    to serve as a complement to the cost imposition strategies
    offered by our conventional and nuclear forces. Together they
    give our decisionmakers time and credible options to deter
    aggression, assure lethality, protect the American people from
    harm, and respond to attacks if deterrence fails.
        The Department of Defense remains committed to making the
    necessary investments in our strategic posture to deter our
    adversaries and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.
    The missile defense and defeat mission requires sufficient and
    consistent funding and support.
        Thank you for your dedication to our mission and our
    servicemembers and for the opportunity to testify to you today
    alongside my colleagues. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Yaffe follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Ms. Andrea Yaffe
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of
    the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify on the Department
    of Defense's missile defense posture. I am grateful to appear alongside
    my distinguished colleagues. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)
    for Space Policy is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of
    Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy on all missile defense and defeat activities. It is
    my privilege and honor to oversee this office pending the nomination
    and confirmation of a new ASD for Space Policy. For this testimony, I
    will review how air and missile threats have evolved over the last year
    and provide an update on our missile defense policy, strategy, and
    programs to meet these challenges.
        Missile defenses are a vital element of our strategic force
    posture, both as a means of deterrence as well as defending the U.S.
    Homeland and security interests abroad. As we see nearly every day in
    conflicts across the world, offensive missile capabilities are now a
    central feature of modern warfare. China, the Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran now routinely deploy
    advanced missile systems to coerce and intimidate opponents, inflict
    tactical damage, and carry-out strategic campaigns.
        Our adversaries are investing in the next generation of offensive
    capabilities to hold the United States Homeland at risk, coerce our
    allies and partners, and threaten our deployed forces. China, Russia,
    and the DPRK, are fielding more advanced missiles with greater ranges
    and in larger numbers to provide the means for strategic-level attack
    against the Homeland, including nuclear and conventional options. These
    adversaries are rapidly modernizing, expanding, and diversifying their
    missile forces, incorporating technological advances into warheads,
    delivery systems of all types, and supporting command and control
    systems. Iran, meanwhile, has the capability to strike targets
    throughout the Middle East and continues to arm its proxies in the
    region. The President's Golden Dome for America Executive Order
    underscores this point: ``The threat of attack by ballistic,
    hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial attacks,
    remains the most catastrophic threat facing the United States.''
        To counter these growing threats, we need next generation missile
    defeat and missile defense architectures that can complement our
    existing nuclear and conventional offensive capabilities. The President
    has mandated that the United States will develop and field a next
    generation missile defense shield to provide for the common defense of
    our citizens and the Nation, and deter, defend against, and defeat any
    foreign aerial attack on the Homeland. We will also guarantee our
    secure second-strike capability. This broad mission set is the task
    before us today.
        Missile defense and the space domain are intrinsically linked as
    key elements of the necessary solution. Proliferated space-based
    sensors offer an optimal perspective for missile warning and tracking,
    and efforts in the space domain will be critical for the future
    technological growth of missile defense. The other essential
    requirement for countering missile attacks is to develop and deploy
    capabilities to defeat them prior to launch.
                              security environment
        Missile threats pose a substantial and growing risk to the American
    people, U.S. national interests, and our allies and partners. The
    growing cooperation and potential for more coordinated action among
    China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran is displaying a shared interest in
    undermining United States interests globally.
    China
        China is modernizing its missile forces to enhance its strategic
    deterrence capabilities and to deter and counter third-party
    intervention in regional conflicts. Today, China maintains a diverse
    arsenal of intercontinental-range forces, theater-range road-mobile
    ballistic missile systems, strategic hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)
    capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and sea-launched ballistic
    missile submarines that can hold the United States and our allies and
    partners at risk. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at
    extraordinary speed, developing a nuclear triad of land-based and sea-
    based missiles and a nuclear-capable strategic bomber. The United
    States Intelligence Community assesses that China will have more than
    1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, many of which will be
    deployed at higher readiness levels. We remain very concerned about the
    lack of transparency from China regarding these developments.
        China is also developing more survivable intercontinental ballistic
    missiles (ICBMs) to improve its nuclear-capable missile forces. Its
    ICBM arsenal currently consists of approximately 400 missiles,
    including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching unitary and
    multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. China's development
    of advanced nuclear delivery systems, such as a strategic HGV and a
    fractional orbital bombardment system, creates new challenges for
    deterrence.
        China views the possession of advanced conventional missile systems
    as a means to coerce neighbors and subvert U.S. efforts in the region.
    China possesses a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched,
    short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
    and ground-launched cruise missiles to enable long-range precision
    strikes within the First and Second Island Chains. This includes
    conventionally armed anti-ship ballistic missile variants and multi-
    role missiles for targeting aircraft carriers and other ships in the
    Western Pacific.
        Beijing is also developing and testing more advanced theater-range
    missiles, including capabilities and methods to counter adversary
    ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. This includes the DF-17 and
    longer-ranged DF-27 that have HGV payloads designed to evade early
    warning radars and associated defenses. More alarmingly, China is
    exploring the development of conventionally armed intercontinental
    range missile systems. If developed and fielded, these capabilities
    would enable China to strike all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
    and United States territories with conventional missiles. The
    introduction of intercontinental conventional capabilities has the
    potential to introduce uncertainty regarding whether an attack has a
    conventional or nuclear payload, thereby risking escalation to a
    nuclear exchange. In addition to missile development, China is making
    significant advancements in Command, Control, Computing,
    Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
    Targeting (C5ISRT) capabilities, such as a space-enabled targeting
    network, as well as counter C5ISRT capabilities, such as ground-based
    and space-based counterspace weapons, to strengthen their kill webs,
    enable the successful delivery of their long-range precision weapons,
    and, ultimately, hold U.S. and allied and partner forces at risk.
    Russia
        Russia continues to field ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic
    missiles and is using these systems extensively in Ukraine. It has
    employed air-launched, ground-launched, and sea-launched systems, some
    of which could also deliver a nuclear warhead. In addition, Russia is
    pursuing novel and destabilizing nuclear systems that are additive to
    its existing capabilities, and are designed to hold the United States
    Homeland, allies, and partners at risk.
        Additionally, the direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles and on-
    orbit counterspace capabilities being developed by China and Russia
    threaten the space-based sensors critical for our early warning and
    missile defense architecture. These threats underscore the need to
    create a shared international understanding what constitutes
    responsible operational rules for safety and stability in space.
    DPRK and Iran
        The DPRK and Iran also have missile capabilities that threaten our
    territory, forces, and allies. The DPRK continues to develop its ICBM
    forces with frequent long-range tests of new systems, including the
    test last October of a new, more powerful solid-fueled missile capable
    of reaching most of the continental United States. The DPRK's
    conventional missile forces, including short and medium-range ballistic
    missiles, and cruise missiles, remain a substantial threat to the
    DPRK's neighbors and to U.S. territory and forces in the region.
        Iran possesses the largest missile program in the Middle East and
    twice demonstrated its willingness and ability to use this force last
    year with coordinated air and ballistic missile strikes of more than a
    thousand kilometers against Israel. Iran also remains the world's
    biggest proliferator of ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned
    aircraft attack systems and related technologies to State and non-State
    entities. The recipients of Iran's support include Hamas in Gaza, the
    Houthis in Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Like Iran, these groups
    have demonstrated a willingness to use these weapons--whether against
    Israel or commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
    Adversary Cooperation
        We also see these countries working together to advance their
    respective interests. Russia has provided technical and economic
    assistance to the DPRK and Iran in return for thousands of munitions,
    attack drones, and ballistic missiles. Russia has employed DPRK
    missiles in Ukraine, resulting in improvements in their accuracy and
    destructive capability. The significant growth in the DPRK-Russia
    strategic partnership merits close attention because the two countries
    increasingly share resources, knowledge, and technology to bolster and
    expand their air and missile forces.
    Adversary Missile Defense Capabilities
        China and Russia possess the largest integrated air and missile
    defense forces in the world, dedicated to protecting their respective
    homelands and forces from air and missile attack. China is modernizing
    its ballistic missile defense capabilities, fielding the indigenous CH-
    AB-02 (HQ-19) and developing kinetic-kill vehicle technology to field a
    mid-course interceptor. This mid-course interceptor will form the upper
    layer of a multi-tiered missile defense. China tested a land-based,
    mid-course interceptor on February 4, 2021. Russia, meanwhile, has
    maintained a missile defense system to defend Moscow since the 1970's.
    It currently consists of about 68 nuclear-armed interceptors. Russia is
    also developing the S-500, which has some capability against ballistic
    missiles, and operates other credible air and missile defenses to
    defend critical assets and fielded forces.
                      missile defense strategy and posture
        DOD must contend with adversaries possessing a range of
    sophisticated technologies, including advanced cruise and ballistic
    missiles and maneuverable HGVs, as well as lower-tier threats, like
    unmanned aircraft system (UAS), from both State and non-State actors.
    These capabilities continue to evolve and include a wide range of
    platforms, speeds, distances, and attack vectors that are easily
    concealed and evasive.
        This is where the value of missile defense--a core component of
    deterrence-by-denial--comes in. Robust missile defense capabilities
    raise the threshold for conflict and introduce uncertainty and
    complexity into attack planning, thereby undermining an adversary's
    confidence that an attack will be successful. The greater the
    cumulative challenges for an adversary, the greater the likelihood of
    avoiding an attack in the first place. If deterrence fails and an
    attack does occur, missile defenses limit the damage and assure the
    means of effective responses. Moreover, missile defenses provide time
    and space for the President to decide how to respond most effectively.
    The financial outlays of missile defense and missile defeat today more
    than offset the exponentially greater cost that would be incurred by
    the lack of defenses in a potential conflict tomorrow. This premise is
    at the core of the Golden Dome executive order.
        Missile defense systems also contribute to deterrence by
    reinforcing our diplomatic and security posture while reassuring allies
    and partners. Should deterrence fail, the United States, our allies,
    and partners would need robust missile defense and defeat options not
    only to defend and protect our interests, but also to manage
    escalation. Integration with our allies and partners improves our all-
    domain awareness, redundancy, and shot deconfliction, and we are
    working to overcome barriers to data and cost sharing.
        Last year, we witnessed this scenario unfold on multiple occasions.
    Iran's large-scale ballistic, cruise missile, and UAS attack against
    Israel in April and follow-on massive ballistic missile attack in
    October 2024 represented one of the largest concentrated barrages ever
    conducted by any nation. The successful coalition missile defense and
    missile defeat responses against both attacks created opportunities for
    strategic pause, allowing Israel to calibrate its next moves rather
    than rush into a counterattack with potential unintended escalation.
        The deterrence by denial contributions to missile defense continue
    to serve as a complement to the cost imposition strategies offered by
    our conventional and nuclear forces. Together they give our
    decisionmakers time and credible options to deter aggression, assure
    lethality, and protect the American people from harm and respond to
    attacks if deterrence fails.
        Space-based capabilities and assurance of nuclear second-strike
    capabilities are also part of the direction for a Golden Dome for
    America. The executive order calls for the ground-breaking development
    and deployment of a next generation missile defense shield capable of
    protecting the American people against a catastrophic missile attack.
    Golden Dome is a top priority for the Department and will include the
    development of cutting-edge domain awareness systems, kinetic and non-
    kinetic missile defeat capabilities in the space and cyberspace
    domains, and advanced command, control, and battle management systems
    to integrate and augment traditional U.S. missile defense capabilities.
        Burden sharing with allies and partners is also a priority in the
    missile defense arena. Japan's co-development of the Glide Phase
    Interceptor with us is a prime example, as is their acquisition of
    Aegis system equipped vessels and SM-6 interceptors. Data sharing in
    the Indo-Pacific region is also a crucial initiative, with efforts
    already in place with Japan and South Korea, and discussions underway
    with Australia as well. Meanwhile, we are co-developing the Arrow 4 and
    co-producing Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow 3 BMD systems with
    Israel, and Saudi Arabia is acquiring seven THAAD batteries. Closer, to
    home, Canada is acquiring over-the-horizon radars that will be helpful
    for the defense of North America. Finally, in Europe, Germany, Norway,
    Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland are acquiring Patriot
    batteries and interceptors. These allied investments are a start, but
    not sufficient to meet the growing threats that we collectively face
    today. As the Secretary has stated many times, greater burden-sharing
    is required, and we continue to emphasize this point in our discussions
    with our allies and partners.
                                   conclusion
        The Department of Defense remains committed to making the necessary
    investments in our strategic posture to deter our adversaries and, if
    deterrence fails, prevail in conflict. The missile defense and defeat
    mission requires sufficient and consistent funding and support. Thank
    you for your dedication to our mission and our servicemembers, and for
    the opportunity to testify to you today alongside my distinguished
    colleagues. I look forward to answering your questions.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. General Guillot,
    welcome.

       STATEMENT OF GENERAL GREGORY M. GUILLOT, USAF, COMMANDER,
      UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
                            DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Guillot. Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    holding this important hearing. North American Aerospace
    Defense Command and United States Northern Command have
    critical roles in defending The Homeland from missile attack,
    and your support remains vital to our success.
        I would like to start by recognizing the tremendous work
    being done by Lieutenant General Collins, Acting Principle
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Yaffe, and
    Lieutenant General Rasch. Northern American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD) and NORTHCOM are fortunate to have such
    committed partners in our shared no-fail mission.
        Defending the United States from missile threats remains a
    top command priority. That mission is more important than ever
    as global competitors continue their rapid development and
    fielding of advanced missile capabilities and delivery
    platforms along with increased cooperation and technology
    sharing.
        To counter these growing challenges, NORAD and NORTHCOM
    rely on realistic planning, on-time investments based on
    specific threats, and forward-looking policies that ensure the
    command's ability to detect, track, and defeat potential
    threats in all domains.
        To ensure our ability to defend against missile attacks,
    NORAD and NORTHCOM require a layered, domain awareness network,
    from seabed to space, to detect and track threats to North
    America. That sensing network is vital to today's ballistic and
    cruise missile defense missions and to the Golden Dome concept
    because we can't defeat what we can't see.
        Alongside improved domain awareness we must also improve
    our capability and capacity to defeat advanced missile threats.
    The Next-Generation Interceptor is vital to countering North
    Korea's growing ICBM capability, and innovation investment in
    advanced defeat mechanisms, which could include directed energy
    and boost-phase intercept will be crucial against cruise
    missiles, hypersonics, and other advanced threats.
        There are significant challenges ahead of us, but NORAD and
    NORTHCOM stand ready to deter aggression and defeat threats to
    our Nation.
        Again, thank to this Subcommittee and my fellow witnesses
    for your continued support, and I look forward to your
    questions. We have the watch.
        [The prepared statement of General Guillot follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General Gregory M. Guillot
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members
    of the Sub-Committee: I am honored to appear today and to represent the
    men and women of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Both commands continue to
    defend North America through what is arguably the most complicated and
    rapidly evolving operational environment we have seen. The USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD operational environment remains diverse and dynamic, ranging
    from persistent competitor activity in the vicinity of North America to
    major natural disasters that have impacted millions of Americans. I am
    proud to report that the service members and civilian Federal employees
    at the heart of every USNORTHCOM and NORAD endeavor have risen to each
    challenge as they stand their unending watch over our homelands.
        USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands linked by history,
    collaboration, and a shared commitment to defending North America.
    USNORTHCOM was established in 2002 as the U.S. geographic combatant
    command responsible for homeland defense, security cooperation with
    allies and partners in the command's area of responsibility, and
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the continental United
    States and Alaska. USNORTHCOM is responsible for defending the United
    States--to include Hawaii and Alaska--from ballistic missile attacks,
    while the Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated by the Unified
    Command Plan as the Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic
    Capabilities. Finally, in accordance with Presidential Executive Orders
    issued on 20 January, 2025, USNORTHCOM is rapidly integrating requested
    military personnel and assets to support the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs & Border Protection (USCBP) along the
    southern border, employing unique military capabilities in all domains,
    and developing plans for establishing territorial integrity along the
    southern border. USNORTHCOM's current mission in support of USCBP is to
    seal the borders and repel all forms of invasion including mass
    migration, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and
    other criminal activities.
        Established in 1958 to counter the threat of Soviet long-range
    bombers, NORAD is the bi-national United States and Canadian command
    responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning for North America. For nearly 67 years, the United States and
    Canadian personnel assigned to NORAD have worked side-by-side in a
    shared commitment to continental defense. Forged through operational
    experience and a common vision, NORAD consistently demonstrates world-
    class professional standards while executing its critical defense
    mission 24 hours a day. Today, NORAD remains the world's only bi-
    national command, safeguarding the United States and Canada while
    routinely demonstrating seamless interoperability and operational
    excellence that our competitors can only hope to match.
        Together, USNORTHCOM and NORAD's experience, expertise, and
    dedication to homeland defense are more critical today than ever.
    Following years of steady investment, our strategic competitors have
    the means to overcome U.S. advantages provided by our favorable
    geography and advanced technology. Today, our competitors have the
    capability and capacity to threaten all of North America with a range
    of advanced nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic systems while
    employing disruptive grey-zone, cyber, and information operations
    against the United States and our international partners. As part of
    that effort, competitors have formed strategic relationships that
    increase their collective ability to challenge U.S. and allied
    interests around the world with growing disregard of international
    norms or the sovereignty of nations that challenge their expansionist
    ambitions. Meanwhile, unprecedented flows of illicit drugs and human
    traffic across the U.S. southern border have created a crisis that
    undermines national security and the safety of citizens and communities
    across the country.
        The dynamic operational environment and evolving threats to North
    America require USNORTHCOM and NORAD to execute new missions on a
    moment's notice without sacrificing ongoing operations and future
    planning. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are fortunate to draw upon decades of
    shared history and lessons learned to shape the commands' plans and
    operations, and defending the homelands in the coming years will
    require forward thinking, advanced capabilities, and a professional
    workforce with the experience and technical knowledge necessary to
    plan, resource, and execute the commands' crucial missions in
    tremendously demanding conditions.
        The Homeland defense enterprise will continue to rely on realistic
    planning, targeted investment, and forward-looking policies that ensure
    the Commands' ability to detect, track, and defeat potential threats in
    all domains. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are working in close synchronization
    with each of the commands' interagency, international, and DOD partners
    to improve shared all-domain awareness, interoperability, and the
    defeat mechanisms required for a layered all-domain defense capable of
    deterring and defeating a wide range of threats to critical
    infrastructure, force projection capability, and our citizens.
        As competitor ambitions and capabilities grow, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    remain committed to improving all-domain awareness, reinforcing our
    vital network of allies and partners, and fostering a workforce of
    skilled and dedicated civilian and military professionals. Each of
    these focus areas are critical to ensuring the homeland defense
    enterprise remains ready to deter and defeat any threat to our nations
    today and well into the future, and both commands have made significant
    strides in building the capabilities, networks, and people needed to
    execute their vital missions.
                            threats to north america
        The global security environment is growing increasingly volatile,
    characterized by intensifying competition among major powers and
    mounting threats to the rules-based international order. Among the
    myriad developments that are reshaping the strategic environment, three
    trends are of particular concern to NORAD and USNORTHCOM due to their
    immediate implications for our Homeland Defense mission.
        First, the likelihood of a direct conflict between the United
    States and one of its four principal adversaries is increasing. While
    the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran each seek to avoid armed
    conflict with the United States, their perception of Western decline
    fosters a growing willingness to challenge the United States on the
    global stage and increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis. As
    Russia's brutal and misguided invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth
    year, there remain several plausible pathways by which the war could
    escalate into a direct military conflict with the United States.
    Similarly, the conflict ignited by Hamas' October 2023 attack on Israel
    has expanded to encompass much of the Middle East and threatens to
    embroil the United States in a direct military conflict with Iran and
    its proxies.
        Meanwhile, simmering tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China
    Sea carry a persistent risk of escalation into armed conflict between
    China and the United States, with consequences that could span a
    generation. Finally, Kim Jong Un's public abandonment of peaceful
    reunification as a national goal and growing assertiveness on the
    global stage risks sparking renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula
    after more than seven decades of uneasy Armistice.
        Second, strategic cooperation between and among our four principal
    adversaries has grown substantially since the beginning of the Ukraine
    War, increasing the risk that war with one adversary could quickly
    expand into war with an enemy coalition. To date, each of these
    relationships has remained mostly transactional, and none has advanced
    to the level of a formal military alliance. Nonetheless, these
    countries' shared perceptions of the West as a global destabilizing
    force could form the foundation of a wartime partnership. At the center
    of this concerning dynamic is a rapidly evolving relationship between
    the United States' two most capable adversaries.
        Despite decades of mutual mistrust, Beijing and Moscow seem
    determined to advance their strategic partnership and military
    cooperation to counter what they perceive as a persistent United States
    threat to their core security interests. Catalyzed by the onset of a
    major war, this nascent military cooperation could quickly expand into
    coordinated military operations that complicate U.S. and allied
    planning and advance each adversary's ability to threaten North
    America. We saw glimpses of this enhanced military cooperation last
    summer when Chinese bomber aircraft deployed to a Russian Arctic
    airbase and flew a combined patrol with Russian heavy bombers over the
    Bering Sea.
        Such ``access transfer'' accelerates and extends China's ability to
    threaten North America in the air domain and raises the specter of
    coordinated military operations in the event of a strategic conflict.
    Separately, North Korea's willingness to risk its own troops in support
    of Russia's war in Ukraine demonstrates the lengths to which these
    partners are willing to go to advance their strategic positions and
    defy the Western-led international order. It also raises concerning
    questions about the quid pro quo that Moscow may offer in return,
    potentially including expertise that could accelerate Pyongyang's
    development of advanced strategic weapons.
        Third, each of our adversaries is advancing its ability--and, in
    some cases, rehearsing its plans--to threaten North America in multiple
    domains and from multiple vectors, increasing the likelihood that an
    armed conflict would include direct strikes on the Homeland. The PRC is
    expanding its ability to hold portions of North America at risk with
    conventionally armed weapons, providing Beijing a strike option against
    our Homeland that is above its demonstrated robust cyberattack
    capabilities but below its threshold for nuclear use. Last July,
    Chinese surface combatants deployed to the Bering Sea for the fourth
    straight year and operated within cruise missile range of critical
    infrastructure throughout Alaska. Since 2023, China has launched two
    hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-powered guided-missile
    submarines (SSGN), which in the coming years could provide Beijing a
    clandestine land-attack option against critical infrastructure in
    Alaska and the U.S. West Coast. In November, China incorporated air-
    refuellable H-6N medium bombers into a Sino-Russian combined bomber
    patrol, marking the first long-range use of a platform that will extend
    the PLA Air Force's strike range to include portions of Alaska even
    without basing or overflight permissions from the Russians. Finally,
    China may be exploring the development of conventionally armed ICBMs
    that could allow Beijing to strike targets in Alaska and the
    continental United States without crossing the nuclear threshold.
        Meanwhile, China is advancing the quantity and sophistication of
    its North America-threatening nuclear deliver platforms. Chinese
    missile developers are probably developing nuclear-armed ICBMs equipped
    with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) or the ability to fly a
    fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) trajectory that approaches
    North America from the south rather than the traditional northerly
    vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed. Such
    systems, if fielded, would erode strategic stability by degrading our
    ability to provide granular and actionable warning of an inbound
    attack.
        Despite the degradation of its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine,
    Russia has enhanced its already formidable capability to threaten North
    America with conventionally armed air-and sea-based cruise missiles.
    Three years of strike operations into Ukraine have provided valuable
    operational experience to Russian aircrews and naval forces. In the
    last year, Russia's heavy bomber fleet has resumed its pre-war pace of
    strategic deterrence patrols--including multiple flights along the
    North American coastline--while simultaneously intensifying its strike
    operations into Ukraine. In the maritime domain, the Russian submarine
    force conducted its first port call in Cuba since the cold war and
    further integrated advanced Severodvinsk-class SSGNs into the Russian
    Pacific Fleet, portending regular--and potentially concurrent--patrols
    by cruise missile-capable submarines off North America's Atlantic and
    Pacific coasts.
        In the nuclear domain, Russia fielded the world's first HGV-
    equipped ICBM over 5 years ago and continues to develop and test other
    novel nuclear delivery systems, like the FOBS-capable Sarmat heavy
    ICBM, the Poseidon transoceanic torpedo, and the Burevestnik nuclear-
    propelled cruise missile. If fielded, these advanced weapons will
    severely challenge our ability to detect and characterize an inbound
    attack and determine an appropriate response during a conflict.
        North Korea continues to defy the international nonproliferation
    regime and advance its strategic weapons program. Kim Jong Un's newest
    ICBM--the Hwasong-19 he first tested last October--probably can deliver
    a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America while minimizing
    our ability to provide pre-launch warning due to the shortened launch
    preparation timelines afforded by its solid-propellant design. Regime
    rhetoric surrounding the new ICBM suggests Kim is eager to transition
    his strategic weapons program from research and development to serial
    production and fielding, a process that could rapidly expand North
    Korea's inventory and narrow my confidence in USNORTHCOM's ballistic
    missile defense capacity in the coming years.
        Finally, Iran retains the capability to strike the United States in
    the cyber domain and through its asymmetric and proxy operations.
    Meanwhile, Iran's burgeoning nuclear energy and space launch programs
    provide a viable pathway for developing a North America-threatening
    ICBM should its leaders determine that they need a more forceful means
    of challenging the United States.
        Separately, we face a variety of non-traditional threats that could
    disrupt critical services in the Homeland and degrade NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM's ability to carry out our no-fail missions. Key among these
    is a spate of activity over the past year involving small uncrewed
    aircraft systems (sUAS) operating over sensitive DOD installations and
    other Defense Critical Infrastructure. While much of this activity may
    be attributable to hobbyists, peer adversaries clearly have incentive
    to collect intelligence on these installations, and our law enforcement
    partners have uncovered evidence of a foreign intelligence nexus in
    some of these incidents.
        Meanwhile, our principal adversaries are concentrating their
    increasingly sophisticated offensive cyberoperations on U.S. defense
    and civilian infrastructure. Over the last year, Russian-affiliated
    cyber actors have conducted attacks on water supply, wastewater,
    hydroelectric, and energy facilities in the United States, while PRC-
    sponsored cyber actors have positioned themselves on IT networks in
    multiple United States sectors, potentially enabling them to rapidly
    transition to disruptive attacks in the event of a crisis or conflict.
        Finally, I remain highly concerned by threats presented by non-
    State actors. USNORTHCOM assesses the threat of a foreign terrorist
    attack in North America is at the highest level in at least 5 years, as
    the Israel-Hamas conflict has motivated foreign terrorist organizations
    to rejuvenate their attack planning against the United States. These
    groups have also redoubled their propaganda efforts in the last 18
    months to inspire lone-wolf terrorists to pursue attacks within the
    Homeland, as seen with the deadly January 1st 2025 attack in New
    Orleans.
        Separately, transnational criminal organizations based in Mexico
    continue to threaten United States sovereignty and territorial
    integrity through the production and trafficking of fentanyl and other
    dangerous drugs and the facilitation of unlawful mass migration toward
    the U.S. southern border. Drug-related violence has escalated in recent
    years as rival cartels fight for control of lucrative drug and human
    trafficking routes and demonstrate a growing willingness to directly
    engage Mexican security forces, increasing the risk of spillover
    violence into the United States.
                             defending the homeland
        Homeland defense remains USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top priority and
    essential task. Strategic competitors continue their rapid testing and
    fielding of precision weapons systems capable of striking targets well
    into the U.S and Canadian interior. As those threats increase,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are tasked with defending critical defense
    infrastructure in the Homeland from attack in order to preserve U.S.
    Force projection capability and mitigating risks to vital
    transportation, energy, and manufacturing hubs. Addressing threats from
    long-range missiles, cyberattacks, and unmanned aerial systems requires
    close coordination and collaboration with a host of interagency,
    international, and DOD partners, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are ideally
    situated to serve as the synchronizer and integrator for that crucial
    whole-of-government enterprise.
        Over the course of the last year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have
    expanded on already robust efforts to improve the capability of the
    Joint Force and the interagency community to defend key sites--from
    military installations to civilian transportation and energy nodes--
    from attack. That effort is making significant progress thanks in large
    part to the expertise, cooperation, and commitment of our DOD and
    interagency partners. As this critical effort moves forward, success
    will depend on collaboration across the interagency community, as well
    as on developing the forward-looking capabilities and policies
    necessary to ensure a seamless and well-coordinated defensive
    enterprise that accounts for the unique requirements of conducting
    defensive operations inside the United States and Canada.
        In the event of combat operations or attacks against the United
    States, USNORTHCOM will have a role in protecting DOD installations--
    along with airports, seaports, rail networks, and highway
    infrastructure necessary to project forces into overseas geographic
    combatant commands--from both kinetic and cyber threats. USNORTHCOM is
    actively engaged with the whole-of-government enterprise involved in
    this nationwide effort to refine the plans and deployable, low-
    collateral capabilities required to mitigate the wide range of threats
    to these key sites inside the United States.
    Protecting Territorial Integrity
        Following the January 20, 2025 Presidential declaration of a
    national emergency on the U.S. southern border, USNORTHCOM was assigned
    amplified responsibilities for maintaining the territorial integrity
    and sovereignty of the United States. In accordance with Presidential
    Executive Orders and Department directives, USNORTHCOM immediately
    deployed 1,800 military personnel, aircraft, and equipment to the
    southern border to reinforce existing Federal military personnel,
    aircraft, and equipment to the southern border to reinforce existing
    Federal military personnel, aircraft, and equipment to the southern
    border to reinforce existing Federal military personnel, aircraft, and
    equipment to the southern border to reinforce existing Federal border
    security operations in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    (USCBP). Meanwhile, the command is preparing a Commander's estimate and
    a detailed contingency plan (CONPLAN), in accordance with Presidential
    Executive Orders and Department directives, toprovide steady-state
    border security in accordance with the pending update to the Unified
    Campaign Plan (UCP) directed by the President. USNORTHCOM's priority is
    to meet the requirement and intent of these directives, and the
    command's actions and plans reflect the urgency associated with the
    President's emergency declaration.
    Defending Against Air and Missile Threats
        The DPRK continues to test increasingly capable ICBMs, while Russia
    and the PRC have steadily expanded their stockpiles of highly capable
    long-range land-attack cruise missiles and the fleets of the delivery
    platforms that launch them. The risks to the homeland posed by nuclear-
    armed ICBMs are clear, while advanced PRC and Russian cruise missiles
    are difficult to detect and can carry both nuclear and conventional
    payloads. All of these weapons can be launched against the United
    States and Canada in an effort to degrade the infrastructure enabling
    United States military force projection, inflict economic harm, and
    weaken public support for U.S. intervention in overseas conflicts.
        As air and missile threats to the homeland will continue to mount,
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking immediate actions to implement the
    January 27, 2025 Executive Order directing the building of a Missile
    Defense Shield for North America. USNORTHCOM and NORAD envision this
    defensive system of systems as three overlapping defensive domes that
    will provide a continental all-domain awareness network directly linked
    to tailored defensive systems capable of defeating threats ranging from
    high-altitude ballistic missiles to lower-flying air-breathing threats,
    including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. These systems
    threaten all of North America, and the commands are working closely
    with Canadian allies to ensure a fully integrated approach to
    continental defense.
        As the foundational dome, improved domain awareness from the
    seafloor to space remains the most critical priority for deterring and
    defeating missile threats to the Homeland. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
    working closely with the U.S. Air Force, which has been tasked as the
    executive agent for air-and cruise-missile defense of the homeland to
    identify potential solutions to domain awareness challenges. It is
    vital that the domain awareness network provide the ability to detect,
    discriminate, and deliver crucial real-time information and a single
    common operational picture to leaders at all appropriate levels.
    Command modernization initiatives, including the establishment of a
    layered system of sensors such as space-based Airborne Moving Target
    Indicator (AMTI), Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR), the E-7 Wedgetail, and
    Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), remain critical to
    continental defense in order to detect, track, and prosecute adversary
    submarines, aircraft and surface vessels, as well as inbound missiles.
        In the next tier, USNORTHCOM will continue to defend the United
    States--to include Alaska and Hawaii--attacks from ballistic missiles
    as well as emerging threat systems. In the near-term, the current
    United States ground-based midcourse defense system has a long record
    of success and remains fully capable of defending against a potential
    DPRK missile attack. However the DPRK's demonstration of larger and
    more capable ICBM technology will require a corresponding increase in
    United States BMD capability beyond planned inventories. The on-time
    fielding of the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) remains a major
    USNORTHCOM priority, and I am working closely with the Missile Defense
    Agency and the Department to ensure that program remains on track.
    Looking forward, the United States and Canada must develop the
    capability to detect, track, and defeat emerging adversary systems, to
    include ICBMs armed with multiple independently targetable reentry
    vehicles (MIRVs), hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and fractional
    orbital bombardment systems (FOBS).
        The final tier will defend against air-breathing threats, to
    include unmanned aerial systems, threat aircraft, advanced land-attack
    cruise missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles designed to challenge
    U.S. Homeland defense systems from lower altitudes. To ensure
    effectiveness, the three nodes must be resilient, interconnected, and
    tailored to defeat specific threats, and developing these defenses and
    associated policy guidance that reflect the complex strategic
    environment and the reality of a homeland at risk will be critical in
    the coming years. I have every confidence in our collective ability to
    overcome these challenges and remain fully committed to collaboration
    with the Department, international allies, industry partners, and this
    Committee in pursuit of that critical goal.
                          operation noble eagle (one)
        While some of the capabilities required for comprehensive air and
    missile defense of the homeland remain in development, Operation NOBLE
    EAGLE (ONE) and NORAD's aerospace control mission have secured North
    American airspace for decades, adapting constantly to ever-evolving
    threats including Russian--and now PRC--bombers, violent extremist
    threats to civilian aviation, and advanced cruise missiles launched
    from the air and sea. NORAD's ability to adapt to and outpace emerging
    challenges is a cornerstone of the command's longstanding reputation as
    a pillar of continental defense.
        The threats to North American airspace have steadily grown more
    complex, and now include a spectrum of competitor capabilities that
    range from modernized long-range bombers and hypersonic cruise missiles
    down to small unmanned systems that can fit into a backpack. While two
    decades of whole-of-government response have reduced the threat of
    terrorist threats to civil aircraft, NORAD maintains the ability to
    deter and defeat nation-State threats from every avenue of approach to
    North America while safeguarding national leaders from aerial threats,
    both in the National Capital Region and around the country.
        Given the evolving security environment and robust mitigation
    efforts carried out by interagency partners, NORAD, in cooperation with
    the Department and the National Guard Bureau, will make specific
    changes to ``just in case'' aerospace control alert forces (ACA-1) this
    year and is conducting ongoing analysis of ``just in time'' flexible
    response capabilities (ACA-2). Such adjustments will allow NORAD to
    optimize protection of prioritized Defense Critical Infrastructure
    while maintaining adequate national response capability in support of
    civilian air traffic. In turn, the Air Force and the Air National Guard
    will be able to generate greater readiness against high-end threats
    though enhanced campaigning and training while remaining available to
    NORAD when indications and warning triggers are met.
        I am grateful to the Committee for your support for these key
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities, as we work to identify effective and
    affordable capabilities that will meet this important challenge now and
    well into the future. The same can be said of our Canadian partners, as
    the Government of Canada has committed to fielding long-range sensors
    and weapons system to deter and defeat potential air, sea, and missile
    threats in the approaches to North America. Integration and
    collaboration with Canada--through NORAD and in broader continental
    defense initiatives--will grow even more necessary as our competitor
    field greater numbers of increasingly advanced long-range cruise
    missiles.
    Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems
        There is perhaps no better example of the rapidly evolving
    strategic environment than the emergence of small unmanned aerial
    systems (sUAS) as a threat to infrastructure and personnel in the
    homeland. The availability and utility of small drones has grown
    exponentially over the last decade, and some have repeatedly employed
    these systems for illicit purposes. While U.S. and coalition forces
    overseas have faced the threat of weaponized unmanned systems for
    years, small drones have emerged as a significant risk to
    infrastructure and safety in the United States in a relatively short
    period of time. The widespread availability of small drones, coupled
    with a complicated regulatory structure and limitations on UAS
    countermeasures based on concerns for flight safety and privacy, has
    created significant vulnerabilities that have been exploited by known
    and unknown actors.
        There have been multiple incursions by UAS over military
    installations in the United States over the past year. To mitigate the
    potential threats to safety and security presented by UAS overflight of
    DOD facilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in close coordination with the
    military Services and DOD, resourced equipment and analytic tools to
    installation commanders to assist with detection, tracking, and
    mitigation of potential UAS threats. In November 2024, then-Secretary
    of Defense Austin directed USNORTHCOM to serve as the synchronizer,
    integrator, and/or coordinator of domestic counter-small UAS (C-sUAS)
    activities within the continental United States and Alaska for DOD and,
    when requested and approved, for the interagency. USNORTHCOM will play
    a critical role in an enduring whole-of-government effort to protect
    people, infrastructure, aircraft, and facilities from malign sUAS
    incursions. This effort will require investment in robust and evolving
    mitigation technologies suitable for use in the United States,
    alignment with interagency and industry partners, and policy and
    statutory changes that balance safety, privacy, and defensive
    requirements.
        In October 2024, USNORTHCOM and NORAD were proud to host
    Demonstration FALCON PEAK 25.1, which brought together DOD,
    interagency, and industry partners seeking to demonstrate counter-sUAS
    sensors and defeat mechanisms. Thanks to extraordinary support from the
    U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division, 10th Special Forces Group
    (Airborne), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Colorado
    National Guard, and many others, demonstration participants tracked and
    engaged live sUAS targets in complex, realistic scenarios over a number
    of days and nights within military Special Use Airspace. The
    demonstration provided important insights that the Commands and our
    partners will continue to build on, including during FALCON PEAK 25.2,
    which will include a larger slate of vendors, participants, and systems
    in August 2025, meeting FY25 National Defense Authorization Act
    direction.
        In recognition of the sUAS threat and the Commands' increased
    responsibilities, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have shifted resources and
    personnel to establish a C-UAS operations branch within our
    headquarters. This Committee has long been aware of the potential
    threat presented by sUAS, and I would like to extend my appreciation
    for your ongoing support for C-UAS research and acquisitions. That
    support will remain critical as success in the homeland C-sUAS mission
    will depend on improved C-UAS technology, interagency collaboration,
    and corresponding authorities and resourcing for the mission to defend
    against this significant risk to safety and security.
    Cyber Domain Roles and Responses
        Threats to civil and military infrastructure are a direct and
    constant concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While not directly
    responsible for the defense of non-USNORTHCOM networks, cyberattacks
    against United States and Canadian infrastructure carry the potential
    to negatively impact DOD force projection and could require significant
    defense support to civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of a
    damaging cyberattack against transportation, energy, or economic
    networks.
        Any direct action against the United States by a major competitor
    would almost certainly involve cyberattacks against strategic North
    American infrastructure, and USNORTHCOM collaborates daily with U.S.
    Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
    Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
    any number of other intergovernmental partners to deter, defend, and--
    if necessary--respond to cyberattacks.
    Defense Operations in the Arctic
        Defending North America is inherently linked to the ability of the
    Joint Force to operate effectively across the entire USNORTHCOM area of
    responsibility--to include the Arctic. Russia is expanding its
    capability and capacity to conduct military operations in the Arctic,
    seeking to control access to northern sea lanes and threaten North
    America from the northern approaches. In 2024, Russian and PRC aircraft
    and surface vessels conducted joint patrols in the Bering Sea, while
    the PRC repeatedly deployed dual-purpose vessels into the Arctic as
    part of a longstanding effort to expand the ability of the People's
    Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct multi-domain operations in the
    high north.
        Arctic responsibilities are shared across multiple geographic and
    functional combatant commands, and as competition in the region
    increases, safeguarding Arctic access and freedom of maneuver will
    depend on Joint Force Arctic operational capabilities and build on the
    already strong ties between Arctic partners. USNORTHCOM places enormous
    value on the ability to conduct operations and exercises in the high
    north and to execute assigned missions in coordination with fellow
    combatant commands.
        The annual ARCTIC EDGE exercise is a key example of a USNORTHCOM
    event that evaluates combatant command planning, communications, and
    operational oversight while simultaneously providing warfighters and
    enablers with valuable operational experience as they test the people,
    equipment, and logistics trains needed to execute their missions in
    remote and austere locations. Regular exercises and real-world
    operations in the Arctic remain critically important and generate
    valuable lessons learned for participants from the combatant command
    and components headquarters down to the operational and tactical
    levels. Effective operations in the Arctic require specialized training
    and equipment under the best of conditions, and there is no substitute
    for real-world experience in the region. USNORTHCOM and NORAD will
    continue to advocate for designated Arctic units that are specifically
    trained and equipped to execute their assigned missions in all
    conditions.
        As inter-reliance between allies and partners grows increasingly
    vital to ensuring a secure and open Arctic, USNORTHCOM and NORAD gain
    strength and capability from our military partnerships. In particular,
    the Canadian Armed Forces' expertise in Arctic operations and the
    Government of Canada's longstanding commitment to Arctic security are
    of enormous value to continental defense. Canada's Arctic Foreign
    Policy (CAFP), announced in December 2024, clearly recognizes the
    significance of Russia-PRC collaboration in the Arctic as well as the
    vast importance of the North American Arctic to both the United States
    and Canada.
        This policy will directly support NORAD through international
    diplomatic engagement and a series of important Canadian defense
    investments that will strengthen shared continental defense
    capabilities. The extraordinary value of the United States-Canadian
    defense relationship has proven itself time and again over the course
    of six decades, and I have every confidence that the the strategic
    vision and commitment to North American defense articulated in the
    CAFP, when resourced, will pay dividends for the defense of North
    America for many years to come.
                  security cooperation with regional partners
        USNORTHCOM's regional security cooperation relationships remain a
    critical element of the command's missions. USNORTHCOM's military
    partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas enhance our own
    homeland defense while building the capacity of those partners to
    operate and communicate with United States Forces. Those relationships
    are vital to countering competitor influence and presence in the
    Western Hemisphere while improving intelligence sharing, border
    security, and domain awareness.
        Decades of information sharing, combined exercises, and routine
    direct engagement between USNORTHCOM senior leaders and our Canadian,
    Mexican, and Bahamian military counterparts has brought North American
    defense cooperation to a historic high point. The bilateral and
    multilateral ties between our militaries will be of critical importance
    over the next 18 months as the United States, Mexico, and Canada
    prepare to host the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2026. USNORTHCOM's
    capacity to synchronize interagency and international partners will be
    crucial to ensuring the safety and security of this quadrennial global
    tournament. That work--which will involve dozens of military,
    intelligence community, and law-enforcement partners from all three
    host nations--is already well underway and will grow in scope and scale
    through the end of the competition.
        In the meantime, USNORTHCOM's routine engagements and exercises
    with our regional partners have produced operational capability with
    direct benefits for the defense of North America. In 2024, as a Russian
    Navy surface action group (SAG) transited the Atlantic Ocean,
    USNORTHCOM, NORAD, the Canadian Armed Forces, United States European
    Command, and United States Southern Command maintained constant common
    situational awareness of the SAG's location, while executing seamless
    operations across multiple international and combatant command
    boundaries. The execution of this mission was the direct result of the
    close ties between USNORTHCOM and our international and cross-command
    partners and demonstrated a degree of commonality and interoperability
    that our competitors are years from being able to match.
        Building our partners' ability to operate with U.S. Forces has led
    directly to improved regional domain awareness, information sharing,
    and cooperation against shared security challenges, especially given
    the efforts of peer competitors to gain influence with the United
    States' nearest neighbors. USNORTHCOM's dedicated efforts to support
    our partners' defense requirements over the years have played an
    important role in maintaining the United States as the clear partner of
    choice while simultaneously improving our partners' capability and
    capacity for addressing internal security challenges. USNORTHCOM
    remains committed to these essential relationships.
                  defense support of civil authorities (dsca)
        USNORTHCOM's support to civilian Federal agencies in times of need
    stands as the command's most visible mission to American citizens.
    Operating in support of a lead Federal agency, USNORTHCOM leverages the
    command's expertise in planning, synchronization, and operations to
    prepare for, assess, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.
    In 2024, USNORTHCOM provided air assets and ground forces to fight
    major wildfires in the western United States, to include the recent
    fires in Los Angeles; delivered relief to Americans in need following
    major hurricanes and flooding along the Atlantic coast; supported
    Federal law enforcement in securing National Special Security Events
    (NSSE); reinforced Federal counter-drug efforts, and augmented USCBP
    border operations.
        USNORTHCOM is proud to support each Federal partner, and delivering
    relief to American citizens exercises the same planning, operations,
    and communications mechanisms required to conduct homeland defense
    operations during periods of crisis and conflict. Drawing on the
    Command's expertise, specialized capabilities, and robust interagency
    networks, USNORTHCOM supports the vital missions of U.S. Federal law
    enforcement partners as they safeguard U.S. borders and citizens by
    leveraging the command's specialized intelligence collection
    capabilities abroad.
        Those capabilities also allow USNORTHCOM to play an increasing role
    in illuminating the illicit networks used by criminal cartels to move
    money, human traffic, and illegal drugs. The narcotics smuggled into
    the United States by transnational criminal organizations are directly
    responsible for tens of thousands of deaths each year, and USNORTHCOM
    welcomes the opportunity to assist partners in reducing the flow of
    illicit drugs into the United States.
        In the aftermath of the catastrophic flooding that struck eastern
    North Carolina in October 2024, USNORTHCOM supported the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with ground forces and aviation
    assets for search and rescue, delivery of relief supplies, route
    clearance, and other key missions that directly assisted residents of
    the affected areas. I want to specifically recognize the extraordinary
    response of leaders and Soldiers from the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne
    Corps, to include units from the 101st Airborne Division and the 82d
    Airborne Division. Thanks to their readiness, skill, and devotion to
    their mission, every USNORTHCOM request for forces was executed well
    ahead of required timelines and enabled an extraordinary response to a
    historic disaster. While there were certainly lessons learned for an
    even more effective response in future contingencies, I am extremely
    proud of the work done by USNORTHCOM, U.S. Army North and the deployed
    U.S. Army units whose incredible efforts helped so many Americans in
    need.
        A similar level of support from across the Department enabled
    USNORTHCOM to augment U.S. Secret Service (USSS) protection of the
    major Presidential and vice-Presidential candidates during the last
    several months of the 2024 Presidential campaign. In response to a USSS
    request for assistance following the attempted assassination of
    President Trump, USNORTHCOM, in concert with the Joint Staff and the
    military Services, provided explosive ordinance technicians, military
    working dog teams, and rotary-wing assets to ensure the safety and
    security of the candidates at nearly 200 locations. Successfully
    deploying dozens of highly specialized security teams to hundreds of
    event sites was a testament to the professional planners and operators
    involved with the mission, and I am proud of USNORTHCOM's support for
    this critical effort.
                                   conclusion
        I am honored and privileged to lead the men and women of USNORTHCOM
    and NORAD. I thank our service members and civilian employees for their
    efforts while executing our noble mission of defending the United
    States and Canada as both commands continue to expand our bi-national,
    whole-of-government, continental approach to homeland defense. I
    appreciate the critical role Congress plays in ensuring our service
    members remain ready to defend our homeland now and in the future, and
    I look forward to continued collaboration with all of our critical
    partners in defending our great nations.
                          We Have the Watch

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. General Collins,
    welcome.

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HEATH A. COLLINS, USAF,
                    DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Collins. Thank you, ma'am. Good afternoon, Chair
    Fischer, Ranking Member King, distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to talk about the
    Missile Defense Agency portfolio.
        MDA is moving quickly to provide effective defenses against
    a dangerous missile threat to defend the U.S. Homeland, our
    deployed forces, and our allies and friends. The agency is
    transforming itself, its enterprise, and its industry base in
    order to develop and deliver capabilities to the warfighter, at
    scale and speed.
        As we move with urgency to deliver the next-generation
    missile defense system, we intend to leverage the performance
    efficiencies found at integrated layered defenses. We also will
    continue to integrate and improve the space domain to support a
    missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and
    adaptable, to known and unanticipated threats.
        MDA's focus is on the improvement and sustainment of U.S.
    Homeland and regional defenses. We are enhancing the
    performance and capability of the fielded, Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense system along with development and testing of
    the Next-Generation Interceptor. We are working with the Navy
    to improve the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability
    and enhance hypersonic defenses, and with the Army to make
    investments in the future development of the Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense system, THAAD.
        Together in support of the Nation's missile defense
    enterprise and Golden Dome for America, MDA remains focused on
    delivering advanced, reliable, and resilient capabilities on
    accelerated timelines to meet the warfighter's needs.
        I greatly appreciate your continued support for MDA and for
    the missile defense mission, and I look forward to answering
    your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Collins follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
    discuss the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) portfolio.
        MDA is moving fast to provide effective defenses for the protection
    of the U.S. Homeland, deployed forces, and our allies and friends. We
    are focused on delivering advanced, reliable, resilient capabilities on
    accelerated timelines to meet Warfighter needs. Today, MDA is
    transforming itself, its enterprise, and its industry base to employ
    modern digital frameworks, models, and tools that improve decision
    advantage in order to field capabilities to the Warfighter at speed and
    scale. MDA is also engaging non-traditional companies with their
    innovative tools and approaches to tackle complex design and
    integration challenges. These efforts will reduce lead times and
    increasing transparency, agility, and efficiency to enable the MDA
    workforce to focus on delivering next generation missile defense
    capabilities.
        Over the past decade, adversaries have significantly advanced their
    ability to strike the homeland and field more sophisticated long-range
    weapons, including new ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.
    China is at varying stages of developing nuclear-armed Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), orbital
    weapons, and even conventionally armed long-range missiles designed to
    strike the Continental United States (CONUS) without crossing the
    nuclear threshold. Russia has improved its already formidable
    capability to threaten CONUS and recently fielded the world's first
    HGV-equipped ICBM. Moscow continues to develop and test other novel
    nuclear delivery platforms like the Sarmat heavy ICBM and the
    Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile. Russian bombers and naval
    combatants have resumed deterrence patrols that place their cruise
    missiles in range of the homeland. North Korea is advancing its
    strategic weapons program. In October 2024, Pyongyang tested the new
    Hwasong-19 ICBM that can probably deliver a nuclear payload to points
    across North America. Iran is growing its nuclear and space launch
    programs to provide a viable pathway for developing a nuclear-armed
    ICBM, should Tehran decide to do so.
            layering and integration critical to system performance
        Layering defenses is critical to improving the performance of any
    missile defense system. A network of geographically dispersed sensors
    and diverse weapon systems allows the system to engage inbound threats
    at varying times in the missile's flight to improve overall defense
    effectiveness. There are system performance benefits to having
    engagement capabilities in different geographic domains and the ability
    to layer engagements, to include increasing the probability of a
    successful intercept.
        An examination of the defense of Israel from real world missile
    attacks over the past 17 months provides a look at the performance
    efficiencies integrated layered defenses make possible. In 2024, Iran
    conducted two large-scale aerial and missile attacks on Israel. Israeli
    missile defenses and the United States Missile Defense System
    demonstrated combat-proven interoperability by detecting, tracking, and
    engaging the most complex, dense, and stressing ballistic missile
    attacks in history, saving countless Israeli and American lives. These
    same United States and Israeli assets have successfully defended Israel
    against dozens of missiles launched from Yemen by the Houthis.
        Working together with Israeli missile defense systems, Aegis BMD
    and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) have performed
    exceptionally well, contributing to the highly successful protection of
    Israel as well as United States and international military forces and
    the civilian population. Aegis BMD demonstrated operational capability
    outside its design requirements. Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IA and
    Block IB missiles demonstrated high reliability and excess capabilities
    in these operations. SM-6 missiles fired in Sea-Based Terminal mode
    demonstrated high reliability and effectiveness. We have been working
    closely during this period with the Navy to deliver missile software
    upgrades and Aegis weapon system upgrades to improve defenses.
    Additionally, the U.S. Army deployed THAAD to Israel in October 2024
    and has since conducted the first U.S. engagement with the weapon
    system. The system has performed very well with regional partners in
    defensive operations demonstrating the maturity, reliability, and
    effectiveness of the THAAD system, fully integrated and layered with
    the Israeli missile defense systems. During these operations, we
    learned much about the effectiveness of our sensors, weapons, command
    and control systems and the tactics, techniques and procedures to
    employ them effectively, validating the need for layered missile
    defenses. The exo-and endo-atmospheric layers across multiple systems
    proved vital in reducing the engagement burden on lower tier systems,
    prevented damage to critical defended assets, and ultimately saved
    lives.
        A missile defense system is only as effective as its ability to
    command and control all integrated elements. The Command and Control,
    Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system proved its value in
    integrating real-world combat operations. C2BMC provides global
    communications, command and control and is a force multiplier that
    brings different sensors and shooters together so that systems not
    designed to work together can share data and engage threats they
    otherwise would not have been able to see. In the Middle East, C2BMC
    enabled remote engagements by both Aegis and Israeli systems,
    correlated and combined overhead and terrestrial sensor data, extended
    engagement ranges far beyond internal weapon system radars resulting in
    improved system level performance.
        As part of a future layered defense construct within the Missile
    Defense System, we will buildupon C2BMC to deploy a more scalable,
    operational open architecture to increase data processing capabilities,
    improve missile defense system performance, and enable situational
    awareness for senior commanders and battle management and command and
    control for operational warfighters throughout a mass raid situation.
    C2BMC will also expand the existing, globally deployed network to
    integrate more sensors and shooters and provide secure, physical
    communication data links for all new sites.
        There is a growing Warfighter demand for enhanced joint force
    capabilities to combat threats across the continuum of air, cruise,
    ballistic and hypersonic missiles. MDA, as the Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense (IAMD) Technical Authority, is engineering and
    prototyping the Joint Tactical Integrated Fire Control (JTIFC)
    architecture focusing on multi-domain, cross-Service kill chains,
    enabling true ``right sensor, right shooter'' capability to counter
    emerging threats. JTIFC enhances integrated fire control capabilities
    across the Services and agencies by essentially ``connecting'' existing
    sensors, command and control systems, and weapons at the tactical
    level.
        JTIFC efforts include MDA's Joint Track Management Capability
    (JTMC) Bridge, which is designed to connect Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
    and Air Force weapons, sensors, and fire control networks into a Joint
    Integrated Fire Control Network. The JTMC Bridge is on a path to field
    with the Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), Navy Cooperative
    Engagement Capability (CEC), and Air Force Tactical Operations Center--
    Light (TOC-L) Programs of Record in 2027 to 2028.
        This JTIFC architecture has been demonstrated at multiple Combatant
    Command and Service exercises, to include the successful intercept of a
    cruise missile during Army Flight Test 6 in 2021. Recurring Service
    exercises include the Army's annual Project Convergence (Capstone 5
    upcoming), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's biennial Valiant Shield and
    Operation Sling Stone, and U.S. Northern Command's Northern Edge.
    Future JTIFC capabilities to be engineered and planned for delivery to
    the Services' programs include the fusion of combat identification
    features from all sensors, force level engagement coordination, and
    distributed electronic protection capabilities. The Guam Defense System
    builds on the JTIFC core architecture and future capabilities, ensuring
    joint weapons and sensors are integrated for layered area defense.
    Recognizing that a more effective force is integrated and interoperable
    with allies and partners, JTIFC can enable cross-Nation kill chains in
    support of evolving warfighting concepts and security partnerships.
                    space is vital to future missile defense
        We must continue to integrate and leverage the space domain as we
    sharpen our focus today to develop and deliver the next generation
    missile defense system. The exploitation of space supports a missile
    defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and adaptable to
    known and unanticipated threats. The proximity, persistence, and
    precision of space-based missile defense assets offers a truly
    transformative capability.
        To ensure rapid gap coverage, MDA has developed prototypes designed
    with Warfighter capabilities in mind. The MDA Hypersonic and Ballistic
    Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) program, for example, is helping to close
    the gap by supporting detection and tracking of hypersonic weapons and
    providing multi-domain support to the Overhead Persistent Infrared
    (OPIR) enterprise architecture. HBTSS, which provides fire control
    quality data to support engagements, is proving to be a critical
    element of our future hypersonic kill chain. Currently, HBTSS has
    collected over half a million images, to include data collected from
    test targets, targets of opportunity, and real-world events.
    Additionally, the HBTSS program has made remarkable development
    achievements. It implemented a new enterprise ground system in just 36
    months; rapidly designed and built two satellites within 36 months;
    conducted the first accelerated National Security Space Launch within
    12 months in collaboration with the Space Force; and participated in
    its first test within 119 days of launch. MDA will continue to grow its
    collaboration with the Space Force to develop and deliver this vital
    capability to the future Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture.
        Following an extremely successful HBTSS program, we are pursuing
    the same approach in developing the Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS)
    to perform birth-to-death tracking and discrimination of in-flight
    ballistic missiles and their payload objects. MDA will launch a DSS
    prototype satellite in 2029, followed by on-orbit test and
    demonstration of DSS capabilities to inform future space-based
    architecture and design requirements. The DSS prototype will
    demonstrate the technology required to track ballistic missiles from
    space birth to death while discriminating lethal objects from non-
    lethal objects, with the final operational DSS system design to be
    decided by the Space Force. MDA will expand the demonstration of
    critical DSS capabilities to provide the United States an interim
    capability to defend against ballistic and other advanced missile
    threats from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries.
        Finally, President Trump's January 27, 2025 Executive Order
    highlighted the need to develop cutting-edge, next generation, kinetic
    and non-kinetic capabilities that will include a focus on the
    development of space-based interceptors (SBI) capable of boost phase
    defense. A space engagement layer would complement land-and sea-based
    defenses. MDA stands ready to work closely with the Space Force and
    other stakeholders on the development and delivery of the SBI
    architecture. From a missile defense architect and developer
    perspective, a space-based missile defense layer would offer numerous
    benefits, including a persistent on-call global presence, which would
    reduce the risks associated with hostile missiles launched with little
    or no notice from different regions around the world.
            leveraging advanced technologies for future capabilities
        MDA is rapidly developing, demonstrating, and transitioning
    disruptive missile defeat capabilities to deter, degrade, and destroy
    adversary threats. MDA is using the rapid development of prototypes to
    develop and demonstrate disruptive, ``game-changing'' capabilities,
    with incremental capability off-ramps to the Warfighter. We recently
    unveiled a new framework to streamline the acquisition of missile
    defense technologies. One significant part of this framework is the use
    of a Multiple Authority Announcement (MAA), which consolidates a broad
    range of procurement authorities and methods, such as Other
    Transactions, Commercial Solution Openings, Procurement for
    Experimental Purposes, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements,
    grants, and research and development agreements. The MAA, which was
    released last month, is an acquisition approach gear toward reaching
    non-traditional defense contractors. However, it does not prevent
    traditional defense contractors from participating when they have
    solutions that could potentially meet the Government's needs. The MAA
    seeks responses from a broad set of innovative technology companies to
    develop capabilities that allow MDA to better manage complex design and
    integration challenges and accelerate critical decisionmaking. The
    combination of a competitive environment with simplified procurement
    processes and continued leverage of MDA's unique acquisition
    authorities will strengthen our ability to accelerate overall timelines
    and deliver operational capability to the Warfighter.
        The Agency is developing a multi-layered defensive architecture to
    counter hypersonic threats in defense of the homeland. This
    architecture leverages advanced sensors for early warning,
    identification, and persistent tracking of hypersonic threats. MDA is
    analyzing several initiatives to address these threats, including:
    enhancing persistent tracking of unpredictable targets, improving
    communication systems, adapting fire control strategies, and developing
    new kinetic interceptors with exceptional agility in extreme
    aerothermal environments. Additionally, MDA is exploring non-kinetic
    solutions and payloads to effectively neutralize hypersonic threats.
        MDA is collaborating across the DOD Special Projects enterprise to
    synergize resources and leverage residual missile defense capabilities.
    Our advanced Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis laboratory provides
    element-and component-level performance assessment up to mission-level
    analysis at all levels of classification. The lab is on a growth path
    to federate the models across the DOD, providing an integrated approach
    to missile defeat.
        MDA is prioritizing the integration of Directed Energy (DE) systems
    into the Missile Defense System, which would reduce the burden on
    kinetic interceptors and augment existing capabilities. In 2024, the
    Directed Energy Independent Assessment Team recommended MDA reestablish
    efforts to develop and deploy DE systems. MDA also initiated work on a
    phased, long-range detect and track rapid prototype, coupled with a
    kill laser. Conceptually, a High Energy Laser can thin out the number
    of objects in an attack, lower the cost per kill, and provide a nearly
    unlimited magazine. MDA is on a path to demonstrate progressively
    higher High Energy Laser power levels, with incremental capability off-
    ramps to Service partners on the path to an objective capability. MDA
    also supports a joint DOD effort to determine the effectiveness of High
    Energy Laser weapon systems against a series of dynamic targets. In
    2024-2025, the Probability of Weapons Effectiveness Experiment
    successfully engaged and negated a series of dynamic targets in
    crossing and head-on profiles. Finally, High Energy Laser for Regional
    Airborne Defense (HELRAD) explores the application space for state-of-
    the-art directed energy systems as they apply to future MDA
    architectures, identifying opportunities for MDA's future DE programs.
    MDA will continue to partner across the DOD and Intelligence Community
    to ensure a seamless left-through-right-of-launch integration effort in
    defeating missile threats.
                                homeland defense
        For homeland defense, MDA continues to improve performance of the
    fielded Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which recently
    celebrated its 20 year anniversary of 24/7 defense of the homeland. In
    2025, we will deploy capability to increase battle-space via a change
    to the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) that enables firing only two of
    the three solid rocket motors along with discrimination improvements to
    improve overall system performance against more complex threats with
    countermeasures. Additionally, MDA is continuing development and
    testing of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), which is the future
    replacement for the GBI fleet. The NGI's modular design will facilitate
    upgrades to address evolving threats and provide a substantial increase
    in firepower given the multiple kill vehicles on board. Additionally,
    NGI will provide a reduced cost-per-kill through its increased
    efficiency, reliability, and availability, providing greater magazine
    depth.
        We received authority to proceed into the Product Development Phase
    with the NGI program in September 2024 and have enjoyed many successes
    thus far in this new phase of development. However, there are some
    challenges we are addressing given the complexity of the NGI weapon
    system. Beyond the expected design challenges, we have experienced
    unanticipated programmatic, technical, and producibility challenges
    that are driving increases to the estimated development and deployment
    schedule. The earlier-than-planned down-select in April 2024 had a
    significant impact on NGI's supply chain. Upon learning of the early
    down-select, NGI suppliers moved quickly to limit fiscal exposure and,
    in some instances, stopped development work on critical NGI components
    while waiting for the final down-select decision. The combination of
    these supply chain impacts along with post-COVID-induced inflation have
    adversely impacted the program. In addition, we have experienced
    significant development and manufacturing challenges with the solid
    rocket motor cases to be used in qualification testing. Solid rocket
    motors are on the critical path to executing the first flight test of
    the NGI. These development and supply chain challenges required us to
    develop a comprehensive NGI re-plan schedule. The result is key
    milestones have shifted to the right.
        Despite these challenges, the NGI program continues to move forward
    while still enforcing technical rigor and a ``fly before you buy''
    approach to deliver this critically important capability. The NGI
    program will execute an All Up Round Critical Design Review in first
    quarter fiscal year 2027 on the way to completing two rigorous flight
    tests in fiscal year 2029. This will provide USNORTHCOM with an
    opportunity to declare an Initial Operational Capability no later than
    fiscal year 2030. To demonstrate confidence and to reduce program risk,
    MDA is exploring options for a flight test demonstration in 2028.
        Concurrent with NGI development, MDA is upgrading the legacy
    fielded homeland defense system ground components supporting the GBI
    fleet to ensure seamless NGI compatibility to address the evolving
    threat. The ground weapon system monitors the health and status of
    interceptors, conducts pre-launch activities, performs engagement
    planning, tasks interceptors at launch, provides in-flight updates to
    the interceptor, and ensures communication connectivity between all of
    the launch sites and ground-based sensors. We have synchronized the
    ground weapon system development schedule with the NGI re-plan
    schedule. Together, these two programs have an executable path forward
    to provide USNORTHCOM with improved capability and capacity against the
    2030+ advanced peer, near-peer, and rogue nation threats.
        From a sensor perspective, MDA added Long Range Discrimination
    Radar (LRDR) for Space Domain Awareness in December 2024. LRDR is
    currently preparing for an operational flight test, Flight Test Other
    (FTX)-26a, in the third quarter of fiscal year 2025. LRDR will use an
    updated software build to improve discrimination performance against
    additional threats while adding hypersonic defense tracking capability.
    MDA is partnering with Space Force, USNORTHCOM, and U.S. Space Command
    (USSPACECOM) to accelerate fielding these LRDR capability improvements.
    MDA plans to complete the LRDR transition and transfer process with the
    Space Force in 2025.
        Finally, we will deliver a new C2BMC capability to USNORTHCOM and
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in summer 2025, including
    faster user interface responsiveness and improvements allowing
    USNORTHCOM to receive GMD real-time fire control options, improving
    USNORTHCOM Commander decision-space timing. In fiscal year 2026, we
    plan to upgrade space track processing timelines, improving defense
    against large raids and reporting on hypersonic threats to potential
    missile defense shooters.
                                regional defense
        Globally deployed sea-based and land-based Aegis BMD capabilities
    are critical to the Nation's defense of our deployed forces, allies,
    and partners against a wide variety of short-, medium-, and
    intermediate-range missile threats. MDA continues to design
    improvements to the Aegis BMD capability, improving Sea Based Terminal
    (SBT) defense, advancing weapon system and missile reliability, and
    enhancing Aegis BMD engagement capacity and lethality. We will continue
    to develop Aegis BMD weapon system software to enhance functionality
    and leverage more-capable radars and National Technical Means.
        Aegis Baseline 9.2.4 (with BMD 5.1.5) is still on track to meet
    certification in third quarter fiscal year 2025. Once certified, this
    baseline is expected to deploy to 14 U.S. Navy ships. BMD 5.1.5 adds
    capability for Sea-Based Terminal Increment 3, increased ballistic and
    hypersonic threat space, expanded hypersonic tracking and Link 16
    reporting, enhanced space domain awareness, and discrimination
    architecture improvements. MDA is on track to meet our SM-3 Blk IB and
    IIA deliveries for FY2025, having completed 54 new production
    deliveries and 35 recertifications across all variants.
        MDA has received supplemental funding in both fiscal year 2024 and
    fiscal year 2025 to procure replacement missiles for those expended in
    combat operations, as well as an increase in fiscal year 2025 funding
    to continue production of SM-3 Block IB missiles. MDA is proactively
    working to minimize and mitigate expected SM-3 Block IB production gaps
    while the Prime contractor works to complete its proposal in support of
    a synergy buy. With fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 funds, MDA is
    moving forward to award this contract for procurement of SM-3 Block IB
    missiles by the end of calendar year 2025.
        MDA is committed to developing a layered defense against rapidly
    evolving threats, with a particular focus on countering regional
    hypersonic missiles. Today, Aegis BMD ships are equipped with SBT
    capability, which is tested, certified, and deployed, including an
    initial defensive capability against hypersonic threats. MDA has been
    working closely with the Navy to develop field and upgrade SBT defenses
    to counter advanced threats. With the successful Flight Test Aegis
    Weapon System (FTM)-32 in March 2024 and the FTX-40 successful
    demonstration this past March, we moved another step closer to making
    SBT Increment 3 an operational capability, improving our capability
    against some hypersonic threats.
        The Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) development program represents a
    key element in defeating the rapidly evolving hypersonic threat of the
    layered defense strategy. GPI will expand the area defensible against
    these threats and account for expected future developments by our
    adversaries. Developing and fielding GPI capability is essential to
    countering not only the hypersonic threats we face today but also those
    anticipated in 2035 and beyond. MDA's plan for GPI development meets a
    critical need for the warfighter and can be leveraged to deliver this
    capability in defense of the homeland and can be accelerated with
    adequate resources. Additionally, we are seeking a layered approach
    with other kinetic and non-kinetic effects to accelerate the defeat of
    the hypersonic threat as part of the MDA Hypersonic Defense Task Force.
        In May 2024, MDA and Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD) signed a
    formal Cooperative Development arrangement to jointly develop and
    mature the GPI. This strategic collaboration leverages Japan's world-
    class expertise in key missile components, particularly in advanced
    propulsion and aerodynamic control technologies. Cooperative
    development of the GPI will deliver a critical capability to counter
    threats in the USINDOPACOM region for both Japan and the United States.
        As mentioned last year, previous Department priorities and funding
    decisions drove MDA to move forward with carrying out the prototype
    project with a single interceptor developer in September 2024, opposed
    to two, in contrast to our approved acquisition strategy. As a result,
    the program schedule moved right to 2035 and the overall programmatic
    risk is high. MDA is working diligently with our partner, Japan, and
    our industry partner to shore up the program and look for any
    opportunities to accelerate and burn down risk as soon as possible. In
    addition to GPI interceptor development, MDA continues to develop
    enhancements to the mature and capable Aegis Weapon System. These
    software-only enhancements will enable seamless integration of the GPI
    interceptor by leveraging existing Aegis capability to engage and kill
    threats based on remote sensor data.
        The Department is continuing development of a missile defense
    capability for the defense of Guam against diverse missile threats. In
    collaboration with the Navy, we are supporting the Army as they execute
    the USINDOPACOM requirement for a layered missile defense capability on
    Guam against simultaneous raids of cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and
    hypersonic glide threats. MDA successfully conducted a live intercept
    in December 2024 of a ballistic missile target, marking the first BMD
    intercept test event executed from Guam. With Flight Test Experiment
    Aegis Weapon System (FEM)-02, the initial Aegis Guam System integrated
    with the new AN/TPY-6 radar and Vertical Launching System fired a SM-3
    Block IIA, which intercepted an air-launched MRBM target off the coast
    of Guam. The AN/TPY-6 radar tracked the target shortly after launch to
    intercept in the first end-to-end tracking use of the radar during a
    live ballistic missile flight test.
        The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System has a
    proven track record of defeating incoming threats and serves as a vital
    component of our Nation's layered Missile Defense System. The THAAD
    Weapon System is a globally transportable, ground-based missile defense
    weapon system that is highly effective against short-, medium-and
    intermediate-range missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in
    the terminal phase of flight. MDA supports and sustains THAAD batteries
    in CONUS as well as in the USINDOPACOM and U.S. Central Command
    (USCENTCOM) Areas of Responsibility.
        Through the end of second quarter fiscal year 2025, in conjunction
    with the Army, MDA completed fielding of the global THAAD System Build
    4.0 (TH 4.0) to five of seven batteries. The capabilities include
    enabling remote launch and enhancing integration of Patriot Missile
    Segment Enhanced (MSE) interceptors within a THAAD battery. These
    capabilities provide an increase in the defended area and greater
    engagement opportunities by allowing the Patriot MSE interceptors to
    leverage the highly effective THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar. Also, with close
    coordination to better support Commander USCENTCOM, MDA significantly
    reduced time required to provide warfighters a quick-look analysis
    following a THAAD Weapon System real-world event.
        Starting this quarter, MDA will begin delivering THAAD Battery 8,
    the first U.S. battery with THAAD Configuration 3.1 hardware and THAAD
    System Build 5.0 (TH 5.0) software. Configuration 3.1 is the largest
    hardware upgrade to-date modifying over 190 components to address
    obsolescence and increase cybersecurity to improve weapon system
    performance. System-level testing will start at the end of fiscal year
    2025. THAAD Battery 8 will execute a series of rigorous test events and
    demonstrations culminating in Flight Test THAAD Weapon system (FTT)-26
    in fiscal year 2027 and supporting the Army's fielding process. MDA
    plans to begin upgrade on the first of seven U.S. Batteries to
    Configuration 3.1 in the 2027 timeframe.
        MDA will leverage the recently awarded THAAD Evolutionary
    Development Task Order to continue developing the weapon system and
    deliver enhanced capabilities to the Warfighter within a more agile and
    responsive development process. THAAD System Build 6.0 (TH 6.0) and
    Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) THAAD Integration (ITI), while
    experiencing a delayed start due to the incremental continuing
    resolutions and reduction in the appropriation, will be developed
    within this agile process. TH 6.0 provides initial capability against
    non-ballistic threats and increased threat engagement space.
        The Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2
    (AN/TPY-2) is a highly transportable multi-functional, high-resolution,
    phased-array ground-based X-Band sensor that is highly effective at
    acquiring targets in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. AN/TPY-
    2 can be deployed in forward-based mode (FBM) or terminal mode (TM)
    configurations for THAAD fire control and engagement operations. FBM
    radars provide detection close to the threat origin as well as target
    acquisition and discrimination to the C2BMC interface to support
    external shooters to include: GBI, Aegis, THAAD, Patriot, and
    international systems. Currently AN/TPY-2 is deployed in both modes
    supporting operations in the USINDOPACOM, U.S. European Command, and
    USCENTCOM areas of responsibility.
                              allies and partners
        Close collaboration with our Allies and partners is critical for
    addressing today's security challenges. MDA actively and closely
    engages with multiple partners across the globe to build capability and
    interoperability against shared missile threats.
        Asia/Pacific. MDA uses Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to deliver the
    SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA interceptors to Japan and provide the
    weapon system components and associated software for two Japanese-built
    Aegis System Equipped Vessels, which will be fielded with the solid-
    State SPY-7 radar and an Aegis Weapon System. The first tactical SPY-7
    (V)1 radar array has been installed at the Production Test Center in
    Moorestown, NJ, and has successfully tracked satellites and aircraft.
    Production of the remaining radar hardware is on track to support full
    system light-off by the end of fiscal year 2025. MDA is also providing
    technical assistance to Australia to support its development of a Joint
    Air Battle Management System that will integrate Australia's air and
    missile defenses and enable interoperability with United States and
    other allied IAMD capabilities. MDA conducts cooperative research and
    development projects and studies with Japan, Republic of Korea, and
    Australia.
        Middle East. MDA continues to foster a strong, long-standing
    partnership with the Israel Missile Defense Organization. MDA provides
    $500 million per year for engineering, development, co-production,
    testing, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System, the David's Sling
    Weapon System, and co-production for the Iron Dome Defense System. MDA
    is also executing fiscal year 2024 $5.2 billion Israel Security
    Supplemental Funding for additional procurement of Iron Dome Defense
    System, David's Sling Weapon System, and Iron Beam defense systems to
    counter short-range rocket threats. Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome
    proved their immense value in Operation Swords of Iron and allow Israel
    to maintain their qualitative military edge against their adversaries.
    As a key participant in the development and negotiation of the
    supplemental Exchange of Letters, MDA's required U.S. workshare worth
    $2.750 billion will be brought back to the U.S. industrial base.
        In support of our global partners, MDA is currently in production
    of seven THAAD batteries, including interceptors, for the Kingdom of
    Saudi Arabia (KSA) FMS case. One battery has been emplaced in Saudi
    Arabia, and the second is scheduled for shipment later this year. THAAD
    KSA battery equipment and interceptor production deliveries will
    continue through fiscal year 2027. MDA also continues to support and
    provide additional capabilities via FMS to the two THAAD batteries of
    the United Arab Emirates. UAE was the first nation to employ fielded
    THAAD batteries during attacks from Iranian proxies. Working
    multilaterally with the Gulf Cooperation Council, MDA is defining
    recommendations for an integrated air and missile early warning
    architecture of sensors and command and control for the Arabian Gulf
    region.
        Europe and North America. MDA has a number of ongoing cooperative
    research and development projects and studies with the Netherlands,
    Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. MDA also works closely with
    NATO by providing subject-matter expertise to the NATO Communication
    and Information Agency for the continuous testing and interoperability
    of BMD systems. Last year, MDA and Canada began a study to examine
    potential architectures to increase missile defense capabilities of
    North America. This is the first cooperative project between MDA and
    Canada in 17 years.
                         laser focus on the warfighter
        None of the Agency's many efforts would be possible without
    continuous collaboration with the Warfighter. To that end, MDA has
    intensified strategic engagement with the Combatant Commands, Services,
    and the Joint Staff. Our Missile Defense Board of Director meetings
    continue to serve as the premiere senior level forums to coordinate
    missile defense programs and issues with the Lead Military Departments.
    MDA goes to great lengths to involve the Warfighter early on during the
    technology development and product development phases to address
    requirements. We also support Lead Military Department efforts to plan
    for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel,
    Facilities and Policy factors. Once the capability is fielded, close
    collaboration with the Services and Combatant Commands is essential to
    sustain and, as required, enhance that capability throughout its
    service life. Additionally, we back this up with real-time technical
    support, as demonstrated during recent real-world operations. Ensuring
    the Combatant Commanders and Services have what they need to fight and
    win will always be my top priority.
                                   conclusion
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, Members of the
    Subcommittee, the Missile Defense Agency is committed to attracting and
    building the strong, skilled workforce we need to develop and deliver
    this Nation's next generation missile defense system. I would like to
    recognize and thank the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces at
    home and abroad and who operate the Missile Defense System with the
    support of our dedicated civilian and contractor workforce. I greatly
    appreciate your continued support for MDA and the missile defense
    mission, and I look forward to answering the committee's questions.
    Thank you.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. General Rasch,
    welcome.

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT A. RASCH, USA, EXECUTIVE
           OFFICER, GUAM DEFENSE SYSTEM JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE

        General Rasch. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Fischer,
    Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members of this
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
    you today to discuss the criticality of defending the island of
    Guam. On behalf of the Army Senior Leadership, we thank you for
    your continued support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, guardians, civilians, and their families.
        Guam is an indispensable part of the Homeland, and its
    defense is not only essential to the security of the United
    States but is also a strong deterrence to the ever-evolving
    complex threats we face. The fiscal year 2023 National Defense
    Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to
    designate a senior official to oversee the missile defense of
    Guam. In February 2024, as directed by the Under Secretary of
    Defense, Acquisition and Sustainment, the Guam Defense System
    Joint Program Office, JPO, was established at the Army Rapid
    Capability and Critical Technologies Office. Beyond the
    Department's investments in Guam's defense, the Under Secretary
    of the Navy is the appointed lead senior defense official for
    all other DOD efforts in Guam.
        The Joint Program Office is charged with synchronizing the
    development, testing, fielding, and sustainment of the Guam
    Defense System components and the integration of the
    corresponding command and control systems resulting in the
    development of a Joint Integrated Battle Manager, and this
    Battle Manager will allow current service and agency-owned
    components to behave as an integrated and unified system.
        The Joint Program Office works closely with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Guam
    Synchronization Oversight Council, and leadership across the
    services and the Missile Defense Agency to build and sustain an
    architecture capable of defending Guam against a multitude of
    complex air and missile defense threats.
        Together, the Department is working diligently and with
    urgency to secure the initial capability increment in 2027.
    This will provide capability well beyond the currently employed
    THAAD battery as part of Task Force Talon. Your continued
    support ensures that we remain capable of fighting for and from
    Guam, meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you about
    this critical mission and the joint commitment to the defense
    of Guam. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Rasch follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Robert A. Rasch
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and Members of this
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss the criticality of defending the island of Guam. On behalf
    of the Army Senior Leadership, we thank you for your continued support
    of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, Civilians, and
    their Families.
        Guam is an indispensable part of the United States, and we are
    moving with haste to ensure we have the capabilities necessary to
    defend the island from ever-evolving complex threats. In addition to
    being part of the homeland, a robust defense of Guam provides a strong
    deterrence and preserves combat power and Joint Force projection if
    conflict arises.
        Pursuant to the Fiscal Year (FY) 23 National Defense Authorization
    Act, the Secretary of Defense designated the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) as the Senior Defense
    Official responsible for the missile defense of Guam. In February 2024,
    as directed by the USD(A&S), the Guam Defense System Joint Program
    Office (GDS JPO) was established at the Army Rapid Capability and
    Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO).
                guam defense system architecture and background
        The JPO is charged with synchronizing the development, testing,
    fielding and sustainment of the Guam Defense System components and the
    integration of the corresponding command and control (C2) systems
    resulting in the development of a Joint Integrated Battle Manager
    (JIBM). The JIBM will allow current service and agency--owned
    components to behave as an integrated and unified system. The GDS
    effort includes the synchronization of over 20 prototype efforts and
    programs of record across three services and the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA). Because of that, the JPO does not control resourcing for Service
    and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs contributing to the GDS
    architecture. The JPO is the materiel developer for GDS at the systems
    level and is responsible for providing GDS system-level architectural
    baselines and Guam-specific technical requirements. The JPO synthesizes
    the integrated system-level cost, schedule, performance, and risk
    posture of the GDS, providing senior Department of Defense (DOD) and
    congressional stakeholders with the necessary information to make
    informed investment and priority decisions to ensure success.
        The DOD's investments in Guam extend beyond the GDS. In January
    2024, the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed the Under Secretary of
    the Navy as the Lead Senior Defense Official for the DOD's efforts in
    Guam. Through the Guam Synchronization Oversight Council, a forum that
    includes senior leaders from across the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and the services, the Under Secretary of the Navy ensures
    visibility on key issues, synchronizes military construction efforts,
    and serves as the Department's primary liaison to the government of
    Guam.
        The JPO works closely with the USD(A&S), the Guam Synchronization
    Oversight Council, and leadership across the services and the MDA to
    build and sustain an architecture capable of defending Guam against a
    multitude of complex air and missile defense threats. Together, the
    Department is working diligently and with urgency to secure the initial
    capability increment in 2027-2028, beyond the currently employed the
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Battery in Task Force
    Talon. To this end, the JPO is leading the Department's efforts to
    synchronize and integrate GDS capabilities across several capability
    domains (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
    education, personnel, facilities, and policy) with a specific focus on
    creating doctrine to fight as an integrated, digitized Joint Force for
    the Integrated Air and Missile Defense fight. We are working across the
    enterprise to finalize the organizational structure and path to certify
    the Guam Command Center, and have also been tasked to create a common
    understanding across the DOD on the status of GDS and identify risks/
    gaps to provide mitigation recommendations to the Commander, U.S. Indo-
    Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) through a routine series of updates.
        The JPO was approved by the USD(A&S) to pursue a hybrid acquisition
    strategy in which the synchronization of integrated air and missile
    defense components' deliveries will be managed as a Middle Tier
    Acquisition for Rapid Fielding and the Joint Integrated Battle Manager
    will be developed using the software pathway. The JIBM will provide an
    integrated command and control layer over proven systems from across
    the Services such as Aegis, Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
    Command System (IBCS), Command and Control Battle Management
    Communications (C2BMC), and Tactical Operations Center--Light (TOC-L)
    enabling efficient responses to threats without duplication. This
    integration layer will provide artificial intelligence-optimization
    algorithms and decision management aids to enhance performance of the
    joint system against the scale and complexity of the threat. The use of
    the software acquisition pathway provides flexibility to rapidly design
    and deliver an open system that will have the ability to be replicated
    or scaled quickly to other Areas of Operation. This will benefit not
    only USINDOPACOM, but any Combatant Command providing Commanders with
    the capability needed to fight and win.
        Similarly, as the Department refines its plans for the Golden Dome
    of America, the investment in the GDS may play a pivotal role informing
    this strategy. During a recent visit to Guam, the Secretary of Defense
    emphasized the importance of this approach, stating that 'the Guam
    Defense System is a model for the Golden Dome.' This alignment
    underscores the critical role that Guam's defense architecture and
    command and control integration will play in shaping future U.S.
    defense initiatives, setting a standard for how we approach and
    implement integrated defense systems across the Nation. Critical
    components to the joint architecture that might be shared by both Guam
    and Golden Dome include MDA's Joint Track Management Capability bridge
    as a functional joint engagement coordination baseline, joint
    electronic protection attributes to add resiliency to our sensor
    network, non-kinetic threat engagement capabilities to preserve high
    value kinetic interceptors, the integration of the Army's IAMD Battle
    Command System with MDA's THAAD system to support joint force
    employment flexibility and the Joint Integrated Battle Management
    capability that integrates the service and agency C2 systems.
        Thank you once again for the opportunity to speak with you today
    about this critical mission and the joint commitment to the defense of
    Guam. Your continued support ensures that we remain capable of fighting
    for and from Guam, meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General Resch, and thank you
    all for your opening statements.
        We don't have too many of us here today so we may have more
    than one round of questions. I will begin the first round.
        General Guillot, I have appreciated our past conversations
    about the need for increased domain awareness, for we cannot
    shoot what we cannot see. As we look toward Golden Dome and the
    future of missile defense, what additional improvements need to
    be made with respect to domain awareness?
        General Guillot. Madam Chair, I think that what I call the
    domain awareness layer of Golden Dome is the most critical that
    we need to have first, for the reasons that you just mentioned.
    Any chance of using advanced interceptors or defeat
    capabilities would not be possible if we can't detect and track
    these threats.
        I think that it is a seabed-to-space approach. We need to
    have undersea sensors to detect submarines that can now get
    closer to North America than they could before, based on
    improved stealthiness of those ships. Then a ground layer that
    can see much further out because of the advanced standoff
    weapons that our adversaries can now employ. We need an air
    layer, like the E-7, to close the kill chain with fighter
    aircrafts or surface-to-air systems, and then a space layer.
    The space layer would both track airborne moving targets or
    aircraft, but also systems like Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking
    Space Sensor (HBTSS) that could track hypersonics, as well as
    the warning capability that we need to detect the launches to
    begin with.
        Senator Fischer. Is there anything you can tell us in this
    setting about Golden Dome and the options that may be available
    on the sensors and the radar systems that would be used?
        General Guillot. Madam Chair, I don't know what the Golden
    Dome will look like, but I suspect that it would be able to use
    a lot of the systems that are already in place and currently in
    development, which would give us a full capability in probably
    something closer to zero to 5 years, as opposed to something,
    you know, a decade out into the future. A couple of those
    systems would be the HBTSS that I just mentioned for the
    hypersonics, space-based Airborne Moving Target Indication
    (AMTI), which we have a number of prototype systems on orbit
    now, over-the-horizon radars which are also operational in, not
    in the United States, but elsewhere. For instance, the E-7
    which many other countries operate.
        Senator Fischer. So given that, how much risk would Golden
    Dome incur if the Department was forced to vacate the lower 3
    Gigahertz (GHz) or a portion of the 7-8 GHz spectrum that it
    now has?
        General Guillot. Madam Chair, it is my assessment that we
    would assume an extraordinarily high level of risk if we lose
    control of those portions of the spectrum. Many of the systems
    that we rely on every day today, much less in the future, for
    Homeland defense, reside in that spectrum range.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. General Collins, can you
    provide us with an update on the Hypersonic and Ballistic
    Tracking Space Sensor, or the HBTSS system?
        General Collins. Yes, Madam Chair, thank you. So, the
    Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor is a prototype
    program that MDA pursued to prove out the technology such that
    from space we could close the kill chain on a hypersonic
    weapon. The focus of that was to prove out that the space
    system could have the accuracy, the track quality, and get that
    data into the command-and-control system fast enough to be able
    to close that fire control loop.
        Those two systems, launched in February of last year, have
    gone through two test bed launches where we had a test bed
    target launch fly a hypersonic profile, and we have collected
    data from the sensors during that. So far, we have proven out
    the timeliness, latency of the fire control loop with those
    systems, as well as the sensitivity of those systems to close
    the loop. We are going back with some algorithm updates into
    the payload to improve on the track quality. But we see that
    closing as well.
        It has been a very successful prototype program, and all
    along, we have worked in parallel with the Space Force and
    Space Development Agency. They now have our HBTSS-like
    requirements as part of their proliferated warfighting space
    architecture. In the tranches to come in the follow-on years
    they will slowly be building up an operational hypersonic
    tracking layer for us.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Perhaps in another setting we
    can talk about a more definitive timeline when that would be
    available. Thank you.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. The nature of my
    questions may appear to be critical. I am certainly in favor of
    defending the Homeland against missile attack. No question. My
    fundamental question is, is it feasible, given today's
    technology and also the cost involved. I will quote Lincoln:
    ``Your critic is your best friend,'' so take it in that spirit.
        For example, Ms. Yaffe, you mentioned deterrence by denial.
    Is that really viable today, deterrence by denial? Can we
    realistically say that we could deny a substantial missile
    attack from Russia or China, or heaven forbid, both?
        Ms. Yaffe. Senator----
        Senator King. I am a great believer in deterrence. I am
    just not sure deterrence by denial is realistic in this
    setting. Convince me.
        Ms. Yaffe. Senator, thank you for the question. This is
    meant to be an integrated air and missile defense system that
    is intended to send a message to the adversary that they may
    not achieve their objectives. What we want to do is place the
    burden of escalation on the adversary and demonstrate that it
    will be harder for them to achieve their objectives in an
    attack.
        Right now, as you are well aware, we do not have a homeland
    missile defense system that is intended to guard against
    adversary threats beyond North Korea or rogue State actor
    threats. Meanwhile, the threats themselves have been expanding
    significantly, with Russia and China pursuing a breadth of
    capability----
        Senator King. Well, that is my point. We have developed a
    Missile Defense Agency essentially to defend against North
    Korea and Iran and perhaps a rogue, not China and Russia. Now
    we are talking about an accelerating Chinese pursuit of this
    capability. Russia already has the largest nuclear stockpile in
    the world.
        What level of scaling up would it take to have a missile
    defense system capable of providing any realistic deterrent to
    China and Russia?
        Ms. Yaffe. Sir, this is not an answer that will be
    deliverable overnight. However, what the President has done is
    challenged us to actually look at what an integrated air and
    missile defense system of the Homeland would look like, which
    is not something we----
        Senator King. What does that mean? Is that 1,000 THAAD
    batteries around cities?
        Ms. Yaffe. Sir, I can't weigh in on what the specific
    architecture would look like. I can't get ahead of what the
    architecture decision will be that will come out, I think, with
    the budget. However, it is intended to leverage new
    technologies to get ahead--we have got, certainly, the lift in
    the executive order--but to leverage some new technologies both
    to accelerate the deployment of the HBTSS on the hypersonic
    side, also to leverage non-kinetics. I know that you are
    interested in directed energy to see what directed energy might
    be able to help with, to help us change the cost curve.
        But it should be a mix of new technologies that we might be
    able to demonstrate in the next 4 or 5 years, along with----
        Senator King. What is the assumption----
        Ms. Yaffe.--legacy systems.
        Senator King. General Collins, what is the assumption of
    how many Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) would have to be
    launched to knock out one North Korean ICBM?
        General Collins. Sir, that would be a classified number. We
    would have to wait until the closed session to answer that.
        Senator King. All right. Well, General Guillot, you
    mentioned seabed. Isn't that a critical area where we need
    better sensors, better knowledge, and particularly in your Area
    of Responsibility (AOR), in the Northwest?
        General Guillot. Senator, absolutely. It is critical, the
    seabed. Detection and awareness of the seabed and the undersea
    environment are critical to homeland defense.
        Senator King. The Russians are, in fact, significantly
    building up their military infrastructure on their shore of the
    Arctic Ocean. Is that correct?
        General Guillot. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator King. So that is an area where we have to have
    better visibility, and also to the west, as the balloon
    incident told us.
        General Guillot. Yes, sir. All true.
        Senator King. You mentioned directed energy. The reason for
    my question, General Collins--and I understand in classified--
    but those interceptors are about $60 million a copy. I can
    understand maybe that is a reasonable number if you are talking
    about a limited capacity of North Korea or Iran, but if you are
    talking about between now it is 300, up to 1,000 missiles in
    China, I don't know how many, several thousand, from Russia,
    the economics don't work. How do you feel about the potential
    of directed energy, which is about 75 cents a shot once it is
    installed?
        General Collins. Yes, sir. We are certainly interested in
    pursuing directed energy from a missile defense perspective. At
    this point in time, we are years away from having a capability
    that would be able to have an effect against an
    intercontinental ballistic missile. So for the near future we
    will still very much rely on the layered approaches that we
    have today for ballistic missile defense.
        Senator King. Define layered approach. You have used that
    term several times.
        General Collins. Yes, sir. We look to be able to take
    multiple engagements on any missile as it is coming in. So in a
    perfect world we would try to intercept and take out the
    missile when it is still coming out of the ground and being
    launched from the enemy territory. That is the boost phase.
    While it is in space it is midcourse phase, and then as it is
    coming back into the atmosphere it is the terminal phase.
        Today we very much focus on the midcourse for engagements.
    We would certainly look to be able to try to bring technology
    to bear that we could get into the boost phase preferred, but
    then we may also have capabilities, an underlayer of
    capability, that could be brought to bear to then have a second
    shot or a second engagement capability while it is in terminal.
        So the layers of defense, or defense in depth, is what I
    refer to when I mention layered missile defense.
        Senator King. I think the prior administration lowered the
    directed energy budget by a half over the past 4 or 5 years. I
    think that was a terrible strategic mistake. I hope this
    Administration will remedy that, because you mentioned it is
    going to be years. One way to make it months instead of years
    is to devote more resources to the research and development of
    that capability, which it seems to me is clearly the technology
    of the future in this field.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator
    Tuberville.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Sounds like a guessing game
    to me, a lot of things that are going to happen, and of course,
    I don't know how many missiles could reach our mainland that
    they have right now, but obviously space is going to decide a
    lot of that, with missiles coming from space in the near
    future.
        But that being said, General, how are we doing on Guam? We
    got the Aegis system started, what, about 3 years ago, maybe a
    little less? How are you doing? Getting better?
        General Rasch. Senator, getting better. Lots of teamwork
    across the services and with Missile Defense Agency, and my hat
    goes off to General Collins and his team who really led the
    Department of Defense in early implementation, all the legwork
    for laying the ground efforts for the military construction
    that occurred there.
        MDA demonstrated this last year early Aegis Guam capability
    with a flight test that was executed there, very successfully.
    That work was really the starting point. That equipment has
    stayed onsite. It offers a credible deterrence against
    potential adversaries, while the Army then does its planning to
    come in, in the 2027 timeframe, with the next, what we call
    tranche one of capability for Guam.
        It is a lot of consensus building. It is a lot of teamwork
    across the Department of Defense. This is the Homeland, so, in
    in several ways, we are learning a lot of lessons that we
    believe can also apply to the Golden Dome team as they continue
    that mission set. But very optimistic that the Army is going to
    meet its mission, that will have a credible capability on
    island in the timeframe we lay out.
        Senator Tuberville. Have we decided who is going to operate
    it?
        General Rasch. Well, that decision, as we build out the
    overall command and control capability, the C2 for the defense
    of Guam would typically fall to the Air Force to conduct that
    overall coordination. But it will be manned jointly as we have
    both Navy systems, Air Force systems, Army systems on the
    ground. We will have, you know, servicemen and women from all
    of those services operating it typically under an Air Force
    leadership who will then report to the combatant commander,
    Admiral Paparo.
        Senator Tuberville. Does that include Reserve, National
    Guard?
        General Rasch. Sir, it absolutely can. Even with the small
    footprint the Army has had on island today with the Task Force
    Talon, which is the THAAD battery, we have relied heavily on
    the Guam National Guard who provides a security force for that
    unit that is operating away from a typical Army base. A great
    job of those soldiers, supporting that mission truly defending
    the Homeland. Within the Army, there is talk about potentially
    expanding that mission set for the Guard members on Guam. It is
    still under discussion, so I can't get ahead of those decisions
    as they play out. But I believe all things are on the table at
    this point.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. I know it is a long process,
    a long process. I mean, how many years do you think we have got
    left to be fully operational?
        General Rasch. Senator, I believe we will be improving this
    capability forever, and defense never rests because offensive
    threat never rests. So, we will continually evolve. The point
    of our effort is to try to get as much capability as soon as
    possible, and capability isn't just a thing. It is not just,
    you know, a launcher. It is not just a radar. It is not even
    just a command and control. It is soldiers, you know, airmen,
    you know, all the folks actually manning this equipment,
    ensuring they are properly trained. It is ensuring that we have
    the proper sustainment tail on island to support it, that we
    can sustain it not just for a day, but for years in time. So,
    we will be at this for a while.
        Senator Tuberville. It is like defending a different
    offense every week, if you are a football coach. You have got
    to change, don't you?
        General Rasch. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. General Collins, thank you
    for the footprint you have in my State of Alabama at Redstone
    Arsenal. We are proud of all the work you are doing. How much
    of MDA's effort and investment in Golden Dome do you expect to
    take place in Huntsville? Do you expect to request any
    additional resources for maintenance or buildings or anything
    like that in the future?
        General Collins. Well, Sir, Missile Defense Agency is
    really proud of being part of the Tennessee Valley and that
    Redstone Arsenal. Certainly, a large contingent of our
    workforce is at Redstone Arsenal, and as well as many of our
    industry partners are in that area, as well.
        I can't give you an exact percentage, but certainly the
    engineers, the program managers, the contracting officers, the
    entire workforce of Missile Defense Agency and the associated
    industry members are going to be very busy and very devoted to
    making any of the parts of Golden Dome real.
        Senator Tuberville. You are building things right now too,
    right? You have got things under construction, I think the last
    time I was there.
        General Collins. Yes, sir. We are doing them. We are in the
    middle of a ground test facility infrastructure update, which
    is a fairly large renovation and construction project that is
    going on. That is going on right now, to help get us ready for
    the ground test infrastructure we need to support next gen
    missile defense. As we start digesting and dissolving the
    Golden Dome requirements, there may be additional requirements
    that we need to make sure we are ready to go.
        Senator Tuberville. I got one more question, if we got time
    here. General Collins, I want to ask you about our space-based
    sensors, which is an absolutely critical component of any
    effort to develop the next-generation missile defense
    capability. Last year, the U.S. put a new hypersonic and
    ballistic tracking space sensor satellite in orbit. Do we have
    any plans, either as part of the Golden Dome architecture or
    independently, to expand that capability?
        General Collins. Yes, sir. We, as well, believe that a very
    effective and resilient space layer is going to be critical to
    the future missile defense requirements of the Homeland as well
    as our deployed forces. We rely on space assets today as part
    of our kill chain for initial tip-off, and we will continue to
    do that.
        The Space Force, Space Development Agency, will
    operationalize the HBTSS capability. The relationship we have
    with Space Force is we may prototype technology that is
    required and prove it out for missile defense. The Space Force
    will operationalize that capability as we move forward, and
    HBTSS will be foundational. That type of technology will be
    foundational to hypersonic missile defense in the future. We
    are working on future prototyping space sensor capabilities, in
    particular, discriminating space sensor to help improve
    ballistic missile defense in the future as well. We will
    prototype and Space Force will operationalize. Space will be
    very key to protecting the Homeland and our deployed forces in
    the future. Thanks, Senator.
        Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Tuberville.
        General Rasch, when you look at the defense that Guam is
    going require, you and I, earlier today, we had a conversation
    about that and the importance of integrating those systems--
    Army, Navy, MDA.
        My Co-Chair talked about directed energy and how important
    the uses of that could be, and it would be a lot cheaper. But,
    can you compare the systems that we need to integrate for the
    defense of Guam specifically, and some of the challenges that
    we face looking at directed energy and the capabilities it has
    in some more adverse conditions that are out there, maybe not
    always ready, and the different options it provides you and
    your soldiers with as you look toward defending that island?
        General Rasch. Madam Chair, absolutely, and thank you for
    the question. As we spoke earlier, the new thing that we are
    doing for Guam is not just putting the individual material
    systems and programs on island, but really taking the first
    step at integrating the command and control functions. So Air
    Force has a system, Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Light. The
    Navy has their Aegis system, which will be Aegis Guam. Missile
    Defense Agency has Command, Control, Battle, Managment
    Communications (C2BMC), and the Army has the Integrated Air
    Missile Defense Battle Command System, IBCS. These are four
    separate systems that loosely interoperate now, but we believe
    that is not good enough in the long term. So we are integrating
    these with a layer of decision support on top of the Joint
    Integrated Battle Manager.
        This capability will leverage a lot of the work that
    Missile Defense Agency has done to date in that single
    integrated air picture arena, of getting a common air picture
    with those systems, and then providing a layer of decision aids
    on top, so that the decisionmaking, who has got a hard decision
    to make on a potential threat, can actually do fire direction
    to the appropriate system that actually has a killing
    capability.
        So that is the new work that we are doing for Guam from a
    command and control or fire control perspective.
        With regards to directed energy, as General Collins said,
    the technology is evolving, and the Army, I know, has invested
    a lot in ground systems from a directed energy perspective. We
    have deployed several of those systems overseas to get
    continued operational assessment. For the defense of Guam there
    is the potential, as those technologies continue to evolve, to
    be integrated in as part of this architecture.
        Realizing, though, that directed energy is not a panacea.
    As you pointed out, there are days, good days and bad days, for
    lasers. Weather can affect their lethality. It can affect the
    range. So, as we continue to learn about this technology and
    what its capability is, we also have to ensure that we
    integrate the atmospherics at the time. You know, as you get
    closer to the Earth the air is dirtier. Windy days create dust,
    which can reflect or refract the light. Moisture can do the
    same thing, if it is raining.
        So having a mix of capabilities, and that the soldiers that
    are operating that integrated system understand basically how
    good the laser is today. The ranges of those directed energy
    systems are not out at the ranges of our more exquisite and
    expensive missile systems are.
        So we have to build that trust with the soldiers, that if
    they let a threat getting closer, to allow directed energy to
    be the effector, that it is going to work. So that is something
    that the Army, I know, was working at lower powers,
    necessarily, than we would put on Guam, but starting down that
    venture now, and we are looking forward to seeing where that
    technology takes us.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Senator Kelly, you are recognized.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Collins, so
    last year Missile Defense Agency proposed termination of the
    Standard Misile-3 (SM-3), and months after that termination
    recommendation that missile was used in defense of Israel
    against ballistic missiles. So based on the recent combat
    experience with the SM-3, and I am not sure exactly what the
    number of rounds that were fired, but what is the current plan
    for the SM-3 going forward? Has that plan been reevaluated?
        General Collins. Thanks, Senator, for that question.
    Certainly in last year's hearing we certainly talked about the
    decision, the fiscal decision that was made to terminate the
    SM-3 Block 1B line. Since that, you are very right, it has been
    a workhorse in the Eastern Mediterranean, protecting the
    citizens of the State of Israel.
        As we now are planning with the increased focus on missile
    defense of the Homeland and missile defense in general, the
    future decision space within the SM-3 program is being re-
    looked at, as part of the deliberations for Golden Dome, and,
    as well, with the President's budget that is in development.
        What I would also, though, say is through a number of
    supplementals we do appreciate the support that has come
    through supplemental funding that has come back to replenish
    the SM-3 1B lots that were expended in the Eastern Med, and we
    will continue to track that very closely with both the Block 1B
    and the Block 2A's, moving forward.
        Senator Kelly. Do you know how many rounds were fired, SM-3
    rounds?
        General Collins. I do not have the latest but it is in the
    dozens.
        Senator Kelly. The SM-3 line has not been shut down at all,
    so it sounds like, in fact, the rate of production has
    increased.
        General Collins. The rate of production is still
    continuing. We still have fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025
    plus the supplemental funding that still will go on contract
    before the end of this year. So that line will still remain
    open for years into the future. It takes a few years from
    beginning to end to get those rounds out.
        The funding decisions, though, are here and now, to make
    sure that we continue to keep that line open and viable as we
    move forward.
        Senator Kelly. Go back to last year when the decision was
    made to terminate production of SM-3. What was the plan for the
    follow-on missile that would perform the duties of the SM-3?
        General Collins. Sir, there was not a plan set forward on a
    replacement for the SM-3 1B. It was to rely more on the Block
    2A line, which is a larger, more expensive missile, but the
    quantity production rates were lower for that missile. But that
    was the decision.
        Senator Kelly. General Rasch, I appreciate all the work you
    and your team have done on the Guam defense system. I am
    interested in hearing any lessons from Guam Defense that can be
    applied to Golden Dome as we come up with a plan. I know the
    study has been, well, the timeline for the 60-day study is
    complete. But anything that informed that study from Guam
    Defense?
        General Rasch. Senator, thank you for your question, and
    absolutely lessons learned. Guam, being part of the Homeland,
    provides a lot of the same challenges that we will have here at
    Continental United States (CONUS). Interagency cooperation and
    coordination will be required. We have certainly learned that
    on Guam, so it is not just a DOD venture. It is bringing in the
    whole-of-government as far as site locations, environmentals,
    everything that we have to do there. We have certainly shared
    that across with the teammates as they are thinking about the
    Golden Dome, the Golden Dome challenge.
        The other area that I believe is significant is the
    integration of our command and control systems. Our services
    have typically fought the air missile defense threat as
    stovepipes, and so our work to do that level of integration,
    for at least the land piece of those systems, from the Army,
    the Navy, the Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency, to start
    the integration of that, absolutely should be a model, or at
    least a starting point for how we take on the bigger challenge
    of developing and air missile defense capability across the
    entire continental U.S.
        Senator Kelly. Ms. Yaffe, on the 60-day study, I know the
    report has gone to the White House. I don't know if the
    President has signed off on it yet. It doesn't sound like it.
    But I want to just hear, if you can speak to what kind of
    preliminary activities have been accomplished and anything you
    can say about what you have discovered in the 60-day study.
        Ms. Yaffe. Sir, thank you. I think I can say broadly, as
    you know, this executive order really challenged the Department
    to take this integrated approach in a really unprecedented way
    that would require the breaking down of silos to be successful.
        When it came into the building, our office, the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, joining with Joint Staff to bring
    together all of the stakeholders and start working on different
    design options, we matured them to a place where the technical
    experts took over and really refined them into a few different
    options to bring to the Secretary.
        My understanding is the Secretary of Defense and other
    Department leaders have engaged with the President, and the
    hope is that there will be an announcement soon, certainly tied
    with the budget. There was a breadth of options looked at that
    tied the new and potential ways to accelerate developmental
    capabilities to get some demonstrations with the existing
    capabilities, so that we can have an integrated, layered
    system.
        Senator Kelly. Okay. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator King you
    are recognized.
        Senator King. General Rasch, I am very interested in Guam
    as a test bed, which has been discussed repeatedly in this
    hearing. My question is, how much has the development of
    missile defense infrastructure on Guam cost?
        General Rasch. Senator, that is a good question, and
    obviously one that gets a lot of interest because there tends
    to be a conflating of different costs to support overall the
    island of Guam. Obviously still recovering from a horrible
    typhoon a few years ago. There are dollars that the DOD is
    investing in fixing things that were damaged.
        Senator King. No, I understand that. But can the defense
    piece that you have discussed here today, be isolated and
    identified? Somebody must know what it has cost.
        General Rasch. Yes, Senator, it can, and we have estimated
    that at about an $8 billion investment. Not new investment but
    really it is the cost of the systems that the services were
    building already that will now be located at Guam,
    approximately $8 billion across all of the services when you
    look through the overall cost of the individual components.
        Senator King. I find that concerning because I just did a
    calculation here, 779 cities in the United States with more
    than 50,000 people. In fact, Guam is half the size of San
    Antonio. So if we are talking about providing the level of
    defense that we have on Guam for our citizens in our country,
    we are talking about an awful lot of money. I can't do the math
    in my head, but 800 times $6 billion is a pretty astronomical
    cost.
        Again, as you can tell, I am skeptical. I want to be proven
    wrong. I look forward to future hearings and discussions and
    seeing how Golden Dome evolves. The question is, is it the best
    place to put our money, or should we be developing our
    deterrent capability and accelerating the reconstruction of the
    Triad as a more effective deterrent than one that looks like it
    has some technical and financial questions.
        But I think the next time we have this hearing we probably
    will have some more answers about what Golden Dome actually
    looks like. Don't get me wrong, I am all for protecting the
    Homeland. It is just a question of how much will it cost
    relative to other defense needs and how effective can it be
    technologically, given the development of things like
    hypersonics, maneuverable missiles that, as you know, General
    Guillot, are below the level of traditional sensors and much
    more difficult to intercept.
        I look forward to continuing this discussion, and certainly
    I hope, Madam Chair, that as soon as Golden Dome is more
    formulated we can have a hearing to discuss its components.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. I agree with you.
    I believe Golden Dome is part of the mix and the options that
    are out there as we look at the defense of our Homeland, and
    specifically in the Indo-Pacific with Guam, as well. We have
    heard from a number of our panelists at posture hearings but
    also in classified briefings that the Administration has
    followed previous administrations in putting the top priority
    on our Triad, on modernization, on making sure that the
    President will have options there, as well.
        So I look forward to seeing, with you, how Golden Dome is
    going to be able to fit in the mix, along with hypersonics and
    many other options that are going to be available in the
    future.
        With that I thank the panel for being here today. Senator
    King and I need to get down and vote. But we thank all of you
    for your dedication, for the time you give us here in the
    Senate, and on this Subcommittee especially, and the
    information you provide us. Thank you.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:34 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                               required resources
        1. Senator Cotton. General Collins, will you be advocating for a
    significantly bigger budget to effectively implement Golden Dome?
        Lieutenant General Collins. Beginning with fiscal year 2026
    President's Budget requestfor fiscal year , the Missile Defense Agency
    future budget requests will include the requisite funding to
    effectively support the implementation and integration of the Golden
    Dome architecture.
                             golden dome diplomacy
        2. Senator Cotton. General Collins, how will the Golden Dome
    architecture provide a stabilizing force between the United States and
    its adversaries, by providing the freedom of maneuver to respond to an
    attack?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Golden Dome architecture provides a
    stabilizing force between the United States and its adversaries by
    presenting a formidable missile defense system. It is in response to
    years of adversaries' developing advanced capabilities to threaten our
    security and the increasingly unstable situation that they have
    created. Robust defenses raise the stakes for adversaries and introduce
    significant uncertainty and complexity into their attack planning,
    ultimately undermining their confidence in a successful outcome.
    Combined with the United States' enhanced ability to deter through
    punishment, missile defenses disincentivize, and reduce the likelihood
    of, a contemplated armed attack on the United States.
        Should deterrence fail, a robust national missile defense system
    would limit the damage inflicted on the United States' population,
    infrastructure, and retaliatory capabilities. This, in turn, would
    afford the President more time and flexibility in decisionmaking,
    safeguard offensive options from destruction, and potentially
    facilitate de-escalation. If the Golden Dome architecture is not
    developed to address advancing missile threats, U.S. options during
    crisis escalation could be significantly curtailed.
                       golden dome magazine requirements
        3. Senator Cotton. General Collins, how much is successful
    intercept of advanced threats a function of capabilities versus arsenal
    size, and how do you balance that?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Banks
                                 space sensors
        4. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, President Trump has made the
    implementation of a Golden Dome missile defense system a priority. The
    need for a defense system with the ability to neutralize the threat of
    ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles is essential to national
    security. How can Congress help revitalize the defense industrial base
    and its supply chain to help accelerate and deploy a Space-Based Sensor
    Layer for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
                 hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor
        5. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, the President's Executive Order (EO)
    directs the acceleration of the deployment of Hypersonic and Ballistic
    Tracking Space Sensor. With the likelihood of the Department of Defense
    operating under a continuing resolution (CR) throughout the entirety of
    the calendar year, how will this affect the timing of Golden Dome
    initiatives?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
                        acquisition policy--lead agency
        6. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, as we look to accelerate the
    implementation of the Golden Dome, which specific agency of the
    Department intends to lead the acquisition process?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.

        7. Senator Banks. Ms. Yaffe, if no single agency will lead the
    process, what aspects of the process does the Department plan to be led
    by which agencies?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                           missile defense of hawaii
        8. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, the President's recent missile
    defense Executive Order tasks you with providing ``an updated
    assessment of the strategic missile threat to the Homeland''. I remain
    concerned about the viability of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    strategy to defend Hawaii from missile threats. Will you commit to
    include the missile defense of Hawaii as part of your assessment?
        General Guillot. Yes, in coordination with USINDOPACOM, I will
    include missile defense of Hawaii in my assessment.
                           missile defense resourcing
        9. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, our adversaries are investing
    heavily in advanced air and missile systems that threaten the United
    States and require increased investments in missile defense
    capabilities. How is United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
    coordinating with United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to
    ensure the missile defense of Hawaii?
        General Guillot. USNORTHCOM is responsible for the Ballistic
    Missile Defense of Hawaii and routinely conducts exercises to ensure a
    high level of proficiency. We also have well-established processes with
    USINDOPACOM to share information on potential threats and our Ballistic
    Missile Defense posture.

        10. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, will you commit to working
    with my office to ensure that Hawaii is protected as part of the
    implementation of the Golden Dome EO and additional architecture?
        General Guillot. Yes, I commit to ensuring Hawaii is protected as
    part of the Golden Dome Executive Order.

        11. Senator Hirono. General Guillot, between January 20 and April
    8, the U.S. military flew 46 flights that carried migrants on military
    aircraft. These flights lasted 802.5 hours, at a cost of approximately
    $21,087,300, according to information provided in response to
    congressional Requests for Information. As the operational leader for
    the border mission, how is NORTHCOM's expanded border security and
    mission impacting resourcing for the missile defense?
        General Guillot. I am not aware of the border mission having any
    impact on missile defense resourcing. Both missions are priorities for
    the Department of Defense, and NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not anticipate
    one mission competing for funding with the other.
                              ground-based sensors
        12. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Collins, how is the
    Department integrating commercial ground-based sensors in the Golden
    Dome architecture and leveraging the Joint Global Hypersonic
    Operational Sensor Tasking program sponsored by the Missile Defense
    Agency to identify promising commercial sensors that could augment the
    current integrated air and missile defense architecture?
        Lieutenant General Collins. [Deleted.]
                   engagement with non-traditional companies
        13. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Collins, how is the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) improving communication and transparency with non-
    traditional companies as part of the Golden Dome program?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA is prioritizing a greater focus
    on research and development with nontraditional defense contractors.
    MDA will work directly with the Director of GDA on efforts in which
    communication and transparency will be critical to rapidly developing
    missile defense technologies and capabilities.
             engagement with allies and partners on missile defense
        14. Senator Hirono. Ms. Yaffe, how are you increasing engagement
    with allies and partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, on missile
    defense?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.

        15. Senator Hirono. Ms. Yaffe, what type of cross-DOD and
    interagency coordination is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    (USD(P)) pursuing and leading to this end?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
                           missile defense of hawaii
        16. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Collins, will you commit to
    working with my office to ensure that Hawaii is protected as part of
    the implementation of the Golden Dome EO and additional architecture?
        Lieutenant General Collins. I am committed to protecting the
    homeland, which includes Hawaii. In coordination with the Director of
    GDA, I will work with your office on matters related to implementing
    GDA.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                  golden dome
        17. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is DOD's estimate or range
    for the cost of deploying the so-called ``Golden Dome'' or a similar
    system across the entire United States? Please describe your
    methodology for the estimate or the source.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. The Administration recently announced a potential
    cost of $175 billion for Golden Dome for America over a period of 3
    years. The Department of Defense closely coordinated with the Services
    and the Missile Defense Agency to develop cost estimates, and I defer
    to the Department regarding the methodology for this estimate.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        18. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, please describe the process the
    DOD will use to estimate the costs of Golden Dome.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are primarily responsible for
    establishing operational requirements for executing the commands'
    assigned missions. The recently established Direct Reporting Program
    Manager, in coordination with the Services and Missile Defense Agency,
    will lead the process for estimating costs.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        19. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, please describe the process the
    DOD will use to provide program justification for Golden Dome.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are primarily responsible for
    establishing operational requirements for executing the commands'
    assigned missions. I would defer to the Department regarding the
    Department's processes for program justification.
        Lieutenant General Collins. There will be primary programs aligned
    to the DRPM of GDA as well as GDA contributing to programs existing in
    other services portfolios. Many MDA programs will be a primary resource
    for executing the GDA program and this differentiation will be outlined
    in PB27 budget documentation.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        20. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, please describe the process the
    DOD will use to assess and determine the technological feasibility of
    Golden Dome.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are primarily responsible for
    establishing operational requirements utilizing an Initial Capabilities
    Document. The recently established Direct Reporting Program Manager, in
    coordination with the Services and Missile Defense Agency, will lead
    the process for estimating technological feasibility.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Twenty years of advancements in U.S.
    missile defense technology, as well as recent successful deployments to
    protect allies and partners, have demonstrated the technological
    feasibility of our systems. Building on these successes, GDA will
    require next-gen investments and integration across the DoW components
    to realize the full GDA architecture.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        21. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, would DOD cut, delay, or reduce
    the scope of any existing missile defense programs that may duplicate
    Golden Dome capabilities? Please describe which existing programs could
    be considered duplicative and whether they would be cut, delayed, or
    reduced in scope.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not identified
    duplicative capabilities requiring cuts, delays, or reduction in scope.
    In fact, the commands have advocated for earlier operationalization of
    identified capabilities to meet operational requirements. NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM will continue to work with the Golden Dome Direct Reporting
    Program Manager to support the Department's effort in delivering a
    capable and cost-effective defense system.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates. In
    this capacity, he will identify the contributing programs for inclusion
    within the system-of-systems GDA architecture.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        22. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, given that the Israeli Iron Dome
    is designed to intercept slow, short-range threats, is there a
    technical plan to adapt that system into one that can counter more
    advanced missile threats possessed by the United States's adversaries?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Israel's Iron Dome is just one system within
    Israel's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) network. Similarly,
    Golden Dome for America (GDA) will also be an IAMD network designed to
    counter the entire spectrum of current and evolving air and missile
    threats. It is imperative to have comprehensive domain awareness and
    integration within and across the layers of the GDA architecture to
    protect a larger area against more advanced threats. Unfortunately, the
    scope and scale of threats GDA must defend against is likely to make a
    direct adaptation of Israel's IAMD network, including Iron Dome,
    infeasible.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA will use a system-of-systems
    approach leveraging new and existing U.S. missile defense capabilities
    to detect and defend against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise
    missiles, as well as other next-generation aerial threats from peer,
    near-peer, and rogue adversaries.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        23. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, how much would such adaptations
    cost?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are responsible for
    establishing operational requirements for Golden Dome. While I defer to
    the Department regarding estimated costs, and the adaptation of Israeli
    systems is likely infeasible, the commands will continue to work with
    the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager to support the
    Department's effort in delivering a capable and cost-effective defense
    system.
        Lieutenant General Collins. he Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        24. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is the estimated timeline
    to field an operational system for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. The President's has directed the Department to
    deliver a capability within 3 years, and NORAD and USNORTHCOM are
    supporting the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager and the
    Services efforts to meet that directive.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future program schedules.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        25. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, how confident are you that an
    operational system for Golden Dome could be fielded within 5 years?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I am quite confident that 5 years is an achievable
    timeline. USNORTHCOM and NORAD currently operate the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense system and the National Capital Region Integrated Air
    Defense System, both of which will integrate with additional Golden
    Dome capabilities, and additional capabilities are available now and
    ready for operational use when funded. Other capabilities require some
    technical development but have a viable path for delivery within 5
    years, within the directed timeline.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future program schedules.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        26. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, are you aware of any analysis of
    alternatives or similar studies completed or underway for the Golden
    Dome program? Please provide any completed analyses and estimated
    timelines for competing analyses underway.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes. In collaboration with the Missile Defense
    Agency and the Services, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have supported past
    studies and analysis, including Air and Cruise Missile Defense of the
    Homeland, layered homeland defense, and ballistic missile defense
    sensor architecture. The Department is leveraging those analyses to
    help inform the Golden Dome for America (GDA) architecture development
    and is continuing to conduct analysis in support of the GDA
    architecture and its cost. I would defer to the Department regarding
    the release of those analyses and timelines for those currently
    underway.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA architecture is being built on
    a foundation of over 40 years of development and fielding of U.S.
    missile defenses and recent successful demonstrations of missile
    defense capabilities protecting allies and partners. In the near term,
    the fiscal year 2025 reconciliation package has identified resources
    that would buttress this existing foundation with additional studies
    and analysis.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        27. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, in the 1990's, it was determined
    that space-based missile defense (SDI or ``Star Wars'') was too
    technically challenging and prohibitively expensive. What are the
    greatest technological challenges facing a Golden Dome system?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I believe the key technological challenges for a
    Golden Dome for America system include integrating multiple defense
    layers (such as radars, interceptors, and directed energy) across vast
    geographical areas; handling the high cost of interceptors versus
    relatively inexpensive threat systems such as UAVs; and ensuring
    resilience against cyberattacks and electronic warfare. The system is
    also likely to require advanced AI for real-time target discrimination
    and coordination, as well as the need to overcome environmental
    limitations such as weather effects on directed energy weapons and
    power requirements for continuous operations. With that said, many of
    the NORAD and USNORTHCOM requirements for homeland defense, including
    increased all-domain awareness, are currently available and could be
    integrated into existing defense networks within a zero-to-three-year
    timeframe.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA will use a system-of-systems
    approach that leverages new and existing U.S. missile defense
    capabilities to deter and defend against ballistic, hypersonic, and
    advanced cruise missile, and other next-generation aerial threats from
    peer, near-peer, and non-State adversaries. Large-scale integration and
    next-gen capability investment across the DoW will be required to
    successfully develop and deploy GDA.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        28. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Collins and Lieutenant Gen
    Rasch, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
    Michael Griffin and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Research and Engineering Lisa Porter, who both served during the first
    Trump administration, contend that the MDA is not structured to lead an
    effort of Golden Dome's magnitude. Do you agree with their assessment?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    schedules. MDA was identified as the systems-of-systems engineering and
    global test execution lead for the integrated GDA architecture.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        29. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, former officials Michael Griffin
    and Lisa Porter also contend that the Golden Dome program management
    should not be performed within any existing agency. Do you agree, and
    if so, should a new agency be created to manage this program?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. While I respectfully defer to the Department on
    matters of policy, NORAD and USNORTHCOM are committed to working
    closely with the Direct Reporting Program Manager and other partners to
    define requirements for Golden Dome capabilities in support of homeland
    defense.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA will work directly with the
    Director of GDA to manage GDA.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        30. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do you believe Golden Dome would
    require an entirely new approach to command and control?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. The increased scope and scale of the air and
    missile defense mission will place a greater emphasis on timely and
    seamless command and control integration across geographic regions,
    mission areas, the Interagency, and with Allies and Partners. I do not
    believe this would represent an entirely new approach to command and
    control. The Department has considered this more expansive approach in
    the Joint All-Domain Command and Control concept, as well as the work
    being done for the defense of Guam. NORAD and USNORTHCOM, along with
    all of our partners, will leverage these efforts to the greatest extent
    possible in the command and control approach to Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future architectures.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        31. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, is there a possibility that
    adversaries who see the U.S. investment in a Golden Dome begin to adapt
    their offensive forces in response?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes, U.S. adversaries are likely to adapt their
    offensive forces in response to the U.S. Golden Dome initiative in an
    attempt to ensure their ability to hold the U.S. Homeland at risk.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA is required because peer and
    near-peer competitors of the United States have been advancing their
    offensive capabilities for decades in order to hold us at risk and/or
    prevail during armed conflict.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        32. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, have DOD or U.S. intelligence
    agencies assessed how our potential adversaries are likely to respond
    to the development and deployment of Golden Dome? If so, please
    summarize what the DOD or intelligence agencies found to be the likely
    reaction to the Golden Dome options.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes, the National Intelligence Council published a
    Top Secret-level assessment of China's and Russia's likely reactions to
    the United States Golden Dome initiative on March 12, 2025. The
    product, serial number NICM 2025-07785-A, was coordinated with multiple
    DOD agencies and commands--including NORAD and USNORTHCOM.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA is required because peer and
    near-peer competitors of the United States have been advancing their
    offensive capabilities for decades in order to hold us at risk and/or
    prevail during armed conflict.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        33. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, if DOD does not have an
    assessment of how potential adversaries would respond, when will DOD
    conduct one?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Multiple DOD agencies and commands--including
    NORAD and USNORTHCOM--coordinated on and concurred with the National
    Intelligence Council's March 12, 2025 assessment of China's and
    Russia's likely reactions to the United States Golden Dome initiative
    (NICM 2025-07785-A). In addition, the Secret-level version of the
    Defense Intelligence Agency's February 19, 2025 assessment on
    ``Strategic Missile Threats to the U.S. Homeland'' (DIA--F--25I85-C)
    contains a similar assessment of our adversaries' likely reactions.
        Lieutenant General Collins. I defer to my colleagues in the
    Intelligence Community when an assessment should be conducted. When it
    is, MDA will participate as requested and appropriate.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        34. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, once DOD has an assessment of
    how potential adversaries would respond, will you commit to sharing
    those results with the Senate Armed Services Committee?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. The National Intelligence Council's Top Secret-
    level assessment of China's and Russia's likely reactions to the United
    States Golden Dome initiative (NICM 2025-07785-A, published March 12,
    2025) is available on CIA's ``WIRe'' website. The Secret-level version
    of the Defense Intelligence Agency's February 19, 2025 assessment on
    Strategic Missile Threats to the U.S. Homeland (DIA--F--25I85-C)
    contains a similar assessment of our adversaries' likely reactions
    (beginning on page 31) and is available on DIA's ``Source'' website.
    Additionally, I commit to sharing my perspective on how USNORTHCOM
    intends to counter the threat.
        Lieutenant General Collins. I will share my views on the
    assessment's implications for MDA's efforts on missile defense
    capability development.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        35. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do the architecture options and
    cost estimates provided by the DOD to the President take into
    consideration the need to respond to the likely reactions of potential
    adversaries to each option?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. While I defer to the Department regarding its
    development of cost estimates, NORAD and USNORTHCOM are certainly
    considering current and future threats in developing requirements for
    the Golden Dome architecture.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        36. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, how much does DOD estimate a missile
    from Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, and any other potential
    adversary costs to produce?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        37. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General Collins, and
    Lieutenant General Rasch, how much more expensive is a U.S. interceptor
    for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) (whether the existing
    ground-based interceptor, the sea-based SM-3 Block IIA, or the future
    Next-Generation Interceptor) compared to Chinese or Russian ICBMs,
    roughly?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I would respectfully defer to the intelligence
    community for information regarding the cost of adversary weapons
    systems. However, NORAD and USNORTHCOM are well aware of the need to
    pursue lower-cost defensive capabilities and remain ahead of the ``cost
    curve'' as competitor capability and capacity increases.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The cost of defensive interceptors is
    greater than the cost of adversary ICBMs. The cost of allowing a
    nuclear weapon to detonate in a population center, however, would be
    hundreds of thousands of fatalities and hundreds of billions of dollars
    of damage. The existing GBIs' cost is on the order of $100 million per
    round (including cost of the recent Service Life Extension Program).
    Next Generation Interceptors are estimated to cost on the order of $140
    million per round, and SM-3 Block IIA are on the order of $25 million
    per round.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Missile Defense Agency.

        38. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, DOD's 2024 Annual Report on
    Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of
    China states at several points that China ``may be exploring
    development of conventionally armed intercontinental range missile
    systems''. General Guillot has testified before the House that China
    may be developing a conventionally armed ICBM. Why would the existing
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, designed to defend against the
    North Korean ICBM threat, not be sufficient for addressing this Chinese
    conventionally armed ICBM problem?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. The current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system
    was designed and deployed to defend against ICBM threats from rogue
    nations such as North Korea. China's advanced long-range missiles
    create geometry, capability, and capacity challenges that North Korean
    missiles do not match. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are working with the
    Department to ensure that the capabilities of the Golden Dome,
    including the Next Generation Interceptor, are able to defend against
    the full spectrum of current and future intelligence-assessed threats.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The missile defense system can engage
    and destroy a limited number of nuclear or conventional ICBMs launched
    from China but would become depleted when faced with a quantity of
    adversary ICBMs larger than that of North Korea.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Missile Defense Agency.

        39. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, did the DOD assess how each
    architecture option provided to the president for Golden Dome is
    compatible with the president's stated goal of seeking
    ``denuclearization'' agreements with Russia and China? If so, please
    describe what the Department's conclusion was about the effect Golden
    Dome would have on this Presidential priority.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Office of the
    Undersecretary of Defense for Policy regarding the Department's
    assessments. NORAD and USNORTHCOM, along with USSPACECOM, the Missile
    Defense Agency, the Services, and other stakeholders, provided input
    and advice to the Department throughout the development of the Golden
    Dome for America architecture and remain fully aligned with the
    Department's approach to defending the Homeland.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Consistent with one of the President's
    stated policy goals for pursuing GDA, our missile defenses will help to
    ensure our Nation's second-strike capability, thus diminishing an
    adversary's perceived benefit of using nuclear weapons to attack the
    United States. Decreasing the utility of nuclear weapons can put us on
    a path toward denuclearization.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        40. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, the Congressional Budget Office
    (CBO) recently estimated that it would cost between $160 and $540
    billion to deploy and maintain for 20 years a boost-phase interceptor
    constellation that would protect the United States from the North
    Korean threat of a decade ago. The CBO warns, however, that costs of a
    program relevant to today would likely be higher. Do you still believe
    boost-phase intercept is the most cost-effective way to utilize space-
    based interceptors?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department and U.S.
    Space Command regarding the costs related to space-based capabilities.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by
    NORTHCOM.

        41. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, in the defense portion of the
    reconciliation bill, the majority has proposed to appropriate $25
    billion for Golden Dome missile defense programs. Because some of these
    programs, notably the $5.6 billion proposal for a space-based intercept
    capability, are entirely new concepts, it is not clear that a large
    influx of research, development, test, and evaluation funding in the
    first fiscal year would be appropriate. What are DOD's plans for
    allocating the reconciliation funds, if they materialize, over the next
    4 years?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department regarding
    budgetary decisions. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are responsible for
    establishing operational requirements and support the Golden Dome
    Direct Reporting Program Manager, the Services, and the Department as
    they assess resource allocation for Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        42. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, when do you expect to have an
    independent cost estimate for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Historically, obtaining an independent cost
    estimate (ICE) for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) typically
    takes between 6 to 12 months, though the timeline can vary depending on
    the program's complexity and maturity. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will
    continue to work with the Department to support a timely ICE.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        Defense Program Oversight
        43. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do you agree that generally any
    new major defense program should receive an independent cost estimate
    before Congress funds the program?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes. Independent cost estimates are essential for
    ensuring new major defense programs are financially viable and
    accountable. They provide a robust foundation to make informed funding
    decisions, promote transparency, prevent waste, and help ensure
    taxpayer money is spent wisely on defense priorities. Without them,
    there is a heightened risk of moving forward with programs with
    unrealistic cost expectations, leading to future financial challenges.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Major defense programs should receive
    an independent cost estimate before Congress funds the program,
    contingent on the severity and timeline of the threat the program is
    addressing.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. I believe that communication with
    congressional stakeholders is a critical piece to the success of
    defense programs. In the case of the Guam Defense System, as new major
    defense program, joint cost estimates were created in coordination with
    OSD CAPE. In addition, OSD CAPE completed an independent assessment of
    the GDS total cost and integrated master schedule.

        44. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, do you agree that a
    Congressional Budget Office cost estimate of a major defense program
    would help inform decisionmakers at DOD and in Congress on whether a
    program is worth pursuing?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes, a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate
    of a major defense program is helpful for decisionmakers at both the
    DOD and in Congress. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will support the Department
    in its effort to appropriately inform decisionmakers both internally
    and in Congress as they determine which programs are worth pursuing.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The Department of Defense often utilizes
    independent entities in the development of programs and to support
    milestone decisions.

        45. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, how does independent technical
    expertise in areas such as nuclear and space science benefit your
    office?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Independent technical expertise in nuclear and
    space science is indispensable for enhancing homeland defense. It
    provides objective analysis, advanced technology development, and risk
    mitigation strategies to help ensure the U.S. remains prepared for
    emerging threats in both the nuclear and space domains. From missile
    defense and space security to nuclear deterrence and threat
    assessments, this expertise supports the development of comprehensive,
    resilient, and effective defense strategies to protect the U.S.
    Homeland.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The independent technical expertise
    provides another perspective to our organic agency nuclear and space
    science expertise. The independent team is able to leverage their
    knowledge of supporting programs outside of MDA offices and provide our
    team insight into how other entities address similar issues.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO utilizes independent experts
    at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab and MITRE to support
    modeling and simulation and systems engineering for both exo-
    atmospheric and endo-atmospheric missile engagements.

        46. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, Acting Assistant Secretary Yaffe
    stated in the hearing that the President still has to make some
    decisions on the missile defense architecture and that the architecture
    will be released along with the DOD budget. Will a report on the final
    missile defense architecture be released by DOD or any other government
    agency? If so, please describe what level of classification the report
    will be released at and whether there will be an unclassified summary.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department on the
    release of DOD-level reporting. NORAD and USNORTHCOM execute the
    missile defense missions but are not directly involved in authoring or
    releasing potential reports on future architecture, but both commands
    are ready to provide support, expertise, and advice as additional
    guidance becomes available.
        Lieutenant General Collins. If a report is directed by Congress,
    DoW will be responsible for releasing the final product. The
    classification of the product will be as required.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        47. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will you commit to voluntarily
    complying with information requests and deadlines set by the DOD
    Inspector General or your service-specific Inspector General on Golden
    Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes, I will comply with any Inspector General
    requests received regarding Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. Yes.

        48. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will you commit to voluntarily
    complying with information requests and deadlines set by the Government
    Accountability Office on Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes, I will comply with Government Accountability
    Office requests received regarding Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. Yes.

        49. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will you commit to voluntarily
    complying with information and testimony requests by Congress on Golden
    Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. Yes, I will comply with requests for information
    and testimony by Congress regarding Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. Yes.

        50. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, has an Inspector General or the
    Government Accountability Office reached out to your offices about
    Golden Dome? If so, please describe the nature of that outreach.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. No, NORAD and USNORTHCOM has not been contacted by
    an Inspector General or the Government Accountability Office regarding
    Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. No.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not received requests or
    communications from the Inspector General or Government Accountability
    Office on Golden Dome. The Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

                       golden dome conflicts of interest
        51. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, which private sector entities
    has DOD consulted regarding the Golden Dome program? Please provide a
    complete list of all outside entities consulted.
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department regarding
    private-sector consulting it may have conducted.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The GDA Office is responsible for all
    information concerning the Department of War's activities on Golden
    Dome.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not consulted industry or
    outside entity engagements regarding Golden Dome as the JPO is not
    directly involved in the development of GDA.

        52. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what role, if any, has SpaceX,
    Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed Martin, L3Harris, or any of the company's
    officers or representatives had in developing or advising on
    requirements for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM (N&NC) establish operational
    requirements based on our assigned missions. While industry can present
    capability options to address those requirements, the commands are in
    support of the Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program Manager, the
    Services, and Missile Defense Agency as the organizations tasked with
    determining the best capabilities to meet requirements. NORAD and
    USNORTHCOM do not have any visibility on the role, if any, defense
    contractors have in developing or advising on Golden Dome requirements.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not participated in
    engagements or conversations with SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed
    Martin, or L3 Harris regarding Golden Dome as the JPO is not directly
    involved in the development of GDA.

        53. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what information have your
    offices received from SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed Martin,
    L3Harris, or any of the company's officers or representatives regarding
    Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have received briefings from
    Anduril, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, while other companies are
    scheduled to present on either the Golden Dome for America (GDA) writ
    large or various components in support of the GDA.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The listed companies responded to MDA's
    GDA RFI last spring. DOW and MDA routinely receive unsolicited
    proposals from companies with ideas for new capabilities.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO is not a direct part of
    Golden Dome and has not discussed GDA's development with industry
    partners.

        54. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, has there been any formal or
    informal involvement in the process of developing requirements for
    Golden Dome or awarding Golden Dome contracts by Elon Musk, or by
    individuals working for or on behalf of SpaceX, Anduril, Palantir,
    Lockheed Martin, or L3Harris, or any Government Department of
    Efficiency affiliated employees?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. While N&NC have no acquisition authority for the
    GDA, we have and will continue to work with the GDA Direct Reporting
    Program Manager, the Services, and Missile Defense Agency to determine
    the best capabilities to meet requirements.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not participated in
    engagements or conversations whether formal or informal with SpaceX,
    Anduril, Palantir, Lockheed Martin, or L3 Harris regarding Golden Dome
    as the JPO is not directly involved in the development of GDA.

        55. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, has your office or any DOD
    office you are aware of been consulted by or in discussion with Elon
    Musk or any of his representatives regarding the Golden Dome program?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not discussed Golden
    Dome development with Mr. Musk or his representatives.
        Lieutenant General Collins. No.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO has not participated in
    engagements with Mr. Musk or anyone acting on his behalf.

        56. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, according to press reports, DOD
    is considering a ``subscription model'' to acquire SpaceX services.
    What cost analysis has DOD performed related to its consideration of
    this model?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department regarding
    acquisitions and related cost analysis. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are not
    involved in specific acquisition approaches.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO does not currently have plans
    to acquire SpaceX services.

        57. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, to the extent that DOD has
    performed the cost analyses mentioned in the question above, what have
    they shown?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as NORAD
    and USNORTHCOM are not involved in this decision.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. The GDS JPO does not currently have plans
    to acquire SpaceX services and as such no cost analysis for that
    procurement have been conducted.

        58. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, according to press reports a
    subscription model could cause DOD to be ``locked into a subscription
    and lose control over its ongoing development and pricing.'' What are
    the long-term cost risks of a subscription model?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as NORAD
    and USNORTHCOM are not involved in this decision.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. Neither the GDS JPO nor the Rapid
    Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) utilize
    subscription models for our programs.

        59. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is DOD's intellectual
    property rights strategy for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as NORAD
    and USNORTHCOM do not have a role in determining intellectual property
    rights strategies related to Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The DOD Instruction 5010.44 requires
    DoW programs to have an intellectual property (IP) strategy. For GDA
    efforts, the Director of GDA is required to manage a robust IP strategy
    to identify and manage the full spectrum of IP and related matters
    (e.g., technical data and computer software deliverables, patented
    technologies, and license rights) from the inception of a program and
    updated throughout entire product life cycle--initially as part of the
    acquisition strategy, and during the operations and support phase as
    part of the life-cycle sustainment plan.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        60. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, will the DOD provide an
    assessment of the cost and readiness risks associated with a
    ``subscription-based'' model for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department as NORAD
    and USNORTHCOM are not involved in determining costs or risks
    associated with this reported model.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        61. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, what is the cost estimate for
    the ``subscription-based'' model for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department as I have
    not been made aware of the DOD cost estimate for a ``subscription-
    based'' model.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

        62. Senator Warren. Ms. Yaffe, General Guillot, Lieutenant General
    Collins, and Lieutenant General Rasch, which companies are most likely
    to benefit from an accelerated timeline for Golden Dome?
        Ms. Yaffe did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in Committee files.
        General Guillot. I respectfully defer to the Department, as I do
    not have specific information about contracts related to Golden Dome.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The Director of GDA is responsible for
    establishing requirements that will inform future cost estimates and
    architecture options.
        Lieutenant General Rasch. This question is best answered by the
    Golden Dome program office. While there are potential synergies between
    the two, as it stands, the Guam Defense System and Golden Dome for
    America (GDA) are separate efforts and the JPO is not directly involved
    in the development of GDA.

                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
                                    sm-3 ib
        63. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, fiscal year 2024
    funding and supplemental dollars for SM-3 IB were available nearly 12
    months ago. When did MDA re-engage the prime contractor for missile
    production?
        Lieutenant General Collins. On December 29, 2022, the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a
    combined SM-3 Block (Blk) IB/SM-3 Blk IIA fiscal year (FY) 2023-2025
    procurement contract. On July 11, 2023, the prime contractor submitted
    their initial proposal to MDA, but it was not fully compliant.
    Following termination of new production in the fiscal year 2025
    President's Budget request, initial expenditure of Blk IA/IB missiles
    in combat, and the receipt of supplemental funding to replace those
    missiles, MDA provided the prime contractor with an updated All-Up
    Round (AUR) Blk IB procurement RFP on August 16, 2024. In that RFP, MDA
    requested pricing for a minimum quantity of 10 AURs and a maximum
    quantity of 78 AURs. Since that time, we have remained engaged with the
    prime contractor to identify and mitigate production gaps and to
    accelerate the proposal and award timeline.

        64. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, extended delays in
    contracting have implications for the industrial base of any program.
    MDA recently stated that the SM-3 IB suppliers are in production. Are
    all SM-3 IB suppliers currently in production?
        Lieutenant General Collins. No. The fiscal year 2019-2023 Multiyear
    Procurement (MYP) contract for SM-3 Blk IB remains in progress, with
    final deliveries planned for August 2026. Several suppliers have
    already delivered their components in support of the MYP contract. Many
    of these suppliers also deliver the same or similar components to other
    Department of War programs and maintain a current production line.

        65. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, did any SM-3 IB
    suppliers fall out of qualification during the period of program
    termination?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA is aware that production has
    been completed for several suppliers on the prior contract, and they
    will require restart and possibly requalification. We have worked with
    the prime contractor to award two Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCA).
    These UCAs will allow the SM-3 Blk IB supplier base to begin material
    procurement and assembly in advance of the fully definitized contract,
    using fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year 2025 funds. We anticipate
    awarding that contract by the end of this calendar year. MDA will
    complete a risk-based evaluation of the requalification process,
    balancing cost, delivery timeline, and technical risk, to determine if
    they can apply extensions or waivers on a case-by-case basis.

        66. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, if so, what are the
    costs and schedule delays caused to the program by these delays and
    qualification lapses?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The costs associated with production
    gaps have been estimated by the prime contractor to be as high as $180
    million. The cost estimates included assumptions about requalification
    requirements that may be reduced following case-by-case evaluation of
    requalification requirements. Requalification of production lines is
    not currently driving the production schedule. The primary schedule
    driver for production is an obsolescence effort with a resulting 33-
    month gap in deliveries between the current multiyear procurement
    contract and the follow-on fiscal year 2024/2025 contract. MDA and the
    prime contractor are working to reduce the timeline for the
    obsolescence effort and bring delivery schedule to the left.

        67. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is the
    production restart cost associated with the continuation of the SM-3 IB
    program?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA does not expect any explicit
    production restart costs other than those associated with supplier
    requalification and/or obsolescence efforts, as discussed above.

        68. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what are the Non-
    Recurring Engineering (NRE) costs associated with the termination?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The prime contractor's Not-To-Exceed
    estimate for the NRE associated with AUR procurement is $180 million.
    The government anticipates the final NRE costs will be lower but is
    dependent upon the final proposal and subject to negotiation of final
    cost.

        69. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what percentage of
    the NRE could have been mitigated with a 2025 Undefinitized Contract
    Action (UCA) award?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA has awarded two UCAs in support
    of SM-3 Blk IB production. The first was for MK 72 Boosters, MK 104
    Dual Thrust Rocket Motors, and Integrated Detector Assemblies and was
    awarded in February 2025. The second UCA was for up to 55 AURs awarded
    in May 2025. Definitization of these UCAs is planned by the end of this
    calendar year. MDA will not be able to estimate the percentage of NRE
    that will be mitigated by the use of these UCAs until after the
    contract is definitized. The use of UCAs did give the prime contractor
    the ability to begin production activities approximately 9 months
    earlier than would otherwise have been possible.

        70. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is the MDA plan
    to utilize UCA awards for the SM-3IB program in the future?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA awarded two Undefinitized
    Contract Actions (UCA) to support fiscal year 2024/2025 SM-3 Blk IB
    procurement. MDA awarded the first UCA in February 2025, for MK 72
    Boosters, MK 104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motors, and Integrated Detector
    Assemblies. MDA awarded the second UCA in May 2025, for up to 55 All-Up
    Rounds (AUR). MDA plans to definitize these UCAs by the end of this
    calendar year. These UCAs will mitigate production gap risk and enable
    AUR delivery earlier. In the future, MDA will continue to evaluate the
    risks and benefits of using UCAs to accelerate outcomes and reduce Non-
    recurring Engineering (NRE) costs for SM-3 procurement.

        71. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the Committee is
    aware that the decision to terminate led the prime contractor to turn
    off significant advance company funding for the program that would have
    bridged fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2024. How many missiles does
    the NRE value equate to at planned unit costs for fiscal year 2024/
    2025?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The prime contractor has estimated the
    NRE cost at $180 million. Pending the final negotiated and definitized
    AUR per unit cost, this NRE cost equates to approximately 10 AURs.

        72. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is the MDA's
    plan to accelerate production and lower costs using Long Lead
    procurement, instead of relying on industry funding, in order to recoup
    schedule loss?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The SM-3 program cannot utilize Advance
    Procurement (Long Lead-time Items) as defined in Department of War
    Financial Management Regulations (FMR) because no component, part, or
    material lead times exceed the life of the appropriation (FMR Vol 2A
    Chapter 1 section 2.2.3.3). SM-3 will utilize Economic Order Quantity
    in conjunction with future Multi-year Procurements (FMR Vol 2A Chapter
    1 section 2.2.3.4). MDA awarded two UCAs to replace industry funding,
    which will allow the prime contractor and its suppliers to begin
    material procurement and assembly. These UCAs should allow MDA to
    recoup approximately 9 months compared to traditional contracting
    processes. An obsolescence issue, not covered under the UCAs, drives
    the first delivery of AURs. MDA awarded a separate contract action for
    that effort in June 2025. MDA and the prime contractor will work with
    the supplier to accelerate that effort and bring first delivery
    forward.

        73. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, MDA's termination
    decision also interrupted planned improvements to add capability and
    address obsolescence. How are those costs being addressed in the fiscal
    year 2024/2025 contract?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The fiscal year 2024/2025 contract will
    not address added capability. As a result of the Department's decision
    to terminate, MDA is making several life-of-type buys for obsolete
    components to support the maximum quantity of AURs (78) specified in
    the Request for Proposal. These obsolescence mitigation efforts have
    been ongoing in parallel with the prime contractor's production
    contract proposal efforts. A separate contract covers obsolescence
    mitigation, and the AUR unit cost does not reflect it.

        74. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the committee notes
    that the Director indicated that the SM-3 IB program will continue in
    production ``for years into the future'' during his testimony before
    the committee. How many SM-3 IB missiles does MDA intend to request in
    fiscal year 2026?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.

        75. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, how many missiles
    annually will MDA request across the future years defense program
    (FYDP)?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The fiscal year 2026 President's Budget
    request does not include additional procurement of SM-3 Blk IB missiles
    but does include procurement of 12 SM-3 Blk IIA missiles. The fiscal
    year 2026 President's Budget request only includes fiscal year 2026
    procurement, not FYDP.

        76. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the Director noted
    that there was no plan with the termination of SM-3 IB to fill the
    mission set and suggested the plan was to fill that mission set with
    SM-3 IIA. What are the distinct missions that both missiles do that are
    not common?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.

        77. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what mission sets
    does MDA give up with the termination of SM-3 IB and a planned reliance
    on SM-3 IIA?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.

        78. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, the Director noted
    that there was no plan with the termination of SM-3 IB to fill the
    mission set and suggested the plan was to fill that mission set with
    SM-3 IIA. Are there distinct missions that both missiles do that are
    not common?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.

        79. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what mission sets
    what MDA giving up with the termination of SM-3 IB and a planned
    reliance on SM-3 IIA?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.

        80. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, MDA did not request
    additional SM-3 IIAs in fiscal year 2025. What is the outlook for SM-3
    IIA across the FYDP?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The response contains sensitive
    information and will be provided to the requestor by other means.

        81. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, what is MDA's plan
    for annual production?
        Lieutenant General Collins. The fiscal year 2026 President's Budget
    request does not include additional SM-3 Blk IB procurement but does
    include procurement of 12 SM-3 Blk IIA missiles.

        82. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Collins, has MDA revisited
    inventory requirements for SM-3 IB and SM-3 IIA? Please provide the
    latest inventory requirements and current inventories.
        Lieutenant General Collins. The MDA monitors the Navy Munitions
    Requirements Process (NMRP) for the SM-3 Blk IA/IB and SM-3 Blk IIA.
    The NMRP serves as the only formal capacity requirement for SM-3
    missiles and accounts for new procurement, sustainment
    (recertification/repair/increased service life), operational
    expenditures, flight test expenditures, demilitarization, and unplanned
    losses. The NMRP is classified and updated annually and establishes the
    program's acquisition objective. The classified SM-3 Block IA/IB and
    IIA total munitions requirement numbers have been sent via other means.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 20, 2025

                          United States Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT
                      OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:46 p.m. in room
    SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb Fischer
    (Chairwoman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members Present: Senators Fischer, Rounds, King,
    and Kelly.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Welcome. The hearing will come to order.
    Welcome to our distinguished witnesses. Thank you for appearing
    before us today, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
    This Subcommittee frequently hears about the threats that we
    will face in the coming years. We know that Russia and China
    are modernizing and diversifying their nuclear forces. We know
    that these nations have a No Limits partnership and are working
    together more closely than we ever anticipated, and we know
    that our modernization efforts have slipped.
        There are many reasons for these delays, but this afternoon
    I want to hear from our witnesses about what the Department of
    Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) are doing to move
    forward with nuclear modernization. Today we welcome two panels
    of witnesses. On our first panel, we have Mr. James J.
    McConnell, and Mr. Roger Jarrell. Did I say that correctly?
    Jarrell, from the National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) and Admiral William Houston from the Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program.
        On our second panel, we have Mr. David Hoagland from NNSA,
    General Thomas Bussiere from Air Force Global Strike Command,
    and Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe from the Navy Strategic Systems
    Programs. We also have Dr. Brandy Vann, who is performing the
    duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs.
        The Subcommittee was instrumental in creating that position
    in section 1621 of last year's, National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA). We did so because we observed a lack of cleared
    leadership within the office of the Secretary of Defense for
    the nuclear enterprise. I understand the implementation plan
    for Section 1621 has yet to be submitted to Congress. This
    delay does not instill confidence that the department is taking
    these reforms with the seriousness they deserve.
        Before I turn it over to Senator King, I do want to
    congratulate NNSA on completing the first production unit of
    the new B61-13 nuclear bomb, which provides the President with
    additional options to go after harder targets. I look forward
    to hearing more about how NNSA was able to achieve this so
    quickly, and what opportunities exist to take lessons learned
    from manufacturing the B61-13 and apply them to other
    production lines.
        Senator King, you are recognized for any remarks.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING JR.

        Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it's
    important to emphasize at the beginning of this hearing why
    nuclear weapons. Why is it that we have this focus on your
    production of nuclear weapons and also on our strategic
    delivery platforms? It's because of deterrence. The whole idea
    of nuclear weapons is to never have to use them, and they will
    never have to be used as long as our adversaries are convinced
    that if they use nuclear weapons first, they will pay a
    terrible and unacceptable price.
        So I think it's important that we remember the fundamental
    purpose of this whole enterprise, which is to make this country
    safer and to avoid the use of these unthinkable weapons. Every
    year, or probably every 12 months or so, I speak at the launch
    of a new destroyer at Bath Iron Works in Maine, and my remarks
    always have a similar theme, which is we're building these
    ships in the hopes that they will never have to be used in
    conflict, because having them there, having the capability that
    you're responsible for developing is what keeps this country
    safe and avoids the unthinkable, which is a nuclear
    confrontation.
        I am concerned, and I'm sure we will examine these
    questions in during the course of the hearing with issues of
    staffing whether it's at Hanford or at the National Labs or in
    NNSA generally because we can't solve these problems, we can't
    meet the demands that are being placed upon you without the
    people.
        I'm worried that we've lost in the past few months some
    pretty important people, some very capable people, and I want
    to be sure that the expertise that those people carried with
    them is being transferred to new staff coming on, and that
    we're adequately staffing various departments and bureaus in
    order to be sure that we can meet the demands. We're now well
    into the modernization of the nuclear triad with missiles with
    the bomber, with the new Columbia class submarine, but they
    have to have the weapons in order to make them the effective
    deterrent, and that's where NNSA comes in.
        So I'm looking forward to the hearing, and I hope you will
    address issues of staffing and adequacy of staffing because I
    am concerned that that could hobble our ability to meet the
    very high level of demand that we have in the Nuclear
    Modernization Project. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Now I look
    forward to hearing the opening statements from our first
    members of the panel. Mr. McConnell, you are recognized.

       STATEMENT OF JAMES J. McCONNELL, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
                             ADMINISTRATOR

        Mr. McConnell. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    provide an update on the Department of Energy's National
    Nuclear Security Administration. With the support of the
    administration in Congress, the NNSA is executing its vital
    National Security missions, which cannot be accomplished
    anywhere else in the U.S. Government.
        Not since the cold war have we had seven simultaneous
    weapon programs in the program of record, and not since the
    Manhattan Project have we so fundamentally overhauled our
    infrastructure. Within these monumental tasks, I'm proud to
    report on some of NNSA's accomplishments. NNSA is
    simultaneously delivering major stockpile modernization
    programs that cover all three legs of the nuclear triad,
    introducing new capabilities for the President to strengthen
    deterrence.
        Noticeably, the first war reserve plutonium pit for the
    W87-1 warhead was produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory in
    October. Last December, the B61-12 Life extension program,
    which improved the B61's safety, security, and reliability
    completed its last production unit. Additionally, NNSA achieved
    the first production unit for the B61-13 just yesterday, almost
    a year ahead of schedule.
        Alongside stockpile modernization efforts, NNSA must design
    new materials for future stockpile needs, certify components,
    and assess the stockpiles condition annually. Our world class
    science and technology capabilities ensure that our stockpile
    is safe, secure, reliable, and effective without underground
    nuclear explosive testing.
        Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory recently installed
    El Capitan, our first exascale computer system for national
    security. It has been benchmarked as the world's fastest
    supercomputer and is running full 3D nuclear weapons
    simulations in support of stockpile stewardship activities.
        Infrastructure modernization across the enterprise is
    required to meet today's needs and provide enduring, flexible,
    and resilient capabilities. To this end, the enterprise
    blueprint aligns timely delivery of specialized infrastructure
    with mission demands over the next 25 years. We are making
    progress on large and small-scale projects. The uranium
    processing facility is now over 70 percent complete with
    operations plan to begin in 2032.
        Reestablishing the capability to produce new plutonium pits
    remains a priority, and we continue to make progress at the Los
    Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project and the Savannah River
    Plutonium Processing Facility. The Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Program is another key element of our national
    deterrent and helps to keep nuclear and radiological threats as
    far from the U.S. Homeland as possible.
        As the share of nuclear power in the global energy mix
    grows, NNSA facilitates the global deployment of U.S. developed
    nuclear reactors that incorporate the highest standards of
    nuclear safeguards, security, and proliferation resistance.
    This work would not be possible without the dedicated
    professionals of the Federal and contractor workforce.
        We are grateful for Congress's continued support. Thank
    you, and I look forward to your questions.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. McConnell. Mr. Jarrell,
    welcome.

     STATEMENT OF ROGER A. JARRELL II, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
                 SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

        Mr. Jarrell. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
    Members of the Subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you
    today.
        The Environmental Management (EM) program was born out of
    the Manhattan Project, a monumental effort that helped end
    World War II and win the cold war. Today, EM is entrusted with
    the largest environmental cleanup effort in the world. Enabled
    by significant investments from Congress, EM is leveraging the
    best of American industry to achieve our mission safely and
    effectively. The budget request reflects the Trump
    administration's strong commitment to the EM mission and what
    it brings to the American people.
        With treatment capabilities in place, addressing
    radioactive tank waste safely, effectively, and efficiently is
    a top priority for EM. Key demolitions are advancing, including
    at West Valley, where the last major building is set to come
    down next month. In Nevada, we're on track to complete legacy
    cleanup over the next 5 years. In addressing legacy waste of
    the past, EM is helping launch a golden era of American energy
    driving innovation and enabling national security missions of
    the future.
        This is vividly on display in Tennessee. Transformational
    progress there is unleashing commercial nuclear power and
    supporting modernization of NNSA's Y12 complex, and the Oak
    Ridge National Lab. Management responsibilities for the
    Savannah River site have been successfully transferred to NNSA.
    In Idaho, our team is helping with key demolitions for naval
    reactors, and this spring we completed key infrastructure
    upgrades at WIP, so the facility can support Department of
    Energy (DOE) missions for years to come.
        As we execute our mission, we're looking forward to ways to
    deliver cleanup commitments more efficiently without
    sacrificing safety or effectiveness. Just last month, we
    completed the 2000-gallon test bed initiative. It's a tool
    that's helping us look at options with the potential to address
    Hanford tank waste sooner, safer, and at less cost to the
    American taxpayers.
        I thank the Subcommittee for this longstanding support of
    our program. I look forward to working with you and to answer
    your questions. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Adam Houston, welcome.
    It's good to see you again.
        Admiral Houston. It's great seeing you too, Chair Fischer.

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. HOUSTON, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVAL
                       NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM

        Admiral Houston. Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King,
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today.
        Your support for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
    enables my team to design, operate, and maintain the world's
    preeminent force of submarines and aircraft carriers that
    routinely carry out high priority national security missions
    around the world. Through decades of investment in research and
    development, Naval Reactors has delivered the advanced
    technology that assures the U.S. Navy's current dominance. Our
    talented and dedicated people, peerless technology, and state-
    of-art facilities, give us the ability to operate our nuclear
    fleet wherever and whenever we choose.
        To continue as the greatest naval force on the planet, we
    must continue to invest if we want to sustain our advantage.
    This year, Naval Reactors will prioritize three key areas and
    two priority projects. First, our most important resource, our
    people. The people within the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    Enterprise are essential to the management and oversight of the
    important work we perform for our Nation.
        Second, we'll continue to focus on research and development
    of technologies that support our current and future fleets to
    reduce overall costs, shorten construction timelines, and add
    capability to the fleet. Finally, we'll continue to execute
    efforts that modernize and sustain critical infrastructure
    throughout our aging Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE)
    laboratories.
        I'm seeking your continued support for two national
    priority projects. The first is the continued development of
    the reactor plant for the Columbia-class ballistic missile
    submarine, directly supporting the Navy's number one
    acquisition priority. The second project is continued
    construction of the Navy Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho,
    which enables long-term reliable processing of spent fuel from
    the Navy's nuclear fleet.
        We continue to experience challenges with this project, but
    I've been to the site multiple times in the last year, and
    progress is visible. In closing, your strong enduring support
    enables the Naval reactors to succeed and continue to excel
    over 76 years beyond the early days of Admiral Rickover. I
    respectfully urge your continued support across our efforts
    this year. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral William Houston
    follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Statement of Admiral William Houston
        Chair Fischer, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss Naval Reactors. Your continued, strong support for the
    mission of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program enables the United
    States' nuclear Navy to maintain and expand the maritime dominance our
    Nation has secured for many decades.
        Naval Reactors continues to embody the foundational principles and
    standards of excellence set forth by Admiral Rickover over 76 years
    ago. Within my role, I routinely interact with our experts across the
    naval nuclear enterprise, directly supervise our dedicated laboratories
    and related work at our nuclear capable shipyards, and ensure safe and
    effective execution of the Program's cradle-to-grave responsibilities.
    As part of my annual appearance before the subcommittee, I want to
    assure you that the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is well positioned
    for the challenges ahead. On any given day, our Naval Reactors team is
    providing continuous support for a globally deployed force while
    maintaining an eye on future requirements and ensuring our position as
    the world's premier fighting force.
        Naval Reactors' congressional support and the trust of the American
    people has been steady throughout our 76+ years of service. That
    support has positioned us well, but we will not rest on our existing
    reputation or processes, as the world continues to change around us.
    Naval Reactors must outpace that change in all aspects of naval nuclear
    propulsion and the Program is committed to maximizing the resources
    provided by the American people to make that happen.
        As part of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program's responsibilities,
    we train every nuclear operator that serves onboard our nuclear-powered
    ships. I have interviewed hundreds of officer candidates in my first
    year as the Director and I am routinely impressed with the young,
    talented and energetic candidates who sit across from me. When I talk
    with commanding officers returning from deployment, there is a
    consistent message that the propulsion plants are performing very well
    and are highly reliable. It is the combination of willing, capable
    experts and the finest technology in the world that sets the framework
    for the future of naval nuclear propulsion.
        I have established three pillars for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    program to focus on in the year ahead: our mission, our people, and our
    foundation. Our mission centers on ensuring the nuclear powered Navy is
    increasingly ready to fight today. That fight could include not only
    traditional weapons and combat systems, but also a hybrid mix of new,
    ambiguous threats. Our nuclear Navy must be ready to respond.
        ``People, not organizations, get things done,'' at Naval Reactors,
    and throughout the naval nuclear enterprise, we live this mantra on a
    daily basis. Our flat organizational construct enables and encourages
    seamless connections with our Fleet Sailors, public and private
    shipyards, the Navy and Department of Energy civilian workforce, and
    our Naval Nuclear Laboratory subject matter experts. As I will outline
    later in this testimony, our cadre of highly trained, educated and
    experienced professionals is keeping the US Navy ahead of competitors.
    Together, our people build and maintain the nuclear Navy, operate our
    dedicated research laboratories, train operators, utilize our nuclear
    infrastructure to support the Fleet, and ensure safe disposition of our
    spent naval nuclear fuel. Your partnership and leadership, together
    with the Department of Energy and the Navy is needed now, more than
    ever, as we design, manufacture and deliver warfighting ships that will
    power our fleet and protect the national security of the United States
    for the rest of this century and beyond.
        Finally, Naval Reactors must solidify and reinforce our existing
    foundation, including the logistical frameworks we rely on to design,
    build, maintain and dispose of the nuclear powered fleet. While our
    continued success relies heavily on that foundation, we must keep an
    eye on the horizon. Through advanced development of cutting-edge
    technology, new materials and innovative designs, we continue to
    shepherd the naval nuclear industrial base while maintaining our high
    standards and delivering new capabilities.
        Looking forward, we are increasingly aware of our adversaries'
    ambitions and the nature of new threats to our national defense both
    above and below the sea. Our actions today in executing cradle-to-grave
    responsibility for naval nuclear propulsion will impact the security
    and prosperity of our Nation for generations and our supremacy cannot
    be taken for granted. Naval Reactors will ensure our mission, people
    and foundation can efficiently meet the challenges the Nation has
    entrusted us with.
                            naval reactors overview
        This Committee's support has enabled Naval Reactors to continue to
    power maritime dominance and preserve our record of safely operating
    and maintaining our ships, while protecting personnel, the public and
    the environment. We accomplish this through sharply focused regulatory
    oversight of all aspects of the Program, documented in annual
    performance reports available via the Department of Energy webpage.
    Your support has been essential to the design, development, production,
    and proving out of manufacturability of the Columbia-class propulsion
    plant, ongoing construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility
    in Idaho, and recent resumption of training at our prototype research
    and training reactor at the Kesselring Site in New York. In the last
    year, we have made substantial progress with construction and assembly
    of Columbia-class life-of-ship cores which are in serial production,
    with the second and third ship cores currently being built.
        We will continue to meet current and near-term commitments, but we
    are constantly investing and planning for the future of naval nuclear
    propulsion. For example, Naval Reactors remains engaged with DOE and
    NNSA leadership to ensure a future uranium enrichment capability will
    support national security requirements, including naval nuclear
    propulsion, into the next century. Through the support of Congress, we
    continue to develop and pursue advanced technologies and recapitalize
    infrastructure across all four of our Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites.
    The Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho includes the Expended Core
    Facility (ECF), which provides the capability to manage and examine
    spent naval nuclear fuel, and materials irradiated in the Advanced Test
    Reactor. The ECF is over 60 years old, and Naval Reactors is
    transitioning its capabilities in stages, starting with spent fuel
    management, which will take place within the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
    Facility by the early 2030's. Naval Reactors is also beginning crucial
    design and scoping work on the second infrastructure project that will
    transition spent naval nuclear fuel examinations out of the ECF. As a
    continuation of our phased approach, a future irradiation testing
    capability will be vital to the Naval Reactors program into the next
    century.
                                 major projects
    Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
        The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy's
    number one acquisition priority. Research, development, and design for
    the Columbia-class SSBN began in fiscal year 2010 and construction
    started in fiscal year 2021. The Navy-funded electric drive propulsion
    system for the Columbia-class is revolutionary. To date, lead ship
    reactor plant components have been delivered on schedule and the
    reactor core remains on track to support lead ship delivery. Naval
    Reactors will continue reactor plant design, fabrication, and safety
    analysis work required for lead ship reactor testing. Additionally,
    Naval Reactors recently commenced testing of the lead ship electric
    drive propulsion system at the compatibility test facility (CTF) in
    Philadelphia, PA.
    Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
        Construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility at the Naval
    Reactors Facility in Idaho is progressing. The Naval Spent Fuel
    Handling Facility is essential to management and disposition of naval
    spent nuclear fuel in support of aircraft carrier and submarine fleet
    operations. Near-term milestones include erection of structural steel
    for the main process building, construction of the reinforced concrete
    spent fuel pools, and procurement and installation of the process and
    utility systems required for operations. I want to encourage Members
    and staff to visit the site to view this project's scale and progress
    to date. As the visible progress and constant activity at the site get
    us closer to the finish, Naval Reactors remains committed to keeping
    the committee informed of progress on this complex and large-scale
    infrastructure project.
    Naval Examination Acquisition Project (NEAP)
        The Naval Examination Acquisition Project (NEAP) is the second
    major project at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho. NEAP will
    recapitalize and transition the existing reactor core examinations
    capability out of the aging ECF. These core examinations allow
    scientists and engineers to compare actual fleet operation-measured
    reactor core performance data, to performance predicted by models and
    testing programs during development and production of the core. These
    examinations provide vital data to validate, improve, and deliver, safe
    and unrestricted operations throughout the multi-decade lifespans US
    Navy reactor cores are designed to operate. Without examining actual
    spent fuel, current fleet operations may be restricted or limited when
    issues arise, with conservatism maintained to protect the crew, the
    core and the environment. The Program will move forward on the several-
    year detailed design phase to prepare for NEAP construction to support
    these examinations. We are incorporating lessons learned from the Spent
    Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project and are engaged with NNSA and
    DOE on timing and sequence of planned infrastructure projects at the
    Idaho National Laboratory. I look forward to providing an update in the
    coming years as we come through the complex design phase for this
    essential facility.
                                 technical base
        In addition to the three priority projects discussed above, Naval
    Reactors maintains a world-class, high-performing workforce across the
    naval nuclear propulsion technical base. Our workforce provides
    sustained, uninterrupted support of the cradle-to-grave operations of
    our Nuclear Navy, and on-call assistance for hundreds of operational
    requests on an annual basis. The Program's technical base includes a
    foundation of specialists at our dedicated facilities and laboratories
    that provide a human-in-the loop, utilizing cutting edge equipment
    related to nuclear materials, nuclear physics, thermal-hydraulics
    testing, acoustics, electronics, software development, and systems
    integration, to conduct our work.
        The Naval Reactors technical base not only supports the fleet
    operating today, it sets the foundations for our Navy to retain and
    expand our technological advantages over competitors. Specifically, the
    technical base: 1) receives daily emergent requests and feedback from
    our globally deployed nuclear fleet, 2) executes cutting-edge
    technology research and development in support of improving today's
    nuclear fleet and delivering a more capable and lethal future fleet,
    and 3) modernizes critical dedicated infrastructure and equipment while
    safely and efficiently addressing the Program's legacy environmental
    liabilities.
        Recruiting, promoting and retaining top talent in our government
    civilian and contract workforce is critical to our ability to fulfill
    and mature our mission amidst a wide array of challenges and new
    demands. The broad range of talent in our organization is in high
    demand from all areas of our economy, but many choose to stay with the
    Program because we are directly supporting national defense. We remain
    focused on attracting and retaining a well-trained, highly qualified
    workforce and continue to work with our laboratories, private
    shipyards, Navy, and DOE leadership to stay competitive in this
    aggressive talent market within the nuclear enterprise.
    Program Direction
        The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will utilize Federal employees
    to supervise, set direction for, and effectively manage operations at
    our Headquarters in Washington D.C. and field offices in New York,
    Pennsylvania, and Idaho.
        Supporting several classes of nuclear-powered ships whose lifetimes
    can extend over half a century requires staffing continuity and
    longevity, and that workforce possesses the deep technical knowledge to
    execute Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave responsibilities. The
    combination of increasingly complex systems, new and innovative
    research, and evolving and expanding vulnerabilities are informing our
    human capital strategy to develop and mature generational expertise.
    Recruiting, training, and retaining the Naval Reactors workforce is a
    fundamental enabler of all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, and
    assures the power to propel our submarines and aircraft carriers and
    their systems.
        In concert with our ongoing focus on research and development, we
    continue to identify new approaches to attract the Nation's top talent
    and retain the skilled workforce to meet the critical requirements of
    naval nuclear propulsion.
    Research and Development of Naval Reactors (NRD)
        Naval Reactors Development (NRD) is focused on safely and
    effectively delivering competitive advantage in all that we do.
    Technology investment today will increase capability, reduce costs,
    shorten lead times, and tighten construction spans for current and
    future nuclear powered warships.
        Our first priority is today's fleet of nuclear powered submarines
    and aircraft carriers. Our laboratories and resident experts directly
    respond to hundreds of operational requests and technical evaluations
    annually. They assess and respond to emergent issues, keep our ships
    mission-ready, safe to operate, and deployable anywhere, any time. The
    unique nature of military operations has a significant portion of our
    nuclear powered ships at sea and globally deployed all day, every day.
    Their propulsion and power systems are required to remain online at all
    times. That does not happen without critical support, years of
    technical expertise, and a ready technical laboratory infrastructure.
        Naval Reactors has reinvigorated advanced technology development
    for the next generation of nuclear powered ships and submarines. We are
    pursuing advanced reactor core and fuel systems, manufacturing methods
    and inspection techniques, next-generation propulsion plant equipment,
    instrumentation and control systems and sensors, and asymmetrical
    applications of technologies. These advancements take time to
    materialize and be proven, but in response to today's strategic
    environment, we are executing with a higher sense of urgency to
    simultaneously shorten development timelines, lower acquisition and
    lifecycle costs, and improve adaptability. I invite you to visit our
    facilities with your staffs, talk with our naval nuclear propulsion
    experts and enhance your understanding of how we are delivering this
    capability.
    Operations, Facilities and Infrastructure
        Our operations, facilities and infrastructure support a wide
    spectrum of Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave related work and
    recapitalization projects at multiple Naval Nuclear Laboratory
    facilities and infrastructure systems. Many of the Program's required
    facilities have supported the Program since its inception under Admiral
    Rickover, over 76 years ago.
        Decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) facilities that date back
    to the early 1950's, including some no longer in use, is also part of
    our facilities and infrastructure plan. We have approximately $6B in
    environmental liabilities requiring D&D efforts. A significant portion
    of this estimate includes the cost to remediate and demolish the
    inactive facilities and infrastructure at the Naval Nuclear Laboratory
    sites, which were essential to earlier propulsion plants on now-retired
    classes of submarine and surface ships.
        We continue to retire these liabilities in an environmentally
    responsible and cost-effective manner. Our established partnership with
    the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM)
    leverages their experience in efficient, safe, and cost-effective
    remediation of environmental liabilities. DOE-EM is working on all four
    of our sites, including D&D of the S1W prototype that supported
    development of the USS Nautilus (SSN 571), which will complete
    dismantlement later this year.
                                   conclusion
        Over 76 years of maritime dominance does not guarantee we will
    continue to lead, and every day, there are active challenges to our
    maritime position. Naval nuclear propulsion remains an incredible but
    unforgiving technology, we harness it with a constant focus on safe
    operation across the cradle-to-grave responsibilities the Nation
    entrusts to Naval Reactors. We are balancing investment in today's
    fleet with future fleet requirements, while delivering unflinching
    naval nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy. I appreciate the strong
    support of Congress for this program.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. The committee will now
    start our first round of questioning, 5-minute round, please.
        Mr. McConnell, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I
    commend NNSA's workforce for their dedication and speed in
    delivering the first production unit of the B61-13. In this
    setting, are there any lessons learned from the production of
    the B61-13 that can be applied to other production lines?
        Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator. Most definitely there
    are. The clear collaboration and alignment between the
    Department of Defense and the Department of Energy and NNSA
    from the beginning in the initiation of the B61-13 concept
    allowed us to move promptly into a design and approval process,
    which allowed for maximum use of the production capabilities
    that had been established for the B61-12 and allow us to very
    efficiently and effectively transition from the last production
    unit of the B61-12 into the first production unit of the B61-
    13, using very similar production and equipment components.
        So that ability to maximize efficiency and minimize the
    transition time and to add another capability to the President
    and the war fighters to address, as you had said in your
    opening remarks, harder and larger targets with the B61-13
    allowed us to fill a need in our deterrence and address that
    very quickly.
        Senator Fischer. Do you see any other opportunities where
    we can increase and accelerate the weapons production?
        Mr. McConnell. So NNSA has for quite a while had a program
    to enhance stockpile responsiveness, which is a across the
    board effort to identify opportunities to improve the
    efficiency of everything from design, through design for
    manufacturing, through production, production certification,
    and rate production through this effort that's been underway
    for, as I said years now.
        At the same time, we're looking to do more accelerated
    capabilities and create an office that would allow us to be
    even more focused on identifying new and novel ways to bring
    options to the President and the war fighters to address
    ongoing and new needs.
        Senator Fischer. Last October, you released your enterprise
    blueprint and that outlined the plans for recapitalizing major
    infrastructure projects over the next 25 years, and that
    includes how it will replace facilities that date back to the
    Manhattan Project. I appreciate the level of thought that went
    into those plans, including the careful sequencing to ensure
    that new facilities come online as they're needed so it can
    support the production of our nuclear weapons.
        Can you provide us with an update about the ongoing capital
    assets projects?
        Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
    continued attention and awareness to our enterprise blueprint
    and the opportunity that it represents.
        Senator Fischer. I find it very exciting, the opportunity
    it presents. I hope it's followed.
        Mr. McConnell. Very much so. We have laid out a very--as
    you indicated, a very thoughtful and careful and not extreme
    list of key facilities that are necessary over the next 25
    years to produce a agile and responsive and resilient nuclear
    security enterprise that is fit for the challenges that we will
    face. It is time-phased to make sure that we bring the
    facilities on in order that they're needed to produce the
    actual products that we deliver to the Department of Defense.
    So there is a logic and a sequencing to it.
        Nonetheless, it is a fairly large group of things to be
    done. Thankfully the President's budget is strongly supportive
    of nuclear modernization, and we are off to a very good start
    to execute the facilities that are in the first earliest phase
    of that time sequenced enterprise blueprint.
        Senator Fischer. In your opening comments, sir, you in
    passing--I felt it was in passing, you mentioned Savannah
    River. Can you provide us with an update on Savannah River and
    the plutonium processing facility there?
        Mr. McConnell. Yes, so a couple different things. My
    colleague discussed that we have transitioned the site itself
    from an Office of Environmental Management focused site to NNSA
    as the landlord for the entire site in recognition of our long
    and continuing and growing need for operations at Savannah
    River, not the least of which is the Savannah River Plutonium
    Production Facility. That facility is well underway under
    design.
        We look forward to achieving the 90 percent design
    threshold, a key threshold for us for having significant
    understanding of the expectations, requirements, and design
    details of the facility in calendar year 2026. There are other
    things going on in parallel. We need the facility. We also need
    the talented people to man the facility and for example, our
    welding certification facility is up and running, and so now we
    are putting students through in order to be able to have
    talented and capable skilled craft in the numbers we need with
    the certifications we need to execute the mission as soon as
    the facility itself is ready.
        Senator Fischer. Are you comfortable with the schedule
    you're on?
        Mr. McConnell. We need to do everything fast. Time is our
    most significant figure of merit. It is a very complicated,
    large, and difficult facility to construct. We are on a good
    timeframe. We are making progress to meet our expected
    milestones. But major, one-of-a-kind high hazard nuclear
    facilities like these are always difficult to manage and I
    would always like to have more margin.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Senator King, you are
    recognized.
        Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. McConnell, I
    think one of the most underappreciated risks that this country
    faces is the danger of terrorists getting ahold of nuclear
    materials. My frustration is that I can't find where in the
    whole Federal enterprise, somebody's in charge of thinking
    about that. So I'm going to start with you. All of our
    attention is to our near peer adversaries, and I understand
    that, but if nuclear materials and rudimentary explosive device
    fell into the hands of a terrorist group, deterrence doesn't
    work.
        They don't have a capital city to destroy. They don't care
    about dying, and the damage on a nuclear device in a tramp
    steamer headed into the port of New York would be incalculable.
    Talk to me about proliferation and how we keep our own
    materials safe, but how can we think about this in a broader
    sense, for example, developing technology to sense nuclear
    materials in a place where they shouldn't be.
        Mr. McConnell. Thank you for the question, Senator. Your
    question in your opening remarks, you talked about the
    deterrent with a T, the safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    deterrent that we are responsible for. We are also responsible
    for many other aspects of deterrence with a C, including our
    Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and the Office of
    Counter-Terrorism Counterproliferation.
        Senator King. Is that within NNSA?
        Mr. McConnell. Those are within NNSA. They are a senate
    confirmed Presidential appointee at the same rank and the same
    position as our deputy administrator for defense programs. The
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation mission includes the efforts
    to figure out how to frustrate and prevent risks posed by non-
    State actors. You're absolutely right, sir. The non-State
    actors are not deterred in the same way as the State actors
    are. We have a integrated system between Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, and the Counter-Terrorism
    Counterproliferation folks with the support of the scientists
    and engineers and capabilities of the defense programs part.
        Senator King. I would hope also the intelligence community.
        Mr. McConnell. The intelligence community and our
    Department of Energy Intelligence group to prevent, counter,
    and respond to those threats. Our approach is to make sure that
    it is extremely difficult, virtually impossible for those non-
    State actors to get access to the material and the technology
    that is necessary to create a device and to make the penalty
    they pay for attempting to acquire that material or that
    knowledge very high and to make sure that our ability to detect
    and to counter and prevent any efforts are successful so that
    we can maintain safety and security and provide that deterrence
    as far from the U.S. shores as possible.
        Senator King. I agree and I appreciate that. I just hope
    this will maintain a high level of focus because, as I say, I
    think it's a somewhat underappreciated risk when we're talking
    about national security. I view this as one of the most serious
    that we face. Let me talk for a moment about staffing. As you
    know, there was a 16 percent cut initially, and people came
    back. Now, I think we're talking about an 8 percent cut in the
    staffing of NNSA. But my impression is you were understaffed to
    start with.
        Has any cost benefit analysis been made about what the cost
    to the enterprise is of losing people versus the fairly limited
    savings from the salary involved?
        Mr. McConnell. I'm not aware that we've done an analysis in
    that parameter space. We have evaluated the risk to our mission
    of the recent reductions in staff and have found them
    acceptable for now and in the short term to continue to achieve
    our mission.
        Senator King. That strikes me as implausible, given the
    level of the demands being placed upon the agency at this
    particular moment in time where we're modernizing, we're
    developing new weapons, we're trying to get back into the pit
    business. Downsizing in that situation doesn't strike me as a
    logical management move.
        Mr. McConnell. We believe we are acceptably managing the
    risk of the status quo. Our mission is increasing over time and
    the speed by which our mission is increasing is also getting
    more rapid. It is important as we go forward with the
    enterprise blueprint, with the program of record, with all of
    the work in front of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, that as our output requirements and mission
    requirements increase, that our ability to meet those mission
    requirements and outputs are commensurate.
        We are never going to be able to buy our way to success and
    there's, there's limits to that. So a fundamental part of our
    ability to achieve----
        Senator King. I might suggest there's something between
    buying your way to success and staff cuts that diminish the
    ability of the enterprise to meet its goals.
        Mr. McConnell. I agree, Senator, and we are going to need
    to make sure that our resources are adequate. We're also going
    to continuously need to look for those productivity and
    efficiency enhancements that will fundamentally allow us to
    unlock additional output and achieve the mission that the
    Nation and the Department of Defense and the President expect
    of us.
        Senator King. Thank you. I'll have some followup questions.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
    you are recognized.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all,
    gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. Mr.
    McConnell, China and Russia are significantly expanding their
    nuclear arsenals. How is the NNSA adjusting its stockpile
    stewardship and modernization priorities to maintain a credible
    deterrence against both near peer competitors simultaneously?
    How does the growing parody between Chinese and U.S. nuclear
    arsenals impact the ability of the U.S. to maintain that
    nuclear deterrence?
        Just to throw in just a third one here, just for the heck
    of it, as the combined nuclear arsenals of Russia and China
    begin to eclipse that of the United States in terms of numbers
    of warheads, will that increase the likelihood or decrease the
    interest of our partners or unaligned nations seeking their own
    nuclear deterrent?
        So basically, how are we stacking up against our
    adversaries? What are we doing to stay ahead? What's that going
    to do to the stability in the rest of the world?
        Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator. As I indicated earlier,
    we are currently engaged in seven weapon modernization programs
    at the same time. This is the most active and the highest
    number of weapons systems we've been producing or working on
    developing at one time since the height of the cold war. That
    is reflective of the requirements that we get from the
    President, the strategic command, and the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. We are very successful up to this point in delivering.
    We have delivered the B61-12, the B61-13, we're on track with
    the W88, which is to achieve first production unit relatively
    soon.
        We're continuing with the other weapon systems, W87, W80-4,
    all of those programs represent our increased focus on the
    ability to ensure that the President and the war fighters have
    the options they need to respond to the geopolitical realities
    we are in. That is not to say that we're at or trying to get to
    parody, certainly not parody with the combined capabilities of
    the Chinese and the Russians, that we can deter and provide the
    deterrence with a flexible, effective, efficient, and reliable
    suite of options in our deterrence, which is what we're working
    on.
        That combined with our dedicated efforts to improve the
    physical condition of the security enterprise, both its
    production capabilities and its science capabilities that are
    essential to be able to design, certify, and assess the
    stockpile gives us and continues to give us the edge and the
    confidence that we need to provide deterrence, both for
    ourselves and in somewhat into your last point is also the
    extended deterrent that we provide to our allies and our other
    friendly nations.
        We are rising to the challenge, but the challenge keeps
    rising also. We will continue on that path.
        Senator Rounds. Out of curiosity, because we're talking
    about lots of demand for it, and along with fuel for our
    carriers and our submarines, where are we getting our uranium?
    Can we talk about that in this open setting?
        Mr. McConnell. Yes, to a certain extent. So we need uranium
    for many different uses. We need unencumbered uranium in order
    to run reactors to produce tritium. We need highly enriched
    uranium to fuel the Admiral's reactors for our nuclear fleet of
    submarines and aircraft.
        Senator Rounds. No question about the need. My question is
    in this open setting, and I'm not sure if we can do it or not,
    but where are we getting it from?
        Mr. McConnell. So we have enough material on hand for the
    near term for both unencumbered fuel for production uses and
    for the Navy. But we are going to need eventually to create a
    domestic enrichment capability, and that the Department of
    Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration are
    currently on a two-pronged effort to do that. We have an
    activity going on with Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Energy (BWXT)
    to produce the Domestic Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge
    Experiment, DOUCE, it's much easier as an acronym. Then we have
    the AC 100 also.
        Senator Rounds. I didn't do a very good job of asking it
    maybe. Where are we getting our uranium from? Can we talk about
    that in here?
        Mr. McConnell. Perhaps----
        Senator Rounds. Admiral Houston?
        Mr. McConnell. Phone a friend.
        Admiral Houston. Yes, Senator. We're getting it from
    existing stockpiles. We haven't produced highly enriched
    uranium since 1992. For my program, which is the primary user,
    because I actually expend that highly enriched uranium because
    I'm using it in my reactors. We are good into the 2050's for
    that. But we are watching, we will need an enrichment
    capability, just like the weapons complex will need an
    enrichment capability. That's part of the enterprise blueprint
    that's outlined by NNSA to develop that enrichment capability.
        Senator Rounds. So the enrichment capabilities that we will
    need, we know it, we've got till 2050, but between now and then
    we should be talking about it.
        Admiral Houston. Absolutely, Senator, and that's going to
    be due to the difficulty and standing up that capability----
        Senator Rounds. That's not a 5-year plan either, is it?
        Admiral Houston. It is not. It is a long-term plan across
    there, and it's laid out in the NNSA blueprint, sir.
        Senator Rounds. Excellent. Thank you. Thank you, Madam
    Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds. For our next
    rounds of round of questions, I would ask that we just ask one
    question since we have a second panel coming up. Mr. McConnell,
    you're getting a work over today. Can you provide us with an
    update on--no, I want to ask you this one.
        How are you working to ensure that Los Alamos can meet the
    demand for pits until Savannah River can do that rate
    production?
        Mr. McConnell. Thank you, Senator. As I indicated, we've
    hit a major milestone in producing the first diamond stamped
    war reserve, W87-1hit at Los Alamos in October of last year. We
    are now actively working on the project, which will allow us to
    achieve rate production of at least 30 pits per year at Los
    Alamos. We call it 30 base.
        That project is executing right now to deliver
    approximately 2028, and then we will followup with additional
    work to improve the reliability of our ability to deliver. So a
    more reliable production rate at 30 pits per year, which will
    take us into the early 2030's. What that work means
    specifically is we need to move old equipment out of the space
    to create D and D we call it. It's another thing that EM does
    quite a lot of, in order to create white space that we can then
    move new work spaces, new glove boxes and capabilities in.
        Senator Fischer. Are you speaking specifically about Los
    Alamos here?
        Mr. McConnell. Yes, all of that happens in PF4.
        Senator Fischer. And how that ties in then to what happens
    at Savannah River.
        Mr. McConnell. Right. So by 2028, we get to the 30 pit per
    year capability at Los Alamos. In parallel at Savannah River,
    at the Savannah River Plutonium Production Facility, SRPPF, as
    they indicated, we're working to mature the design to get to 90
    percent design in calendar year 2026, which will then allow us
    to move on to construction and production of the plant by 2032
    to get to initial production and then rate production of at
    least 50 pits per year at Savannah River in that timeframe.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Senator King.
        Senator King. Mr. Jarrell, I'm going to give you a question
    for the record so it doesn't count as my one question. If you
    could supply the Committee with an analysis of your staffing
    levels. I know you've lost some key people at Hanford. But for
    the record, not now, but if you could give me some background
    on that.
        Senator King. Admiral, my question is, is Naval Reactors on
    track with the Columbia Construction Project? In other words,
    when the submarines are ready, will the new reactors be ready?
        Admiral Houston. Senator King, absolutely. My reactor for
    District of Columbia is ready. It's just waiting to be shipped
    when Electric Boat wants it. We don't ship it early just due to
    security requirements.
        Senator King. Of course.
        Admiral Houston. The second reactor core is 75 percent
    complete. Now, we don't have issues with that. Our heavy plant
    equipment we are on schedule to meet required in yard dates so
    that steam generators, pressurizers, reactor cooling pumps. Our
    largest component, which I've mentioned before that had the
    most concern for us was the turbine generator. That turbine
    generator is at Electric Boat right now. It's being outfitted,
    completely tested. Our turbine generator has been tested and
    it's being packaged for shipment from the vendor across
    country, and it is not the critical path on delivery of
    District of Columbia. So we are within the timeframe on that.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. I will pass.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. With that, I would like to thank our
    first panel for being here today and providing us with
    information. You may get other questions for the record, and I
    would ask that you return those within 2 weeks. Thank you. If
    we could have the second panel.
        Welcome to our members of panel two. We appreciate you
    being here today. If you are ready, we will take your opening
    statements. Let's begin with Dr. Vann, please?

     STATEMENT OF DR. BRANDI C. VANN, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
       ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
                      BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        Dr. Vann Yes, ma'am. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member
    King, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify here before you today regarding our
    nuclear forces.
        As President Trump and Secretary of Defense, Hegseth have
    stated, the United States will achieve peace through strength
    by rebuilding our military and reestablishing deterrence.
    Nuclear weapons provide a unique deterrence effect that no
    other element of our U.S. military power can replace, and our
    Nation must continue to field a flexible and modern nuclear
    deterrent. These capabilities are critical to the continued
    safety and security of our American people, our allies, and
    partners, both now and in the future.
        The Department continues to prioritize nuclear
    modernization and sustainment of the three legs of the triad
    and our nuclear command control and communications, as well as
    all the supplemental capabilities to the program of record.
    Additionally, the department supports the efforts of Department
    of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to
    recapitalize, sustain, and operate the nuclear enterprise. The
    United States must deliver the nuclear modernization program of
    record while continuing to sustain our legacy systems to avoid
    a deterrence shortfall and mitigate risk.
        To that end, the President's top line budget request for
    the Department of Defense does include a prioritization of our
    nuclear modernization and sustainment efforts. The Department
    of Defense remains staunchly committed to the viability of the
    United States nuclear deterrent in response to an unprecedented
    security environment with multiple nuclear challengers who have
    not followed our lead as a responsible nuclear power.
        DOD is acutely aware of the significant challenges that we
    face and recognizes that urgent action is required. In response
    to this evolved threat landscape, the department and the
    Nuclear Weapons Council continue to make the necessary policy
    changes and implement necessary actions to address what we
    acknowledge is a program of record that is necessary but maybe
    insufficient for the realities of the security environment that
    we will face.
        We recognize that we must be flexible, efficient, and
    adaptable to the evolving geopolitical landscape in order to
    defend the Homeland and provide options to the Secretary and
    the President that bolster deterrence. I want to close by
    acknowledging the creation of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
    Defense Policy and Programs referred to in the department as
    the ASDNDCBD, who will be at the forefront of the DOD's efforts
    to sustain and modernize this nuclear deterrent. This position
    will serve as a key point of accountability to Secretary
    Hegseth and to Congress on this critical national security
    mission.
        Finally, thank you to this Committee for your longstanding
    bipartisan support to our nuclear deterrent mission and to the
    dedicated professionals across our nuclear enterprise, as well
    as my colleagues here at the table who work diligently every
    day to execute this highest priority defense mission. Thank
    you, and I look forward to your questions.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Dr. Vann. Mr. Hoagland,
    welcome.

    STATEMENT OF DAVID A. HOAGLAND, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
                            DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        Mr. Hoagland. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
    King, and members of the committee, I'm grateful for the
    opportunity to represent the men and women of the NNSA today.
    It is an honor to describe the extraordinary range of
    activities being executed across our nuclear enterprise.
        NNSA performs national security functions that exist
    nowhere else in the U.S. Government. Among these
    responsibilities is to ensure the safety, security, and
    effectiveness of the stockpile, which has been the cornerstone
    of America's defense for more than 75 years. The foundation of
    our mission is our workforce, the cadre of scientists,
    engineers, technicians, Federal agents, and others at NNSA and
    across our enterprise who provide exceptional expertise to our
    nuclear deterrent.
        Although this mission has spanned decades, we are now
    performing it in a strategic environment that grows more
    challenging with each passing year. The United States must
    simultaneously deter multiple nuclear armed adversaries whose
    own nuclear capabilities continue to advance. To ensure the
    dependability of our deterrence, NNSA is now modernizing both
    the legacy stockpile as well as the scientific and the
    production infrastructure upon which it depends.
        NNSA is presently executing seven major stockpile
    modernization programs covering all three legs of the nuclear
    triad. One recent addition to this program of record, which has
    been discussed, the B 61-13 observed a key milestone this month
    when we completed the first production unit of the new bomb
    fully 1 year ahead of schedule. This acceleration was achieved
    by implementing several technical and programmatic innovations
    to optimize production in an approach we hope to apply to
    future modernization efforts.
        NNSA has also established a program for the Nuclear Armed
    Sea launched cruise missile, which will provide the Navy with
    considerable new options to deter China in the Indo-Pacific.
    Work is on schedule for the W 80-4 warhead, the warhead for the
    Air Force's long-range standoff missile, and beyond these
    current programs, NNSA is also pursuing two formal studies to
    meet requirements for hard and deeply buried target defeat and
    next generation reentry capabilities.
        Underlying both our stockpile modernization programs and
    the development of future capabilities is the infrastructure of
    the weapons complex. As the committee is acutely aware, both
    our production plans and the facilities used to design,
    certify, and assess the stockpile are urgently in need of
    recapitalization. Even as we maintain and operate legacy
    facilities, we're prioritizing infrastructure investments to
    align with mission needs over the next quarter century through
    the enterprise blueprint.
        In particular, NNSA is advancing multiple large
    construction projects to provide the strategic materials needed
    for the deterrent, including plutonium, uranium, lithium,
    tritium, and high explosives. Successfully meeting NSA's
    objectives and in turn ensuring the dependability of the
    Nation's strategic deterrent, consistent investment. I
    appreciate Congress's unwavering support of the deterrence
    mission, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. James McConnell and
    Mr. Dave Hoagland follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement by Mr. James McConnell and Mr. Dave Hoagland
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the
    Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the Subcommittee's ongoing support.
        NNSA performs national defense and public safety and security
    missions that exist nowhere else in the U.S. Government. In addition to
    maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and powering the Navy's nuclear
    fleet, NNSA is responsible for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
    to foreign states and terrorists and responding to life-threatening
    nuclear emergencies. Over the last year, NNSA continued to deliver
    modernized nuclear weapons to the Department of Defense (DoD) while
    sustaining stockpile systems and minimizing or securing nuclear and
    radioactive materials around the globe to stop threats as far from the
    U.S. Homeland as possible. This work is being carried out every day by
    the dedicated and highly talented women and men across the nuclear
    security enterprise's Federal and contractor workforce.
        NNSA is executing these missions against the backdrop of an
    increasingly complex and volatile international environment that
    presents significant, often overlapping, challenges. China represents a
    unique threat as it rapidly modernizes and expands its nuclear arsenal
    while continuing to be an economic peer. At the same time, Russia
    maintains the world's largest nuclear arsenal, continues to expand its
    capabilities, and has revised its nuclear use doctrine, expanding the
    set of circumstances under which it may launch a nuclear attack. The
    need to deter Russia and China simultaneously presents a new deterrence
    challenge distinct from the cold war and presents a possible future
    where the U.S. must counter two nuclear peers.
        We are also witnessing growing threats from regional actors like
    Iran and North Korea. Iran continues to take steps to reduce the amount
    of time it would take to produce a nuclear weapon. North Korea is
    committed to developing long-range, nuclear-armed missiles capable of
    posing a direct threat to the United States, its allies, and critical
    assets across the Indo-Pacific region.
        Finally, we are seeing growing levels of military and economic
    cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, including
    technology sharing. As the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.
    Intelligence Community noted, ``These primarily bilateral
    relationships, largely in security and defense fields, have
    strengthened their individual and collective capabilities to threaten
    and harm the United States, as well as improved their resilience
    against U.S. and Western efforts to constrain or deter their
    activities.''
        In this challenging strategic environment, the U.S. nuclear
    stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective. However, we
    recognize that deterrence is not static; new and modern capabilities
    and options for the President are necessary to not only maintain but
    strengthen deterrence.
        NNSA is also challenged by aged and fragile infrastructure across
    the nuclear security enterprise. It is becoming more challenging to
    reliably meet deterrence needs in decades-old production facilities and
    science and technology infrastructure. NNSA is working to maintain
    existing facilities to meet current stockpile demands while
    simultaneously investing in modern infrastructure.
        Considering the compounding challenges facing the enterprise, I am
    proud to report on some of NNSA's recent accomplishments. In a major
    milestone, the first war reserve (WR) diamond-stamped plutonium pit for
    the W87-1 warhead was produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
    last October, reestablishing a previously dormant manufacturing
    capability essential for our enduring stockpile. Last year, NNSA
    completed the Last Production Unit (LPU) of the B61-12 Life Extension
    Program (LEP). The successful execution of this program saw the
    consolidation of multiple B61 variants with updated non-nuclear
    components and improved safety, reliability, and accuracy metrics that
    will extend its service life for at least another 20 years. By taking
    advantage of existing B61 production lines, NNSA now anticipates
    producing the first B61-13 almost a year ahead of schedule.
        The unmatched scientific capabilities we use every day to design,
    certify, and assess our stockpile have made further groundbreaking
    advances, which are foundational to our confidence in the nuclear
    deterrent. Last year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory installed
    El Capitan, our first exascale computing system for national security.
    With the capability to perform 2.79 quintillion calculations per second
    at peak performance, it has been benchmarked as the world's fastest
    supercomputer and is currently running classified, full 3D nuclear
    weapon simulations in support of nuclear stockpile stewardship
    activities. Additionally, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) has now
    repeated its seminal 2022 fusion ignition breakthrough numerous times
    and continues to see increased yields and net energy gains. On April 7,
    NIF achieved a record fusion energy yield of 8.6+MJ, demonstrating the
    first gain greater than 4 times. Fusion ignition provides unparalleled
    insights into the exceptionally high pressures and temperatures present
    inside a nuclear explosion. The ability to successfully replicate
    ignition at higher yields and greater net energy gains improves our
    ability to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile.
        Over the past year, NNSA has also achieved significant
    accomplishments across the full range of its nonproliferation,
    counterterrorism, and emergency response activities, significantly
    contributing to U.S. security by eliminating or mitigating nuclear
    security threats before they affect the Homeland, our interests
    overseas, or our allies. NNSA has worked to improve the United States'
    space-based nuclear detection capability in partnership with U.S. Space
    Force through the delivery of Global Burst Detector III payloads. These
    sensors are integrated into satellites in support of the nuclear
    warfighting mission and treaty verification. Additionally, NNSA has
    replaced or is in the process of replacing almost 90 percent of the
    cesium-based blood irradiators in the United States with devices that
    do not use radioactive sources, permanently reducing the risk of a
    ``dirty bomb'' attack on American soil.
        NNSA's Naval Reactors program continues to ensure the U.S. Navy's
    competitive warfighting edge and secure the sea-based leg of the
    nuclear triad with unmatched submarine technology. The reactor for the
    new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines and reactor designs for
    the next generation of fast-attack submarines are in progress. The S8G
    Prototype reactor at the Kesselring Site completed its refueling
    overhaul last July, providing an additional 20 years of training,
    research, and development opportunities. The Spent Fuel Handling
    Recapitalization Project at the Naval Reactors Facility also continues
    to progress, and with the near-term award of the last major
    construction subcontract, the Project retires a significant amount of
    risk and will be entirely in execution mode through completion. The
    project has completed its heavily reinforced concrete foundations,
    continued erecting structural steel for the main process building, and
    started construction of the spent fuel pools.
        Finally, to help plan the modernization and recapitalization of
    NNSA's aged and fragile infrastructure, NNSA published its Enterprise
    Blueprint which outlines a 25-year plan to align the construction of
    specialized infrastructure with demands across the nuclear stockpile,
    global security, and naval nuclear propulsion missions. The United
    States can no longer rely on decades-old production facilities and
    science and technology infrastructure to meet deterrence needs. The
    nuclear security enterprise must re-establish eliminated capabilities;
    replace buildings that are failing; and meet modern safety, security
    and environmental standards. While the Enterprise Blueprint provides a
    roadmap to modernize and recapitalize NNSA's specialized
    infrastructure, we recognize that as an enterprise we must reliably
    deliver projects on time and within cost parameters if we are to
    successfully deliver a modern infrastructure capable of delivering a
    modern stockpile for our Nation's defense.
        These accomplishments demonstrate NNSA's determination to fulfill
    our national security missions while remaining clear-eyed about the
    scale of the work ahead. We intend to move forward with urgency and
    precision.
                               weapons activities
        NNSA's Weapons Activities portfolio covers activities including
    stockpile management; production modernization; stockpile research,
    technology, and engineering; infrastructure and operations; defense
    nuclear security; secure transportation; and information management and
    cybersecurity.
    Stockpile Management
      Stockpile Major Modernization
        NNSA is executing an expanded program of record to meet extant and
    emerging DOD requirements. We are delivering seven major stockpile
    modernization programs which are at different stages of design,
    engineering, and production simultaneously. The modernization programs
    cover all three legs of the nuclear triad and introduce new options and
    capabilities for the President.
        In December 2024, NNSA achieved the LPU for the B61-12 LEP just 3
    years after the announcement of the First Production Unit (FPU) in
    fiscal year 2022. In fiscal year 2026, the program will transition to
    Stockpile Sustainment.
        NNSA is also building the B61-13, which strengthens deterrence and
    assurance by providing the President with additional options against
    certain harder and large-area military targets. The program will be in
    Phase 6.6, (Full-Scale Production). Appropriated funds in fiscal year
    2024 for the B61-13, allowed NNSA to leverage active B61-12 production
    capabilities. NNSA appreciates the support from Congress to authorize
    and appropriate these funds in fiscal year 2024. This has improved
    efficiency and enabled NNSA to quickly meet an emerging DOD need. NNSA
    plans for a system level FPU in fiscal year 25, significantly ahead of
    our previous fiscal year 2026 timeline.
        The W88 Alt 370 Program will remain in Phase 6.6 (Full-Scale
    Production) and is scheduled to reach LPU in the final quarter of
    fiscal year 2025. The W88 warhead has been deployed in the stockpile
    for more than 30 years. The W88 Alt 370 modernizes the arming, fuzing,
    and firing subsystem; improves surety; and replaces the conventional
    high explosive and associated materials.
        The W80-4 LEP will remain in Phase 6.4, (Production Engineering),
    and reached a major milestone with reacceptance of the WR plutonium
    pit. The program has also reached FPU for multiple components. It
    remains on track for system FPU in fiscal year 2027, aligned with the
    Long-Range Standoff Weapon and the Air Force's schedule for initial
    operational capability.
        In accordance with Section 1640 of the fiscal year 2024 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), NNSA and DOD added the Nuclear-Armed
    Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) to the program of record. The
    program entered a tailored Phase process which combined Phase 6.2
    (Feasibility Study and Option Down-Select) and 6.2a (Design Definition
    and Cost Study) in June 2024. In January 2025, NNSA's SLCM-N Federal
    program office down-selected the warhead to the W80 family and
    continues to coordinate with DOD as missile options are evaluated.
        The W87-1 Modification Program is currently in Phase 6.3
    (Development Engineering). The program is replacing the W78 warhead,
    currently one of the oldest in the stockpile. It will be the first
    weapon to receive newly manufactured plutonium pits. This program took
    a critical step forward last year when the first WR plutonium pit for
    the W87-1 was diamond stamped at LANL. NNSA continues to closely
    coordinate with the Air Force's Sentinel Program, and the FPU for the
    W87-1 is scheduled to be delivered in the early 2030's.
        The W93 program will be in Phase 2a, (Design Definition and Cost
    Study), with efforts focused on ascertaining the cost and schedule
    associated with development and production of the W93/Mk7. The W93 will
    meet DOD requirements to enhance operational effectiveness of the U.S.
    ballistic missile submarine force. The W93 program is being undertaken
    in parallel with the UK A21/Mk7 or Astraea warhead program, continuing
    coordination through the U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement.
      Stockpile Sustainment and Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD)
        Stockpile Sustainment supports maintenance, sustainment, and
    surveillance activities to ensure the existing U.S. nuclear deterrent
    remains safe, secure, and effective. Stockpile Sustainment directly
    executes maintenance, limited life component exchanges, minor
    alterations, surveillance, assessment, surety studies and capability
    improvements, management activities, and support of weapons until they
    are dismantled for all enduring weapons systems in the stockpile. WDD
    also provides material and components from dismantled weapons for reuse
    in the current and modern stockpile and provides for safe and secure
    dismantlement of nuclear weapons, components, and critical materials
    for the stockpile, production modernization, and other stakeholders
    across the nuclear security enterprise.
      Production Operations (PO) and Nuclear Enterprise Assurance (NEA)
        PO provides the unique foundation for site-specific, production-
    enabling capabilities to execute weapons production, including process
    improvements and investments focused on increased efficiency of
    production performance. Scope covers recruitment and development of
    skilled labor required for nuclear weapon systems capabilities that
    enable individual weapon production and are not specific to one
    material stream. PO also provides production equipment maintenance and
    calibration services for manufacturing operations to meet DOD WR
    requirements. In addition to these activities, NEA prevents, detects,
    and mitigates potential consequences of subversion across the
    enterprise, both to the stockpile and to the associated capabilities to
    design, produce, and test nuclear weapons.
    Production Modernization
        The production modernization program re-establishes and modernizes
    the manufacturing capabilities for nuclear weapons that degraded or
    were eliminated after the cold war. This includes modernization of
    unique materials production capabilities across the enterprise
    including plutonium, uranium, lithium, high explosives, tritium, non-
    nuclear components, weapons assembly/disassembly and special materials.
    All of these materials and capabilities require modern infrastructure
    to ensure reliable production capabilities at required capacities.
      Plutonium Pit Production
        NNSA's highest production modernization priority is re-establishing
    the ability to produce new plutonium pits at scale, a capability that
    has been absent since Rocky Flats ceased operations in 1989. Although
    the W87-1 and W93 programs are setting the pace and quantity for pit
    production now, NNSA's long-term stewardship of the nuclear stockpile,
    including future weapons systems, will require newly produced pits. We
    recognize, fundamentally, that as long as nuclear weapons exist, we
    will need a pit production capability. To achieve the requisite pits
    per year (ppy) necessary for current and future stockpile needs, NNSA
    is pursuing a two-site strategy at LANL and the Savannah River Site
    (SRS). The two-site strategy is a key component of NNSA's development
    of a modern nuclear security enterprise, with an emphasis on
    flexibility and resilience.
        NNSA's pit production plan includes a redesign and refurbishment of
    plutonium facilities at LANL to support a production capacity of no
    fewer than 30 ppy while simultaneously increasing the production of WR
    qualified pits for the W87-1. This work achieved a major breakthrough
    when the first diamond stamped WR plutonium pit for the W87-1 was
    produced last year. We anticipate Los Alamos achieving the capability
    to produce 30 ppy by 2028, with increased manufacturing rate confidence
    as additional equipment is installed into the early 2030's. In the
    coming year, NNSA is planning to conduct engineering evaluations for
    Los Alamos pit production in concert with increased equipment
    purchases, installation activities, and removal of legacy equipment in
    pursuit of rate production. Our ability to execute work on the pit
    production line while producing qualified plutonium pits for the W87-1
    is a testament to our adaptability as an organization and the urgency
    around reconstituting this vital capability.
        NNSA is also making progress on the Savannah River Plutonium
    Processing Facility (SRPPF) to establish the capacity to produce at
    least 50 ppy. The SRPPF Main Process Building is on track to reach 90
    percent design completion in calendar year 2026 and NNSA aims to
    establish a cost and schedule baseline for the project in fiscal year
    2026. Demolition and removal of equipment and commodities from the
    interior of the Main Process Building at SRPPF was completed in 2024
    with over 2,500 gross tons of material sent offsite for recycling. We
    have also completed design in areas such as road construction and other
    required site preparations to accelerate the start of construction.
        As NNSA ramps up efforts to bring on the workforce necessary to
    operate SRPFF, SRS is also bringing new facilities online that will be
    essential for training specialized machinists and operators, such as
    the Machining Training Center, established last year. Once SRPPF
    construction is finished, NNSA will introduce nuclear material and
    begin the manufacturing process for pits and reach rate production as
    soon as possible. We recognize the aggressiveness of SRPPF's schedule
    and appreciate congressional support for construction and long-lead
    procurements.
        NNSA expects to make progress on the final design of the overall
    SRPPF project and the beginning of construction of the High-Fidelity
    Training Center, Main Process Building and the Operations Center. These
    subprojects are being pursued in parallel with ongoing execution of
    long-lead procurement such as production equipment, gloveboxes, and
    bulk material.
      Uranium
        Alongside pit production, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at
    the Y-12 National Security Complex is a top infrastructure
    modernization priority. Current uranium processing is carried out in
    Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era facility well past its design
    life. By contrast, UPF will relocate casting, special oxide production,
    and salvage and accountability capabilities into a new, modern, more
    efficient, and safe facility. The construction of the overall UPF
    project is now over 70 percent complete. We expect construction to be
    finished in 2027 with transition to operations to complete no later
    than 2032. The current UPF cost estimate is $10.35B. While UPF is under
    construction, NNSA continues to maintain legacy facilities to produce
    weapons components.
        Along with UPF, NNSA is advancing its development of one or more
    gas centrifuge technologies for domestic uranium enrichment. Our
    nearest-term priority is to produce unobligated low-enriched uranium
    (LEU) to fuel tritium production. Over the long-term, we will need to
    produce unobligated highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program. For almost 10 years, NNSA's efforts have been
    focused on research and development at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to
    advance the Domestic Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge Experiment (DUECE)
    gas centrifuge technology. This past August, NNSA contracted with BWXT-
    Nuclear Fuel Services to conduct a year-long engineering study that
    will help us plan our acquisition approach for a pilot plant using the
    DEUCE technology. The next step will be to contract for the design and
    licensing to deploy this pilot plant at the beginning of fiscal year
    2026.
        To reduce risk to meeting domestic uranium enrichment program
    objectives, NNSA is also exploring the feasibility of a second
    centrifuge technology, the AC100. This past December, NNSA released a
    Request for Information for industry input on an AC100 deployment that
    would provide a limited early production capability and demonstrate one
    of the available centrifuge technologies. NNSA is on track to contract
    for an AC100 project execution plan at the beginning of fiscal year
    2026.
      Lithium
        Lithium handling, packaging, and processing are key capabilities in
    the nuclear weapon production mission. NNSA requires specialized,
    weapon-specific forms of lithium for the production of nuclear weapon
    components. NNSA currently processes lithium in Building 9204-02 at the
    Y-12 National Security Complex, which is 82 years old and suffers from
    structural degradation. In 2023, NNSA broke ground on the Lithium
    Processing Facility (LPF). NNSA will ensure the continuity of critical
    lithium processing capabilities during the transition to LPF.
      Tritium
        Tritium gas, a critical component of nuclear weapons systems,
    decays over time and must be continually replenished to maintain
    stockpile effectiveness. NNSA produces tritium by irradiating Tritium
    Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) at two Tennessee Valley
    Authority (TVA) reactors before transferring them to SRS for
    extraction, purification, and loading into gas transfer system
    reservoirs, or for other national security needs. During this past
    year, NNSA, in coordination with the TVA, pursued and received Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval to increase the per-reactor
    operating cycle maximum TPBAR limit from 1,792 to 2,496. This
    represents a 39 percent increase in TPBARs and by extension, a similar
    increase to the Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) reactor site tritium production
    capacity. The increase will enhance programmatic flexibility and
    capacity to meet demand fluctuations or recover from a potential
    realization of programmatic risks. NNSA continues to support an
    increasingly reliable, resilient, and flexible tritium supply chain to
    meet the growing nuclear security enterprise mission.
    High Explosives and Energetics
        NNSA is currently working on two major construction projects that
    support our high explosives capability. The High Explosives Science and
    Engineering (HESE) facility at the Pantex Plant will consolidate 15
    aging facilities into three new, more efficient ones to conduct
    science, technology, engineering, and production activities. We
    anticipate HESE completion in 2028. Additionally, at Pantex, the High
    Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production Facility (HESFP) will
    replace 11 deteriorating World War II-era formulation facilities and
    establish an in-house high explosives manufacturing capability. NNSA is
    working to achieve the operational start date for HESFP as required by
    the fiscal year 2024 NDAA. While NNSA executes these major capital
    projects within the complex, we are also working closely with partners
    in DOD to establish main charge insensitive high explosives production
    at Holston Army Ammunition Plant, and with the Naval Surface Warfare
    Center Indian Head Division for HE formulation. Additionally, to ensure
    a sufficient supply of critical FK-800 binder needed to manufacture
    these high explosives, NNSA successfully contracted with 3M to procure
    up to 32,000 pounds of remaining FK-800 supply, which is anticipated to
    be delivered by the end of fiscal year 2025. NNSA is also formulating
    new insensitive high explosives to replace existing formulas that use
    FK-800.
      Non-Nuclear Components
        The overwhelming majority of a nuclear weapons package consists of
    highly specialized non-nuclear components. NNSA designs most of the
    non-nuclear components at Sandia National Laboratories and produces
    them at the Kansas City National Security Campus. The need to execute
    seven weapon modernization programs simultaneously presents a
    production capacity challenge at Kansas City, as the current
    manufacturing complex was designed for a requirement of one weapons
    system in development and one system in production. Changes in the
    program of record have resulted in a significantly increased need for
    non-nuclear components, and therefore a doubling of the workforce since
    2014. To meet expanded production, facility, and workforce needs, NNSA
    launched the Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation (KCNExT),
    a multi-phase real eState acquisition approach, allowing the
    utilization of each phase immediately upon completion while
    construction continues elsewhere. NNSA broke ground on Phase One last
    year and a Topping Out Ceremony for Phase One occurred in February.
        In addition, all weapons require trusted, warhead strategic
    radiation hardened microelectronics (WSRH). These can only be designed
    and manufactured at the Sandia National Laboratories' Microsystem
    Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) complex. Strategic
    radiation hardened microelectronics are essential components of a
    nuclear weapon's arming, fuzing, and firing system, which provides the
    signals that initiate the nuclear explosive chain. Production of WSRH
    components at MESA is considered high risk due to high downtime rates
    of old equipment that is no longer supported by the manufacturer.
            stockpile research, technology, and engineering (srt&e)
        The SRT&E program provides the foundation for science-based
    stockpile decisions; delivers advanced capabilities to support DOD
    requirements and counter emerging threats; and innovates across the
    nuclear security enterprise to improve productivity, efficiency, and
    responsiveness. For more than 30 years, NNSA's unrivaled scientific
    enterprise has provided the decisive edge to maintain confidence in the
    stockpile without the need for explosive testing. Thanks to the
    tireless work of a generation of scientists and engineers, we now have
    a better understanding of a nuclear weapon than at any time in the
    atomic era.
        Within SRT&E, the Advanced Simulation and Computing program
    supports the subject matter experts, integrated design codes and other
    physics and engineering models, along with the enabling infrastructure
    represented by El Capitan and other computational systems. These
    capabilities provide unprecedented modeling and simulations essential
    for certifying the nuclear stockpile and also provide support for
    NNSA's nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions.
        As Secretary Wright has said, AI is the next Manhattan Project.
    NNSA is taking decisive action to leverage advantages offered by AI. We
    believe this technology can be applied to every aspect of our nuclear
    deterrent mission, accelerating the time needed to solve some of the
    Nation's toughest science challenges. That is why NNSA is already
    starting to harness our premier computing power to support AI to
    analyze diagnostic data, optimize experimental designs, and improve our
    facility operations. NNSA will not only use AI to support the critical
    Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) with data those who created the
    program did not know was possible, but will also use it to provide
    valuable insights into the potential for AI to advance similar non-NNSA
    defense missions and assess our adversaries' military activities.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion program gives NNSA experimental
    access to extreme temperature and pressure regimes characteristic of
    nuclear weapons explosions to support design, certification, and
    assessment of the nuclear stockpile. While commercial fusion energy
    facilities are being designed and built, LLNL's NIF remains the only
    location on Earth capable of achieving fusion ignition. NIF's ability
    to repeatably provide multi-megajoule fusion yields allows stockpile
    scientists to test the survivability of U.S. stockpile systems when
    exposed to hostile environments, improve the predictive capability of
    NNSA's simulations, develop high-fidelity diagnostics and advanced
    experimental platforms, and better understand the outputs of nuclear
    explosions. As modernization decisions will be reliant on the
    certification of new materials, components and systems not previously
    fielded in the stockpile, the capability to generate fusion yield in
    the laboratory is a critical tool that is unique to the U.S. nuclear
    complex.
        The Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation program develops
    agile, affordable, assured, and responsive technologies and
    capabilities for nuclear stockpile sustainment and modernization. This
    action accelerates the nuclear weapons lifecycle by rapidly developing,
    building and testing prototypes through ground and flight test
    demonstrations. The Engineering and Integrated Assessments program
    ensures system-informed survivability in present and future stockpile-
    to-target sequences and ensures a responsive nuclear deterrent through
    collaborative partnerships, proactive integration, disruptive
    innovation, and assessments. NNSA is supporting two Phase 1 system
    studies for early exploration of concept assessments for hard and
    deeply buried target defeat and non-ballistic reentry systems in
    response to Nuclear Weapons Council requests for joint studies of
    future weapon and nuclear security enterprise capabilities. NNSA will
    continue to support our DOD partners and harness the creative and
    dynamic capabilities of our labs, plants, and sites to rapidly address
    the shifting threat environment.
        A critical infrastructure investment to support the design,
    certification, and assessment of the current and future stockpile, NNSA
    is constructing the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments
    (ECSE). The current focus is on the expansion and construction efforts
    at the Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation
    (PULSE) at the Nevada National Security Site. ECSE includes development
    of the Z-Pinch Experimental Underground System (ZEUS) and Advanced
    Sources Detectors (ASD) Scorpius instruments. Experiments with these
    tools at PULSE will allow NNSA to conduct system-level plutonium aging
    experiments by the end of the decade, providing an important capability
    to assess system designs. Importantly, they will support certification
    of the W80-4, W87-1, and W93 programs.
                         infrastructure and operations
        As NNSA's workload increases in response to the global threat
    environment, the enterprise urgently requires modernized
    infrastructure. A significant portion of NNSA's critical facilities is
    operating beyond its 40-year life span while other capabilities must be
    reestablished. Recapitalizing and restoring these capabilities is
    critical for on-time delivery of the weapons modernization program of
    record.
        While new facilities are under construction, NNSA must continue to
    maintain and operate in legacy facilities to enable weapons
    modernization at an increased pace as well as meet global nuclear
    security requirements, including counterterrorism,
    counterproliferation, and nuclear emergency response. As noted
    previously, the need to operate legacy facilities while also
    constructing new ones places additional financial and workforce strain
    on NNSA and requires our adaptability and flexibility.
        The Enterprise Blueprint issued last year is the plan for
    surmounting this challenge. It provides a roadmap for the next quarter-
    century of NNSA programmatic construction to carefully manage the
    overlapping requirements of weapons delivery schedules, legacy facility
    maintenance, and new facility construction by employing new approaches
    to improve performance in delivering projects. Even so, we are clear-
    eyed that reform must come from within, and NNSA must keep costs and
    schedules within appropriate levels as part of our responsibility to
    Congress and the American people.
        Infrastructure modernization goes beyond the construction of new
    facilities. It also delivers modern capabilities and efficient
    technologies that take advantage of revolutions in production over
    previous decades while promoting higher safety and security standards
    for our workforce and the communities in which we operate. The overall
    aim of our infrastructure modernization effort is to make the nuclear
    security enterprise scalable and flexible to meet non-linear mission
    demand over the coming decades.
                             secure transportation
        NNSA's Secure Transportation program includes the Mobile Guardian
    Transporter (MGT) acquisition program, leading-edge communication
    systems and recruitment, retention, and training for our highly
    qualified Federal Agents. MGT is the next generation secure trailer
    system and with our highly qualified Federal agents, will ensure the
    safety and security of existing and planned cargoes, meet nuclear
    explosive safety standards, and protect the public. Due to the rigorous
    screening and training required for these Federal agents, maintaining a
    steady cadence of Federal Agent Training Courses is essential, and NNSA
    appreciates support for continuing to onboard new agents.
        The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program, which provides this
    capability, has a record of 100 percent safe and secure shipments
    without compromise, loss of components, or release of radiological
    material.
                            defense nuclear security
        Defense Nuclear Security provides protection for NNSA personnel,
    facilities, weapons, and materials from a full spectrum of threats
    ranging from minor security incidents to acts of terrorism in a rapidly
    evolving technology threat landscape.
        As NNSA's overall mission set continues to grow, NNSA is enhancing
    security capabilities through the acquisition and employment of
    innovative physical security technology to improve risk mitigation and
    promote more efficient security operations. Additional personnel,
    larger facility footprints, and larger quantities of sensitive
    materials require additional shifts and potential return to 24/7
    operations at some locations. Furthermore, rapidly evolving technology
    presents novel security challenges that require novel solutions.
        One of the most complex and rapidly evolving security threats NNSA
    faces is from drones and other uncrewed aircraft systems. NNSA is
    making substantial investments in next-generation counter-uncrewed
    aircraft systems (CUAS) while updating hardware and software of current
    platforms. In partnership with Idaho National Laboratory, NNSA is using
    the lab's dedicated CUAS range to conduct testing and evaluation of
    future-generation CUAS acquisitions, assisting security planners in
    identifying future generation solutions to improve NNSA's existing CUAS
    platforms.
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity
        NNSA faces a growing array of IT and cybersecurity challenges and
    is responding through strategic modernization of its IT and
    cybersecurity environments to include more resilient and flexible
    capabilities. These investments focus on enterprise-scale cybersecurity
    infrastructure, operational technology security, Nuclear Enterprise
    Assurance requirements, zero trust architectures, and commercial cloud-
    based technologies for both classified and unclassified networks.
    Additional investments include integrated communications and innovative
    collaboration services. These actions are geared toward making NNSA
    systems more secure in an increasingly digital world.
        NNSA continues to invest in its digital transformation and digital
    engineering efforts. In July 2024, NNSA launched Enterprise Secure
    Network (ESN) Hub, a centralized classified computing environment that
    will connect partners and collaborators across the enterprise in new
    ways, increasing productivity while keeping our work secure. For the
    first time, NNSA mission personnel can access a common enterprise-wide
    computing infrastructure from secure locations across the enterprise at
    any time. This effort is just one part of NNSA's broader digital
    transformation initiative that will streamline and optimize efficiency
    across the enterprise through new tools and revised work processes.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        The work conducted under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation creates a
    multilayered defense to prevent, counter, and respond to the threat of
    nuclear and radiological terrorism, as well as the threat of hostile
    countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This work makes America safer by
    both protecting American citizens and interests overseas and keeping
    threats as far from the U.S. Homeland as possible. These activities are
    a powerful and necessary component of strategic deterrence.
        NNSA's nonproliferation programs also facilitate the global
    deployment of U.S.-developed nuclear reactors that incorporate the
    highest standards of nuclear safeguards, security, and proliferation
    resistance. NNSA's work in this area is a ``win-win'' that helps
    unleash the American nuclear renaissance while also keeping America
    safe from the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
      Material Management and Minimization
        The Office of Material Management and Minimization works to prevent
    hostile State or non-State actors from acquiring weapons-usable
    material for use in an improvised radiological or nuclear device by
    eliminating it or replacing it with less attractive material.
        NNSA is successfully executing a recovery project for high-assay
    low-enriched uranium (HALEU). This activity removes unusable scrap
    HALEU materials from Y-12's aging 9212 facility and processes it into
    an oxide form. Once produced, the material is being provided to DOE's
    Office of Nuclear Energy to support advanced reactor demonstrations. In
    addition to the benefits to industry, this project will support a more
    efficient transition to UPF. To date, NNSA has produced over 300 kg of
    oxide and is on track to produce more over the next 2 years.
        NNSA also works with partners in the United States and with
    countries around the world to convert research reactors and medical
    isotope productionsites away from HEU to LEU or HALEU. These
    conversions allow for critical research and business activities to
    continue while eliminating the associated proliferation risk. Most
    recently, NNSA's partnership with Japan achieved the conversion of the
    first of two reactor cores at Kyoto University's Critical Assembly from
    HEU to HALEU. This marks the 110th research reactor or medical isotope
    facility that NNSA has helped convert to a proliferation resistant fuel
    or otherwise verified as shutdown.
        Additionally, NNSA works with partner countries around the world to
    eliminate excess inventories of HEU and plutonium. To date, NNSA has
    eliminated over 7,345 kg of HEU and plutonium, the material equivalent
    of several hundred nuclear weapons.
      Global Material Security
        The Office of Global Material Security makes America safer by
    working in the United States and internationally to secure and prevent
    the smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials that could be used
    in an attack against the United States or its interests.
        Global Material Security also works with U.S. industry to advance
    U.S. competitiveness, prosperity, and security. The program currently
    works with nine U.S. advanced reactor vendors on security by design to
    increase global competitiveness and exportability. It also supports the
    development of groundbreaking technologies to replace radioactive
    materials, such as cesium-137 and cobalt-60 across a broad spectrum of
    medical, agricultural, and industrial applications. This includes a
    congressional mandate to eliminate all cesium-137 blood irradiators in
    the United States by 2027. To date, NNSA has eliminated 400 such
    devices. Eliminating these materials ensures that they can never be
    used in a radiological device that poses a threat to the United States,
    its citizens, or interests. Global Material Security also deploys
    American radiation detection equipment in countries around the world to
    build partner-country capacity to stop radiological and nuclear
    smuggling. This forward-leaning approach disrupts illicit smuggling
    supply chains and halts threats before they can reach the Homeland.
      Nonproliferation and Arms Control
        Dating back to the Eisenhower Administration, it has been U.S.
    policy to support the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Today,
    that growth is larger than at any point in history. In 2023, there were
    more than 410 nuclear reactors in operation across 30 countries. Today,
    more than 40 countries are considering expanding their civilian nuclear
    fleets or adopting nuclear power. Many of these countries are nuclear
    newcomers who lack the sophisticated technical experience and
    safeguards regime to ensure the safe use and operation of these power
    plants and their material. China and Russia also dominate the field of
    nuclear reactor construction. Of the 52 reactors that have started
    construction since 2017, 48 are of either Chinese or Russian design.
        To balance longstanding U.S. support for expanded nuclear power use
    and the potential known and unknown proliferation risks associated with
    that expansion, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control program
    undertakes a wide array of activities, including building the capacity
    of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Member States to
    implement international nuclear safeguards; strengthening domestic and
    global capacity to detect and prevent illicit transfers of prohibited
    materials, equipment, and technology; provide technical assistance to
    the Department of State on the negotiation and implementation of
    nuclear cooperation agreements and implement the nuclear export control
    regulations at 10 CFR Part 810, under which the Secretary of Energy
    authorizes U.S. companies to export unclassified nuclear technology and
    assistance.
      Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
        Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development directly
    contributes to nuclear security by developing U.S. capabilities to
    detect and characterize global nuclear security threats, specifically
    foreign nuclear material production and weapons development activities,
    movement, and illicit diversion of special nuclear materials and global
    nuclear detonations. Irrespective of existing arms control agreements,
    these capabilities provide the U.S. with the ability to independently
    detect and verify foreign nuclear weapons development and activities
    around the world and in outer space.
        Current programmatic focus is on the production of nuclear
    detonation detection satellite payloads in line with the schedule
    established with the U.S. Space Force; continued development of
    technical approaches, including remote sensing and AI, to drive early
    detection of nuclear proliferation; and ongoing infrastructure
    recapitalization activities to meet future mission objectives and
    anticipate threats through demonstration and validation in
    representative environments.
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
        The CTCP program counters nuclear terrorism and nuclear
    proliferation and responds to any nuclear or radiological threat,
    incident, or accident worldwide. CTCP acts in an expanded
    counterterrorism and counterproliferation environment given the growing
    use and reach of nuclear and radiological material, potential risks
    inherent in emerging technologies like AI that lower the barrier to
    access nuclear technical expertise, and the nuclear emergency response
    implications of a deteriorating global security environment. CTCP
    harnesses DOE's decades of experience with nuclear weapons and
    materials, directs it toward understanding substantial and unresolved
    scientific challenges associated with nuclear threats posed by any
    adversary, and maintains the capability to respond to those threats in
    fulfilment of key national security and public safety missions.
        To effectively respond to nuclear emergencies worldwide, CTCP is
    responsible for the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), an
    organization of on-call technical specialists trained and equipped to
    respond to nuclear threats, incidents, and accidents anywhere on Earth.
    NEST maintains a vast array of capabilities to detect, assess, defeat
    and attribute the provenance of loose nuclear material or improvised
    nuclear devices; safely resolve any accidents involving a U.S. nuclear
    weapon and mitigate impacts to public health and safety during a
    radiological or nuclear emergency of any scale. NEST executed 27
    unclassified emergency response operations in 2024 and continues this
    steady operational tempo in 2025 while maintaining 24/7/365 readiness
    to respond. NNSA was proud to celebrate NEST's 50th anniversary last
    September, a reflection on half a century of critical, often unseen,
    work keeping the United States citizens and our interests around the
    world safe.
        CTCP also engages in extensive training and coordination with
    local, State, and Federal partners to prepare them for a potential
    nuclear or radiological emergency. These partners have repeatedly and
    successfully worked alongside NEST for the protection of large-scale
    national events, including Presidential inaugurations, Super Bowls and
    the Olympics. CTCP also partners with the FBI to sustain advanced
    counter-WMD capabilities in 14 major U.S. cities and is building an
    enhanced baseline capability in each FBI field office to conduct
    initial counter-WMD operations.
        In addition, CTCP assesses emergency response gaps and works to
    address these through building capable partnerships with State and
    local communities and international allies so they can counter and
    respond to radiological and nuclear incidents, accidents and terror
    threats. These domestic partnerships strengthen and exercise local
    response coordination. Internationally, NNSA is a leader in nuclear and
    radiological emergency response. CTCP works to build partnerships
    capable of countering threats before they reach the Homeland, and,
    should an incident occur, mitigating impacts to public health and
    safety to preserve American safety, security, and economic interests.
        CTCP also retains extensive nuclear forensic capabilities, which
    deter a malign State and non-State actors from carrying out a nuclear
    terror attack. To maintain this deterrent, CTCP is focused on
    strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to ensure decisionmakers
    receive timely assessments that support attribution in the event of a
    nuclear incident. As with other nonproliferation, counterterrorism and
    emergency management activities, robust forensics serves as a key
    complement to our nuclear weapons deterrent, reinforcing the certainty
    of an American response to any nuclear attack.
                                 naval reactors
        The Naval Reactors portfolio supports NNSA's close partnership with
    the U.S. Navy in support of the nuclear fleet. Naval Reactors is
    advancing naval nuclear propulsion capabilities to keep the U.S. Navy
    on the cutting edge of warfighting capability, maintaining the assured
    second-strike capability of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, and
    building the next generation of naval nuclear propulsion infrastructure
    for continued operational success. Last year NNSA celebrated the75th
    anniversary of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and its
    unprecedented record of technological innovation and success.
        Naval Reactors is currently working on four major initiatives:
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine reactor systems development;
    development of future advanced submarine technology to support next
    generation designs; continued progress on base technology development;
    and infrastructure recapitalization at program sites, including
    decontamination and decommissioning efforts leading to a reduction in
    long-term program liabilities.
        These infrastructure efforts include constructing the Naval Spent
    Fuel Handling Facility at the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho to
    recapitalize the capabilities for naval spent nuclear fuel handling
    that exist in the over-60-year-old Expended Core Facility.
        Finally, Naval Reactors continues to support the Australia-United
    Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership through reimbursable work
    with Australia and the U.K. NNSA will continue its collaboration with
    the Departments of State and Defense to advance the goals of the
    enhanced trilateral security partnership.
                         federal salaries and expenses
        NNSA's Federal workforce executes the essential government
    functions of the agency including mission program management, project
    management, budget development, contract management, and effective
    oversight of its management and operating contractors.
        NNSA's mission is accomplished through the hard work and innovative
    spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to public service. NNSA
    is a lean organization that will continue to identify efficiencies to
    provide an agile and efficient organization to meet evolving mission
    needs.
                                   conclusion
        These are unprecedented times for the nuclear security enterprise.
    Not since the cold war have we had seven simultaneous weapons programs
    in the program of record, and not since the Manhattan Project have we
    so fundamentally overhauled our infrastructure. Never have we tried to
    undertake both these tasks at the same time, in an already turbulent
    international environment. We appreciate Congress' continuous support
    for our mission priorities. NNSA is committed to delivering modernized
    weapons on time and at pace to the DOD, safeguarding nuclear materials
    globally, creating the next generation of naval nuclear propulsion
    technology, and doing it all while modernizing our infrastructure.
    There is much work to be done, but I am confident in our ability to
    succeed. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Hoagland. General Bussiere,
    welcome. Good to see you.

        STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. BUSSIERE, USAF COMMANDER

        General Bussiere. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Fischer,
    Ranking Member King, Members of the distinguished Committee. I
    have the honor of representing the men and women of Air Force
    Global Strike Command and to be providing you an update today
    on our mission, our airmen, our ongoing modernization efforts,
    and the challenges of sustaining our legacy weapon systems.
        I'd like to thank Congress for your continued support for
    not only our Nation's defense, but for the Air Force's nuclear
    deterrence and long-range strike missions. My full statement
    has been submitted for the record. The Air Force Global Strike
    team has the privilege of executing our Nation's strategic
    nuclear deterrence and conventional long-range strike missions.
    My top priority remains maintaining a viable legacy force while
    modernizing and taking care of our airmen and their families.
        Modernization efforts include the Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile (ICBM) leg, the B21, the B52 J model, the MH-
    139 Gray Wolf helicopter, the Survival Airborne Operations
    Center, our Weapons Generation facility upgrades, our long-
    range standoff weapons, and the nuclear command and control and
    communications architecture. This Committee recognizes the
    serious nuclear threats to our Nation. We face the challenge of
    deterring two major nuclear powers, China and Russia, who
    possess both modern and diverse arsenals. Additionally, North
    Korea poses an escalating threat, and there is the potential of
    a nuclear armed Iran.
        This dangerous and unprecedented security environment is
    further complicated by the increased coordination among these
    U.S. rivals. This underscores the importance of fielding a
    flexible and modern nuclear force to effectively deter them.
    While Global Strike Command leads the charge in sustaining
    current forces in deploying future long-range strike weapon
    systems, we do recognize this is the bedrock of our military
    strength. It's the foundation of our Nation's defense and
    essential for assuring our allies and partners.
        Equally important to a viable and effective nuclear
    deterrence is our ability to effectively conduct conventional
    long-range strike missions. We remain focused on sustaining and
    modernizing our conventional bombers and fielding improved
    long-range strike capabilities to provide the Nation with a
    full range of deterrence options. Through it all, our Striker
    airmen remain our greatest strength, their dedication,
    innovation, resilience, make it all possible.
        But the world is an uncertain place. We must remain
    vigilant and continue to invest in our airmen and their
    families and provide them with the resources, training, and
    support they need to get the job done we're asking them to do.
        The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise is in a critical phase of
    transition. There is no operational margin remaining and our
    resources continue to be stretched, impacting the readiness and
    well-being of our dedicated airmen. Today I request your
    continued support as we confront these pressing challenges
    while upholding our Nation's security. Thank you. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Bussiere follows:]

                Prepared Statement by General Thomas A. Bussiere
                                  introduction
        Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) provides strategic
    deterrence and long-range strike capabilities anytime, anywhere as
    directed by the President, and the Commander, United States Strategic
    Command (USSTRATCOM). As a cornerstone of our Interim National Defense
    Strategy, AFGSC sustains current forces while simultaneously
    integrating future long-range strike weapon systems. This past August
    marked the 15th anniversary of AFGSC's establishment, a testament to
    our vital role as the central force provider for the Air Force's
    strategic responsibilities, but our command is younger than our weapon
    systems. The B-2A and B-1B are over 30 years old, and the B-52H just
    had its 72d birthday. The Minuteman III missile (MMIII) is 55 years old
    and the overall intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) weapon system
    is even older. The nuclear, command, control, and communications
    systems (NC3) is built on cold war-era architecture. As AFGSC
    transitions legacy systems to new technologies, we must achieve balance
    between critical sustainment of aging systems and continued funding for
    essential replacements such as the B-21 bomber and the Sentinel ICBM.
        AFGSC demonstrates dedication to the Nation's credible deterrent
    through continuous global engagement. Strengthening deterrence requires
    a force that is demonstrably lethal, always ready, and operates with
    shared national security objectives. In 2024, AFGSC planned and
    executed 33 Bomber Task Force (BTF) events, encompassing 267 days of
    deployed bomber operations across multiple geographic commands. AFGSC
    executed more bomber task missions in the last 12 months than the last
    20 years combined. The demand signal for BTFs to showcase American
    airpower, empower allies and partners, and give adversaries pause is
    significant, and will likely only increase in the future. The 24/7
    vigilance of our ICBM force marks 55 years of unyielding resolve
    afforded by the MMIII. The dedication to our operational tempo, coupled
    with our focus on people, mission, modernization, and engagement,
    enables AFGSC to maintain its strategic advantage in both the nuclear
    and conventional realms.
        However, AFGSC faces a watershed moment: there is no remaining
    margin in our legacy fielded forces but the demand for these
    capabilities has not waned. Arguably, AFGSC capabilities have never
    been more important for our overall defense due to the modernization,
    increasing capabilities, and diversification of the nuclear
    capabilities of our adversaries. We must never forget the weight of our
    responsibility in safeguarding national security. Sustaining our legacy
    systems cannot be overlooked as all hands focus on the daunting
    challenge of modernizing and recapitalizing all legs of the nuclear
    triad. AFGSC needs continued support and on-time, stable funding to
    equip our Airmen to compete effectively in this ever-changing and
    challenging strategic environment.
                          global security environment
        The United States and Allies and partners face one of the most
    challenging threat environments since the cold war, as highlighted by
    the need to simultaneously deter two major nuclear-armed adversaries
    and a nuclear-armed rogue nation, the DPRK). China and Russia possess
    advanced and diverse nuclear capabilities, demanding a complex and
    multifaceted strategic approach. The Kremlin's deployment of nuclear
    weapons to Belarus and its plans to aggressively expand its military
    present new challenges to European security. Additionally, the
    Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has doubled down on
    expanding nuclear capabilities, and the potential for Iran to develop
    nuclear weapons remains a grave concern. In an unprecedented move, the
    DPRK has deployed approximately 10,000 troops to support Russia's
    efforts against Ukraine on the battlefield. Most alarming is the
    deepening alignment amongst these nuclear-armed actors and the need to
    be ready to defeat this new axis of aggressors.
        As the Department's pacing threat, China continues to pursue an
    unprecedented military buildup, including the expansion, modernization,
    and diversification of its nuclear and conventional forces. China's
    growing stockpile of deliverable air-, ground-, and sea-launched weapon
    systems pose a challenge to current United States and allied missile
    defense systems beyond the Second Island Chain. China remains on an
    accelerated pace to possess 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by the
    end of the decade, complicating the requirements for United States
    deterrence globally. China's establishment of new silo fields and new
    ICBMs will only increase the threat posed by the Chinese Communist
    Party's (CCP). Consequently, China will possess new options for
    coercive purposes before and during a crisis or conflict. China is also
    rapidly modernizing air and sea conventional capabilities with next-
    generation aircraft such as their stealth H-20 bomber and enhanced
    naval strike weapons to keep United States and allied forces outside of
    optimum employment parameters in a regional conflict.
        China's nuclear force expansion is complemented by an increasing
    industrial base capacity to create plutonium from fast-breeder
    reactors. Of additional concern is China's deepening economic,
    diplomatic, and military support to and alignment with Russia. China's
    economic and diplomatic support is helping Russia sustain its war in
    Ukraine. China and Russia are also expanding their defense cooperation
    beyond Ukraine; for the first time last year, Chinese and Russian
    bombers conducted a joint patrol in international airspace off the
    coast of Alaska.
        China's nuclear and conventional expansion efforts, in conjunction
    with deepening growing ties to Russia, raise the risk to United States
    and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite Russia's heavy
    losses, it still maintains the world's largest nuclear stockpile with
    modernized systems and a growing arsenal of novel asymmetric nuclear
    weapons. Additionally, President Putin announced that Russia reserves
    the right to use nuclear weapons against any country that poses a
    critical threat, including from conventional weapons, to Russian or
    Belarusian sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. Additionally,
    President Putin stated the participation of, or support from, a nuclear
    State conducting aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its
    Allies from any non-nuclear State would be considered a joint attack.
        While the DPRK is not an adversary on the same scale as China or
    Russia, it still presents deterrence dilemmas for the United States and
    our allies and partners. The DPRK poses a persistent threat and growing
    danger to the United States Homeland and the Indo-Pacific region. The
    DPRK continues to expand, diversify, and improve both conventional and
    nuclear strike capabilities. The development of liquid and solid-fueled
    missile systems will further complicate our ability to monitor and
    react to ballistic missile threats. The DPRK has expanded partnerships
    with both China and Russia, which provides political cover for Kim Jong
    Un regime's continued nuclear weapons expansion. The DPRK and Russia
    signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in June 2024, which
    includes a mutual defense provision and highlights the deepening
    strategic alignment between the countries, particularly in their
    opposition to the United States and our allies. The agreement also
    codified cooperation in areas such as trade, investment, and nuclear
    energy. DPRK rhetoric also continues to become more confrontational as
    the United States and the Republic of Korea conduct strategic exercises
    and bring strategic assets into the theater. The situation remains
    tense and any conflict on the Peninsula could involve multiple nuclear-
    armed actors, thus raising the risk of escalation and nuclear
    employment.
        As of today, Iran does not possess a nuclear weapon and it remains
    the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon
    and ICBM capability; however, Iran is expanding its nuclear program in
    concerning ways, to include producing highly enriched uranium. Iran
    continues to enhance military capabilities, holding the largest
    inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, and funds militia groups
    as well as terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East. Iran
    also continues to pursue destabilizing policies across the region,
    providing material and lethal support to a range of U.S.-designated
    terrorist organizations and militia groups. Iran's longstanding support
    to Hamas enabled the October 7th terrorist attack against Israel.
    Furthermore, Iran's continued support to the Houthis has enabled the
    ongoing attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
    and numerous attacks on U.S. forces across the region.
        Most concerning are the increasing transactional relationships
    between nuclear-armed adversaries. This axis of aggressors continues to
    defy international law through technology exchanges, joint exercises,
    and mutual support. China and Russia's ``strategic partnership''
    features extensive military cooperation, with China supplying crucial
    materials that bolsters Russia's defense industry. Iran provides Russia
    with drones and missiles, while the DPRK has sent vast quantities of
    arms, ammunition, and personnel. The continued cooperation raises the
    possibility of a multi-front war, which necessitates a reassessment of
    long-term defense strategies and escalation dynamics.
         facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (fsrm)
        The current Air Force Installation Infrastructure Action Plan
    highlights a critical vulnerability for AFGSC, most notably aging
    facilities and infrastructure coupled with consistent underinvestment
    in power projection platforms. Installations are increasingly
    susceptible to both adversarial threats and extreme weather
    environments, posing an unacceptable risk to the Striker mission. All
    of these concerns undermine global strike options for our Nation.
    Weapons Generation Facilities and Weapon Storage Areas
        In addition to modernization of weapon systems, the command
    continues our long-term plan to recapitalize aging Weapon Storage Areas
    (WSAs) with facilities known as Weapons Generation Facilities (WGFs).
    These facilities fulfill a major security initiative for the command
    and help ensure nuclear security by significantly reducing operational,
    logistical, and munitions risk. The sequencing and timing of the WGF
    recapitalization efforts are driven by operational requirements and
    outdated WSA conditions. Of the seven planned, five are currently in
    the fiscal year 2025-29 Future-Years Defense Program and four are under
    construction. Of those under construction, two are bomber WGFs and two
    are ICBM WGFs. The WGF at Dyess Air Force Base (AFB) is planned for
    fiscal year 2028, and the design is scheduled to complete this fiscal
    year. F.E. Warren AFB has seen the first completed WGF and is scheduled
    to reach full operational capability (FOC) in early 2026. The timing
    and sequencing of the modernization endeavor are critical to sustaining
    credible deterrence while ensuring integration of and support to new
    mission weapon systems.
    Supply Chain and Flying Hour Program Challenges
        Every weapon system that AFGSC provides must have a defense
    industrial base robust enough to support the sustainment of operational
    capabilities in order to maintain a credible deterrent against
    adversaries. Current and future weapon systems cannot withstand any
    further supply chain disruptions and must be funded to the maximum
    extent possible to restore supply chain resiliency. The Air Force must
    restore readiness and posture, so our platforms will be ready today and
    for the future.
        A critical shortage of parts is severely limiting the bomber
    execution of the fleet flying hour program. The shortage, driven by
    diminishing manufacturing sources, materiel shortages, long repair
    times, and a shrinking industrial base, is reflected in the rising
    Total Non-Mission Capable Supply rate, leading to increased downtime
    and cannibalization of parts from other aircraft. Current support and
    readiness spares packages are insufficient to meet operational demands.
    This parts crisis directly impacts essential maintenance, hindering
    both Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) and home-station work, reducing
    operational flexibility.
        Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages issues,
    the lack of vendor bids, and long lead times have resulted in delayed
    delivery of required parts. These issues have negatively affected
    Aircraft Availability (AA). Continued support of the Full-Scale Fatigue
    Testing is imperative to keep the B-52H airframe in use since it has
    surpassed its scheduled lifespan. Similarly, the Forward Intermediate
    Fuselage replacement for any high hour airframes must be pursued to
    maintain the current and future fleet size. We must continue to
    modernize the B-52H avionics systems to ensure compatibility in joint
    operations and global airspace.
        The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) provides a
    survivable command and control capability. The fleet is approaching
    end-of-service life and faces sustainment challenges. The low density/
    high demand dynamic of the platform prioritizes AA as the E-4B 's top
    concern. Along with aircraft age, other factors include lengthening PDM
    times, diminished manufacturing sources, and parts obsolescence.
    Initiatives such as PDM flow optimization, KC-10 engine long-core
    procurement and overhaul, and recovering unused 747-200 parts from a
    NASA aircraft retirement action have shown some success toward
    mitigating known sustainment issues.
        The E-4B Program Office will also sustain and modernize mission
    system capabilities until the replacement platform, the Survivable
    Airborne Operations Center (SAOC), is operational. Current examples of
    successful ongoing modernization programs include a Low Frequency
    Transmit System, Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal and
    Survivable Super High Frequency systems. Additionally, as the E-4B gets
    closer to SAOC transition and subsequent end-of-life, AFGSC will
    balance modernization efforts and AA.
                                   operations
    ICBM Operations
        The modernization of the U.S. ICBM force is critical to maintaining
    a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. ICBMs are the most
    responsive leg of the U.S. nuclear triad providing rapid global strike
    capability. The Sentinel program is a massive undertaking that is
    pivotal to U.S. national security and represents the Air Force's most
    critical recapitalization effort to date. The sheer size, scale, and
    scope of this effort cannot be overstated as the entire system is being
    rebuilt from the ground up. Even with its inherent complexities,
    Sentinel remains essential to national security and there are no
    alternatives to the program that provide acceptable capability to meet
    joint requirements at less cost as certified by the Department of
    Defense (DoD) to Congress in 2024. By enhancing the accuracy, security,
    and reliability of the U.S. ICBM force, Sentinel will ensure the
    effectiveness of this critical leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.
    ICBM Modernization Roadmap
        In 2024, the Sentinel program underwent a Nunn-McCurdy review to
    address cost overruns exceeding 37 percent. The Department's final
    Nunn-McCurdy estimate determined the cost increase to be 81 percent. In
    response, AFGSC immediately initiated a comprehensive review of both
    system requirements and Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The ongoing
    process focused on refining system requirements, operational concepts,
    and fostering collaboration between stakeholders to ensure a cost-
    effective and successful modernization of the ICBM force.
        RV Modernization: The ICBM warhead stockpile continues to fulfill
    USSTRATCOM mission requirements beyond its planned lifespan. AFGSC
    engages in efforts with DOD partners to produce fuse replacements for
    the existing stockpile of Mk21s to support Sentinel initial operational
    capability (IOC). This effort not only strengthens the industrial base
    but also establishes a framework for future capabilities, ensuring the
    land-based leg of the nuclear triad remains a robust and adaptable
    strategic deterrent.
    Collaborative Leadership for Sentinel Success
        Unified Approach: AFGSC and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
    (AFNWC) have formed a strong partnership to address Sentinel challenges
    and accelerate ICBM modernization efforts. Leadership from both
    organizations collaborate regularly through integrated partner teams,
    General Officer Steering Groups, and Executive Steering Boards to
    proactively resolve issues and ensure alignment.
        Revalidated Requirements: Since July 2024, AFGSC has spearheaded an
    effort to revalidate and recertify all Sentinel requirements to
    maintain performance. The objective is to work toward a cost-effective
    strategy for the program, expected to be refined by the end of the
    year. All requirements were traced to source documentation for need and
    military utility. The collaborative effort between AFGSC and AFNWC
    assures the Sentinel program delivers a weapon system that meets all
    strategic requirements.
        Evolving Concept of Operations: The Sentinel CONOPS serves as a
    critical communication tool, clearly articulating operational
    requirements to both the acquisition community and contractors during
    the design phase. The Weapon System Requirements and current CONOPS
    were reviewed and signed in March 2025.
    Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) Achievements
        In October 2024, the Sentinel program transitioned from Program
    Integration Offices to fully operational Task Force at F. E. Warren
    AFB, Malmstrom AFB, and Vandenberg Space Force Base (SFB). Minot AFB is
    progressing to establish its task force presence, marking a significant
    milestone in the program's execution. Simultaneously, Sentinel support
    facilities are undergoing preparations to accommodate Sentinel-assigned
    personnel and equipment at these bases, ensuring a smooth transition
    while safeguarding operational readiness of the MMIII weapon system.
    Local engagements
        The Director of ICBM Modernization continues to take a holistic
    approach to Sentinel education and socialization by visiting the three
    missile wings and engaging in dialog with community members. These
    engagements offer an opportunity to address concerns from the local
    population and leaders within the areas impacted by the Sentinel weapon
    system. These conversations will continue with community town hall
    meetings through 2025.
        While many aspects of the Sentinel program are going right, we must
    remain vigilant and fully committed to the unparalleled
    recapitalization of a critical component of our national security.
    Maintaining the MMIII weapon system while concurrently bringing
    Sentinel online demands careful and sustained attention. The Sentinel
    program is not just about modernization--it is about preserving peace
    through strength.
                            security response forces
        Our nuclear security teams, comprised of steadfast and highly
    trained professionals, stand ready to defend our Nation's nuclear
    arsenal. However, they face a rapidly evolving threat landscape that
    requires constant adaptation and support. Our leaders are actively
    addressing the complex challenges of organizing, training, and
    equipping these defenders to meet current and emerging threats, from
    countering unmanned aerial system (UAS) activity to operating in
    extreme weather conditions at our bomber and missile bases. Their
    crucial mission demands unwavering focus and investment as it remains
    central to USSTRATCOM operational plans and national security.
        To enhance the safety and lethality of our Security Forces, AFGSC
    is modernizing its vehicle fleet. This modernization effort directly
    addresses serious safety concerns surrounding the aging Up-Armored High
    Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAHMMWV), a platform
    tragically linked to multiple fatal rollover accidents at AFGSC ICBM
    wings, resulting in the loss of two defenders in 2023 and 2024. The
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a modern and improved tactical
    vehicle providing better field of view, suspension systems, and modern
    safety features compared to the currently employed UAHMMWV. I continue
    to request congressional support to field AUVs to reduce the risk of
    mishaps and unnecessary loss of life.
        As AFGSC navigates these modernization efforts, the arrival of the
    MH-139A Grey Wolf marks a positive step toward strengthening the
    security posture of the ground-based nuclear deterrent. The MH-139A
    provides greater speed, range, and carrying capacity above the current
    UH-IN fleet. Following successful testing, the MH-139A is on track for
    IOC in 2025, with full deployment across all ICBM bases by 2027.
        As of February 2025, 13 MH-139A helicopters have been delivered--
    seven to Malmstrom AFB, three to Maxwell AFB, and two are in retrofit
    status for the environmental control system and radio. The current buy
    profile procures 19 aircraft, 11 of which will field at Malmstrom AFB
    and eight at Maxwell AFB by August 2025. The arrival of the MH-139 Grey
    Wolf marks a decisive upgrade for AFGSC, bringing a more lethal
    presence to the defense of the ground-based nuclear deterrent.
    Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems
        Since 2016, AFGSC, with crucial backing from USSTRATCOM, has made
    strides in counter-unmanned aircraft technology to strengthen our
    national deterrence. During 2024, two U.S. military bases experienced
    security breaches involving UAS, raising concerns about this growing
    threat. In August, multiple UAS conducted a week-long surveillance
    operation over Plant 42 in California, potentially gathering
    intelligence on classified projects. In November, a Chinese citizen was
    apprehended for using a UAS to photograph Vandenberg SFB. These
    incidents underscore the vulnerability of military installations to UAS
    surveillance and the potential compromise of national security.
        We must match our capabilities to the threats we face. The Joint
    Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems C-sUAS Office and Office of the
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment lead the overall
    DOD effort to combat current and future UAS threats, and United States
    Northern Command is the synchronizer for Counter-UAS (c-UAS) efforts in
    the Homeland. In recognition of this growing challenge, the Department
    launched Replicator-2, a whole-of-department and interagency effort to
    improve c-sUAS protection for critical assets, largely centered on the
    Homeland (CONUS). AFGSC is actively contributing to these efforts as
    well as leveraging internal innovation endeavors to seek solutions for
    the specific challenges our forces face from UAS, especially as they
    relate to operations in the ICBM missile fields and defense of our WSAs
    and WGFs. As we modernize our nuclear capabilities over the coming
    decade, we must also prioritize modernizing our defenses against UAS
    threats.
                               bomber operations
        The United States must maintain military superiority by integrating
    new technologies while sustaining existing capabilities. AFGSC will
    work with the Secretary of the Air Force's staff to obtain waivers of
    the 5-year ``sunset'' prohibition on modernizing aircraft scheduled to
    retire, (as codified in Section 2244a of Title 10) as doing so is
    clearly in the national security interest of the United States.
    Leveraging this statutory authority for the B-2A is essential to
    maintaining long-range global strike nuclear deterrent capabilities
    while completing modernization programs impacting all Air Force
    bombers.
    Nuclear Requirements and Conventional Long-Range Strike Mission
        Conventional long-range strike capabilities are equally important
    and must evolve to address emerging threats. AFGSC must maintain the
    ability to hold any target at risk, anywhere in the world, at any time.
    Our airmen routinely demonstrate this capability through CONUS-to-CONUS
    missions and BTF deployments, reinforcing allied confidence and
    deterring adversary aggression. The future of conventional long-range
    strike will be shaped by a two-tiered approach. The B-21 Raider and its
    family of systems will provide advanced stand-in capabilities by
    leveraging next-generation stealth, sensing, and precision-strike
    technology to penetrate contested environments. Simultaneously, the B-
    52H, armed with the Standoff Attack Weapon, will deliver massed fires
    from outside heavily defended areas. This integrated force will enable
    AFGSC to generate a persistent, scalable, and lethal global strike
    capability, ensuring dominance across the spectrum of conflict.
    B-21 Raider
        The B-21 is the most exquisite weapon system ever built. At its
    core, the B-21 enhances deterrence by ensuring the United States can
    hold any target worldwide at risk, even in contested regions protected
    by sophisticated air defense systems. We are building on lessons
    learned from the B-2A to give the B-21 a survivability edge in high-
    threat environments. The B-21's ability to penetrate and persist in
    hostile airspace makes it uniquely suited for both deterrence and, if
    needed, decisive action.
        Beyond its combat capability, the B-21's strategic value is
    amplified by its role in a broader network of systems. This makes it
    more than just a bomber--it is a force multiplier that enhances
    situational awareness and joint operations. Its design also emphasizes
    adaptability, with a modular structure and digital engineering that
    allow rapid upgrades to counter new threats, ensuring relevance for
    decades.
        From the outset, the B-21 program has leaned forward and considered
    sustainment while the design was in development. As a result of those
    early considerations, the B-21 program is ahead of schedule on certain
    portions such as technological data, product support, and material
    readiness. Affordability, combined with easier maintenance due to
    advancements in stealth coatings and manufacturing, supports a larger,
    more sustainable fleet, which will be key for deterring adversaries who
    might otherwise exploit any gaps a smaller force could create. We must
    continue looking at how to right-size the bomber fleet to meet the
    demands the Nation is asking of it.
        The B-21's dual nuclear and conventional capabilities are critical
    as competitors seek to challenge us by operating below nuclear
    thresholds. As a result, the United States must also deter using
    conventional weapons tailored to meet the needs and capabilities of the
    B-21; if we lose the ability to deter malicious regional actions via a
    combination of stand-in and standoff, nuclear, and conventional
    effects, we play into adversary anti-access/area denial aspirations.
    The B-21's fusion of stealth, versatility, scalability, and enduring
    design strengthens U.S. deterrence, ensures credible response
    capabilities, and offers cost-effective modernization for maintaining
    tactical and strategic advantage in the 21st century. The success of
    the B-21 Raider program is a testament to the unprecedented
    collaboration among our military and civilian experts. The seamless
    integration of operational, acquisition, and industry professionals--
    specifically, the mighty Eighth Air Force, the Rapid Capabilities
    Office, and Northrop Grumman--is the driving force behind this
    program's remarkable progress. This synergistic partnership enables us
    to develop and field the world's most advanced platform unrivaled in
    its ability to project power globally at a time and place of our
    choosing.
    B-2A
        The B-2A is the USAF's sole penetrating bomber, providing unmatched
    stealth and strike capability, making it a cornerstone of both
    conventional and nuclear deterrence. Targeted modernization in low
    observable signature and supportability modifications, communications
    upgrades, and weapons delivery ensures the B-2A maintains its lethal
    edge through B-21 fielding. The Adaptable Communications Suite is
    entering test and evaluation with efforts to accelerate fielding in
    fiscal year 2026. The B-2A Displays Modernization Program is currently
    in test and evaluation and is anticipated to enter the Production and
    Deployment Phase (Milestone-C) in 4Qfiscal year 2025, alleviating the
    second Mission Impaired Capability Awaiting Parts driver for the B-2A
    fleet. These modernization efforts are essential to bridge the
    capability gap until the B-21 reaches FOC.
    B-1B
        The B-1B platform remains a conventional force workhorse until the
    B-21s are fully fielded. Time and again, B-1Bs have taken the lead in
    combat, demonstrating their critical role in combat operations. This,
    in addition to their enduring participation in the DOD's BTFs, is
    designed to demonstrate that the United States can reach any target in
    the world with minimal risk to its forces. The B-1B is currently
    undergoing the most significant modernization program in its 30-year
    history. Through the B-1 Embracing Agile Scheduling Team program, the
    B-1B received a suite of accelerated upgrades, including enhanced
    friend-or-foe identification, more secure communications, and improved
    defensive systems. The program also introduced valuable new tools like
    a modernized simulator and digital twin technology, enabling more
    effective training and proactive maintenance. As both a proven combat
    platform and a cornerstone of future deterrence strategies, the B-1B
    will remain a vital asset for projecting American airpower well into
    the 21st century.
    B-52H
        The B-52H Stratofortress remains the backbone of the USAF,
    providing unmatched long-range strike capability and heavy payload
    capacity for the past 70 years. Even today, the B-52H continues to
    demonstrate its relevance in operations around the world. To ensure the
    B-52H can continue to deliver this level of combat power for decades to
    come, AFGSC is undertaking major modernization efforts for its aging B-
    52H fleet, aiming to extend its service life beyond 2050. This includes
    re-engining the bomber with Rolls-Royce Fl30 turbofans, upgrading its
    radar to an Active Electronically Scanned Array system for improved
    reliability and mission effectiveness, and procuring a new Weapon
    System Trainer to simulate future B-52H configurations and
    capabilities. The B-52H's modernization into the B-52J platform is not
    just about upgrades--it is essential for viability of the bomber.
        Even as we upgrade to the more lethal B-52J, global demand for BTFs
    is surging, not subsiding. B-52H deployments showcase the importance
    the United States places on assuring Allies and partners as the visible
    presence of our bombers, airmen, and integrated operations provides a
    critical deterrent against potential adversaries. This demand for a
    strong, responsive bomber presence will only intensify in the coming
    years, making our modernization efforts all the more urgent.
        Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
        The Air Force is replacing its aging ALCM with the LRSO weapon,
    which is being designed, developed, and deployed as a modern nuclear-
    capable cruise missile. The LRSO program is progressing well, having
    achieved a successful design review and currently undergoing flight
    testing.
                           airborne operations center
        AFGSC's NC3 architecture connects our Commander-in-Chief and
    command authorities to forces around the globe, before and during
    conflict. One component in this NC3 network is the NAOC, which is
    always on alert to connect the President, Secretary of Defense,
    Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior leaders.
        The E-4B Program Office will sustain and modernize mission system
    capabilities as necessary through the transition period until the
    replacement platform is operational. The Sierra Nevada Corporation--
    SAOC contract is progressing well. Three aircraft were received in
    April 2025, and we are on track to receive an additional two in
    September 2025. The Integrated Baseline Review was completed in October
    2024 and the System Requirements Review and Digital Data Package
    process are both on track. The SAOC program stands to mitigate all
    issues within the current NAOC fleet as well as serve as a next-
    generation aircraft that will be postured to directly support the
    President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff well into the future.
        This need for reliable command and control is met in part by the
    newly activated 95th Wing, which brings together specialized units to
    ensure seamless execution of strategic operations. The 95th Wing now
    provides combatant commanders with assured command and control (C2)
    over assigned forces through global command, control, and communication
    capabilities. The wing organizes, trains, and equips the total force to
    execute strategic requirements as set forth by commanders.
        Operating under 8th Air Force and AFGSC, the 95th Wing incorporates
    existing units from across different components of the Air Force. These
    include the 595th Command and Control Group, the 253d Command and
    Control Group; and the 610th Command and Control Squadron. This
    integration forms a cohesive and powerful unit.
               nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
        AFGSC plays a critical role in ensuring robust NC3 capabilities. We
    are responsible for the Strategic Readiness and effectiveness of our
    Air Force's nuclear deterrent forces, which hinges on reliable NC3.
    These efforts ensure vital NC3 systems are integrated into my portion
    of our Nation's strategic nuclear enterprises.
        Furthermore, AFGSC and the United States Space Force (USSF) have
    critical interdependency when it comes to NC3. Space-based assets are
    integral to NC3 by providing early warning of missile launches and
    enabling swift decisionmaking and response options. Satellites provide
    secure communication channels between national leaders and nuclear
    forces, ensuring reliable transmission of orders and information.
    Through coordinated efforts, AFGSC and USSF unlock amplified
    capabilities that exponentially enhance the effectiveness and
    resilience of the Nation's strategic deterrence. For example, AFGSC is
    integrating the Advanced Extremely High Frequency system into our
    ICBMs, bomber forces, and command posts. AFGSC is also advancing
    efforts to enhance survivable beyond-line-of sight communications for
    the bomber force, including the development of High-Speed Terminals.
        Additionally, we continue reexamining legacy technologies through a
    modern lens. Long established high-frequency waveforms are now
    benefiting from digital software-defined radios, which enhance
    performance and provide critical redundancy in the event of space-based
    system failures. In the Very Low Frequency domain, we continue to
    modernize our receivers with smaller, plug-and-play replacement
    solutions that enable seamless upgrades while maintaining compliance
    with cryptographic standards. Additionally, our Senior Leader Network
    remains a vital asset, ensuring strategic decisionmakers in Washington
    have reliable worldwide communications and services in times of crises.
        NC3 is the cornerstone of America's deterrence posture. AFGSC
    continues to leverage industry and academia to pursue next-generation
    technologies including protected satellite communications for secure
    connectivity, artificial intelligence (AI) powered cyber defense for
    real-time threat detection and mitigation, and integrated multi-domain
    command and control for faster, more adaptable agile decisionmaking.
    Every day, AFGSC hones this strategic capability, ensuring that if
    called upon, we will be ready.
                              airmen and families
        The unwavering dedication of our Striker Airmen, who work
    tirelessly 24/7, truly enables AFGSC to stand ready to face any
    challenge or threat, even as our advanced weapons systems and
    modernization efforts capture global attention.
    Innovation
        Maintaining our competitive edge demands a steadfast commitment to
    innovation, a commitment embodied by our resourceful and dedicated
    Airmen. STRIKEWERX, the Global Strike innovation hub, stands as a
    testament to this commitment. Recognizing that our airmen are our
    greatest asset, we have fostered an environment where ingenuity can
    flourish. We connect Airmen with industry experts and academia,
    sparking partnerships that drive rapid and impactful technological
    improvements.
        We continue to adapt and adopt inexpensive commercial sector
    technologies, including improving bomber pilot training, modernizing
    bomber crew alert communications, training for emergency situations
    more realistically, and providing our security forces with more
    effective technology as they secure our nuclear capability. Airman
    ideas have produced tangible results, including operationally fielded
    B-52H engine pod covers and deployable maintenance structures to
    facilitate operations in frigid conditions at our northern bases. This
    ability to rapidly translate innovative ideas into executable solutions
    underscores AFGSC's dedication to equipping warfighters with leading-
    edge technologies.
        To combat recurring engine failures in B-52Hs at Minot AFB caused
    by extreme cold, engineers developed a new engine inlet cover design
    incorporating a heating duct. This initiative, culminating in the
    ``Strike Tank 2023'' project approved in October 2023, saw delivery of
    testable prototypes by June 2024. These covers, offering full engine
    encapsulation and a heating mechanism, proved so effective that 12 were
    immediately procured for operational testing. By August 2024, the
    success of the covers led to equipping the entire Minot B-52H fleet.
    This proactive solution saves an estimated 7,500 maintenance hours per
    year and prevents costly engine damage, showcasing a remarkable return
    on investment in operational readiness.
        In addition, we are empowering Airmen to harness the power of data
    analytics and AI. The Command uses AI to project trends in operational
    status and quickly address and identify problem areas. Our use of
    centrally funded Air Force cloud platforms brings together enterprise
    and Command data to inform the Commander's risk assessment. The Command
    uses commercial AI/machine learning offerings within the USAF data
    fabric to accelerate business processes. AFGSC is also one of the most
    prolific users of robotic process automation tools in the USAF. By
    providing access to cutting-edge tools and training, we enable Global
    Strike Airmen to develop and leverage secure cloud-based applications
    that streamline processes and maximize the efficiency and effectiveness
    of our personnel.
    Missile Community Cancer Study
        The health and well-being of our Airmen and their families is a top
    priority. This is why AFGSC teamed up with the USAF School of Aerospace
    Medicine (USAFSAM) in 2023 to conduct a thorough investigation to
    address concerns about a possible link between working on missile
    fields and cancer. The Missile Cancer Community Study includes a
    comprehensive environmental analysis. Over 2,400 samples are being
    collected and analyzed in three phases across three Missile Wings and
    Vandenberg SFB. With two rounds of sampling already completed, the
    investigation revealed trace amounts of polychlorinated biphenyls
    (PCBs) exceeding the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recommended
    threshold on 4 out of 1205 total surface swipe samples. To ensure the
    safety and well-being of our Airmen, Missile Alert Facilities with PCBs
    above the EPA threshold were promptly and thoroughly cleaned. They have
    since passed rigorous safety inspections and are now back in full
    operation. Initial findings from phases IA and 1B of the epidemiologic
    study have shown no increase in cancer rates among our Missile
    Community compared to the non-Missile Community or the general U.S.
    population. This includes data on 14 common cancers.
        Additionally, Phase 1C did not identify a statistically significant
    elevated mortality of these cancers in the Missile Community when
    compared to the general U.S. population. While the initial phases of
    our study have been reassuring, we are committed to gathering the most
    comprehensive data possible. To that end, we are incorporating State
    cancer registries into the second phase of our study to gain a complete
    understanding of potential health risks within the Missile Community.
    Phase 2, scheduled for completion by the end of 2025, will offer a more
    complete and detailed analysis of cancer incidence within the Missile
    Community. AFGSC is actively engaging with leading health organizations
    such as the USAFSAM, the Defense Centers for Public Health, and
    Veterans Affairs throughout this process. To ensure full transparency,
    we hold quarterly town hall meetings, provide updates on a dedicated
    webpage, and share findings with stakeholders to ensure our Airmen and
    families are informed. We understand this is about more than just
    data--it is about the health and peace of mind of our Airmen, their
    families, and our veterans. We are unwavering in our commitment to
    providing them with clear, accurate information and ensure complete
    transparency throughout this process. They deserve nothing less.
    Professional Military Education and Development
        Building a culture of excellence and pride within AFGSC is key to
    maintaining the warrior ethos and achieving mission success. My AFGSC
    Force Development Division is committed to providing our personnel with
    the knowledge, skills, and experiences necessary to excel and lead our
    command with distinction.
        AFGSC partners with Air University to modernize Professional
    Military Education (PME), particularly Intermediate Developmental
    Education (IDE). Our flagship effort is the School of Advanced Nuclear
    Deterrence Studies at Air Command and Staff College, which develops
    deterrence and assurance experts equipped to advise senior leaders
    across the DOD. AFGSC also participated in the successful Agile
    Learning pilot program, an IDE modernization initiative focused on
    flexible, mission-relevant learning experiences. Building on this
    success, AFGSC is committed to exploring the full potential of
    innovative programs like Agile Learning. Beyond officer PME, AFGSC
    provides high-quality professional development opportunities for
    enlisted Airmen, including unique, mission-focused content incorporated
    into Enlisted
        Robust pre-command education is also critical. The Nuclear
    Stewardship Executive Course provides Group and Wing Commanders and
    their Senior Enlisted Leaders with a deep understanding of their
    nuclear mission responsibilities. Our AFGSC Command Team Course unites
    Squadron Commanders and their Senior Enlisted Leaders, forging a shared
    understanding and purpose. Through this course, they gain the knowledge
    and skills to lead their squadrons as one cohesive force, effectively
    executing this critical mission. We continuously assess and refine our
    pre-command education to ensure relevance and efficacy in preparing
    commanders for the complexities of the nuclear enterprise.
        In addition to education and training, AFGSC offers coveted
    internships-including AFGSC Intern, Striker Trident, Striker Titan, and
    Striker Trailblazer-providing exceptional officers, enlisted personnel,
    and civilian Airmen with invaluable hands-on experience in the nuclear
    enterprise. The Academic Partnerships in Nuclear Education program
    collaborates with academic institutions to provide Airmen access to
    advanced education in fields like defense and strategic studies,
    nuclear deterrence, and engineering management.
        These initiatives, alongside our Air Force Reserve Officer Training
    Corps Summer Internship Program, are key to attracting and developing
    top talent for AFGSC. By cultivating an environment where individuals
    are recognized and rewarded based on their abilities, performance, and
    contributions, we aim to attract the best and brightest. Upholding
    rigorous standards for our Airmen is non-negotiable, as it directly
    contributes to mission accomplishment and the long-term health of our
    command.
        To encourage individual drive, recognize excellence, and cultivate
    a strong sense of pride within its ranks, AFGSC is exploring various
    strategic initiatives focused on enhancing both talent management and
    retention rates. The Personnel Division has launched a series of
    ``sprints'' to rapidly analyze data and assess recommendations that
    will enhance transparency in the assignment process, as well as
    incentivize AFGSC bases.
        AFGSC is working on restoring recurring Career Field Health
    Briefings and expanding the Commander's Nuclear Focus list to include
    additional Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs). In line with improving
    retention, AFGSC reevaluated Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)
    multipliers based on recommendations from the RAND study and updating
    related policies. The input from key AFSCs regarding SRB adjustments is
    under review.
        AFGSC addressed quality of life by introducing a one-time cold
    weather pay incentive for Airmen stationed at northern tier locations
    such as Malmstrom and Minot AFB, effective from 1 April 2024. In
    addition, AFGSC with assistance from the Assistant Secretary of the Air
    Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, instituted a civilian retention
    incentive in order to retain top civilian talent. The 10 percent
    monetary incentive is calculated as a percentage of the employee's rate
    of basic pay.
        These initiatives prioritize transparency, flexibility, and
    competitive compensation to effectively align talent management with
    the demanding requirements of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrence mission.
    By investing in its Airmen, AFGSC reaffirms its commitment to its
    workforce and strengthens America's fighting force.
    Defense Health Agency
        The current State of healthcare within AFGSC needs attention. The
    Defense Health Agency (DHA) recently reorganized and established a
    Personnel Reliability Program Tiger Team to address gaps that could
    jeopardize the readiness of our Airmen and their families, particularly
    with the impending B-21 bed-down at Ellsworth AFB. While the Tiger Team
    addressed some concerns, the lack of a Surety Support Coordination Cell
    highlights a lack of uniformity. Chronic underfunding and staffing
    shortages across the Military Health System worsen our DHA's ability to
    provide timely and quality care. This chronic instability, resulting in
    hundreds vacant positions at MTFs on Air Force Bases, directly impacts
    mission readiness and reduces access to care for military families.
                                   conclusion
        AFGSC stands at a watershed moment. The world is watching as we
    simultaneously sustain aging cold war systems and usher in a new era of
    strategic deterrence. We are modernizing at a significant pace while
    ensuring legacy systems remain ready to answer the Nation's call. We
    are tackling challenges head-on, including aging infrastructure, supply
    chain disruptions, or the need to counter evolving threats like UAS.
    Through it all, our greatest strength remains our Striker Airmen--the
    heart and soul of AFGSC. Their dedication, innovation, and resilience
    are the driving force behind our success. However, we cannot afford to
    be complacent and must remain vigilant in the face of growing threats.
    We must continue to invest in our people, ensuring they have the
    resources, training, and support they need to carry out their critical
    mission. With unwavering commitment to our mission and steadfast
    congressional support, AFGSC will continue to deter aggression, assure
    Allies, and safeguard our Nation's security, now and into the future.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Admiral Wolfe, good to
    see you.
        Admiral Wolfe. And good to see you.
        Senator Fischer. Welcome.

     STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN DIRECTOR
                     FOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Wolfe. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, and
    distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, it is an honor to
    be here and a privilege to continue representing the
    servicemembers, civilians, and families of the Navy Strategic
    Systems Programs, SSP. I'd like to thank Congress for its
    continued support in providing us with the resources required
    to execute our assigned mission. I have submitted my posture
    statement for the record.
        I'll begin by assuring you that the Navy's nuclear forces,
    the bedrock of our national security are safe, secure,
    effective, and credible. As the Navy command that provides cost
    effective, safe, and secure, sea-based strategic deterrent
    solutions, SSP is entrusted to provide cradle to grave
    lifecycle support to three critical programs.
        The Trident II(D5) Strategic Weapons System, the Navy's
    Conventional Prompt Strike Hypersonic program, and the Nuclear
    Armed Sea Launch Cruise Missile, SLCM-N program. These are
    three of the Nation's highest priority acquisition programs and
    with your support, they ensure the Navy is delivering peace
    through strength.
        SSP ensures the highest levels of readiness and
    modernization for the Trident Strategic Weapon System, which
    underlies our national strategy to deter any adversary who
    threatens United States, our allies, or our interest. As the
    most survivable leg of the triad, the ballistic missile
    submarine force represents a substantial portion of our
    Nation's deployed nuclear warheads, providing an unyielding
    foundation for assured response against any adversary.
        The Navy strategic deterrent stands at a critical juncture.
    To maintain our advantage in the face of evolving threats, we
    must prioritize the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure
    and industrial base. A strong domestic industrial base is the
    foundation of a credible deterrent. Using resources authorized
    by this committee, SSP is actively working to revitalize this
    natural interest, ensuring the timely production and delivery
    of critical strategic weapon system components while fostering
    American jobs and technological superiority.
        Our modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in
    research and development. The critical skills for our workforce
    and the facilities needed to produce, sustain, and certify our
    strategic systems. Our infrastructure is also at an inflection
    point. Existing facilities are reaching their 30-year
    recapitalization windows as we enter into a once in a
    generation transition of both the Trident Strategic Weapons
    System and the Ballistic Missile Submarine Platform. In
    accordance with the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, SSP has established
    a SLCM-N program office and over the past year, we have focused
    on conducting the assessments needed to deliver a weapon system
    that meets war fighters' needs.
        Executing this program requires a careful balancing of
    resources to ensure existing critical Navy and Air Force
    programs of record and our submarine fleet are not adversely
    impacted. SSPs mission, strategic deterrence, is critical to
    this Nation. It is the foundation of the National Defense
    Strategy and is a top priority of the Department of Defense.
        In order to accomplish all of all three national missions,
    SSP relies on a relatively small number of trained, skilled
    employees, and it is critical that my command is able to
    appropriately staff its workforce with these highly specialized
    technical experts. People are as foundational to our nuclear
    deterrent as the strategic weapons themselves.
        As the 14th Director of Strategic Systems programs, I have
    absolute faith and confidence in the safety, security,
    effectiveness, and credibility of our Nation's strategic
    deterrent due to the proficiency and professionalism of the
    dedicated service members and civilians who have made strategic
    deterrence their life's work. With continued congressional
    support and stable on-time funding, the Navy will continue to
    effectively defend our Nation and preserve peace for future
    generations.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
                                  introduction
        Strategic Systems Programs' (SSP) mission is to deter strategic
    attack by providing credible and affordable nuclear and non-nuclear
    capabilities to the Warfighter to underwrite the security of our
    Nation. As the Navy command that provides cost-effective, safe, and
    secure sea-based strategic deterrence solutions, the SSP team is
    entrusted to provide cradle-to-grave lifecycle support to three
    critical programs: the Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon System (SWS),
    Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonics, and the Nuclear-Armed
    Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) programs.
        The U.S. nuclear triad's most survivable leg is provided by the
    sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD). This force represents a
    substantial portion of our Nation's deployed nuclear warheads,
    providing an unyielding foundation for assured response against any
    adversary. The SBSD encompasses a formidable network of assets: the
    strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, the
    Trident II SWS and its associated nuclear warheads, the Navy Nuclear
    Command, Control, and Communications systems, and the crucial shore-
    based maintenance and security infrastructure. Underpinning these
    capabilities is a wide-ranging industrial base, ensuring the
    sustainment and modernization of this vital deterrent for decades to
    come.
                  maintaining unmatched strength and lethality
        SSP's core mission supporting the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the safety and
    security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the Navy; and
    the design, development, production, and sustainment of the Navy's SWS.
    We strive to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned by rigorous
    self-assessment, to achieve the highest standards of performance and
    integrity for personnel supporting the strategic deterrent mission. We
    focus unrelentingly on our tremendous responsibility for the custody
    and accountability of our Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of
    SSP, our Sailors, our Marines, our Navy Masters at Arms, our Coast
    Guardsmen, and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the
    strategic deterrence mission, ready to respond to the emerging needs of
    our Warfighter, and committed to protecting and safeguarding our
    Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. Thank you to the
    congressional defense committees for your unwavering and continuing
    support for our critical mission.
        The safety, security and reliability of the Navy's nuclear weapons
    is SSP's highest priority. The SSP flight test program measures
    performance and reliability of the SWS in order to ensure military
    effectiveness. SSP has successfully conducted 193 flight tests of the
    Trident II missile--the most recent of which occurred in April 2025.
    Furthermore, the Navy strictly complies with the Nuclear Weapons Surety
    Standard for all nuclear weapons in its custody and regularly evaluates
    itself to ensure we are meeting those standards. The Trident II program
    is safe, secure, and highly reliable.
            ssp priorities: lethality, warfighting, homeland defense
        SSP approaches our mission through the lens of our three main
    priorities:
          Lethality: SSP ensures the highest levels of readiness
    and modernization for the Trident II (D5) SWS, providing critical
    support to the U.S. national strategy to deter any adversary who
    threatens the United States, our allies, or our interests.
          Warfighting: Our unwavering focus on designing,
    developing, and deploying the most advanced SLBM, SLCM-N, and
    hypersonic technology ensures the U.S. Navy maintains its competitive
    edge in an increasingly contested maritime domain.
          Homeland Defense: As the most survivable leg of the
    nuclear triad, the SBSD, under SSP's stewardship, stands constant,
    providing an unshakeable deterrent against attack on our Homeland.
                              state of the program
        Today's strategic nuclear triad benefits from the strategic
    foresight and the decisions of those who have come before. Strategic
    investment into a nuclear weapons support infrastructure promoted both
    the safety and longevity of the SWS as well as the high levels of
    security required for weapons of such importance. After seven decades
    of use, the Navy must revitalize and build the capacity that will allow
    this infrastructure to continue to meet Warfighter requirements in the
    face of evolving threats. In addition to revitalizing legacy
    infrastructure to sustain SWS shore operations, the Nuclear Enterprise,
    and SSP in particular, must prioritize expanded and new infrastructure
    to promote the safety, security, efficacy, and credibility of the SWS
    through 2084. These investments will be made in weapon design and
    development capacity, transportation and storage infrastructure,
    technical operations, and nuclear weapons security facilities.
        A minimum of 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each equipped with 16 missile
    tubes, will replace the current fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each
    equipped with 20 operational missile tubes (in accordance with the New
    START Treaty). The continued demonstrated high performance of the SWS
    will ensure the Columbia-class meets U.S. Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM) direction to meet requirements derived from Presidential
    guidance. A decrease in demonstrated performance could impact the
    Navy's ability to meet USSTRATCOM requirements, which establish the
    minimum force necessary to deter adversary attack against the Homeland
    and to provide the President with an assured survivable second-strike
    capability. For this reason, the Navy must maintain a robust Ohio-class
    SSBN age management program to avoid a degradation in mission
    capabilities in the transition as the Columbia-class SSBN prepares to
    enter service.
        The SBSD stands at a critical juncture. Decades of strategic
    foresight have delivered an unparalleled capability; but to maintain
    our advantage in the face of evolving threats, we must prioritize the
    modernization of our nuclear infrastructure and industrial base. SSP
    will continue to balance the following priorities as we move into a new
    era of balancing sustainment and new programs:
          Prioritizing Modernization: With their advanced
    capabilities, the Columbia-class SSBN combined with its Trident SWS,
    represent a generational leap forward in our undersea deterrent. With
    improvements in the SSBN platform come upgrades to the SWS as well--
    both the Trident missile and its warhead. SSP is fully committed to
    ensuring a seamless transition from the Ohio-class SSBN, leveraging
    existing infrastructure while modernizing the SWS to meet the demands
    of the future.
          Revitalizing the Industrial Base: A strong domestic
    industrial base is the bedrock of a credible deterrent. SSP is actively
    working to revitalize this vital national asset, ensuring the timely
    production and delivery of critical SWS components while fostering
    American jobs and technological superiority.
          Confronting Emerging Threats: In light of the ever
    evolving threat landscape, SSP is fully committed to investing in
    strategic deterrence technologies, including SLCM-N and conventional
    hypersonics, and strategies to protect our strategic assets from those
    who seek to undermine our national security.
          Balancing Systems Integration: SSP is the system
    integrator for the SWS. This requires our civilian workforce with
    critical knowledge of design, development, and sustainment to
    collaborate with industry partners in support of nuclear modernization.
     sws sustainment on ohio-class ssbn and procurement for columbia-class
                                      ssbn
        The 14 ship Ohio-class fleet remains the backbone of U.S. strategic
    deterrence, carrying approximately 70 percent of the U.S.'s New START
    Treaty-accountable deployed nuclear warheads in the form of the W76 and
    W88 families of warheads. Originally designed for a 30-year service
    life, the Ohio-class submarines were called upon to extend this service
    to 42 years, supporting a delay in investment in the next generation of
    SSBNs. To account for this extension in service life, SSP embarked on a
    life extension program for the Trident II D5 missile to update
    critical, aging missile electronics systems. SSP introduced the first
    Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) program to the fleet in 2017 and
    the missile will remain an effective and credible SWS into the 2040's--
    supporting the Ohio-class submarine through end of service life and
    serving as the initial SWS for the Columbia- and UK Dreadnought-class
    SSBNs.
        In parallel, SSP's program efforts and collaboration with the UK
    through the Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended (PSA) and Mutual
    Defense Agreement, as amended (MDA) support the UK's Continuous At Sea
    Deterrent through Vanguard-class SSBN end of service life and the
    transition to a Dreadnought-class SSBN fleet.
        To meet these critical program responsibilities, SSP will sustain
    our deployed systems and modernize for our new ones, ensuring that we
    continue to keep the Navy's nuclear weapons safe and secure. We will
    develop and protect our logistics supply chain. Through these measures,
    SSP will continue to unlock new capabilities that the Warfighter can
    leverage to enhance strategic deterrence and act decisively should
    deterrence fail.
               trident ii d5 life extension and life extension 2
        The Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program is essential to
    maintaining a credible SBSD through the life of the Columbia-class
    SSBN. This program will:
          Extend Service Life: D5LE2 will replace the D5 and D5LE
    missiles to align with the Columbia-class, ensuring a credible at-sea
    deterrent for decades to come.
          Enhance Capabilities: Using a hybrid approach of
    leveraging existing reliable technology and integrating cutting-edge
    advancements, D5LE2 will have the flexibility to counter emerging
    threats throughout its life.
          Strengthen the Industrial Base: D5LE2 is a critical
    driver in revitalizing our domestic industrial base, ensuring the
    availability of critical components and supporting American jobs.
        As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our
    Ohio-class SSBNs, we have assessed how we can ensure the SWS is
    available throughout the life of the Columbia-class SSBNs. A minimum of
    12 Columbia-class SSBNs will replace today's 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, and
    beginning in fiscal year 2030, we will load current D5LE missiles on
    Hulls 1 through 8 of Columbia-class SSBNs. Production of additional
    D5LE missiles is not practical due to obsolete parts and the current
    lack of a robust industrial base.
        To meet inventory requirements and maintain a credible strategic
    deterrent in the face of evolving threats, we will need to design,
    engineer, produce, and deploy D5LE2 in time for strategic outload of
    Columbia Hull 9. D5LE2 will be incorporated on all follow on Columbia-
    class Hulls and later on Columbia-class Hulls 1-8 during their Extended
    Refit Period from fiscal year 2039-49. D5LE2's architecture will ensure
    the weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and survivability
    while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by multiple nuclear
    challengers until Columbia-class end of life.
        D5LE2 is a hybrid of existing, cost-effective technology (e.g.,
    solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components
    (e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture); it is structured to
    maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance
    while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to
    emerging needs and to maintain a credible SBSD.
                       industrial base and infrastructure
        The Nation requires a modernized nuclear force and supporting
    infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Unlike SLBM programs
    of the past, D5LE2 does not have the benefit of a healthy defense
    industrial base that was historically built on simultaneously
    maintaining production and continuous development. Our modernization
    needs cannot succeed without investing in research and development, the
    critical skills in the workforce, and the facilities needed to produce,
    sustain, and certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and
    aerospace industrial base capabilities--such as radiation-hardened
    electronics, strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket
    motors--remains an important priority in conjunction with research and
    development investment.
        SSP has placed particular emphasis on the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
    industry and its sub-tier suppliers. We appreciate the support of
    Congress to allow for the continuous production of these vital
    components. Over the past 15 years, the SRM industrial base waned
    following the completion of the Space Shuttle missions, Minuteman III
    re-graining, and disruption of the space launch market by new Liquid
    Rocket Engine entrants. However, SRM demand is increasing due to
    competing programs (CPS, Sentinel, Next Generation Interceptor) and
    production rate increases for D5LE and D5LE2. In addition, the Trident
    II D5 SRM production line is aging and requires modernization in order
    to ensure production can continue well into the 2060's.
        In short, full support of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving Initial
    Fleet Introduction in 2039 and to embarking on a path that maintains an
    SLBM deterrent capability through the service life of the Columbia-
    class SSBNs. If the Nation does not continue to address these concerns,
    no amount of money will be able to mitigate the risks realized if we do
    not adequately prepare our industrial base.
        In addition to SRMs, we also need a national capability to build
    aeroshells, which protect the payload upon re-entry to the atmosphere.
    The Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980's and
    needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a
    small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche
    industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-
    effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force and our
    strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their
    independent warhead program endeavors.
        The program's infrastructure is also at an inflection point, as
    existing facilities are reaching their 30-year recapitalization windows
    as we enter into a once-in-a-generation transition of both the weapons
    system and platform. The Navy relies on a limited footprint in Kings
    Bay, Georgia, Bangor, Washington, and Florida's Space Coast to process
    missiles and outfit the SSBNs. Maintaining and sustaining facilities is
    critical to meeting USSTRATCOM and Fleet mission requirements, as well
    as providing new capabilities through military construction. We will
    make smart investments to address capability gaps, throughput
    constraints, and design for surge capacity to address requirements
    presented by new and emerging threats. Our Nation and the Navy will
    continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization
    of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and
    flexible deterrent now and into the future.
        As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN
    and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, DOD and the Department of
    Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA)
    infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving
    needs of the Nation. We must have an effective, resilient, and
    responsive plutonium pit production capability. This capability can
    address age-related risks, support planned refurbishments, as well as
    prepare for future uncertainty. Additionally, tritium, lithium, and
    uranium, and high explosives and energetics, among other strategic
    materials, are vital to ensuring the Navy can continue to meet its
    strategic deterrent requirements.
        Efforts to sustain and modernize deterrent industrial base and
    infrastructure must continue. Our strategic forces underpin every
    military operation around the world, and we cannot afford to delay
    given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
                      warhead and reentry body activities
        The Navy is also working in partnership with NNSA to refurbish our
    existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in response to
    USSTRATCOM requirements. As the threat environment faced by the nuclear
    enterprise continues to evolve, it is critical that the Navy designs,
    develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the Warfighter.
        Today, the Trident II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types
    of warhead families, the W76 and the W88. SSP is designing and
    developing a new warhead system: the W93 warhead and Mk7 reentry body
    system. It will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2 missiles
    and, through the PSA and MDA, and the Mk7 reentry body will support the
    UK's sovereign Replacement Warhead program.
        W93/Mk7 will provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future
    Warfighter needs. With the near simultaneous age out of the deployed
    stockpile beginning in the 2040's, the W93/Mk7 will help address
    production concerns in the Nuclear Enterprise and ensure an
    uninterrupted at sea deterrent for the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad. In 2021, the Navy entered Phase 1 of the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear
    Weapons Lifecycle Process with NNSA for the W93. The Phase 1 effort
    addressed evolving ballistic missile warhead modernization
    requirements; improving operational effectiveness for USSTRATCOM; and
    mitigating technical, operational, and programmatic risk in the sea-
    based leg of the nuclear triad while simultaneously reinvigorating the
    atrophied industrial base. In fiscal year 2022, the W93 program
    received Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) authorization to enter Phase 2,
    Feasibility Study and Design Options, which further refined and matured
    the design of the W93/Mk7 program in a manner that provides an
    affordable, credible, safe, and secure weapon to the Warfighter. This
    marked the first time a nuclear weapons program had reached Phase 2
    since the W88 which ended production in the 1990's. As of March 2025,
    the W93/Mk7 program proceeded into Phase 2A. The W93/Mk7 will not
    increase the size of the deployed stockpile and will not require
    underground nuclear explosive testing. The Navy will work in close
    coordination with the DOD, NNSA, NWC, and Congress as this effort
    matures.
       polaris sales agreement (psa) and mutual defense agreement (mda):
                         support to the united kingdom
        Fundamental to U.S. strategic and extended deterrence policies is
    the special relationship between the U.S. and the UK through the 1958
    MDA and the 1963 PSA. Under the PSA, the U.S. sells the Trident II SWS
    to the UK along with associated support, testing and training
    equipment, and defense services. This sales agreement allows the U.S.
    to procure the SWS, other equipment, and services for the UK on U.S.
    contracts under the same terms and conditions as those for the United
    States, allowing for increased economies of scale and sharing certain
    costs and liabilities.
        In particular, certain SWS equipment, including missiles, are
    ``mingled'' in common asset pools. Although the U.S. maintains these
    mingled assets in the United States, the UK retains right to title for
    mingled assets in the United States, and the United States transfers
    title to the UK for deployment. The United States and the UK
    proportionately share costs and liabilities to maintain (and eventually
    dispose) of mingled assets throughout their lifecycles.
        Under the MDA, the United States cooperates with the UK on the uses
    of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. The PSA and MDA
    agreements are complementary, and together enable the U.S. Navy to sell
    SWS delivery system and reentry body equipment to the UK, as well as to
    exchange controlled unclassified and classified information, including
    atomic information, with the UK. This framework has ensured the U.S.
    ability to support the UK with strategic capabilities to ensure a
    robust, sovereign nuclear deterrent.
        SSP's key responsibility associated with the Columbia-class program
    is the integration of the SWS onto the new SSBNs. A critical aspect is
    the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) that will support Trident II SWS
    deployment on Columbia-class SSBNs and the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
    The CMC represents the most recent example of the PSA partnership, in
    which our nations established a cost-sharing arrangement to design,
    develop, and produce common shipboard infrastructure that improves
    comingling of Trident II D5 missile inventory and sets the stage to
    improve maintenance system consistency across the two fleets.
        SSP also supports the SSBN Program Executive Office as it oversees
    U.S. industry's delivery of CMC components to both Navies for
    installation into their new SSBNs. Full lead ship construction is in
    progress along with delivery of SWS equipment to the UK in support of
    construction and outfitting efforts under the authorities of the 1963
    PSA.
        As with the Columbia-class SSBNs, the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs
    will initially carry the Trident II D5LE missile. The development of
    the Mk7 reentry system to support the U.S. W93 warhead program is also
    critical to the UK's independent development of a next generation
    nuclear warhead and reentry system. Our nations are working separate
    and sovereign nuclear warhead programs that will leverage the Mk7
    reentry system. SSP will continue to nurture and safeguard this special
    relationship with the UK as it contributes to ensuring peace through
    strength with the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) today while
    modernizing and building flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency into
    the UK's future CASD.
                      sea-launched cruise missile, nuclear
        Today, our deterrent force is challenged by adversaries' theater
    nuclear capabilities for which we have limited response options and
    against which we must invest now in capabilities to maintain deterrence
    for the future. In the fiscal year 2024 NDAA (Public Law 118-31),
    Congress directed establishment of a major defense acquisition program
    for SLCM-N. SLCM-N is a flexible, credible, and survivable sea-based
    regional deterrent capability designed to complement existing
    capabilities and to expand Presidential options.
        In accordance with the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, Navy established a
    SLCM-N Program Office at SSP in March 2024. Over the past year, SSP has
    focused on standing up this program office and conducting the
    assessments needed to deliver a weapon system that meets Warfighter
    needs. The SLCM-N program is focused on achieving a milestone decision
    in fiscal year 2026 and continuing program assessments to buy down
    technical and programmatic risk. Executing this program requires
    careful balancing of resources to ensure existing critical Navy
    programs of record are not adversely impacted.
        Fiscal year 2024 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation funding
    enabled the program to begin building the technical understanding and
    programmatic underpinnings in support of a SLCM-N capability delivery
    by fiscal year 2034. Over the last year, the SLCM-N program has focused
    on understanding and determining the Weapon System's architectures.
    SLCM-N development will span the missile system, fire control, launcher
    system, platform integration, and warhead system integration as well as
    development of applicable support equipment, telemetry and flight test
    hardware, ashore infrastructure, and training material. The program
    office has focused efforts on defining the system architecture that
    integrates these elements, conducting systems engineering analysis to
    inform key Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) decisions, and establishing
    the acquisition framework that will enable successful program
    execution.
        The program has conducted assessments of early candidate airframe
    options to understand the key technical challenges unique to developing
    SLCM-N. Challenges identified include integration of a nuclear warhead
    into a conventionally armed cruise missile design while meeting nuclear
    surety requirements and marinizing a missile not originally designed
    for underwater launch. In addition to these initial technical
    assessments, the program researched potential alternate airframe and
    component vendor options to understand the missile options that may
    best meet requirements and provide the best path to Initial Operating
    Capability (IOC) by fiscal year 2034. Beyond SLCM-N airframe
    considerations, the Navy, in cooperation with NNSA, has worked to
    assess available warhead options for selection of a warhead that meets
    requirements.
        The program has been equally focused on the integration of SLCM-N
    into the Virginia-class submarine. As the SLCM-N shipboard architecture
    matures, preliminary platform interfaces are being established,
    shipboard environments defined, and fire control solutions that meet
    nuclear surety requirements assessed. Over the last year, the SLCM-N
    program has conducted numerous programmatic and engineering assessments
    to help define and narrow the shipboard integration trade space and
    enable MSA engineering decisions. The SLCM-N weapon system is being
    designed and integrated with the intent to minimize impact to Virginia-
    class readiness and operations.
        In parallel with efforts to develop the missile system and
    integrate it into the submarine, the program is working to develop the
    supporting infrastructure needed to store, maintain, and deploy SLCM-N.
    The weapon will be stored and loaded at the Strategic Weapon Facilities
    (SWF) already used for the Trident II D5 SWS and will leverage a
    combination of existing, modified, and new facilities at the SWFs.
    Early studies are focused on developing a plan for the SWFs that
    supports SLCM-N requirements while ensuring SWS programs of record are
    not impacted.
        The Navy is moving rapidly to complete the activities needed for a
    successful milestone decision in fiscal year 2026. Consistent funding
    resources are critical to the program's ability to deliver a system
    with an IOC by fiscal year 2034. The ability to find and rapidly scale
    the workforce that will develop SLCM-N is critical to mission success.
                                   workforce
        SSP's mission--strategic deterrence--is critical to this Nation. It
    is the foundation of the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance
    and is the top priority of the Secretary of Defense. Based on the
    success of the Trident program, SSP has also been tasked with rapidly
    developing and producing the Navy's first hypersonic weapon system,
    CPS, along with the Army's long range hypersonic weapons system. At the
    same time, SSP is currently developing the SLCM-N. This is a new
    capability that required the organization to establish a new program
    office, along with corresponding staff. Finally, I have Echelon I
    command responsibilities for the personnel that execute regulatory
    oversight of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission and technical
    authority on Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons
    systems, effort that provides a holistic Navy view of the no-fail
    mission.
        Because of our demonstrated success, and the importance of these
    new programs, SSP's workforce has been growing and requires continued
    growth. SSP must recruit, train, and retain some of the most sought-
    after skills in the U.S. job market to support the breadth and
    complexity of SSP's strategic deterrence mission. SSP requires a
    workforce comprised of highly specialized, technical experts. Failing
    to appropriately staff this command would be catastrophic to the Navy's
    Fleet Ballistic Missile program, the Conventional Prompt Strike program
    and the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile--Nuclear program.
        History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
    execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950's was
    truly a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a
    cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational
    leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated
    predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners alike--
    responded to the national need with focused determination and propelled
    the program forward with a vision. People are as fundamental to our
    nuclear deterrent as the SWS itself. Today, SSP and its industry
    partners are focused on inspiring, growing, and retaining a generation
    of workforce that did not live through the darkest days of the cold
    war. Connecting a new workforce to this fundamental global security
    mission remains an important task shared among the entire nuclear
    enterprise.
        Our mission has grown significantly, while our workforce size has
    not grown in the same proportion. Additionally, as the global threat
    environment has changed and the operational tempo has increased, the
    workforce is challenged to manage the increased strain on an already
    aging deployed weapons system. In order to accomplish SSP's sustainment
    and development missions, SSP must have trained, skilled employees on-
    board and able to work independently.
        The next decade is a time of great importance to successfully
    accomplish concurrent development efforts, on top of the sustainment of
    the aging D5/D5LE weapon system. SSP has spent the past several years
    posturing its workforce, organizational structure, infrastructure,
    culture, and technical capabilities to ensure optimal success for the
    impending bow wave of critical development, testing, deployment, and
    sustainment.
                                   conclusion
        Since the 1950's, our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has
    been a critical component of our national security and must continue to
    assure our allies and partners and deter potential adversaries well
    into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible, and
    strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the proper stewardship,
    custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the
    Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability is a vital national security requirement.
        As the fourteenth Director at SSP, I have absolute faith and
    confidence in the safety, security, effectiveness, and credibility of
    our Navy's strategic deterrent due to the proficiency and
    professionalism of the dedicated service members and civilians
    committed to our mission. With continued congressional support and
    stable, on-time funding, the Navy will continue to effectively defend
    our Nation and preserve peace for future generations.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral. We will begin our
    first round of questions. Five-minute questions please. Admiral
    Wolfe, I've appreciated our discussions on standing up the
    SLCM-N. Can you update the Committee on the progress that the
    Navy's made on that?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. Yes,
    as I've said, we stood up our program office, we started to
    look at what----
        Senator Fischer. Do you found that to be helpful?
        Admiral Wolfe. What to be helpful, ma'am?
        Senator Fischer. That you've got the office stood up.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. What that is a lot--
    --
        Senator Fischer. Was that faster than you anticipated?
        Admiral Wolfe. Excuse me, ma'am?
        Senator Fischer. Was it quicker than you anticipated?
        Admiral Wolfe. I wouldn't say it was quicker than
    anticipated. We're still trying to ramp up to get the right
    number of folks, but what that small group of people, since
    we've stood that up, has been able to do in the last year,
    we've been able to focus on what are the things that we need to
    do to get to meeting the requirement of 2034, but as
    importantly, it's allowed us to work with NNSA in partnership
    to select a family of warheads.
        It's allowed us to pulse industry and start to get ideas
    and new ways of thinking into this system, so that we can
    continue to meet all of the requirements. We've really started
    to hone in on what are those concepts and how are we going to
    integrate this system onto a platform that was never built to
    carry nuclear weapons.
        We've had many discussions with this Committee in the past
    about how we're going to do that, and in the last years we've
    worked with the fleet, we've also been able to get their ideas
    to understand exactly how we can go about this without
    impacting the larger SSN mission.
        Senator Fischer. You have a 2034 timeline, what's the
    greatest risk to that, do you think?
        Admiral Wolfe. I think the greatest risk to the 2034
    timeline again, is it goes back to that it's really
    understanding how are we going to get this system integrated
    into a platform that was never purpose built for that. It's
    also to be able to do that in a way so that we don't deter from
    the primary SSN mission. This will be a whole new
    infrastructure that we have to stand up. Getting all of those
    things in place, getting the weapons system done, but as
    importantly, getting the fleet trained, getting all the things
    that we need to do, that's going to be one of the challenging
    parts of this.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. Mr. Hoagland, can you provide
    an update on NNSA's progress on the future warhead for SLCM-N?
        Mr. Hoagland. Yes, Senator. Thank you. Paralleling Admiral
    Wolfe's comments, we stood up a program office last summer.
    Among the first responsibilities of that office. They ran a
    very disciplined warhead selection process using over 30
    metrics to grade and rank the suitable warheads for options. We
    have selected and identified the W 80 family of warheads as
    most suitable for this purpose, that this allows us to stay
    ahead of the interface documents that we'll be pursuing the
    engineering required and emphasis on staying very coupled to
    the Navy during development with the platform into which that
    warhead will go.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you. I appreciate the thoughtful
    work that both NNSA and the Navy along with U.S. Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM) and the combatant commanders are doing to
    assess the best way forward for this program. I appreciate the
    close communication with this Subcommittee as design choices
    are considered. So, thank you for that.
        General Bussiere, the Air Force is responsible for many of
    the components that comprise our NC3 system, including
    delivering the new Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC)
    aircraft. Can you provide us with an update on that program?
        General Bussiere. So, Madam Chair, of the Survivable
    Airborne Operations Center, the 747-8is that will replace the--
    --
        Senator Fischer. Oh, mic?
        General Bussiere. Yes, it is.
        Senator Fischer. Can you get a little closer?
        General Bussiere. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Bussiere. So, the SAOC weapon system that's going
    to replace the existing E-4B National Airborne Operations
    Center is fairly nascent in its execution from the contract
    award last year but going very well. So the primary contractor
    has built facilities in Ohio and they purchased the original or
    the initial buy of 7478is, and they're going through initial
    processes of it.
        We're also outlining the military construction to outfit
    off Air Force base and I think most members of the Committee
    are aware that we stood up the 95th Wing to take host of that
    capability as well as others in that portfolio.
        Senator Fischer. What can you share about the 95th wing
    that was stood up? What are the operations of the unit? How are
    they progressing it off it?
        General Bussiere. So, they're literally, we just stood it
    up a few months ago. Colonel Leaumont is the first commander as
    most Committee Members are aware. He was the five 95th command
    and control group commander, which is the group that previously
    had the NAOC mission. He's standing up his command team
    outfitting his organization and we're giving him the resources
    to pull together.
        I think most committee members are aware, when I first
    wanted to stand up this wing, it was bringing together both
    Active Duty, Guard, Reserve elements in the, in the in the
    realm of communications and control in our special space into
    the leadership oversight of one commander. We're very pleased
    with its progress so far.
        Senator Fischer. Good to hear. Thank you. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you. Admiral Wolfe, you used a term
    I've never heard before, stable on time funding. What does that
    mean?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Let's hope that we can make that happen.
    That's certainly the goal, and I understand how debilitating it
    is to not have stable on time funding.
        Dr. Vann, I just understand that you're leaving Federal
    service shortly after 15 distinguished years, and I just wanted
    to congratulate you and thank you for your extraordinary
    service to the country. Let me start with a question for you
    Dr. Vann. The prior organization that preceded where you are
    now included chemical and biological defense and threat
    reduction. I don't think that's in the new job description.
    Where has that gone? Is that still being attended to somewhere?
        Dr. Vann No, so it actually is still a part of the
    implementation plan of the nuclear deterrent and chem/bio
    defense policy and programs. So, it will be all pulled together
    into an organization.
        Senator King. It's going to stay in the current, the new
    organization?
        Dr. Vann That is the hope and the current plan based off of
    the legislation.
        Senator King. Mr. Hoagland, if you were listening to the
    first panel, you won't be surprised by this question. You
    mentioned the phrase, ``the foundation is our workforce.'' How
    is your workforce? Do you have sufficient workforce? Did you
    have to go through rifts and fork-in-the-road and people
    leaving? Where are you compared with where the organization was
    in terms of staffing on January 1st of this year?
        Mr. Hoagland. Thank you, Senator King. We did recover. We
    have brought back all the terminated employees that were lost
    in February. The people I speak to and work with in NNSA, in
    particular in the weapons activities portfolio, are here for
    the mission. They're motivated by the mission. They recognize
    the multi-generational inflection point we're experiencing in
    the nuclear deterrent, and they're laser focused, and they're
    delivering with some losses from the deferred resignation
    program.
        We undertook a process to identify critical needs, either
    from those absences or because of emergent requirements in the
    program, and we've shifted staff around to attend to the most
    important needs, and we continue to deliver.
        Senator King. Well, one of my questions is, is the hiring
    freeze still in effect?
        Mr. Hoagland. By and large, the hiring freeze is still in
    effect.
        Senator King. Well, that's what worries me is with people
    are taking deferred whatever you call it, fork in the road
    retirement, and the hiring freeze is in effect, you end up
    with, could end up with some pretty important vacancies.
        Mr. Hoagland. That's very true. With the Secretary's
    support, we have exempted the hiring freeze for the Office of
    Secure Transportation. We're very pleased to note that we've
    been able to offer job opportunities and we are starting a new
    class for Office of Secure Transportation this month to
    continue the pipeline into that particular mission space.
        Senator King. Thank you. General Bussiere, good to see you
    again.
        General Bussiere. Same here, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you for the service that you're
    providing. We had some discussion in the Armed Services
    Committee this morning about Air Force availability. Do you
    have a figure for availability of your strike force? In other
    words--well, you know what I mean. What's the percentage of
    your force that's available at any given moment?
        General Bussiere. From a bomber perspective, Senator?
        Senator King. Correct.
        General Bussiere. So, between the B1, B2, and B52 force, we
    hover around the fifties for aircraft availability just because
    of spare parts and the legacy weapon system sustainment.
        Senator King. In terms of spare parts, one of the things
    the committee is looking at is when we are acquiring new
    platforms that we also acquire the intellectual property so
    that we can make our own spare parts. I believe there should be
    a 3D printer in every depot and on every naval ship. Right now,
    is spare parts a bottleneck for you? Because to be honest, 50
    percent availability the commercial aircraft is 98 percent
    availability. They'd be long out of business if they had a 50
    percent availability.
        General Bussiere. It's not necessarily unique to the bomber
    fleet, it's just it's----
        Senator King. No, I understand that. That was the number we
    had this morning for the Air Force generally.
        General Bussiere. The bomber fleet is challenged by what we
    call is legacy vendors that don't actually make the parts we
    need. So that's a challenge for the acquisition community to
    get those contracts put on order. As you know, the B52 is----
        Senator King. Pretty old.
        General Bussiere.--70 years plus old. The B2 is in its
    thirties, the B1 is in its forties and fifties, depending on
    the year the aircraft was made, and we're using them a lot. So
    the demand signal for our bombers is at the highest level that
    I've seen it in my career. While we're also challenged to get
    the sustainment parts on the shelf for the legacy.
        Senator King. I hope that could be a priority in terms of
    sustainment and maintenance and maintaining a higher level of
    availability that's a better deal for the taxpayers and it
    makes sure service all the more lethal if it's available
        General Bussiere. Without a doubt, and that's obviously the
    reason why we're going to be fielding the B21 Raider platform
    to replace the B1 and the B2 is because of the age and the
    legacy fleet and modernizing the B52 H to the B52 J model.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair. Once again, thank
    you all for your service to our country. General Bussiere, the
    B21 program is critical to the future bomber leg of the triad.
    Based on what you know of the current and projected demand
    commensurate to a great power competition paradigm with two
    near peer nuclear adversaries, how many B21s do you believe
    would be optimally needed to support U.S. war plans and
    deterrence?
        What do you think the key drivers are going to be with
    regard to managing the procurement and sustainment right now,
    based on what you're seeing and recognizing that, I think
    there's a lot of us would like to see these B21s come on at a
    higher rate than what they're currently planned for, but this
    is probably one of the best examples of a system which is
    working. It's on time, it's on budget.
        Can you share with us a little bit about what you think the
    needs are for this particular platform?
        General Bussiere. Yes, Senator Rounds, very pleased with
    the progress so far. The B21 Raider platform. As the committee
    is aware, we've had first flight, we have one aircraft, T-One
    is in testing, developmental testing out at Edwards Air Force
    Base, and we have a classified number on the production line.
    Ellsworth Air Force Base is the first installation, we'll field
    the B21, and our construction projects to bed down that weapon
    system are going very well also, as well as the repair of the
    runway to field that capability.
        As the Committee is aware, the program of record currently
    is at least 100. The Air Force back in 2018 and 1919, I believe
    testified before Congress that the right number at that time
    potentially could be as high as 145. I understand General
    Cotton testified to that effect this year. I support assessing
    the increase of the production from 100 to 145. But I think the
    real question for the department and for the Nation is what's
    the right mix of long-range strike platforms versus other
    strike platforms?
        It's a reasonable question the Nation has asked several
    times in the last year or two, and that there are ongoing
    efforts, I believe, both on the Hill and in the Department of
    Defense to assess what the correct number of long-range strike
    platforms are in the Department of the Air Force.
        Senator Rounds. I think part of that also goes back to what
    exactly will the threat be. Part of what we're asking to be
    developed based on the NDAA last year was a study anyway as to
    how we handle two different theaters at the same time. Because
    there's a general consensus out there that if we're going to
    have a significant problem with one of our near peer
    adversaries in one theater, very high probability that we'd
    have a similar threat develop in a second theater. Thus,
    putting the demand out there to be able to respond in both
    locations with appropriate platforms.
        I'm going to come over to Dr. Vann for just a second. Can
    you share a little bit about the direction that you see the
    approach taking? I know that you know, either we talk about a
    new defense strategy we look at revising somehow our current
    one. Can you share with us a little bit about the, the
    direction that you see in terms of our strategic response and
    what we can expect from the Administration?
        Dr. Vann Sure. Yes, sir. Secretary Hegseth, of course,
    approved an interim National Defense Strategic Guidance
    classified document, which really goes into some details about
    how the DOD is going to implement President Trump's peace
    through strength kind of agenda. In there, there was some
    discussion about the prioritizing, planning, resourcing
    decisions that will be kind of entered into with a full
    National Defense Strategy (NPS).
        As you know, the NDS requires a review of our force size,
    shape, posture considerations, and all of the detailed
    prioritization of the threats, missions, and major investments.
    We do anticipate an in-depth look in the NDS on our nuclear
    strategy and our posture, especially in this kind of new
    geopolitical environment. I would anticipate broadly nuclear
    strategy and posture will be leveraging the work of things like
    the Strategic Posture Commission's analysis, as well as some of
    the updated information that we have about the geopolitical
    threat environment.
        Senator Rounds. Do you have a timeline?
        Dr. Vann Sir, it is just begun and it is just underway. Our
    policy colleagues are working on pulling that together as we
    speak.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kelly.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. Admiral Wolfe, I
    want to come back to the SLCM-N discussion. So you talked about
    you stood up the program office, you are in the process of
    looking through a family of warheads to figure out what the
    warhead would be a pulsed industry. You've been working with
    the fleet and you talked about how to integrate this needed
    platform on a platform that wasn't designed for a nuclear
    weapon.
        You mentioned that we can't deter, and I think I wrote this
    down as a quote, ``We can't deter from the primary SSN
    mission.'' The primary Virginia-class submarine attack,
    conventional attack mission. And that's my big concern here.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kelly. So, explain to me how do we do that and how
    do we integrate a nuclear weapon into a Virginia-class sub
    without impacting training, mission systems, security? I assume
    we're going to have to have marines on board. Usually with
    nuclear weapons, we provide a contingent, unless that is a
    decision that does not apply in this case, we've got to store
    these weapons.
        So, my assumption, and I might be wrong, we would carry
    fewer torpedoes. This could possibly change the ops tempo of
    the submarine, because now we have different systems that we
    have to maintain that are additional systems. We're going to be
    limited in the ports we can go in, so maybe even maintenance
    overseas and resupply could be impacted. I assume there's going
    to be additional operator positions for the nuclear enterprise
    on board. So what positions are we going to take away?
        So, if you can go into a little bit about that and then
    come back to how this doesn't deter from the primary
    conventional mission.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So, acknowledge all your concerns
    we've talked about those in the past. So those are all the
    things as we work with the fleet, we are looking at what are
    the ways that we can architect the system to be able to do just
    what you said. Certainly there's going to be--I would tell you
    there's not going to be zero impact, but as we've worked with
    the fleet, what we believe is, we can come up with the right
    concepts of how do I train a crew that can deploy with this
    weapon to do the things that it needs to do that doesn't
    require the rest of the crew doing the missions they would
    normally do.
        Senator Kelly. Where do these people sleep?
        Admiral Wolfe. So, we're going to work through that, sir.
    It's not going to take a large number of folks once you get
    that weapon on board. Just to address your, your concern about
    marines in a submarine environment, we don't need marines. We
    don't need that type. We know how to do that in different ways.
    It's what we do on our Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear
    (SSBN)s today. So we're going to take the best of all of those,
    and we're going to figure out how we do that and integrate that
    with a very small number of additional folks. I can tell you,
    having done this a long time, it will be a small number of
    folks that actually have to operate that particular system,
    which will be different than all of the other systems that are
    on board, so.
        Senator Kelly. Madam Chair, let me be clear here. Here's my
    concern. I understand we're going to try to do the best job we
    can at this, but we have an incredibly capable platform in the
    Virginia-class submarine.
        Admiral Wolfe. We still will.
        Senator Kelly. Well, we do now, and it's a conventional
    platform----
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kelly.--that the Chinese and the Russians pretty
    much, but definitely the Chinese cannot compete with. I'm
    concerned we come out of this and the likelihood that we have
    to use the conventional part of this, of a Virginia class
    submarine and a conflict with China is rather high, if we got
    into a conflict. The probability that we would use the nuclear
    systems aboard this submarine are actually rather low. So,
    we're going to sacrifice the exquisite capability of this
    platform, and it's going to become a little less capable. I
    don't know how less capable. My concern is it could be
    significant.
        My other concern is, we've set $2 billion aside for the
    development of this. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
    estimates, the cost of SLCM-N and its war add at $10 billion
    between 2023 and 2032 if the program began in 2024. That amount
    does not cover pro production costs beyond 2032, nor does it
    include any of the costs for integrating the weapon system into
    the submarines, which I think is going to be substantial. I
    mean, we're talking about billions of dollars.
        Then we have the additional costs beyond that of, you know,
    security and operations and weapon storage costs. So, I don't
    think this thing has been fully thought out, but again, my
    biggest concern about this, and I am not against having another
    tactical nuclear option, I just think that the costs not only
    the financial costs, but the cost to the conventional submarine
    fleet, in my view, is too high.
        I come from the aviation background, so it's kind of hard
    for me to say that I think our conventional submarine force is
    unmatched anywhere in the world. And it is something where we
    have this substantial overmatch with the Chinese and I feel
    we're putting it at risk. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Kelly. General
    Bussiere, I urge you to work closely with Secretary Meink and
    also to be able to reach that next milestone that we have with
    Sentinel. The longer we delay the decisions, the more budget
    uncertainty that program's going to face. It's been determined
    that that is a program that is priority and that this country
    needs. Can you please describe the risks that we may incur if
    Sentinel is not adequately funded in fiscal year 2026 budget?
        General Bussiere. So, Madam Chair, I look forward to the
    opportunity for our new Secretary of the Air Force Secretary
    Meink to come visit Barksdale and get a complete update on all
    our--at least two thirds of the Nation's nuclear triad from Air
    Force Global Strike Command. As it relates to the Sentinel
    Weapon System, I've said in several public forms that this July
    will be the 55th anniversary of fielding the Minuteman III
    capability, the 91st Missile Wing in Minot, North Dakota. 55
    years ago.
        So, the time for recapitalizing, the land leg of the triad,
    quite frankly, was probably a decade or two decades ago. But
    here we are today in 2025 and we're restructuring the Sentinel
    Weapon System to be able to field that capability at a very
    stressed time in our Nation's history. I agree with the
    committee's position that the Sentinel Weapon system needs to
    be funded sufficiently to get that program back on track and
    field it as expeditiously as we can as a department. I'm
    confident that our secretary will have the same position.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. Admiral Wolfe, can you
    provide an update on the Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2)
    and the impact of the recent contract modification that took
    place?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. So D5LE2, as you know, is the
    replacement for the current system that we have. We've just
    come through a recent review to know that we're starting to
    understand the exact requirements, which dovetail from what we
    actually have today. So we've come through that. That program
    is on schedule it's on track and certainly the contract
    modifications were to continue down that path so that we can
    eventually get into our preliminary design review, our critical
    design review with the goal of, right now the plan is to start
    flight testing of that system in 2033.
        We're challenging the team to pull that to the left to get
    early learning. It's things we've gotten, what we've learned in
    other programs, like hyper sonics, get that testing done as
    quickly as you can. So the modifications you're referring to
    are to start us down that path and get industry ramped up to
    continue that development effort.
        Senator Fischer. What do you see as the biggest threat to
    being able to execute those timelines?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am. It's kind of what I said in my
    opening testimony. I think our biggest, I wouldn't say threat,
    but the thing we're going to watch closely is how we ramp
    industry back up in all of these modernization programs. Not
    this one, but, you know, things like Rad-hard electronics,
    solid rocket motors, all of those things which are very small,
    industrial based. Again, with and as we're all trying to do
    this at the same time, making sure we've got the industrial
    capacity and capability to meet all of our program needs to
    keep them on track.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you. Senator King, other
    questions?
        Senator King. Just a couple. Admiral Wolfe, you're working
    with the British on the W 93. How is that collaboration going?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So I would tell you both programs,
    they're being done in parallel. Obviously, the UK design is a
    sovereign design, but as we work in parallel both us and NNSA
    under the Mutual Defense Agreement, I think we have gotten to
    the point where both teams are moving forward in parallel, the
    right amount of data is being shared where it needs to be
    shared. I would say the way that we're all three of our
    organizations are working together is, is really good right
    now.
        Senator King. Final question, General Bussiere, how are you
    doing on retaining pilots? That's been a problem with the
    fighter pilots. Is it a similar problem with bomber pilots or
    is that a different breed of cat?
        General Bussiere. No, our rated management stressors are
    pretty agnostic of the platform. So, we're experiencing similar
    challenges in retaining. You know, historically when the
    airlines are hiring, we have a retention problem, and when
    they're not hiring, we don't. There's different dynamics that
    affect a aviator's decision to stay in the Air Force. But we
    have similar challenges in Air Force Global Strike Command.
        Senator King. A couple of years ago Senator Cotton and I
    had what amounted to a focus group with Young Air Force pilots
    without the brass around. To sort of get from them some
    information about their view of the retention issues and the
    pilot shortage issues. It was very interesting. We expected
    going into that meeting, it was going to be all about bonuses
    and quality of life and housing and all those kinds of things.
        What they shared with us almost universally was they want
    to fly. What was pushing them toward the door were desk
    assignments. These were people that joined the military and
    they don't necessarily want to be a General, they want to fly
    airplanes. I thought that was a very interesting insight that
    came across to Tom Cotton and I very strongly, and I just
    commend that to you for your thinking in terms of retention.
        General Bussiere. Senator King, that's a universal aspect
    of retention for aviators in the Department of the Air Force.
    Across the board the department is aggressively trying to come
    up with not only new ways for generating aviators through our
    pilot pipeline, but also coming up with programs to convince
    our aviators of staying in service to their nation in the Air
    Force.
        Senator King. Well, one way may be to have parallel tracks.
    You're on the pilot track or you're on the officer track, and
    it may be that some people choose to stay with flying as
    opposed to moving up in the ranks. But I just wanted to share
    that with you because the impression came through so
    dramatically to us that this was one of the principle issues.
    So, I just, again, wanted to share that insight.
        General Bussiere. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King. Thank you to our
    panel members today. Appreciate you being here and providing us
    with important information. With that, the hearing is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                   nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile
        1. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, is there a need for Nuclear
    Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) or a variant to field prior
    to 2034?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. Our deterrent forces are challenged by U.S.
    adversaries' theater nuclear capabilities, for which we have limited
    response options. SLCM-N is a theater nuclear system intended to expand
    the President's options for responding to limited nuclear use and
    strategic, non-nuclear attacks. The Navy is executing the SLCM-N
    program to meet the requirement established by the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) of fiscal year 2024, as amended, to achieve a
    SLCM-N initial operational capability (IOC) by September 30, 2034.

        2. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, what is driving that need
    for an earlier SLCM-N variant to field prior to 2034?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's SLCM-N program is executing to meet
    the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA's requirement, as amended, to achieve IOC by
    September 30, 2034. The program is working to effectively deliver the
    required capability as soon as feasibly achievable.

        3. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, you stated that SLCM-N
    fielding by 2034 was on a ``very, very aggressive timeline''. Is the
    SLCM-N program still on track to reach initial operating capability
    (IOC) by 2034?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The SLCM-N program is executing to a schedule
    based on the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA requirement, as amended, to reach
    IOC by September 30, 2034 and the program is on track to meet that
    schedule. The program's next major programmatic event is Milestone A in
    fiscal year 2026, with Milestone B anticipated to occur in fiscal year
    2029 and Milestone C anticipated in fiscal year 2032.

        4. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, has the Navy given you a
    requirement to demonstrate a SLCM-N capability earlier than IOC?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy is executing the SLCM-N program to the
    congressionally mandated requirement to achieve IOC by September 30,
    2034. The Navy has not levied a requirement to demonstrate a SLCM-N
    capability earlier than the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA requirement.

        5. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, will the Navy fiscal year
    2026 budget request include early submarine platform funding to make a
    submarine available sooner than required for IOC?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's fiscal year 2026 budget supports the
    SLCM-N program's approach to submarine platform integration, including
    funding that will be used to 1) develop and produce a prototype nuclear
    fire control subsystem, 2) conduct submarine platform systems
    modifications, and 3) begin development of SLCM-N engagement and
    mission planning systems.

        6. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, will the Navy fiscal year
    2026 budget request for SLCM-N include the budget to develop an
    additional missile sooner than the missile required for IOC?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy's fiscal year 2026 budget supports the
    program's approach to competitively design and prototype multiple
    missile airframe options. The budget will be used to procure hardware
    for early developmental testing, including early prototyping, ground
    testing, and long-lead components for early flight testing.

        7. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, has the Navy proposed any
    legislative recommendations to Congress to allow for an earlier SLCM-N
    deployment option?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The Navy has not proposed any legislative
    recommendations to Congress to alter the Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA
    requirement to achieve SLCM-N IOC by 2034.

        8. Senator Cotton. Vice Admiral Wolfe, for any alternative, earlier
    systems being pursued, does this take resources from, or add any risks
    to the original SLCM-N system?
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. The DOD is committed to funding the SLCM-N
    program to deploy a capability that meets program requirements to
    achieve IOC by September 30, 2034. Any options to accelerate delivery
    of a SLCM-N capability earlier than fiscal year 2034 will require
    additional consideration.

        9. Senator Cotton. Mr. Hoagland, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) established a Federal Program Office for SLCM-N
    in July 2024. What progress has been made on the SLCM-N program since
    July?
        Mr. Hoagland. Since establishing a Federal program office for SLCM-
    N in July 2024, NNSA has made significant progress on this program.
    This includes developing selection criteria for the SLCM-N warhead,
    down-selecting the warhead type in concert with the Navy, and
    establishing a milestone-based schedule for development, testing, and
    production of the weapon. NNSA continues to coordinate with DOD/Navy
    partners as missile options are evaluated.
                                    sentinel
        10. Senator Cotton. Dr. Vann, what is the expected operational
    capability date for Sentinel?
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Drew Walter, Performing the Duties of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
    Defense Policy and Programs, responded to questions on behalf of Dr.
    Vann. Pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 14265, Modernizing Defense
    Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base
    (April 9, 2025), the Department of Defense is conducting a review of
    Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), and the Sentinel Program is
    being reviewed as part of that effort. In parallel, the Sentinel
    program continues its restructuring efforts, as required after the
    Nunn-McCurdy certification, and has not yet reached a new Milestone B
    approval. The expected initial operational capability will not be known
    until the restructuring is complete and the program is approved for a
    new Milestone B.

        11. Senator Cotton. Dr. Vann, how do you assess the risk of
    strategic deterrent requirements caused by current delays to the
    Sentinel program?
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    U.S. nuclear forces remain sized and postured to support deterrence
    objectives identified for the nuclear triad. Current projected delays
    of Sentinel re-emphasize the importance of the Minuteman III (MMIII)
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system. My team and I will continue
    to work with General Bussiere and the Air Force to ensure MMIII remains
    a safe, secure, viable, and effective facet of the nuclear triad as
    long as it remains in the field.
        The programmatic risk of a delayed fielding of Sentinel remains
    under evaluation, and I remain confident in the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent's ability to meet all objectives.
                           enriched uranium resupply
        12. Senator Cotton. Admiral Houston, what is the most specific date
    you can provide for when the NNSA will need a new supply of enriched
    uranium to meet national security needs?
        Admiral Houston. The amount of HEU currently allocated from the
    existing Department of Energy (DOE) stockpile for Naval Reactors' use
    is projected to last until the 2050's under the previous
    administration's shipbuilding plan. Pending no major changes to either
    future shipbuilding plans or to current HEU allocations, NNSA's current
    schedule to have new HEU enrichment capabilities operating before 2050
    will support uninterrupted Navy nuclear shipbuilding, inclusive of the
    United States' commitment to deliver nuclear-powered submarines under
    AUKUS. Any acceleration in shipbuilding plans or reallocation of
    stockpiled HEU away from Naval Reactors will drive an earlier
    enrichment need.

        13. Senator Cotton. Admiral Houston, do you believe that the NNSA's
    domestic uranium enrichment program can meet that date?
        Admiral Houston. NNSA's program has so far met initial milestones
    for testing and deployment of new enrichment capability, and my team is
    following and supporting these efforts. To augment these efforts and
    maximize margin to the Navy's need, my team is also engaged in DOE's
    efforts to implement the President's Executive Order on Reinvigorating
    the Nuclear Industrial Base, which includes actions to ensure a
    domestic nuclear fuel cycle sufficient to meet civilian and defense
    needs, if necessary.

        14. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, given the growing nuclear
    threats, do you think 80 plutonium pits per year will be enough to meet
    deterrence requirements?
        Mr. McConnell. NNSA has committed to producing no fewer than 80
    plutonium pits per year as soon economically and technically possible,
    with the goal of re-establishing the capability for steady-State rate
    production of plutonium pits on the timelines required to meet DOD
    requirements.
                               rapid acquisition
        15. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, the NNSA's acquisition cycle to
    modernize the weapons in our stockpile can take around 20 years. Do you
    think there's a role for a rapid acquisition effort in the NNSA that is
    dedicated to delivering capabilities faster by tailoring requirements
    and prioritizing speed?
        Mr. McConnell. NNSA is currently executing seven nuclear
    modernization programs in the program of record while sustaining the
    existing stockpile and recapitalizing the enterprise's industrial base.
    Major modernization efforts often take at least a decade.
        The evolving global security environment requires the nuclear
    security enterprise, in coordination with DOD, to rapidly demonstrate
    and potentially deploy new nuclear weapons with novel characteristics.
    The enterprise is developing weapon concepts that fill emerging
    deterrence gaps, producing systems at ``the speed-of-need'' while
    minimizing impacts to the ongoing Program of Record (PoR).
        NNSA believes the fastest and most efficient path to the rapid
    demonstration of novel capabilities is through the use of existing
    programmatic authorities. Today, NNSA is rapidly demonstrating
    capabilities on a small scale through initiatives such as the Stockpile
    Responsiveness Program (SRP). NNSA is modestly reorganizing this
    program within the Office of Research, Development, Test, and
    Evaluation (RDT&E) to accelerate execution. NNSA's Office of Stockpile
    Modernization is also streamlining execution where possible to field
    new weapons with service engagement and authorized acquisition
    programs; however, the office does not need any additional programmatic
    authorities. The B61-13 is the most recent example of rapidly fielding
    a new capability.
        Within current programmatic lines, NNSA is chartering a Nuclear
    Deterrence Rapid Capability Team (ND RCT) to streamline oversight and
    execution of rapid capability demonstration activities. ND RCT will
    integrate efforts across several subprograms to support up to three
    simultaneous projects that address identified capability gaps. As ND
    RCT executes these projects, it will identify opportunities and future
    activities necessary for full system development, production, and
    accelerated fielding, as directed.

        16. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, should we use the approach used
    in W76-2 and the B61-13 programs, which delivered new capability in
    years, not decades, to address some of our near-term deterrence
    challenges?
        Mr. McConnell. The W76-2 and B61-13 programs are recent examples of
    NNSA using existing production lines to quickly adapt to a changing
    threat environment and rapidly deliver additional capabilities to
    address deterrence gaps. NNSA, in coordination with the Department of
    Defense, will continue to evaluate opportunities to apply similar
    approaches for future programs, however, these opportunities are rare.
        Recognizing that the evolving geostrategic environment presents
    challenges to the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA is chartering a
    Nuclear Deterrence Rapid Capability Team using existing authorities to
    address deterrence gaps identified with the Department of Defense.
                          personnel retention efforts
        17. Senator Cotton. Mr. McConnell, Fort Chaffee in Arkansas is home
    to the Training Command for the NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation,
    which transports nuclear weapons all around the country. What is your
    plan to improve both recruiting and retention of our transport agents
    trained here?
        Mr. McConnell. The Office of Secure Transportation's (OST) Federal
    Agents (FAs), also known as Nuclear Materials Couriers (NMCs),
    safeguard nuclear weapons, weapon components, and Special Nuclear
    Materials in transit throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
        Recruitment and retention of our FAs remains a top priority for
    NNSA. NNSA recently approved a 1-year extension of OST's 25 percent
    recruitment incentive for NMCs. Since offering this incentive in April
    2023, OST has increased Federal Agent class sizes. NNSA is actively
    recruiting OST agents to ensure our mission is executed securely and we
    continue to prioritize hiring for these critical positions.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
                            enriched uranium supply
        18. Senator Tuberville. Mr. McConnell, I have been a proponent of
    thorium-based salt reactors for a long time, which is a promising
    energy source technology that we invented and later abandoned, but that
    China is known to be pursuing in our stead. Resuming the development of
    this technology relies on the United States taking advantage of our
    stockpile of Uranium-233--the largest inventory in the world--which the
    Department of Energy has unfortunately identified for disposal. Can you
    tell us the size and disposition of our remaining Uranium-233 inventory
    today?
        Mr. McConnell. Safely processing and disposing of the U-233
    inventory at Oak Ridge remains one of the Department's highest cleanup
    priorities. Disposing of the remaining U-233 will reduce the security
    posture at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, enable the demolition of
    legacy facilities, and significantly reduce security costs. The
    Department has completed direct disposition of about half of the total
    U-233 inventory at Oak Ridge. The remaining U-233 requires processing
    and down-blending before disposal, and the Department has processed
    approximately 40 percent of this material.

        19. Senator Tuberville. Mr. McConnell, what is the Department's
    latest plan for the material?
        Mr. McConnell. The Department will continue to process and dispose
    of the remaining U-233 at Oak Ridge, consistent with congressional
    direction. Our approach is enabling the Department to process U-233 in
    a cost-effective manner while also providing private industry with
    isotopes for next-generation cancer treatments. There is no suitable
    long-term storage solution for the U-233. If the Department were to
    forgo processing and down-blending, the government would need to create
    a suitable storage option, which would entail considerable time and
    cost. This could also jeopardize financial and other support for the
    disposition project and impact current contracts. Those impacts would
    eliminate material for cancer treatments worldwide and further impact
    the government financially.

        20. Senator Tuberville. Mr. McConnell, what can you tell us about
    thorium reactor technology and what advantage, military or otherwise,
    might China gain over the United States if it goes unchallenged in its
    pursuit of it?
        Mr. McConnell. Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are a class of advanced
    nuclear reactors under development that have the potential to
    contribute to many U.S. energy policy objectives. While some MSR
    designs might use a thorium-based fuel cycle, all current U.S.
    commercial reactors use uranium and the U.S. infrastructure for nuclear
    energy is built to support reactors that use uranium. There are two
    naturally occurring fuel source options for nuclear reactors: uranium
    and thorium. Both have been studied and developed in the past in the
    United States as potential fuel materials for nuclear energy sources.
    The choice of fuel material to be used in a nuclear reactor is made by
    the developers of the commercial reactor, and some MSR developers are
    designing concepts that could use thorium as fuel. With the absence of
    an economic driver to establish such a commercial thorium fuel
    infrastructure and with the current abundance of uranium, U.S.
    Government investment in a thorium fuel cycle is not warranted at this
    time. If a need for thorium fuel emerges in the future, this position
    may be revisited. The use of thorium fuels also poses a proliferation
    risk which would need to be mitigated to support their use in reactors.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                right-to-repair
        21. Senator Warren. General Bussiere, you stated in the hearing
    that between the B-1, B-2, and B-52, ``we hover around the 50's for
    aircraft availability just because of spare parts and the legacy weapon
    sustainment''. Does the Air Force own the intellectual property rights
    needed to manufacture those spare parts itself?
        General Bussiere. Each aircraft spare part is unique in what it
    takes to manufacture or refurbish. The Air Force does not own rights to
    every part the bombers need to operate. Many parts are sent back to the
    Depots for refurbishment and other parts are re-manufactured after a
    lengthy process of finding and funding a company that did not initially
    build it.

        22. Senator Warren. General Bussiere, if the Air Force were allowed
    to manufacture the spare parts it needs or have the technical data
    necessary to allow other companies to compete to manufacture those
    required spare parts, could the bomber availability rate increase?
        General Bussiere. These matters generally fall under the purview of
    Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). As such, Air Force Global Strike
    Command (AFGSC) defers to AFMC on this inquiry.

        23. Senator Warren. General Bussiere, how can the Air Force prevent
    new weapon systems from following a similar path as the bombers, where
    sustainment becomes a challenge due to legacy vendors who no longer
    make needed spare parts?
        General Bussiere. These matters generally fall under the purview of
    Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). As such, Air Force Global Strike
    Command (AFGSC) defers to AFMC on this inquiry.
           national nuclear security administration non-proliferation
        24. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, the fiscal year
    2025 continuing resolution shifted $185 million from the NNSA's Office
    of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) to weapons programs,
    threatening DNN's critical missions of securing nuclear materials
    worldwide so they don't fall into the wrong hands, enhancing nuclear
    detection capabilities, and strengthening arms control verification and
    monitoring. Do you fully support these DNN missions?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
    is fully committed to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation activities that
    have the greatest impact on making America safer, stronger, and more
    prosperous. Nonproliferation and nuclear deterrence are mutually
    reinforcing for U.S. national security as the strategic threat
    environment continues to evolve. DNN and Defense Programs (DP) work in
    concert to ensure that NNSA carries out its mission. DNN leverages the
    unique technical and scientific knowledge that underpins DP's Stockpile
    Stewardship Program for a range of nonproliferation,
    counterproliferation, and counterterrorism missions, from assessing
    foreign weapons programs and potential terrorist devices to enhancing
    security and safeguards for civil nuclear applications. Therefore,
    increasing funding for DP benefits DNN activities and NNSA's mission.
    Furthermore, DNN is revising its international engagement model to
    include more cost-sharing with partners thereby reducing program costs.

        25. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how important
    is NNSA's role in the U.S. Government's non-proliferation work?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
    plays a pivotal leadership role in the U.S. Government's nuclear
    nonproliferation work, drawing on the unique capabilities of DOE's
    national laboratories, plants, and sites. From designing space-based
    sensors that detect nuclear explosions to removing weapons-usable
    nuclear material from foreign countries and managing and maintaining
    24/7/365 capabilities to respond to worldwide nuclear and radiological
    threats, NNSA performs vital national security functions that do not
    exist anywhere else in the U.S. Government.

        26. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how does NNSA
    plan to ensure that non-proliferation work does not fall behind at a
    time of growing nuclear risks?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
    is strongly committed to its nonproliferation mission. NNSA has a
    proven record of responding nimbly to a changing global threat
    environment, ranging from programs to secure nuclear materials after
    the fall of the Soviet Union; to increased efforts to prevent nuclear
    and radiological terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001; to
    today's work to address nuclear and radiological threats in one of the
    most challenging geopolitical environments that the United States has
    ever faced.
        To keep pace with today's threat environment, NNSA is evaluating
    and leveraging emerging technologies including artificial intelligence,
    developing advanced monitoring and verification capabilities, revising
    our international engagement model to include more cost-sharing--
    simultaneously reducing program costs and improving program
    sustainability. Additionally, NNSA is committed to providing its
    unparalleled expertise with nuclear topics to ensure any planning to
    address growing nuclear risks is technically informed.

        27. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what impact
    will the current funding trajectory of DNN have on global nuclear
    threat reduction programs, particularly those focused on radiological
    material removal and illicit trafficking prevention?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: DNN
    is reprioritizing its efforts to focus on activities that have the
    greatest impact on making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
    This includes activities that permanently eliminate radioactive sources
    and that form partnerships in regions with the highest trafficking
    risks. To increase efficiency, DNN also is looking to expand burden-
    sharing with its partners, so that they bear more of the costs for
    maintenance and sustainment of any support or equipment provided by
    DNN.

        28. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, the United States
    and Russia are no longer engaged in arms control negotiations, and
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is set to expire in 2026. What specific
    risks does your office foresee if the U.S. enters a world without
    legally binding arms control agreements?
        Mr. McConnell., Admiral Houston and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: The expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026--
    absent any breakthroughs on arms control--will be the first time in
    decades there is no bilateral international agreement to limit the size
    of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. NNSA is preparing for
    this nuclear environment, including through the development, testing,
    and demonstration of applied monitoring and verification technologies.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. While the New START Treaty (NST) remains in
    force, Strategic Systems Programs is committed to fully implementing
    and complying with the Treaty, to include maintaining inspection
    readiness of all NST-declared facilities, providing required
    notifications of motor movements, and adhering to all other treaty
    requirements.
        I defer any questions about a world without legally binding arms
    control agreements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy (OUSD(P)).
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    The expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026--absent any
    breakthroughs on arms control--will be the first time in decades there
    is no bilateral international agreement to limit the size of United
    States and Russian strategic nuclear forces.
        DOD is preparing for this nuclear environment. Should the
    circumstances for arms control and risk reduction negotiations emerge,
    DOD stands ready to contribute to those efforts.
        General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to discuss arms control
    agreements.
             national nuclear security administration modernization
        29. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how is the NNSA
    addressing workforce shortages at key sites?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: The
    workforce at NNSA's laboratories, plants and sites is the
    organization's most valuable asset. NNSA has successfully implemented
    several initiatives to attract, recruit and retain employees for our
    M&O workforces, including recognizing service credit across the nuclear
    security enterprise to allow the movement of employees and introducing
    special targeted funds, stipends and bonuses to retain employees where
    attrition is high. The normalization of attrition to rates comparable
    to or lower tha historical rates indicate that these retention efforts
    have been effective.

        30. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what are you
    doing to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear scientists
    and engineers?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: The
    unique work within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    requires specialized skills in a broad array of technical fields, many
    of which are in high demand within the private sector. The science,
    technology, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities within the
    nuclear security enterprise underpin NNSA's ability to conduct
    stockpile stewardship, solve the technical challenges of verifying
    treaty compliance, combat nuclear terrorism, detect and counter nuclear
    proliferation, and guard against the threat posed by nuclear
    technological surprises.
        NNSA's ability to meet these national security missions depends
    upon its ability to recruit, train, and retain its world-class
    workforce. As part of the strategy to address future workforce needs,
    NNSA has implemented multiple university programs to provide the next
    generation of scientists with the opportunity to acquire the experience
    and expertise needed to sustain the enterprise and provide valuable
    basic and applied research in support of NNSA's missions.

        31. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
    employees have left in 2025?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: Since
    the beginning of the fiscal year 2025 (October 1, 2024) through May 31,
    2025, 148 employees in the Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) account,
    45 employees in the Office of Secure Transportation, and 21 employees
    in Naval Reactors have separated from NNSA. This includes four previous
    Deferred Resignation Program participants who have since separated from
    the agency and no longer receive salary and benefits.

        32. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
    employees do you expect will leave or accept offers to leave?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: While
    130 employees across NNSA have elected to participate in the Office of
    Personnel Management Deferred Resignation Program and will be resigning
    or retiring in 2025, NNSA remains committed to upholding its critical
    mission to protect America's national security.

        33. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many years
    of work experience did each NNSA employee who has left since 2025 have?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
    employees who have departed since the beginning of 2025 possess varying
    professional backgrounds. The average years of Federal Service of
    employees who retired, resigned, or transferred to other Federal
    agencies was 16.5 years.

        34. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, do you have any
    examples or data to indicate that the abrupt firing of parts of the
    NNSA workforce earlier this year undermines your recruiting efforts?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: There
    are no examples of data that indicate NNSA recruiting efforts have been
    undermined. NNSA is actively hiring Nuclear Materials Couriers within
    the Office of Secure Transportation and over 100 applications have been
    received to date for each advertised location.

        35. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
    employees were fired at the request of the Department of Government
    Efficiency this year?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: DOGE
    did not direct the termination of employees at NNSA.

        36. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
    employees were asked to come back after they had been fired?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: Of
    the 177 probationary employees initially terminated, all terminations
    were rescinded.

        37. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, how many NNSA
    employees returned after been asked to come back?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: Of
    the 177 probationary employees initially terminated, all but three
    elected to return.

        38. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what were the
    costs of this firing and rehiring?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
    has not conducted an internal audit to determine the costs attributed
    to these release and rehiring actions.

        39. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, what were the
    effects of this firing and rehiring on the NNSA's work and mission?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: NNSA
    continues to deliver on its critical national security missions without
    interruption.

        40. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell and Mr. Hoagland, with
    constrained resources and multiple programs facing delays, what
    criteria is the NNSA using to prioritize among competing modernization
    efforts?
        Mr. McConnell. and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: For
    stockpile modernization, NNSA executes the nuclear modernization
    Program of Record (PoR), as directed by the President and authorized
    and appropriated by Congress. Prioritization and sequencing of programs
    across the PoR is coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council, of
    which NNSA is a member.

        41. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, given the costs of deploying
    and maintaining a new nuclear cruise missile, should this program take
    precedence over investments in conventional capabilities like
    shipbuilding that could achieve similar deterrent effects?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
    Department of Defense.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about investment strategy
    to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management &
    Comptroller.
        General Bussiere. I defer to OSD for investment prioritization.
    AFGSC remains committed to ensuring the readiness and effectiveness of
    our Air Force's nuclear deterrent forces.

        42. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, has your office evaluated the
    operational effects that a new nuclear-armed cruise missile would have
    on the conventional mission?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
    Department of Defense.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about operational effects
    of fielding SLCM-N to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
        General Bussiere. The Air Force has operated nuclear-armed cruise
    missiles alongside conventional munitions for decades. AFGSC
    continuously evaluates the readiness of airmen to operate both nuclear
    and conventional munitions.

        43. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, how long could Minuteman III
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the current ground-based leg of
    the nuclear triad, stay operational?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
    Department of Defense.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about Minuteman III to
    Air Force Global Strike Command.
        General Bussiere. Modernizing the land-leg of the nuclear triad is
    critical to maintaining a credible and effective nuclear deterrent.
    AFGSC, in partnership with the AFNWC, will continue operating and
    sustaining the Minuteman III weapon system to ensure that it remains
    safe, secure, and effective until it is replaced by Sentinel.

        44. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, and General Bussiere, if the Air Force plans to
    extend Minuteman III to 2050, would the Air Force and lead contractor
    Northrop Grumman Corporation benefit from additional time to better
    plan and manage the Sentinel program?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
    Department of Defense.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about Minuteman III to
    Air Force Global Strike Command.
        General Bussiere. Additional delays will hinder the modernization
    of our capabilities and increase the risk of being unprepared for
    future threats. Furthermore, the issue of Diminishing Manufacturing
    Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) will continue to pose
    considerable challenges, which are expected to worsen as the Minuteman
    ages. AFGSC is actively collaborating with the Air Force Nuclear
    Weapons Center (AFNWC) to ensure the Sentinel program is brought online
    as soon as possible, while also maintaining the capabilities of the
    Minuteman III.

        45. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, President Trump and
    Vice President Vance repeatedly indicated support for denuclearization
    since taking office in January. Has the Administration or the
    Department of Defense made denuclearization a priority for your work?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have reaffirmed the
    importance of modernizing our nuclear triad. The decision to enter into
    arms control negotiations rests with the President. NNSA stands ready
    to support the negotiation and implementation of any such agreements
    through our unique technical capabilities, especially as related to
    monitoring and verification.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about nuclear strategy to
    the OUSD(P).
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    Risk reduction efforts and arms control can contribute to U.S. security
    by helping to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and inadvertent
    escalation. Any such agreements must enhance U.S. security, be
    stabilizing, and be verifiable. If the circumstances for arms control
    negotiations can meet these factors in support of U.S. interests, the
    Department stands ready to contribute to these efforts. As long as
    nuclear weapons exist, and until the security environment becomes
    conducive for disarmament, the Department will maintain a safe, secure,
    and effective deterrent.
        General Bussiere. The Administration has been clear about the
    importance of mitigating the risk of nuclear conflict, including by
    strengthening the U.S. deterrent. I defer to OSD to provide further
    details on prioritization.

        46. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, how is support for
    denuclearization reflected in the budget request?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have reaffirmed the
    importance of modernizing our nuclear triad. The decision to make
    reductions to the U.S. nuclear stockpile rests with the President.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about nuclear strategy to
    the OUSD(P).
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    Risk reduction efforts and arms control can contribute to U.S. security
    by helping to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and inadvertent
    escalation. Any such agreements must enhance U.S. security, be
    stabilizing, and be verifiable. As long as nuclear weapons exist, and
    until the security environment becomes conducive for disarmament, the
    Department will maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. The
    Department's budget request funds full scope modernization of U.S.
    nuclear forces and NC3 capabilities, as well as modernization of the
    defense industrial base and the Department of Energy's nuclear security
    enterprise, which are critical to our ability to sustain our legacy
    nuclear force and deliver a modern force in the coming decades.
        General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to answer this question.

        47. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, what steps are
    being taken by your office to move toward denuclearization?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have reaffirmed the
    importance of modernizing our nuclear triad. The decision to make
    reductions to the U.S. nuclear stockpile rests with the President.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about nuclear strategy to
    the OUSD(P).
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    Risk reduction efforts and arms control can contribute to U.S. security
    by helping to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and inadvertent
    escalation. Any such agreements must enhance U.S. security, be
    stabilizing, and be verifiable. As long as nuclear weapons exist, and
    until the security environment becomes conducive for disarmament, the
    Department will maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. We
    must continue to message to Russia and China that neither country will
    be safer in an unconstrained environment--a position we repeatedly hear
    from allies and partners in multilateral venues.
        General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to answer this question.

        48. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, Mr. Hoagland,
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann, and General Bussiere, there continue to
    be numerous unanswered questions pertaining to operational impacts of
    the SLCM-N, impacted U.S. military communities, and relationships with
    allies such as Australia. How will the SLCM-N affect the conventional
    mission of our attack submarines?
        Mr. McConnell, Admiral Houston, and Mr. Hoagland. On behalf of NNSA
    witnesses: As this is not in NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the
    Department of Defense.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about operational effects
    to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    In accordance with section 1640 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2024, as amended, the Department established
    the SLCM-N program in March 2024. As the program progresses to
    Milestone A, expected in fiscal year 2026, we will continue to actively
    evaluate the SLCM-N impacts to U.S. military communities, conventional
    missions, and allies.
        General Bussiere. I defer to Navy or OSD to discuss impacts SLCM-N
    could have on the conventional mission of attack submarines.

        49. Senator Warren. Mr. McConnell, Mr. Hoagland, and Mr. Jarrell,
    what will the potential infrastructure investment be to house these new
    missiles in communities that are currently not home to nuclear weapons?
        Mr. McConnell, Mr. Hoagland, and Mr. Jarrell. On behalf of NNSA and
    DOE-EM witnesses: As this is not in DOE-EM or NNSA's purview, DOE
    defers to the Department of Defense.

        50. Senator Warren. Admiral Houston, Vice Admiral Wolfe, Dr. Vann,
    and General Bussiere, how will this weapons system impact AUKUS
    [Australia, United Kingdom, United States]?
        Admiral Houston. On behalf of NNSA witnesses: As this is not in
    NNSA's purview, NNSA defers to the Department of Defense.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe. I defer any questions about AUKUS to the
    OUSD(P).
        Dr. Vann. Mr. Walter responded to questions on behalf of Dr. Vann.
    We continue to actively evaluate the SLCM-N impacts to U.S. military
    communities, conventional missions, and allies. We are committed to
    meeting congressional requirements for SLCM-N in a manner that is fully
    consistent with our obligations to our AUKUS partners.
        General Bussiere. I defer to OSD to discuss potential impacts.

                                     [all]