[Senate Hearing 119-75, Part 5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2296
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
APRIL 8, 2025
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 2296
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
APRIL 8, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-983 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa, Chairman
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED BUDD, North Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
TIM SHEEHY, Montana MARK KELLY, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_______
April 8, 2025
Page
United States Special Operations Command......................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Joni K. Ernst............................... 1
Statement of Senator Elissa Slotkin.............................. 2
Witness Statements
Jenkins, Colby C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 3
Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Fenton, General Bryan P., USA Commander, United States Special 4
Operations Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 38
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2025
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Joni Ernst
(Chairwoman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Ernst, Wicker, Budd,
Sheehy, Reed, Slotkin, Shaheen, Rosen, and Kelly.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI K. ERNST
Senator Ernst. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee meets today to review the posture of our Special
Operations Enterprise. Thank you to our witnesses for appearing
before the subcommittee today. I want to take a moment to
welcome Senator Slotkin as the Subcommittee's new Ranking
Member. I look forward to working closely together.
For the Members' information, today's hearing will begin in
open session, and then transition to a closed session in SVC-
217 in the Office of Senate Security, no later than 3:45 p.m.
For years, I have worked closely with our Special Operations
Forces (SOF) community to ensure they have the resources to
counter evolving threats. SOF is more than a counter-terrorism
force. They are indispensable in countering the malign
activities of the Chinese Communist Party, Russia, and their
authoritarian allies.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is operated under
stagnant budgets. The limitation of SOF and strength was a very
shortsighted decision at a time when SOF capabilities are
needed, more than ever. We must change course now. That is why
I intend to work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to
rebuild SOCOMs budget. Given SOF's critical role in national
security, this is a wise and cost-effective investment.
Additionally, we must update DOD policies and authorities
to leverage SOF capabilities fully. Irregular warfare has been
a core SOF mission since World War II, yet unnecessary
restrictions have hampered their flexibility. We need to
empower our combatant commanders to unleash SOF's full
potential. President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and our
witnesses today recognize the urgency of these threats and the
vital role SOF plays.
As Chair of this Subcommittee, I will prioritize these key
forces, which are essential for this era of great power
competition and for ensuring the security of the American
people. This is not just about defense and deterrence. It's
about ensuring the U.S. remains the preeminent global force. We
have no time to waste.
Now, I would like to recognize Senator Slotkin for her
opening comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELISSA SLOTKIN
Senator Slotkin. Thank you, Chairwoman Ernst. Important
hearing on readiness, but importantly, happy to be here with
you in our first official hearing on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee of the 119th, my first time Ranking
Member in the Senate, so, I'm happy to be here and I look
forward to maintaining a really strong, robust bipartisan
approach.
I think we want the same things, which is to make sure that
our Special Operations Forces have the resources, the
potential, the acquisition, everything you need to deal with a
world of really changing fast changing threats and challenges.
Welcome to our guests. We're happy to have you here. I think we
want to express our appreciation for everything you do every
day particularly in guiding the Special Operations Forces,
given that, as you were describing to us earlier, the
precipitous increase in the missions you are being asked to do.
I think that we are keenly aware of that.
Obviously, the gray zone challenges in places like China,
Russia, Iran, North Korea, and enabling the joint force, but I
think in particular, I think it's hard to have this
conversation without thinking about Taiwan and sort of the
scenarios we have going forward with Taiwan and the important
role you all will play. Space, cyber, information operations,
you all are at the forefront of a very changing world on
conflict. Conflict is just going to look different and continue
to look different than it was when many of us were starting
out.
We want you to have those resources and therefore I will
just flag, I'm very interested in what's going on right now and
the cuts that are potentially on the table at the Defense
Department. We've heard rumors of 80,000, 90,000 forces, for
instance, from the Army being cut. I don't think anyone is
against cutting actual fat on the bone, but being surgical and
smart about it and not cutting the very operators that we need
to perform this ever-expanding group of missions, you're being
asked to do.
So, with that Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I'd like to thank Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) Ranking Member, Senator Reed for
being here today. Senator Reed, do you have any opening
comments or thoughts?
Senator Reed. I just want to commend you Madam Chairman and
the Ranking Member. I have great confidence.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. We will go ahead and
proceed to your opening statements, and Mr. Jenkins, we will
start with you and then we will proceed to General Fenton. So,
gentlemen, you each have 5 minutes for your opening statements.
STATEMENT OF COLBY C. JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you. Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member
Slotkin, Chairman Wicker when he comes, Ranking Member Reed,
and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our
Nation's Special Operations Forces, or SOF. I'm honored to
testify alongside General Fenton. We are joined here today by
two extraordinary Americans, who I would like to take a moment
to recognize.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
and Director of the Special Operations Secretariat, Dr. Sandra
Hobson, seated behind me, as well as Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intense Conflict (SO/LIC) Senior
Enlisted Advisor, Command Master Chief Brad Rhinelander, also
seated behind me. These dedicated servant leaders bring
expertise and insights that have been invaluable as we advocate
within the Department of Defense, on behalf of our SOF
servicemembers and their families. As a combat veteran Green
Beret myself, the opportunity to work with these incredible
teammates and represent our SOF enterprise is profoundly
humbling and special.
Today's global security environment has become increasingly
complex, as artificial intelligence (AI) and other
technological advancements rapidly transform the character of
warfare, threats from State and non-State actors continue to
converge. Our global competitors actively seek to undermine the
United States and our allies. Terrorists and transnational
criminal networks continue to pose a serious threat to the
Homeland.
In these turbulent times, my office, the Office of Special
Operations, Low Intensity Conflict or SO/LIC, and the U.S.
Special Operations Command remain at the forefront of our
Nation's strategic priorities, representing less than 2 percent
of the defense budget. Our Special Operations Forces provide
unique and outsized effects, adding exceptional value to the
Nation. Tasked with the most challenging and dangerous
missions, SOF remain the world's most lethal, adaptable, and
capable force.
Our priorities for the SOF enterprise are squarely nested
within Secretary Hegseth's priorities for the joint force,
defend the Homeland, strengthen deterrence, and increase burden
sharing with U.S. allies and partners. Our elite warriors deter
our adversaries by creating strategic asymmetric advantages and
maintaining irregular warfare superiority.
Leveraging our close relationships with our foreign
partners in critical regions, SOF are uniquely positioned to
identify and counter our adversary's malign and coercive
activities. Whether in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, Western Hemisphere, or near our own southern
border, these low-cost, small-footprint efforts promote
stability, empower partners and allies, and lead efforts
against China, terrorists, drug traffickers, and other threats.
Even with the global increase in demand, our Special
Operations Forces face personnel cuts and resource constraints.
In fact, armed conflict and regional instability have driven a
200 percent increase in our crisis response mission over the
past 3 years. While at the same time, operational and logistics
costs for crisis response have increased 260 percent.
We must ensure SOFs readiness while balancing operational
demands and optimizing available resources. We must also
promote accountability through rigorous analytics and data-
driven decisionmaking. Congress wisely established civilian
oversight of Special Operations to ensure that SOF remains
strategically aligned, ethically grounded, and accountable. My
office provides policy direction, resource advocacy, and
oversight needed to ensure that SOFs initiatives and efforts
stay focused on war fighter needs and national objectives,
without mission creep or undue strain on the force.
This oversight is not bureaucratic. In fact, it is
essential to effective war fighting. Our Nation's security
depends on a strong, agile, modernized, and accountable SOF
enterprise. With your support, we will continue ensuring that
SOF is ready to deter, fight, and win anytime, anywhere. Thank
you again for the opportunity to testify. I invite you to visit
our SOF community around the globe, to meet our servicemembers
and their families, and to see firsthand the capabilities that
we bring in defense of the Nation. Your continued support is
critical. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. General Fenton, you
are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Fenton. Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member Slotkin,
distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, Chairman Wicker
when he comes, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
This month marks 38 years since the creation of Special
Operations Command. We are thankful for Congress's incredible
foresight in creating us and steadfast support ever since. I'm
joined today by Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter. Shane
exemplifies the unmatched caliber of our non-commissioned
officer corps. If you look at the hardest problems facing our
Nation in the darkest corners of this earth, you will find our
Special Operations non-commissioned officers solving them.
Our Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) exemplify the
precision, lethality of your Special Operations teams and
demonstrate our competitive and comparative advantage. They are
the reason we are envied by militaries around the globe. It's
the honor of a lifetime for Shane and me to represent the
uniform and civilian members of your Special Operations
Command, as well as our U.S. Interagency Partners and the
Global SOF Warriors from 28 nations who are stationed at our
SOCOM headquarters in Tampa.
I'm also honored today to testify alongside Secretary
Jenkins from Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) SO/LIC. We
rely on SO/LIC 's partnership, support, and advocacy to ensure
your Special Operations warriors and their families who serve
alongside them continue to thrive and win. We are in an era of
serious national security challenges. The border, communist
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist organizations
all pose significant threats in isolation.
However, we're increasingly seeing these threats converge
across the globe. Meanwhile, the changing character of war is
changing at a rate faster than we've ever seen. The innovation
cycle now turns in days and weeks, not months and years. Our
adversaries use $10,000 one-way drones that we shoot down with
$2 million missiles. That cost benefit curve is upside down.
To summarize, this is the most complex, asymmetric, and
hybrid threat security environment I've seen in 38 years of
service. Contending with these challenges demands more from
your Special Operations Forces that requires tough choices,
forcing tradeoffs as we strike to balance an increase in
operations readiness and the need for modernization.
Your elite SOCOM team provides an outsized return on any
investment. However, with only 3 percent of DODs forces and
less than 2 percent of DODs budget, we are now playing a zero-
sum game. Yet I'd submit your Special Operations Forces were
tailor made for this era, rapidly responding to crisis,
disrupting terrorist organizations, and asymmetrically
deterring our adversaries.
Employed expressly at the direction of the President and
Secretary of Defense, SOCOM's Crisis Response Mission is the
Nation's most lethal and surgical tool to eliminate threats to
the Homeland, rescue American citizens, protect our diplomats,
all at a moment's notice. In the past 3\1/2\ years, the
frequency of these Presidentially directed missions
significantly increased by 200 percent. Yet for this sacred
obligation, we'll accept no risk in today's crisis response
mission.
Some may think we're done fighting terror. I'd submit
terror is not done with us. SOCOM's mission to degrade
terrorist groups starts at our border, spans the globe. In
recent months, your Special Operations team eliminated over 500
terrorists who had the intent and capability to strike the
Homeland. Alongside our global Special Operations partners,
we've captured over 600. Aligned with the Department's
priorities, deterrence has long been a part of SOCOM's DNA.
We are America's irregular warfare experts. We deter war by
altering our adversaries' decision below the threshold of
conflict in the gray zone. We stand ready to prevail if
deterrence fails, as combatant commands seek to strengthen,
deterrence requests for SOCOM capabilities have increased by
more than 35 percent in the last 2 years alone. Against that
backdrop, we continue to grapple with years of flat budgets, a
14 percent decrease in buying power, significant personnel
reductions, and the requirement to evolve our technology and
authorities.
All this forces tradeoffs, tough choices that challenge
current missions and puts modernization at risk. Yet SOCOM
remains the world's premier Special Operations Force. I pledge
to always provide the Nation with the best Special Operations
capability for the fiscal and personnel resources we receive.
We will never compromise on standards and lethality. We are
grateful for this Subcommittee's work on novel approaches to
SOF funding and authorities.
I look forward to taking your questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement Mr. Colby C. Jenkins and
General Bryan P. Fenton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton, and we will start
now with the senators' questions. I'll start with 5 minutes of
questions and go on to the Ranking Member. If we have other
Members join, we will have them ask questions as well. If we
don't have other Members join, we will recess briefly and move
to the closed hearing. So, this may be a very speedy round but
I will go ahead and start.
General Fenton, so you mentioned the personnel reductions
in force, and since the announcement of SOF personnel cuts
under the previous Administration, I have been very firmly and
vocally opposed to that. The return on investment our Nation
gets from our Special Operations Forces is not only measurable,
it is absolutely unmatched. Despite those reductions, SOF
continues to do what it does best, it's adapting, innovating,
and overcoming.
General Fenton, can you speak to how SOF is adapting its
training pipelines to enable future operators to integrate high
tech capabilities like AI, cyber, and electronic warfare more
effectively?
General Fenton. Senator, I can. I would start by saying I
think you know you're your SOF very well, in terms of that we
innovate and I like to think we innovate for today and we
modernize for tomorrow. As we think about tomorrow, that's
certainly through the lens of the lessons learned that we're
watching vis-a-vis the events in Ukraine. I think it's more
important to not just observe those lessons, but as you laid
out, institutionalize them.
I think in the instance of institutionalization of those
lessons I would offer U.S. Army Special Operations, ARSOF, has
undergone two, what I think are pretty significant efforts
against this change of character of war. First, is they've
created a brand-new course, the remote Uncrewed Systems
Integration Course down at Fort Bragg, a course that is about a
6-week program of instruction, bringing together everything
from learning how to build the drone, fly drones, and then
certainly adapt them as we have seen on the battlefield.
The second thing they've done, I would characterize in
terms of institutionalizing, is they've created a brand-new
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or job title. That job
title is remote systems integrator, and they've created that
around the backdrop of a Special Forces warrant officer, a
Green Beret warrant officer, and after their training is
complete a multi-month program of instruction, they'll go back
to the Special Forces groups and start to really take that as a
master trainer and weave it into all group training.
You would see that across many of our components. But I
think, Senator, those are a couple of examples I'd want to give
you.
Senator Ernst. No, that's great, and I think many of us
recognize there's nothing more dangerous than a warrant
officer. So, appreciate that new MOS. So, let's talk a little
bit more about those cuts. A critical strength of SOF is their
ability to lead on emerging technologies and developing those
capabilities that kind of ripple across the broader force, and
it speaks directly to the indispensable role that they play in
today's complex threat environment.
So, any additional reductions that we might see in SOF
wouldn't just impact our SOF, they would degrade our ability to
project power around the globe. So, General Fenton, from an
operational perspective, how would further force reductions
impact SOF's ability to respond to emerging threats in regions
like Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Europe, and of course
the Middle East?
General Fenton. Well, Senator, I would offer right out the
gate that that would absolutely hurt. It would hurt fairly
significantly, especially against the backdrop of, I think over
the last 3, 3\1/2\ years, we've seen a 5,000-person teammate
reduction inside of SOCOM already. That's against the backdrop
of communications, logistics, intelligence, civil affairs, and
sci-ops, and of course operators. I think all those are the
type of capabilities that you see combatant commanders, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, asking for more and more to
the tune of about 35 percent. I think that would absolutely
impact that. We're already forced to make tough choices and
tradeoffs. Those would certainly make those would amplify those
tough choices and tradeoffs and really put us in a place where
I've mentioned earlier in the statement, we're already at a
zero-sum game.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, and just in the time that I have
remaining, can you please characterize the situation that
unfolds when we have SOF teams that are out on the ground as
force multipliers? One example that I'm thinking about this is
many years ago in Africa when we had Special Forces Operational
Detachment Alphas (ODAs) there, we were able to bring together
many different nations. Those nations had teams on the ground
as well, but they could not get along with the populations that
exist in some of those regions.
It took Americans and the leadership that these teams
brought into Africa to bring all of these nationalities
together into a collaborative force. Can you speak to how SOF
really can provide that leadership in small teams, small
numbers without a huge footprint and be able to bring different
nations together?
General Fenton. I can, Senator. Small teams, small
footprints, big impact, is the way I like to think about it. I
think that starts with the fact that in our DNA is partnering,
and SOF is known as a premier partner force. That's what we do
across the globe and maybe even today to the tune of about
7,000 folks in about 80 different countries. It's all about
beginning partnerships, and those partnerships then evolve into
trust.
Once you get trust, then we're able to do everything, build
partner capacity, develop some level of competency and
capability. I think it just goes on from there, and even do
exactly as you just described, bring folks together who
otherwise may not be together. I think at the end of the day,
amplify capability and capacity for any combatant commander or
for the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton. Ranking Member
Slotkin.
Senator Slotkin. Thank you. The Senator had very similar
questions to the ones I had about what are the tradeoffs of
these cuts, right? For me, it's hard to miss that Space Force
got excluded from having to take cuts. I'm happy for them,
that's a mission that's extremely important, but just would
hope that if there's someone who's picking and choosing
missions that are going to be cut versus protected, that I know
you're advocating, but that sort of, we realize that the units
that are in highest demand should not be taking the same
haircut as everybody else across the force. So, hope that
that's happening. Thank you for illustrating some of those
tradeoffs that you would have.
I do want to, you know, understand what missions you have
been tasked to do in recent months. I am, as someone who was a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and a Middle East
specialist and did three tours in Iraq, I am 100 percent with
you that just because you don't hear about threats in the news
every day doesn't mean that they're not still out there
plotting to kill Americans, attack the Homeland and do really
devastating things. We of course have nation states that are
causing all kinds of problems.
But I did see that the President designated Mexican
cartels, a number of named cartels, as foreign terrorist
organizations restricting in a positive way American citizens
from providing support, materiel, leadership in any way to
those organizations. Can you describe what, if any, guidance
you've been getting and giving on lethal force against cartels
on the southern border, given the buildup of about 10,000 U.S.
Forces down there?
General Fenton. Thank you. I can begin with that and then
we can talk the details. The designation of foreign terrorist
organization does not grant us any new authorities as a DOD
entity is. What it really does is it helps us unlock the doors
to whole-of-government approach. Our threat finance analysts
can now better provide their target packets to our counterparts
in the whole-of-government approach. But what we are doing now
is making sure that we provide options that we can be ready,
lethal, and prepared should the President need us to continue
to seal and protect the border.
To answer your question directly, it does not grant us any
new authorities to take direct action or so forth.
Senator Slotkin. So, you would need commander-in-chief
authority to go, for instance, and pursue drone attacks inside
Mexico against cartels? I'm just asking, Mr. Musk said publicly
that that foreign terrorist designation authorizes drone
strikes against Mexican cartels inside Mexico. I'm just trying
to understand fact from fiction here.
Do you believe you have that authority today? Understanding
the designation alone may not give it to you, do you believe
you have the authority today to cross over the Mexican border
and use drone strikes to go after cartels?
General Fenton. No, ma'am. The designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTO) does not grant us any new
authorities.
Senator Slotkin. But separate from the FTO designation, do
you, as the service secretary believe you have that? I'm just
trying to understand. I'm not----
General Fenton. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Slotkin. I have no problem with them being
designated. I have no problem going against them and their
financing, right, their materiel. But I think certainly as part
of this Committee, we want to understand use of lethal force in
a neighboring State.
So, is there in any way separate from FTO designation, do
you currently have the authority to shoot down, shoot at
Mexican cartels over the border right now?
General Fenton. No, ma'am. I do not.
Senator Slotkin. Okay. Thank you for clarifying, and then
you know, I think a lot of us on the Committee are very worried
about Taiwan and a potential problem with China over the next
few years. I'm the co-chair of the Taiwan caucus, so we think
about this a lot.
Can you give me your best assessment of, you know, what our
security assistance activities there, our training, maybe we
have to go into classified session, but would appreciate you
know, your role and deterrence understanding the role you're
playing in that issue.
General Fenton. Senator, we'll absolutely have to go into a
closed session to provide details. What I would offer is that,
in support of INDOPACOM, you would see your Special Operations
Forces doing many of the missions you described earlier.
Certainly, always being prepared for crisis response inside
that area of responsibility (AOR) through our theater, Special
Operations Command, Special Ops Command Pacific, that is a
sacred obligation.
I think you would also see us in a counter-terrorism way
making sure that any counter-terrorism (CT) threats, in this
case, ISIS East Asia, we're doing in a partnered way with
teammates in that region. Then I think you would see us
certainly in deterrence. The way we present ourselves is
placement and access. It builds relationships and partnerships
and capability and all that I think is very valuable to Sam
Paparo, and any Combatant Command (COCOM) commander because it
provides options and opportunities they wouldn't otherwise
have, and dilemmas and challenges to the adversary.
Senator Slotkin. Thank you. I yield back.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, and next we will go to Senator
Budd. Thank you.
Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Again, thank you all for
being here. General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins, thank you both for
testifying before the committee on SOF. I was grateful for the
opportunity to travel with Chairman Wicker last year to Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg and to talk
about the important work that SOF is doing not only in North
Carolina, but around the world.
General Fenton, how would you characterize the demand and
requirements for Special Operations Forces particularly in
crisis response, General Fenton?
General Fenton. Senator first, thanks for visiting our
forces and thanks for allowing us to be in the great State of
North Carolina.
Senator Budd. Our honor.
General Fenton. Appreciate all the hospitality there. I
know all our forces do. I would offer in my opening statement;
I laid out a couple.
I think in terms of crisis response, we have seen a pace
and a scale and duration that I frankly have not seen in my 20
to 30 years in the Special Operations community. It is called
on more. So, there's a requirement that's gone up by 200
percent in the last 3\1/2\ years. That's on or about 15
missions where we've been asked to get out very quickly and do
the type of missions that I mentioned, either recover
diplomats, protect an embassy at some point, maybe even recover
a U.S. citizen. I think I don't anticipate the world to get any
less volatile, and that looks like a pattern to me, and so, I
think that demand has certainly gone up.
In deterrence, the combatant commanders have asked for
Special Operations in the last 2 years at an increase of about
35 percent to do the type of missions that they're looking for
us to do. That could involve anything from partner-based
training to unilateral operations that would give them
additional opportunities and advantages, maybe an unfair
outsize advantage and give the adversaries a bunch of dilemmas
and challenges. So, I think I anticipate that going up.
Then I just mentioned earlier, terrorism is not done with
us, and I think we absolutely have to stay focused on the
threat that ISIS, al Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab pose and all three
of those missions are absolutely in SOF wheelhouse.
Senator Budd. General, talk a little bit about, you gave
some numbers, 35 percent increase in area, 200 percent in
another area. When you're called upon, how often do you have to
say no because of that increased demand and perhaps the lack of
readiness or rest or requirements that are needed?
General Fenton. Senator, I think that that question is at
the heart of something the Command Sergeant Major and I think
about every day, that's risk. I think in this case that risk is
a combination of operational risk: do we have the capability
and the capacity? Then for the first time, certainly in my
memory, fiscal constraint risk: can we actually do it?
I think that drives to the heart of I've had to say no in
some instances in deterrence, where I feel like I am taking
risk almost 41 times in the last year, to combatant commanders
that would want Special Forces operational detachments, so 12
Green Berets, folks who may want command and control nodes. I
could go on and on.
I can give you additional examples in closed session, but I
think it's certainly way too often, and my sense is that,
first, that is risk. We're not meeting the combatant command,
DURs demands in a special ops peculiar way. I'm also taking
risk in modernization, and in a sense, I feel like I'm saying
no to the SOCOM enterprise when we don't have the top line
increase and the budget needed to modernize not only
technology, but certainly our humans.
So, we think about education for an uncertain world, that's
modernization, and on top of that, certainly even our
authorities. So, I think I say no way too much. Then those two
categories to combatant commanders in deterrence, and frankly,
to where we need to be as a SOCOM enterprise to win tomorrow,
just like we've been winning today and in the past years.
Senator Budd. Thank you for that, and lots of other
questions, either for the record or the closed session.
Senator Budd. Mr. Jenkins, again, thank you for being here.
See if you're tracking this provision in the Senate Fiscal Year
2026 NDAA includes a provision requiring the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and the Commander of Special
Operations to ensure the annual defense planning guidance
includes specific guidance for requirements and employments
Special Operation Forces across the spectrum of conflict. Are
you tracking that, sir, and care to elaborate?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir. Yes, and thank you for that very
much. So, with our Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance,
we have three lines of effort, defend the Homeland, deter
China, and increased burden sharing. The only force that can
fill in or blend across all three lines of effort there is the
Special Operations Force.
In my service like capacity, I've been able to advocate and
make sure that as the defense planning guidance goes forward
and now gets underway in earnest, that my peers, my
counterparts, ensure that SOF is adequately and thoroughly
accounted for in all three lines of effort there, and not just
as an asterisk, that we play a major part.
Senator Budd. [Presiding.] Thank you both again. It appears
I'm out of time. Chairman Reed, you're recognized.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Gentlemen,
thank you for your service and your sacrifice and that of your
family. I endorse your tribute to the non-commissioned
officers, General Fenton.
General Fenton. Yes.
Senator Reed. I would be in Fort Leavenworth not the
military side, the other side without my NCO, so thank you.
General Fenton. I think we all would, Senator.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir. Mr. Jenkins, SO/LIC is a work in
progress, and I think we're making great progress. We want, as
we envision a service secretary like civilian overlooking those
Special Operations. I would note in the prepared partial
statement for today, it says, ``SO/LIC requires the requisite
tools, workforce, and resources to accelerate the
implementation of these priorities and enable Special
Operations to be the most effective disciplined and
strategically relevant force it can be.''
Could you tell us what additional tool, workforce, and
resources you need?
Mr. Jenkins. First, thank you and thank you to Congress for
having the vision and foresight to make sure that SO/LIC
exists, that we do have the tools that we do have right now.
I'd just like to point out, thanks to section 922 and
Congress's vision, you can see the physical manifestation back
here with Dr. Sandra Hobson, who's the first to sit in that
position, that 922 facilitated. So, we are underway in
establishing the service secretary side of Special Operations,
and that's thanks to Congress. So, we welcome your continued
engagement and reinforcement.
In terms of additional authorities or funding that we would
need, we certainly welcome that, your continued engagement. One
area that comes to mind, is in the realm of talent management.
We want to make sure that SOF officers and enlisted leaders,
that we have the ability as SOF enterprise leaders to advocate
for their advancement, just like our service counterparts would
for theirs as well. As a Green Beret, I come from the Army, but
I'm also a SOF officer, and so, we want to make sure that we
have that.
Then in terms of acquisition authorities we welcome
additional discussion on how we can have more agile, more
abundant acquisition authorities so that we can answer the need
of those quick problems that we encounter out on the
battlefield and be able to innovate and modernize and fund
those accordingly.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. General Fenton, from
your perspective, have you seen the benefits of this empowered
senior civilian like secretary?
General Fenton. Senator, absolutely. I think this will be
my third time at this table saying how critical it is, how much
we appreciate the work this Congress has done in that arena. I
think the first thing I offered you before, and maybe even
yesterday, and thank you for the office call, was that having
Secretary Jenkins at the Service Secretary table, along with
the Secretary of Defense representing Special Operations and
SOCOM issues, is critical.
I think about that on the service side of the SOCOM
organization. Also advocating for issues that support our
servicemembers, our civilians, and our family members, and
those run the gamut. Certainly, the human performance program,
preservation of the force and family, and many other items that
we have inside of our enterprise. I would also offer in terms
of thinking through modernization and certainly transformation.
So, I think there's a great deal that we've been able to
achieve together as a team of teams in the SOF enterprise.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, and after some
notable civilian casualty several years ago, the Department of
Defense set up the Civilian Harm Center of Excellence. In the
last year's prepared statement submitted, it pointed out that
these policies and procedures outlined by the Department
through the center assist with counter violent extremist
organizations efforts as they prevent the underlying dynamics
from creating more extremism.
I think in layman terms, it means if you're out there and
you're hurting a lot of civilians, the reaction is the enemy
gets more recruits, essentially. But I've heard public
indications that the Department is considering to rescind the
policy guidance and to eliminate the center of excellence. Mr.
Jenkins, what's your understanding of that?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, first, Senator, thank you for pointing
that out. We agree that the ability and requirement to mitigate
and limit civilian harm on the battlefield is paramount
responsibility for us. Second, it's the law. It's the law, and
so, we have to be respondent to that.
I can also say there have been no decisions made on what
the program may be called or the form that it will take. But
the requirement and the need to report back and make sure that
we are always mitigating civilian harm will always be present
no matter what it's called or how it looks, Senator.
Senator Reed. Again, let me add to the point. It's not only
the law and the sense of humanity, it's also a very practical
situation because by antagonizing the population, you'll lose
ground.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Once you lose it, you don't gain it. Just
General, final question. Can you say if SOCOM has received
adequate support from the center and that it's been an asset to
your operations?
General Fenton. Senator, I'm not--from the center?
Senator Reed. From the center.
General Fenton. Senator, I think certainly. As we've
thought through it, I go back to Secretary Jenkins piece, we
absolutely, as your SOCOM team always aim to do the mission,
especially in the kinetic ops that you're referring to, and
then protect non-combatants and civilians as part of who we are
and what we stand for. I think to your point, that sends a very
powerful message across the globe that we're there to eliminate
or disrupt a bad actor, yet at the same time protect innocence
and vulnerable and non-combatants. That's a very different
signal from a nation. That's what your SOCOM team works to do
everyday.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, thank
you.
Senator Ernst. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ranking Member.
We'll recognize now Senator Kelly for 5 minutes of questions.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Fenton, in
your opening statement, you highlighted your flat budget since
2019, which appears to be a 14 percent decrease in purchasing
power, and SOCOM has also faced some significant personnel cuts
over the past years. Is it fair to say right now that the
demand for Special Operations Forces continues to increase? Is
that a fair observation?
General Fenton. Senator, that's absolutely a fair
characterization, as I've laid out in the opening statement.
Senator Kelly. With this flat budget then, where have you
assumed any additional risk because of budgetary and personnel
constraints?
General Fenton. Senator, I'd actually offer two places. In
the operational arena, we've assumed risk in deterrence, as I
mentioned in the opening statement, I'll assume no risk in
crisis response today. That is a sacred obligation, and as we
go across the spectrum in deterrence, as I've laid out, there
have been instances where I've had to say no to combatant
commander requirements because of operational risk and fiscal
constraints in a way I haven't seen before.
So, first in operations deterrence. Second is in
modernization. Working to have the SOCOM team and at times
tying it to the joint force, for sure. Be able to win in the
future environment like we have won for years and years and
years in an increasingly contested and congested environment.
We're taking risks there. The inability to get after the things
I think that are asymmetric, that are part of the changing
character of war, do it at speed.
You could add anything, uncrewed artificial intelligence,
additive manufacturing, autonomy, all that. I think we're
accruing high risk because we at SOCOM are not able to get
after that based on a flat top line on 5 years, $1 billion in
lost buying power that is reflective of that 14 percent lost
buying power.
Senator Kelly. Would it be fair for me to say then that a
risk in deterrence because if you're not deterring our
adversaries, there's a higher chance you're going to have to
put some of your troops in harm's way that the risk to your
forces, personally risk to them being injured or killed in
combat, that that has gone up.
I think it's probably fair to say the same thing on the
modernization side of this. If you don't have the equipment you
need and you're facing a more challenging adversary, that
that's possibly putting folks at risk as well?
General Fenton. Senator, I'll take it from the
modernization piece first. I think first and foremost, the risk
is not winning, not being able to complete the mission in the
future environment. Again, against the backdrop of what we're
seeing in Ukraine with the changing character of war that has,
I call it a version of symmetry and asymmetry.
Symmetry, being all the things--and certainly the Russian
Federation had, that any nation needs to go to war tanks, and
missiles, and airplanes, and helicopters. Then asymmetry, where
Ukraine did not have that, and has imposed costs on the Russian
Federation through all things that we're observing,
institutionalizing, and operationalizing. I think we're taking
risks there and that risk is about winning.
It certainly has a force protection component to it,
because if you're unable to get through the contested and
congested battle space of integrated air missile defense, radio
frequency spectrums, knocking your things down, electronic
warfare, there is a force protection component for sure to
that. I look at both, but I think it's both of those and
modernization.
In deterrence, I think it's more about aggregated risk, us
not being able to fulfill the parts of a campaign plan or a no
plan that the combatant commanders absolutely would rely on.
That probably at some point has aggregated risk for his end
states and certainly their operations.
Senator Kelly. Right. Thank you, General, and Mr. Jenkins,
on China Gray Zone operations, they execute this all the time
as an instrument of national power and in their effort to
supplant us as the world's preeminent superpower. So, what
adjustments, just quickly in statute or fiscal authorities,
would you need to better compete and deter the People's
Republic of China (PRC)?
Mr. Jenkins. In terms of authorities, we are working
sufficiently and efficiently with what we have right now. It
comes down to what, what the general outlined in terms of
resources. We clearly recognize that deterring China is not
just in the South China Sea of the first island chain. It's
everywhere, and in the closed session, we'll be able to give
you some good vignettes on where we are going head-to-head to
deter in the irregular warfare arena to make sure that we not
only meet China where they are, but where they want to be,
where they, where they're trying to be.
So, in terms of authorities, we're moving out and executing
on what we have, but we're always looking to evolve with them
as well.
Senator Kelly. If you identify something----
Mr. Jenkins. We will.
Senator Kelly.--please, come to us with that. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Kelly, and now I
recognize SASC Chairman, Senator Wicker.
Chairman Wicker. Well, thank you Madam Chair, and thank you
Senator Kelly as you leave because I'm going to followup on the
very important lines of questioning that you pursued. I was
planning on asking about what extra things your command has
been required to do for less buying power.
But let's talk about the gray zone and followup if we can
on that. Do you find that there's not enough coordination in
the irregular warfare field and would you recommend any changes
in the way our defense department is organized with regard to
no one having a particular domain over that particular issue
and coordinating it across the various commands?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you for pointing that out.
Certainly, over the last 20 years plus, we've seen our counter-
terrorism muscle be exercised tremendously and our irregular
warfare muscle, not so much. But nowadays, we are certainly
exercising that muscle and meeting and deterring, as the
Senator alluded, China, where they are and where they're trying
to be. SO/LIC itself----
Chairman Wicker. Tell us and those listening what sort of
things, specifically some examples of what the Chinese are
doing?
Mr. Jenkins. Well, Senator, certainly we can get into more
details in the closed session, but it's safe to say, areas
where you would not think China is, they are. They're trying to
be there, not only in the South China Sea, the first Island
chain, but in the Southern Hemisphere.
We have specific examples that we can point to, to show
where we have met, deterred, and even ejected their influence
from certain areas, and so, it's incumbent upon us to not only
just be counter-terrorist experts, but also irregular warfare
specialists.
Chairman Wicker. You can talk about the economic warfare in
this hearing, can you not?
Mr. Jenkins. For sure, yes, sir, and that's as you alluded
to. In China, it's a whole-of-government approach when it comes
to economic warfare. General Fenton's actually starting a new
program to bring that together to harness not only attention
amongst our economic machines here in the United States, but to
show them where they could draw their power to help our Nation
as well.
Chairman Wicker. So, are we organized sufficiently in this
area, or should one office, one person be in charge of
coordinating this for either of you?
Mr. Jenkins. In the irregular warfare arena?
Chairman Wicker. Yes.
Mr. Jenkins. We are sufficiently organized within SO/LIC.
We have a department, we have a team, an actual DASD (Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense), that has irregular warfare
within, its charter that it's responsible for and leads through
the Department in terms of helping combatant commands draw
campaign plans that involve irregular warfare and educating
throughout the joint force in terms of its irregular warfare is
not just a SOF opportunity. It's a whole of Department of
Defense opportunity.
General Fenton. Senator, I would add.
Chairman Wicker. Sure, General Fenton.
General Fenton. I think for now, sufficiently organized,
you know, as we talk and work through this, it's through
Secretary Jenkins on their policy side. I think for SOCOM, it's
unequivocal that we do irregular warfare and our components in
our operational elements know it. They go back to the SOCOM
headquarters or geographic combatant commanders.
What I would offer is, I think it's always worth relooking
because of the pace of the world and the way the world's
changing and all type of levels. I talk about modernizing
authorities, and I think it's always good to keep an eye on
things so we're not complacent, or even as we think about
technology, how fast it's moved. My sense is there's certainly
a need to re-look authorities to make sure that they have not
stayed stagnant or they have moved as fast as we need them.
Chairman Wicker. Okay, well, I might want to have a
conversation, an ongoing conversation with you General and for
as long as I can, Mr. Jenkins, about how we could perhaps make
the coordination better in this area. We're intruding on the
time, Madam Chair, but let me just say.
There's been a 35 percent increase from the COCOMs for your
capabilities in the last 3 years. Is that right, General?
General Fenton. That's correct, Senator.
Chairman Wicker. One hundred and seventy percent increase
in SOCOM crisis response missions. Including, but not limited
to hostage rescues?
General Fenton. Yes, sir. In fact, we just updated the
numbers after we got chance to see you. I think today I
reported 200 percent in 3\1/2\ years.
Chairman Wicker. So, instead of 170 percent. Then manpower
cuts of nearly 5,000 personnel in recent years. How did those
come about?
General Fenton. Well, Senator a couple things. I think
through the lens of the defense planning scenario and the work
that the service has to do along with the Department, against
any potential scenario, and I'll leave at that because we could
talk more in a classified session. My sense is that services
took a look at the lens that they were given through those
scenarios and came away with, we don't need X number of SOF.
Over time, my sense is that that continued surely to gain
traction in the Department. As a result, I think you're very
aware of a point last year where Secretary of Defense Austin
made a decision to reduce SOF by 3,000 people.
Chairman Wicker. Well, have these crisis response requests
gone unanswered?
General Fenton. Senator, that----
Chairman Wicker. With everything you're facing with the
lack of funding and the lack of purchasing power and cuts of
5,000?
General Fenton. As I said in my opening statement, crisis
response is the one place that I'm taking no risk. So, we put
everything we have against the crisis response today because
our sense is that is a sacred obligation. Presidentially
directed, SECDEF directed, we cannot fail.
Chairman Wicker. So, the other things that you might put
behind those crisis response things might be, for example?
General Fenton. Senator, I feel like we're absolutely
taking risks in two places, modernization, and deterrence.
Deterrence would be that mission that we are taking risk in and
we're taking risk because in my sense, we are unable to answer
the combatant commander's requirements to the level that they
have requested and certainly need. When I look at that, that is
risk to them and certainly risk to your SOF forces and that
we're bringing the value that we could be bringing to the
combatant commands, in preventing great power conflict and
certainly preparing for it.
Chairman Wicker. One other thing, Madam Chair. I just hope
the General understands the Committee's position on both sides
of the dais, that we need to hear fully from you on your
unfunded requirements. Tell us what you need, be honest about
it, and we'll try to get it for you. But we have found that
some places within our defense establishment, they're reluctant
to actually be honest with us about all the requirements that
remain unfunded.
Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Chairman.
General Fenton. You got my commitment to that Senator.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton. Next, I will
recognize Senator Shaheen 5 minutes. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair. So, Mr. Jenkins,
you talked about feeling confident about our irregular warfare
capacity. Where do you put information operations that
irregular warfare?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you for pointing that out, because
irregular warfare is just like, when you think about a kinetic
strike, there are regular warfare strikes that are just as
potent or valuable or important and need to be timed
accordingly. So, the coordination for information operations
actually resides within SO/LIC, within my organization.
So, we have the unique opportunity to coordinate across the
combatant commands, not only within DOD, but also with our
sister agencies, with the Agency, with Department of State, and
so those information operation plans are coordinated. So, that
messages are comprehensive and complimentary was the word I was
trying to think of instead of getting each other off track and
timed accordingly. So, it's very important.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I understand that you have the
ability to coordinate. I'm concerned. General Fenton, you
talked about the 3000 person cuts to SOF, and my understanding
is that many of those were enablers for the military
information support operations (MISO). Is that correct?
General Fenton. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. I am concerned about our ability to
compete in those information operations. We had a hearing in
the Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of the year
where our China experts said that China is spending $1.1
billion a year on information operations, disinformation
misinformation. Right now, we've completely dismantled our
humanitarian and foreign aid presence in the regions where
China has a foothold. We don't have anybody in charge of
information operations across as far as I can tell--now, maybe
we do, and I just don't know about it--across defense, State,
and the Administration and the President just fired General
Haugh, the head of Cyber Command.
So, help me understand how we're able to compete in the
information arena when we don't have anybody in charge, and
when we've lost a lot of our people who are doing that work.
General Fenton. Yes, ma'am. In terms of that, who's
actually in charge and in coordination for the Department of
Defense, that would fall by default to my organization, because
I support the Under Secretary of Defense for policy, who is the
principal information operation advisor to the SECDEF.
So, we do have a coordination body and ability to do that.
I have a full-time team that that's organizing and actively
engaging with the combatant commands in terms of funding, also
in messaging. Then they work outwardly with our State and
agency partners so that if one agency is going to employ a
message or an information operation, it's adequately
coordinated with the other so that we don't have fracture side.
Senator Shaheen. So, if China's spending over a billion
dollars a year on their messaging strategy, how much are we
spending in the Department of Defense on our messaging
strategy?
General Fenton. Ma'am, I'd have to get back to you with
that specific number. But what we are doing is we're trying to
make sure that we are good stewards----
Senator Shaheen. Is it fair to say we're not spending a
billion dollars a year?
General Fenton. Correct. Yes, ma'am. That is fair.
Senator Shaheen. Significantly less?
General Fenton. Significantly less. We are trying to be
smart with every penny for sure, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. But it's not likely that we're able to
match the operations that China's doing, despite our intention
and the fact that we think we can do it better, because we
don't have the infrastructure to do that. We've dismantled our
global engagement center at the Department of State. We're
dismantling Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, all of the media
that we've relied on really since the cold war to get messaging
across to accurately reflect the position of the United States
against our adversaries.
So, again, I would ask you, General Fenton, do you think
you have--should we be doing more to resource those information
operations?
General Fenton. Well, Senator, you and I have talked about
this for----
Senator Shaheen. We have.
General Fenton.--quite some time. My sense, I'll start with
information operations are absolutely critical. You know,
there's a sense of you may not win a war with information
operations like you could with artillery. You can certainly
lose it if you're not a key part of that and putting out the
messages. I would offer, I think as a United States of America,
we've got a great message to tell. My sense is that there is a
void. You mentioned misinformation, disinformation by any
adversary. There's a void out there that's not being filled by
our message.
I think we take it certainly in Special Operations Command
with our information officer professionals to really work at
that in concert with our more often not our country teams, our
embassy country teams, to put those messages out that assure
populations or reassure and also at points in time, deter
adversaries. That is also part of the information operations
space. So, thank you for the opportunity to comment.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Senator Shaheen. We'll move
to Senator Rosen.
Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking
Member Slotkin for holding this hearing. It's very important.
I'd also like to thank General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins for
testifying today and for your service--excuse me, I'm going to
scoot in a little bit here--service to our Nation.
I want to talk about Special Operations Forces in Syria
because the United States and Syrian Democratic Forces, the
SDF, they share an interest in preventing an Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurgence in northeastern Syria. Any
escalation in the region, which is Turkish backed Syrian
National Army and the central government in Damascus engaged
military with the SDF would lead to instability that we know
ISIS could exploit.
That is extremely concerning, as is the possibility that
such instability combined with destabilizing efforts from Iran
and its proxies could cause SDF personnel guarding ISIS prisons
and displaced persons camps to leave their posts in order to
defend their territory. This would open the door to the
possible escape of captured ISIS fighters and their families,
as we saw that just play out in 2019.
So, General Fenton, given our SOF partnership with the SDF
and the Defeat ISIS campaign, including security training and
assistance, what are SOF and the SDF doing to prevent breakouts
from SDF run prisons and displaced persons camps to ensure that
captured ISIS fighters and their families do not return to the
battle space?
I know this is a question that geographically pertains to
CENTCOM, but our troops performing these counter-terrorism
mission missions are Special Operation Forces.
General Fenton. Senator, I think the very first thing we do
is partner with our SDF partners, it's almost a decade now. I
can get back and certainly provide written on the record how
long we've done it, but I think it's about a decade, is
disrupt, degrade and work to defeat ISIS in Syria. It's a
threat certainly in the United States as we've laid out before.
Many of the committees have come before you have talked about
it.
But I think the first thing we do is disrupt and degrade
ISIS along with SDF counterparts, that certainly vectors into
protecting the prisons and the camps. I think that, you know,
if you look at it that's keeping improvised explosive ISIS
bombers from attacking those, creating a level of or
opportunities for breakout, that is taking action in places
that may not be close to the camps, but we know have planning
going on in the camp.
So, I think there's many things your ARSOF team is doing
along with our SDF partners to first and foremost, and that is
the mission, disrupt and degrade and diminish ISIS, spur the
CENTCOM and SECDEF direction, and also protect those camps from
a breakout and a prison as well.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I'm going to direct this question
to both of you staying on the same topic, because how does a
continued elimination of ISIS leadership and which SOF you have
accomplished time and time again, impact ISIS's ability to plan
and carry out attacks on United States Forces and SDF front
prisons and displaced persons camps? What are we doing more
specifically to degrade Iranian aligned militias from attacking
or attempting to attack United States and coalition forces?
Mr. Jenkins, we can start with you and go on to the General
please.
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, ma'am. We see all those problems
clear-eyed for sure, and thank you for sharing that concern
with us. As General Fenton alluded to, looking at what SOF can
control what we can do in this space. We take that very
seriously. We are at the leading edge to make sure that our SDF
partners can maintain control of those prisons, that they can
repatriate where appropriate and when possible, so that we can
decrease the population of potential breakout and under
difficult situations.
Then in terms of decreasing malign influence, we have to
make sure that, similar to China, that we are deterring
wherever possible, whether it's at the level of armed conflict
or below with irregular warfare. We have the ability and lots
of tools across the spectrum to make sure that we are deterring
them from being in the battle space where they want to be, and
where they're trying to be.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. General Fenton, anything to add?
General Fenton. Senator, I would offer on the ISIS piece I
think is very important, as you've alluded to, to keep the
pressure on ISIS by degrading their leadership the operational
experience, personnel, the communicators, financiers, all of
these things come together for attacks, not only in the Middle
East against our forces, and that is force protection as we
take it, but also in Europe and against our Homeland.
ISIS is an ex-op's threat. So, I think that is the multiple
responsibility for your Special Operations teammates, not only
ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda, but getting after these layers
is really important to keep any of those terrorist groups from
being able to plan and execute an attack on the Homeland.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I'll yield back, but I'm going to
actually ask a question for the record about the Houthis
relations with Al-Shabaab. So, I'm glad you brought that up
because it's critically important we discuss that as well.
Thank you.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Rosen, and at this time,
we will recess for about 7 minutes, which will give us time to
move over to the SVC-217, and we will go into a closed hearing
at that point. So, I call a recess.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
special operations command and supplements
1. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, it also surprised me that the
Special Operations Community does not currently provide supplements
that average Americans are allowed to utilize for optimal athletic
performance such as creatine. Do you support special operators having
access to these supplements, not on their own dime, to optimize
performance?
General Fenton. USSOCOM supports the use of appropriated funds for
the provision of third-party certified dietary supplements, in
accordance with Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6130.06, Use
of Dietary Supplements in the DOD, such as creatine to enhance optimal
performance and operational readiness of special operators, while also
ensuring the safe use of any dietary supplement. We look forward to
Congress' support in this effort.
2. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, can you commit to working with
Congress to address this issue and get our special operators the
supplements and hormone therapies they deserve after sending them into
some of the most demanding and dangerous environments in the world?
General Fenton. Yes, USSOCOM is committed to collaborating with
Congress, the Department of Defense, academia, and industry to address
the need for evidence-based dietary supplementation and FDA-approved
hormone therapy solutions that support the unique physical and
psychological demands placed on our special operators.
operator syndrome
3. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, there are widespread impacts of
``operator syndrome''--the syndrome associated with low testosterone
and other imbalances resulting from years of operating under chronic
stress. Do you believe the Special Operations community should call for
regular blood testing to identify hormonal imbalances associated with
``operator syndrome''?
General Fenton. USSOCOM medical providers adhere to current
clinical guidelines on hormonal imbalances and ensure that Special
Operators who are experiencing symptoms, which may be related to low
testosterone or other hormonal imbalances, receive a comprehensive
work-up, including blood testing of hormone levels and appropriate
treatment. USSOCOM partners with medical specialists at military
medical treatment facilities and within the provider networks,
including endocrinologists, urologists, and sports medicine physicians
to ensure optimal care.
USSOCOM would support a longitudinal study of hormone levels in
Special Operators, which could inform future guidelines on testing and
supplementation. Normal testosterone levels vary widely, and current
medical literature provides a broad reference range. Research that
specifically targets the SOF population would be extremely helpful to
determine if and how their ``normal'' hormone levels differ from the
general population, and how those differences correlate with
performance optimization and health improvement.
4. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, do you believe our policies
should reflect a desire to get as many operators access to hormone
treatment as possible--acknowledging that their needs may be more
aggressive than the average citizen?
General Fenton. Our policies are currently designed to ensure that
every operator who is experiencing symptoms due to hormonal imbalances
receives a comprehensive evaluation with the appropriate specialists,
and when indicated, treatment to correct irregularities. USSOCOM's
medical and Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) human
performance teams--which include medical providers and SOF medics,
licensed nutritionists, physical therapists, strength and conditioning
specialists, athletic trainers, mental health providers, and cognitive
performance specialists--are trained to recognize potential symptoms of
hormone imbalance and communicate their concerns to SOF patients and
clients.
While Special Operations personnel face unique operational demands
and potentially higher stress levels contributing to hormonal
imbalances, treatment decisions prioritize individual medical needs and
established clinical guidelines for hormone replacement therapy. In
addition to hormone replacement therapy when appropriate, our medical
providers rely on non-pharmacological interventions including stress
management, sleep optimization, exercise, and nutritional counseling.
preservation of the force and family
5. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations
Command] has a program called Preservation of the Force and Family
[POTFF] that is specifically designed to enhance human performance. Yet
out of the approximately $80 million allocated for that program, none
is allocated to address these hormone or supplement performance and
optimization issues. Will you commit to seeing if any of that money can
be re-allocated to address this appropriately?
General Fenton. USSOCOM lacks the statutory authority to procure
quality dietary supplements and sports foods using Major Force Program
11 funding. If granted new authorities to procure dietary supplements
and sports food items for SOF servicemembers, USSOCOM will work with
ASD SO/LIC and DHA on policy and budgetary requirements associated with
any changes to authorities to ensure the health and mission
effectiveness of SOF, without degrading the other key POTFF services
for SOF warfighters. Currently, the POTFF program budget does include
contracted service support of Performance Dietitians to advise SOF
Commands on hormone and supplements issues.
__________
Senator Joni Ernst
ubiquitous technical surveillance
6. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, as you are aware of the threat of
Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance [UTS], from your standpoint, are we
executing a coordinated strategy to deal with such a threat? In your
opinion, who owns or should own that strategy? What measures will you
implement to conduct thorough digital risk assessments aimed at
identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities exploited through UTS?
General Fenton. Yes. In the 2024 National Counterintelligence
Strategy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence through
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) identified
the growing threat of cutting-edge technologies, such as technical
surveillance equipment being employed by foreign intelligence entities,
and goals for the intelligence community to mitigate.
The NCSC's charter as the Nation's premier source for
counterintelligence and security expertise leads the development of a
whole of government strategy to address the challenges of UTS.
The USSOCOM Director of Intelligence (J2), in accordance with the
2024 National Counterintelligence Strategy guidance, as the office of
primary responsibility for the UTS problem set in close collaboration
with the Director of Operations (J3), and intelligence community
partners to effectuate the NCSC strategy, has developed procedures to
assess the counterintelligence risks to include UTS of on-going
operational activities, specifically leveraging sensitive intelligence
reporting to identify adversary capabilities to exploit UTS threat
vectors, and develop mitigation techniques to secure those operations,
activities, and investments. USSOCOM has identified an enterprise gap
in countering the long-term threats posed by UTS and the J2 is
sponsoring a capability development requirement to centralize and
synchronize counter UTS efforts across the enterprise to gain
efficiencies within the current fiscal constraints.
7. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, the recently published SOF
[Special Operations Forces] Imperatives 2025 document highlighted the
threat the digital surveillance economy or UTS poses to SOF. The
digital surveillance economy collects, resells, and resolves our
commercial transactions and digital habits is an unavoidable part of
today's operating environment. The digital signatures and patterns of
life of our SOF operators, their communities, and partners risk being
exploited by our adversaries. What requirements, policies and programs
does SOCOM and its subordinate commands have in place to manage this
UTS risk?
General Fenton. USSOCOM established an Identity Management Program
of Record in 2014 with the Director of Operations, J3, as the Office of
Primary Responsibility. This program provides identity assessment and
threat mitigation capabilities by incorporating people, technology, and
tools to: assist with the protection of SOF members, their families,
and our organizations; coordinate identity management standards and
procedures; and provide training to enable and empower USSOCOM
personnel to protect their identities. In doing so, USSOCOM strengthens
its resilience against UTS threat vectors and ensures viable options--
especially in the case of sensitive activities. The USSOCOM Identity
Management Program adheres to three key tenets: (1) Train: Train and
Educate the force to protect identity data; (2) Govern: Provide policy
and governance to the SOF Enterprise, and (3) Employ: Deliberate and
judicious application of capability to execute the program's vision.
USSOCOM incorporates these key tenets of Identity Management into a
larger strategy that supports, enables, and protects SOF before,
during, and after the conduct of global special operations and
activities. Additionally, USSOCOM disaggregates its Identity Management
Program by providing trained Identity Management Technicians to
subordinate Commands. Identity Management Technicians are then able to
conduct tailored identity management activities for individual
personnel, organizations, and assets that are unique to assigned
missions and acceptable risk. Furthermore, the J3 coordinates closely
with the J2, Director of Intelligence to deconflict and share training
opportunities on protecting identities against the threat of UTS.
Looking to the future, USSOCOM is seeking opportunities to partner
closer with the Services. Identity management programs at the Service
level will be mutually beneficial to educate and protect the General
Purpose Force and potentially mitigate digital dust prior to a
servicemembers ascension into the SOF community.
__________
Senator Elizabeth Warren
civilian harm
8. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, do you agree
that one difference between the United States and its potential
adversaries is the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on
protecting human life and liberty at home and abroad?
Mr. Jenkins. The Department of Defense has a strong history of
compliance with the law of armed conflict, and our commanders strive to
minimize harm to civilians
General Fenton. USSOCOM, like the Department of Defense, values all
human life, be it a combatant or non-combatant, and is committed to
mitigating and responding to civilian harm for legal, moral,
operational, and strategic reasons, including to improve the
capabilities and effectiveness of our SOF, while recognizing the
protection of civilians during military operations. This is not only a
top priority for USSOCOM, but a moral obligation for all our SOF
members currently operating around the globe.
9. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what is your
understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian
Protection Center of Excellence?
Mr. Jenkins. I am aware of the statute, which requires DOD to
operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence as a focal point
for matters relating to civilian harm, spells out its purpose and use,
and requires the issuance of an annual report.
General Fenton. Title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 184 mandated the Secretary of
Defense to operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP
CoE) with the purpose of institutionalizing and advancing knowledge,
practices, and tools for preventing, mitigating, and responding to
civilian harm. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.17 designated the
Army as the joint proponent for Civilian Harm Mitigation Response
(CHMR) and directs the Army to establish the CP CoE.
10. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, the U.S.
military has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent
and mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including
through the development of the DOD [Department of Defense] Instruction
on Civilian Harm under the first Trump administration. These efforts
received bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition
from the U.S. military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. What do
you understand to be the importance of preventing and responding to
civilian harm for successful special operations, including in areas
outside of active hostilities or in support of allies and partners?
Mr. Jenkins. I believe it is both morally right and in the U.S.
national interest to reduce civilian harm caused by military
operations. The Department will continue to address the challenges of
civilian presence on the battlefield in a way that enhances our
effectiveness and does not constrain our commanders or diminish our
lethality.
General Fenton. USSOCOM values demand the safeguarding of non-
combatants during SOF operations. Failure to prioritize this undermines
our legitimacy, erodes public trust, and fuels adversary propaganda.
Civilian Harm Mitigation is vital for maintaining local support,
strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries opportunities to
exploit civilian casualties. Mitigating and appropriately responding to
civilian harm underscores both our values and the precision of our
capabilities. Furthermore, it sets a critical example for our partners
and allies to emulate.
11. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what value can
advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response
provide to commanders?
Mr. Jenkins. Advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation
and response support our commanders by analyzing planned operations,
identifying potential risks to civilians, and recommend adjustments to
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to minimize harm.
General Fenton. In the past, CHMR advisors assisted Commanders and
their staffs in mitigating civilian harm without compromising
lethality. Their expertise enhanced precision, preserving legitimacy
and enabling mission success. They proactively shaped strategies,
providing foresight into the civilian environment and potential second
and third-order effects of operations. This strengthens partnerships,
safeguards our forces, and informs decisionmaking. Early staff
integration during Shape and Deter planning is key to mitigating harm
and preparing appropriate responses to potential incidents.
12. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how has Special
Operations benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence?
Mr. Jenkins. The Civilian Protection Center of Excellence has
provided support to Special Operations in preparation for, during, and
following military operations by enhancing operational effectiveness,
increasing battlefield awareness, and minimizing harm caused to
civilians.
General Fenton. The CP CoE served as hub and facilitator of
Department-wide analysis and expertise related to civilian harm
mitigation and response, aiding the operationalization of CHMR concepts
through guidance, force development, training and education.
13. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how has Special
Operations supported and implemented the Civilian Harm Mitigation
Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
Mr. Jenkins. SO/LIC and numerous other DOD components, including
the Combatant Commands, contributed to the design of the CHMR-AP and
worked with others across the force to implement it. We continue to
support CHMR efforts being applied in a way that enhances our military
effectiveness and does not constrain commanders or diminish our
lethality.
General Fenton. USSOCOM has made significant progress on its
assigned CHMR actions, reaching an estimated 52 percent completion
rate. However, further progress is contingent upon the CP CoE and
higher echelons completing their tasks. USSOCOM and its Subordinate
Components are actively working with supported Geographic Combatant
Commands to ensure the effective integration of SOF capabilities and
protection of civilians and non-combatants during operations and
exercises involving SOF.
14. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what have been
the benefits for Special Operations in supporting and implementing the
Civilian Harm Mitigation Response and Action Plan?
Mr. Jenkins. Advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation
and response support our commanders by analyzing planned operations,
identifying potential risks to civilians, and recommend adjustments to
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to minimize harm.
General Fenton. This increased transparency fosters trust with
local populations and strengthens the legitimacy of our operations.
Proactive mitigation is enhanced through a collaborative effort across
the DOD, Combat Supported Agencies (CSA), and NGO's to accurately
depict the civilian environment through rigorous data analysis, and
adherence to policies that mitigate civilian harm.
15. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, do you believe
that our troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of
civilian deaths from U.S. military operations or U.S.-led military
operations increases?
Mr. Jenkins. American security rests on the ability and will to use
lawful and appropriate military power. This is a simple fact in a
dangerous world. At the same time the Department of Defense has a
strong history of compliance with the law of armed conflict, and our
commanders strive to minimize harm to civilians
General Fenton. Civilian harm can fuel resentment and potentially
motivate retaliatory actions against U.S. forces, impacting both their
physical security and the overall operational environment. SOF
recognizes that minimizing civilian harm is crucial for maintaining
local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries
exploitable propaganda.
16. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how does
preventing and mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. national
security?
Mr. Jenkins. Actions taken to mitigate civilian harm--such as
increasing our battlefield awareness and our precision--also enhance
our military effectiveness. In addition, mitigating civilian harm
supports U.S. strategic goals and limits strategic advantages for our
adversaries.
General Fenton. Preventing and mitigating civilian harm
significantly contributes to U.S. national security. Respect for
civilian lives and property enhances U.S. legitimacy on the global
stage, bolstering international partnerships and facilitating foreign
policy objectives. Conversely, causing civilian harm undermines U.S.
credibility, alienating allies, and empowering adversaries. Protecting
civilians improves stability and security in conflict zones, reducing
the likelihood of protracted conflicts, terrorism, and the need for
costly U.S. military interventions. Furthermore, it protects U.S.
servicemembers by mitigating the risk of retaliatory violence and
hostility. Finally, protecting civilians upholds core American values
of human life and dignity, reinforcing the Nation's moral standing and
maintaining public support for military operations both domestically
and internationally.
17. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, does having
civilian-harm prevention personnel build trust and relationships with
local civil society groups help commanders to collect useful
intelligence information?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes. By demonstrating a commitment to mitigating
civilian harm, commanders can build trust and cooperation with local
communities. This improves intelligence gathering, facilitates access
to key areas, and reduces resistance to military operations.
General Fenton. USSOCOM recognizes the importance of building trust
and relationships, critical actions to develop a robust civilian
environment picture and gather critical intelligence to inform
Commanders and their staffs.
18. Senator Warren. General Fenton, in what ways do you see
civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM's
mission and the effectiveness of its operations?
General Fenton. Protecting civilians and non-combatants
significantly enhances USSOCOM's mission effectiveness. Minimizing
civilian harm reduces blowback, fostering a permissive operating
environment for SOF and improving mission success. This effort
strengthens operational legitimacy, increasing cooperation with
partners and bolstering information operations by countering negative
narratives. It also builds trust with partner forces, improving
interoperability; furthermore, it fosters greater access and freedom of
movement by building rapport with local populations. Finally, it
mitigates legal and political risks, while contributing to long-term
stability and security, reducing the need for future interventions.
blast overpressure
19. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how have Special Operators
benefited from working with community partners, such as Home Base, to
treat servicemembers who have been exposed to blast overpressure or
have suffered brain injuries?
General Fenton. USSOCOM has benefited greatly from Community
partners who address traumatic brain injury (TBI) or blast overpressure
injuries. Our Special Operators deserve to have the best care that they
can possibly get from the military healthcare system and in our
communities. Our partnership with Home Base and other institutions
remains strong as we have a commitment to taking care of our
servicemembers. Community organizations have become an integral part of
ensuring that we take care of Special Operators while in uniform and
afterwards.
20. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how have Special Operators
benefited from the Comprehensive Brain Health and Trauma [ComBHaT]
Program at Home Base?
General Fenton. Over 1,150 USSOCOM servicemembers have attended
ComBHaT since the 2019 pilot program and 93 percent have returned to
duty after attending. This high return-to-duty rate demonstrates the
effectiveness of ComBHaT, and the value of partnership with community
organizations like Home Base in supporting the health and readiness of
our operators.
21. Senator Warren. General Fenton, why is it important to mitigate
the risks of blast overpressure for Special Operators?
General Fenton. It is important for us to understand and mitigate
the risk of blast overpressure because of our inherent commitment to
our people. People are our No. 1 priority. We have an obligation to
protect the brain health and cognitive functioning of our USSOCOM
servicemembers, while preserving the required lethality. USSOCOM is
leveraging next-generation technologies to mitigate blast overpressure
risks, while effectively monitoring and tracking operator exposures.
22. Senator Warren. General Fenton, why is it important to ensure
Special Operators have access to quality care after exposure to blast
overpressure?
General Fenton. While much remains unknown about the long-term
effects of blast overpressure on the brain, USSOCOM is taking decisive
action to protect our personnel today. USSOCOM is committed to early
identification of operators with brain injuries and symptoms from blast
overpressure to treat and mitigate possible long-term consequences. We
invest heavily in our people, and we want them to operate at their
best.
23. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how do you work with the
Department of Veterans Affairs to make sure that servicemembers,
veterans, and their families are aware of the risks of blast
overpressure and traumatic brain injury?
General Fenton. USSOCOM has a strong partnership with the
Department of Veterans Affairs. USSOCOM utilizes the VA's Polytrauma
System of Care and network of specialized rehabilitation programs to
treat SOF servicemembers with TBI and polytrauma. An integral part of
these rehabilitation program is interdisciplinary evaluation and
treatment, case management and family education and training. USSOCOM
families provide a source of strength for our servicemembers, and it is
critical that they remain involved in medical treatment and
rehabilitation.
24. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how would Special Operators
benefit from logs detailing their exposure to blast overpressure and
traumatic brain injury, including the number, date, and intensity of
exposures?
General Fenton. Special Operators would benefit from being able to
objectively measure their individual blast overpressure exposure. This
would allow individuals, Commanders, medical personnel, and researchers
to integrate risk management, correlate blast overpressure exposure to
blast related injuries. USSOCOM is at the forefront of developing tools
to help SOF operators monitor their exposure, to include coordinating
with Program Managers for the Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record
and Electronic Health Record to capture and present exposure data to
our Healthcare Providers. A key focus is the investment in and
deployment of advanced blast sensors that provide the most accurate
measurement capabilities available. These sensors are being developed
and fielded to deliver precise data on blast exposure in real-time,
empowering operators and medical teams to better assess risks and take
timely action.
25. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how would Special Operators
benefit from annual neurocognitive assessments, including one before
they begin training to establish a baseline, and one before they leave
the military to determine changes in cognitive health over time?
General Fenton. In 2019, USSOCOM instituted requirements for more
frequent neurocognitive assessments than the Department of Defense
required at the time as we needed closer monitoring of our operators'
cognitive functioning throughout their careers. The benefit of more
frequent assessments is that it allows for earlier identification and
treatment of cognitive changes over the course of a servicemember's
career. USSOCOM is attempting to validate and leverage tools like rapid
cognitive and balance assessment apps to establish baselines before
training events, and to enhance our medical screening processes. The
August 2024 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum on DOD Requirements
for Management of Brain Health Risks from Blast Overpressure directed
baseline cognitive testing for all new Active and Reserve members
during initial military training. This baseline data will greatly
benefit all servicemembers to include those who become Special
Operators for monitoring and documentation.
26. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what steps are you taking to
address concerns about increased risks of suicide after exposure to
blast overpressure?
General Fenton. To address concerns about increased risks of
suicide after exposure to blast overpressure, the USSOCOM POTFF program
continues to take a multipronged approach. In the prevention space, we
have modernized suicide prevention training, integrating virtual
reality (VR) training to assist with these efforts. The training
modules highlight the symptoms often seen in those who have experienced
repeated blast exposure, such as headaches, fatigue, and memory
difficulties. In addition to highlighting these various concerns, the
goal of the VR training is to encourage early identification of
teammates in distress, have uncomfortable yet necessary conversations,
and have the servicemember connected to care. Leveraging interactive,
innovative training technology, we hope to decrease stigma in
addressing these concerns, and getting necessary assistance before
turning into a crisis.
Additionally, the Command Senior Enlisted Leaders and I host
quarterly ``1st SOF Truth Events'' with the leaders of our O-5 and
above Command teams to discuss key people topics, such as suicide
prevention, brain health, and mental health to ensure that Command
leadership teams across the SOCOM enterprise are adopting best
practices and are taking proactive actions. Our next event will focus
exclusively on Blast Overpressure education and mitigation strategies.
27. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what steps are you taking to
ensure that servicemembers and their families are aware of potential
increased risks of suicide after exposure to blast overpressure?
General Fenton. As mentioned earlier, USSOCOM has modernized
suicide prevention training, integrating VR suicide prevention training
that also includes a module specifically designed for spouses. The
training module highlights the symptoms often seen in those who have
experienced repeated blast exposure, such as headaches, fatigue, and
memory difficulties. It is our hope that the VR suicide prevention
training module for spouses will provide them the opportunity to
practice addressing concern, asking hard questions, and ultimately
getting their SOF members help if necessary. Following each VR suicide
prevention training experience is a guided discussion that allows
participants to conduct a targeted discussion on elevated suicide risks
after a blast overpressure exposure.
Our quarterly 1st SOF Truth Events, focused on suicide prevention,
brain health, and mental health enable Command leadership teams to
implement proactive actions and promulgate best practices throughout
their units and down to the servicemembers themselves.
28. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what resources and support do
you provide for the families of Special Operators so that they can
understand the risks of blast overpressure and recognize if their loved
one may be experiencing symptoms as a result of this exposure?
General Fenton. USSOCOM wants to increase awareness, identify the
need for further evaluation, and foster a culture of early reporting
and intervention. We know that spouses are often the first to recognize
any change in their partner's well-being.
It is our hope the VR suicide prevention training module for
spouses will provide them a tool to help identify the symptoms of blast
overpressure and the opportunity to support their loved ones in getting
help they need.
Additionally, there is an optional survey for spouses as part of
the USSOCOM's brain health monitoring program. USSOCOM requires every
SOF Warfighter to complete a Comprehensive Assessment and Symptom
History (CASH) within 12 months of completing initial SOF training and
every 5 years afterward. Spouses can take an optional CASH survey
designed for them. The CASH documents SOF Warfighters' experiences in
combat and training that may not have been reported previously. Our
CASH assessors spend a significant amount of time educating Operators
on TBI and blast overpressure symptoms to enhance treatment.
In alignment with DOD BOP Implementation Guidance, ASD SO/LIC and
USSOCOM are committed to educating our servicemembers potentially
exposed to BOP hazards on the potential adverse health and performance
effects and actions they can take to protect themselves. We have
broadened the audience of our quarterly 1st SOF Truth events to include
the spouses of our O5 and above Command teams. By educating informing
the spouses of our SOF leaders, they will in turn, help mentor and
support the spouses of our servicemembers.
29. Senator Warren. General Fenton, do you support addressing the
risks of blast overpressure to servicemembers through the swift
implementation of Sections 721 through Section 725 of the fiscal year
2025 NDAA [Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act]?
General Fenton. Yes, I support these DOD-wide efforts to address
the risk of BOP on servicemembers' brain health.
__________
Senator Jackie Rosen
30. Senator Rosen. General Fenton, the Iranian-backed Houthis are
diversifying their military capabilities and leveraging regional
conflicts to expand their influence. In recent months, there have been
reports that the Houthis are working to provide weapons to the Somali
terrorist group, al-Shabab. This development is incredibly concerning,
as al-Shabab could utilize more sophisticated Houthi weapons--including
drones--to target U.S. equities and personnel in the Horn of Africa,
such as our base in Djibouti. To the extent that you are able in this
open setting, can you share more about the growing partnership between
the Houthis and al-Shabab and the risk this poses not only to US
equities in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa
Command], but also to global shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden?
General Fenton. Since at least June 2024, the Houthis have provided
small weapons, ammunition, explosives, and training to al-Shabaab, one
of al-Qa'ida's wealthiest affiliates. A pragmatic strategic interest
drives the relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, with
reported heightened tactical collaboration in transporting equipment
and weapons, training, and intelligence sharing. The Houthis may be
facilitating the transfer of advanced weaponry, such as UAVs and
surface-to-air missiles in exchange for access to al-Shabaab networks
and new locations from which to attack commercial ships, further
disrupting freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Iranian encouragement may also drive some of the willingness of the
Houthis to engage with an ideological adversary, such as al-Shabaab.
While a formal alliance remains unconfirmed, the growing evidence of
tactical cooperation, particularly in maritime activities, arms
trafficking, and potential training exchanges suggests a growing and
more diverse threat to U.S. equities and global shipping in the region.
Al-Shabaab has used Houthi-supplied weapons in attacks on the African
Union presence in Somalia and the group could use Houthi-supplied
weapons in the current offensive in Lower and Middle Shabelle, Somalia.
31. Senator Rosen. General Fenton, since our withdrawal from our
two air bases in Niger last year--at the behest of the host nation--our
ability to conduct ISR within the Sahel and throughout the African
continent has been severely degraded. Can you share more about the
challenges this poses to countering violent extremism in the region?
General Fenton. The withdrawal of U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and U.S. SOF from Niger impacted
USAFRICOM's ability to maintain indications and warnings of terrorist
activity, and support and enable African partner-led counterterrorism
in the Sahel, respectively. Terrorist groups in the Sahel, including
ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates, present a regional threat as they expand
their activities and attacks from the Sahel into northern Cote
d'Ivoire, Benin, Ghana, and Togo. Continued and increasing control over
territory and resources may enable these groups to fund, plan, and
execute attacks on the U.S. Homeland, and U.S. persons and interests
abroad. To mitigate this impact, the Department of Defense works with
and through our West African partners to disrupt, degrade, and deny the
terrorist activities by strengthening their northern borders with
Sahelian states, bolstering their military capabilities, and improving
their own intelligence capabilities. The Department also is working
with non-African allies and partners to maintain situational awareness
of terrorist groups in the Sahel.
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