    [Senate Hearing 119-75, Part 5]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 5

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2296

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   ----------

                                 APRIL 8, 2025

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                                      S. Hrg. 119-75, Pt. 5

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2296

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 8, 2025

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                       _______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    61-983 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2025

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                JACK REED, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    JONI K. ERNST, Iowa                  RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota           TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, Florida                  ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
    TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama            ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma           GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TED BUDD, North Carolina             TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JIM BANKS, Indiana                   MARK KELLY, Arizona
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan

                            John P. Keast, Staff Director
                         Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                       _______

               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

                           JONI K. ERNST, Iowa, Chairman
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                   ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota              JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota             KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma             TIM KAINE, Virginia
    TED BUDD, North Carolina               GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri                 JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana                    MARK KELLY, Arizona

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     _______

                                 April 8, 2025

                                                                       Page

    United States Special Operations Command.........................     1

                               Members Statements

    Statement of Senator Joni K. Ernst...............................     1

    Statement of Senator Elissa Slotkin..............................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Jenkins, Colby C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,             3
      Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

    Fenton, General Bryan P., USA Commander, United States Special        4
      Operations Command.

    Questions for the Record.........................................    38

                                     (iii)

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
     REQUEST FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
                                DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2025

                              United States Senate,
                       Subcommittee on Emerging
                              Threats and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                    UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Joni Ernst
    (Chairwoman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Ernst, Wicker, Budd,
    Sheehy, Reed, Slotkin, Shaheen, Rosen, and Kelly.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI K. ERNST

        Senator Ernst. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee meets today to review the posture of our Special
    Operations Enterprise. Thank you to our witnesses for appearing
    before the subcommittee today. I want to take a moment to
    welcome Senator Slotkin as the Subcommittee's new Ranking
    Member. I look forward to working closely together.
        For the Members' information, today's hearing will begin in
    open session, and then transition to a closed session in SVC-
    217 in the Office of Senate Security, no later than 3:45 p.m.
    For years, I have worked closely with our Special Operations
    Forces (SOF) community to ensure they have the resources to
    counter evolving threats. SOF is more than a counter-terrorism
    force. They are indispensable in countering the malign
    activities of the Chinese Communist Party, Russia, and their
    authoritarian allies.
        Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is operated under
    stagnant budgets. The limitation of SOF and strength was a very
    shortsighted decision at a time when SOF capabilities are
    needed, more than ever. We must change course now. That is why
    I intend to work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to
    rebuild SOCOMs budget. Given SOF's critical role in national
    security, this is a wise and cost-effective investment.
        Additionally, we must update DOD policies and authorities
    to leverage SOF capabilities fully. Irregular warfare has been
    a core SOF mission since World War II, yet unnecessary
    restrictions have hampered their flexibility. We need to
    empower our combatant commanders to unleash SOF's full
    potential. President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and our
    witnesses today recognize the urgency of these threats and the
    vital role SOF plays.
        As Chair of this Subcommittee, I will prioritize these key
    forces, which are essential for this era of great power
    competition and for ensuring the security of the American
    people. This is not just about defense and deterrence. It's
    about ensuring the U.S. remains the preeminent global force. We
    have no time to waste.
        Now, I would like to recognize Senator Slotkin for her
    opening comments.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELISSA SLOTKIN

        Senator Slotkin. Thank you, Chairwoman Ernst. Important
    hearing on readiness, but importantly, happy to be here with
    you in our first official hearing on Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee of the 119th, my first time Ranking
    Member in the Senate, so, I'm happy to be here and I look
    forward to maintaining a really strong, robust bipartisan
    approach.
        I think we want the same things, which is to make sure that
    our Special Operations Forces have the resources, the
    potential, the acquisition, everything you need to deal with a
    world of really changing fast changing threats and challenges.
    Welcome to our guests. We're happy to have you here. I think we
    want to express our appreciation for everything you do every
    day particularly in guiding the Special Operations Forces,
    given that, as you were describing to us earlier, the
    precipitous increase in the missions you are being asked to do.
    I think that we are keenly aware of that.
        Obviously, the gray zone challenges in places like China,
    Russia, Iran, North Korea, and enabling the joint force, but I
    think in particular, I think it's hard to have this
    conversation without thinking about Taiwan and sort of the
    scenarios we have going forward with Taiwan and the important
    role you all will play. Space, cyber, information operations,
    you all are at the forefront of a very changing world on
    conflict. Conflict is just going to look different and continue
    to look different than it was when many of us were starting
    out.
        We want you to have those resources and therefore I will
    just flag, I'm very interested in what's going on right now and
    the cuts that are potentially on the table at the Defense
    Department. We've heard rumors of 80,000, 90,000 forces, for
    instance, from the Army being cut. I don't think anyone is
    against cutting actual fat on the bone, but being surgical and
    smart about it and not cutting the very operators that we need
    to perform this ever-expanding group of missions, you're being
    asked to do.
        So, with that Madam Chairman, I yield back.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you. I'd like to thank Senate Armed
    Services Committee (SASC) Ranking Member, Senator Reed for
    being here today. Senator Reed, do you have any opening
    comments or thoughts?
        Senator Reed. I just want to commend you Madam Chairman and
    the Ranking Member. I have great confidence.
        Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. We will go ahead and
    proceed to your opening statements, and Mr. Jenkins, we will
    start with you and then we will proceed to General Fenton. So,
    gentlemen, you each have 5 minutes for your opening statements.

     STATEMENT OF COLBY C. JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you. Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member
    Slotkin, Chairman Wicker when he comes, Ranking Member Reed,
    and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
    for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our
    Nation's Special Operations Forces, or SOF. I'm honored to
    testify alongside General Fenton. We are joined here today by
    two extraordinary Americans, who I would like to take a moment
    to recognize.
        Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
    and Director of the Special Operations Secretariat, Dr. Sandra
    Hobson, seated behind me, as well as Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low-Intense Conflict (SO/LIC) Senior
    Enlisted Advisor, Command Master Chief Brad Rhinelander, also
    seated behind me. These dedicated servant leaders bring
    expertise and insights that have been invaluable as we advocate
    within the Department of Defense, on behalf of our SOF
    servicemembers and their families. As a combat veteran Green
    Beret myself, the opportunity to work with these incredible
    teammates and represent our SOF enterprise is profoundly
    humbling and special.
        Today's global security environment has become increasingly
    complex, as artificial intelligence (AI) and other
    technological advancements rapidly transform the character of
    warfare, threats from State and non-State actors continue to
    converge. Our global competitors actively seek to undermine the
    United States and our allies. Terrorists and transnational
    criminal networks continue to pose a serious threat to the
    Homeland.
        In these turbulent times, my office, the Office of Special
    Operations, Low Intensity Conflict or SO/LIC, and the U.S.
    Special Operations Command remain at the forefront of our
    Nation's strategic priorities, representing less than 2 percent
    of the defense budget. Our Special Operations Forces provide
    unique and outsized effects, adding exceptional value to the
    Nation. Tasked with the most challenging and dangerous
    missions, SOF remain the world's most lethal, adaptable, and
    capable force.
        Our priorities for the SOF enterprise are squarely nested
    within Secretary Hegseth's priorities for the joint force,
    defend the Homeland, strengthen deterrence, and increase burden
    sharing with U.S. allies and partners. Our elite warriors deter
    our adversaries by creating strategic asymmetric advantages and
    maintaining irregular warfare superiority.
        Leveraging our close relationships with our foreign
    partners in critical regions, SOF are uniquely positioned to
    identify and counter our adversary's malign and coercive
    activities. Whether in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle
    East, Africa, Western Hemisphere, or near our own southern
    border, these low-cost, small-footprint efforts promote
    stability, empower partners and allies, and lead efforts
    against China, terrorists, drug traffickers, and other threats.
        Even with the global increase in demand, our Special
    Operations Forces face personnel cuts and resource constraints.
    In fact, armed conflict and regional instability have driven a
    200 percent increase in our crisis response mission over the
    past 3 years. While at the same time, operational and logistics
    costs for crisis response have increased 260 percent.
        We must ensure SOFs readiness while balancing operational
    demands and optimizing available resources. We must also
    promote accountability through rigorous analytics and data-
    driven decisionmaking. Congress wisely established civilian
    oversight of Special Operations to ensure that SOF remains
    strategically aligned, ethically grounded, and accountable. My
    office provides policy direction, resource advocacy, and
    oversight needed to ensure that SOFs initiatives and efforts
    stay focused on war fighter needs and national objectives,
    without mission creep or undue strain on the force.
        This oversight is not bureaucratic. In fact, it is
    essential to effective war fighting. Our Nation's security
    depends on a strong, agile, modernized, and accountable SOF
    enterprise. With your support, we will continue ensuring that
    SOF is ready to deter, fight, and win anytime, anywhere. Thank
    you again for the opportunity to testify. I invite you to visit
    our SOF community around the globe, to meet our servicemembers
    and their families, and to see firsthand the capabilities that
    we bring in defense of the Nation. Your continued support is
    critical. I look forward to answering your questions.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. General Fenton, you
    are now recognized for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
                   STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        General Fenton. Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member Slotkin,
    distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, Chairman Wicker
    when he comes, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you today.
        This month marks 38 years since the creation of Special
    Operations Command. We are thankful for Congress's incredible
    foresight in creating us and steadfast support ever since. I'm
    joined today by Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter. Shane
    exemplifies the unmatched caliber of our non-commissioned
    officer corps. If you look at the hardest problems facing our
    Nation in the darkest corners of this earth, you will find our
    Special Operations non-commissioned officers solving them.
        Our Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) exemplify the
    precision, lethality of your Special Operations teams and
    demonstrate our competitive and comparative advantage. They are
    the reason we are envied by militaries around the globe. It's
    the honor of a lifetime for Shane and me to represent the
    uniform and civilian members of your Special Operations
    Command, as well as our U.S. Interagency Partners and the
    Global SOF Warriors from 28 nations who are stationed at our
    SOCOM headquarters in Tampa.
        I'm also honored today to testify alongside Secretary
    Jenkins from Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) SO/LIC. We
    rely on SO/LIC 's partnership, support, and advocacy to ensure
    your Special Operations warriors and their families who serve
    alongside them continue to thrive and win. We are in an era of
    serious national security challenges. The border, communist
    China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist organizations
    all pose significant threats in isolation.
        However, we're increasingly seeing these threats converge
    across the globe. Meanwhile, the changing character of war is
    changing at a rate faster than we've ever seen. The innovation
    cycle now turns in days and weeks, not months and years. Our
    adversaries use $10,000 one-way drones that we shoot down with
    $2 million missiles. That cost benefit curve is upside down.
        To summarize, this is the most complex, asymmetric, and
    hybrid threat security environment I've seen in 38 years of
    service. Contending with these challenges demands more from
    your Special Operations Forces that requires tough choices,
    forcing tradeoffs as we strike to balance an increase in
    operations readiness and the need for modernization.
        Your elite SOCOM team provides an outsized return on any
    investment. However, with only 3 percent of DODs forces and
    less than 2 percent of DODs budget, we are now playing a zero-
    sum game. Yet I'd submit your Special Operations Forces were
    tailor made for this era, rapidly responding to crisis,
    disrupting terrorist organizations, and asymmetrically
    deterring our adversaries.
        Employed expressly at the direction of the President and
    Secretary of Defense, SOCOM's Crisis Response Mission is the
    Nation's most lethal and surgical tool to eliminate threats to
    the Homeland, rescue American citizens, protect our diplomats,
    all at a moment's notice. In the past 3\1/2\ years, the
    frequency of these Presidentially directed missions
    significantly increased by 200 percent. Yet for this sacred
    obligation, we'll accept no risk in today's crisis response
    mission.
        Some may think we're done fighting terror. I'd submit
    terror is not done with us. SOCOM's mission to degrade
    terrorist groups starts at our border, spans the globe. In
    recent months, your Special Operations team eliminated over 500
    terrorists who had the intent and capability to strike the
    Homeland. Alongside our global Special Operations partners,
    we've captured over 600. Aligned with the Department's
    priorities, deterrence has long been a part of SOCOM's DNA.
        We are America's irregular warfare experts. We deter war by
    altering our adversaries' decision below the threshold of
    conflict in the gray zone. We stand ready to prevail if
    deterrence fails, as combatant commands seek to strengthen,
    deterrence requests for SOCOM capabilities have increased by
    more than 35 percent in the last 2 years alone. Against that
    backdrop, we continue to grapple with years of flat budgets, a
    14 percent decrease in buying power, significant personnel
    reductions, and the requirement to evolve our technology and
    authorities.
        All this forces tradeoffs, tough choices that challenge
    current missions and puts modernization at risk. Yet SOCOM
    remains the world's premier Special Operations Force. I pledge
    to always provide the Nation with the best Special Operations
    capability for the fiscal and personnel resources we receive.
    We will never compromise on standards and lethality. We are
    grateful for this Subcommittee's work on novel approaches to
    SOF funding and authorities.
        I look forward to taking your questions. Thank you.
        [The joint prepared statement Mr. Colby C. Jenkins and
    General Bryan P. Fenton follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton, and we will start
    now with the senators' questions. I'll start with 5 minutes of
    questions and go on to the Ranking Member. If we have other
    Members join, we will have them ask questions as well. If we
    don't have other Members join, we will recess briefly and move
    to the closed hearing. So, this may be a very speedy round but
    I will go ahead and start.
        General Fenton, so you mentioned the personnel reductions
    in force, and since the announcement of SOF personnel cuts
    under the previous Administration, I have been very firmly and
    vocally opposed to that. The return on investment our Nation
    gets from our Special Operations Forces is not only measurable,
    it is absolutely unmatched. Despite those reductions, SOF
    continues to do what it does best, it's adapting, innovating,
    and overcoming.
        General Fenton, can you speak to how SOF is adapting its
    training pipelines to enable future operators to integrate high
    tech capabilities like AI, cyber, and electronic warfare more
    effectively?
        General Fenton. Senator, I can. I would start by saying I
    think you know you're your SOF very well, in terms of that we
    innovate and I like to think we innovate for today and we
    modernize for tomorrow. As we think about tomorrow, that's
    certainly through the lens of the lessons learned that we're
    watching vis-a-vis the events in Ukraine. I think it's more
    important to not just observe those lessons, but as you laid
    out, institutionalize them.
        I think in the instance of institutionalization of those
    lessons I would offer U.S. Army Special Operations, ARSOF, has
    undergone two, what I think are pretty significant efforts
    against this change of character of war. First, is they've
    created a brand-new course, the remote Uncrewed Systems
    Integration Course down at Fort Bragg, a course that is about a
    6-week program of instruction, bringing together everything
    from learning how to build the drone, fly drones, and then
    certainly adapt them as we have seen on the battlefield.
        The second thing they've done, I would characterize in
    terms of institutionalizing, is they've created a brand-new
    Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or job title. That job
    title is remote systems integrator, and they've created that
    around the backdrop of a Special Forces warrant officer, a
    Green Beret warrant officer, and after their training is
    complete a multi-month program of instruction, they'll go back
    to the Special Forces groups and start to really take that as a
    master trainer and weave it into all group training.
        You would see that across many of our components. But I
    think, Senator, those are a couple of examples I'd want to give
    you.
        Senator Ernst. No, that's great, and I think many of us
    recognize there's nothing more dangerous than a warrant
    officer. So, appreciate that new MOS. So, let's talk a little
    bit more about those cuts. A critical strength of SOF is their
    ability to lead on emerging technologies and developing those
    capabilities that kind of ripple across the broader force, and
    it speaks directly to the indispensable role that they play in
    today's complex threat environment.
        So, any additional reductions that we might see in SOF
    wouldn't just impact our SOF, they would degrade our ability to
    project power around the globe. So, General Fenton, from an
    operational perspective, how would further force reductions
    impact SOF's ability to respond to emerging threats in regions
    like Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Europe, and of course
    the Middle East?
        General Fenton. Well, Senator, I would offer right out the
    gate that that would absolutely hurt. It would hurt fairly
    significantly, especially against the backdrop of, I think over
    the last 3, 3\1/2\ years, we've seen a 5,000-person teammate
    reduction inside of SOCOM already. That's against the backdrop
    of communications, logistics, intelligence, civil affairs, and
    sci-ops, and of course operators. I think all those are the
    type of capabilities that you see combatant commanders, as I
    mentioned in my opening statement, asking for more and more to
    the tune of about 35 percent. I think that would absolutely
    impact that. We're already forced to make tough choices and
    tradeoffs. Those would certainly make those would amplify those
    tough choices and tradeoffs and really put us in a place where
    I've mentioned earlier in the statement, we're already at a
    zero-sum game.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, and just in the time that I have
    remaining, can you please characterize the situation that
    unfolds when we have SOF teams that are out on the ground as
    force multipliers? One example that I'm thinking about this is
    many years ago in Africa when we had Special Forces Operational
    Detachment Alphas (ODAs) there, we were able to bring together
    many different nations. Those nations had teams on the ground
    as well, but they could not get along with the populations that
    exist in some of those regions.
        It took Americans and the leadership that these teams
    brought into Africa to bring all of these nationalities
    together into a collaborative force. Can you speak to how SOF
    really can provide that leadership in small teams, small
    numbers without a huge footprint and be able to bring different
    nations together?
        General Fenton. I can, Senator. Small teams, small
    footprints, big impact, is the way I like to think about it. I
    think that starts with the fact that in our DNA is partnering,
    and SOF is known as a premier partner force. That's what we do
    across the globe and maybe even today to the tune of about
    7,000 folks in about 80 different countries. It's all about
    beginning partnerships, and those partnerships then evolve into
    trust.
        Once you get trust, then we're able to do everything, build
    partner capacity, develop some level of competency and
    capability. I think it just goes on from there, and even do
    exactly as you just described, bring folks together who
    otherwise may not be together. I think at the end of the day,
    amplify capability and capacity for any combatant commander or
    for the Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton. Ranking Member
    Slotkin.
        Senator Slotkin. Thank you. The Senator had very similar
    questions to the ones I had about what are the tradeoffs of
    these cuts, right? For me, it's hard to miss that Space Force
    got excluded from having to take cuts. I'm happy for them,
    that's a mission that's extremely important, but just would
    hope that if there's someone who's picking and choosing
    missions that are going to be cut versus protected, that I know
    you're advocating, but that sort of, we realize that the units
    that are in highest demand should not be taking the same
    haircut as everybody else across the force. So, hope that
    that's happening. Thank you for illustrating some of those
    tradeoffs that you would have.
        I do want to, you know, understand what missions you have
    been tasked to do in recent months. I am, as someone who was a
    Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and a Middle East
    specialist and did three tours in Iraq, I am 100 percent with
    you that just because you don't hear about threats in the news
    every day doesn't mean that they're not still out there
    plotting to kill Americans, attack the Homeland and do really
    devastating things. We of course have nation states that are
    causing all kinds of problems.
        But I did see that the President designated Mexican
    cartels, a number of named cartels, as foreign terrorist
    organizations restricting in a positive way American citizens
    from providing support, materiel, leadership in any way to
    those organizations. Can you describe what, if any, guidance
    you've been getting and giving on lethal force against cartels
    on the southern border, given the buildup of about 10,000 U.S.
    Forces down there?
        General Fenton. Thank you. I can begin with that and then
    we can talk the details. The designation of foreign terrorist
    organization does not grant us any new authorities as a DOD
    entity is. What it really does is it helps us unlock the doors
    to whole-of-government approach. Our threat finance analysts
    can now better provide their target packets to our counterparts
    in the whole-of-government approach. But what we are doing now
    is making sure that we provide options that we can be ready,
    lethal, and prepared should the President need us to continue
    to seal and protect the border.
        To answer your question directly, it does not grant us any
    new authorities to take direct action or so forth.
        Senator Slotkin. So, you would need commander-in-chief
    authority to go, for instance, and pursue drone attacks inside
    Mexico against cartels? I'm just asking, Mr. Musk said publicly
    that that foreign terrorist designation authorizes drone
    strikes against Mexican cartels inside Mexico. I'm just trying
    to understand fact from fiction here.
        Do you believe you have that authority today? Understanding
    the designation alone may not give it to you, do you believe
    you have the authority today to cross over the Mexican border
    and use drone strikes to go after cartels?
        General Fenton. No, ma'am. The designation of Foreign
    Terrorist Organizations (FTO) does not grant us any new
    authorities.
        Senator Slotkin. But separate from the FTO designation, do
    you, as the service secretary believe you have that? I'm just
    trying to understand. I'm not----
        General Fenton. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Slotkin. I have no problem with them being
    designated. I have no problem going against them and their
    financing, right, their materiel. But I think certainly as part
    of this Committee, we want to understand use of lethal force in
    a neighboring State.
        So, is there in any way separate from FTO designation, do
    you currently have the authority to shoot down, shoot at
    Mexican cartels over the border right now?
        General Fenton. No, ma'am. I do not.
        Senator Slotkin. Okay. Thank you for clarifying, and then
    you know, I think a lot of us on the Committee are very worried
    about Taiwan and a potential problem with China over the next
    few years. I'm the co-chair of the Taiwan caucus, so we think
    about this a lot.
        Can you give me your best assessment of, you know, what our
    security assistance activities there, our training, maybe we
    have to go into classified session, but would appreciate you
    know, your role and deterrence understanding the role you're
    playing in that issue.
        General Fenton. Senator, we'll absolutely have to go into a
    closed session to provide details. What I would offer is that,
    in support of INDOPACOM, you would see your Special Operations
    Forces doing many of the missions you described earlier.
    Certainly, always being prepared for crisis response inside
    that area of responsibility (AOR) through our theater, Special
    Operations Command, Special Ops Command Pacific, that is a
    sacred obligation.
        I think you would also see us in a counter-terrorism way
    making sure that any counter-terrorism (CT) threats, in this
    case, ISIS East Asia, we're doing in a partnered way with
    teammates in that region. Then I think you would see us
    certainly in deterrence. The way we present ourselves is
    placement and access. It builds relationships and partnerships
    and capability and all that I think is very valuable to Sam
    Paparo, and any Combatant Command (COCOM) commander because it
    provides options and opportunities they wouldn't otherwise
    have, and dilemmas and challenges to the adversary.
        Senator Slotkin. Thank you. I yield back.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, and next we will go to Senator
    Budd. Thank you.
        Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. Again, thank you all for
    being here. General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins, thank you both for
    testifying before the committee on SOF. I was grateful for the
    opportunity to travel with Chairman Wicker last year to Joint
    Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg and to talk
    about the important work that SOF is doing not only in North
    Carolina, but around the world.
        General Fenton, how would you characterize the demand and
    requirements for Special Operations Forces particularly in
    crisis response, General Fenton?
        General Fenton. Senator first, thanks for visiting our
    forces and thanks for allowing us to be in the great State of
    North Carolina.
        Senator Budd. Our honor.
        General Fenton. Appreciate all the hospitality there. I
    know all our forces do. I would offer in my opening statement;
    I laid out a couple.
        I think in terms of crisis response, we have seen a pace
    and a scale and duration that I frankly have not seen in my 20
    to 30 years in the Special Operations community. It is called
    on more. So, there's a requirement that's gone up by 200
    percent in the last 3\1/2\ years. That's on or about 15
    missions where we've been asked to get out very quickly and do
    the type of missions that I mentioned, either recover
    diplomats, protect an embassy at some point, maybe even recover
    a U.S. citizen. I think I don't anticipate the world to get any
    less volatile, and that looks like a pattern to me, and so, I
    think that demand has certainly gone up.
        In deterrence, the combatant commanders have asked for
    Special Operations in the last 2 years at an increase of about
    35 percent to do the type of missions that they're looking for
    us to do. That could involve anything from partner-based
    training to unilateral operations that would give them
    additional opportunities and advantages, maybe an unfair
    outsize advantage and give the adversaries a bunch of dilemmas
    and challenges. So, I think I anticipate that going up.
        Then I just mentioned earlier, terrorism is not done with
    us, and I think we absolutely have to stay focused on the
    threat that ISIS, al Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab pose and all three
    of those missions are absolutely in SOF wheelhouse.
        Senator Budd. General, talk a little bit about, you gave
    some numbers, 35 percent increase in area, 200 percent in
    another area. When you're called upon, how often do you have to
    say no because of that increased demand and perhaps the lack of
    readiness or rest or requirements that are needed?
        General Fenton. Senator, I think that that question is at
    the heart of something the Command Sergeant Major and I think
    about every day, that's risk. I think in this case that risk is
    a combination of operational risk: do we have the capability
    and the capacity? Then for the first time, certainly in my
    memory, fiscal constraint risk: can we actually do it?
        I think that drives to the heart of I've had to say no in
    some instances in deterrence, where I feel like I am taking
    risk almost 41 times in the last year, to combatant commanders
    that would want Special Forces operational detachments, so 12
    Green Berets, folks who may want command and control nodes. I
    could go on and on.
        I can give you additional examples in closed session, but I
    think it's certainly way too often, and my sense is that,
    first, that is risk. We're not meeting the combatant command,
    DURs demands in a special ops peculiar way. I'm also taking
    risk in modernization, and in a sense, I feel like I'm saying
    no to the SOCOM enterprise when we don't have the top line
    increase and the budget needed to modernize not only
    technology, but certainly our humans.
        So, we think about education for an uncertain world, that's
    modernization, and on top of that, certainly even our
    authorities. So, I think I say no way too much. Then those two
    categories to combatant commanders in deterrence, and frankly,
    to where we need to be as a SOCOM enterprise to win tomorrow,
    just like we've been winning today and in the past years.
        Senator Budd. Thank you for that, and lots of other
    questions, either for the record or the closed session.
        Senator Budd. Mr. Jenkins, again, thank you for being here.
    See if you're tracking this provision in the Senate Fiscal Year
    2026 NDAA includes a provision requiring the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and the Commander of Special
    Operations to ensure the annual defense planning guidance
    includes specific guidance for requirements and employments
    Special Operation Forces across the spectrum of conflict. Are
    you tracking that, sir, and care to elaborate?
        Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir. Yes, and thank you for that very
    much. So, with our Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance,
    we have three lines of effort, defend the Homeland, deter
    China, and increased burden sharing. The only force that can
    fill in or blend across all three lines of effort there is the
    Special Operations Force.
        In my service like capacity, I've been able to advocate and
    make sure that as the defense planning guidance goes forward
    and now gets underway in earnest, that my peers, my
    counterparts, ensure that SOF is adequately and thoroughly
    accounted for in all three lines of effort there, and not just
    as an asterisk, that we play a major part.
        Senator Budd. [Presiding.] Thank you both again. It appears
    I'm out of time. Chairman Reed, you're recognized.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Gentlemen,
    thank you for your service and your sacrifice and that of your
    family. I endorse your tribute to the non-commissioned
    officers, General Fenton.
        General Fenton. Yes.
        Senator Reed. I would be in Fort Leavenworth not the
    military side, the other side without my NCO, so thank you.
        General Fenton. I think we all would, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Yes, sir. Mr. Jenkins, SO/LIC is a work in
    progress, and I think we're making great progress. We want, as
    we envision a service secretary like civilian overlooking those
    Special Operations. I would note in the prepared partial
    statement for today, it says, ``SO/LIC requires the requisite
    tools, workforce, and resources to accelerate the
    implementation of these priorities and enable Special
    Operations to be the most effective disciplined and
    strategically relevant force it can be.''
        Could you tell us what additional tool, workforce, and
    resources you need?
        Mr. Jenkins. First, thank you and thank you to Congress for
    having the vision and foresight to make sure that SO/LIC
    exists, that we do have the tools that we do have right now.
    I'd just like to point out, thanks to section 922 and
    Congress's vision, you can see the physical manifestation back
    here with Dr. Sandra Hobson, who's the first to sit in that
    position, that 922 facilitated. So, we are underway in
    establishing the service secretary side of Special Operations,
    and that's thanks to Congress. So, we welcome your continued
    engagement and reinforcement.
        In terms of additional authorities or funding that we would
    need, we certainly welcome that, your continued engagement. One
    area that comes to mind, is in the realm of talent management.
    We want to make sure that SOF officers and enlisted leaders,
    that we have the ability as SOF enterprise leaders to advocate
    for their advancement, just like our service counterparts would
    for theirs as well. As a Green Beret, I come from the Army, but
    I'm also a SOF officer, and so, we want to make sure that we
    have that.
        Then in terms of acquisition authorities we welcome
    additional discussion on how we can have more agile, more
    abundant acquisition authorities so that we can answer the need
    of those quick problems that we encounter out on the
    battlefield and be able to innovate and modernize and fund
    those accordingly.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. General Fenton, from
    your perspective, have you seen the benefits of this empowered
    senior civilian like secretary?
        General Fenton. Senator, absolutely. I think this will be
    my third time at this table saying how critical it is, how much
    we appreciate the work this Congress has done in that arena. I
    think the first thing I offered you before, and maybe even
    yesterday, and thank you for the office call, was that having
    Secretary Jenkins at the Service Secretary table, along with
    the Secretary of Defense representing Special Operations and
    SOCOM issues, is critical.
        I think about that on the service side of the SOCOM
    organization. Also advocating for issues that support our
    servicemembers, our civilians, and our family members, and
    those run the gamut. Certainly, the human performance program,
    preservation of the force and family, and many other items that
    we have inside of our enterprise. I would also offer in terms
    of thinking through modernization and certainly transformation.
    So, I think there's a great deal that we've been able to
    achieve together as a team of teams in the SOF enterprise.
        Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, and after some
    notable civilian casualty several years ago, the Department of
    Defense set up the Civilian Harm Center of Excellence. In the
    last year's prepared statement submitted, it pointed out that
    these policies and procedures outlined by the Department
    through the center assist with counter violent extremist
    organizations efforts as they prevent the underlying dynamics
    from creating more extremism.
        I think in layman terms, it means if you're out there and
    you're hurting a lot of civilians, the reaction is the enemy
    gets more recruits, essentially. But I've heard public
    indications that the Department is considering to rescind the
    policy guidance and to eliminate the center of excellence. Mr.
    Jenkins, what's your understanding of that?
        Mr. Jenkins. Well, first, Senator, thank you for pointing
    that out. We agree that the ability and requirement to mitigate
    and limit civilian harm on the battlefield is paramount
    responsibility for us. Second, it's the law. It's the law, and
    so, we have to be respondent to that.
        I can also say there have been no decisions made on what
    the program may be called or the form that it will take. But
    the requirement and the need to report back and make sure that
    we are always mitigating civilian harm will always be present
    no matter what it's called or how it looks, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Again, let me add to the point. It's not only
    the law and the sense of humanity, it's also a very practical
    situation because by antagonizing the population, you'll lose
    ground.
        Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Once you lose it, you don't gain it. Just
    General, final question. Can you say if SOCOM has received
    adequate support from the center and that it's been an asset to
    your operations?
        General Fenton. Senator, I'm not--from the center?
        Senator Reed. From the center.
        General Fenton. Senator, I think certainly. As we've
    thought through it, I go back to Secretary Jenkins piece, we
    absolutely, as your SOCOM team always aim to do the mission,
    especially in the kinetic ops that you're referring to, and
    then protect non-combatants and civilians as part of who we are
    and what we stand for. I think to your point, that sends a very
    powerful message across the globe that we're there to eliminate
    or disrupt a bad actor, yet at the same time protect innocence
    and vulnerable and non-combatants. That's a very different
    signal from a nation. That's what your SOCOM team works to do
    everyday.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, thank
    you.
        Senator Ernst. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ranking Member.
    We'll recognize now Senator Kelly for 5 minutes of questions.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Fenton, in
    your opening statement, you highlighted your flat budget since
    2019, which appears to be a 14 percent decrease in purchasing
    power, and SOCOM has also faced some significant personnel cuts
    over the past years. Is it fair to say right now that the
    demand for Special Operations Forces continues to increase? Is
    that a fair observation?
        General Fenton. Senator, that's absolutely a fair
    characterization, as I've laid out in the opening statement.
        Senator Kelly. With this flat budget then, where have you
    assumed any additional risk because of budgetary and personnel
    constraints?
        General Fenton. Senator, I'd actually offer two places. In
    the operational arena, we've assumed risk in deterrence, as I
    mentioned in the opening statement, I'll assume no risk in
    crisis response today. That is a sacred obligation, and as we
    go across the spectrum in deterrence, as I've laid out, there
    have been instances where I've had to say no to combatant
    commander requirements because of operational risk and fiscal
    constraints in a way I haven't seen before.
        So, first in operations deterrence. Second is in
    modernization. Working to have the SOCOM team and at times
    tying it to the joint force, for sure. Be able to win in the
    future environment like we have won for years and years and
    years in an increasingly contested and congested environment.
    We're taking risks there. The inability to get after the things
    I think that are asymmetric, that are part of the changing
    character of war, do it at speed.
        You could add anything, uncrewed artificial intelligence,
    additive manufacturing, autonomy, all that. I think we're
    accruing high risk because we at SOCOM are not able to get
    after that based on a flat top line on 5 years, $1 billion in
    lost buying power that is reflective of that 14 percent lost
    buying power.
        Senator Kelly. Would it be fair for me to say then that a
    risk in deterrence because if you're not deterring our
    adversaries, there's a higher chance you're going to have to
    put some of your troops in harm's way that the risk to your
    forces, personally risk to them being injured or killed in
    combat, that that has gone up.
        I think it's probably fair to say the same thing on the
    modernization side of this. If you don't have the equipment you
    need and you're facing a more challenging adversary, that
    that's possibly putting folks at risk as well?
        General Fenton. Senator, I'll take it from the
    modernization piece first. I think first and foremost, the risk
    is not winning, not being able to complete the mission in the
    future environment. Again, against the backdrop of what we're
    seeing in Ukraine with the changing character of war that has,
    I call it a version of symmetry and asymmetry.
        Symmetry, being all the things--and certainly the Russian
    Federation had, that any nation needs to go to war tanks, and
    missiles, and airplanes, and helicopters. Then asymmetry, where
    Ukraine did not have that, and has imposed costs on the Russian
    Federation through all things that we're observing,
    institutionalizing, and operationalizing. I think we're taking
    risks there and that risk is about winning.
        It certainly has a force protection component to it,
    because if you're unable to get through the contested and
    congested battle space of integrated air missile defense, radio
    frequency spectrums, knocking your things down, electronic
    warfare, there is a force protection component for sure to
    that. I look at both, but I think it's both of those and
    modernization.
        In deterrence, I think it's more about aggregated risk, us
    not being able to fulfill the parts of a campaign plan or a no
    plan that the combatant commanders absolutely would rely on.
    That probably at some point has aggregated risk for his end
    states and certainly their operations.
        Senator Kelly. Right. Thank you, General, and Mr. Jenkins,
    on China Gray Zone operations, they execute this all the time
    as an instrument of national power and in their effort to
    supplant us as the world's preeminent superpower. So, what
    adjustments, just quickly in statute or fiscal authorities,
    would you need to better compete and deter the People's
    Republic of China (PRC)?
        Mr. Jenkins. In terms of authorities, we are working
    sufficiently and efficiently with what we have right now. It
    comes down to what, what the general outlined in terms of
    resources. We clearly recognize that deterring China is not
    just in the South China Sea of the first island chain. It's
    everywhere, and in the closed session, we'll be able to give
    you some good vignettes on where we are going head-to-head to
    deter in the irregular warfare arena to make sure that we not
    only meet China where they are, but where they want to be,
    where they, where they're trying to be.
        So, in terms of authorities, we're moving out and executing
    on what we have, but we're always looking to evolve with them
    as well.
        Senator Kelly. If you identify something----
        Mr. Jenkins. We will.
        Senator Kelly.--please, come to us with that. Thank you.
        Mr. Jenkins. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Kelly, and now I
    recognize SASC Chairman, Senator Wicker.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, thank you Madam Chair, and thank you
    Senator Kelly as you leave because I'm going to followup on the
    very important lines of questioning that you pursued. I was
    planning on asking about what extra things your command has
    been required to do for less buying power.
        But let's talk about the gray zone and followup if we can
    on that. Do you find that there's not enough coordination in
    the irregular warfare field and would you recommend any changes
    in the way our defense department is organized with regard to
    no one having a particular domain over that particular issue
    and coordinating it across the various commands?
        Mr. Jenkins. Well, thank you for pointing that out.
    Certainly, over the last 20 years plus, we've seen our counter-
    terrorism muscle be exercised tremendously and our irregular
    warfare muscle, not so much. But nowadays, we are certainly
    exercising that muscle and meeting and deterring, as the
    Senator alluded, China, where they are and where they're trying
    to be. SO/LIC itself----
        Chairman Wicker. Tell us and those listening what sort of
    things, specifically some examples of what the Chinese are
    doing?
        Mr. Jenkins. Well, Senator, certainly we can get into more
    details in the closed session, but it's safe to say, areas
    where you would not think China is, they are. They're trying to
    be there, not only in the South China Sea, the first Island
    chain, but in the Southern Hemisphere.
        We have specific examples that we can point to, to show
    where we have met, deterred, and even ejected their influence
    from certain areas, and so, it's incumbent upon us to not only
    just be counter-terrorist experts, but also irregular warfare
    specialists.
        Chairman Wicker. You can talk about the economic warfare in
    this hearing, can you not?
        Mr. Jenkins. For sure, yes, sir, and that's as you alluded
    to. In China, it's a whole-of-government approach when it comes
    to economic warfare. General Fenton's actually starting a new
    program to bring that together to harness not only attention
    amongst our economic machines here in the United States, but to
    show them where they could draw their power to help our Nation
    as well.
        Chairman Wicker. So, are we organized sufficiently in this
    area, or should one office, one person be in charge of
    coordinating this for either of you?
        Mr. Jenkins. In the irregular warfare arena?
        Chairman Wicker. Yes.
        Mr. Jenkins. We are sufficiently organized within SO/LIC.
    We have a department, we have a team, an actual DASD (Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense), that has irregular warfare
    within, its charter that it's responsible for and leads through
    the Department in terms of helping combatant commands draw
    campaign plans that involve irregular warfare and educating
    throughout the joint force in terms of its irregular warfare is
    not just a SOF opportunity. It's a whole of Department of
    Defense opportunity.
        General Fenton. Senator, I would add.
        Chairman Wicker. Sure, General Fenton.
        General Fenton. I think for now, sufficiently organized,
    you know, as we talk and work through this, it's through
    Secretary Jenkins on their policy side. I think for SOCOM, it's
    unequivocal that we do irregular warfare and our components in
    our operational elements know it. They go back to the SOCOM
    headquarters or geographic combatant commanders.
        What I would offer is, I think it's always worth relooking
    because of the pace of the world and the way the world's
    changing and all type of levels. I talk about modernizing
    authorities, and I think it's always good to keep an eye on
    things so we're not complacent, or even as we think about
    technology, how fast it's moved. My sense is there's certainly
    a need to re-look authorities to make sure that they have not
    stayed stagnant or they have moved as fast as we need them.
        Chairman Wicker. Okay, well, I might want to have a
    conversation, an ongoing conversation with you General and for
    as long as I can, Mr. Jenkins, about how we could perhaps make
    the coordination better in this area. We're intruding on the
    time, Madam Chair, but let me just say.
        There's been a 35 percent increase from the COCOMs for your
    capabilities in the last 3 years. Is that right, General?
        General Fenton. That's correct, Senator.
        Chairman Wicker. One hundred and seventy percent increase
    in SOCOM crisis response missions. Including, but not limited
    to hostage rescues?
        General Fenton. Yes, sir. In fact, we just updated the
    numbers after we got chance to see you. I think today I
    reported 200 percent in 3\1/2\ years.
        Chairman Wicker. So, instead of 170 percent. Then manpower
    cuts of nearly 5,000 personnel in recent years. How did those
    come about?
        General Fenton. Well, Senator a couple things. I think
    through the lens of the defense planning scenario and the work
    that the service has to do along with the Department, against
    any potential scenario, and I'll leave at that because we could
    talk more in a classified session. My sense is that services
    took a look at the lens that they were given through those
    scenarios and came away with, we don't need X number of SOF.
        Over time, my sense is that that continued surely to gain
    traction in the Department. As a result, I think you're very
    aware of a point last year where Secretary of Defense Austin
    made a decision to reduce SOF by 3,000 people.
        Chairman Wicker. Well, have these crisis response requests
    gone unanswered?
        General Fenton. Senator, that----
        Chairman Wicker. With everything you're facing with the
    lack of funding and the lack of purchasing power and cuts of
    5,000?
        General Fenton. As I said in my opening statement, crisis
    response is the one place that I'm taking no risk. So, we put
    everything we have against the crisis response today because
    our sense is that is a sacred obligation. Presidentially
    directed, SECDEF directed, we cannot fail.
        Chairman Wicker. So, the other things that you might put
    behind those crisis response things might be, for example?
        General Fenton. Senator, I feel like we're absolutely
    taking risks in two places, modernization, and deterrence.
    Deterrence would be that mission that we are taking risk in and
    we're taking risk because in my sense, we are unable to answer
    the combatant commander's requirements to the level that they
    have requested and certainly need. When I look at that, that is
    risk to them and certainly risk to your SOF forces and that
    we're bringing the value that we could be bringing to the
    combatant commands, in preventing great power conflict and
    certainly preparing for it.
        Chairman Wicker. One other thing, Madam Chair. I just hope
    the General understands the Committee's position on both sides
    of the dais, that we need to hear fully from you on your
    unfunded requirements. Tell us what you need, be honest about
    it, and we'll try to get it for you. But we have found that
    some places within our defense establishment, they're reluctant
    to actually be honest with us about all the requirements that
    remain unfunded.
        Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Chairman.
        General Fenton. You got my commitment to that Senator.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, General Fenton. Next, I will
    recognize Senator Shaheen 5 minutes. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair. So, Mr. Jenkins,
    you talked about feeling confident about our irregular warfare
    capacity. Where do you put information operations that
    irregular warfare?
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you for pointing that out, because
    irregular warfare is just like, when you think about a kinetic
    strike, there are regular warfare strikes that are just as
    potent or valuable or important and need to be timed
    accordingly. So, the coordination for information operations
    actually resides within SO/LIC, within my organization.
        So, we have the unique opportunity to coordinate across the
    combatant commands, not only within DOD, but also with our
    sister agencies, with the Agency, with Department of State, and
    so those information operation plans are coordinated. So, that
    messages are comprehensive and complimentary was the word I was
    trying to think of instead of getting each other off track and
    timed accordingly. So, it's very important.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, I understand that you have the
    ability to coordinate. I'm concerned. General Fenton, you
    talked about the 3000 person cuts to SOF, and my understanding
    is that many of those were enablers for the military
    information support operations (MISO). Is that correct?
        General Fenton. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. I am concerned about our ability to
    compete in those information operations. We had a hearing in
    the Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of the year
    where our China experts said that China is spending $1.1
    billion a year on information operations, disinformation
    misinformation. Right now, we've completely dismantled our
    humanitarian and foreign aid presence in the regions where
    China has a foothold. We don't have anybody in charge of
    information operations across as far as I can tell--now, maybe
    we do, and I just don't know about it--across defense, State,
    and the Administration and the President just fired General
    Haugh, the head of Cyber Command.
        So, help me understand how we're able to compete in the
    information arena when we don't have anybody in charge, and
    when we've lost a lot of our people who are doing that work.
        General Fenton. Yes, ma'am. In terms of that, who's
    actually in charge and in coordination for the Department of
    Defense, that would fall by default to my organization, because
    I support the Under Secretary of Defense for policy, who is the
    principal information operation advisor to the SECDEF.
        So, we do have a coordination body and ability to do that.
    I have a full-time team that that's organizing and actively
    engaging with the combatant commands in terms of funding, also
    in messaging. Then they work outwardly with our State and
    agency partners so that if one agency is going to employ a
    message or an information operation, it's adequately
    coordinated with the other so that we don't have fracture side.
        Senator Shaheen. So, if China's spending over a billion
    dollars a year on their messaging strategy, how much are we
    spending in the Department of Defense on our messaging
    strategy?
        General Fenton. Ma'am, I'd have to get back to you with
    that specific number. But what we are doing is we're trying to
    make sure that we are good stewards----
        Senator Shaheen. Is it fair to say we're not spending a
    billion dollars a year?
        General Fenton. Correct. Yes, ma'am. That is fair.
        Senator Shaheen. Significantly less?
        General Fenton. Significantly less. We are trying to be
    smart with every penny for sure, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. But it's not likely that we're able to
    match the operations that China's doing, despite our intention
    and the fact that we think we can do it better, because we
    don't have the infrastructure to do that. We've dismantled our
    global engagement center at the Department of State. We're
    dismantling Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, all of the media
    that we've relied on really since the cold war to get messaging
    across to accurately reflect the position of the United States
    against our adversaries.
        So, again, I would ask you, General Fenton, do you think
    you have--should we be doing more to resource those information
    operations?
        General Fenton. Well, Senator, you and I have talked about
    this for----
        Senator Shaheen. We have.
        General Fenton.--quite some time. My sense, I'll start with
    information operations are absolutely critical. You know,
    there's a sense of you may not win a war with information
    operations like you could with artillery. You can certainly
    lose it if you're not a key part of that and putting out the
    messages. I would offer, I think as a United States of America,
    we've got a great message to tell. My sense is that there is a
    void. You mentioned misinformation, disinformation by any
    adversary. There's a void out there that's not being filled by
    our message.
        I think we take it certainly in Special Operations Command
    with our information officer professionals to really work at
    that in concert with our more often not our country teams, our
    embassy country teams, to put those messages out that assure
    populations or reassure and also at points in time, deter
    adversaries. That is also part of the information operations
    space. So, thank you for the opportunity to comment.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Senator Shaheen. We'll move
    to Senator Rosen.
        Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking
    Member Slotkin for holding this hearing. It's very important.
    I'd also like to thank General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins for
    testifying today and for your service--excuse me, I'm going to
    scoot in a little bit here--service to our Nation.
        I want to talk about Special Operations Forces in Syria
    because the United States and Syrian Democratic Forces, the
    SDF, they share an interest in preventing an Islamic State of
    Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurgence in northeastern Syria. Any
    escalation in the region, which is Turkish backed Syrian
    National Army and the central government in Damascus engaged
    military with the SDF would lead to instability that we know
    ISIS could exploit.
        That is extremely concerning, as is the possibility that
    such instability combined with destabilizing efforts from Iran
    and its proxies could cause SDF personnel guarding ISIS prisons
    and displaced persons camps to leave their posts in order to
    defend their territory. This would open the door to the
    possible escape of captured ISIS fighters and their families,
    as we saw that just play out in 2019.
        So, General Fenton, given our SOF partnership with the SDF
    and the Defeat ISIS campaign, including security training and
    assistance, what are SOF and the SDF doing to prevent breakouts
    from SDF run prisons and displaced persons camps to ensure that
    captured ISIS fighters and their families do not return to the
    battle space?
        I know this is a question that geographically pertains to
    CENTCOM, but our troops performing these counter-terrorism
    mission missions are Special Operation Forces.
        General Fenton. Senator, I think the very first thing we do
    is partner with our SDF partners, it's almost a decade now. I
    can get back and certainly provide written on the record how
    long we've done it, but I think it's about a decade, is
    disrupt, degrade and work to defeat ISIS in Syria. It's a
    threat certainly in the United States as we've laid out before.
    Many of the committees have come before you have talked about
    it.
        But I think the first thing we do is disrupt and degrade
    ISIS along with SDF counterparts, that certainly vectors into
    protecting the prisons and the camps. I think that, you know,
    if you look at it that's keeping improvised explosive ISIS
    bombers from attacking those, creating a level of or
    opportunities for breakout, that is taking action in places
    that may not be close to the camps, but we know have planning
    going on in the camp.
        So, I think there's many things your ARSOF team is doing
    along with our SDF partners to first and foremost, and that is
    the mission, disrupt and degrade and diminish ISIS, spur the
    CENTCOM and SECDEF direction, and also protect those camps from
    a breakout and a prison as well.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I'm going to direct this question
    to both of you staying on the same topic, because how does a
    continued elimination of ISIS leadership and which SOF you have
    accomplished time and time again, impact ISIS's ability to plan
    and carry out attacks on United States Forces and SDF front
    prisons and displaced persons camps? What are we doing more
    specifically to degrade Iranian aligned militias from attacking
    or attempting to attack United States and coalition forces?
        Mr. Jenkins, we can start with you and go on to the General
    please.
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, ma'am. We see all those problems
    clear-eyed for sure, and thank you for sharing that concern
    with us. As General Fenton alluded to, looking at what SOF can
    control what we can do in this space. We take that very
    seriously. We are at the leading edge to make sure that our SDF
    partners can maintain control of those prisons, that they can
    repatriate where appropriate and when possible, so that we can
    decrease the population of potential breakout and under
    difficult situations.
        Then in terms of decreasing malign influence, we have to
    make sure that, similar to China, that we are deterring
    wherever possible, whether it's at the level of armed conflict
    or below with irregular warfare. We have the ability and lots
    of tools across the spectrum to make sure that we are deterring
    them from being in the battle space where they want to be, and
    where they're trying to be.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. General Fenton, anything to add?
        General Fenton. Senator, I would offer on the ISIS piece I
    think is very important, as you've alluded to, to keep the
    pressure on ISIS by degrading their leadership the operational
    experience, personnel, the communicators, financiers, all of
    these things come together for attacks, not only in the Middle
    East against our forces, and that is force protection as we
    take it, but also in Europe and against our Homeland.
        ISIS is an ex-op's threat. So, I think that is the multiple
    responsibility for your Special Operations teammates, not only
    ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda, but getting after these layers
    is really important to keep any of those terrorist groups from
    being able to plan and execute an attack on the Homeland.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I'll yield back, but I'm going to
    actually ask a question for the record about the Houthis
    relations with Al-Shabaab. So, I'm glad you brought that up
    because it's critically important we discuss that as well.
    Thank you.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Senator Rosen, and at this time,
    we will recess for about 7 minutes, which will give us time to
    move over to the SVC-217, and we will go into a closed hearing
    at that point. So, I call a recess.
        [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                   special operations command and supplements
        1. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, it also surprised me that the
    Special Operations Community does not currently provide supplements
    that average Americans are allowed to utilize for optimal athletic
    performance such as creatine. Do you support special operators having
    access to these supplements, not on their own dime, to optimize
    performance?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM supports the use of appropriated funds for
    the provision of third-party certified dietary supplements, in
    accordance with Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6130.06, Use
    of Dietary Supplements in the DOD, such as creatine to enhance optimal
    performance and operational readiness of special operators, while also
    ensuring the safe use of any dietary supplement. We look forward to
    Congress' support in this effort.

        2. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, can you commit to working with
    Congress to address this issue and get our special operators the
    supplements and hormone therapies they deserve after sending them into
    some of the most demanding and dangerous environments in the world?
        General Fenton. Yes, USSOCOM is committed to collaborating with
    Congress, the Department of Defense, academia, and industry to address
    the need for evidence-based dietary supplementation and FDA-approved
    hormone therapy solutions that support the unique physical and
    psychological demands placed on our special operators.

                               operator syndrome
        3. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, there are widespread impacts of
    ``operator syndrome''--the syndrome associated with low testosterone
    and other imbalances resulting from years of operating under chronic
    stress. Do you believe the Special Operations community should call for
    regular blood testing to identify hormonal imbalances associated with
    ``operator syndrome''?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM medical providers adhere to current
    clinical guidelines on hormonal imbalances and ensure that Special
    Operators who are experiencing symptoms, which may be related to low
    testosterone or other hormonal imbalances, receive a comprehensive
    work-up, including blood testing of hormone levels and appropriate
    treatment. USSOCOM partners with medical specialists at military
    medical treatment facilities and within the provider networks,
    including endocrinologists, urologists, and sports medicine physicians
    to ensure optimal care.
        USSOCOM would support a longitudinal study of hormone levels in
    Special Operators, which could inform future guidelines on testing and
    supplementation. Normal testosterone levels vary widely, and current
    medical literature provides a broad reference range. Research that
    specifically targets the SOF population would be extremely helpful to
    determine if and how their ``normal'' hormone levels differ from the
    general population, and how those differences correlate with
    performance optimization and health improvement.

        4. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, do you believe our policies
    should reflect a desire to get as many operators access to hormone
    treatment as possible--acknowledging that their needs may be more
    aggressive than the average citizen?
        General Fenton. Our policies are currently designed to ensure that
    every operator who is experiencing symptoms due to hormonal imbalances
    receives a comprehensive evaluation with the appropriate specialists,
    and when indicated, treatment to correct irregularities. USSOCOM's
    medical and Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) human
    performance teams--which include medical providers and SOF medics,
    licensed nutritionists, physical therapists, strength and conditioning
    specialists, athletic trainers, mental health providers, and cognitive
    performance specialists--are trained to recognize potential symptoms of
    hormone imbalance and communicate their concerns to SOF patients and
    clients.
        While Special Operations personnel face unique operational demands
    and potentially higher stress levels contributing to hormonal
    imbalances, treatment decisions prioritize individual medical needs and
    established clinical guidelines for hormone replacement therapy. In
    addition to hormone replacement therapy when appropriate, our medical
    providers rely on non-pharmacological interventions including stress
    management, sleep optimization, exercise, and nutritional counseling.

                      preservation of the force and family
        5. Senator Cotton. General Fenton, SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations
    Command] has a program called Preservation of the Force and Family
    [POTFF] that is specifically designed to enhance human performance. Yet
    out of the approximately $80 million allocated for that program, none
    is allocated to address these hormone or supplement performance and
    optimization issues. Will you commit to seeing if any of that money can
    be re-allocated to address this appropriately?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM lacks the statutory authority to procure
    quality dietary supplements and sports foods using Major Force Program
    11 funding. If granted new authorities to procure dietary supplements
    and sports food items for SOF servicemembers, USSOCOM will work with
    ASD SO/LIC and DHA on policy and budgetary requirements associated with
    any changes to authorities to ensure the health and mission
    effectiveness of SOF, without degrading the other key POTFF services
    for SOF warfighters. Currently, the POTFF program budget does include
    contracted service support of Performance Dietitians to advise SOF
    Commands on hormone and supplements issues.

                                   __________
                               Senator Joni Ernst
                       ubiquitous technical surveillance
        6. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, as you are aware of the threat of
    Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance [UTS], from your standpoint, are we
    executing a coordinated strategy to deal with such a threat? In your
    opinion, who owns or should own that strategy? What measures will you
    implement to conduct thorough digital risk assessments aimed at
    identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities exploited through UTS?
        General Fenton. Yes. In the 2024 National Counterintelligence
    Strategy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence through
    the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) identified
    the growing threat of cutting-edge technologies, such as technical
    surveillance equipment being employed by foreign intelligence entities,
    and goals for the intelligence community to mitigate.
        The NCSC's charter as the Nation's premier source for
    counterintelligence and security expertise leads the development of a
    whole of government strategy to address the challenges of UTS.
        The USSOCOM Director of Intelligence (J2), in accordance with the
    2024 National Counterintelligence Strategy guidance, as the office of
    primary responsibility for the UTS problem set in close collaboration
    with the Director of Operations (J3), and intelligence community
    partners to effectuate the NCSC strategy, has developed procedures to
    assess the counterintelligence risks to include UTS of on-going
    operational activities, specifically leveraging sensitive intelligence
    reporting to identify adversary capabilities to exploit UTS threat
    vectors, and develop mitigation techniques to secure those operations,
    activities, and investments. USSOCOM has identified an enterprise gap
    in countering the long-term threats posed by UTS and the J2 is
    sponsoring a capability development requirement to centralize and
    synchronize counter UTS efforts across the enterprise to gain
    efficiencies within the current fiscal constraints.

        7. Senator Ernst. General Fenton, the recently published SOF
    [Special Operations Forces] Imperatives 2025 document highlighted the
    threat the digital surveillance economy or UTS poses to SOF. The
    digital surveillance economy collects, resells, and resolves our
    commercial transactions and digital habits is an unavoidable part of
    today's operating environment. The digital signatures and patterns of
    life of our SOF operators, their communities, and partners risk being
    exploited by our adversaries. What requirements, policies and programs
    does SOCOM and its subordinate commands have in place to manage this
    UTS risk?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM established an Identity Management Program
    of Record in 2014 with the Director of Operations, J3, as the Office of
    Primary Responsibility. This program provides identity assessment and
    threat mitigation capabilities by incorporating people, technology, and
    tools to: assist with the protection of SOF members, their families,
    and our organizations; coordinate identity management standards and
    procedures; and provide training to enable and empower USSOCOM
    personnel to protect their identities. In doing so, USSOCOM strengthens
    its resilience against UTS threat vectors and ensures viable options--
    especially in the case of sensitive activities. The USSOCOM Identity
    Management Program adheres to three key tenets: (1) Train: Train and
    Educate the force to protect identity data; (2) Govern: Provide policy
    and governance to the SOF Enterprise, and (3) Employ: Deliberate and
    judicious application of capability to execute the program's vision.
    USSOCOM incorporates these key tenets of Identity Management into a
    larger strategy that supports, enables, and protects SOF before,
    during, and after the conduct of global special operations and
    activities. Additionally, USSOCOM disaggregates its Identity Management
    Program by providing trained Identity Management Technicians to
    subordinate Commands. Identity Management Technicians are then able to
    conduct tailored identity management activities for individual
    personnel, organizations, and assets that are unique to assigned
    missions and acceptable risk. Furthermore, the J3 coordinates closely
    with the J2, Director of Intelligence to deconflict and share training
    opportunities on protecting identities against the threat of UTS.
    Looking to the future, USSOCOM is seeking opportunities to partner
    closer with the Services. Identity management programs at the Service
    level will be mutually beneficial to educate and protect the General
    Purpose Force and potentially mitigate digital dust prior to a
    servicemembers ascension into the SOF community.

                                   __________
                            Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                 civilian harm
        8. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, do you agree
    that one difference between the United States and its potential
    adversaries is the greater value that the U.S. Government puts on
    protecting human life and liberty at home and abroad?
        Mr. Jenkins. The Department of Defense has a strong history of
    compliance with the law of armed conflict, and our commanders strive to
    minimize harm to civilians
        General Fenton. USSOCOM, like the Department of Defense, values all
    human life, be it a combatant or non-combatant, and is committed to
    mitigating and responding to civilian harm for legal, moral,
    operational, and strategic reasons, including to improve the
    capabilities and effectiveness of our SOF, while recognizing the
    protection of civilians during military operations. This is not only a
    top priority for USSOCOM, but a moral obligation for all our SOF
    members currently operating around the globe.

        9. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what is your
    understanding of title 10 U.S.C. 184, which established the Civilian
    Protection Center of Excellence?
        Mr. Jenkins. I am aware of the statute, which requires DOD to
    operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence as a focal point
    for matters relating to civilian harm, spells out its purpose and use,
    and requires the issuance of an annual report.
        General Fenton. Title 10 U.S.C. Sec.  184 mandated the Secretary of
    Defense to operate the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP
    CoE) with the purpose of institutionalizing and advancing knowledge,
    practices, and tools for preventing, mitigating, and responding to
    civilian harm. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.17 designated the
    Army as the joint proponent for Civilian Harm Mitigation Response
    (CHMR) and directs the Army to establish the CP CoE.

        10. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, the U.S.
    military has spent many years working to improve its ability to prevent
    and mitigate civilian harm without sacrificing lethality--including
    through the development of the DOD [Department of Defense] Instruction
    on Civilian Harm under the first Trump administration. These efforts
    received bipartisan support from Congress and grew out of a recognition
    from the U.S. military itself that, after over 2 decades of U.S. wars,
    warfighters needed better tools and trustworthy systems to prevent
    civilian harm, uphold U.S. values, and prevent the moral injury and
    psychological trauma that too often comes with deadly mistakes. What do
    you understand to be the importance of preventing and responding to
    civilian harm for successful special operations, including in areas
    outside of active hostilities or in support of allies and partners?
        Mr. Jenkins. I believe it is both morally right and in the U.S.
    national interest to reduce civilian harm caused by military
    operations. The Department will continue to address the challenges of
    civilian presence on the battlefield in a way that enhances our
    effectiveness and does not constrain our commanders or diminish our
    lethality.
        General Fenton. USSOCOM values demand the safeguarding of non-
    combatants during SOF operations. Failure to prioritize this undermines
    our legitimacy, erodes public trust, and fuels adversary propaganda.
    Civilian Harm Mitigation is vital for maintaining local support,
    strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries opportunities to
    exploit civilian casualties. Mitigating and appropriately responding to
    civilian harm underscores both our values and the precision of our
    capabilities. Furthermore, it sets a critical example for our partners
    and allies to emulate.

        11. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what value can
    advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation and response
    provide to commanders?
        Mr. Jenkins. Advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation
    and response support our commanders by analyzing planned operations,
    identifying potential risks to civilians, and recommend adjustments to
    tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to minimize harm.
        General Fenton. In the past, CHMR advisors assisted Commanders and
    their staffs in mitigating civilian harm without compromising
    lethality. Their expertise enhanced precision, preserving legitimacy
    and enabling mission success. They proactively shaped strategies,
    providing foresight into the civilian environment and potential second
    and third-order effects of operations. This strengthens partnerships,
    safeguards our forces, and informs decisionmaking. Early staff
    integration during Shape and Deter planning is key to mitigating harm
    and preparing appropriate responses to potential incidents.

        12. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how has Special
    Operations benefited from the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence?
        Mr. Jenkins. The Civilian Protection Center of Excellence has
    provided support to Special Operations in preparation for, during, and
    following military operations by enhancing operational effectiveness,
    increasing battlefield awareness, and minimizing harm caused to
    civilians.
        General Fenton. The CP CoE served as hub and facilitator of
    Department-wide analysis and expertise related to civilian harm
    mitigation and response, aiding the operationalization of CHMR concepts
    through guidance, force development, training and education.

        13. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how has Special
    Operations supported and implemented the Civilian Harm Mitigation
    Response and Action Plan (CHMR-AP)?
        Mr. Jenkins. SO/LIC and numerous other DOD components, including
    the Combatant Commands, contributed to the design of the CHMR-AP and
    worked with others across the force to implement it. We continue to
    support CHMR efforts being applied in a way that enhances our military
    effectiveness and does not constrain commanders or diminish our
    lethality.
        General Fenton. USSOCOM has made significant progress on its
    assigned CHMR actions, reaching an estimated 52 percent completion
    rate. However, further progress is contingent upon the CP CoE and
    higher echelons completing their tasks. USSOCOM and its Subordinate
    Components are actively working with supported Geographic Combatant
    Commands to ensure the effective integration of SOF capabilities and
    protection of civilians and non-combatants during operations and
    exercises involving SOF.

        14. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, what have been
    the benefits for Special Operations in supporting and implementing the
    Civilian Harm Mitigation Response and Action Plan?
        Mr. Jenkins. Advisors with expertise in civilian harm mitigation
    and response support our commanders by analyzing planned operations,
    identifying potential risks to civilians, and recommend adjustments to
    tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to minimize harm.
        General Fenton. This increased transparency fosters trust with
    local populations and strengthens the legitimacy of our operations.
    Proactive mitigation is enhanced through a collaborative effort across
    the DOD, Combat Supported Agencies (CSA), and NGO's to accurately
    depict the civilian environment through rigorous data analysis, and
    adherence to policies that mitigate civilian harm.

        15. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, do you believe
    that our troops are at higher risk for retribution as the number of
    civilian deaths from U.S. military operations or U.S.-led military
    operations increases?
        Mr. Jenkins. American security rests on the ability and will to use
    lawful and appropriate military power. This is a simple fact in a
    dangerous world. At the same time the Department of Defense has a
    strong history of compliance with the law of armed conflict, and our
    commanders strive to minimize harm to civilians
        General Fenton. Civilian harm can fuel resentment and potentially
    motivate retaliatory actions against U.S. forces, impacting both their
    physical security and the overall operational environment. SOF
    recognizes that minimizing civilian harm is crucial for maintaining
    local support, strengthening partnerships, and denying adversaries
    exploitable propaganda.

        16. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, how does
    preventing and mitigating civilian harm help to promote U.S. national
    security?
        Mr. Jenkins. Actions taken to mitigate civilian harm--such as
    increasing our battlefield awareness and our precision--also enhance
    our military effectiveness. In addition, mitigating civilian harm
    supports U.S. strategic goals and limits strategic advantages for our
    adversaries.
        General Fenton. Preventing and mitigating civilian harm
    significantly contributes to U.S. national security. Respect for
    civilian lives and property enhances U.S. legitimacy on the global
    stage, bolstering international partnerships and facilitating foreign
    policy objectives. Conversely, causing civilian harm undermines U.S.
    credibility, alienating allies, and empowering adversaries. Protecting
    civilians improves stability and security in conflict zones, reducing
    the likelihood of protracted conflicts, terrorism, and the need for
    costly U.S. military interventions. Furthermore, it protects U.S.
    servicemembers by mitigating the risk of retaliatory violence and
    hostility. Finally, protecting civilians upholds core American values
    of human life and dignity, reinforcing the Nation's moral standing and
    maintaining public support for military operations both domestically
    and internationally.

        17. Senator Warren. Mr. Jenkins and General Fenton, does having
    civilian-harm prevention personnel build trust and relationships with
    local civil society groups help commanders to collect useful
    intelligence information?
        Mr. Jenkins. Yes. By demonstrating a commitment to mitigating
    civilian harm, commanders can build trust and cooperation with local
    communities. This improves intelligence gathering, facilitates access
    to key areas, and reduces resistance to military operations.
        General Fenton. USSOCOM recognizes the importance of building trust
    and relationships, critical actions to develop a robust civilian
    environment picture and gather critical intelligence to inform
    Commanders and their staffs.

        18. Senator Warren. General Fenton, in what ways do you see
    civilian harm mitigation and response efforts furthering SOCOM's
    mission and the effectiveness of its operations?
        General Fenton. Protecting civilians and non-combatants
    significantly enhances USSOCOM's mission effectiveness. Minimizing
    civilian harm reduces blowback, fostering a permissive operating
    environment for SOF and improving mission success. This effort
    strengthens operational legitimacy, increasing cooperation with
    partners and bolstering information operations by countering negative
    narratives. It also builds trust with partner forces, improving
    interoperability; furthermore, it fosters greater access and freedom of
    movement by building rapport with local populations. Finally, it
    mitigates legal and political risks, while contributing to long-term
    stability and security, reducing the need for future interventions.
                               blast overpressure
        19. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how have Special Operators
    benefited from working with community partners, such as Home Base, to
    treat servicemembers who have been exposed to blast overpressure or
    have suffered brain injuries?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM has benefited greatly from Community
    partners who address traumatic brain injury (TBI) or blast overpressure
    injuries. Our Special Operators deserve to have the best care that they
    can possibly get from the military healthcare system and in our
    communities. Our partnership with Home Base and other institutions
    remains strong as we have a commitment to taking care of our
    servicemembers. Community organizations have become an integral part of
    ensuring that we take care of Special Operators while in uniform and
    afterwards.

        20. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how have Special Operators
    benefited from the Comprehensive Brain Health and Trauma [ComBHaT]
    Program at Home Base?
        General Fenton. Over 1,150 USSOCOM servicemembers have attended
    ComBHaT since the 2019 pilot program and 93 percent have returned to
    duty after attending. This high return-to-duty rate demonstrates the
    effectiveness of ComBHaT, and the value of partnership with community
    organizations like Home Base in supporting the health and readiness of
    our operators.

        21. Senator Warren. General Fenton, why is it important to mitigate
    the risks of blast overpressure for Special Operators?
        General Fenton. It is important for us to understand and mitigate
    the risk of blast overpressure because of our inherent commitment to
    our people. People are our No. 1 priority. We have an obligation to
    protect the brain health and cognitive functioning of our USSOCOM
    servicemembers, while preserving the required lethality. USSOCOM is
    leveraging next-generation technologies to mitigate blast overpressure
    risks, while effectively monitoring and tracking operator exposures.

        22. Senator Warren. General Fenton, why is it important to ensure
    Special Operators have access to quality care after exposure to blast
    overpressure?
        General Fenton. While much remains unknown about the long-term
    effects of blast overpressure on the brain, USSOCOM is taking decisive
    action to protect our personnel today. USSOCOM is committed to early
    identification of operators with brain injuries and symptoms from blast
    overpressure to treat and mitigate possible long-term consequences. We
    invest heavily in our people, and we want them to operate at their
    best.

        23. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how do you work with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs to make sure that servicemembers,
    veterans, and their families are aware of the risks of blast
    overpressure and traumatic brain injury?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM has a strong partnership with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs. USSOCOM utilizes the VA's Polytrauma
    System of Care and network of specialized rehabilitation programs to
    treat SOF servicemembers with TBI and polytrauma. An integral part of
    these rehabilitation program is interdisciplinary evaluation and
    treatment, case management and family education and training. USSOCOM
    families provide a source of strength for our servicemembers, and it is
    critical that they remain involved in medical treatment and
    rehabilitation.

        24. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how would Special Operators
    benefit from logs detailing their exposure to blast overpressure and
    traumatic brain injury, including the number, date, and intensity of
    exposures?
        General Fenton. Special Operators would benefit from being able to
    objectively measure their individual blast overpressure exposure. This
    would allow individuals, Commanders, medical personnel, and researchers
    to integrate risk management, correlate blast overpressure exposure to
    blast related injuries. USSOCOM is at the forefront of developing tools
    to help SOF operators monitor their exposure, to include coordinating
    with Program Managers for the Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record
    and Electronic Health Record to capture and present exposure data to
    our Healthcare Providers. A key focus is the investment in and
    deployment of advanced blast sensors that provide the most accurate
    measurement capabilities available. These sensors are being developed
    and fielded to deliver precise data on blast exposure in real-time,
    empowering operators and medical teams to better assess risks and take
    timely action.

        25. Senator Warren. General Fenton, how would Special Operators
    benefit from annual neurocognitive assessments, including one before
    they begin training to establish a baseline, and one before they leave
    the military to determine changes in cognitive health over time?
        General Fenton. In 2019, USSOCOM instituted requirements for more
    frequent neurocognitive assessments than the Department of Defense
    required at the time as we needed closer monitoring of our operators'
    cognitive functioning throughout their careers. The benefit of more
    frequent assessments is that it allows for earlier identification and
    treatment of cognitive changes over the course of a servicemember's
    career. USSOCOM is attempting to validate and leverage tools like rapid
    cognitive and balance assessment apps to establish baselines before
    training events, and to enhance our medical screening processes. The
    August 2024 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum on DOD Requirements
    for Management of Brain Health Risks from Blast Overpressure directed
    baseline cognitive testing for all new Active and Reserve members
    during initial military training. This baseline data will greatly
    benefit all servicemembers to include those who become Special
    Operators for monitoring and documentation.

        26. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what steps are you taking to
    address concerns about increased risks of suicide after exposure to
    blast overpressure?
        General Fenton. To address concerns about increased risks of
    suicide after exposure to blast overpressure, the USSOCOM POTFF program
    continues to take a multipronged approach. In the prevention space, we
    have modernized suicide prevention training, integrating virtual
    reality (VR) training to assist with these efforts. The training
    modules highlight the symptoms often seen in those who have experienced
    repeated blast exposure, such as headaches, fatigue, and memory
    difficulties. In addition to highlighting these various concerns, the
    goal of the VR training is to encourage early identification of
    teammates in distress, have uncomfortable yet necessary conversations,
    and have the servicemember connected to care. Leveraging interactive,
    innovative training technology, we hope to decrease stigma in
    addressing these concerns, and getting necessary assistance before
    turning into a crisis.
        Additionally, the Command Senior Enlisted Leaders and I host
    quarterly ``1st SOF Truth Events'' with the leaders of our O-5 and
    above Command teams to discuss key people topics, such as suicide
    prevention, brain health, and mental health to ensure that Command
    leadership teams across the SOCOM enterprise are adopting best
    practices and are taking proactive actions. Our next event will focus
    exclusively on Blast Overpressure education and mitigation strategies.

        27. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what steps are you taking to
    ensure that servicemembers and their families are aware of potential
    increased risks of suicide after exposure to blast overpressure?
        General Fenton. As mentioned earlier, USSOCOM has modernized
    suicide prevention training, integrating VR suicide prevention training
    that also includes a module specifically designed for spouses. The
    training module highlights the symptoms often seen in those who have
    experienced repeated blast exposure, such as headaches, fatigue, and
    memory difficulties. It is our hope that the VR suicide prevention
    training module for spouses will provide them the opportunity to
    practice addressing concern, asking hard questions, and ultimately
    getting their SOF members help if necessary. Following each VR suicide
    prevention training experience is a guided discussion that allows
    participants to conduct a targeted discussion on elevated suicide risks
    after a blast overpressure exposure.
        Our quarterly 1st SOF Truth Events, focused on suicide prevention,
    brain health, and mental health enable Command leadership teams to
    implement proactive actions and promulgate best practices throughout
    their units and down to the servicemembers themselves.

        28. Senator Warren. General Fenton, what resources and support do
    you provide for the families of Special Operators so that they can
    understand the risks of blast overpressure and recognize if their loved
    one may be experiencing symptoms as a result of this exposure?
        General Fenton. USSOCOM wants to increase awareness, identify the
    need for further evaluation, and foster a culture of early reporting
    and intervention. We know that spouses are often the first to recognize
    any change in their partner's well-being.
        It is our hope the VR suicide prevention training module for
    spouses will provide them a tool to help identify the symptoms of blast
    overpressure and the opportunity to support their loved ones in getting
    help they need.
        Additionally, there is an optional survey for spouses as part of
    the USSOCOM's brain health monitoring program. USSOCOM requires every
    SOF Warfighter to complete a Comprehensive Assessment and Symptom
    History (CASH) within 12 months of completing initial SOF training and
    every 5 years afterward. Spouses can take an optional CASH survey
    designed for them. The CASH documents SOF Warfighters' experiences in
    combat and training that may not have been reported previously. Our
    CASH assessors spend a significant amount of time educating Operators
    on TBI and blast overpressure symptoms to enhance treatment.
        In alignment with DOD BOP Implementation Guidance, ASD SO/LIC and
    USSOCOM are committed to educating our servicemembers potentially
    exposed to BOP hazards on the potential adverse health and performance
    effects and actions they can take to protect themselves. We have
    broadened the audience of our quarterly 1st SOF Truth events to include
    the spouses of our O5 and above Command teams. By educating informing
    the spouses of our SOF leaders, they will in turn, help mentor and
    support the spouses of our servicemembers.

        29. Senator Warren. General Fenton, do you support addressing the
    risks of blast overpressure to servicemembers through the swift
    implementation of Sections 721 through Section 725 of the fiscal year
    2025 NDAA [Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act]?
        General Fenton. Yes, I support these DOD-wide efforts to address
    the risk of BOP on servicemembers' brain health.
                                   __________
                              Senator Jackie Rosen
        30. Senator Rosen. General Fenton, the Iranian-backed Houthis are
    diversifying their military capabilities and leveraging regional
    conflicts to expand their influence. In recent months, there have been
    reports that the Houthis are working to provide weapons to the Somali
    terrorist group, al-Shabab. This development is incredibly concerning,
    as al-Shabab could utilize more sophisticated Houthi weapons--including
    drones--to target U.S. equities and personnel in the Horn of Africa,
    such as our base in Djibouti. To the extent that you are able in this
    open setting, can you share more about the growing partnership between
    the Houthis and al-Shabab and the risk this poses not only to US
    equities in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and AFRICOM [U.S. Africa
    Command], but also to global shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden?
        General Fenton. Since at least June 2024, the Houthis have provided
    small weapons, ammunition, explosives, and training to al-Shabaab, one
    of al-Qa'ida's wealthiest affiliates. A pragmatic strategic interest
    drives the relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabaab, with
    reported heightened tactical collaboration in transporting equipment
    and weapons, training, and intelligence sharing. The Houthis may be
    facilitating the transfer of advanced weaponry, such as UAVs and
    surface-to-air missiles in exchange for access to al-Shabaab networks
    and new locations from which to attack commercial ships, further
    disrupting freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
    Iranian encouragement may also drive some of the willingness of the
    Houthis to engage with an ideological adversary, such as al-Shabaab.
    While a formal alliance remains unconfirmed, the growing evidence of
    tactical cooperation, particularly in maritime activities, arms
    trafficking, and potential training exchanges suggests a growing and
    more diverse threat to U.S. equities and global shipping in the region.
    Al-Shabaab has used Houthi-supplied weapons in attacks on the African
    Union presence in Somalia and the group could use Houthi-supplied
    weapons in the current offensive in Lower and Middle Shabelle, Somalia.

        31. Senator Rosen. General Fenton, since our withdrawal from our
    two air bases in Niger last year--at the behest of the host nation--our
    ability to conduct ISR within the Sahel and throughout the African
    continent has been severely degraded. Can you share more about the
    challenges this poses to countering violent extremism in the region?
        General Fenton. The withdrawal of U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and U.S. SOF from Niger impacted
    USAFRICOM's ability to maintain indications and warnings of terrorist
    activity, and support and enable African partner-led counterterrorism
    in the Sahel, respectively. Terrorist groups in the Sahel, including
    ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates, present a regional threat as they expand
    their activities and attacks from the Sahel into northern Cote
    d'Ivoire, Benin, Ghana, and Togo. Continued and increasing control over
    territory and resources may enable these groups to fund, plan, and
    execute attacks on the U.S. Homeland, and U.S. persons and interests
    abroad. To mitigate this impact, the Department of Defense works with
    and through our West African partners to disrupt, degrade, and deny the
    terrorist activities by strengthening their northern borders with
    Sahelian states, bolstering their military capabilities, and improving
    their own intelligence capabilities. The Department also is working
    with non-African allies and partners to maintain situational awareness
    of terrorist groups in the Sahel.

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