    [Senate Hearing 119-213]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-213

                           DEFENDING AGAINST DRONES:
                         SETTING SAFEGUARDS FOR COUNTER
                     UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AUTHORITIES
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 20, 2025

                                   __________

                              Serial No. J-119-18

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                            www.judiciary.senate.gov
                                www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-982                  WASHINGTON : 2026
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                      CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois,
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                       Ranking Member
    MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah                 SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina          RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana              MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               ALEX PADILLA, California
    KATIE BOYD BRITT, Alabama            PETER WELCH, Vermont
    ASHLEY MOODY, Florida                ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

                 Kolan Davis, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
             Joe Zogby, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page

    Grassley, Hon. Charles E.........................................     1
    Durbin, Hon. Richard J...........................................    13

                                   WITNESSES

    Daskal, Jennifer.................................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................    32
    Dixon, Ricky D...................................................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    42
    Donohue, Laura K.................................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................    45
        Responses to written questions...............................    90
    Dooley, Robert...................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    71
    Wilson, Troy E...................................................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................    74

                                    APPENDIX

    Items submitted for the record...................................    93

                           DEFENDING AGAINST DRONES:
                             SETTING SAFEGUARDS FOR
                           COUNTER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
                              SYSTEMS AUTHORITIES

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 20, 2025,

                                  United States Senate,
                                    Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
    Room 226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E.
    Grassley, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Grassley [presiding], Cornyn, Lee,
    Kennedy, Blackburn, Schmitt, Britt, Moody, Durbin, Klobuchar,
    and Blumenthal.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY,
                 A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

        Chairman Grassley. The meeting will come to order.
    Normally, we don't start without Senator Durbin being here, but
    he's busy in another Committee and will come along later. I
    have his permission to move ahead.
        Thank you all for coming. Today's hearing will highlight
    the challenges faced by State and local law enforcement when
    they encounter drones that pose threats to their own public
    safety. In 2018, most of us serving on this Committee,
    including this Senator and Ranking Member Durbin, voted to
    grant advanced counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems authority to
    the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security for public
    safety functions. These authorities have been extended
    temporarily eight times since they were originally signed into
    law in 2018, which is a testament to their importance.
        The counter-drone authorities granted to the Department of
    Justice and the Department of Homeland Security in 2018 left
    State and local law enforcement out of this framework, but the
    threats that local law enforcement faces are very much the
    same. As the threat of dangerous drone use continues to expand
    and evolve, Congress must find a way to equip law enforcement
    with the vital tools, while serving civil liberties. These
    principles are not incompatible.
        Notably, the drone industry itself has been asking for
    clear rules and responsibly deployed counter-drone authorities
    by State and local law enforcement for several years now. Safer
    skies are better for everyone, including even amateur drone
    hobbyists.
        Over the years, Congress has heard a lot from the Federal
    Government on this issue, but today we're going to hear from
    our State law enforcement officials, telling us their part of
    the story. The law enforcement professionals here today have
    unique perspectives on some of the most pressing challenges
    when it comes to criminal use of drones. These include
    correctional facilities, where organized crime groups bombard
    prisons with contraband like dangerous weapons, drugs, cell
    phones, and tools to aid escape. Illegal drone incursions force
    prisons around the country to lock down at the expense of those
    who seek rehabilitation, education, and other programming while
    serving their sentences.
        Drones are also a massive threat at our Southern border,
    where cartels use them to conduct surveillance of U.S. law
    enforcement, to smuggle dangerous drugs into our communities,
    and as weapons of war. We can't wait until a creative criminal
    or terrorist succeeds in mass casualty attacks before Congress
    acts. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and
    Federal law enforcement can't be everywhere all at once. But
    expanded law enforcement authorities must come with oversight
    and accountability. Our witnesses today will tell you in our
    Committee that they're not afraid of oversight or
    accountability. They've already taken oaths to defend the
    Constitution as well as their communities.
        I will play a 1-minute video displaying some of the
    creative and disturbing ways that criminals use drones. As it
    currently stands, there's very little our State and local law
    enforcement officials can do about them, and that needs to
    change. And that's why we are having this hearing. Would you
    start the television?
        [Video is shown.]
        [Voice heard off microphone.]
        Chairman Grassley. Okay. Now, if Senator Durbin wants to
    give his opening statement when he gets here, I'll call on him
    at that time. And he was going to introduce his witness. I'm
    going to do that for him; is that right?
        Voice. Correct.
        Chairman Grassley. Yes. Okay. Our first witness is Captain
    Troy Wilson. Captain Wilson joined the Texas Department of
    Public Safety in 1993. Captain Wilson is the Texas Ranger
    Division Unmanned Aircraft System Program Coordinator.
    Currently, the Texas Department of Public Safety has
    approximately 402 UAS aircraft and 384 pilots. The Ranger
    Division that Captain Wilson coordinates has approximately 67
    UAS pilots and 108 U.S. aircraft. Captain Wilson is uniquely
    qualified to discuss the growing drone threat along the border.
        Next is Sergeant Robert Dooley. Sergeant Dooley is
    statewide UAS counter-UAS coordinator with the Florida Highway
    Patrol. Sergeant Dooley has more than 23 years of service as a
    Florida State trooper and has developed and led the Florida
    Highway Patrol's UAS program since its inception. Sergeant
    Dooley has a broad range of experience that includes working
    with other partner agencies at the local, State, interstate,
    and Federal levels, as well as lawmakers, State attorneys, and
    other community stakeholders.
        Finally, we have president Ricky Dixon. Mr. Dixon serves as
    secretary of Florida's Department of Corrections and is also
    currently serving as president of the American Correctional
    Association. Mr. Dixon began his career in corrections in 1996.
    Throughout his early career, Dixon served as a correctional
    officer, colonel of the Florida State Prison, assistant warden,
    and warden at three separate correctional institutions. In
    2021, Mr. Dixon was appointed to be secretary of the Florida
    Department of Corrections. He is widely recognized as a--
    correctional subject matter.
        Okay. Introduction of minority witnesses. I'd first like to
    welcome Jennifer Daskal. Ms. Daskal is a partner with the
    Venable cybersecurity team. She recently served during the
    Biden administration as deputy homeland security advisor,
    principal deputy legal advisor to the National Security
    Council, and acting general counsel for the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        I also welcome Laura Donohue, professor of law, Georgetown
    University Law Center, and faculty director of Georgetown
    Center on National Security and the Law. She is a recognized
    expert in national security and privacy, technology, and
    constitutional law as an expert on drones.
        Now I would like to do what we customarily do: swear the
    team. So, would you please rise? And I'd like to administer
    this oath.
        [Witnesses are sworn in.]
        Chairman Grassley. I've seen a positive response from all
    of you. Thank you very much. Now we'll go my left to my right,
    so we'll start with Mr. Wilson. Captain Wilson.

     STATEMENT OF TROY E. WILSON, DIVISION PROGRAM COORDINATOR FOR
             UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, TEXAS RANGERS, TEXAS

        Mr. Wilson. Good morning. Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member
    Durbin, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today.
    As you know, my name is Troy Wilson, and I'm a staff captain
    with the Texas Rangers, with the Department of Public Safety.
    My responsibilities also include overseeing drone operations
    within the Texas Ranger Division.
        The Texas Ranger Division has been operating UAS on the
    Texas-Mexico border since 2019. Currently, each week we are
    sending four special operations group ground teams to the
    border. Each team is supported by a two-man UAS team. We have
    operated along the border from El Paso to Brownsville, and
    these teams work very closely with U.S. Border Patrol and their
    marine operations.
        When we started this in 2019, there was very little UAS
    used by the criminal organizations, but their ground counter-
    surveillance was substantial. Currently, they still maintain
    their ground counter-surveillance but have augmented it with
    UAS surveillance of law enforcement personnel at all levels. In
    the past, we have had attempts by criminal UAS operators trying
    to crash their drones into our drones. We've had their drones
    hovering above our helicopters. Our helicopters would be at
    about 1,100 feet, and the drone would be above that, just
    watching.
        We have seen it used to surveil where law enforcement is
    and is not, on the border. And most recently, about a month
    ago, one of our drones was mitigated by a cartel across in
    Laredo, Nuevo Laredo. Transnational criminal organizations use
    unmanned aircraft along the Texas-Mexico border; it presents a
    significant evolving threat. These organizations are
    increasingly leveraging UAS technology for intelligence-
    gathering purposes, which enables them to exploit border
    security operations.
        Over the past 12 months, from April 2024 to April 2025,
    Texas DPS' own sensors have identified 1,216 UAS border
    incursions. We know this is a fraction of the actual number of
    incidents, but alarmingly, nearly half of these range in
    altitude between 600 and 1,800 feet above ground level--the
    typical altitude range for where our helicopters and border
    patrol helicopters operate.
        The increasing presence of UAS operations in the same
    airspace as manned aviation introduces an alarming possibility
    of collisions, endangering the citizens of the State of Texas
    and law enforcement personnel and equipment. Such incidents
    critically impair border security operations and endanger
    lives, underscoring the urgent need for enhanced detection and
    mitigation systems. The interference with legitimate border
    security operations, UAS operations by these unauthorized
    drones undermines critical efforts to maintain control and
    effectively monitor the region.
        Taken together, these threats underscore the urgent need
    for Congress to grant authority to State and local law
    enforcement agencies to operate robust detection and mitigation
    strategies to counter the threat of drones and ensure the
    safety and security of the border regions. The existing 12
    sensors owned by the Texas DPS are limited in scope and only
    detect DJI drones. This means they only--they make up about 80
    percent of the market, and the 12 sensors cover just 14 percent
    of the 1,200-mile stretch of the Texas-Mexico border.
        This illustrates the urgent need to expand sensor coverage
    both in terms of geography and the variety that UAS can be
    detected. Addressing these threats requires a comprehensive,
    layered approach. Detection technologies must be integrated to
    identify potential UAS threats promptly and accurately, while
    any mitigation strategies must be implemented with precision to
    minimize collateral damage. Surgical mitigation techniques are
    essential to neutralize threats effectively without
    compromising public safety or causing unintended disruptions.
        Above all, we all understand that any counter-UAS detection
    and mitigation policy or practice must abide by any applicable
    State or Federal laws and align with the First and Fourth
    Amendments. Despite significant efforts at the State level,
    Texas DPS and other law enforcement agencies face constraints
    imposed by the Federal Government that limit the scope of
    action needed to address the growing UAS threat. State and
    local and tribal territory law enforcement agencies need the
    ability to detect and mitigate criminal UAS along the border
    and near or over correctional facilities, prisons.
        On behalf of the Texas Department of Public Safety, we urge
    Congress to take action to address this issue. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson appears as a
    submission for the record.]
        Chairman Grassley. Thank you. Ms. Daskal.

                     STATEMENT OF JENNIFER DASKAL,
                  PARTNER, VENABLE LLP, WASHINGTON, DC

        Ms. Daskal. Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
    me to testify today on an issue of critical importance: the
    safety and security of Americans from the potential misuse of
    drones. I will start with a standard disclaimer. I am a partner
    at Venable LLC and former deputy Homeland Security advisor, but
    I am testifying solely in my personal capacity, not on behalf
    of Venable, not on behalf of its clients, and not on behalf of
    the former administration.
        I will also start with the bottom line. Drones serve key
    public safety, recreational, and commercial functions, and it
    is absolutely essential that we do everything possible to
    support the domestic drone industry, including their ability to
    test and innovate. But as we've already heard, drones also can
    be weaponized by malicious actors and used carelessly in ways
    that interfere with lawfully present aircraft and put Americans
    at risk. We need congressional action to protect Americans from
    the potential misuse of drones. The bipartisan legislation
    introduced by Senators Gary Peters and Ron Johnson, included
    most recently as an amendment to the National Defense
    Authorization Act of 2025, is, in my view, the place to start.
        Drone safety issues rose to prominence during the last 2
    months of 2024, when there were numerous reports of drones
    flying over New Jersey. At the time, I was a deputy Homeland
    Security advisor. FBI, Department of Homeland Security,
    Department of Defense, and FAA officials surged resources in
    attempt to determine what was happening and support local
    officials, subject to the limits of current authorities. They
    did not find any evidence of malicious activity, foreign
    involvement, or criminal action. Instead, it turns out that
    many of the reported drone sightings were aircraft and
    helicopters. Others were lawfully present drones.
        In early January 2025, the Trump administration reached a
    similar conclusion. As the President conveyed through his press
    secretary, ``The drones that were flying over New Jersey in
    large numbers were authorized. This was not the enemy.'' But at
    the time, the fear was palpable, and it was justified. The risk
    of drones being weaponized by malicious actors is real, and the
    Federal Government lacks sufficient authority and resources to
    address these threats.
        Just last week, on May 13, the Department of Justice
    arrested a 19-year-old for planning to conduct a mass shooting
    at a Michigan military base on behalf of ISIS. On the day of
    the arrest, also the planned day of the attack, the 19-year-old
    had already launched a surveillance drone in support of the
    attack. One need only glance at the headlines regarding Ukraine
    and the Middle East to know how easy it is to purchase off-the-
    shelf drone technologies and equip them with deadly weapons.
    And even non-malicious uses of drones, including the careless
    flying of drones into protected airspace, pose significant risk
    to aviation security.
        Currently, just four Federal agencies--the Department of
    Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
    Defense, and Department of Energy--have authority to engage in
    advanced detection and mitigation measures to protect Americans
    from these risks. State, local, and tribal and territorial
    officials do not have authority to do so, to protect their
    communities from the misuse of drones. They are wholly
    dependent on limited Federal support.
        In April 2022, the prior administration, in recognition of
    the current vulnerability, submitted to Congress a legislative
    proposal that would've expanded the authorities and set of
    actors who could respond to the misuse of drones. The key
    elements of that proposal are also included in the bipartisan
    legislation authored by Senator Peters and Senator Johnson and
    that I urge Congress to support.
        The legislation would do three key things. First, it would
    expand the authority to detect and mitigate threats to
    airports, critical infrastructure, and public gatherings.
    Second, it would give State and local law enforcement
    officials, as well as airport and critical infrastructure
    owners, authority to engage in advanced detection measures,
    helping to ensure the early detection of threats.
        Third, it would create a limited pilot, subject to
    oversight and review, that would give trained State and local
    officials the authority to mitigate the threats that do emerge.
    This is a critical element of any effort to provide sufficient
    protection to the American people, given limited federal
    resources.
        The legislation also includes important safety protections
    and protections for civil rights and civil liberties. We were
    very lucky that the 2024 reported sightings in New Jersey
    turned out to be a false alarm, but next time we might not be
    so lucky, and I urge Congress to act. Thank you. I look forward
    to the questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Daskal appears as a
    submission for the record.]
        Chairman Grassley. Thank you, Ms. Daskal. Now, Mr. Dooley.

     STATEMENT OF ROBERT DOOLEY, UAS PROGRAM COORDINATOR, FLORIDA
                        HIGHWAY PATROL, FLORIDA

        Mr. Dooley. Good morning, everyone. I'm Sergeant Robert
    Dooley, and I serve as the statewide UAS coordinator for the
    Florida Highway Patrol. I'm also proud to be here to represent
    not only the State of Florida and the Florida Highway Patrol,
    but I also serve in other capacities, as well. I'm an FAA
    Safety Team member, which is the educational arm of the FAA. We
    help and assist public safety agencies with UAS and education
    training. I'm the director of public safety for AUVSI, the
    Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, for the
    Florida chapter. We started the group in Florida through
    DRONERESPONDERS, the Florida Public Safety Coordination Group--
    again, coordinating with our public safety professionals, both
    law enforcement and fire. And I also sit on the aviation
    committee for the IACP.
        Today, we're here to talk about the critical importance of
    drone detection and mitigation for public safety. As unmanned
    aircraft systems continue to proliferate across recreational,
    commercial, and other domains, the ability of public safety
    agencies to detect and mitigate unauthorized and threatening
    drones has become a national imperative. This statement
    outlines the growing threat and landscape associated with
    drones, discusses the current challenges in detecting and
    mitigation, and advocates for urgent integration of counter-UAS
    capabilities within a public safety framework.
        The rapid evolution and accessibility of drone technology
    has transformed industries and revolutionized emergency
    response and public safety operations; however, with this
    growth comes an increasing threat of misuse, whether
    intentional or through negligence. From contraband drops over
    prison yards to surveillance of critical infrastructure and
    interruptions of emergency scenes, public safety agencies now
    face a complex airspace risk. The ability to detect, track,
    identify, and, when necessary, mitigate rogue drones is
    essential for protecting lives and preserving critical
    infrastructure and ensuring operational integrity.
        Drones present a unique set of challenges to public safety.
    Criminal exploitation--as we saw in the video, whether they're
    smuggling drugs, weaponizing, or contraband into correctional
    facilities and across the border. I've physically been present
    at the Texas border. We've been serving out there for 2\1/2\
    years, and I've seen some of the things that the Captain
    described. Terrorist use--adversarial States and non-State
    actors who have experimented with drones for surveillance and
    weaponization, creating low-cost, low-detection threat vectors.
    In 2018, in Caracas, two drones were weaponized to go after, if
    memory serves, Maduro. Both were unsuccessful, but again, we
    can see how easy it was for them to do that.
        Privacy violations and harassment--drones can be used to
    stalk, harass, or violate the privacy of civilians and law
    enforcement officers, often in ways that are difficult to
    detect and prevent. Interference with public safety
    operations--unauthorized drones flying near traffic crashes,
    fire scenes, which is what we saw in California with a drone
    strike on one of those airplanes--or disaster zones can impede
    emergency response, creating hazardous conditions for both
    responders and civilians. Most recently, we had a horrific car
    crash where--we call it Trauma Hawk, which is the helicopter
    service that comes and transports patients, and they couldn't
    take off because there was a rogue drone hovering over the
    helicopter, and it created a huge hazard.
        The need for detection and mitigation capabilities--public
    safety agencies must be able to detect, identify, and, if
    authorized, mitigate UAS threats in real time. Without the
    capacity, agencies operate blindly in shared airspace,
    increasing the risk to both responders and the public. Some of
    the benefits to these capabilities would be situational
    awareness, threat identification, incident mitigation, et
    cetera. The current limitations and legal barriers--despite the
    urgent need, most State, local, tribal, and territorial public
    safety agencies lack the legal authority to mitigate drones and
    often face limitations even detecting them. Only Federal
    agencies currently possess this broad CUAS authority, leaving a
    gap in homeland security at the local level.
        Additionally, technology access--CUAS systems are costly.
    They're complex and often limited to military or Federal use.
    Interagency coordination--the lack of real-time data-sharing
    and standard operational procedures hinders unified responses
    when we are working with our Federal partners and our State
    partners and our local partners. And policy gaps--existing
    Federal laws, including FAA preemption of airspace regulation,
    complicate the roles and responsibilities of our SLTT agencies.
        Moving forward, we're asking for legislative reform to
    grant limited, controlled UAS authority by vetted and trained
    public safety entities under Federal oversight, as proposed in
    legislation efforts before. Training and standardization--
    technology deployment--fund and deploy scalable, non-kinetic
    drone detection systems to local agencies, particularly those
    responsible for critical infrastructure and mass events, and
    also encourage public and private collaboration, where we
    collaborate with industry to figure out what technology would
    be appropriate to use and craft it toward specific public
    safety applications and community engagement, which is probably
    one of the most important ones.
        In conclusion, the ability to detect and mitigate rogue
    drones is no longer a futuristic concept. It is a present-day
    necessity. Public safety professionals stand on the front lines
    of both natural and manmade crises, and their lack of CUAS
    capabilities leaves a critical vulnerability in our national
    preparedness. The Federal agencies play a vital role.
    Empowering State and local responders with the tools, training,
    and authority to protect their communities from aerial threats
    is the next essential step in securing the homeland.
        And that is it. And I await your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dooley appears as a
    submission for the record.]
        Chairman Grassley. Thank you. Professor Donohue.

      STATEMENT OF LAURA K. DONOHUE, PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGETOWN
                          LAW, WASHINGTON, DC

        Professor Donohue. Thank you. Chairman Grassley, Ranking
    Member Durbin, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
    thank you for inviting me to today's hearing. UAS are part of
    our daily lives. They're used for agriculture, construction,
    sports broadcasting, film production, and myriad other peaceful
    purposes. They act as first responders. They're used for
    artistic expression. UAS also can be levied by States and non-
    State actors for nefarious purposes. They carry drugs, guns,
    bombs, flamethrowers, and CBNRW. They can be outfitted with
    tracking technologies enhanced by biometric identification.
    Autonomous swarms present further challenges.
        It's important that we have the authorities necessary to
    meet these threats, but what Congress passes cannot be a blank
    check. It needs to be carefully drafted to take account of
    constitutional rights. The law currently raises troubling
    First, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendment concerns.
        On the First Amendment, courts have long considered video
    recording to fall within freedom of speech and the press. The
    right to obtain footage includes the right to record government
    employees in public space. That ability undergirds one of the
    primary First Amendment aims, which is to hold government
    officials accountable.
        That right is not absolute, but provisions which impact
    that right cannot ``burden substantially more speech than is
    necessary to further the Government's legitimate interest.''
    The statute, on its face, violates this test. There are no
    limits on the Government facilities which are covered. There's
    no requirement for distance from the facility, the direction of
    travel, or whether the drone is over private property. There's
    no showing that must be made about specific targets. The
    provisions could be used to prevent media coverage on matters
    of great importance to the electorate. It has already occurred.
        The AG guidelines detailing covered facilities are
    similarly troubling. To determine whether activities constitute
    a credible threat, seven possibilities are offered, some of
    which--such as the reasonable belief that UAS could harm a
    person or damage property--it's true of all drones. Six of the
    seven have no nexus to any facility or asset, and any
    interference in the execution of government activity counts,
    potentially including lawful protest.
        Further, to satisfy the requirement that the facility be
    connected to an authorized mission, the guidelines include any
    National Special Security Event, which is defined as a
    designated event that, by virtue of its political, economic,
    social, or religious significance, may be the target of
    terrorism or other criminal activity. All of those are core
    First Amendment protected activities.
        The right to petition, moreover, applies to all three
    branches and promotes continual active political engagement.
    Courts use an experience and logic test to determine whether
    there's a qualified right of public access to public
    facilities. The law, however, allows the Government to forbid
    access to all Federal facilities and Federally owned land
    without regard to its historical use.
        On the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, one of the most glaring
    concerns in the statutory language is that it essentially
    operates as a general warrant, which is forbidden under the
    Fourth Amendment. A general warrant is a document issued by an
    official, not based on any evidence of wrongdoing. It lacks
    particularity in the person or place to be searched or the
    papers or records to be seized. Unsupported by oath, it's used
    to find evidence of criminal activity. At the founding, such
    documents violated the reason of the common law and were thus
    unreasonable.
        The current law gives the Government the authority to
    access all communications between the operator and the drone,
    to seize control of all UAS systems, and to search devices to
    find evidence of illegal activity. There's no oath, no third
    party, no probable cause. The act is a general warrant.
        RF drone detection systems share similarities here with
    geofence warrants in criminal law, which compel companies to
    provide location data from users' devices. They also lack
    particularity, but unlike the drone provisions, geofence
    warrants involve third-party magistrates, a demonstration of
    probable cause, and an oath. Even so, circuits are split as to
    whether they constitute general warrants. For the Fifth
    Circuit, they do. 124n suffers from the same constitutional
    defect.
        Finally, on States' rights, control of real property--
    including the airspace above land, outside of Federally owned
    property--falls in the purview of States. It's reserved to them
    through the Tenth Amendment. There's nothing in the Federal
    provisions which acknowledges State control over adjacent
    airspace, much less State rights to operate their own UAS over
    public property. These deficiencies can be addressed to assure
    the Government has the power to protect against UAS, while
    protecting constitutional rights.
        First, Congress could require a probable cause warrant to
    target specific drones under the protective measures, subject
    to exigency exceptions as well as the border exception. Second,
    Congress should institute substantive First Amendment
    protections. And, third, Congress should respect State rights
    by ensuring that States have the lead for drones under 400 feet
    and exempting State drones from Federal targeting. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Professor Donohue appears as a
    submission for the record.]
        Chairman Grassley. Thank you, Professor. Now, Mr. Dixon.

                STATEMENT OF RICKY D. DIXON, PRESIDENT,
               AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, FLORIDA

        Mr. Dixon. First of all, Chairman Grassley and members,
    thank you so much for the opportunity to speak on this
    important issue today. Again, my name is Ricky Dixon. I'm the
    secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, and I
    currently serve as the president of the American Correctional
    Association. I'm here today representing several hundred
    thousand correctional professionals across this Nation who work
    tirelessly to maintain order, security, and provide
    rehabilitation within our facilities. I've spent nearly 3
    decades in this profession, starting as a correctional officer
    and working through the ranks to lead one of the largest prison
    systems in the United States.
        I tell you that to say that I know firsthand the urgent
    threats facing our staff, the inmates we house, and the public
    we serve. Now, I'm here today to sound the alarm and make you
    aware of a growing crisis within our profession, one that calls
    for immediate action. The criminal use of unmanned aircraft
    systems, or drones, is escalating, and we do not have the tools
    or the legal authority to stop them.
        These drones are no longer just a nuisance. They're
    sophisticated weapons for organized crime, smuggling fentanyl,
    heroin, razor blades, weapons, and contraband cell phones into
    our facilities with precision. Each time a drone enters our
    airspace, we're forced to lock down, halting education, job
    training, drug treatment, and mental health programs--programs
    that reduce recidivism and prepare individuals for successful
    reintegration into society; programs you've appropriately
    supported and allocated funding for. The consequences--they're
    deadly.
        Drone-delivered narcotics have led to numerous overdose
    deaths inside our prisons throughout this Nation and contribute
    significantly to violence against other inmates and our staff.
    But make no mistake. This crisis is not just a local issue. It
    does not end at our facility gates. Contraband cell phones,
    smuggled in by drones, are powerful criminal tools. From behind
    bars, inmates are orchestrating drug trafficking, intimidating
    witnesses, and directing violent crimes in our communities.
        Families are being extorted, forced to send money to
    protect loved ones from harm inside the prison walls. Inmates
    are being brutally assaulted to serve as examples of what can
    happen when families don't comply. American prisons are turning
    into command centers for drug cartels and gang leaders, driving
    crime well beyond our fences.
        It's only a matter of time before a firearm or firearms are
    dropped in by drones, with timing synchronized with cell phones
    so that a specific inmate or group of inmates are in a position
    to receive them, in an effort to take over a facility. All of
    this happens at a time when staffing shortages are already
    pushing our workforce to its limits. Officers are working
    mandatory overtime, just to keep operations running. Adding
    drone-related lockdowns, heightened security demands, and
    emergency searches makes their jobs unsustainable. Yet, despite
    the severity of this issue, correctional agencies remain
    legally prohibited from taking action.
        Only four Federal agencies have the authority to counteract
    drone threats. Meanwhile, State and local correctional
    facilities, among the most frequently targeted, remain
    defenseless. Waiting for Federal intervention is putting lives
    at risk. We appreciate legislative proposals for pilot programs
    to test counter-drone solutions, but let's be clear. Pilot
    programs alone will not solve this national crisis.
        The issue requires a comprehensive, scalable, and well
    regulated legal framework--one that grants correctional and law
    enforcement agencies the authority for advanced detection and
    mitigation, backed by funding, training, and oversight. Every
    authorized drone that enters correctional airspace undermines
    public safety. Every contraband cell phone delivered by drone
    strengthens criminal enterprises, and every lockdown caused by
    drone activity hinders rehabilitation and destabilizes
    institutions.
        We urge you to act. Give us the tools, the authority, and
    support we need to support this growing threat before it
    spirals further out of control--to stop this growing threat;
    sorry. The safety of our correctional facilities, our
    workforce, and our communities depend on it. Without this
    authority, we allow modern technology to become a weapon that
    undermines justice, facilitates contraband trafficking, and
    jeopardizes lives: threats the framers never intended the
    First, Fourth, Fifth, or Tenth Amendment to shield.
        I'll leave you with this. This issue will be addressed
    eventually; there's no doubt. The only question is whether we
    act now with foresight or wait for disaster and attempt to
    recover after the fact. Thank you, and I stand ready to take
    any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dixon appears as a
    submission for the record.]
        Chairman Grassley [off mic]. Finance Committee, so I hope
    somebody on my side of the aisle will take over while I'm gone.
    Captain Wilson, in your testimony you mentioned an incident in
    which Texas State law enforcement drone was actually mitigated
    by Mexican cartel members. Can you please elaborate on the
    challenge that you face from cartel drones and speak to the
    safety of the risk to your department faces by not being able
    to employ the same technology that cartels have started to use
    against U.S. law enforcement?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The----
        Chairman Grassley. Push your button.
        Mr. Wilson. That would help, wouldn't it?
        Chairman Grassley. Yes.
        Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, in 2019 they started the ground
    surveillance. They would follow us for 1\1/2\, 2 hours, back to
    our hotels from where we were working on the border. People are
    sitting in a tree or sitting on a fence line. All they're there
    for is to scout for us, for law enforcement: for Federal,
    State, local law enforcement. UAS has increased significantly
    since then, to now where they're--like I mentioned earlier,
    they're trying to crash drones into our drones; they're trying
    to--they're hovering over our helicopters at 1,500, 1,600 feet,
    clearly above 400 feet, and presenting a clear danger to any
    manned aviation in that area.
        In the last month, we were mitigated by the cartels. We
    were in conversation or in communication with U.S. Border
    Patrol. They had asked us to see if we could--they had a
    detection over in Mexico, and we're asked to see if we could
    find the pilot for that drone. After a little bit of time, we
    were able to locate that pilot and follow him.
        There was communication with Mexico to try to get the
    Government there to respond, and as they were responding and
    before they got into the area, the criminal drone came down and
    departed the area. We continued to stay with the pilot and his
    co-pilot, if you will, to--eventually, our drone lost
    connection and was mitigated by the cartel, as we found out
    later, and crashed about 1,000 feet away from where the
    mitigation took place.
        Chairman Grassley. Thank you for that. Sergeant Dooley, you
    and your office provide support for Federal law enforcement at
    mass gatherings and during protective operations. I'd like to
    have you elaborate on your role providing this support and
    explain how enhanced counter-UAS authorities would better
    enable you to support Federal partners.
        Mr. Dooley. Yes. So, that's a huge request we get. A lot of
    our Federal and State partners know that we have the ability to
    do that. In most cases, our Federal partners are--their
    equipment is much more sophisticated than what we're allowed to
    use, but it is of--still--use. That's the number one question I
    get when they ask for our help, when we're using our equipment
    to help them in their detection--is, can we mitigate? And, of
    course, my response is, no, we can't do that.
        They have a desperate need, I think, for a force multiplier
    and a support from the State, when we especially have our
    Federal partners who rotate in and out from certain details and
    come to Florida. They're not the same people, normally, over
    and over again, so when they come down and they are not
    terribly familiar, and we educate them on what our capabilities
    are and how we're supporting them already, again, over and over
    again: Can you help us mitigate?
        No, we cannot. Our technology is passive. We use radars,
    cameras, remote ID, et cetera. We don't get into hacking and RF
    and all those things. But again, it still helps; it's just not
    on the level that they can perform those same duties. But it is
    a huge request that we get for those capabilities.
        And on top of that, I will get phone calls from our Federal
    partners, as well, when they do have a request--because most of
    the requests that our Federal partners get can't be fulfilled.
    They don't have enough resources and equipment, et cetera, to
    cover all the requests. And they'll call me. And again, I can't
    perform some of the same duties that they can, so it's--and in
    some cases it is of no use, because what they need specifically
    is the mitigation or the ability to detect on a higher level
    than what we're able to provide.
        Chairman Grassley. Okay. Mr. Dixon, in your testimony you
    mentioned the dangers that drone-delivered contraband like
    weapons and cell phones present to prisons. Elaborate on the
    threat of contraband cell phones to prison security.
        Mr. Dixon. Sure, Mr. Chair. So, cell phones and drones,
    combined, are a few of the most critical security threats we
    have right now. The irony in this is drones deliver cell
    phones, and the very cell phones that are delivered are what is
    used to coordinate additional drone deliveries. Everything bad
    that happens in a prison usually starts with a conversation.
    So, if we intercept or prevent the cell phones that are
    delivered by drones, we reduce a significant amount of the
    violence.
        As I mentioned in my testimony, cell phones are used to
    extort families, to maintain criminal networks on the street.
    As I mentioned, prisons in some cases are command centers for
    drug cartels, because they continue their criminal enterprises.
    If we eliminate cell phones and drive the communication back to
    our State systems, we have sophisticated tools to monitor those
    systems, whether it be on our tablets or our institutional
    phone systems, but when they, you know, circumvent that through
    cell phones that drones deliver, it's one of the major issues
    we have to combat.
        Chairman Grassley. Thank you. Senator Durbin.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN,
               A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

        Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Let me apologize for
    coming in late. I had another hearing, in Appropriations with
    Secretary Kennedy, and I'm sorry I missed the opening. Special
    thanks to Ms. Daskal and Professor Donohue, our witnesses that
    I was not here to introduce. Thanks, Senator Grassley, for
    doing that.
        So, I'm sure most of us were watching the Cubs-Sox series
    in Wrigley Field this weekend. And I was struck by the fact
    that they were doting on the capacity they had with the drone
    to show images of Wrigley Field from angles and perspectives
    never known before. It was beautiful, and the Cubs won, so it
    was a good day all around. But it raised a question in my mind
    that I wanted to pose to several members of the panel here.
        If I were sitting in Wrigley Field with a friend or son or
    granddaughter, and I saw a drone overhead, I would want to be
    sure that it was a safe and friendly drone. I don't know that,
    when I'm sitting there. Somebody has to find out or at least
    ask the question. With over a million drones in our country
    today--and drones possibly hovering over fields of sports and
    other things--it raises the question of who's going to monitor
    that activity to make sure these are safe vehicles, air
    vehicles, that don't endanger anyone.
        At the same time, those drones could be gathering
    information, not so much at a ball field, but maybe you're
    going to have a wedding at someone's home. There's a privacy
    angle there, too. Who's protecting the privacy of the people
    that they are broadcasting or gathering information on? So, I'd
    like to ask Professor Donohue, how do you balance this? The
    drones over Wrigley Field--are they friendly or not? The
    gathering of information in my own back yard--is it anybody's
    business? Who's protecting me?
        Professor Donohue. Thank you very much for the question. As
    a matter of large-scale outdoor events, for instance, most
    States have regulations and laws in place that prohibit the
    flight of drones over certain large-scale events. They require
    that there be agreement--some consent from the property owner
    or from the venue owner--in order or some sort of contract in
    place.
        In terms of how to balance those rights and the privacy,
    most States--they actually have carve-outs saying that others
    cannot fly drones over private property without the consent of
    the property owner themselves, because owing to this ancient
    doctrine of ad coelum, property owners own the adjacent
    airspace over their land. And so they have the right to exclude
    drones. That----
        Senator Durbin. Let's talk about the practical world.
    You've got air traffic controllers monitoring commercial
    aircraft, other aircraft, but in terms of monitoring actual
    drone activity to the point of knowing whether it's complying
    with the State law--and if it's not, what to do about it--
    what's the answer there?
        Professor Donohue. Anything below 400 feet is within the
    State domain; that is adjacent airspace.
        Senator Durbin. How is it enforced?
        Professor Donohue. Through State monitoring of this. There
    are agreements with the FAA. For instance, if you need to have
    a temporary flight restriction over particular areas, as
    during, for instance, the Super Bowl, in those cases, the way
    to balance the civil liberties concerns is to make sure that
    there are restrictions.
        For instance, you don't extend the Super Bowl coverage for
    a month, and you don't extend it over any land or any drone
    anywhere in the country, but it has to be a drone that's
    actually adjacent to that particular site. So, when the Federal
    Government is involved, if there's the potential for the
    Federal Government to take down a drone or to interfere in its
    operation or to conduct a search of the device itself, then
    there needs to be some nexus to the actual open-air facility or
    the place that's trying to be protected.
        Senator Durbin. Professor Donohue, if counter-drone
    authorities are not drafted carefully, could they permit
    government authorities to intercept data or communications in
    violation of the Fourth Amendment?
        Professor Donohue. Yes.
        Senator Durbin. Thank you for that. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Grassley. Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to each of you
    for being here. Over the last 15 years or so, drones have
    become increasingly a part of our lives. They've been used not
    only by the military, by law enforcement, by immigration
    authorities, but also by businesses, hobbyists, and other kinds
    of enthusiasts. Yet in some instances, drones can present
    threats--grave threats, pretty dire threats. Meanwhile, the
    current regulatory framework creates a problem insofar as it
    inhibits State and local law enforcement from adequately
    addressing those same threats that can be uniquely posed by
    drones.
        That's why I introduced a bill called the SHIELD-U Act:
    Stopping Harmful Incidents to Enforce Lawful Drone Use. And
    this legislation, once enacted, will help State and local law
    enforcement by giving them authority, on a limited, constrained
    basis, that they need in order to protect their citizens and
    their communities from those who would use drone technology to
    harm the public.
        Sergeant Dooley, let's start with you. Now, you've
    testified about the limitations imposed by Federal law that
    effectively prohibit State and local law enforcement--in fact,
    they expressly prohibit them--from effectively utilizing
    counter-drone, counter-UAS systems. This bill that I referred
    to, the SHIELD-U Act, lifts some of those restrictions. How
    would passing that bill and granting limited counter-UAS
    capabilities enhance State and local law enforcement and your
    ability to protect the public?
        Mr. Dooley. Well, number one, I agree with almost
    everything that was said earlier--is we do need some
    significant oversight. We need accountability. We need
    training. We need all these things. Like, someone like me
    shouldn't exist, where I had to figure it out on my own because
    there was no----
        Senator Lee. Well, you should exist.
        Mr. Dooley. Well, but you understand what I'm getting at?
    There should be some type of oversight, guidance, and training
    where we could establish that, and then when this was rolled
    out, it would be controlled. Like, you know, how would you
    mitigate something? Okay, why would you even set up a system in
    the first place in a particular location? Justify it. Why are
    you here? What are you going to do, if you saw a drone in the
    airspace? Are you just detecting it, that it's there and it's
    minding its own business, or is it a threat? Why did you do
    what you did?
        But the bill would dramatically increase our ability to
    keep critical infrastructure, VIPs, other mass--like sporting
    events--a lot safer and people--like, to the other Senator's
    point, you know, when you see a drone flying over the Cubs
    game, is it a friend or foe? And that's what we would like to
    do: not necessarily interfering--and, again, regulating what
    exactly is being detected.
        Remote ID, for example--it's not great. It's hard to detect
    at times because every drone broadcasts it slightly
    differently, but if you were doing standard RF detection or
    something of that nature, where it's only picking up what type
    of drone it is and serial number; it's not telling you anything
    about the operator or the person operating it--nothing
    personal, right--we still have to go and follow the legal
    process to get that information--I think it would be of great
    use and of great help to public safety, if used in the proper
    way.
        Senator Lee. That's a great point. You know, I like the way
    you phrased it. It reminds me about an analogy Robin Williams
    once referred to: the unarmed English bobby who, being unarmed,
    upon seeing the commission of a crime, yells, stop, or I'll
    yell stop again. But if you can't do more than that, there are
    going to be problems, and that's something we face with drones.
        Captain Wilson, let's go to you next. Now, you've
    highlighted the need for counter-UAS capabilities at and near
    the border. If State and local law enforcement capabilities
    were unleashed in the counter-UAS sphere, how would law
    enforcement efforts at the border be improved corresponding to
    that, or as a result of that, I should say?
        Mr. Wilson. It would allow us law enforcement at all levels
    to work closer together, to have--again, identify those
    locations that we wish to have a sensor and based on activity
    or that's going on, and it'd keep us and the community safer,
    being able----
        Senator Lee. It would help?
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. To detect--yes, sir--and detect
    and then, if necessary, mitigate.
        Senator Lee. Secretary Dixon, when drones are detected
    overhead a prison, a correctional facility, what are the
    security protocols that you go through, once you see it?
        Mr. Dixon. Thank you, Senator, for that question. It's
    quite extensive. We lock the compound down. That could be for
    hours, days, weeks in some cases, depending on the payload
    that--the portion of the payload we discovered, if at all.
    Significant consequences occur, between gangs and different
    members and different inmates in the institution, if the
    payload doesn't make it to its intended target. So, it's a
    dangerous situation. It, as I mentioned earlier----
        Senator Lee. So, there's no way that that doesn't
    compromise your ability to operate correctional facilities in a
    manner that is effective and safe.
        Mr. Dixon. It absolutely does, in addition to--as I
    mentioned earlier--stop all the rehabilitative programming, the
    mental health programming. All those functions that we're
    supposed to carry out, we put on pause at a time we're already
    in a difficult staffing situation.
        I do want to--in appreciation for Senator Durbin's comment
    earlier, as well, I do think there's a differentiation to be
    made between our environment in the prison setting versus the
    citizenry. You know, when it comes to the Fourth Amendment,
    there's no reasonable expectation of privacy for those people
    we house there, and so we're simply asking for that--when
    drones enter our airspace, to be able to deal with them and
    mitigate the threat at that point.
        Senator Lee. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Grassley. Senator Klobuchar.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you all. This
    has been really interesting testimony. I think, what, there's
    over a million drones registered with the FAA that can be used
    for some really good stuff. Farmers in Minnesota are using them
    for farm management; civil engineers for surveying. I
    especially see this in rural areas. When we have everything
    from train wrecks on, they're incredibly helpful.
        We also know the risks. You just brought up this, Mr.
    Dixon, at the correctional institutes, and I hadn't thought
    through all that. Thank you. We know that there's privacy
    concerns which--and our liberties, which Senator Durbin, I
    know, discussed.
        I just want to start with something that's on my mind a
    lot, Ms. Daskal, and that is commercial aviation. As you noted
    in your written testimony, drones accounted for nearly two-
    thirds of near-misses with commercial passenger planes, which
    is kind of an extraordinary number. You also noted that
    airports lack critical authority to protect against drone
    incursions. We saw what happened in LA with the firefighting
    plane at a time of just critical danger. What authority should
    Congress provide airports and other critical infrastructure
    operatives to ensure they're able to protect the public?
        Ms. Daskal. Thank you, Senator. I share the concerns,
    particularly the concerns around airports and critical
    infrastructure. And as I said in my testimony, I think that the
    legislation, the bipartisan legislation that was introduced by
    Senator Peters and Senator Johnson, is----
        Senator Klobuchar. Yes, I think----
        Ms. Daskal [continuing]. A really good place----
        Senator Klobuchar. Yes.
        Ms. Daskal [continuing]. To start, and it does a couple of
    things. First, it gives airport owners and critical
    infrastructure owners new authority to engage in advanced
    detection measures which they don't currently have, to be able
    to identify the threats that do arise. That is important. It's
    also subject to training requirements, to privacy compliance
    requirements, to the use of technologies that are tested and
    approved. And, secondly, the other piece of this that I also
    think is critical is ensuring that State and local authorities
    have the ability to mitigate, as appropriate, subject to
    oversight and review.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Yes, I think I'm a co-sponsor
    of that bill, and I hope we can move that. News organizations--
    you know how we have to protect their right to be able to take
    photos and the like, of disasters, so the public knows that.
    Could you talk about balancing the uses that news organizations
    have for drones, so that they don't interfere with public
    safety? Quickly.
        Ms. Daskal. Yes, absolutely. So, as you know, Senator, the
    FAA has the authority to put in place temporary flight
    restrictions for a range of reasons, including safety and
    security reasons. There is also a process by which media
    organizations can seek waivers in the event that there are
    temporary flight restrictions, in order to engage in First
    Amendment-protected activity and to ensure that the public is
    made aware of critical information. And those waivers--that
    process needs to continue.
        Senator Klobuchar. Okay. Thank you. Sergeant Dooley, in
    your testimony, your written testimony, you suggested granting
    State and local law enforcement limited counter-UAS
    authorities, subject to standardized training and
    certification. There are examples of this across law
    enforcement. For example, all bomb technicians across the
    country are trained at the FBI's Hazardous Device School. How
    would you envision this standardized training?
        Mr. Dooley. Number one, it would have to come from, I
    think, one of our Federal partners that's already been
    authorized to do this and has been doing it. They would have
    the most experience. Number two, I don't think that everybody
    necessarily would need this right off the bat. I think there
    should be some level of credentialing as to different levels of
    detection and mitigation, as well. You may have, like, a
    multitiered approach of someone that just can simply detect and
    do nothing about it because of whatever reason, and then you go
    down the list, and then you may have more critical
    infrastructure or maybe a higher profile target area that may
    need those additional permissions.
        I think that you should have, like--for example, like, just
    to be a drone pilot, I have to get a Part 107 airman's
    certificate, right? I have to register my drone. There's a
    processing place. When I wanted to drive a car, I had to go
    take a driving test. Like, there's tests for everything. I
    wanted to be a trooper; had to go----
        Senator Klobuchar. I got it.
        Mr. Dooley. Yes. So, this is no different. I think we could
    figure it out to where----
        Senator Klobuchar. Okay.
        Mr. Dooley [continuing]. There would be different levels.
        Senator Klobuchar. Got it.
        Mr. Dooley. I think one of the four should definitely be
    the starting point----
        Senator Klobuchar. Okay. My----
        Mr. Dooley [continuing]. Of the four Federal agencies.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. My last question: Mr. Dixon,
    you talked about things being smuggled in through drones into
    prisons. You also noted that correctional facilities are
    legally prohibited from employing counter-UAS technology. Could
    you talk about the threat to correctional officers and inmates
    at a facility?
        Mr. Dixon. Thank you for the question. Absolutely. Anytime
    drugs are introduced to the compound and the kind of contraband
    that comes in--it increases the threat, in terms of--I've seen
    a, you know, 98 percent increase in outside medical trips, for
    security, in the last several years, much of that related to
    the contraband drones bring in. It's one of the most dangerous
    things we do--is take inmates outside of our fence to local
    hospitals. The violence that's associated with drugs coming in,
    the contraband coming in has increased exponentially since this
    became a problem.
        Senator Klobuchar. And, last, just--when the drones breach
    the perimeter, it's obviously a major threat, but what type of
    counter-UAS authorities do correctional facilities need? And
    make it quick, because I've gone over my time.
        Mr. Dixon. And we're not resistant at all to oversight and
    training, but we need the ability to mitigate that threat to a
    greater extent than we do now, to intercept those drones coming
    over our facility.
        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
        Chairman Grassley. Senator Britt.
        Senator Britt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding this hearing today on this important topic. I hear this
    from people all across Alabama: The lack of drone mitigation
    authority for State and local law enforcement has become a
    critical issue. We see it specifically when we're looking at
    large public gatherings, which includes large sporting events,
    which my State takes great pride in. And we want to make sure
    that public safety comes first.
        Even when it comes to Federal installations in Alabama,
    it's often State and local law enforcement and personnel who
    are the closest and most capable of actually responding. We see
    this, too: Our Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, who is headed by
    Secretary Hal Taylor, who does a tremendous job--they assist
    Federal partners and are likely the first ones to be able to
    respond and to do it in a meaningfully and efficient way. But
    without proper authority, they can't act with the speed and
    coordination that they need, that matters most in a time of a
    crisis.
        So, I'm going to address this question to Captain Wilson
    and Sergeant Dooley, to start with. Is there a legislative
    solution that is as simple as just extending existing
    mitigation authorities to State and local law enforcement, that
    would actually help in these situations? Or is there other gaps
    in the law that needs to be considered? And what should our top
    priorities be when considering a legislative solution to
    actually address this issue?
        Mr. Dooley. We looked at it extensively, especially when we
    started working with our Federal partners. Those permissions
    were granted by Congress, right?
        Senator Britt. Mm-hmm.
        Mr. Dooley. So, they can't be delegated. Like, for example,
    some TFO programs--temporary Federal officer programs, where
    the U.S. Marshals will deputize local law enforcement with
    certain abilities to do U.S. Marshals things--we looked into
    that, and again, we feel that the authority couldn't be
    delegated. Like, that would've been the simplest approach:
    Deputize me as whatever----
        Senator Britt. Right.
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. And under your supervision or
    guidance, we would move forward and do this. But we don't think
    that's correct. So, I don't know what we would do as a simple
    solution, other than--we're in this room here trying to figure
    it out. But we've tried to look down some of those legal
    avenues of doing it correctly, but we--that was what we came up
    with, and they can't delegate those authorities if they were to
    bless us as a TFO.
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, and like Sergeant Dooley said earlier,
    that it has to be--there has to be training, and there has to
    be some accountability. There has to be transparency for all
    the agencies that start, and you're going to have to start
    somewhere with some credentialing of some law enforcement
    agencies at the appropriate level, to work.
        Senator Britt. So, are those things that we could be doing
    right now? What are things that we could be doing right now to
    make sure that we're preparing for that, that we're taking
    proactive steps to be able to allow State and local law
    enforcement to have this capacity or this ability in the
    future?
        Mr. Dooley. So, I think, like, right now you should
    probably establish, like, who would run this, from----
        Senator Britt. Okay.
        Mr. Dixon [continuing]. A Federal level. That would--once
    we get started with that, then we start figuring out how we
    should roll this out, who should be a part of the initial
    rollout, and what type of equipment we should be using--and,
    more importantly, some type of process in place of
    standardizing how this is used: a reporting process in place,
    et cetera, to where if I do deploy something and we do detect
    and we do mitigate or whatever it is, that there is proper--
    like we talked about, multiple times, of accountability.
        So, if I'm right, everything's fine; I submit a report. If
    I did something wrong, we can identify it and either correct it
    or discipline or whatever the case is. There has to be right or
    wrong. We have to have transparency to do that. But I think we
    should identify a Federal entity of some sort that should
    control this, moving out toward public safety having this----
        Senator Britt. And is the training in place now to be able
    to make these moves?
        Mr. Dooley. No, ma'am.
        Mr. Wilson. No.
        Senator Britt. So, we would need to be able to invest in
    that, as well?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes.
        Mr. Dooley. Yes.
        Senator Britt. Okay. I want to turn to you, Secretary
    Dixon, in my last few minutes. In Alabama, like most other
    States, we have seen an increase in drones--using to fly
    contraband into correctional facilities. As you have testified
    today and spoken with my colleagues about, that presents a real
    risk not only to inmates but obviously the officers, as well.
    Based on your experience, can you kind of explain to us some of
    the unique challenges related to drone mitigation when it comes
    to a correctional setting and how those should inform us as
    we're looking at potential legislation?
        Mr. Dixon. Thank you, Senator. One of the most significant
    challenges is that they come in and we don't know they're
    there. Often they fly--sometimes they fly high. They're fast;
    they're swift. So, often, the contraband is delivered and we
    never saw it coming, so we're defenseless. We have limited
    systems that help detect when they're coming in, but not nearly
    as advanced as they should be, as the technology is capable to
    deliver right now if we had the Federal authorities we need.
        And I would just like to add, not to be melodramatic, but I
    would encourage us to act with the same sense of urgency that
    we would if we were watching on the news right now that
    multiple automatic weapons were just delivered into one of our
    compounds by drone, and to gang members, and they escaped or
    harmed or killed other inmates or staff, because that is a very
    likely scenario. That's not being an alarmist; it's very
    likely. And I'm not implying we're not--it's why we're here
    today, and we're so thankful that we're having this discussion.
        Senator Britt. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Grassley. Senator Moody.
        Senator Moody. Thank you. It's not too often I get to go
    behind my fellow junior Senator.
        Senator Britt. That's right.
        Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    hearing and for all of the witnesses for taking time away from
    your jobs and your families to be here in Washington,
    especially to my fellow Floridians. Very proud of you. Thank
    you for being here and representing the great free State of
    Florida.
        I think something that resonated, Mr. Dixon--what you said
    was, act with a sense of urgency: something that we in Congress
    don't take to heart a lot around here. As a mother, I certainly
    do, because I know what we do right now in this Congress will
    protect or leave vulnerable many Americans and certainly our
    children.
        In Florida, we are home to many military installations.
    Certainly, we have three combatant commands in our State. The
    sensitivity of what is taking place within the State of
    Florida, not only on military bases--also on our Space Coast.
    Most of our launches are done from Kennedy Space Center. So, we
    have a lot of sensitive personnel, information, movements,
    commands right in the heart of Florida. And I know that,
    Sergeant Dooley, with FHP, you are coordinating the UAV program
    there, and you assist when there are incursions in military
    space and violations and use State assets to help with that. I
    want to thank you for being an expert and for your attention on
    that.
        One of the things that I have been trying to highlight and
    have passed legislation to do is to stop visas right now,
    student visas, particularly, from the Chinese government,
    because they have laws in place right now that require their
    citizens to gather intelligence and work with the CCP, and yet
    we're importing 300,000 a year into the United States. And
    particularly I want to point out an example. In August 2021, we
    allowed in to study one of these students, to study at the
    University of Minnesota, and particularly, thereafter we're
    told that he was gathering information from military bases.
        On January 18 of 2024, the FBI arrested him in San
    Francisco for operating an unarmed aircraft system in violation
    of national defense airspace and photographing defense
    installations. Further investigation found that he had taken
    photographs and used a drone to photograph the naval base in
    Norfolk, Virginia. Here on a visa to study at the university.
    Thankfully, he was finally deported just a couple of weeks ago
    and sent home. Thankfully, we have an administration that's
    taking these things seriously now.
        But this is a weakness, I believe, in our Espionage Act, in
    the sense that we outlaw photographing military bases using
    drones. In fact, in this particular case, they found video on
    this drone, but they could only charge the photographs. It's a
    weakness in the evolution of technology that we have failed to
    update our laws. And so I would ask you, Sergeant, is this
    something that you believe we need to shore up, to make sure we
    can criminally charge, when we don't just have foreign agents
    taking photographs of sensitive military bases and
    installations but also video?
        Mr. Dooley. Yes. No, I totally agree. And we also have some
    pretty robust statutes in Florida that also allow law
    enforcement or public safety to have at least a little bit more
    teeth in the bite when we do have some type of these
    situations: Florida Statute 330.41 and 934.50, which also
    protect people's rights to privacy with drone operations, et
    cetera. So, I completely agree that we should figure something
    out and make it to where these things can't happen.
        Senator Moody. And Mr. Chair----
        Professor Donohue. Senator, may I possibly add----
        Senator Moody. One moment. I just want to say, Mr.
    Chairman, today I'm going to introduce the Drone Espionage Act
    legislation, which would include--it would strengthen the
    Espionage Act of 1917 and include videography of sensitive
    national defense sites as a crime; include videography in
    addition to photographs. This is an issue that doesn't just
    affect Florida. All of the members here have sensitive military
    sites in their States.
        Many Congressional Members have States where folks have
    come over here on visas; foreign nationals have been caught
    videoing sensitive military sites in this country. And we have
    to put an end to it. It has to be a crime. And I appreciate the
    time, and I'm sorry I have run out of time. And I will leave to
    the Chairman whether or not he wants to permit additional
    testimony.
        Chairman Grassley. Is there any comment from any of you on
    her last point?
        Professor Donohue. Yes, please. I just wanted to comment on
    the last point. I also build drones, and I work in national
    security issues, so thermal imaging, lasers, like LADAR; the
    use of other imaging and sensor technologies--it is a gap, in
    my view, in the Espionage Act, and it is something that needs
    to be addressed. I also just wanted to add the border exception
    here, because obviously along the border--case law is very
    strong in showing that there's an exception to warrant
    requirements along the border because of national interest,
    within at least 20 miles of the border if it's contiguous with
    entering and leaving the United States.
        So--and then the third point is the military sites are
    precisely the kind of sensitive facility that should be subject
    to these types of provisions, but that's very different from,
    you know, every public library, right, or every other Federal
    facility across the board, which is why that tailoring actually
    would matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, with exceptions
    built in for certain sites as well as along the border itself.
        Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Grassley. Senator Schmitt.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I note that a
    couple of witnesses brought up some of the potential First
    Amendment concerns related to drones and monitoring activities.
    And Ms. Daskal mentioned specifically that she wanted to make
    sure she was ensuring people could engage in First Amendment-
    protected activity. And it's this sort of line of questioning
    I'd like to pursue with you. Did you, in your time at DHS, co-
    chair the Biden administration's Disinformation Governance
    Board?
        Ms. Daskal. I--no, I was not the co-chair of the
    governance----
        Senator Schmitt. Did you write the charter?
        Ms. Daskal. I--in my time at DHS, I was--at the time, I was
    the acting general counsel at DHS.
        Senator Schmitt. Well, I have a memo here from you with a
    couple things that we're going to get into, but you wrote the
    charter, correct?
        Ms. Daskal. I was, as I said, Senator--I was in a general
    counsel role, and in that role, everything came through my----
        Senator Schmitt. Did you have a role in picking Nina
    Jankowicz to be the executive director of the Disinformation
    Governance Board?
        Ms. Daskal. I was not the hiring authority.
        Senator Schmitt. Did you have input before she became Mary
    Poppins? Were you aware that she was going to become the
    executive director of the Disinformation Governance Board?
        Ms. Daskal. I was aware, yes.
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. Did you support that?
        Ms. Daskal. I am not going to get into internal
    conversations about----
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, we'll get into--how about some
    public documents, here? Actually, let's just get into the memo
    that you authored. On January 31, 2022, you authored a memo to
    Secretary Mayorkas, asking him to sign off on the charter that
    you authored. In that charter, there's a few things that you
    were trying to address to dispel--as it relates to
    misinformation or disinformation relating to the origins and
    effects of COVID-19. Is your position that it would've been
    appropriate for the Government to work with social media
    companies to censor points of view that maybe COVID-19
    originated in China?
        [Poster is displayed.]
        Ms. Daskal. Senator, it's my view that it's not appropriate
    for the Government to censor any points of view.
        Senator Schmitt. Literally, you were a part of the
    Disinformation Governance Board of the United States of
    America. My contention is: The Orwellian name of Ministry of
    Truth was already taken, so the Disinformation Governance Board
    slid right in. And you were a big part of this. I mean, you
    wrote the charter. It also wanted to censor views--dispel
    disinformation about the efficacy of masks, another conspiracy
    theory that the Government thought it was their job to dispel.
        And so I find it kind of rich that you're here expressing
    concerns about--First Amendment concerns about anything. A
    Federal district court judge said this was the biggest affront
    to the First Amendment in the history of the United States of
    America, this censorship enterprise that the Biden
    administration engaged in, that you were a big part of.
        I want to ask you also about--in that memo that you wrote,
    attached to the charter, there is a proposed time schedule with
    Twitter for April 28, 2022. You were going to meet with Twitter
    executives, including Yoel Roth, who--the head of site
    integrity, to discuss--it's noted that Nick and Yoel both know
    the Disinformation Governance Board director, Nina Jankowicz,
    and the purpose was for them to become more involved with the
    Disinformation Governance Board analytic. Were you at that
    meeting?
        Ms. Daskal. I do not recall that meeting.
        Senator Schmitt. You don't recall? Well, it turns out that
    Twitter actually became very involved in your efforts, didn't
    they?
        Ms. Daskal. I was not engaged with Twitter on these
    efforts.
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. Well, they were engaged in helping
    dispel the Hunter Biden laptop as ``a hack-and-leak--Russian
    hack-and-leak operation,'' which was cited, by the way, in the
    charter of things to address. COVID-19 conspiracy theories--I
    just think--I don't have a lot of time, and there's a--we could
    do a whole hearing on this, but as Missouri's Attorney General,
    I happened to bring the lawsuit Missouri v. Biden, which is why
    I'm so familiar with your efforts.
        And I think that we would be remiss to not, at every point,
    point out the people who were involved in this, who would
    trample individual rights in this country, their ability to
    speak their mind because they thought the Government should
    decide what the truth was. And this country was founded on the
    principle that that's not the case; that individuals can make
    up their own minds. So, hopefully we never go down this road
    again, but you ought to be ashamed of yourself for your role in
    this.
        Senator Moody [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
    Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. So, this topic caused the events of July
    the 13, 2024 to come to mind: the attempted assassination of
    President Trump, where the shooter used a drone in advance of
    the event to surveil the location of this program or this
    rally--and in a place that was supposed to be among the most
    protected in America, where temporary flight restrictions were
    in place. The Secret Service apparently didn't have adequate
    anti-drone technology or the know-how to actually stop these
    drones. So, to me, that just demonstrates that nowhere is safe.
    And, Mr. Dixon, you've made that point several times.
        I want to ask Captain Wilson--Captain Wilson, thank you for
    your service to our State over many years. Obviously this is a
    big challenge at the Texas-Mexico border, and of course the
    Department of Public Safety--you're a Texas Ranger, former DPS
    officer. DPS has had a lot of experience dealing with border
    security matters over many years, but what's the--can you give
    us a sense of the volume or the number of drone encounters that
    are seen at the border these days? Is this an occasional
    occurrence? Is it a daily occurrence? Is it an hourly
    occurrence? How frequent are the drone incursions?
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Senator. It depends on the location.
        Senator Cornyn. Right.
        Mr. Wilson. In a 12-month period, there were a little over
    1,200 drone incursions across the border that we detected on
    our sensors.
        Senator Cornyn. That you knew of?
        Mr. Wilson. That we knew of, and that's an important point
    to make note of--is that we knew of. It is just our sensors,
    not--we're not combining all of the U.S. Border Patrol, DEA, or
    anybody else's sensors, where we can have a common operating
    picture of what's going on down there on the border.
        Senator Cornyn. Would that be helpful?
        Mr. Wilson. It would absolutely be helpful. El Paso, UTEP,
    has a system out there that is very robust and very layered,
    and it will actually scare you if you look at what flights are
    crossing the border.
        Senator Cornyn. It strikes me as bizarre that, after all
    these years with all the attention being given to the border--
    both in the failures of the previous administration's policies
    to deal with border security matters and then now--that we
    still lack the capability to know what all is coming across the
    borders. And I think that's a matter of urgent need for the
    Congress to address. This is, after all, an international
    border, and it's fundamentally the Federal Government's
    responsibility. I understand the State of Texas under Governor
    Abbott had to step up in the absence of Federal Government law
    enforcement, to try to fill the gap, but it's still a huge
    challenge.
        Every time I have been to the border--and I've been there
    many times and welcomed many of my colleagues down there so
    they could learn, as I have, from the people who are on the
    ground there--I've always been told by Border Patrol that
    border security is really a combination of three things. It's
    infrastructure; it's boots on the ground; and it's technology.
    But I take it from your testimony that the technology still
    isn't capable of filling this particular gap.
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. And if you go along the Rio Grande River,
    if you ride in one of the river boats that the Department of
    Homeland Security has or the DPS has, you'll see a number of
    scouts by the cartels and the coyotes, directing the movement
    of immigrants across the border, where they see an opening or
    an opportunity. Is that right?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. And so these drones provide an enhanced
    ability to defeat the efforts by the Federal, State, and local
    law enforcement to secure the border?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. So, let's talk briefly about the scourge of
    fentanyl. Fentanyl has taken tens of thousands of lives in
    America. It showed up in every community throughout the
    country. And the unfortunate characteristic of fentanyl is it's
    easy to make from chemical precursors, and it's relatively
    compact and easy to transport. But do drones currently
    transport fentanyl across the border?
        Mr. Wilson. I'm not aware--personally aware of any, but I'm
    sure there are, and I know that there's been those instances
    where drugs and other things have been flown across.
        Senator Cornyn. These drones are capable of carrying a
    significant payload, right?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Of whatever is put on the drone. And, to
    your knowledge, are the transportation of fentanyl across the
    border confined to the ports of entry, or do they also include
    the space between the ports of entry?
        Senator Moody. And we're past time, but I'll let you finish
    that question.
        Mr. Wilson. Between the ports of entry. Yes, sir.
        Senator Moody. Thank----
        Senator Cornyn. And not between----
        Mr. Wilson. No, between----
        Senator Cornyn. You say----
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. The ports.
        Senator Cornyn [continuing]. Including----
        Mr. Wilson. Between the ports----
        Senator Cornyn. Okay.
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Of entry. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Thank you.
        Senator Moody. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Well, there's this strange myth out there
    that the movement of drugs is just across the ports of entry
    and not between the ports of entry, but that's not your
    experience, is it?
        Mr. Wilson. No, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Moody. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. The bad guys are using drones. Does
    anybody disagree with that? Okay. And the Federal Government
    has the authority to fight back, does it not? But State--nobody
    disagrees with that statement? Sure, Professor.
        Professor Donohue. I would say within limits, yes. Within
    constitutional limits.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay. Do any of you disagree with giving
    State and local law enforcement the authority to fight back?
        Professor Donohue. Again, within constitutional limits.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay. Tell me what your constitutional
    concerns are, Professor.
        Professor Donohue. So, I have three primary concerns. The
    first has to do with the Fourth Amendment and the conditions
    under which a warrant is required and a general warrant is
    forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. So, in this particular case,
    it's----
        Senator Kennedy. Professor, before you give me one of your
    lectures, are you saying that we should require State and local
    law enforcement to get a warrant before they fight back?
        Professor Donohue. It depends on the condition. So, in an
    exigent circumstance or something along the border----
        Senator Kennedy. I'm aware of the exceptions to the warrant
    requirement. But generally speaking, you want to require them
    to get a warrant?
        Professor Donohue. Only for the search of a device or the
    seizure of property. There are also due process implications of
    that.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay. You started to mention another one
    of your objections.
        Professor Donohue. First Amendment.
        Senator Kennedy. First Amendment. Okay. Any others?
        Professor Donohue. Yes, I also have a State rights, a Tenth
    Amendment concern here, which is that States own the airspace
    adjacent to the land within their State that's not Federally
    owned, and the current Federal provisions don't recognize State
    sovereignty in that way.
        Senator Kennedy. So, you want to give State and local law
    enforcement the authority to fight back, but you want to list a
    whole lot of conditions. Is that a fair assessment?
        Professor Donohue. Not a whole lot, but some. There needs
    to be a nexus to the facility; it can't be any drone, anywhere
    in America, if you're concerned about a particular facility,
    but right now it's too broad. There have to be acknowledgments
    of First Amendment concerns--so, for instance, limiting the
    covered facilities to the experience and logic test which the
    courts use for right of public access or prohibiting media bans
    across the board or removing--setting a time limit before and
    after special events, so they don't extend extensively. This is
    what a number of State measures already do, and I'd like to see
    that at a Federal level and applied to bring this within the
    constitutional limits.
        Senator Kennedy. Sounds like a lot of conditions to me.
        Professor Donohue. No, not very many. As long as there's
    probable cause and the conditions are met, then absolutely you
    can----
        Senator Kennedy. Have you ever heard----
        Professor Donohue [continuing]. Search.
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Of a legislative practice
    called loving a bill to death?
        Professor Donohue. Yes.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay. And that's when you take a bill, and
    somebody says, I'm really for this bill, but then they add so
    many amendments and they screw it up so badly that the bill
    either becomes ineffective or doesn't pass. Is that a pretty
    accurate description?
        Professor Donohue. Of the term?
        Senator Kennedy. Yes.
        Professor Donohue. Yes.
        Senator Kennedy. You're trying to love this to death,
    aren't you?
        Professor Donohue. I disagree.
        Senator Kennedy. You're not really for giving law
    enforcement the power to fight back, are you?
        Professor Donohue. I am in favor of giving law enforcement
    that power and respecting constitutional limits.
        Senator Kennedy. I don't believe you, Professor. Okay.
    You're not talking to Bambi's baby brother, here. Okay. I've
    read some of your stuff. I think you'd be more intellectually
    honest if you'd just come out and say, I'm on the side of the
    bad guys here. I think we shouldn't give State and local law
    enforcement the authority to fight back. You're trying to make
    it as hard as possible, aren't you?
        Professor Donohue. We'll have to disagree on that point,
    Senator.
        Senator Kennedy. Nah. You ever heard the expression, watch
    what they do, not what they say? I've watched what you've done.
    I know what you believe. Were you--you're on the FISA Court?
        Professor Donohue. I'm not on the court, no. I'm an amicus
    for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Court
    of Review.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay. Were you there when you guys issued
    all those bad warrants against Trump's people?
        Professor Donohue. I can't discuss my work on the court,
    unfortunately.
        Senator Kennedy. Oh, it's top secret. Right. I'd be--you'd
    have to put me on double--the American people on double secret
    probation if you told them the truth, wouldn't you?
        Professor Donohue. No. I can't discuss my matters that I've
    handled before the court. I can discuss the public ones, where
    I've dealt with First Amendment concerns and the right to
    petition. I did an extensive history looking----
        Senator Kennedy. I'm done.
        Professor Donohue [continuing]. At that right----
        Senator Kennedy. I'm done----
        Professor Donohue [continuing]. To petition.
        Senator Kennedy [continuing]. Madam Chair.
        Senator Moody. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. We're
    going to turn it over to Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Madam Chair. You know, when
    there're sightings or reports of drones, the ones who respond
    are often the local and State police; law enforcement, as you
    know. And very often DHS or the Department of Justice take a
    lot longer to respond, and the ones on the line--as we've seen
    recently in Connecticut, reports, sightings, many of them--and
    they often lack the resources, really, to provide adequate
    answers. Shouldn't we be providing more authority and resources
    to local and State law enforcement?
        The FAA, right now, is strained as it is. I don't need to
    tell anyone in this room. Can barely provide for air safety. In
    fact, as we've seen, is losing the skilled workforce that it
    needs to protect safety in the skies. Shouldn't we be giving
    more authority to local and State law enforcement, along with
    the resources to do their job? Let me ask all of you that
    question. And maybe be more----
        Mr. Wilson. Yes.
        Senator Blumenthal [continuing]. Specific----
        Ms. Daskal. Yes.
        Senator Blumenthal [continuing]. About what specific
    equipment should be provided and how it should be provided.
        Mr. Dooley. Again, that's a question that, again, some of
    our four Federal partners--our Federal partners that are
    allowed to do this; they've been doing it longer; they've had
    more capabilities than us--again, like my earlier statement, I
    think that it should be training, number one. Rules and
    regulations. Someone should not only be fluent with how the
    technology works but also FAA rules and regulations, privacy
    concerns, et cetera, so that when they make that decision to
    not only detect but mitigate, it's done correctly or as
    correctly as a human being can make that decision. But I think
    that that's how you move forward.
        And yes, they should have the ability, but it should be
    under certain guidelines and restrictions, that they need
    certain levels of training, certification, education, et
    cetera, to make sure that when they do detect something,
    they're making the right decision, based on a multitude of
    different things to either mitigate it or shoo it away. It
    should be done in that way.
        Ms. Daskal. I agree, as well, Senator. I think it is also
    important that State and local authorities, as well as airport
    owners and critical infrastructure owners, are given the
    authority to engage in advanced detection measures, which they
    currently do not have, so that there is a common understanding
    and awareness of threats before it becomes too late. There also
    should be an expansion of authority to trained State and local
    authorities--subject to oversight; subject to protections for
    civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy--that would allow
    trained State and local authorities to engage in appropriate
    mitigation measures. And, finally, there needs to be, as well,
    the ability for our domestic drone industry to test and
    innovate and be able to do the kind of testing to ensure that
    the Federal Government and State and locals have the best
    technology to engage in, ideally, the kind of disruptions that
    don't require kinetic action, as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you concerned about how robust the
    domestic drone industry is?
        Ms. Daskal. I think it is important to support the domestic
    drone industry, and I also think it's important to ensure that,
    as entities within the domestic drone industry are seeking the
    opportunity to engage in the testing, that that is facilitated
    so that the drone industry is a step ahead of the adversaries.
        Senator Blumenthal. The overwhelming number of drones used
    in this country are made abroad, correct?
        Ms. Daskal. Yes. That is a concern.
        Senator Blumenthal. In China?
        Ms. Daskal. That is a concern, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. What is the percentage? You may have
    already testified to it, and I apologize for repeating.
        Professor Donohue. If I may, 80 percent of the drones are
    DJI, which is a Chinese-owned company.
        Senator Blumenthal. Eighty percent. And what can be done to
    increase the number made in this country and perhaps restrict
    the number made in China? Mr. Wilson?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, Senator. I'm going to echo what my
    partner here has said already. Increase the funding for
    American drone manufacturers to not--to be competitive in
    technology and price. They can do it. They just haven't.
        Senator Blumenthal. With increased funding.
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Senator Moody. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator
    Blackburn.
        Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
    all for being here. And I think to each of us, when you look at
    DJI, their numbers are of tremendous concern for us. That's why
    some of us have had provisions that remove the ability of our
    military to use DJI drones, and also for local law enforcement,
    from them using DJI drones. Any of these drones that are
    manufactured by adversaries or in these adversarial situations
    are a safety risk to us because of the transmission of that
    data and then who holds that data and where they hold that
    data.
        So, as we continue to push back on utilization of foreign-
    manufactured drones, it gives openings for the domestic
    industry to increase their presence. And we hope, Mr. Wilson--
    in answer to or in addition to what you were saying, we hope
    that this helps to motivate domestic manufacturing of these
    drones. We do know there are some supply chain issues around
    that, and as we look at tariffs and trade we are seeking to
    address some of those issues.
        I represent Tennessee. We have a lot of outdoor events in
    Tennessee. We've got Titans football that people enjoy; we've
    got the Bonnaroo Music Festival and so many festivals around
    our State. I've recently done the Fish Fry and the Strawberry
    Fest and a couple of others in our beautiful State. But one of
    the things people are concerned about is when they do hear that
    drone flying overhead, because they don't know who put it there
    and why they put it there and if this is an infringement on
    their privacy or if they are being spied upon or--and the first
    person they turn to is going to be local law enforcement.
        And I agree with some of you and disagree with Professor
    Donohue. I think it's an imperative that we give local and
    State law enforcement the ability to participate in this
    policing and the mitigation efforts that need to take place. I
    would like--and Sergeant Dooley, let me come to you on this.
    Let's break this down and look at what kind of partner the FBI
    and the FAA have been for State and local law enforcement. As
    you look at these mitigation efforts, what kind of partner are
    they when it comes to these counter-UAS efforts? And where
    could that relationship be strengthened?
        Mr. Dooley. Number one, the relationship--the stakeholder
    relationship we have with both of those entities is pretty
    strong. The FAA is super supportive; unfortunately, they can't
    grant those permissions to do those things. Even some of the
    data that some of our Federal partners at times collect--
    they're worried about, like, how it was collected, et cetera.
    But it can be strengthened by, again, just starting the process
    of establishing one of those Federal entities as the lead to
    help guide people forward. And then from there I think it'll
    just blossom and organically grow into something much stronger,
    where there is regulation: Now we have a pathway forward. Now
    people can start learning how to do this.
        And again, I'm a strong believer that you shouldn't just
    understand the technology itself. You should have a firm grasp
    on everything that goes into it, including FAA rules and
    regulations, et cetera, so that when you have one of those
    events in Tennessee, you know, if someone had a legal right to
    be there, fair and equitable access to that airspace they're
    up, they have the proper permissions or whatever the case is,
    and they're just documenting or taking photos or whatever it
    is, it doesn't mean that we shouldn't know that that's
    something benign versus something that's bad.
        Senator Blackburn. So, basically a pre-clearance----
        Mr. Dooley. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn [continuing]. To be in that space?
        Mr. Dooley. Yes.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Thank you for that. I want to move
    on to something--Mr. Dixon had talked about this earlier. And,
    Sergeant Dooley, I'll stay with you. We've had two instances in
    Tennessee where a criminal attempted to use an armed drone to
    murder someone. And in one case, there was somebody that was
    planning an attack on the Knoxville FBI field office, and in
    another a man attempted to attack an electronic substation with
    homemade drones. So, we know that this takes place. And Mr.
    Dixon talked about it with law enforcement and prisons and
    jails. So, it just leads me to believe that there has got to be
    some reforms on how we look at the regulations around the
    drones.
        And I know I am over time. Madam Chairman, if I may take a
    moment--and, Sergeant Dooley, let me have you talk a bit--how
    we do these reforms, before there is a successful attack that
    is carried out from--how would we go about those reforms so
    we're in front of any type attack that takes place?
        Mr. Dooley. Again, we have three handsome public safety
    professionals; we have our Senators here, decisionmakers; and
    we have some legal experts. I mean, there's a pathway forward.
    It can be quick. It can be done correctly. But again, I'm a
    firm believer that we have to establish someone who's the lead,
    and then from there I think that we can move forward to get it
    done pretty quickly. And then, of course, all of our States
    represented here--Florida and Texas--it would obviously step up
    to whatever level we would need to, to make it happen in a
    timely fashion.
        Senator Blackburn. Okay. Secretary Dixon, anything to add
    on that?
        Mr. Dixon. I agree. The frustrating thing is the technology
    exists. That's not our problem. It's the authority we need. So,
    that's good news and bad news. The technology's there to do
    everything we need to do. I would distinguish ourself a little
    independently in the corrections industry, because we are a
    fixed site and we have a different population, so I don't think
    there's any reason we can't work together to move ahead on
    authorities we need to combat this immediately.
        Senator Blackburn. So, the Federal, State, and local
    partnership--we need to work through that?
        Mr. Dixon. Yes. The partnership is great. We need the
    congressional--we need language, authority from the Federal
    level, to allow us to utilize the tools.
        Senator Moody. Thank you, Senator Blackburn. And thank you
    to all of our witnesses for being here today. I know this was a
    long hearing, but I appreciate your attention and participation
    throughout. Written questions can be submitted by Senators for
    the record until May 27 at 5 p.m., and then we'll ask the
    witnesses to respond and return the questions to the Committee
    as quickly as possible.
        Senator Moody. With that, you are free to go and enjoy
    lunch. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
        [Additional material submitted for the record follows.]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 A P P E N D I X

    The following submissions are available at:

      https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-119shrg61982/pdf/CHRG-
        119shrg
        61982-add1.pdf

    Submitted by Chair Grassley:

     American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), statement.................     2

     Association for Uncrewed Vehicle System International (AUVSI),
        statement.....................................................     5

     Commercial Drone Alliance (CDA), statement.......................     8

     DroneResponders (CUAS), statement................................    14

     Right On Crime, letter...........................................    19

     U.S. Chamber of Commerce, letter.................................    21

    Submitted by Ranking Member Durbin:

     American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), statement.................     2

     Association for Uncrewed Vehicle System International (AUVSI),
        statement.....................................................     5

     U.S. Chamber of Commerce, letter.................................    21

    Submitted by Senator Schmitt:

     Big Sister, poster...............................................    23

                                     [all]