[Senate Hearing 119-160]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-160
NATO SUMMIT 2025: AN ASSESSMENT OF
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-565 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director
Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
Risch, Hon. James E., Chairman, U.S. Senator From Idaho.......... 1
Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, Ranking Member, U.S. Senator From New
Hampshire...................................................... 3
Witnesses
Rough, Peter, Senior Fellow and Director, Center on Europe and
Eurasia, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC...................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Polyakova, Dr. Alina, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC............ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Peter Rough to Questions Submitted by:..........
Senator James E. Risch....................................... 43
Senator David McCormick...................................... 44
Responses of Dr. Alina Polyakova to Questions Submitted by:......
Senator James E. Risch....................................... 46
Senator David McCormick...................................... 47
(iii)
NATO SUMMIT 2025: AN ASSESSMENT OF
TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:54 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.
Risch presiding.
Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, Shaheen,
Coons, Merkley, Booker, and Van Hollen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. This morning's hearing is on the NATO Summit
of 2025 on assessment of transatlantic security cooperation.
Obviously, this is coming up quite soon. We don't have an
ambassador in place. The ranking member and I have been
discussing that. I think both of us are the frame of mind that
we need our ambassador in place. We hope we can get the
cooperation to move it forward, notwithstanding everything else
that's going on. But this is particularly, at this point in
time, with what's happening in Europe, it's important we have
an ambassador there.
To our witnesses, thank you. And we'll get to you in a
moment.
I'm going to make an opening statement, yield to Senator
Shaheen, who will do so. We will then hear from each of you
your thoughts. And we really, really appreciate you coming here
to talk with us today. And then we'll go with a round of
questions for the witnesses.
So, NATO was founded in 1949 to protect the United States
and transatlantic partners from the aggression of those who
seek to harm us. In fact, it was Russian aggression and a
divided Berlin that finally convinced our partners to sign the
treaty.
The world has endured a lot in the past 76 years since
then, but NATO has played a crucial role in preserving
stability and security. It is this security that has provided
room for enormous U.S. and European economic prosperity. Today,
as in times past, NATO must adapt to new changes and new
challenges. Our alliance faces unprecedented threats from a
rising China, a belligerent Russia, and rogue actors in Iran,
North Korea, and elsewhere.
This year's NATO Summit presents a unique opportunity to
assess the threats facing our alliance and the response they
demand from us if we hope to maintain the security and
stability the world has enjoyed for so long, much of it due to
what NATO offers us.
Over the last decade, but particularly the last 3 years,
Putin's aggression has created the largest security crisis in
Europe since the Second World War. In 2014, Russia invaded
Ukraine for the first time, and Europe did little to deter
further aggression after the full scale invasion. In 2022,
Europe leaders made momentous pledges to take more
responsibility. Three years on, Europe still has a long way to
go.
Since January 20, President Trump has worked diligently to
determine whether peace between Ukraine and Russia is possible,
and we strongly support his efforts to secure a lasting peace
in the region. Russia's actions demonstrate an unwillingness to
support peace and a preference for war to continue, a war that
is already radically reshaped the security landscape in Europe
and proving one indisputable fact: NATO is more relevant than
ever and will be for decades to come.
There are still actors who seek to subvert America, our
allies, and the values we hold dear. Russia's invasion of
Ukraine proved that we do not live in a ``post-conflict era''
as Secretary General Rutte has pointed out. Russia could be
ready to use military force against a NATO nation within a few
years. We could only defend against these threats together, but
there are still members of NATO that take the alliance and U.S.
support for granted.
For decades, our European allies have left the heavy
lifting to America, and by their own admission, did not pull
their own weight in defense spending. This is starting to
change thankfully. NATO has always succeeded because there was
no first or second tier membership, unanimity, and voting
guarantees. Sovereignty and equality is respected.
However, the failure of Europe to spend appropriately on
defense started to create the very tiers that NATO worked to
avoid. Europeans must make dramatic investment in their
defense. U.S. taxpayers will not continue to foot their bill
thanks to President Trump's leadership since he first came to
office, I believe Europe now understands this.
Many of us on this committee have underscored that issue
with them when we meet with them. The number of allies
fulfilling their defense spending pledges has risen from six
members in 2017 when President Trump first took office to 23
today, with many more presenting plans to reach 2 percent by
the end of this year. This is great progress, and I'm glad that
Secretary General Rutte has called for greater defense
investment in production capacity across NATO.
Our allies must agree to raise defense spending levels to 5
percent of their GDP and not through defense adjacent
expenditures. That means increasing production of defense
capabilities, equipment, recruitment, and developing innovative
technologies that enhance lethality. Many of these topics will
be discussed at the NATO Summit in June, and I look forward to
seeing the outcomes of those conversations.
After all, Russia is not the only threat NATO faces. NATO
security umbrella does not and should not cover Asia. But Iran,
North Korea, and China actively support Russia's war in
Ukraine. These authoritarian actors are not operating in silos,
and NATO can't think of them as such. Indeed, China poses risk
to NATO military readiness. The Alliance must set standards for
its members to guard against malign Chinese investments and
supply chain vulnerabilities that threaten NATO security in
Europe.
Above all, we must remember that we are united. There may
be disagreements from trade to technology, but the threats we
face are existential, and none of us can face them alone. NATO
is still the most successful political and military
organization in the history of this planet. Adversaries who
seek to do us harm would be wise to recognize that fact.
I'm grateful to our witnesses for being with us today and
look forward to a productive conversation on the future of the
NATO alliance.
With that, I yield to the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Shaheen.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,
RANKING MEMBER, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
welcome to both of our witnesses today. We appreciate your
willingness to sit through our business meeting while we wait
for your testimony.
I want to actually begin by going to a different region of
the world and expressing my concern about the conflict between
Israel and Iran because the exchange of missile attacks not
only endangers our partners in the region, but also the safety
of American service members, diplomats, and their families.
And I asked Secretary Hegseth about this at an earlier
hearing. We have 40,000 troops in the region, many of whom are
within range of Iranian missiles. And he was not at all clear
about what we're doing to protect those service members.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that we will ask the Administration on
the part of this committee for a briefing on what's going on in
this area.
Senator Risch. Thank you. We've talked about that, and
we're going to try to make that happen----
Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you.
Senator Risch [continuing]. That's a legitimate request.
Senator Shaheen. One of the things that this conflict does
is it makes the upcoming NATO Summit and the need for
international partners, as the chairman has said, even more
consequential. As co-chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, I
will be attending the summit along with Senator Tillis, and we
hope to have a good bipartisan delegation from the Senate.
The support for NATO is also reflected here at home. A
recent Pew Research poll found that nearly two-thirds of U.S.
adults see a benefit to NATO membership. Our European allies
feel the same. Despite the rhetoric and the trade practices
from this Administration, our allies continue to recognize
NATO's value, perhaps now more than ever.
According to official figures, 23 out of NATO's 32 member
states currently meet or exceed the defense spending threshold
of 2 percent. And as the chairman said, I certainly agree with
him in hoping that out of the summit will come an agreement to
adopt 5 percent as the new defense spending target at the Hague
Summit.
In fact, Sweden and the Netherlands just announced plans to
spend 5 percent of GDP on defense, and these increases are not
the result of trade policies or tariffs. They are a direct
response to Russian aggression to Vladimir Putin's willingness
to lay waste to Ukraine. As NATO Secretary General Rutte has
said, and I quote, ``We are all on the eastern flank now.''
The reality of this shared vulnerability is clear. If Putin
wins in Ukraine, he will not stop there. He's already sent
troops into Belarus. He threatens the Balkans, the Baltic
states, and the Black Sea, and Russia's ambitions also continue
to play out over our own borders, through the Kremlin's
repeated attacks on our financial institutions and energy
infrastructure. That's why I don't understand the
Administration's continued refusal to lower the price cap for
Russian oil sanctions at the G7. It would've put more pressure
on Putin.
I think Congress needs to act, and we have legislation
supported by 82 members of the Senate that will put in place
additional sanctions on Vladimir Putin. I think we should get
that done as soon as possible. I also think that we shouldn't
stop there, that NATO membership should be on the table for
Ukraine. NATO's open door policy enshrined in the Washington
Treaty should not be up for negotiation to satisfy what
Vladimir Putin wants, but its membership should determine who
has the opportunity to get into the alliance, and Ukraine's
membership would strengthen that. They have the largest army in
Europe, the most experienced army in Europe at this point, and
we are developing cutting edge countermeasures based on
Ukraine's real time experience against Russian systems.
We should also not forget the power of alliances in taking
on adversaries like Russia, or Iran, or others. As Senator
Risch has rightly said, the NATO alliance is the most
successful political and defensive organization that's ever
been on the face of the planet. I agree with that, and I hope
our witnesses today can speak to the full picture for NATO, the
challenges that NATO should address at this year's summit, as
well as the opportunities and advantages that NATO offers each
of its members.
So, I very much look forward to hearing your thoughts and
to our discussion. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
We have now two distinguished witnesses we're going to hear
from. I'd ask you to keep you remarks to about 5 minutes.
You're going to get questions from the committee. If you have
other remarks or you go beyond 5 minutes, if you'd put them in
writing for the record, we will see that they are included in
the record of this hearing. And again, we sincerely appreciate
you coming here.
We're going to start with Mr. Peter Rough. He's a senior
fellow and director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia at the
Hudson Institute, where he focuses on U.S. national security,
defense, and foreign policy toward Europe. He writes and
comments on U.S. foreign policy and regularly briefs official
delegations, news media, public intellectuals, academics, and
business leaders, and convenes several Track 1.5 dialogues.
In the past Mr. Rough served in White House Office of
Strategic initiatives, USAID, and U.S. Army Special Operations
Command Strategic Initiatives Group. He holds his BA from the
George Washington University, and MA in Law and Diplomacy from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
He's a member of the boards of the American Main Street
Initiative, the Bastion Institute, and has been named a next
generation leader at several think tanks, including the Munich
Security Conference, which we all know.
Mr. Rough, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER ROUGH, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
CENTER ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Rough. Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member
Shaheen, and members of the committee, thank you for the honor
of testifying today and for your attention to the upcoming NATO
Summit. My name is Peter Rough, and I'm the director of the
Center on Europe and Eurasia at Hudson Institute. My views are
my own and should not be construed as representing the position
of Hudson.
With your permission, I'd like to take this opportunity to
summarize my written testimony, which I'd like to submit for
the record.
For starters, it's worth repeating that Europe remains of
vital importance to the United States with the stock of two way
foreign direct investment totaling $7.5 trillion in 2023. In
fact, the Netherlands, host of next week's NATO Summit, holds
the largest FDI position in the United States of any country in
the world.
Worryingly, the peace and prosperity of Europe are under
threat. Russia's reconstitution of its Leningrad Military
District, de facto takeover of Belarus, plans to expand and
enlarge its ground forces, establishment of bases and rail
networks along the Russian-Finnish border, and waves of hybrid
attacks have all reinforced the truth that Russia remains
implacably hostile to the alliance.
A recent Danish intelligence assessment even characterized
Russian re-armament as having ``changed character from
reconstruction to an intensified military build up.'' As NATO
Secretary General Mark Rutte put it rather dramatically last
week, Europe now faces a choice: ``Either invest in defense or
learn to speak Russian.''
That message is resonating. Two weeks ago, defense
ministers in Brussels agreed to new capability targets that
represent on average a 30 percent increase over existing goals.
At the NATO Summit, the alliance will agree to a new investment
pledge: 5 percent of gross domestic product for defense, of
which 3.5 percent is to be set aside for hard power, while 1.5
percent is to be earmarked for related costs such as
cybersecurity and infrastructure.
Central to this breakthrough is Germany, which has taken up
the mantle of leadership under its new Chancellor, Friedrich
Merz. In a refreshing break from its recent past, Germany has
now committed to convert its economic power into military
capabilities. This sets up a new NATO bargain: Five for five.
In return for NATO adopting its new defense spending target,
President Trump should reiterate the United States' ironclad
commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which
obligates member states to mutual defense.
To turn promises into reality, NATO should consider
supplementing its defense ministerials with a finance
ministerial comprised of allied ministers of finance, many of
whom in parliamentary democracies control their country's purse
strings.
There is no bigger deterrent to Russian aggression in
Europe than forward deployed U.S. forces. In his own words,
General Cavoli has ``consistently recommended'' that we
maintain our current force posture to counteract Russia's local
superiority on the eastern flank of the alliance. As we have
seen this week, U.S. bases in Europe project American power
into other theaters. The KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-46
Pegasuses that deployed from the United States on Sunday and
Monday are now at air bases in Spain, Greece, Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom, as the President weighs his options on
Iran. Our Ambassador to NATO, Ambassador Whitaker has promised
to ``make sure that there are no security gaps,'' in Europe. As
the U.S. undertakes this global force posture review, this will
be especially important for the strategic enablers, which
Europe still lacks.
Russia cannot take on NATO on its own. Unfortunately, it
now enjoys close defense industrial ties with the People's
Republic of China, whose supply of machine tools and
microelectronics have powered the Russian war on Ukraine.
Russia's drones, which now count for more casualties in Ukraine
than any other weapon system, are derivatives of Iran's Shahed
family of unmanned aerial vehicles. Meanwhile, North Korean
shells now make up half of all Russian artillery fired in
certain sectors of the front line.
Earlier this year, a division sized force of North Korean
troops played a decisive role in Russia's counteroffensive in
Kursk Oblast. In return, Russia has provided each of its
partners with diplomatic, technological, and economic benefits.
If the U.S. cannot prevent the alignment of these revisionist
actors, it should, at the very least, vector Europe's stark
opposition to Russia into a tougher transatlantic stance
against China, Iran, and North Korea.
As the President suggested at the G7 2 days ago, whatever
sanctions Europeans are requesting of the United States should
be mirrored by similar actions from our allies on the
continent.
Finally, given the presence of major war in eastern Europe,
no NATO Summit can ignore the plight of Ukraine. It is not
expected that Ukraine will receive significant mention in the
Summit Declaration, but leaders should plan now rather than
later for how to support Ukraine as U.S. congressional funding
runs out over the coming months.
Europe will fill gaps and shoulder much of the load, but
for those systems that Europe cannot replace, NATO leaders
should begin exploring U.S. attitudes toward either another
supplemental or direct military sales. For example, the U.S.
could backfill Europe's air defenses as those countries
transfer interceptors to Ukraine.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Peter Rough follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Peter Rough
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, distinguished members of
the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
europe's strategic backdrop
Europe remains of vital importance to the United States. Last year,
total U.S. trade in goods and services with Europe exceeded $2 trillion
while European foreign direct investment (FDI) in the U.S. stood at
$3.5 trillion and U.S. FDI in Europe reached $4 trillion. \1\ The
Netherlands, host of next week's North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Summit, holds the largest FDI position in the United States of
any country in the world. \2\ At one-third of global gross domestic
product (GDP), the transatlantic economy dwarfs that of all other U.S.
relationships in the world, including with Asia.
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\1\ Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic
Economy 2025 (Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University SAIS/
Transatlantic Leadership Network, 2025), https://
transatlantic.amchameu.eu/.
\2\ Bureau of Economic Analysis, ``Direct Investment by Country and
Industry, 2023,'' news release, July 23, 2024, https://www.bea.gov/
news/2024/direct-investment-country-and-industry-2023.
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Worryingly, the transatlantic alliance is under threat. Russian
President Vladimir Putin remains implacably opposed to the U.S.-
European partnership, which he seeks to undermine at every opportunity.
In recent months, European intelligence services have issued one
warning after another about the prospect of Russian aggression against
a NATO member state. \3\
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\3\ Simon Saradzhyan, ``Would Russia Attack NATO and, If So,
When?,'' In the Thick of It (blog), June 5, 2025, https://
www.russiamatters.org/blog/would-russia-attack-nato-and-if-so-when.
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In February, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service forecast that
under the right conditions, Russia would be able to begin hostilities
with a neighboring state within 6 months of a cease-fire in Ukraine.
\4\ The Economist reported last month that a separate Danish
intelligence assessment characterized Russian rearmament as having
``changed character from reconstruction to an intensified military
build-up.'' \5\ Russia's reconstitution of its Leningrad Military
District, de facto takeover of Belarus, \6\ plans to expand its ground
forces, \7\ and establishment of bases and rail networks along the
Russian-Finnish border \8\ have all reinforced to Europe the
unavoidable truth that Russia's postwar focus will be on NATO. As Bruno
Kahl, the outgoing head of Germany's Federal Intelligence Agency,
stated last week, ``We see that NATO's collective defence promise is to
be tested . . . We are very sure, and we have intelligence evidence to
back this up, that Ukraine is only one step on Russia's path towards
the West.'' \9\
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\4\ ``Opdateret vurdering af truslen fra Rusland mod
Rigsfellesskabet'' [Updated assessment of the threat from Russia
against the Kingdom of Denmark], Danish Defense Intelligence Service,
February 9, 2025, https://www.fe-ddis.dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/
2025/trusselsvurderinger/-
20250209_opdateret_vurdering_af_truslen_fra_rusland_mod--.pdf.
\5\ ``Would Vladimir Putin Attack NATO?,'' The Economist, May 8,
2025, https://www.economist.com/brie.ng/2025/05/08/would-vladimir-
putin-attack-nato.
\6\ ``Putin Signs Agreement Offering Russia's Security Guarantees
to Ally Belarus,'' Associated Press, December 6, 2024, https://
apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-security-agreement-nuclear-doctrine-
c07ef5d341f93be6934ac14a77b58f8b.
\7\ ``Putin Orders Military to Boost Troop Numbers by 180,000 to
1.5 Million as Ukraine Fighting Continues,'' Associated Press,
September 16, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-
military-numbers-9c5554302486adfe7b3d69cb297f8a98.
\8\ Jeffrey Gettleman, Amelia Nierenberg, and Johanna Lemola,
``Russia Beefs Up Bases Near Finland's Border,'' New York Times, May
19, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/19/world/europe/russia-
finland-border.html; https://yle.fi/a/74-20135804.
\9\ Thomas Escritt, ``Russia Could Send `Little Green Men' to Test
NATO's Resolve, German Intelligence Boss Warns,'' Reuters, June 9,
2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-plans-test-natos-
resolve-german-intelligence-chief-warns-2025-06-09/; Nick Alipour,
``Russia planning attack on Nato `to test article 5', warns Germany,''
The Times of London, June 10, 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/world/
russia-ukraine-war/article/attack-nato-germany-9700tn2z2.
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a new nato bargain: five for five
Europe now faces a choice, as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte put
it last week: either invest in defense or ``learn to speak Russian.''
\10\ Europe's post-cold war fallback option, to offload deterrence onto
the United States, is no longer tenable.
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\10\ Chatham House, ``NATO Chief Mark Rutte Warns Russia Could Use
Military Force Against Alliance in Five Years,'' news release, June 9,
2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/nato-chief-mark-rutte-warns-
russia-could-use-military-force-against-alliance-five-years.
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Since returning to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump has
walked a tightrope, exposing allies in Europe to just enough Russian
power to engender burden-shifting without going so far as to risk
another security crisis on the continent. Thus far, this approach has
achieved a high return on investment, most notably by prodding Europe's
economic giant, Germany, into exempting defense spending from its
constitutional debt brake. Over time, the upshot could be hundreds of
billions of euros in new defense outlays.
Two weeks ago, defense ministers paved the way in Brussels by
agreeing to new capability targets that represent, on average, a 30
percent increase over existing goals. To turn promises into reality,
NATO should consider supplementing its defense ministerials with a new
finance ministerial, comprised of allied ministers of finance, many of
whom in parliamentary democracies control their country's purse
strings. As my Hudson Institute colleague, Luke Coffey, has argued,
this would prove far more useful than annual leader-level summits,
which have proven costly, time-consuming, and often unnecessary
bordering on the counterproductive.
To be sure, the same Trumpian style that is pushing Europe toward
these increased defense spending targets has also raised questions
about America's staying power. Left unattended, these anxieties may
spur allies to engage in hedging by way of so-called European strategic
autonomy, with all the attendant downsides such an approach would
entail for U.S. defense contractors and America's leverage against
China.
At the NATO Summit, therefore, President Trump should look to
convert Europe's unease into deliverables. Thanks to his leadership,
NATO stands on the cusp of an ambitious new investment pledge: 5
percent of GDP for defense, of which 3.5 percent is to be set aside for
hard power while 1.5 percent is to be earmarked for related costs, such
as cybersecurity and infrastructure.
At President Trump's urging and Secretary General Rutte's behest,
NATO should ratify the new 5 percent goal, to be achieved over a 5-year
time horizon, with tightly defined categories for what constitutes
defense spending; in return, President Trump should preempt any moves
toward strategic autonomy by reiterating his ironclad commitment to
Article V of the Washington Treaty, which commits allies to mutual
defense.
Such a ``five for five'' arrangement would have the additional
benefit of challenging the U.S. to make larger investments in our own
military going forward. \11\ Most importantly, it would force Russia to
think twice about any moves against NATO.
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\11\ Dustin Walker, ``Will the U.S. Pull Its Weight in NATO?,''
Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/will-
america-pull-its-weight-in-nato-trump-gdp-target-spend-717dc8c3.
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u.s. force presence
There is no bigger deterrent to Russian aggression in Europe than
forward-deployed U.S. forces. Today, the U.S. stations just over 65,000
troops in permanent facilities across Europe, with an additional 20,000
forces rotating through the continent since Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. In total, the number of U.S. servicemembers across Europe
remains far below the historical average of the past seventy-five
years. \12\
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\12\ Data for military and civilian personnel by service/agency by
state/country, Defense Manpower Data Center, accessed June 2025,
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/workforce-reports.
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The expectation across the alliance is that the U.S. will downsize
its troop presence in Europe. \13\ Although U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Matt Whitaker has communicated to partners that in-depth consultations
will not begin until after next week's Summit, the status of American
forces in Europe will loom over the proceedings. \14\
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\13\ Gordon Lubold, Dan De Luce, and Courtney Kube ``Pentagon
Considering Proposal to Cut Thousands of Troops from Europe, Officials
Say,'' NBC News, April 8, 2025. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
national-security/pentagon-considering-proposal-cut-thousands-troops-
europe-officials-sa-rcna199603.
\14\ ``U.S. Ambassador to NATO Reveals Trump's Plan to Reassess
American Military Presence in Europe After NATO Hague Summit,'' Baltic
Sentinel, May 21, 2025, https://balticsentinel.eu/8253450/u-s-
ambassador-to-nato-reveals-trump-s-plan-to-reassess-american-military-
presence-in-europe-after-nato-hague-summit.
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The preference of our senior military commander is clear. ``Since
we originally surged forces forward in 2022, we have periodically
reviewed for structure both the military and policy level,'' General
Christopher Cavoli, the outgoing head of EUCOM and SACEUR argued before
the House Armed Services Committee in April, ``and I have consistently
recommended throughout that period to maintain the forces we surged
forward, and I would continue to do so now if asked.'' \15\
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\15\ Hearing to Discuss U.S. Military Posture and National Security
Challenges in Europe before the House Committee on Armed Services,
118th Cong. (2025) (Statement of Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, Commander,
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe), https://
armedservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=5030.
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The reasons are myriad. An on-the-ground presence allows U.S.
forces to absorb local factors like terrain and weather, deepen
interoperability with allies, benefit from the savings of host nation
support, and project power around the world. As my Hudson Institute
colleague, Dan Kochis, reminds us in a forthcoming paper, the U.S.
forces ordered to respond to the attack on the U.S. embassy in
Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012, were based in Spain at Naval
Station Rota.
Most of all, U.S. forces in Europe counteract Russian advantages.
Although NATO is a superior fighting force, Russia has local
superiority on the eastern flank of the alliance. It can deploy forces
opposite NATO countries that lack strategic depth and heavy divisions.
Moreover, because NATO is a defensive alliance while Russia is a
revisionist power, Putin can decide to initiate hostilities at a time
and place of his choosing secure in the knowledge that NATO is highly
unlikely to act first.
These factors make it all the more important that NATO maintains a
forward presence and adequately resources the NATO Force Model's multi-
tiered system of force generation. \16\ Ambassador Whitaker has
promised ``to make sure that there are no security gaps'' in Europe.
\17\ For now, this will require the continued deployment of U.S.
strategic enablers, from Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) assets and Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) capabilities to Strategic
Airlift, Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD), and Command and Control (C2)
infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Can Kasapoglu, ``NATO Is Not Ready for War: Assessing the
Military Balance between the Alliance and Russia,'' Hudson Institute,
June 28, 2024, https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/nato-not-
ready-war-assessing-military-balance-between-alliance-russia-can-
kasapoglu.
\17\ ``Digital Press Briefing: U.S. Permanent Representative to
NATO Ambassador Matthew Whitaker,'' U.S. Department of State, June 4,
2025, https://www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-u-s-permanent-
representative-to-nato-ambassador-matthew-whitaker.
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russia's hybrid way of war
To date, Russia has eschewed major war with NATO. Instead, it
operates just below the threshold of conventional war by prosecuting a
campaign of gray zone attacks that numbers in the dozens, if not
hundreds, of incidents. \18\ These range from funneling illegal
immigrants toward NATO borders to undertaking arson attacks on major
public venues. \19\ Moscow even reportedly planned the assassination of
Armin Papperger, the CEO of Rheinmetall, one of Europe's largest arms
manufacturers, and planted incendiary devices on Western cargo planes,
with plans to target airplanes bound for the United States. \20\
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\18\ Sam Clark, ``Russia's Hybrid Warfare Could Cause `Substantial'
Casualties, Senior NATO Official Says,'' Politico, December 29, 2024,
https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-hybrid-warfare-defense-
substantial-casualties-james-appathurai-nato/.
\19\ Marek Strzelecki, ``Poland Says Russian Secret Service Behind
2024 Fire in Warsaw Shopping Centre,'' Reuters, May 11, 2025, https://
www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-says-russian-secret-service-behind-
2024-fire-warsaw-shopping-centre-2025-05-11/.
\20\ Michael Schwirtz and Julian E. Barnes, ``Russia Plotted to Put
Incendiary Devices on Cargo Planes, Officials Say,'' November 5, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/05/world/europe/russia-plot-dhl-
planes.html.
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Russia's hybrid war is now discussed at nearly every NATO
ministerial, but the alliance's response remains deliberate bordering
on the tepid. This month, the alliance adopted a new hybrid strategy,
but it has mostly confined itself to three categories of
countermeasures. First, NATO has improved information sharing within
the alliance and publicly blamed Russia for its operations. Second, it
has sought to drive up the costs of Russia's actions. In December, for
example, Finnish forces boarded the oil tanker Eagle S and took legal
steps against it for dragging its anchor across an undersea power
cable, an increasingly common occurrence. \21\ Third, NATO has pulled
together an observation mission in the Baltic Sea. In January, NATO
launched an operation called Baltic Sentry to patrol and track Russia's
shadow fleet of tankers. \22\
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\21\ In May, Estonia's navy intercepted the oil tanker Jaguar in
the Gulf of Finland, leading Russia to dispatch a Su-35 fighter jet in
response, one of only hundreds of incidents annually of Russia
violating Baltic air space.
\22\ NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
``Baltic Sentry to Enhance NATO's Presence in the Baltic Sea,'' news
release, January 14, 2025, https://shape.nato.int/news-releases/baltic-
sentry-to-enhance-natos-presence-in-the-baltic-sea.
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These defensive measures have not deterred Russia. \23\ At little
cost to itself, Russia has saddled the alliance with huge expenses,
like repairing damaged undersea infrastructure. NATO members may need
to consider additional countermeasures, like offensive cyber
operations, to reestablish deterrence in the realm of hybrid
operations. Moreover, some NATO members have begun to explore and
define at what threshold a hybrid attack could lead to the invocation
of Article V. \24\
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\23\ Victor Jack, Lucia Mackenzie, and Sam Clark, ``Europe's new
war with Russia: Deep sea sabotage,'' Politico, April 7, 2025, https://
www.politico.eu/article/russia-sabotage-undersea-cables-baltic-sea-
europe-war/.
\24\ ``Russian Acts of Sabotage May Lead to NATO Invoking Article
5, Says German Intel Chief,'' Reuters, November 27, 2024, https://
www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-hybrid-attacks-may-lead-nato-
invoking-article-5-says-german-intel-chief-2024-11-27/.
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russia's alliance system
Russia cannot take on NATO on its own. In fact, it still borrows
power from the West today. In 2024, the European Union (EU) saw a
rebound in Russian gas imports, even as the European Commission works
to end Russian energy imports in the next 2 years. \25\ Similarly,
Russia continues to use systems in Ukraine that rely on dual-use
technologies sourced from Western commercial markets. As a first step,
therefore, the West must redouble its efforts to end its Russian energy
imports and block Russian shell companies from circumventing export
controls.
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\25\ Victor Jack and Louise Guillot, ``EU's Top Russian LNG Buyers
Wary of Brussels' Gas Ban,'' Politico, June 3, 2025, https://
www.politico.eu/article/eus-top-russian-lng-buyers-wary-of-brussels-
gas-ban/; European Commission, ``Roadmap to Fully End EU Dependency on
Russian Energy,'' news release, May 6, 2025, https://
commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/roadmap-fully-end-eu-
dependency-russian-energy-2025-05-06_en.
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More broadly, however, it will have to tighten the noose on
Russia's global partnerships. In the 2019 London Declaration, NATO
flagged ``China's growing influence'' as a factor for the alliance for
the first time. \26\ By the time of the Washington Summit last year,
NATO expressed ``profound concern'' for the ``coercive policies'' of
China and its deepening strategic partnership with Russia. Beijing's
vast defense industrial support for the Russian war machine, especially
its provision of microelectronics and machine tools, has proven of the
utmost significance for Russia in Ukraine. It is an open question if
Russia could continue the war in Ukraine without Chinese support.
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\26\ ``London Declaration,'' NATO, December 4, 2019, https://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
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Iranian drones and North Korean artillery have also allowed Russia
to defy expectations and sustain a high operational tempo in Ukraine.
Many of Russia's drones, which now account for more casualties in
Ukraine than any other weapon system, are derivates of Iran's Shahed
family of unmanned aerial vehicles. Meanwhile, North Korean shells now
make up half of all Russian artillery fired in certain sectors of the
front-line. Earlier this year, a division-sized force of North Korean
troops played a decisive role in Russia's counteroffensive in Kursk
Oblast. In return, Russia has provided each of its partners with
diplomatic, technological, and economic benefits.
If the U.S. cannot prevent the alignment of these revisionist
actors, it should at the very least vector Europe's visceral opposition
to Russia into a tougher transatlantic stance against China, Iran, and
North Korea. For example, the U.S. should encourage allies to tighten
their screening of Chinese greenfield investments and FDI into critical
areas like Artificial Intelligence (AI), microelectronics, quantum
technologies, space, drones, and pharmaceuticals. \27\ Moreover, the
U.S. should make clear to its NATO partners and the EU and its member
states that Chinese control of critical infrastructure, from
telecommunications networks to some 30 port terminals across Europe,
poses a threat to the alliance. \28\ The U.S. and much of Europe are
treaty allies; it is entirely appropriate for Washington to ask our
closest partners to choose between the United States and our
adversaries on matters of security.
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\27\ Camille Gijs and Francesca Micheletti, ``EU Countries Soften
Push to Stop Chinese Tech Buyouts,'' Politico, May 6, 2025, https://
www.politico.eu/article/eu-countries-soften-push-to-curb-chinese-
access-to-sensitive-tech/.
\28\ Martina Sapio, ``Chinese Companies Bought Up European Ports--
and Now Brussels Is Starting to Worry,'' Politico, May 9, 2025, https:/
/www.politico.eu/article/chinese-companies-bought-up-european-ports-
and-now-brussels-is-starting-to-worry/.
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future of ukraine
Of course, the war in Ukraine will loom over this Summit as it has
over all debates on transatlantic security for the past 3 years. And
yet, it is already clear that in The Hague leaders will not take
significant political decisions on the war; just like at this week's
meeting of the Group of Seven, the war will receive hardly a mention in
the NATO Summit Declaration.
At minimum, though, alliance leaders would be wise to revisit the
extraordinary advances in Ukraine's military capabilities, especially
in drone warfare. Today, despite the establishment of the Joint
Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), NATO is struggling to
keep pace with Russia and Ukraine as they iterate new forms of drone
warfare in real time on the battlefield. Without becoming a party to
the conflict, NATO countries will need to consider a more robust in-
country presence to supplement the analysis being undertaken at JATEC
in Bydgoszcz, Poland. This holds doubly true for Western industry.
Ukraine is eager to share lessons-learned from the battlefield as a
form of repayment for Western support; we should seize that
opportunity.
Second, NATO leaders should plan now rather than later for how to
supply Ukraine as U.S. Congressional funding runs out over the coming
months. Europe will fill gaps and shoulder much of the load, but for
those systems that Europe cannot replace, NATO leaders should begin
exploring U.S. attitudes toward direct military sales. For example, the
U.S. could backfill Europe's air defenses as those countries transfer
interceptors to Ukraine.
Finally, given that Russian projectiles have periodically transited
NATO airspace or even crashed onto allied soil, leaders in The Hague
should consider the establishment of a joint liaison office to
facilitate coordination between NATO's air policing and air and missile
defense architecture and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Alliance members
may even wish to consider authorizing troops in Poland and Romania to
shoot down Russian missiles and drones flying across western Ukraine
toward NATO. \29\
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\29\ Luke Coffey, ``Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A
Strategy for the Trump Administration,'' Hudson Institute, November 19,
2004, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/getting-ukraine-position-
strength-strategy-trump-administration-luke-coffey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
eu defense spending
The NATO Summit in The Hague will be the first meeting of allied
leaders since the EU adopted its ReArm Europe Plan. This initiative
should be applauded for exempting up to 1.5 percent of GDP over 4 years
in defense spending from the fiscal strictures of the Stability and
Growth Pact. In theory, this will benefit U.S. and European defense
industry alike. Moreover, the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE)
instrument establishes a long-maturity =150 billion credit line for EU
members. Under SAFE, 65 percent of procurements for any one program
must come from EU states, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
countries of Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Iceland, and/or
Ukraine. By including Ukraine in its regulations, the EU is sending an
important signal of support to Kyiv.
At the same time, while encouraging Europe to buildup its own
defense industrial base is a U.S. priority, regulations that dictate
where euros are spent warrant special scrutiny. This applies to SAFE
but also to the European Defense Industrial Program, a modest =1.5
billion EU spending program to be unveiled in the coming months that is
widely viewed as a template for how future EU defense euros will be
spent.
If a non-EU member like Switzerland, which has withheld export
licenses to an allied country attempting to support Ukraine, is
eligible for SAFE, so, too, should the United States qualify for
contracts above the 35 percent value threshold. Most worryingly,
however, SAFE mandates European design authority for certain classes of
weapons, which could hamper the participation of U.S. defense firms
altogether. Moreover, Asian countries like Japan and South Korea with
which the EU has struck a Security and Defense Partnership receive
preferential treatment over the U.S. to participate in procurement
programs. At the very least, the U.S. should insist that procurement
decisions are consistent with NATO capability targets and that SAFE
design stipulations do not serve as templates for future European
defense spending.
Ultimately, NATO Summits are opportunities for leaders to exchange
views and communicate directly with one another. Sudden, unexplained
policy decisions, like the Biden administration's decision in January
to assign allies like Poland second-tier status through its AI
diffusion rule, weaken the alliance. President Trump is off to a strong
start in reversing that decision and landing spending commitments from
our partners.
Now is the time to seal the deal through consistent, predictable
policymaking that raises the standard for the alliance.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
We'll now turn to Dr. Alina Polyakova. And she's president
and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis, where she
focuses on transatlantic relations and European security. She's
also the Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger
Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies.
Previously, she has held roles at the Brookings Institution
and Atlantic Council, among others. She has also held numerous
prestigious fellowships, including at the National Science
Foundation, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, and the Fulbright Foundation, among others.
She serves on the board of the Free Russia Foundation and
is a member of the Leadership Council for Women in National
Security and the Scientific Council of the Elcano Royal
Institute. She holds a PhD and MA in sociology from the
University of California, Berkeley, and a bachelor's in
economics and sociology from Emory University.
Dr. Polyakova, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALINA POLYAKOVA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Polyakova. Well, thank you so much, Chairman Risch, and
Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members of the
committee. It is a true honor to address you today on a
critical matter of U.S. national security, the 2025 NATO
Summit. You should know that the views expressed in this
testimony do not reflect those of the Center for European
Policy Analysis of which I'm president and CEO, or its staff
and fellows.
The NATO Summit in The Hague next week convenes a pivotal
moment as the transatlantic community confronts an increasingly
volatile geopolitical landscape marked by Russia's war in
Ukraine, and the growing cooperation between Russia, China,
Iran, and North Korea, who collectively aim to undermine the
United States and our allies. Therefore, the summit represents
a powerful opportunity for the United States to engage with
allies as they commit to massive new defense spending levels.
Because as was true at NATO's founding and is still the
case today, the alliance remains central to the vital national
security interests of defending the U.S. homeland. NATO's
European allies are poised to commit to 5 percent of GDP to
defense spending, which is a significant and appropriate level
given the growing Russian threat to NATO and the broader
geopolitical environment. This new commitment signifies a
profound transformation positioning Europe, as an example for
other partners, a point very aptly made by Secretary of Defense
Pete Hegseth and his remarks to Indo-Pacific partners last
month.
Indeed, the Trump administration deserves a great deal of
credit for pushing European allies to step up in such a
significant way in defense. Therefore, U.S. leadership, both
from the executive branch and also from the Members of
Congress, will be instrumental in ensuring that these financial
commitments translate into concrete defense capabilities that
will ultimately benefit global U.S. national security
interests.
Showing Allied unity at the summit will serve as an
important deterrent. In my written testimony I provide specific
examples on three key points I'll summarize here. First, Europe
is indeed stepping up, but U.S. leadership and commitment, in
principle, people, and resources, remain critical for NATO's
continued success as the strongest military alliance in
history.
European allies are taking the right steps by setting these
ambitious spending targets to rebalance the burden sharing
relationship. And as Secretary General Rutte recently said, it
is in all our interest to have a NATO that is stronger, fairer,
and more lethal. But while Europe takes up the challenge, there
is no magic wand that would allow European allies to produce a
highly competent force that can deploy rapidly across the
continent. That requires years of planning, as our military
commanders will likely confirm.
Europe would be a sitting duck for Putin without U.S.
presence, capabilities, and political leadership for NATO. The
U.S. is indeed the indispensable nation for NATO and the key
enabler for European capabilities as the alliance confronts
Putin's growing appetite to use military force in Europe.
Number two, Russia is the threat today to NATO that we
feared it was at the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
As General Cavoli recently testified, Russia's military has
shown a remarkable ability to adapt and reconstitute.
Thanks to support from its partners Russia is also carrying
out an increasingly aggressive shadow war against NATO in
Europe, and it is on a path to long term societal
militarization. These are trends that we did not see even
during the cold war era, and NATO is not well positioned to
respond to the dual challenges of Russia's conventional, non-
conventional threats. This means that Russia's actions are
signaling that Russia will prepare and is actively preparing
for direct military confrontation with NATO, and we need a
common and comprehensive strategy to respond to this threat.
Number three, my last point, NATO's open door policy is a
core asset to the alliance and the United States. Since the end
of the cold war, NATO has doubled in size from 16 to 32
members. The integration of the former Soviet bloc states in
the 1990s and early 2000s has ensured not only stability in
Europe, it ensured that these countries would be the strongest
pro-American allies, which is still the case today.
The most recent inclusion of Finland, Sweden has added
significantly to native's capabilities, force posture, and
strategic depth. Ukraine will also be a significant asset to
NATO, bringing the largest most battle tested army to Europe
with the most cutting edge capabilities.
With that, I yield the rest of my time, and I thank you for
your time and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Alina Polyakova follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Alina Polyakova
introduction
Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, Distinguished Members of
the Committee:
It is an honor to address you today on a critical matter of US
national security and foreign policy. I should note that the views
expressed in this testimony do not reflect those of the Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA) or its staff and fellows.
The upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague next week convenes at a
pivotal moment, as the transatlantic community confronts an
increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally reshaped global
security, prompting a wake-up call among European allies that they will
need to take far greater responsibility for their defense. The growing
cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea is also
reshaping the geopolitical order, fueling Russia's war economy and
warranting a new vision of European security.
Therefore, this Summit not only falls at a pivotal moment, but also
represents a powerful opportunity for the United States to engage with
allies as they commit to massive new defense spending levels. Because
as was true at NATO's founding and is still today, the alliance remains
central to the vital US national security interest of defending the US
homeland.
It is important to view the historical context to understand how
significant these new European defense spending targets are--which are
bound to garner press attention. Prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine,
only seven European allies met the 2 percent GDP defense spending
target. Now, 23 of 32 NATO allies are expected to meet or exceed this
target by 2024. \1\
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\1\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm
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At this historic Summit, NATO's European allies are poised to
commit to an even higher threshold of GDP on defense. This new
commitment signifies a profound transformation, positioning Europe as
an example for other partners--a point made by Secretary of Defense
Pete Hegseth in his remarks to Indo-Pacific allies in Singapore last
month. \2\ Indeed, the Trump Administration deserves a great deal of
credit for pushing European allies to step up in such a significant way
on defense, something that until now, they were not able or willing to
do.
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\2\ https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4202494/
remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-the-2025-shangri-la-
dialogue-in/
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The Summit thus also provides an important opportunity for Allies
to make significant progress not just on spending but capability
development and investment. Interoperability will be key for NATO
strength and cohesion. US leadership, both from the executive branch
and from Members of Congress, will be instrumental in ensuring that
financial commitments translate into concrete defense capabilities that
will ultimately benefit global US national security interests and send
a strong message to adversaries, strengthening deterrence.
Therefore, my testimony today focuses on three interconnected
points vital to US national security and the collective interests of
the Alliance. These imperatives collectively underpin transatlantic
unity amid great-power competition and Russia's revisionist ambitions.
1. Europe is stepping up, but US leadership and commitment--in
principle, people, and resources--remain critical for NATO's continued
success as the strongest military alliance in history, ensuring its
central role in defense of the US homeland.
2. Russia is a far greater threat to NATO now than it was at
beginning of the full scale invasion.
3. Commitment to NATO's open-door policy by all allies is critical
for alliance credibility, resilience, and capability improvement.
1. us leadership in nato: critical to the alliance's past, present, and
future
NATO is the most successful military alliance in history, with its
core mission of collective defense, enshrined in Article 5, having
deterred aggression and ensured stability for over seven decades.
Facing renewed great-power competition, particularly from a revisionist
Russia, NATO has rediscovered its core purpose: to defend and deter in
the European theater. The Alliance provides the indispensable framework
for coordinating defense, sharing intelligence, and projecting a
unified front.
NATO serves vital US national security interests. The United States
led NATO's formation in 1949 to prevent another devastating European
war, contain the Soviet Union, and establish a core pillar of the US-
led global order. As large-scale conflict again rages in Europe, these
founding principles remain urgent and relevant in the present day.
America's consistent commitment to NATO, coupled with strong US
leadership, sends a clear signal to Russia as well as others across the
globe who would question US resolve and security commitments that
America always stands with its friends and allies and delivers in
moments of crisis. In addition, the US has used its presence in Europe
for decades to forward project globally. It is this capability,
enshrined in NATO, that ultimately protects the US homeland from global
threats.
It is, of course, no secret that there has been a long-standing
imbalance in burden sharing within NATO. The US is by far the largest
contributor to NATO: providing for 60 percent of NATO's rapid reaction
capacity and contributing the highest proportion (16 percent or
approximately $650 million) of the cost share for NATO's common
funding. \3\ Historically, overall US spending on defense has far
exceeded the 2 percent threshold that Allies agreed on almost 20 years
ago and formalized at the 2014 Wales Summit. On average, the US spent
3.52 percent of GDP in defense between 2014 and 2024 but spending has
been decreasing in recent years to 3.38 percent in 2024. The US also
provides the nuclear umbrella to NATO allies via the nuclear burden
sharing framework enshrined within NATO.
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\3\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these operational and capability contributions, as
of this year, the US had approximately 84,000 troops stationed across
Europe under the US European Command (EUCOM) as well as a network of US
bases--31 persistent bases and 18 other military sites to which the
Department of Defense (DoD) has access in Europe, encompassing air
bases, naval stations, army garrisons, missile defense systems, and
surveillance hubs. \4\ The base network and force posture serve as
``the first line of defense of our homeland,'' according to General
Christopher Cavoli's testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) in April, serving as a core foundation for NATO
operations, regional deterrence, and global US power projection. \5\
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\4\ https://cepa.org/article/going-going-the-us-base-network-in-
europe/; https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R48123.pdf
\5\ https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2025_useucom_posture_statement_-_hasc.pdf
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The US has consistently utilized our European bases to carry out
operations across the globe in various conflict zones in the Middle
East, Africa, and the Arctic, which has allowed the US military to
become the only truly global military force in the world and to
maintain that position for decades.
There are many examples in how US bases in Europe serves not just
European security but US projection and national security. Below are
four key examples that have supported US national security interests:
\6\
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\6\ Text below is drawn from recent CEPA research: https://
cepa.org/article/going-going-the-us-base-network-in-europe/
1. Aviano Air Base (Italy)
a. Aviano Air Base houses the 31st Fighter Wing, the only US
fighter wing south of the Alps, and is a key NATO air power hub in
southern Europe supporting US air combat missions and contingency
missions across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. \7\ Aviano has
supported major US operations, including Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Odyssey Dawn, the US
contribution to the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya. \8\
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\7\ https://www.aviano.af.mil/Units/31st-Fighter-Wing/
\8\ https://www.aviano.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/
280335/31st-fighter-wing/
2. Incirlik Air Base (Turkey)
a. Incirlik Air Base is critical for US military operations,
particularly in the Middle East, with aviation facilities and
rotational aerial refueling capabilities. It has played a crucial role
in US and coalition military campaigns, serving as the launch point for
combat missions over Northern Iraq during the First Gulf War and later
supporting US-led operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring
Freedom. \9\ It has also been heavily used in counterterrorism
missions, including operations against ISIS, and enables a rapid US
military response in the region. \10\
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\9\ https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-turkeys-incirlik-air-base/a-
38869196
\10\ https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-troops-turkish-air-
base-highest-force-protection/story?id=40634670
3. Mihael Kogalniceanu Air Base (Romania)
a. Mihael Kogalniceanu Air Base is a major and fast-growing hub for
US and NATO forces, supporting deployments to the Black Sea, Middle
East, and Africa. It has been a staging area for US operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. \11\
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\11\ https://avim.org.tr/UEPRapor/EXPANDING-NATO-S-FOOTPRINT-THE-
NEW-MIHAIL-KOG%C4%82LNICEANU-BASE-IN-ROMANIA-24-06-2024
4. Naval Station Rota (Spain)
a. Naval Station Rota is a major logistics hub for US and NATO
forces, providing cargo, fuel, and support to naval vessels and
military units transiting the region. It hosts four US destroyers
equipped with Aegis Baseline 9 Ballistic Missile Defense systems,
forming a key component of EUCOM's regional missile defense strategies.
\12\
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\12\ https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48123
5. Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath and Mildenhall (United Kingdom)
a. RAF Lakenheath is a significant US Air Force base in the UK and
home to the 48th Fighter Wing, tasked with providing combat airpower
worldwide. \13\ It has played a key role in combat operations in the
Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and was a launchpad for the 1986
bombing of Libya. \14\
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\13\ https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/in-depth-overview/
raf-lakenheath
\14\ https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458950/
1986-operation-el-dorado-canyon/
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b. RAF Mildenhall, together with its sister base at Lakenheath,
hosts the largest United States Air Force presence in the United
Kingdom. \15\ It is home to the 100th Air Refueling Wing, the only
permanent US air refueling wing in the European theater. \16\ From this
hub, US forces conduct missions across Europe, the Arctic, Africa, and
the Black Sea. Because of its strategic location and rapid deployment
capabilities, the base has contributed to major campaigns, including
the Kosovo War, the War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ https://55wa.org/raf-mildenhall/
\16\ https://www.mildenhall.af.mil/About-Us/FOIA/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the US plays such a vital role in NATO from a capability
and contribution perspective, its political leadership of the alliance
is that much more important. The US perspective impacts NATO policy,
European defense spending, day to day decisions of various NATO bodies
and the key strategic decisions reached at the North Atlantic Council
(NAC). The Summit will provide an opportunity to influence these
details.
The long-standing tradition of an American Supreme Allied Commander
of Europe (SACEUR) is a cornerstone of NATO's command structure,
reflecting the foundational role of the United States in the Alliance's
collective defense, particularly its nuclear deterrent and substantial
military contributions. The United States possesses the largest and
most robust nuclear arsenal within NATO, which serves as the ultimate
guarantee of the Alliance's security through ``extended deterrence.''
Having an American SACEUR ensures a direct and seamless link between
NATO's conventional defense plans and the US nuclear umbrella,
enhancing the credibility of the overall while retaining US control of
nuclear forces. \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/why-america-
should-keep-nato-command-chair-rebeccah-heinrichs
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In terms of global security and perceptions, US adversaries, most
notably Russia, see US views and engagement with NATO as a bellwether
for assessing the pull of US global leadership and Europe's
vulnerability. There is no question that the US commitment to Article 5
is at the core of NATO's effective defense and credible deterrence.
Even more so than US direct contributions to NATO and European
security, it is this political commitment that has kept the peace in
NATO's European domain.
2. european allies are stepping up, but deep vulnerabilities remain
There is broad recognition among NATO allies that the imbalance in
burden sharing must be rectified. In a speech last week, NATO Secretary
General Mark Rutte reiterated the long-standing call for European
allies to ``pull their weight,'' asserting that ``America has carried
too much of the burden for too long.'' \18\ As Secretary General Rutte
said, NATO has to become a ``stronger, fairer and more lethal
Alliance''--an objective shared by all Allies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_235867.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, European NATO member
states have significantly increased their defense budgets as a whole.
Europe's defense budgets have risen from =218 billion in 2021 to =326
billion in 2024, with a projected further increase of at least =100
billion by 2027. \19\ By 2024, 23 of NATO's 32 members were expected to
meet or had met the 2 percent GDP spending benchmark. \20\ Poland has
significantly escalated its spending to 4.12 percent of GDP in 2024
(plans to reach 4.7 percent in 2025), making it NATO's top defense
spender by GDP. \21\ Germany reached 2.12 percent of GDP in 2024 and
approved a =500 billion fund for defense in 2025. \22\ France raised
spending to 2.06 percent of GDP in 2024, intending to reach 3.5
percent. \23\ Countries like Italy and Spain have vowed to reach 2
percent in 2025, while Sweden and the Netherlands aim for 5 percent.
\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/07/eu-member-states-defence-
budgets/
\20\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm
\21\ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/
772846/EPRS_ATA(2025)772846_EN.pdf
\22\ Ibid.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This rapid increase in defense spending and the push for higher GDP
targets at the Hague Summit (5 percent with 3.5 percent for core
defense) indicate a fundamental shift in Europe's strategic posture and
thinking. If European allies meet the 3.5 percent target in the next
years, they will still be spending less than the US on defense in
absolute terms but more than the US in proportional terms (as a
percentage of GDP). To be sure, this shift in European NATO Allies'
commitment is long overdue, and most European states (with the
exception of the frontline states of the Eastern Flank) are far from a
war footing, which would require even higher expenditures and far more
rapid armed force preparedness as well as defense industrial
production.
2.2. Europe Stepping Up on Spending
Given overlap between EU and NATO member states--23 of 32 NATO
member states are also EU members--it is important to highlight the
growing EU investment and strategic shift on defense. In fact, the EU
is rapidly becoming a defense and security actor in its own right.
Europe having extra defense production capacity is a net positive
for the US, especially as our own defense industrial base is already
stretched and struggling to deliver on US requirements, let alone
foreign partner requirements. Europe producing more of the capabilities
it needs will, in the long run, make it more self-sufficient. Europeans
will also still seek to buy US equipment because their militaries will
require the best and most effective systems, which are made by the US.
Europe may be able to scale up on low-end items like munitions, but it
will take them 5-10 years to do so. In the foreseeable future, Europe
will still have to rely on US industry for high-end exquisite systems
and strategic enablers (ISR, air/sealift, refueling, hyperscaler
technology, etc.). The key for European defense companies will be to
identify complementary capabilities, opportunities for co-production
and joint ventures. The key for US defense industry resilience will be
in the US ability to make it easier for industry to sell product and
engage in co-production.
Building on its robust direct military support for Ukraine, the EU
is also stepping up its direct investment in Ukraine's defense
industry, reflecting its ambition to integrate it into the EU's defense
industrial base. The ReArm Europe Plan, part of this effort, offers
significant fiscal leeway, mobilizing up to EUR 800 billion, with EUR
650 billion potentially unleashed by activating the national escape
clause under the Stability and Growth Pact. Separately, SAFE Regulation
loans specifically allocate up to EUR 150 billion to enable joint
procurement and contracts directly with Ukrainian industry.
Moreover, while the increased financial commitment deserves
recognition, it also exposes a critical challenge: translating budgets
into capabilities. Russia's war in Ukraine has exposed shortcomings in
Europe's defense industrial base's ability to meet surging demand for
``quality and quantity in a short timeframe.'' \25\ For Europe, the
invasion has made it painfully obvious that Europe will need
significant time to rebuild, or in many cases build afresh, a defense
industrial capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2025/06/12/natos-
path-to-peace-and-security-in-an-unstable-world/index.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.3. Europe's Vulnerabilities
A true ``wartime mindset'' requires industrial mobilization and
strategic coordination, not just budget allocation. The need for
``long-term contracts to stabilize and ensure the predictability of
supplies'' and addressing ``bureaucratic hurdles'' highlights a
systemic bottleneck. \26\ If production cannot keep pace or delays
occur, increased spending targets will fail. A more integrated,
alliance-wide industrial strategy, potentially including joint
procurement, is necessary to overcome fragmentation and ensure
interoperability and scale, especially considering Russia's capacity to
fully shift its economy to a ``war footing.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One area that could have significant impact--and is particularly
relevant to this committee--is that of ongoing defense sales reform, to
include alignment of export control policy with national security
priorities and interests. As the Trump Administration's April 9th
Executive Order on Foreign Military Sales noted, export controls should
now ``focus protections solely on our most sensitive and sophisticated
technologies,'' allowing the vast majority of controlled items to be
shared with allies whether through sales or joint ventures such as co-
development and co-production. \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/
reforming-foreign-defense-sales-to-improve-speed-and-accountability/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Europe is also very exposed to Russian military and nonconventional
threats (more on Russia's military capabilities in the following
section). For example, US-led and NATO exercises are taking place at a
``significantly increased tempo and scale,'' which are vital for
readiness, interoperability, and alliance cohesion. The increased US
military footprint in Poland, with additional troops, and NATO's
forward presence in the Baltic states (around 12,000 troops as of June
2025) demonstrates Article 5 commitment to deter Russian aggression.
\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, roughly 12,000 troops in the Baltics are explicitly
``insufficient to counter a Russian land offensive.'' \29\ The Nordic
Response exercise in March 2024 exposed gaps in rapid reinforcement
capabilities, with only 40 percent of planned logistics support
arriving within 72 hours. \30\ This disparity between deterrence intent
and actual reinforcement capacity reveals a critical vulnerability
given Russia's military reconstitution. Effective deterrence requires
vastly improved military mobility, pre-positioning of supplies, and
resilient logistics chains to withstand hybrid and conventional
attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ https://armedservices.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=5030
\30\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
De facto, sudden US withdrawal of forces from NATO's Eastern Flank
would be an invitation to Vladimir Putin as it would leave the European
frontline exposed without a reinforcement force to fill the gap. The
reason for this is simple: it takes planning and time to stand up an
army, and while Europe is taking up the challenge, there is no magic
wand that would allow European allies to produce a highly competent
force that can deploy rapidly across the continent.
General Cavoli, in his April 2025 testimony, provided the most
pointed and stark assessment of several key vulnerabilities within the
European defense landscape, underscoring areas where significant
improvements are needed to counter the evolving Russian threat. \31\ It
is worth detailing them here as these vulnerabilities collectively
highlight a gap between the desired deterrence posture and current
capabilities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2025_useucom_posture_statement_-_hasc.pdf
Insufficient Forces on Borders with Russia: Cavoli
explicitly stated that the current troop levels on NATO's borders with
Russia, particularly in the Baltic states (e.g., around 12,000 troops
as of June 2025), are ``insufficient to counter a Russian land
offensive.'' This suggests a critical numerical and readiness deficit
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
against a potentially large-scale conventional attack.
Reliance on US for Sea Control: European allies ``cannot
marshal the forces necessary to gain sea control without US support.''
This points to a significant dependency on American naval power for
critical maritime operations, which could be a strategic vulnerability
if US resources are strained or redirected.
Vulnerability to Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure:
Cavoli warned that Europe is ``highly vulnerable to cyberattacks on
military-critical infrastructure.'' This extends beyond traditional
military hardware to the digital backbone supporting defense,
logistics, and even civilian life, making it a prime target for
Russia's extensive ``grey zone'' and non-kinetic warfare tactics.
Need for Unmanned Systems Buildup: The testimony
highlighted Europe's urgent need to ``undertake a massive buildup of
unmanned vehicles.'' This implies a current deficiency in drone
capabilities and other autonomous systems, which have proven critical
in modern conflicts like the one in Ukraine.
Logistics and Reinforcement Gaps: Related to troop
numbers, exercises like ``Nordic Response'' in March 2024 exposed
``gaps in rapid reinforcement capabilities,'' with only 40 percent of
planned logistics support arriving within 72 hours. This suggests that
even if forces are available, the ability to move them quickly and
sustain them in a conflict zone remains a challenge.
Defense Industrial Capacity Limitations: While European
defense budgets have increased, Cavoli emphasized that the European
defense industrial base faces challenges in meeting the surging demand
for military hardware in both ``quality and quantity in a short
timeframe.'' This highlights bottlenecks in production, the need for
long-term contracts, and addressing ``bureaucratic hurdles'' to ramp up
output, especially when Russia has fully shifted its economy to a ``war
footing.''
In sum, while Europe is making progress in defense spending, the
continent still faces significant material, logistical, and readiness
challenges that could impede its ability to independently deter or
defend against a fully mobilized Russian threat without substantial and
sustained US support.
3. the growing russian threat to nato
Russia today is the threat we feared it was at the start of the
full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After suffering initial strategic and
tactical losses, Russia's military capability has undergone a
significant transformation, marked by accelerated reconstitution and
adaptation. The new Russian military is emerging larger, more
industrially mobilized, and increasingly adaptive.
This is being driven by the switch to a full war economy, which now
allows Russia to produce the amount of ammunition in 3 months than all
of NATO can produce in a year. \32\ While NATO states struggle to fully
reach 2 percent spending on defense, Russia's military expenditure
reached an estimated $149 billion in 2024, representing 7.1 percent of
Russia's GDP and accounting for almost 20 percent of all Russian
government spending. \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_235867.htm
\33\ https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-
rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-
surges
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This marks a 38 percent increase from 2023 and a doubling of
spending since 2015. It is clear that Russia is on a long-term path of
militarization that is designed to not just fight a war with Ukraine
but to eventually confront NATO. SG Rutte estimated that Russia ``could
be ready to use military force against NATO within 5 years.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_235867.htm
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While early stages of the invasion saw considerable losses of
personnel and equipment, the Russian army is now ``larger than it was
at the beginning of the war--despite suffering an estimated 790,000
casualties.'' \35\ This reconstitution is occurring at a rate ``faster
than most analysts had anticipated,'' defying initial Western
expectations of longterm degradation. \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
general_cavoli_opening_statements.pdf
\36\ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
issue-brief/immediate-steps-that-europe-can-take-to-enhance-its-role-
in-nato-defense/
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As of early 2025, Russia's armed forces are estimated to number
approximately 1,134,000 troops, an increase of 234,000 compared to the
pre-war estimate of 900,000. \37\ Its Ground Forces alone are estimated
at 550,000, while the Aerospace Forces maintain around 1,224
operational aircraft. Notably, the Russian Navy's personnel strength
has seen a decline from 150,000 in 2021 to 119,000 in 2025, reflecting
losses primarily in the Black Sea Fleet and naval infantry imposed by
Ukraine's remarkable success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/koizumi_02.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia is rapidly expanding its industrial output. Specific figures
indicate projections for 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200
Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles to be rolled out in 2025 alone.
\38\ Furthermore, Russia is anticipated to produce 250,000 artillery
shells per month, aiming for a stockpile three times greater than the
United States and Europe combined. \39\ This sustained output is
achieved through expanding existing facilities, opening new ones, and
converting commercial production lines for military purposes. This
process is actively leveraging support from partners like China, North
Korea, and Iran, with Russia having a ``critical dependency on Chinese
components to produce tactical and long-range drones.'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2025_useucom_posture_statement_-_hasc.pdf
\39\bid.
\40\ https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-
generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.1. Force Generation and Manpower
Russia's ability to replenish its ranks is a testament to
aggressive and varied recruitment efforts. The Kremlin has intensified
its recruitment drives, employing tactics such as dynamic pricing for
enlistment bonuses, luring individuals via online job platforms under
false pretenses, recruiting foreigners, offering compensation for
referrals, and forming all-female detachments. They are also
contracting out Russian patriotic centers to meet recruitment quotas
and offering military service contracts to university students facing
deferment or poor academic performance. \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ummary of data from The Institute for Study of War's
``Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update''
series.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, Russia is coercing Ukrainian men in occupied
territories into signing military service contracts, with reports of
over 55,000 men recruited from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
\42\ The Kremlin continues to expand military-patriotic education
initiatives for youth, including Ukrainian children, and is integrating
veterans into positions of power to elevate their status and encourage
future military service. \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ https://kyivindependent.com/intelligence-russia-has-forcibly-
mobilized-up-to-60-000-men-in-occupied-territories/
\43\ https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/8c54abb4-
3c6d-94b5c-be05-727f612afccc; https://jamestown.org/program/veterans-
of-war-against-ukraine-become-new-russian-elite/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.2. Battlefield Adaptation and Technological Advancements
The Russian military has demonstrated a notable capacity to learn
and adapt from the conflict. This includes rapid cycles of adaptation
and the development of new capabilities.
Examples include the deployment of V2U strike unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) that can autonomously search and select targets using
AI, adapting to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) effectiveness by
using only one GPS module. \44\ Russian forces are incorporating
Chinese hardware, including electronics, navigation, optical, and
telemetry systems, and using 50-kilometer-long fiber-optic coils to
enable longer drone ranges. \45\ They are also reportedly experimenting
with jet-powered Dan-M drones for combat, initially designed as
training targets. \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-
generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
\45\ https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-
generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
\46\ https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-
generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New anti-drone measures are continuously being tested and deployed,
such as combat lasers (e.g., Chinese-made Silent Hunter), fiber-optic
cable cutters, and advanced EW adaptations like the Mgla-Sarmat dome
complex. \47\ Footage has shown Russian forces testing FPV drones
equipped with shotguns to shoot down Ukrainian drones. Unmanned Ground
Systems (UGVs) are being used for logistics, capable of transporting
significant supplies and freeing up personnel. \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Efforts also include centralizing control over drone and AI
development companies and restricting foreign cloud servers to enhance
self-sufficiency. \49\ Russia is also belatedly constructing hangars
and other defensive infrastructure at airfields to protect aircraft
from Ukrainian drones. While Russia is also moving to modernize its
strategic nuclear arsenal by replacing older Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) and phasing out older nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) in favor of newer models, the development of
next-generation strategic bombers (PAK-DA) has been slow. \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. russia's shadow war against nato in europe
In addition to the clear and imminent threat posed by Russia in the
conventional domain, Russia's military doctrine centers on the notion
of ``full spectrum'' warfare, which strategically incorporates
nonconventional or hybrid capabilities. While many of these types of
operations are not new--the Soviet Union was infamous for using
propaganda and other types of active measures to undermine the United
States globally--the rapid acceleration and expansion of these
operations since 2022 is difficult to overestimate. They amount to a
full out systematic ``shadow war'' against NATO's European domain.
Russia's shadow operations--ranging from sabotage and
assassinations to cyberattacks and disinformation--reflect doctrine of
perpetual war. This whole-of-system model treats dissent, defection,
and Western resistance as existential threats to the regime,
legitimizing continuous sub-threshold conflict. NATO is facing more
than a diffuse and haphazard series of attacks, what Russia is
executing is covert activity aimed at the physical destruction and/or
severe disruption of human life, infrastructure, and economic activity
outside of a recognized warzone. Russia's shadow war operations claim
lives and go beyond the ``active measures'' that characterized much of
the Soviet Union's approach to the West, and even the ``hybrid
warfare'' that has occupied so much Western thinking since the mid-
2010s.
NATO does not have the tools and doctrine to defend and deter
against this type of renewed Russian aggression. This is primarily
because Russian operatives target weak points in European security--
from logistics and critical infrastructure to political polarization--
making use of deniable proxies, local recruits, and hybrid methods to
undermine European unity and willpower without triggering formal NATO
thresholds.
(See Appendix Table 2 for a list of recent Russian operations in
Europe.)
Russia's shadow war is an extension of its conventional war in
Ukraine. It is meant to weaken the NATO Alliance and damage NATO's
ability to carry out appropriate defense and deterrence operations.
Responding to these attacks and building resilience to them should be
part of any NATO strategy when it comes to defense investment.
NATO's defense ministers have already endorsed a refresh of their
counter-hybrid strategy which will likely include new measures to
protect critical infrastructure and respond to Russia's shadow fleet of
tankers in the Baltic Sea. \51\ It would be in the U.S. interest to
encourage coordinated responses at the NATO level while pushing for a
more forward leaning approach to push back against Russia's shadow war.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ https://cepa.org/programs/democratic-resilience/countering-
russias-shadow-war/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. nato's open door policy is a strategic asset for the alliance
NATO's open door policy has been the bedrock of NATO's success and
credibility over the decades. It is crucial for solidifying continent-
wide security, extending stability, and deterring future Russian
aggression. Integrating new members also removes vulnerabilities and
denies adversaries strategic advantages by eliminating ``grey zones.''
Recent Successful Integrations: Finland and Sweden
Finland and Sweden's recent NATO accessions are powerful examples
of the open door policy's strategic impact. Both abandoned long-
standing neutrality after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Public
support for NATO membership shifted dramatically (over 60 percent in
Sweden, 80 percent in Finland). Thanks to both joining NATO, the
alliance is better equipped, better prepared, more lethal and far more
effective.
In particular, the integration of Sweden and Finland significantly
contributes to NATO's capabilities and strategic depth:
Force Contribution: Collectively add almost 300,000 active
and reserve troops. Finland alone can muster over 900,000 personnel.
Geographic Advantage: Transform the Baltic Sea into a
``NATO internal sea,'' increasing naval superiority. Finland doubles
NATO's land border with Russia (to 1,584 miles).
Strategic Depth and Logistics: Sweden provides strategic
depth in Scandinavia, serving as a crucial logistical hub for NATO
reinforcements to the Baltics and Finnish-Norwegian border. This
enhances information sharing in maritime/air domains and focuses on
Arctic security.
Expertise and Resilience: Both bring invaluable expertise
in civil defense, cold weather operations, and understanding the
Russian threat. Sweden's ``Total Defence'' model offers insights into
societal resilience.
Defense Industrial Contribution: Sweden has a strong
defense industry (Gripen jets, Archer artillery, CV-90s, submarines).
Finland's sophisticated defense sector can help meet Europe's
production shortfalls.
Integration Mechanisms: Both signed Defense Cooperation
Agreements (DCAs) with the US, allowing US force/equipment stationing
in the Arctic. Finland's request for an FLF formation and Multi Corps
Land Component Command was approved, with Sweden leading the Finnish
FLF.
Finland and Sweden's detailed contributions (geographic control,
extended border security, industrial capacity, expertise, logistics)
demonstrate NATO expansion dynamically alters the strategic landscape.
Russia's aggression, intended to deter expansion, instead triggered it,
leading to a stronger Alliance. The open door policy acts as a
deterrent by expanding security and denying Russia a ``sphere of
influence.'' It's a strategic force multiplier, strengthening
collective defense. This success provides a powerful precedent for
Ukraine's future integration into NATO.
6. ukraine is a security asset to nato
For long-term strategic security and stability in Europe, there is
no better answer than Ukraine's membership in NATO. Ukraine's strategic
value to NATO and European defense is profound. Its integration is not
merely about extending security guarantees to Ukraine but leveraging a
battle-hardened military and unique insights to significantly enhance
the Alliance's collective capabilities.
Assessment of Ukraine's Strategic Contributions to NATO:
Battlefield Experience & Military Modernization: Ukraine
fields Europe's largest, most combat-hardened land force (1 million
personnel), demonstrating ``relentless adaptability and ingenuity.''
This provides NATO invaluable, real-time insights into modern warfare,
Russian tactics, and effective countermeasures. NATO must use this
proving ground to inform decisionmaking, capability development,
training, and strategic posture.
Defense Industrial Base & Innovation: Ukraine possesses an
extensive, inventive defense industry, ``supercharged by war.'' It has
developed homegrown technologies (drones, long-range strike systems),
responsible for 75 percent of Russian battlefield casualties. Drone
manufacturing approaches millions annually, with an ``ecosystem'' of
production and rapid battlefield improvements. This industrial capacity
can help meet Europe's defense production shortfalls and offers
critical lessons for NATO. Ukraine serves as a ``real-life testbed''
for advanced US weapons systems.
Countering Hybrid Threats: Ukraine's resilience to Russian
shadow war offers invaluable, real-time insights into Russian tactics
and countermeasures, providing NATO practical knowledge to counter
cyberattacks, PMCs, illicit finance, and intelligence operations.
Strategic Geographic Position & Deterrence: Ukraine's
location on NATO's eastern flank makes it a critical buffer. Its
continued resistance degrades Russia's military, buying time for
European rearmament. If Ukraine fell, NATO would face urgent, expensive
eastern flank reinforcement, and Ukrainian technology/factories would
fall to the Kremlin. Ukraine's success is essential for solidifying
continent-wide security and deterring Russian aggression. Its
integration into NATO removes a persistent vulnerability, denies Russia
a strategic advantage, and offers the only credible pathway for the US
to reduce its military footprint in Europe without undermining NATO
deterrence.
7. policy recommendations for strengthening nato
To strengthen transatlantic security and ensure NATO's future
effectiveness, the following recommendations are put forth for the
Committee's consideration:
7.1. Recommendations for Continued US Leadership and Investment in
NATO:
Invest in Strategic Air Defense Capabilities: Recent
conflicts have shown that NATO is far more vulnerable in the air
domain. US should continue to focus on supporting European efforts
while executing on previously agreed deployment of long-range fires
capabilities. This includes the execution of the US Multi-Domain Task
Force in Germany, which will eventually include SM-6, Tomahawk, and
developmental hypersonic weapons.
Establish Joint Procurement at the NATO Level: A more
integrated, alliance-wide industrial strategy is necessary to overcome
fragmentation and ensure interoperability and scale within Europe's
defense industrial base
Sustained European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Funding:
Critical for forward defense in Europe, supporting US rotational
forces.
Confirm the New US SACEUR: Demonstrates continued US
leadership and a needed US voice, and Congress should act swiftly to
confirm the Administration's nominee.
Renewed Baltic Security Support: Continue military aid and
support, boosting air defense capabilities.
Uninterrupted NATO Exercises: Maintain increased tempo and
scale; vital for readiness and cohesion.
Support Complementary European Defense Efforts: Actively
support Europe's defense initiatives (e.g., U.K.-led CJEF, French-led
EII, EU CSDP/PESCO), ensuring they complement US efforts.
Pressure on Burden-Sharing: Continue to press allies to
meet/exceed 2 percent GDP defense as a bare minimum and, if agreed at
the Hague Summit, to deliver the 3.5-5 percent spending.
Invest in congressional Expertise on Russia's Shadow War:
Develop in-house congressional expertise on Russian shadow war
operations in the NATO space.
7.2 Recommendations for Enhanced Support and Clear Pathways for
Ukraine's Eventual Integration:
Sustained, Predictable Assistance: Provide targeted
funding, clear partnership objectives, and multi-year authorities and
appropriation mechanisms (e.g., MOU).
Investment in Ukraine's Defense Industrial Base: Support
expanding Ukraine's industrial capacity; address bureaucratic hurdles
for co-development/production.
Immediate Use of Russian Frozen Assets: Utilize
immediately for Ukraine's recovery and defense; provides crucial
funding.
Accelerate Adoption of Autonomous Weapon Systems: US/NATO
must accelerate adoption and build mass to extend military
capabilities, learning from Ukraine.
Continued Pressure on Ukrainian Reforms: Maintain
consistent pressure on Kyiv for judicial and anti-corruption reforms;
conditional assistance.
7.3. Strategies for Leveraging Ukraine's Strategic Value for NATO's
Future and European Defense:
Integrate Ukraine's Cyber Resilience and Innovation:
Enhance public-private information sharing and investment in cyber
defense (DIANA), incorporating Ukraine's experience.
Harness Ukraine's Battlefield Innovation for NATO's
Modernization: Accelerate adoption of autonomous weapon systems,
drawing from Ukraine's adaptability/ingenuity.
Develop European Defense Industrial Base with Ukrainian
Capacity: Support expanding Ukraine's industrial capacity; integrate
into Western defense industrial base.
Develop Ecosystem Approach with Ukrainian Collaboration:
Work with US agencies tracking Russian illicit finance/PMCs/disruptive
groups, integrating lessons from Ukraine.
conclusion: a call to action for a secure future
The challenges posed by Russia's aggression and evolving warfare
demand urgent, coordinated action across the transatlantic community.
The 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague is a crucial opportunity. The
Kremlin's toolkit is exposed, yet Russia has faced few consequences for
malign activities, signaling impunity to other actors.
The stakes are clear: the future of the international order and
democratic values depend on our collective resolve. By strengthening
NATO, providing unwavering, predictable support to Ukraine's Euro-
Atlantic future, and proactively countering hybrid threats, the
transatlantic community can secure a future where democratic principles
prevail and stability is restored. To do otherwise is to leave this
arena open for authoritarians to set the rules.
APPENDIX
Table 1: NATO Allies' Defense Spending
The data below includes 2024 spending projections and 2023
confirmed figures. The along with the 2 percent commitment for many,
can be traced back to:
NATO Public Releases/Reports on Defence Expenditures
National Government Statements: For specific targets and
commitments.
SIPRI Military Expenditure Data base: For additional
confirmed spending data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Announced Target/
Member State 2024 Expected Defense Commitment (percent GDP
Spending (percent GDP) and/or timeframe)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall EU-NATO (23 1.99 (combined) Minimum 2% (2023 Vilnius
members) Pledge)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Poland 4.20 Plans to reach 4.7% in
2025; Publicly committed
to 5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia 3.43 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States 3.38 Advocates for 5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Latvia 3.15 Publicly committed to 5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greece 3.08 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lithuania 2.85 Publicly committed to 5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finland 2.41 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Denmark 2.37 Reached 2% in 2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United Kingdom 2.33 Has met 2% target
annually since 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Romania 2.25 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Macedonia 2.22 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Norway 2.20 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bulgaria 2.18 Projected to reach 2.5%
over 3 years
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sweden 2.14 Intends to reach 5% (3.5%
core)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germany 2.12 Exempt defense spending
beyond 1% GDP from debt
limits, =500bn fund;
Reached 2% in 2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hungary 2.11 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Czechia 2.10 Accepted new capability
targets; Reached 2% in
2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turkey 2.09 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
France 2.06 Intends to reach 3.5% (no
timeframe); Reached 2%
in 2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Netherlands 2.05 Intends to reach 5% (3.5%
core, 1.5% other);
Reached 2% in 2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Albania 2.03 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Montenegro 2.02 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Slovakia 2.00 At least 2% (reached)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Croatia 1.81 3% by 2030
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Portugal 1.55 At least 2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Italy 1.49 Vowed to reach 2% in 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada 1.37 At least 2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium 1.30 2% by end of 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Slovenia 1.29 At least 2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Luxembourg 1.29 At least 2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spain 1.28 Vowed to reach 2% in 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iceland 0.0 (No standing army,
participates in common
defense)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2: Russian Operations in Europe (since Russia's Feb. 2022 Full-
Scale Invasion of Ukraine)
Data from forthcoming CEPA report.
assassinations and attempted assassinations:
In December 2022, then Eskom CEO Andre De Ruyter survived
an attempted assassination by cyanide poisoning. His company was in the
process of clamping down on corruption, theft, and illicit revenue from
procurement irregularities.
In 2023, exiled Russian journalist Irina Babloyan was
poisoned in an assassination attempt in Tbilisi after investigating
reports of Ukrainian children being forcibly taken to Russia.
In 2023, Germany opened investigations into the attempted
assassination of Berlin-based Russian journalist Elena Kostyuchenko,
who reported on Russian war crimes in Ukraine, via poison.
In May 2023, President of the Free Russia Foundation,
Natalia Arno, was poisoned in an assassination attempt while visiting
Prague.
In February 2024, Russia assassinated Russian military
defector, Maxim Kuzminov, in a Spanish town near Madrid.
In July 2024, a Russian plot to assassinate Armin
Papperger, CEO of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, was foiled by
Germany and the US.
In March 2024, three arrests were made after a close ally
of Alexei Navalny, Leonid Volkov, was attacked outside his home in
Lithuania.
sabotage, arson and property destruction:
In December 2023, a Polish court convicted 14 citizens of
Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine of espionage and planning to derail trains
delivering aid to Ukraine.
In February 2024, the Estonian Security Service (KAPO)
detained 10 individuals for desecrating several national memorial sites
and vandalizing the cars of the interior minister and a journalist on
behalf of the Russian special services.
In February 2024, two men recruited by Russian special
services attempted to set fire to the Museum of the Occupation in
Latvia.
In March 2024, two British men were charged with helping
Russian intelligence services after a suspected arson attack on a
Ukraine-linked business in London.
In May 2024, pro-Russian saboteurs committed arson at
Diehl Metall factory, which produces Iris-t air defense systems for
Ukraine, in Berlin.
In June 2024, Parisian police made an arrest in response
to an attempted explosive attack orchestrated in Moscow on a hardware
store north of Paris.
In the summer of 2024, multiple arson incidents targeted
logistical facilities in Poland, including a paint factory and a
shopping mall, and an Ikea warehouse in Vilnius. Authorities suspected
GRU involvement.
In July 2024, incendiary parcels ignited at DHL cargo hubs
in Leipzig, Germany, and Birmingham, UK. Authorities suspected these
were `trial runs' in preparation for attacks on transatlantic cargo
flights.
In July 2024, coordinated arson attacks damaged three
French high-speed rail lines on the opening day of the Paris Olympics,
disrupting rail services to and from the event.
infrastructure disruption:
Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, global communications company, Viasat, faced a Russian cyber-
attack that impacted the Ukrainian military, Central European
windfarms, and personal and commercial internet users globally.
Since 2022, Russia has repeatedly tampered with and
blocked navigational systems on western ships and boats from
Kaliningrad.
In April 2023, following a joint investigation by public
broadcasting companies in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, Russia
was charged with spying in the Baltic and North Seas using civilian
fishing trawlers, cargo ships, and yachts.
In April 2023, Norway barred 15 Russian intelligence
officers from the Russian embassy for ``engaging in activities not
compatible with their diplomatic status,'' following an earlier removal
of three intelligence officers in 2022.
In May 2024, the Danish Security Intelligence Service
(PET) announced the increasing threat of Russian-directed physical
sabotage campaigns against military and civilian targets in Denmark in
response to the government's support for Ukraine.
In May 2024, Russia's GPS jamming for flights over and
ships in the Baltic Sea led Finnish airline Finnair to suspend all
flights between Helsinki and the Estonian airport at Tartu.
In May 2024, Germany accused Russia of large-scale cyber-
attacks against its defense and aerospace firms.
In November 2024, two fiber-optic cables in the Baltic Sea
(BCS East-West and C-Lion 1) were deliberately damaged by anchor drags
involving Russian-linked vessels.
UK noted rising concern over undersea cable sabotage. The
UK reported 12 suspected incidents from 2021 to 2025 linked to Russian
`shadow fleet' vessels.
Senator Risch. Well, again thank you to both of you. You
both have deep, deep knowledge of the matter that is near and
dear to everybody's heart on this committee. We embrace NATO
and want to see it continue to prosper. It's, I believe, truly
stronger today than it's ever been. Putin seems to never miss
an opportunity to make a mistake. And the mistakes he's made
has actually done a lot to strengthen NATO, not the least of
which is to add two new members in the considerably longer
border of his with NATO. So, we're going to continue to support
NATO in every way we can.
I have a question for each, and I like your thoughts. I
believe although Putin has made a lot of mistakes, there's a
mistake I think he won't make, and that is, I don't think he
will engage militarily a NATO country. We have committed to our
allies that Article 5 means exactly what it says. That includes
the Baltic states and everybody between there and Los Angeles.
And I personally met with the Baltics right after the
invasion of Ukraine. They were concerned, and I assured them
that our position and policy of the United States is not one
square inch of NATO ground will be given up, not one square
inch. I think that message has been conveyed to Putin loud and
clear. I think he understands it, and I don't think he'll make
that mistake, which would be a disaster for his country.
Your thoughts, please, starting with you, Mr. Rough.
Mr. Rough. Well, sir, I think that deterrence is a matter
of capabilities and will. And I would just submit there could
be three or four measures that NATO might want to undertake to
strengthen Article 5.
Number one, Putin has been undertaking a campaign of hybrid
attacks, numbering in the dozens, if not hundreds, of incidents
across the NATO alliance for years now. It might be worth
considering calling an Article 4 meeting of the North Atlantic
Council to discuss how to push back and deter against these
hybrid attacks.
Operation Baltic Sentry kicked off in January to guard
against sabotage attacks, but thus far, information sharing and
some legal actions have been the only pushback we've seen from
the alliance on this.
Second, speaking of the Baltics, it might be worth
considering upgrading the battle group in Estonia to a brigade
level. We have this now in Lithuania, thanks to the German
brigade as of last month, which was activated.
The Estonians have invested more in long range fires in
prepositioning stocks.
It's very expensive to host a brigade, but really, the
issue there is the framework nation. The UK only has two
maneuverable heavy brigades in the British Army today. We need
to find a way, I think, to deploy more forward and that
instance.
And then third, it might be worthwhile considering the
alliance in Romania and Poland shooting down missiles and
drones, which are violating NATO airspace. We've seen drones
land across the Danube in Romania. We've seen missile impact in
eastern Poland and killing farmers in Poland. That would be a
measure that I don't think would be escalatory, but could help
reinforce the Article 5, which is so important.
Senator Risch. Good thoughts.
Doctor.
Dr. Polyakova. I actually agree completely with my
colleague. I think your question is a really important one,
Chairman, because I would've agreed with you a few years ago
that Russia would not risk direct confrontation with NATO. I
think at this point, seeing the trends in Russia's military
capabilities, reconstitution, adaptation, the build up in
Russian forces there is no other reason to do that unless
you're expecting a confrontation with a much larger potential
adversary than Ukraine, because just to fight the war in
Ukraine, Russia doesn't need to do what it's currently doing.
So, that is a very clear signal that there are long term
strategic plans. I'm not sure that it will happen in the next 5
years as the Secretary General Rutte said, but certainly no
longer a 20 or 25 year horizon.
That being said, I think whether that happens or not
depends a huge amount on the United States, in particular. Some
of the recommendations that my colleague, Mr. Rough, made in
supporting the Eastern flank are critical. Russia will be
deterred if it sees that we are acting from a position of
strength and we are there with our allies.
I think in addition to what Peter has just suggested, I
think there's huge opportunities in learning from Ukraine's
deployment of autonomous systems in the Black Sea, in
particular, as well as what our allies have been doing in the
Nordic Baltic region to further push back and also provide more
ISR capabilities so that we can at least have a red flag
warning if we are seeing some sort of confrontation emerging
from Russia.
But I think the shadow war or hybrid threats that Russia
has been carrying out across Europe are significant, and they
are very aggressive, and we have very, very few deterrent
capabilities there.
Senator Risch. Good thoughts from all of you. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much for your
testimony.
Dr. Polyakova, I was really struck by your talking about
the increased militarization of Russian society, because I have
continued to believe that one of the most important reasons to
support Ukraine is because it sends a very strong message to
not just our allies and partners that we would be there for
them, but to our adversaries who threaten the United States.
And it was pointed out to me recently that one of the other
really important aspects of that is that we do not want to be
in a position 5 or 10 years down the road where Russia actually
is able to absorb Ukraine and has access to all of the
increased build up that Ukraine has done and their expertise,
technology, innovation to go against NATO and our other allies
and partners.
Can you talk about that and how you calibrate that concern
against other issues with respect to Russia?
Dr. Polyakova. Well, thank you so much for that question,
Senator Shaheen.
It is true that the militarization of Russian society is
not new, but it has accelerated significantly since Russia's
invasion of Ukraine.
And what I mean by that is that there is consistent
reporting that, for example, children as young as kindergarten
age are receiving military drill education. And this continues
on through the school ages and of course up to the years of
military service. And this is deeply, deeply concerning for a
variety of reasons, as you can imagine.
That being said, to your point about what would be the
consequences if Russia was able to eventually completely take
over Ukraine. The first consequence is how expensive it would
be for NATO to then have a Ukraine that is completely occupied
and controlled, together with Belarus, together with Russia's
positions in Kaliningrad, as well to defend and deter against
that. That's going to cost us a lot more than what we're
already spending and where our European allies are spending on
Ukraine. So, there's a real expense there aside from the
security threat.
I think broadly speaking, it's important to remember that
Russia is a strategic and direct threat to the United States,
not just our allies in Ukraine. It seeks to undermine as a core
objective the United States as its position as a global leader.
That is what the war in Ukraine is at the end of the day about.
It is not about some territory in the Donetsk region. It's not
about Crimea. It's about deposing the United States as the
leader of the free world, and that is the key objective. And
that is why Russia has partnerships with China and others.
Senator Shaheen. And do you think this Administration and
this President recognize that?
Dr. Polyakova. I think there are certainly members of the
Administration who do recognize that. Personally, I would like
to see that message be very, very clear to our allies at the
summit. I think the one question that a lot of our European
allies have is are we aligned on the threat perception between
all the NATO partners, not just the United States? Do we have
the same understanding of the threat that Russia represents?
And I think if we can get some movement on that at the summit,
that would be very significant.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Rough, can you answer that question as
well?
Mr. Rough. Well, I would note that American weapons
continue to transit via Poland into Ukraine. There is a
sanctions regime in place, even if we can quibble about the
size and scope of it, as well as sanctions enforcement. And the
United States is a member of NATO. Just 2 weeks ago, NATO held
a defense ministerial on the sidelines of which the Ukraine-
NATO Council met, as well as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
Twenty billion Euros in new security systems has been
pledged this year. So, while the U.S. is adopting this
mediating role, this form of neutrality almost between Ukraine
and Russia, it's neutral bending toward Ukraine, I would say.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Are either of you surprised that Russia has not come to the
aid of Iran in the current conflict with Israel? That they're
not providing the weapons, or at least news reports are that
they're not providing the weapons that Iran has requested?
Mr. Rough. I do think it was notable that in the phone call
the President held with President Putin, there was a heavy
section on Iran, and the President even said explicitly in his
own readout that they focused very little on Ukraine. So, I do
think that President Putin is trying to vector the Americans
against the Israelis and to try to shut down the war so that
the Iranians can recover.
In that sense, I think he's carrying diplomatic water--the
Russians are for the Iranians. But I see no evidence of direct
military transfers to date or anything of that nature.
Senator Shaheen. Dr. Polyakova.
Dr. Polyakova. Just very briefly. I'm not surprised because
Russia is not a reliable partner, and we saw this in Syria as
well. They tried to protect Bashar al-Assad, but then when the
fall of his regime came, the Russians were nowhere to be found.
And I think that's the real message that hope we can also
convey across the world as the United States.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, both.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Ricketts.
Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses here to testify today.
At the 75th anniversary of NATO Summit in Washington last
year, conversations about the Indo-Pacific took the stage in
ways they never had before. The alliance's decision to deepen
engagement with regional partners like Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand signals a shift in strategic priorities.
This was also recognition that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are
linked.
NATO's European members are now deploying assets to the
region, signing on to joint exercises, coordinating cyber and
hybrid defense cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies.
Additionally, the summit's endorsement of the NATO Indo-Pacific
Partnership, along with the growing defense industrial links
between South Korea, Japan, and the European NATO members, as
well as AUKUS, marks an evolution in the alliance's posture.
Mr. Rough, what is the real value of NATO's Indo-Pacific
outreach, and what should the future coordination look like?
Mr. Rough. Well, for one, I think it's in the American
vital interest that there is a pro-American balance of power on
both ends of the Eurasian landmass. And if the Russians are
going to forge tight links with the Chinese, the North Koreans,
and the Iranians, then I think it behooves us to try to bring
together lessons learned on both sides of the Asian landmass to
learn lessons on defense industrial based cooperation. You'll
note that Poland recently signed a major procurement deal with
South Korea for the provision of tanks, for example.
And so, I think there is a lot of mutual support that can
be undertaken in the free world amongst partners and allies.
And we can share a common threat perception, which I think is
also useful. That's one of the reasons why I think NATO should
be a Russia focused, continental deterrence organization,
nonetheless has a role in being active in the Indo-Pacific
because it can see exactly what is taking place, where and how
China's aggression is unfolding. And I think that's a useful
exercise for our partners.
Senator Ricketts. Are there practical steps that NATO could
do to develop meaningful co-development defense technologies in
the region?
Mr. Rough. Well, for starters NATO sought to open a liaison
office in Tokyo that was ultimately blocked by the French. I
think there are opportunities for tighter linkage there.
Clearly, Japan and South Korea have first rate, cutting edge
technology and defense industrial based capabilities, which our
European partners could learn from. And I would just encourage
more collaboration in all of those areas.
Senator Ricketts. In your opening remarks, you mentioned
about the five for five, NATO going to a 5 percent of GDP
defense spending target, and this will include 3.5 percent for
core military spending, and 1.5 percent for broader defense and
security related measures. Obviously, at the Wales Summit in
2014, we saw a NATO committing to 2 percent, and it took a
decade for most of the allies to start even getting in that
direction. Today's threat environment doesn't really allow for
a decade to get to 5 percent.
As you mentioned in your written testimony, you said you
would ratify a new 5 percent goal should be achieved in 5 year
horizon. Can you tell us why it's so important we get that so
soon, rather than taking 7 to 10 years to achieve this target?
Mr. Rough. Well, simply put, the intelligence assessments
all suggest that there is an urgent threat and that Russia is
rebuilding. It's standing up the new 44th Army Corps in Karelia
opposite Finland. The new targets for the Russian armed forces
are to put 1.5 million men under arms. All of that suggests
that Russia will be facing NATO once the war in Ukraine is
ultimately wound down, if it is wound down.
And so I think it's very important that we begin to take
those measures. It's not just the time horizon. But on top of
that, I think very carefully crafted what the categories are
for 3.5 and 1.5 percent of GDP so that areas like climate
spending, for example, don't count toward defense adjacent
military expenditures.
Senator Ricketts. Yes.
Dr. Polyakova, do you have anything you want to add to that
with regards to the 5 percent?
Dr. Polyakova. I completely agree, and I think the reason
that it has to happen much more rapidly than we've seen in the
past is that Europe really has no choice at this point. I think
there's broad recognition of that. What I'd like to see
European allies commit to 5 percent on core defense spending,
not the 3.5/1.5 split.
Yes, this is, I see, as a step to get there, but not the
ultimate conclusion. I would like to see them continue to
spend, but I think if they move in that direction, we need to
also spend more on our defense because we are below 3.5 percent
right now. So, that would be the counterpoint there.
Senator Ricketts. All right. Thanks.
I've only just got a few seconds of time left. Mr. Rough,
you wrote a little bit about AI diffusion. Can you talk a
little bit about what the previous policy was, for example, so
insulting to our allies like Poland?
Mr. Rough. Well, in January, the outgoing Biden
administration issued an AI diffusion rule that essentially
tiered our allies into different categories for AI chips. And
Poland, since you mentioned it, was considered a Category 2
partner, meaning it didn't have access to certain AI chips. And
this could have implications for the rollout of 6G. It could
have implications for the types of software embedded in
different weapon systems like the F-35.
And so I think the European Commission, and in particular
our eastern European allies who never understood and this is
directly, I think, the case for Warsaw, why they were placed in
Category 2, are pleased that the Trump administration has
lifted that diffusion rule.
Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Dr. Polyakova, in your testimony, you note, ``For long
term strategic security and stability, there is no better
answer than Ukraine's membership in NATO. Ukraine's strategic
value to NATO and European defense is profound.''
You go on to note the many values that come from that
battlefield experience, defense industrial base, countering
hybrid threats, geographic location, strategic position. So,
given that, how do you assess the impact of Trump
administration stated opposition to Ukraine's NATO membership?
Dr. Polyakova. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I would say it's not just the United States that opposes
NATO membership for Ukraine right now. There is no consensus on
that among allies. And we saw that in the previous
Administration as well, that there was no consensus on that
among allies on the Biden administration.
That being said I think while there is an active hot war in
Ukraine, it's difficult to see how Ukraine could become a NATO
member. But it is a goal that we should keep open in the
future. And the reason for that is not because it's Ukraine,
and it's our duty or some sort of moral obligations. Because
Ukraine is a huge asset. It's the largest country in Europe.
Giving Ukraine over to the Russians would be a huge hit to our
military capabilities that would absorb all of their innovative
capabilities they've developed for the last 3 \1/2\ years.
So, I think seeing Ukraine as an asset for Europe's defense
industrial base, as an asset for our own military versus a
vulnerability is the key. But it is a long term path, not a
medium path.
Senator Merkley. No, that's helpful. And there's even a
provision in the NATO protocols that says you cannot bring into
membership a nation that is partially occupied so that we're
not bringing NATO into an immediate conflict. But does this
give you kind of any reflections on how quickly Trump basically
stated support for Russia's position that Ukraine never become
part of NATO?
Dr. Polyakova. Well, I hope that the President will change
that position. I think he has said different things and the
message could be more clear. Again, I think the ultimate desire
by the Administration, the President, to reach some sort of
lasting, peaceful, negotiated solution between Russia and
Ukraine has the right instinct.
I think the reality is that Russia plays the obstructionist
obstacle here, and the Ukrainians have come to the table at
every moment. And I think recognizing that is key. And I think
taking things off the table before we are even at the table, so
to say, is the real problem.
Senator Merkley. Yes, I couldn't agree more.
Let me turn to another piece of the puzzle. And that is,
the U.S. certainly provides a nuclear umbrella for NATO, but
Trump's statements that imply that our commitment to NATO is
perhaps not rock solid. How does that affect the role of our
nuclear umbrella and the possibility of nations, other nations
starting to consider whether they need a different strategy?
Dr. Polyakova. There is no substitute for the U.S. nuclear
umbrella in Europe. The European allies of NATO that do have
nuclear capability are far, far below, and it would take many,
many years, and a complete rewriting of NATO, frankly, and the
founding treaty and the Washington Treaty to have some sort of
different arrangement between NATO allies in Europe for them to
provide for their own nuclear capability and defense umbrella.
So, that's really not even an option.
Frankly, I will say that when I speak to European allies,
they're not concerned that the United States will recommit to
Article 5. What they're more concerned about, of course, is a
very quick drawdown of U.S. presence in Europe, which we
believe is going to happen at some point. They understand
that's coming. They want it to be thoughtful, strategic, and
not sudden. And they are willing to step in and take more
responsibility. But I will say, I don't see as much concern,
right now anyway, that the United States will not support NATO
and recommit to Article 5.
Senator Merkley. No, I--and thank you very much.
And Mr. Rough, appreciated your testimony, and I wanted to
ask you about the implications for NATO of China's support for
Russia's war in Ukraine, and how might Beijing be drawing
lessons from the West's response as it considers its ambitions
toward Taiwan?
Mr. Rough. Well, first of all, China's support to the
Russian war effort has been essential. It is a dubious
proposition that Russia could maintain the high operational
tempo it has without Chinese provision of dual use technologies
to the Russian armed forces. And in particular, this applies to
the overwhelming support of microelectronics, semiconductors,
and machine tools that have been very important to the
Russians.
As to what lessons the Chinese are drawing, I'm sure
they're scrubbing down the Russian war effort very carefully.
We ourselves have stood up so called JATEC, a NATO outfit in
Poland, to try to learn lessons from the war in Ukraine. But I
will say, I worry that Russia and Ukraine can iterate at a much
faster rate than the United States observing this war from a
distance and even from the forward post in Poland can observe.
And I think that is something that the Alliance does need
to address. Are we able to keep pace with the cutting edge
evolutions in drone technologies, for example? The Ukrainians
are more than eager to share their lessons in a way, thanking
us for our generosity and support to Ukraine. But that will
probably require industry and even presence in Ukraine closer
to the action to understand what is happening.
But there's no doubt that the Chinese are watching this
very closely, and we've already seen Xi Jinping scrub down his
own armed forces to try to push out corruption, doubtlessly
aware of the corruption that plagued the Russian armed forces
and caused their underperformance in the opening days of the
war.
Senator Merkley. Thank you very much.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, and thank both of you for
your testimony here.
And Dr.----
Senator Shaheen. Senator Van Hollen, I'm sorry----
Senator Van Hollen. That's what I thought.
Senator Shaheen. Senator Coons is next, and I know he has
got to get back to another hearing, so I apologize.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your patience.
I'm the ranking member on the Defense Appropriation
Subcommittee. We are having the Army budget hearing right now.
And the discussion you were just having about innovation,
agility, and iteration is actually a big piece of what's being
discussed downstairs.
So, Mr. Rough, you agree that Russia is an adversary of the
United States and that the Ukrainians have inflicted
significant damage?
Mr. Rough. Yes.
Senator Coons. My understanding over the last 3 years,
Ukraine's imposed enormous costs on one of our principal global
adversaries; more than a million casualties, half the Black Sea
fleet, thousands of Russian tanks destroyed. I could go on
without a single American soldier directly in harm's way for
less than 1 percent of our Federal budget, while modernizing
our own stocks through replenishment.
I continue to be all in in terms of our support for Ukraine
in their war against Russian aggression, as are many of my
colleagues, both Republican and Democrat. It's a worthy
investment in our national security. But you raised what I
think is the critical question. How quickly can we learn from
the EW, UAS, counter-UAS experiences of the Ukrainians and
implement it not just in the U.S. armed forces, but among our
NATO Allied forces? What recommendations do you have about how
we can strengthen and increase the speed of that iteration?
Mr. Rough. Well, there are a few lessons. The first is, I
think, to get defense punch, you do have to have strong top
line numbers. And even the fiscal year 2026 request with
reconciliation moneys built in is around 3 percent. That's a
long way away from, for example, what Senator Wicker
recommended last year, Peace Through Strength, or what the NATO
Allies will describe next week as the new defense investment
pledge.
But within that, I think it's very important to focus on
procurement numbers. The Wales Pledge had a scheme where it was
2 percent of GDP for defense, but 20 percent of those 2 percent
went to procurement. And I think that's worth keeping in mind.
What some of my colleagues in the Center for Defense
Concepts and Technology at Hudson have described is the value
of looking to the commercial base to find solutions for defense
problems. This helps reduce costs and also accelerates the
speed of adaptation.
Modularity, I think, is also something worth studying
rather than expensive, exquisite, bespoke systems. And then the
economies of scale that we can achieve through our joint
procurement projects is something I think we should look at.
Europe has some 12 tanks because, of course, it is a mosaic of
nations more than a continent acting in the defense sphere
together. And joint procurement would be a worthy thing.
And the last point I would make, which my colleague Mike
Gallagher, the former Congressman from Wisconsin, wrote in the
pages of the Wall Street Journal recently, is maybe looking at
reforming cost plus contracting as a way to get more bang for
our buck. So, all of those elements along with studying the
Ukrainian war efforts, which they're so eager to share with us,
can really improve our performance on the battlefield.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Dr. Polyakova, the same sort of question to you, if I
might. His reference to 12 different tanks on the continent,
the Ukrainians have done a masterful job of managing to service
and to keep in the fight a remarkable array of armored
personnel carriers, and tanks, and artillery pieces. Dozens of
different systems--despite not having the OEM and long supply
chain that we insist is necessary. They've MacGyvered their way
into capable fighting forces, not just drones, but across all
these platforms. What lessons are there for us about our
procurement, and what lessons are there for NATO? We're about
to go to a NATO Summit where Europe's pledged nearly $1
trillion in defense spending. What are the opportunities here
for joint production and for speeding innovation?
Dr. Polyakova. Well, Senator, thank you for that question.
And you point to a core issue that I raised in my written
testimony as well. I'll just summarize. One, you're right that
Ukrainians are operating something like over 400 different
kinds of systems from different places. Some domestically
produced, many from foreign partners. And that's been
incredible to see.
I think the main lesson for us is one, we have to simplify
our foreign military sales if we really want to take advantage
of what's happening in Ukraine. The big question that our
European partners have from the defense industry in particular
is how do we actually do joint ventures and co-development, co-
production with U.S. defense industrial base?
It is incredibly difficult. ITAR is a huge issue, as you
know. On top of that, I think NATO needs to really push forward
in joint procurement which is a part of the answer to your
question. But how do you translate money into capabilities?
Because money isn't everything. It has to be spent on the right
things in the right ways, and NATO is the right framework to
coordinate those efforts across the alliance to make sure this
is complementarity not duplication.
Senator Coons. Last, I just traveled to the Philippines and
Taiwan with Senator Ricketts. The upcoming NATO Summit does not
include Indo-Pacific partners. I think it's a significant
mistake. How do you think the lessons of Ukraine can and should
be learned or applied across some of our Indo-Pacific allies
and partners?
Dr. Polyakova. This is a fantastic question that we started
to discuss earlier. There is already a technology export vector
that is taking place directly from Ukraine, capabilities that
are being learned on the ground by companies, the private
sector directly for export to Taiwan. That's already happening
right now.
My concern is, the United States, we are missing out. And I
will just point to Ukraine's recent operation. I think you saw
the Spider Web Operation, and we cannot defend against that
operation. I don't know because I'm not privy to that
information. I don't know if we can carry it out, that kind of
operation in a country like Russia. So, I think that is all a
huge opportunity for us to learn.
And to your point about the European theater and the Indo-
Pacific theater being inexplicably linked is the key point. And
Taiwan is very, very interested in buying directly from those
defense tech companies that have capabilities they've tested in
the battlefield, and that they have been able to innovate in a
super, super rapid fashion. And they're buying those
capabilities as we speak. We should be, too, but we need to do
a lot of work to simplify that for through FMS in particular.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Now, Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, and thank both of you for
your testimony here.
And I'm going to start with you Dr. Polyakova. It's good to
see you again. I want to talk about what message we should aim
to have come out of the NATO Summit with respect to Ukraine.
Because the messages that the Trump administration has been
sending for months, in my view, have undermined our position,
our collective U.S.-NATO position, in support of Ukraine.
We don't have to revisit the spectacle in the Oval Office
with President Zelensky and all those other issues. But more
recently we've seen Secretary Rubio acknowledge that Ukraine's
need for air defense is significant. But to my knowledge,
there's no plan to get Ukraine more air defense. We also saw
Secretary Hegseth skip the Ukraine Defense Contact Group
meeting in Brussels. The first time a U.S. Secretary of Defense
has done so since Russia's full scale invasion began in 2022.
Secretary Hegseth also confirmed that the proposed 2026
budget request includes cuts to funding for weapons purchases
to Ukraine. As you mentioned with respect to the possibility of
Ukraine's future, you know, home in NATO, taking that off the
table unilaterally is a pretty bad negotiating position.
So, could you just describe what message you think needs to
come out of NATO Summit with respect to Ukraine, what kind of
united message, and then whether you think--what the prospects
are for that, given what President Trump's position has been?
Dr. Polyakova. Well, we understand that this summit has a
much shorter agenda than usual NATO summits. That the
communique is also going to be quite short and very simple, and
straightforward, really focusing on NATO's core capabilities,
and not talking necessarily so much about our other partners
and allies.
What I would like to see is, of course, clear messaging
from the Administration that we will stand with Ukraine against
the Russian aggressor. That's what I would like to see. That
being said, I think we can probably get to a communique that
does mention that Russia's the aggressor, of course, and that
Ukraine is the victim and also a partner to the United States.
That's what I'm hoping for. Whether it'll be viable, I think,
will depend a lot on the conversations between leaders on the
ground, as we've seen in the past.
I think one very specific thing that I think this NATO
Summit could achieve, which is not necessarily to NATO, but to
Ukraine, is to allow the sales of U.S. military equipment to
Europeans who can then transfer it to Ukraine as they see fit.
We have not provided that yet, that third party transfer, but
that's something that I think is very much within reach and
something that we can do.
And that in itself will send a clear message that even
though we may not be debating a new supplemental in this House,
though, I hope that that may change, that the United States
will still allow European allies to buy American and then
transfer those capabilities to Ukraine.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that.
Let me ask both of you now quickly on the subject of
coordinating both with our NATO partners, but also more broadly
with the EU partners in terms of our approach to China, right?
During the first Trump administration, we worked on a
bipartisan basis to try to encourage our colleagues to de-risk
their economies from China, especially in critical strategic
supply chains.
There seems to be more confusion this time around in the
Trump administration. I would note that on June 10, our
Ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, posted on X, ``What
happens in the Indo-Pacific matters for transatlantic security,
that's why NATO works with partners globally.'' Something I
agree with.
But the Deputy Secretary of State Landau then posted and
then deleted a reply. His tweet though was, ``He obviously
didn't get the memo of our deputies committee meeting on this
very issue. NATO is still a solution in search of a problem.''
What is your view on these sort of different conflicting
positions we seem to see within the Trump administration, and
how is that hurting our ability to work with our European
allies? And finally, when we're putting these large tariffs
across the board, tariffs on many of our EU partners, and the
question is, how can we be asking them to de-risk from China
when we and our actions are putting their economies at such
risk?
Dr. Polyakova. Thank you for your question, Senator.
Again, I think the messaging, as you say, has not been
clear to European allies on a variety of different issues,
including terrorists, including our commitment to Ukraine,
including our policy on China.
I do think it's early in the Administration, and we can
allow them a little bit more time to figure out what those
positions are. That being said, it is producing a great deal of
stress and anxiety among allies to not really have a clear
sense of where the Administration is going to take its
policies.
So, I would like to see very clear messaging, on NATO in
particular. I agree with some other members of the
Administration who said if we didn't have NATO, we'd have to
invent it. So, NATO does have a very clear purpose, is to
defend and deter Russia in Europe and to allow for lessons to
be learned from the Indo-Pacific.
NATO's core function is Europe. But there are many lessons
that we've been discussing here for the Indo-Pacific
environment and to provide some key technologies and
capabilities as well. That's what I would like to see come out
of the summit, is coherence and a common threat assessment of
what NATO is actually doing and why we have it.
Senator Van Hollen. If Mr. Rough could be able to----
Mr. Rough. I would just say rather than grand
pronouncements, what really matters is just the hard work, the
daily grind of cleaning Chinese infrastructure out of the
critical areas in Europe. I think the Chinese have, or Chinese
controlled companies have stakes in 33 port terminals across
Europe.
CK Hutchinson, thanks in part to President Trump's pressure
campaign, is now considering selling 14 of them to a U.S.-
Swiss-Italian consortium. The Chinese are all over the ports of
Rotterdam and Antwerp. They have a 24.9 percent stake in the
Port of Hamburg. All of that just needs to be steadily worked
on because it does have carryover effects, for example,
military mobility and American troop movements in Europe.
I'd also add telecoms to that list. None of the big EU
countries are expected to have 5G networks that are entirely
free of Chinese products by 2028. We need to try to accelerate
those timelines to the extent we can. And that might go below
the radar of the grand political declarations at a place like
The Hague next week, but I think it's essential for the
alliance.
Senator Van Hollen. Got it. Thank you.
Thank you, both.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Chairwoman.
I want to just say that you, Ms. Polyakova, you had a kind
of a statement that I want to explore a little bit. You said
Russia would be a sitting duck without the United States. It
makes me concerned because I hear the President publicly
flirting with indulging Russia's maximalist aims, and it seems
to make me really, really alarmed.
Last week, a Russian deputy foreign minister said that
Ukraine won't end until NATO reduces or eliminates its military
footprint in eastern Europe across NATOs Eastern flank. This
includes Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and so on. When I was in Estonia, their
concerns for the U.S. alliance and partnership especially under
the Trump administration had many people I talked with very
alarmed.
And so, I'm wondering if you can expand on this line of
thought and maybe impress upon this committee the urgency, the
dire urgency of this moment we have right now before us with
Russia, and with the President whose posture at times really
worries me.
Dr. Polyakova. Thank you so much, Senator Booker.
It is an urgent moment as I outlined in my written
testimony, mainly because Russia is on a war footing, and
confrontation with NATO seems increasingly more inevitable
unless the United States continues to take up a leadership
position, NATO continues to deter and defend in the European
theater. So, Russia has in fact been the main obstacle to peace
in Ukraine.
President Putin's maximalist positions, that he's not
stepped away from, I think signal a very basic truth that we've
learned around many Administrations, that a reset with Russia
doesn't get you anywhere. I think this Administration has been
learning that in fact and like other Administrations have tried
to reset with Russia, and I hope that they will pivot to a
different strategy.
That means that we need to apply pressure to the Russians
to come to the table, economic pressure, military pressure, and
also pressure on their partners and allies that have been
feeding Putin's war machine over the last several years. I hope
that is the thinking that the Administration is going to pursue
the next several months, because obviously, the incentive model
has not worked to produce results.
Senator Booker. And my staff corrected me, for the record
that I said Russia, but Europe would be a sitting duck. And so,
you said that your view of the Trump administration is that
they understand the urgency for the American engagement
involvement. Am I right to assume that that's what you were
implying?
Dr. Polyakova. To be frank, I don't know if that is the
coherent view of everyone in the U.S. Government and in the
executive branch. I do think there are some certainly that
understand the threat, yes.
Senator Booker. It's very diplomatic of you.
I want to shift in my remaining time and talk about sort of
the Arctic strategy. I was really surprised on my visit last
year to Iceland to understand the extent of the urgencies, and
the need for America to have a greater Arctic strategy, and pay
close attention to really what's happening in the Arctic right
now. The shortest flight path between Russia and the United
States is through the Arctic. The combination of melting ice
caps, as you know, critical natural resources being removed and
fought over, Russia's military build up, and increasing
cooperation between Russia and China and the Arctic have really
a lot of potential to increase tensions and expose a lot of the
vulnerabilities in that area.
Now, Sweden and Finland joining NATO provides to what I
believe is just a great boost to the collective defense in the
High North. Now, seven of the eight Arctic states are part of
NATO, which is incredible stride, I believe from Russia's ghost
fleets that sabotage undersea cables and critical
infrastructure to protecting strategic ports. I just believe we
need to expand NATO's capabilities.
Now, I'll tell you I was hearing reports when I was there
that the Chinese have been doing, pun intended, fishy things in
that area. And so, I'm wondering from both of you, what new and
emerging capabilities should NATO be considering when it comes
to protecting allied interest in the Arctic? And are there
gaps, as you see them, in NATO's current approach to challenges
in the Arctic?
Dr. Polyakova. I was hoping somebody would ask the question
about the Arctic. I hope you might come with us again to the
Arctic this August. I'll be in touch about that. That being
said, you're absolutely right that we have a huge opportunity
with the kind of strategic depth that Finland and Sweden
joining the alliance has provides us. Now, we have a land mass
connecting the Arctic Sea and the Baltic Sea, and we haven't
quite understood what the opportunity there is to deter and
defend.
I think we have significant challenges in our logistics,
operations, communications that are well suited for that harsh
environment that we haven't quite thought through. I think
there's a huge amount more that we can do to ensure that we
have a defense and security hub that is closely coordinated
with the Nordic, Baltic aid grouping that is closely
coordinated with the NATO framework to position ourselves as
the Arctic nation the United States is and China is not in
particular.
The Chinese have for years seen significant interests
emerge for themselves in the Arctic, and have declared
themselves a near, I think, a near polar or near Arctic nation,
which of course they're not. And they're doing a lot through
their proxies. The Russians now try to plant a flag, and try to
influence, and undermine a strategic cohesion, the Arctic. But
we have the upper hand there, because now the seven of the
eight Arctic states are NATO members, and we should take
advantage of that.
But I think exercise is number one, logistics and comms
number two, and then we can think about maybe positioning of
some additional resources and kit in the region.
Senator Booker. Mr. Rough.
Mr. Rough. You are right, Senator. This is a real
opportunity. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, the Arctic was
mentioned for the first time in the NATO Summit communique. In
2010, at the last time--or it's not the communique, the
strategic policy document for the alliance--at that last go
around, the alliance could not agree because of the Norwegians
wanted more NATO, the Canadians wanted to keep this a national
issue. We now have more consensus in the alliance, and we've
seen the Nordic powers really begin to work more with one
another as well. It's the first time since the Kalmar Union of
the 16th century that all the Nordic powers are in one
alliance, which is a real opportunity.
And there, I would just say that the Arctic Council is
essentially dead. But the Arctic seven are all in NATO, and we
have capabilities that have now come on board. The Finns are
world leaders in icebreaker design. They and all of the Arctic
powers have skills in cold weather operations, and I'd like to
see us cooperate more also on Russian anti-submarine
capabilities and exercises. The GIUK gap is of course central
here, where Russians from Murmansk would try to break out from
the Norwegian Sea into the Atlantic where they can threaten the
American Atlantic seaboard.
Tony Radakin, the chief of staff of the British Armed
Forces, just a few years ago, right before the outbreak of the
full scale invasion of Ukraine, described a phenomenal increase
in Russian submarine activity. In April, General Cavoli
testified similarly in front of the House Armed Services
Committee. These are areas where cooperation, I'd like to see
us work more with the Arctic seven, within the NATO alliance,
and probably leave the Arctic Council, which of course includes
Russia, in its latent state.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. That urgency is
something I'd love the committee to focus a little bit more on.
And I want to say I've never seen, Mr. Rough, a witness
throw my staff under the bus. They didn't put in my briefing
document about the Arctic, the Kalmar Treaty of 16th century.
I'm going to be on my staff very upset about that lack of in my
briefing.
Senator Shaheen. Well, what I am struck by, Senator Booker,
is the similarity in approach that both of our witnesses have
today, which I think speaks to the importance of NATO and how
we should respond.
I actually want to do another round before we close,
because I want to start, Mr. Rough, with asking you about the
idea of a financial or a finance ministerial for NATO. Because
I think that's a really interesting idea as we think about how
we really shut down our adversaries. It's not just militarily,
it also needs to be economically.
And one of the huge loopholes that exists is the ability
for cryptocurrencies to pay for what our adversaries are doing,
but also their ability to put their laundered money into our
Western financial systems. So, talk a little bit about how you
see that ministerial being structured and the extent to which
NATO has to this point discussed this idea and what the
challenges are.
Mr. Rough. Well, for starters, NATO really is run by five
defense ministerials that take place during the course of the
year. And I don't know when it became written in stone,
Senator, that we have to have an annual NATO Summit. There
were, I think, three summits all through the cold war. They're
enormously time consuming. They're expensive. Moving the
President to The Hague alone is a big undertaking.
They create a lot of bureaucratic angst, and at times that
can even be counterproductive as bureaucrats run around the
corridors of Brussels looking for low hanging fruit to pluck to
put into a communique. So, I think letting the defense
ministers run NATO, as they have in the past, and supplementing
it with the finance minister only because defense ministers
oftentimes can't make budgeting promises the way that finance
ministers actually have to.
Moreover, I was heartened to see Mark Rutte either in the
press conference following his Chatham House remarks last week
or after the defense ministerial say that he will have annual
plans as the allies ascend the step stair to 5 percent to keep
them to it, because it's very easy as a politician, I think, to
make a 10 year horizon plan when your successor actually has to
find a way to pay for it. So, I think this is just a way to
actually put brass tacks behind the pronouncements that are
made to force allies to really concentrate on how they will
make their way there.
And I would welcome the inclusion of some of these other
components, like for example, the implications of
cryptocurrency. How do banking systems, traditionally a domain
of the European Union and the member states, play when it comes
to NATO security and defense? How should we think about all of
this? And I think that's a worthy area for investigation.
And before I get in trouble, Senator, I should mention this
idea I've stolen from a colleague of mine, Luke Coffey at
Hudson Institute, who shared it with me some time ago.
Senator Shaheen. We will give him attribution.
Dr. Polyakova, do you want to add to that as you think
about this potential?
Dr. Polyakova. I would just add that many European NATO
member states, including Germany, you know, traditionally the
defense ministry has played a relatively minor role. And it's
really been the finance ministry that has led the way and has
had a powerful head. Like, nobody wanted defense ministry in
German politics for years. So, I think now is the moment to
rebalance that.
And I think this is a very good idea that I'm just hearing
for the first time actually. But I think it makes a lot of
sense, for Europeans in particular, because the money's going
to have to be allocated. It's going to have to come from
somewhere. And who controls those purse strings well as
parliaments, but it's really the finance ministers.
Senator Shaheen. And to what extent has this been
discussed? Are you aware of any conversations about this? Any
particular NATO member who is pushing this idea?
Mr. Rough. I don't believe so, Senator. I think this is
still a somewhat nascent incipient concept.
Senator Shaheen. Interesting. Well, I think it's a great
idea. I think we should think about how we push it.
Dr. Polyakova, you and Mr. Rough both mentioned the hybrid
threat from Russia to our NATO allies. Can you expand on that a
little bit? Because one of the things that has struck me is
that it is an area that we have, particularly around the
information space, where we have not at all either been able or
willing to match what our adversaries are doing. And we've
heard that that applies not just to the United States, but to
other NATO countries. So, can I ask both of you to speak to
that and to what more we ought to be thinking about there?
Dr. Polyakova. Oh, thank you so much, Senator for that
question.
I will preface my answer to your specific question on the
information influence operations to say that what Russia's
currently carrying out against our European allies in NATO, we
have not seen even in the cold war. It's not even hybrid or
non-conventional. This is warfare.
We call it in my institution ``shadow warfare'' because it
does include assassinations, it does include very well
documented attacks on critical infrastructure that is costing
lives and producing mass civilian as well as military
disruption and destruction. And this is something very new that
we have not grasped as an alliance, and that we must.
I think, increasingly, information influence operations are
even less needed, I would say, because the Russians have
unleashed their intelligence agencies to wreak havoc across
Europe and all these other various ways. That being said, they
haven't gone anywhere. Certainly not. I mean, the use of
propaganda type tools has been around for all of humanity and
was effectively used by the Russians. I think that the
unfortunate situation we find ourselves in now is that I think
with some of the cuts that the Administration has made and also
that Congress has not, for example reconstituted funding, the
Global Engagement Center as one, but also some of the cuts to
VOA, RFE/RL are diminishing our ability to compete in the
information space. I think there's no question about that, not
just in Europe, but across the world. And I hope that's
something that we may reconsider in the near term.
Senator Shaheen. I certainly agree.
Mr. Rough.
Mr. Rough. Yes, just maybe on the Baltic Sea, since it's
much in the news. This is a vast body of water, something like
15 percent of global traffic transits it, and it's very shallow
at 52 or 55 meters, which means it's rather inexpensive for a
part of Russia's shadow fleet to drag a rusty anchor across its
seabed and destroy data, transmission, or communications, or
even power cables.
A third of the EU's natural gas is imported via undersea
pipelines from Norway, for example, which could prove rather
damaging to the economy, and to repair these data cables,
transmission lines is rather expensive; somewhere between 5, to
10, to 150, to $200 million. There's only 60, 70, 80 repair
vehicles available in the world.
All this is a huge problem, which means that really, when
it comes to the balance of threat, the Russians know the
political economy works in their direction. It's inexpensive
for them, and it's expensive for us, which I do think means, as
much as I hate to say it, that we should consider
countermeasures to try to put the Russians on their back heel.
Maybe it's worthwhile considering the lights going off in
the Moscow Metro for half a day or something like that to send
a message to Vladimir Putin. He cannot act with impunity and
just expect us to play defense all of the time. That's just not
going to be an effective way for us to go forward.
Senator Shaheen. I totally agree with that. I thought it
was very interesting, I think it was Finland who the last time
the cables, the undersea cables were interrupted in the Baltic
Sea, took the ship and all of its crew into port and arrested
them basically, and said, we're not going to let you get away
with it. We've got to get much tougher on those kinds of
measures.
Well, thank you both very much for being here. We really
appreciate your testimony and the ideas that you've shared with
us.
I don't think that we'll have any questions for the record,
but if we do, we would ask that you might be willing to respond
to those as quickly as possible.
So, with that, this hearing is adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Peter Rough to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Nearly all members of NATO have announced that they will
fulfill the 2 percent GDP defense spending pledge by the end of this
year. One of the most important outcomes of this year's NATO summit
will be a new pledge to spend 5 percent.
Directing more funding and resources toward defense is critical,
but what are the primary practical obstacles to modernizing NATO
readiness and what actions must we take to overcome them?
Answer. Even NATO's stronger militaries will struggle to handle the
requirements assigned to them under the DDA (Deterrence and Defence of
the Euro-Atlantic Area) Family of Plans adopted at the NATO Summit in
Vilnius in 2023. The alliance must move with greater urgency and speed,
which means doubling down on the transatlantic defense industrial base
rather than chasing the illusion of strategic autonomy. In the
Netherlands this week, the alliance should focus on greater
transatlantic collaboration in (1) procurement, (2) standardization,
and (3) production capacity.
Question. While Article 5 remains rock-solid, we must continue to
invest in military readiness to keep it strong and credible. Russia
spends 6-8 percent of its GDP on defense and has largely transitioned
to a wartime economy. Some speculate it will reconstitute its military
in the next 5 years and could invade a NATO ally.
Beyond strengthening our hard-power capabilities, what actions can
NATO take to send a strong and clear message that Article 5 is strong,
and NATO will not give up one square inch of Ally territory?
Answer. First, NATO has proven rather tepid in its response to
Russia's hybrid warfare. The alliance should consider a range of
countermeasures to reestablish deterrence lest this issue spirals out
of control and triggers an Article V-style contingency.
Second, NATO should consider upgrading the Forward Land Forces in
Estonia into a brigade-sized force.
Third, NATO should consider intercepting Russian missiles and
drones heading toward NATO airspace, even if still flying over western
Ukrainian. As my colleague, Luke Coffey, has suggested, this would
underscore to Russia that it cannot fire weapons toward the alliance
with the potential of drones crashing into Romania or missiles falling
into Poland. If properly organized, the risk of escalation for such an
air defense mission would be low, given Ukraine's size and the distance
between Poland and Romania on the one side and Russian forces on the
other.
Question. To get to a new pledge to spend 5 percent of GDP on
defense, allies have suggested a pledge of 3.5 percent on military
expenditures and 1.5 percent on defense-related investments.
How could NATO strictly define the category of ``defense-related''
spending to make sure countries' spending actually serves our
collective defense?
Answer. NATO has had a common definition of what counts as defense
spending since the 1950s. Even that defense category could be
tightened, however. For example, retirement pensions for civilian
employees in ministries of defense are included in spending targets
across the alliance. So, too, are expenditures for ``humanitarian
operations.'' For starters, therefore, the alliance should tighten the
actual defense spending category.
As a second step, NATO should define ``defense-related'' as
directly relevant to warfighting. For example, investments in
infrastructure that allow heavy armour to flow across the continent or
spending on cyber defenses to ensure stable command and control should
clearly count toward the 1.5 percent. By contrast, energy security may
be a worthy undertaking but should not count as ``defense-related.''
Question. U.S. troop presence is a pillar of NATO deterrence in
Europe. Eastern Flank allies say there is nothing that shows the
strength of Article 5 like the presence of U.S. troops.
How can the U.S. maximize our troops' cost-effectiveness and more
effectively posture our troops in Europe?
Question. How can European host nations help shoulder the burden
and make it easier for the U.S. to keep troops there?
Answer. U.S. forces benefit from host-nation support, which helps
defray costs. Moreover, approximately 90 percent of U.S. ground forces
and two-thirds of the U.S. Navy are already in CONUS and assigned to
the Indo-Pacific, respectively.
It would be difficult to cut troops from central and eastern Europe
without signaling weakness to Russia. It would be equally difficult to
cut forces from western Europe, where U.S. soldiers benefit from top-
flight facilities located in strategic locations that allow America to
project power around the world.
Ultimately, however, our posture in Europe should be guided less by
the total numbers of soldiers and more by the strategic enablers our
allies cannot yet provide.
Question. The Russia-Ukraine war continues to alter the security
landscape of Europe. Russia's military was weakened early in the
conflict but is now regrowing at an alarming pace. It continues to
recruit manpower at a rate that more than keeps pace with the massive
casualties its forces have suffered. Russia has also shed many outdated
capabilities and is now developing new ones, like drones and
hypersonics, to which we must develop new responses.
How should NATO's defense readiness plans reflect the evolution in
Russia's military posture?
Answer. NATO recognizes the threat of Russia. The Strategic
Concept, DDA Family of Plans, Defense Planning Process, Capabilities
Targets, and Investment Pledges are all focused laser-like on one issue
above all others: deterring a major war in Europe.
To counter Russia's reorganization of its military districts,
recruitment drive to enlarge its armed forces, and strategic steps like
the absorption of Belarus, NATO will need to make its forward
deployments into the Bucharest 9 states permanent and intensify work
with the Nordic-Baltic 8 now that all of these states are inside one
alliance for the first time in centuries.
It is past time for NATO to acknowledge what is already widely
appreciated; namely, that the NATO-Russia Founding Act is a dead
letter.
______
Responses of Mr. Peter Rough to Questions
Submitted by Senator David McCormick
Question. Many Senators on this Committee are concerned about the
metastasizing cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. These countries are the foremost adversaries of the
U.S. and instigators of global instability from Ukraine to the South
China Sea. I was happy to partner with Senator Coons to introduce S.
1883, which would require the executive branch to develop an
interagency strategy to disrupt this axis of chaos. I don't advocate
for NATO to be the world's policeman but given the proliferation of
Iranian drones and North Korean munitions used against Ukrainian
civilians these events are not happening in a vacuum, and they are
directly impacting European security.
How should NATO cooperate to counter both the strategic challenges
posed by this four-country axis as well as the operational challenges
like technological cooperation in missile development, AI, and cyber
warfare?
Answer. Russia would not be able to maintain its operational tempo
in Ukraine absent the support of its three major partners: the DPRK,
Iran, and the PRC. The most recent reporting suggests North Korea may
even deploy troops into Ukraine.
There is scope for greater cooperation amongst America's allies
around the world to counter this ``axis of chaos.'' For example,
Polish-South Korean partnership in defense technology is a good model
for future NATO collaboration with the IP-4 states. Moreover, the U.S.
should push our European and Asian allies to synchronize tighter export
controls, intellectual property protections, and outbound investment
restrictions toward the PRC in dual-use areas. NATO countries should
not be empowering China while Beijing helps undermine European
security.
Finally, NATO allies should recognize the contribution Israel has
made in eroding Iran's ability to project power. The Israeli campaign
against Iran has sown doubts in Tehran about Russia's reliability and
utility as a partner. This is a good thing.
Question. Since invading Ukraine, Russia has employed ``gray zone''
tactics against NATO allies to disrupt their support for Ukraine
without escalating to outright conflict. According to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Russia's campaign of subversion
and sabotage against European and U.S. targets has nearly tripled
between 2023 and 2024, following a quadrupling from 2022 to 2023.
Targets have included transportation hubs, critical infrastructure,
factories, energy terminals, and undersea cables.
How can NATO enhance its intelligence-sharing mechanisms to detect
and counter Russian gray zone tactics, such as sabotage actions,
misinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks, in real time?
Answer. The alliance has debated the challenges posed by Russia's
gray zone tactics at nearly every ministerial in recent years. It is
improving its intelligence-sharing on hybrid operations and has begun
to impose costs on Russia, including through legal action against
Russia's shadow fleet.
At base, however, the economics of hybrid warfare cut against NATO.
It costs far less to bribe a captain, for example, to drag an anchor
across the Baltic Sea than it does to repair the resulting damaged
infrastructure. To restore deterrence, NATO may need to consider
offensive operations of its own, perhaps in the cyber realm and
carefully scoped so as to limit the risk of escalation.
Question. What role should NATO play in protecting domestic
critical infrastructure, and how should those responsibilities be
coordinated among the alliance?
Answer. Last month, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte set a broad
defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP. This includes NATO members
raising their defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, along with an
additional 1.5 percent for broader security-related items by 2032.
These targets have already faced some skepticism, particularly because
some NATO allies still struggle to meet the existing 2 percent
threshold.
Question. What specific mechanisms should exist to ensure
accountability for these new spending targets?
Answer. As the Hague Summit Declaration notes: ``Allies agree to
submit annual plans showing a credible, incremental path to reach this
goal.'' These annual plans, reviewed by the Secretary General, are the
central mechanism by which the alliance will measure the commitment to
increased defense spending.
Furthermore, NATO should consider complementing its defense
ministerial process with a finance ministerial, comprised of ministers
of finance, many of whom control the pursue strings in parliamentary
democracies.
Question. As the U.S. seeks to rebalance its commitment and
presence to Europe, key partners--such as France and the UK--have
voiced a willingness to create a ``reassurance force'' to backstop a
cease-fire in Ukraine with ``tacit support'' from the U.S.
How should the U.S. define terms of support for such a European
reassurance force and what would its coordination with NATO look like
to avoid unwanted escalation?
Answer. It is unlikely that a European force will backstop a cease-
fire in Ukraine. If it does materialize, such a force is more likely to
resemble a training mission, based mostly in western Ukraine, and
numbering in the hundreds rather than thousands of personnel. In the
event of renewed hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, such a force
would go to barracks rather than risk war with Russia. The only true
deterrent to renewed aggression will be the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
European partners have asked for strategic enablers to support such
a force, but it is unlikely to include any American troops on the
ground.
Question. Mr. Rough, you mentioned in your testimony that NATO
commanders have asked alliance members to raise their military
capability targets by 30 percent.
What specific capabilities should European partners focus on, and
which European nations are best positioned to lead defense production
for certain systems?
Answer. The NATO Defense Planning Process has set capabilities
targets for each of the allies within the framework of the DDA
(Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area) family of plans
ratified at the Vilnius Summit.
Europe should focus on (1) fulfilling the targets set by SACEUR in
those plans and (2) building capabilities in those areas where Europe
is entirely dependent on the United States. In the event of hostilities
in the Indopacific, for example, key U.S. capabilities will leave
Europe abruptly. Our European allies should therefore invest in
acquiring those systems on which it has historically relied entirely on
the United States. In the short-run, that will mean increased European
investments in the U.S. defense industrial base; in the long-run, it
will ideally mean the development of complementary European
capabilities.
______
Responses of Dr. Alina Polyakova to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Nearly all members of NATO have announced that they will
fulfill the 2 percent GDP defense spending pledge by the end of this
year. One of the most important outcomes of this year's NATO summit
will be a new pledge to spend 5 percent.
Directing more funding and resources toward defense is critical,
but what are the primary practical obstacles to modernizing NATO
readiness and what actions must we take to overcome them?
Answer. Increased spending is an important step forward for NATO's
European allies, but it is critical that NATO allies ensure that the
funding is translated into concrete national level investments that
complement the alliance as a whole.
In particular, a core problem for Europe is a highly fragmented
defense industry, which presents challenges for alliance
interoperability. A more integrated, alliance-wide industrial strategy,
potentially including joint procurement and stronger standardization
processes, are necessary to overcome fragmentation and ensure
interoperability and scale.
To regularly identify gaps and interoperability issues, the
alliance should hold uninterrupted NATO exercises, maintaining
increased tempo and scale, which is vital for readiness and cohesion.
Question. While Article 5 remains rock-solid, we must continue to
invest military readiness to keep it strong and credible. Russia spends
6-8 percent of its GDP on defense and has largely transitioned to a
wartime economy. Some speculate it will reconstitute its military in
the next 5 years and could invade a NATO ally.
Beyond strengthening our hard-power capabilities, what actions can
NATO take to send a strong and clear message that Article 5 is strong,
and NATO will not give up one square inch of Ally territory?
Answer. NATO Summits are a key political opportunity for
deterrence. Reaffirming US commitment to NATO and Article 5 is just as
important for allies as it is for sending a clear message to
adversaries.
U.S. presence in NATO's Eastern Flank is also key for defense and
deterrence against Russia.
In addition, NATO should take up a much more forward learning
approach to Russia's shadow war--Russia's increasing kinetic attacks on
critical infrastructure, such as undersea cables, as well as sabotage
campaigns in the cyber domain are undermining alliance cohesion and
exposing deep security vulnerabilities. In particular, NATO should take
an active role in surveilling and monitoring Russian ``shadow fleet''
activities in the Nordic-Baltic domain and the Arctic, ensuring that
Russia does not have open opportunities to attack allies' assets.
Question. To get to a new pledge to spend 5 percent of GDP on
defense, allies have suggested a pledge of 3.5 percent on military
expenditures and 1.5 percent on defense-related investments.
How could NATO strictly define the category of ``defense-related''
spending to make sure countries' spending actually serves our
collective defense?
Answer. This will be a key issue for allies assuming that the 5
percent commitment with the 1.5 percent defense related proportion is
made. Defining what counts toward defense related spending is likely to
vary across nation states, but NATO can and should provide clear
guidance on what constitutes legitimate spending and what does not.
Importantly, NATO should set a benchmark of how much of the 1.5 percent
should be new spending rather than counting existing expenditures
toward defense.
Question. U.S. troop presence is a pillar of NATO deterrence in
Europe. Eastern Flank allies say there is nothing that shows the
strength of Article 5 like the presence of U.S. troops.
How can the U.S. maximize our troops' cost-effectiveness and more
effectively posture our troops in Europe?
Answer. There are several ways to maximize costs and effectiveness
of US presence in Europe. First, consistent and comprehensive
resources, policies, and authorities ensure sustained funding and
investment by the US and its allies and partners in infrastructure
needs, training, exercises, and capability.
Second, the debate over rotational versus permanent presence of US
forces continues. Finding the right balance between a rotational
presence, which can increase readiness and agility of US posture, and
permanent presence which can increase long-term deterrence and
increased capability of allies and partners, with continual US
leadership, is critical.
Third, effective posture of US troops in Europe considers the
forward projection of US capabilities for other regions including the
Middle East and Africa. The US should have a comprehensive strategy for
long-term presence to achieve global national security priorities. (for
more, please see CEPA's work on The Future of US Bases in Europe.)
Question. How can European host nations help shoulder the burden
and make it easier for the U.S. to keep troops there?
Answer. European allies should contribute more to maintaining US
troops in Europe--many already commit to building and maintain the
infrastructure needed for US troops, such as housing, roads, schools,
etc. Going forward, more European allies should take up the cost that
the US carries for base maintenance, new base development, as well as
making other additional contributions (for more, please see CEPA's 2021
Military Mobility Project.)
Question. The Russia-Ukraine war continues to alter the security
landscape of Europe. Russia's military was weakened early in the
conflict but is now regrowing at an alarming pace. It continues to
recruit manpower at a rate that more than keeps pace with the massive
casualties its forces have suffered. Russia has also shed many outdated
capabilities and is now developing new ones, like drones and
hypersonics, to which we must develop new responses.
How should NATO's defense readiness plans reflect the evolution in
Russia's military posture?
Answer. NATO's defense plans should continually evolve to achieve a
successful deterrence and denial mission. With the upcoming capability
targets being released this Fall to reflect the regional defense plans,
allies should prioritize these targets to better align on planning and
defense.
As Russia continues to increase its presence and capability in the
Arctic/High-North, seize on vulnerable regions of Europe including the
Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, continue to threaten allies and
partners on its borders, and continue its illegal invasion of Ukraine--
Russia's military posture will continue to be stretched thin. But as
Russia continues on its war footing re-arming itself from its losses in
Ukraine, its posture priorities will have to be evaluated at regular
intervals. These evaluations, in conjunction with alliance priorities
and investments must weigh immediate needs of the alliance with long-
term planning and threat assessments of adversaries.
______
Responses of Dr. Alina Polyakova to Questions
Submitted by Senator David McCormick
Question. Many Senators on this Committee are concerned about the
metastasizing cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. These countries are the foremost adversaries of the
U.S. and instigators of global instability from Ukraine to the South
China Sea.
I was happy to partner with Senator Coons to introduce S. 1883,
which would require the executive branch to develop an interagency
strategy to disrupt this axis of chaos. I don't advocate for NATO to be
the world's policeman but given the proliferation of Iranian drones and
North Korean munitions used against Ukrainian civilians these events
are not happening in a vacuum and they are directly impacting European
security.
How should NATO cooperate to counter both the strategic challenges
posed by this four-country axis as well as the operational challenges
like technological cooperation in missile development, AI, and cyber
warfare?
Answer. The growing partnership between Russia, China, Iran and
North Korea presents a serious long term challenge to the US and our
allies. In the NATO domain, Russia has been the primary threat to
European allies but China has been actively seeking opportunities to
undermine alliance cohesion while positioning itself as a military
player. The Arctic is a key area where both Russia and China have
strategic security interests that undermine US and NATO interests.
To better counter this ``meta-threat,'' NATO allies should develop
a common threat perception and strategy to address each country
individually and all four as an intertwined challenge. Such a joint
strategy does not currently exist. NATO should also actively seek to
integrate the innovation insights in the applications of AI and defense
technology being deployed in Ukraine. Lessons learned from the current
conflict in Ukraine and overall understanding of the threat and
application of the alliance's regional defense plans will ensure that
the alliance is ready to fight any potential future wars.
Furthermore, joint venture projects between US and European defense
companies, including co-development and co-production, will be critical
for alliance interoperability including harmonization of production
lines and product.
Question. Since invading Ukraine, Russia has employed ``gray zone''
tactics against NATO allies to disrupt their support for Ukraine
without escalating to outright conflict. According to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Russia's campaign of subversion
and sabotage against European and U.S. targets has nearly tripled
between 2023 and 2024, following a quadrupling from 2022 to 2023.
Targets have included transportation hubs, critical infrastructure,
factories, energy terminals, and undersea cables.
How can NATO enhance its intelligence-sharing mechanisms to detect
and counter Russian gray zone tactics, such as sabotage actions,
misinformation campaigns, and cyberattacks, in real time?
Answer. Russia's shadow war against NATO has accelerated
significantly since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA) is currently engaged in a comprehensive
research project to identify a deterrence strategy for such kinetic
nonconventional threats.
One initial insight from the research is that Russia's intelligence
services, who are driving and executing the shadow war, have been
unleashed to a level not seen even during the cold war. NATO countries'
intelligence agencies have simply not kept up in terms of
counterintelligence and deterrence.
A second insight is that NATO can do much more on the most
immediate threats in the Baltic Sea in particular where there have been
more than a dozen attacks on undersea cables in the last 2 years. NATO
can and should conduct regular surveillance of critical infrastructure
that could include patrols, ISR capabilities, and the use of autonomous
undersea drones.
Question. What role should NATO play in protecting domestic
critical infrastructure, and how should those responsibilities be
coordinated among the alliance?
Answer. As part of the 1.5 percent defense spending commitment
agreed upon at the 2025 NATO Summit at The Hague, allies need to invest
in domestic capabilities including infrastructure, logistics, etc. As
the alliance has noted for many years, the interoperability of critical
infrastructure for allies is a long-standing challenge. NATO has an
opportunity to lead efforts to coordinate and collaborate with allies
as they make these investments connecting these resource decisions to
the NATO regional defense plans and accompanying capability targets.
In addition, addressing security challenges including cyber, space,
and data, NATO can play a critical role in coordinating defense and
deterrence among all domains. In protecting and enabling strong
domestic critical infrastructure, those investments will have wide-
ranging effects on alliance-wide critical infrastructure and security.
NATO will need the ability to monitor and coordinate these efforts
across allies either with existing methods or strengthened leverage to
advise and support these investments.
Question. Last month, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte set a broad
defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP. This includes NATO members
raising their defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, along with an
additional 1.5 percent for broader security-related items by 2032.
These targets have already faced some skepticism, particularly because
some NATO allies still struggle to meet the existing 2 percent
threshold.
What specific mechanisms should exist to ensure accountability for
these new spending targets?
Answer. The agreement from the Wales Summit in 2014, instilling 2
percent GDP on defense spending as well as 20 percent on equipping was
difficult to track. NATO allies used a diverse set of factors to
provide information on their defense spending. The new targets should
go hand in glove with the alliance's capability targets for its
regional defense plans.
NATO has the opportunity to lead the allies on security investment
targets and spending as opposed to individual allies leading the
effort. This leadership must originate in the ability to hold allies
accountable on each of their spending and budgeting. While the
individual defense spending decisions are with individual allies, we
saw from the work of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, started at the
beginning of Russia's illegal invasion in Ukraine in 2022, the ability
for leadership to demand support and contributions to that effort can
be applied in a NATO setting. The situation is urgent, the adversary is
on a war footing, and the alliance must meet the moment.
Question. As the U.S. seeks to rebalance its commitment and
presence to Europe, key partners--such as France and the UK--have
voiced a willingness to create a ``reassurance force'' to backstop a
cease-fire in Ukraine with ``tacit support'' from the U.S.
How should the U.S. define terms of support for such a European
reassurance force and what would its coordination with NATO look like
to avoid unwanted escalation?
Answer. The US should support the efforts of the European led force
while encouraging other allies to join this coalition of the willing.
The specific action that the US could take would be to commit to
serving as the ``backstop'' to European forces, which could include
strengthened air defense, comprehensive enablers, increased
intelligence sharing and domain awareness, and prepositioned
capabilities in Europe. Short of that, the US can provide capabilities,
operations, training, and logistical support to the European led
effort.
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