[Senate Hearing 119-157]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-157
THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE JOINT FORCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND
MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 12, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-560 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, INDIANA MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN
John P. Keast, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
TIM SHEEHY, Montana
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
march 12, 2025
Page
The Current Readiness of the Joint Force......................... 1
Member Statements
Statement of Senator Dan Sullivan................................ 1
Statement of Senator Mazie K. Hirono............................. 2
Witness Statements
Mingus, General James J., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 5
Department of the Army.
Kilby, Admiral James W., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 11
Department of the Navy.
Mahoney, General Christopher J., USMC, Assistant Commandant of 19
the Marine Corps, Department of the Navy.
Guetlein, General Michael A., USSF, Vice Chief of Space 28
Operations, Department of the Air Force.
Spain, Lieutenant General Adrian, Air Force DCS Operations....... 35
Maurer, Diana C., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, 40
Government Accountability Office.
Questions for the Record......................................... 125
(iii)
THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE JOINT FORCE
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2025
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dan
Sullivan (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Sullivan, Wicker,
Scott, Schmitt, Sheehy, Hirono, and Kaine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
Senator Sullivan. This hearing will come to order.
The Readiness Subcommittee meets today to receive the
testimony on the current readiness of the United States Armed
Forces.
I deeply appreciate our witnesses, our esteemed witnesses
from our military services. This is a impressive photo right
here of all five services and our excellent work from the
Government Accountability Office by Diana Maurer.
This is one of the most important hearings certainly this
Committee undertakes all year. In my view, it is one of the
most important hearings in the Senate for the year because
there are very few other issues more important than the
readiness of our United States military.
I look forward to the valuable testimony of the witnesses
as it will pertain to their services' readiness. I hope we can
have a really good, candid discussion.
We are living in a very dangerous world where our
adversaries can and regularly do contest us across the globe
and we must remain vigilant in our pursuit of balancing
readiness, modernization, and training with our global
commitments.
In my view, for the last 4 years we have taken a holiday
from history with the Biden administration's focus on issues in
the military that had nothing to do with readiness.
The list is long, climate change over ship building,
transgender surgery for Active Duty troops, Diversity, Equity,
Inclusion (DEI), a lack of focus on war fighting and lethality
and defeating our enemies.
I appreciate Secretary Hegseth's three priorities:
restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military, and
reestablishing our deterrence.
Many of you know, and I have talked to all of you about
this, I am a big fan of the book by T. R. Fehrenbach ``This
Kind of War,'' which marines and soldiers all read, and it is
about the Korean War and how in 1945 we had the most lethal
military in world history and 5 years later in 1950 the United
States military had a hard time stopping and defeating a
peasant army from North Korea, and thousands of American troops
died in the process because a lack of leadership from our
civilian and uniformed military.
This must never happen again. There must never be another
Task Force Smith that we saw in the Korean War.
My view is we have a moral obligation to prepare for any
future conflict beginning with the realization that unlike any
previous conflict our servicemembers will be at risk from
threats well before they reach foreign soil, airspace, or
waters.
The world has changed dramatically as it pertains to our
Homeland as well. We can no longer consider ourselves safe
based solely on the tyranny of distance from nations and actors
that would do us harm.
One of the things that we are working on in this Congress
and this Committee in conjunction with the President is his
Iron Dome, now Golden Dome, legislation of mine with Senator
Cramer we hope to make bipartisan in this Committee to
bolstering our Homeland defense.
Suffice to say the world is a dangerous place and the facts
demand a response from not just the uniformed personnel sitting
before us and again, I respect the service, decades and decades
of military service from all of you, but from Congress as well.
Let us look at a few facts. In the last 4 years have done
to our militaries provided by the military services and GAO the
Army has done an outstanding job working to increase recruiting
but there remains significant operational demands and
increasing pressures on an already under strength force with
units being manned at less than 80 percent.
Sixteen of the Navy's 32 amphibious warfare ships are in
unsatisfactory condition and the Air Force of today is very
different from what we saw during the global war on terror.
Yes, we have more capable aircraft and yet the KC-46 and
KC-135 tanker fleets sits at an aircraft availability rate of
52 percent and 57 percent respectively versus 66 percent during
the entirety of the global war on terror.
While modernization will help improve these figures at what
cost will that come in terms of readiness and training? These
are the key issues that so many of you as our leaders in the
military have been focused on.
There are many other issues that GAO has raised and our
members here will be raising, but I want to thank the witnesses
in advance again for their exceptional service to our country
and for their testimony today.
I look forward to that testimony and now I would like to
turn it over to Ranking Member Senator Hirono.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Senator Chairman, Senator
Sullivan, rather. Well, you have new responsibilities.
[Laughter.]
Gentlemen, thank you for your dedicated service to our
Nation and I thank the servicemembers and each of your
respective branches as well.
Ms. Maurer, it is always great to have you back and to see
you. The tireless work that you and your team deliver to
Congress every year is instrumental to each National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA).
In your opening statements I ask that each of you briefly
describe what impacts to readiness a full year continuing
resolution (CR) would have.
For example, billions in military construction and family
housing projects would not occur in a full CR. So please, for
all three of you, I would like you to briefly go over what the
impacts of a full CR may be, a year's CR.
Even without a full CR readiness challenges range from
retaining a skilled civilian workforce, balancing modernization
with legacy platform maintenance, and training to core
missions.
Yet, while Congress provides ample resources to the
Department of Defense (DOD) every year we still see delays in
ship maintenance, cost overruns in military construction
projects, and avoidable problems with family housing and
barracks.
Each of you are doing the best you can. Readiness requires
the consumption of dedicated resources, time, training, and
equipment. Which is why deployments to the Southwest border,
which are all for show mind you, are stripping precious time,
focus, and resources away from our servicemembers.
In its request for assistance from DOD for fiscal year 2025
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acknowledged that
tasks at the Southwest border require no specific military
training skill set or specialty to perform Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) duties.
Some of the DHS requests include operator level maintenance
of CBP civilian vehicles, which can be found in the owner's
manual of a Support Utility Vehicle (SUV).
Other requests include changing tires, windshield wipers,
light bulbs, oil changes, stocking warehouses, data entry,
administrative support, et cetera.
In 2019 DOD discontinued support like this because they
found units were not performing core military functions and
continuing to do so would adversely impact readiness and
morale.
Yet, here we are again. Perhaps having elite warfighters
from the 101st Mountain Division change oil in Chevy Tahoe or
mechanized infantry of a Stryker Brigade combat team overseeing
the stocking of civilian warehouses and data entry on the CBP
computers are what Secretary Hegseth envisions when he talks
about lethality.
But those nonmilitary roles do not sound like they
contribute to restoring the warrior ethics and they certainly
do not rebuild readiness.
These are slogans that Secretary Hegseth likes to throw out
but the reality is our troops are being deployed to the
Southwest border to do things which does nothing to contribute
to readiness.
DOD has written a blank check, moreover, to DHS for its
time, personnel, and resources. As it stands now DOD is
electing to do all of this on a nonreimbursable basis in an
open ended timeline. Incredible.
We are not even 2 months into this Administration, yet here
are some of the opportunity costs to date. Marines are missing
the chance to train in a bilateral exercise with our allies and
partners.
Army soldiers will miss a combat training center rotation.
Air Force aircraft from the immediate response force and the
Space Force are using limited resources to perform tactical
surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking programs for DHS and
CBP.
Where will the readiness of our forces be 60 days from now
and beyond?
During the first Trump administration it took units from
the 101st Airborne Division a year to regain their readiness
after being deployed to the border. We should learn from that
mistake.
DOD is slow to respond to the requests for information to
this committee, yet publishes nearly daily photo ops of troops
on the border.
In the meantime, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
are dressing up like they are in the military. Soldiers are
performing data entry in uniform in the same room as CBP agents
are processing migrants, and airmen are removing their name
tags and unit patches when they transport migrants on military
aircraft.
All of these actions erase the distinction between civilian
and military personnel. Removing active duty forces from their
units and core missions to perform support functions of law
enforcement agencies does not contribute to lethality or war
fighting.
Where is Secretary Hegseth's meritocracy when DHS and CBP
asks DOD to do their jobs for them and foot the bill no less?
Not only does this Administration prioritize these
deployments but claims with a straight face that ordering U.S.
servicemembers to cover the jobs of DHS civilians has no impact
on military readiness and resources.
This is delusional, dishonest, unbelievable. The choice to
burn readiness to score imagined political points is
dangerously misguided. It is a massive waste of time,
resources, and personnel when border crossings are at an all-
time low.
In closing, again, I wanted to thank the vice chiefs and
Ms. Maurer for their service, for being here, for your hard
work, insights and leadership, and I would really appreciate a
frank discussion with you today.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Hirono. I appreciate
your renewed found focus on readiness. I am just thrilled about
that.
By the way, we have been sending troops to the border for
decades. My first deployment as a United States Marine I came
back from a WestPac 31st Marine Expedition Unit (MEU)
deployment under President Clinton after being in the Taiwan
Strait, and half my battalion immediately got sent to the
border. This has been going on for quite some time and it is
nothing new. But I appreciate your focus on----
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, I do not think it serves our
purposes because you and I have worked together----
Senator Sullivan. Well, we are going to get into the----
Senator Hirono.--for you to personally insult me, okay.
Senator Sullivan. I am not insulting you at all.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. I am not insulting you. I am just glad
you are focused on readiness.
Senator Hirono. That is what it felt like.
Senator Sullivan. My Democrat colleagues and the Biden
administration have not always been so focused but it is great
that you guys are.
So with that, I would like to begin our testimony and,
gentlemen, I am going to have to step out for a minute but I
will be here for the whole hearing.
So, General Mingus, if you can begin, sir. Thank you very
much. You will have 5 minutes and your extended written
testimony can be submitted for the record.
Thank you, General.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES J. MINGUS, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
General Mingus. Thank you.
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
address you today.
The Army stands ready to defend our Nation. Right now over
109,000 soldiers are deployed or forward stationed across 140
countries, executing missions that deter, defend and provide
immediate response options.
Still, our adversaries are moving faster than we are. That
is why we are reorganizing our formations, refining how we
fight, and modernizing faster than ever pushing new
capabilities into the force in months, not years.
Under transformation in contact (TIC), which I will talk
about throughout, we are enhancing our tactical networks,
rapidly fueling Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)/counter UAS
electronic warfare systems and increasing mobility across our
formations.
In the last 9 months TiC delivered 11 new capabilities and
technologies to war fighters across the 101st, the 25th, 10th
Mountain, and 34th Infantry Divisions.
In fiscal years 2025 and 2026 we will expand this to TIC
2.0 and it will encompass all units within the 101st, 25th,
82d, 4th Infantry Division, and additionally it will extend to
include additional armored and Stryker Brigade combat teams.
We will also scale to integrate three multi-domain task
forces and further integrate Army National Guard units. Central
to the Army modernization are command and control, integrated
air and missile defense and long-range precision fires.
Next generation command and control (Next-Gen C2), will
provide resilient data sharing and real time situational
awareness, enabling war fighters to synchronize combat power
across all domains.
We are also improving our layered air defenses, expanding
Patriot formations, increasing short-range air defense
battalions, and adding directed energy systems capable of
countering most or more sophisticated UAS threats.
Additionally, the Army's long-range hypersonic weapon will
soon be operational by the end of this year, adding
unprecedented speed and range to our arsenal both for us and
the Navy.
At the heart of those efforts is the health and
effectiveness of our organic industrial base. We continue to
execute our $18 billion, 15-year plan to modernize 23 depots,
arsenals, and ammunition plants.
Newly established facilities in Lake City, Missouri and
Mesquite, Texas are expanding 6.8 millimeter and 155 munition
productions while for the first time in 40 years
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) production is being reestablished in the
United States to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers.
However, weapons and equipment do not define readiness,
soldiers do. The Army is making targeted investments to ensure
that they can focus on their mission, new barracks and
construction, modernizing efforts, and replacing outdated
housing.
Dining facilities are being updated to provide more
flexible, nutritious options and the holistic health and
fitness program (H2F), embeds experts directly into our units
to ensure peak human performance.
Recruiting remains a priority. The Army exceeded its goal
in fiscal year 2024 with over 55,000 new soldiers and we are
targeting 61,000 this year, and we are currently 72.7 percent
of that goal for this year, 44,358 as of this morning, which is
50 percent ahead of where we were this time last year.
I will end on budget. With no budget increases to offset
inflation and reducing buying power the continual growth and
the cost of paying allowances is crowding out the Army's
ability to modernize its force or maintain its infrastructure.
The Army essentially has three levers to address top line
shortfalls. End strength, readiness, and modernization. Our end
strength is approximately 25,000 personnel less than the
improved structure, resulting in undermanned formations and
overtaxed high demand units such as Patriot battalions.
Additionally, the Army has had to slash its modernization
budget by billions over the last few years. As a result,
procurement is reduced to minimum sustainable rates, delaying
fielding of new material to formations and research and
development has been cut, slowing technological advances.
Ultimately, the Army can afford a large, ready, or modern
force but with the current budget it cannot afford all three.
Either we provide soldiers the capabilities needed to win or
accept greater risks in other areas.
But whatever risk we accept now we will likely pay for it
later, not in delayed projects or budget adjustments but in
real-world battlefield consequences.
We need to invest in the things in training our soldiers
need for the next fight, not the last fight.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General James J. Mingus
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General James J. Mingus
introduction
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
readiness of our Nation's Army. On behalf of the Secretary of the Army,
Honorable Daniel Driscoll, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Randy George, we appreciate this Subcommittee's work in ensuring that
the Army is not just resourced but fully prepared for the demands of
today's missions and the uncertainty of what comes next.
delivering combat ready forces today
The Army remains engaged worldwide, responding to immediate
security challenges while modernizing to ensure long-term readiness.
More than 109,000 soldiers across 140 countries support global
operations, strengthen alliances, and maintain deterrence. At the same
time, the Army is transforming its force to increase lethality,
survivability, mobility, and operational reach. Investments in
training, force posture, and modernization ensure readiness for both
immediate and future demands.
Combat Training Centers provide the toughest and most realistic
training outside of combat. Over the past year, rotations at the
National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Joint
Pacific Multinational Readiness Center demonstrated improvements in
battlefield agility, joint integration, and rapid decision making.
Units are advancing their ability to employ long-range fires,
electronic warfare, and counter-drone capabilities while operating
seamlessly with Joint and coalition partners.
Every Active Component Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in the Army,
except three Infantry BCTs supporting the Immediate Response Force, is
scheduled to deploy in support of Combatant Command requirements. The
Army is operating at full capacity to meet today's operational
priorities. We remain fully committed to global operations, including
Operations SPARTAN SHIELD and INHERENT RESOLVE, which focus on building
partner nation capacity and counter-ISIS efforts.
In the Indo-Pacific, the Army is expanding its presence through
Operation PATHWAYS, bolstering deterrence and interoperability with
Allies and partners. Participation in exercises such as TALISMAN SABRE,
SUPER GARUDA SHIELD, and BALIKATAN reinforces the Army's critical role
in the region. These investments improve force positioning,
sustainment, and warfighting capabilities in key areas, including long-
range fires, air defense, deep sensing, and contested logistics. Forces
stationed west of the International Date Line now include a rotational
Multi-Domain Task Force with Mid-Range Capability and precision strike
missiles, a Watercraft Company in Japan, and additional air defense
capabilities in Guam.
In Europe, the Army is currently advancing deterrence through force
presence, joint exercises, and infrastructure improvements. For the
Joint Force, prepositioned stocks provide a strategic advantage in
rapid response. Six European sites house a division-sized set of
equipment with corps-level enablers, including two Armored Brigade
Combat Teams, fires, air defense, sustainment, and medical units.
Sustaining high readiness requires continuous modernization and
investment in the industrial base. The Organic Industrial Base
Modernization Implementation Plan is a 15-year, $18 billion initiative
upgrading 23 depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants. Since October
2023, $1.5 billion has been directed toward modernizing critical
infrastructure. The fiscal year 2025 budget includes another $1.5
billion for further improvements, including a 450,000-square-foot
ammunition production facility at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant and
the first domestic TNT production facility since the 1980's, set for
construction in Graham, Kentucky.
continuous transformation: from concept to capability
The Army is moving quickly to adapt, field new capabilities, and
restructure its formations to outpace our adversaries. Transforming in
Contact (TIC) delivers results in cycles as short as 12 to 18 months,
ensuring that forces are always evolving. In the past 9 months, TIC
introduced 11 new capabilities to brigade combat teams from the 101st
Airborne Division, 25th Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and
34th Infantry Division. These units tested mobile and light brigade
designs across multiple combat training center rotations, refining
tactics, techniques, and procedures, and employing next-generation
technologies to shape future Army formations.
This effort is expanding. In fiscal year 2025, TIC 2.0 will scale
to drive transformation across all brigade combat teams and enablers in
the 25th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division, as well as
select Armored BCTs from 1st Cavalry Division and 3d Infantry Division
as well as Stryker BCTs formations from 2d Cavalry Regiment and 7th
Infantry Division. It will also extend to all three Multi-Domain Task
Forces. TIC 2.0 further integrates Army National Guard units, including
the 38th Infantry Division, 138th Field Artillery Brigade, 76th Mobile
Brigade Combat Team, and the 116th Light Brigade Combat Team. These new
capabilities include, counter-UAS Detect and Defeat systems, Silent
Tactical Energy Enhanced Dismount (STEED) technology, Infantry Squad
Vehicles (ISV), and the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance
(LASSO) weapon system.
The Army is fielding TiC divisions with specialized C-sUAS
equipment to detect, jam, and neutralize aerial threats from fixed
sites and mobile platforms. In the Middle East, the Army is also
integrating directed energy into its layered defense design, through
High Energy Laser prototypes operating as palletized systems and hosted
on its neuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Stryker vehicles.
The fight for dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum is
intensifying. The spectrum is saturated with adversary, commercial,
partner, and U.S. military systems. To integrate capabilities into
training and operations, the Army is fielding Terrestrial Layered
System Manpacks to multiple brigade combat teams, enabling them to
detect, intercept, and disrupt enemy command and control networks
critical to ground maneuver forces. The goal is an agile, responsive
electronic warfare capability that operates seamlessly across ground,
air, maritime, cyber, and space domains.
Additionally, the Army continues developing Launched Effects (LE),
a family of operationally consumable Uncrewed Aircraft Systems that are
launched from both air and ground platforms to enhance the overall
range of lethal and non-lethal effects. In July 2024, the Army enhanced
LE by increasing payload capacity and adding modularity.
Success in these efforts depends on training forces to operate,
maintain, and integrate these capabilities. Combat Training Centers
have incorporated UAS, counter-UAS, and electronic warfare into large-
scale exercises, exposing units to realistic battlefield scenarios.
Home-station training equips leaders to coordinate airspace, sustain
systems, and train personnel. Army Cyber Command is also conducting a
radio frequency effects pilot to identify gaps and update training,
policy, and force structure requirements. Pre-deployment training
programs continue to refine unit skills, and the Joint C-sUAS
University at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is providing advanced instruction
tailored to emerging threats.
transforming our capabilities
The Army continues prioritizing capabilities that will define the
future fight, prioritizing command and control, integrated air and
missile defense, long-range precision fires, mobility, protection, and
contested logistics. We are accelerating modernization, combining
cutting edge technologies, and rapidly fielding capabilities at scale.
Command and Control: For the past two decades, the Army's command
and control (C2) architecture centered around counterinsurgency and
brigade combat teams as the primary maneuver force. That structure does
not hold up against modern adversaries with advanced electronic
warfare, long-range precision fires, and within contested
communications environments. To address these challenges, the Army is
changing how it commands and fights by shifting to more agile,
survivable, and data-driven C2 networks. In August 2024, the Army
started with C2 Fix to streamline tactical networks, reduce complexity,
and enhance mobility by minimizing electromagnetic signatures and
improving on-the-move communication.
While C2 Fix addresses immediate operational needs, Next Generation
Command and Control (NGC2) seeks to create a more adaptable and modular
network for future operations. This integrated network allows
commanders to make faster decisions, minimize risks from long-range
fires by adversaries, and lessen vulnerability to electronic and
cyberattacks. NGC2 adopts a competitive, open architecture model that
allows multiple vendors to contribute technology, ensuring continuous
updates as lessons are learned and threats evolve. Central to NGC2 and
the unified network architecture is a robust data and cloud backbone.
In March 2025, the Army will execute Project Convergence--Capstone 5 to
test NGC2 in realistic battlefield conditions and prepare for full-
scale implementation.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) remains a critical priority for fiscal year 2025, and
our investments reflect our commitment to developing a robust, layered
defense system capable of addressing current and future challenges. Our
air and missile defense forces are the most heavily deployed, with
ongoing demand across multiple Combatant Commands. To enhance
readiness, the Army plans to increase its air and missile defense
capacity by adding one M-SHORAD Battalion and three Division Air
Defense Battalions by 4th quarter fiscal year 2025. Additionally, in
line with TAA 25-29, the Army is implementing a series of force
structure changes aimed at improving our ability to project power,
protect critical assets, and maintain overmatch against potential
adversaries. These changes include the establishment of nine Integrated
Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Battalions, a Patriot/IFPC Composite
Battalion in Guam, and two additional Patriot Battalions.
Major modernization efforts within this portfolio focus on four
critical systems: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
System (IBCS), Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS),
IFPC, and M-SHORAD. In fiscal year 2025, the Army is fielding the
Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) to three Patriot Battalions in
Fort Bliss, Texas, Germany, and the Republic of Korea. These efforts
will significantly increase our overall air and missile defense
capabilities and enable operators to optimize the best sensor-effector
option for engagements in the Indo-Pacific and other theaters of
operation. In keeping with POTUS and the Department's priorities, we
will also be supporting the research and development of Golden Dome in
partnership with our sister Services and agencies.
Fires: The Army delivers advanced long-range strike capabilities to
strengthen deterrence, enhance readiness, and support Joint Force
operations in key regions. In December 2024, we conducted an end-to-end
flight test of the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, launching a hypersonic
missile using the Transporter Erector Launcher and a Battery Operation
Center. With the successful flight test, the first combat-capable units
will be operational by the end of 2025. To enhance long-range strike
capabilities, the Army developed the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), a
next-generation surface-to-surface ballistic missile intended to engage
critical targets on the battlefield under all weather conditions. We
increased the production capacity for PrSM with plans to procure 400
missiles in fiscal year 2025.
The Army invested $755 million from the 2024 Ukraine supplemental
to surge production of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile
Segment Enhanced. Annual missile output is set to increase from 550 to
650 by fiscal year 2027, with production on track to reach 550 by the
end of 2nd quarter fiscal year 2025. Additionally, the Mid-Range
Capability system features a road-mobile precision fire weapon that can
target locations over 2,000 kilometers away. Recently, a second battery
deployed to the Indo-Pacific to support rotational forces, with three
more batteries currently in production.
Mobility: The Army is modernizing its combat vehicle and aviation
fleets to enhance lethality, mobility, and protection while developing
next-generation capabilities. The Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) improves
tactical mobility for Infantry BCTs, enabling medium-distance insertion
operations with greater freedom of movement and action. In the 1st
quarter fiscal year 2025, the Army fielded 136 ISVs to BCTs in the 10th
Mountain Division and 25th Infantry Division, increasing their ability
to maneuver rapidly across complex terrain. The Armored Multi-Purpose
Vehicle (AMPV) replaces the M113 in Armored BCTs, improving
survivability, power, and cooling. In fiscal year 2025, the Army will
field 240 AMPVs with funding from the base budget and the 2024 Ukraine
supplemental.
Aviation proficiency and safety remain top priorities, and the Army
is taking immediate steps to mitigate risk while working to build and
retain experience levels over the long term. A shortage of mid-career
warrant officers has led to lower aircrew experience, prompting the
Army to offer Aviation Bonuses to retain skilled, retirement-eligible
pilots. Furthermore, disruptions in executing the fiscal year 2024
Flying Hour Program due to unpredictable funding, hindered the ability
of commanders to fully conduct training. Active Component aviation is
currently flying 4.3 percent below fiscal year 2025 projections,
affecting readiness.
Protection: Through informed, iterative developments, we are
consistently advancing our protective equipment to best protect
soldiers under a variety of operational conditions with options to
scale the protective system to match the threat while minimizing the
soldier load. A lighter protective vest means greater mobility, faster
movement, and increased lethality without sacrificing survivability. As
soldier gear evolves, the Army is developing the Lightweight Small Arms
Protective Insert (LSAPI), which uses advanced materials to provide the
same level of protection at 30 percent less weight than the current
Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) GEN III. The LSAPI is
expected to be approved by the second quarter of fiscal year 2025.
Sustainment: Future conflicts will target logistical networks,
cyber infrastructure, and key deployment hubs. The Army's ability to
move supplies quickly is critical to sustaining combat power, but with
70 percent of sustainment formations in the Reserve Component,
mobilizing logistics at scale remains a challenge, particularly without
early warning.
To enhance sustainment operations, the Army is exploring various
innovative solutions to provide options for combatant commanders. We
are leasing commercial watercraft to rapidly increase readiness while
also exploring long-term investments in autonomous systems.
Additionally, we are utilizing the expertise of Army Materiel Command
to 3-D print parts, which helps reduce our logistical tail.
Furthermore, the Army is implementing the Disconnected Operations
initiative, which integrates Predictive Logistics (PL) and Enterprise
Business System-Convergence (EBS-C). EBS-C will consolidate logistics
data into a single, authoritative system, improving accuracy,
transparency, and auditability while ensuring that our forces remain
mission-ready.
recruiting and retention
The Army is bringing in the right people, investing in their
potential, and preparing them for the challenges ahead. The success of
the fiscal year 2024 recruiting mission reflects this strategy, as the
Army surpassed its goal of 55,000 accessions by bringing in 55,150
soldiers and maintaining a delayed entry pool (DEP) of 11K. That
momentum continues into fiscal year 2025 with an increased mission of
61,000 new accessions and a Delayed Entry Program (DEP) target of at
least 10K. Achieving these goals requires sustained effort, but the
Army is building on a solid foundation. The successes of fiscal year
2024 and expectations for fiscal year 2025 stem from transformative
efforts within the Recruiting Enterprise, involving improved recruiting
processes, training, leadership, marketing, medical support at MEPS,
and improvement toward Recruiter quality of life. Notably, the Future
Soldier Prep Course, established in 2022, has enabled 33,560 trainees
to overcome academic and fitness barriers and progress to basic
training.
quality of life investments
As operational demands grow more complex, maintaining human
performance must remain a priority. For generations, soldiers have
pushed their bodies and minds to the limit without the tools needed to
sustain peak performance. The focus remained on treating injuries
instead of preventing them and expected resilience without the
integrated support systems to develop it. Holistic Health and Fitness
(H2F) is changing that by integrating strength coaches, athletic
trainers, physical and occupational therapists, dietitians, and program
coordinators directly into units. This approach ensures that soldiers
recovering from injuries rebuild strength under expert guidance and
that young soldiers receive proper training from the start. Science-
backed methods are replacing outdated fitness habits, significantly
enhancing performance in combat and promoting long-term health.
H2F currently supports 55 percent of the force, with 71 brigades
fully resourced by the end of fiscal year 2025. While this is progress,
too many soldiers remain without access to these resources. The next
phase adds 91 H2F teams to the Active Component and launches a 2-year
pilot at four Army National Guard and two Army Reserve locations. This
pilot will refine how to implement H2F for part-time formations,
ensuring that soldiers outside the Active Component receive the same
level of expertise.
Health and well-being extend beyond fitness. The conditions where
soldiers live impact their quality of life, performance, and ability to
focus on the mission. Barracks improvements remain a key priority, with
over $2.1 billion allocated annually for military construction,
sustainment, restoration, and modernization from 2026-2030. Every
barracks type will receive full sustainment funding. In fiscal year
2024 alone, $1.092 billion went toward new construction and upgrades,
creating 1,910 new bed spaces and improving nearly 7,500 existing ones.
Moreover, between 2020 and 2024, privatized housing providers
invested over $1.3 billion to build 439 new homes and renovate more
than 14,000 existing ones. In fiscal year 2024, the Army contributed
$50 million each to Fort Eisenhower, GA, and Fort Leonard Wood, MO,
supporting the construction of 76 new homes and 22 major renovations at
Fort Eisenhower. A contract awarded in 2024 will add 75 homes at U.S.
Army Garrison-Miami by Summer 2027, while 26 homes at Tobyhanna Army
Depot are scheduled for demolition and replacement.
Providing high-quality food options is another essential step in
improving soldier well-being. Traditional dining facilities no longer
meet the total needs of today's force. Soldiers require flexible,
nutritious dining options that fit their schedules and fuel
performance. Over the past year, the Army expanded access to food
kiosks, food trucks, and meal prep programs. More than one million
meals were purchased from kiosks in fiscal year 2024, demonstrating a
clear demand for accessible, high-quality dining options. Today, 26
food trucks and 23 kiosks operate on installations, with five
additional kiosks scheduled to open by September 2025.
To further modernize dining, the Army is launching the Campus-Style
Dining Venue pilot at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart,
Georgia; Fort Cavazos, Texas; Fort Drum, New York; and Fort Carson,
Colorado. This model creates a more contemporary food service
experience similar to what is available on university campuses.
Soldiers will benefit from a wider variety of meal choices, healthier
options, and greater flexibility in their dining experience. This
initiative will also help the Army gather information on what, when,
and where soldiers are eating, allowing the Department to tailor each
program to better support the needs of every installation. By expanding
food access, the Army enhances performance, accelerates recovery, and
ensures soldiers receive the nutrition they need to perform their best.
closing
A modern, capable force is not built in a single budget cycle. It
takes years of sustained investment, careful planning, and a commitment
to keeping pace with an evolving adversary. The Army is making
deliberate choices now to ensure that when conflict emerges, Soldiers
have the weapons, training, and support they need to win. Hypersonic
missiles, unmanned systems, and advanced air defense are being fielded
on schedule. Formations are being reorganized to fight smarter and
sustain longer. Investments in barracks, housing, fitness, and
nutrition are strengthening the foundation of readiness.
For several years, the Army has stretched the same budget over a
growing list of requirements. We can prioritize, we can tighten, and we
can innovate, but at some point, tradeoffs become losses. These are not
abstract choices. Every dollar we allocate to maintaining force
structure is a dollar we cannot invest in new capabilities. Every
investment in modernization pulls resources away from training the
force we have today. Readiness, our ability to fight and win tonight,
must be balanced against the need to prepare for future conflicts.
There is no perfect answer, and every decision carries risk.
We are taking a hard look at where we can streamline, consolidate,
or step away from specific infrastructure, capabilities, and programs.
Some of these choices are clear-cut. Others are difficult. Scaling down
in one area may free up resources, but it can also limit our ability to
respond to crises, surge forces, or sustain operations.
Our adversaries are not waiting for us to catch up and they are not
making the same compromises we are. Our soldiers will always give
everything they have. They will push through resource constraints, make
do with less, and find ways to succeed because that is who they are.
But we should not put them in that position. The Army will always adapt
and find ways to win, but it is our responsibility to ensure that it is
never a fair fight. Our soldiers should always have the best training,
the best equipment, and the advantage in every battle.
This is about what kind of Army we want to put in combat. One that
is postured to win or one that is constantly closing gaps. That
decision is being made right now, and the consequences will last far
beyond this year or the next.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
Admiral?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES W. KILBY, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Kilby. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono,
Subcommittee Members, thank you for the opportunity to
testify----
[Technical issue.]
Admiral Kilby.--of the United States around the world. Your
oversight and funding help us to be ready when the Nation
calls.
In the past year alone American sailors have defeated
hundreds of drones, missiles, and carried out dozens of
offensive strikes in the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean.
They have strengthened alliances and deterred aggression in
the Western Pacific and they have used unmanned systems to
counter the flow of illegal narcotics across the southern
border.
In short----
[Technical issue.]
Admiral Kilby.--remains posture----
[Technical issue.]
Admiral Kilby.--resting and neither will we----
[Technical issue.]
Admiral Kilby.--to improve with urgency. I have spoken to
several of you about a sustained focus on adapting the mindset,
skill set, and tool set to drive meaningful process
improvement. Consistent and predictable funding is foundational
to our improvement efforts.
The Navy will need to make hard choices this year if we are
operating under a full year continuing resolution.
[Technical issue.]
Admiral Kilby.--in this----
[Technical issue.]
Admiral Kilby.--will slow our progress to get weapons and
equipment we need to modernize our fleet and we will also slow
ship building including our amphibious warships.
With the Navy exceeding recruiting and retention goals last
year and on track to do so again we will need additional
funding to sustain our momentum.
Our priority remains our readiness accounts which are most
vulnerable under a CR or sequestration. We are optimistic that
Congress will grant us the flexibility to allocate funds to our
top priorities.
Despite these challenges, your Navy will maintain ready
platforms, people, and infrastructure. We set a goal to make 80
percent of our ships, submarines, and aircraft combat surge
ready by January 1st, 2027.
To do that we are reducing maintenance delays and improving
manning, training, modernization, and sustainment. We are
seeing progress in the last year. We increased our surface ship
depot maintenance from 41 percent on time completion to 68
percent.
Unfortunately, this progress is not consistent across all
platforms. I am not satisfied with amphibious ship maintenance.
Our Navy and Marine Corps operate as a lethal integrative force
and we have work to do here.
To improve we are procuring spare parts earlier, refining,
partnering, planning with industry partners, acquiring diesel
engine repair kits, and building steam plant expertise.
Our second goal is recruiting and retention. The Navy is
committed to attracting and developing Americans who can
innovate, solve hard problems, and dominate in combat.
Thanks to process improvements, our targeted investments,
we contracted over 40,000 sailors last year, the most since
2003. We are currently on pace to exceed our recruiting goals
in 2025.
We are committed to improving quality of service. We
reduced the wait list for child development centers from 3,400
children in 2024 to 2,500 as of January 31st, 2025.
We have reduced poor unaccompanied housing. We have reduced
our pool of unaccompanied housing rooms rated as poor from 25
percent to 21 percent and will continue to reduce this through
focusing investments.
We are focusing on the investment of critical
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, targeting it to where it
has our most impact on our war fighters.
The shipyard infrastructure optimization program is a once
in a century opportunity for us to improve the effectiveness of
our public yards. Through Single Integrated Operational Plan
(SIOP) we have completed over 40 projects and invested $1
billion in getting ship maintenance completed on time.
The budget you are reviewing today includes an additional
$6.3 billion for the next 40 projects. I am proud of the Navy's
accomplishments in the past year. We still have work to do to
ensure that we remain the world's most premier Navy for another
250 years.
Your leadership and support are critical to Navy readiness.
On behalf of our sailors, civilians and families around the
world, thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral James W. Kilby follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral James W. Kilby
introduction
Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the readiness of your
Navy.
strategic environment
For 250 years, your Navy has promoted and protected America's
interests worldwide by manning, training, and equipping our forces to
perform a wide range of missions, from seabed to space. We are
strategically positioned to provide a rapid response to emerging
crises, serve as an enduring presence to defend American interests, and
decisively win wars. Whether responding to Houthi attacks on maritime
shipping or deterring an invasion of Taiwan, we are maximizing our
contributions to the Joint Force. In the past year, your support of
Navy readiness has delivered returns worldwide.
In the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, our ships, aircraft,
and submarines are in combat alongside our Allies and partners. Your
Navy has successfully defeated over 400 drones, cruise missiles, and
ballistic missiles, and carried out dozens of offensive strikes against
Houthi aggressors in Yemen. During the past 17 months, over 20 Navy
ships have deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility,
including four carrier strike groups and an amphibious ready group.
In the Indian Ocean, sailors assigned to the submarine tender USS
Emory S. Land (AS 39) worked alongside their Royal Australian Navy
counterparts to perform routine and emergent maintenance on the attack
submarine USS Hawaii (SSN 776). This marked the first time Australian
personnel performed maintenance on a nuclear-powered attack submarine
under the auspices of AUKUS, a necessary step toward establishing
Submarine Rotational Force--West, from which we will employ attack
submarines, our most capable strike asset, within the Western Pacific.
In the Western Pacific, the USNS city of Bismarck (T-EPF 9)
conducted Operation Pacific Partnership, enhancing regional
interoperability, strengthening military-to-military engagements, and
countering the influence of China in the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific
Partnership series is Navy's largest annual multinational humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission. It is one example
of our efforts in the Indo-Pacific, where we've deployed 44 ships over
the past 12 months--in addition to our forward deployed naval forces.
Throughout these operations, Navy's fleet of ballistic missile
submarines conducted uninterrupted strategic deterrence patrols,
providing a powerful and ever-present deterrent to any who would do us
harm.
Since I last testified before the Subcommittee, we updated the
Navy's strategic guidance, setting seven targets to enhance lethality
and readiness by 2027. For today's hearing, I will focus on five of
those targets: readying our platforms, recruiting and retaining talent,
delivering our sailors a quality of service commensurate with their
sacrifice, investing in warfighter competency, and restoring our
critical infrastructure.
ready our platforms
Navy unequivocally advocates for a larger fleet. However, current
threats will not wait for new platforms to be delivered. We must
therefore generate more available ships, submarines, and aircraft from
the fleet we have today. To do so, we are increasing the combat-surge
readiness of our platforms by reducing maintenance delays and embracing
novel approaches to manning, training, modernization, and sustainment.
Our goal is to achieve and sustain an 80 percent combat-surge ready
(CSR) posture. We began these efforts with naval aviation in 2018,
improving the operational availability of tactical aircraft. We are now
scaling our efforts across all aviation platforms, as well as in the
surface and submarine communities.
CSR is a certification for air, surface, and submarine platforms to
execute combat missions. It is distinct from Global Force Management,
which provides forces in response to Combatant Commander demand,
balanced with available supply. CSR-certified units meet minimum
requirements for material condition, training, manning, and armament.
To increase our combat surge readiness, we are reducing the number of
platforms in depot maintenance through improved business and
maintenance practices, as well as certifying training earlier in the
force-generation cycle. Type Commanders have been designated as the
single accountable officers to ensure their respective forces achieve
80 percent CSR. This accountability, along with the above reforms, has
already resulted in a fleet-wide cultural shift toward aggressively
prioritizing readiness.
To sustain a high operational tempo, we must maintain a robust
inventory of spare parts. We cannot wait until missiles are in the air
to replenish our stockrooms. With this philosophy, Navy is moving from
a ``just in time'' model to ``just in case,'' so that our sailors have
parts on hand to keep their systems operational, lethal, and ready.
Navy's budget for spare parts has increased by over 350 percent since
fiscal year 2020. This critical funding ensures that our ships,
submarines, and aircraft are prepared to respond to commander tasking
or adversary action and are not sidelined by equipment casualties. Navy
appreciates congressional support to improve the parts inventories that
keep our warfighting platforms operational.
aviation
Navy's 11 aircraft carriers and associated carrier strike groups
provide unmatched options for national leadership, from peacetime
missions to full-scale combat operations. They can conduct lethal
strikes from international waters, without coordination or approval
from other countries.
In the last 2 years alone, carrier strike groups have rapidly
redeployed to deter aggression against Israel, support contingency
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, defend shipping in the Red
Sea, and conduct strikes in Yemen and Somalia. This capability deters
adversaries, enhances security, and supports the free flow of commerce.
Achieving 80 percent CSR in the aviation community requires
improved maintenance and training for both aircraft carriers and
carrier air wings, which certify independently. Navy has improved the
number of mission capable tactical jets and is scaling proven methods
across all aircraft. Aircraft carrier availability remains the primary
constraint for reaching 80 percent CSR in the aviation community. We
are improving aircraft carrier availability through performance
improvement in our public shipyards. Conducting maintenance early,
prior to her Planned Incremental Availability, contributed to George H.
W. Bush (CVN 77) completing that availability on-time and on-budget.
Recent investments in our naval shipyards have focused on workforce
expansion, workforce training, optimizing maintenance schedules, and
implementing advanced planning and logistics management practices.
maintenance of nuclear-powered ships and submarines
Attack submarines are our most lethal conventional strike asset,
and ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the
nuclear triad. Taken together, the submarine force and our undersea
capabilities remain our military's primary strategic advantage over
China.
Production and maintenance delays are keeping our submarines in the
shipyard and driving up costs. Navy is working closely with all
stakeholders to drive innovation and target investments where they will
yield the greatest results in the shortest time. We are improving our
production and maintenance processes by embracing industry best
practices such as outsourcing certain work, increasing material on hand
prior to work commencing, and pushing project management authority as
close as possible to the worker on the shop floor.
As part of our broader investment in the maritime industrial base,
Navy is focused on improving the submarine industrial base across six
lines of effort: workforce development, supplier development,
shipbuilder infrastructure, strategic outsourcing, manufacturing
technology, and government oversight. Since fiscal year 2018, Navy has
budgeted for over 725 supplier development projects with more than 300
suppliers across 33 states to add capability, capacity, and resiliency
to the supply chain. Navy has also invested in Virginia-class spare
parts and has ordered contingency material to have on hand for
inspection-based work. Those efforts are yielding results: Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyard completed both USS Hawaii (SSN 776) and USS Minnesota
(SSN 783) availabilities on time, returning both submarines to the
fleet in July 2024. Navy will continue to focus on planning and
material until this becomes the standard.
Our four public shipyards--Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard--
are vital to our effort to achieve 80 percent CSR submarines. I have
visited each shipyard and seen the work being done by the 37,500
engineers, tradespeople, and support personnel who serve there. The
workforce of our public shipyards is committed to improving the
readiness of these critical assets, and Navy is committed to supporting
their efforts through improved compensation and work environments. At
Navy's request, DOD conducted a wage survey in the Norfolk Tidewater
region to achieve pay parity between Norfolk Naval Shipyard and the
surrounding private shipyards. The survey showed that in the early
1980's, new wage-grade workers earned four times the minimum wage. Now,
those same workers earn approximately one and a half times the minimum
wage. Navy has used these studies to make wages more competitive
beginning in fiscal year 2024. We must continue to invest in shipyard
infrastructure, expand and enhance the submarine industrial base,
increase productivity, shorten maintenance timelines, and reduce our
maintenance backlog to stay ahead of our adversaries and prepare our
submarine force for the threats of tomorrow.
surface ship readiness
Surface combatants deliver strategic advantage by combining in a
single platform advanced multi-mission capabilities such as integrated
air and missile defense, conventional strike, and surface and undersea
warfare to assert maritime dominance and project power. The versatility
of our surface force deters adversaries globally and enables rapid,
coordinated responses to emerging threats. Our ships must be prepared
to engage the full spectrum of threats, from existing capabilities to
emerging ballistic and hypersonic missiles. To maintain the readiness
of these capable and adaptable platforms, the surface force
continuously balances investments in near-term readiness with
modernization to introduce the latest capabilities.
Navy surface ship depot maintenance has improved significantly,
from 41 percent on-time completion in fiscal year 2023 to 68 percent in
fiscal year 2024. The surface Navy concurrently reduced maintenance
backlog, the accumulated ``debt'' of deferred maintenance, from $2.3
billion in fiscal year 2022 to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2024.
Furthermore, Navy was able to extend the service life for 12 destroyers
and three cruisers based on improved material condition, maintenance
processes, and Life Cycle Health Assessments.
Navy is improving the readiness of our surface fleet while
simultaneously modernizing fleet capabilities to ensure that our naval
forces are lethal and effective against both current and future
threats. Installation of the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)
hypersonic weapons system on DDG 1000 to increase its long-range strike
lethality is an example of modernization for long term advantage. To
increase capability in the near-term, Navy installed SEWIP Blk III, a
next-generation non-kinetic anti-ship missile defense system, on USS
Pinckney (DDG 91) during a scheduled maintenance period.
Navy fully supports our Marine Corps brethren. We must continue to
improve the material readiness of the amphibious fleet. To that end,
the fiscal year 2025 Shipbuilding Plan maintains the legally mandated
inventory of 31 amphibious ships. In 2024, the Chief of Naval
Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps tasked Navy and Marine
Corps to develop a comprehensive plan to improve the readiness of our
amphibious warfare ships, and Navy is implementing this plan.
munitions readiness
The $2.3 billion of munitions expenditures in the war in Ukraine,
the Israel-Hamas conflict, and combat operations in the Red Sea
highlight the urgent need to increase weapons production capacity,
expand magazine depth, and improve capability. Although the Navy does
not procure SM-3, we have employed them to great effect in the eastern
Mediterranean. Navy appreciates the contingency funding provided by
Congress, but many of our munitions inventories remain below the Total
Munition Requirement today. Navy has increased munitions investments to
more than $6.6 billion in the past 2 years to prepare for potential
conflict with an advanced adversary. We are now procuring weapons at or
near maximum rates, but industry is challenged to meet this increase in
demand.
Navy is investing in industrial base capacity and must continue to
do so, with congressional support, while also investing in the next
generation of munitions to prepare for future conflict. Beginning in
fiscal year 2023, we have invested to increase the production rate of
SM-6 missiles. Navy's Energetics Comprehensive Modernization Plan will
also revitalize our organic energetics industrial base using
authorities for a Center for Technical Excellence and by forming
public-private partnerships with both legacy companies and startups. In
addition to partnering with companies focused on accelerating solid
rocket motor production capacity, Navy's plan will expand by twofold
production of organic energetics at the Navy facility in Indian Head,
MD.
I urge Congress to continue to support Navy as we leverage
acquisition authorities such as multi-year procurement, advance
procurement, and other transaction authorities to reduce procurement
cost and provide a stable demand signal to industry. Increases in the
cost of labor and material are driving cost growth in Navy's munitions
and their components. The cost of an SM-6, for example, has risen 50
percent per unit over the past 5 years. To grow weapons inventory in
the near-term, Navy is recertifying aging rounds. When combined with
new production, recertification is a cost-effective means to build
inventory and get as much capability into theater as possible, as fast
as possible.
In parallel with these initiatives, Navy is preparing for the next
generation of munitions: from improvements to current designs like SM-6
and LRASM, to the development of new options with greater reach and
lethality, like CPS. Navy is also investing in munitions like the
Coyote and Roadrunner systems which provide effective layers of defense
against unmanned aerial systems and lower the cost-per-kill.
contested logistics
The current strategic environment demands a naval logistics
enterprise capable of assuring readiness and sustainment at speed and
scale for the Joint Force. Navy is modernizing our logistics enterprise
to be more agile, resilient, and capable of sustaining combat
effectiveness in contested environments against peer adversaries. To
address the challenges of refueling, rearming, and resupplying inside
weapons engagement zones, we are investing in next generation logistics
ships to augment the current combat logistics force and in new
capabilities such as rearming at sea.
recruit and retain talent
Our Navy builds great people, great leaders, and great teams to
innovate, solve hard problems, and dominate in combat. Our sailors
stand ready as a lethal fighting force to deter or confront any
adversary.
After missing our fiscal year 2023 recruiting goal by approximately
7,000 sailors, we raised our goal for fiscal year 2024--and exceeded
that goal by contracting 40,978 future sailors, the most since 2003. We
achieved this improvement by implementing data informed processes
throughout the recruiting enterprise. Navy established a Recruiting
Operations Center to monitor data in real time, implemented the Future
Sailor Preparatory Course to improve accession success, streamlined
medical waiver reviews, increased the quality and number of recruiters,
adjusted recruiting goal incentives, improved marketing processes, and
identified and removed barriers to recruiter productivity. These
changes are sustainable. As a result, Navy is on pace to exceed our
fiscal year 2025 recruiting goal of 40,600. This performance, coupled
with improved retention, will make progress toward our primary manning
goal of 100 percent enlisted rating fill by the end of 2026 and will
translate directly to reducing our gaps at sea.
We continue to explore innovative strategies to attract qualified,
motivated individuals. Navy is maximizing its pool of recruits with the
physical and academic Future Sailor Preparatory Courses, as well as by
expanding our reach through partnerships and traditional and mixed
media marketing. Increasing access has not lowered the standard--every
recruit must complete the same training at boot camp and meet all
qualifications for his or her assigned rating.
Navy is dedicated to retaining our most capable sailors; retention
is a critical component of achieving our end-strength goals. To that
end, we leverage monetary and non-monetary incentives, including
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, suspension of High Year Tenure Length
of Service gates, the Retention Excellence Award and Best in Class
program, and enhanced exit and milestone surveys which focus our
retention efforts. As a result, enlisted retention remains healthy. We
exceeded our fiscal year 2024 retention benchmark forecasts in zone A
(0 to 6 years), zone B (6 to 10 years), and zone C (10 to 14 years).
Navy continues to meet or exceed its retention benchmark forecast for
fiscal year 2025.
These efforts are improving manning in critical billets at sea and
ashore, ensuring we have the right people in the right places to
maintain our operational readiness. We regularly review compensation
packages to ensure we remain competitive in a tight labor market,
positioning the Navy as an employer of choice. The latest Department of
Defense Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation highlights that our
compensation package is strongly competitive with the civilian
employers.
While officer retention remains a challenge in specific career
fields, we appreciate the continued support of Congress in enabling our
monetary retention incentives in areas such as Aviation, Explosive
Ordnance Disposal, Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Naval Special
Warfare, and Health Professions Officers.
Ship manning is an essential element of operational readiness, but
it also impacts job satisfaction and retention. Since 2015, Navy has
increased the number of authorized billets on at-sea units, but at-sea
manning has not kept pace with that growth. At the beginning of fiscal
year 2025, Navy had a shortfall of sailors relative to at-sea billets.
Our recruiting and retention efforts will drive progress toward our
primary manning goal of 100 percent enlisted rating fill by the end of
2026. Gaps at sea have fallen from 15 percent to 13 percent, although
this metric trails recruiting successes by the length of time it takes
for new accessions to complete training and report to the fleet.
deliver quality of service
Quality of service (QoS) improves force readiness. Navy is
committed to providing the QoS that our sailors deserve. Childcare
capacity and housing quality are crucial, as they contribute directly
to positive work environments for our sailors and their families.
The Navy provides high-quality childcare programs but has
insufficient capacity, particularly in fleet concentration areas.
Improvement requires a comprehensive approach including strategic
staffing, new facilities, and leverage of community resources.
Enrollment in Navy childcare centers is up from 76 percent of total
capacity at the start of fiscal year 2023 to 88 percent today, and
staffing has grown from 75 percent of demand at the start of fiscal
year 2023 to 87 percent today. The waitlist for Navy Child Development
Centers (CDCs) has shrunk from 3,400 at the start of fiscal year 2024
to 2,500 as of January 31, 2025. Navy has also expanded the Military
Child Care in Your Neighborhood program, which provides fee assistance
for families that are geographically dispersed or face long waitlists
for on-base care, from 6,500 spaces at the start of fiscal year 2024 to
over 9,000 today.
To improve CDC staffing, Navy deployed 150 supplemental staff
across our child and youth programs through a contract with Utah Tech
University. This resource fills staffing shortfalls during peak summer
and Permanent Change of Station seasons at both domestic and overseas
locations. In order to attract quality candidates, Navy also expanded
the staff childcare discount for Direct Care employees. Employee use of
the discount increased from 22 percent in fiscal year 2023 to 32
percent by the end of fiscal year 2024.
We also owe our sailors quality housing, and too many of our
barracks are in poor condition. At the end of fiscal year 2023, 25
percent of Navy Permanent Party Unaccompanied Housing (UH) bedrooms had
a Building Condition Index (BCI) of `poor.' We have driven this pool
down to 21 percent as of the end of fiscal year 2024, but still have
work to do. Our long-term strategy will recapitalize our facilities to
eliminate `poor' housing through focused investments and divestitures.
Navy has increased its Restoration and Modernization investments to
repair inadequate UH and is conducting a comprehensive review of UH to
guide future investments.
invest in warfighter competency
Live training is often constrained by range space, spectrum
limitations, threat replication challenges, and operational security.
In order to build tactical proficiency independent of geographical
location, Navy is establishing a reliable, realistic, relevant, and
recordable Live Virtual Constructive (LVC)-enabled architecture to
train all of our warfighters, whether deployed or pier-side. LVC
training is the most viable and cost-effective means to prepare for
operations in contested environments against high-end threats. Navy
virtual constructive capabilities are already facilitating safe,
efficient, and practical high-value training events.
The Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE) further enhances
our LVC training capability by realistically replicating complex
operational scenarios in a common, distributed setting. NCTE integrates
live platforms and ranges with synthetic ranges at requisite security
levels. This integration is crucial for simulating realistic adversary
tactics and enhancing our force readiness.
Recent operational successes underscore the importance of LVC
capabilities in all phases of training. In response to the latest
combat developments, Navy acquisition commands and Warfighting
Development Centers created advanced tactics, techniques, and
procedures for countering unmanned threats. The Warfighting Development
Centers then developed LVC scenarios to train deployed and pre-
deployment forces on the new threats presented by the Houthis in the
Red Sea.
These combined capabilities are essential not only for preparing
sailors to counter unmanned threats, but also for maintaining their
proficiency in high-end combat scenarios. The continuous development
and integration of LVC technologies ensures that our naval forces
remain ready to face any challenge.
critical infrastructure
The Navy sustains and projects maritime operations from its shore
installations. After decades of underinvestment, these platforms need
targeted funding to restore capability and capacity. Restoration and
Modernization funding is key to revitalizing our degraded critical
infrastructure. Navy cannot address all degraded facilities
concurrently and is targeting investment in the infrastructure that is
most impactful for our warfighters including facilities that support
Nuclear Deterrence, Naval Operational Architecture, Unaccompanied
Housing, Fitness Centers, and Shipyards.
infrastructure optimization programs
The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) is crucial
for eliminating maintenance delays and supporting construction of new
nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. SIOP has completed 40
projects across four shipyards, an investment of over $1B. We have six
dry dock construction projects currently underway. In addition to
recapitalization, SIOP optimizes physical shipyard layout for
efficiency and to align construction with warfighting requirements.
Notably, dry docks at Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards are
being upgraded to meet seismic resiliency criteria.
An additional 40 SIOP projects worth $6.3 billion are under
contract. The Navy is taking an integrated approach to installation
resiliency by emphasizing initiatives in energy-, water-, and cyber-
resilience. SIOP projects improve operational efficiency and strengthen
adaptability to emerging threats.
For aviation maintenance, the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC)
Infrastructure Optimization and Modernization Program (FIOP) follows a
holistic investment strategy to integrate all infrastructure and
equipment investments. FIOP optimizes maintenance, manufacturing,
modification, repair, and overhaul infrastructure at naval aviation
depots to ensure equipment readiness and improve material availability
as fast as possible. Full congressional support for FIOP will help the
Navy maintain our momentum.
closing
We must achieve and sustain our readiness goals to deliver a lethal
Navy capable of defending American interests around the world. To
maximize the availability of our ships, submarines, and aircraft, we
will continue to improve our maintenance practices. We will continue to
recruit and retain talented, dedicated Americans. We will deliver the
quality of service that our sailors and their families deserve. We will
invest in our warfighters through innovative training, and we will
restore our aging infrastructure. Consistent and predictable funding is
foundational to meeting our readiness objectives, and budgetary
instability creates a cascade of challenges. I look forward to working
with you to support our sailors, civilians, and families.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral.
General?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER J. MAHONEY, USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
General Mahoney. Good morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking
Member Hirono, Senator Kaine. Thanks for the opportunity to
appear this morning.
I am honored to represent the Marine Corps and discuss our
current warfighting readiness. Since my testimony last year,
your Marine Corps has continued to progress and refine our
force design implementation through a campaign of learning.
We are modernizing our force to meet the challenges of the
modern battlefield. As directed by our commandant, we balance
that modernization with our ability to respond to crises.
This balance ensures that over 32,000 marines forward
postured and deployed are trained and ready to support the
combatant commanders' competition campaign, deter global
threats, and when necessary fight our Nation's battles.
Whether acting as the forward eyes and ears in the
southwest islands or expanding maritime domain awareness in a
unified High North and across the Baltic Sea or the defense
support of civil authorities by constructing obstacles in intel
analysis on the southern border, your marines are ready to
operate in any clime and place, as our song says.
There remain external challenges, though, to our
warfighting readiness. The most acute readiness detractors are
the lack of amphibious ship availability, which has been
brought up already by my shipmate, and the absence of organic
littoral mobility to marry up with our MLR capabilities.
The gap in these capabilities creates significant risk and
degrade force readiness across the competition spectrum toward
conflict.
Yet, despite these challenges your Marine Corps remains
ready. Our personnel, our maintenance, supply and training
readiness remain high, just as all of you would expect.
In both recruiting and retention the Marine Corps made
mission and exceeded expectations in fiscal year 2024, and you
heard it here first. We will make our numbers this year and, in
fact, we will be able to push contracts on the order of a
thousand into the next fiscal year.
I remain completely humbled by the quality of our recruits
and the marines we make fleet wide. I cannot say enough about
the excellence and discipline of our recruiting force and
continue to do what others say is not possible, making mission
without lowering standards, which is something we will never
do.
That discipline together with consistent funding remain key
ingredients for a high State of readiness. Our unprecedented
second unmodified audit opinion is evidence of that discipline.
Our books are clean. Our books are open.
The Marine Corps is appreciative of the continued support
from Congress and support for the commandant's priorities,
which are creating and enduring total force readiness.
With your advocacy we will sustain our current future force
readiness to maintain the honor of being the first to fight
when called.
With your support for additional resources, we will restore
the State of our infrastructure readiness in a manner
consistent with your expectations as well as the expectations
of our commandant.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I look forward
to your questions. Semper Fidelis.
[The prepared statement of General Christopher J. Mahoney
follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Christopher J. Mahoney
Chair, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, I am thankful for the opportunity to report on the State
of Marine Corps Readiness. We have accomplished much over the last 5
years to modernize the Marine Corps and improve its warfighting
readiness. We are moving in the right direction but cannot slow down.
In fact, we must go faster. The work of this Subcommittee is crucial to
the continued success and readiness of the Marine Corps--its
warfighting forces, its individual marines, and its families. I look
forward to working with each Member over the coming year to ensure the
continued readiness of your Marine Corps.
CMC Priorities in Support of Readiness
The Marine Corps' readiness is maintained through clear guidance,
engaged and accountable leadership at every echelon, a ruthless focus
of readiness, and predictable and adequate funding. The Commandant
provided that clear guidance upon assuming office, which remains
unchanged. Those priorities are: 1) Balance Crisis Response with
Modernization Efforts; 2) Naval Integration and Organic Mobility; 3)
Quality of Life; 4) Recruit, Make and Retain Marines; and 5) Maximize
the Potential of our Reserves. These priorities inform all Marine Corps
planning, including our budget. More importantly, they give us clear
guidance and intent on what is necessary to ensure maximum warfighting
readiness. Finally, the Commandant's priorities account for readiness
across the board, from force design and warfighting to individual and
unit training, personnel readiness, and our back-to-back unmodified
audit opinions.
warfighting readiness
The character of warfare has changed in a few short years, and the
four disparate threat State actors, China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea, are colluding into a single, complex, and adaptive global threat
system. At the tactical level, we are witnessing the effects of the
mass proliferation of drones and littoral sea denial in the Black Sea.
This creates a twofold challenge of making maneuver increasingly
challenging while demonstrating the criticality of winning the
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance contest. We are also
relearning past lessons regarding the need for robust offensive and
defensive electronic warfare capabilities across all tactical
formations. At the operational level, we are witnessing the importance
of possessing and maintaining a depth of magazine sufficient for
protracted operations, and the rise of space as a critical warfare
domain.
Warfighting Readiness Assessment
Your Marine Corps possesses the trained and ready forces necessary
for crisis or contingency as identified by Operational Plans. We are
ready to fulfill our 10 USC Sec. 8063 requirements; ready to support
our allies and partners in the East and South China Seas; ready to
support the Republic of Korea on the Korean Peninsula; ready to combat
Iran or its proxies globally; ready to fulfill our commitments in the
High North alongside Norway, Sweden, and Finland; ready with the
operational reach necessary to strike violent extremists; ready to
support sea denial efforts; ready to seize and defend key maritime
terrain; ready to support civil authorities along the southern border;
and, ready to respond to crises in this hemisphere or anywhere else.
The Marine Corps balances readiness with two primary and competing
metrics: sourcing day-to-day missions and modernizing to meet the
demands of the future operating environment. Through modernization, our
units are equipped with more advanced equipment and supplies, receive
more robust individualized training, and participate in more collective
training--much of which is force-on-force.
Marine aviation continues to see improvements in readiness as we
retire older airframes, accelerate the acquisition of the CH-53K and
fifth-generation F-35B/C, and fully employ our unmanned MQ-9
surveillance aircraft. Improvements in aircraft readiness from fiscal
year 2019 to fiscal year 2024 have been realized thanks to support
provided by this Subcommittee and the herculean efforts of our marine
aviation maintainers.
We are innovating and adapting from lessons learned from the modern
battlefields of Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, Red Sea, and our own exercises.
We are innovating through experimentation with autonomous, low-profile
technology to help us maneuver and sustain in a distributed
environment. We are also innovating through the integration of
automation and artificial intelligence in our fires and sustainment
systems to respond faster and more accurately to the demands of the
modern battlefield. But while technology has changed, the foundational
elements of warfighting and lethality have not. We remain the world's
most elite fighting force with the most proficient combined arms teams
and best small unit leaders. The extraordinary quality of our marines
remains our principal advantage.
Marine Forces Reserve
As the Marine Corps modernizes and operational tempo increases, the
Marine Corps Reserve Component remains an integral part of the total
Force. Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) has increasingly activated
units to provide operational relief to the Active Component (AC). In
fiscal year 2024, support to the AC nearly doubled over fiscal year
2023 with 600 activations supporting Joint Force commanders in
Southwest Asia, South America, Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. In
fiscal year 2025, activations will more than double fiscal year 2024
levels, with nearly 1,500 Reserve marines, approximately 4 percent of
the Reserve Component (RC), activating to support global force
management commitments. Looking beyond fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year
2025, MARFORRES expects to continue to activate large combat formations
such as infantry battalions, artillery batteries, and aviation
squadrons, while simultaneously providing critical enabler support such
as civil affairs experts, foreign advisors, and countless other
specialty skill sets unique to the RC.
force design
Force Design is the Marine Corps' enduring strategic initiative for
pursuing new capabilities and concepts to ensure we remain the premier
force. The Marine Corps has made significant progress in our
formations, equipment, and concepts through the pillars of
modernization, talent management, training and education, and
logistics.
Marine Littoral Regiment: The foundation of our Force Design
progress is our Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs). MLRs are specialized
units designed to fight and win in a modern peer fight with dispersed,
task-organized operations that integrate advanced command, control,
communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities. These regiments enhance the ability to
rapidly find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess threats, and are
capable of maritime domain awareness and sea denial operations in
support of maritime, joint, and combined operations.
The first MLR to stand up, 3d MLR, has achieved Initial Operational
Capability with the activation of all its subordinate units. They are
equipped with modern capabilities--both for sensing and lethality--
including our first six Navy-Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
Interdiction System launchers. In 2024, the 3d MLR participated in
exercises such as BALIKATAN, Archipelagic Coastal Defense, and Marine
Aviation Support Activity in the Philippines, validating its capacity
to operate in dispersed maritime environments alongside allies.
Similarly, 12th MLR, based in Okinawa, Japan, has activated its
Littoral Logistics Battalion and plans to establish its Littoral Anti-
Air Battalion and Littoral Combat Team by the end of fiscal year 2025.
12th MLR has engaged in joint and bilateral exercises, bolstering
deterrence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region as it develops
interoperability with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force.
Joint / Coalition Kill Webs and Combined Joint All Domain Command
and Control (CJADC2): To support CJADC2, the Marine Corps is investing
in advanced sensors to contribute to joint kill webs. Key examples of
this include investments in electronic sensing capabilities provided by
Electronic Remote Sensors, TPS-80 radar enhancements.
The service utilizes joint programs and initiatives that support
decision advantage. Those unique emerging Marine Corps systems are
``born joint'' at the outset to ensure that the service is integrated
at the Joint Force level. This includes electronic warfare systems
feeding Spectrum Services Framework to provide electronic sensing to
the joint community to support decision advantage; the use of Maven
Smart System to Find, Fix and Track targets; and the fielding and
integration of the Family of Integrated Targeting Cells in conjunction
with the Navy and Army to support fusion and a target quality Common
Operational Picture.
Talent Management
Commandant's Retention Program (CRP): The Commandant's Retention
Program identifies the most competitive marines and offers them an
opportunity to stay a marine via a pre-approved reenlistment. The
fiscal year 2025 CRP cohort yielded over 1,450 reenlistments,
accounting for nearly 20 percent of the overall First Term Alignment
Plan mission for fiscal year 2025. We secured over 7,950 FTAP
reenlistments for the Active Component, achieving 114 percent of our
goal. For the inaugural year of the Reserve Component CRP, we secured
248 reenlistments and drilling obligations from the first-year cohort,
reaching 103 percent of our goal. The CRP remains critical in
incentivizing the reenlistment of our highest-performing marines.
Talent Marketplace: This year, we released the Talent Management
Engagement Platform (TMEP), an internally developed digital prototype
to arm marines with more accessible and transparent information. Since
May 2024, TMEP has been tested by approximately 12,000 enlisted marines
across 10 MOSs. The platform has been released to Active component
marines in the ranks of second lieutenant through colonel, consisting
of approximately 16,000 marines.
Training and Education
Enhanced Infantry Training / Infantry Marine Course (IMC): The
Marine Corps continues to improve initial training through Enhanced
Infantry Training / IMC. More than 15,000 marines have attended IMC
since it was expanded in October 2021. We anticipate another 4,000
marines to complete the training in 2025. Unlike those who went before,
these marines will join their initial units with skills commensurate
with those who have been in the unit for years and, as a result, these
IMC graduates will be more easily integrated into our infantry
battalions and more ready for the rigors of combat on any future
battlefield.
Close Combat Lethality: In addition to producing more combat-
capable marines, and based upon lessons learned from ongoing conflicts,
we overhauled our Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Program to include
our Annual Rifle Qualification (ARQ). The new ARQ incorporates shooting
positions that are more realistic in combat into an efficient course of
fire that provides for engagements at ranges between 15 and 500 yards
and based on lethality zones. As a result, the ARQ target and course of
fire reinforce the importance of marksmanship lethality.
We have also expanded our data and modeling-enhanced Infantry
Marksmanship Training Program (IMTP) across the fleet. IMTP has been
developed and validated to increase lethality by analyzing speed,
precision, executive control, adaptability, and risk exposure metrics.
IMTP has increased lethality across these metrics by 99 percent
compared to traditional marksmanship training.
Project Tripoli: Project Tripoli is the Marine Corps' initiative to
provide a Live, Virtual, and Constructive Training Environment (LVC-TE)
that is persistent, globally available, all-domain, and all-echelon. We
are currently in the execution phase and have fielded Force-on-Force
Training System Next which enables live force-on-force training with
after action assessment support in a virtual and constructive domain,
enhancing our formations all-domain training readiness. These LVC-TE
capabilities recently supported the 3d MLR Certification Exercise and
are planned for use during fiscal year 2025 exercises STEEL KNIGHT,
Balikatan, and Service Level Training Exercise 2-25.
Project Triumph: Project Triumph is the Marine Corps effort to
transform training and education to an outcomes-based, student-centric,
information age learning model to generate cognitively agile marines
who can make bold and consequential decisions in challenging
environments. This transformation will take place through three lines
of effort: 1) Policy Development and Outcomes-Based Learning; 2)
Instructors as Learning Leaders; and 3) Technological Integration of
all aggregate Marine Corps learning systems. These LOEs have influenced
the IMC to implement active, student-centered experimental learning
techniques with emphasis on problem solving and the reinforcement of
sound decisionmaking skills with a bias for action.
Project Trident: Project Trident is the Marine Corps effort to
enable the combat readiness of warfighting organizations by providing
individual and unit-level training to build and close kill webs in a
contested maritime environment at all echelons and in all domains. We
are doing this through two lines of effort: 1) enhanced courseware, and
2) practical application in training exercises. Courseware initiatives
include littoral targeting and fires, naval expeditionary operations
planning, and advanced fires and effects. Practical application non-
kinetic effects in a peer threat environment include the integration of
marine space, cyber, and air components to Service Level Training
Exercise 2-24 to provide realistic and real-time non-kinetic effects
through signals intelligence, electronic warfare, and cyber security
threats.
Marine Corps Attack Drone Team: The Marine Corps recently created a
Marine Corps Attack Drone Team (MCADT), whose mission is to support the
rapid acceleration and scaling of the lessons learned from armed first-
person view drone use in modern combat. This initiative will ensure our
Corps continues to enhance our readiness and lethality to hunt down and
destroy our Nation's adversaries. The MCADT's first competition is this
July in Florida, where the marines will battle in the first ever US
Military Drone Crucible Championship. After July, the MCADT will next
focus on lessons learned from that competition and develop efforts to
provide intermediate and advanced armed FPV drone skills to the Fleet
Marine Force and Total Force via the Competition-in-Arms Program.
Logistics Modernization
Contested Logistics: The ability to move personnel, equipment, and
supplies in a contested environment is just as critical as the ability
to find, fix, and destroy adversary formations. To ensure persistence
in such environments, the Marine Corps is shifting from traditional
supply chains to a more resilient sustainment web. Marine Forces
Pacific's operational concept--designed to deter conflict and, if
necessary, fight and win--is reliant upon the integration of key
warfighting functions: maneuver, mobility, and sustainment. This
integration will be accomplished through the Global Positioning
Network, which includes the establishment of terrestrial supply points
in strategic locations and already established maritime prepositioning
forces. Initiatives are also underway to enhance base resiliency,
ensuring the ability to operate under attack, and rapidly recover as a
warfighting platform.
Supply and Distribution Modernization: Experimentation and
modernization of multi-domain distribution capabilities are progressing
rapidly. Across the Fleet Marine Force, 58 Tactical Resupply Unmanned
Aircraft Systems and Unmanned Logistics Systems--Air have been fielded
for testing. Additionally, 504 Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles have been
delivered to infantry battalions and MARSOC. The Marine Corps is also
collaborating with the Navy, Army, and allied and partner nations to
integrate stern landing vessels and autonomous low-profile vessels to
enhance littoral distribution. Additive manufacturing initiatives are
also advancing, including the deployment of the portable expeditionary
fabrication lab and Tactical Fabrication, both of which are now fielded
to Combat Logistics Battalions and Maintenance Battalions.
Medical Modernization: Medical support is also evolving to meet
expeditionary requirements, with a focus on smaller, more mobile Damage
Control (initial stabilization of critically injured patients),
Resuscitation, and Surgical teams, as well as Patient Holding and long-
range enroute care capabilities.
training readiness
In support of generating greater warfighting readiness in our
Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), the Marine Corps has executed
an annual series of force-on-force training exercises for several
years. The training objectives of those warfighting exercises are: 1)
employ the principles of maneuver warfare; 2) apply adaptive
decisionmaking; 3) conduct assured command and control; 4) execute the
targeting cycle; 5) conduct logistics in a contested and austere
environment; and 6) win in a multidomain operational environment. These
are accomplished via an operational environment that seeks to
approximate combat operations' friction, disorder, and uncertainty, and
test decisionmaking against a live, thinking, adaptive enemy.
Training Exercises and Readiness
Our mission is as clear as it is vital: we forge marines into
organizations and units designed to fight across all domains. Marines
have been multi-domain since there were only two--land and sea. We have
adapted to the changes that technology has brought to warfare. We test
the mettle of our marines by forcing them to fight at a disadvantage
across domains we have historically maintained the advantage--
especially the air.
Throughout the last year, the Marine Corps continued to execute
bilateral and multi-lateral exercises throughout the globe to build and
maintain the readiness of our formations. Nowhere is our commitment to
working with allies and partners to more apparent than in the priority
theater of Indo-Pacom. I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and III MEF
forces operate from Darwin, through the Pacific Islands, to Southeast
Asia and into Northeast Asia. They continue to conduct coordinated
rehearsals, operations, and activities that demonstrate deterrence to
would be aggressors trying to disrupt the status quo while we provide
assurance to friends, allies, and partners who have stood with us for
decades. We have practiced full naval integration in our exercises and
experimentation through Task Force 76/3, a joint task force with 3d
Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Expeditionary Strike Group SEVEN. We
have also enhanced joint and combined partnerships and interoperability
through exercises like Yama Sakura 87, a trilateral exercise involving
III MEF the U.S. Army, Australian Defence Force, and Japan Ground Self
Defense Force. The exercise spanned three nations, six locations, and
over 7,000 servicemembers, demonstrating the value of the Marine Corps'
permanent presence in Japan and our ability to effectively integrate
with joint, Australian, and Japanese forces. Our presence and
partnerships translate into a rapid response capability that has proven
invaluable to our partners in the Pacific during times of crisis. Our
ability to respond quickly and decisively to natural disasters ranging
from devastating typhoons in the Philippines to volcanic eruptions in
Papua New Guinea remind the region that the United States is the
partner of choice. Projecting power responsibly and constructively in
the Indo-Pacific has allowed this vibrant region to thrive and has made
the United States safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
Reserve Training Readiness
The Marine Forces Reserve maintains individual readiness through
monthly and annual drill periods, and unit readiness through
participation in Service Level Training Exercises such as the
Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat
Center in Twentynine Palms. ITX is an annual capstone training event
for our Reserve Forces. ITX builds readiness by providing Selected
Marine Corps Reserve units an opportunity to focus exclusively on
offensive and defensive operations, their core mission essential tasks.
At ITX, MARFORRES employs an entire MAGTF, over 4,500 marines and
sailors. It also prepares the MARFORRES Staff for the complexities of a
mass mobilization scenario.
MARFORRES has also participated in Exercise UNITAS for the last 3
years. UNITAS offers a large-scale training venue for our Reserve units
to form and train as a MAGTF alongside their AC counterparts from I and
II MEF. Through Exercise UNITAS, our Reserve Forces gain experience
operating under a combatant commander and integrating with our partner
nations' amphibious forces. This year, MARFORRES will also participate
in joint and multilateral exercises, Arctic Edge 25, and Red Flag
Alaska 25-2 and 25-3. These exercises, conducted in Alaska, will
provide critical all-domain C2, fires, and air control training while
exercising homeland defense tasks and preparing marines to operate in
the arctic environment.
Safety
Improving the safety of our marines is critical to maintaining
Marine Corps readiness. As such, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
implemented several key initiatives designed to enhance safety and
readiness across the fleet. Included in these initiatives are the
establishment of a Force Preservation Directorate and a Local Area
Assessment program. The Force Preservation Directorate is led by a
General Officer. The goal of the program is to align and optimize
current behavioral assessment programs to better serve the marines and
their commands. The Local Area Assessment is a program in partnership
with the Naval Safety Command and tailored for Marine Corps aviation.
Its purpose is to identify potential safety hazards, facilitate their
prompt recognition, and ensure that necessary support and resources are
allocated. In addition to these initiatives, we are using data to
improve the safety of our tactical vehicle operators to assist
commanders in reducing risk by enhancing driver proficiency across all
levels of tactical vehicle operations. These efforts and our continuous
assessment of our safety programs will ensure our weapon systems,
equipment, and units are safe-to-operate and operated-safely--making
your Marine Corps inherently more lethal.
personnel readiness
The cornerstone of Marine Corps readiness is the individual
marine--how we recruit them, invest in them, and retain them.
Recruiting
Our success in maintaining an elite force begins with recruiting
young Americans with the values, character, mental aptitude, physical
and psychological fitness, and desire to earn the title ``Marine.'' We
must collectively ensure the health of our All-Volunteer Force and the
strategic advantage it provides--talent, capability, and warfighting
excellence. The Marine Corps remains committed to providing resources
and sending only our best marines to be recruiters. Our refusal to
lower standards sustains our brand as tough and smart professionals to
the American public and continues to attract those who aspire to prove
themselves worthy of earning the title. The Marine Corps once again
made its Total Force recruiting mission in fiscal year 2024 and remains
on track to obtain an even larger mission this fiscal year while
growing the start pool and maintaining quality standards.
The quality of marine recruits remains exceptionally high and
exceeds every measurable Department of Defense metric. Last fiscal
year, we achieved over 64 percent CAT I-IIIAs mental group, the top
scoring candidates, compared to the DOD standard of 60 percent. We
assessed no CAT IV individuals. In addition, the Marine Corps saw
marked improvement in overall military occupational specialty
alignment. Last, we have almost tripled the previous year's prior
service accessions, which brought experienced marines with critical
skills directly back to the operating forces.
Regardless of our success, we must remain mindful of the long game:
these impressive gains face constant headwinds and are susceptible to
disruption. Recruiting will continue to be a challenge into the future.
Reinforcing and realigning the recruiting force has helped; however, to
exploit success, we will continue to require robust resourcing for
advertising and continued reinforcement of the Military Entrance
Processing Command. Additionally, we thank Congress for its continued
focus on and support for recruiter access to high schools and colleges.
The fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act provided
additional timeliness guidelines for recruiter access to directory
lists. The single biggest reason we hear from young people for not
joining the Corps is that they simply were not aware of the potential
opportunities we offer. Maintaining reliable and expanded access to
high schools and student directories remains a top priority.
Suicide Prevention
Suicide rates in the U.S. have reached their highest levels since
1941. The Marine Corps rates have remained flat, but any loss from
suicide is unacceptable. Efforts to prevent these tragic deaths include
implementing recommendations from the Suicide Prevention and Response
Independent Review Committee and investments in the Marine Corps
Training and Total Fitness (MCTF) program. MCTF is a holistic approach
to integrating physical, mental, social, and spiritual fitness programs
to promote the combat readiness of our marines. These programs employ a
leadership out-front approach along four preventative lines of efforts:
1) prevention and skill-building (e.g., leadership and ethics courses
with the Lejeune Leadership Institute); 2) feedback from the force via
application of data and research (e.g., lethal means survey); 3) small
unit leader communication (e.g., Warfighter Mental Readiness Playbook);
and 4) collaboration with key support resources (e.g., preventative and
proactive medical care; body and mind physical and mental training and
education; and financial management counseling/guidance.)
Marine and Family Readiness--Childcare
Providing quality childcare for marines and their families remains
an important readiness enabler, with 16 Marine Corps installations
having Child Development Centers (CDCs). At MCB Camp Pendleton, a $44.1
million CDC is under construction to add 250 childcare spaces, expected
to eliminate waitlists for Category 1 personnel. A $105.2 million CDC
was awarded at NSA Andersen AFB, Guam, to support 276 children amid the
Corps' buildup. Additionally, a $37.7 million CDC was completed in
November 2023, adding 412 new childcare spaces. These efforts aim to
reduce childcare shortages and support Marine Corps families while
improving servicemember readiness. Still waitlist remain. Lengthy
waitlists are primarily due to shortage of qualified workers, high
turnover, less competitive pay, lengthy hiring process, and seasonal
PCS fluctuations.
infrastructure readiness
Barracks 2030
The Commandant and I are committed to providing the marines with
barracks they deserve and can be proud of. However, the obstacles to
overcome are enormous--and decades in the making. As the Commandant
often says--we became marines to do hard things, and remediating nearly
two decades of under-investments and deferred maintenance in a fraction
of the time is one of those hard things.
The Barracks 2030 initiative is focused on three specific lines of
effort: Management, Materiel, and Modernization. The initiative
improves management of the barracks with professional barracks and
building managers in the facilities and dedicated service teams to
provide 24-hour maintenance support. The Marine Corps will modernize
its barracks with in-stride room repairs, consolidation of marines into
its best facilities, demolition of poor-quality ones, renovations to
modernize existing building, and construction of new facilities.
Finally, the service will modernize by replacing furniture on regular
intervals and providing upgraded locks in the barracks. Since its
inception, the Marine Corps has conducted wall--to-wall inspections to
first and foremost ensure marines are living in environmentally safe
conditions, and to inform necessary corrective actions.
Right-Sizing Inventory: While it may appear counterintuitive to
identify increased demolition (physical destruction) as a requirement
for improved quality of life, it is necessary to both generate
resources and improve the living conditions of our marines. Our current
inventory of 658 barracks includes approximately 69 that need to be
demolished. Doing so would free the service from the costs associated
with heating, cooling, cleaning, and repairing old, poor-quality
facilities and would generate approximately $50 million per year in
savings and cost avoidances.
clean audit opinion
Every investment and expenditure that has been discussed in this
statement has been guaranteed by our achievement of an unmodified audit
for two straight years. As we invest in new platforms, barracks, and
training, it is our responsibility as good stewards of taxpayer funds
to continue to prove that when the Corps is provided a taxpayer dollar,
we can show exactly where and how it has been invested. For an
unprecedented second year in a row, the Marine Corps achieved an
unmodified--or ``clean''--audit option. We have been comprehensively
tested by Independent Public Accountants to validate budgetary balances
and records and account for physical assets at installations and bases
across the globe. This process included counting military equipment,
buildings, structures, supplies, and ammunition held by the Marine
Corps and our DOD partners. The audit's favorable opinion was only
possible through the support and hard work of dedicated marines and our
civilian marines.
By better leveraging technology--by automating our system
interfaces and streamlining the functionality of our systems and
related business processes--we believe that we can get to a place where
we more efficiently and effectively maintain our clean opinion. These
clean audits also provide evidence of what we have believed for a long
time--when Congress provides the Marine Corps a dollar--we invest it
wisely, with transparency and accountability, and in a manner that
allows us to tell you how those investments generate readiness. With
that in mind, we request this subcommittee's support in addressing the
service readiness degraders listed below.
readiness degraders
Amphibious Warship Availability
Reduced Amphibious Warship (AWS) availability has significantly
impacted the Marine Corps' ability to achieve or sustain proficiency in
core amphibious skills. In 2023 and 2024, AWS operational availability
delayed or limited the service's ability to train to amphibious
standards and deploy Marine Expeditionary Units embarked on Amphibious
Readiness Groups in all three marine MEFs.
Since June 2024, AWS has averaged 48.7 percent available for Navy
and Marine Corps training and operations (fully mission capable /
mission capable / partially mission capable). Our LHA/LHD in-reporting
average (ships not in a planned maintenance availability) is 55
percent, and the LPD/LSD average is 47 percent. If AWS availability
shortfalls are not resolved, each element of the MAGTF will experience
further degradation in its ability to train to and meet operational
requirements in support of Combatant Commanders. Further, the atrophy
of amphibious operations experience at all ranks could jeopardize
safety in future training and increase risk in the event of conflict.
We recognize that increasing current AWS availability will not be
accomplished overnight; however, addressing this issue will require a
mix of timely and predictable funding and maintenance planning and
strategies to replace aging AWS platforms with new construction.
Sustaining select mid-life upgrades, service life extensions, along
with the recently signed multi-ship procurement contract for four
amphibious ships signal industry to invest in its workforce and create
stability in public and private shipyards for maintenance periods. It
will also save the government billions of dollars. For example, recent
multi-ship procurement of one LHA and three LPDs is projected to save
the taxpayers $901 million dollars compared to buying the ships
individually.
Organic Littoral Mobility
Mobility is critical to enable the dispersion and persistence of
stand-in forces. MLRs' littoral mobility will be essential to maneuver
through the Indo-Pacific's complex geography. We recognized this
capability gap early as we developed concepts for the Indo-Pacific and
designed a purpose-built Medium Landing Ship (LSM) as a critical
element of Force Design. Separate and complementary to AWS, the LSM is
a maneuver asset and, as a shore-to-shore vessel, is unique and vital
to expeditionary littoral mobility. LSMs facilitate campaigning and can
support diverse missions. Key missions include operational intra-
theater mobility, tactical maneuvers in archipelagic environments,
logistics support, and maritime domain awareness. The Fiscal Year 2025
President's Budget request includes funding for the first LSM. However,
contract award in fiscal year 2025 estimates delivery of first LSM no
earlier than fiscal year 2029. Any delays past fiscal year 2025 shifts
delivery beyond fiscal year 2029.
Procurement of LSM is late to need. The LSM procurement timeline
introduces a significant gap in maneuver capabilities for the priority
theater. To address this gap, in October 2023, a naval resources and
requirements review board (R3B) endorsed an initial littoral maneuver
bridging solution (LMBS) for experimentation and operational use until
the LSM becomes available to support a minimum of one MLR in fiscal
year 2034. This initial LMBS was deemed inexecutable due to Military
Sealift Command (MSC) shortfalls in their civilian mariners. The
Department of the Navy is exploring options to mitigate the gap. These
options include commercially available roll-on and roll-off chartered
vessels, six LCU 2000's available for purchase or charter, and funding
additional steaming days for Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships.
Without a timely LMBS solution, critical experimentation and
operational capabilities of our MLRs are significantly impacted in the
priority theater.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
Since 2012, the Navy's MPF has been reduced from 16 Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS) across three Maritime Prepositioning
Squadrons to just seven Full Operating Status MPS across two MPSRONs,
with two additional ships in Reduced Operating Status. This reduction
has had a direct and negative impact on the Marine Corps' strategic
mobility and sustainment capabilities. The Marine Corps requires 2.1
million square feet of MPS lift to meet operational needs. The current
fleet provides only 1.3 million square feet. This shortfall limits the
ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in a crisis and removes
critical redundancy and depth. As adversaries expand their capabilities
and the geopolitical landscape grows more volatile, reducing MPF
capacity weakens the Marine Corps' ability to rapidly project power and
respond to emerging threats.
Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) Training Readiness
The Marine Corps has provided over $2 billion (replacement cost
about $5 billion) in equipment and munitions to the Armed Forces of
Ukraine via PDA. Replacement and reimbursement for these inventory
losses are needed to rebuild the depth of magazine needed to gain and
maintain lost proficiency. Though some funds have been reimbursed
through PDA replenishment funds, the defense industrial base (DIB)
faces significant challenges in meeting production demands for
replenishment. New procurement lead times delay replenishment, as
existing programmed deliveries take priority. To mitigate impacts, the
Marine Corps has adjusted training allocations and inventory
management. However, continued high-demand support may require the
service to accept further risks to either training readiness or
strategic readiness.
MV-22B
The MV-22 fleet has been seriously impacted by fleet groundings. As
the backbone of Marine Corps combat assault transport capability, MV-
22B squadrons have conducted 109 operational deployments and flown over
630,000 flight hours since 2007. The MV-22B flies approximately twice
as many flight hours per year as any other Marine Corps rotary-wing
aircraft. The MV-22 maintains a safety record on par with other Marine
Aviation assets. From fiscal year 2020 to the present, there were a
total of six Class A MV-22 mishaps within 212,114.5 total flight hours
with the Class A mishap rate is 2.82 per 100,000 flight hours. The MV-
22 10-year (2015-2025) Class A mishap rate is 3.04. Both are lower than
the Marine Corps 10-year average of 3.17.
We remain committed to enhancing both the safety and performance of
the aircraft by improving the proprotor gearbox (PRGB). Improvements in
critical gears and bearings are being addressed with a more refined
Triple-Melt steel. Additional sensors are also being installed in
critical areas to provide better data to forecast necessary maintenance
to prevent part failure. Finally, a redesigned PRGB Input Quill
Assembly (IQA) will reduce the incidence of the wear-out mode observed
in previous IQA failures that led to aircraft Hard Clutch Engagement
occurrences.
While solutions to material challenges are in place, pilot and
aircrew production and training challenges induced by the groundings
are also impacting the fleet. To mitigate the impacts of the groundings
on pilot and crew chief production and to prioritize contract
utilization (fleet health) over time to train, the Marine Corps worked
with Chief of Naval Air Training to pause intermediate tiltrotor and
advanced tiltrotor pipelines from February through August 2024. Marine
Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204 (VMMT-204) tiltrotor pilot
production deliveries are not projected to return to steady State pre-
grounding levels until quarter 1 fiscal year 2026. VMMT-204 can surge
MV-22 crew chief production through fiscal year 2025 based on available
aircraft. This capability will deplete the backlog of 42 crew chief
students that developed during the grounding with a return to steady
State crew chief production in quarter 1 fiscal year 2026.
Flight Hours
While the material readiness of our aircraft routinely receives the
most attention, sustaining individual pilot readiness is equally
important. In fiscal year 2019, we executed 218,299 total flight hours
in support of the FMF as part of our overall flight hours program.
Those hours cost a total of $2.44 billion and supported the readiness
of 3,161 total pilots. In fiscal year 2024, we executed 200,647 in
total flight hours. Those hours cost $3.7 billion and supported the
readiness of 3,312 total pilots. Active Component pilots averaged 14.1
Hours per month in fiscal year 2024. This is a decrease from fiscal
year 2019 when pilots averaged 17.2 Hours per month. The major driver
in the reduction was the prolonged MV-22 grounding. Sustaining and
increasing individual pilot readiness at current levels while
remediating readiness lost within the MV-22 community will require
topline relief.
TACAIR Pilot Training
Low readiness of the T-6 trainer aircraft is the primary challenge
in tactical aviation production, with material readiness consistently
hovering at 75 percent. The primary issue is the lack of parts in the
supply system, requiring additional attention from the DOD, as the T-6
serves as the foundational trainer for all fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aviators. Naval Air Systems Command and the Chief of Naval Air Training
(CNATRA), in coordination with the U.S. Air Force Joint Program Office,
are working to address these challenges by improving the supply chain
and enhancing contractor performance under the Contractor Operated and
Maintained Base Supply contract. Additional funding through CNATRA 1A2A
is also critical, as the issue remains on CNATRA's fiscal year 2025
Unfunded Priorities List.
conclusion
The investments we make today in support of our marines, sailors,
and their collective warfighting readiness will reverberate through the
rest of this decisive decade. There is only one thing that our Nation
cannot give to our military--more time. We must make critical
resourcing decisions now so that we have the warfighting readiness
needed for tomorrow. I am perpetually grateful for the support that
this body has provided our Corps' Force Design initiatives. Every
dollar invested allows us to realize our modernization strategy and
build a more ready force--one capable of satisfying the demands of the
Joint Warfighting Concept and the expectations of our Combatant
Commanders.
The Marine Corps will be ready to respond to any crisis or
contingency in the future, just as we have in the past. However, we
must use the time we have remaining to ensure that we have the right
capabilities at the right time and in the right place. The Marine Corps
will continue to do its part by continuing to maximize every dollar
invested so that legislators can be confident that we are deliberate
with the finite resources that are provided to us. We will also remain
the best stewards of the taxpayers' funds through transparency,
accountability, and discipline--all evident in our second consecutive
successful audit opinion. Through the audit's success, we demonstrated
that the funds provided to us by Congress will be used effectively to
support our core mission: organize, train, and equip marines.
The Commandant and I remain committed to ensuring that the Marine
Corps remains our Nation's force-in-readiness. With your help, we will
ensure your marines are provided world-class training, improved quality
of life, and enabled with the capabilities required to fight our
Nation's battles anywhere, anytime. I thank the Subcommittee for your
continued advocacy and support of the Naval Services and the Marine
Corps. Semper Fidelis.
Senator Hirono. [Presiding.] Thank you, General.
I call on General Guetlein. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL A. GUETLEIN, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Guetlein. Thank you, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking
Member Hirono, and the distinguished Members of this
Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to discuss the
United States Space Force with you and with the American people
today.
The Space Force underpins our Nation's capabilities within
the Joint Force, within our economy, and within the society as
a whole.
In our first 5 years of existence we validated the
importance of the Space Force as a service and made remarkable
progress in building an agile mission-focused organization that
grasped the magnitude of the space threat.
We delivered critical capabilities, developed doctrine, and
took significant steps to integrate space power into joint
operations.
We are now comprised of approximately 15,000 guardians,
including officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel. We are
integrated into other DOD components, the intelligence
community, our allies, and commercial partners, maintaining
maximum readiness and securing our advantages in space.
Our military is faster, better connected, more informed,
precise and lethal based on our ability to harness space. The
world's use of space is growing at an accelerating rate
demonstrated by a significant growth in space launches and an
increase in active spacecraft in orbit.
As access to and the use of space grows the strategic
landscape in space is becoming increasingly complex and
perilous. What were once theoretical threats are now daily
occurrences.
I have observed our adversaries' actions and they are
employing new capabilities to counter our advantages. Our
competitors are jamming Global Positioning System (GPS)
signals, spoofing and disrupting satellite communications, and
developing advanced anti-satellite weapons.
Unfortunately, this behavior has become the norm rather
than the exception, creating an increasingly hostile
environment and putting at risk our continued freedom in the
space domain.
To meet these challenges, the Space Force is accelerating
our transformation as a warfighting service through our theory
of success called competitive endurance. Competitive endurance
is the bedrock of our ability to deter and, if necessary,
defeat our adversaries.
It deters them from extending conflict into the space
domain and enables the Joint Force to achieve space superiority
while preserving the long-term safety, security, and
sustainability of space.
This approach ensures we avoid operational surprise, deny
first mover advantage, and engage in responsible counter space
campaigning, all of which result in deterring aggression and,
if necessary, decisively defeating challenges to our way of
life.
An essential requirement supporting competitive endurance
is guardian development. We are focused on purpose built
training to meet the unique needs of the Space Force.
Our guardians are dedicated war fighters who understand the
gravity of the threats that we face. We must ensure that they
have the necessary training, resources and unwavering
commitment to continue to face these threats head on.
Also essential is our continued integration as a critical
component of the Joint Force in fostering enduring partnerships
with the commercial sector and our allies around the world.
Which will allow us to overcome resource constraints and build
a resilient hybrid space architecture forging the Space Force
we need.
At only 3 percent of the DOD budget the Space Force offers
an immense value proposition for the Joint Force and for our
Nation.
However, it is woefully under resourced to meet the
Nation's demand for space capabilities. We must increase
investment to deter the threat and if necessary to decisively
defeat challenges to U.S. space superiority.
The strategic choices we make today will determine whether
space remains a domain for peace and progress or becomes a
contested battleground for future conflict.
The Space Force is committed to ensuring a future where
space remains a source of American strength and a foundation
for global security.
Achieving this vision requires a shared commitment to
providing the Space Force with the resources, the authorities,
and the support necessary to meet the growing challenges of the
space warfighting domain.
On behalf of all guardians and their families, thank you
for your support and commitment to ensuring the United States
Space Force remains a cornerstone of the Joint Force in
protecting the American way of life.
I look forward to working with all of you and I look
forward to taking your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Guetlein follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Michael A. Guetlein
introduction
The United States Space Force underpins our Nation's strength
within the Joint Force, economy, and society. In our first 5 years, we
have validated the importance of the Space Force as a stand-alone
service and made remarkable progress in building an agile, mission-
focused organization that grasps the magnitude of the threat. We have
established our identity, developed doctrine, and taken significant
steps to integrate space power into joint operations. We are now
comprised of more than 15,000 officers, enlisted, and civilian
personnel and are integrated with other components, the Intelligence
Community (IC), allies, and commercial partners, maintaining maximum
readiness and securing our advantage in space.
The world's use of space is growing at a phenomenal rate,
demonstrated by a 488 percent growth of spacecraft launches and 400
percent increase of active spacecraft in orbit since the establishment
of the service in 2019. As the access to and use of space grows, the
strategic landscape in space is becoming increasingly complex and
perilous, even compared to other warfighting domains.
Unfortunately, what were once theoretical threats are now daily
occurrences. I have observed various actors in space maneuvering
satellites on orbit to monitor our assets, engaging in testing orbital
warfare capabilities, and employing new tactics to counter our
advantage. Our competitors are jamming GPS signals, spoofing satellite
communications, and developing advanced anti-satellite weapons. These
actions create an increasingly hostile environment for the space
capabilities essential to our security and prosperity and put at risk
the continued superiority to which we have become accustomed.
To meet these challenges, the Space Force must accelerate our
transformation by embracing a culture of ``Competitive Endurance.''
This theory of success drives the ability to deter adversaries from
extending conflict into the space domain, and should deterrence fail,
enables the Joint Force to achieve space superiority while preserving
the long-term safety, security, and sustainability of space for
operational use. This approach prioritizes: 1) deterring attacks
against U.S. interests; 2) preventing the use of space to attack our
Homeland or the Joint Force; and 3) avoiding operational surprise.
Destruction of assets in space can create harmful and long-lasting
debris that significantly reduce the effectiveness of the Joint Force
to prevail in conflict and degrades civilian and commercial use of the
space domain for generations to come. For this reason, the Space
Force's concept of space superiority seeks to protect U.S. interests
without jeopardizing the future of the space domain.
The demand for our capabilities far exceeds our current force
structure. Achieving our mission will require a focused warrior ethos,
enhancing deterrence by acquiring the necessary resources and latest
technology to match our threat and building stronger partnerships with
the IC, commercial sector, and our allies worldwide.
Despite being responsible for the largest warfighting domain while
providing critical capabilities to enhance warfighting in all other
domains, the Space Force provides this warfighting capability at only 3
percent of the Department of Defense's budget. We have the smallest
budget and the smallest force. With the committee's and our partners'
leadership, we can overcome emerging challenges by leveraging the
latest technology, acquiring what we need, and developing only what we
must.
evolving threat landscape
The U.S. faces a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex threat
landscape in space. Across the globe, nations are aggressively pursuing
advanced military capabilities, seeking to challenge the established
balance of power and exploit the space domain for strategic advantage.
These advancements, coupled with a growing convergence of capabilities
and intent among potential adversaries, present a significant challenge
to U.S. interests.
We are witnessing a proliferation of new technologies and
operational concepts designed to disrupt, degrade, and deny access to
our space-based capabilities. Adversary forces are increasingly
integrating space-enabled capabilities into their operations,
recognizing the strategic importance of the space domain for command
and control, intelligence gathering, navigation, and precision strike.
Alarmingly, the development and deployment of counterspace weapons,
including a new satellite designed to potentially carry a nuclear
weapon with that could create long-lasting debris fields, poses an
unprecedented threat to the safety, security, and sustainability of the
space environment, society, economy, and the stability of peace.
Adding to this complexity is the growing convergence of
capabilities and intent among nations and non-State actors. Strategic
partnerships, technology transfer, and shared operational concepts are
creating a more challenging and unpredictable security environment. The
Space Force must adapt its strategies, policies, and capabilities to
address this evolving threat landscape and ensure the continued safety,
security, and sustainability of the space domain for all.
personnel
The Space Force is committed to building the most agile and capable
force necessary to meet the evolving demands of the space domain. We
will remain ahead of strategic competitors by developing guardians with
a strong warrior ethos, intently focused on the threat. This requires a
sustained commitment to preparing our force by developing a talent
management system that optimizes the skills and expertise of our
guardians. Over the next 5 to 15 years, the Space Force will require
continued resources to meet the Joint Force's evolving needs.
Recently enacted legislation with the Space Force Personnel
Management Act is a critical enabler for growth, allowing the Space
Force to transfer space missions currently residing in the Air Force
Reserve. This will result in approximately 300 full-time Reserve space
professionals transferring into the Space Force in fiscal year 2025,
with part-time Reserve professionals beginning to transfer in fiscal
year 2026. As our Service grows, we must also ensure our training
pipeline can accommodate increased throughput, providing our guardians
in and out of uniform with the skills and expertise necessary to
operate in a highly contested and dynamic space environment.
Additionally, the Space Force is actively building Service
Components to provide dedicated space capabilities and expertise to the
Combatant Commands, further increasing our operational footprint.
The Space Force is committed to optimizing its workforce through
innovative development programs for officer, enlisted, and civilian
guardians. We have established clear delineations of roles,
responsibilities, and duties for each personnel category, ensuring a
cohesive and efficient force. We have implemented a new integrated
Officer Training Course (OTC) for officer accessions, focusing on
space, intelligence, and cyber operations. We are also developing Space
Force-specific enlisted development programs, incorporating fully
qualified promotions and codifying our foundational warfighting
capabilities into our functional career fields. For our civilian
guardians, we have launched the Guardian Civilian Optimization for
Space (GCO-S) course, providing a foundational understanding of our
mission, values, and operations.
The Space Force is currently exceeding its fiscal year 2025
recruiting goal and has proudly met its goals every year since
inception. This success is the product of effectively conveying a
strong value proposition to young people ready to serve their country.
Our recruits have continued to boast high Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores over the last 5 years, a testament to
our uncompromising standards.
assured access to space
In an era of rapid technological advancement and evolving security
threats, the Space Force needs an agile space architecture to
appropriately address the unpredictable challenges we face. The launch
complex remains the foundation of our assured access to space. However,
this access is not a static concept but rather a dynamic and evolving
necessity. While the Space Force currently utilizes a robust and
innovative commercial launch market to provide a full spectrum of
launch services, we recognize the need to continuously adapt our
approach to address the complexities of an increasingly contested space
environment.
To foster innovation and reduce cost, the National Security Space
Launch (NSSL) program established a dual-lane approach that assures
access to space for missions that require the highest reliability and
provides opportunities for emerging launch providers to compete for
more risk-tolerant missions. The Space Force must continue to diversify
launch providers, increase launch sites, and invest in range
facilities, including payload processing capacity, all while actively
monitoring the launch supply chain.
Expanding options for launch locations ensures that in the event of
natural or man-made disasters, access to space is never compromised.
Creating a more resilient space architecture through proliferation,
disaggregation, and orbital diversity is a national security
imperative. By expanding options for Launch Service Providers, we
reduce our vulnerability to any single point of failure. Further,
actively fostering a vibrant commercial space sector enhances our
Nation's economic competitiveness and technological edge, ensuring we
maintain a robust industrial base capable of supporting our national
security needs.
commercial and allied space strategy
The Space Force recognizes that partnerships are essential to
maintaining the competitive edge in space. Therefore, the commercial
space sector and our allies are not merely an adjunct to national
security space activities but are fundamental drivers of innovation,
capability, and capacity. The rapid growth of this sector presents a
unique opportunity to seamlessly integrate commercial and allied
capabilities, establishing a hybrid space architecture. A hybrid
architecture enables military and commercial systems to operate in
concert, which significantly increases resiliency through added
capacity, redundancy, and proliferation. This integration is
foundational to our ability to meet the growing demand for capability
at a cost we can afford and at the speed required as well as reduce
vulnerabilities and deny potential adversaries the benefits of
attacking U.S., allied, and partner space systems. The U.S. Space Force
Commercial Space Strategy published on 8 April 2024 guides the
integration of commercial space solutions to leverage American business
and industrial strength to counter threats to our advantages in space
and ensure American's get the most of their tax dollars.
By incorporating commercial solutions, we enhance our existing
capabilities, such as Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Satellite
Operations (SATOPS). We can deploy cutting-edge capabilities faster and
maintain an advantage over our adversaries by utilizing an approach
that takes advantage of the private sector's ability to deliver
advanced technology and services more quickly than traditional
government programs. For example, The VICTUS NOX program demonstrated
the remarkable agility of the commercial space sector. A satellite was
transported to the launch site in just 58 hours and was ready for
launch a mere 27 hours later--fully tested, fueled, and prepared to
fly. The industry's responsiveness was so swift that they were ready to
launch even before favorable conditions on Earth allowed.
The commercial sector offers solutions to enhance our capacity,
resilience, and responsiveness in each area. We will prioritize the
integration of commercial solutions in key mission areas such as
SATCOM, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), Space Access, Mobility and
Logistics (SAML), Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking
(TacSRT), and Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM), to name a
few. The Space Force is committed to fostering a strong and enduring
relationship with the commercial space sector. We will prioritize
transparency, streamline our acquisition processes, and work
collaboratively with industry to ensure their success is inextricably
linked to ours.
The Space Force is also committed to become ``allied by design,''
leveraging the strengths of our allies and coalition partners. This
commitment extends to all phases of our organize, train, and equip
(OT&E) activities, fostering collaboration from the earliest stages of
concept development to the execution of combined operations. This new
approach prioritizes burden and cost sharing, opening up options to
fight more effectively today and fight differently in the future.
We will move beyond outdated paradigms and embrace a new era of
partnership, characterized by cooperative capability development,
enhanced interoperability, and expanded operational cooperation. This
means actively pursuing joint capability development initiatives,
sharing expertise, pooling resources, and accelerating the fielding of
critical space capabilities. We will review data sharing agreements and
security paradigms, prioritizing the development of scalable
architectures and open standards that enable seamless integration of
allied and partner systems while ensuring compliance with statute and
policy.
Furthermore, we will deepen operational coordination and liaison
with our allies, conducting joint exercises, sharing space situational
awareness data, and ensuring a unified response to threats in space. We
will actively support the development of our allies' space capabilities
through professional education and training programs, technology
transfer initiatives, and collaborative research and development
efforts. Transitioning to a hybrid space architecture including
commercial and allied partners enables us to leverage a more resilient
and robust space enterprise.
operational test and training infrastructure
To ensure our continued superiority in space, our guardians must be
the best-trained, best-equipped, and the most prepared space
warfighters on the planet. Achieving this goal necessitates the use of
realistic and challenging training environments that authentically
mirror the complexities of modern battlespaces. Our Operational Test
and Training Infrastructure (OTTI) has been meticulously crafted to
fulfill this vital mission.
OTTI is more than a single program or facility; it is an extensive,
enterprise-wide framework integrating live and synthetic training
systems and processes. It includes dynamic live training ranges,
sophisticated modeling and simulation tools, simulated adversary
forces, and secure networks. Each component synergistically combines to
forge a holistic and immersive training environment that effectively
spans the entire spectrum of potential conflict.
Central to the OTTI is the National Space Test and Training Complex
(NSTTC). This state-of-the-art facility will endow our guardians with
unparalleled training capabilities across a myriad of domains, such as
orbital, electromagnetic, cyber, and digital environments. This
sophisticated complex will enable us to realistically simulate the
myriad of threats our guardians might face, preparing the Joint Force
for the current and future complexities of warfare.
missile warning and missile defense
The Space Force is steadfastly committed to safeguarding our
Homeland and allies against increasingly sophisticated missile threats
through a comprehensive and integrated missile defense strategy.
Avoiding operational surprise requires the Space Force to maintain
constant awareness of the battlespace, supplemented by a robust
capability to produce indications and warnings accurately. This
foundational principle recognizes that the initial step in missile
warning and defense is the ability to detect and track threats;
effectively, one cannot neutralize an undetectable threat. We are
leveraging our existing space-based assets while simultaneously
developing new capabilities to adapt to the evolving threat landscape.
Therefore, we must deploy advanced maneuverable satellites with
state-of-the-art sensors. This technology combines optics and
electronics to detect, track, and identify targets. This emphasis
aligns with USSPACECOM's urgent operational needs to enable agile space
operations and establish sophisticated space systems capable of
sustained maneuverability.
When Iran launched over 300 missiles and drones at Israel in April
and October 2024, it was the Space Force that provided the first line
of defense. guardians, operating missile warning systems, detected the
launches in real-time, providing critical early warning data that
enabled United States, Israeli, and allied forces to intercept many of
the incoming threats. Crews of guardians worked tirelessly, analyzing
data, validating tracks, and relaying information to those in harm's
way--all within a matter of minutes. Their efforts were instrumental in
minimizing casualties and damage.
Iran's recent missile attacks against Israel underscore the
critical importance of space-based missile warning and the need for
continued investment in advanced detection capabilities. The Space
Force's ability to provide timely and accurate warning data is
essential not only for Homeland Defense but also for enabling the Joint
Force's ability to effectively respond to threats. Investing in
maneuverable satellites equipped with state-of-the-art sensors will
enhance our ability to detect and track emerging threats, ensuring we
can maintain constant awareness of the battlespace, provide timely
warnings, and ultimately, deny our adversaries the element of surprise.
These capabilities assist to deliver on the Presidents Golden Dome for
America Initiative and highlight the central role space-based
capabilities will play in bringing that effort to fruition.
service component activation
The Space Force has activated seven Service Components within
Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to seamlessly integrate space power into
joint military operations. These component field commands (C-FLDCOMs),
led by a Commander, Space Forces (COMSPACEFOR), serve as the primary
mechanism for providing combatant commanders (CCDRs) with dedicated
space expertise, ensuring space effects are fully integrated into joint
plans and operations.
These Service Components are fundamental building blocks of the
Joint Force, serving as the CCMD's dedicated subordinate command
focused solely on the space domain. COMSPACEFOR provides the CCDR with
direct access to space expertise, ensuring they are fully informed of
all Space Force issues, activities, and capabilities relevant to their
warfighting priorities, requirements, and resources.
ground-based infrastructure
The Space Force relies heavily on its facilities and infrastructure
to execute its missions. FSRM priorities include essential upgrades to
power systems, electrical systems, heating and cooling, water systems,
fire suppression, roofs, and dormitories. MILCON priorities focus on
increasing capacity and reducing risk to the mission, with an emphasis
on mission beddown, energy resilience, assured access to space,
security improvements, and supporting Combatant Command requirements in
the Indo-Pacific and in defense of the Homeland.
However, the MILCON and FSRM portfolio faces significant repair
backlog and deferred maintenance challenges, posing a growing risk to
our operational readiness. We remain committed to sustaining existing
infrastructure and improving the quality of life for our guardians,
airmen, and their families.
conclusion
The Space Force has proven vital to safeguarding our Nation in its
first 5 years. We deliver effects that increase Joint Force lethality
and effectiveness; as well as forces designed to protect the Joint
Force from space-enabled attack. Space Superiority is an indispensable
prerequisite to the success of the Joint Force. However, the Space
Force must grow to continue to contest and win against our adversaries.
We must continue investing in transforming our force from our
current posture to a dominant warfighting force capable of deterring
and, if necessary, defeating our adversaries. We must prioritize
essential modernization and timely and predictable funding is crucial
to avoid delays in fielding critical capabilities.
Competitive Endurance is the bedrock for the ability to deter, and
if necessary, defeat adversaries, preventing them from extending
conflict into the space domain and enabling the Joint Force to achieve
space superiority while preserving the long-term safety, security, and
sustainability of space for continued operational use and freedom of
maneuver. Continued integration into the Joint Force and establishing
enduring partnerships with the commercial sector and our allies around
the world will allow us to overcome resource constraints and build a
resilient, hybrid space architecture forging the Competitive Endurance
we need.
Guardian development is an essential requirement for Competitive
Endurance and our culture must be purpose-built to meet the unique
needs of the Space Force. Our guardians are dedicated professionals who
understand the gravity of the threats we face. We must ensure they have
the training, resources, and unwavering commitment necessary to
continue to serve and face these threats head-on.
The strategic choices we make today may shape whether space remains
a safe for peaceful use and progress or becomes a battleground for
future conflict. The Space Force is committed to ensuring a future
where space remains a source of American strength and a foundation for
global security. However, achieving this vision requires a shared
commitment to providing the Space Force with the resources and support
necessary to meet the growing challenges of the space domain.
Senator Sullivan. [Presiding.] Thank you, General.
Lieutenant General Spain?
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ADRIAN SPAIN, AIR FORCE DCS
OPERATIONS
Lieutenant General Spain. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member
Hirono, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity this hearing provides to talk about the elements of
readiness for the Air Force. The four primary pillars being
parts and supply, people, flying and training, and current
infrastructure.
To these I would add elements for future readiness,
rebuilding acquisitions, long-term sustainment, and recruiting
and retention at a relevant pace and scale, all in a way that
reflects our shared purpose.
Senators, I can confidently State that your United States
Air Force stands ready and able to defend America's Homeland,
ensure a robust nuclear deterrent via our two legs of the
triad, and project power around the world to deter and win as
the Nation requires.
It is our solemn duty and your airmen are ready. It is also
a fact that today's airmen will do so with the oldest
airplanes, the smallest force, and with fewer monthly flying
hours than at any point in our history.
Airmen have and always will get the job done but today they
do so at elevated risk. Meanwhile, China's military forces are
expanding and modernizing. Their nuclear modernization, long-
range missile proliferation, and recent test flights of two
six-gen aircraft is simply further evidence of the elevated
threat in this strategic environment.
Conflict is certainly not desirable nor is it inevitable.
It is our responsibility to be prepared should diplomacy or
deterrence fail.
Often, we have focused on the individual elements of
readiness and not how they must be synchronized to create a
warfighting capability over time. Even in this hearing, we will
likely talk about individual programs and individual projects,
all of which are very important.
But the previous strategic environment, mostly permissive
and without a significant challenger, allowed us the luxury of
segmented attention, priority, and risk. Today's strategic
environment does not.
Today's readiness requires a synchronized approach. The
right parts and the right maintainers and the right support
infrastructure and the right qualified air crew and all in the
right balance and, not or.
Many of our past decisions were appropriate given the
previous strategic environment but no longer. So we have taken
deliberate steps to see this for what it is and do something
about it.
We have specifically prioritized parts and supply in
applying our program. We have also reconnected our manpower and
infrastructure priorities directly to our core readiness
outcomes in both our processes and our data.
It is our intent to maintain focus and priority on these
pillars to strengthen our readiness and improve our lethality
and we are moving out.
I am grateful for this Committee and the broader Congress'
support and look forward to working with you to deliberately
improve our current and future readiness posture and undeniably
retain our position as the world's greatest Air Force.
With respect to the CR, without anomalies the CR clearly
has impact on our readiness up to the tune of about $4 billion.
Anomalies, without anomalies and with the Fiscal
Responsibility Act kicking in, it is closer to $14 billion
which we cannot afford.
However, we expect and look forward to the final version of
this CR if it were to pass with flexibility and agility and
anomalies to spend as required to retain readiness to the
maximum possible level.
Thank you, and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Adrian Spain
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Adrian Spain
introduction
Today's Air Force is the oldest and smallest it has ever been.
However, some go further to State that today's Air Force is the ``least
ready'' it has ever been. This last statement is far from the truth.
While we still face serious challenges across our force, I can
confidently State that your United States Air Force stands ready to
defend our Nation and its interests, at home and abroad. If called to
fight, we will do so effectively alongside our joint and coalition
partners, and we will win.
Any discussion of readiness must begin by considering the variables
of assets, requirements, and risk within the context of the strategic
environment. These variables act like the sides of a triangle in
constant tension with each other; when one side is manipulated, the
other sides are inevitably affected. We optimize readiness when we
adequately support our forces to accomplish their required missions
within an acceptable level of risk while considering the threats we
face. In a permissive environment, under-resourcing immediate readiness
is tolerable because the overall risk is comparatively low. However, in
today's strategic environment, shortcomings in immediate readiness
reduces our ability to deter our adversaries, increasing the
possibility of a damaging and costly conflict. Today, our Nation finds
itself in a strategic competition with China. The People's Liberation
Army is expanding, modernizing, and diversifying its entire military--
including cyber, space, and nuclear forces--at a rapid pace to support
revisionist goals and objectives. These developments pose unique and
fundamentally new challenges for deterrence, and while conflict is
certainly not inevitable, the risk of military confrontation is
increased in this environment.
In light of this reality, the Nation faces a decision about what
kind of Air Force it wants. We are, and have been, built to fight the
conflicts of the past, yet the new strategic environment demands that
we rebuild the lethal and ready force we need to compete and win. The
readiness challenge confronting us lies in creating the force we need
for tomorrow while not neglecting deterrence and readiness today. While
generating readiness for today and modernization for tomorrow will be
an ongoing challenge, it will be much more difficult to fight a war
with a peer because deterrence failed.
The following pages will detail the U.S. Air Force's efforts to
bridge this gap--remaining ready to answer its nation's call today
while preparing for future conflicts. This statement focuses on three
broad categories of readiness. First, the foundational accounts that
drive immediate-term readiness--being prepared to fight today. Next,
the near to medium-term modernization efforts and their impacts on the
Air Force's readiness for sustained competition against our pacing
challenge--being prepared to fight tomorrow. Finally, the
infrastructure and other long-term readiness concerns we must fund now
to create sustained readiness over time--being prepared to fight well
into the future.
foundational accounts: immediate-term readiness
The foundation for readiness in the U.S. Air Force is realistic
training to prepare airmen for wartime operations. To do this, we need
the right number of people with the right skills, the right amount of
equipment in the right condition, and the right amount of non-deployed
time at home station. These ``readiness levers''--people, equipment,
training, and operations--are used simultaneously to influence our
immediate-term readiness. They must be manipulated in concert with each
other, with consideration to how each factor influences the others and
the time delays inherent in each. The spin-up time to bring in and
train additional personnel can take years, and Weapons System
Sustainment improvements often take months to years to bear fruit. If
training is increased without prior development of people and Weapons
System Sustainment, that increase is less productive than hoped, as too
few people attempt to fly too many sorties on systems that are too old
and too poorly supported. Similarly, if these cycles are disrupted, the
process loses momentum, and years of gains can be squandered.
Therefore, the goal of foundational readiness is to support our people,
equipment, and training at consistently adequate levels to sustain
required operations over time. Today's Air Force maintains a high level
of core tactical readiness, but a gap has opened between our
requirements and our ability to meet those requirements. Decades of
overtasking have put these readiness levers out of balance and
threatened the viability of our force. Decreased manning and experience
levels coupled with sustained high workloads have created a negative
feedback loop on both our people and equipment. We must break that
cycle.
The Air Force's lethality is grounded in the proficiency, capacity,
and skill of its airmen. The Air Force's recruiting and retention
efforts are sufficient to meet our congressionally mandated end
strength. Recruitment for the Air Force remains strong, with the Active
component meeting its accession goals for four of the past 5 years.
Though there was a dip in recruiting in fiscal year 2023, the Air Force
successfully closed the gap in fiscal year 2024 due to increased
recruiter manning, changes to training processes, and an increase in
the Delayed Entry Program to its highest level in 10 years. Retention
has been similarly on target, enabling the Air Force to maintain its
mandated end strength. Critical pockets of the force, however, are less
healthy. Maintenance manpower has emerged as an acute issue in the last
several years. A shortfall of over 9,700 maintainers has opened across
the total force--ten percent of the total maintenance manpower
requirement. The manpower shortfall both reduces current aircraft
availability and creates retention problems as the remaining workforce
must put in extra hours to account for the missing maintainers.
Likewise, aircrew shortfalls remain a persistent issue. While many of
our initiatives to reverse the decline in aircrew manning are beginning
to take effect, we expect manning to continue to decline until
approximately the end of fiscal year 2026. After that point, we expect
capacity increases in our pilot training pipeline to take effect and
begin to reduce the shortfall.
Beyond accessions and retention, however, there is a more
pernicious personnel issue facing the Air Force: the misallocation of
personnel, particularly when planned Air Force divestments are later
prohibited or limited. When the Air Force programs force structure
divestments--often two or more years ahead of time--it also re-programs
the end strength associated with those divestments. That does not mean
that the Air Force separates the maintainers, pilots, or flight
engineers associated with the divested platform; rather, the Air Force
re-allocates those personnel to a different requirement. For example,
A-10 pilots may be retrained to fly the F-35, and F-22 maintainers may
be trained to work on the F-35. When those force structure divestments
are canceled late in the process, the manpower requirement is
disrupted. Therefore, when an F-22 squadron's divestment is canceled,
it may well cause an F-35 maintenance unit to suffer personnel
shortfalls. The Air Force is a large enterprise and can absorb many of
these shocks, but compounding divestment restrictions over many years
have added up and contributed to significant personnel shortfalls.
Predictable force structure changes over time are critical for ensuring
maximum utilization of our airmen and readiness of our capabilities.
While we invest in our people, we must simultaneously invest in our
equipment, creating a holistic approach to increasing weapon systems
and parts availability. Many ingredients come together to generate
aircraft--trained and ready maintainers, mission-capable aircraft,
adequate spare parts, and serviceable repair facilities are some of the
most significant. The Air Force constantly manages these elements, but
since 2020, they have been knocked out of balance, pushing aircraft
availability rates steadily downward. First, inflation and labor
shortages have deeply cut into the purchasing power of all aspects of
sustainment. Second, aging aircraft have begun to systematically fail
in an expensive, difficult-to-predict, and difficult-to-repair manner.
These two factors combine to push Weapons System Sustainment
requirements steadily higher, with a nearly 20 percent increase in
Weapons System Sustainment requirements in the last 5 years. Despite
that increased requirement, an undermined industrial base has led to
curtailing parts supply and driving costs even higher for what remains.
The 50 percent increase in the non-mission capable rate for supply
since 2019 (from 11 to 17 percent, on average) indicates the severity
of the issue. That increase translates to roughly 340 additional
aircraft--equivalent in number to all the fighter and attack aircraft
assigned to Pacific Air Forces--sitting on the ramp every day, waiting
for spare parts.
Our training faces similarly significant challenges. Training takes
many different shapes throughout our Air Force, but flight training
funded by the Flying Hour Program (FHP) is one of the most meaningful
indicators, especially since many functional training areas ultimately
support flying missions. By assessing the health of flight training, we
gain insight into the overall State of Air Force immediate readiness.
For this reason, it is alarming to see a negative trend in the health
of our flight training. Since 2020, aircrew have flown less than the
required number of hours to properly build experience, and the gap
between required and flown is forecasted to grow in the coming years.
For the last several years, the FHP has been set to executable levels
rather than the levels needed for aircrew seasoning and combat
readiness. As our ability to execute programmed flying hours decreases,
we set the bar lower and lower every year. Ultimately, the FHP does not
provide all the inputs required to conduct flying training, and many
have become increasingly out of balance in recent years. Those inputs
include aircrew manning, maintainer manning and skill levels, spares
availability, aircraft age, and a continually and increasingly high
operational requirement from the combatant commanders. Inflation also
eats away at the buying power of the FHP over time. Closing the flying
hour gap will require a rebalance of these inputs holistically--not
just an increase to the FHP. In particular, the Air Force needs the
right trained personnel and spares availability sustained over time.
Proper training is the result of matching the right people with the
right equipment, and each lever of readiness must be properly sequenced
to ultimately boost readiness.
modernization: near-to-medium-term readiness
During the Global War on Terror, the Nation consistently
prioritized extending the lives of older systems because it was the
most cost-effective way to meet the needs of the combatant commanders
at the time. We preferred systems with long endurance and high
availability over more exquisite systems. The MQ-9, MC-12, A-10, and
KC-135 fleets, among others, were all sustained or expanded despite
significant budgetary pressures. Recapitalization was often curtailed
or elongated as a cost-saving measure to pay for decades of heavy
demand in Southwest Asia. To sustain readiness across the near to
medium term, we must break from this mindset. We must build an Air
Force specifically designed to counter our most pressing threats today
and in the future, not the threats of the past.
Moving forward, our modernization construct seeks to adapt to the
rapidly changing character of war. We must divest legacy systems that
are ineffective against high-end threats and inefficient against low-
end threats. For 20 years in Afghanistan, the total cost of the stack
of aircraft above troops in contact would often exceed $150,000 per
flying hour, far more than any individual modern platform. Those same
aircraft, each designed with niche capabilities often dating to the
last years of the cold war, would stand little chance of prevailing
against a Chinese threat in the Western Pacific. Instead of relying on
these expensive older capabilities, the Air Force must continue its
modernization push and realize both the cost and effectiveness gains
from new mixes of equipment. This modernization imperative goes beyond
the procurement of platforms. Though Collaborative Combat Aircraft, B-
21s, or F-35s will allow us unparalleled access, connectivity, and
survivability, platforms are only one link in the long-range kill
chain. Other critical links include advanced munitions, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, cyber forces,
communication platforms, battle management, electromagnetic warfare
platforms, tankers, resiliency, and other elements of a family of
systems that support a weapon getting to its target. Each of these
links extends the kill chain and increases its resilience to enemy
action. Development and procurement of munitions and other supporting
systems must be a top priority to ensure conventional lethality.
Finally, the Air Force remains fully committed to a robust and credible
nuclear deterrent. The Air Force's full-scope nuclear modernization
program--to include the E-4C Survivable Air Operations Center, Sentinel
intercontinental ballistic missile, the B-21 Raider family of systems,
the Long Range Stand Off cruise missile, and a modernized B-52--
recapitalizes all current systems and supporting infrastructure whose
life cannot be extended to deliver modern and credible deterrence
capabilities. This is particularly true of the ballistic missile leg of
the nuclear triad. Despite the restructuring of the Sentinel program
following the recent Nunn-McCurdy breach, it remains the best path
forward to ensure the United States maintains the most responsive leg
of the nuclear triad.
The Air Force must, however, balance modernization against
foundational readiness accounts to optimally distribute risk over time.
Investing too heavily in readiness today risks disrupting or
eliminating necessary modernization--eating the seed corn of tomorrow.
On the other hand, too heavy an investment in modernization starves
foundational readiness accounts, reducing the deterrent value of the
current force and risking a readiness tailspin that would be difficult
to recover from. Over the last few years, we have prioritized
modernization at the cost of immediate readiness. In the coming years,
we will need to constantly evaluate the balance between immediate and
near-to-medium-term readiness as the strategic environment continues to
evolve.
infrastructure: long-term readiness
As the Air Force continues to focus balancing available resources
against the current strategic environment and across the different time
horizons, our infrastructure requires careful re-examination to ensure
it is both resilient and efficient. Years of competing priorities have
eroded the Air Force's ability to maintain its infrastructure across
the globe. Simultaneously, air bases are threatened in ways not seen in
modern history. the Air Force's Installation Infrastructure Action
Plan, released in November 2024, details actions we intend to take to
resolve some of these issues,
Air base resiliency has proven to be increasingly important as
adversary long-range precision attack capabilities have rapidly
improved. Particularly in the Indo-Pacific, China has spent decades
building a deep magazine of advanced cruise and ballistic missiles
specifically to threaten U.S. force presence in the region. In
response, the Air Force has spent considerable time, energy, and
resources to develop an Agile Combat Employment (ACE) scheme of
maneuver, emphasizing rapid mobility and force dispersal in the region.
ACE complicates the adversary's wartime calculus and denies them the
lucrative targeting opportunities that known, fixed, and thinly
protected locations provide. Additionally, the Air Force, in
collaboration with our Joint partners, is actively seeking measures to
improve air base air defense capabilities. The successful defense of
Israel against several Iranian missile and UAS attacks in 2024 and the
Houthi attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea paint a stark
picture of the need for robust defense against airborne threats as well
as increased capacity to restore our bases after attack. Those
incidents also emphasize the level of resources required for an
effective defense, with airborne, space-based, ground-based, maritime-
based, and international assets all participating in defense activity.
Air Force defensive capabilities must also include additional
capabilities to counter small drones. In recent congressional
testimony, the NORTHCOM commander noted the continued incursions of
civilian drones into controlled airspace at several Air Force bases in
2024, highlighting the problem's pervasiveness. The capability to
detect and intercept unmanned aerial systems in peacetime equates
directly to our readiness and ability to respond to enemy aerial
incursions in wartime.
The Air Force currently carries significant excess infrastructure
across the board, along with a $49.5 billion maintenance backlog that
continues to grow. Since 1990, the Air Force has reduced in size
considerably, including a 40 percent reduction in end strength and a 60
percent reduction in fighter squadrons, but it has only reduced its
CONUS footprint by 15 percent. Moreover, today, roughly half of all
infrastructure across the Air Force is in a moderate or high-risk
condition. While the Air Force has been able to prioritize its
resources to keep critical mission generation infrastructure (e.g.,
runways) in good working order, such prioritization has come at the
expense of our supporting infrastructure. For example, over 70 percent
of utility infrastructure on Air Force bases in the Indo-Pacific are in
a high-risk condition, a problem made acute by the highly corrosive
tropical or arctic environments of many facilities and by limited
skilled local labor. Meanwhile, our buying power has eroded, with
construction costs rising roughly 50 percent in the last 10 years. The
Air Force acknowledges the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA section 2680
requirement to fund infrastructure investment at 4 percent of plant
replacement value by fiscal year 2030 and is moving out with a number
of initiatives outlined in our Installation Infrastructure Action Plan.
However, we will struggle to meet this requirement in full without
support for reductions in inventory.
conclusion
We are in a race to maintain our position as the world's preeminent
Air Force. The United States faces a competitor whose national
purchasing power exceeds our own and is actively developing a force to
counter America's air and maritime competitive advantages. Conflict is
not inevitable--we must seek to prevent it through readiness. We must
ensure that readiness is optimized across time, with proper
consideration to both immediate-term foundational readiness, but also
to medium-term modernization, and long-term infrastructure concerns.
Only by solving the readiness equation across all three time horizons
can we underwrite the Nation's security and prosperity in the decades
ahead. The Air Force appreciates the continued support of our Congress,
and I look forward to working with the Members of this Committee to
create the momentum needed to address these challenges.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General, for your very frank
testimony. I very much appreciate that.
Finally, Ms. Maurer from the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), thank you for your great work on many issues.
STATEMENT OF DIANA C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Maurer. All right. Well, good morning, Chairman
Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, and other Members.
[Technical issue.]
Ms. Maurer.--here today to discuss GAO's recommendations to
help the military address long-standing readiness challenges
that span several Administrations.
I would like to in particular highlight three cross cutting
challenges that we continue to find across the services.
First, DOD faces growing gaps between mission and
resources. In many areas the services assume risk because of
imbalances between what they have been tasked to do and the
people, parts, and facilities they have----
[Technical issue.]
Ms. Maurer.--Pentagon needs to focus more on sustainment.
Buying new systems is just the beginning. Ensuring combat-ready
units can operate and sustain those systems is the hard part,
and all too often a host of sustainment problems means planes,
ships, and vehicles are not available when needed.
And third, DOD's ability to move and support forces lags
behind operational needs. The services face potential
adversaries who will contest the movement of people, material
and information.
DOD needs to adapt its decades-long reliance on uncontested
logistics, just in time distribution----
[Technical issue.]
Ms. Maurer. My written statement summarizes reports with
over 100 recommendations to help address these challenges.
So, for example, the Navy needs an industrial based
strategy to help get better results from the private companies
that repair and build ships. The Army should ensure units have
the necessary training, facilities, and support before fielding
new equipment.
The Space Force needs to refine its plans for training and
exercising its squadrons. The Navy should coordinate with the
Marine Corps to fix amphibious ships and reach agreement on
what it means for a ship to be available.
DOD should decide when and how various services will assume
sustainment responsibilities for missile defense systems. For
the F-35 program DOD needs to reassess the balance of
sustainment responsibilities between contractors, services, and
ensure maintainers have access to the technical data they need
to meet operational mission needs.
GAO's recommendations will help improve military readiness
and that is the heart of what we do at GAO. We help improve the
Government.
Now, we are currently in the midst of a vigorous national
debate about improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the
Federal Government.
GAO's independent nonpartisan role in the legislative
branch is as important now as it has ever been. We will
continue to provide facts, analyses, and recommendations to
this Committee and to all 535 Members so you can execute your
congressional oversight of executive branch programs and
activities.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Diana C. Maurer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Maurer, and I agree with
you that you guys do excellent work.
I recently had the opportunity to highlight your work on
the Navy industrial base issues to our incoming Secretary of
the Navy, and I think that was a excellent report.
So I am going to begin with just a line of questions. By
the way, it is great to have our Chairman of the Full Committee
here. Shows the importance of this Subcommittee and the topics
we are tackling today.
I will begin my questioning for all six witnesses so please
try to be brief. It is going to focus on bad news, good news,
and flexibility.
So what do I mean? You have already touched on it, General
Spain. You did a good job. The CR, right? I think from a
readiness standpoint none of us think this is helpful.
What would be worse, in my view, is a Government shutdown.
So the impact of the CR and then, very importantly, and General
Mingus, you and I had the opportunity to talk about this
yesterday. Flexibilities that you would like us to provide you
in the future, NDAAs on budgeting, that is a topic that when we
deal with these CRs. Unfortunately, it has been a way of life
for our military for many years. It is a failure on the part of
Congress.
But what kind of flexibilities do you need to be more ready
that you could use? And this could be very broad or very
specific.
Then the good news, very quickly, we have had a turnaround
in recruiting. I think it has a lot to do with some of the
comments I made in my opening statement. Where the last 4 years
our military was not focused on lethality and warfighting, and
why young men and women join to fight and defend their country
was focused on other stuff, irrelevant stuff, and it hurt
recruiting.
Where are you on recruiting and why do you think there has
been such a dramatic turnaround?
So those are the questions I would like each of you to
answer. We will start in the lineup here.
General Mingus, if you can hit on all three of those.
General Mingus. Thank you, Chairman.
A full year-long continuing resolution impact, yes, to the
degree and the severity is unknown as was kind of talked about
earlier.
Based on the anomalies that come out of this, the puts and
takes in the various lines in the budget, what is plussed up
and not we will have to take a couple of days to kind of
fully--if it is actually enacted before the end of the week the
true impact.
But new starts, spending limits, spending power and buying
power, those are critically the ones that always rise to the
top and we have never had a yearlong continuing resolution.
This it will the first for the Department of Defense.
So a lot to be determined in terms of what those impacts
are going to be.
Flexibility sir, you and I talked about this last night. We
all submit a justification book (J-book) and a budget almost 18
to 20 months before we actually see an enactment in an
appropriation. A lot can happen in that 18 to 20 months.
Every line of accounting, every piece of equipment, every
radio, has its own individual line within the J-books that come
back in our budget line items on the back end of
appropriations.
For high-tech things, UAS, counter UAS, high-tech command
and control systems that evolve at a rate faster than our
budget cycle. We would like to compress those lines to allow us
to move in year of execution those moneys to new things that
come online in year of execution.
Senator Sullivan. If you can work with us, all the services
with regard to language on those kind of flexibilities are
really important, I think needed, and something that we could
work on to get in the NDAA.
General Mingus. Sir, and I yield my time to the others
because I went pretty deep in recruiting.
Senator Sullivan. Just for the Committee's sake, real quick
here. I mean, we talked about it but just for the on the record
I think it is important for lessons learned on recruiting.
General Mingus. Who you recruit, where you recruit, how we
recruit, more professionalization of our recruiting force,
expanding the population. All those things that we have been
working for the last 18 to 24 months we believe are coming to
fruition this year.
We have seen momentum unlike we have seen in probably a
decade. We are at 50 percent ahead of where we were last year,
73 percent of mission. So as I said in my opening statement,
just over 44,000 of a mission of 61,000.
I think as you and I talked last night, we are going to
have the opposite problem we did a couple years ago where come
this summer we may have an end strength that is actually bigger
than what we have an appropriations for.
Senator Sullivan. Maybe we can work on that.
Admiral, and, again, I will yield time back. These are
important questions but we will get through all of them.
Go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Kilby. Sure. Hey, two big buckets. One, the CR.
Major impact on us. We have gotten used to partial CRs. As
General Mingus says, this is our first full year CR so we will
have to figure that out, and we are looking forward to
flexibility, anomalies, authorities, to address the kind of
things that General Mingus talked about.
Let me just use one specific example. Two years ago,
probably a little more than 2 years ago, we were thinking about
counter UAS. We were not thinking about counter UAS from the
perspective that we have grown to appreciate in the Red Sea.
So the ability to turn quickly and use money and have the
flexibility to address those things, as we are trying to do
with the forward strike group where we are bolting on systems
that are more effective for counter UAS like Coyote and Road
Runner. Those are all appreciated and hard to do in a CR.
So I give you that piece, the flexibilities and for us to
work through it. There is a merge with the next topic, which is
recruiting. We have made some progress in the Navy as the other
services have.
We have stormed the problem. We understand, and you and I
went over, and Ranking Member Hirono and I discussed what we
did in the Navy to break down the problem and understand what
it takes to make a productive recruiter.
So I think there is renewed focus and clarity on that. We
have done the things General Mingus has described where we have
spread to zip codes to get every available person into the Navy
and we are ahead of goal.
Right now our projection was 12,000 contracted. We have
contracted 14,000. We were supposed to have 12,200 shipped. We
have shipped 12,700. So we are ahead of goal.
I am very concerned about the CR and the impact on that
machine and slowing it down. So for us we want to maintain
course and speed, accelerate and bring in all the people we
need to close down our gaps at sea. CR makes that a little more
challenging.
Senator Sullivan. Great. I am going to yield back to
Senator Hirono. I will get through this line of questioning.
I do want to do a recognition, Admiral, to the sailors and
marines who have been deploying all over the world and in the
Red Sea in particular, you know, remarkable performance in
terms of shooting down all the incoming missiles and drones at
your ships.
My understanding it is the most combat that the Navy has
undertaken in terms of serious missile threats to our ships
since World War II and you have done it incredibly well.
So to all the sailors and marines on those deployed ships
for the great job they have done, thank you from the
entire U.S. Senate.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I get that a full year CR is going to present some very
unique challenges for all of our services including our Space
Force. So we will do what we can to help you all.
Admiral Kilby, I recognize the need to build a larger
fleet. However, I have significant concerns about the Navy's
basically dismal track record of maintaining ships and
submarines in the current fleet.
We consistently see delays, increased costs, ships without
adequate crew, a lack of spare parts, and other issues.
General Mahoney, it seems clear that maintaining amphibious
ships is not a top Navy priority and I do understand Ms. Maurer
said that the Navy and the Marine Corps need to come to an
agreement on how these amphibious ships will be maintained.
But how do delays in the Marine Corps' amphibious ship
maintenance impact your ability to train and deploy marines and
how would you be better supported by and how could you be
better supported by the Navy?
General Mahoney. Senator, thank you for the question.
We are very concerned with the condition of the amphibious
fleet and the availability of the amphibious fleet. As of this
morning, I check it every morning, there were 13 of 32
amphibious ships available. In order to get to a goal of 3.0
MEUs, that is heel to toe MEUs, combined with our amphibious
shipping off the East Coast--one off the East Coast, one off
the West Coast, and one in the Forward Deployed Naval Forces
(FDNF). That number is not going to do it.
I look at it in short, medium and kind of longer term,
perhaps, solution sets, and we are working closely with the
Navy. Of course, we have to get to terms of reference.
We cannot classify a ship that has not sailed in 10 years
and probably never will sail as an available ship of any class,
much less an amphib.
What I would say is we need to resource amphibious shipping
to make it to their service lives and not decommission them
early.
Second, we have to get ahead of the maintenance curve. That
means years ahead of port loading, of availability sequences,
getting the avails in on time, making sure that we have the
parts and the maintenance crews to maintain them and get them
out of the avails on time.
More toward the midterm, we need to make every ship count
with service life extensions and midlife upgrades.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I am sorry to interrupt but I
think that your needs are being clearly articulated, and as Ms.
Maurer suggested, it sounds like a good suggestion to me, that
the Navy and the Marine Corps need to get to an agreement on
what we are going to do with the maintenance of these
amphibious ships. To have only 13 out of 32 available is what
we say unacceptable.
So as we sit here can we have a commitment from the Navy
that you are going to get into an agreement on this issue with
the Marine Corps?
Admiral Kilby. Ranking Member Hirono, you have my
commitment to that. We do brief off the same data, which is an
improvement in the Navy and the Marine Corps.
We have the same data base so we look at the things
similarly from big deck amphibs to Landing Platform Docks
(LPDs) to Landing Ship Docks (LSDs). So to me that is a start.
We have to do better.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I agree you need to do better.
Let me move on to General Mingus.
Several of the critical training areas the Army uses in
Hawaii, the main one being Pohakuloa on the Big Island, and the
leases are set to expire in 2029 and these are vital. These
leases are vital to ensure military forces can adequately train
in the Pacific. When we talk about the importance of the Indo-
Pacific area we obviously need our people to be trained.
I would like to ask you will you commit to continue
engaging in good faith with State officials, because that is
who you are negotiating these important leases with, and the
community to ensure lease negotiation is renegotiated in a way
that is fair to the State, the people of Hawaii and the
military?
General Mingus?
General Mingus. Absolutely, ma'am. We are committed to
that. Since 2017 we have been working this. As you are well
aware, over 500 town halls, meetings, various engagements that
are out there.
2029 seems like a long ways away but it will be here
tomorrow.
Senator Hirono. I know that it is not.
General Mingus. We will continue to, and are committed to
working this with you.
Senator Hirono. To the extent that a land swap may be in
the offing, I do believe that we need to provide the Secretary
of the Army with the authority for that. Is that correct?
General Mingus. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, like you I have a number of
other questions. Could I just go over 1 minute?
Senator Sullivan. Sure.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
So, General Mingus, last year we spoke at this hearing
about the Army's crumbling infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
region. In Hawaii, 50 percent of Army facilities are currently
classified as failing or failed, and the cost to repair or
replace them is over $5 billion.
However, the Army and other services are not using non-DOD-
funded contracting mechanisms like energy savings performance
contracts to upgrade its infrastructure and lock in lower
utility bills.
What is the Army's plan to repair or replace infrastructure
in Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific?
General Mingus. Ma'am, as we talked last year there were
significant investments in 2023 to 2024. We are committed to
that for 2025 and beyond.
We know that the water and some of the critical
infrastructure underneath a lot of these locations are failing.
We actually think it is maybe in excess of $5 billion.
We have committed over a billion for this next year so we
absolutely want to work with you on those infrastructure to
include the leadership that goes with this as well.
Kwajalein is an example where that was largely paid for
with Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
dollars. We have actually put a garrison commander there to
make sure that the leadership in addition to the resources is
there to fix these problems.
Senator Hirono. I think the energy projects, for example,
are important because the Army is the biggest user of it in the
DOD, Army in particular, is the biggest user of energy and
whatever sums you can save on energy costs as well can go to
other needed, necessary projects.
So would you commit to clear the logjam on installation of
energy projects funded through non-DOD contract mechanisms?
General Mingus. Absolutely can take a look at that, ma'am,
yes.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Chairman Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Well, Chairman, I surely am glad you gave
Senator Hirono a few extra moments. You offered me an opening
statement and so I may take those few extra moments.
Senator Sullivan. You are the Chairman of the Committee.
You can do whatever you want.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. But I also want to congratulate
Chairman Sullivan and Senator Hirono for their leadership in
calling this hearing. It is a terrific panel and it has been
great so far.
Let me say this about the CR. We repeatedly say House and
Senate, Republican and Democrat, that we never need to do this
again and for some reason something comes up, some group is
unwilling to compromise and look at the long picture, and we
find ourselves in this position.
I will say this about the fact that this is the first
yearlong CR for the Department of Defense. I guess we could at
least admit that it is a hybrid CR in the sense that there are
the anomalies that our witnesses have mentioned and the numbers
have been plussed up just a little bit.
But this is a shame on our process and it is not in keeping
with what the Founders intended. They intended for legislation
to be difficult but they intended for the parties and the
houses to compromise and have some give and take and finally
get in the right direction.
In my view, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Ranking Member, the real
flaw in the CR that we will be voting on later this week is
that it does not provide enough money, regardless of the
anomalies and the tiny plus ups here and there. Regardless of
that it does not provide adequate support for the military and
for the challenges we have from four adversary nations pacing
challenges, plus Russia, plus North Korea, plus Iran, that
never before have worked together to bring us ill.
It is contrary, Mr. Chairman and Madam Ranking Member, to
the voice of the Senate in the National Defense Authorization
Act which plussed up national defense out of the Armed Services
Committee and from a bipartisan vote on the floor about $25
billion. We could not get that done in conference and so we are
where we are on the authorization.
But were it not for the prospect of a reconciliation bill
that adds $150 billion for vital national security purposes, I
could not vote for the Continuing Resolution as it is.
Unless something changes, I will have to swallow my words
again this year and go ahead and pass it because the
alternative is so unpalatable and so dangerous.
But I will say this. Based on what we see and based on what
is in this Continuing Resolution, $150 billion in the
reconciliation bill may not be enough, and I am hearing some
comforting words, Mr. Chairman, from the Administration that
they realize that too.
I realize they are the budget hawks in this city and they
are the defense hawks in this city and we all want fiscal
responsibility.
But I am telling you $150 billion in the reconciliation
bill may not be enough based on the way we have treated defense
over the past few years and based on what we are about to do
this week.
So thank you all for doing what you can with the
authorities, anomalies, and little plus ups that would give
you.
In the time I have to ask questions, let us talk about the
ability, and I will direct this to you, General Mingus, the
ability of our Reserve component to be ready for potential
conflicts with near peer adversaries.
If a conflict began today, General, is the Army Reserve
component manned, trained, and equipped appropriately to be
successful?
General Mingus. I would say it would depend on the type of
organization within the Guard and the Reserve, sir. We meet our
directed readiness tables requirements in terms of the Active
component, the Guard and the Reserve, in terms of what are
required inside those immediate forces that are needed inside
of 10 days, 30 days, and 45 days.
Once you get beyond that then it is not as pretty as you
would see. This last year we did have to bring down in the op
tempo accounts for the Guard and Reserve. We typically like to
keep them at 85 percent of their training requirements. We had
to bring that down a little bit this year because of the top
line that we were at. So there is concern.
Now, as a result of that, the Secretary and the Chief and
all of us are taking a look at what is the right balance
between the Active Guard and Reserve and what mission sets
should be in those, and there is an active look at all of that.
Senator Wicker. Well, do you not wish you did not have to
begin your answer with it depends. I wish you did not have to
begin your answer with it depends.
You talked about the balance. How about the balance between
the types of Reserve units?
General Mingus. That is what I mean, sir. So, for example,
our petroleum capacity is almost all in the Reserve component.
We know that we are going to need some of that capability early
on in a fight and so do we need to move some of that from our
Reserve component into the Active component. So that is some of
the analysis that that we are looking at.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let us go to Admiral Kilby.
It seems that we are picking on that end of the table so
far today.
Admiral Kilby, the Navy spends billions of dollars each
year to operate and maintain its combat surface ships. Those
surface ships are vital to combat deterrence, defense of the
Homeland. Yet, year after year we hear about significant
challenges to the readiness of our Navy's surface fleet.
How is the Navy changing and modernizing in this regard and
also in the way they attack ship maintenance to get problems
under control?
Admiral Kilby. Two general areas here, sir. Thanks for that
question. One was addressed by General Mahoney.
One, locking down that planning in advance of that
availability is key. That requires the funding and the contract
closed about 4 months before we start the availability, which
allows the contractor to order those long lead parts and
develop those teams, in particular for amphibs, steam
maintainers and diesel maintainers, which are a shrinking pool
in our Nation.
So lock down that project ahead of time and understand the
condition of the ship, which means you have to do inspections
and really understand vice opening things and inspecting them
during the avail.
So that is the first part about that. The second part is
this piece I mentioned in my opening statement, which you did
not hear, but getting to 80 percent of combat surge-ready
ships, aircraft and submarines.
We have had some success in the Navy doing that with our
fighter fleet and are spreading it to all our aircraft. We want
to do the same thing with our ships, same thing with our
submarines.
That is a bigger challenge because of the complexity of it
but that is the goal we are after. That requires some focus and
some effort to do that but it also requires looking at
processes which may not be helpful now in changing those
processes, and that is what we did with aviation, sir.
Senator Wicker. Okay, and then let me just ask General
Mingus and Admiral Kilby, on the recruiting is part of making
this more successful long term a better career path for the
people we place in these positions?
General?
General Mingus. Yes, sir. I mean, most come in the military
to serve, to make a better way for themselves in terms of their
lifestyle, some it is to get college benefits.
Senator Wicker. A better career path for the people we put
in recruiting position.
General Mingus. Oh yes, sir. Absolutely. I misunderstood
the question.
That is one of the things we have talked about, similar to
what the Marine Corps has been doing for decades. If we are
going to put talent out in our recruiting formations we have to
reward that talent on the back end of it.
Senator Wicker. Absolutely.
General Mingus. So absolutely.
Admiral Kilby. Same applies for the Navy. Focus on those
recruiters, teach that, one, telling their story to a potential
recruit is what sells it.
Identifying with that individual and connecting with them
on a very personal level and having them see their future in
that is what we need. So focus on that process.
For us we had an incentivized structure which was not to
get the max people in. It was to recruit a certain number of
people per month.
We have taken those limits off. Bring everybody in. Do not
save up recruits for next month. Bring them all in as soon as
you can and that will either fill up our delayed entry program
or get those sailors to boot camp as soon as possible. That has
been our success.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I want people in the
military who are assigned to our recruiting programs to say,
thank gosh I got this great position. My career path looks
bright because I have been put on a fast track by being a
recruiter. That is my point.
Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, so you want to comment
on that because the Marine Corps has been doing that for
decades.
General Mahoney. Yes, I would. Of the three things that I
think are the pillars of our success in recruiting, the one
main one is a professional recruiting force.
These people are screened, slated, handpicked, incentivized
while they are in the job. Typically, will get meritorious
promotions, and when they get out what we find is when they
return to the fleet they are some of our strongest officers and
staff NCOs.
The Commandant was a recruiter.
Senator Sullivan. Most commandants have been recruiters.
General Mahoney. Most commandants have been recruiters.
Most of our general officers have been recruiters. Among our
most successful staff and COs, the sergeant major of the Marine
Corps was a recruiter.
So as far as Senator Wicker seeing a path, that is baked in
to how we make our recruiters and they are a breed apart.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, just real quick. Eighty percent, you hit that with
naval aviation on maintenance, right? Or on readiness.
Admiral Kilby. We certainly hit it with fighters. I get a
report every week on every type, model, series of aircraft in
the United States Navy. We are not hitting it in Cargo Multi-
Mission Vertical Takeoff/Landing (CMV) 22s.
That is another story. That is our goal is to get there
across the board for every type, model, series that requires a
different level of attention and daily individual management by
the Air Forces and the Navy to make that happen. We want to
apply that same level of focus to our surface ships and our
submarines.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Good.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and like others I am
just going to talk about the CR first.
You know, I came on this Committee in January 2013 and
every year you all and your predecessors sit before us and tell
us that a CR is a bad thing and we do not listen to you.
You know, at some point you got to measure by the action,
not by the words that we say. We have allowed a CR to be normal
from October 1 to the end of the calendar year. That is just
kind of the norm.
But we have often gone beyond that into the next calendar
year, and we stand on the threshold of the first time where we
have just gone to CR for the entire year.
I agree with what the Chairman said earlier, the Chairman
of the subcommittee, that a CR is better than a shutdown. I do
agree with that. But why do we have to accept half-assed over
catastrophic?
The House voted on the CR yesterday and they left town.
They are out. They adjourned. Now we are going to hear what the
Senate has to say and then try to do the right thing for the
country.
They are gone, because they are, like, okay, we can jam you
to vote for a CR that is bad for the defense of this Nation by
skipping town on a Tuesday.
This speaks very loudly about the priorities of this Nation
and this is all done in public with our adversaries watching.
Admiral Kilby, I think you testified in your opening
testimony that under a CR one-fifth of our ships will miss
their maintenance schedule. Did I hear that right?
Admiral Kilby. Eleven. Specifically, 11 ships those
maintenance availabilities are at risk.
Senator Kaine. Okay. So we want to get to 80 percent ready
on ships and subs. Where are we now?
Admiral Kilby. Depending on the day, around 67 percent.
Senator Kaine. On both ships and subs?
Admiral Kilby. Ships and submarines are a little less.
Senator Kaine. Okay. What will one-fifth of our ships
missing their maintenance schedule under the CR. What will that
do to the quest to get to 80 percent readiness for ships and
subs?
Admiral Kilby. Well, it will certainly be a setback. We
will take a penalty there. We will have to bow wave that
maintenance to the next year depending on the availability and
scheduling of that ship.
Worse off, we skip that availability which means it is
doubled down for the next one, which means we will have growth
work and a lot of things we did not anticipate.
Senator Kaine. All right. So we are being told in public
this is the impact of voting yes on this CR that is coming to
us, that we are just accepting that the quest to get to 80
percent is going to be set back because maintenance
availabilities for one-fifth of the ships under a CR are not
going to be, according to protocol.
Admiral Kilby. The only, and I do not want to say silver
lining in that because I do not see a lot of silver lining. If
we get a flexibility to move money we may be able to address
that. But it will impact something else.
Senator Kaine. Yes. You will pull it out of something else,
of course.
But, we are told, well, it is better than a shutdown. Hey,
it is Wednesday morning. I mean, on the Senate side the
appropriators basically had a deal at the end of last year and
that deal is still basically on the table.
My hope is that there will at least be a vote in the Senate
to do a short-term CR and then actually get an omnibus for the
rest of the year.
I mean, an omnibus is kind of a funny thing, word, to apply
to a budget for less than half of the year but it would be far
preferable to a CR because you would have new starts. You would
have other authorities within an omnibus that you are not going
to get in the CR and we ought to be able to do that.
The House decided on Tuesday night, we are splitting so we
can force the Senate to accept a substandard CR that will hurt
the military. Great week, man.
Great, great week of work to leave town on Tuesday night
feeling good about yourself because you forced the Senate to
try to accept a substandard work product year after year after
year after year.
General Mingus, I want to ask you one question about
counter UAS readiness because the Army is the DOD's executive
agent.
Talk to me about how you are ensuring coordination between
the services and developing a joint counter small UAS doctrine
and solutions to addressing the UAS threat.
General Mingus. Thank you, sir.
As the executive agent you are well aware of the joint
counter UAS officer (JCO). It is a joint entity, and everybody
that is sitting at this table there is probably very few weeks
that do not go by where we do not come together to talk about
this problem set. Whether it is in the venue of what Replicator
2.0 is going to bring across 100-plus sites across the country
to now what is going to be part of the Golden Dome.
But this conversation on the counter UAS side is absolutely
a joint problem. Yes, we have an Army officer in charge of it
but he is in a joint billet and he is speaking for and trying
to solve this problem for the Joint Force, and I collectively
think this team is trying to get after that.
Senator Kaine. Give your effort a grade. That will be my
last question. Give the joint effort a grade right now.
General Mingus. I would give it a grade in two ways. One,
compared to where we were 2 years ago in the B to B+ category
compared to where we need to be it is probably in the C.
Given the rate of technology changes in this space and
where our adversaries are going in this space, we cannot go
fast enough when it comes to counter UAS.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. So my Democrat colleagues do not like CRs
but the prior majority leader, a Democrat, would not even bring
up a spending bill that we could have done last summer to make
sure we did not ever have to do a CR at all.
After 4 years of the Biden administration appeasing our
enemies and making our forces less lethal, I am glad President
Trump's back and restoring peace through strength.
He has been clear that he takes the threat posed by
Communist China seriously, ensuring the United States is posed
to combat these threats. I look forward to hearing how you are
doing with that.
But my first question for General Mingus and Admiral Kilby,
since President Trump was elected recruitment numbers are way
up. So is that a result of President Trump's election?
General Mingus. I think it is a combination of things, sir.
I think it is the efforts as I talked about in my opening
statement that have been put into place for the last 18 to 24
months. But we have seen a momentum over the last couple months
that has been pretty remarkable.
Admiral Kilby. I agree with General Mingus. We really took
a round turn on this last year. We had 373 more sailors than we
predicted to get at last year.
So we had an apparatus that was aligned to try to get after
this. I will take any win to get sailors in the Navy that want
to serve our country. So I do not know that I can map that to
the election or not but I am going to ride that wave as long as
I can.
Senator Scott. So my background before I got into politics
was I ran businesses and, you know, the expectation was you had
to beat your competition by improving every day. You had to get
your costs better. You had to get your quality better.
Everything you did you had to get better.
So, General Mingus and Admiral Kilby, can you tell me in
the last 12 months what would you say, for what you are
responsible for, what would you say is the big improvements?
General Mingus. Sir, I would say our transformation and
contact effort. We have infused the latest and greatest
technology when it comes to mobility, firepower, our network,
our UAS, counter UAS efforts into multiple formations, infuse
that technology at a rate faster than we typically would do in
quantities that is greater than we would typically do because
we want to learn from them bottom up to refine the decisions
that we are going to make programmatically down the road.
So that is going to expand into more formations as part of
TIC, transformation in contact 2.0 this year and next year. But
that has been over the last 12 months what I would say that has
been our biggest win.
Admiral Kilby. Two things. One, coming from the same type
of thinking we are trying to build in the Navy, a focused
mindset, skill set, and tool set to get after that continuous
improvement.
There are some common themes here that we have applied
across the board from aviation. So the recruiting is an
improvement and I would say on-time completion of ship
availabilities as well as some success in submarine
availabilities.
But we have got a long way to go there, sir, to apply that
model consistently every single day.
Senator Scott. Thanks.
Admiral Kilby, we have seen the Pentagon failing to
recruit, pass an audit or deliver ships, equipment, missiles,
et cetera, on time and on budget.
On top of that, while the Marine Corps and Air Force are
100 percent recapitalized on their C-130's, the Navy needs over
30 C-130's and has yet to program for this critical tactical
air lift platform.
Today, the Navy only has one on contract. So can you
explain why that is?
Admiral Kilby. Sir, we try to balance our program across
the board, all aircraft, all ships, all submarines. I will take
that question for the record and come back to you with
specifics about C-130. But, again, it is building the most
lethal program we can afford.
[IFR INSERT HERE]
Senator Scott. General Mahoney, what would you say as far
as if you take the last 12 months how are you in a better
position and your response forward in a better position than
you were a year ago?
General Mahoney. Senator, two things.
The first is the second clean audit opinion 2 years in a
row and I think we are in the midst of having a hat trick.
Why do I say that? One of the things, I call it the audit
dividend, we know exactly what we own, exactly where it is,
exactly who takes care of it, and what it is worth. In that
audit we can tell the condition of those pieces of equipment so
we have an increased visibility into the operational readiness
as a result of the audit.
The second thing is our 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment has
just undergone a CRTX. They have been delivered their long-
range precision fires, their air defense.
So the concept of force design has gone forward. I wish we
could accelerate it and deepen the magazine but we have seen
that success on time.
Now we need to marry that capability up with organic
littoral maneuver in the form of the light amphibious worships.
But those are the two things, force design and audit.
Senator Scott. Thank you Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Sheehy?
Senator Sheehy. General Mahoney, am I to understand the
Marine Corps is the only branch to have passed an audit?
General Mahoney. That is correct, Senator. The only DOD
branch, sir.
Senator Sheehy. I get really tired of marines lecturing me
how much better they are than I am. My wife is a marine so I
already get it every day.
Senator Sullivan. I am glad your wife has wisdom.
Senator Sheehy. Well, I was in the Navy so I had to marry
up, right?
[Laughter.]
Counter UAS, General Mingus, you brought it up. General
Mingus was my boss, actually, back in the day when I went to
Ranger school.
Counter UAS, what branch, what functional branch of the
Army do you guys place the counter UAS responsibility in?
General Mingus. We have six warfighting functions inside
the Army so intel, command and control, maneuver, fires,
protection is where counter UAS sits right now.
But as we think about the future in the Army, the land
force, the vast majority of casualties that occur on a
battlefield is direct fire.
I think that a future battlefield the most casualties are
going to occur from the air, and so the notion of the
convergence of offensive and defensive fires, taking it out of
that protection warfighting function and making it part of that
scheme of fires and scheme of maneuver, I think, is the way of
the future. But today, to answer your question, it is in the
protection function.
Senator Sheehy. Okay. Admiral Kilby, where does the Navy
view counter UAS as a functional area?
Admiral Kilby. Because of our platform, Senator, we keep
them owned by the resource sponsors. So it is a division of
labor between the N9, which owns all our warfighting platforms,
and the N4, which owns our shore installations. So there is a
mix between those two.
Senator Sheehy. General Mahoney, where does the Marine
Corps place that?
General Mahoney. Our counter small UAS, two parts.
Operational units with two programs of record, Marine Air
Defense Integrated System (MADIS) and Light MADIS, in our
installations with installations counter UAS.
Just as a comment, as General Mingus brought up, we are
part of Project Convergence which has a counter small UAS
element to it in Research and Development (R&D) and
experimentation.
We are a big part of Replicator 2.0 which also invests in
counter small UAS, and we are invested in the program office as
well.
Senator Sheehy. General Spain, in Space Force and Air Force
where do you guys place counter UAS as a functional area?
General Guetlein. From a Space Force perspective it is very
limited. We have very limited involvement.
Senator Sheehy. Right. Yes.
Lieutenant General Spain. Senator, we put it in the
protection function as well. It is with our defenders. But as
was mentioned by the other panelists, we are in the process of
evolving that to the operational function.
So it is a blend of our both defender force and our
operational force as we go forward.
Senator Sheehy. Well, I ask that because I actually was one
of the manufacturers of the MADIS program back in my former
life before I came here and so I spent a lot of time on the
range with your air defense Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (LAAB)
platoon marines working with that and what I found as we worked
with all the branches as each branch, understandably, had a
very different view of where the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
function fell and how they viewed it.
You know, the Air Force was very much looking at it from a
security forces perspective, fixed installation defense. The
Navy, of course, was focused on it from a shipboard.
When the Boxer had its incident with Iran in 2019 the Army,
of course, had more of an electronic warfare (EW). They really
viewed it kind of as an electronic warfare issue.
What I found was as each branch looked at it through their
own lens, the joint capability's office really struggled to
coalesce that into an acquisition vision that actually worked
and they ended up just buying any shiny object that was dangled
in front of their face and it led to kind of the schizophrenic
approach to it.
It is not a criticism. It is just a reality that as that
technology was developing quickly it was hard to meet all the
needs.
So I think trying to determine whether it is a specific
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or actually assigning a
functional area within the branches that say this is a
fundamental change in battlefield tactic technology.
As we see in Ukraine, I mean, every single day whether it
is First Person View Drones (FPVs) or beyond line of sight
drones it is not transforming warfare but it is functionally
transforming how maneuver units will behave on the ground, and
I think treating it as a subspecialty that is branching off
whatever convenient, you know, area is there by focusing on
what really is a core capability, in my opinion, would help
coalesce the operational vision for what counter drone looks
like. It will also help streamline the acquisition process so
we can find that good technology quickly and field it quickly.
But then also there is the offensive aspect where, you
know, we think of offensive drones as Reapers and Predators
dropping Hellfires and that we are defending against small
drones, but we are not, as far as I can tell, adopting small
UAS organic to our maneuver elements.
Just like every infantry squad has an automatic weapon
every infantry squad should have an organic small unmanned
aircraft systems (SUAS) offensive capability, a backpack full
of FPVs that they can fly at and into the enemy maneuver units
and disrupt them just like we are seeing all over the world in
battlefields, from Iranian proxy groups to the Russia-Ukraine
war.
From my old buddies still in uniform I do not hear that we
have an organic offensive small UAS capability within our
maneuver units and I think that is going to be a great
disservice to our young men and women when the next conflicts
arises.
I yield back. Thank you.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Sheehy.
I am going to continue my line of questioning that I
started with General Mahoney to you just, again. We have
already touched on it a lot but it is okay. I want to hear from
all the services.
The negative impact on the CR, the budget flexibility that
you would want or request as part of this year's NDAA, and then
any lessons learned on the good news that we are all starting
to see, I think, across the services on recruiting and to make
sure we are learning across services on that. I do not think
you got enough press but if you have an All-Volunteer Force and
we are hitting a recruiting crisis of tens of thousands of
Americans who we were short that is an existential threat to
our military.
Fortunately, it looks like we are beyond that but we need
to embed the lessons learned from all the services on how we
got out of that danger zone.
So, General, to you on those three questions.
General Mahoney. Senator, as far as the CR we have
canvassed pretty much all the negative things. I would just
like to hammer down on one.
We talked about anomalies and flexibility in order to move
between appropriations or accounts. We also need to be mindful
of what the top line is.
If there is only so much top line from which to flex or
with to move we are going to rob from one account to pay for
another.
Examples might be inflation that outpaces the plus up, pay
raises that were not planned for or budgeted but are must pay
bills, that money will come from somewhere, and nonbudgeted
contingencies that we pay out of primarily our own merged
appropriation (M) accounts will have to be accounted for
somewhere in the rules of that continuing resolution. A knock-
on effect specific to the Marine Corps is if, and it has
already been touched on by Admiral Kilby, if ship maintenance
or ship building or procurement or anything that touches
amphibious shipping it will have a knock-on effect to the
Marine Corps, as I spoke about with Senator Hirono earlier.
As far as flexibility goes, I would reference the Lord Hale
study on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
reform and I will just bring up three things that come to mind
immediately.
I think they have 16 recommendations in there which are all
really good. Multiyear availability of 1-year accounts so that
you are not forced into making bad decisions at the end of the
year and buying things that you really do not need but have a
period of availability to where you can make better executive
and managerial decisions against that appropriation.
Greater transfer authority so that we can move between
appropriations or move between sub activity groups in order to
solve a problem early so that we do not have to come to
Congress for an above threshold massive reprogramming late in
the year that may be related to need or not solve the problem.
And last, and I will let it go, is multiyear COLIS
appropriations to have flexibility within a portfolio to
strengthen where you are weak and move money around to make
sure that you can get your objectives attained within an
account.
So multiyear availability, greater transfer authority, and
multiyear COLIS appropriation. We did the last one in, if you
think of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and you think
of Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) back in the day, that
worked pretty well to get things done at an accelerated pace.
I am running on here but recruiting, for us three things.
We have a brand that we will not back off from. We believe that
that brand is attractive.
We believe it is a magnet to a wide demographic of young
Americans who will prove themselves physically, mentally, and
morally qualified. We will not back off of the standard.
Counter intuitively if you maintain a standard at a high
level that attracts people who want to perform to that
standard.
Senator Sullivan. That is a great lesson and I think we
have to always keep that in mind. All the services, no matter
what our recruiting challenges are, it is counter intuitive but
it works. So thank you for that.
General Mahoney. Lastly, Senator, I already talked about it
in detail and that is our recruiting force, a breed apart who
are hand screened, selected, incentivized, promoted, and, as I
said, when they get back in the fleet, as you know, they are
some of the best staff Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and
officers we have and they become a sergeant major in the Marine
Corps and commandant in the Marine Corps.
Senator Sullivan. Real quick, General Guetlein, can you
just hit on these three questions? Try to be concise. I am
going over my time here. I want to be respectful to my
colleagues but I do want to get through this issue of CR,
budget flexibilities and recruiting.
General Guetlein. Yes, Chairman, I can go pretty quick.
From a CR, is a huge challenge. It is very, very
inefficient. It does impact us especially because we are the
smallest force with the smallest budget. So any churn in our
budget is a huge hit to us.
As far as what we would ask for flexibilities, I agree with
the rest of the staff. New start--we are seeing an enormous
amount of threats emerging every single year and it is very
hard to get after those threats when you have to wait two to 4
years to get the budget to get after those threats. So anything
you can do, budget flexibility for new start authorities.
Private equity consolidation, the ability to move money
between programs would be hugely beneficial, and then the
multiyear procurement, the multiyear execution authority that
General Mahoney talked about.
As far as recruiting and retention we have actually got a
much easier problem because we have a much smaller force. But
we are seeing two volunteers for every recruit that we take
into the United States Space Force.
So we are able to be very, very, very selective for high
quality. Almost nearly 15 percent of our recruits have some
college level of education to include all the way up to Masters
and Doctors of Philosophy (PhDs).
Our recruiting objectives were met the last 4 years in a
row, 104 percent for our enlisted, 101 percent for our
officers, and we are looking at continuing growth in the future
and our retention rate has been in excess of 98 percent.
Senator Sullivan. Wow. Great. That is great news. Great
job, General.
Senator Schmitt?
Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Kilby, I want to direct this question to you. I
feel like the fever has broke finally on this obsession that
the previous Administration had with DEI. That is a good thing.
The previous Administration also treated climate change as
a national security priority. I actually had one of the more
ridiculous exchanges in my first couple years here with
Secretary Del Toro, who told me Admiral Nimitz would have cared
about climate change too. It was sort of like the ``Twilight
Zone.''
But we have issues, right, in ship building. Now that we
are refocused on warfighting capability what should Congress do
to prioritize modernizing the fleet as opposed to this
political stuff?
Admiral Kilby. Two things, sir, super important for us is
to keep our maintenance going. We have got to get our ships
available. I am not going to build a whole mess of new ships in
2 years so I have got to get the ships I have up to speed and
available.
The other thing we can do is continue to invest in
munitions. I think the lead time for them is shorter than a
ship so we must renew our magazines so we are ready to fight if
called.
Senator Schmitt. Okay. Sticking with you, Admiral Kilby,
and then also for General Spain, if we had to fight a peer war
in the next 2 years. What would be our greatest capability gap
and what should Congress do to address that?
Admiral Kilby. I will start first.
Again, munitions, long-range munitions, preferred
munitions, are an area where we need to increase our
productivity as a Nation, and then from just a general sense,
our capabilities are pretty good with the exception of that
munitions quantity but our capacity is a problem. So getting
those ships and funding available out on time will result in a
greater capability overall.
Lieutenant General Spain. Senator, thanks for the question.
To your point, in the next 2 years the greatest challenge
for us is going to be regaining the sustainment edge in our
current fleet.
The lead time required for parts and supply within that
timeframe required would require an infusion to help us with
our aircraft availability, our mission capable rates, and
training our flying force to be ready within that window.
In addition, some flexibility on new opportunities with
technology in terms of asymmetric capabilities that would
enable us to actually inculcate our Force Design, which calls
for both high-end exquisite capability paired with low-end, low
cost per effect massive capability that can augment the air
component commanders who are in the field.
Senator Schmitt. Sounds like next generation air dominance
(NGAD).
Lieutenant General Spain. Next generation air dominance
would be an example of the exquisite, yes, sir.
Senator Schmitt. General, I guess, with the time that I
have remaining, General Mingus and Mahoney, I just wanted to
ask in sort of the similar theme of flexibility, if you had
unrestricted funding for readiness how should that be spent,
first, in order to get that high-end capability what would we
be doing?
Like, if we are in an era of scarcity, right, that we have
to accept at some level what is the level of priority or what
are the priorities?
General Mingus. For us I would say well, the second one
would be just what Admiral Kilby talked about, our magazine
depth, precision-guided munitions, long-range precision fires,
and the ability to scale rapidly at time of crisis and
conflict.
So it is one thing to bring production rates up but it is
another to have the ability to rapidly scale at time of crisis
and conflict.
Senator Schmitt. How would you rate where we are at right
now on that front? Because I have heard that. I agree with
that. Where do you think we are at with that?
General Mingus. Well, just using 155 as an example, before
the Russia-Ukraine conflict we were producing at 14,000 rounds
a month.
We had a higher water mark in November of 42,000, ramp into
70,000 by this summer, and 100,000 a month by this fall. So
that is a 2-year journey. We have got to be able to do that in
months, not years.
It is about automation and robotics. People are hard to
bring in, let go, bring in, let go, and so the key to all this
is automating those both organic and defense industrial systems
and bases to be able to do that.
Then the second place that I would put that money is in our
transformation efforts that I described earlier, our TiC 1.0
and 2.0.
The end result of that infuse of technology into those
formations is they are more lethal, they are more agile, they
are lighter, they can get to places much faster, and they are
just better formations that are designed purpose built for the
next fight, not the last fight.
General Mahoney. Senator, if I had a three-part wish list
the first one would be to accelerate our Force Design to ensure
victory and more killing power in the contact layer.
I agree completely with depth of magazine across people,
parts, programs. There are several things that we do not have
enough of that we need to build more and deepen that.
If anything, what Ukraine, what the Levant, what the
Houthis, show us is that the short sharp illusion is just that,
a short sharp illusion. We need to shoot. We need to be able to
take a hit. We need to reset and get back in the fight.
Second, our fourth-gen platforms are, and specifically our
barracks for our marines, if we are going to count on them to
generate a lethal force we have got to provide them the quality
of life and the living conditions that they rate.
Third, we have already talked about it extensively, is the
ability for us to move, maneuver and sustain on 73 percent of
the Earth's surface. That is amphibious shipping and project
power from sovereign American soil when we do that, as well as
organic littoral maneuver in order to move shore to shore in
order to maneuver to a position of advantage in order to
sustain in the contact group.
Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would say that as our services with the exception of
Space Force are facing recruiting challenges why should we
discourage or why would we be discouraging women and minorities
from enlisting with all this anti-DEI stuff?
Admiral Kilby the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program, or SIOP, projects were unfortunately not
included in Secretary Hegseth's list of protected and
prioritized programs following his directive to implement an 8
percent budget cut across the board at the Pentagon.
You testified today on the importance of SIOP and, of
course, clearly, we need to do a better job of repair and
maintaining our ships.
So with the flexibility that you are requesting in the CR,
even if SIOP is not on Secretary Hegseth's list of priorities,
are you planning to prioritize critical SIOP projects across
the fleet including, for example, completion of the dry dock
and planning and design for our waterfront production facility
at Pearl Harbor?
Indeed, we need to get on with continuing to modernize our
four public shipyards so that you will have available ships to
do what you need to do. So would you use the flexibility that
you request in the CR to prioritize SIOP?
Admiral Kilby. We want to continue on our SIOP program,
ma'am.
I have talked about the 40 projects we have done, the
additional $6.3 billion that are in the budget that we want to
continue on, and the remaining projects we need to execute. So
we are committed to SIOP.
Senator Hirono. Good. I am looking to you for that because
what is the point in enabling us to build more ships if we
cannot maintain the fleet that we currently have.
A skilled workforce is foundational to military readiness.
However, this Administration has implemented a DOD hiring
freeze and is planning to fire up to 60,000 DOD employees.
DOD is eliminating people across the spectrum, from firing
general, in fact, officers without cause to removing new and
motivated employees. These would be the employees who had just
gotten hired and are being trained, and you would think that we
would want to keep those folks.
But the people in probationary status are among the first
to go, as happened across the Administration. For example, the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which is
already strapped with the need to hire people, they just
eliminated some 2,400 employees and about to eliminate 83,000
employees, going forward.
So, gentlemen and Ms. Maurer, how are these personnel
actions impacting the hiring, training, and retaining of a
skilled national security workforce, briefly? You can say it is
not helping.
General Mahoney. I will start.
Specific to the Marine Corps, we started our leaning out
process six budget cycles ago in accordance with Force Design
and talent management. So the start game of this exercise for
us we are pretty lean so any cut is going to have some impacts.
However, of the 2,300 employees that we have identified we
have got protection, either exemption or exclusion, down to a
number south of 75. Not without impact but manageable from the
Marine Corps' standpoint.
What I am also concerned about is the exclusions or
exemptions for a hiring freeze. We lose about 7 to 10 percent
of our civilian workforce just through natural attrition each
year so we have to figure out a way to replenish that or the
number will just keep going down.
Senator Hirono. Well, hundreds of thousands of Federal
employees are being fired. These firings are not based on any
kind of a job performance evaluation. So it is going to happen
to DOD, I would say.
So anybody else wants to weigh in?
Admiral Kilby. I will just connect there our last exchange.
Senator Hirono. Admiral?
Admiral Kilby. Ranking Member. The shipyards are exempt
from the probationary employees and they are exempt from the
hiring freeze.
So we are trying to shape this in a manner that allows us
to continue the most important work as we work through guidance
from the Administration. Also exempted from the hiring freeze
is the military Sealift Command, an important force for us to
maintain our fleet. So I think those are efforts on the
services' part to manage.
Senator Hirono. So basically all three of you are needing
to identify some very critical people that you want to make
sure that these firings do not hit. Is that what you are doing?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
I am going to finish this line of questioning with you,
General Spain, on the CR budget flexibilities and specific, if
you can get there, and then Air Force recruiting and lessons
learned, and then, Ms. Maurer, I would like you to answer the
same question as well.
Lieutenant General Spain. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the
question.
We talked a little bit in the opening statement about the
bad but echo the comments from across the table on top line
restrictions.
Flexibility, in my mind, really comes down to treating our
readiness accounts and quality of life accounts in terms of
MILCON and Facilities Sustainment, Restorations, and
Modernization (FSRM) with the same flexibility as operations.
The readiness impacts within those accounts have the same
deleterious effect across the force as stopping current
operations.
So by allowing flexibility across the pillars of those
readiness accounts, that is manpower, infrastructure, flying
and training, and parts and supply. We can mitigate some of
that risk that comes along with the CR.
From a recruiting standpoint, the Air Force is above glide
slope on our recruiting goals for the year. We increased the
number by 20 percent and in fact we are still above the 20
percent increase, and we have the largest delayed entry pool
that we have had in 10 years and the most recruiting that we
have done at this point in the year in the last 15 years.
So we are in a good position.
Senator Sullivan. Are there lessons learned from what you
did to get over that hump?
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes, sir. So we have increased
the number of recruiters. We have increased the training, which
reflects some of the things that were said before.
I was a recruiter when I first started out in the Air Force
waiting to go to pilot training. It is a tough job and you need
the right people doing that work and we are bringing the right
people in and we are training them even better than we had
before.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Ms. Maurer, do you have any views in general, the line of
questioning that I have been going through on the CR . In
particular what I want to hear from you is your sense on
flexibilities, that I know that we could provide more in the
budget to give our services the ability to address some of the
challenges that you put in your report but also give them
flexibility that if we have to, you know, and certainly I would
not advocate for it but another CR, another kind of budgetary
constraint issue that they have more flexibility to address
them.
Then also if GAO has looked at lessons learned from the
recruiting kind of challenge that we had over the last three or
4 years and how that has come about. What are those?
Ms. Maurer. Sure. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
On the issue of CR, talking about a full year CR makes me
think back to work that we did over a decade ago looking at the
impacts on sequestration.
Obviously, it is a little bit apples to oranges but we
issued a report 2015-ish that looked at how sequestration
impacted DOD, and at that time we had a recommendation that DOD
collect the lessons learned from sequestration and stockpile
them in case they needed those lessons later on down the road.
In 2017 we reached out to the comptroller's shop. They said
they had taken action to implement that recommendation. So that
is sort of a takeaway item for the department is to look back
at what DOD did back in 2017 in terms of lessons learned on
sequestration and see what, if any of those lessons can be
applied to today.
In terms of flexibilities, we have heard a lot and my teams
have heard a lot about the types of flexibilities that the
generals and the admiral talked about today.
Obviously, GAO tries to stay a little bit agnostic in terms
of specific flexibilities but what I will say is that whatever
flexibilities are offered should be directed toward ensuring
the ability of the services to meet the readiness challenges
that they face.
I talked about earlier in my opening statement there is a
significant imbalance between resources and mission and so
anything that we have done to help bring that into better
balance would be very helpful.
In terms of recruiting we are very encouraged to see that
the recruiting numbers have come up. We have issued a whole
series of reports in areas where the services have critical
shortfalls in the number of people they need.
So, for example, at the Navy, for every six sailors that
they need for the fleet they only have five assigned. We found
efficiencies in the number of air defenders, that the Space
Force has a really good force generation model but they do not
have enough guardians to actually carry that out, much less on
the civilian and the contractor side. So their improvements and
that the change in the trend line in recruiting can be helpful
in that regard.
In some of our work on recruiting we think it is important
for the different programs, the different services, to get an
understanding of what is working, what is not working, and then
double down on the things that are working and then share those
lessons with each other. That way you will get a better
outcome.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, great. Thank you on that, and I
still have a number of questions. Senator Hirono, do you want
to do another round or do you want to submit questions?
I am going to stay for a while since I have all these very
important members of our military.
Senator Hirono. I will be submitting questions for the
record. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Great.
Well, let me continue with some additional questions.
General Mingus, one of the things that I want to try to
nail down is my understanding is the top line number for the
end strength of the Army was reduced because of the recruiting
challenges. We almost had to do it in a forced way.
Now that we have met these numbers again and you have
almost a surplus, will you be requesting from us and so you
have the flexibility to increase your top line to a certain
number? What is your flexibility on that? Because I would like
to see it.
If you need more funding to get to that higher top line, I
think we would all be certainly willing to provide it. But what
kind of authorities do you need to get back to a higher end
strength when the reduction in your end strength was actually a
result and function of the recruiting challenges?
Now that you are going in the positive direction we want to
take advantage of that to increase your end strength.
What do you need? Money? Authorities? Both.
General Mingus. Thank you, Chairman.
Money, yes, in the Military Personnel Services (MILPERS)
account, because what we asked for in this year's budget was an
appropriations for an end strength of 442,000.
What I believe will happen if the trajectories remain
consistent with where they are at today we are going to end
this year somewhere between 449,000 and 452,000 so almost
10,000 over what we believe will be appropriated from a
military pay and allowance account standpoint.
So there will be a deficit there that we will have to come
back and ask for help.
Senator Sullivan. Okay.
I would strongly encourage you to do that. Nobody wants a
smaller army and the fact that you had to shrink due to
recruiting challenges nobody wanted that, and now that you are
fixing it we need to reward you, in my view, to get back to a
higher end strength.
General Mingus. Yes, sir.
For authorities, the Secretary of the Army, all the service
secretaries, can authorize a 2 percent deviation from the
NDAAs. So that would put you at about 451,000. So we think
unless it goes above that we will be okay on authorities.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Great.
General Mahoney, I want to go to a topic you and I and the
commandant have discussed a lot. That is where we are in Force
Design and, you know, a very innovative Marine Corps
initiative, started with General Berger, but not without
criticism.
Any time you innovate you are going to get criticized.
There is no doubt about that. I think the Marine Corps has
gotten ahead of the curve on a lot of issues relating to drones
and loitering munitions and, you know, light, flexible forces
that can move with weapons systems that can take out Chinese
shipping. All very innovative.
However, one of the criticisms was that the divest to
invest strategy divested too much combat power. In the Marine
Corps' primary mission of a 911 force with amphibs to go any
anywhere in the world at a moment's notice to kick in the door
with sufficient combat power was reduced. A lot of criticisms
came from, you know, within the family, retired four stars and
retired commandants and retired very well respected marines.
So that is a difficult balance. I remember a hearing that
we had a couple years ago on Force Design where, you know, I
asked one of the top Marine Corps officers, hey, look, you do
an amphibious invasion and then you get three miles in wherever
you are and you have to cross a river. Wait a minute.
Marine Corps got rid of all its bridging equipment. How are
we going to cross a river? The answer, I think, if I remember
was we are going to call on the Army.
Now, I love the Army but in the Marine Corps tradition
calling on the Army was not something that we typically have
done.
So where are we on the balance? Where are we on things like
bridging and route clearing? Where are we on things like
artillery, infantry, which the Marine Corps cut a lot.
Do you still think this criticism, which came from some
very, very well respected marines, is legit? Are we
recalibrating a little bit in terms of, we want an innovative
Marine Corps but we do not want to get rid of our 911
capability to kick in the door anywhere in the world and bring
significant combat power to bear anywhere and what is the
balance and how we doing on all those things, General?
General Mahoney. Senator, we talked extensively about this
and if you remember where the Force Design journey started and
that was with the statement that we are not manned, trained, or
equipped for the future fight.
That is something tough for a marine to swallow. That is
what generated the shift in some of the design elements of our
force.
We believe that we are on the right course based on
operations extant today, based on experimentation that we have
done, based on what the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) demand.
That having said, the top priority of our Commandant, in
fact, is to balance that modernization. If we put that in the
modernization bin, although Force Design is modernization,
talent management, training and education and logistics, we
will put it in the modernization bin with the ability to
respond to crises.
We have talked about the dearth of amphib shipping. That is
significant. I believe it is strategic to the Nation. As far as
organic combat power goes, we divested of heavy armor. We do
not believe in the situations that we were faced that we need
organic heavy armor for maneuver or maneuver support.
We believe we have enough artillery, both rocket artillery
and cannon artillery, for the problems that we will face. We
believe that we have enough engineering and engineering
support.
You brought up bridging. What we have found at gap
negotiation, gap crossing, is a shortfall and we have divested
of bridging equipment, frankly, that was too heavy and
logistically unsupportable.
Senator Sullivan. So can marines cross a river if they do
an amphibious invasion and find themselves three miles inland
and have to cross a river?
General Mahoney. So there are other ways to negotiate a
gap, Senator. You know that. But as far as bridging goes, we
are looking at more expeditionary solutions and this circles
back to your point of recalibration.
One of the things about Force Design, I will try to keep
this short, was that it immediately admitted to being wrong. We
were to challenge all the assumptions along the way.
If we found an assumption wanting or invalid then we had to
adjust to satisfy and verify that assumption. We have looked
very closely through what we call the campaign of learning at
those assumptions.
We have adjusted the size of a battalion. We have adjusted
some of the aviation capabilities we have. We have adjusted
some of the weapons that we have either bought or not bought,
and to your point where we are looking hard at expeditionary
solutions to bridging.
As far as joint support, frankly, I am less concerned about
the Army providing an M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank for us as I
am about us as a Joint Force being able to project, set a
theater, and sustain a theater from a joint perspective.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Senator Hirono?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In 2019 the Secretary of Defense discontinued certain tasks
at the border after determining that servicemembers were not
performing military functions and the continued support would
negatively affect military readiness and morale.
I think that is an important aspect of what is happening,
the impact on morale.
General Mingus and General Mahoney, how is the current
deployment any different from 2019 when DHS was asking your
units to perform the same non-DOD tasks?
General Mingus. Thank you, ma'am.
We have been asked to defend and secure the border and we
are going to do that. That is a priority for this
Administration. We are going to execute that mission as we have
been asked to do.
Anytime you are asked to defend it has three critical
components, a physical, a technical, and a human. As those
physical and technical things come online, as our Secretary
testified, the human resources associated with this mission set
will come down.
But to answer your specific question that the lessons we
learned from 2019 is the troop to task, as we like to use, was
a one for one. Detection and monitoring, Path of Exile (POE)
support, admin support, data entry, et cetera.
So there was no time to come offline to continue to train
and do their mission.
Senator Hirono. So it does not sound much different than
what was going on in 2019.
General Mingus. No, this time we are going to make sure
that the troop to task allows for rotations so that the
degradation in readiness is not as substantial as what we saw
in 2019.
Senator Hirono. That remains to be seen.
Do you have something to add?
General Mahoney. Senator, similar but not the same.
We have been on the border, as has been stated, for a
while. The mission has changed with this recent evolution where
we are primarily executing engineering tasks and engineering
support tasks.
Think barrier and placement. But we are also executing
intelligence tasks and in both of those there is training
value, especially for the intelligence analysts, to collect and
analyze what is a very complex situation.
But as General Mingus brought up, any time you have 10
essential tasks and you are only training to one or two of them
you have to figure out a way to either accept risk in the tasks
that you are not training to or to figure out a training plan.
Maybe unlike the Army, we even before we had a rotational
basis where we could plus up the skills any tasks that were not
being performed and we will manage the same way right now.
Senator Hirono. From what you are testifying, you are
needing to find some tasks that our military people are doing
on the border that somehow has more relevance to what they
should be doing in the military. Perhaps, if you had your
druthers your people would not be in the border at all,
especially as border crossings are at an all-time low.
During the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
posture hearing, General Guillot said that units deployed to
the Southwest border get only one dedicated training day per
week.
General Mingus, General Mahoney, and Ms. Maurer is 1 day a
week normal for military training?
General Mingus. Depending on which cycle you are in, ma'am,
it could be normal. But I will go back to where I talked about
before it is the ability to cycle people in and out of their
tasks associated with the border mission versus going back and
the ability to train on their mission and central tasks.
The other thing I would offer, and this is going to expand
on General Mahoney, is that at the highest level of our
doctrine the Joint Force has to be able execute offense,
defense, and stability operations simultaneously.
This is a defensive operation and so there is training
value associated with that. Is it going to be the same as if
they went to the National Training Center? Absolutely not. But
there is still value to be had if the leadership takes the
right approach to it.
General Mahoney. Senator, I am not familiar with exactly
what NORTHCOM said but I would maintain that our engineers and
our intel analysts have had far more than 1 day of training to
train for this mission.
For obstacle and placement, for intelligence analysts, they
undergo a whole battery of training to prepare them for just to
support the civilians.
Senator Hirono. So you are saying that our troops on the
border are actually getting something that is equivalent to
more than 1 day a week in training.
So, you know what? I mean, I think that you are doing your
best to be very forthcoming in your assessment of your troops
being deployed to the border and, clearly, you are doing your
best to enable these people to be getting some sort of
equivalent training.
But it is hard to, frankly, it kind of stretches the
imagination to think that that is happening and that they are
not losing the kind of training and opportunities to train that
would be the case if they were not.
Ms. Maurer. Senator, from a GAO perspective I will just say
real briefly that I think back to one of my previous jobs at
GAO was on GAOs Homeland Security and Justice team and that
team continues to do oversight of the DHS, and I think about
all the capabilities that currently exist within Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and other Federal law enforcement agencies on the border.
I think from an oversight perspective it would be
interesting to pursue what those agencies are doing and at what
point are their capabilities insufficient to meet the mission
needs on the Southwest border and we are not looking
specifically at that topic right now. But I think that is
something valuable to think about.
From a readiness perspective one of the trends we have seen
over the years is there can sometimes be a tendency to look to
DOD to perform functions that can also be performed by the
domestic and civilian agencies.
In many cases that is definitely warranted, but DOD comes
in with a heavier footprint, it costs bigger dollars, and it
does have a readiness and a mission and a resource tradeoff for
the department as well.
Senator Hirono. Yes. Of course, a flight using military
aircraft to take only about 100 people to another country costs
over $2 million. That is not a very efficient use of military
resources.
You raise a good point, Ms. Maurer. I know you know that up
to today we have not received information from either the
Homeland Security or the DOD as to the need asserted for the
troops to go to the border.
We await that kind of information but until then, highly
questionable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
I am going to wrap up here with just a few more questions.
Again, thanks for the patience. This has been a really good,
enlightening hearing and I appreciate all the witnesses'
testimony and frank discussion of our readiness challenges.
General Spain, I am going to turn to you a little bit on
contested logistics. Ms. Maurer talked about it. We all deal
with it, all the services, but the Air Force, I think, in
particular with its tanker fleet, is particularly challenged
because tankers are so important.
The previous Secretary of the Air Force committed after the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force and many others over the last
several years we are going to be moving more KC-135s to
Eielson.
But what is the sense of your tanker fleet writ large and
how can we be addressing that, and can you commit to me to
keeping that timeline on getting those four tankers? I think
one has already been moved to Eielson but we need three more
with over 100 fifth-gen fighters in Alaska.
As you know, our Air Force is doing a fantastic job, real-
world missions, very regularly intercepting Russian Bear
bombers in our Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Chinese
and Russian strategic bombers in our ADIZ.
Our military, our Air Force has done a great job up there.
But as you know, those intercept missions are not easy and we
need tankers, but we need tankers throughout the world. So what
is the situation there?
Lieutenant General Spain. Thanks, Senator. I appreciate the
question.
As you are fully aware, we are committed to the KC-46
program, 89 aircraft on the ramp today, and recent deployments
have been wildly successful in their ability to offload gas to
a multitude of receivers both in theater and around the world.
For the KC-135, obviously, we did some reengineering and
service life extension in the 1980's and the 1990's that will
keep the platform flying for decades to come.
But we are also fully committed to tanker recapitalization
post the KC-46 program. Right now we are on track to continue
to procure 15 KC-46es a year and we are continuing to move the
tanker recap acquisition strategy forward and we will continue
to do so.
To your point, we are continuing to move down the path to
bringing the remaining three KC-135s to Eielson for the reasons
that you mentioned. We have some work to do with the department
on some notifications but beyond that we will be able to move
relatively quickly.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Keep me posted on that. That is
very important.
General Mingus, we talked about the 11th Airborne Division,
Arctic Angels. I would like to just to get an update from your
perspective on how that unit is doing. I try to touch base with
them a lot.
From what I can tell they seem to be very motivated, and
now that that is a warfighting headquarters any other
additional personnel that we talked about coming to that unit
in Alaska.
Then any other thoughts about additional multi-domain task
force that you are looking at placing? I know that you were
looking at Alaska for a multi-domain task force at one point
but just to update, really, the operations and morale of the
11th Airborne Division, who do a great job in my State.
General Mingus. Thanks, Chairman. I know you are proud of
them and we are as well.
Their trajectory still continues to move in a very positive
direction both on the suicide front, also on the people side
that you and I talked yesterday, but also on the operational
side.
Multiple warfighter exercises, they just demonstrated their
ability to self-deploy in flight rig all the way from Alaska to
Hawaii, jump in and participate in a high-scale warfighter
exercise on island just a couple months ago. So from an
operational perspective they continue to improve and get better
every day.
The other fundamental change that we made in Alaska was
converting the brigade in Alaska from a Stryker to an infantry
brigade combat team.
So that climate, culture, and the identity associated with
being light fighters, Arctic light fighters, they absolutely
have embraced that. It has turned the corner in that
organization and they are often a great start. So very, very
proud of where they are headed.
On the multi-domain task forces we did consider but in the
end, sir, we did not make a selection to go to Alaska for the
for the fifth multi-domain.
Senator Sullivan. Where is the fifth multi-domain task
force going to be home ported?
General Mingus. Fort Lewis, Fort Carson, Hawaii, Fort
Bragg, and Europe.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, great. Thank you.
Admiral, you and I had a good discussion on Adak the other
day. If you look at a map it is an incredibly strategic base.
It is the gateway to the Arctic. It is much further west than
Hawaii. It is kind of a dagger in the flank of China.
Can you give me your sense on the strategic value of Adak
and any updates since you and I talked about that?
Admiral Kilby. Well, just for the record, sir, we went to
look at Adak from kind of a small, medium and large warm basing
perspective on what we could do in the future with your
support, and we are going to send up a team to engage with the
Aleut Corporation and the Department of Transportation from
Alaska to really understand that to a greater level.
We sent 14 ships to Dutch Harbor last year, two from the
Forward Deployment Naval Forces (FDNF), 12 from San Diego. So
there is a need. I happened to speak to Admiral Paparo last
night on a number of issues. This came up. He talked about the
increased activity by China and Russia in that area.
So, to me, that lends itself to address those types of
activities so we are not having to sail so far to get there.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate that, and again, that
is not just aircraft. Strategic bombers and our ADIZ that our
great Air Force is doing such a good job of addressing.
To your point, it is Chinese and Russian joint naval task
forces in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up in Alaska. This
is happening on a regular basis. The rest of the country does
not really notice but we notice in Alaska. We are on the front
lines, and we appreciate the great work our servicemembers are
doing there.
I want to thank you on that and look forward to working
with you on that.
Can we get to a point, I know it was already discussed in
depth, but on the on the amphibs between the Navy and the
Marine Corps?
You know, General Mahoney, we talked about the marines kind
of 911 kick in the door capability. But essentially that goes
away if you do not have a MEU Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that
you can rely on.
So, Admiral, can you commit to us to work with us and the
Marine Corps on prioritizing amphibs? You know, I am just being
frank here. You do not get the sense that if it was a Ford-
class carrier or something like that that the maintenance
numbers that GAO has reported would be so challenged.
Right now the recent GAO report stated, roughly, 50 percent
of the amphib fleet was in poor condition, poor material
condition, including five out of the nine Landing Helicopter
Assault/Dock (LHA/LHD) carriers, in 90 percent of the LSDs.
Those are numbers that are shocking and they really undermine
the Marine Corps' ability to do its job. It is a team--one
team, one fight, Navy/Marine Corps. But that is a real
detriment.
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. I am not
satisfied with amphibious maintenance or readiness. We are
committed to the 80 percent combat surge ready.
Senator Sullivan. So that is going to be all surface
warships, the 80 percent idea?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. As a subset, I have asked Admiral
McLane, who is a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) boss, to really
do a deep dive on amphibious ships in particular and there are
some things I discussed that we can do better there.
But you have my commitment to meet that goal, to exceed
that goal, and to ensure that we have a three-ship amphibious
ready group (ARG) ready for the Marine Corps when they embark.
As a result of the Boxer and Wasp challenges, the LHDs that
you mentioned, I directed a study in last April, and I reviewed
that study in November and there are some actions that were
taken to get after that splitting up the flag responsibilities
of Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNMRC), which is
a maintenance command, as of today, and C-21. Admiral Bill
Greene will give command to Admiral Lannamann and he will be C-
21 and Admiral Lannamann will be CNRMC.
So focusing on that with that effort and leadership I think
will help us there but as a subset of our perform to plan for
surface ships I am going to focus on amphibious ships. You have
my commitment.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much for that.
General, how many MEU ARGs did we deploy out of the West
Coast last year?
General Mahoney. Fifteenth MEU.
Senator Sullivan. Was it a full complement?
General Mahoney. It was not. It was due to the issues with
Boxer, Somerset sailed as a single. She was joined by Harper's
Ferry. Boxer had to go back for maintenance, and so it was a
conga line of three ships. I believe they only operated as a
three-ship for less than 2 months.
Senator Sullivan. We need to fix that.
My final question is a bit of a complicated one. So,
General Guetlein, I am going to give it to you since it seems
to make the most sense but it is an issue that I am trying to
figure out how we work this, and it relates to the President's
vision for a Golden Dome.
As I mentioned, have drafted legislation with Senator
Cramer that we are hoping is going to be bipartisan. It is very
comprehensive in terms of missile defense for the country.
I think most people would be surprised that missile defense
for America really, really strongly entails pretty much every
service right here. Of course, there is a space-based
component, that is in my bill. There is an Army component.
General Mingus, you certainly know the 49th missile defense
battalion is a U.S. Army battalion at Fort Greely that really
protects the whole country right now.
I love their motto, ``The 300 protecting the 300 million,''
but all the ground-based missile interceptors protecting our
country are at Fort Greely. This bill would dramatically plus
that up.
Admiral, this bill has a lot of Aegis Ashore focus, in
Hawaii, for example, in other places. Then, of course, General
Spain, the Air Force plays a huge role in missile defense.
So my question is as we are working on this, I briefed Mike
Waltz on our bill. I briefed Secretary Hegseth on our bill, I
have even briefed President Trump on the legislation that we
put together after the executive order came out. So I know the
Pentagon is really getting on this.
How do we coordinate? What is your sense, and, General, I
will start with you as the Space Force service.
What is the best way to try to integrate and work together?
This Committee wants to work with all the services but it is an
integrated effort. It literally is Space Force, Air Force,
Army, Navy.
The Marine Corps, as I am sure, has some tactical element
to it, General Mahoney, but this is a full service approach.
What is the best way that we can work together
legislatively, of course, with the President's executive order,
but the full Pentagon integrating the different services, all
of whom play a important role?
I think a lot of Americans would be surprised that, you
know, the cornerstone of missile defense, which is in Alaska,
all the ground-based missile interceptors commanded by the
Army, all the major radar sites, particularly the Clear Space
Force Air Station with the new long-range discrimination radar.
How do we integrate that, General, and if anyone else has a
thought on that. It is a really important issue. It is a really
good vision that the President has put forward. We just need to
operationalize it between the Pentagon, the Congress, and we
need to get on it.
Ms. Maurer, if you have a view on this as well I would
welcome that.
So, General, why do we not start with you? Final question,
I promise, but it is an important one.
General Guetlein. Thank you, Senator. Let me start with it
is a very bold vision that is going to have a lot of complexity
to it, as you said.
The good news is we just met with the Vice Chairman
yesterday in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. So we
had all the combatant commands.
We had the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staffs.
We had the service staffs. We had National Geospacial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA). We had Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
and the National Reconnaissance Office all present in that room
talking about what is it going to take to get after something
of this magnitude.
I would compare this, the only time that I can think of in
the history of the United States where we have gone after
something this complex was the Manhattan Project. That is how
complex this capability is going to be.
I am going to tell you it is not complex because the
technology is going to be hard. It is complex because of the
number of organizations and the number of agencies that need to
be involved as you said as you were going around with your
question.
Organizational behavior and culture are going to be our two
biggest challenges. The way to get through organizational
behavior and challenges is we got to make sure first and
foremost that we have one entity in charge that has the full
support of the Nation, from the President, from the Hill and
from the American people on down. That person or that that
entity needs to be empowered and resourced to make decisions
across organizational boundaries.
Senator Sullivan. Do we have that yet?
General Guetlein. We do not have that yet. That is what was
in discussion. That is what we talked about yesterday with the
Vice Chairman. We are going to talk about it next week with the
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
General Guetlein. The Secretary of Defense owes an answer
back to the President by the end of March.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
General Guetlein. We are on path to do that. Not only is it
an organizational challenge between agencies and services but
we also need to bring the full blunt of our industrial base
into the equation and empower them to be successful, harness
their innovation.
That means we need to embrace the nontraditional
contractors and get their ideas and get their capabilities on
the table.
Senator Sullivan. By the way, they are really motivated,
those nontraditional contractors, to play an important role
here. So I am really glad you are highlighting that.
General Guetlein. Yes, sir. We have had numerous industry
days. I have taken numerous meetings.
The Missile Defense Agency had an industry day trying to
look at the whole of the U.S., not just the government, but the
whole of the U.S. to get after this problem. We are also having
conversations with our allies, can the allies bring
capabilities to the table.
The Canadians are very interested in partnering with us on
the protection of the Homeland. They would like it to be the
protection of the continent. So we are having those kind of
conversations as well.
Senator Sullivan. It would be great to see the Canadians
participating and helping fund missile defense right now. It is
my distinct recollection that they do not participate hardly at
all. They do not do anything on North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) missile defense.
General Guetlein. They do participate in NORAD. They do not
participate in missile defense. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. They need to participate in missile
defense. If a rogue North Korean missile is shot into our
continent we are not going to wait to see if it hits Chicago or
Toronto. We are going to shoot it down.
Canada needs to step up like they have not been on defense
spending. It has been woefully inadequate as a wealthy North
American Treaty Organization (NATO) member, and they need to do
it on missile defense, too.
I have been pressing the Canadians for years on this. They
do not put any money into missile defense and it is not
acceptable.
General Guetlein. The last element that I would bring to
bear on here, as we start to look at the authorities and start
looking at the accountability everything we have talked about
in this session today dealing with the continuing resolution
also comes to bear.
This program to be successful has to have funding
stability. They have to know that they are going to have those
resources from year to year to be successful or else they are
going to be very inefficient and they are going to suffer death
by a thousand cuts through fits and starts and stops.
Senator Sullivan. That is an outstanding answer, General. I
really appreciate that.
Any other comments? Ms. Maurer, do you have a----
Ms. Maurer. Yes, very quickly, Mr. Chairman.
So we issued a report a couple weeks ago looking at
sustainment of missile defense in Guam, which I think could be,
in a sense, sort of a preview of potential coming attractions,
and the general's point is definitively spot on about the sheer
complexity of the number of organizations.
That report we had probably the most complicated org chart
that I have ever put in a report that I signed out under my
name because there are so many different organizations.
That is just Guam, which is a small island, as you know. So
getting arms around that challenge is going to be important.
The second point I would like to make is that thinking
about sustainment, that needs to be part of the conversation
from day one. That has been a continuing challenge in the
missile defense enterprise.
The Missile Defense Agency develops and purchases the
technology. In theory, it is handed off to one of the services
to operate and sustain. Those handoffs have not been happening
in the way that they have been envisioned.
In fact, that is one of our recommendations in this report
on Guam is that DOD needs to spell out specifically who is
going to do what and how sustainment is going to work for a
Guam defense system.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Any other thoughts?
Admiral?
Admiral Kilby. Yes. I am just going to offer one thing I
talked about at Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). We
can do this. In 2008 we shot down a satellite that was
deorbiting full of fuel in 6 weeks.
The whole-of-government got together with agencies, the
science community, and industry and we made it happen. So we
can do this. We just need to do the things that were outlined
and provide clear lines in C2 and solid, consistent budgeting,
and I am convinced that we can deliver.
Senator Sullivan. Good. That is a great answer. Anyone else
on this topic?
General Spain?
Lieutenant General Spain. Senator, briefly, I agree with
everything that has been said.
The stitching together of the various capabilities will be
the key enabler of Iron Dome and Golden Dome, obviously, the
scaffolding of which exists today in Air Force forces and Space
Force forces, along with the Army ground-based deterrent.
The integrated Program Executive Officer (PEO) that we have
in Major General Luke Cropsey in our Advanced Battle Management
System (ABMS) program and the Combined Joint All Domain Command
and Control (CJADC2) program will be the thing that will allow
each of the services to connect the effectors, the sensors, and
the sense making capability across all services and agencies.
That will need to be a primary focus of this effort along
with the capabilities that each of the services will bring.
Senator Sullivan. Good. Well, these are great answers. You
know, you have a strong vision from the Commander in Chief. The
President, obviously, is really focused on this. He mentioned
it in his State of the Union last week.
It will be in the budget reconciliation bill that we are
working on. The DOD component is going to have a lot of funding
on this. So I think it is a sense of urgency that we all need
to work together on, the Congress, the executive branch.
General, you kind of laid out a vision in the importance of
some key principles and we look forward to working with all of
you and look forward to having that designated individual or
agency in charge. I think that is a really important component
as well.
So with that, I want to thank everybody. This has been a
long hearing but a really important hearing. I want to thank,
again, all six of you for your decades of service to our
country in uniform and not in uniform. GAO does a great job.
If there are additional questions for the record my Senate
colleagues will submit those in the next few days, and we
respectfully request that you try to respond to those within
the next 2 to 3 weeks.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
alaska
1. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, 6 years ago, the Marine Corps
was poised to alter its Indo-Pacific force laydown to account for the
inherent risk of access, basing, and overflight (ABO) denial and
limited training opportunities on Marine Corps bases across the Indo-
Pacific. The 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert
Neller, sent several teams to Alaska to assess infrastructure and
training opportunities to support a Unit Deployment Program (UDP) to
preposition assets the Marine Corps would need to surge forward in the
event of conflict with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Alaska's
benefits were as obvious then as they are now: Alaska provides year-
round training for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in nearly
every clime and place found on the globe; Alaska's cold weather
training opportunities are cheaper than other overseas options and
permit significantly larger forces to train simultaneously; perhaps
most importantly, Alaska is in the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
Area of Responsibility (AOR). The Secretary of the Navy nominee, John
Phelan, committed to work with me to resource the Marine Corps to get a
UDP or regular rotation to Alaska. Will you work with me to ensure we
resource our Marine Corps appropriately so that we can support a UDP or
regular rotation to Alaska and take advantage of the unique
opportunities afforded by the great State of Alaska?
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps prioritizes maximizing
participation in Alaska-based exercises, including Red Flag, Northern
Edge, and Arctic Edge. Arctic Edge 25 exemplifies this increased focus,
evolving from a single company commitment into a large-scale,
distributed, multi-domain exercise, led by a Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) and spanning the Aleutian Islands. The Marine Corps uses
the Unit Deployment Program (UDP), governed by the Global Force
Management Allocation Process (GFMAP), to manage all unit deployments.
Currently, six UDPs exist, five within the U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Three of these
USINDOPACOM deployments position infantry battalions in Okinawa, Japan,
while two are seasonal deployments to Australia and Singapore. Any
increase in UDPs necessitates Combatant Command Requests for Forces
through the GFMAP or direct intervention by the Secretary of Defense.
To source an additional UDP without pulling out of existing
requirements, the Marine Corps would require either end-strength growth
or relief from current taskings. Otherwise, deploying units would face
an unsustainable deployment to dwell ratio and a high level of risk to
operational readiness.
2. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, can you elaborate on what the
Army is doing regarding Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Counter
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (cUAS) testing with the University of
Alaska--Fairbanks and what its plans might be to expand that testing in
the future?
General Mingus. The Army and University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)
Alaska Center for UAS Integration (ACUASI) have developed a strong
partnership in the area of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). UAF has
worked with Army partners on cold weather UAS requirement development,
additive manufacturing feasibility, National Defense Authorization Act-
compliant small UAS training, and airspace deconfliction. Potential
areas for expansion in the future include lethal UAS integration
efforts, longer term airspace management strategy development, and the
addition of a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility for
increased ability for ACUASI to handle classified information.
3. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, the 11th Airborne Division
(Arctic Angels) is the Nation's premiere Arctic unit and it's only
Arctic-designated Airborne Unit. However, in recent years the rollout
of the Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CAT-V) and procurement
contracts for cold weather clothing have fallen short of desired
resourcing levels. Can you describe on what efforts the Army is taking
to speed up CAT-V deployment?
General Mingus. The Army is leveraging fiscal year 2024
Supplemental funding through the Tranche replacement process to
complete the fielding of the Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CAT-V)
to the two brigades of the 11th Airborne Division (ABD). We are on
track to deliver 11 CATVs this fiscal year and another 24 vehicles in
fiscal year 2026. I have approved the developing Arctic Modified Tables
of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to reflect the doctrinal
requirement for equipment required to operate in the Arctic. The
initial basis of issue for CAT-V in an Arctic MTOE is 92 per brigade.
We anticipate this MTOE change to reflect later in fiscal year 2026.
The All-Range Tactical Clothing (ARTC) program for the 11th ABD is
currently on track to award a Low-Rate Initial Production contract in
fiscal year 2026, with initial fielding planned for the 1st quarter of
fiscal year 2027. We are working with the 11th ABD to establish
procedures that will enable the Division to execute direct procurement
of cold weather clothing.
4. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, can you describe what the Army
is doing to create long-term supply chains for winter weather clothing
and personally issued equipment for 11th Airborne?
General Mingus. To improve the delivery of Organizational Clothing
and Individual Equipment (OCIE), the Army has established the Army OCIE
Board (AOB) at the Headquarters Department of the Army level. The AOB
will align current and future OCIE programs with Army priorities,
ensuring optimal funding and addressing the unique needs of units
operating in extreme cold weather, such as the 11th ABD. By fostering
collaboration and enhancing visibility, the AOB will oversee the
funding, fielding, and maintenance of new capabilities for soldiers,
like the ARTC, being developed by the Program Executive Office Soldier,
for operating in arctic climates. This improved oversight will enable
more accurate long-term demand forecasting for our supply partners. The
Army utilizes Regional Logistics Supply Centers and Central Issue
Facilities to efficiently distribute equipment for units.
The Army continues to collaborate closely with our supply partners
through contract reviews, prioritizing clothing and equipment needs,
seeking opportunities to improve visibility into contract performance
and mitigate potential supply shortfalls. The addition of the AOB will
further strengthen the long-term supply chain for extreme weather
clothing and personally issued equipment for units operating in
extreme-weather environments.
In 2024, we enhanced cold weather readiness in Alaska by increasing
the basis of issue for Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System layers 1,
2, and 5, providing an additional set to all Soldiers, including those
in the 11th ABD. This initiative, driven by Soldier feedback and a 2022
request, ensures adequate layering options and addresses laundry cycle
needs in the extreme Alaskan climate. It included utilizing on-hand
stocks and increasing orders, transitioning to Operational Camouflage
Pattern items in 2024.
5. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, as you may know, the President
of the United States (POTUS) signed an executive order called
``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential'' which relies
heavily on the U.S. Army to help the Governor of Alaska facilitate
large scale building projects in Alaska. Can you work with me to ensure
that we are maintaining levels of readiness in U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) to complete these types of projects?
General Mingus. Yes, I will ensure that the Department of the Army
supports and complies with the President's Executive Order to enable
actions in compliance with current law. I will also ensure that the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains a level of readiness to continue
providing assistance to the State of Alaska in accordance with the
President's Executive Order.
6. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, in a 2018 interview, then
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, said that the Navy ``needs to
have on-sea presence [in the Arctic] now that we have a blue water
Arctic more times than not.'' He additionally pushed the Navy to look
at ``warming up Adak again,'' not only for additional training but also
for naval sea and air facilities, as well as bulk fuel capability. When
Chinese and Russian naval vessels and air assets enter the Alaska
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), aircraft and ships must often travel long distances, which
stretch sustainment and make it more difficult to keep a constant
presence in the region where our adversaries are located. How concerned
are you that our existing infrastructure in Alaska is insufficient to
counter the threats posed by China and Russia in the Arctic?
Admiral Kilby. Russia and China are expected to continue their
episodic air and maritime operations in the Arctic region to signal
their deepening defense ties. China has declared itself a ``near-
Arctic-state'' with rights to participate in Arctic governance, as it
seeks to legitimize its influence in Arctic affairs. China is expected
to leverage its increased cooperation with Russia to increase its
Arctic presence. However, neither Chinese nor Russian advancements in
the Arctic have kept pace with their stated goals for Arctic expansion.
The U.S. Navy operates and exercises in the Subarctic Region and
conducts subsurface and periodic surface operations and exercises
within the Arctic Region, including in response to Russian and Chinese
out of area deployers. While dedicated U.S. Navy infrastructure in
Alaska to support these operations is limited, the Navy successfully
relies on joint and commercial infrastructure. Navy combatants--and
more frequently--Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, have refueled in
Alaskan commercial ports including Dutch Harbor and Anchorage over the
past several years. Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and
reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) routinely deploy to and operate from
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. In short, given
the current trajectory of Russian and Chinese military capabilities in
the Arctic, our existing infrastructure in Alaska is sufficient to
counter these threats in the near to mid-term.
7. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, Alaska is the only U.S. State
in the Arctic region. What advantages do you see in having multiple
ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S. Navy
ships?
Admiral Kilby. In the Arctic, as elsewhere, a military force that
possesses multiple locations to rearm, refuel, repair, resupply, and
revive maximizes its operational flexibility. Distributed logistics
hubs allow a fleet to operate persistently, with fewer limitations, and
sustain a higher tempo in support of sustained combat operations. That
being said, the establishment of a forward base with the necessary
capabilities, infrastructure, and personnel to support naval combatants
comes at a very high cost with frequent severe operational restrictions
due to the harsh Arctic environment. We must balance our requirements
for each theater and assess the relative value of potential forward
bases within each theatre compared to the resources required to build
and sustain those bases. With the rapidly increasing reach of the
pacing threat, fixed bases are subject to adversary strikes from
strategic distances, especially in Alaska and the Aleutians, and would
drive a requirement for substantive missile defense capability.
8. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Spain, in 2024, after 10
years of discussions, the Secretary of the Air Force recently signed
off on a memorandum to base 4x KC-135's in Alaska through active
association to Eielson Air Force Base. We are still waiting for final
delivery of 3x KC-135s to Eielson Air Force Base along with the
facilities and military construction projects needed to support them.
This Active Duty component brings flexibility to a very critical
capability in our Air National Guard. Can I get your commitment to
fulfill the promise of Secretary Frank Kendall to send the remaining
three aircraft to Alaska as quickly as possible?
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. On December 13, 2024, the Air Force
announced an increase in KC-135 at Eielson Air Force Base (AFB) with
the first of the four aircraft already assigned and on-station at
Eielson AFB. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) will continue with the transfer
and movement of aircraft, personnel and their families throughout
fiscal year 2026 to meet Full Operational Capability. The USAF is
finalizing its analysis of personnel requirements and expects an
increase of 8175 (plus dependents). Initial coordination of the
Overseas Force Structure Change is being staffed by the Joint Staff and
OSD.
unmanned aircraft systems and counter unmanned aircraft systems
9. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, how are lessons learned about
UAS/cUAS warfare from Ukraine and the Tower 22 incident in the Middle
East making their way into maneuver doctrine and training?
General Mingus. The Army, with feedback from Army Commands to
include our joint partners, uses the lessons learned and observations
drawn from recent conflicts to inform our approach to doctrine
development, Initial Military Training, and unit training in
preparation for combat operations. For example, the Maneuver Center of
Excellence (MCoE) recently published Counter-sUAS Training Modules in
Joint Knowledge On-Line and has published the react to sUAS contact
mounted and dismounted battle drill. The team is currently developing a
doctrinal publication describing the tactical employment of sUAS and
two Training Circulars providing training guidance for both sUAS and
lethal sUAS systems. The MCoE also ensures Initial Military Training,
Infantry and Armor Basic Officer Leader Courses, Maneuver Captains
Career Courses, and multiple functional courses all incorporate sUAS
into training. This training uses specific techniques, such as the use
of cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersion, radio, and electronic
transmission discipline as well as incorporating inert drop munitions
(water balloons and chalk) to simulate sUAS aerial attack in training.
All this is done to enable Soldiers to operate in an environment
contested with the ubiquitous presence of sUAS or drones. Finally,
lessons learned are used to develop Opposing Forces threat scenarios at
our Combat Training Centers providing the most realistic combat
training and scenarios to develop the most lethal Warfighters and
units.
10. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, what does that pipeline look
like from the moment the lessons are gathered to dissemination into the
Force?
General Mingus. The pipeline of observations from the evolving
character of warfare and change on battlefields is best characterized
as The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) which consists of--
Military Analyst Forward--Field units--our automated Quickfire system
and connections to the Joint Lessons Learned System.
Ukraine along with multiple theaters are actively monitored due to
rapidly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures of warfare.
Regardless of the source for the observation, trend, or insight, we
have the systems and processes in place to rapidly analyze the
observation for U.S. Army implications. This process feeds the
development of changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).
To enable rapid entry and dissemination, we have the Quickfire
observation portal that allows all Army components maximum access to
enter observation, trend, and insight feedback. Quickfire affirms that
every Soldier is a mobile and agile sensor. Senior leaders can view a
dashboard to quickly detect training and operation trends that span the
DOTMLPF-P spectrum. CALL maintains the data entries in a cloud with
Microsoft Business Intelligence software.
Changes in Doctrine, Training, and Leadership and Education are
relatively fast--days to weeks from the time we screen an observation
as valid and identify its U.S. Army implications. Solutions requiring
organizational re-design, new materiel, upgraded facilities, or even
revised policies take longer--months to even years depending on the
respective manning, equipping, or military construction processes.
Continuous Transformation addresses all time horizons: Transformation
in Contact (near term solutions 18-24 months), Deliberate
Transformation (2-7 years), and Concept-Driven Transformation (7 to 15
years).
Concurrently, CALL analysts are present with key units, locations,
and training events to observe and guide the feedback process pipeline.
In addition, CALL conducts quarterly lesson learned reviews and updates
across the Army enterprise which brings in all Army leaders to
highlight changes, current trends and status of on-going lessons
integration. This is also the venue where field units are selected to
share and brief key observations from recent exercises, training events
or experimentation. This pipeline enables DOTMLPF-P integration with
the alignment of Army Futures Command, Futures and Concepts Center,
Cross Functional Teams, Capability Development Integration Directorates
with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Combined Arms Center,
and Centers of Excellence. These key organizations enable enterprise-
level force development and provide warfighters with the concepts and
future force designs needed for transformation.
11. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus and General Mahoney, how are
the Army and Marine Corps working together to develop UAS or cUAS
capabilities for ground forces?
General Mingus. The Army has partnered with the USMC on a few
efforts in both the C-sUAS and sUAS capabilities. In the C-sUAS space,
the Army leveraged USMC Tactical Resupply UAS program for our Joint
Tactical Autonomous Aerial Resupply System efforts. We utilized the
same air vehicle (Service Engineering TRV-150) and leveraged USMC
research and development efforts and their data to support Army
Airworthiness Release, Authority to Operate, Life Cycle Sustainment
Plan, and other documentation. In the sUAS space, we coordinate with
USMC to leverage their data on systems they have researched to support
our Long-Range Reconnaissance (LRR) effort, which consists of at least
one of the potential awardees for the LRR development contract. The
Army also expects to initiate Middle Tier Rapid Prototyping efforts in
early fiscal year 2026 for its Launched Effects Long Range effort and
plans to again leverage significant investment made by the USMC in
their launched effects capabilities. This will allow for accelerated
fielding to Soldiers and provide a valuable baseline for further
development.
General Mahoney. The Army and Marine Corps are collaborating to
develop UAS capabilities for ground forces through mutual briefings and
integration efforts. The Marine Corps recently briefed Army
stakeholders on the Unmanned Common Control (UCC) concept and policy,
while the Army shared details on its Uncrewed Vehicle Control (UVC)
program, which leverages common software like Robotics and Autonomous
Command and Control (RAC2) for ground systems and small UAS, and
Scalable Control Interface (SCI) for larger UAS. The Army excels in
software development but faces hardware challenges, whereas the Marine
Corps has identified MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link (MANGL) hardware
nodes for UCC but lacks integrated software. In fiscal years 2025 to
2026, UCC efforts will involve competing and selecting UCC software,
with Army's SCI, RAC2, and UVC under consideration. Regular meetings
and Army UVC demonstration touchpoints facilitate further integration.
The Marine Corps works directly with the Army and the Joint Force
to inform development of cUAS capabilities. Additionally, the
relationship with the Joint Counter-Small UAS Office (JCO), led by the
Army as the Department of Defense's executive agent for counter-small
UAS, identifies opportunities for resource sharing, enhanced
interoperability, and potential streamlined acquisition. The forum
provided by the JCO governance process at the working group and general
officer levels enhances information sharing and promotes collaboration.
The Marine Corps actively engages with the JCO, leveraging lessons
learned from JCO activities to inform air defense capability
development. Also, the Marine Corps' participation in periodic
demonstrations, experiments, and exercises with the Army Rapid
Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office has provided welcomed
exposure to the myriad cUAS solutions, some of which may be adopted for
Marine Corps use. Additionally, the Marine Corps is exploring expanding
participation in JCO-developed training materials and courses at the
Joint Counter-Small UAS University (JCU) at Fort Sill to improve cUAS
capabilities across the Marine Corps and promote further alignment with
Army UAS efforts.
12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Spain, in my home State of
Alaska we have the highest concentration of combat-coded fifth
generation aircraft in the world including F-35s. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has reported extensively on F-35
sustainment challenges including low mission capable and full mission
capable rates that do not meet service targets, reliability and
maintenance issues, and spare parts availability.
Lieutenant General Spain, in 2024, GAO reported that Department of
Defense (DOD) plans call for procuring 2,470 F-35s at an estimated
total acquisition cost of about $442 billion and an additional $1.58
trillion in sustainment costs. These costs have grown 44 percent since
2018 due to an extension of the planned life cycle of the aircraft to
the 2070's and 2080's. In recent years the program has not met
performance goals for F-35 aircraft readiness. What is the Air Force
doing to improve F-35 affordability and availability to ensure the
aircraft are ready to support mission needs?
Lieutenant General Spain. We are also not satisfied with the
current sustainment posture in the F-35 program. The USAF is engaged
with the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), international partners, and
industry teammates to address sustainment costs challenges and fully
supports the current JPO F-35 Sustainment Reset efforts. The USAF will
continue to provide expertise and resources to assist the JPO in
working sustainment contracting, modernization prioritization, and
propulsion issues, among others. The largest Service drivers for
sustainment costs are fleet size, flying hours, and personnel. The USAF
is reviewing the Future Force Design, the appropriate mix of live,
virtual, and constructive training for our pilots, and the optimum
number of maintenance personnel for the program.
13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Spain, how do the
sustainment challenges I've outlined above effect the Services' ability
to meet operations and training requirements for the aircraft in the
near and long term?
Lieutenant General Spain. Shortfalls in F-35 mission capability
rates directly impact operational readiness and training requirements.
Deployed units are meeting their readiness requirements, but units in
garrison are operating at suboptimal capacity, are suffering training
shortfalls, and are forced to focus on priority training requirements
to mitigate those impacts. The F-35 flying training units face
additional challenges from older model aircraft that have lower mission
capability rates than the fleet average. We fully support the F-35
Joint Program Office Sustainment Reset efforts to aggressively address
all F-35 readiness issues.
shipbuilding capacity
14. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and Ms. Maurer, since 2018 the
Navy has been implementing the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program (SIOP) to improve the Nation's four public yards and maximize
maintenance availabilities. Can you describe what the status of those
improvements are overall and whether you're pleased with the progress
the Navy has made?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, the Navy is satisfied with the improvements
delivered to date and appreciates the ongoing support from Congress for
this critically important program. To date, SIOP has completed 45
projects, 237 new pieces of capitalized equipment, and an Area
Development Plan for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. Included in the $1.2B
of completed construction is a Waterfront Production Facility at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard expected to reduce submarine maintenance
period duration by 2 percent, as well as upgraded piers for the newest
Virginia Class Submarines and a training facility in Norfolk that
consolidates classrooms from 14 different buildings. Progress continues
with 48 projects in execution (valued at $6 billion), including the dry
dock 3 replacement in Pearl Harbor, the shipyard electrical backbone in
Puget Sound, the dry dock 4 refueling complex in Norfolk, and the
multi-mission dry dock #1 extension in Portsmouth.
Ms. Maurer. The Navy must have combat-ready ships to keep the U.S.
safe and ensure the seas are open to trade. The Navy's four public
shipyards in the U.S. play a critical role in helping the Navy maintain
the readiness of its fleet of nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines
and in supporting ongoing operations around the world.
The Navy has taken several actions in recent years to improve the
four public Navy shipyards in the U.S. but has made limited progress
implementing its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP).
Since 2017, GAO has issued a series of reports with 10 recommendations
to help enhance the Navy's efforts to improve the public shipyards. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions
that Affect Operations, GAO-17-548 (Washington, DC, Sept. 12, 2017);
GAO, Naval Shipyards: Key Actions Remain to Improve Infrastructure to
Better Support Navy Operations, GAO-20-64 (Washington, DC, Nov. 25,
2019); GAO, Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Cost and Schedule
Estimates for Shipyard Improvement, GAO-23-106067 (Washington, DC, June
28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO found in prior work, for example:
The Navy's four public shipyards in the U.S are in poor
condition, and capital equipment is generally past its useful life.
Navy dry docks are unable to support newer ship classes,
such as the Ford-class aircraft carrier and some Virginia-class attack
submarines.
Navy drydocks are vulnerable to flooding and seismic
risks such as earthquakes.
The Navy's public shipyards in the U.S. have inefficient
layouts that contribute to thousands of days of maintenance delays for
aircraft carriers and submarines.
GAO reported that in July 2022, the Navy completed a shipyard-
specific plan for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to inform estimates for
the overall SIOP costs--including dry dock, facility optimization, and
capital equipment costs. The Navy's estimated costs to implement the
plan significantly increased--by $9.9 billion, or 162 percent above its
2018 estimate--due to several factors, such as expanding the scope of
individual projects as well as identifying additional projects that
were not part of the original cost estimate. As noted previously, the
Navy intends to complete a shipyard-specific plan for each of the four
public shipyards in the U.S.
In 2023, GAO identified several key challenges affecting dry docks,
facilities, and equipment.\2\ These include: costs of SIOP drydock
projects have more than doubled; backlog of restoration and
modernization projects intended to restore, renovate, or replace
buildings or components has continued to grow in recent years, and is
now over $7 billion; and the age of capital equipment has grown since
2016, and more than half of all shipyard equipment is past its expected
service life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Cost and
Schedule Estimates for Shipyard Improvement, GAO-23-106067 (Washington,
DC, June 28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of March 2025, the Navy has implemented five of GAO's
recommendations. Implementing these recommendations has allowed the
Navy to better manage its SIOP efforts by ensuring clear roles and
responsibilities, performing regular management reviews, and providing
consistent updates to Congress, among others (see table 1).
However, as of March 2025, the Navy has not implemented five GAO
recommendations related to SIOP (see table 2).
Absent improvements, the Navy public shipyards in the U.S. will be
unable to support about a third of the Navy's planned maintenance
availabilities for aircraft carriers and submarines through 2040. The
lack of a results-oriented management approach could lead to
ineffective investment, resulting in missed opportunities for
improvement that could affect shipyard cost and schedule performance.
Further, if the shipyards are unable to maintain facilities and
equipment, they risk not being able to support Navy readiness over the
long term. Moreover, by developing a more complete cost estimate, the
Navy could reduce the risk that it might request too little funding to
achieve its desired outcome. Without high-quality estimates, agencies
are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and
performance shortfalls. Last, by ensuring the Navy follows best
practices for cost and schedule estimating for all key SIOP projects,
the Navy could reduce the risk that it might request too little funding
to achieve its desired outcomes or experience schedule slippages that
could adversely affect its ongoing maintenance missions.
GAO is currently examining the Navy's implementation of SIOP,
including plans and projects at each of the four public Navy shipyards.
Specifically, GAO is reviewing the extent to which (1) Navy oversight
of SIOP includes processes for identifying, mitigating, and
communicating program risks to inform decisionmaking; (2) the Navy has
established project management mechanisms to ensure each shipyard's
SIOP projects fulfill shipyard, fleet, and program requirements and
objectives; and (3) what, if any, challenges, efficiencies, or other
observations the Navy has identified implementing SIOP to date, and to
what extent has it informed relevant SIOP planning or project
activities. GAO plans to issue its report in early 2026.
15. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, last year in response to
concerns about ship repair capacity in allied shipyards, my team worked
on a provision to expand repair access for U.S. ships in overseas
locations. That provision got significantly pared back. Do you believe
that we have adequate ship repair capability between Guam and the First
Island Chain right now or should we look to expand on last year's
provision?
Admiral Kilby. The Navy appreciates your support and the additional
authorities provided by the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA in 10 USC 8680. They
provide the Navy with the ability to conduct limited maintenance
availabilities on non-forward deployed naval vessels in foreign
shipyards. These authorities to conduct this maintenance for non-
forward deployed vessels is key. This ensures that exercises do not
impact the operational or personnel tempo of forward deployed naval
vessels. The authorities provided are critical in aiding the Navy to
identify which foreign shipyards are capable of adequately maintaining
and repairing U.S. naval vessels prior to the start of any potential
conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and this authority allows us to do so.
16. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, last year it was discovered
that there were a number of issues with critical welds made on
submarines made at Newport News Shipbuilding. Can you provide an update
on how Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and the Navy are working
together to take corrective action on this issue?
Admiral Kilby. Huntington Ingalls Industries--Newport News
Shipbuilding (NNS) identified a global population of 35,015 joints that
could be faulty due to improper adherence to weld procedures. With the
assistance of the Navy and General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB), NNS
deemed 20,836 joints acceptable as built. The remaining 14,179 joints
were subjected to additional engineering analysis that included various
sampling and lab tests of the actual welds. NNS identified, via their
analysis, 82 welds that required repair, all of which have been
repaired. Based on the positive analysis results and completion of the
weld sampling plan, no additional repairs are required and NNS and the
Navy are finalizing the official documentation to approve the affected
hulls for full-service life.
17. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and Ms. Maurer, what amount of
money do you estimate the Navy needs for repair and maintenance to get
the Marine Corps amphibious fleet above 80 percent surge readiness by
fiscal year 2027?
Admiral Kilby. The Surface Warfare Enterprise is conducting
analysis into what changes will be required to deliver 80 percent
Combat Surge Readiness in the Amphibious Force and the rest of the
Surface Force. There are actions we are already taking such as
procuring diesel engine overhaul kits, expanding rotatable pools of
parts for cranes and davits, locking in work packages at least 120 days
ahead of availability start, and up to 500 days ahead for LHA/LHD class
ships, and completing open and inspect work prior to availability
start. Navy is aggressively identifying other specific drivers with
supporting metrics that we can use to drive improvements in the system
and a more efficient flow of ships through the shipyards. Once the
analysis is complete, we will be able to more accurately understand the
cost to deliver 80 percent Combat Surge Ready across the Amphibious
Force and the rest of the Surface Navy.
Ms. Maurer. As GAO has been reporting for the past decade, the Navy
faces persistent maintenance challenges that continue to hinder its
efforts to rebuild ship readiness. The Navy recognizes that addressing
these challenges will require years of sustained management attention
and resources. While the full cost to repair and maintain the
amphibious fleet is unknown, taking action to address GAO's many
recommendations can help the Navy make decisions about resource
allocation to meet the Chief of Naval Operations' goal of achieving an
80 percent combat surge ready posture by 2027.
According to GAO, one of the key reasons that the Navy is not
meetings its ship availability targets is the poor condition of many
amphibious warfare ships. As of March 2024, the Navy's Surface
Maintenance Engineering Planning Program assessed that 16 of the Navy's
32 amphibious warfare ships were in unsatisfactory condition. \1\ With
half of the fleet in poor condition--including some ships that have
been unavailable for years at a time--we are concerned it may be
difficult for the Navy to get the amphibious fleet to 80 percent surge
readiness by fiscal year 2027.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Navy's March 2024 assessment did not include two LPD class
ships it took delivery of in 2022 and 2024, but we included them in
this analysis as the Navy considers new ships to be in satisfactory
material condition until they are evaluated as part of their first
major maintenance period, which had not yet occurred for either ship at
the time of our analysis. According to officials from the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, the assessment also included a timeframe for
when (and if) a ship in unsatisfactory condition is expected to return
to a satisfactory State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another key reason the Navy is not meeting its ship availability
goals is that it has generally failed to complete amphibious warfare
ship maintenance in accordance with its planned schedules. For
amphibious warfare ships that began depot maintenance periods in fiscal
years 2020-2022, the Navy only completed three of 14 of those periods
on schedule.\2\ The remaining 11 maintenance periods that the Navy did
not complete on schedule resulted in more than 1,200 days of cumulative
delays. Maintenance delays can result in cascading delays to training
and, ultimately, deployment. Additionally, in total, the maintenance
periods cost $400 million more than the original contract value for the
efforts. To address the poor condition of the amphibious fleet and the
Navy not meeting amphibious ship planned maintenance schedules, it is
important that the Navy implement the recommendations GAO has made to
improve readiness outcomes. In a selection of reports published from
2020 through 2024 on Navy ship sustainment, GAO has made a total of 49
recommendations that, as of April 2025, have not been implemented.
Among others:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to these delays. For example,
we reported in April 2021 that COVID-19 exacerbated challenges they
were already facing with their workforce when the pandemic began, such
as personnel shortages or not having personnel with the right skills to
perform work. GAO, Depot Maintenance: DOD Should Improve Pandemic Plans
and Publish Working Capital Fund Policy, GAO-21-103 (Washington, DC:
April 6, 2021).
In December 2024, GAO recommended that the Navy should
not cancel depot maintenance for amphibious ships proposed for
divestment that have yet to reach the end of their expected service
life, prior to providing the requisite certification to the
congressional defense committees and completing the divestment waiver
process.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Amphibious Warfare Fleet: Navy Needs to Complete Key
Efforts to Better Ensure Ships Are Available for Marines, GAO-25-106728
(Washington, DC.: Dec. 3, 2024).
In December 2024, GAO recommended that the Navy establish
performance goals with tangible, measurable objectives and associated
timeframes that can be used to measure progress, for implementing the
recommendations identified in the May 2023 Amphibious Readiness Review
and, when completed, for implementing recommendations resulting from
the Navy's April 2024 review.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO-25-106728.
In May 2022, GAO recommended that the Navy identify and
assess the full range of fleet-wide risks, including operational,
technical, and economic risks, associated with deferred surface ship
depot maintenance.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Navy Ships: Applying Leading Practices and Transparent
Reporting Could Help Reduce Risks Posed by Nearly $1.8 Billion
Maintenance Backlog, GAO-22-105032 (Washington, DC.: May 9, 2022).
In February 2022, GAO made 4 recommendations for the Navy
to improve its intermediate maintenance periods, including to establish
and implement procedures to collect and analyze reliable maintenance
data; designate an entity to address maintenance challenges; share best
practices and lessons learned; and include the performance of
intermediate maintenance periods in strategic planning efforts.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Navy Ship Maintenance: Actions Needed to Monitor and
Address the Performance of Intermediate Maintenance Periods, GAO-22-
104510 (Washington, DC: Feb. 8, 2022).
The Navy requested about $24.9 billion to maintain combat surface
fleet ships--which include amphibious fleet ships--from fiscal years
2020 through 2023. Approximately $25.9 billion was enacted--about $1
billion more than requested. The Navy obligated $25.8 billion--or 99.7
percent of the about $25.9 billion--and, as of the end of fiscal year
2023, had expended about $20 billion in obligations. Specifically for
amphibious assault ships (which includes 2 LHA and 7 LHD ships), the
Navy requested approximately $7.2 billion for maintenance from fiscal
years 2020 through 2023, with approximately $7.7 billion enacted, $7.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
billion obligated, and $6.2 billion expended.
18. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, how does that number change if
we are talking about continuous maintenance and readiness as opposed to
surge capacity?
Admiral Kilby. The focus for amphibious ship maintenance is to
capitalize on opportunities to improve readiness and operational
availability through on time completion of depot level maintenance and
through the use of continuous maintenance, which plays a critical role
in sustaining readiness levels between major overhauls. This is
especially important as we aim for an 80 percent surge ready fleet by
January 2027. The 80 percent combat surge ready metric is measured
across all ships not in the maintenance phase. Navy is actively
exploring avenues to better align funding with the Navy's long-term
readiness objectives while ensuring that continuous maintenance
processes are maximized effectively across all available windows.
19. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, my office passed the
requirement for the Marine Corps to have 31 amphibious ships at all
times minimum. The Marine Corps Commandant is attempting to meet
operational planning requests from the combatant commands by setting a
requirement of 3x Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit
(ARG/MEU) ready and able to deploy at any one time worldwide. In a
recent Voice of America article, you mentioned the 31 ship requirement
as the requirement you are planning for and that the ARG/MEU 3.0
requirement is not a requirement. While that is legally correct, why is
the Navy choosing not to take the combatant command requirement as the
requirement is should shoot for when it comes to readiness?
Admiral Kilby. While the Navy attempts to resource all combatant
command requests, the Combatant Commands regularly request more forces
than the Navy can supply--across all platforms. The Joint Staff and
Office of the Secretary of Defense conduct a thorough review of all
requests and adjudicate those requests against the current strategic
guidance and the Services' ability to source those requirements.
Ultimately, the Joint Staff directs the services on which Combatant
Command requests to meet.
Navy Force Design and Development efforts are aligned to the
Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance as well as the Joint
Warfighting Concept. Following the publication of the forthcoming
National Defense Strategy, and the associated Defense Planning
Scenarios, Navy will initiate the Battle Force Ship Assessment and
Requirement process, per U.S. Code Title 10, Section 8695, to identify
future fleet composition and size to meet the NDS and as a component of
Navy long-range planning efforts. This effort will include all
components of the battle force and will ensure that the Navy is able to
field a Fleet suitable for global operations.
Presently, our primary focus is to increase the combat surge ready
(CSR) status of our existing amphibious fleet with a goal of achieving
80 percent CSR. Amphibious ship CSR is currently 42 percent which we
acknowledge is unacceptable. We are taking actions to increase
readiness by procuring diesel engine overhaul kits, expanding rotatable
pools of parts for cranes and davits, locking in work packages at least
120 days ahead of availability start and up to 500 days ahead for LHA/
LHD class ships, and completing open and inspection work prior to
availability start.
20. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, do you agree we should be
aiming for 3.0 MEUs deployable and if not, why not?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, we should aim for this goal, but under the
current force structure of ships and marines, a continuous deployable
3.0 Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) is not
achievable. The Navy must also work to meet demand for aircraft,
carriers, submarines, and surface combatants and balance the demand
across all platforms. To meet combatant command demand across all
platforms, the Nation requires a much larger Navy with the manpower,
maintenance, ordnance, infrastructure, and operations funding to
support that larger fleet. Additionally, there is a process within the
Department of Defense to adjudicate the COCOM demand against the
Service's ability to provide those forces. That process generates the
required presence the Service must supply. The Navy does, however, owe
the Marine Corps, and regional combatant commanders, a three-ship ARG/
MEU and we are executing targeted actions to ensure the ARG/MEU can
deploy as a group.
21. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mahoney, please
outline here your personal positions when it comes to how you think the
Navy should change its budget and resourcing allocations to get
amphibious ships above the 80 percent surge readiness threshold. Please
include analysis of how the navy is currently allocating budgetary
resources to naval warship repair and maintenance versus amphibious
ship repair and maintenance. Please also include a side-by-side
comparison of the length of delays for Navy warships versus similar
amphibious warships when it comes to repair and maintenance. Finally,
please outline using bullet points any disagreements you all have about
the way the resources described above are being allocated currently and
how you are working toward finding a solution.
Admiral Kilby. I am committed to getting the amphibious ships above
the 80 percent surge readiness threshold.
The Navy is transforming amphibious ship maintenance to improve
readiness in a few different ways:
World-Class Planning: NAVSEA led a planning sprint with
combined input from 50+ stakeholders across the surface force readiness
enterprise comparing Navy processes against cruise lines, commercial
aviation, and commercial nuclear power plants. Navy adopted some of the
best practices like generating a Government Preliminary Schedule (GPS)
up to 540 days before maintenance. This allows us to lock the scope of
the maintenance period based upon the duration of our schedule and not
cost.
Pit Stop Strategy: This strategy removes complex diesel
overhauls out of major maintenance periods and doing them in targeted
continuous maintenance availabilities (CMAVS). This accelerates
readiness and reduces downtime. Pit Stops have been successfully
accomplished on five LSD class amphibs and the goal is to expand this
strategy to other classes of amphib ships.
Contracting Strategies: Surface maintenance acquisition
strategies are evolving to enhance surface ship repair capabilities and
improve operational readiness. We are developing a holistic suite of
contracting options to support a resilient and tailored contracting
approach.
Planning is key to successful execution. Learning from
past experiences, our large deck amphibious ships can benefit from
being awarded earlier than A-120 award. By awarding our most
challenging availabilities at A-360, we are providing a longer planning
window with a committed industry partner. This workload certainty for
industry will assist in developing more effective resource and
availability planning. The first two will be USS Makin Island and USS
John P. Murtha.
Reducing risk in critical efforts directly improves the
ability to deliver ships on time. Complex system repairs to systems
such as steam boilers, main propulsion diesels, and lifting and
handling systems are drivers in meeting schedule. We are developing
strategies to partner with providers (whether it be an Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or others) to provide a continuity of
support for targeted systems across platforms. Dedicated resources (in
the form of trade skills and material) can provide increased schedule
resiliency.
We are exploring longer term contractual relationships
with our industry partners for our continuous maintenance
availabilities (CMAVs). By establishing competitive pricing for
standard work that is typically performed in short in port maintenance
windows, we are building a more responsive and balanced contractual
relationship (single award IDIQ contract) to ensure operational support
while providing increased work certainty for industry.
Updating Class Maintenance Plans: This approach shifts
from the ``open and inspect'' strategy to clearly defining the repair
requirement before the maintenance period starts. For example, for USS
America (LHA 6), nearly all mandatory tank inspections were completed
before the maintenance period started by using insertable camera
technology versus manned entry tank inspections. By using the
insertable camera system, 50 tanks are able to be inspected per week by
a six-person team.
Material Readiness: To maximize operational readiness, we
are transitioning from reactive maintenance to a proactive, data-driven
approach for diesel, steam, and crane/davit systems. Utilizing
predictive analytics and condition-based maintenance technologies, we
will anticipate maintenance needs, enabling proactive forecasting and
timely ordering of materials from the DOD supply system. This strategy
minimizes downtime, optimizes resource allocation, and increases
material availability.
The Navy uses the same scheduling, programming, methodology and
funding tools to generate current and future years maintenance
requirements for ALL surface ships, which includes amphibious and other
surface combatants. All surface vessel CNO availability maintenance is
conducted in the private sector, primarily in fleet concentration
areas, and selected forward deployed regional maintenance centers in
Japan, Spain and Bahrain. Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning
Program (SURFMEPP) is responsible for generating detailed Technical
Foundation Papers (TFP's) by class and twice annually updates
individual by hull, by specific availability ship sheets from which the
CNO availability maintenance requirements are developed and priced.
Multiple factors impact in-year execution of individual ship depot
maintenance packages. Among these factors are the volatility of
operational schedules impacting maintenance execution, longer
deployment cycles, unanticipated growth and new work found after
contract signing that impacts size and duration of CNO availabilities,
and private industry struggles to assume the total Navy workload in
fleet concentration areas. CNO maintenance availability packages for
amphibious ships, particularly large deck amphibs, tend to be bigger
and longer in duration due to the negative impact of higher than
average operational tempo and age of vessels.
Based on our increased efforts such as procuring diesel engine
overhaul kits, expanding rotatable pools of parts for cranes and
davits, locking in work packages at least 120 days ahead of
availability start, and completing open and inspect work prior to
availability start, the Navy is aggressively driving improvements in
the system and a more efficient flow of amphibious ships through the
shipyards. The Surface fleet has obtained a combat surge readiness of
62 percent with the Amphibious fleet at 42 percent combat surge ready.
While the process improvements in amphibious ship maintenance is
beginning to take effect, I am not satisfied as we continue to work
toward meeting the goal of 80 percent combat surge readiness and close
the gap between the amphibious fleet and our other surface platforms.
Navy is conducting a detailed analysis of how the Navy is currently
allocating budgetary resources to surface combatant warship repair and
maintenance versus amphibious ship repair and maintenance. The Navy
will continue to review opportunities to refine its approach to
requesting and allocating resources for surface ship maintenance with
an eye toward opportunities to improve amphibious ship readiness.
General Mahoney. Recent GAO reports highlighted how the Navy has
allocated budgetary resources to warship repair and maintenance versus
amphibious ship maintenance. The Navy's Amphibious Ship Maintenance
Performance (ASMP) Review also highlights focus areas that contribute
to low readiness for amphibious warfare ships. The Marine Corps will
continue to work with our Navy shipmates on improving maintenance and
construction so that the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is ready to support combatant commander
registered and Joint Staff-validated requirements. Given the GAO
reports and the ASMP, specific focus areas include the availability of
long-lead-time materials, steam-repair contract capacity, and mid-life
upgrades. Ultimately, the Marine Corps supports the Navy's efforts to
maintain, modernize, and procure AWS, and the Navy's desire to break
out AWS in its performance to plan effort.
While the Navy has an 80 percent surge readiness goal, Sec. 352 of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2024
(Semiannual Briefing on the Operational Status of the Amphibious
Warship Fleet) requires a maintenance and repair plan for sustaining a
3.0 ARG/MEU. The Marine Corps is supporting the Navy in any way
possible in developing this congressionally mandated plan since a 3.0
ARG/MEU is a top commandant-level priority. Combatant commanders gain a
sustained presence from a 3.0 ARG/MEU, which differs from a surge
force. The plan mandated in Sec. 352 will provide a detailed analysis
of the resources needed to get to a 3.0 ARG/MEU. However, any
additional resources put toward AWS in service to an 80 percent surge
readiness goal will likely improve the currently low rates of
readiness.
22. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Maurer, please outline the major
difference GAO noted in its recent report on Shipbuilding Repair and
Maintenance between how the Marine Corps and the Navy view the
amphibious ship repair problem, especially when it comes to allocation
of resources.
Ms. Maurer. In GAO's December 2024 report on the amphibious warfare
fleet, we reported that the Navy and Marine Corps have disagreed on the
number of ships that should be available at any given time to conduct
operations and training. \1\ The services have established an
analytical process to further develop ship availability definitions and
targets, but the definitions require further refinement. Additionally,
the process does not have a timeframe for completion or implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Amphibious Warfare Fleet: Navy Needs to Complete Key
Efforts to Better Ensure Ships Are Available for Marines, GAO-25-106728
(Washington, DC.: Dec. 3, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, according to Navy and Marine Corps officials, the
services have yet to agree on how many ships within the amphibious
fleet should be available for operations and training at any given
time. For the past several years, the Navy and Marine Corps have not
agreed on basic amphibious warfare fleet requirements, such as the size
and availability of the fleet. Congress has subsequently enacted
statutes that provide the Marine Corps with more influence in
establishing requirements for the amphibious warfare fleet.
In February 2024, Navy and Marine Corps leadership established a
memo that requires the services to conduct an analytical process
resulting in a plan that meets two general goals related to (1) ship
availability definitions and (2) ship availability concerns. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The memorandum establishes a four-step process that the Navy
and Marine Corps must complete. For the purposes of this report, we
group those four steps into two general goals. While the memo's goal
related to defining ship availability is unclassified, its remaining
contents and required outputs are classified.
1) The first goal is intended to define what constitutes an
available ship. In June 2024, the Navy and Marine Corps completed this
goal by agreeing on a common understanding of what constitutes an
available ship. Although the services took an initial step to define
ship availability, we found these definitions are not tied to specific
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and measurable terms in some cases.
2) The second goal is to generally address concerns related to
amphibious warfare ship availability. Completion of this goal should
result in a plan that partially addresses challenges the Navy and
Marine Corps face related to ship availability. As we reported in
December 2024, Navy officials told us that they and the Marine Corps
had yet to complete their initial report. Additionally, the memo does
not clearly specify that the final plan should identify a specific
number of ships that need to be available over the near-and long-term
future to meet Marine Corps and statutory requirements. \3\ According
to officials from Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat Development &
Integration, a preliminary Marine Corps assessment conducted prior to
the memo's release indicated that a higher number of amphibious warfare
ships should be available for operations or training compared to the
Navy's initial assessment. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024,
Pub. L. No. 118-31 (2023) requires the Secretary of the Navy to prepare
a plan to schedule maintenance and repair in a manner that provides for
the continuous operation of a total of three Amphibious Ready Groups.
\4\ The specific numbers of ships that should be available
according to the Marine Corps' and Navy's respective assessments are
classified.
To address the differences between the Navy and Marine Corps
regarding the amphibious fleet, we made two recommendations that the
services 1) refine definitions related to amphibious warfare ship
availability to include specific and measurable terms and 2) establish
a timeframe for completing and implementing their ongoing joint plan to
address ship availability concerns and ensure that the analysis results
in a specific number of amphibious warfare ships that the Navy and
Marine Corps require to be available at any given time. Until the
services implement these recommendations, they will be at continued
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
risk of late or disaggregated marine deployments.
23. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, will you commit to working
with the Senate Armed Services Committee to review military
specification requirements for naval vessels created and executed by
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and to proactively recommend the
removal of those deemed most burdensome?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, I will commit to reviewing naval vessel
requirements executed by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). I
recognize the importance of ensuring these requirements support
operational effectiveness and readiness without overly complicating
ship design and construction. I am committed to identifying and
recommending the removal or revision of requirements that are outdated,
overly burdensome, or do not add clear value to the mission.
air and missile defense
24. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, how is the Army ensuring that
combatant commands' requirements for missile defense are being met
considering the low retention and recruitment levels of Army air
defense soldiers?
General Mingus. Recruiting efforts for our Air Defense Soldiers
have resulted in achieving 109 percent of our goal, year-to-date, and
we are projected to be at 105 percent at the end of the fiscal year.
Our emphasis on a robust bonus structure, guaranteed preferred
assignments, and the success of the United States Army Recruiting
Command (USAREC) drives our effectiveness. These efforts come at a
particularly critical time as the Army undergoes the most significant
air and missile defense modernization in the last 40 years, by adding
such capabilities as the 16th and 17th Patriot battalion, 9 IFPC
battalions, and additional divisional short-range air defense
battalions, which include counter-UAS capabilities.
25. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office has reported that the Army faced challenges
meeting service goals and requirements and factors that contributed to
these challenges. These challenges include air and missile defense
soldiers experiencing high operational tempo, unpredictable deployment
schedules, the lack of an implementation plan to achieve recruitment
goals for this specialty, and a personnel management data system that
oftentimes provided inaccurate or incomplete data. What is the Army
doing to increase its recruitment and retention rates for Air Defense
(14 series) soldiers?
General Mingus. The Army has taken this seriously. USAREC
prioritized air defense artillery positions through critical skills
bonuses, training seat management, and station of choice in negotiating
enlistment contracts. As a result, recruitment for this Career
Management Field (CMF) has steadily improved in first term accessions
over the last 3 years. In fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2025, the
Army achieved 62 percent, 92 percent and 106 percent of the CMF goals
respectively. Projecting forward, the Army's recruiting force through
its transformation is positioned to meet the needs of the force for
this CMF. To implement the Army's strategic vision, retaining and
growing our Air and Missile Defense (AMD) population is crucial. CMF 14
has maintained a steady and positive retention rate over the last 3
years. In fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2025, retention rates for CMF
14 remained at an average of 882 percent. Projecting forward, the Army
has CMF target rate to facilitate precision targeting within retention.
To date, CMF 14 is at 97.3 percent of the fiscal year 2025 retention
target. The Army launched a plan to monitor and improve retention rates
across AMD commands while targeting specific reclassification goals to
increase this population. We're also focusing on key military
occupational specialty reclassifications to meet future operational
needs, with a phased approach that balances growth and sustainability
to improve predictability and stability. Moving forward, we will
continually assess our progress and adjust strategies to maintain a
healthy AMD force while ensuring alignment with our broader talent
management and leader development efforts.
training accidents
26. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General
Mahoney, General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, training
accidents, such as accidents involving ground combat vehicles, continue
to be a challenge for the military services resulting in aircraft,
equipment, and vehicle damage, and servicemember injuries and deaths.
Recent GAO reports have pointed to issues related to accident data
collection, safety and risk management processes, and training. For
example, in 2018, GAO reported that DOD safety centers did not collect
standardized data as part of their accident investigations. In
addition, a 2021 GAO report on military vehicle accidents found that
improper supervision, training, and risk management processes
contributed to more than half of the most serious accidents. To what
extent has your service taken steps to collect and analyze standardized
data as part of accident investigations?
General Mingus. The Army has implemented the DOD safety data
standards in the Army Safety Information Management System to provide
standardized data for use across the Army. The Army is collecting and
analyzing this standardized data in formal collaboration with the other
Military Departments through the Joint Safety Council to prevent future
mishaps. Data collected over the last 2 years demonstrates an overall
decrease in tactical vehicle mishaps by 4 percent. Class A tactical
vehicle mishaps reduced from 9 incidents in fiscal year 2023 to 7 in
fiscal year 2024; there were 14 Class B mishaps in fiscal year 2023 and
fiscal year 2024; and Class C mishaps reduced from 147 to 142 over that
time.
Admiral Kilby. In early 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) and
the services agreed to a set of minimum data elements for uniform
safety data collection to improve understanding and awareness when
sharing information across the DOD. In accordance with 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 185(d)(2)(A), the DOD and the Service Safety Chiefs established
uniform data collection standards and established the Force Risk
Reduction (FR-2) management tool as the standardized repository on
March 1, 2024. As of March 1, 2024, all services are reporting service
safety data into the FR-2 repository. The DOD Force Safety and
Occupational Health Office continually reviews the compliance of each
military department in adopting and using the established uniform data
collection standards.
The uniform repository allows the Department and Joint Safety
Council to review the compliance of each military department in
adopting and using the uniform data collection standards established in
early 2023. Additionally, the uniform repository allows for joint level
analysis into mishap events and their associated causalities.
While each service has unique attributes with their investigational
processes due to organizational and executional differences, the
uniform data repository affords the DOD and Joint Safety Council access
to service data to assess, identify, and prioritize risk mitigation
efforts and safety improvement efforts across the Department.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps has taken significant strides in
standardizing data collection and analysis. In early 2023, the
Department of Defense and the services agreed to a set of minimum data
elements for uniform safety data collection to improve understanding
and awareness when sharing information across the DOD. In accordance
with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 185(d)(2)(A), the DOD and the service safety chiefs
established uniform data collection standards and established the Force
Risk Reduction (FR-2) management tool as the standardized repository on
March 1, 2024. As of March 1, 2024, all services were reporting service
safety data into the FR-2 repository. The DOD Force Safety and
Occupational Health Office continually reviews the compliance of each
military department in adopting and using the established uniform data
collection standards.
The uniform repository allows the Department and Joint Safety
Council (JSC) to review the compliance of each military department in
adopting and using the uniform data collection standards established in
early 2023. Additionally, the uniform repository allows for joint-level
analysis into mishap events and their associated causalities.
While each service has unique attributes with its investigational
processes due to organizational and executional differences, the
uniform data repository affords the DOD and JSC access to service data
to assess, identify, and prioritize risk mitigation efforts and safety
improvement efforts across the Department.
General Guetlein. Since 2018, the Air Force Safety Center regularly
works with the other Services as part of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Readiness-Safety Information Management (SIM) Working
Group, led by the ASD (R), Force Safety & Occupational Health, to
standardize data collection. Through the SIM Working Group, the
Services agreed to a common set of data standards for safety
investigation & reporting systems specific to each Service that feed
OSD's Force Risk Reduction (FR2) system. Within the Department of the
Air Force (DAF), we've updated our automated mishap reporting and
investigation system to collect a larger data set than the minimum
joint standards and designed a Unit Risk Forecasting tool to be
deployed across the Air Force later this year. This effort will allow a
more detailed analysis of mishap data and foster greater cross-
communication and sharing of lessons learned across the military
departments.
Our Space Safety Division inside the Air Force Safety Center
ensures space equities, nomenclature, and operations are appropriately
considered in all training, written guidance, and other DAF safety
efforts. Additionally, we continue to mature our Space Mishap
Investigator Course to bolster Guardians' understanding of mishaps with
respect to causes, human factors, and prevention opportunities. These
efforts not only aid mishap prevention within the U.S. Space Force
(USSF), but they also directly correlate to standardization of data and
analyses with the other Services.
Lieutenant General Spain. Since 2018, the Air Force Safety Center
regularly works with the other Services as part of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Readiness, Force Safety & Occupational Health-
led Safety Information Management (SIM) Working Group to standardize
data collection. Through the SIM Working Group, the Services agreed to
a common set of data standards for safety investigation & reporting
systems specific to each Service that feed OSD's Force Risk Reduction
(FR2) system. Within the Department of the Air Force (DAF), we've
updated our automated mishap reporting and investigation system to
collect a larger data set than the minimum joint standards and designed
a Unit Risk Forecasting tool to be deployed across the Air Force later
this year. This effort will allow a more detailed analysis of mishap
data and foster greater cross-communication and sharing of lessons
learned across the military departments. Informed by mishap
investigations on military vehicle incidents, Air Force Global Strike
Command instituted new processes to better identify and mitigate risks.
This action is in addition to the Command's consideration of employing
a different vehicle potentially better suited for the mission. Similar
actions across the Air Force will be considered for codification in
written guidance as part of the next phase of the Chief of Staff of the
Air Force's Integrating Risk and Readiness campaign.
27. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General
Mahoney, General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, are there any
changes your service has made to training in the past 2 years to help
mitigate and prevent accidents?
General Mingus. Following the publication of GAO-21-361 in July
2021, which identified areas for improvement in military vehicle
safety, the Army proactively established an Operational Planning Team
(OPT) in November 2021 to address the GAO report's recommendations. The
OPT is spearheading significant updates to driver and operator training
programs. A major revision to Army Regulation (AR) 600-55, The Army
Driver and Operator Standardization Program, is currently in the final
stages of publication at the Army Publishing Directorate. This revision
focuses on bolstering training, licensing, and performance standards to
reduce accident risk. In addition to OPT recommended improvements,
revisions to AR 350-1, which are pending publication, moved Driver's
Training within the top 4 of 17 common mandatory tasks for all
Soldiers, and included it under warfighting skill sustainment and
proficiency. Furthermore, the Army is comprehensively updating motor
vehicle Training Circulars to include enhanced safety awareness
training, particularly regarding vehicle rollover prevention, more
challenging driver training scenarios, and integration of standardized
Training Support Packages for consistent instruction. To ensure
effective implementation, the Unit Safety Officer Course has also been
updated to reflect the latest safety protocols and risk mitigation
strategies.
Admiral Kilby. As a learning organization, the Navy utilizes
command investigations, mishap and hazard reports, and near-miss
reporting as opportunities to identify latent organizational causality
and develop recommendations leading to changes in doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). These corrective actions across the
DOTMLPF-P spectrum are performed to drive residual risk as low as
reasonably achievable. Training is but one aspect for how the Navy
implements continuous improvement.
Examples:
In October 2021, while sailing in the Pacific Ocean on
patrol, USS Connecticut hit an uncharted seamount. Based on that
investigation, the Navy made changes to the submarine operations manual
and improvements to the training curriculum for all facets of the
submarine navigation team, to include additional emphasis on proper
risk management during navigation planning and execution, as well as
enhancements to understanding chart pedigree.
In September 2013, the Navy tragically lost 2 aviators
while conducting helicopter operations on USS William P Lawrence. The
Navy implemented a wide host of improvements because of that mishap.
Over the course of the subsequent years while monitoring the
effectiveness of those mitigations, the Navy assessed that the controls
were neither as enduring nor effective as needed. While there have been
no fatal mishaps since 2013 involving wave incursions, the Navy
documented several follow-on minor mishaps and near-misses.
Accordingly, the Navy developed further solutions which include radar
improvements to predict wave height and exposing ship's bridge teams to
the wave incursion hazard in high fidelity ship handling simulators so
the watch teams could experience the challenges in a controlled
training environment to better understand how to mitigate the issue.
In 2018, the Navy tragically lost a young surface warfare
officer during small boat operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of
Operations. As a result of this mishap, the Navy implemented several
policy changes and engineering controls to reduce the likelihood of a
sailor being ejected from small boats. Over the course of subsequent
years, the Navy assessed that the controls implemented were stovepiped
into addressing risk only for our surface fleet; however, several
communities within the Navy operate small boats and were thus exposed
to similar risks. Based on that assessment, within the last 18 months,
the Navy developed a standardized small boat coxswain curriculum and
piloted a Basic Small Craft Operator Course. The Navy is continuing to
develop a continuum of training across the career of our small boat
coxswains to ensure competency and proficiency, as well as to align all
small boat operations policy for training, certification, and
operations at the echelon I level to drive consistency across the
entire Navy enterprise.
Following the tragic loss of two SEALs in the Arabian
Sea, Naval Special Warfare partnered with the United States Coast Guard
to assess and improve equipment, proficiency and maintenance of
flotation devices used by Special Warfare Sailors and more specifically
in visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations. As a result, the
Navy has procured the MD1250 Personal Flotation Device (PFD) and is in
the process of testing the RATIS life-preserving unit (LPU) for
increased survivability in case of unintentional or incapacitated water
entry. The MD-1250 offers automatic activation through water pressure
sensors, enhancing operator safety in the event of unintentional water
entry. In addition, the Force Training Readiness Manual was updated and
signed by Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command in October 2024 and
incorporates several critical changes to include mandatory gear checks,
platform safety briefs, and specific buoyancy tests with operational
gear prior to every maritime mission.
General Mahoney. As a learning organization, the Marine Corps uses
investigations, reports, and near-miss reporting to drive continuous
improvement through changes to doctrine, training, equipment,
leadership, and policy, aiming to minimize risk. The Marine Corps has
implemented targeted aviation, ground, and Amphibious Combat Vehicle
(ACV) training changes over the past 2 years to reduce accidents and
enhance operational readiness.
Aviation: The Aviation Training and Readiness (T&R)
Program Manual, setting training standards for aircrews and support
personnel, is continuously refined (20 revisions across 33 manuals in 2
years). Examples include:
- C-40A T&R Manual (Oct 2023): Improved proficiency tracking
when marine pilots fly with the Navy. The update allows for accurate
logging and tracking of Navy training events, previously done manually
and prone to error, ensuring pilots remain proficient when operating
with either service. This reduces workload and errors, leading to safer
joint operations.
- F-35B/C T&R Manual (June 2024): Standardized minimum
requirements for conversion pilots to become flight leaders (section or
division leaders). This change provides objective training standards,
replacing previously subjective qualifications, aligning with the
Aviation Training and Readiness Program Manual, and enhancing both
training quality and safety.
- CH-53K T&R Manual (Jan 2025): Enhanced tracking of carrier
qualification environments. The update separates day and night
qualifications (previously undifferentiated) to provide commanders with
better visibility into pilot qualifications for shipboard operations.
This supports improved validation and safer execution of those
operations.
- Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP)
Enhancements: This training management system has been improved with:
Daily/Weekly Flight Schedule Validation: M-SHARP
generates validation reports based on flight schedules, considering
crew rest, crew day, crew pairing, and flight profiles. The system
verifies compliance with DOD, Department of the Navy (DoN), and USMC
requirements, identifying risks that might otherwise go unnoticed,
significantly reducing human error and providing commanders better
information for risk decisions.
Rule Book Manager: This tool allows units to input
their own specific safety rules into M-SHARP to enhance the validation
process, imposing more stringent requirements on crew rest, flight
time, etc. Training and Education Command (TECOM) Aviation Standards
Branch has implemented rules to notify units if a pilot is carrier
qualified before deploying to Navy ships.
Read and Initial Board Module: This module automates
the Read and Initial (R&I) board process for safety notifications,
enabling the Department of Safety and Standardization to track, manage,
and log completion of required R&I postings for the entire squadron,
reducing human error and improving monitoring.
Ground: The Motor Transport T&R manual was updated to
reduce the sustainment interval for incidental operators from 12 to 6
months, enhancing both effectiveness and safety. Current initiatives
being developed focus on increasing incidental operator proficiency,
standardizing assistant driver training, and developing driver
simulators for deployment throughout the Fleet Marine Force.
ACV: The Marine Corps has implemented several key changes
to improve the ACV's training, safety, and operational effectiveness:
- Revised training procedures standardized training and
certification, by billet, for all ACV operators and maintainers,
outlined in the Assault Amphibian Training Operations Procedures
Standardization and updated Navy Marine Corps (NAVMC) 3500.2D Assault
Amphibian Training and Readiness manual.
- The use of driver simulators, mandatory Water Safety
Instructor and Shallow Water Egress Trainer qualifications.
- MCBul 3502's standardized surf observation reporting.
- Fielding of the Assault Amphibian Safety Boat providing
dedicated waterborne support, aligning with naval safety practices.
- A ``leader to led'' initiative reduced ACV formation size
ratio from 1:9 to 1:4, improving leadership oversight and mitigating
risk.
General Guetlein. The Space Force continually evaluates training
programs are to provide the most effective and safest environment along
with the most realistic training possible. We have made multiple
changes to the curricula of our Space Mishap Investigation Course and
the annual training for Investigating mishap officers to improve
training content and relevancy. Additionally, the USSF brought on a
Highly Qualified Expert (HQE) with an extensive space safety and
operations background to better incorporate risk management, system
safety, and safety policy within our service. Last, our Space Safety
Division is helping to create a Unit Risk Forecasting tool. This tool
will enable leaders at all levels to see real-time risk assessments of
units based on current data and how that data relates to risk
indicators from years of mishap investigations.
Lieutenant General Spain. Training programs are continually
evaluated to ensure the most effective and safest environment possible
while garnering the maximum benefit of realistic training to
participants. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force recently implemented
his Integrating Risk and Readiness campaign to bolster the integration
and application of risk management throughout the force. Our efforts
will increase the use of tools to assess and manage risk while
enhancing decision making on mitigation strategies at lower supervisory
levels to enhance readiness, lethality, and combat capability.
In addition, the implementation of virtual reality simulations in
aviation, maintenance, and vehicle operations provides trainees
enhanced realism and a greater understanding of the risks associated
with their assigned tasks. Virtual reality increases training
effectiveness while reducing exposure to real-world hazards and risks
inherent in military training.
The Air Force, in concert with the Joint Safety Council's Motor
Vehicle Working Group, is also exploring a study to better understand
motorcycle rider behavior. The results will inform changes to how
services train motorcycle riders to safely operate in the dynamic
traffic environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
human performance requirements
28. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
and Lieutenant General Spain, how does the DOD use wearable technology
and biometric health data to measure servicemember heart rate, blood
pressure, heart rate variability, blood oxygen, respiratory rate, blood
glucose and body temperature?
General Mingus. The Army is actively evaluating the operational use
of wearable technology and biometric monitoring to improve Soldier
health, performance, and readiness. Ongoing assessments led by the U.S.
Army Center for Initial Military Training (CIMT) are focused on the
feasibility and value of commercial-grade wearables in Basic Combat
Training and operational environments. These wearables currently track
metrics such as heart rate, heart rate variability, respiration, sleep,
and skin temperature, offering a continuous, real-time view of
physiological status.
Although some measures like blood glucose and continuous blood
pressure monitoring are not yet widely reliable in commercial devices,
the Army is closely tracking technological advancements and preparing
for future integration. These early efforts aim to inform scalable
solutions that enhance injury prevention, optimize training, and
support performance-based decision making across Army formations.
Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force has several ongoing research
efforts that use wearable technology (e.g., Oura ring, Garmin watches)
to collect biometric data to measure servicemember heart rate, heart
rate variability, blood oxygen, respiratory rate, skin temperature, and
activity.
The Surface Force's most advanced R&D effort is the Command
Readiness, Endurance, and Watchstanding (CREW) Program, which is a
shipboard sensor suite that leverages Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
sleep tracking wearable technology (e.g., Oura Ring) to collect
objective sleep data and a secure, offline shipboard data architecture
that provides Commanders with objective data to inform operational
fatigue risk management decisions. While still in advanced development,
CREW is a shipboard tactical warfighting solution that the Navy is
considering transitioning to a Program of Record in future budgets. The
CREW system is being developed to be device agnostic and may be able to
collect additional biometric health data in the future.
In addition to developing the CREW system, the Surface Force is
evaluating the feasibility and efficacy of using wearable technology to
collect biometric health data at scale for additional use cases.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps has not implemented service-wide
wearable technology for tracking servicemember health data. However,
research into potential applications is ongoing. For example, the
Marine Corps, in collaboration with the U.S. Army Research Institute of
Environmental Medicine, has tested a Heat Illness Prevention System
designed to reduce heat-related injuries during entry-level training.
The Marine Corps integrated bioelectrical impedance analysis (BIA)
devices into its body composition program in 2022. This ongoing
investment enables commanders to assess marines with greater accuracy,
while allowing marines to track their critical biomarkers such as lean
body mass and basal metabolic rate--metrics that directly contribute to
their overall health and fitness.
The Marine Corps will continue assessing our programs, policies,
and requirements to determine if there are wearable solutions that are
valid, cost effective, and can be implemented at scale.
Lieutenant General Spain. The Department is increasingly leveraging
wearable technology and biometric health monitoring systems to track a
broad spectrum of physiological metrics in servicemembers. These tools
are central to advancing force readiness, optimizing performance, and
enabling early detection of illness or injury--ultimately enhancing
operational effectiveness.
Wearable and biometric technologies fall into two main categories:
those focused on readiness and fitness monitoring, and those approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for medical use. Regardless
of their classification, all systems must comply with applicable DOD
cybersecurity standards, Federal regulations, and medical data
protection requirements, including HIPAA, protections for personally
identifiable information (PII), and encryption protocols for use in
secure environments.
The Air Force continues to evaluate wearable technologies that
balance the dual imperatives of operational readiness and
cybersecurity. While adoption remains limited to small-scale trials,
promising results are emerging. For example, Air Mobility Command
(AMC), in collaboration with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), is
piloting wearable systems designed to help commanders and aircrews
monitor real-time readiness indicators during max endurance operations
in the Pacific.
These efforts are driven by a clear need: commanders and crew
members want real-time, data-driven insights into fatigue levels and
early signs of infectious disease, tailored to individual biometric
profiles. This capability was recently showcased during the Air Force's
Mobility Guardian exercise, where wearable technologies demonstrated
both operational utility and the ability to safeguard sensitive health
data. Such initiatives reflect growing interest across the service in
scalable, secure, and mission-aligned wearable solutions that support
the health and effectiveness of the force.
29. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
and Lieutenant General Spain, how does your service view the utility of
servicemember biometric health data to improve individual health
readiness metrics?
Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force is conducting multiple
longitudinal research efforts to evaluate the utility of collecting
servicemember biometric health data to improve individual health
readiness metrics. While the studies are ongoing and final analysis
will not be completed for several years, preliminary and anecdotal
evidence suggests using wearable technology to provide sailors with
biometric health data has a positive effect on individual health
behaviors. For example, data from deployed Naval warships indicated
that approximately 22 to 40 percent of sailors issued a wearable device
self reported improvements in their sleep, physical activity, nutrition
habits, and mental well being.
General Mingus. The Army views biometric health data as a
transformative tool to enhance individual readiness and optimize human
performance. Metrics such as heart rate variability, sleep quality, and
movement patterns can be used to monitor stress, recovery, fatigue, and
overtraining. These insights enable commanders and human performance
teams to proactively manage workloads, personalize training, and reduce
preventable injuries.
When integrated into the Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F)
Management System (H2FMS), this biometric data supports a shift from
reactive care to predictive readiness management. By enabling real-
time, data-informed adjustments across the five H2F domains--physical,
nutritional, mental, sleep, and spiritual--the Army aims to improve
Soldier resilience, maximize performance, and reduce long-term
healthcare costs.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps does not currently track
servicemembers' health data outside of semiannual body composition
assessments. BIA devices employed in the Marine Corps' body composition
program provide individual health readiness metrics to influence
physical fitness training and health decisions to increase warfighter
readiness.
Lieutenant General Spain. The integration of biometric health and
fitness data with advanced machine learning has the potential to act as
a powerful force multiplier for the Armed Forces. When implemented with
clearly defined parameters around security, privacy, and authority,
this fusion of technology can deliver real-time, actionable insights
into both individual and unit-level health and readiness.
For military operations, this translates into earlier detection and
more effective management of injuries such as concussions, improved
triage accuracy, and faster, more informed medical decisions. It also
enables a reduction in training time lost to illness through predictive
health monitoring and facilitates swift containment of infectious
disease outbreaks in high-density environments like dorms, aircraft, or
forward-operating bases. Ultimately, this leads to a measurable
enhancement in overall force health, resilience, and operational
readiness.
30. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
and Lieutenant General Spain, what is the feasibility and advisability
of developing a data collection and tracking system to provide
commanders with insights into servicemembers' readiness and well-being,
incorporating biometric health data for descriptive analysis and
accessibility to servicemembers?
General Mingus. The development of such a system is both feasible
and already underway through the H2FMS. The H2FMS is being built to
securely aggregate biometric, behavioral, cognitive, and training data
to create individual Soldier readiness profiles. These profiles are
accessible through role-based dashboards that support commanders, human
performance teams, and Soldiers themselves in making evidence-based
decisions.
The H2FMS includes embedded tools to deliver configurable training
plans, targeted education, and tailored interventions across all five
H2F domains. To ensure long-term scalability and impact, the Army is
aligning H2FMS implementation with full strategic integration, ensuring
that the capability is embedded across Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities,
and Policy (DOTMLPFP). As H2FMS and technology continue to evolve, it
will incorporate artificial intelligence and machine learning to
generate predictive and prescriptive insights that support early
intervention and individualized readiness optimization strategies.
Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force's primary program measuring near-
real time servicemember readiness is the Command Readiness Endurance
and Watchstanding (CREW) Program. CREW is a shipboard sensor suite that
leverages Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) wearable technology (e.g.,
Oura Ring) to collect objective sleep data and a secure, offline
shipboard data architecture that provides Commanders with objective
biometric data, providing insights into sailors' readiness and well-
being. By providing these data to operational Unit Commanders, these
leaders can make holistic tactical warfighting decisions that integrate
metrics related to both (a) materiel readiness and (b) personnel
readiness of the unit.
CREW feasibility testing has been ongoing since 2020 with
operational demonstrations including 39 units (surface and aviation),
two joint international exercises (i.e., Talisman-Sabre 23, RIMPAC 24),
two Carrier Strike Groups, and more than 5000 sailors and marines.
Results indicate that the availability of biometric data to Unit
Commanders improves unit readiness and Operational Risk Managment
decisions. While still in advanced development, CREW as a shipboard
tactical warfighting solution is being considered to transition to a
Program of Record in future budgets.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps currently uses two systems, the
Marine Corps Training Information Management System and Command
Individual Risk and Resiliency Assessment System), which collect
different aspects of readiness and well-being data. By leveraging these
systems, the Marine Corps can gain insights into servicemember
readiness and well-being. However, implementation must address critical
concerns to include maintaining separation between Protected health
information and personally identifiable information, preserving the
security strengths of current systems, ensuring regulatory compliance,
and providing appropriate servicemember access to their own data.
Lieutenant General Spain. Commanders and first sergeants are
entrusted with access to servicemembers' health data to maintain unit
readiness and ensure operational effectiveness. This access, however,
must be governed by strict safeguards to protect against potential
exploitation by adversaries, prevent the misuse or misinterpretation of
sensitive data, and shield personnel from inappropriate or punitive
actions stemming from inaccurate conclusions.
Any health monitoring systems deployed must fully comply with
Department of Defense (DOD) cybersecurity standards, ensuring data
integrity, confidentiality, and controlled access. Broader
implementation across the force will require robust, scalable
infrastructure capable of securely supporting millions of users. Such
infrastructure must be interoperable with existing military health
record systems, maintain continuous data protection, and ensure
compliance with privacy and authority protocols.
While commercial health and performance monitoring products--such
as those used by major corporations or professional sports teams--may
offer valuable capabilities, their adoption in a military context will
depend on their ability to meet stringent DOD requirements. These
systems must not only align with military security and interoperability
standards but also uphold the overarching goal: enhancing mission
readiness while safeguarding the health, privacy, and trust of the
force.
31. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
and Lieutenant General Spain, does your service have an office that
specifically provides oversight on the human performance (HP)
initiatives throughout the service, from mental to physical with the
authority?
General Mingus. Yes. Oversight of human performance initiatives
resides with the U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training (CIMT),
which serves as the specified Force Modernization Proponent for H2F, as
outlined in AR 5-22. CIMT leads the development and synchronization of
human performance doctrine, capability requirements, standards, and
modernization strategies across the Army.
Through H2F, the Army embeds multidisciplinary human performance
teams in brigade formations and aligns efforts to the H2F Strategic
Objectives: reducing injuries, improving performance, accelerating
rehabilitation, increasing multi-domain readiness, and optimizing cost-
effectiveness. CIMT works in coordination with the Army Commands,
Program Executive Office Soldier--Project Manager Soldier
Survivability, HQDA G1 and HQDA G9 to ensure integrated, accountable,
and scalable execution of human performance initiatives across all
components and readiness domains.
Admiral Kilby. Human Performance (HP) in the Navy is not overseen
by a single office. Multiple commands manage HP based on their
operational needs. The Office of Naval Research Warfighter Protection
and Applications Division leads HP research and technology efforts
focused on health, survival, and performance of Navy personnel. Naval
Education and Training Command and Bureau of Naval Personnel supports
HP through training programs and personnel policy.
Along these lines, I am investigating an opportunity to consolidate
sailor optimization programs akin to the Army Holistic Health And
Fitness Program. The Navy's effort in this area is in the early stages
of development and I am committed to maximizing our sailors health and
productivity.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps has two entities that share
jurisdiction over human performance initiatives. The Deputy Commandant
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine and Family Programs Division
serves as Marine Corps lead for the Marine Corps Total Fitness program
policy, resourcing, integration, and delivery. The commanding general,
Training and Education Command is responsible for standardization of
service requirements.
Lieutenant General Spain. Currently, human performance initiatives,
from mental to physical, fall under A3 (aircrew), A1 (fitness), and
Surgeon General (Integrated Operational Support, mental health, etc).
Regarding wearable technology for human performance improvements, there
is no single DAF office with oversight of all human performance
initiatives. For the subset of such activities which constitute human
research, DAF has one oversight office within the Air Force Surgeon
General's Office: the Component Office of Human Research Protections
(COHRP). Each Service has their own COHRP IAW DODI 3216.02, Protection
of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DOD-Conducted
and--Supported Research.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
space readiness
32. Senator Hirono. General Guetlein, Space Force is increasing in
size to address the significant threats posed by China and Russia.
However, your service is faced with challenges to grow beyond the
roughly 10,000 Guardians and 5,000 civilians it has today. While your
current retention rate may be high, what challenges are you
experiencing with growing the Space Force, and how can Congress better
support your force structure and training efforts?
General Guetlein. Funds in the Space Force's MILPERS, Operations &
Maintenance (O&M), and military construction (MILCON) appropriations
are necessary to support space-focused training, education, manpower,
and infrastructure needed to sustain growth. Congressional support for
the President's Budget will allow the Space Force to continue to grow
in order to meet expanding mission demands and enable credible force
presentation in the space domain.
33. Senator Hirono. General Guetlein, how are you ensuring your
ground-based capabilities and infrastructure to support space assets
are more energy and water-resilient?
General Guetlein. Investments in installation energy programs are
critical to the success of operational missions and the effectiveness
of our warfighter capabilities. These programs provide enduring mission
capabilities through energy resilience, by deploying innovative
technologies and alternative generation sources to protect against
failures caused by commercial power grid outages or disruptions.
The USSF adopts a mission-centric approach to enhance the security
of energy and water systems by conducting Energy Resilience Readiness
Exercises (ERREs) and Water Resilience Readiness Exercises. These
exercises simulate emergency scenarios to identify and mitigate
vulnerabilities in critical assets. We have completed ERREs at
Vandenberg, Schriever, Peterson, Buckley, and Patrick, Space Force
Bases (SFBs) and at Clear, Cape Cod, and Cape Canaveral Space Force
Stations (SFSs). The USSF is installing microgrids with onsite energy
generation capacity at Vandenberg and Buckley SFB, and Cape Cod SFS.
Additionally, resilience threats to mission continuity are assessed
through Installation Energy Plans. This strategic planning process
provides a comprehensive roadmap for future energy and water needs,
enabling proactive investments that align with shifting priorities.
operational energy demand reduction
34. Senator Hirono. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, Lieutenant General Spain, and Ms. Maurer, energy
demand reduction extends operational reach for warfighters and enables
our military's lethality and readiness. Hybrid vehicles lower costly
fuel consumption and offer longer operational duration. This saves the
U.S. military time, money, and most importantly--servicemembers' lives.
Can each of you briefly talk about how your operational and
installation energy programs support the warfighter and base resiliency
and why they are worth funding?
General Mingus. The Army is transforming how the Army sources,
stores, distributes, converts, and manages battlefield energy to
provide resilient, assured power at the tactical edge. The Army is
exploring hybrid powertrains for the XM30 Infantry Combat Vehicle and
M1E3 Abrams. Besides potentially lower fuel consumption, hybrid
vehicles could have extended silent watch capabilities.
The effort to reduce sustainment demands extends beyond investing
and deploying technologies and practices that reduce fuel consumption.
Reducing the demand for supplies and services or providing Soldiers the
means to meet that demand at or closer to their point of need, reduces
the frequency of logistics operations. Such efforts reduce Soldier
exposure to enemy action, extend the range and endurance of the
formation, and provide commanders greater flexibility and freedom of
action.
For our installations, the Army continues to explore all power
generation assets that can be combined with specific circuity to allow
the islanding of our installations, which provides resilient energy for
critical functions. Areas under consideration include investment in two
key advanced technologies: nuclear energy and microgrids. Currently the
Army has 31 operational microgrids deployed across 24 installations
worldwide. Additionally, the Army plans for and measures installations'
energy resilience through black start exercises. These exercises test
our energy generation and distribution systems to ensure mission
continuity is not interrupted when the commercial grid on which they
rely is disrupted.
Admiral Kilby. The Navy's installation energy programs prioritize
reliable energy access, minimize vulnerable fuel supply chains, lower
utility costs, mitigate cyber threats, and enhance mission execution
through resilient infrastructure. We conduct regular assessments and
exercises to improve adaptability and long-term operational
effectiveness to support the warfighter with the delivery of critical
energy loads on time and on target, including mitigating any loss of
productivity in our four Navy shipyards from power outages. Resilient
installations are crucial for projecting power, defending national
interests, and sustaining warfighting operations.
The Navy's operational energy investments target a 15 percent
operational efficiency improvement across platforms, increasing time-
on-station and availability of precision fires for strike groups and
fleet commanders. We've already achieved an 8 percent efficiency
improvement in destroyers, demonstrating tangible progress toward our
goal. Our research investments, including autonomous refueling and
advanced battery technology, directly support warfighter lethality and
readiness by maximizing available power in contested environments and
enabling future platforms to field directed energy technology.
Continued funding is crucial to maintaining energy dominance and
meeting evolving threats.
General Mahoney. For the Marine Corps, supporting the Fleet Marine
Force and ensuring the resiliency of our installations means preparing
for a future where reliable power, both in the field and at our bases,
is increasingly contested. Our energy programs directly support the
warfighter by:
Extending Operational Reach: By investing in efficient
power generation and advanced battery storage, we reduce our reliance
on vulnerable fuel convoys, increasing the operational range and
endurance of our units. This allows us to operate in austere
environments for longer periods, maintain battlefield superiority, and
achieve mission objectives with less logistical burden.
Enhancing Base Resiliency: Our installations are critical
nodes for power projection. We are hardening our bases against a
growing range of threats, both physical and cyber, that could disrupt
power supply. Resilient bases mean resilient warfighters.
Increasing Lethality & Readiness: Reliable power is the
backbone of modern warfare. Our programs ensure that our weapons
systems, communication networks, and critical infrastructure remain
operational, giving our marines the edge they need to prevail in any
conflict.
To achieve these goals, we leverage available congressional
authorities like Energy Savings Performance Contracts, Utility Energy
Service Contracts, and Enhanced Use Leasing agreements, in conjunction
with appropriated funding. These strategic investments in energy
resilience are not just about saving money; they are about saving lives
and ensuring the Marine Corps remains the Nation's premier fighting
force. Continued funding for these programs is critical to maintaining
our competitive advantage and fulfilling our commitment to the
warfighter.
General Guetlein. Uninterrupted and reliable electric power is a
mission-critical necessity for the USSF. We rely on dependable power to
perform our core functions--e.g., space control, global mission
operations, space access, and enterprise functions.
The USSF is making investments in energy infrastructure and
initiatives that fund microgrids, onsite generation projects, battery
energy storage systems, base-wide energy efficiency programs, advanced
controls, and distribution networks. In particular, the USSF is
installing microgrids with onsite energy generation at Vandenberg and
Buckley SFBs, and Cape Cod SFS. Electric power also supports space
launch facilities, ground control stations, autonomous data and
artificial intelligence processes, all vital to maintaining national
security and overseeing global military and space operations. To ensure
resilience in a contested environment, the USSF prioritizes against
cyber threats and physical disruptions to power infrastructure,
enabling continuous and secure operations.
Lieutenant General Spain. Our operational energy efforts are
focused on increasing capability and lethality per gallon and
minimizing impacts to our airmen who deliver fuel in the battlespace to
support operations. Initiatives such as legacy aircraft drag reduction,
mission planning software improvements, and focused training/behavior
changes are increasing combat capability per gallon, and saving service
member lives.
Our recent efforts have resulted in $222 million in fuel cost
avoidance, with $64 million of prior year expired funds recouped and
reinvested to further enhance combat capability and mission assurance.
Our vision of ``Mission Assurance through Energy and Water
Assurance'' focuses on sustaining warfighting capabilities through
advanced planning, innovative technology, and process enhancements. We
evaluate both near-and long-term energy and water requirements,
emphasizing resilience, cost effectiveness, and streamlined deployment
of domestic energy sources to ensure secure, reliable, and affordable
power for our installations.
The DAF is spearheading several initiatives to harness domestic
energy resources. For example, the Department is piloting advanced
geothermal projects to deliver consistent, around-the-clock power,
increase installation readiness and resilience, and bolster behind-the-
fence capabilities for emergency responses. Geothermal energy, a
domestic and abundant resource, offers the dual benefit of potential
revenue generation while utilizing existing equipment and expertise
from the oil and gas industry.
Ms. Maurer. GAO has recently reported on Department of Defense
(DOD) efforts to support the warfighter via operational and
installation energy programs.
Operational Energy
With respect to operational energy, GAO currently has ongoing work
looking at DOD's supply and distribution of fuel during a contested
Indo-Pacific conflict, with a classified report expected to be
delivered to the Congress by June 2025. While DOD works on energy
demand reduction, the use of fuel remains important during operations.
GAO also reported in 2020 on the Navy's hybrid electric drive (HED)
program. In 2009, the Secretary of the Navy established goals that, in
part, focused on reducing the energy consumption of the Navy's forces.
Two years later, the Navy initiated a program to develop and install
HED systems on its fleet of Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51 Flight IIA)
destroyers. The Navy's HED system is designed to save fuel by using
excess power from the ship's electrical system to propel the ship. In
October 2018, the Navy completed installation of one of the systems on
the USS Truxtun. Senate Report 115-262 accompanying the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 asked the Navy to submit
a report on the HED system installed on the USS Truxtun and asked GAO
to review the Navy's report.
We issued a report in 2020 in which we (1) assessed the extent to
which the Navy's report on the USS Truxtun included information
regarding the assessment areas as requested by Congress, and (2)
described the Navy's decision to suspend the HED program and use the
systems for a different effort. \1\ We found that the Navy did not
include a summary of the investment planned for the HED system
installed on the USS Truxtun in its January 2020 report to Congress, as
requested by Congress. Specifically, the Navy's report on the HED
system installed on the USS Truxtun did not contain an assessment of
the costs and benefits of the HED system or an assessment of the
funding needed to execute the program. We also found that the Navy's
report on the HED system installed on the USS Truxtun provided some
performance information that was not based on comprehensive testing. We
did not make any recommendations in this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers: Observations on the Navy's
Hybrid Electric Drive Program, GAO-21-79R, Washington, DC, Nov.. 5,
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installation Energy
With respect to installation energy, GAO issued a report in 2023.
\2\ GAO found that DOD had efforts underway to achieve sustainability
goals associated with greenhouse gas emissions reductions, energy and
water efficiencies, and waste reduction in the December 2021 Executive
Order 14057. Specifically, DOD had (1) established an organizational
structure that supports implementation of the order, (2) developed some
implementation plans, (3) started dedicating staff to support
implementation of the order, and (4) increased funding and updated
guidance for key energy resilience and conservation installation
projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Environmental Sustainability: DOD Should Identify
Workforce Capacity Needed to Achieve Goals,'' GAO-23-105239
(Washington, DC. May 31, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO has also reported in 2016 on DOD's Energy Resilience and
Conservation Investment Program (ERCIP), then known as the Energy
Conservation Investment Program (ECIP). \3\ In that report, GAO noted
that, while DOD and the military services made use of several different
programs to accomplish their energy goals, ECIP was DOD's primary
source of directly appropriated military construction funding for
energy conservation projects. DOD is required to notify congressional
committees of the ECIP projects that it plans to construct, although it
is not required by either law or its own guidance to include in its
project notifications information on the anticipated performance of
those projects, including the anticipated returns on investment,
estimates of the energy or water savings, or renewable energy
production. However, providing project notifications without including
performance information reduced Congress's ability to review in a
single source what to expect from the ECIP program, such as whether DOD
components expect their respective overall portfolios to meet the
minimum return on investment. Further, anticipated performance
information would provide a baseline from which DOD and the committees
could later evaluate ECIP program implementation. GAO recommended that
the Secretary of Defense should review the strategic goals for the ECIP
program and make any needed adjustments to reflect current DOD
priorities to help improve DOD's ability to report on and measure
anticipated and actual savings from ECIP projects and to provide
guidance to inform further project selection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Energy Conservation Investment
Program Needs Improved Reporting, Measurement, and Guidance, GAO-16-162
(Washington, DC, Jan. 29, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOD concurred with and implemented GAO's recommendation.
Specifically, DOD updated the ``Strategic Vision for the Program''
section in the ECIP annual guidance for fiscal years 2019 and 2020 to
reflect current DOD priorities. Additionally, DOD's proposed funding
allocation for Fiscal Year 2021 aligned with its strategic vision to
boost energy resilience and met the intent of our recommendation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
price gouging
35. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, do you support efforts
to ensure contracting officers have the cost and pricing data they need
to negotiate fair deals for taxpayers?
General Mingus. I fully support all efforts by Army contracting
officers to obtain the necessary cost and pricing data required to
establish a fair and reasonable price as it is in the best interest of
both the Government and the U.S. taxpayer. Any exceptions for certified
data must be approved by the Head of the Contracting Activity, and any
exceptions for other than certified cost or pricing data must be
approved by the Senior Contracting Official. Requiring exceptions to be
approved at these senior levels demonstrates the Army's strong
commitment to requiring cost and pricing data whenever it is necessary
and appropriate to do so.
Admiral Kilby. Yes. The Navy will leverage Commercial and
Competitive procedures wherever possible and appropriate. When those
procedures are not possible, access to cost and pricing data is
critical in determining the fair and reasonable price of products and
services.
General Mahoney. Yes. DOD has established comprehensive resources
to support contracting officers' decision making process with
establishing a fair and reasonable cost or price for contracts.
Specifically, from an enterprise perspective, resources include field
pricing team support from Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).
DCMA support includes proposal review, overhead should-cost reviews and
negotiation support; Contract Business Analysis Repository a tool
maintained by DCMA which provides Contracting Officers with negotiation
data for Defense contractors across the DOD; Navy Price Fighters, who
support providing cost and price analysis, should-cost amounts,
commercial price analysis, commerciality reviews and market analysis.
Additionally, Defense Acquisition University provides a baseline of
training for contracting officers and continuous learning on a cadre of
functional areas relating to cost and pricing to equip the contracting
workforce with the skill set to be successful in negotiating fair and
reasonable contracts.
General Guetlein. Yes. Space Force Contracting Officers (COs) must
have current, complete, and accurate cost and pricing data, to obtain
fair deals for our taxpayers. The USSF employs several strategies to
negotiate fair and reasonable prices on sole-source contracts for the
required products and services we use. Our COs use statutory and
regulatory authority to secure and analyze data to determine and
negotiate fair and reasonable prices to the best of their ability.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring Air Force Contracting
Officers (COs) have access to current, complete, and accurate cost and
pricing data is integral to having negotiation parity to obtain fair
deals for our taxpayers.
36. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, the Government
Accountability Office's 2023 High-Risk Report identifies
vulnerabilities in DOD's contracting processes, emphasizing systemic
risks of fraud, waste, and abuse. Notably, it highlighted that
sustained leadership commitment and robust internal controls are
critical for addressing contractor misconduct and preventing
overcharges in government contracts. In light of the steps laid out in
this GAO report and the scale at which defense contractors are fleecing
the Pentagon and taxpayers, what measures is your service implementing
to ensure contractors do not engage in price gouging of your service
and U.S. taxpayers?
General Mingus. The Army takes overcharging and price gouging very
seriously. The Army conducts regular training on best practices to
recognize and address these issues and utilizes the Army's peer review
process to obtain insights into potential systemic or material
challenges across the acquisition enterprise. Contracting officers rely
upon the guidance provided by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and
its DOD and Army supplements, along with input from technical teams, in
reviewing cost/price proposals. Additionally, the Army collaborates
with the Defense Contract Audit Agency when a contract is determined to
be at risk for potential overcharging or price gouging to request a
Truth in Negotiations Act audit, otherwise known as a defective pricing
audit.
Admiral Kilby. In order to ensure the Navy obtains fair and
reasonable pricing for products and services, the Navy leverages
competition and commercial procurement practices as appropriate. If
neither competition nor commercial practices are appropriate for the
procurement in question, the Navy will ensure that it obtains whatever
cost and pricing data is necessary to support meaningful analysis and
establish a fair and reasonable price. Additionally, the Navy will
utilize organizations like Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to assist in both pre-award
reviews and post-award monitoring.
General Mahoney. The DOD takes the GAO's 2023 High-Risk Report
seriously and is committed to addressing the vulnerabilities identified
in our contracting processes. The Marine Corps recognizes the
importance of preventing fraud, waste, and abuse, and we are actively
implementing measures to ensure contractors do not engage in price
gouging. These measures are grounded in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) and are designed to strengthen our internal controls
and promote accountability. One key area of focus is:
Rigorous Cost and Price Analysis (FAR 15.404): We are
reinforcing our commitment to thorough cost and price analysis,
including the use of appropriate techniques like price comparisons,
parametric estimating, and cost realism analysis. This helps us
determine fair and reasonable prices and identify potential
overcharges. We are also ensuring our contracting officers receive
appropriate training and support in these areas.
We recognize this is an ongoing effort that requires continuous
improvement. We are committed to working with all stakeholders to
strengthen our contracting processes and ensure that we are getting the
best value for taxpayer dollars.
General Guetlein. The DOD has made significant strides addressing
systemic risks identified in the 2023 GAO review. With the
establishment of policies, boards, and regular reviews of service
contracts, GAO assessed that DOD met all Operational Contract Support
criteria and improved to meeting three of five service contract
criteria. The Space Service Acquisition Executive initiated annual
service contract requirement reviews for accountability. The Space
Force continues to support efforts and use tools such as the Contractor
Responsibility Watch List, a tool provided by Congress, to hold
contractors accountable for delivering on commitments. Additionally,
the U.S. Space Force continues to look for opportunities to foster
competition, which reduces the probability of price gouging.
Lieutenant General Spain. The DAF utilizes existing regulatory and
statutory authorities that permit Contracting Officers (COs) to request
data needed to determine fair and reasonable prices. The DAF has
published training and guidance to reinforce the CO's authority to
obtain the necessary data to ensure they can determine a fair and
reasonable price. The DAF also conducts training for its Major Defense
Systems' Multi-Functional Teams. This training provides in-depth
analysis of industry trends, market dynamics, and major vendor
financial strategies to inform our acquisition and negotiation
strategies to obtain fair and reasonable prices.
The DAF also supported DOD's work with Congress to strengthen the
Department's ability to obtain pricing data for commercial subsystems,
subcomponents, and spare parts. In commercial acquisitions when other
than cost and pricing data is not provided, DAF COs follow data denial
procedures while elevating through DAF and vendor leadership to seek
resolution. Unresolved data denials are reported to the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment), Defense Pricing,
Contracting, and Acquisition Policy (DPCAP) for congressional
reporting.
37. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, have you identified any
methods your service can use to enhance competition in the defense
industrial base?
General Mingus. A healthy and competitive defense industrial base
(DIB) is crucial and enhancing competition within the DIB is a critical
priority. Market research has always played a vital role in achieving
this goal. Market research helps us identify existing and emerging
technologies, products, and services that can meet the Army's needs in
potentially more efficient and cost-effective ways. This can lead to
the adoption of cutting-edge solutions that might not have been
considered otherwise.
Army reviews requirements that are currently met using a sole
source (vendor locked) solution. Acquisition plans and requested
approvals for sole source contracts are required include a plan to
compete the requirement in the future. Additionally, the acquisition
planning process must include a review of the Army's needs for data
rights and access to a contractor's intellectual property to ensure the
Army is able to compete future requirements to the maximum extent
possible.
Admiral Kilby. The current industrial base is designed for
efficient peacetime production of ships and munitions. Historic
underinvestment and industry consolidation following the end of the
cold war have reduced competition and capacity at the Tier 1 shipyards
and their suppliers, leading to workforce-constrained build schedules
that do not meet Navy targets. In response to these challenges, the
Navy recently stood up the Maritime Industrial Base Office, which is
charged with addressing, developing, integrating, and managing
enterprise maritime industrial base efforts. MIB's six lines of effort
are focused on having dedicated teams and initiatives for the major
issues that are impacting our industry partners and the ability of our
shipbuilding programs to deliver ships on time and on budget:
workforce, supplier development, shipbuilder infrastructure, strategic
outsourcing, advanced manufacturing, and government oversight. These
efforts include identifying opportunities to increase competition by
increasing overall industrial base capacity, which also lowers barriers
to entry for small businesses, and other innovative and non-traditional
suppliers.
General Mahoney. Yes. Improving communication and relationships
with our industry partners has been a goal for the Department. Our
contracting offices hold contracts and small business industry days,
and the Director of Contracts has recently instituted reverse industry
days to listen to challenges and opportunities from our DOD industry
partners, so we can better define our requirements and communicate
upcoming procurement opportunities.
General Guetlein. The USSF is always looking for opportunities to
leverage our domestic suppliers in our acquisition mission. Our Service
is implementing the DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the
USSF Commercial Space Strategy to enhance competition in the defense
industrial base.
Our space acquisition Program Executive Officers and program
offices are actively seeking every option to use domestic commercial
products in their technical baselines. They submit requests for
proposal (RFPs) to industry to solicit innovative warfighting
capabilities to meet program requirements as well as directly and in
partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) utilizing Other
Transaction Authority. These advanced technologies will be cross-
cutting, meaning that they will affect multiple mission areas across
the Space Enterprise. For our more traditional space programs, the
Service has pursued acquisition strategies that provide for competition
to the maximum extent possible.
The NSSL Phase 3 dual-lane acquisition strategy enables USSF to
grow the industry base by onboarding new launch service providers, put
capabilities on orbit more efficiently, and enhance resiliency while
decreasing costs. Phase 3 Lane 1 allows the USSF to flexibly contract
launch services for more risk-tolerant commercial-like payloads,
putting more capabilities into orbit when needed for national security.
Phase 3 Lane 2 provides the full complement of mission assurance for
our Nation's most critical warfighting space assets.
Our most recent initiative, the Commercial Space Office, looks to
incorporate small businesses into capabilities through the Space
Systems Command Front Door, SpaceWERX, and DIU, which not only
increases our domestic industrial capacity, but also creates more jobs
across the country.
In addition, the USSF is an active member of the Space Industrial
Base Working Group and collaborates with other mission partners like
National Reconnaissance Office, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and Missile Defense Agency to address joint space
issues and work with industry to mitigate risks, adding resiliency to
our defense industrial base.
Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force can enhance competition
within the defense industrial base by promoting a clear and consistent
demand signal for industry, incentivizing capital investment in key
industrial capabilities, and promoting multiple competitive
opportunities throughout the lifecycle of its programs. This approach,
coupled with strategic efforts to lower barriers to entry for non-
traditional contractors and new acquisition pathways such as the
Software Acquisition Pathway and utilizing Other Transaction Authority,
will help foster a more robust and diverse industrial base.
Additionally, prioritizing direct engagement with contractors at all
levels of the supply chain, including small businesses, will help us
understand and mitigate risks and constraints. By proactively
addressing potential bottlenecks and shaping incentives for innovation
and production, the Air Force can ensure a healthy and competitive
industrial base capable of meeting current and future national security
needs.
38. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, should your service's
contracting officers have more access to cost and pricing data for sole
source contracts?
General Mingus. The Army fully supports gaining access to better
and more thorough cost and pricing data. Actual costs on both fixed and
cost type contracts provides valuable cost and pricing data and will
help the Army better negotiate a fair and reasonable price. This data
is valuable at the whole contract level but individual cost element
data it is highly preferred. Cost performance on a contract has
influence beyond just a fair and reasonable determination; it informs
the Army of the overall risk to the contractor, which can shape the
contract type and be factored in the overall negotiated profit.
Admiral Kilby. Yes. The Navy will leverage Commercial and
Competitive procedures to the maximum extent, which obviates the need
for cost and pricing data. However, when those procedures are not
possible, access to cost and pricing data is critical in determining
the fair and reasonable price of products and services for sole source
contracts.
Providing, in a consistent manner, greater access to cost and
pricing data to the DOD would assist in speed to award at fair and
reasonable prices.
General Mahoney. Yes, contracting officers should have access to
cost and pricing data for sole-source contracts, when applicable.
Contracting officers currently have access to cost and pricing data in
support of sole source contracts exceeding $2 million. The FAR
emphasizes the importance of obtaining cost and pricing data to
determine fair and reasonable prices, especially in sole-source
situations where the usual market forces of competition are absent.
With the implementation of AI tools, we believe the speed of access
will continue to improve.
General Guetlein. For sole-source contracts, our contracting
officers seek to obtain certified cost or pricing data or other than
certified cost or pricing data as required and appropriate. DAF COs use
the statutory language in 10 U.S. Code Sec. 3455 to pursue product
technical and pricing data to ensure accurate commercial product and
price reasonableness determinations for sole-source, military unique
major weapon subsystem, components, and spare parts. The DAF works
actively to expand competition across the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
as competition is a powerful tool critical to gaining the best value
for the taxpayer and our warfighters as one of our best methods of
proving prices fair and reasonable. The DAF holds our prime contractors
accountable for pursuing competition to the maximum extent possible and
ensuring fair prices at the subcontract and vendor levels. Congress can
help by maintaining and strengthening the ability of the DAF
acquisition workforce to gain insight into contractors' cost and
pricing data so that we can effectively evaluate industry's proposals.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring Air Force Contracting
Officers (COs) have access to current, complete, and accurate cost and
pricing data is integral to having negotiation parity to obtain fair
deals for taxpayers.
39. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney, General
Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, does getting better access to a
program's cost or pricing data help enhance your service's readiness?
General Mingus. Better access to a program's cost or pricing data
has the potential to help enhance readiness. The Army may, through a
better understanding of actual costs, achieve cost savings, which could
be allocated to procurement of additional goods and services or enhance
the Army's efficiency in meeting its objectives and requirements.
Admiral Kilby. Yes. If neither competition nor commercial practices
are appropriate for the procurement in question, the Navy will ensure
that it obtains whatever cost and pricing data is necessary to support
meaningful analysis and establish a fair and reasonable price. Ensuring
fair and reasonable pricing is critical to being a good steward of the
taxpayer's funding and executing programs in accordance with their
budgets. Ensuring access to adequate cost or pricing data is a critical
enabler to protecting limited resources and being able to maximize the
goods and services the Navy can procure to improve readiness and
availability.
General Mahoney. Yes. Speed of access will assist in improved
negotiation positions and access to detailed cost data strengthens the
government's negotiating position. Contracting officers can leverage
this data to challenge unreasonable costs, negotiate fairer prices, and
avoid overpaying for goods and services. This directly impacts
readiness by freeing up funds for other critical requirements. This
also allows for better contract performance; by tracking actual costs
against proposed costs, the government can identify potential cost
overruns or inefficiencies early on and take corrective actions. This
helps ensure programs stay on track and deliver the required
capabilities to support readiness.
General Guetlein. Yes, understanding cost or pricing data can help
enhance a Service's readiness. Depending on the capability and
acquisition strategy, there may be several ways a Service can obtain
cost or pricing data. As a service, we are implementing the DOD
Commercial Space Integration Strategy and USSF Commercial Space
Strategy. By increasing competition, leveraging commercial
capabilities, and using firm-fixed price contracts where appropriate,
the USSF is benefiting from a competitive environment to understand
market prices. Expanding competition across the DIB is a powerful tool
critical to gaining the best value for the taxpayer and our warfighters
since competition is one of our best methods of proving prices fair and
reasonable. Paying fair and reasonable prices ensures each dollar spent
on readiness is enhancing the personnel, training, equipment, and
sustainment to accomplish our missions in anticipated threat
environments.
Lieutenant General Spain. Being able to project costs helps us to
program and budget more effectively, which allows us to gain and
maintain readiness through efficient resourcing of our programs.
Improving access to a program's cost and pricing information will
significantly boost our service's readiness. While we have decent
access to the cost and pricing data already, enhancing visibility into
cost and pricing data will further improve the DAF's ability to
negotiate better prices. The savings achieved through more advantageous
procurement can be allocated to additional end items or other critical
procurements. Furthermore, the availability of spare parts directly
influences our operational mission effectiveness and readiness. With
improved pricing, our program offices will have the capacity to acquire
more parts, thereby enhancing our operational readiness.
right-to-repair
40. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, your testimoneys
highlighted servicemembers' ability and willingness to defend our
Nation even when facing increasing sustainment and maintenance
challenges. For instance, Admiral Kilby discussed a focus on reducing
maintenance delays and procuring spare parts earlier; General Mahoney
pointed to lack of amphibious ship availability; and Lieutenant General
Spain cited prioritization of parts and supply in the Flying Hour
program. As Chairman Sullivan said during the hearing, half of the
Navy's amphibious warfare ships are in unsatisfactory condition, and
the KC-46 and KC-135 tanker fleets are available less than 60 percent
of the time. Do provisions in procurement contracts that restrict
servicemembers' ability to repair services' own equipment contribute to
these readiness challenges?
General Mingus. Yes, provisions in procurement contracts that
restrict Servicemembers' ability to repair their own equipment can
contribute to readiness challenges. Such restrictions and dependency on
external contractors can lead to increased maintenance delays, which in
turn can result in longer equipment downtimes and reduced availability.
To mitigate these challenges, Army contracting works closely with Army
programs to ensure that the included provisions are based on the needs
of the program office as outlined in the product support strategy and
lifecycle sustainment plan. Carefully negotiating these provisions is
critical to enabling sustainment and ensuring readiness.
Admiral Kilby. Access to technical data is a key enabler in
assuring the Navy has the ability to procure the products and services
needed to support the warfighters and certain technical data is needed
to perform organic repair.
The Navy continually assesses the feasibility and business case for
procurement of technical data packages and associated license rights
throughout the program's life cycle in an effort to reduce sustainment
and repair costs and to improve operational availability.
The Navy continuously considers repair costs attributable to lack
of access to technical data or limited rights in delivered technical
data associated with weapon systems in its mandatory sustainment
reviews and assessments of life cycle sustainment plans.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps fully supports initiatives that
speed maintenance and procuring of spare parts. Additive manufacturing,
3D printing, and the owning of technical data rights for its platforms
play a key role in accelerating this process. To ensure marines can
effectively repair equipment, the program office must, from the very
beginning of the procurement process, clearly identify and prioritize
the need for organic repair capabilities when defining the
requirements.
General Guetlein. Possibly; however, it's worth noting that many
commercial components that support space capabilities include
warranties that would be voided should a Guardian attempt to repair the
equipment. This indeed can increase readiness challenges. The Lifecycle
Sustainment Management Plan or similar documents help space systems and
programs align repair risks to maintain readiness and ensure Guardians
are focused on their warfighting and Joint Force contribution.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes, provisions in procurement contracts
that restrict the Air Force's ability to repair its own equipment can
contribute to readiness challenges. The Air Force has a skilled
workforce of maintenance personnel who are capable of accomplishing
maintenance tasks both in the field and in the depots. This workforce
cannot be used effectively when contractual limitations preclude these
personnel from access to technical data, the associated Intellectual
Property (IP), and the rights to use them, to support maintenance.
41. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, in the hearing,
Director Maurer discussed the need for DOD to ``ensure maintainers have
access to the technical data they need to meet operational mission
needs.'' Do you believe ensuring your service has access to the
technical data rights needed for servicemembers to repair the service's
own equipment could advance your service's sustainment and readiness?
General Mingus. Yes, ensuring that Servicemembers have access to
the necessary technical data and license rights to repair equipment is
crucial for advancing the Army's sustainment and readiness. Having the
necessary technical data and license rights allows for timely and
efficient maintenance and repairs, reducing downtime and dependency on
external contractors. This capability enhances operational readiness by
ensuring that equipment is in optimal condition and can be quickly
returned to service when needed.
Admiral Kilby. Yes. The Navy is actively working through our
program managers to ensure we are procuring the technical data packages
and obtaining associated data rights necessary to support efficient and
affordable sustainment of our weapons systems.
General Mahoney. Yes, in most cases, enabling Service members to
access the technical data package to conduct repairs themselves would
significantly enhance the Marine Corps' ability to sustain the weapons
systems and maintain higher readiness rates.
General Guetlein. Yes, access to technical data rights is helpful
for those capabilities that a Space Force Guardian might be able to
repair. As the smallest service, our Guardians are focused on
developing their proficiency, skillsets, and readiness in space
warfighting and contributing as part of the Joint Force.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring the Air Force has access to
necessary technical data, the associated IP, and the rights to use
them, is essential for enhancing sustainment and readiness. Empowered
maintainers who have access to the data they need, translate to reduced
downtime, increased equipment availability, and improved responsiveness
to mission needs. The Air Force's organic maintenance capability
strengthens our resilience and agility, ultimately contributing to a
more ready and capable force and our national security.
42. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, do you believe ensuring
your service has access to the technical data rights needed for
servicemembers to repair the service's own equipment could help reduce
your service's repair and sustainment costs?
General Mingus. Yes, ensuring that Servicemembers have access to
technical data and license rights to repair equipment can help reduce
sustainment costs. By leveraging organic maintenance and repairs, the
Army can avoid the high costs associated with outsourcing these tasks
to contractors. Additionally, timely access to technical data and
license rights can lead to quicker repairs, reducing equipment downtime
and associated costs. Overall, this approach promotes cost-efficiency
and enhances the Army's ability to maintain operational readiness.
Admiral Kilby. Yes. Access to technical data is a key enabler in
assuring the Navy has the ability to procure the products and services
needed to support the warfighters. Access to technical data enables
organic repair capability or to have a vendor perform the required
efforts on the Navy's behalf.
General Mahoney. Yes. Having the right technical data package and
rights needed for Service members to repair Marine Corps equipment
would reduce repair and sustainment costs.
General Guetlein. Yes, access to technical data rights could help
reduce costs for those capabilities that a Space Force Guardian might
be able to repair.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. The Air Force believes that
outfitting our skilled maintainers with technical data, the associated
IP, and the rights to use them, are essential to repairing our own
equipment and cost-effective sustainment. The Air Force's dedicated
maintenance workforce, both in the field and at depot-level facilities,
represent a valuable and often more affordable alternative to relying
solely on contractor support.
43. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, do you believe ensuring
your service has access to the technical data rights needed for
servicemembers to repair the service's own equipment could help improve
servicemember proficiency, skillsets, and readiness?
General Mingus. Yes, ensuring that Servicemembers have access to
the technical data and license rights needed to repair their own
equipment can significantly improve their proficiency, skillsets, and
readiness. Access to products, such as technical manuals, allows
Servicemembers to gain hands-on experience and develop a deeper
understanding of the equipment they operate and maintain. This
knowledge enhances their technical skills and problem-solving
abilities, leading to more effective and efficient maintenance
practices. Additionally, it empowers servicemembers with the knowledge
and skills required to address technical issues independently,
fostering a more self-reliant, ready, and capable force.
Admiral Kilby. Ensuring the Navy has access to technical data
packages under the appropriate data rights licensing agreements ,
especially early in the acquisition lifecycle of our programs, affords
the acquisition workforce the ability to execute maintenance planning
and task analysis to ensure informed decisionmaking and business case
analysis to select the most effective product support strategy for a
weapons system. It will help ensure that the Navy can meet its core
logistics capabilities requirements to ensure a ready and controlled
source of technical competence per 10 USC 2464. Additionally, assured
access provides the Navy the opportunity to standardize maintenance
procedures and practices, which can accelerate diagnostics and repairs.
In short, servicemembers would be better able to develop and refine
their expertise and skillsets if the Navy is assured access to
technical data packages needed to repair their equipment.
General Mahoney. Yes, ensuring our service has access to the
necessary technical data rights is essential to enhancing servicemember
proficiency, skillsets, and overall readiness. When Service members are
empowered with the technical information required to maintain and
repair equipment, they not only develop deeper operational
understanding but also foster a more resilient and self-sufficient
force. This access directly contributes to faster maintenance cycles,
reduced downtime, and more mission-capable units in both training and
operational environments.
General Guetlein. Yes, access to technical data rights for those
capabilities that a Space Force Guardian might be able to repair could
help improve Guardians' proficiency, skillsets, and readiness. While
the Space Force is unique because many of our capabilities cannot be
serviced once launched, our Guardians are focused on developing their
proficiency, skillsets, and readiness in space warfighting and
contributing as part of the Joint Force.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring access to technical data,
the associated IP, and the rights to use them, is essential for
improving Service member proficiency, skillsets, and overall readiness.
Hands-on maintenance experience, enabled by access to and the right to
use the necessary data, provides invaluable training and development
opportunities for Air Force maintainers while they provide life cycle
support.
44. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how will you ensure
servicemembers who are stationed abroad repair equipment that is
damaged, in a timely and cost-effective fashion, especially in a
contested logistics environment?
General Mingus. The Army remains focused on conducting repairs
forward, reducing reliance on reconstitution or sending unserviceable
weapon systems and parts to Continental United States industrial base
facilities for repair. The Army employs expeditionary maintenance teams
and advanced manufacturing capabilities to theaters to assist units
with repairs and sustainment actions. In addition, the Army is planning
to establish theater distribution centers to increase logistics
capacity in austere locations. Our goal is to leverage in-theater
capabilities, with allies and partners, to reduce maintenance costs,
reduce repair times, and increase readiness at the point of need. We
also conduct periodic reviews of theater authorized stockage lists to
ensure adequate levels of repair parts are available to support units.
The Army recognizes the value of advanced manufacturing (AM) at the
point of need and is scaling AM capabilities at echelon. US Army Tank
Automotive and Armaments Command's Joint Manufacturing and Technology
Center at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois is leading this effort for our
organic industrial base. Further fielding of the Metal Working and
Machine Shop Set positions the Army to conduct AM in large scale combat
operations.
The Army increasingly leverages tele-maintenance to assist units--
through virtual contact with assistance representatives and
technicians--with fault isolating and troubleshooting equipment
failures for corrective action. The knowledge transfer from equipment
manufacturers and depot level experts to maintainers at forward
locations enables rapid repair in real-time, reduces downtime, and
increases readiness. The Army continues to balance the need for
commercial expertise with the necessity to sustain a capable organic
workforce.
Finally, the Army maintains the inherent right to repair equipment
in contested environments leveraging battle damage and repair
authorities.
Admiral Kilby. The maintenance capability provided by
servicemembers is integral to ensure damaged equipment can be repaired
in a contested logistics environment. Therefore, service members are
trained and equipped to conduct organizational and intermediate
maintenance actions abroad.
The Surface Training Advanced Virtual Environment (STAVE) program
provides surface enlisted apprentice, journeyman, and master level
training to increase sailor's capability to conduct organizational and
intermediate maintenance actions. Additionally, through the Navy Afloat
Maintenance Training Strategy (NAMTS), sailors are trained by utilizing
I-Level hands-on maintenance production to ``forge maintenance
warriors,'' who can maintain and repair shipboard equipment.
The Navy's capital ships, such as aircraft carriers and amphibious
assault ships, have significant repair capability and use the Strike
Force Intermediate Maintenance Activity, to pull damaged parts from
nearby activities to repair them in-theater. These platforms also have
synthetic and metal advanced manufacturing (AM) equipment and even
smaller Navy platforms are being outfitted with limited AM equipment to
increase self-sufficiency. The Navy is also increasing investments for
spares and repair parts for ships and aircraft to increase onboard
inventories and sustain operations at sea. In addition, forward
deployed maintenance activities assist service members in conducting
repair requirements at oversees locations.
General Mahoney. The ability to repair equipment in a contested
environment is just as critical as the ability to find, fix, and
destroy adversary formations. To ensure persistence in such
environments, the Marine Corps is shifting from traditional supply
chains to a more resilient sustainment web. Marine Forces Pacific's
operational concept--designed to deter conflict and, if necessary,
fight and win--is reliant on the integration of maneuver, mobility, and
sustainment accomplished through, in part, the Global Positioning
Network, the Global Resiliency Initiative, and the Regional Sustainment
Framework:
Global Positioning Network--A logistics concept designed
to provide sustainable logistics in a contested environment by
integrating pre-positioned stocks into diversified distribution models,
resourcing and improving sustainment capabilities, and ensuring
resilient installations.
Global Resiliency Initiative--DOD's efforts to enhance
the resilience of its forces, infrastructure, and operations against a
wide range of threats and disruptions, both physical and cyber. Key
aspects of the DOD's Global Resiliency Initiative include:
- Cybersecurity: Protecting DOD networks and systems from cyber
attacks.
- Infrastructure Resilience: Hardening military bases and
critical infrastructure against natural disasters, terrorist attacks,
and other threats.
- Supply Chain Security: Ensuring the reliability and security
of the DOD's supply chains.
- Energy Resilience: Improving the resilience of military energy
systems to ensure reliable power for critical operations.
- Personnel Resilience: Enhancing the physical, mental, and
emotional well-being of military personnel and their families.
- Operational Resilience: Developing redundant systems and
procedures to ensure that critical missions can continue even if some
systems are disrupted.
Regional Sustainment Framework--The DOD's Regional
Sustainment Framework contributes opportunities for greater allied
burden sharing by focusing on bi-lateral agreements to ensure the
highest-level combat readiness and lethality in a contested logistics
environment, representing a global advancement in DOD's sustainment
strategy. Prior sustainment strategies relied on the ability to return
materiel to the Continental United States (CONUS) for repair,
retrograde, and replenishment and then send back outside the
Continental United States (OCONUS) for the end user, costing
considerable amounts of time in priority theaters such as the Indo-
Pacific. By developing distributed co-sustainment capabilities, such as
maintenance, repair and overhaul, supply, and storage capabilities,
closer to the warfighter's point of need with allies and partners, RSF
seeks to decrease sustainment timelines, improving readiness and
helping to reestablish deterrence.
These three undertakings tie service operating concepts to joint
sustainment efforts and leverage commercial partners, as well as allied
sustainment capabilities, to enable the operations of Combatant
Commanders.
General Guetlein. Most USSF assets are deployed-in-place at
respective bases. For deployed assets, the Space Force is heavily
reliant on Contract Logistics Support (CLS) to repair equipment. CLS
provides onsite technical support, onsite sparing, routine preventative
maintenance activities, depot field teams, and subject matter expertise
reach-back support as required to support warfighter demands. Depot
Field teams provide onsite scheduled and unscheduled depot maintenance
of weapon systems to include emergency/urgent type repairs as required.
Lieutenant General Spain. Repairing aircraft in a timely and cost-
effective fashion, especially in a contested logistics environment
requires skilled maintainers who combine the use of established
procedures and guidance with constant assessment to ensure that policy,
training and resources support rather than hinder our Airmen. It
requires Proactive Logistics, a Regional Sustainment Framework,
prepositioning, Inter-service operability agreements/processes, and
exploration of new and unconventional concepts to ensure rapid access
to parts and expertise.
It also requires the forward deployment and posturing of Aircraft
Battle Damage Repair and Depot Field Teams who bring technical
assistance and specialized repair capabilities forward when and where
required. And finally, it requires Tech-Enabled support and Augmented/
Virtual Reality applications to connect maintainers with Subject Matter
Experts and to obtain real-time expertise and guidance. This multi-
faceted approach--emphasizing agile logistics and emerging technology--
maximizes aircraft availability, even in challenging environments.
45. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how would including a
right-to-repair or technical data rights clause (that provides fair and
reasonable access to technical data rights to repair and maintain
equipment) in your services' acquisition contracts benefit your
service?
General Mingus. Including appropriate contract language and Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clauses in acquisition
contracts benefits the Army by facilitating access to the necessary
technical data and license rights for equipment repair and maintenance.
These help to provide Servicemembers with the needed technical data and
license rights to perform timely and efficient repairs, reducing
reliance on external contractors and associated costs. As a result, the
Army enhances operational readiness by minimizing equipment downtime
and ensuring that maintenance can be conducted by servicemembers.
Admiral Kilby. Access to technical data is a key enabler in
assuring the Navy has the ability to procure the products and services
needed to support the warfighters. Access to technical data enables
organic repair capability or to have a vendor perform the required
efforts of the Navy's behalf.
General Mahoney. Including right-to-repair and technical data
rights clauses in our service's acquisition contracts offers
significant advantages in terms of cost, readiness, and operational
flexibility. These clauses directly benefit the Marine Corps by:
Reducing Lifecycle Costs: By securing access to technical
data, we can perform repairs and maintenance in-house or through
competitive bidding, rather than being locked into sole-source
contracts with the original equipment manufacturer. This dramatically
reduces the long-term costs of owning and operating our equipment.
Improving Readiness and Sustainment: With the ability to
repair equipment ourselves or through multiple vendors, we can minimize
downtime and ensure that our warfighters have the equipment they need,
when they need it. This enhances readiness and improves our ability to
sustain operations in the field.
Promoting Competition and Innovation: Right-to-repair
clauses foster a more competitive marketplace for maintenance and
repair services. This encourages innovation and drives down costs, as
multiple vendors can compete for our business.
Enhancing Operational Flexibility: Access to technical
data allows us to modify and adapt equipment to meet specific
operational needs. This gives us greater flexibility and agility in
responding to evolving threats.
The Marine Corps uses the appropriate FAR and DFARS clauses, like
DFARS 252.227-7013 and others, to carefully manage technical data
rights and ensure we get what we need without infringing on legitimate
proprietary rights. We ensure that we secure the necessary data rights
prior to contract award by including these requirements in the
contract's terms, documented in the Contract Data Requirements List
(CDRL) and Data Item Description (DID).
In short, right-to-repair and technical data rights clauses are not
just about saving money; they are about empowering our service to be
more self-sufficient, resilient, and adaptable. They are a critical
investment in our long-term readiness and operational effectiveness.
This is a strategic advantage that pays dividends in terms of cost
savings, improved readiness, and enhanced warfighting capabilities.
General Guetlein. Including a right-to-repair or a similar
technical-data-rights clause would allow the Service to solicit third
parties for equipment maintenance but may drive additional costs to
obtain such data rights.
Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force strongly supports the
concept of a ``right to repair'' and believes Air Force personnel
should be able to repair their own equipment. For certain weapon
systems, lack of access to technical data and the associated IP, and
rights to use them, has forced the Air Force to rely on prime
contractors for maintenance services, stifling competition and
hindering the use of organic maintenance capabilities. A carefully
crafted right-to-repair clause has the potential to ameliorate these
issues.
46. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how do you ensure
contractors deliver technical data rights to your service when a
contract requires or allows it?
General Mingus. The Army requires activities to identify the
minimum needs for technical data and license rights and consider
availability and delivery of the identified data and rights during
source selection. To ensure contractors deliver technical data and
license rights, it is essential to include clear and specific language
in the contract that outlines the delivery requirements. Regular
monitoring and compliance checks should be conducted to verify that
contractors are adhering to these requirements. Additionally,
establishing a robust contract management process with defined
milestones and deliverables can help track the progress and ensure
timely delivery of technical data. Effective communication and
collaboration with contractors are crucial to addressing any issues or
discrepancies promptly.
Admiral Kilby. The Navy ensures that all requirements of contracts
have been satisfied and delivered with the appropriate markings. Navy
is working with industry to include data rights in our contracts to
enable Navy to repair equipment and not be reliant upon contractors for
technical assistance and repair. If contractors are not delivering the
technical data required by the contract, the Navy has mechanisms to
support enforcement of data delivery such as withholding of financing
payments or termination of the contract. Navy appreciates the support
of Congress for ``right to repair.''
General Mahoney. The solicitation and resulting contract would
include CDRLs and DIDs which would define what and when the data is
required.
General Guetlein. Our acquisition community, under the authority of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration, ensures our contracts include Contract Data Requirements
Lists for delivering technical data rights when required or allowed.
The Service provides intellectual property resources such as the DAF
Intellectual Property Cadre, a multi-functional team of intellectual
property experts, that assist with acquisition strategy planning,
negotiation, and execution.
Lieutenant General Spain. We anticipate delivery of technical data
and the associated IP, and rights to use them, based on specified
contract terms. Unfortunately, we routinely encounter data and IP
rights controversies, often involving contractors failing to provide
the government with the actual deliverable, technical data and the
associated IP, and/or the rights to use them. This occurs even when the
Air Force has paid for such deliverables. The only recourse is for the
Air Force to issue a Contracting Officer's Final Determination and
await contractor-initiated litigation at the Court of Federal Claims or
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. However, those tribunals do
not have the statutory authority to order contractors to deliver
mission-critical data needed by the warfighter; the relevant statute
provides for only monetary relief and contract interpretation (i.e.,
declaratory relief), which take years to resolve. Sometimes, the
failure to deliver is a result of the prime contractor not properly
requesting or obtaining the necessary rights from its subcontractor. If
delivered, the Air Force can only use the deliverable according to the
markings placed on the data, which may not accurately reflect the
rights granted in the contract. If improperly marked, the Air Force
must seek to have the contractor delete the marking or change it to the
marking required by the contract, thereby allowing the Government the
ability to use the deliverable as contracted.
47. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, does your service have
an assessment that outlines the costs incurred due to lack of access to
technical data rights needed for your servicemembers to repair or
sustain equipment? If yes, what did the assessment conclude?
General Mingus. The Army does not currently have an assessment that
specifically outlines the costs incurred due to lack of access to
technical data and license rights. However, the Army assesses
operations and sustainment costs with a focus on identifying
contributing factors to cost growth during Sustainment Reviews.
Sustainment decisions related to technical data and license rights are
program dependent and may change over the weapon system's life cycle.
Admiral Kilby. The Navy continuously considers repair costs
attributable to lack of access to technical data or limited rights in
delivered technical data associated with weapon systems in its
mandatory sustainment reviews and assessments of life cycle sustainment
plans. To date, there is not a single Navy-wide assessment. However,
the Navy looks forward to discussing the results of any assessment
performed in this area with Congress.
General Mahoney. We are unaware of any service-level assessment
capturing incurred costs due to lack of technical data rights.
General Guetlein. While the USSF does not have a single,
comprehensive assessment that quantifies all costs associated with
limited technical data rights across every system, we recognize limited
technical data rights is an issue. Each program tracks sustainment
costs, including those driven by reliance on Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs); however, compiling a service-wide assessment is
difficult because isolating the specific cost premium attributable
solely to data rights, as opposed to other sustainment factors, is
challenging.
However, the data we have consistently demonstrate that
insufficient technical data rights lead to higher sustainment costs,
longer downtimes, and reduced competition.
We are working to include stronger data rights provisions into our
contracts up front, learning from past challenges. Where feasible, we
are investing in training and facilities to allow for more in-house
maintenance and repair, reducing reliance on OEMs, and we are
developing a comprehensive data strategy to better manage technical
data throughout a system's lifecycle.
Lieutenant General Spain. While a formal assessment specifically
focused on the costs incurred due to a lack of access to technical
data, the associated IP, and the rights to use them, has not been
conducted, the Air Force recognizes the impact this lack of access can
have on lifecycle support and sustainment costs while negatively
impacting overall readiness.
48. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, if your service does
not have such an assessment, would you commit to ensuring an assessment
is conducted and the results of that assessment are made public?
General Mingus. I commit to ensure that the Army continues to
review the operational limitations, challenges, and obstacles our
Soldiers face with maintenance of our equipment. I also will ensure
that such information is conveyed up the chain-of-command so Army
Senior Leaders have the details necessary to tackle these issues
properly. It is vital that the proper data is conveyed in a manner
which fully supports the continued development of our systems and our
Soldiers. Promptly addressing any issues or discrepancies which present
themselves is crucial to the Army's continued success.
Admiral Kilby. Yes, the Navy is committed to continually conducting
necessary assessments to fully understand the costs associated with not
having technical data. This analysis would further improve the Navy's
ability to assess the value of technical data delivery requirements
during contract formation.
General Mahoney. Yes. The Marine Corps, through our acquisition
activities, would support such an assessment to the maximum extent
possible.
General Guetlein. Yes, we will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to
evaluate the financial implications of limited technical data rights
across the USSF. We believe this assessment would provide valuable
insights to guide future policy and acquisition decisions we. We are
committed to transparency and will share the results of this assessment
with Congress with appropriate safeguards for classified data.
Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force strives to ensure its
programs deliberately assess their long-term technical data needs and
execute acquisition strategies that provide for the necessary technical
data rights, required IP, and the rights to use them for sustainment.
The Air Force is focused on empowering our skilled maintainers with the
technical data and the associated IP and rights to use them as
necessary to repair our own equipment and plans to continue working to
achieve optimal outcomes in this area. The Air Force will continue to
work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Pricing,
Contracting, and Acquisition Policy (DPCAP) IP Cadre for assessments
and make any results public.
49. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, the Navy has the
Taxpayer Advocacy Project to ensure cost-efficiency in the service.
What programs or initiatives does your service have to protect taxpayer
dollars from contractor tactics that drive up costs, such as right-to-
repair restrictions?
General Mingus. The Army takes measures to protect taxpayer dollars
and avoid excessive costs associated with contractor dependencies,
including those stemming from right-to-repair restrictions and has
initiatives to address these challenges.
The Army is refining its intellectual property (IP) policy on
planning, acquiring, and managing IP, emphasizing a tailored approach
and early consideration of technical data and license rights in the
acquisition life cycle. The policy includes defining required data
deliverables in solicitations and negotiating favorable license terms
for maintenance and repair flexibility. Additionally, the Army is
investing in workforce training on IP management, including contract
requirements, cost-effective pricing, data rights assertions, and
licensing agreements.
The Army promotes the use of Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)
principles to reduce the reliance on single-source vendors and
proprietary systems. MOSA encourages the use of open standards and
interoperable components, enabling greater competition and maintenance
flexibility.
The Army actively adopts refined acquisition and sustainment
policies to emphasize early planning for product support analysis
necessary for sustainment planning, data rights acquisition, and life
cycle cost considerations.
Admiral Kilby. The Taxpayer Advocacy Project (TAP) was developed by
the Navy to ensure that the taxpayer gets the best value for their
investment by providing Program Executive Officers, Program Managers,
Contracting Officers, and Attorneys with legal tools and strategies to
improve and enhance negotiations with the industrial base. TAP's goal
was accomplished through an updated and implemented matrix of legal
authorities, public engagement with other agencies and Congress,
analysis of contractor financial data, and analysis of contract
deliverables. TAP initially focused on contractors' refusal to deliver
technical data despite statutes and regulations allowing for such
delivery and contract clauses mandating delivery. Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) refused to agree to deliver complete Technical
Data Packages (TDPs) to the Navy, or expressed concern over what is
necessary to constitute a complete TDP that would enable the Navy to
operate, maintain, and sustain deliverables. When the Navy attempted to
include such technical data delivery requirements in contracts, the
OEMs declined to bid on these requirements, holding up contract award.
The OEMs characterized the Navy's delivery requirements as an attempt
to force the OEMs to relinquish their intellectual property rights.
This was inaccurate. The Navy was willing to accept the level of
license rights to which it would be entitled by operation of the
technical data statutes, regulations, and clauses. Eventually, the Navy
was successful in negotiating a special license agreement to define TDP
requirements such that the OEM's most significant intellectual property
concerns were addressed while ensuring that the Navy was able to use
the delivered technical data to sustain and maintain weapons systems.
General Mahoney. In addition to ensuring the service remains on
track for another successful audit opinion, the Marine Corps has also
taken a multifaceted approach to reducing sustainment costs through
service level guidance and adoption of key programs to improve
operational readiness and availability through more cost-effective
means. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 4700.4 Advanced Manufacturing directs
commanders at all levels to employ additive manufacturing to fullest
extent possible to increase readiness in support of operations, and MCO
4151.22 Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) direct the integration
of predictive maintenance capabilities to reduce life cycle sustainment
costs over time and increase lethality through improved operational
readiness. In support of implementation, Marine Corps Systems Command
(MARCORSYSCOM) has delivered to DASN(S) their CBM+ Strategic
Implementation Plan for ground acquisitions and is coordinating with
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) on
the development of a service level CBM+ implementation strategy.
General Guetlein. Through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Space Acquisition and Integration, acquirers are implementing nine
(9) space acquisition tenets focused on best practices to ensure
taxpayer dollars are providing warfighter capabilities. Thank you for
the authorities in the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization
Act (FY25 NDAA) that elevated the Contractor Responsibility Watch List
(CRWL) from Space Systems Command to the Service Acquisition Executive.
The CRWL provides a unique authority for holding contractors
accountable for performance, including by managing costs. Additionally,
by increasing competition, leveraging commercial capabilities, and
using firm-fixed price contracts where appropriate, the USSF is
benefiting from a competitive environment to reduce the probability of
price gouging and vendor-lock.
Lieutenant General Spain. While the Air Force does not have a
similar project to the one described, we are committed to making sound
sustainment strategy decisions and are continuing work to ensure that
the right-to-repair resides with the Air Force to avoid readiness
delays and single-source repairs. Therefore, the Air Force's
Intellectual Property (IP) Cadre is working with acquisition leadership
to develop an IP pricing ``tiger team'' to support programs in the IP
valuation team. The aim is to acquire the necessary IP license rights,
technical data, and software (IP) at reasonable prices in order to
specifically repair our weapons systems when needed, and more generally
to be better able to compete or in-source future sustainment efforts
for our mission critical platforms, thereby protecting taxpayer
dollars.
50. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what is your service's
strategy to reduce acquisition and sustainment costs?
General Mingus. Early and continuous planning throughout the
acquisition life cycle can significantly reduce acquisition and
sustainment costs. First, we consider sustainment as a performance
parameter and consider tradeoffs early in system design to improve
durability and reduce future operations and maintenance costs. Second,
we encourage competition to the maximum extent practicable and use
commercial technology when available to drive down acquisition and
procurement costs. Finally, we design our systems to incorporate a
modular open system approach to enable iterative upgrades, enable
continuous competition, and incorporate new technology to keep systems
relevant over the long term.
Admiral Kilby. The Navy follows statute and policy focusing on
reducing acquisition and sustainment costs. The Independent Logistics
Assessment (ILA) is directed by Title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 4325, and policy
is provided in DODI 5000.91. ILAs are conducted on all major weapon
systems through the acquisition process in order to analyze product
support outcomes as identified by the product support strategy, as well
as identifying features that are likely to drive future operating and
support costs. Recommending changes to a system design or support
concept could reduce costs. During sustainment, Title 10 U.S.C. 4325
requires periodic reviews of sustainment costs of major weapon systems
after such systems achieve initial operational capability. This enables
the program to identify and address factors resulting in growth in
sustainment costs and adapt support strategies to reduce such costs.
Title 10 U.S.C. 4323 requires Sustainment Reviews (SR) for covered
systems beginning 5 years after achieving iniital operation capablity
and every 5 years thereafter. SRs examine sustainment cost drivers, and
programs must provide remediation plans if cost growth has occurred.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps strategy for reducing acquisition
and sustainment costs is multifaceted. MCO 4700.4 Advanced
Manufacturing and MCO 4151.22 CBM+ both establish programs to address
key tenants necessary for the reduction of acquisition and sustainment
costs. MARCORSYSCOM recently delivered to DASN(S) their CBM+ Strategic
Implementation Plan for ground acquisitions. Concurrently, DC CD&I is
developing the service level CBM+ implementation strategy.
Multiple MARCORSYSCOM orders are in the process of being
established or updated to address improvements to sustainment and
readiness at an affordable cost. MARCORSYSCOM Order 4105.2, Product
Support Strategy (PSS), requires program managers (PMs) to develop a
robust PSS based on analyses conducted with vendors, program office
representatives, and subject matter experts from the Fleet Marine
Force. MARCORSYSCOM Order 4151.22, Reliability Centered Maintenance,
emphasizes the requirement for Fleet Marines to provide subject matter
expertise in the execution of this analysis to ensure increased
readiness at an affordable cost. These lines of efforts between
Headquarters Marine Corps and MARCORSYSCOM will directly increase
readiness in support of our Nation's warfighters.
General Guetlein. The USSF implemented a Commercial Space Strategy
with four guiding principles of balance, interoperability, resilience,
and responsible conduct. This strategy supports a robust industrial
base where competition drives down costs. Additionally, the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration has
implemented nine (9) tenets for space systems and programs to improve
acquisition outcomes by delivering programs on cost and schedule
through rigorous program management discipline and execution.
Lieutenant General Spain. Operations and Sustainment (O&S) costs
are the largest cost for programs and our military understands the
importance of bringing those costs down as much as possible. Throughout
the acquisition lifecycle process, and even in the early stages, we
look for efficiencies to reduce those costs prior to entering O&S. One
of the primary objectives of the DAF is to decrease cost for both
acquisition and sustainment, as highlighted in several initiatives and
strategies. This involves leveraging partnerships and commercial
solutions, providing opportunities for rapid prototyping and
experimentation, enhancing production capabilities and capacity, and
adopting strategies such as digital engineering to promote efficiency
and reduce costs in acquisition. Further, the DAF has prioritized life-
cycle costs by improving reliability, availability, maintainability,
and supportability to achieve reductions in sustainment expenses.
51. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, Director Maurer stated
that at least one service ``needs an industrial base strategy to help
get better results from the private companies that repair ships,'' and
for at least one program, ``DOD needs to reassess the balance of
sustainment responsibilities between contractors and services.'' Please
provide an example of when your service did not have the technical data
rights needed to repair or sustain a piece of equipment and describe
any resulting wasted time, extra costs, or reduced readiness.
General Mingus. There are instances by which the Army may choose
not to procure the technical data rights needed to repair or sustain a
piece of equipment. Specific example is with centrally purchased or
non-centrally managed equipment, information technology assets, and
commercial off the shelf equipment with vendor or manufacturer
warranties. The Army uses this strategy in accordance with Federal
acquisition regulation and only when the benefits to be derived from a
warranty are commensurate with the cost of the warranty.
Admiral Kilby. OEMs for programs such as F/A-18 and JSF have in the
past refused to agree to deliver complete technical data packages or,
like on MQ-25, expressed concern over what is necessary to constitute a
complete TDP that would enable the government to operate, maintain, and
sustain the aircraft. This can generate significant contracting delays
while negotiations endure, ultimately impacting Fleet readiness.
One example involving sustainment of a system is the Main Rotor
Actuator (MRA) for AH-1Z (Viper)/UH-1Y(Venom), managed by PMA-276.
These components have sporadically been responsible for requests
for priority assistance over fiscal year 24. There was an uptick in
demand while the OEM (Woodward) had issues with their sub-vendor that
produces manifolds for the MRA. This caused delays and increased
turnaround time. This drove cannibalization actions to prevent
readiness impacts. NAVSUP and Woodward have worked with the sub-vendor
to remedy the issues.
General Mahoney. The ACV Family of Vehicles (FoV) was procured as a
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)/Non-Developmental Item (NDI) vehicle.
As such the U.S. Government had not funded the initial development of
the vehicle offered by the Original Equipment Manufacturer, but did opt
to incorporate critical survivability needs, resulting in extended
maintenance periods and increased costs. This experience highlights the
critical importance of securing adequate technical data rights, even
for COTS acquisitions, to ensure timely, cost-effective sustainment and
maintain operational readiness.
General Guetlein. Director Maurer raises an important issue that
resonates with the USSF as well. Access to technical data rights is
essential for effective and affordable sustainment of space systems.
The service has encountered challenges with programs where limited
access to proprietary technical data held by the OEM created
sustainment obstacles. This experience underscored the criticality of
securing appropriate technical data rights up front in the acquisition
process. We are taking steps to prevent similar situations in the
future.
Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force awarded a contract to
modernize a sensitive sensor system. The contract required delivery of
firmware and software in appropriate detail to ensure operational needs
were met. Unfortunately, some subsystems were delivered without this
required information. When challenged, the vendor stated the items were
considered firmware and therefore did not meet the definition of
``computer software.'' After multiple engagements, this issue was
finally resolved with the program deciding to buy all the components in
the sub-system with firmware pre-installed. While this satisfied the
immediate need, it unfortunately will cost the Air Force the ability to
have additional suppliers for these items in the future and allows the
contractor to charge other government entities for the same units.
52. Senator Warren. Ms. Maurer, you testified during the hearing
that GAO's ``independent nonpartisan role'' is to ``help improve the
government.'' What additional information would be helpful in order to
continue assessing to what degree failure to access technical data
rights harms our military readiness?
Ms. Maurer. Our work has shown that the Department of Defense's
(DOD) access to intellectual property or technical data--such as user
manuals, engineering design data, models, and computer software--has
been a long-standing issue negatively affecting the ability of
maintainers to conduct maintenance on weapon systems, limiting the
availability of those systems to the warfighter. Acquiring and
licensing technical data is critical for ensuring weapon systems and
equipment remain functional, sustainable, upgradable, and affordable.
We have generally been provided the necessary information by the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services to conduct our
work on this issue. However, DOD and the military services have not
taken action to fully implement our recommendations. For example:
In 2022 (GAO-23-106217), we reported that access to
technical data posed sustainment challenges for 15 of 45 aircraft,
having an effect on the availability of the aircraft and costs required
to sustain those aircraft according to program officials. There are a
variety of reasons across military aircraft programs that result in
access to technical data being a limiting factor in sustaining those
systems. For example, in 2014 (GAO-14-778), we found that DOD had not
fully addressed access to technical data for the F-35 aircraft, which
has impacted affordability and operational readiness of the aircraft.
We recommended that DOD develop a long-term Intellectual Property
Strategy to include, but not be limited to, the identification of (1)
current levels of technical data rights ownership by the Federal
Government and (2) all critical technical data needs and their
associated costs. Over a decade later--as of May 2025--this
recommendation has not been implemented by DOD. In part due to this,
DOD and the military services continue to struggle in its efforts to
sustain the F-35 and meet availability goals of the military services.
In 2020 (GAO-20-2), we reported on 11 different
shipbuilding programs--including the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), Wasp (LHD
8), America (LHA 6), San Antonio (LPD 17), Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), and
Virginia (SSN 774)--and found that nearly all of them experienced
sustainment issues due to a lack of technical data that resulted from
poor planning in the early stages of the acquisition process.
Specifically, the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) for these ships
did not consistently address the full spectrum of potential
intellectual property and technical data related issues, such as
attaining the technical data needed to repair and replace ship systems.
Nearly all of the LCSPs we reviewed stated, in general terms, that the
Navy would obtain the technical data to which it had rights. However,
in these LCSPs, the Navy did not address how this strategy met the
Navy's needs for competitive and affordable acquisition and sustainment
over the life cycle of a ship class, such as to ensure maintenance
could be carried out as planned by a ship's crew. We made 11 of
recommendations to the Navy to improve sustainment planning for ships,
including addressing deficiencies in LCSPs and sustainment risks
associated with the lack of technical data. However, only 1 of the 11
recommendations are fully implemented, as of May 2025.
In addition, we have an on-going review examining DOD weapon system
programs in sustainment and their planning for intellectual property
acquisition, efforts to ensure data procured is received and reviewed
for accuracy by DOD, and challenges faced by weapon systems in
sustainment due to data rights shortfalls. We plan to report on the
results of that work later in 2025.
modular open system approach
53. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how will a Modular Open
System Approach (MOSA) to contracts for equipment benefit your service?
General Mingus. The Army values the MOSA as it provides important
development benefits throughout the lifecycle of the program. One, it
enhances competition as individual subcomponents can be recompeted as
it avoids long-term vendor lock and allows opportunity for industry
partners to enter into the space. Second, it improves interoperability
with other systems as hardware and software can be changed out
independently to coincide with both legacy systems and that of partner
nations. Third, it allows the Army to incorporate innovation at a
higher speed as the flexibility with MOSA allows for easier
reconfiguration as new technology becomes available. Fourth, it
provides cost savings/avoidance as the Army is not locked into one
vendor should supply chain or cost becomes an issue.
Admiral Kilby. A Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) enables our
equipment to be adapted, updated and modernized to the needs of our
operational forces in a more cost-effective manner. By rapidly fielding
emerging technologies, we ensure our warfighting forces remain the
strongest and most lethal in the world. By designing and acquiring our
systems to be modular and open, we both support the revival of the
industrial base where vendors can compete in areas that were once more
challenging to gain footing, as well as enable new partners who can
offer unique solutions to address our needs. Finally, a MOSA supports
incorporation of cost-effective and efficient solutions that are
vetted, tested and fielded more quickly than traditional acquisition
methods.
General Mahoney. The Modular Open System Approach (MOSA) encourages
the development of open, standardized system architectures that enable
flexibility in integrating emerging technologies, evolving requirements
and advanced capabilities without the need for a full system redesign.
MOSA is particularly crucial in a dynamic defense environment, where
the ability to quickly adapt to changing threats and operational needs
is vital for mission success. By leveraging modularity in system
architecture, the Marine Corps can ensure that different modules
(hardware and software) can be swapped in or upgraded independently.
This reduces time to field capability while promoting the reuse of
design elements across multiple platforms. An open system architecture
allows for increased competition among vendors and broadens the
Industrial Base, making it easier to incorporate solutions from a range
of suppliers while maintaining interoperability. This also minimizes
dependency on specific vendors, creating a more resilient and
competitive procurement environment and enabling a more sustainable,
cost-effective procurement processes.
Incorporating MOSA requirements into contracts helps align system
development with operational needs, ensuring systems remain agile and
adaptable. By focusing on architectural flexibility and
standardization, the Marine Corps gains the ability to stay ahead of
technological advances, enhance mission readiness and respond to
evolving threats effectively. This results in faster modernization and
more timely responses to operational challenges, keeping the Marine
Corps ready and capable.
General Guetlein. Embracing MOSA in our acquisition strategies is
not simply a technological shift, it's a strategic imperative for the
USSF. MOSA provides enhanced competition and innovation, improved
affordability and lifecycle costs, and increased flexibility and
resilience. MOSA also fosters collaboration and interoperability
because it shifts the Space Force from expensive, proprietary systems
to a more agile, affordable, and adaptable approach to space
acquisition. This is crucial for the Space Force to maintain
technological superiority and address the evolving challenges in the
space domain.
Lieutenant General Spain. A Modular Open System Approach (MOSA)
provides an important benefit for the DAF, enabling us to reduce costs
and risk associated with technology refresh and system capability
upgrades. MOSA provides a unified framework enabling interoperability
among systems to achieve joint and coalition missions. MOSA also
increases opportunities for competition and innovation from industry by
opening up systems that have traditionally been vendor locked.
54. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, does your service
provide any justification or analysis to back up the determination that
a MOSA is not practicable in a contract?
General Mingus. The Army values the MOSA as it provides important
development benefits throughout the lifecycle of the program, however,
sometimes it's not feasible to be required in a contract agreement. For
example, as we look to leverage buying commercial off the shelf
capabilities, utilizing MOSA may not be available at the speed to which
we are procuring a system or simply an option based on the technology.
Admiral Kilby. Our teams have been working to develop guidance for
programs on the business case and value proposition of MOSA. Dictating
how a contractor applies a MOSA for a given system may be limiting and
stifle innovative approaches. Instead, our goal is to ensure strategies
for system acquisition, design, and sustainment to support a MOSA that
enables interoperability, reusability, and open standards The guidance
we provide to programs for use in their statements of work and
solicitation requirements will be aimed at showing how a MOSA can
benefit the full system lifecycle, from development through
sustainment. This comprehensive approach enables and empowers programs
to craft requirements and contracts that best align to their
acquisition strategy, strengthens the industrial base, and provides
best value to the Government.
General Mahoney. MARCORSYSCOM (MCSC) is contributing a
representative to the Naval MOSA Working Group, under the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Engineering. The goal is to ensure that system acquisition and
sustainment strategies align with MOSA principles that promote
interoperability and reusability. Guidance to Program Management
Offices will include business case and contract considerations to
demonstrate how MOSA implementation can benefit the full system
lifecycle.
General Guetlein. The USSF understands the long-term benefits of
open systems and only pursues a non-MOSA approach in limited
circumstances, supported by rigorous analysis. Our default position is
to incorporate MOSA to the maximum extent practicable while recognizing
that a tailored approach is sometimes necessary. If a program
determines that MOSA is not suitable for a specific contract or
subsystem, they are required to provide a clear and compelling
justification. We are dedicated to ensuring our decisions are driven by
data, analysis, and a focus on mission effectiveness.
Lieutenant General Spain. In accordance with DOD and DAF MOSA
policy and standard engineering practice, all programs evaluate their
architectures at the technical, programmatic, and contractual levels to
ensure maximum value from MOSA. These findings directly inform
acquisition, support, and modernization contract strategies and are
documented in engineering artifacts. MOSA is a core element of DAF
Digital Materiel Management.
55. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what challenges is your
service facing in implementing MOSA requirements?
General Mingus. The Army has embraced implementing MOSA as it
brings needed flexibility to the development of our systems, but it
doesn't come without its challenges. For example, depending on the
resources, schedule and requirements, implementing MOSA either
partially or entirely for the system may not be a feasible option. The
Army also has to be mindful of negotiating IP rights that allow modular
system design that recognizes industry investment while also allows the
government to maintain flexibility to meet its needs.
Admiral Kilby. We identified several challenges in implementing
MOSA requirements, including awareness of the requirement, the breadth
of considerations when developing a MOSA, a trained and equipped
workforce, and implementation guidance from both technical and business
perspectives. We recently developed and released the Naval Open Systems
Implementation Guidebook Version One to bring awareness and guide the
workforce on the scope and elements of MOSA. Presently, an update of
the Guidebook is underway and scheduled to be released later this year
with additional guidance for requirements development, business case
analyses, the importance of system architectures, and how MOSA can be
leveraged for different acquisition pathways. Finally, the Navy is
reviewing training material, such as courses and webinars, and
developing new training where it would most benefit the workforce.
General Mahoney. Determining what constitutes acceptable MOSA
compliance is often a gray area, and with few successful examples to
learn from make it harder to build a clear path forward.
The urgency of meeting operational timelines can often clash with
the time required to fully integrate MOSA principles, leading to
tradeoffs in both design and implementation. The imperative to rapidly
field systems, particularly in high-stakes, high-risk scenarios,
creates pressures that hinder the depth of analysis necessary for
robust MOSA implementation, such as modularity decomposition and
ensuring appropriate data rights.
To address these challenges, MARCORSYSCOM is contributing a
representative to the Naval MOSA Working Group, under the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Engineering. A key step in this effort has been the release of the
Naval MOSA Guidebook Version 1.0, signed by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition in January 2025,
which provides introductory guidance in implementing MOSA from both
technical and business perspectives. MARCORSYSCOM is also participating
in updating the Naval MOSA Guidebook, incorporating additional support
tools and resources for workforce development.
General Guetlein. While the USSF is fully committed to implementing
MOSA, transitioning to a MOSA-driven architecture takes time and
presents challenges. The Space Force is working to overcome these
challenges to ensure our systems are affordable, adaptable, and
resilient for the future. The challenges include:
1. Legacy Systems and Culture: Many of our existing systems were
designed before MOSA became a priority. Retrofitting them for
modularity is complex, expensive, and sometimes impossible. Shifting
from traditional ``build-to-spec'' acquisition to a more modular
approach requires cultural change both within the Space Force and
across our industry partners.
2. Defining and Enforcing Standards: Establishing clear,
consistent, and enforceable MOSA standards across various domains
(e.g., software, hardware, interfaces) is an ongoing effort. Balancing
flexibility for innovation with standardization for interoperability
requires careful consideration.
3. Workforce Expertise: Developing and acquiring systems built on
MOSA principles demands a workforce proficient in these concepts. We
are working to establish training and education to address this gap.
4. Ensuring Security: Modularity can introduce new attack surfaces
and vulnerabilities. We are meticulously addressing cybersecurity
concerns associated with MOSA implementation.
5. Measuring Success: Quantifying the benefits of MOSA--such as
reduced costs, increased competition, and faster technology insertion--
can be challenging. We are developing metrics to track our progress and
demonstrate value.
The USSF initiatives to address these challenges include investing
in research and development of MOSA standards and technologies,
partnering with industry leaders to foster a robust and competitive
MOSA ecosystem, implementing robust cybersecurity measures designed for
modular systems, and developing clear metrics to track our progress and
demonstrate the value of MOSA.
Lieutenant General Spain. MOSA implementation is unique to every
program and there are varying degrees of modularity, openness, and
approaches. We are continuing to strengthen our governance of open
architecture standards and government reference architectures (GRAs) to
efficiently use DAF resources to address the opportunity cost
associated with a long-term MOSA framework. Key to the long-term
strategy is commitment and continued adoption of the state-of-the-art
within both the public and private sectors.
56. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what guidance does your
service have when deciding whether to include MOSA in a request for
proposals?
General Mingus. The Army's guidance on incorporating MOSA into
solicitations is aligned with DOD's policies to enhance flexibility,
competition, and innovation in system design and acquisition in
accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. 4401 and DOD Instruction 5000.02,
``Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Function Framework.'' The Army
adopts MOSA into solicitations and tailors MOSA requirements to
individual programs with comprehensive consideration of IP
requirements, including MOSA objectives and the support of operational
and lifecycle needs. Army Directive 2020-06, Modular Open Systems
Approach'' and the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(AFARS) Appendix AA--The Army Source Selection Supplement (AS3)
Appendix E--Intellectual Property (updated Sep 2024) reinforces DOD
policies and provides specific MOSA implementation guidance for Army
programs.
Admiral Kilby. Our approach has been to require the addition of
MOSA into solicitation requirements and allow the contractors to offer
solutions on how they intend to provide the Navy with solutions that
meet our requirements using MOSA approaches. The Navy developed sample
language for programs to use in solicitations and is continuing to
engage with partners to ensure the Navy is best positioned to develop
and field rapidly adaptable, lethal systems. The Navy will continue to
aggressively pursue incorporation of MOSA into solicitations for
systems design and development.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps is planning to leverage broader
Department of the Navy efforts, particularly the initiatives of the
Naval MOSA Working Group, under the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Engineering. These
efforts include the development and refinement of MOSA-related
guidance, best practices and tools to facilitate better integration of
MOSA into both Navy and Marine Corps acquisition processes.
As an initial step, the Naval MOSA Guidebook Version 1.0 was signed
and released by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition in January 2025 and provides a process for
implementing MOSA applicable to all Naval acquisition programs across
the Naval Systems Commands (including MARCORSYSCOM). The Naval MOSA
Working Group plan of action involves creating a collaborative digital
environment for MOSA, updating acquisition processes to incorporate
MOSA principles and capturing MOSA training, with MARCORSYSCOM
contributing a representative to these efforts.
General Guetlein. The USSF is fully committed to leveraging the
advantages of MOSA in our systems and acquisitions. Our guidance for
including MOSA in RFPs hinges on a few key principles, including
mission need and suitability, cost-effectiveness and sustainability,
risk management, and collaboration and interoperability.
We are focused on implementing MOSA principles in a way that
maximizes operational effectiveness and long-term value for the Space
Force. We have taken concrete steps to integrate MOSA into our
acquisition process, such as incorporating MOSA principles into our
acquisition guidance to incorporate and engage with industry to foster
a robust and competitive MOSA ecosystem.
Lieutenant General Spain. In accordance with DOD and DAF MOSA
policy and standard engineering practice, all programs evaluate their
architectures at the technical, programmatic, and contractual levels to
ensure maximum value from MOSA. The DAF MOSA Guidebook provides
decision support and management of open architecture standards and
GRAs. Program managers, contracting officers, and systems engineers use
this guidance to craft Requests for Proposals that include compliance
with MOSA-enabling interfaces, identify appropriate data rights, and
use business models that allow for system components to be severable.
v-22 osprey safety
57. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, would you support
keeping information about witnesses to investigations confidential but
sharing overall conclusions of Safety Investigation Boards to enhance
congressional oversight and identify problems that need to be fixed?
General Mingus. I fully support protecting the confidentiality of
witness information. I also welcome the opportunity to work with this
Committee to identify problems and develop solutions to fix those
problems. The lessons learned from safety investigations help inform us
on how to not only fix, but prevent, mishaps. I look forward to
collaborating with Congress, the Secretary, and the Chief on ways to
ensure our force is safer and stronger as our warfighter needs continue
to evolve.
Admiral Kilby. It is executive branch policy to protect Department
of Defense personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational
illness; to protect the public from risk of death, injury, illness, or
property damage caused by Department activities; and to protect
Department property from damage. Military safety investigations are
conducted solely to support this policy.
The Department recognizes that there are other compelling needs for
transparency in the event of most serious mishaps, so each Service also
conducts a separate independent legal investigation for those other
purposes, including public release and preservation of evidence for use
in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative
action. Of note, all non-privileged evidence gathered by a safety
investigation is handed over to and included in the associated legal
investigation.
The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to prevent mishaps, saving
lives and treasure. It is so effective not only because certain safety
investigations can offer confidentiality to witnesses, but also because
of the candid analysis of investigators and privileged technical
evaluations. The military safety privilege fosters their unsparing
candor, secure in the knowledge that the resulting analysis will be
used solely within the Department to prevent future mishaps. Those
aspects of the safety investigation are not releasable outside of the
Department, and even within the Department may not be used for any
other purpose, including disciplinary or adverse administrative
actions, contract actions, or claims for or against the United States.
Compromising that assurance that investigators' privileged analysis
will remain in-house would most assuredly devaState that candor and
result in cautious, measured analysis intended for public distribution.
The Department also respects the congressional oversight role. To
that end, the Department and the Armed Services Committees agreed on a
procedure to discuss certain privileged safety information with the
Chair and Ranking Member of the SASC and HASC, memorialized in the
Aspin-Rice Agreement.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps respects the congressional armed
services oversight role. To that end, the DOD and the Armed Services
Committees agreed on a procedure to discuss certain privileged safety
information with the chairman and ranking member, memorialized in the
Aspin-Rice Agreement. The Marine Corps will comply with the current
policy.
It is executive branch policy to protect DOD personnel from
accidental death, injury, or occupational illness; to protect the
public from risk of death, injury, illness, or property damage caused
by Department activities; and to protect Department property from
damage. Military safety investigations are conducted solely to support
this policy.
The Department recognizes there are other compelling needs for
transparency in the event of most serious mishaps, so each service also
conducts a separate independent legal investigation for those other
purposes, including public release and preservation of evidence for use
in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative
action. Of note, all non-privileged evidence gathered by a safety
investigation is handed over to, and included in, the associated legal
investigation.
The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to prevent mishaps, saving
lives and treasure. It is so effective not only because certain safety
investigations can offer confidentiality to witnesses, but also because
of the candid analysis of investigators and privileged technical
evaluations. The military safety privilege fosters their unsparing
candor, secure in the knowledge that the resulting analysis will be
used solely within the Department to prevent future mishaps. Those
aspects of the safety investigation are not releasable outside of the
Department, and even within the Department may not be used for any
other purpose, including disciplinary or adverse administrative
actions, contract actions, or claims for or against the United States.
Compromising that assurance that investigators' privileged analysis
will remain in-house would most assuredly devastate that candor and
result in cautious, measured analysis intended for public distribution.
Lieutenant General Spain. It is executive branch policy to protect
DOD personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational illness;
to protect the public from risk of death, injury, illness, or property
damage caused by Department activities; and to protect Department
property from damage. Military safety investigations are conducted
solely to support this policy.
The Department of the Air Force recognizes there are other
compelling needs for transparency in the event of most serious mishaps,
so each Service also conducts a separate independent legal
investigation for those other purposes, including public release and
preservation of evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary
action, and adverse administrative action. Of note, all of the non-
privileged evidence gathered by a safety investigation is handed over
to and included in the associated legal investigation. Similarly, a
report redacted of safety privilege information can be made available.
The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to preventing mishaps and
saving lives and treasure. Compromising, the assurance that
investigators' privilege will remain in-house would most assuredly
devaState that candor and would result in cautious, measured analysis
if public releasability is a concern. The military safety privilege
fosters their unsparing candor, secure in the knowledge that the
resulting analysis will be used solely within the Department to prevent
future mishaps. Those aspects of the safety investigation are not
releasable outside of the Department, and even within the Department
may not be used for any other purpose, including disciplinary or
adverse administrative actions, contract actions, or claims for or
against the United States. Compromising the assurance that
investigators' privileged analysis will remain in-house would most
assuredly devaState that candor and result in cautious, measured
analysis intended for public distribution.
The Department also respects the congressional armed services
oversight role. To that end, the Department and the Armed Services
Committees agreed on a procedure to discuss certain privileged safety
information with the Chair and Ranking Member of the SASC and HASC,
memorialized in the Aspin-Rice Agreement.
General Guetlein. It is executive branch policy to protect DOD
personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational illness; to
protect the public from risk of death, injury, illness, or property
damage caused by Department activities; and to protect Department
property from damage. Military safety investigations are conducted
solely to support this policy.
The Department recognizes there are other compelling needs for
transparency in the event of most serious mishaps, so each service also
conducts a separate independent legal investigation for those other
purposes, including public release and preservation of evidence for use
in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative
action. Of note, all of the non-privileged evidence gathered by a
safety investigation is handed over to and included in the associated
legal investigation.
The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to prevent mishaps, saving
lives and treasure. Compromising the assurance that investigators'
privilege will remain in-house would most assuredly devaState that
candor and would result in cautious, measured analysis if public
releasability is a concern. The military safety privilege fosters their
unsparing candor, secure in the knowledge that the resulting analysis
will be used solely within the Department to prevent future mishaps.
Those aspects of the safety investigation are not releasable outside of
the Department, and even within the Department may not be used for any
other purpose, including disciplinary or adverse administrative
actions, contract actions, or claims for or against the United States.
Compromising the assurance that investigators' privileged analysis will
remain in-house would most assuredly devaState that candor and result
in cautious, measured analysis intended for public distribution.
The Department also respects the congressional armed services'
oversight role. To that end, the Department and the Armed Services
Committees agreed on a procedure to discuss certain privileged safety
information with the Chair and Ranking Member of the SASC and HASC,
memorialized in the Aspin-Rice Agreement.
58. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, have your service's
policies or procedures changed based on findings or recommendations
released by the Joint Safety Council? If so, please describe which
policies.
General Mingus. The Army does not fly or maintain the V-22 Osprey.
However, the Joint Safety Council (JSC) is taking an opportunity to
review select completed Service or Joint mishap investigations, such as
mishaps involving the V-22, to provide lessons learned that inform
actions and recommendations to improve policy, streamline systems and
processes, identify resources, and refine overall support mechanisms to
the investigative process. As this process matures, we can expect the
JSC to establish routine sharing of the results, trends, and lessons
learned from key mishap investigations and discuss mishap data,
information, and products that enable informed mishap prevention
strategies across the DOD.
Admiral Kilby. The Defense Analytics Working Group (DAWG) under the
auspices of the Joint Safety Council (JSC) officially stood up on 22
April 2024 to establish consistent cross-service analytical initiatives
that help drive proactive measures to identify factors that positively
affect the cross-service safety missions of safeguarding our
Warfighters, protecting resources and improving readiness. Jointly led
reviews enabled insightful discussions across the services regarding
mishap types/rates as well as solutions in-work and safety processes in
place which would not have been possible otherwise due to current data
sharing limitations
Additionally, the Department and the Joint Safety Council undertook
an initiative to create service-level operational mishap information
sharing forums for communities of interest. In July 2023, the U.S. Army
shared several mishap events with U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S.
Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard aviation leaders at the general
officer/flag officer level. Although platform specific, the key
causalities of the presented mishaps were of universal applicability.
The operational aviation leaders were extremely receptive to the brief
and found value in sharing.
The Joint Safety Council has also worked with the services to
develop a process to debut and share standardized executive summaries
of major Service mishaps to increase cross-service visibility and
awareness of mishaps to address a National Commission on Military
Aviation Safety recommendation. The executive summaries allow for
quick, concise information sharing to identify trends and opportunities
for Services to work collaboratively to solve common causal factors
influencing multiple mishaps. The Joint Safety Council has reviewed
Comprehensive Review safety findings for the V-22 program which has
enhanced sharing of lessons learned across the Services. During 2025,
this process will continue to mature allowing opportunities for the
Joint Safety Council to work across the services to develop mitigations
for common hazards and causalities through the establishment of ad-hoc
working groups.
General Mahoney. The Marine Corps, in close coordination with the
other Services and under the leadership of the JSC, has participated in
several efforts shaping the way we share safety data, identify trends,
and implement solutions. Rather than acting independently, the Marine
Corps has prioritized joint approaches to safety policy development
that reflect shared risks and lessons learned. These cross-service
collaborations are already informing internal practices and will be
further codified into policy by the end of 2025.
The Defense Analytics Working Group under the auspices of the JSC
officially stood up on April 22, 2024, to establish consistent cross-
service analytical initiatives that help drive proactive measures to
identify factors that positively affect the cross-service safety
missions of safeguarding our warfighters, protecting resources and
improving readiness. Jointly led reviews enabled insightful discussions
across the services regarding mishap types/rates as well as solutions
in-work and safety processes in place which would not have been
possible otherwise due to current data sharing limitations.
Additionally, the Department and the JSC undertook an initiative to
create service-level operational mishap information sharing forums for
communities of interest. In July 2023, theU.S. Army shared several
mishap events with U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and
U.S. Coast Guard aviation leaders at the general officer/flag officer
level. Although platform specific, the key causalities of the presented
mishaps were of universal applicability. The operational aviation
leaders were extremely receptive to the brief and found value in
sharing. The JSC adopted a plan to codify service-level aviation,
space, ground (e.g., troops, armor, and government motor vehicles), and
maritime (e.g., ships, small craft, and barges) communities of interest
to provide a cross-service operational safety information forum. The
JSC expects to codify these forums in policy by the end of 2025.
The JSC has also worked with the Services to develop a process to
debut and share standardized executive summaries of major Service
mishaps to increase cross-Service visibility and awareness of mishaps
to address a National Commission on Military Aviation Safety
recommendation. The executive summaries allow for quick, concise
information sharing to identify trends and opportunities for Services
to work collaboratively to solve common causal factors influencing
multiple mishaps. During 2025, this process will continue to mature
allowing opportunities for the JSC to work across the services to
develop mitigations for common hazards and causalities through the
establishment of ad-hoc working groups.
General Guetlein. In calendar year 2022, the newly established
Joint Safety Council (JSC) commenced collaborative actions to enhance
the effectiveness and synergy of multiple operational safety efforts
across all the Services, encompassing safety analysis, information
sharing, protection of safety information, and standardization of
mishap report information, with the ultimate aim to further improve
mishap prevention across the entire DOD.
The JSC accomplished a number of joint initiatives that enhanced
mishap prevention. Through the JSC, the services work together to
establish data standards and provide data streams to DOD's FR2 System.
This effort not only baselined data categorization and requirements,
but it also bolstered Force Support and Occupational Health office's
ability to conduct oversight of service safety organizations. The JSC
provided a unique opportunity to identify information-access needs
across the services and a forum for seamlessly increasing access to
joint Privileged Safety Information, through a JSC-sponsored Memorandum
of Agreement.
Additionally, the JSC provided a unique joint forum to share mishap
lessons on joint systems. Since services investigate their own mishaps,
relevant information was not guaranteed to flow in a timely manner to
other service safety teams whose service may also operate that system.
The JSC institutionalized a joint mishap review working group to cull
relevant mishap prevention data from joint platform mishaps. This
working group also extracts mishap investigation best practices and
opportunities for improvement it can share with service safety
organizations.
Last, the JSC is uniquely positioned to determine shared issues
that could be better addressed through research and studies. The JSC is
able to leverage its relationship with the Defense Safety Oversight
Council governance structure to seek advocacy and funding for studies.
The joint equity ensures a large return on investment, and it expands
the stakeholder perspectives involved in the study. The results of the
studies are shared across the services, and the JSC has an opportunity
to shape and implement recommendations for the DOD.
Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. The Joint Safety Council (JSC)
accomplished a number of joint initiatives that enhanced mishap
prevention. Through the JSC, the services worked together to establish
data standards, and to provide data streams to DOD's Force Risk
Reduction system (FR2). This effort not only baselined data
categorization and requirements, but it also bolstered Force Support
and Occupational Health's office ability to conduct oversight of
service safety organizations. The JSC provided a unique opportunity to
identify a need for better information access across the services and a
forum by which they could seamlessly execute the increased access to
joint Privileged Safety Information through a JSC-sponsored Memorandum
of Agreement.
Additionally, the JSC provided a unique joint forum to share mishap
lessons on joint systems. Since services investigate their own mishaps,
relevant information was not guaranteed to flow in a timely manner to
other service safety teams whose service may also operate that system.
The JSC institutionalized a joint mishap review working group to cull
out relevant mishap prevention data from joint platform mishaps. This
working group also extracts mishap investigation best practices and
opportunities for improvement so it can share it with service safety
organizations.
Last, the JSC is uniquely positioned to determine shared issues
that could be better addressed through research and studies. The JSC is
able to leverage its relationship with the Defense Safety Oversight
Council governance structure to seek advocacy and funding for studies.
The joint equity ensures a large return on investment, and it expands
the stakeholder perspectives involved in the study. The results of the
studies get shared across the services, and the JSC has an opportunity
to shape and implement recommendations for the DOD.
program management
59. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, when a program has a
significant cost overrun, does that hurt military planning and
readiness?
General Mingus. Cost overruns create a cascading effect on military
planning and readiness. It impacts the availability of modernized
capabilities and disrupts equipment fielding timelines which are
synchronized with leader development, unit training, and deployment
timelines. Units maintain older or obsolete equipment longer than
anticipated impacting readiness of the organizations and overall
modernization of the force.
The Army is not interested in any unanticipated costs as it
prevents flexibility in budget execution. The Army programs and
estimates cost to the best of its ability in a volatile and challenging
environment. Cost over-runs, either due to inflationary pressures,
technological volatility or evolving requirements, always place
pressure on the prioritized investments within the Secretary's budget.
The Army regularly works to create opportunities for budgetary
flexibility and resilience to mitigate the threat of cost over-runs and
still deliver the necessary resources to support plans and highly
prioritized readiness.
Admiral Kilby. Significant cost overruns in Navy programs are a
serious concern that triggers extensive review and consideration. They
can have cascading negative effects on military planning by creating
budgetary pressures, delaying crucial capabilities, and ultimately
impacting the readiness of the armed forces to meet their missions. The
Navy constantly seeks strategies to prevent and mitigate cost overruns
to ensure efficient resource allocation and maintain a strong and ready
military.
General Mahoney. Program cost overruns are a serious challenge that
requires a multifaceted approach to address. They can significantly
impact the ability to maintain operational readiness, diverting funds
from other critical programs, delaying planned modernization efforts,
and compromising the ability to meet operational requirements.
General Guetlein. Yes, every dollar spent on an overrun is a dollar
less that could be spent on another warfighter priority.
Lieutenant General Spain. These cost overruns can significantly
affect our ability to plan, prepare, and execute missions effectively,
potentially leading to gaps in readiness and capability. For example,
cost overruns can: 1) force reallocation of funds from other areas,
potentially affecting programs that deliver equipment, supplies and
other technologies essential to military readiness 2) disrupt long term
strategic planning, which can effect execution of critical mission
threads and kill-chains 3) cause delays in getting the latest
technology deployed to our troops, leaving them at a significant
disadvantage.
60. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what do you consider
the role of independent analysis in program management?
General Mingus. The role of independent analysis in program
management is to provide DOD leadership, Service leadership, and
program management with independent perspectives on program performance
through the lens of the overarching strategic defense posture.
Organizations like OSD Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense Contract Audit
Agency, and OSD analysts provide valuable updates and feedback to
ensure programs are providing the best capability to our warfighters at
the best value to the taxpayer to ensure national security.
Admiral Kilby. Independent analysis acts as a vital check and
balance within the complex landscape of DOD program management. It
fosters objectivity, rigor, and informed decisionmaking, ultimately
contributing to more effective and efficient use of resources in
support of national security. Furthermore, independent analysis plays a
critical role across the spectrum of Navy program management, extending
beyond just programs with overruns or delays. It serves to provide
objective insights, challenge assumptions, and ultimately improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of defense acquisitions and operations.
General Mahoney. Independent analysis ensures analytic rigor in a
program's cost position/baseline by removing bias through leveraging
cost and schedule experiences from analogous historical program
acquisitions and applying the lessons learned to their cost estimates.
Incorporating a best practice would then involve a reconciliation
between the PM's cost estimate and the independent analysis.
General Guetlein. Independent analysis is an essential tool in
program management, serving as an objective and unbiased reality check
throughout a projects lifecycle. It helps validate initial assumptions,
identify hidden risks and opportunities, and provide an accurate
measurement of progress, all while enhancing credibility and trust with
stakeholders. By offering a fresh perspective and expert insights,
independent analysis empowers program managers to make informed
decisions, mitigate potential problems, and ultimately increase the
likelihood of achieving successful outcomes.
Lieutenant General Spain. Independent data-based studies outside
the program manager's chain of command can augment specific analysis
goals to assist in setting cost and schedule baselines that are
executable to be able to plan effectively and deliver the capability to
the warfighter. Also, strategic, long-term planning depends on
successful program management since military readiness is directly
affected by the ability of individual programs to deliver on schedule.
61. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what do you consider
the role of independent analysis in reviewing a program with
significant cost overruns or schedule delays?
General Mingus. The role of independent analysis in reviewing a
program with significant cost overruns or schedule delays is to provide
DOD leadership, service leadership, and program management with
independent perspectives on the impact to cost and delivery schedules
as weighed against the national security need. Organizations like the
OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Cost & Economics help assess if the
capability the materiel solution is providing is commensurate with the
investment of resources, time, and criticality to national defense.
Similarly, organizations like Army G-8 and Army G-3/5/7 provide
independent insight into the impact of weapon systems' fielding delays
on the Army's readiness and defense posture.
Admiral Kilby. Independent analysis serves as a crucial mechanism
for ensuring responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars and effective
program management within the Department of the Navy. By providing
objective assessments, alternative perspectives, and enhanced
transparency, it empowers our decisionmakers to address costly overruns
and schedule delays and to improve the overall acquisition process
going forward.
General Mahoney. The role of independent analysis is to ensure bias
for the program is removed while reviewing significant cost overruns
and schedules. Independent analysis provides analytical rigor by
leveraging cost and schedule experiences from historical analogous
program acquisitions and then applies the lessons learned to the cost
and schedule estimating methodologies.
General Guetlein. Independent analysis is crucial for reviewing
programs facing cost or schedule overruns. It provides an objective
perspective, free from internal biases, to uncover the root causes of
problems, whether poor planning, unrealistic goals, or technical
issues. This analysis helps determine if overruns stem from internal or
external factors. Independent analysis rebuilds stakeholder trust
through transparency and informs critical decisions like course
correction or program termination, ensuring responsible resource use
and successful project delivery.
Lieutenant General Spain. Programs troubled with cost overruns and
schedule delays can significantly benefit from independent analysis,
especially when an additional perspective is required to determine root
causes and assess a realistic cost and schedule to accurately re-
baseline the program. This independence builds credibility and
transparency, augmenting the assessment of whether the current program
should continue or if a different approach would be more effective.
Analysis performed outside the Program Executive Office chain of
command allows the right balance of optimism and realism for these
programs so that leadership can make data-driven decisions about the
most effective solution for the warfighter.
[all]