    [Senate Hearing 119-157]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-157

                    THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE JOINT FORCE
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND
                               MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 12, 2025

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov
                                    __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    61-560 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2026

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman

      DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JACK REED, Rhode Island
      TOM COTTON, Arkansas			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
      MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
      JONI ERNST, Iowa			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
      DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
      KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia
      RICK SCOTT, Florida			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
      TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
      MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma	        GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
      TED BUDD, North Carolina		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
      ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri			JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
      JIM BANKS, INDIANA			MARK KELLY, Arizona
      TIM SHEEHY, MONTANA                  	ELISSA SLOTKIN, MICHIGAN

      		   John P. Keast, Staff Director
      		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
    _________________________________________________________________

                Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman		MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia
    RICK SCOTT, Florida			ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri			 TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S
    _________________________________________________________________

                                 march 12, 2025

                                                                       Page

    The Current Readiness of the Joint Force.........................     1

                               Member Statements

    Statement of Senator Dan Sullivan................................     1

    Statement of Senator Mazie K. Hirono.............................     2

                               Witness Statements

    Mingus, General James J., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,       5
      Department of the Army.

    Kilby, Admiral James W., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,        11
      Department of the Navy.

    Mahoney, General Christopher J., USMC, Assistant Commandant of       19
      the Marine Corps, Department of the Navy.

    Guetlein, General Michael A., USSF, Vice Chief of Space              28
      Operations, Department of the Air Force.

    Spain, Lieutenant General Adrian, Air Force DCS Operations.......    35

    Maurer, Diana C., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,     40
      Government Accountability Office.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   125

                                     (iii)

                    THE CURRENT READINESS OF THE JOINT FORCE

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2025

                              United States Senate,
                  Subcommittee on Readiness and
                                    Management Support,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dan
    Sullivan (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Sullivan, Wicker,
    Scott, Schmitt, Sheehy, Hirono, and Kaine.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

        Senator Sullivan. This hearing will come to order.
        The Readiness Subcommittee meets today to receive the
    testimony on the current readiness of the United States Armed
    Forces.
        I deeply appreciate our witnesses, our esteemed witnesses
    from our military services. This is a impressive photo right
    here of all five services and our excellent work from the
    Government Accountability Office by Diana Maurer.
        This is one of the most important hearings certainly this
    Committee undertakes all year. In my view, it is one of the
    most important hearings in the Senate for the year because
    there are very few other issues more important than the
    readiness of our United States military.
        I look forward to the valuable testimony of the witnesses
    as it will pertain to their services' readiness. I hope we can
    have a really good, candid discussion.
        We are living in a very dangerous world where our
    adversaries can and regularly do contest us across the globe
    and we must remain vigilant in our pursuit of balancing
    readiness, modernization, and training with our global
    commitments.
        In my view, for the last 4 years we have taken a holiday
    from history with the Biden administration's focus on issues in
    the military that had nothing to do with readiness.
        The list is long, climate change over ship building,
    transgender surgery for Active Duty troops, Diversity, Equity,
    Inclusion (DEI), a lack of focus on war fighting and lethality
    and defeating our enemies.
        I appreciate Secretary Hegseth's three priorities:
    restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military, and
    reestablishing our deterrence.
        Many of you know, and I have talked to all of you about
    this, I am a big fan of the book by T. R. Fehrenbach ``This
    Kind of War,'' which marines and soldiers all read, and it is
    about the Korean War and how in 1945 we had the most lethal
    military in world history and 5 years later in 1950 the United
    States military had a hard time stopping and defeating a
    peasant army from North Korea, and thousands of American troops
    died in the process because a lack of leadership from our
    civilian and uniformed military.
        This must never happen again. There must never be another
    Task Force Smith that we saw in the Korean War.
        My view is we have a moral obligation to prepare for any
    future conflict beginning with the realization that unlike any
    previous conflict our servicemembers will be at risk from
    threats well before they reach foreign soil, airspace, or
    waters.
        The world has changed dramatically as it pertains to our
    Homeland as well. We can no longer consider ourselves safe
    based solely on the tyranny of distance from nations and actors
    that would do us harm.
        One of the things that we are working on in this Congress
    and this Committee in conjunction with the President is his
    Iron Dome, now Golden Dome, legislation of mine with Senator
    Cramer we hope to make bipartisan in this Committee to
    bolstering our Homeland defense.
        Suffice to say the world is a dangerous place and the facts
    demand a response from not just the uniformed personnel sitting
    before us and again, I respect the service, decades and decades
    of military service from all of you, but from Congress as well.
        Let us look at a few facts. In the last 4 years have done
    to our militaries provided by the military services and GAO the
    Army has done an outstanding job working to increase recruiting
    but there remains significant operational demands and
    increasing pressures on an already under strength force with
    units being manned at less than 80 percent.
        Sixteen of the Navy's 32 amphibious warfare ships are in
    unsatisfactory condition and the Air Force of today is very
    different from what we saw during the global war on terror.
        Yes, we have more capable aircraft and yet the KC-46 and
    KC-135 tanker fleets sits at an aircraft availability rate of
    52 percent and 57 percent respectively versus 66 percent during
    the entirety of the global war on terror.
        While modernization will help improve these figures at what
    cost will that come in terms of readiness and training? These
    are the key issues that so many of you as our leaders in the
    military have been focused on.
        There are many other issues that GAO has raised and our
    members here will be raising, but I want to thank the witnesses
    in advance again for their exceptional service to our country
    and for their testimony today.
        I look forward to that testimony and now I would like to
    turn it over to Ranking Member Senator Hirono.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Senator Chairman, Senator
    Sullivan, rather. Well, you have new responsibilities.
    [Laughter.]
        Gentlemen, thank you for your dedicated service to our
    Nation and I thank the servicemembers and each of your
    respective branches as well.
        Ms. Maurer, it is always great to have you back and to see
    you. The tireless work that you and your team deliver to
    Congress every year is instrumental to each National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA).
        In your opening statements I ask that each of you briefly
    describe what impacts to readiness a full year continuing
    resolution (CR) would have.
        For example, billions in military construction and family
    housing projects would not occur in a full CR. So please, for
    all three of you, I would like you to briefly go over what the
    impacts of a full CR may be, a year's CR.
        Even without a full CR readiness challenges range from
    retaining a skilled civilian workforce, balancing modernization
    with legacy platform maintenance, and training to core
    missions.
        Yet, while Congress provides ample resources to the
    Department of Defense (DOD) every year we still see delays in
    ship maintenance, cost overruns in military construction
    projects, and avoidable problems with family housing and
    barracks.
        Each of you are doing the best you can. Readiness requires
    the consumption of dedicated resources, time, training, and
    equipment. Which is why deployments to the Southwest border,
    which are all for show mind you, are stripping precious time,
    focus, and resources away from our servicemembers.
        In its request for assistance from DOD for fiscal year 2025
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acknowledged that
    tasks at the Southwest border require no specific military
    training skill set or specialty to perform Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) duties.
        Some of the DHS requests include operator level maintenance
    of CBP civilian vehicles, which can be found in the owner's
    manual of a Support Utility Vehicle (SUV).
        Other requests include changing tires, windshield wipers,
    light bulbs, oil changes, stocking warehouses, data entry,
    administrative support, et cetera.
        In 2019 DOD discontinued support like this because they
    found units were not performing core military functions and
    continuing to do so would adversely impact readiness and
    morale.
        Yet, here we are again. Perhaps having elite warfighters
    from the 101st Mountain Division change oil in Chevy Tahoe or
    mechanized infantry of a Stryker Brigade combat team overseeing
    the stocking of civilian warehouses and data entry on the CBP
    computers are what Secretary Hegseth envisions when he talks
    about lethality.
        But those nonmilitary roles do not sound like they
    contribute to restoring the warrior ethics and they certainly
    do not rebuild readiness.
        These are slogans that Secretary Hegseth likes to throw out
    but the reality is our troops are being deployed to the
    Southwest border to do things which does nothing to contribute
    to readiness.
        DOD has written a blank check, moreover, to DHS for its
    time, personnel, and resources. As it stands now DOD is
    electing to do all of this on a nonreimbursable basis in an
    open ended timeline. Incredible.
        We are not even 2 months into this Administration, yet here
    are some of the opportunity costs to date. Marines are missing
    the chance to train in a bilateral exercise with our allies and
    partners.
        Army soldiers will miss a combat training center rotation.
    Air Force aircraft from the immediate response force and the
    Space Force are using limited resources to perform tactical
    surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking programs for DHS and
    CBP.
        Where will the readiness of our forces be 60 days from now
    and beyond?
        During the first Trump administration it took units from
    the 101st Airborne Division a year to regain their readiness
    after being deployed to the border. We should learn from that
    mistake.
        DOD is slow to respond to the requests for information to
    this committee, yet publishes nearly daily photo ops of troops
    on the border.
        In the meantime, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
    are dressing up like they are in the military. Soldiers are
    performing data entry in uniform in the same room as CBP agents
    are processing migrants, and airmen are removing their name
    tags and unit patches when they transport migrants on military
    aircraft.
        All of these actions erase the distinction between civilian
    and military personnel. Removing active duty forces from their
    units and core missions to perform support functions of law
    enforcement agencies does not contribute to lethality or war
    fighting.
        Where is Secretary Hegseth's meritocracy when DHS and CBP
    asks DOD to do their jobs for them and foot the bill no less?
        Not only does this Administration prioritize these
    deployments but claims with a straight face that ordering U.S.
    servicemembers to cover the jobs of DHS civilians has no impact
    on military readiness and resources.
        This is delusional, dishonest, unbelievable. The choice to
    burn readiness to score imagined political points is
    dangerously misguided. It is a massive waste of time,
    resources, and personnel when border crossings are at an all-
    time low.
        In closing, again, I wanted to thank the vice chiefs and
    Ms. Maurer for their service, for being here, for your hard
    work, insights and leadership, and I would really appreciate a
    frank discussion with you today.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Hirono. I appreciate
    your renewed found focus on readiness. I am just thrilled about
    that.
        By the way, we have been sending troops to the border for
    decades. My first deployment as a United States Marine I came
    back from a WestPac 31st Marine Expedition Unit (MEU)
    deployment under President Clinton after being in the Taiwan
    Strait, and half my battalion immediately got sent to the
    border. This has been going on for quite some time and it is
    nothing new. But I appreciate your focus on----
        Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, I do not think it serves our
    purposes because you and I have worked together----
        Senator Sullivan. Well, we are going to get into the----
        Senator Hirono.--for you to personally insult me, okay.
        Senator Sullivan. I am not insulting you at all.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. I am not insulting you. I am just glad
    you are focused on readiness.
        Senator Hirono. That is what it felt like.
        Senator Sullivan. My Democrat colleagues and the Biden
    administration have not always been so focused but it is great
    that you guys are.
        So with that, I would like to begin our testimony and,
    gentlemen, I am going to have to step out for a minute but I
    will be here for the whole hearing.
        So, General Mingus, if you can begin, sir. Thank you very
    much. You will have 5 minutes and your extended written
    testimony can be submitted for the record.
        Thank you, General.

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES J. MINGUS, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
                  OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

        General Mingus. Thank you.
        Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    address you today.
        The Army stands ready to defend our Nation. Right now over
    109,000 soldiers are deployed or forward stationed across 140
    countries, executing missions that deter, defend and provide
    immediate response options.
        Still, our adversaries are moving faster than we are. That
    is why we are reorganizing our formations, refining how we
    fight, and modernizing faster than ever pushing new
    capabilities into the force in months, not years.
        Under transformation in contact (TIC), which I will talk
    about throughout, we are enhancing our tactical networks,
    rapidly fueling Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)/counter UAS
    electronic warfare systems and increasing mobility across our
    formations.
        In the last 9 months TiC delivered 11 new capabilities and
    technologies to war fighters across the 101st, the 25th, 10th
    Mountain, and 34th Infantry Divisions.
        In fiscal years 2025 and 2026 we will expand this to TIC
    2.0 and it will encompass all units within the 101st, 25th,
    82d, 4th Infantry Division, and additionally it will extend to
    include additional armored and Stryker Brigade combat teams.
        We will also scale to integrate three multi-domain task
    forces and further integrate Army National Guard units. Central
    to the Army modernization are command and control, integrated
    air and missile defense and long-range precision fires.
        Next generation command and control (Next-Gen C2), will
    provide resilient data sharing and real time situational
    awareness, enabling war fighters to synchronize combat power
    across all domains.
        We are also improving our layered air defenses, expanding
    Patriot formations, increasing short-range air defense
    battalions, and adding directed energy systems capable of
    countering most or more sophisticated UAS threats.
        Additionally, the Army's long-range hypersonic weapon will
    soon be operational by the end of this year, adding
    unprecedented speed and range to our arsenal both for us and
    the Navy.
        At the heart of those efforts is the health and
    effectiveness of our organic industrial base. We continue to
    execute our $18 billion, 15-year plan to modernize 23 depots,
    arsenals, and ammunition plants.
        Newly established facilities in Lake City, Missouri and
    Mesquite, Texas are expanding 6.8 millimeter and 155 munition
    productions while for the first time in 40 years
    Trinitrotoluene (TNT) production is being reestablished in the
    United States to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers.
        However, weapons and equipment do not define readiness,
    soldiers do. The Army is making targeted investments to ensure
    that they can focus on their mission, new barracks and
    construction, modernizing efforts, and replacing outdated
    housing.
        Dining facilities are being updated to provide more
    flexible, nutritious options and the holistic health and
    fitness program (H2F), embeds experts directly into our units
    to ensure peak human performance.
        Recruiting remains a priority. The Army exceeded its goal
    in fiscal year 2024 with over 55,000 new soldiers and we are
    targeting 61,000 this year, and we are currently 72.7 percent
    of that goal for this year, 44,358 as of this morning, which is
    50 percent ahead of where we were this time last year.
        I will end on budget. With no budget increases to offset
    inflation and reducing buying power the continual growth and
    the cost of paying allowances is crowding out the Army's
    ability to modernize its force or maintain its infrastructure.
        The Army essentially has three levers to address top line
    shortfalls. End strength, readiness, and modernization. Our end
    strength is approximately 25,000 personnel less than the
    improved structure, resulting in undermanned formations and
    overtaxed high demand units such as Patriot battalions.
        Additionally, the Army has had to slash its modernization
    budget by billions over the last few years. As a result,
    procurement is reduced to minimum sustainable rates, delaying
    fielding of new material to formations and research and
    development has been cut, slowing technological advances.
        Ultimately, the Army can afford a large, ready, or modern
    force but with the current budget it cannot afford all three.
    Either we provide soldiers the capabilities needed to win or
    accept greater risks in other areas.
        But whatever risk we accept now we will likely pay for it
    later, not in delayed projects or budget adjustments but in
    real-world battlefield consequences.
        We need to invest in the things in training our soldiers
    need for the next fight, not the last fight.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General James J. Mingus
    follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by General James J. Mingus
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, and distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
    readiness of our Nation's Army. On behalf of the Secretary of the Army,
    Honorable Daniel Driscoll, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
    Randy George, we appreciate this Subcommittee's work in ensuring that
    the Army is not just resourced but fully prepared for the demands of
    today's missions and the uncertainty of what comes next.
                      delivering combat ready forces today
        The Army remains engaged worldwide, responding to immediate
    security challenges while modernizing to ensure long-term readiness.
    More than 109,000 soldiers across 140 countries support global
    operations, strengthen alliances, and maintain deterrence. At the same
    time, the Army is transforming its force to increase lethality,
    survivability, mobility, and operational reach. Investments in
    training, force posture, and modernization ensure readiness for both
    immediate and future demands.
        Combat Training Centers provide the toughest and most realistic
    training outside of combat. Over the past year, rotations at the
    National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Joint
    Pacific Multinational Readiness Center demonstrated improvements in
    battlefield agility, joint integration, and rapid decision making.
    Units are advancing their ability to employ long-range fires,
    electronic warfare, and counter-drone capabilities while operating
    seamlessly with Joint and coalition partners.
        Every Active Component Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in the Army,
    except three Infantry BCTs supporting the Immediate Response Force, is
    scheduled to deploy in support of Combatant Command requirements. The
    Army is operating at full capacity to meet today's operational
    priorities. We remain fully committed to global operations, including
    Operations SPARTAN SHIELD and INHERENT RESOLVE, which focus on building
    partner nation capacity and counter-ISIS efforts.
        In the Indo-Pacific, the Army is expanding its presence through
    Operation PATHWAYS, bolstering deterrence and interoperability with
    Allies and partners. Participation in exercises such as TALISMAN SABRE,
    SUPER GARUDA SHIELD, and BALIKATAN reinforces the Army's critical role
    in the region. These investments improve force positioning,
    sustainment, and warfighting capabilities in key areas, including long-
    range fires, air defense, deep sensing, and contested logistics. Forces
    stationed west of the International Date Line now include a rotational
    Multi-Domain Task Force with Mid-Range Capability and precision strike
    missiles, a Watercraft Company in Japan, and additional air defense
    capabilities in Guam.
        In Europe, the Army is currently advancing deterrence through force
    presence, joint exercises, and infrastructure improvements. For the
    Joint Force, prepositioned stocks provide a strategic advantage in
    rapid response. Six European sites house a division-sized set of
    equipment with corps-level enablers, including two Armored Brigade
    Combat Teams, fires, air defense, sustainment, and medical units.
        Sustaining high readiness requires continuous modernization and
    investment in the industrial base. The Organic Industrial Base
    Modernization Implementation Plan is a 15-year, $18 billion initiative
    upgrading 23 depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants. Since October
    2023, $1.5 billion has been directed toward modernizing critical
    infrastructure. The fiscal year 2025 budget includes another $1.5
    billion for further improvements, including a 450,000-square-foot
    ammunition production facility at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant and
    the first domestic TNT production facility since the 1980's, set for
    construction in Graham, Kentucky.
             continuous transformation: from concept to capability
        The Army is moving quickly to adapt, field new capabilities, and
    restructure its formations to outpace our adversaries. Transforming in
    Contact (TIC) delivers results in cycles as short as 12 to 18 months,
    ensuring that forces are always evolving. In the past 9 months, TIC
    introduced 11 new capabilities to brigade combat teams from the 101st
    Airborne Division, 25th Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and
    34th Infantry Division. These units tested mobile and light brigade
    designs across multiple combat training center rotations, refining
    tactics, techniques, and procedures, and employing next-generation
    technologies to shape future Army formations.
        This effort is expanding. In fiscal year 2025, TIC 2.0 will scale
    to drive transformation across all brigade combat teams and enablers in
    the 25th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division, as well as
    select Armored BCTs from 1st Cavalry Division and 3d Infantry Division
    as well as Stryker BCTs formations from 2d Cavalry Regiment and 7th
    Infantry Division. It will also extend to all three Multi-Domain Task
    Forces. TIC 2.0 further integrates Army National Guard units, including
    the 38th Infantry Division, 138th Field Artillery Brigade, 76th Mobile
    Brigade Combat Team, and the 116th Light Brigade Combat Team. These new
    capabilities include, counter-UAS Detect and Defeat systems, Silent
    Tactical Energy Enhanced Dismount (STEED) technology, Infantry Squad
    Vehicles (ISV), and the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance
    (LASSO) weapon system.
        The Army is fielding TiC divisions with specialized C-sUAS
    equipment to detect, jam, and neutralize aerial threats from fixed
    sites and mobile platforms. In the Middle East, the Army is also
    integrating directed energy into its layered defense design, through
    High Energy Laser prototypes operating as palletized systems and hosted
    on its neuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Stryker vehicles.
        The fight for dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum is
    intensifying. The spectrum is saturated with adversary, commercial,
    partner, and U.S. military systems. To integrate capabilities into
    training and operations, the Army is fielding Terrestrial Layered
    System Manpacks to multiple brigade combat teams, enabling them to
    detect, intercept, and disrupt enemy command and control networks
    critical to ground maneuver forces. The goal is an agile, responsive
    electronic warfare capability that operates seamlessly across ground,
    air, maritime, cyber, and space domains.
        Additionally, the Army continues developing Launched Effects (LE),
    a family of operationally consumable Uncrewed Aircraft Systems that are
    launched from both air and ground platforms to enhance the overall
    range of lethal and non-lethal effects. In July 2024, the Army enhanced
    LE by increasing payload capacity and adding modularity.
        Success in these efforts depends on training forces to operate,
    maintain, and integrate these capabilities. Combat Training Centers
    have incorporated UAS, counter-UAS, and electronic warfare into large-
    scale exercises, exposing units to realistic battlefield scenarios.
    Home-station training equips leaders to coordinate airspace, sustain
    systems, and train personnel. Army Cyber Command is also conducting a
    radio frequency effects pilot to identify gaps and update training,
    policy, and force structure requirements. Pre-deployment training
    programs continue to refine unit skills, and the Joint C-sUAS
    University at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is providing advanced instruction
    tailored to emerging threats.
                         transforming our capabilities
        The Army continues prioritizing capabilities that will define the
    future fight, prioritizing command and control, integrated air and
    missile defense, long-range precision fires, mobility, protection, and
    contested logistics. We are accelerating modernization, combining
    cutting edge technologies, and rapidly fielding capabilities at scale.
        Command and Control: For the past two decades, the Army's command
    and control (C2) architecture centered around counterinsurgency and
    brigade combat teams as the primary maneuver force. That structure does
    not hold up against modern adversaries with advanced electronic
    warfare, long-range precision fires, and within contested
    communications environments. To address these challenges, the Army is
    changing how it commands and fights by shifting to more agile,
    survivable, and data-driven C2 networks. In August 2024, the Army
    started with C2 Fix to streamline tactical networks, reduce complexity,
    and enhance mobility by minimizing electromagnetic signatures and
    improving on-the-move communication.
        While C2 Fix addresses immediate operational needs, Next Generation
    Command and Control (NGC2) seeks to create a more adaptable and modular
    network for future operations. This integrated network allows
    commanders to make faster decisions, minimize risks from long-range
    fires by adversaries, and lessen vulnerability to electronic and
    cyberattacks. NGC2 adopts a competitive, open architecture model that
    allows multiple vendors to contribute technology, ensuring continuous
    updates as lessons are learned and threats evolve. Central to NGC2 and
    the unified network architecture is a robust data and cloud backbone.
    In March 2025, the Army will execute Project Convergence--Capstone 5 to
    test NGC2 in realistic battlefield conditions and prepare for full-
    scale implementation.
        Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) remains a critical priority for fiscal year 2025, and
    our investments reflect our commitment to developing a robust, layered
    defense system capable of addressing current and future challenges. Our
    air and missile defense forces are the most heavily deployed, with
    ongoing demand across multiple Combatant Commands. To enhance
    readiness, the Army plans to increase its air and missile defense
    capacity by adding one M-SHORAD Battalion and three Division Air
    Defense Battalions by 4th quarter fiscal year 2025. Additionally, in
    line with TAA 25-29, the Army is implementing a series of force
    structure changes aimed at improving our ability to project power,
    protect critical assets, and maintain overmatch against potential
    adversaries. These changes include the establishment of nine Integrated
    Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Battalions, a Patriot/IFPC Composite
    Battalion in Guam, and two additional Patriot Battalions.
        Major modernization efforts within this portfolio focus on four
    critical systems: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
    System (IBCS), Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS),
    IFPC, and M-SHORAD. In fiscal year 2025, the Army is fielding the
    Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) to three Patriot Battalions in
    Fort Bliss, Texas, Germany, and the Republic of Korea. These efforts
    will significantly increase our overall air and missile defense
    capabilities and enable operators to optimize the best sensor-effector
    option for engagements in the Indo-Pacific and other theaters of
    operation. In keeping with POTUS and the Department's priorities, we
    will also be supporting the research and development of Golden Dome in
    partnership with our sister Services and agencies.
        Fires: The Army delivers advanced long-range strike capabilities to
    strengthen deterrence, enhance readiness, and support Joint Force
    operations in key regions. In December 2024, we conducted an end-to-end
    flight test of the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, launching a hypersonic
    missile using the Transporter Erector Launcher and a Battery Operation
    Center. With the successful flight test, the first combat-capable units
    will be operational by the end of 2025. To enhance long-range strike
    capabilities, the Army developed the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), a
    next-generation surface-to-surface ballistic missile intended to engage
    critical targets on the battlefield under all weather conditions. We
    increased the production capacity for PrSM with plans to procure 400
    missiles in fiscal year 2025.
        The Army invested $755 million from the 2024 Ukraine supplemental
    to surge production of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile
    Segment Enhanced. Annual missile output is set to increase from 550 to
    650 by fiscal year 2027, with production on track to reach 550 by the
    end of 2nd quarter fiscal year 2025. Additionally, the Mid-Range
    Capability system features a road-mobile precision fire weapon that can
    target locations over 2,000 kilometers away. Recently, a second battery
    deployed to the Indo-Pacific to support rotational forces, with three
    more batteries currently in production.
        Mobility: The Army is modernizing its combat vehicle and aviation
    fleets to enhance lethality, mobility, and protection while developing
    next-generation capabilities. The Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) improves
    tactical mobility for Infantry BCTs, enabling medium-distance insertion
    operations with greater freedom of movement and action. In the 1st
    quarter fiscal year 2025, the Army fielded 136 ISVs to BCTs in the 10th
    Mountain Division and 25th Infantry Division, increasing their ability
    to maneuver rapidly across complex terrain. The Armored Multi-Purpose
    Vehicle (AMPV) replaces the M113 in Armored BCTs, improving
    survivability, power, and cooling. In fiscal year 2025, the Army will
    field 240 AMPVs with funding from the base budget and the 2024 Ukraine
    supplemental.
        Aviation proficiency and safety remain top priorities, and the Army
    is taking immediate steps to mitigate risk while working to build and
    retain experience levels over the long term. A shortage of mid-career
    warrant officers has led to lower aircrew experience, prompting the
    Army to offer Aviation Bonuses to retain skilled, retirement-eligible
    pilots. Furthermore, disruptions in executing the fiscal year 2024
    Flying Hour Program due to unpredictable funding, hindered the ability
    of commanders to fully conduct training. Active Component aviation is
    currently flying 4.3 percent below fiscal year 2025 projections,
    affecting readiness.
        Protection: Through informed, iterative developments, we are
    consistently advancing our protective equipment to best protect
    soldiers under a variety of operational conditions with options to
    scale the protective system to match the threat while minimizing the
    soldier load. A lighter protective vest means greater mobility, faster
    movement, and increased lethality without sacrificing survivability. As
    soldier gear evolves, the Army is developing the Lightweight Small Arms
    Protective Insert (LSAPI), which uses advanced materials to provide the
    same level of protection at 30 percent less weight than the current
    Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert (ESAPI) GEN III. The LSAPI is
    expected to be approved by the second quarter of fiscal year 2025.
        Sustainment: Future conflicts will target logistical networks,
    cyber infrastructure, and key deployment hubs. The Army's ability to
    move supplies quickly is critical to sustaining combat power, but with
    70 percent of sustainment formations in the Reserve Component,
    mobilizing logistics at scale remains a challenge, particularly without
    early warning.
        To enhance sustainment operations, the Army is exploring various
    innovative solutions to provide options for combatant commanders. We
    are leasing commercial watercraft to rapidly increase readiness while
    also exploring long-term investments in autonomous systems.
    Additionally, we are utilizing the expertise of Army Materiel Command
    to 3-D print parts, which helps reduce our logistical tail.
    Furthermore, the Army is implementing the Disconnected Operations
    initiative, which integrates Predictive Logistics (PL) and Enterprise
    Business System-Convergence (EBS-C). EBS-C will consolidate logistics
    data into a single, authoritative system, improving accuracy,
    transparency, and auditability while ensuring that our forces remain
    mission-ready.
                            recruiting and retention
        The Army is bringing in the right people, investing in their
    potential, and preparing them for the challenges ahead. The success of
    the fiscal year 2024 recruiting mission reflects this strategy, as the
    Army surpassed its goal of 55,000 accessions by bringing in 55,150
    soldiers and maintaining a delayed entry pool (DEP) of 11K. That
    momentum continues into fiscal year 2025 with an increased mission of
    61,000 new accessions and a Delayed Entry Program (DEP) target of at
    least 10K. Achieving these goals requires sustained effort, but the
    Army is building on a solid foundation. The successes of fiscal year
    2024 and expectations for fiscal year 2025 stem from transformative
    efforts within the Recruiting Enterprise, involving improved recruiting
    processes, training, leadership, marketing, medical support at MEPS,
    and improvement toward Recruiter quality of life. Notably, the Future
    Soldier Prep Course, established in 2022, has enabled 33,560 trainees
    to overcome academic and fitness barriers and progress to basic
    training.
                          quality of life investments
        As operational demands grow more complex, maintaining human
    performance must remain a priority. For generations, soldiers have
    pushed their bodies and minds to the limit without the tools needed to
    sustain peak performance. The focus remained on treating injuries
    instead of preventing them and expected resilience without the
    integrated support systems to develop it. Holistic Health and Fitness
    (H2F) is changing that by integrating strength coaches, athletic
    trainers, physical and occupational therapists, dietitians, and program
    coordinators directly into units. This approach ensures that soldiers
    recovering from injuries rebuild strength under expert guidance and
    that young soldiers receive proper training from the start. Science-
    backed methods are replacing outdated fitness habits, significantly
    enhancing performance in combat and promoting long-term health.
        H2F currently supports 55 percent of the force, with 71 brigades
    fully resourced by the end of fiscal year 2025. While this is progress,
    too many soldiers remain without access to these resources. The next
    phase adds 91 H2F teams to the Active Component and launches a 2-year
    pilot at four Army National Guard and two Army Reserve locations. This
    pilot will refine how to implement H2F for part-time formations,
    ensuring that soldiers outside the Active Component receive the same
    level of expertise.
        Health and well-being extend beyond fitness. The conditions where
    soldiers live impact their quality of life, performance, and ability to
    focus on the mission. Barracks improvements remain a key priority, with
    over $2.1 billion allocated annually for military construction,
    sustainment, restoration, and modernization from 2026-2030. Every
    barracks type will receive full sustainment funding. In fiscal year
    2024 alone, $1.092 billion went toward new construction and upgrades,
    creating 1,910 new bed spaces and improving nearly 7,500 existing ones.
        Moreover, between 2020 and 2024, privatized housing providers
    invested over $1.3 billion to build 439 new homes and renovate more
    than 14,000 existing ones. In fiscal year 2024, the Army contributed
    $50 million each to Fort Eisenhower, GA, and Fort Leonard Wood, MO,
    supporting the construction of 76 new homes and 22 major renovations at
    Fort Eisenhower. A contract awarded in 2024 will add 75 homes at U.S.
    Army Garrison-Miami by Summer 2027, while 26 homes at Tobyhanna Army
    Depot are scheduled for demolition and replacement.
        Providing high-quality food options is another essential step in
    improving soldier well-being. Traditional dining facilities no longer
    meet the total needs of today's force. Soldiers require flexible,
    nutritious dining options that fit their schedules and fuel
    performance. Over the past year, the Army expanded access to food
    kiosks, food trucks, and meal prep programs. More than one million
    meals were purchased from kiosks in fiscal year 2024, demonstrating a
    clear demand for accessible, high-quality dining options. Today, 26
    food trucks and 23 kiosks operate on installations, with five
    additional kiosks scheduled to open by September 2025.
        To further modernize dining, the Army is launching the Campus-Style
    Dining Venue pilot at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart,
    Georgia; Fort Cavazos, Texas; Fort Drum, New York; and Fort Carson,
    Colorado. This model creates a more contemporary food service
    experience similar to what is available on university campuses.
    Soldiers will benefit from a wider variety of meal choices, healthier
    options, and greater flexibility in their dining experience. This
    initiative will also help the Army gather information on what, when,
    and where soldiers are eating, allowing the Department to tailor each
    program to better support the needs of every installation. By expanding
    food access, the Army enhances performance, accelerates recovery, and
    ensures soldiers receive the nutrition they need to perform their best.
                                    closing
        A modern, capable force is not built in a single budget cycle. It
    takes years of sustained investment, careful planning, and a commitment
    to keeping pace with an evolving adversary. The Army is making
    deliberate choices now to ensure that when conflict emerges, Soldiers
    have the weapons, training, and support they need to win. Hypersonic
    missiles, unmanned systems, and advanced air defense are being fielded
    on schedule. Formations are being reorganized to fight smarter and
    sustain longer. Investments in barracks, housing, fitness, and
    nutrition are strengthening the foundation of readiness.
        For several years, the Army has stretched the same budget over a
    growing list of requirements. We can prioritize, we can tighten, and we
    can innovate, but at some point, tradeoffs become losses. These are not
    abstract choices. Every dollar we allocate to maintaining force
    structure is a dollar we cannot invest in new capabilities. Every
    investment in modernization pulls resources away from training the
    force we have today. Readiness, our ability to fight and win tonight,
    must be balanced against the need to prepare for future conflicts.
    There is no perfect answer, and every decision carries risk.
        We are taking a hard look at where we can streamline, consolidate,
    or step away from specific infrastructure, capabilities, and programs.
    Some of these choices are clear-cut. Others are difficult. Scaling down
    in one area may free up resources, but it can also limit our ability to
    respond to crises, surge forces, or sustain operations.
        Our adversaries are not waiting for us to catch up and they are not
    making the same compromises we are. Our soldiers will always give
    everything they have. They will push through resource constraints, make
    do with less, and find ways to succeed because that is who they are.
    But we should not put them in that position. The Army will always adapt
    and find ways to win, but it is our responsibility to ensure that it is
    never a fair fight. Our soldiers should always have the best training,
    the best equipment, and the advantage in every battle.
        This is about what kind of Army we want to put in combat. One that
    is postured to win or one that is constantly closing gaps. That
    decision is being made right now, and the consequences will last far
    beyond this year or the next.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
        Admiral?

     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES W. KILBY, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
                   OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        Admiral Kilby. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono,
    Subcommittee Members, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify----
        [Technical issue.]
        Admiral Kilby.--of the United States around the world. Your
    oversight and funding help us to be ready when the Nation
    calls.
        In the past year alone American sailors have defeated
    hundreds of drones, missiles, and carried out dozens of
    offensive strikes in the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean.
        They have strengthened alliances and deterred aggression in
    the Western Pacific and they have used unmanned systems to
    counter the flow of illegal narcotics across the southern
    border.
        In short----
        [Technical issue.]
        Admiral Kilby.--remains posture----
        [Technical issue.]
        Admiral Kilby.--resting and neither will we----
        [Technical issue.]
        Admiral Kilby.--to improve with urgency. I have spoken to
    several of you about a sustained focus on adapting the mindset,
    skill set, and tool set to drive meaningful process
    improvement. Consistent and predictable funding is foundational
    to our improvement efforts.
        The Navy will need to make hard choices this year if we are
    operating under a full year continuing resolution.
        [Technical issue.]
        Admiral Kilby.--in this----
        [Technical issue.]
        Admiral Kilby.--will slow our progress to get weapons and
    equipment we need to modernize our fleet and we will also slow
    ship building including our amphibious warships.
        With the Navy exceeding recruiting and retention goals last
    year and on track to do so again we will need additional
    funding to sustain our momentum.
        Our priority remains our readiness accounts which are most
    vulnerable under a CR or sequestration. We are optimistic that
    Congress will grant us the flexibility to allocate funds to our
    top priorities.
        Despite these challenges, your Navy will maintain ready
    platforms, people, and infrastructure. We set a goal to make 80
    percent of our ships, submarines, and aircraft combat surge
    ready by January 1st, 2027.
        To do that we are reducing maintenance delays and improving
    manning, training, modernization, and sustainment. We are
    seeing progress in the last year. We increased our surface ship
    depot maintenance from 41 percent on time completion to 68
    percent.
        Unfortunately, this progress is not consistent across all
    platforms. I am not satisfied with amphibious ship maintenance.
    Our Navy and Marine Corps operate as a lethal integrative force
    and we have work to do here.
        To improve we are procuring spare parts earlier, refining,
    partnering, planning with industry partners, acquiring diesel
    engine repair kits, and building steam plant expertise.
        Our second goal is recruiting and retention. The Navy is
    committed to attracting and developing Americans who can
    innovate, solve hard problems, and dominate in combat.
        Thanks to process improvements, our targeted investments,
    we contracted over 40,000 sailors last year, the most since
    2003. We are currently on pace to exceed our recruiting goals
    in 2025.
        We are committed to improving quality of service. We
    reduced the wait list for child development centers from 3,400
    children in 2024 to 2,500 as of January 31st, 2025.
        We have reduced poor unaccompanied housing. We have reduced
    our pool of unaccompanied housing rooms rated as poor from 25
    percent to 21 percent and will continue to reduce this through
    focusing investments.
        We are focusing on the investment of critical
    infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific, targeting it to where it
    has our most impact on our war fighters.
        The shipyard infrastructure optimization program is a once
    in a century opportunity for us to improve the effectiveness of
    our public yards. Through Single Integrated Operational Plan
    (SIOP) we have completed over 40 projects and invested $1
    billion in getting ship maintenance completed on time.
        The budget you are reviewing today includes an additional
    $6.3 billion for the next 40 projects. I am proud of the Navy's
    accomplishments in the past year. We still have work to do to
    ensure that we remain the world's most premier Navy for another
    250 years.
        Your leadership and support are critical to Navy readiness.
    On behalf of our sailors, civilians and families around the
    world, thank you. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral James W. Kilby follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Admiral James W. Kilby
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the readiness of your
    Navy.
                             strategic environment
        For 250 years, your Navy has promoted and protected America's
    interests worldwide by manning, training, and equipping our forces to
    perform a wide range of missions, from seabed to space. We are
    strategically positioned to provide a rapid response to emerging
    crises, serve as an enduring presence to defend American interests, and
    decisively win wars. Whether responding to Houthi attacks on maritime
    shipping or deterring an invasion of Taiwan, we are maximizing our
    contributions to the Joint Force. In the past year, your support of
    Navy readiness has delivered returns worldwide.
        In the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, our ships, aircraft,
    and submarines are in combat alongside our Allies and partners. Your
    Navy has successfully defeated over 400 drones, cruise missiles, and
    ballistic missiles, and carried out dozens of offensive strikes against
    Houthi aggressors in Yemen. During the past 17 months, over 20 Navy
    ships have deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility,
    including four carrier strike groups and an amphibious ready group.
        In the Indian Ocean, sailors assigned to the submarine tender USS
    Emory S. Land (AS 39) worked alongside their Royal Australian Navy
    counterparts to perform routine and emergent maintenance on the attack
    submarine USS Hawaii (SSN 776). This marked the first time Australian
    personnel performed maintenance on a nuclear-powered attack submarine
    under the auspices of AUKUS, a necessary step toward establishing
    Submarine Rotational Force--West, from which we will employ attack
    submarines, our most capable strike asset, within the Western Pacific.
        In the Western Pacific, the USNS city of Bismarck (T-EPF 9)
    conducted Operation Pacific Partnership, enhancing regional
    interoperability, strengthening military-to-military engagements, and
    countering the influence of China in the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific
    Partnership series is Navy's largest annual multinational humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission. It is one example
    of our efforts in the Indo-Pacific, where we've deployed 44 ships over
    the past 12 months--in addition to our forward deployed naval forces.
        Throughout these operations, Navy's fleet of ballistic missile
    submarines conducted uninterrupted strategic deterrence patrols,
    providing a powerful and ever-present deterrent to any who would do us
    harm.
        Since I last testified before the Subcommittee, we updated the
    Navy's strategic guidance, setting seven targets to enhance lethality
    and readiness by 2027. For today's hearing, I will focus on five of
    those targets: readying our platforms, recruiting and retaining talent,
    delivering our sailors a quality of service commensurate with their
    sacrifice, investing in warfighter competency, and restoring our
    critical infrastructure.
                              ready our platforms
        Navy unequivocally advocates for a larger fleet. However, current
    threats will not wait for new platforms to be delivered. We must
    therefore generate more available ships, submarines, and aircraft from
    the fleet we have today. To do so, we are increasing the combat-surge
    readiness of our platforms by reducing maintenance delays and embracing
    novel approaches to manning, training, modernization, and sustainment.
    Our goal is to achieve and sustain an 80 percent combat-surge ready
    (CSR) posture. We began these efforts with naval aviation in 2018,
    improving the operational availability of tactical aircraft. We are now
    scaling our efforts across all aviation platforms, as well as in the
    surface and submarine communities.
        CSR is a certification for air, surface, and submarine platforms to
    execute combat missions. It is distinct from Global Force Management,
    which provides forces in response to Combatant Commander demand,
    balanced with available supply. CSR-certified units meet minimum
    requirements for material condition, training, manning, and armament.
    To increase our combat surge readiness, we are reducing the number of
    platforms in depot maintenance through improved business and
    maintenance practices, as well as certifying training earlier in the
    force-generation cycle. Type Commanders have been designated as the
    single accountable officers to ensure their respective forces achieve
    80 percent CSR. This accountability, along with the above reforms, has
    already resulted in a fleet-wide cultural shift toward aggressively
    prioritizing readiness.
        To sustain a high operational tempo, we must maintain a robust
    inventory of spare parts. We cannot wait until missiles are in the air
    to replenish our stockrooms. With this philosophy, Navy is moving from
    a ``just in time'' model to ``just in case,'' so that our sailors have
    parts on hand to keep their systems operational, lethal, and ready.
    Navy's budget for spare parts has increased by over 350 percent since
    fiscal year 2020. This critical funding ensures that our ships,
    submarines, and aircraft are prepared to respond to commander tasking
    or adversary action and are not sidelined by equipment casualties. Navy
    appreciates congressional support to improve the parts inventories that
    keep our warfighting platforms operational.
                                    aviation
        Navy's 11 aircraft carriers and associated carrier strike groups
    provide unmatched options for national leadership, from peacetime
    missions to full-scale combat operations. They can conduct lethal
    strikes from international waters, without coordination or approval
    from other countries.
        In the last 2 years alone, carrier strike groups have rapidly
    redeployed to deter aggression against Israel, support contingency
    operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, defend shipping in the Red
    Sea, and conduct strikes in Yemen and Somalia. This capability deters
    adversaries, enhances security, and supports the free flow of commerce.
        Achieving 80 percent CSR in the aviation community requires
    improved maintenance and training for both aircraft carriers and
    carrier air wings, which certify independently. Navy has improved the
    number of mission capable tactical jets and is scaling proven methods
    across all aircraft. Aircraft carrier availability remains the primary
    constraint for reaching 80 percent CSR in the aviation community. We
    are improving aircraft carrier availability through performance
    improvement in our public shipyards. Conducting maintenance early,
    prior to her Planned Incremental Availability, contributed to George H.
    W. Bush (CVN 77) completing that availability on-time and on-budget.
    Recent investments in our naval shipyards have focused on workforce
    expansion, workforce training, optimizing maintenance schedules, and
    implementing advanced planning and logistics management practices.
              maintenance of nuclear-powered ships and submarines
        Attack submarines are our most lethal conventional strike asset,
    and ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the
    nuclear triad. Taken together, the submarine force and our undersea
    capabilities remain our military's primary strategic advantage over
    China.
        Production and maintenance delays are keeping our submarines in the
    shipyard and driving up costs. Navy is working closely with all
    stakeholders to drive innovation and target investments where they will
    yield the greatest results in the shortest time. We are improving our
    production and maintenance processes by embracing industry best
    practices such as outsourcing certain work, increasing material on hand
    prior to work commencing, and pushing project management authority as
    close as possible to the worker on the shop floor.
        As part of our broader investment in the maritime industrial base,
    Navy is focused on improving the submarine industrial base across six
    lines of effort: workforce development, supplier development,
    shipbuilder infrastructure, strategic outsourcing, manufacturing
    technology, and government oversight. Since fiscal year 2018, Navy has
    budgeted for over 725 supplier development projects with more than 300
    suppliers across 33 states to add capability, capacity, and resiliency
    to the supply chain. Navy has also invested in Virginia-class spare
    parts and has ordered contingency material to have on hand for
    inspection-based work. Those efforts are yielding results: Pearl Harbor
    Naval Shipyard completed both USS Hawaii (SSN 776) and USS Minnesota
    (SSN 783) availabilities on time, returning both submarines to the
    fleet in July 2024. Navy will continue to focus on planning and
    material until this becomes the standard.
        Our four public shipyards--Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval
    Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard--
    are vital to our effort to achieve 80 percent CSR submarines. I have
    visited each shipyard and seen the work being done by the 37,500
    engineers, tradespeople, and support personnel who serve there. The
    workforce of our public shipyards is committed to improving the
    readiness of these critical assets, and Navy is committed to supporting
    their efforts through improved compensation and work environments. At
    Navy's request, DOD conducted a wage survey in the Norfolk Tidewater
    region to achieve pay parity between Norfolk Naval Shipyard and the
    surrounding private shipyards. The survey showed that in the early
    1980's, new wage-grade workers earned four times the minimum wage. Now,
    those same workers earn approximately one and a half times the minimum
    wage. Navy has used these studies to make wages more competitive
    beginning in fiscal year 2024. We must continue to invest in shipyard
    infrastructure, expand and enhance the submarine industrial base,
    increase productivity, shorten maintenance timelines, and reduce our
    maintenance backlog to stay ahead of our adversaries and prepare our
    submarine force for the threats of tomorrow.
                             surface ship readiness
        Surface combatants deliver strategic advantage by combining in a
    single platform advanced multi-mission capabilities such as integrated
    air and missile defense, conventional strike, and surface and undersea
    warfare to assert maritime dominance and project power. The versatility
    of our surface force deters adversaries globally and enables rapid,
    coordinated responses to emerging threats. Our ships must be prepared
    to engage the full spectrum of threats, from existing capabilities to
    emerging ballistic and hypersonic missiles. To maintain the readiness
    of these capable and adaptable platforms, the surface force
    continuously balances investments in near-term readiness with
    modernization to introduce the latest capabilities.
        Navy surface ship depot maintenance has improved significantly,
    from 41 percent on-time completion in fiscal year 2023 to 68 percent in
    fiscal year 2024. The surface Navy concurrently reduced maintenance
    backlog, the accumulated ``debt'' of deferred maintenance, from $2.3
    billion in fiscal year 2022 to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2024.
    Furthermore, Navy was able to extend the service life for 12 destroyers
    and three cruisers based on improved material condition, maintenance
    processes, and Life Cycle Health Assessments.
        Navy is improving the readiness of our surface fleet while
    simultaneously modernizing fleet capabilities to ensure that our naval
    forces are lethal and effective against both current and future
    threats. Installation of the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)
    hypersonic weapons system on DDG 1000 to increase its long-range strike
    lethality is an example of modernization for long term advantage. To
    increase capability in the near-term, Navy installed SEWIP Blk III, a
    next-generation non-kinetic anti-ship missile defense system, on USS
    Pinckney (DDG 91) during a scheduled maintenance period.
        Navy fully supports our Marine Corps brethren. We must continue to
    improve the material readiness of the amphibious fleet. To that end,
    the fiscal year 2025 Shipbuilding Plan maintains the legally mandated
    inventory of 31 amphibious ships. In 2024, the Chief of Naval
    Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps tasked Navy and Marine
    Corps to develop a comprehensive plan to improve the readiness of our
    amphibious warfare ships, and Navy is implementing this plan.
                              munitions readiness
        The $2.3 billion of munitions expenditures in the war in Ukraine,
    the Israel-Hamas conflict, and combat operations in the Red Sea
    highlight the urgent need to increase weapons production capacity,
    expand magazine depth, and improve capability. Although the Navy does
    not procure SM-3, we have employed them to great effect in the eastern
    Mediterranean. Navy appreciates the contingency funding provided by
    Congress, but many of our munitions inventories remain below the Total
    Munition Requirement today. Navy has increased munitions investments to
    more than $6.6 billion in the past 2 years to prepare for potential
    conflict with an advanced adversary. We are now procuring weapons at or
    near maximum rates, but industry is challenged to meet this increase in
    demand.
        Navy is investing in industrial base capacity and must continue to
    do so, with congressional support, while also investing in the next
    generation of munitions to prepare for future conflict. Beginning in
    fiscal year 2023, we have invested to increase the production rate of
    SM-6 missiles. Navy's Energetics Comprehensive Modernization Plan will
    also revitalize our organic energetics industrial base using
    authorities for a Center for Technical Excellence and by forming
    public-private partnerships with both legacy companies and startups. In
    addition to partnering with companies focused on accelerating solid
    rocket motor production capacity, Navy's plan will expand by twofold
    production of organic energetics at the Navy facility in Indian Head,
    MD.
        I urge Congress to continue to support Navy as we leverage
    acquisition authorities such as multi-year procurement, advance
    procurement, and other transaction authorities to reduce procurement
    cost and provide a stable demand signal to industry. Increases in the
    cost of labor and material are driving cost growth in Navy's munitions
    and their components. The cost of an SM-6, for example, has risen 50
    percent per unit over the past 5 years. To grow weapons inventory in
    the near-term, Navy is recertifying aging rounds. When combined with
    new production, recertification is a cost-effective means to build
    inventory and get as much capability into theater as possible, as fast
    as possible.
        In parallel with these initiatives, Navy is preparing for the next
    generation of munitions: from improvements to current designs like SM-6
    and LRASM, to the development of new options with greater reach and
    lethality, like CPS. Navy is also investing in munitions like the
    Coyote and Roadrunner systems which provide effective layers of defense
    against unmanned aerial systems and lower the cost-per-kill.
                              contested logistics
        The current strategic environment demands a naval logistics
    enterprise capable of assuring readiness and sustainment at speed and
    scale for the Joint Force. Navy is modernizing our logistics enterprise
    to be more agile, resilient, and capable of sustaining combat
    effectiveness in contested environments against peer adversaries. To
    address the challenges of refueling, rearming, and resupplying inside
    weapons engagement zones, we are investing in next generation logistics
    ships to augment the current combat logistics force and in new
    capabilities such as rearming at sea.
                           recruit and retain talent
        Our Navy builds great people, great leaders, and great teams to
    innovate, solve hard problems, and dominate in combat. Our sailors
    stand ready as a lethal fighting force to deter or confront any
    adversary.
        After missing our fiscal year 2023 recruiting goal by approximately
    7,000 sailors, we raised our goal for fiscal year 2024--and exceeded
    that goal by contracting 40,978 future sailors, the most since 2003. We
    achieved this improvement by implementing data informed processes
    throughout the recruiting enterprise. Navy established a Recruiting
    Operations Center to monitor data in real time, implemented the Future
    Sailor Preparatory Course to improve accession success, streamlined
    medical waiver reviews, increased the quality and number of recruiters,
    adjusted recruiting goal incentives, improved marketing processes, and
    identified and removed barriers to recruiter productivity. These
    changes are sustainable. As a result, Navy is on pace to exceed our
    fiscal year 2025 recruiting goal of 40,600. This performance, coupled
    with improved retention, will make progress toward our primary manning
    goal of 100 percent enlisted rating fill by the end of 2026 and will
    translate directly to reducing our gaps at sea.
        We continue to explore innovative strategies to attract qualified,
    motivated individuals. Navy is maximizing its pool of recruits with the
    physical and academic Future Sailor Preparatory Courses, as well as by
    expanding our reach through partnerships and traditional and mixed
    media marketing. Increasing access has not lowered the standard--every
    recruit must complete the same training at boot camp and meet all
    qualifications for his or her assigned rating.
        Navy is dedicated to retaining our most capable sailors; retention
    is a critical component of achieving our end-strength goals. To that
    end, we leverage monetary and non-monetary incentives, including
    Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, suspension of High Year Tenure Length
    of Service gates, the Retention Excellence Award and Best in Class
    program, and enhanced exit and milestone surveys which focus our
    retention efforts. As a result, enlisted retention remains healthy. We
    exceeded our fiscal year 2024 retention benchmark forecasts in zone A
    (0 to 6 years), zone B (6 to 10 years), and zone C (10 to 14 years).
    Navy continues to meet or exceed its retention benchmark forecast for
    fiscal year 2025.
        These efforts are improving manning in critical billets at sea and
    ashore, ensuring we have the right people in the right places to
    maintain our operational readiness. We regularly review compensation
    packages to ensure we remain competitive in a tight labor market,
    positioning the Navy as an employer of choice. The latest Department of
    Defense Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation highlights that our
    compensation package is strongly competitive with the civilian
    employers.
        While officer retention remains a challenge in specific career
    fields, we appreciate the continued support of Congress in enabling our
    monetary retention incentives in areas such as Aviation, Explosive
    Ordnance Disposal, Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Naval Special
    Warfare, and Health Professions Officers.
        Ship manning is an essential element of operational readiness, but
    it also impacts job satisfaction and retention. Since 2015, Navy has
    increased the number of authorized billets on at-sea units, but at-sea
    manning has not kept pace with that growth. At the beginning of fiscal
    year 2025, Navy had a shortfall of sailors relative to at-sea billets.
    Our recruiting and retention efforts will drive progress toward our
    primary manning goal of 100 percent enlisted rating fill by the end of
    2026. Gaps at sea have fallen from 15 percent to 13 percent, although
    this metric trails recruiting successes by the length of time it takes
    for new accessions to complete training and report to the fleet.
                           deliver quality of service
        Quality of service (QoS) improves force readiness. Navy is
    committed to providing the QoS that our sailors deserve. Childcare
    capacity and housing quality are crucial, as they contribute directly
    to positive work environments for our sailors and their families.
        The Navy provides high-quality childcare programs but has
    insufficient capacity, particularly in fleet concentration areas.
    Improvement requires a comprehensive approach including strategic
    staffing, new facilities, and leverage of community resources.
        Enrollment in Navy childcare centers is up from 76 percent of total
    capacity at the start of fiscal year 2023 to 88 percent today, and
    staffing has grown from 75 percent of demand at the start of fiscal
    year 2023 to 87 percent today. The waitlist for Navy Child Development
    Centers (CDCs) has shrunk from 3,400 at the start of fiscal year 2024
    to 2,500 as of January 31, 2025. Navy has also expanded the Military
    Child Care in Your Neighborhood program, which provides fee assistance
    for families that are geographically dispersed or face long waitlists
    for on-base care, from 6,500 spaces at the start of fiscal year 2024 to
    over 9,000 today.
        To improve CDC staffing, Navy deployed 150 supplemental staff
    across our child and youth programs through a contract with Utah Tech
    University. This resource fills staffing shortfalls during peak summer
    and Permanent Change of Station seasons at both domestic and overseas
    locations. In order to attract quality candidates, Navy also expanded
    the staff childcare discount for Direct Care employees. Employee use of
    the discount increased from 22 percent in fiscal year 2023 to 32
    percent by the end of fiscal year 2024.
        We also owe our sailors quality housing, and too many of our
    barracks are in poor condition. At the end of fiscal year 2023, 25
    percent of Navy Permanent Party Unaccompanied Housing (UH) bedrooms had
    a Building Condition Index (BCI) of `poor.' We have driven this pool
    down to 21 percent as of the end of fiscal year 2024, but still have
    work to do. Our long-term strategy will recapitalize our facilities to
    eliminate `poor' housing through focused investments and divestitures.
    Navy has increased its Restoration and Modernization investments to
    repair inadequate UH and is conducting a comprehensive review of UH to
    guide future investments.
                        invest in warfighter competency
        Live training is often constrained by range space, spectrum
    limitations, threat replication challenges, and operational security.
    In order to build tactical proficiency independent of geographical
    location, Navy is establishing a reliable, realistic, relevant, and
    recordable Live Virtual Constructive (LVC)-enabled architecture to
    train all of our warfighters, whether deployed or pier-side. LVC
    training is the most viable and cost-effective means to prepare for
    operations in contested environments against high-end threats. Navy
    virtual constructive capabilities are already facilitating safe,
    efficient, and practical high-value training events.
        The Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE) further enhances
    our LVC training capability by realistically replicating complex
    operational scenarios in a common, distributed setting. NCTE integrates
    live platforms and ranges with synthetic ranges at requisite security
    levels. This integration is crucial for simulating realistic adversary
    tactics and enhancing our force readiness.
        Recent operational successes underscore the importance of LVC
    capabilities in all phases of training. In response to the latest
    combat developments, Navy acquisition commands and Warfighting
    Development Centers created advanced tactics, techniques, and
    procedures for countering unmanned threats. The Warfighting Development
    Centers then developed LVC scenarios to train deployed and pre-
    deployment forces on the new threats presented by the Houthis in the
    Red Sea.
        These combined capabilities are essential not only for preparing
    sailors to counter unmanned threats, but also for maintaining their
    proficiency in high-end combat scenarios. The continuous development
    and integration of LVC technologies ensures that our naval forces
    remain ready to face any challenge.
                            critical infrastructure
        The Navy sustains and projects maritime operations from its shore
    installations. After decades of underinvestment, these platforms need
    targeted funding to restore capability and capacity. Restoration and
    Modernization funding is key to revitalizing our degraded critical
    infrastructure. Navy cannot address all degraded facilities
    concurrently and is targeting investment in the infrastructure that is
    most impactful for our warfighters including facilities that support
    Nuclear Deterrence, Naval Operational Architecture, Unaccompanied
    Housing, Fitness Centers, and Shipyards.
                      infrastructure optimization programs
        The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) is crucial
    for eliminating maintenance delays and supporting construction of new
    nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. SIOP has completed 40
    projects across four shipyards, an investment of over $1B. We have six
    dry dock construction projects currently underway. In addition to
    recapitalization, SIOP optimizes physical shipyard layout for
    efficiency and to align construction with warfighting requirements.
    Notably, dry docks at Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards are
    being upgraded to meet seismic resiliency criteria.
        An additional 40 SIOP projects worth $6.3 billion are under
    contract. The Navy is taking an integrated approach to installation
    resiliency by emphasizing initiatives in energy-, water-, and cyber-
    resilience. SIOP projects improve operational efficiency and strengthen
    adaptability to emerging threats.
        For aviation maintenance, the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC)
    Infrastructure Optimization and Modernization Program (FIOP) follows a
    holistic investment strategy to integrate all infrastructure and
    equipment investments. FIOP optimizes maintenance, manufacturing,
    modification, repair, and overhaul infrastructure at naval aviation
    depots to ensure equipment readiness and improve material availability
    as fast as possible. Full congressional support for FIOP will help the
    Navy maintain our momentum.
                                    closing
        We must achieve and sustain our readiness goals to deliver a lethal
    Navy capable of defending American interests around the world. To
    maximize the availability of our ships, submarines, and aircraft, we
    will continue to improve our maintenance practices. We will continue to
    recruit and retain talented, dedicated Americans. We will deliver the
    quality of service that our sailors and their families deserve. We will
    invest in our warfighters through innovative training, and we will
    restore our aging infrastructure. Consistent and predictable funding is
    foundational to meeting our readiness objectives, and budgetary
    instability creates a cascade of challenges. I look forward to working
    with you to support our sailors, civilians, and families.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral.
        General?

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER J. MAHONEY, USMC, ASSISTANT
         COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        General Mahoney. Good morning, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking
    Member Hirono, Senator Kaine. Thanks for the opportunity to
    appear this morning.
        I am honored to represent the Marine Corps and discuss our
    current warfighting readiness. Since my testimony last year,
    your Marine Corps has continued to progress and refine our
    force design implementation through a campaign of learning.
        We are modernizing our force to meet the challenges of the
    modern battlefield. As directed by our commandant, we balance
    that modernization with our ability to respond to crises.
        This balance ensures that over 32,000 marines forward
    postured and deployed are trained and ready to support the
    combatant commanders' competition campaign, deter global
    threats, and when necessary fight our Nation's battles.
        Whether acting as the forward eyes and ears in the
    southwest islands or expanding maritime domain awareness in a
    unified High North and across the Baltic Sea or the defense
    support of civil authorities by constructing obstacles in intel
    analysis on the southern border, your marines are ready to
    operate in any clime and place, as our song says.
        There remain external challenges, though, to our
    warfighting readiness. The most acute readiness detractors are
    the lack of amphibious ship availability, which has been
    brought up already by my shipmate, and the absence of organic
    littoral mobility to marry up with our MLR capabilities.
        The gap in these capabilities creates significant risk and
    degrade force readiness across the competition spectrum toward
    conflict.
        Yet, despite these challenges your Marine Corps remains
    ready. Our personnel, our maintenance, supply and training
    readiness remain high, just as all of you would expect.
        In both recruiting and retention the Marine Corps made
    mission and exceeded expectations in fiscal year 2024, and you
    heard it here first. We will make our numbers this year and, in
    fact, we will be able to push contracts on the order of a
    thousand into the next fiscal year.
        I remain completely humbled by the quality of our recruits
    and the marines we make fleet wide. I cannot say enough about
    the excellence and discipline of our recruiting force and
    continue to do what others say is not possible, making mission
    without lowering standards, which is something we will never
    do.
        That discipline together with consistent funding remain key
    ingredients for a high State of readiness. Our unprecedented
    second unmodified audit opinion is evidence of that discipline.
    Our books are clean. Our books are open.
        The Marine Corps is appreciative of the continued support
    from Congress and support for the commandant's priorities,
    which are creating and enduring total force readiness.
        With your advocacy we will sustain our current future force
    readiness to maintain the honor of being the first to fight
    when called.
        With your support for additional resources, we will restore
    the State of our infrastructure readiness in a manner
    consistent with your expectations as well as the expectations
    of our commandant.
        Thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I look forward
    to your questions. Semper Fidelis.
        [The prepared statement of General Christopher J. Mahoney
    follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Christopher J. Mahoney
        Chair, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee, I am thankful for the opportunity to report on the State
    of Marine Corps Readiness. We have accomplished much over the last 5
    years to modernize the Marine Corps and improve its warfighting
    readiness. We are moving in the right direction but cannot slow down.
    In fact, we must go faster. The work of this Subcommittee is crucial to
    the continued success and readiness of the Marine Corps--its
    warfighting forces, its individual marines, and its families. I look
    forward to working with each Member over the coming year to ensure the
    continued readiness of your Marine Corps.
    CMC Priorities in Support of Readiness
        The Marine Corps' readiness is maintained through clear guidance,
    engaged and accountable leadership at every echelon, a ruthless focus
    of readiness, and predictable and adequate funding. The Commandant
    provided that clear guidance upon assuming office, which remains
    unchanged. Those priorities are: 1) Balance Crisis Response with
    Modernization Efforts; 2) Naval Integration and Organic Mobility; 3)
    Quality of Life; 4) Recruit, Make and Retain Marines; and 5) Maximize
    the Potential of our Reserves. These priorities inform all Marine Corps
    planning, including our budget. More importantly, they give us clear
    guidance and intent on what is necessary to ensure maximum warfighting
    readiness. Finally, the Commandant's priorities account for readiness
    across the board, from force design and warfighting to individual and
    unit training, personnel readiness, and our back-to-back unmodified
    audit opinions.
                             warfighting readiness
        The character of warfare has changed in a few short years, and the
    four disparate threat State actors, China, Russia, Iran, and North
    Korea, are colluding into a single, complex, and adaptive global threat
    system. At the tactical level, we are witnessing the effects of the
    mass proliferation of drones and littoral sea denial in the Black Sea.
    This creates a twofold challenge of making maneuver increasingly
    challenging while demonstrating the criticality of winning the
    reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance contest. We are also
    relearning past lessons regarding the need for robust offensive and
    defensive electronic warfare capabilities across all tactical
    formations. At the operational level, we are witnessing the importance
    of possessing and maintaining a depth of magazine sufficient for
    protracted operations, and the rise of space as a critical warfare
    domain.
    Warfighting Readiness Assessment
        Your Marine Corps possesses the trained and ready forces necessary
    for crisis or contingency as identified by Operational Plans. We are
    ready to fulfill our 10 USC Sec.  8063 requirements; ready to support
    our allies and partners in the East and South China Seas; ready to
    support the Republic of Korea on the Korean Peninsula; ready to combat
    Iran or its proxies globally; ready to fulfill our commitments in the
    High North alongside Norway, Sweden, and Finland; ready with the
    operational reach necessary to strike violent extremists; ready to
    support sea denial efforts; ready to seize and defend key maritime
    terrain; ready to support civil authorities along the southern border;
    and, ready to respond to crises in this hemisphere or anywhere else.
        The Marine Corps balances readiness with two primary and competing
    metrics: sourcing day-to-day missions and modernizing to meet the
    demands of the future operating environment. Through modernization, our
    units are equipped with more advanced equipment and supplies, receive
    more robust individualized training, and participate in more collective
    training--much of which is force-on-force.
        Marine aviation continues to see improvements in readiness as we
    retire older airframes, accelerate the acquisition of the CH-53K and
    fifth-generation F-35B/C, and fully employ our unmanned MQ-9
    surveillance aircraft. Improvements in aircraft readiness from fiscal
    year 2019 to fiscal year 2024 have been realized thanks to support
    provided by this Subcommittee and the herculean efforts of our marine
    aviation maintainers.
        We are innovating and adapting from lessons learned from the modern
    battlefields of Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, Red Sea, and our own exercises.
    We are innovating through experimentation with autonomous, low-profile
    technology to help us maneuver and sustain in a distributed
    environment. We are also innovating through the integration of
    automation and artificial intelligence in our fires and sustainment
    systems to respond faster and more accurately to the demands of the
    modern battlefield. But while technology has changed, the foundational
    elements of warfighting and lethality have not. We remain the world's
    most elite fighting force with the most proficient combined arms teams
    and best small unit leaders. The extraordinary quality of our marines
    remains our principal advantage.
    Marine Forces Reserve
        As the Marine Corps modernizes and operational tempo increases, the
    Marine Corps Reserve Component remains an integral part of the total
    Force. Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) has increasingly activated
    units to provide operational relief to the Active Component (AC). In
    fiscal year 2024, support to the AC nearly doubled over fiscal year
    2023 with 600 activations supporting Joint Force commanders in
    Southwest Asia, South America, Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. In
    fiscal year 2025, activations will more than double fiscal year 2024
    levels, with nearly 1,500 Reserve marines, approximately 4 percent of
    the Reserve Component (RC), activating to support global force
    management commitments. Looking beyond fiscal year 2024 and fiscal year
    2025, MARFORRES expects to continue to activate large combat formations
    such as infantry battalions, artillery batteries, and aviation
    squadrons, while simultaneously providing critical enabler support such
    as civil affairs experts, foreign advisors, and countless other
    specialty skill sets unique to the RC.
                                  force design
        Force Design is the Marine Corps' enduring strategic initiative for
    pursuing new capabilities and concepts to ensure we remain the premier
    force. The Marine Corps has made significant progress in our
    formations, equipment, and concepts through the pillars of
    modernization, talent management, training and education, and
    logistics.
        Marine Littoral Regiment: The foundation of our Force Design
    progress is our Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs). MLRs are specialized
    units designed to fight and win in a modern peer fight with dispersed,
    task-organized operations that integrate advanced command, control,
    communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance capabilities. These regiments enhance the ability to
    rapidly find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess threats, and are
    capable of maritime domain awareness and sea denial operations in
    support of maritime, joint, and combined operations.
        The first MLR to stand up, 3d MLR, has achieved Initial Operational
    Capability with the activation of all its subordinate units. They are
    equipped with modern capabilities--both for sensing and lethality--
    including our first six Navy-Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship
    Interdiction System launchers. In 2024, the 3d MLR participated in
    exercises such as BALIKATAN, Archipelagic Coastal Defense, and Marine
    Aviation Support Activity in the Philippines, validating its capacity
    to operate in dispersed maritime environments alongside allies.
    Similarly, 12th MLR, based in Okinawa, Japan, has activated its
    Littoral Logistics Battalion and plans to establish its Littoral Anti-
    Air Battalion and Littoral Combat Team by the end of fiscal year 2025.
    12th MLR has engaged in joint and bilateral exercises, bolstering
    deterrence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region as it develops
    interoperability with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force.
        Joint / Coalition Kill Webs and Combined Joint All Domain Command
    and Control (CJADC2): To support CJADC2, the Marine Corps is investing
    in advanced sensors to contribute to joint kill webs. Key examples of
    this include investments in electronic sensing capabilities provided by
    Electronic Remote Sensors, TPS-80 radar enhancements.
        The service utilizes joint programs and initiatives that support
    decision advantage. Those unique emerging Marine Corps systems are
    ``born joint'' at the outset to ensure that the service is integrated
    at the Joint Force level. This includes electronic warfare systems
    feeding Spectrum Services Framework to provide electronic sensing to
    the joint community to support decision advantage; the use of Maven
    Smart System to Find, Fix and Track targets; and the fielding and
    integration of the Family of Integrated Targeting Cells in conjunction
    with the Navy and Army to support fusion and a target quality Common
    Operational Picture.
    Talent Management
        Commandant's Retention Program (CRP): The Commandant's Retention
    Program identifies the most competitive marines and offers them an
    opportunity to stay a marine via a pre-approved reenlistment. The
    fiscal year 2025 CRP cohort yielded over 1,450 reenlistments,
    accounting for nearly 20 percent of the overall First Term Alignment
    Plan mission for fiscal year 2025. We secured over 7,950 FTAP
    reenlistments for the Active Component, achieving 114 percent of our
    goal. For the inaugural year of the Reserve Component CRP, we secured
    248 reenlistments and drilling obligations from the first-year cohort,
    reaching 103 percent of our goal. The CRP remains critical in
    incentivizing the reenlistment of our highest-performing marines.
        Talent Marketplace: This year, we released the Talent Management
    Engagement Platform (TMEP), an internally developed digital prototype
    to arm marines with more accessible and transparent information. Since
    May 2024, TMEP has been tested by approximately 12,000 enlisted marines
    across 10 MOSs. The platform has been released to Active component
    marines in the ranks of second lieutenant through colonel, consisting
    of approximately 16,000 marines.
    Training and Education
        Enhanced Infantry Training / Infantry Marine Course (IMC): The
    Marine Corps continues to improve initial training through Enhanced
    Infantry Training / IMC. More than 15,000 marines have attended IMC
    since it was expanded in October 2021. We anticipate another 4,000
    marines to complete the training in 2025. Unlike those who went before,
    these marines will join their initial units with skills commensurate
    with those who have been in the unit for years and, as a result, these
    IMC graduates will be more easily integrated into our infantry
    battalions and more ready for the rigors of combat on any future
    battlefield.
        Close Combat Lethality: In addition to producing more combat-
    capable marines, and based upon lessons learned from ongoing conflicts,
    we overhauled our Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Program to include
    our Annual Rifle Qualification (ARQ). The new ARQ incorporates shooting
    positions that are more realistic in combat into an efficient course of
    fire that provides for engagements at ranges between 15 and 500 yards
    and based on lethality zones. As a result, the ARQ target and course of
    fire reinforce the importance of marksmanship lethality.
        We have also expanded our data and modeling-enhanced Infantry
    Marksmanship Training Program (IMTP) across the fleet. IMTP has been
    developed and validated to increase lethality by analyzing speed,
    precision, executive control, adaptability, and risk exposure metrics.
    IMTP has increased lethality across these metrics by 99 percent
    compared to traditional marksmanship training.
        Project Tripoli: Project Tripoli is the Marine Corps' initiative to
    provide a Live, Virtual, and Constructive Training Environment (LVC-TE)
    that is persistent, globally available, all-domain, and all-echelon. We
    are currently in the execution phase and have fielded Force-on-Force
    Training System Next which enables live force-on-force training with
    after action assessment support in a virtual and constructive domain,
    enhancing our formations all-domain training readiness. These LVC-TE
    capabilities recently supported the 3d MLR Certification Exercise and
    are planned for use during fiscal year 2025 exercises STEEL KNIGHT,
    Balikatan, and Service Level Training Exercise 2-25.
        Project Triumph: Project Triumph is the Marine Corps effort to
    transform training and education to an outcomes-based, student-centric,
    information age learning model to generate cognitively agile marines
    who can make bold and consequential decisions in challenging
    environments. This transformation will take place through three lines
    of effort: 1) Policy Development and Outcomes-Based Learning; 2)
    Instructors as Learning Leaders; and 3) Technological Integration of
    all aggregate Marine Corps learning systems. These LOEs have influenced
    the IMC to implement active, student-centered experimental learning
    techniques with emphasis on problem solving and the reinforcement of
    sound decisionmaking skills with a bias for action.
        Project Trident: Project Trident is the Marine Corps effort to
    enable the combat readiness of warfighting organizations by providing
    individual and unit-level training to build and close kill webs in a
    contested maritime environment at all echelons and in all domains. We
    are doing this through two lines of effort: 1) enhanced courseware, and
    2) practical application in training exercises. Courseware initiatives
    include littoral targeting and fires, naval expeditionary operations
    planning, and advanced fires and effects. Practical application non-
    kinetic effects in a peer threat environment include the integration of
    marine space, cyber, and air components to Service Level Training
    Exercise 2-24 to provide realistic and real-time non-kinetic effects
    through signals intelligence, electronic warfare, and cyber security
    threats.
        Marine Corps Attack Drone Team: The Marine Corps recently created a
    Marine Corps Attack Drone Team (MCADT), whose mission is to support the
    rapid acceleration and scaling of the lessons learned from armed first-
    person view drone use in modern combat. This initiative will ensure our
    Corps continues to enhance our readiness and lethality to hunt down and
    destroy our Nation's adversaries. The MCADT's first competition is this
    July in Florida, where the marines will battle in the first ever US
    Military Drone Crucible Championship. After July, the MCADT will next
    focus on lessons learned from that competition and develop efforts to
    provide intermediate and advanced armed FPV drone skills to the Fleet
    Marine Force and Total Force via the Competition-in-Arms Program.
    Logistics Modernization
        Contested Logistics: The ability to move personnel, equipment, and
    supplies in a contested environment is just as critical as the ability
    to find, fix, and destroy adversary formations. To ensure persistence
    in such environments, the Marine Corps is shifting from traditional
    supply chains to a more resilient sustainment web. Marine Forces
    Pacific's operational concept--designed to deter conflict and, if
    necessary, fight and win--is reliant upon the integration of key
    warfighting functions: maneuver, mobility, and sustainment. This
    integration will be accomplished through the Global Positioning
    Network, which includes the establishment of terrestrial supply points
    in strategic locations and already established maritime prepositioning
    forces. Initiatives are also underway to enhance base resiliency,
    ensuring the ability to operate under attack, and rapidly recover as a
    warfighting platform.
        Supply and Distribution Modernization: Experimentation and
    modernization of multi-domain distribution capabilities are progressing
    rapidly. Across the Fleet Marine Force, 58 Tactical Resupply Unmanned
    Aircraft Systems and Unmanned Logistics Systems--Air have been fielded
    for testing. Additionally, 504 Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles have been
    delivered to infantry battalions and MARSOC. The Marine Corps is also
    collaborating with the Navy, Army, and allied and partner nations to
    integrate stern landing vessels and autonomous low-profile vessels to
    enhance littoral distribution. Additive manufacturing initiatives are
    also advancing, including the deployment of the portable expeditionary
    fabrication lab and Tactical Fabrication, both of which are now fielded
    to Combat Logistics Battalions and Maintenance Battalions.
        Medical Modernization: Medical support is also evolving to meet
    expeditionary requirements, with a focus on smaller, more mobile Damage
    Control (initial stabilization of critically injured patients),
    Resuscitation, and Surgical teams, as well as Patient Holding and long-
    range enroute care capabilities.
                               training readiness
        In support of generating greater warfighting readiness in our
    Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), the Marine Corps has executed
    an annual series of force-on-force training exercises for several
    years. The training objectives of those warfighting exercises are: 1)
    employ the principles of maneuver warfare; 2) apply adaptive
    decisionmaking; 3) conduct assured command and control; 4) execute the
    targeting cycle; 5) conduct logistics in a contested and austere
    environment; and 6) win in a multidomain operational environment. These
    are accomplished via an operational environment that seeks to
    approximate combat operations' friction, disorder, and uncertainty, and
    test decisionmaking against a live, thinking, adaptive enemy.
    Training Exercises and Readiness
        Our mission is as clear as it is vital: we forge marines into
    organizations and units designed to fight across all domains. Marines
    have been multi-domain since there were only two--land and sea. We have
    adapted to the changes that technology has brought to warfare. We test
    the mettle of our marines by forcing them to fight at a disadvantage
    across domains we have historically maintained the advantage--
    especially the air.
        Throughout the last year, the Marine Corps continued to execute
    bilateral and multi-lateral exercises throughout the globe to build and
    maintain the readiness of our formations. Nowhere is our commitment to
    working with allies and partners to more apparent than in the priority
    theater of Indo-Pacom. I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and III MEF
    forces operate from Darwin, through the Pacific Islands, to Southeast
    Asia and into Northeast Asia. They continue to conduct coordinated
    rehearsals, operations, and activities that demonstrate deterrence to
    would be aggressors trying to disrupt the status quo while we provide
    assurance to friends, allies, and partners who have stood with us for
    decades. We have practiced full naval integration in our exercises and
    experimentation through Task Force 76/3, a joint task force with 3d
    Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Expeditionary Strike Group SEVEN. We
    have also enhanced joint and combined partnerships and interoperability
    through exercises like Yama Sakura 87, a trilateral exercise involving
    III MEF the U.S. Army, Australian Defence Force, and Japan Ground Self
    Defense Force. The exercise spanned three nations, six locations, and
    over 7,000 servicemembers, demonstrating the value of the Marine Corps'
    permanent presence in Japan and our ability to effectively integrate
    with joint, Australian, and Japanese forces. Our presence and
    partnerships translate into a rapid response capability that has proven
    invaluable to our partners in the Pacific during times of crisis. Our
    ability to respond quickly and decisively to natural disasters ranging
    from devastating typhoons in the Philippines to volcanic eruptions in
    Papua New Guinea remind the region that the United States is the
    partner of choice. Projecting power responsibly and constructively in
    the Indo-Pacific has allowed this vibrant region to thrive and has made
    the United States safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
    Reserve Training Readiness
        The Marine Forces Reserve maintains individual readiness through
    monthly and annual drill periods, and unit readiness through
    participation in Service Level Training Exercises such as the
    Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat
    Center in Twentynine Palms. ITX is an annual capstone training event
    for our Reserve Forces. ITX builds readiness by providing Selected
    Marine Corps Reserve units an opportunity to focus exclusively on
    offensive and defensive operations, their core mission essential tasks.
    At ITX, MARFORRES employs an entire MAGTF, over 4,500 marines and
    sailors. It also prepares the MARFORRES Staff for the complexities of a
    mass mobilization scenario.
        MARFORRES has also participated in Exercise UNITAS for the last 3
    years. UNITAS offers a large-scale training venue for our Reserve units
    to form and train as a MAGTF alongside their AC counterparts from I and
    II MEF. Through Exercise UNITAS, our Reserve Forces gain experience
    operating under a combatant commander and integrating with our partner
    nations' amphibious forces. This year, MARFORRES will also participate
    in joint and multilateral exercises, Arctic Edge 25, and Red Flag
    Alaska 25-2 and 25-3. These exercises, conducted in Alaska, will
    provide critical all-domain C2, fires, and air control training while
    exercising homeland defense tasks and preparing marines to operate in
    the arctic environment.
    Safety
        Improving the safety of our marines is critical to maintaining
    Marine Corps readiness. As such, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
    implemented several key initiatives designed to enhance safety and
    readiness across the fleet. Included in these initiatives are the
    establishment of a Force Preservation Directorate and a Local Area
    Assessment program. The Force Preservation Directorate is led by a
    General Officer. The goal of the program is to align and optimize
    current behavioral assessment programs to better serve the marines and
    their commands. The Local Area Assessment is a program in partnership
    with the Naval Safety Command and tailored for Marine Corps aviation.
    Its purpose is to identify potential safety hazards, facilitate their
    prompt recognition, and ensure that necessary support and resources are
    allocated. In addition to these initiatives, we are using data to
    improve the safety of our tactical vehicle operators to assist
    commanders in reducing risk by enhancing driver proficiency across all
    levels of tactical vehicle operations. These efforts and our continuous
    assessment of our safety programs will ensure our weapon systems,
    equipment, and units are safe-to-operate and operated-safely--making
    your Marine Corps inherently more lethal.
                              personnel readiness
        The cornerstone of Marine Corps readiness is the individual
    marine--how we recruit them, invest in them, and retain them.
    Recruiting
        Our success in maintaining an elite force begins with recruiting
    young Americans with the values, character, mental aptitude, physical
    and psychological fitness, and desire to earn the title ``Marine.'' We
    must collectively ensure the health of our All-Volunteer Force and the
    strategic advantage it provides--talent, capability, and warfighting
    excellence. The Marine Corps remains committed to providing resources
    and sending only our best marines to be recruiters. Our refusal to
    lower standards sustains our brand as tough and smart professionals to
    the American public and continues to attract those who aspire to prove
    themselves worthy of earning the title. The Marine Corps once again
    made its Total Force recruiting mission in fiscal year 2024 and remains
    on track to obtain an even larger mission this fiscal year while
    growing the start pool and maintaining quality standards.
        The quality of marine recruits remains exceptionally high and
    exceeds every measurable Department of Defense metric. Last fiscal
    year, we achieved over 64 percent CAT I-IIIAs mental group, the top
    scoring candidates, compared to the DOD standard of 60 percent. We
    assessed no CAT IV individuals. In addition, the Marine Corps saw
    marked improvement in overall military occupational specialty
    alignment. Last, we have almost tripled the previous year's prior
    service accessions, which brought experienced marines with critical
    skills directly back to the operating forces.
        Regardless of our success, we must remain mindful of the long game:
    these impressive gains face constant headwinds and are susceptible to
    disruption. Recruiting will continue to be a challenge into the future.
    Reinforcing and realigning the recruiting force has helped; however, to
    exploit success, we will continue to require robust resourcing for
    advertising and continued reinforcement of the Military Entrance
    Processing Command. Additionally, we thank Congress for its continued
    focus on and support for recruiter access to high schools and colleges.
    The fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act provided
    additional timeliness guidelines for recruiter access to directory
    lists. The single biggest reason we hear from young people for not
    joining the Corps is that they simply were not aware of the potential
    opportunities we offer. Maintaining reliable and expanded access to
    high schools and student directories remains a top priority.
    Suicide Prevention
        Suicide rates in the U.S. have reached their highest levels since
    1941. The Marine Corps rates have remained flat, but any loss from
    suicide is unacceptable. Efforts to prevent these tragic deaths include
    implementing recommendations from the Suicide Prevention and Response
    Independent Review Committee and investments in the Marine Corps
    Training and Total Fitness (MCTF) program. MCTF is a holistic approach
    to integrating physical, mental, social, and spiritual fitness programs
    to promote the combat readiness of our marines. These programs employ a
    leadership out-front approach along four preventative lines of efforts:
    1) prevention and skill-building (e.g., leadership and ethics courses
    with the Lejeune Leadership Institute); 2) feedback from the force via
    application of data and research (e.g., lethal means survey); 3) small
    unit leader communication (e.g., Warfighter Mental Readiness Playbook);
    and 4) collaboration with key support resources (e.g., preventative and
    proactive medical care; body and mind physical and mental training and
    education; and financial management counseling/guidance.)
    Marine and Family Readiness--Childcare
        Providing quality childcare for marines and their families remains
    an important readiness enabler, with 16 Marine Corps installations
    having Child Development Centers (CDCs). At MCB Camp Pendleton, a $44.1
    million CDC is under construction to add 250 childcare spaces, expected
    to eliminate waitlists for Category 1 personnel. A $105.2 million CDC
    was awarded at NSA Andersen AFB, Guam, to support 276 children amid the
    Corps' buildup. Additionally, a $37.7 million CDC was completed in
    November 2023, adding 412 new childcare spaces. These efforts aim to
    reduce childcare shortages and support Marine Corps families while
    improving servicemember readiness. Still waitlist remain. Lengthy
    waitlists are primarily due to shortage of qualified workers, high
    turnover, less competitive pay, lengthy hiring process, and seasonal
    PCS fluctuations.
                            infrastructure readiness
    Barracks 2030
        The Commandant and I are committed to providing the marines with
    barracks they deserve and can be proud of. However, the obstacles to
    overcome are enormous--and decades in the making. As the Commandant
    often says--we became marines to do hard things, and remediating nearly
    two decades of under-investments and deferred maintenance in a fraction
    of the time is one of those hard things.
        The Barracks 2030 initiative is focused on three specific lines of
    effort: Management, Materiel, and Modernization. The initiative
    improves management of the barracks with professional barracks and
    building managers in the facilities and dedicated service teams to
    provide 24-hour maintenance support. The Marine Corps will modernize
    its barracks with in-stride room repairs, consolidation of marines into
    its best facilities, demolition of poor-quality ones, renovations to
    modernize existing building, and construction of new facilities.
    Finally, the service will modernize by replacing furniture on regular
    intervals and providing upgraded locks in the barracks. Since its
    inception, the Marine Corps has conducted wall--to-wall inspections to
    first and foremost ensure marines are living in environmentally safe
    conditions, and to inform necessary corrective actions.
        Right-Sizing Inventory: While it may appear counterintuitive to
    identify increased demolition (physical destruction) as a requirement
    for improved quality of life, it is necessary to both generate
    resources and improve the living conditions of our marines. Our current
    inventory of 658 barracks includes approximately 69 that need to be
    demolished. Doing so would free the service from the costs associated
    with heating, cooling, cleaning, and repairing old, poor-quality
    facilities and would generate approximately $50 million per year in
    savings and cost avoidances.
                              clean audit opinion
        Every investment and expenditure that has been discussed in this
    statement has been guaranteed by our achievement of an unmodified audit
    for two straight years. As we invest in new platforms, barracks, and
    training, it is our responsibility as good stewards of taxpayer funds
    to continue to prove that when the Corps is provided a taxpayer dollar,
    we can show exactly where and how it has been invested. For an
    unprecedented second year in a row, the Marine Corps achieved an
    unmodified--or ``clean''--audit option. We have been comprehensively
    tested by Independent Public Accountants to validate budgetary balances
    and records and account for physical assets at installations and bases
    across the globe. This process included counting military equipment,
    buildings, structures, supplies, and ammunition held by the Marine
    Corps and our DOD partners. The audit's favorable opinion was only
    possible through the support and hard work of dedicated marines and our
    civilian marines.
        By better leveraging technology--by automating our system
    interfaces and streamlining the functionality of our systems and
    related business processes--we believe that we can get to a place where
    we more efficiently and effectively maintain our clean opinion. These
    clean audits also provide evidence of what we have believed for a long
    time--when Congress provides the Marine Corps a dollar--we invest it
    wisely, with transparency and accountability, and in a manner that
    allows us to tell you how those investments generate readiness. With
    that in mind, we request this subcommittee's support in addressing the
    service readiness degraders listed below.
                              readiness degraders
    Amphibious Warship Availability
        Reduced Amphibious Warship (AWS) availability has significantly
    impacted the Marine Corps' ability to achieve or sustain proficiency in
    core amphibious skills. In 2023 and 2024, AWS operational availability
    delayed or limited the service's ability to train to amphibious
    standards and deploy Marine Expeditionary Units embarked on Amphibious
    Readiness Groups in all three marine MEFs.
        Since June 2024, AWS has averaged 48.7 percent available for Navy
    and Marine Corps training and operations (fully mission capable /
    mission capable / partially mission capable). Our LHA/LHD in-reporting
    average (ships not in a planned maintenance availability) is 55
    percent, and the LPD/LSD average is 47 percent. If AWS availability
    shortfalls are not resolved, each element of the MAGTF will experience
    further degradation in its ability to train to and meet operational
    requirements in support of Combatant Commanders. Further, the atrophy
    of amphibious operations experience at all ranks could jeopardize
    safety in future training and increase risk in the event of conflict.
        We recognize that increasing current AWS availability will not be
    accomplished overnight; however, addressing this issue will require a
    mix of timely and predictable funding and maintenance planning and
    strategies to replace aging AWS platforms with new construction.
    Sustaining select mid-life upgrades, service life extensions, along
    with the recently signed multi-ship procurement contract for four
    amphibious ships signal industry to invest in its workforce and create
    stability in public and private shipyards for maintenance periods. It
    will also save the government billions of dollars. For example, recent
    multi-ship procurement of one LHA and three LPDs is projected to save
    the taxpayers $901 million dollars compared to buying the ships
    individually.
    Organic Littoral Mobility
        Mobility is critical to enable the dispersion and persistence of
    stand-in forces. MLRs' littoral mobility will be essential to maneuver
    through the Indo-Pacific's complex geography. We recognized this
    capability gap early as we developed concepts for the Indo-Pacific and
    designed a purpose-built Medium Landing Ship (LSM) as a critical
    element of Force Design. Separate and complementary to AWS, the LSM is
    a maneuver asset and, as a shore-to-shore vessel, is unique and vital
    to expeditionary littoral mobility. LSMs facilitate campaigning and can
    support diverse missions. Key missions include operational intra-
    theater mobility, tactical maneuvers in archipelagic environments,
    logistics support, and maritime domain awareness. The Fiscal Year 2025
    President's Budget request includes funding for the first LSM. However,
    contract award in fiscal year 2025 estimates delivery of first LSM no
    earlier than fiscal year 2029. Any delays past fiscal year 2025 shifts
    delivery beyond fiscal year 2029.
        Procurement of LSM is late to need. The LSM procurement timeline
    introduces a significant gap in maneuver capabilities for the priority
    theater. To address this gap, in October 2023, a naval resources and
    requirements review board (R3B) endorsed an initial littoral maneuver
    bridging solution (LMBS) for experimentation and operational use until
    the LSM becomes available to support a minimum of one MLR in fiscal
    year 2034. This initial LMBS was deemed inexecutable due to Military
    Sealift Command (MSC) shortfalls in their civilian mariners. The
    Department of the Navy is exploring options to mitigate the gap. These
    options include commercially available roll-on and roll-off chartered
    vessels, six LCU 2000's available for purchase or charter, and funding
    additional steaming days for Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships.
    Without a timely LMBS solution, critical experimentation and
    operational capabilities of our MLRs are significantly impacted in the
    priority theater.
    Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
        Since 2012, the Navy's MPF has been reduced from 16 Maritime
    Prepositioning Ships (MPS) across three Maritime Prepositioning
    Squadrons to just seven Full Operating Status MPS across two MPSRONs,
    with two additional ships in Reduced Operating Status. This reduction
    has had a direct and negative impact on the Marine Corps' strategic
    mobility and sustainment capabilities. The Marine Corps requires 2.1
    million square feet of MPS lift to meet operational needs. The current
    fleet provides only 1.3 million square feet. This shortfall limits the
    ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in a crisis and removes
    critical redundancy and depth. As adversaries expand their capabilities
    and the geopolitical landscape grows more volatile, reducing MPF
    capacity weakens the Marine Corps' ability to rapidly project power and
    respond to emerging threats.
    Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) Training Readiness
        The Marine Corps has provided over $2 billion (replacement cost
    about $5 billion) in equipment and munitions to the Armed Forces of
    Ukraine via PDA. Replacement and reimbursement for these inventory
    losses are needed to rebuild the depth of magazine needed to gain and
    maintain lost proficiency. Though some funds have been reimbursed
    through PDA replenishment funds, the defense industrial base (DIB)
    faces significant challenges in meeting production demands for
    replenishment. New procurement lead times delay replenishment, as
    existing programmed deliveries take priority. To mitigate impacts, the
    Marine Corps has adjusted training allocations and inventory
    management. However, continued high-demand support may require the
    service to accept further risks to either training readiness or
    strategic readiness.
    MV-22B
        The MV-22 fleet has been seriously impacted by fleet groundings. As
    the backbone of Marine Corps combat assault transport capability, MV-
    22B squadrons have conducted 109 operational deployments and flown over
    630,000 flight hours since 2007. The MV-22B flies approximately twice
    as many flight hours per year as any other Marine Corps rotary-wing
    aircraft. The MV-22 maintains a safety record on par with other Marine
    Aviation assets. From fiscal year 2020 to the present, there were a
    total of six Class A MV-22 mishaps within 212,114.5 total flight hours
    with the Class A mishap rate is 2.82 per 100,000 flight hours. The MV-
    22 10-year (2015-2025) Class A mishap rate is 3.04. Both are lower than
    the Marine Corps 10-year average of 3.17.
        We remain committed to enhancing both the safety and performance of
    the aircraft by improving the proprotor gearbox (PRGB). Improvements in
    critical gears and bearings are being addressed with a more refined
    Triple-Melt steel. Additional sensors are also being installed in
    critical areas to provide better data to forecast necessary maintenance
    to prevent part failure. Finally, a redesigned PRGB Input Quill
    Assembly (IQA) will reduce the incidence of the wear-out mode observed
    in previous IQA failures that led to aircraft Hard Clutch Engagement
    occurrences.
        While solutions to material challenges are in place, pilot and
    aircrew production and training challenges induced by the groundings
    are also impacting the fleet. To mitigate the impacts of the groundings
    on pilot and crew chief production and to prioritize contract
    utilization (fleet health) over time to train, the Marine Corps worked
    with Chief of Naval Air Training to pause intermediate tiltrotor and
    advanced tiltrotor pipelines from February through August 2024. Marine
    Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204 (VMMT-204) tiltrotor pilot
    production deliveries are not projected to return to steady State pre-
    grounding levels until quarter 1 fiscal year 2026. VMMT-204 can surge
    MV-22 crew chief production through fiscal year 2025 based on available
    aircraft. This capability will deplete the backlog of 42 crew chief
    students that developed during the grounding with a return to steady
    State crew chief production in quarter 1 fiscal year 2026.
    Flight Hours
        While the material readiness of our aircraft routinely receives the
    most attention, sustaining individual pilot readiness is equally
    important. In fiscal year 2019, we executed 218,299 total flight hours
    in support of the FMF as part of our overall flight hours program.
    Those hours cost a total of $2.44 billion and supported the readiness
    of 3,161 total pilots. In fiscal year 2024, we executed 200,647 in
    total flight hours. Those hours cost $3.7 billion and supported the
    readiness of 3,312 total pilots. Active Component pilots averaged 14.1
    Hours per month in fiscal year 2024. This is a decrease from fiscal
    year 2019 when pilots averaged 17.2 Hours per month. The major driver
    in the reduction was the prolonged MV-22 grounding. Sustaining and
    increasing individual pilot readiness at current levels while
    remediating readiness lost within the MV-22 community will require
    topline relief.
    TACAIR Pilot Training
        Low readiness of the T-6 trainer aircraft is the primary challenge
    in tactical aviation production, with material readiness consistently
    hovering at 75 percent. The primary issue is the lack of parts in the
    supply system, requiring additional attention from the DOD, as the T-6
    serves as the foundational trainer for all fixed-wing and rotary-wing
    aviators. Naval Air Systems Command and the Chief of Naval Air Training
    (CNATRA), in coordination with the U.S. Air Force Joint Program Office,
    are working to address these challenges by improving the supply chain
    and enhancing contractor performance under the Contractor Operated and
    Maintained Base Supply contract. Additional funding through CNATRA 1A2A
    is also critical, as the issue remains on CNATRA's fiscal year 2025
    Unfunded Priorities List.
                                   conclusion
        The investments we make today in support of our marines, sailors,
    and their collective warfighting readiness will reverberate through the
    rest of this decisive decade. There is only one thing that our Nation
    cannot give to our military--more time. We must make critical
    resourcing decisions now so that we have the warfighting readiness
    needed for tomorrow. I am perpetually grateful for the support that
    this body has provided our Corps' Force Design initiatives. Every
    dollar invested allows us to realize our modernization strategy and
    build a more ready force--one capable of satisfying the demands of the
    Joint Warfighting Concept and the expectations of our Combatant
    Commanders.
        The Marine Corps will be ready to respond to any crisis or
    contingency in the future, just as we have in the past. However, we
    must use the time we have remaining to ensure that we have the right
    capabilities at the right time and in the right place. The Marine Corps
    will continue to do its part by continuing to maximize every dollar
    invested so that legislators can be confident that we are deliberate
    with the finite resources that are provided to us. We will also remain
    the best stewards of the taxpayers' funds through transparency,
    accountability, and discipline--all evident in our second consecutive
    successful audit opinion. Through the audit's success, we demonstrated
    that the funds provided to us by Congress will be used effectively to
    support our core mission: organize, train, and equip marines.
        The Commandant and I remain committed to ensuring that the Marine
    Corps remains our Nation's force-in-readiness. With your help, we will
    ensure your marines are provided world-class training, improved quality
    of life, and enabled with the capabilities required to fight our
    Nation's battles anywhere, anytime. I thank the Subcommittee for your
    continued advocacy and support of the Naval Services and the Marine
    Corps. Semper Fidelis.

        Senator Hirono. [Presiding.] Thank you, General.
        I call on General Guetlein. Please proceed.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL A. GUETLEIN, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF
             SPACE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

        General Guetlein. Thank you, Chairman Sullivan, Ranking
    Member Hirono, and the distinguished Members of this
    Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to discuss the
    United States Space Force with you and with the American people
    today.
        The Space Force underpins our Nation's capabilities within
    the Joint Force, within our economy, and within the society as
    a whole.
        In our first 5 years of existence we validated the
    importance of the Space Force as a service and made remarkable
    progress in building an agile mission-focused organization that
    grasped the magnitude of the space threat.
        We delivered critical capabilities, developed doctrine, and
    took significant steps to integrate space power into joint
    operations.
        We are now comprised of approximately 15,000 guardians,
    including officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel. We are
    integrated into other DOD components, the intelligence
    community, our allies, and commercial partners, maintaining
    maximum readiness and securing our advantages in space.
        Our military is faster, better connected, more informed,
    precise and lethal based on our ability to harness space. The
    world's use of space is growing at an accelerating rate
    demonstrated by a significant growth in space launches and an
    increase in active spacecraft in orbit.
        As access to and the use of space grows the strategic
    landscape in space is becoming increasingly complex and
    perilous. What were once theoretical threats are now daily
    occurrences.
        I have observed our adversaries' actions and they are
    employing new capabilities to counter our advantages. Our
    competitors are jamming Global Positioning System (GPS)
    signals, spoofing and disrupting satellite communications, and
    developing advanced anti-satellite weapons.
        Unfortunately, this behavior has become the norm rather
    than the exception, creating an increasingly hostile
    environment and putting at risk our continued freedom in the
    space domain.
        To meet these challenges, the Space Force is accelerating
    our transformation as a warfighting service through our theory
    of success called competitive endurance. Competitive endurance
    is the bedrock of our ability to deter and, if necessary,
    defeat our adversaries.
        It deters them from extending conflict into the space
    domain and enables the Joint Force to achieve space superiority
    while preserving the long-term safety, security, and
    sustainability of space.
        This approach ensures we avoid operational surprise, deny
    first mover advantage, and engage in responsible counter space
    campaigning, all of which result in deterring aggression and,
    if necessary, decisively defeating challenges to our way of
    life.
        An essential requirement supporting competitive endurance
    is guardian development. We are focused on purpose built
    training to meet the unique needs of the Space Force.
        Our guardians are dedicated war fighters who understand the
    gravity of the threats that we face. We must ensure that they
    have the necessary training, resources and unwavering
    commitment to continue to face these threats head on.
        Also essential is our continued integration as a critical
    component of the Joint Force in fostering enduring partnerships
    with the commercial sector and our allies around the world.
    Which will allow us to overcome resource constraints and build
    a resilient hybrid space architecture forging the Space Force
    we need.
        At only 3 percent of the DOD budget the Space Force offers
    an immense value proposition for the Joint Force and for our
    Nation.
        However, it is woefully under resourced to meet the
    Nation's demand for space capabilities. We must increase
    investment to deter the threat and if necessary to decisively
    defeat challenges to U.S. space superiority.
        The strategic choices we make today will determine whether
    space remains a domain for peace and progress or becomes a
    contested battleground for future conflict.
        The Space Force is committed to ensuring a future where
    space remains a source of American strength and a foundation
    for global security.
        Achieving this vision requires a shared commitment to
    providing the Space Force with the resources, the authorities,
    and the support necessary to meet the growing challenges of the
    space warfighting domain.
        On behalf of all guardians and their families, thank you
    for your support and commitment to ensuring the United States
    Space Force remains a cornerstone of the Joint Force in
    protecting the American way of life.
        I look forward to working with all of you and I look
    forward to taking your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Guetlein follows:]

               Prepared Statement by General Michael A. Guetlein
                                  introduction
        The United States Space Force underpins our Nation's strength
    within the Joint Force, economy, and society. In our first 5 years, we
    have validated the importance of the Space Force as a stand-alone
    service and made remarkable progress in building an agile, mission-
    focused organization that grasps the magnitude of the threat. We have
    established our identity, developed doctrine, and taken significant
    steps to integrate space power into joint operations. We are now
    comprised of more than 15,000 officers, enlisted, and civilian
    personnel and are integrated with other components, the Intelligence
    Community (IC), allies, and commercial partners, maintaining maximum
    readiness and securing our advantage in space.
        The world's use of space is growing at a phenomenal rate,
    demonstrated by a 488 percent growth of spacecraft launches and 400
    percent increase of active spacecraft in orbit since the establishment
    of the service in 2019. As the access to and use of space grows, the
    strategic landscape in space is becoming increasingly complex and
    perilous, even compared to other warfighting domains.
        Unfortunately, what were once theoretical threats are now daily
    occurrences. I have observed various actors in space maneuvering
    satellites on orbit to monitor our assets, engaging in testing orbital
    warfare capabilities, and employing new tactics to counter our
    advantage. Our competitors are jamming GPS signals, spoofing satellite
    communications, and developing advanced anti-satellite weapons. These
    actions create an increasingly hostile environment for the space
    capabilities essential to our security and prosperity and put at risk
    the continued superiority to which we have become accustomed.
        To meet these challenges, the Space Force must accelerate our
    transformation by embracing a culture of ``Competitive Endurance.''
    This theory of success drives the ability to deter adversaries from
    extending conflict into the space domain, and should deterrence fail,
    enables the Joint Force to achieve space superiority while preserving
    the long-term safety, security, and sustainability of space for
    operational use. This approach prioritizes: 1) deterring attacks
    against U.S. interests; 2) preventing the use of space to attack our
    Homeland or the Joint Force; and 3) avoiding operational surprise.
    Destruction of assets in space can create harmful and long-lasting
    debris that significantly reduce the effectiveness of the Joint Force
    to prevail in conflict and degrades civilian and commercial use of the
    space domain for generations to come. For this reason, the Space
    Force's concept of space superiority seeks to protect U.S. interests
    without jeopardizing the future of the space domain.
        The demand for our capabilities far exceeds our current force
    structure. Achieving our mission will require a focused warrior ethos,
    enhancing deterrence by acquiring the necessary resources and latest
    technology to match our threat and building stronger partnerships with
    the IC, commercial sector, and our allies worldwide.
        Despite being responsible for the largest warfighting domain while
    providing critical capabilities to enhance warfighting in all other
    domains, the Space Force provides this warfighting capability at only 3
    percent of the Department of Defense's budget. We have the smallest
    budget and the smallest force. With the committee's and our partners'
    leadership, we can overcome emerging challenges by leveraging the
    latest technology, acquiring what we need, and developing only what we
    must.
                           evolving threat landscape
        The U.S. faces a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex threat
    landscape in space. Across the globe, nations are aggressively pursuing
    advanced military capabilities, seeking to challenge the established
    balance of power and exploit the space domain for strategic advantage.
    These advancements, coupled with a growing convergence of capabilities
    and intent among potential adversaries, present a significant challenge
    to U.S. interests.
        We are witnessing a proliferation of new technologies and
    operational concepts designed to disrupt, degrade, and deny access to
    our space-based capabilities. Adversary forces are increasingly
    integrating space-enabled capabilities into their operations,
    recognizing the strategic importance of the space domain for command
    and control, intelligence gathering, navigation, and precision strike.
    Alarmingly, the development and deployment of counterspace weapons,
    including a new satellite designed to potentially carry a nuclear
    weapon with that could create long-lasting debris fields, poses an
    unprecedented threat to the safety, security, and sustainability of the
    space environment, society, economy, and the stability of peace.
        Adding to this complexity is the growing convergence of
    capabilities and intent among nations and non-State actors. Strategic
    partnerships, technology transfer, and shared operational concepts are
    creating a more challenging and unpredictable security environment. The
    Space Force must adapt its strategies, policies, and capabilities to
    address this evolving threat landscape and ensure the continued safety,
    security, and sustainability of the space domain for all.
                                   personnel
        The Space Force is committed to building the most agile and capable
    force necessary to meet the evolving demands of the space domain. We
    will remain ahead of strategic competitors by developing guardians with
    a strong warrior ethos, intently focused on the threat. This requires a
    sustained commitment to preparing our force by developing a talent
    management system that optimizes the skills and expertise of our
    guardians. Over the next 5 to 15 years, the Space Force will require
    continued resources to meet the Joint Force's evolving needs.
        Recently enacted legislation with the Space Force Personnel
    Management Act is a critical enabler for growth, allowing the Space
    Force to transfer space missions currently residing in the Air Force
    Reserve. This will result in approximately 300 full-time Reserve space
    professionals transferring into the Space Force in fiscal year 2025,
    with part-time Reserve professionals beginning to transfer in fiscal
    year 2026. As our Service grows, we must also ensure our training
    pipeline can accommodate increased throughput, providing our guardians
    in and out of uniform with the skills and expertise necessary to
    operate in a highly contested and dynamic space environment.
        Additionally, the Space Force is actively building Service
    Components to provide dedicated space capabilities and expertise to the
    Combatant Commands, further increasing our operational footprint.
        The Space Force is committed to optimizing its workforce through
    innovative development programs for officer, enlisted, and civilian
    guardians. We have established clear delineations of roles,
    responsibilities, and duties for each personnel category, ensuring a
    cohesive and efficient force. We have implemented a new integrated
    Officer Training Course (OTC) for officer accessions, focusing on
    space, intelligence, and cyber operations. We are also developing Space
    Force-specific enlisted development programs, incorporating fully
    qualified promotions and codifying our foundational warfighting
    capabilities into our functional career fields. For our civilian
    guardians, we have launched the Guardian Civilian Optimization for
    Space (GCO-S) course, providing a foundational understanding of our
    mission, values, and operations.
        The Space Force is currently exceeding its fiscal year 2025
    recruiting goal and has proudly met its goals every year since
    inception. This success is the product of effectively conveying a
    strong value proposition to young people ready to serve their country.
    Our recruits have continued to boast high Armed Services Vocational
    Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores over the last 5 years, a testament to
    our uncompromising standards.
                            assured access to space
        In an era of rapid technological advancement and evolving security
    threats, the Space Force needs an agile space architecture to
    appropriately address the unpredictable challenges we face. The launch
    complex remains the foundation of our assured access to space. However,
    this access is not a static concept but rather a dynamic and evolving
    necessity. While the Space Force currently utilizes a robust and
    innovative commercial launch market to provide a full spectrum of
    launch services, we recognize the need to continuously adapt our
    approach to address the complexities of an increasingly contested space
    environment.
        To foster innovation and reduce cost, the National Security Space
    Launch (NSSL) program established a dual-lane approach that assures
    access to space for missions that require the highest reliability and
    provides opportunities for emerging launch providers to compete for
    more risk-tolerant missions. The Space Force must continue to diversify
    launch providers, increase launch sites, and invest in range
    facilities, including payload processing capacity, all while actively
    monitoring the launch supply chain.
        Expanding options for launch locations ensures that in the event of
    natural or man-made disasters, access to space is never compromised.
    Creating a more resilient space architecture through proliferation,
    disaggregation, and orbital diversity is a national security
    imperative. By expanding options for Launch Service Providers, we
    reduce our vulnerability to any single point of failure. Further,
    actively fostering a vibrant commercial space sector enhances our
    Nation's economic competitiveness and technological edge, ensuring we
    maintain a robust industrial base capable of supporting our national
    security needs.
                      commercial and allied space strategy
        The Space Force recognizes that partnerships are essential to
    maintaining the competitive edge in space. Therefore, the commercial
    space sector and our allies are not merely an adjunct to national
    security space activities but are fundamental drivers of innovation,
    capability, and capacity. The rapid growth of this sector presents a
    unique opportunity to seamlessly integrate commercial and allied
    capabilities, establishing a hybrid space architecture. A hybrid
    architecture enables military and commercial systems to operate in
    concert, which significantly increases resiliency through added
    capacity, redundancy, and proliferation. This integration is
    foundational to our ability to meet the growing demand for capability
    at a cost we can afford and at the speed required as well as reduce
    vulnerabilities and deny potential adversaries the benefits of
    attacking U.S., allied, and partner space systems. The U.S. Space Force
    Commercial Space Strategy published on 8 April 2024 guides the
    integration of commercial space solutions to leverage American business
    and industrial strength to counter threats to our advantages in space
    and ensure American's get the most of their tax dollars.
        By incorporating commercial solutions, we enhance our existing
    capabilities, such as Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Satellite
    Operations (SATOPS). We can deploy cutting-edge capabilities faster and
    maintain an advantage over our adversaries by utilizing an approach
    that takes advantage of the private sector's ability to deliver
    advanced technology and services more quickly than traditional
    government programs. For example, The VICTUS NOX program demonstrated
    the remarkable agility of the commercial space sector. A satellite was
    transported to the launch site in just 58 hours and was ready for
    launch a mere 27 hours later--fully tested, fueled, and prepared to
    fly. The industry's responsiveness was so swift that they were ready to
    launch even before favorable conditions on Earth allowed.
        The commercial sector offers solutions to enhance our capacity,
    resilience, and responsiveness in each area. We will prioritize the
    integration of commercial solutions in key mission areas such as
    SATCOM, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), Space Access, Mobility and
    Logistics (SAML), Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking
    (TacSRT), and Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM), to name a
    few. The Space Force is committed to fostering a strong and enduring
    relationship with the commercial space sector. We will prioritize
    transparency, streamline our acquisition processes, and work
    collaboratively with industry to ensure their success is inextricably
    linked to ours.
        The Space Force is also committed to become ``allied by design,''
    leveraging the strengths of our allies and coalition partners. This
    commitment extends to all phases of our organize, train, and equip
    (OT&E) activities, fostering collaboration from the earliest stages of
    concept development to the execution of combined operations. This new
    approach prioritizes burden and cost sharing, opening up options to
    fight more effectively today and fight differently in the future.
        We will move beyond outdated paradigms and embrace a new era of
    partnership, characterized by cooperative capability development,
    enhanced interoperability, and expanded operational cooperation. This
    means actively pursuing joint capability development initiatives,
    sharing expertise, pooling resources, and accelerating the fielding of
    critical space capabilities. We will review data sharing agreements and
    security paradigms, prioritizing the development of scalable
    architectures and open standards that enable seamless integration of
    allied and partner systems while ensuring compliance with statute and
    policy.
        Furthermore, we will deepen operational coordination and liaison
    with our allies, conducting joint exercises, sharing space situational
    awareness data, and ensuring a unified response to threats in space. We
    will actively support the development of our allies' space capabilities
    through professional education and training programs, technology
    transfer initiatives, and collaborative research and development
    efforts. Transitioning to a hybrid space architecture including
    commercial and allied partners enables us to leverage a more resilient
    and robust space enterprise.
                  operational test and training infrastructure
        To ensure our continued superiority in space, our guardians must be
    the best-trained, best-equipped, and the most prepared space
    warfighters on the planet. Achieving this goal necessitates the use of
    realistic and challenging training environments that authentically
    mirror the complexities of modern battlespaces. Our Operational Test
    and Training Infrastructure (OTTI) has been meticulously crafted to
    fulfill this vital mission.
        OTTI is more than a single program or facility; it is an extensive,
    enterprise-wide framework integrating live and synthetic training
    systems and processes. It includes dynamic live training ranges,
    sophisticated modeling and simulation tools, simulated adversary
    forces, and secure networks. Each component synergistically combines to
    forge a holistic and immersive training environment that effectively
    spans the entire spectrum of potential conflict.
        Central to the OTTI is the National Space Test and Training Complex
    (NSTTC). This state-of-the-art facility will endow our guardians with
    unparalleled training capabilities across a myriad of domains, such as
    orbital, electromagnetic, cyber, and digital environments. This
    sophisticated complex will enable us to realistically simulate the
    myriad of threats our guardians might face, preparing the Joint Force
    for the current and future complexities of warfare.
                      missile warning and missile defense
        The Space Force is steadfastly committed to safeguarding our
    Homeland and allies against increasingly sophisticated missile threats
    through a comprehensive and integrated missile defense strategy.
    Avoiding operational surprise requires the Space Force to maintain
    constant awareness of the battlespace, supplemented by a robust
    capability to produce indications and warnings accurately. This
    foundational principle recognizes that the initial step in missile
    warning and defense is the ability to detect and track threats;
    effectively, one cannot neutralize an undetectable threat. We are
    leveraging our existing space-based assets while simultaneously
    developing new capabilities to adapt to the evolving threat landscape.
        Therefore, we must deploy advanced maneuverable satellites with
    state-of-the-art sensors. This technology combines optics and
    electronics to detect, track, and identify targets. This emphasis
    aligns with USSPACECOM's urgent operational needs to enable agile space
    operations and establish sophisticated space systems capable of
    sustained maneuverability.
        When Iran launched over 300 missiles and drones at Israel in April
    and October 2024, it was the Space Force that provided the first line
    of defense. guardians, operating missile warning systems, detected the
    launches in real-time, providing critical early warning data that
    enabled United States, Israeli, and allied forces to intercept many of
    the incoming threats. Crews of guardians worked tirelessly, analyzing
    data, validating tracks, and relaying information to those in harm's
    way--all within a matter of minutes. Their efforts were instrumental in
    minimizing casualties and damage.
        Iran's recent missile attacks against Israel underscore the
    critical importance of space-based missile warning and the need for
    continued investment in advanced detection capabilities. The Space
    Force's ability to provide timely and accurate warning data is
    essential not only for Homeland Defense but also for enabling the Joint
    Force's ability to effectively respond to threats. Investing in
    maneuverable satellites equipped with state-of-the-art sensors will
    enhance our ability to detect and track emerging threats, ensuring we
    can maintain constant awareness of the battlespace, provide timely
    warnings, and ultimately, deny our adversaries the element of surprise.
    These capabilities assist to deliver on the Presidents Golden Dome for
    America Initiative and highlight the central role space-based
    capabilities will play in bringing that effort to fruition.
                          service component activation
        The Space Force has activated seven Service Components within
    Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to seamlessly integrate space power into
    joint military operations. These component field commands (C-FLDCOMs),
    led by a Commander, Space Forces (COMSPACEFOR), serve as the primary
    mechanism for providing combatant commanders (CCDRs) with dedicated
    space expertise, ensuring space effects are fully integrated into joint
    plans and operations.
        These Service Components are fundamental building blocks of the
    Joint Force, serving as the CCMD's dedicated subordinate command
    focused solely on the space domain. COMSPACEFOR provides the CCDR with
    direct access to space expertise, ensuring they are fully informed of
    all Space Force issues, activities, and capabilities relevant to their
    warfighting priorities, requirements, and resources.
                          ground-based infrastructure
        The Space Force relies heavily on its facilities and infrastructure
    to execute its missions. FSRM priorities include essential upgrades to
    power systems, electrical systems, heating and cooling, water systems,
    fire suppression, roofs, and dormitories. MILCON priorities focus on
    increasing capacity and reducing risk to the mission, with an emphasis
    on mission beddown, energy resilience, assured access to space,
    security improvements, and supporting Combatant Command requirements in
    the Indo-Pacific and in defense of the Homeland.
        However, the MILCON and FSRM portfolio faces significant repair
    backlog and deferred maintenance challenges, posing a growing risk to
    our operational readiness. We remain committed to sustaining existing
    infrastructure and improving the quality of life for our guardians,
    airmen, and their families.
                                   conclusion
        The Space Force has proven vital to safeguarding our Nation in its
    first 5 years. We deliver effects that increase Joint Force lethality
    and effectiveness; as well as forces designed to protect the Joint
    Force from space-enabled attack. Space Superiority is an indispensable
    prerequisite to the success of the Joint Force. However, the Space
    Force must grow to continue to contest and win against our adversaries.
        We must continue investing in transforming our force from our
    current posture to a dominant warfighting force capable of deterring
    and, if necessary, defeating our adversaries. We must prioritize
    essential modernization and timely and predictable funding is crucial
    to avoid delays in fielding critical capabilities.
        Competitive Endurance is the bedrock for the ability to deter, and
    if necessary, defeat adversaries, preventing them from extending
    conflict into the space domain and enabling the Joint Force to achieve
    space superiority while preserving the long-term safety, security, and
    sustainability of space for continued operational use and freedom of
    maneuver. Continued integration into the Joint Force and establishing
    enduring partnerships with the commercial sector and our allies around
    the world will allow us to overcome resource constraints and build a
    resilient, hybrid space architecture forging the Competitive Endurance
    we need.
        Guardian development is an essential requirement for Competitive
    Endurance and our culture must be purpose-built to meet the unique
    needs of the Space Force. Our guardians are dedicated professionals who
    understand the gravity of the threats we face. We must ensure they have
    the training, resources, and unwavering commitment necessary to
    continue to serve and face these threats head-on.
        The strategic choices we make today may shape whether space remains
    a safe for peaceful use and progress or becomes a battleground for
    future conflict. The Space Force is committed to ensuring a future
    where space remains a source of American strength and a foundation for
    global security. However, achieving this vision requires a shared
    commitment to providing the Space Force with the resources and support
    necessary to meet the growing challenges of the space domain.

        Senator Sullivan. [Presiding.] Thank you, General.
        Lieutenant General Spain?

      STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ADRIAN SPAIN, AIR FORCE DCS
                               OPERATIONS

        Lieutenant General Spain. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member
    Hirono, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity this hearing provides to talk about the elements of
    readiness for the Air Force. The four primary pillars being
    parts and supply, people, flying and training, and current
    infrastructure.
        To these I would add elements for future readiness,
    rebuilding acquisitions, long-term sustainment, and recruiting
    and retention at a relevant pace and scale, all in a way that
    reflects our shared purpose.
        Senators, I can confidently State that your United States
    Air Force stands ready and able to defend America's Homeland,
    ensure a robust nuclear deterrent via our two legs of the
    triad, and project power around the world to deter and win as
    the Nation requires.
        It is our solemn duty and your airmen are ready. It is also
    a fact that today's airmen will do so with the oldest
    airplanes, the smallest force, and with fewer monthly flying
    hours than at any point in our history.
        Airmen have and always will get the job done but today they
    do so at elevated risk. Meanwhile, China's military forces are
    expanding and modernizing. Their nuclear modernization, long-
    range missile proliferation, and recent test flights of two
    six-gen aircraft is simply further evidence of the elevated
    threat in this strategic environment.
        Conflict is certainly not desirable nor is it inevitable.
    It is our responsibility to be prepared should diplomacy or
    deterrence fail.
        Often, we have focused on the individual elements of
    readiness and not how they must be synchronized to create a
    warfighting capability over time. Even in this hearing, we will
    likely talk about individual programs and individual projects,
    all of which are very important.
        But the previous strategic environment, mostly permissive
    and without a significant challenger, allowed us the luxury of
    segmented attention, priority, and risk. Today's strategic
    environment does not.
        Today's readiness requires a synchronized approach. The
    right parts and the right maintainers and the right support
    infrastructure and the right qualified air crew and all in the
    right balance and, not or.
        Many of our past decisions were appropriate given the
    previous strategic environment but no longer. So we have taken
    deliberate steps to see this for what it is and do something
    about it.
        We have specifically prioritized parts and supply in
    applying our program. We have also reconnected our manpower and
    infrastructure priorities directly to our core readiness
    outcomes in both our processes and our data.
        It is our intent to maintain focus and priority on these
    pillars to strengthen our readiness and improve our lethality
    and we are moving out.
        I am grateful for this Committee and the broader Congress'
    support and look forward to working with you to deliberately
    improve our current and future readiness posture and undeniably
    retain our position as the world's greatest Air Force.
        With respect to the CR, without anomalies the CR clearly
    has impact on our readiness up to the tune of about $4 billion.
        Anomalies, without anomalies and with the Fiscal
    Responsibility Act kicking in, it is closer to $14 billion
    which we cannot afford.
        However, we expect and look forward to the final version of
    this CR if it were to pass with flexibility and agility and
    anomalies to spend as required to retain readiness to the
    maximum possible level.
        Thank you, and look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Adrian Spain
    follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Adrian Spain
                                  introduction
        Today's Air Force is the oldest and smallest it has ever been.
    However, some go further to State that today's Air Force is the ``least
    ready'' it has ever been. This last statement is far from the truth.
    While we still face serious challenges across our force, I can
    confidently State that your United States Air Force stands ready to
    defend our Nation and its interests, at home and abroad. If called to
    fight, we will do so effectively alongside our joint and coalition
    partners, and we will win.
        Any discussion of readiness must begin by considering the variables
    of assets, requirements, and risk within the context of the strategic
    environment. These variables act like the sides of a triangle in
    constant tension with each other; when one side is manipulated, the
    other sides are inevitably affected. We optimize readiness when we
    adequately support our forces to accomplish their required missions
    within an acceptable level of risk while considering the threats we
    face. In a permissive environment, under-resourcing immediate readiness
    is tolerable because the overall risk is comparatively low. However, in
    today's strategic environment, shortcomings in immediate readiness
    reduces our ability to deter our adversaries, increasing the
    possibility of a damaging and costly conflict. Today, our Nation finds
    itself in a strategic competition with China. The People's Liberation
    Army is expanding, modernizing, and diversifying its entire military--
    including cyber, space, and nuclear forces--at a rapid pace to support
    revisionist goals and objectives. These developments pose unique and
    fundamentally new challenges for deterrence, and while conflict is
    certainly not inevitable, the risk of military confrontation is
    increased in this environment.
        In light of this reality, the Nation faces a decision about what
    kind of Air Force it wants. We are, and have been, built to fight the
    conflicts of the past, yet the new strategic environment demands that
    we rebuild the lethal and ready force we need to compete and win. The
    readiness challenge confronting us lies in creating the force we need
    for tomorrow while not neglecting deterrence and readiness today. While
    generating readiness for today and modernization for tomorrow will be
    an ongoing challenge, it will be much more difficult to fight a war
    with a peer because deterrence failed.
        The following pages will detail the U.S. Air Force's efforts to
    bridge this gap--remaining ready to answer its nation's call today
    while preparing for future conflicts. This statement focuses on three
    broad categories of readiness. First, the foundational accounts that
    drive immediate-term readiness--being prepared to fight today. Next,
    the near to medium-term modernization efforts and their impacts on the
    Air Force's readiness for sustained competition against our pacing
    challenge--being prepared to fight tomorrow. Finally, the
    infrastructure and other long-term readiness concerns we must fund now
    to create sustained readiness over time--being prepared to fight well
    into the future.
                foundational accounts: immediate-term readiness
        The foundation for readiness in the U.S. Air Force is realistic
    training to prepare airmen for wartime operations. To do this, we need
    the right number of people with the right skills, the right amount of
    equipment in the right condition, and the right amount of non-deployed
    time at home station. These ``readiness levers''--people, equipment,
    training, and operations--are used simultaneously to influence our
    immediate-term readiness. They must be manipulated in concert with each
    other, with consideration to how each factor influences the others and
    the time delays inherent in each. The spin-up time to bring in and
    train additional personnel can take years, and Weapons System
    Sustainment improvements often take months to years to bear fruit. If
    training is increased without prior development of people and Weapons
    System Sustainment, that increase is less productive than hoped, as too
    few people attempt to fly too many sorties on systems that are too old
    and too poorly supported. Similarly, if these cycles are disrupted, the
    process loses momentum, and years of gains can be squandered.
    Therefore, the goal of foundational readiness is to support our people,
    equipment, and training at consistently adequate levels to sustain
    required operations over time. Today's Air Force maintains a high level
    of core tactical readiness, but a gap has opened between our
    requirements and our ability to meet those requirements. Decades of
    overtasking have put these readiness levers out of balance and
    threatened the viability of our force. Decreased manning and experience
    levels coupled with sustained high workloads have created a negative
    feedback loop on both our people and equipment. We must break that
    cycle.
        The Air Force's lethality is grounded in the proficiency, capacity,
    and skill of its airmen. The Air Force's recruiting and retention
    efforts are sufficient to meet our congressionally mandated end
    strength. Recruitment for the Air Force remains strong, with the Active
    component meeting its accession goals for four of the past 5 years.
    Though there was a dip in recruiting in fiscal year 2023, the Air Force
    successfully closed the gap in fiscal year 2024 due to increased
    recruiter manning, changes to training processes, and an increase in
    the Delayed Entry Program to its highest level in 10 years. Retention
    has been similarly on target, enabling the Air Force to maintain its
    mandated end strength. Critical pockets of the force, however, are less
    healthy. Maintenance manpower has emerged as an acute issue in the last
    several years. A shortfall of over 9,700 maintainers has opened across
    the total force--ten percent of the total maintenance manpower
    requirement. The manpower shortfall both reduces current aircraft
    availability and creates retention problems as the remaining workforce
    must put in extra hours to account for the missing maintainers.
    Likewise, aircrew shortfalls remain a persistent issue. While many of
    our initiatives to reverse the decline in aircrew manning are beginning
    to take effect, we expect manning to continue to decline until
    approximately the end of fiscal year 2026. After that point, we expect
    capacity increases in our pilot training pipeline to take effect and
    begin to reduce the shortfall.
        Beyond accessions and retention, however, there is a more
    pernicious personnel issue facing the Air Force: the misallocation of
    personnel, particularly when planned Air Force divestments are later
    prohibited or limited. When the Air Force programs force structure
    divestments--often two or more years ahead of time--it also re-programs
    the end strength associated with those divestments. That does not mean
    that the Air Force separates the maintainers, pilots, or flight
    engineers associated with the divested platform; rather, the Air Force
    re-allocates those personnel to a different requirement. For example,
    A-10 pilots may be retrained to fly the F-35, and F-22 maintainers may
    be trained to work on the F-35. When those force structure divestments
    are canceled late in the process, the manpower requirement is
    disrupted. Therefore, when an F-22 squadron's divestment is canceled,
    it may well cause an F-35 maintenance unit to suffer personnel
    shortfalls. The Air Force is a large enterprise and can absorb many of
    these shocks, but compounding divestment restrictions over many years
    have added up and contributed to significant personnel shortfalls.
    Predictable force structure changes over time are critical for ensuring
    maximum utilization of our airmen and readiness of our capabilities.
        While we invest in our people, we must simultaneously invest in our
    equipment, creating a holistic approach to increasing weapon systems
    and parts availability. Many ingredients come together to generate
    aircraft--trained and ready maintainers, mission-capable aircraft,
    adequate spare parts, and serviceable repair facilities are some of the
    most significant. The Air Force constantly manages these elements, but
    since 2020, they have been knocked out of balance, pushing aircraft
    availability rates steadily downward. First, inflation and labor
    shortages have deeply cut into the purchasing power of all aspects of
    sustainment. Second, aging aircraft have begun to systematically fail
    in an expensive, difficult-to-predict, and difficult-to-repair manner.
    These two factors combine to push Weapons System Sustainment
    requirements steadily higher, with a nearly 20 percent increase in
    Weapons System Sustainment requirements in the last 5 years. Despite
    that increased requirement, an undermined industrial base has led to
    curtailing parts supply and driving costs even higher for what remains.
    The 50 percent increase in the non-mission capable rate for supply
    since 2019 (from 11 to 17 percent, on average) indicates the severity
    of the issue. That increase translates to roughly 340 additional
    aircraft--equivalent in number to all the fighter and attack aircraft
    assigned to Pacific Air Forces--sitting on the ramp every day, waiting
    for spare parts.
        Our training faces similarly significant challenges. Training takes
    many different shapes throughout our Air Force, but flight training
    funded by the Flying Hour Program (FHP) is one of the most meaningful
    indicators, especially since many functional training areas ultimately
    support flying missions. By assessing the health of flight training, we
    gain insight into the overall State of Air Force immediate readiness.
    For this reason, it is alarming to see a negative trend in the health
    of our flight training. Since 2020, aircrew have flown less than the
    required number of hours to properly build experience, and the gap
    between required and flown is forecasted to grow in the coming years.
    For the last several years, the FHP has been set to executable levels
    rather than the levels needed for aircrew seasoning and combat
    readiness. As our ability to execute programmed flying hours decreases,
    we set the bar lower and lower every year. Ultimately, the FHP does not
    provide all the inputs required to conduct flying training, and many
    have become increasingly out of balance in recent years. Those inputs
    include aircrew manning, maintainer manning and skill levels, spares
    availability, aircraft age, and a continually and increasingly high
    operational requirement from the combatant commanders. Inflation also
    eats away at the buying power of the FHP over time. Closing the flying
    hour gap will require a rebalance of these inputs holistically--not
    just an increase to the FHP. In particular, the Air Force needs the
    right trained personnel and spares availability sustained over time.
    Proper training is the result of matching the right people with the
    right equipment, and each lever of readiness must be properly sequenced
    to ultimately boost readiness.
                  modernization: near-to-medium-term readiness
        During the Global War on Terror, the Nation consistently
    prioritized extending the lives of older systems because it was the
    most cost-effective way to meet the needs of the combatant commanders
    at the time. We preferred systems with long endurance and high
    availability over more exquisite systems. The MQ-9, MC-12, A-10, and
    KC-135 fleets, among others, were all sustained or expanded despite
    significant budgetary pressures. Recapitalization was often curtailed
    or elongated as a cost-saving measure to pay for decades of heavy
    demand in Southwest Asia. To sustain readiness across the near to
    medium term, we must break from this mindset. We must build an Air
    Force specifically designed to counter our most pressing threats today
    and in the future, not the threats of the past.
        Moving forward, our modernization construct seeks to adapt to the
    rapidly changing character of war. We must divest legacy systems that
    are ineffective against high-end threats and inefficient against low-
    end threats. For 20 years in Afghanistan, the total cost of the stack
    of aircraft above troops in contact would often exceed $150,000 per
    flying hour, far more than any individual modern platform. Those same
    aircraft, each designed with niche capabilities often dating to the
    last years of the cold war, would stand little chance of prevailing
    against a Chinese threat in the Western Pacific. Instead of relying on
    these expensive older capabilities, the Air Force must continue its
    modernization push and realize both the cost and effectiveness gains
    from new mixes of equipment. This modernization imperative goes beyond
    the procurement of platforms. Though Collaborative Combat Aircraft, B-
    21s, or F-35s will allow us unparalleled access, connectivity, and
    survivability, platforms are only one link in the long-range kill
    chain. Other critical links include advanced munitions, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, cyber forces,
    communication platforms, battle management, electromagnetic warfare
    platforms, tankers, resiliency, and other elements of a family of
    systems that support a weapon getting to its target. Each of these
    links extends the kill chain and increases its resilience to enemy
    action. Development and procurement of munitions and other supporting
    systems must be a top priority to ensure conventional lethality.
    Finally, the Air Force remains fully committed to a robust and credible
    nuclear deterrent. The Air Force's full-scope nuclear modernization
    program--to include the E-4C Survivable Air Operations Center, Sentinel
    intercontinental ballistic missile, the B-21 Raider family of systems,
    the Long Range Stand Off cruise missile, and a modernized B-52--
    recapitalizes all current systems and supporting infrastructure whose
    life cannot be extended to deliver modern and credible deterrence
    capabilities. This is particularly true of the ballistic missile leg of
    the nuclear triad. Despite the restructuring of the Sentinel program
    following the recent Nunn-McCurdy breach, it remains the best path
    forward to ensure the United States maintains the most responsive leg
    of the nuclear triad.
        The Air Force must, however, balance modernization against
    foundational readiness accounts to optimally distribute risk over time.
    Investing too heavily in readiness today risks disrupting or
    eliminating necessary modernization--eating the seed corn of tomorrow.
    On the other hand, too heavy an investment in modernization starves
    foundational readiness accounts, reducing the deterrent value of the
    current force and risking a readiness tailspin that would be difficult
    to recover from. Over the last few years, we have prioritized
    modernization at the cost of immediate readiness. In the coming years,
    we will need to constantly evaluate the balance between immediate and
    near-to-medium-term readiness as the strategic environment continues to
    evolve.
                      infrastructure: long-term readiness
        As the Air Force continues to focus balancing available resources
    against the current strategic environment and across the different time
    horizons, our infrastructure requires careful re-examination to ensure
    it is both resilient and efficient. Years of competing priorities have
    eroded the Air Force's ability to maintain its infrastructure across
    the globe. Simultaneously, air bases are threatened in ways not seen in
    modern history. the Air Force's Installation Infrastructure Action
    Plan, released in November 2024, details actions we intend to take to
    resolve some of these issues,
        Air base resiliency has proven to be increasingly important as
    adversary long-range precision attack capabilities have rapidly
    improved. Particularly in the Indo-Pacific, China has spent decades
    building a deep magazine of advanced cruise and ballistic missiles
    specifically to threaten U.S. force presence in the region. In
    response, the Air Force has spent considerable time, energy, and
    resources to develop an Agile Combat Employment (ACE) scheme of
    maneuver, emphasizing rapid mobility and force dispersal in the region.
    ACE complicates the adversary's wartime calculus and denies them the
    lucrative targeting opportunities that known, fixed, and thinly
    protected locations provide. Additionally, the Air Force, in
    collaboration with our Joint partners, is actively seeking measures to
    improve air base air defense capabilities. The successful defense of
    Israel against several Iranian missile and UAS attacks in 2024 and the
    Houthi attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea paint a stark
    picture of the need for robust defense against airborne threats as well
    as increased capacity to restore our bases after attack. Those
    incidents also emphasize the level of resources required for an
    effective defense, with airborne, space-based, ground-based, maritime-
    based, and international assets all participating in defense activity.
    Air Force defensive capabilities must also include additional
    capabilities to counter small drones. In recent congressional
    testimony, the NORTHCOM commander noted the continued incursions of
    civilian drones into controlled airspace at several Air Force bases in
    2024, highlighting the problem's pervasiveness. The capability to
    detect and intercept unmanned aerial systems in peacetime equates
    directly to our readiness and ability to respond to enemy aerial
    incursions in wartime.
        The Air Force currently carries significant excess infrastructure
    across the board, along with a $49.5 billion maintenance backlog that
    continues to grow. Since 1990, the Air Force has reduced in size
    considerably, including a 40 percent reduction in end strength and a 60
    percent reduction in fighter squadrons, but it has only reduced its
    CONUS footprint by 15 percent. Moreover, today, roughly half of all
    infrastructure across the Air Force is in a moderate or high-risk
    condition. While the Air Force has been able to prioritize its
    resources to keep critical mission generation infrastructure (e.g.,
    runways) in good working order, such prioritization has come at the
    expense of our supporting infrastructure. For example, over 70 percent
    of utility infrastructure on Air Force bases in the Indo-Pacific are in
    a high-risk condition, a problem made acute by the highly corrosive
    tropical or arctic environments of many facilities and by limited
    skilled local labor. Meanwhile, our buying power has eroded, with
    construction costs rising roughly 50 percent in the last 10 years. The
    Air Force acknowledges the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA section 2680
    requirement to fund infrastructure investment at 4 percent of plant
    replacement value by fiscal year 2030 and is moving out with a number
    of initiatives outlined in our Installation Infrastructure Action Plan.
    However, we will struggle to meet this requirement in full without
    support for reductions in inventory.
                                   conclusion
        We are in a race to maintain our position as the world's preeminent
    Air Force. The United States faces a competitor whose national
    purchasing power exceeds our own and is actively developing a force to
    counter America's air and maritime competitive advantages. Conflict is
    not inevitable--we must seek to prevent it through readiness. We must
    ensure that readiness is optimized across time, with proper
    consideration to both immediate-term foundational readiness, but also
    to medium-term modernization, and long-term infrastructure concerns.
    Only by solving the readiness equation across all three time horizons
    can we underwrite the Nation's security and prosperity in the decades
    ahead. The Air Force appreciates the continued support of our Congress,
    and I look forward to working with the Members of this Committee to
    create the momentum needed to address these challenges.

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General, for your very frank
    testimony. I very much appreciate that.
        Finally, Ms. Maurer from the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO), thank you for your great work on many issues.

     STATEMENT OF DIANA C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
            AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Maurer. All right. Well, good morning, Chairman
    Sullivan, Ranking Member Hirono, and other Members.
        [Technical issue.]
        Ms. Maurer.--here today to discuss GAO's recommendations to
    help the military address long-standing readiness challenges
    that span several Administrations.
        I would like to in particular highlight three cross cutting
    challenges that we continue to find across the services.
        First, DOD faces growing gaps between mission and
    resources. In many areas the services assume risk because of
    imbalances between what they have been tasked to do and the
    people, parts, and facilities they have----
        [Technical issue.]
        Ms. Maurer.--Pentagon needs to focus more on sustainment.
    Buying new systems is just the beginning. Ensuring combat-ready
    units can operate and sustain those systems is the hard part,
    and all too often a host of sustainment problems means planes,
    ships, and vehicles are not available when needed.
        And third, DOD's ability to move and support forces lags
    behind operational needs. The services face potential
    adversaries who will contest the movement of people, material
    and information.
        DOD needs to adapt its decades-long reliance on uncontested
    logistics, just in time distribution----
        [Technical issue.]
        Ms. Maurer. My written statement summarizes reports with
    over 100 recommendations to help address these challenges.
        So, for example, the Navy needs an industrial based
    strategy to help get better results from the private companies
    that repair and build ships. The Army should ensure units have
    the necessary training, facilities, and support before fielding
    new equipment.
        The Space Force needs to refine its plans for training and
    exercising its squadrons. The Navy should coordinate with the
    Marine Corps to fix amphibious ships and reach agreement on
    what it means for a ship to be available.
        DOD should decide when and how various services will assume
    sustainment responsibilities for missile defense systems. For
    the F-35 program DOD needs to reassess the balance of
    sustainment responsibilities between contractors, services, and
    ensure maintainers have access to the technical data they need
    to meet operational mission needs.
        GAO's recommendations will help improve military readiness
    and that is the heart of what we do at GAO. We help improve the
    Government.
        Now, we are currently in the midst of a vigorous national
    debate about improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the
    Federal Government.
        GAO's independent nonpartisan role in the legislative
    branch is as important now as it has ever been. We will
    continue to provide facts, analyses, and recommendations to
    this Committee and to all 535 Members so you can execute your
    congressional oversight of executive branch programs and
    activities.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning and I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Diana C. Maurer follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Maurer, and I agree with
    you that you guys do excellent work.
        I recently had the opportunity to highlight your work on
    the Navy industrial base issues to our incoming Secretary of
    the Navy, and I think that was a excellent report.
        So I am going to begin with just a line of questions. By
    the way, it is great to have our Chairman of the Full Committee
    here. Shows the importance of this Subcommittee and the topics
    we are tackling today.
        I will begin my questioning for all six witnesses so please
    try to be brief. It is going to focus on bad news, good news,
    and flexibility.
        So what do I mean? You have already touched on it, General
    Spain. You did a good job. The CR, right? I think from a
    readiness standpoint none of us think this is helpful.
        What would be worse, in my view, is a Government shutdown.
    So the impact of the CR and then, very importantly, and General
    Mingus, you and I had the opportunity to talk about this
    yesterday. Flexibilities that you would like us to provide you
    in the future, NDAAs on budgeting, that is a topic that when we
    deal with these CRs. Unfortunately, it has been a way of life
    for our military for many years. It is a failure on the part of
    Congress.
        But what kind of flexibilities do you need to be more ready
    that you could use? And this could be very broad or very
    specific.
        Then the good news, very quickly, we have had a turnaround
    in recruiting. I think it has a lot to do with some of the
    comments I made in my opening statement. Where the last 4 years
    our military was not focused on lethality and warfighting, and
    why young men and women join to fight and defend their country
    was focused on other stuff, irrelevant stuff, and it hurt
    recruiting.
        Where are you on recruiting and why do you think there has
    been such a dramatic turnaround?
        So those are the questions I would like each of you to
    answer. We will start in the lineup here.
        General Mingus, if you can hit on all three of those.
        General Mingus. Thank you, Chairman.
        A full year-long continuing resolution impact, yes, to the
    degree and the severity is unknown as was kind of talked about
    earlier.
        Based on the anomalies that come out of this, the puts and
    takes in the various lines in the budget, what is plussed up
    and not we will have to take a couple of days to kind of
    fully--if it is actually enacted before the end of the week the
    true impact.
        But new starts, spending limits, spending power and buying
    power, those are critically the ones that always rise to the
    top and we have never had a yearlong continuing resolution.
    This it will the first for the Department of Defense.
        So a lot to be determined in terms of what those impacts
    are going to be.
        Flexibility sir, you and I talked about this last night. We
    all submit a justification book (J-book) and a budget almost 18
    to 20 months before we actually see an enactment in an
    appropriation. A lot can happen in that 18 to 20 months.
        Every line of accounting, every piece of equipment, every
    radio, has its own individual line within the J-books that come
    back in our budget line items on the back end of
    appropriations.
        For high-tech things, UAS, counter UAS, high-tech command
    and control systems that evolve at a rate faster than our
    budget cycle. We would like to compress those lines to allow us
    to move in year of execution those moneys to new things that
    come online in year of execution.
        Senator Sullivan. If you can work with us, all the services
    with regard to language on those kind of flexibilities are
    really important, I think needed, and something that we could
    work on to get in the NDAA.
        General Mingus. Sir, and I yield my time to the others
    because I went pretty deep in recruiting.
        Senator Sullivan. Just for the Committee's sake, real quick
    here. I mean, we talked about it but just for the on the record
    I think it is important for lessons learned on recruiting.
        General Mingus. Who you recruit, where you recruit, how we
    recruit, more professionalization of our recruiting force,
    expanding the population. All those things that we have been
    working for the last 18 to 24 months we believe are coming to
    fruition this year.
        We have seen momentum unlike we have seen in probably a
    decade. We are at 50 percent ahead of where we were last year,
    73 percent of mission. So as I said in my opening statement,
    just over 44,000 of a mission of 61,000.
        I think as you and I talked last night, we are going to
    have the opposite problem we did a couple years ago where come
    this summer we may have an end strength that is actually bigger
    than what we have an appropriations for.
        Senator Sullivan. Maybe we can work on that.
        Admiral, and, again, I will yield time back. These are
    important questions but we will get through all of them.
        Go ahead, Admiral.
        Admiral Kilby. Sure. Hey, two big buckets. One, the CR.
    Major impact on us. We have gotten used to partial CRs. As
    General Mingus says, this is our first full year CR so we will
    have to figure that out, and we are looking forward to
    flexibility, anomalies, authorities, to address the kind of
    things that General Mingus talked about.
        Let me just use one specific example. Two years ago,
    probably a little more than 2 years ago, we were thinking about
    counter UAS. We were not thinking about counter UAS from the
    perspective that we have grown to appreciate in the Red Sea.
        So the ability to turn quickly and use money and have the
    flexibility to address those things, as we are trying to do
    with the forward strike group where we are bolting on systems
    that are more effective for counter UAS like Coyote and Road
    Runner. Those are all appreciated and hard to do in a CR.
        So I give you that piece, the flexibilities and for us to
    work through it. There is a merge with the next topic, which is
    recruiting. We have made some progress in the Navy as the other
    services have.
        We have stormed the problem. We understand, and you and I
    went over, and Ranking Member Hirono and I discussed what we
    did in the Navy to break down the problem and understand what
    it takes to make a productive recruiter.
        So I think there is renewed focus and clarity on that. We
    have done the things General Mingus has described where we have
    spread to zip codes to get every available person into the Navy
    and we are ahead of goal.
        Right now our projection was 12,000 contracted. We have
    contracted 14,000. We were supposed to have 12,200 shipped. We
    have shipped 12,700. So we are ahead of goal.
        I am very concerned about the CR and the impact on that
    machine and slowing it down. So for us we want to maintain
    course and speed, accelerate and bring in all the people we
    need to close down our gaps at sea. CR makes that a little more
    challenging.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. I am going to yield back to
    Senator Hirono. I will get through this line of questioning.
        I do want to do a recognition, Admiral, to the sailors and
    marines who have been deploying all over the world and in the
    Red Sea in particular, you know, remarkable performance in
    terms of shooting down all the incoming missiles and drones at
    your ships.
        My understanding it is the most combat that the Navy has
    undertaken in terms of serious missile threats to our ships
    since World War II and you have done it incredibly well.
        So to all the sailors and marines on those deployed ships
    for the great job they have done, thank you from the
        entire U.S. Senate.
        Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I get that a full year CR is going to present some very
    unique challenges for all of our services including our Space
    Force. So we will do what we can to help you all.
        Admiral Kilby, I recognize the need to build a larger
    fleet. However, I have significant concerns about the Navy's
    basically dismal track record of maintaining ships and
    submarines in the current fleet.
        We consistently see delays, increased costs, ships without
    adequate crew, a lack of spare parts, and other issues.
        General Mahoney, it seems clear that maintaining amphibious
    ships is not a top Navy priority and I do understand Ms. Maurer
    said that the Navy and the Marine Corps need to come to an
    agreement on how these amphibious ships will be maintained.
        But how do delays in the Marine Corps' amphibious ship
    maintenance impact your ability to train and deploy marines and
    how would you be better supported by and how could you be
    better supported by the Navy?
        General Mahoney. Senator, thank you for the question.
        We are very concerned with the condition of the amphibious
    fleet and the availability of the amphibious fleet. As of this
    morning, I check it every morning, there were 13 of 32
    amphibious ships available. In order to get to a goal of 3.0
    MEUs, that is heel to toe MEUs, combined with our amphibious
    shipping off the East Coast--one off the East Coast, one off
    the West Coast, and one in the Forward Deployed Naval Forces
    (FDNF). That number is not going to do it.
        I look at it in short, medium and kind of longer term,
    perhaps, solution sets, and we are working closely with the
    Navy. Of course, we have to get to terms of reference.
        We cannot classify a ship that has not sailed in 10 years
    and probably never will sail as an available ship of any class,
    much less an amphib.
        What I would say is we need to resource amphibious shipping
    to make it to their service lives and not decommission them
    early.
        Second, we have to get ahead of the maintenance curve. That
    means years ahead of port loading, of availability sequences,
    getting the avails in on time, making sure that we have the
    parts and the maintenance crews to maintain them and get them
    out of the avails on time.
        More toward the midterm, we need to make every ship count
    with service life extensions and midlife upgrades.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I am sorry to interrupt but I
    think that your needs are being clearly articulated, and as Ms.
    Maurer suggested, it sounds like a good suggestion to me, that
    the Navy and the Marine Corps need to get to an agreement on
    what we are going to do with the maintenance of these
    amphibious ships. To have only 13 out of 32 available is what
    we say unacceptable.
        So as we sit here can we have a commitment from the Navy
    that you are going to get into an agreement on this issue with
    the Marine Corps?
        Admiral Kilby. Ranking Member Hirono, you have my
    commitment to that. We do brief off the same data, which is an
    improvement in the Navy and the Marine Corps.
        We have the same data base so we look at the things
    similarly from big deck amphibs to Landing Platform Docks
    (LPDs) to Landing Ship Docks (LSDs). So to me that is a start.
    We have to do better.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you. I agree you need to do better.
        Let me move on to General Mingus.
        Several of the critical training areas the Army uses in
    Hawaii, the main one being Pohakuloa on the Big Island, and the
    leases are set to expire in 2029 and these are vital. These
    leases are vital to ensure military forces can adequately train
    in the Pacific. When we talk about the importance of the Indo-
    Pacific area we obviously need our people to be trained.
        I would like to ask you will you commit to continue
    engaging in good faith with State officials, because that is
    who you are negotiating these important leases with, and the
    community to ensure lease negotiation is renegotiated in a way
    that is fair to the State, the people of Hawaii and the
    military?
        General Mingus?
        General Mingus. Absolutely, ma'am. We are committed to
    that. Since 2017 we have been working this. As you are well
    aware, over 500 town halls, meetings, various engagements that
    are out there.
        2029 seems like a long ways away but it will be here
    tomorrow.
        Senator Hirono. I know that it is not.
        General Mingus. We will continue to, and are committed to
    working this with you.
        Senator Hirono. To the extent that a land swap may be in
    the offing, I do believe that we need to provide the Secretary
    of the Army with the authority for that. Is that correct?
        General Mingus. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, like you I have a number of
    other questions. Could I just go over 1 minute?
        Senator Sullivan. Sure.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        So, General Mingus, last year we spoke at this hearing
    about the Army's crumbling infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
    region. In Hawaii, 50 percent of Army facilities are currently
    classified as failing or failed, and the cost to repair or
    replace them is over $5 billion.
        However, the Army and other services are not using non-DOD-
    funded contracting mechanisms like energy savings performance
    contracts to upgrade its infrastructure and lock in lower
    utility bills.
        What is the Army's plan to repair or replace infrastructure
    in Hawaii and the Indo-Pacific?
        General Mingus. Ma'am, as we talked last year there were
    significant investments in 2023 to 2024. We are committed to
    that for 2025 and beyond.
        We know that the water and some of the critical
    infrastructure underneath a lot of these locations are failing.
    We actually think it is maybe in excess of $5 billion.
        We have committed over a billion for this next year so we
    absolutely want to work with you on those infrastructure to
    include the leadership that goes with this as well.
        Kwajalein is an example where that was largely paid for
    with Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
    dollars. We have actually put a garrison commander there to
    make sure that the leadership in addition to the resources is
    there to fix these problems.
        Senator Hirono. I think the energy projects, for example,
    are important because the Army is the biggest user of it in the
    DOD, Army in particular, is the biggest user of energy and
    whatever sums you can save on energy costs as well can go to
    other needed, necessary projects.
        So would you commit to clear the logjam on installation of
    energy projects funded through non-DOD contract mechanisms?
        General Mingus. Absolutely can take a look at that, ma'am,
    yes.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Chairman Wicker?
        Senator Wicker. Well, Chairman, I surely am glad you gave
    Senator Hirono a few extra moments. You offered me an opening
    statement and so I may take those few extra moments.
        Senator Sullivan. You are the Chairman of the Committee.
    You can do whatever you want.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you. But I also want to congratulate
    Chairman Sullivan and Senator Hirono for their leadership in
    calling this hearing. It is a terrific panel and it has been
    great so far.
        Let me say this about the CR. We repeatedly say House and
    Senate, Republican and Democrat, that we never need to do this
    again and for some reason something comes up, some group is
    unwilling to compromise and look at the long picture, and we
    find ourselves in this position.
        I will say this about the fact that this is the first
    yearlong CR for the Department of Defense. I guess we could at
    least admit that it is a hybrid CR in the sense that there are
    the anomalies that our witnesses have mentioned and the numbers
    have been plussed up just a little bit.
        But this is a shame on our process and it is not in keeping
    with what the Founders intended. They intended for legislation
    to be difficult but they intended for the parties and the
    houses to compromise and have some give and take and finally
    get in the right direction.
        In my view, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Ranking Member, the real
    flaw in the CR that we will be voting on later this week is
    that it does not provide enough money, regardless of the
    anomalies and the tiny plus ups here and there. Regardless of
    that it does not provide adequate support for the military and
    for the challenges we have from four adversary nations pacing
    challenges, plus Russia, plus North Korea, plus Iran, that
    never before have worked together to bring us ill.
        It is contrary, Mr. Chairman and Madam Ranking Member, to
    the voice of the Senate in the National Defense Authorization
    Act which plussed up national defense out of the Armed Services
    Committee and from a bipartisan vote on the floor about $25
    billion. We could not get that done in conference and so we are
    where we are on the authorization.
        But were it not for the prospect of a reconciliation bill
    that adds $150 billion for vital national security purposes, I
    could not vote for the Continuing Resolution as it is.
        Unless something changes, I will have to swallow my words
    again this year and go ahead and pass it because the
    alternative is so unpalatable and so dangerous.
        But I will say this. Based on what we see and based on what
    is in this Continuing Resolution, $150 billion in the
    reconciliation bill may not be enough, and I am hearing some
    comforting words, Mr. Chairman, from the Administration that
    they realize that too.
        I realize they are the budget hawks in this city and they
    are the defense hawks in this city and we all want fiscal
    responsibility.
        But I am telling you $150 billion in the reconciliation
    bill may not be enough based on the way we have treated defense
    over the past few years and based on what we are about to do
    this week.
        So thank you all for doing what you can with the
    authorities, anomalies, and little plus ups that would give
    you.
        In the time I have to ask questions, let us talk about the
    ability, and I will direct this to you, General Mingus, the
    ability of our Reserve component to be ready for potential
    conflicts with near peer adversaries.
        If a conflict began today, General, is the Army Reserve
    component manned, trained, and equipped appropriately to be
    successful?
        General Mingus. I would say it would depend on the type of
    organization within the Guard and the Reserve, sir. We meet our
    directed readiness tables requirements in terms of the Active
    component, the Guard and the Reserve, in terms of what are
    required inside those immediate forces that are needed inside
    of 10 days, 30 days, and 45 days.
        Once you get beyond that then it is not as pretty as you
    would see. This last year we did have to bring down in the op
    tempo accounts for the Guard and Reserve. We typically like to
    keep them at 85 percent of their training requirements. We had
    to bring that down a little bit this year because of the top
    line that we were at. So there is concern.
        Now, as a result of that, the Secretary and the Chief and
    all of us are taking a look at what is the right balance
    between the Active Guard and Reserve and what mission sets
    should be in those, and there is an active look at all of that.
        Senator Wicker. Well, do you not wish you did not have to
    begin your answer with it depends. I wish you did not have to
    begin your answer with it depends.
        You talked about the balance. How about the balance between
    the types of Reserve units?
        General Mingus. That is what I mean, sir. So, for example,
    our petroleum capacity is almost all in the Reserve component.
    We know that we are going to need some of that capability early
    on in a fight and so do we need to move some of that from our
    Reserve component into the Active component. So that is some of
    the analysis that that we are looking at.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Let us go to Admiral Kilby.
        It seems that we are picking on that end of the table so
    far today.
        Admiral Kilby, the Navy spends billions of dollars each
    year to operate and maintain its combat surface ships. Those
    surface ships are vital to combat deterrence, defense of the
    Homeland. Yet, year after year we hear about significant
    challenges to the readiness of our Navy's surface fleet.
        How is the Navy changing and modernizing in this regard and
    also in the way they attack ship maintenance to get problems
    under control?
        Admiral Kilby. Two general areas here, sir. Thanks for that
    question. One was addressed by General Mahoney.
        One, locking down that planning in advance of that
    availability is key. That requires the funding and the contract
    closed about 4 months before we start the availability, which
    allows the contractor to order those long lead parts and
    develop those teams, in particular for amphibs, steam
    maintainers and diesel maintainers, which are a shrinking pool
    in our Nation.
        So lock down that project ahead of time and understand the
    condition of the ship, which means you have to do inspections
    and really understand vice opening things and inspecting them
    during the avail.
        So that is the first part about that. The second part is
    this piece I mentioned in my opening statement, which you did
    not hear, but getting to 80 percent of combat surge-ready
    ships, aircraft and submarines.
        We have had some success in the Navy doing that with our
    fighter fleet and are spreading it to all our aircraft. We want
    to do the same thing with our ships, same thing with our
    submarines.
        That is a bigger challenge because of the complexity of it
    but that is the goal we are after. That requires some focus and
    some effort to do that but it also requires looking at
    processes which may not be helpful now in changing those
    processes, and that is what we did with aviation, sir.
        Senator Wicker. Okay, and then let me just ask General
    Mingus and Admiral Kilby, on the recruiting is part of making
    this more successful long term a better career path for the
    people we place in these positions?
        General?
        General Mingus. Yes, sir. I mean, most come in the military
    to serve, to make a better way for themselves in terms of their
    lifestyle, some it is to get college benefits.
        Senator Wicker. A better career path for the people we put
    in recruiting position.
        General Mingus. Oh yes, sir. Absolutely. I misunderstood
    the question.
        That is one of the things we have talked about, similar to
    what the Marine Corps has been doing for decades. If we are
    going to put talent out in our recruiting formations we have to
    reward that talent on the back end of it.
        Senator Wicker. Absolutely.
        General Mingus. So absolutely.
        Admiral Kilby. Same applies for the Navy. Focus on those
    recruiters, teach that, one, telling their story to a potential
    recruit is what sells it.
        Identifying with that individual and connecting with them
    on a very personal level and having them see their future in
    that is what we need. So focus on that process.
        For us we had an incentivized structure which was not to
    get the max people in. It was to recruit a certain number of
    people per month.
        We have taken those limits off. Bring everybody in. Do not
    save up recruits for next month. Bring them all in as soon as
    you can and that will either fill up our delayed entry program
    or get those sailors to boot camp as soon as possible. That has
    been our success.
        Senator Wicker. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I want people in the
    military who are assigned to our recruiting programs to say,
    thank gosh I got this great position. My career path looks
    bright because I have been put on a fast track by being a
    recruiter. That is my point.
        Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, so you want to comment
    on that because the Marine Corps has been doing that for
    decades.
        General Mahoney. Yes, I would. Of the three things that I
    think are the pillars of our success in recruiting, the one
    main one is a professional recruiting force.
        These people are screened, slated, handpicked, incentivized
    while they are in the job. Typically, will get meritorious
    promotions, and when they get out what we find is when they
    return to the fleet they are some of our strongest officers and
    staff NCOs.
        The Commandant was a recruiter.
        Senator Sullivan. Most commandants have been recruiters.
        General Mahoney. Most commandants have been recruiters.
    Most of our general officers have been recruiters. Among our
    most successful staff and COs, the sergeant major of the Marine
    Corps was a recruiter.
        So as far as Senator Wicker seeing a path, that is baked in
    to how we make our recruiters and they are a breed apart.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, just real quick. Eighty percent, you hit that with
    naval aviation on maintenance, right? Or on readiness.
        Admiral Kilby. We certainly hit it with fighters. I get a
    report every week on every type, model, series of aircraft in
    the United States Navy. We are not hitting it in Cargo Multi-
    Mission Vertical Takeoff/Landing (CMV) 22s.
        That is another story. That is our goal is to get there
    across the board for every type, model, series that requires a
    different level of attention and daily individual management by
    the Air Forces and the Navy to make that happen. We want to
    apply that same level of focus to our surface ships and our
    submarines.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Good.
        Senator Kaine?
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and like others I am
    just going to talk about the CR first.
        You know, I came on this Committee in January 2013 and
    every year you all and your predecessors sit before us and tell
    us that a CR is a bad thing and we do not listen to you.
        You know, at some point you got to measure by the action,
    not by the words that we say. We have allowed a CR to be normal
    from October 1 to the end of the calendar year. That is just
    kind of the norm.
        But we have often gone beyond that into the next calendar
    year, and we stand on the threshold of the first time where we
    have just gone to CR for the entire year.
        I agree with what the Chairman said earlier, the Chairman
    of the subcommittee, that a CR is better than a shutdown. I do
    agree with that. But why do we have to accept half-assed over
    catastrophic?
        The House voted on the CR yesterday and they left town.
    They are out. They adjourned. Now we are going to hear what the
    Senate has to say and then try to do the right thing for the
    country.
        They are gone, because they are, like, okay, we can jam you
    to vote for a CR that is bad for the defense of this Nation by
    skipping town on a Tuesday.
        This speaks very loudly about the priorities of this Nation
    and this is all done in public with our adversaries watching.
        Admiral Kilby, I think you testified in your opening
    testimony that under a CR one-fifth of our ships will miss
    their maintenance schedule. Did I hear that right?
        Admiral Kilby. Eleven. Specifically, 11 ships those
    maintenance availabilities are at risk.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. So we want to get to 80 percent ready
    on ships and subs. Where are we now?
        Admiral Kilby. Depending on the day, around 67 percent.
        Senator Kaine. On both ships and subs?
        Admiral Kilby. Ships and submarines are a little less.
        Senator Kaine. Okay. What will one-fifth of our ships
    missing their maintenance schedule under the CR. What will that
    do to the quest to get to 80 percent readiness for ships and
    subs?
        Admiral Kilby. Well, it will certainly be a setback. We
    will take a penalty there. We will have to bow wave that
    maintenance to the next year depending on the availability and
    scheduling of that ship.
        Worse off, we skip that availability which means it is
    doubled down for the next one, which means we will have growth
    work and a lot of things we did not anticipate.
        Senator Kaine. All right. So we are being told in public
    this is the impact of voting yes on this CR that is coming to
    us, that we are just accepting that the quest to get to 80
    percent is going to be set back because maintenance
    availabilities for one-fifth of the ships under a CR are not
    going to be, according to protocol.
        Admiral Kilby. The only, and I do not want to say silver
    lining in that because I do not see a lot of silver lining. If
    we get a flexibility to move money we may be able to address
    that. But it will impact something else.
        Senator Kaine. Yes. You will pull it out of something else,
    of course.
        But, we are told, well, it is better than a shutdown. Hey,
    it is Wednesday morning. I mean, on the Senate side the
    appropriators basically had a deal at the end of last year and
    that deal is still basically on the table.
        My hope is that there will at least be a vote in the Senate
    to do a short-term CR and then actually get an omnibus for the
    rest of the year.
        I mean, an omnibus is kind of a funny thing, word, to apply
    to a budget for less than half of the year but it would be far
    preferable to a CR because you would have new starts. You would
    have other authorities within an omnibus that you are not going
    to get in the CR and we ought to be able to do that.
        The House decided on Tuesday night, we are splitting so we
    can force the Senate to accept a substandard CR that will hurt
    the military. Great week, man.
        Great, great week of work to leave town on Tuesday night
    feeling good about yourself because you forced the Senate to
    try to accept a substandard work product year after year after
    year after year.
        General Mingus, I want to ask you one question about
    counter UAS readiness because the Army is the DOD's executive
    agent.
        Talk to me about how you are ensuring coordination between
    the services and developing a joint counter small UAS doctrine
    and solutions to addressing the UAS threat.
        General Mingus. Thank you, sir.
        As the executive agent you are well aware of the joint
    counter UAS officer (JCO). It is a joint entity, and everybody
    that is sitting at this table there is probably very few weeks
    that do not go by where we do not come together to talk about
    this problem set. Whether it is in the venue of what Replicator
    2.0 is going to bring across 100-plus sites across the country
    to now what is going to be part of the Golden Dome.
        But this conversation on the counter UAS side is absolutely
    a joint problem. Yes, we have an Army officer in charge of it
    but he is in a joint billet and he is speaking for and trying
    to solve this problem for the Joint Force, and I collectively
    think this team is trying to get after that.
        Senator Kaine. Give your effort a grade. That will be my
    last question. Give the joint effort a grade right now.
        General Mingus. I would give it a grade in two ways. One,
    compared to where we were 2 years ago in the B to B+ category
    compared to where we need to be it is probably in the C.
        Given the rate of technology changes in this space and
    where our adversaries are going in this space, we cannot go
    fast enough when it comes to counter UAS.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
        Senator Scott?
        Senator Scott. So my Democrat colleagues do not like CRs
    but the prior majority leader, a Democrat, would not even bring
    up a spending bill that we could have done last summer to make
    sure we did not ever have to do a CR at all.
        After 4 years of the Biden administration appeasing our
    enemies and making our forces less lethal, I am glad President
    Trump's back and restoring peace through strength.
        He has been clear that he takes the threat posed by
    Communist China seriously, ensuring the United States is posed
    to combat these threats. I look forward to hearing how you are
    doing with that.
        But my first question for General Mingus and Admiral Kilby,
    since President Trump was elected recruitment numbers are way
    up. So is that a result of President Trump's election?
        General Mingus. I think it is a combination of things, sir.
    I think it is the efforts as I talked about in my opening
    statement that have been put into place for the last 18 to 24
    months. But we have seen a momentum over the last couple months
    that has been pretty remarkable.
        Admiral Kilby. I agree with General Mingus. We really took
    a round turn on this last year. We had 373 more sailors than we
    predicted to get at last year.
        So we had an apparatus that was aligned to try to get after
    this. I will take any win to get sailors in the Navy that want
    to serve our country. So I do not know that I can map that to
    the election or not but I am going to ride that wave as long as
    I can.
        Senator Scott. So my background before I got into politics
    was I ran businesses and, you know, the expectation was you had
    to beat your competition by improving every day. You had to get
    your costs better. You had to get your quality better.
    Everything you did you had to get better.
        So, General Mingus and Admiral Kilby, can you tell me in
    the last 12 months what would you say, for what you are
    responsible for, what would you say is the big improvements?
        General Mingus. Sir, I would say our transformation and
    contact effort. We have infused the latest and greatest
    technology when it comes to mobility, firepower, our network,
    our UAS, counter UAS efforts into multiple formations, infuse
    that technology at a rate faster than we typically would do in
    quantities that is greater than we would typically do because
    we want to learn from them bottom up to refine the decisions
    that we are going to make programmatically down the road.
        So that is going to expand into more formations as part of
    TIC, transformation in contact 2.0 this year and next year. But
    that has been over the last 12 months what I would say that has
    been our biggest win.
        Admiral Kilby. Two things. One, coming from the same type
    of thinking we are trying to build in the Navy, a focused
    mindset, skill set, and tool set to get after that continuous
    improvement.
        There are some common themes here that we have applied
    across the board from aviation. So the recruiting is an
    improvement and I would say on-time completion of ship
    availabilities as well as some success in submarine
    availabilities.
        But we have got a long way to go there, sir, to apply that
    model consistently every single day.
        Senator Scott. Thanks.
        Admiral Kilby, we have seen the Pentagon failing to
    recruit, pass an audit or deliver ships, equipment, missiles,
    et cetera, on time and on budget.
        On top of that, while the Marine Corps and Air Force are
    100 percent recapitalized on their C-130's, the Navy needs over
    30 C-130's and has yet to program for this critical tactical
    air lift platform.
        Today, the Navy only has one on contract. So can you
    explain why that is?
        Admiral Kilby. Sir, we try to balance our program across
    the board, all aircraft, all ships, all submarines. I will take
    that question for the record and come back to you with
    specifics about C-130. But, again, it is building the most
    lethal program we can afford.

        [IFR INSERT HERE]

        Senator Scott. General Mahoney, what would you say as far
    as if you take the last 12 months how are you in a better
    position and your response forward in a better position than
    you were a year ago?
        General Mahoney. Senator, two things.
        The first is the second clean audit opinion 2 years in a
    row and I think we are in the midst of having a hat trick.
        Why do I say that? One of the things, I call it the audit
    dividend, we know exactly what we own, exactly where it is,
    exactly who takes care of it, and what it is worth. In that
    audit we can tell the condition of those pieces of equipment so
    we have an increased visibility into the operational readiness
    as a result of the audit.
        The second thing is our 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment has
    just undergone a CRTX. They have been delivered their long-
    range precision fires, their air defense.
        So the concept of force design has gone forward. I wish we
    could accelerate it and deepen the magazine but we have seen
    that success on time.
        Now we need to marry that capability up with organic
    littoral maneuver in the form of the light amphibious worships.
    But those are the two things, force design and audit.
        Senator Scott. Thank you Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Scott.
        Senator Sheehy?
        Senator Sheehy. General Mahoney, am I to understand the
    Marine Corps is the only branch to have passed an audit?
        General Mahoney. That is correct, Senator. The only DOD
    branch, sir.
        Senator Sheehy. I get really tired of marines lecturing me
    how much better they are than I am. My wife is a marine so I
    already get it every day.
        Senator Sullivan. I am glad your wife has wisdom.
        Senator Sheehy. Well, I was in the Navy so I had to marry
    up, right?
        [Laughter.]
        Counter UAS, General Mingus, you brought it up. General
    Mingus was my boss, actually, back in the day when I went to
    Ranger school.
        Counter UAS, what branch, what functional branch of the
    Army do you guys place the counter UAS responsibility in?
        General Mingus. We have six warfighting functions inside
    the Army so intel, command and control, maneuver, fires,
    protection is where counter UAS sits right now.
        But as we think about the future in the Army, the land
    force, the vast majority of casualties that occur on a
    battlefield is direct fire.
        I think that a future battlefield the most casualties are
    going to occur from the air, and so the notion of the
    convergence of offensive and defensive fires, taking it out of
    that protection warfighting function and making it part of that
    scheme of fires and scheme of maneuver, I think, is the way of
    the future. But today, to answer your question, it is in the
    protection function.
        Senator Sheehy. Okay. Admiral Kilby, where does the Navy
    view counter UAS as a functional area?
        Admiral Kilby. Because of our platform, Senator, we keep
    them owned by the resource sponsors. So it is a division of
    labor between the N9, which owns all our warfighting platforms,
    and the N4, which owns our shore installations. So there is a
    mix between those two.
        Senator Sheehy. General Mahoney, where does the Marine
    Corps place that?
        General Mahoney. Our counter small UAS, two parts.
    Operational units with two programs of record, Marine Air
    Defense Integrated System (MADIS) and Light MADIS, in our
    installations with installations counter UAS.
        Just as a comment, as General Mingus brought up, we are
    part of Project Convergence which has a counter small UAS
    element to it in Research and Development (R&D) and
    experimentation.
        We are a big part of Replicator 2.0 which also invests in
    counter small UAS, and we are invested in the program office as
    well.
        Senator Sheehy. General Spain, in Space Force and Air Force
    where do you guys place counter UAS as a functional area?
        General Guetlein. From a Space Force perspective it is very
    limited. We have very limited involvement.
        Senator Sheehy. Right. Yes.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Senator, we put it in the
    protection function as well. It is with our defenders. But as
    was mentioned by the other panelists, we are in the process of
    evolving that to the operational function.
        So it is a blend of our both defender force and our
    operational force as we go forward.
        Senator Sheehy. Well, I ask that because I actually was one
    of the manufacturers of the MADIS program back in my former
    life before I came here and so I spent a lot of time on the
    range with your air defense Littoral Anti-Air Battalion (LAAB)
    platoon marines working with that and what I found as we worked
    with all the branches as each branch, understandably, had a
    very different view of where the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
    function fell and how they viewed it.
        You know, the Air Force was very much looking at it from a
    security forces perspective, fixed installation defense. The
    Navy, of course, was focused on it from a shipboard.
        When the Boxer had its incident with Iran in 2019 the Army,
    of course, had more of an electronic warfare (EW). They really
    viewed it kind of as an electronic warfare issue.
        What I found was as each branch looked at it through their
    own lens, the joint capability's office really struggled to
    coalesce that into an acquisition vision that actually worked
    and they ended up just buying any shiny object that was dangled
    in front of their face and it led to kind of the schizophrenic
    approach to it.
        It is not a criticism. It is just a reality that as that
    technology was developing quickly it was hard to meet all the
    needs.
        So I think trying to determine whether it is a specific
    Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or actually assigning a
    functional area within the branches that say this is a
    fundamental change in battlefield tactic technology.
        As we see in Ukraine, I mean, every single day whether it
    is First Person View Drones (FPVs) or beyond line of sight
    drones it is not transforming warfare but it is functionally
    transforming how maneuver units will behave on the ground, and
    I think treating it as a subspecialty that is branching off
    whatever convenient, you know, area is there by focusing on
    what really is a core capability, in my opinion, would help
    coalesce the operational vision for what counter drone looks
    like. It will also help streamline the acquisition process so
    we can find that good technology quickly and field it quickly.
        But then also there is the offensive aspect where, you
    know, we think of offensive drones as Reapers and Predators
    dropping Hellfires and that we are defending against small
    drones, but we are not, as far as I can tell, adopting small
    UAS organic to our maneuver elements.
        Just like every infantry squad has an automatic weapon
    every infantry squad should have an organic small unmanned
    aircraft systems (SUAS) offensive capability, a backpack full
    of FPVs that they can fly at and into the enemy maneuver units
    and disrupt them just like we are seeing all over the world in
    battlefields, from Iranian proxy groups to the Russia-Ukraine
    war.
        From my old buddies still in uniform I do not hear that we
    have an organic offensive small UAS capability within our
    maneuver units and I think that is going to be a great
    disservice to our young men and women when the next conflicts
    arises.
        I yield back. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Sheehy.
        I am going to continue my line of questioning that I
    started with General Mahoney to you just, again. We have
    already touched on it a lot but it is okay. I want to hear from
    all the services.
        The negative impact on the CR, the budget flexibility that
    you would want or request as part of this year's NDAA, and then
    any lessons learned on the good news that we are all starting
    to see, I think, across the services on recruiting and to make
    sure we are learning across services on that. I do not think
    you got enough press but if you have an All-Volunteer Force and
    we are hitting a recruiting crisis of tens of thousands of
    Americans who we were short that is an existential threat to
    our military.
        Fortunately, it looks like we are beyond that but we need
    to embed the lessons learned from all the services on how we
    got out of that danger zone.
        So, General, to you on those three questions.
        General Mahoney. Senator, as far as the CR we have
    canvassed pretty much all the negative things. I would just
    like to hammer down on one.
        We talked about anomalies and flexibility in order to move
    between appropriations or accounts. We also need to be mindful
    of what the top line is.
        If there is only so much top line from which to flex or
    with to move we are going to rob from one account to pay for
    another.
        Examples might be inflation that outpaces the plus up, pay
    raises that were not planned for or budgeted but are must pay
    bills, that money will come from somewhere, and nonbudgeted
    contingencies that we pay out of primarily our own merged
    appropriation (M) accounts will have to be accounted for
    somewhere in the rules of that continuing resolution. A knock-
    on effect specific to the Marine Corps is if, and it has
    already been touched on by Admiral Kilby, if ship maintenance
    or ship building or procurement or anything that touches
    amphibious shipping it will have a knock-on effect to the
    Marine Corps, as I spoke about with Senator Hirono earlier.
        As far as flexibility goes, I would reference the Lord Hale
    study on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
    reform and I will just bring up three things that come to mind
    immediately.
        I think they have 16 recommendations in there which are all
    really good. Multiyear availability of 1-year accounts so that
    you are not forced into making bad decisions at the end of the
    year and buying things that you really do not need but have a
    period of availability to where you can make better executive
    and managerial decisions against that appropriation.
        Greater transfer authority so that we can move between
    appropriations or move between sub activity groups in order to
    solve a problem early so that we do not have to come to
    Congress for an above threshold massive reprogramming late in
    the year that may be related to need or not solve the problem.
        And last, and I will let it go, is multiyear COLIS
    appropriations to have flexibility within a portfolio to
    strengthen where you are weak and move money around to make
    sure that you can get your objectives attained within an
    account.
        So multiyear availability, greater transfer authority, and
    multiyear COLIS appropriation. We did the last one in, if you
    think of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and you think
    of Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) back in the day, that
    worked pretty well to get things done at an accelerated pace.
        I am running on here but recruiting, for us three things.
    We have a brand that we will not back off from. We believe that
    that brand is attractive.
        We believe it is a magnet to a wide demographic of young
    Americans who will prove themselves physically, mentally, and
    morally qualified. We will not back off of the standard.
        Counter intuitively if you maintain a standard at a high
    level that attracts people who want to perform to that
    standard.
        Senator Sullivan. That is a great lesson and I think we
    have to always keep that in mind. All the services, no matter
    what our recruiting challenges are, it is counter intuitive but
    it works. So thank you for that.
        General Mahoney. Lastly, Senator, I already talked about it
    in detail and that is our recruiting force, a breed apart who
    are hand screened, selected, incentivized, promoted, and, as I
    said, when they get back in the fleet, as you know, they are
    some of the best staff Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and
    officers we have and they become a sergeant major in the Marine
    Corps and commandant in the Marine Corps.
        Senator Sullivan. Real quick, General Guetlein, can you
    just hit on these three questions? Try to be concise. I am
    going over my time here. I want to be respectful to my
    colleagues but I do want to get through this issue of CR,
    budget flexibilities and recruiting.
        General Guetlein. Yes, Chairman, I can go pretty quick.
        From a CR, is a huge challenge. It is very, very
    inefficient. It does impact us especially because we are the
    smallest force with the smallest budget. So any churn in our
    budget is a huge hit to us.
        As far as what we would ask for flexibilities, I agree with
    the rest of the staff. New start--we are seeing an enormous
    amount of threats emerging every single year and it is very
    hard to get after those threats when you have to wait two to 4
    years to get the budget to get after those threats. So anything
    you can do, budget flexibility for new start authorities.
        Private equity consolidation, the ability to move money
    between programs would be hugely beneficial, and then the
    multiyear procurement, the multiyear execution authority that
    General Mahoney talked about.
        As far as recruiting and retention we have actually got a
    much easier problem because we have a much smaller force. But
    we are seeing two volunteers for every recruit that we take
    into the United States Space Force.
        So we are able to be very, very, very selective for high
    quality. Almost nearly 15 percent of our recruits have some
    college level of education to include all the way up to Masters
    and Doctors of Philosophy (PhDs).
        Our recruiting objectives were met the last 4 years in a
    row, 104 percent for our enlisted, 101 percent for our
    officers, and we are looking at continuing growth in the future
    and our retention rate has been in excess of 98 percent.
        Senator Sullivan. Wow. Great. That is great news. Great
    job, General.
        Senator Schmitt?
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Kilby, I want to direct this question to you. I
    feel like the fever has broke finally on this obsession that
    the previous Administration had with DEI. That is a good thing.
        The previous Administration also treated climate change as
    a national security priority. I actually had one of the more
    ridiculous exchanges in my first couple years here with
    Secretary Del Toro, who told me Admiral Nimitz would have cared
    about climate change too. It was sort of like the ``Twilight
    Zone.''
        But we have issues, right, in ship building. Now that we
    are refocused on warfighting capability what should Congress do
    to prioritize modernizing the fleet as opposed to this
    political stuff?
        Admiral Kilby. Two things, sir, super important for us is
    to keep our maintenance going. We have got to get our ships
    available. I am not going to build a whole mess of new ships in
    2 years so I have got to get the ships I have up to speed and
    available.
        The other thing we can do is continue to invest in
    munitions. I think the lead time for them is shorter than a
    ship so we must renew our magazines so we are ready to fight if
    called.
        Senator Schmitt. Okay. Sticking with you, Admiral Kilby,
    and then also for General Spain, if we had to fight a peer war
    in the next 2 years. What would be our greatest capability gap
    and what should Congress do to address that?
        Admiral Kilby. I will start first.
        Again, munitions, long-range munitions, preferred
    munitions, are an area where we need to increase our
    productivity as a Nation, and then from just a general sense,
    our capabilities are pretty good with the exception of that
    munitions quantity but our capacity is a problem. So getting
    those ships and funding available out on time will result in a
    greater capability overall.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Senator, thanks for the question.
        To your point, in the next 2 years the greatest challenge
    for us is going to be regaining the sustainment edge in our
    current fleet.
        The lead time required for parts and supply within that
    timeframe required would require an infusion to help us with
    our aircraft availability, our mission capable rates, and
    training our flying force to be ready within that window.
        In addition, some flexibility on new opportunities with
    technology in terms of asymmetric capabilities that would
    enable us to actually inculcate our Force Design, which calls
    for both high-end exquisite capability paired with low-end, low
    cost per effect massive capability that can augment the air
    component commanders who are in the field.
        Senator Schmitt. Sounds like next generation air dominance
    (NGAD).
        Lieutenant General Spain. Next generation air dominance
    would be an example of the exquisite, yes, sir.
        Senator Schmitt. General, I guess, with the time that I
    have remaining, General Mingus and Mahoney, I just wanted to
    ask in sort of the similar theme of flexibility, if you had
    unrestricted funding for readiness how should that be spent,
    first, in order to get that high-end capability what would we
    be doing?
        Like, if we are in an era of scarcity, right, that we have
    to accept at some level what is the level of priority or what
    are the priorities?
        General Mingus. For us I would say well, the second one
    would be just what Admiral Kilby talked about, our magazine
    depth, precision-guided munitions, long-range precision fires,
    and the ability to scale rapidly at time of crisis and
    conflict.
        So it is one thing to bring production rates up but it is
    another to have the ability to rapidly scale at time of crisis
    and conflict.
        Senator Schmitt. How would you rate where we are at right
    now on that front? Because I have heard that. I agree with
    that. Where do you think we are at with that?
        General Mingus. Well, just using 155 as an example, before
    the Russia-Ukraine conflict we were producing at 14,000 rounds
    a month.
        We had a higher water mark in November of 42,000, ramp into
    70,000 by this summer, and 100,000 a month by this fall. So
    that is a 2-year journey. We have got to be able to do that in
    months, not years.
        It is about automation and robotics. People are hard to
    bring in, let go, bring in, let go, and so the key to all this
    is automating those both organic and defense industrial systems
    and bases to be able to do that.
        Then the second place that I would put that money is in our
    transformation efforts that I described earlier, our TiC 1.0
    and 2.0.
        The end result of that infuse of technology into those
    formations is they are more lethal, they are more agile, they
    are lighter, they can get to places much faster, and they are
    just better formations that are designed purpose built for the
    next fight, not the last fight.
        General Mahoney. Senator, if I had a three-part wish list
    the first one would be to accelerate our Force Design to ensure
    victory and more killing power in the contact layer.
        I agree completely with depth of magazine across people,
    parts, programs. There are several things that we do not have
    enough of that we need to build more and deepen that.
        If anything, what Ukraine, what the Levant, what the
    Houthis, show us is that the short sharp illusion is just that,
    a short sharp illusion. We need to shoot. We need to be able to
    take a hit. We need to reset and get back in the fight.
        Second, our fourth-gen platforms are, and specifically our
    barracks for our marines, if we are going to count on them to
    generate a lethal force we have got to provide them the quality
    of life and the living conditions that they rate.
        Third, we have already talked about it extensively, is the
    ability for us to move, maneuver and sustain on 73 percent of
    the Earth's surface. That is amphibious shipping and project
    power from sovereign American soil when we do that, as well as
    organic littoral maneuver in order to move shore to shore in
    order to maneuver to a position of advantage in order to
    sustain in the contact group.
        Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Schmitt.
        Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would say that as our services with the exception of
    Space Force are facing recruiting challenges why should we
    discourage or why would we be discouraging women and minorities
    from enlisting with all this anti-DEI stuff?
        Admiral Kilby the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure
    Optimization Program, or SIOP, projects were unfortunately not
    included in Secretary Hegseth's list of protected and
    prioritized programs following his directive to implement an 8
    percent budget cut across the board at the Pentagon.
        You testified today on the importance of SIOP and, of
    course, clearly, we need to do a better job of repair and
    maintaining our ships.
        So with the flexibility that you are requesting in the CR,
    even if SIOP is not on Secretary Hegseth's list of priorities,
    are you planning to prioritize critical SIOP projects across
    the fleet including, for example, completion of the dry dock
    and planning and design for our waterfront production facility
    at Pearl Harbor?
        Indeed, we need to get on with continuing to modernize our
    four public shipyards so that you will have available ships to
    do what you need to do. So would you use the flexibility that
    you request in the CR to prioritize SIOP?
        Admiral Kilby. We want to continue on our SIOP program,
    ma'am.
        I have talked about the 40 projects we have done, the
    additional $6.3 billion that are in the budget that we want to
    continue on, and the remaining projects we need to execute. So
    we are committed to SIOP.
        Senator Hirono. Good. I am looking to you for that because
    what is the point in enabling us to build more ships if we
    cannot maintain the fleet that we currently have.
        A skilled workforce is foundational to military readiness.
    However, this Administration has implemented a DOD hiring
    freeze and is planning to fire up to 60,000 DOD employees.
        DOD is eliminating people across the spectrum, from firing
    general, in fact, officers without cause to removing new and
    motivated employees. These would be the employees who had just
    gotten hired and are being trained, and you would think that we
    would want to keep those folks.
        But the people in probationary status are among the first
    to go, as happened across the Administration. For example, the
    United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which is
    already strapped with the need to hire people, they just
    eliminated some 2,400 employees and about to eliminate 83,000
    employees, going forward.
        So, gentlemen and Ms. Maurer, how are these personnel
    actions impacting the hiring, training, and retaining of a
    skilled national security workforce, briefly? You can say it is
    not helping.
        General Mahoney. I will start.
        Specific to the Marine Corps, we started our leaning out
    process six budget cycles ago in accordance with Force Design
    and talent management. So the start game of this exercise for
    us we are pretty lean so any cut is going to have some impacts.
        However, of the 2,300 employees that we have identified we
    have got protection, either exemption or exclusion, down to a
    number south of 75. Not without impact but manageable from the
    Marine Corps' standpoint.
        What I am also concerned about is the exclusions or
    exemptions for a hiring freeze. We lose about 7 to 10 percent
    of our civilian workforce just through natural attrition each
    year so we have to figure out a way to replenish that or the
    number will just keep going down.
        Senator Hirono. Well, hundreds of thousands of Federal
    employees are being fired. These firings are not based on any
    kind of a job performance evaluation. So it is going to happen
    to DOD, I would say.
        So anybody else wants to weigh in?
        Admiral Kilby. I will just connect there our last exchange.
        Senator Hirono. Admiral?
        Admiral Kilby. Ranking Member. The shipyards are exempt
    from the probationary employees and they are exempt from the
    hiring freeze.
        So we are trying to shape this in a manner that allows us
    to continue the most important work as we work through guidance
    from the Administration. Also exempted from the hiring freeze
    is the military Sealift Command, an important force for us to
    maintain our fleet. So I think those are efforts on the
    services' part to manage.
        Senator Hirono. So basically all three of you are needing
    to identify some very critical people that you want to make
    sure that these firings do not hit. Is that what you are doing?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        I am going to finish this line of questioning with you,
    General Spain, on the CR budget flexibilities and specific, if
    you can get there, and then Air Force recruiting and lessons
    learned, and then, Ms. Maurer, I would like you to answer the
    same question as well.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the
    question.
        We talked a little bit in the opening statement about the
    bad but echo the comments from across the table on top line
    restrictions.
        Flexibility, in my mind, really comes down to treating our
    readiness accounts and quality of life accounts in terms of
    MILCON and Facilities Sustainment, Restorations, and
    Modernization (FSRM) with the same flexibility as operations.
    The readiness impacts within those accounts have the same
    deleterious effect across the force as stopping current
    operations.
        So by allowing flexibility across the pillars of those
    readiness accounts, that is manpower, infrastructure, flying
    and training, and parts and supply. We can mitigate some of
    that risk that comes along with the CR.
        From a recruiting standpoint, the Air Force is above glide
    slope on our recruiting goals for the year. We increased the
    number by 20 percent and in fact we are still above the 20
    percent increase, and we have the largest delayed entry pool
    that we have had in 10 years and the most recruiting that we
    have done at this point in the year in the last 15 years.
        So we are in a good position.
        Senator Sullivan. Are there lessons learned from what you
    did to get over that hump?
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes, sir. So we have increased
    the number of recruiters. We have increased the training, which
    reflects some of the things that were said before.
        I was a recruiter when I first started out in the Air Force
    waiting to go to pilot training. It is a tough job and you need
    the right people doing that work and we are bringing the right
    people in and we are training them even better than we had
    before.
        Senator Sullivan. Great.
        Ms. Maurer, do you have any views in general, the line of
    questioning that I have been going through on the CR . In
    particular what I want to hear from you is your sense on
    flexibilities, that I know that we could provide more in the
    budget to give our services the ability to address some of the
    challenges that you put in your report but also give them
    flexibility that if we have to, you know, and certainly I would
    not advocate for it but another CR, another kind of budgetary
    constraint issue that they have more flexibility to address
    them.
        Then also if GAO has looked at lessons learned from the
    recruiting kind of challenge that we had over the last three or
    4 years and how that has come about. What are those?
        Ms. Maurer. Sure. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
        On the issue of CR, talking about a full year CR makes me
    think back to work that we did over a decade ago looking at the
    impacts on sequestration.
        Obviously, it is a little bit apples to oranges but we
    issued a report 2015-ish that looked at how sequestration
    impacted DOD, and at that time we had a recommendation that DOD
    collect the lessons learned from sequestration and stockpile
    them in case they needed those lessons later on down the road.
        In 2017 we reached out to the comptroller's shop. They said
    they had taken action to implement that recommendation. So that
    is sort of a takeaway item for the department is to look back
    at what DOD did back in 2017 in terms of lessons learned on
    sequestration and see what, if any of those lessons can be
    applied to today.
        In terms of flexibilities, we have heard a lot and my teams
    have heard a lot about the types of flexibilities that the
    generals and the admiral talked about today.
        Obviously, GAO tries to stay a little bit agnostic in terms
    of specific flexibilities but what I will say is that whatever
    flexibilities are offered should be directed toward ensuring
    the ability of the services to meet the readiness challenges
    that they face.
        I talked about earlier in my opening statement there is a
    significant imbalance between resources and mission and so
    anything that we have done to help bring that into better
    balance would be very helpful.
        In terms of recruiting we are very encouraged to see that
    the recruiting numbers have come up. We have issued a whole
    series of reports in areas where the services have critical
    shortfalls in the number of people they need.
        So, for example, at the Navy, for every six sailors that
    they need for the fleet they only have five assigned. We found
    efficiencies in the number of air defenders, that the Space
    Force has a really good force generation model but they do not
    have enough guardians to actually carry that out, much less on
    the civilian and the contractor side. So their improvements and
    that the change in the trend line in recruiting can be helpful
    in that regard.
        In some of our work on recruiting we think it is important
    for the different programs, the different services, to get an
    understanding of what is working, what is not working, and then
    double down on the things that are working and then share those
    lessons with each other. That way you will get a better
    outcome.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, great. Thank you on that, and I
    still have a number of questions. Senator Hirono, do you want
    to do another round or do you want to submit questions?
        I am going to stay for a while since I have all these very
    important members of our military.
        Senator Hirono. I will be submitting questions for the
    record. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Great.
        Well, let me continue with some additional questions.
        General Mingus, one of the things that I want to try to
    nail down is my understanding is the top line number for the
    end strength of the Army was reduced because of the recruiting
    challenges. We almost had to do it in a forced way.
        Now that we have met these numbers again and you have
    almost a surplus, will you be requesting from us and so you
    have the flexibility to increase your top line to a certain
    number? What is your flexibility on that? Because I would like
    to see it.
        If you need more funding to get to that higher top line, I
    think we would all be certainly willing to provide it. But what
    kind of authorities do you need to get back to a higher end
    strength when the reduction in your end strength was actually a
    result and function of the recruiting challenges?
        Now that you are going in the positive direction we want to
    take advantage of that to increase your end strength.
        What do you need? Money? Authorities? Both.
        General Mingus. Thank you, Chairman.
        Money, yes, in the Military Personnel Services (MILPERS)
    account, because what we asked for in this year's budget was an
    appropriations for an end strength of 442,000.
        What I believe will happen if the trajectories remain
    consistent with where they are at today we are going to end
    this year somewhere between 449,000 and 452,000 so almost
    10,000 over what we believe will be appropriated from a
    military pay and allowance account standpoint.
        So there will be a deficit there that we will have to come
    back and ask for help.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        I would strongly encourage you to do that. Nobody wants a
    smaller army and the fact that you had to shrink due to
    recruiting challenges nobody wanted that, and now that you are
    fixing it we need to reward you, in my view, to get back to a
    higher end strength.
        General Mingus. Yes, sir.
        For authorities, the Secretary of the Army, all the service
    secretaries, can authorize a 2 percent deviation from the
    NDAAs. So that would put you at about 451,000. So we think
    unless it goes above that we will be okay on authorities.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Great.
        General Mahoney, I want to go to a topic you and I and the
    commandant have discussed a lot. That is where we are in Force
    Design and, you know, a very innovative Marine Corps
    initiative, started with General Berger, but not without
    criticism.
        Any time you innovate you are going to get criticized.
    There is no doubt about that. I think the Marine Corps has
    gotten ahead of the curve on a lot of issues relating to drones
    and loitering munitions and, you know, light, flexible forces
    that can move with weapons systems that can take out Chinese
    shipping. All very innovative.
        However, one of the criticisms was that the divest to
    invest strategy divested too much combat power. In the Marine
    Corps' primary mission of a 911 force with amphibs to go any
    anywhere in the world at a moment's notice to kick in the door
    with sufficient combat power was reduced. A lot of criticisms
    came from, you know, within the family, retired four stars and
    retired commandants and retired very well respected marines.
        So that is a difficult balance. I remember a hearing that
    we had a couple years ago on Force Design where, you know, I
    asked one of the top Marine Corps officers, hey, look, you do
    an amphibious invasion and then you get three miles in wherever
    you are and you have to cross a river. Wait a minute.
        Marine Corps got rid of all its bridging equipment. How are
    we going to cross a river? The answer, I think, if I remember
    was we are going to call on the Army.
        Now, I love the Army but in the Marine Corps tradition
    calling on the Army was not something that we typically have
    done.
        So where are we on the balance? Where are we on things like
    bridging and route clearing? Where are we on things like
    artillery, infantry, which the Marine Corps cut a lot.
        Do you still think this criticism, which came from some
    very, very well respected marines, is legit? Are we
    recalibrating a little bit in terms of, we want an innovative
    Marine Corps but we do not want to get rid of our 911
    capability to kick in the door anywhere in the world and bring
    significant combat power to bear anywhere and what is the
    balance and how we doing on all those things, General?
        General Mahoney. Senator, we talked extensively about this
    and if you remember where the Force Design journey started and
    that was with the statement that we are not manned, trained, or
    equipped for the future fight.
        That is something tough for a marine to swallow. That is
    what generated the shift in some of the design elements of our
    force.
        We believe that we are on the right course based on
    operations extant today, based on experimentation that we have
    done, based on what the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) demand.
        That having said, the top priority of our Commandant, in
    fact, is to balance that modernization. If we put that in the
    modernization bin, although Force Design is modernization,
    talent management, training and education and logistics, we
    will put it in the modernization bin with the ability to
    respond to crises.
        We have talked about the dearth of amphib shipping. That is
    significant. I believe it is strategic to the Nation. As far as
    organic combat power goes, we divested of heavy armor. We do
    not believe in the situations that we were faced that we need
    organic heavy armor for maneuver or maneuver support.
        We believe we have enough artillery, both rocket artillery
    and cannon artillery, for the problems that we will face. We
    believe that we have enough engineering and engineering
    support.
        You brought up bridging. What we have found at gap
    negotiation, gap crossing, is a shortfall and we have divested
    of bridging equipment, frankly, that was too heavy and
    logistically unsupportable.
        Senator Sullivan. So can marines cross a river if they do
    an amphibious invasion and find themselves three miles inland
    and have to cross a river?
        General Mahoney. So there are other ways to negotiate a
    gap, Senator. You know that. But as far as bridging goes, we
    are looking at more expeditionary solutions and this circles
    back to your point of recalibration.
        One of the things about Force Design, I will try to keep
    this short, was that it immediately admitted to being wrong. We
    were to challenge all the assumptions along the way.
        If we found an assumption wanting or invalid then we had to
    adjust to satisfy and verify that assumption. We have looked
    very closely through what we call the campaign of learning at
    those assumptions.
        We have adjusted the size of a battalion. We have adjusted
    some of the aviation capabilities we have. We have adjusted
    some of the weapons that we have either bought or not bought,
    and to your point where we are looking hard at expeditionary
    solutions to bridging.
        As far as joint support, frankly, I am less concerned about
    the Army providing an M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank for us as I
    am about us as a Joint Force being able to project, set a
    theater, and sustain a theater from a joint perspective.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Senator Hirono?
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In 2019 the Secretary of Defense discontinued certain tasks
    at the border after determining that servicemembers were not
    performing military functions and the continued support would
    negatively affect military readiness and morale.
        I think that is an important aspect of what is happening,
    the impact on morale.
        General Mingus and General Mahoney, how is the current
    deployment any different from 2019 when DHS was asking your
    units to perform the same non-DOD tasks?
        General Mingus. Thank you, ma'am.
        We have been asked to defend and secure the border and we
    are going to do that. That is a priority for this
    Administration. We are going to execute that mission as we have
    been asked to do.
        Anytime you are asked to defend it has three critical
    components, a physical, a technical, and a human. As those
    physical and technical things come online, as our Secretary
    testified, the human resources associated with this mission set
    will come down.
        But to answer your specific question that the lessons we
    learned from 2019 is the troop to task, as we like to use, was
    a one for one. Detection and monitoring, Path of Exile (POE)
    support, admin support, data entry, et cetera.
        So there was no time to come offline to continue to train
    and do their mission.
        Senator Hirono. So it does not sound much different than
    what was going on in 2019.
        General Mingus. No, this time we are going to make sure
    that the troop to task allows for rotations so that the
    degradation in readiness is not as substantial as what we saw
    in 2019.
        Senator Hirono. That remains to be seen.
        Do you have something to add?
        General Mahoney. Senator, similar but not the same.
        We have been on the border, as has been stated, for a
    while. The mission has changed with this recent evolution where
    we are primarily executing engineering tasks and engineering
    support tasks.
        Think barrier and placement. But we are also executing
    intelligence tasks and in both of those there is training
    value, especially for the intelligence analysts, to collect and
    analyze what is a very complex situation.
        But as General Mingus brought up, any time you have 10
    essential tasks and you are only training to one or two of them
    you have to figure out a way to either accept risk in the tasks
    that you are not training to or to figure out a training plan.
        Maybe unlike the Army, we even before we had a rotational
    basis where we could plus up the skills any tasks that were not
    being performed and we will manage the same way right now.
        Senator Hirono. From what you are testifying, you are
    needing to find some tasks that our military people are doing
    on the border that somehow has more relevance to what they
    should be doing in the military. Perhaps, if you had your
    druthers your people would not be in the border at all,
    especially as border crossings are at an all-time low.
        During the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
    posture hearing, General Guillot said that units deployed to
    the Southwest border get only one dedicated training day per
    week.
        General Mingus, General Mahoney, and Ms. Maurer is 1 day a
    week normal for military training?
        General Mingus. Depending on which cycle you are in, ma'am,
    it could be normal. But I will go back to where I talked about
    before it is the ability to cycle people in and out of their
    tasks associated with the border mission versus going back and
    the ability to train on their mission and central tasks.
        The other thing I would offer, and this is going to expand
    on General Mahoney, is that at the highest level of our
    doctrine the Joint Force has to be able execute offense,
    defense, and stability operations simultaneously.
        This is a defensive operation and so there is training
    value associated with that. Is it going to be the same as if
    they went to the National Training Center? Absolutely not. But
    there is still value to be had if the leadership takes the
    right approach to it.
        General Mahoney. Senator, I am not familiar with exactly
    what NORTHCOM said but I would maintain that our engineers and
    our intel analysts have had far more than 1 day of training to
    train for this mission.
        For obstacle and placement, for intelligence analysts, they
    undergo a whole battery of training to prepare them for just to
    support the civilians.
        Senator Hirono. So you are saying that our troops on the
    border are actually getting something that is equivalent to
    more than 1 day a week in training.
        So, you know what? I mean, I think that you are doing your
    best to be very forthcoming in your assessment of your troops
    being deployed to the border and, clearly, you are doing your
    best to enable these people to be getting some sort of
    equivalent training.
        But it is hard to, frankly, it kind of stretches the
    imagination to think that that is happening and that they are
    not losing the kind of training and opportunities to train that
    would be the case if they were not.
        Ms. Maurer. Senator, from a GAO perspective I will just say
    real briefly that I think back to one of my previous jobs at
    GAO was on GAOs Homeland Security and Justice team and that
    team continues to do oversight of the DHS, and I think about
    all the capabilities that currently exist within Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (ICE) and other Federal law enforcement agencies on the border.
        I think from an oversight perspective it would be
    interesting to pursue what those agencies are doing and at what
    point are their capabilities insufficient to meet the mission
    needs on the Southwest border and we are not looking
    specifically at that topic right now. But I think that is
    something valuable to think about.
        From a readiness perspective one of the trends we have seen
    over the years is there can sometimes be a tendency to look to
    DOD to perform functions that can also be performed by the
    domestic and civilian agencies.
        In many cases that is definitely warranted, but DOD comes
    in with a heavier footprint, it costs bigger dollars, and it
    does have a readiness and a mission and a resource tradeoff for
    the department as well.
        Senator Hirono. Yes. Of course, a flight using military
    aircraft to take only about 100 people to another country costs
    over $2 million. That is not a very efficient use of military
    resources.
        You raise a good point, Ms. Maurer. I know you know that up
    to today we have not received information from either the
    Homeland Security or the DOD as to the need asserted for the
    troops to go to the border.
        We await that kind of information but until then, highly
    questionable.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        I am going to wrap up here with just a few more questions.
    Again, thanks for the patience. This has been a really good,
    enlightening hearing and I appreciate all the witnesses'
    testimony and frank discussion of our readiness challenges.
        General Spain, I am going to turn to you a little bit on
    contested logistics. Ms. Maurer talked about it. We all deal
    with it, all the services, but the Air Force, I think, in
    particular with its tanker fleet, is particularly challenged
    because tankers are so important.
        The previous Secretary of the Air Force committed after the
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force and many others over the last
    several years we are going to be moving more KC-135s to
    Eielson.
        But what is the sense of your tanker fleet writ large and
    how can we be addressing that, and can you commit to me to
    keeping that timeline on getting those four tankers? I think
    one has already been moved to Eielson but we need three more
    with over 100 fifth-gen fighters in Alaska.
        As you know, our Air Force is doing a fantastic job, real-
    world missions, very regularly intercepting Russian Bear
    bombers in our Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Chinese
    and Russian strategic bombers in our ADIZ.
        Our military, our Air Force has done a great job up there.
    But as you know, those intercept missions are not easy and we
    need tankers, but we need tankers throughout the world. So what
    is the situation there?
        Lieutenant General Spain. Thanks, Senator. I appreciate the
    question.
        As you are fully aware, we are committed to the KC-46
    program, 89 aircraft on the ramp today, and recent deployments
    have been wildly successful in their ability to offload gas to
    a multitude of receivers both in theater and around the world.
        For the KC-135, obviously, we did some reengineering and
    service life extension in the 1980's and the 1990's that will
    keep the platform flying for decades to come.
        But we are also fully committed to tanker recapitalization
    post the KC-46 program. Right now we are on track to continue
    to procure 15 KC-46es a year and we are continuing to move the
    tanker recap acquisition strategy forward and we will continue
    to do so.
        To your point, we are continuing to move down the path to
    bringing the remaining three KC-135s to Eielson for the reasons
    that you mentioned. We have some work to do with the department
    on some notifications but beyond that we will be able to move
    relatively quickly.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Keep me posted on that. That is
    very important.
        General Mingus, we talked about the 11th Airborne Division,
    Arctic Angels. I would like to just to get an update from your
    perspective on how that unit is doing. I try to touch base with
    them a lot.
        From what I can tell they seem to be very motivated, and
    now that that is a warfighting headquarters any other
    additional personnel that we talked about coming to that unit
    in Alaska.
        Then any other thoughts about additional multi-domain task
    force that you are looking at placing? I know that you were
    looking at Alaska for a multi-domain task force at one point
    but just to update, really, the operations and morale of the
    11th Airborne Division, who do a great job in my State.
        General Mingus. Thanks, Chairman. I know you are proud of
    them and we are as well.
        Their trajectory still continues to move in a very positive
    direction both on the suicide front, also on the people side
    that you and I talked yesterday, but also on the operational
    side.
        Multiple warfighter exercises, they just demonstrated their
    ability to self-deploy in flight rig all the way from Alaska to
    Hawaii, jump in and participate in a high-scale warfighter
    exercise on island just a couple months ago. So from an
    operational perspective they continue to improve and get better
    every day.
        The other fundamental change that we made in Alaska was
    converting the brigade in Alaska from a Stryker to an infantry
    brigade combat team.
        So that climate, culture, and the identity associated with
    being light fighters, Arctic light fighters, they absolutely
    have embraced that. It has turned the corner in that
    organization and they are often a great start. So very, very
    proud of where they are headed.
        On the multi-domain task forces we did consider but in the
    end, sir, we did not make a selection to go to Alaska for the
    for the fifth multi-domain.
        Senator Sullivan. Where is the fifth multi-domain task
    force going to be home ported?
        General Mingus. Fort Lewis, Fort Carson, Hawaii, Fort
    Bragg, and Europe.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay, great. Thank you.
        Admiral, you and I had a good discussion on Adak the other
    day. If you look at a map it is an incredibly strategic base.
    It is the gateway to the Arctic. It is much further west than
    Hawaii. It is kind of a dagger in the flank of China.
        Can you give me your sense on the strategic value of Adak
    and any updates since you and I talked about that?
        Admiral Kilby. Well, just for the record, sir, we went to
    look at Adak from kind of a small, medium and large warm basing
    perspective on what we could do in the future with your
    support, and we are going to send up a team to engage with the
    Aleut Corporation and the Department of Transportation from
    Alaska to really understand that to a greater level.
        We sent 14 ships to Dutch Harbor last year, two from the
    Forward Deployment Naval Forces (FDNF), 12 from San Diego. So
    there is a need. I happened to speak to Admiral Paparo last
    night on a number of issues. This came up. He talked about the
    increased activity by China and Russia in that area.
        So, to me, that lends itself to address those types of
    activities so we are not having to sail so far to get there.
        Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate that, and again, that
    is not just aircraft. Strategic bombers and our ADIZ that our
    great Air Force is doing such a good job of addressing.
        To your point, it is Chinese and Russian joint naval task
    forces in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up in Alaska. This
    is happening on a regular basis. The rest of the country does
    not really notice but we notice in Alaska. We are on the front
    lines, and we appreciate the great work our servicemembers are
    doing there.
        I want to thank you on that and look forward to working
    with you on that.
        Can we get to a point, I know it was already discussed in
    depth, but on the on the amphibs between the Navy and the
    Marine Corps?
        You know, General Mahoney, we talked about the marines kind
    of 911 kick in the door capability. But essentially that goes
    away if you do not have a MEU Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that
    you can rely on.
        So, Admiral, can you commit to us to work with us and the
    Marine Corps on prioritizing amphibs? You know, I am just being
    frank here. You do not get the sense that if it was a Ford-
    class carrier or something like that that the maintenance
    numbers that GAO has reported would be so challenged.
        Right now the recent GAO report stated, roughly, 50 percent
    of the amphib fleet was in poor condition, poor material
    condition, including five out of the nine Landing Helicopter
    Assault/Dock (LHA/LHD) carriers, in 90 percent of the LSDs.
    Those are numbers that are shocking and they really undermine
    the Marine Corps' ability to do its job. It is a team--one
    team, one fight, Navy/Marine Corps. But that is a real
    detriment.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. I am not
    satisfied with amphibious maintenance or readiness. We are
    committed to the 80 percent combat surge ready.
        Senator Sullivan. So that is going to be all surface
    warships, the 80 percent idea?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. As a subset, I have asked Admiral
    McLane, who is a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) boss, to really
    do a deep dive on amphibious ships in particular and there are
    some things I discussed that we can do better there.
        But you have my commitment to meet that goal, to exceed
    that goal, and to ensure that we have a three-ship amphibious
    ready group (ARG) ready for the Marine Corps when they embark.
        As a result of the Boxer and Wasp challenges, the LHDs that
    you mentioned, I directed a study in last April, and I reviewed
    that study in November and there are some actions that were
    taken to get after that splitting up the flag responsibilities
    of Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNMRC), which is
    a maintenance command, as of today, and C-21. Admiral Bill
    Greene will give command to Admiral Lannamann and he will be C-
    21 and Admiral Lannamann will be CNRMC.
        So focusing on that with that effort and leadership I think
    will help us there but as a subset of our perform to plan for
    surface ships I am going to focus on amphibious ships. You have
    my commitment.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much for that.
        General, how many MEU ARGs did we deploy out of the West
    Coast last year?
        General Mahoney. Fifteenth MEU.
        Senator Sullivan. Was it a full complement?
        General Mahoney. It was not. It was due to the issues with
    Boxer, Somerset sailed as a single. She was joined by Harper's
    Ferry. Boxer had to go back for maintenance, and so it was a
    conga line of three ships. I believe they only operated as a
    three-ship for less than 2 months.
        Senator Sullivan. We need to fix that.
        My final question is a bit of a complicated one. So,
    General Guetlein, I am going to give it to you since it seems
    to make the most sense but it is an issue that I am trying to
    figure out how we work this, and it relates to the President's
    vision for a Golden Dome.
        As I mentioned, have drafted legislation with Senator
    Cramer that we are hoping is going to be bipartisan. It is very
    comprehensive in terms of missile defense for the country.
        I think most people would be surprised that missile defense
    for America really, really strongly entails pretty much every
    service right here. Of course, there is a space-based
    component, that is in my bill. There is an Army component.
        General Mingus, you certainly know the 49th missile defense
    battalion is a U.S. Army battalion at Fort Greely that really
    protects the whole country right now.
        I love their motto, ``The 300 protecting the 300 million,''
    but all the ground-based missile interceptors protecting our
    country are at Fort Greely. This bill would dramatically plus
    that up.
        Admiral, this bill has a lot of Aegis Ashore focus, in
    Hawaii, for example, in other places. Then, of course, General
    Spain, the Air Force plays a huge role in missile defense.
        So my question is as we are working on this, I briefed Mike
    Waltz on our bill. I briefed Secretary Hegseth on our bill, I
    have even briefed President Trump on the legislation that we
    put together after the executive order came out. So I know the
    Pentagon is really getting on this.
        How do we coordinate? What is your sense, and, General, I
    will start with you as the Space Force service.
        What is the best way to try to integrate and work together?
    This Committee wants to work with all the services but it is an
    integrated effort. It literally is Space Force, Air Force,
    Army, Navy.
        The Marine Corps, as I am sure, has some tactical element
    to it, General Mahoney, but this is a full service approach.
        What is the best way that we can work together
    legislatively, of course, with the President's executive order,
    but the full Pentagon integrating the different services, all
    of whom play a important role?
        I think a lot of Americans would be surprised that, you
    know, the cornerstone of missile defense, which is in Alaska,
    all the ground-based missile interceptors commanded by the
    Army, all the major radar sites, particularly the Clear Space
    Force Air Station with the new long-range discrimination radar.
        How do we integrate that, General, and if anyone else has a
    thought on that. It is a really important issue. It is a really
    good vision that the President has put forward. We just need to
    operationalize it between the Pentagon, the Congress, and we
    need to get on it.
        Ms. Maurer, if you have a view on this as well I would
    welcome that.
        So, General, why do we not start with you? Final question,
    I promise, but it is an important one.
        General Guetlein. Thank you, Senator. Let me start with it
    is a very bold vision that is going to have a lot of complexity
    to it, as you said.
        The good news is we just met with the Vice Chairman
    yesterday in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. So we
    had all the combatant commands.
        We had the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staffs.
    We had the service staffs. We had National Geospacial-
    Intelligence Agency (NGA). We had Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    and the National Reconnaissance Office all present in that room
    talking about what is it going to take to get after something
    of this magnitude.
        I would compare this, the only time that I can think of in
    the history of the United States where we have gone after
    something this complex was the Manhattan Project. That is how
    complex this capability is going to be.
        I am going to tell you it is not complex because the
    technology is going to be hard. It is complex because of the
    number of organizations and the number of agencies that need to
    be involved as you said as you were going around with your
    question.
        Organizational behavior and culture are going to be our two
    biggest challenges. The way to get through organizational
    behavior and challenges is we got to make sure first and
    foremost that we have one entity in charge that has the full
    support of the Nation, from the President, from the Hill and
    from the American people on down. That person or that that
    entity needs to be empowered and resourced to make decisions
    across organizational boundaries.
        Senator Sullivan. Do we have that yet?
        General Guetlein. We do not have that yet. That is what was
    in discussion. That is what we talked about yesterday with the
    Vice Chairman. We are going to talk about it next week with the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Sullivan. Good.
        General Guetlein. The Secretary of Defense owes an answer
    back to the President by the end of March.
        Senator Sullivan. Good.
        General Guetlein. We are on path to do that. Not only is it
    an organizational challenge between agencies and services but
    we also need to bring the full blunt of our industrial base
    into the equation and empower them to be successful, harness
    their innovation.
        That means we need to embrace the nontraditional
    contractors and get their ideas and get their capabilities on
    the table.
        Senator Sullivan. By the way, they are really motivated,
    those nontraditional contractors, to play an important role
    here. So I am really glad you are highlighting that.
        General Guetlein. Yes, sir. We have had numerous industry
    days. I have taken numerous meetings.
        The Missile Defense Agency had an industry day trying to
    look at the whole of the U.S., not just the government, but the
    whole of the U.S. to get after this problem. We are also having
    conversations with our allies, can the allies bring
    capabilities to the table.
        The Canadians are very interested in partnering with us on
    the protection of the Homeland. They would like it to be the
    protection of the continent. So we are having those kind of
    conversations as well.
        Senator Sullivan. It would be great to see the Canadians
    participating and helping fund missile defense right now. It is
    my distinct recollection that they do not participate hardly at
    all. They do not do anything on North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD) missile defense.
        General Guetlein. They do participate in NORAD. They do not
    participate in missile defense. Yes, that is correct.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes. They need to participate in missile
    defense. If a rogue North Korean missile is shot into our
    continent we are not going to wait to see if it hits Chicago or
    Toronto. We are going to shoot it down.
        Canada needs to step up like they have not been on defense
    spending. It has been woefully inadequate as a wealthy North
    American Treaty Organization (NATO) member, and they need to do
    it on missile defense, too.
        I have been pressing the Canadians for years on this. They
    do not put any money into missile defense and it is not
    acceptable.
        General Guetlein. The last element that I would bring to
    bear on here, as we start to look at the authorities and start
    looking at the accountability everything we have talked about
    in this session today dealing with the continuing resolution
    also comes to bear.
        This program to be successful has to have funding
    stability. They have to know that they are going to have those
    resources from year to year to be successful or else they are
    going to be very inefficient and they are going to suffer death
    by a thousand cuts through fits and starts and stops.
        Senator Sullivan. That is an outstanding answer, General. I
    really appreciate that.
        Any other comments? Ms. Maurer, do you have a----
        Ms. Maurer. Yes, very quickly, Mr. Chairman.
        So we issued a report a couple weeks ago looking at
    sustainment of missile defense in Guam, which I think could be,
    in a sense, sort of a preview of potential coming attractions,
    and the general's point is definitively spot on about the sheer
    complexity of the number of organizations.
        That report we had probably the most complicated org chart
    that I have ever put in a report that I signed out under my
    name because there are so many different organizations.
        That is just Guam, which is a small island, as you know. So
    getting arms around that challenge is going to be important.
        The second point I would like to make is that thinking
    about sustainment, that needs to be part of the conversation
    from day one. That has been a continuing challenge in the
    missile defense enterprise.
        The Missile Defense Agency develops and purchases the
    technology. In theory, it is handed off to one of the services
    to operate and sustain. Those handoffs have not been happening
    in the way that they have been envisioned.
        In fact, that is one of our recommendations in this report
    on Guam is that DOD needs to spell out specifically who is
    going to do what and how sustainment is going to work for a
    Guam defense system.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Any other thoughts?
        Admiral?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes. I am just going to offer one thing I
    talked about at Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). We
    can do this. In 2008 we shot down a satellite that was
    deorbiting full of fuel in 6 weeks.
        The whole-of-government got together with agencies, the
    science community, and industry and we made it happen. So we
    can do this. We just need to do the things that were outlined
    and provide clear lines in C2 and solid, consistent budgeting,
    and I am convinced that we can deliver.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. That is a great answer. Anyone else
    on this topic?
        General Spain?
        Lieutenant General Spain. Senator, briefly, I agree with
    everything that has been said.
        The stitching together of the various capabilities will be
    the key enabler of Iron Dome and Golden Dome, obviously, the
    scaffolding of which exists today in Air Force forces and Space
    Force forces, along with the Army ground-based deterrent.
        The integrated Program Executive Officer (PEO) that we have
    in Major General Luke Cropsey in our Advanced Battle Management
    System (ABMS) program and the Combined Joint All Domain Command
    and Control (CJADC2) program will be the thing that will allow
    each of the services to connect the effectors, the sensors, and
    the sense making capability across all services and agencies.
        That will need to be a primary focus of this effort along
    with the capabilities that each of the services will bring.
        Senator Sullivan. Good. Well, these are great answers. You
    know, you have a strong vision from the Commander in Chief. The
    President, obviously, is really focused on this. He mentioned
    it in his State of the Union last week.
        It will be in the budget reconciliation bill that we are
    working on. The DOD component is going to have a lot of funding
    on this. So I think it is a sense of urgency that we all need
    to work together on, the Congress, the executive branch.
        General, you kind of laid out a vision in the importance of
    some key principles and we look forward to working with all of
    you and look forward to having that designated individual or
    agency in charge. I think that is a really important component
    as well.
        So with that, I want to thank everybody. This has been a
    long hearing but a really important hearing. I want to thank,
    again, all six of you for your decades of service to our
    country in uniform and not in uniform. GAO does a great job.
        If there are additional questions for the record my Senate
    colleagues will submit those in the next few days, and we
    respectfully request that you try to respond to those within
    the next 2 to 3 weeks.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                     alaska
        1. Senator Sullivan. General Mahoney, 6 years ago, the Marine Corps
    was poised to alter its Indo-Pacific force laydown to account for the
    inherent risk of access, basing, and overflight (ABO) denial and
    limited training opportunities on Marine Corps bases across the Indo-
    Pacific. The 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert
    Neller, sent several teams to Alaska to assess infrastructure and
    training opportunities to support a Unit Deployment Program (UDP) to
    preposition assets the Marine Corps would need to surge forward in the
    event of conflict with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Alaska's
    benefits were as obvious then as they are now: Alaska provides year-
    round training for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in nearly
    every clime and place found on the globe; Alaska's cold weather
    training opportunities are cheaper than other overseas options and
    permit significantly larger forces to train simultaneously; perhaps
    most importantly, Alaska is in the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)
    Area of Responsibility (AOR). The Secretary of the Navy nominee, John
    Phelan, committed to work with me to resource the Marine Corps to get a
    UDP or regular rotation to Alaska. Will you work with me to ensure we
    resource our Marine Corps appropriately so that we can support a UDP or
    regular rotation to Alaska and take advantage of the unique
    opportunities afforded by the great State of Alaska?
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps prioritizes maximizing
    participation in Alaska-based exercises, including Red Flag, Northern
    Edge, and Arctic Edge. Arctic Edge 25 exemplifies this increased focus,
    evolving from a single company commitment into a large-scale,
    distributed, multi-domain exercise, led by a Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force (MAGTF) and spanning the Aleutian Islands. The Marine Corps uses
    the Unit Deployment Program (UDP), governed by the Global Force
    Management Allocation Process (GFMAP), to manage all unit deployments.
        Currently, six UDPs exist, five within the U.S. Indo-Pacific
    Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Three of these
    USINDOPACOM deployments position infantry battalions in Okinawa, Japan,
    while two are seasonal deployments to Australia and Singapore. Any
    increase in UDPs necessitates Combatant Command Requests for Forces
    through the GFMAP or direct intervention by the Secretary of Defense.
    To source an additional UDP without pulling out of existing
    requirements, the Marine Corps would require either end-strength growth
    or relief from current taskings. Otherwise, deploying units would face
    an unsustainable deployment to dwell ratio and a high level of risk to
    operational readiness.

        2. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, can you elaborate on what the
    Army is doing regarding Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Counter
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (cUAS) testing with the University of
    Alaska--Fairbanks and what its plans might be to expand that testing in
    the future?
        General Mingus. The Army and University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF)
    Alaska Center for UAS Integration (ACUASI) have developed a strong
    partnership in the area of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). UAF has
    worked with Army partners on cold weather UAS requirement development,
    additive manufacturing feasibility, National Defense Authorization Act-
    compliant small UAS training, and airspace deconfliction. Potential
    areas for expansion in the future include lethal UAS integration
    efforts, longer term airspace management strategy development, and the
    addition of a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility for
    increased ability for ACUASI to handle classified information.

        3. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, the 11th Airborne Division
    (Arctic Angels) is the Nation's premiere Arctic unit and it's only
    Arctic-designated Airborne Unit. However, in recent years the rollout
    of the Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CAT-V) and procurement
    contracts for cold weather clothing have fallen short of desired
    resourcing levels. Can you describe on what efforts the Army is taking
    to speed up CAT-V deployment?
        General Mingus. The Army is leveraging fiscal year 2024
    Supplemental funding through the Tranche replacement process to
    complete the fielding of the Cold Weather All-Terrain Vehicle (CAT-V)
    to the two brigades of the 11th Airborne Division (ABD). We are on
    track to deliver 11 CATVs this fiscal year and another 24 vehicles in
    fiscal year 2026. I have approved the developing Arctic Modified Tables
    of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) to reflect the doctrinal
    requirement for equipment required to operate in the Arctic. The
    initial basis of issue for CAT-V in an Arctic MTOE is 92 per brigade.
    We anticipate this MTOE change to reflect later in fiscal year 2026.
        The All-Range Tactical Clothing (ARTC) program for the 11th ABD is
    currently on track to award a Low-Rate Initial Production contract in
    fiscal year 2026, with initial fielding planned for the 1st quarter of
    fiscal year 2027. We are working with the 11th ABD to establish
    procedures that will enable the Division to execute direct procurement
    of cold weather clothing.

        4. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, can you describe what the Army
    is doing to create long-term supply chains for winter weather clothing
    and personally issued equipment for 11th Airborne?
        General Mingus. To improve the delivery of Organizational Clothing
    and Individual Equipment (OCIE), the Army has established the Army OCIE
    Board (AOB) at the Headquarters Department of the Army level. The AOB
    will align current and future OCIE programs with Army priorities,
    ensuring optimal funding and addressing the unique needs of units
    operating in extreme cold weather, such as the 11th ABD. By fostering
    collaboration and enhancing visibility, the AOB will oversee the
    funding, fielding, and maintenance of new capabilities for soldiers,
    like the ARTC, being developed by the Program Executive Office Soldier,
    for operating in arctic climates. This improved oversight will enable
    more accurate long-term demand forecasting for our supply partners. The
    Army utilizes Regional Logistics Supply Centers and Central Issue
    Facilities to efficiently distribute equipment for units.
        The Army continues to collaborate closely with our supply partners
    through contract reviews, prioritizing clothing and equipment needs,
    seeking opportunities to improve visibility into contract performance
    and mitigate potential supply shortfalls. The addition of the AOB will
    further strengthen the long-term supply chain for extreme weather
    clothing and personally issued equipment for units operating in
    extreme-weather environments.
        In 2024, we enhanced cold weather readiness in Alaska by increasing
    the basis of issue for Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System layers 1,
    2, and 5, providing an additional set to all Soldiers, including those
    in the 11th ABD. This initiative, driven by Soldier feedback and a 2022
    request, ensures adequate layering options and addresses laundry cycle
    needs in the extreme Alaskan climate. It included utilizing on-hand
    stocks and increasing orders, transitioning to Operational Camouflage
    Pattern items in 2024.

        5. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, as you may know, the President
    of the United States (POTUS) signed an executive order called
    ``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential'' which relies
    heavily on the U.S. Army to help the Governor of Alaska facilitate
    large scale building projects in Alaska. Can you work with me to ensure
    that we are maintaining levels of readiness in U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers (USACE) to complete these types of projects?
        General Mingus. Yes, I will ensure that the Department of the Army
    supports and complies with the President's Executive Order to enable
    actions in compliance with current law. I will also ensure that the
    U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains a level of readiness to continue
    providing assistance to the State of Alaska in accordance with the
    President's Executive Order.

        6. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, in a 2018 interview, then
    Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer, said that the Navy ``needs to
    have on-sea presence [in the Arctic] now that we have a blue water
    Arctic more times than not.'' He additionally pushed the Navy to look
    at ``warming up Adak again,'' not only for additional training but also
    for naval sea and air facilities, as well as bulk fuel capability. When
    Chinese and Russian naval vessels and air assets enter the Alaska
    Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone
    (ADIZ), aircraft and ships must often travel long distances, which
    stretch sustainment and make it more difficult to keep a constant
    presence in the region where our adversaries are located. How concerned
    are you that our existing infrastructure in Alaska is insufficient to
    counter the threats posed by China and Russia in the Arctic?
        Admiral Kilby. Russia and China are expected to continue their
    episodic air and maritime operations in the Arctic region to signal
    their deepening defense ties. China has declared itself a ``near-
    Arctic-state'' with rights to participate in Arctic governance, as it
    seeks to legitimize its influence in Arctic affairs. China is expected
    to leverage its increased cooperation with Russia to increase its
    Arctic presence. However, neither Chinese nor Russian advancements in
    the Arctic have kept pace with their stated goals for Arctic expansion.
        The U.S. Navy operates and exercises in the Subarctic Region and
    conducts subsurface and periodic surface operations and exercises
    within the Arctic Region, including in response to Russian and Chinese
    out of area deployers. While dedicated U.S. Navy infrastructure in
    Alaska to support these operations is limited, the Navy successfully
    relies on joint and commercial infrastructure. Navy combatants--and
    more frequently--Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, have refueled in
    Alaskan commercial ports including Dutch Harbor and Anchorage over the
    past several years. Navy P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and
    reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) routinely deploy to and operate from
    Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. In short, given
    the current trajectory of Russian and Chinese military capabilities in
    the Arctic, our existing infrastructure in Alaska is sufficient to
    counter these threats in the near to mid-term.

        7. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, Alaska is the only U.S. State
    in the Arctic region. What advantages do you see in having multiple
    ports in the Aleutians and Western Alaska that can refuel U.S. Navy
    ships?
        Admiral Kilby. In the Arctic, as elsewhere, a military force that
    possesses multiple locations to rearm, refuel, repair, resupply, and
    revive maximizes its operational flexibility. Distributed logistics
    hubs allow a fleet to operate persistently, with fewer limitations, and
    sustain a higher tempo in support of sustained combat operations. That
    being said, the establishment of a forward base with the necessary
    capabilities, infrastructure, and personnel to support naval combatants
    comes at a very high cost with frequent severe operational restrictions
    due to the harsh Arctic environment. We must balance our requirements
    for each theater and assess the relative value of potential forward
    bases within each theatre compared to the resources required to build
    and sustain those bases. With the rapidly increasing reach of the
    pacing threat, fixed bases are subject to adversary strikes from
    strategic distances, especially in Alaska and the Aleutians, and would
    drive a requirement for substantive missile defense capability.

        8. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Spain, in 2024, after 10
    years of discussions, the Secretary of the Air Force recently signed
    off on a memorandum to base 4x KC-135's in Alaska through active
    association to Eielson Air Force Base. We are still waiting for final
    delivery of 3x KC-135s to Eielson Air Force Base along with the
    facilities and military construction projects needed to support them.
    This Active Duty component brings flexibility to a very critical
    capability in our Air National Guard. Can I get your commitment to
    fulfill the promise of Secretary Frank Kendall to send the remaining
    three aircraft to Alaska as quickly as possible?
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. On December 13, 2024, the Air Force
    announced an increase in KC-135 at Eielson Air Force Base (AFB) with
    the first of the four aircraft already assigned and on-station at
    Eielson AFB. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) will continue with the transfer
    and movement of aircraft, personnel and their families throughout
    fiscal year 2026 to meet Full Operational Capability. The USAF is
    finalizing its analysis of personnel requirements and expects an
    increase of 8175 (plus dependents). Initial coordination of the
    Overseas Force Structure Change is being staffed by the Joint Staff and
    OSD.
        unmanned aircraft systems and counter unmanned aircraft systems
        9. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, how are lessons learned about
    UAS/cUAS warfare from Ukraine and the Tower 22 incident in the Middle
    East making their way into maneuver doctrine and training?
        General Mingus. The Army, with feedback from Army Commands to
    include our joint partners, uses the lessons learned and observations
    drawn from recent conflicts to inform our approach to doctrine
    development, Initial Military Training, and unit training in
    preparation for combat operations. For example, the Maneuver Center of
    Excellence (MCoE) recently published Counter-sUAS Training Modules in
    Joint Knowledge On-Line and has published the react to sUAS contact
    mounted and dismounted battle drill. The team is currently developing a
    doctrinal publication describing the tactical employment of sUAS and
    two Training Circulars providing training guidance for both sUAS and
    lethal sUAS systems. The MCoE also ensures Initial Military Training,
    Infantry and Armor Basic Officer Leader Courses, Maneuver Captains
    Career Courses, and multiple functional courses all incorporate sUAS
    into training. This training uses specific techniques, such as the use
    of cover, concealment, camouflage, dispersion, radio, and electronic
    transmission discipline as well as incorporating inert drop munitions
    (water balloons and chalk) to simulate sUAS aerial attack in training.
    All this is done to enable Soldiers to operate in an environment
    contested with the ubiquitous presence of sUAS or drones. Finally,
    lessons learned are used to develop Opposing Forces threat scenarios at
    our Combat Training Centers providing the most realistic combat
    training and scenarios to develop the most lethal Warfighters and
    units.

        10. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, what does that pipeline look
    like from the moment the lessons are gathered to dissemination into the
    Force?
        General Mingus. The pipeline of observations from the evolving
    character of warfare and change on battlefields is best characterized
    as The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) which consists of--
    Military Analyst Forward--Field units--our automated Quickfire system
    and connections to the Joint Lessons Learned System.
        Ukraine along with multiple theaters are actively monitored due to
    rapidly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures of warfare.
    Regardless of the source for the observation, trend, or insight, we
    have the systems and processes in place to rapidly analyze the
    observation for U.S. Army implications. This process feeds the
    development of changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
    Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).
        To enable rapid entry and dissemination, we have the Quickfire
    observation portal that allows all Army components maximum access to
    enter observation, trend, and insight feedback. Quickfire affirms that
    every Soldier is a mobile and agile sensor. Senior leaders can view a
    dashboard to quickly detect training and operation trends that span the
    DOTMLPF-P spectrum. CALL maintains the data entries in a cloud with
    Microsoft Business Intelligence software.
        Changes in Doctrine, Training, and Leadership and Education are
    relatively fast--days to weeks from the time we screen an observation
    as valid and identify its U.S. Army implications. Solutions requiring
    organizational re-design, new materiel, upgraded facilities, or even
    revised policies take longer--months to even years depending on the
    respective manning, equipping, or military construction processes.
    Continuous Transformation addresses all time horizons: Transformation
    in Contact (near term solutions 18-24 months), Deliberate
    Transformation (2-7 years), and Concept-Driven Transformation (7 to 15
    years).
        Concurrently, CALL analysts are present with key units, locations,
    and training events to observe and guide the feedback process pipeline.
    In addition, CALL conducts quarterly lesson learned reviews and updates
    across the Army enterprise which brings in all Army leaders to
    highlight changes, current trends and status of on-going lessons
    integration. This is also the venue where field units are selected to
    share and brief key observations from recent exercises, training events
    or experimentation. This pipeline enables DOTMLPF-P integration with
    the alignment of Army Futures Command, Futures and Concepts Center,
    Cross Functional Teams, Capability Development Integration Directorates
    with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Combined Arms Center,
    and Centers of Excellence. These key organizations enable enterprise-
    level force development and provide warfighters with the concepts and
    future force designs needed for transformation.

        11. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus and General Mahoney, how are
    the Army and Marine Corps working together to develop UAS or cUAS
    capabilities for ground forces?
        General Mingus. The Army has partnered with the USMC on a few
    efforts in both the C-sUAS and sUAS capabilities. In the C-sUAS space,
    the Army leveraged USMC Tactical Resupply UAS program for our Joint
    Tactical Autonomous Aerial Resupply System efforts. We utilized the
    same air vehicle (Service Engineering TRV-150) and leveraged USMC
    research and development efforts and their data to support Army
    Airworthiness Release, Authority to Operate, Life Cycle Sustainment
    Plan, and other documentation. In the sUAS space, we coordinate with
    USMC to leverage their data on systems they have researched to support
    our Long-Range Reconnaissance (LRR) effort, which consists of at least
    one of the potential awardees for the LRR development contract. The
    Army also expects to initiate Middle Tier Rapid Prototyping efforts in
    early fiscal year 2026 for its Launched Effects Long Range effort and
    plans to again leverage significant investment made by the USMC in
    their launched effects capabilities. This will allow for accelerated
    fielding to Soldiers and provide a valuable baseline for further
    development.
        General Mahoney. The Army and Marine Corps are collaborating to
    develop UAS capabilities for ground forces through mutual briefings and
    integration efforts. The Marine Corps recently briefed Army
    stakeholders on the Unmanned Common Control (UCC) concept and policy,
    while the Army shared details on its Uncrewed Vehicle Control (UVC)
    program, which leverages common software like Robotics and Autonomous
    Command and Control (RAC2) for ground systems and small UAS, and
    Scalable Control Interface (SCI) for larger UAS. The Army excels in
    software development but faces hardware challenges, whereas the Marine
    Corps has identified MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link (MANGL) hardware
    nodes for UCC but lacks integrated software. In fiscal years 2025 to
    2026, UCC efforts will involve competing and selecting UCC software,
    with Army's SCI, RAC2, and UVC under consideration. Regular meetings
    and Army UVC demonstration touchpoints facilitate further integration.
        The Marine Corps works directly with the Army and the Joint Force
    to inform development of cUAS capabilities. Additionally, the
    relationship with the Joint Counter-Small UAS Office (JCO), led by the
    Army as the Department of Defense's executive agent for counter-small
    UAS, identifies opportunities for resource sharing, enhanced
    interoperability, and potential streamlined acquisition. The forum
    provided by the JCO governance process at the working group and general
    officer levels enhances information sharing and promotes collaboration.
    The Marine Corps actively engages with the JCO, leveraging lessons
    learned from JCO activities to inform air defense capability
    development. Also, the Marine Corps' participation in periodic
    demonstrations, experiments, and exercises with the Army Rapid
    Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office has provided welcomed
    exposure to the myriad cUAS solutions, some of which may be adopted for
    Marine Corps use. Additionally, the Marine Corps is exploring expanding
    participation in JCO-developed training materials and courses at the
    Joint Counter-Small UAS University (JCU) at Fort Sill to improve cUAS
    capabilities across the Marine Corps and promote further alignment with
    Army UAS efforts.

        12. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Spain, in my home State of
    Alaska we have the highest concentration of combat-coded fifth
    generation aircraft in the world including F-35s. The Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) has reported extensively on F-35
    sustainment challenges including low mission capable and full mission
    capable rates that do not meet service targets, reliability and
    maintenance issues, and spare parts availability.
        Lieutenant General Spain, in 2024, GAO reported that Department of
    Defense (DOD) plans call for procuring 2,470 F-35s at an estimated
    total acquisition cost of about $442 billion and an additional $1.58
    trillion in sustainment costs. These costs have grown 44 percent since
    2018 due to an extension of the planned life cycle of the aircraft to
    the 2070's and 2080's. In recent years the program has not met
    performance goals for F-35 aircraft readiness. What is the Air Force
    doing to improve F-35 affordability and availability to ensure the
    aircraft are ready to support mission needs?
        Lieutenant General Spain. We are also not satisfied with the
    current sustainment posture in the F-35 program. The USAF is engaged
    with the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), international partners, and
    industry teammates to address sustainment costs challenges and fully
    supports the current JPO F-35 Sustainment Reset efforts. The USAF will
    continue to provide expertise and resources to assist the JPO in
    working sustainment contracting, modernization prioritization, and
    propulsion issues, among others. The largest Service drivers for
    sustainment costs are fleet size, flying hours, and personnel. The USAF
    is reviewing the Future Force Design, the appropriate mix of live,
    virtual, and constructive training for our pilots, and the optimum
    number of maintenance personnel for the program.

        13. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Spain, how do the
    sustainment challenges I've outlined above effect the Services' ability
    to meet operations and training requirements for the aircraft in the
    near and long term?
        Lieutenant General Spain. Shortfalls in F-35 mission capability
    rates directly impact operational readiness and training requirements.
    Deployed units are meeting their readiness requirements, but units in
    garrison are operating at suboptimal capacity, are suffering training
    shortfalls, and are forced to focus on priority training requirements
    to mitigate those impacts. The F-35 flying training units face
    additional challenges from older model aircraft that have lower mission
    capability rates than the fleet average. We fully support the F-35
    Joint Program Office Sustainment Reset efforts to aggressively address
    all F-35 readiness issues.
                             shipbuilding capacity
        14. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and Ms. Maurer, since 2018 the
    Navy has been implementing the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
    Program (SIOP) to improve the Nation's four public yards and maximize
    maintenance availabilities. Can you describe what the status of those
    improvements are overall and whether you're pleased with the progress
    the Navy has made?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, the Navy is satisfied with the improvements
    delivered to date and appreciates the ongoing support from Congress for
    this critically important program. To date, SIOP has completed 45
    projects, 237 new pieces of capitalized equipment, and an Area
    Development Plan for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. Included in the $1.2B
    of completed construction is a Waterfront Production Facility at
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard expected to reduce submarine maintenance
    period duration by 2 percent, as well as upgraded piers for the newest
    Virginia Class Submarines and a training facility in Norfolk that
    consolidates classrooms from 14 different buildings. Progress continues
    with 48 projects in execution (valued at $6 billion), including the dry
    dock 3 replacement in Pearl Harbor, the shipyard electrical backbone in
    Puget Sound, the dry dock 4 refueling complex in Norfolk, and the
    multi-mission dry dock #1 extension in Portsmouth.
        Ms. Maurer. The Navy must have combat-ready ships to keep the U.S.
    safe and ensure the seas are open to trade. The Navy's four public
    shipyards in the U.S. play a critical role in helping the Navy maintain
    the readiness of its fleet of nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines
    and in supporting ongoing operations around the world.
        The Navy has taken several actions in recent years to improve the
    four public Navy shipyards in the U.S. but has made limited progress
    implementing its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP).
    Since 2017, GAO has issued a series of reports with 10 recommendations
    to help enhance the Navy's efforts to improve the public shipyards. \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Naval Shipyards: Actions Needed to Improve Poor Conditions
    that Affect Operations, GAO-17-548 (Washington, DC, Sept. 12, 2017);
    GAO, Naval Shipyards: Key Actions Remain to Improve Infrastructure to
    Better Support Navy Operations, GAO-20-64 (Washington, DC, Nov. 25,
    2019); GAO, Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Cost and Schedule
    Estimates for Shipyard Improvement, GAO-23-106067 (Washington, DC, June
    28, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GAO found in prior work, for example:

          The Navy's four public shipyards in the U.S are in poor
    condition, and capital equipment is generally past its useful life.

          Navy dry docks are unable to support newer ship classes,
    such as the Ford-class aircraft carrier and some Virginia-class attack
    submarines.

          Navy drydocks are vulnerable to flooding and seismic
    risks such as earthquakes.

          The Navy's public shipyards in the U.S. have inefficient
    layouts that contribute to thousands of days of maintenance delays for
    aircraft carriers and submarines.

        GAO reported that in July 2022, the Navy completed a shipyard-
    specific plan for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to inform estimates for
    the overall SIOP costs--including dry dock, facility optimization, and
    capital equipment costs. The Navy's estimated costs to implement the
    plan significantly increased--by $9.9 billion, or 162 percent above its
    2018 estimate--due to several factors, such as expanding the scope of
    individual projects as well as identifying additional projects that
    were not part of the original cost estimate. As noted previously, the
    Navy intends to complete a shipyard-specific plan for each of the four
    public shipyards in the U.S.
        In 2023, GAO identified several key challenges affecting dry docks,
    facilities, and equipment.\2\ These include: costs of SIOP drydock
    projects have more than doubled; backlog of restoration and
    modernization projects intended to restore, renovate, or replace
    buildings or components has continued to grow in recent years, and is
    now over $7 billion; and the age of capital equipment has grown since
    2016, and more than half of all shipyard equipment is past its expected
    service life.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Navy Readiness: Actions Needed to Address Cost and
    Schedule Estimates for Shipyard Improvement, GAO-23-106067 (Washington,
    DC, June 28, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As of March 2025, the Navy has implemented five of GAO's
    recommendations. Implementing these recommendations has allowed the
    Navy to better manage its SIOP efforts by ensuring clear roles and
    responsibilities, performing regular management reviews, and providing
    consistent updates to Congress, among others (see table 1).

        However, as of March 2025, the Navy has not implemented five GAO
    recommendations related to SIOP (see table 2).

        Absent improvements, the Navy public shipyards in the U.S. will be
    unable to support about a third of the Navy's planned maintenance
    availabilities for aircraft carriers and submarines through 2040. The
    lack of a results-oriented management approach could lead to
    ineffective investment, resulting in missed opportunities for
    improvement that could affect shipyard cost and schedule performance.
    Further, if the shipyards are unable to maintain facilities and
    equipment, they risk not being able to support Navy readiness over the
    long term. Moreover, by developing a more complete cost estimate, the
    Navy could reduce the risk that it might request too little funding to
    achieve its desired outcome. Without high-quality estimates, agencies
    are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and
    performance shortfalls. Last, by ensuring the Navy follows best
    practices for cost and schedule estimating for all key SIOP projects,
    the Navy could reduce the risk that it might request too little funding
    to achieve its desired outcomes or experience schedule slippages that
    could adversely affect its ongoing maintenance missions.
        GAO is currently examining the Navy's implementation of SIOP,
    including plans and projects at each of the four public Navy shipyards.
    Specifically, GAO is reviewing the extent to which (1) Navy oversight
    of SIOP includes processes for identifying, mitigating, and
    communicating program risks to inform decisionmaking; (2) the Navy has
    established project management mechanisms to ensure each shipyard's
    SIOP projects fulfill shipyard, fleet, and program requirements and
    objectives; and (3) what, if any, challenges, efficiencies, or other
    observations the Navy has identified implementing SIOP to date, and to
    what extent has it informed relevant SIOP planning or project
    activities. GAO plans to issue its report in early 2026.

        15. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, last year in response to
    concerns about ship repair capacity in allied shipyards, my team worked
    on a provision to expand repair access for U.S. ships in overseas
    locations. That provision got significantly pared back. Do you believe
    that we have adequate ship repair capability between Guam and the First
    Island Chain right now or should we look to expand on last year's
    provision?
        Admiral Kilby. The Navy appreciates your support and the additional
    authorities provided by the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA in 10 USC 8680. They
    provide the Navy with the ability to conduct limited maintenance
    availabilities on non-forward deployed naval vessels in foreign
    shipyards. These authorities to conduct this maintenance for non-
    forward deployed vessels is key. This ensures that exercises do not
    impact the operational or personnel tempo of forward deployed naval
    vessels. The authorities provided are critical in aiding the Navy to
    identify which foreign shipyards are capable of adequately maintaining
    and repairing U.S. naval vessels prior to the start of any potential
    conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and this authority allows us to do so.

        16. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, last year it was discovered
    that there were a number of issues with critical welds made on
    submarines made at Newport News Shipbuilding. Can you provide an update
    on how Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and the Navy are working
    together to take corrective action on this issue?
        Admiral Kilby. Huntington Ingalls Industries--Newport News
    Shipbuilding (NNS) identified a global population of 35,015 joints that
    could be faulty due to improper adherence to weld procedures. With the
    assistance of the Navy and General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB), NNS
    deemed 20,836 joints acceptable as built. The remaining 14,179 joints
    were subjected to additional engineering analysis that included various
    sampling and lab tests of the actual welds. NNS identified, via their
    analysis, 82 welds that required repair, all of which have been
    repaired. Based on the positive analysis results and completion of the
    weld sampling plan, no additional repairs are required and NNS and the
    Navy are finalizing the official documentation to approve the affected
    hulls for full-service life.

        17. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and Ms. Maurer, what amount of
    money do you estimate the Navy needs for repair and maintenance to get
    the Marine Corps amphibious fleet above 80 percent surge readiness by
    fiscal year 2027?
        Admiral Kilby. The Surface Warfare Enterprise is conducting
    analysis into what changes will be required to deliver 80 percent
    Combat Surge Readiness in the Amphibious Force and the rest of the
    Surface Force. There are actions we are already taking such as
    procuring diesel engine overhaul kits, expanding rotatable pools of
    parts for cranes and davits, locking in work packages at least 120 days
    ahead of availability start, and up to 500 days ahead for LHA/LHD class
    ships, and completing open and inspect work prior to availability
    start. Navy is aggressively identifying other specific drivers with
    supporting metrics that we can use to drive improvements in the system
    and a more efficient flow of ships through the shipyards. Once the
    analysis is complete, we will be able to more accurately understand the
    cost to deliver 80 percent Combat Surge Ready across the Amphibious
    Force and the rest of the Surface Navy.
        Ms. Maurer. As GAO has been reporting for the past decade, the Navy
    faces persistent maintenance challenges that continue to hinder its
    efforts to rebuild ship readiness. The Navy recognizes that addressing
    these challenges will require years of sustained management attention
    and resources. While the full cost to repair and maintain the
    amphibious fleet is unknown, taking action to address GAO's many
    recommendations can help the Navy make decisions about resource
    allocation to meet the Chief of Naval Operations' goal of achieving an
    80 percent combat surge ready posture by 2027.
        According to GAO, one of the key reasons that the Navy is not
    meetings its ship availability targets is the poor condition of many
    amphibious warfare ships. As of March 2024, the Navy's Surface
    Maintenance Engineering Planning Program assessed that 16 of the Navy's
    32 amphibious warfare ships were in unsatisfactory condition. \1\ With
    half of the fleet in poor condition--including some ships that have
    been unavailable for years at a time--we are concerned it may be
    difficult for the Navy to get the amphibious fleet to 80 percent surge
    readiness by fiscal year 2027.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Navy's March 2024 assessment did not include two LPD class
    ships it took delivery of in 2022 and 2024, but we included them in
    this analysis as the Navy considers new ships to be in satisfactory
    material condition until they are evaluated as part of their first
    major maintenance period, which had not yet occurred for either ship at
    the time of our analysis. According to officials from the Office of the
    Chief of Naval Operations, the assessment also included a timeframe for
    when (and if) a ship in unsatisfactory condition is expected to return
    to a satisfactory State.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Another key reason the Navy is not meeting its ship availability
    goals is that it has generally failed to complete amphibious warfare
    ship maintenance in accordance with its planned schedules. For
    amphibious warfare ships that began depot maintenance periods in fiscal
    years 2020-2022, the Navy only completed three of 14 of those periods
    on schedule.\2\ The remaining 11 maintenance periods that the Navy did
    not complete on schedule resulted in more than 1,200 days of cumulative
    delays. Maintenance delays can result in cascading delays to training
    and, ultimately, deployment. Additionally, in total, the maintenance
    periods cost $400 million more than the original contract value for the
    efforts. To address the poor condition of the amphibious fleet and the
    Navy not meeting amphibious ship planned maintenance schedules, it is
    important that the Navy implement the recommendations GAO has made to
    improve readiness outcomes. In a selection of reports published from
    2020 through 2024 on Navy ship sustainment, GAO has made a total of 49
    recommendations that, as of April 2025, have not been implemented.
    Among others:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The COVID-19 pandemic contributed to these delays. For example,
    we reported in April 2021 that COVID-19 exacerbated challenges they
    were already facing with their workforce when the pandemic began, such
    as personnel shortages or not having personnel with the right skills to
    perform work. GAO, Depot Maintenance: DOD Should Improve Pandemic Plans
    and Publish Working Capital Fund Policy, GAO-21-103 (Washington, DC:
    April 6, 2021).

          In December 2024, GAO recommended that the Navy should
    not cancel depot maintenance for amphibious ships proposed for
    divestment that have yet to reach the end of their expected service
    life, prior to providing the requisite certification to the
    congressional defense committees and completing the divestment waiver
    process.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Amphibious Warfare Fleet: Navy Needs to Complete Key
    Efforts to Better Ensure Ships Are Available for Marines, GAO-25-106728
    (Washington, DC.: Dec. 3, 2024).

          In December 2024, GAO recommended that the Navy establish
    performance goals with tangible, measurable objectives and associated
    timeframes that can be used to measure progress, for implementing the
    recommendations identified in the May 2023 Amphibious Readiness Review
    and, when completed, for implementing recommendations resulting from
    the Navy's April 2024 review.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO-25-106728.

          In May 2022, GAO recommended that the Navy identify and
    assess the full range of fleet-wide risks, including operational,
    technical, and economic risks, associated with deferred surface ship
    depot maintenance.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Navy Ships: Applying Leading Practices and Transparent
    Reporting Could Help Reduce Risks Posed by Nearly $1.8 Billion
    Maintenance Backlog, GAO-22-105032 (Washington, DC.: May 9, 2022).

          In February 2022, GAO made 4 recommendations for the Navy
    to improve its intermediate maintenance periods, including to establish
    and implement procedures to collect and analyze reliable maintenance
    data; designate an entity to address maintenance challenges; share best
    practices and lessons learned; and include the performance of
    intermediate maintenance periods in strategic planning efforts.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO, Navy Ship Maintenance: Actions Needed to Monitor and
    Address the Performance of Intermediate Maintenance Periods, GAO-22-
    104510 (Washington, DC: Feb. 8, 2022).

        The Navy requested about $24.9 billion to maintain combat surface
    fleet ships--which include amphibious fleet ships--from fiscal years
    2020 through 2023. Approximately $25.9 billion was enacted--about $1
    billion more than requested. The Navy obligated $25.8 billion--or 99.7
    percent of the about $25.9 billion--and, as of the end of fiscal year
    2023, had expended about $20 billion in obligations. Specifically for
    amphibious assault ships (which includes 2 LHA and 7 LHD ships), the
    Navy requested approximately $7.2 billion for maintenance from fiscal
    years 2020 through 2023, with approximately $7.7 billion enacted, $7.7
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    billion obligated, and $6.2 billion expended.

        18. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, how does that number change if
    we are talking about continuous maintenance and readiness as opposed to
    surge capacity?
        Admiral Kilby. The focus for amphibious ship maintenance is to
    capitalize on opportunities to improve readiness and operational
    availability through on time completion of depot level maintenance and
    through the use of continuous maintenance, which plays a critical role
    in sustaining readiness levels between major overhauls. This is
    especially important as we aim for an 80 percent surge ready fleet by
    January 2027. The 80 percent combat surge ready metric is measured
    across all ships not in the maintenance phase. Navy is actively
    exploring avenues to better align funding with the Navy's long-term
    readiness objectives while ensuring that continuous maintenance
    processes are maximized effectively across all available windows.

        19. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, my office passed the
    requirement for the Marine Corps to have 31 amphibious ships at all
    times minimum. The Marine Corps Commandant is attempting to meet
    operational planning requests from the combatant commands by setting a
    requirement of 3x Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit
    (ARG/MEU) ready and able to deploy at any one time worldwide. In a
    recent Voice of America article, you mentioned the 31 ship requirement
    as the requirement you are planning for and that the ARG/MEU 3.0
    requirement is not a requirement. While that is legally correct, why is
    the Navy choosing not to take the combatant command requirement as the
    requirement is should shoot for when it comes to readiness?
        Admiral Kilby. While the Navy attempts to resource all combatant
    command requests, the Combatant Commands regularly request more forces
    than the Navy can supply--across all platforms. The Joint Staff and
    Office of the Secretary of Defense conduct a thorough review of all
    requests and adjudicate those requests against the current strategic
    guidance and the Services' ability to source those requirements.
    Ultimately, the Joint Staff directs the services on which Combatant
    Command requests to meet.
        Navy Force Design and Development efforts are aligned to the
    Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance as well as the Joint
    Warfighting Concept. Following the publication of the forthcoming
    National Defense Strategy, and the associated Defense Planning
    Scenarios, Navy will initiate the Battle Force Ship Assessment and
    Requirement process, per U.S. Code Title 10, Section 8695, to identify
    future fleet composition and size to meet the NDS and as a component of
    Navy long-range planning efforts. This effort will include all
    components of the battle force and will ensure that the Navy is able to
    field a Fleet suitable for global operations.
        Presently, our primary focus is to increase the combat surge ready
    (CSR) status of our existing amphibious fleet with a goal of achieving
    80 percent CSR. Amphibious ship CSR is currently 42 percent which we
    acknowledge is unacceptable. We are taking actions to increase
    readiness by procuring diesel engine overhaul kits, expanding rotatable
    pools of parts for cranes and davits, locking in work packages at least
    120 days ahead of availability start and up to 500 days ahead for LHA/
    LHD class ships, and completing open and inspection work prior to
    availability start.

        20. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, do you agree we should be
    aiming for 3.0 MEUs deployable and if not, why not?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, we should aim for this goal, but under the
    current force structure of ships and marines, a continuous deployable
    3.0 Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) is not
    achievable. The Navy must also work to meet demand for aircraft,
    carriers, submarines, and surface combatants and balance the demand
    across all platforms. To meet combatant command demand across all
    platforms, the Nation requires a much larger Navy with the manpower,
    maintenance, ordnance, infrastructure, and operations funding to
    support that larger fleet. Additionally, there is a process within the
    Department of Defense to adjudicate the COCOM demand against the
    Service's ability to provide those forces. That process generates the
    required presence the Service must supply. The Navy does, however, owe
    the Marine Corps, and regional combatant commanders, a three-ship ARG/
    MEU and we are executing targeted actions to ensure the ARG/MEU can
    deploy as a group.

        21. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby and General Mahoney, please
    outline here your personal positions when it comes to how you think the
    Navy should change its budget and resourcing allocations to get
    amphibious ships above the 80 percent surge readiness threshold. Please
    include analysis of how the navy is currently allocating budgetary
    resources to naval warship repair and maintenance versus amphibious
    ship repair and maintenance. Please also include a side-by-side
    comparison of the length of delays for Navy warships versus similar
    amphibious warships when it comes to repair and maintenance. Finally,
    please outline using bullet points any disagreements you all have about
    the way the resources described above are being allocated currently and
    how you are working toward finding a solution.
        Admiral Kilby. I am committed to getting the amphibious ships above
    the 80 percent surge readiness threshold.
        The Navy is transforming amphibious ship maintenance to improve
    readiness in a few different ways:

          World-Class Planning: NAVSEA led a planning sprint with
    combined input from 50+ stakeholders across the surface force readiness
    enterprise comparing Navy processes against cruise lines, commercial
    aviation, and commercial nuclear power plants. Navy adopted some of the
    best practices like generating a Government Preliminary Schedule (GPS)
    up to 540 days before maintenance. This allows us to lock the scope of
    the maintenance period based upon the duration of our schedule and not
    cost.

          Pit Stop Strategy: This strategy removes complex diesel
    overhauls out of major maintenance periods and doing them in targeted
    continuous maintenance availabilities (CMAVS). This accelerates
    readiness and reduces downtime. Pit Stops have been successfully
    accomplished on five LSD class amphibs and the goal is to expand this
    strategy to other classes of amphib ships.

          Contracting Strategies: Surface maintenance acquisition
    strategies are evolving to enhance surface ship repair capabilities and
    improve operational readiness. We are developing a holistic suite of
    contracting options to support a resilient and tailored contracting
    approach.

          Planning is key to successful execution. Learning from
    past experiences, our large deck amphibious ships can benefit from
    being awarded earlier than A-120 award. By awarding our most
    challenging availabilities at A-360, we are providing a longer planning
    window with a committed industry partner. This workload certainty for
    industry will assist in developing more effective resource and
    availability planning. The first two will be USS Makin Island and USS
    John P. Murtha.

          Reducing risk in critical efforts directly improves the
    ability to deliver ships on time. Complex system repairs to systems
    such as steam boilers, main propulsion diesels, and lifting and
    handling systems are drivers in meeting schedule. We are developing
    strategies to partner with providers (whether it be an Original
    Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or others) to provide a continuity of
    support for targeted systems across platforms. Dedicated resources (in
    the form of trade skills and material) can provide increased schedule
    resiliency.

          We are exploring longer term contractual relationships
    with our industry partners for our continuous maintenance
    availabilities (CMAVs). By establishing competitive pricing for
    standard work that is typically performed in short in port maintenance
    windows, we are building a more responsive and balanced contractual
    relationship (single award IDIQ contract) to ensure operational support
    while providing increased work certainty for industry.

          Updating Class Maintenance Plans: This approach shifts
    from the ``open and inspect'' strategy to clearly defining the repair
    requirement before the maintenance period starts. For example, for USS
    America (LHA 6), nearly all mandatory tank inspections were completed
    before the maintenance period started by using insertable camera
    technology versus manned entry tank inspections. By using the
    insertable camera system, 50 tanks are able to be inspected per week by
    a six-person team.

          Material Readiness: To maximize operational readiness, we
    are transitioning from reactive maintenance to a proactive, data-driven
    approach for diesel, steam, and crane/davit systems. Utilizing
    predictive analytics and condition-based maintenance technologies, we
    will anticipate maintenance needs, enabling proactive forecasting and
    timely ordering of materials from the DOD supply system. This strategy
    minimizes downtime, optimizes resource allocation, and increases
    material availability.

        The Navy uses the same scheduling, programming, methodology and
    funding tools to generate current and future years maintenance
    requirements for ALL surface ships, which includes amphibious and other
    surface combatants. All surface vessel CNO availability maintenance is
    conducted in the private sector, primarily in fleet concentration
    areas, and selected forward deployed regional maintenance centers in
    Japan, Spain and Bahrain. Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning
    Program (SURFMEPP) is responsible for generating detailed Technical
        Foundation Papers (TFP's) by class and twice annually updates
    individual by hull, by specific availability ship sheets from which the
    CNO availability maintenance requirements are developed and priced.
        Multiple factors impact in-year execution of individual ship depot
    maintenance packages. Among these factors are the volatility of
    operational schedules impacting maintenance execution, longer
    deployment cycles, unanticipated growth and new work found after
    contract signing that impacts size and duration of CNO availabilities,
    and private industry struggles to assume the total Navy workload in
    fleet concentration areas. CNO maintenance availability packages for
    amphibious ships, particularly large deck amphibs, tend to be bigger
    and longer in duration due to the negative impact of higher than
    average operational tempo and age of vessels.
        Based on our increased efforts such as procuring diesel engine
    overhaul kits, expanding rotatable pools of parts for cranes and
    davits, locking in work packages at least 120 days ahead of
    availability start, and completing open and inspect work prior to
    availability start, the Navy is aggressively driving improvements in
    the system and a more efficient flow of amphibious ships through the
    shipyards. The Surface fleet has obtained a combat surge readiness of
    62 percent with the Amphibious fleet at 42 percent combat surge ready.
    While the process improvements in amphibious ship maintenance is
    beginning to take effect, I am not satisfied as we continue to work
    toward meeting the goal of 80 percent combat surge readiness and close
    the gap between the amphibious fleet and our other surface platforms.
        Navy is conducting a detailed analysis of how the Navy is currently
    allocating budgetary resources to surface combatant warship repair and
    maintenance versus amphibious ship repair and maintenance. The Navy
    will continue to review opportunities to refine its approach to
    requesting and allocating resources for surface ship maintenance with
    an eye toward opportunities to improve amphibious ship readiness.
        General Mahoney. Recent GAO reports highlighted how the Navy has
    allocated budgetary resources to warship repair and maintenance versus
    amphibious ship maintenance. The Navy's Amphibious Ship Maintenance
    Performance (ASMP) Review also highlights focus areas that contribute
    to low readiness for amphibious warfare ships. The Marine Corps will
    continue to work with our Navy shipmates on improving maintenance and
    construction so that the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) / Marine
    Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is ready to support combatant commander
    registered and Joint Staff-validated requirements. Given the GAO
    reports and the ASMP, specific focus areas include the availability of
    long-lead-time materials, steam-repair contract capacity, and mid-life
    upgrades. Ultimately, the Marine Corps supports the Navy's efforts to
    maintain, modernize, and procure AWS, and the Navy's desire to break
    out AWS in its performance to plan effort.
        While the Navy has an 80 percent surge readiness goal, Sec. 352 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2024
    (Semiannual Briefing on the Operational Status of the Amphibious
    Warship Fleet) requires a maintenance and repair plan for sustaining a
    3.0 ARG/MEU. The Marine Corps is supporting the Navy in any way
    possible in developing this congressionally mandated plan since a 3.0
    ARG/MEU is a top commandant-level priority. Combatant commanders gain a
    sustained presence from a 3.0 ARG/MEU, which differs from a surge
    force. The plan mandated in Sec. 352 will provide a detailed analysis
    of the resources needed to get to a 3.0 ARG/MEU. However, any
    additional resources put toward AWS in service to an 80 percent surge
    readiness goal will likely improve the currently low rates of
    readiness.

        22. Senator Sullivan. Ms. Maurer, please outline the major
    difference GAO noted in its recent report on Shipbuilding Repair and
    Maintenance between how the Marine Corps and the Navy view the
    amphibious ship repair problem, especially when it comes to allocation
    of resources.
        Ms. Maurer. In GAO's December 2024 report on the amphibious warfare
    fleet, we reported that the Navy and Marine Corps have disagreed on the
    number of ships that should be available at any given time to conduct
    operations and training. \1\ The services have established an
    analytical process to further develop ship availability definitions and
    targets, but the definitions require further refinement. Additionally,
    the process does not have a timeframe for completion or implementation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Amphibious Warfare Fleet: Navy Needs to Complete Key
    Efforts to Better Ensure Ships Are Available for Marines, GAO-25-106728
    (Washington, DC.: Dec. 3, 2024).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Specifically, according to Navy and Marine Corps officials, the
    services have yet to agree on how many ships within the amphibious
    fleet should be available for operations and training at any given
    time. For the past several years, the Navy and Marine Corps have not
    agreed on basic amphibious warfare fleet requirements, such as the size
    and availability of the fleet. Congress has subsequently enacted
    statutes that provide the Marine Corps with more influence in
    establishing requirements for the amphibious warfare fleet.
        In February 2024, Navy and Marine Corps leadership established a
    memo that requires the services to conduct an analytical process
    resulting in a plan that meets two general goals related to (1) ship
    availability definitions and (2) ship availability concerns. \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The memorandum establishes a four-step process that the Navy
    and Marine Corps must complete. For the purposes of this report, we
    group those four steps into two general goals. While the memo's goal
    related to defining ship availability is unclassified, its remaining
    contents and required outputs are classified.

        1) The first goal is intended to define what constitutes an
    available ship. In June 2024, the Navy and Marine Corps completed this
    goal by agreeing on a common understanding of what constitutes an
    available ship. Although the services took an initial step to define
    ship availability, we found these definitions are not tied to specific
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    and measurable terms in some cases.

        2) The second goal is to generally address concerns related to
    amphibious warfare ship availability. Completion of this goal should
    result in a plan that partially addresses challenges the Navy and
    Marine Corps face related to ship availability. As we reported in
    December 2024, Navy officials told us that they and the Marine Corps
    had yet to complete their initial report. Additionally, the memo does
    not clearly specify that the final plan should identify a specific
    number of ships that need to be available over the near-and long-term
    future to meet Marine Corps and statutory requirements. \3\ According
    to officials from Headquarters Marine Corps, Combat Development &
    Integration, a preliminary Marine Corps assessment conducted prior to
    the memo's release indicated that a higher number of amphibious warfare
    ships should be available for operations or training compared to the
    Navy's initial assessment. \4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024,
    Pub. L. No. 118-31 (2023) requires the Secretary of the Navy to prepare
    a plan to schedule maintenance and repair in a manner that provides for
    the continuous operation of a total of three Amphibious Ready Groups.
        \4\ The specific numbers of ships that should be available
    according to the Marine Corps' and Navy's respective assessments are
    classified.

        To address the differences between the Navy and Marine Corps
    regarding the amphibious fleet, we made two recommendations that the
    services 1) refine definitions related to amphibious warfare ship
    availability to include specific and measurable terms and 2) establish
    a timeframe for completing and implementing their ongoing joint plan to
    address ship availability concerns and ensure that the analysis results
    in a specific number of amphibious warfare ships that the Navy and
    Marine Corps require to be available at any given time. Until the
    services implement these recommendations, they will be at continued
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    risk of late or disaggregated marine deployments.

        23. Senator Sullivan. Admiral Kilby, will you commit to working
    with the Senate Armed Services Committee to review military
    specification requirements for naval vessels created and executed by
    Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and to proactively recommend the
    removal of those deemed most burdensome?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, I will commit to reviewing naval vessel
    requirements executed by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). I
    recognize the importance of ensuring these requirements support
    operational effectiveness and readiness without overly complicating
    ship design and construction. I am committed to identifying and
    recommending the removal or revision of requirements that are outdated,
    overly burdensome, or do not add clear value to the mission.
                            air and missile defense
        24. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, how is the Army ensuring that
    combatant commands' requirements for missile defense are being met
    considering the low retention and recruitment levels of Army air
    defense soldiers?
        General Mingus. Recruiting efforts for our Air Defense Soldiers
    have resulted in achieving 109 percent of our goal, year-to-date, and
    we are projected to be at 105 percent at the end of the fiscal year.
    Our emphasis on a robust bonus structure, guaranteed preferred
    assignments, and the success of the United States Army Recruiting
    Command (USAREC) drives our effectiveness. These efforts come at a
    particularly critical time as the Army undergoes the most significant
    air and missile defense modernization in the last 40 years, by adding
    such capabilities as the 16th and 17th Patriot battalion, 9 IFPC
    battalions, and additional divisional short-range air defense
    battalions, which include counter-UAS capabilities.

        25. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, the U.S. Government
    Accountability Office has reported that the Army faced challenges
    meeting service goals and requirements and factors that contributed to
    these challenges. These challenges include air and missile defense
    soldiers experiencing high operational tempo, unpredictable deployment
    schedules, the lack of an implementation plan to achieve recruitment
    goals for this specialty, and a personnel management data system that
    oftentimes provided inaccurate or incomplete data. What is the Army
    doing to increase its recruitment and retention rates for Air Defense
    (14 series) soldiers?
        General Mingus. The Army has taken this seriously. USAREC
    prioritized air defense artillery positions through critical skills
    bonuses, training seat management, and station of choice in negotiating
    enlistment contracts. As a result, recruitment for this Career
    Management Field (CMF) has steadily improved in first term accessions
    over the last 3 years. In fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2025, the
    Army achieved 62 percent, 92 percent and 106 percent of the CMF goals
    respectively. Projecting forward, the Army's recruiting force through
    its transformation is positioned to meet the needs of the force for
    this CMF. To implement the Army's strategic vision, retaining and
    growing our Air and Missile Defense (AMD) population is crucial. CMF 14
    has maintained a steady and positive retention rate over the last 3
    years. In fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2025, retention rates for CMF
    14 remained at an average of 882 percent. Projecting forward, the Army
    has CMF target rate to facilitate precision targeting within retention.
    To date, CMF 14 is at 97.3 percent of the fiscal year 2025 retention
    target. The Army launched a plan to monitor and improve retention rates
    across AMD commands while targeting specific reclassification goals to
    increase this population. We're also focusing on key military
    occupational specialty reclassifications to meet future operational
    needs, with a phased approach that balances growth and sustainability
    to improve predictability and stability. Moving forward, we will
    continually assess our progress and adjust strategies to maintain a
    healthy AMD force while ensuring alignment with our broader talent
    management and leader development efforts.
                               training accidents
        26. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General
    Mahoney, General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, training
    accidents, such as accidents involving ground combat vehicles, continue
    to be a challenge for the military services resulting in aircraft,
    equipment, and vehicle damage, and servicemember injuries and deaths.
    Recent GAO reports have pointed to issues related to accident data
    collection, safety and risk management processes, and training. For
    example, in 2018, GAO reported that DOD safety centers did not collect
    standardized data as part of their accident investigations. In
    addition, a 2021 GAO report on military vehicle accidents found that
    improper supervision, training, and risk management processes
    contributed to more than half of the most serious accidents. To what
    extent has your service taken steps to collect and analyze standardized
    data as part of accident investigations?
        General Mingus. The Army has implemented the DOD safety data
    standards in the Army Safety Information Management System to provide
    standardized data for use across the Army. The Army is collecting and
    analyzing this standardized data in formal collaboration with the other
    Military Departments through the Joint Safety Council to prevent future
    mishaps. Data collected over the last 2 years demonstrates an overall
    decrease in tactical vehicle mishaps by 4 percent. Class A tactical
    vehicle mishaps reduced from 9 incidents in fiscal year 2023 to 7 in
    fiscal year 2024; there were 14 Class B mishaps in fiscal year 2023 and
    fiscal year 2024; and Class C mishaps reduced from 147 to 142 over that
    time.
        Admiral Kilby. In early 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) and
    the services agreed to a set of minimum data elements for uniform
    safety data collection to improve understanding and awareness when
    sharing information across the DOD. In accordance with 10 U.S.C.
    Sec. 185(d)(2)(A), the DOD and the Service Safety Chiefs established
    uniform data collection standards and established the Force Risk
    Reduction (FR-2) management tool as the standardized repository on
    March 1, 2024. As of March 1, 2024, all services are reporting service
    safety data into the FR-2 repository. The DOD Force Safety and
    Occupational Health Office continually reviews the compliance of each
    military department in adopting and using the established uniform data
    collection standards.
        The uniform repository allows the Department and Joint Safety
    Council to review the compliance of each military department in
    adopting and using the uniform data collection standards established in
    early 2023. Additionally, the uniform repository allows for joint level
    analysis into mishap events and their associated causalities.
        While each service has unique attributes with their investigational
    processes due to organizational and executional differences, the
    uniform data repository affords the DOD and Joint Safety Council access
    to service data to assess, identify, and prioritize risk mitigation
    efforts and safety improvement efforts across the Department.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps has taken significant strides in
    standardizing data collection and analysis. In early 2023, the
    Department of Defense and the services agreed to a set of minimum data
    elements for uniform safety data collection to improve understanding
    and awareness when sharing information across the DOD. In accordance
    with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 185(d)(2)(A), the DOD and the service safety chiefs
    established uniform data collection standards and established the Force
    Risk Reduction (FR-2) management tool as the standardized repository on
    March 1, 2024. As of March 1, 2024, all services were reporting service
    safety data into the FR-2 repository. The DOD Force Safety and
    Occupational Health Office continually reviews the compliance of each
    military department in adopting and using the established uniform data
    collection standards.
        The uniform repository allows the Department and Joint Safety
    Council (JSC) to review the compliance of each military department in
    adopting and using the uniform data collection standards established in
    early 2023. Additionally, the uniform repository allows for joint-level
    analysis into mishap events and their associated causalities.
        While each service has unique attributes with its investigational
    processes due to organizational and executional differences, the
    uniform data repository affords the DOD and JSC access to service data
    to assess, identify, and prioritize risk mitigation efforts and safety
    improvement efforts across the Department.
        General Guetlein. Since 2018, the Air Force Safety Center regularly
    works with the other Services as part of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Readiness-Safety Information Management (SIM) Working
    Group, led by the ASD (R), Force Safety & Occupational Health, to
    standardize data collection. Through the SIM Working Group, the
    Services agreed to a common set of data standards for safety
    investigation & reporting systems specific to each Service that feed
    OSD's Force Risk Reduction (FR2) system. Within the Department of the
    Air Force (DAF), we've updated our automated mishap reporting and
    investigation system to collect a larger data set than the minimum
    joint standards and designed a Unit Risk Forecasting tool to be
    deployed across the Air Force later this year. This effort will allow a
    more detailed analysis of mishap data and foster greater cross-
    communication and sharing of lessons learned across the military
    departments.
        Our Space Safety Division inside the Air Force Safety Center
    ensures space equities, nomenclature, and operations are appropriately
    considered in all training, written guidance, and other DAF safety
    efforts. Additionally, we continue to mature our Space Mishap
    Investigator Course to bolster Guardians' understanding of mishaps with
    respect to causes, human factors, and prevention opportunities. These
    efforts not only aid mishap prevention within the U.S. Space Force
    (USSF), but they also directly correlate to standardization of data and
    analyses with the other Services.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Since 2018, the Air Force Safety Center
    regularly works with the other Services as part of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Readiness, Force Safety & Occupational Health-
    led Safety Information Management (SIM) Working Group to standardize
    data collection. Through the SIM Working Group, the Services agreed to
    a common set of data standards for safety investigation & reporting
    systems specific to each Service that feed OSD's Force Risk Reduction
    (FR2) system. Within the Department of the Air Force (DAF), we've
    updated our automated mishap reporting and investigation system to
    collect a larger data set than the minimum joint standards and designed
    a Unit Risk Forecasting tool to be deployed across the Air Force later
    this year. This effort will allow a more detailed analysis of mishap
    data and foster greater cross-communication and sharing of lessons
    learned across the military departments. Informed by mishap
    investigations on military vehicle incidents, Air Force Global Strike
    Command instituted new processes to better identify and mitigate risks.
    This action is in addition to the Command's consideration of employing
    a different vehicle potentially better suited for the mission. Similar
    actions across the Air Force will be considered for codification in
    written guidance as part of the next phase of the Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force's Integrating Risk and Readiness campaign.

        27. Senator Sullivan. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General
    Mahoney, General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, are there any
    changes your service has made to training in the past 2 years to help
    mitigate and prevent accidents?
        General Mingus. Following the publication of GAO-21-361 in July
    2021, which identified areas for improvement in military vehicle
    safety, the Army proactively established an Operational Planning Team
    (OPT) in November 2021 to address the GAO report's recommendations. The
    OPT is spearheading significant updates to driver and operator training
    programs. A major revision to Army Regulation (AR) 600-55, The Army
    Driver and Operator Standardization Program, is currently in the final
    stages of publication at the Army Publishing Directorate. This revision
    focuses on bolstering training, licensing, and performance standards to
    reduce accident risk. In addition to OPT recommended improvements,
    revisions to AR 350-1, which are pending publication, moved Driver's
    Training within the top 4 of 17 common mandatory tasks for all
    Soldiers, and included it under warfighting skill sustainment and
    proficiency. Furthermore, the Army is comprehensively updating motor
    vehicle Training Circulars to include enhanced safety awareness
    training, particularly regarding vehicle rollover prevention, more
    challenging driver training scenarios, and integration of standardized
    Training Support Packages for consistent instruction. To ensure
    effective implementation, the Unit Safety Officer Course has also been
    updated to reflect the latest safety protocols and risk mitigation
    strategies.
        Admiral Kilby. As a learning organization, the Navy utilizes
    command investigations, mishap and hazard reports, and near-miss
    reporting as opportunities to identify latent organizational causality
    and develop recommendations leading to changes in doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). These corrective actions across the
    DOTMLPF-P spectrum are performed to drive residual risk as low as
    reasonably achievable. Training is but one aspect for how the Navy
    implements continuous improvement.
        Examples:

          In October 2021, while sailing in the Pacific Ocean on
    patrol, USS Connecticut hit an uncharted seamount. Based on that
    investigation, the Navy made changes to the submarine operations manual
    and improvements to the training curriculum for all facets of the
    submarine navigation team, to include additional emphasis on proper
    risk management during navigation planning and execution, as well as
    enhancements to understanding chart pedigree.

          In September 2013, the Navy tragically lost 2 aviators
    while conducting helicopter operations on USS William P Lawrence. The
    Navy implemented a wide host of improvements because of that mishap.
    Over the course of the subsequent years while monitoring the
    effectiveness of those mitigations, the Navy assessed that the controls
    were neither as enduring nor effective as needed. While there have been
    no fatal mishaps since 2013 involving wave incursions, the Navy
    documented several follow-on minor mishaps and near-misses.
    Accordingly, the Navy developed further solutions which include radar
    improvements to predict wave height and exposing ship's bridge teams to
    the wave incursion hazard in high fidelity ship handling simulators so
    the watch teams could experience the challenges in a controlled
    training environment to better understand how to mitigate the issue.

          In 2018, the Navy tragically lost a young surface warfare
    officer during small boat operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of
    Operations. As a result of this mishap, the Navy implemented several
    policy changes and engineering controls to reduce the likelihood of a
    sailor being ejected from small boats. Over the course of subsequent
    years, the Navy assessed that the controls implemented were stovepiped
    into addressing risk only for our surface fleet; however, several
    communities within the Navy operate small boats and were thus exposed
    to similar risks. Based on that assessment, within the last 18 months,
    the Navy developed a standardized small boat coxswain curriculum and
    piloted a Basic Small Craft Operator Course. The Navy is continuing to
    develop a continuum of training across the career of our small boat
    coxswains to ensure competency and proficiency, as well as to align all
    small boat operations policy for training, certification, and
    operations at the echelon I level to drive consistency across the
    entire Navy enterprise.

          Following the tragic loss of two SEALs in the Arabian
    Sea, Naval Special Warfare partnered with the United States Coast Guard
    to assess and improve equipment, proficiency and maintenance of
    flotation devices used by Special Warfare Sailors and more specifically
    in visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations. As a result, the
    Navy has procured the MD1250 Personal Flotation Device (PFD) and is in
    the process of testing the RATIS life-preserving unit (LPU) for
    increased survivability in case of unintentional or incapacitated water
    entry. The MD-1250 offers automatic activation through water pressure
    sensors, enhancing operator safety in the event of unintentional water
    entry. In addition, the Force Training Readiness Manual was updated and
    signed by Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command in October 2024 and
    incorporates several critical changes to include mandatory gear checks,
    platform safety briefs, and specific buoyancy tests with operational
    gear prior to every maritime mission.
        General Mahoney. As a learning organization, the Marine Corps uses
    investigations, reports, and near-miss reporting to drive continuous
    improvement through changes to doctrine, training, equipment,
    leadership, and policy, aiming to minimize risk. The Marine Corps has
    implemented targeted aviation, ground, and Amphibious Combat Vehicle
    (ACV) training changes over the past 2 years to reduce accidents and
    enhance operational readiness.

          Aviation: The Aviation Training and Readiness (T&R)
    Program Manual, setting training standards for aircrews and support
    personnel, is continuously refined (20 revisions across 33 manuals in 2
    years). Examples include:

          -  C-40A T&R Manual (Oct 2023): Improved proficiency tracking
    when marine pilots fly with the Navy. The update allows for accurate
    logging and tracking of Navy training events, previously done manually
    and prone to error, ensuring pilots remain proficient when operating
    with either service. This reduces workload and errors, leading to safer
    joint operations.

          -  F-35B/C T&R Manual (June 2024): Standardized minimum
    requirements for conversion pilots to become flight leaders (section or
    division leaders). This change provides objective training standards,
    replacing previously subjective qualifications, aligning with the
    Aviation Training and Readiness Program Manual, and enhancing both
    training quality and safety.

          -  CH-53K T&R Manual (Jan 2025): Enhanced tracking of carrier
    qualification environments. The update separates day and night
    qualifications (previously undifferentiated) to provide commanders with
    better visibility into pilot qualifications for shipboard operations.
    This supports improved validation and safer execution of those
    operations.

          -  Marine Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (M-SHARP)
    Enhancements: This training management system has been improved with:

              Daily/Weekly Flight Schedule Validation: M-SHARP
    generates validation reports based on flight schedules, considering
    crew rest, crew day, crew pairing, and flight profiles. The system
    verifies compliance with DOD, Department of the Navy (DoN), and USMC
    requirements, identifying risks that might otherwise go unnoticed,
    significantly reducing human error and providing commanders better
    information for risk decisions.

              Rule Book Manager: This tool allows units to input
    their own specific safety rules into M-SHARP to enhance the validation
    process, imposing more stringent requirements on crew rest, flight
    time, etc. Training and Education Command (TECOM) Aviation Standards
    Branch has implemented rules to notify units if a pilot is carrier
    qualified before deploying to Navy ships.

              Read and Initial Board Module: This module automates
    the Read and Initial (R&I) board process for safety notifications,
    enabling the Department of Safety and Standardization to track, manage,
    and log completion of required R&I postings for the entire squadron,
    reducing human error and improving monitoring.

          Ground: The Motor Transport T&R manual was updated to
    reduce the sustainment interval for incidental operators from 12 to 6
    months, enhancing both effectiveness and safety. Current initiatives
    being developed focus on increasing incidental operator proficiency,
    standardizing assistant driver training, and developing driver
    simulators for deployment throughout the Fleet Marine Force.

          ACV: The Marine Corps has implemented several key changes
    to improve the ACV's training, safety, and operational effectiveness:

          -  Revised training procedures standardized training and
    certification, by billet, for all ACV operators and maintainers,
    outlined in the Assault Amphibian Training Operations Procedures
    Standardization and updated Navy Marine Corps (NAVMC) 3500.2D Assault
    Amphibian Training and Readiness manual.

          -  The use of driver simulators, mandatory Water Safety
    Instructor and Shallow Water Egress Trainer qualifications.

          -  MCBul 3502's standardized surf observation reporting.

          -  Fielding of the Assault Amphibian Safety Boat providing
    dedicated waterborne support, aligning with naval safety practices.

          -  A ``leader to led'' initiative reduced ACV formation size
    ratio from 1:9 to 1:4, improving leadership oversight and mitigating
    risk.
        General Guetlein. The Space Force continually evaluates training
    programs are to provide the most effective and safest environment along
    with the most realistic training possible. We have made multiple
    changes to the curricula of our Space Mishap Investigation Course and
    the annual training for Investigating mishap officers to improve
    training content and relevancy. Additionally, the USSF brought on a
    Highly Qualified Expert (HQE) with an extensive space safety and
    operations background to better incorporate risk management, system
    safety, and safety policy within our service. Last, our Space Safety
    Division is helping to create a Unit Risk Forecasting tool. This tool
    will enable leaders at all levels to see real-time risk assessments of
    units based on current data and how that data relates to risk
    indicators from years of mishap investigations.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Training programs are continually
    evaluated to ensure the most effective and safest environment possible
    while garnering the maximum benefit of realistic training to
    participants. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force recently implemented
    his Integrating Risk and Readiness campaign to bolster the integration
    and application of risk management throughout the force. Our efforts
    will increase the use of tools to assess and manage risk while
    enhancing decision making on mitigation strategies at lower supervisory
    levels to enhance readiness, lethality, and combat capability.
        In addition, the implementation of virtual reality simulations in
    aviation, maintenance, and vehicle operations provides trainees
    enhanced realism and a greater understanding of the risks associated
    with their assigned tasks. Virtual reality increases training
    effectiveness while reducing exposure to real-world hazards and risks
    inherent in military training.
        The Air Force, in concert with the Joint Safety Council's Motor
    Vehicle Working Group, is also exploring a study to better understand
    motorcycle rider behavior. The results will inform changes to how
    services train motorcycle riders to safely operate in the dynamic
    traffic environment.
                                   __________
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
                         human performance requirements
        28. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    and Lieutenant General Spain, how does the DOD use wearable technology
    and biometric health data to measure servicemember heart rate, blood
    pressure, heart rate variability, blood oxygen, respiratory rate, blood
    glucose and body temperature?
        General Mingus. The Army is actively evaluating the operational use
    of wearable technology and biometric monitoring to improve Soldier
    health, performance, and readiness. Ongoing assessments led by the U.S.
    Army Center for Initial Military Training (CIMT) are focused on the
    feasibility and value of commercial-grade wearables in Basic Combat
    Training and operational environments. These wearables currently track
    metrics such as heart rate, heart rate variability, respiration, sleep,
    and skin temperature, offering a continuous, real-time view of
    physiological status.
        Although some measures like blood glucose and continuous blood
    pressure monitoring are not yet widely reliable in commercial devices,
    the Army is closely tracking technological advancements and preparing
    for future integration. These early efforts aim to inform scalable
    solutions that enhance injury prevention, optimize training, and
    support performance-based decision making across Army formations.
        Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force has several ongoing research
    efforts that use wearable technology (e.g., Oura ring, Garmin watches)
    to collect biometric data to measure servicemember heart rate, heart
    rate variability, blood oxygen, respiratory rate, skin temperature, and
    activity.
        The Surface Force's most advanced R&D effort is the Command
    Readiness, Endurance, and Watchstanding (CREW) Program, which is a
    shipboard sensor suite that leverages Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
    sleep tracking wearable technology (e.g., Oura Ring) to collect
    objective sleep data and a secure, offline shipboard data architecture
    that provides Commanders with objective data to inform operational
    fatigue risk management decisions. While still in advanced development,
    CREW is a shipboard tactical warfighting solution that the Navy is
    considering transitioning to a Program of Record in future budgets. The
    CREW system is being developed to be device agnostic and may be able to
    collect additional biometric health data in the future.
        In addition to developing the CREW system, the Surface Force is
    evaluating the feasibility and efficacy of using wearable technology to
    collect biometric health data at scale for additional use cases.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps has not implemented service-wide
    wearable technology for tracking servicemember health data. However,
    research into potential applications is ongoing. For example, the
    Marine Corps, in collaboration with the U.S. Army Research Institute of
    Environmental Medicine, has tested a Heat Illness Prevention System
    designed to reduce heat-related injuries during entry-level training.
        The Marine Corps integrated bioelectrical impedance analysis (BIA)
    devices into its body composition program in 2022. This ongoing
    investment enables commanders to assess marines with greater accuracy,
    while allowing marines to track their critical biomarkers such as lean
    body mass and basal metabolic rate--metrics that directly contribute to
    their overall health and fitness.
        The Marine Corps will continue assessing our programs, policies,
    and requirements to determine if there are wearable solutions that are
    valid, cost effective, and can be implemented at scale.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The Department is increasingly leveraging
    wearable technology and biometric health monitoring systems to track a
    broad spectrum of physiological metrics in servicemembers. These tools
    are central to advancing force readiness, optimizing performance, and
    enabling early detection of illness or injury--ultimately enhancing
    operational effectiveness.
        Wearable and biometric technologies fall into two main categories:
    those focused on readiness and fitness monitoring, and those approved
    by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for medical use. Regardless
    of their classification, all systems must comply with applicable DOD
    cybersecurity standards, Federal regulations, and medical data
    protection requirements, including HIPAA, protections for personally
    identifiable information (PII), and encryption protocols for use in
    secure environments.
        The Air Force continues to evaluate wearable technologies that
    balance the dual imperatives of operational readiness and
    cybersecurity. While adoption remains limited to small-scale trials,
    promising results are emerging. For example, Air Mobility Command
    (AMC), in collaboration with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), is
    piloting wearable systems designed to help commanders and aircrews
    monitor real-time readiness indicators during max endurance operations
    in the Pacific.
        These efforts are driven by a clear need: commanders and crew
    members want real-time, data-driven insights into fatigue levels and
    early signs of infectious disease, tailored to individual biometric
    profiles. This capability was recently showcased during the Air Force's
    Mobility Guardian exercise, where wearable technologies demonstrated
    both operational utility and the ability to safeguard sensitive health
    data. Such initiatives reflect growing interest across the service in
    scalable, secure, and mission-aligned wearable solutions that support
    the health and effectiveness of the force.

        29. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    and Lieutenant General Spain, how does your service view the utility of
    servicemember biometric health data to improve individual health
    readiness metrics?
        Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force is conducting multiple
    longitudinal research efforts to evaluate the utility of collecting
    servicemember biometric health data to improve individual health
    readiness metrics. While the studies are ongoing and final analysis
    will not be completed for several years, preliminary and anecdotal
    evidence suggests using wearable technology to provide sailors with
    biometric health data has a positive effect on individual health
    behaviors. For example, data from deployed Naval warships indicated
    that approximately 22 to 40 percent of sailors issued a wearable device
    self reported improvements in their sleep, physical activity, nutrition
    habits, and mental well being.
        General Mingus. The Army views biometric health data as a
    transformative tool to enhance individual readiness and optimize human
    performance. Metrics such as heart rate variability, sleep quality, and
    movement patterns can be used to monitor stress, recovery, fatigue, and
    overtraining. These insights enable commanders and human performance
    teams to proactively manage workloads, personalize training, and reduce
    preventable injuries.
        When integrated into the Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F)
    Management System (H2FMS), this biometric data supports a shift from
    reactive care to predictive readiness management. By enabling real-
    time, data-informed adjustments across the five H2F domains--physical,
    nutritional, mental, sleep, and spiritual--the Army aims to improve
    Soldier resilience, maximize performance, and reduce long-term
    healthcare costs.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps does not currently track
    servicemembers' health data outside of semiannual body composition
    assessments. BIA devices employed in the Marine Corps' body composition
    program provide individual health readiness metrics to influence
    physical fitness training and health decisions to increase warfighter
    readiness.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The integration of biometric health and
    fitness data with advanced machine learning has the potential to act as
    a powerful force multiplier for the Armed Forces. When implemented with
    clearly defined parameters around security, privacy, and authority,
    this fusion of technology can deliver real-time, actionable insights
    into both individual and unit-level health and readiness.
        For military operations, this translates into earlier detection and
    more effective management of injuries such as concussions, improved
    triage accuracy, and faster, more informed medical decisions. It also
    enables a reduction in training time lost to illness through predictive
    health monitoring and facilitates swift containment of infectious
    disease outbreaks in high-density environments like dorms, aircraft, or
    forward-operating bases. Ultimately, this leads to a measurable
    enhancement in overall force health, resilience, and operational
    readiness.

        30. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    and Lieutenant General Spain, what is the feasibility and advisability
    of developing a data collection and tracking system to provide
    commanders with insights into servicemembers' readiness and well-being,
    incorporating biometric health data for descriptive analysis and
    accessibility to servicemembers?
        General Mingus. The development of such a system is both feasible
    and already underway through the H2FMS. The H2FMS is being built to
    securely aggregate biometric, behavioral, cognitive, and training data
    to create individual Soldier readiness profiles. These profiles are
    accessible through role-based dashboards that support commanders, human
    performance teams, and Soldiers themselves in making evidence-based
    decisions.
        The H2FMS includes embedded tools to deliver configurable training
    plans, targeted education, and tailored interventions across all five
    H2F domains. To ensure long-term scalability and impact, the Army is
    aligning H2FMS implementation with full strategic integration, ensuring
    that the capability is embedded across Doctrine, Organization,
    Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities,
    and Policy (DOTMLPFP). As H2FMS and technology continue to evolve, it
    will incorporate artificial intelligence and machine learning to
    generate predictive and prescriptive insights that support early
    intervention and individualized readiness optimization strategies.
        Admiral Kilby. The Surface Force's primary program measuring near-
    real time servicemember readiness is the Command Readiness Endurance
    and Watchstanding (CREW) Program. CREW is a shipboard sensor suite that
    leverages Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) wearable technology (e.g.,
    Oura Ring) to collect objective sleep data and a secure, offline
    shipboard data architecture that provides Commanders with objective
    biometric data, providing insights into sailors' readiness and well-
    being. By providing these data to operational Unit Commanders, these
    leaders can make holistic tactical warfighting decisions that integrate
    metrics related to both (a) materiel readiness and (b) personnel
    readiness of the unit.
        CREW feasibility testing has been ongoing since 2020 with
    operational demonstrations including 39 units (surface and aviation),
    two joint international exercises (i.e., Talisman-Sabre 23, RIMPAC 24),
    two Carrier Strike Groups, and more than 5000 sailors and marines.
    Results indicate that the availability of biometric data to Unit
    Commanders improves unit readiness and Operational Risk Managment
    decisions. While still in advanced development, CREW as a shipboard
    tactical warfighting solution is being considered to transition to a
    Program of Record in future budgets.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps currently uses two systems, the
    Marine Corps Training Information Management System and Command
    Individual Risk and Resiliency Assessment System), which collect
    different aspects of readiness and well-being data. By leveraging these
    systems, the Marine Corps can gain insights into servicemember
    readiness and well-being. However, implementation must address critical
    concerns to include maintaining separation between Protected health
    information and personally identifiable information, preserving the
    security strengths of current systems, ensuring regulatory compliance,
    and providing appropriate servicemember access to their own data.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Commanders and first sergeants are
    entrusted with access to servicemembers' health data to maintain unit
    readiness and ensure operational effectiveness. This access, however,
    must be governed by strict safeguards to protect against potential
    exploitation by adversaries, prevent the misuse or misinterpretation of
    sensitive data, and shield personnel from inappropriate or punitive
    actions stemming from inaccurate conclusions.
        Any health monitoring systems deployed must fully comply with
    Department of Defense (DOD) cybersecurity standards, ensuring data
    integrity, confidentiality, and controlled access. Broader
    implementation across the force will require robust, scalable
    infrastructure capable of securely supporting millions of users. Such
    infrastructure must be interoperable with existing military health
    record systems, maintain continuous data protection, and ensure
    compliance with privacy and authority protocols.
        While commercial health and performance monitoring products--such
    as those used by major corporations or professional sports teams--may
    offer valuable capabilities, their adoption in a military context will
    depend on their ability to meet stringent DOD requirements. These
    systems must not only align with military security and interoperability
    standards but also uphold the overarching goal: enhancing mission
    readiness while safeguarding the health, privacy, and trust of the
    force.

        31. Senator Budd. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    and Lieutenant General Spain, does your service have an office that
    specifically provides oversight on the human performance (HP)
    initiatives throughout the service, from mental to physical with the
    authority?
        General Mingus. Yes. Oversight of human performance initiatives
    resides with the U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training (CIMT),
    which serves as the specified Force Modernization Proponent for H2F, as
    outlined in AR 5-22. CIMT leads the development and synchronization of
    human performance doctrine, capability requirements, standards, and
    modernization strategies across the Army.
        Through H2F, the Army embeds multidisciplinary human performance
    teams in brigade formations and aligns efforts to the H2F Strategic
    Objectives: reducing injuries, improving performance, accelerating
    rehabilitation, increasing multi-domain readiness, and optimizing cost-
    effectiveness. CIMT works in coordination with the Army Commands,
    Program Executive Office Soldier--Project Manager Soldier
    Survivability, HQDA G1 and HQDA G9 to ensure integrated, accountable,
    and scalable execution of human performance initiatives across all
    components and readiness domains.
        Admiral Kilby. Human Performance (HP) in the Navy is not overseen
    by a single office. Multiple commands manage HP based on their
    operational needs. The Office of Naval Research Warfighter Protection
    and Applications Division leads HP research and technology efforts
    focused on health, survival, and performance of Navy personnel. Naval
    Education and Training Command and Bureau of Naval Personnel supports
    HP through training programs and personnel policy.
        Along these lines, I am investigating an opportunity to consolidate
    sailor optimization programs akin to the Army Holistic Health And
    Fitness Program. The Navy's effort in this area is in the early stages
    of development and I am committed to maximizing our sailors health and
    productivity.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps has two entities that share
    jurisdiction over human performance initiatives. The Deputy Commandant
    for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine and Family Programs Division
    serves as Marine Corps lead for the Marine Corps Total Fitness program
    policy, resourcing, integration, and delivery. The commanding general,
    Training and Education Command is responsible for standardization of
    service requirements.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Currently, human performance initiatives,
    from mental to physical, fall under A3 (aircrew), A1 (fitness), and
    Surgeon General (Integrated Operational Support, mental health, etc).
    Regarding wearable technology for human performance improvements, there
    is no single DAF office with oversight of all human performance
    initiatives. For the subset of such activities which constitute human
    research, DAF has one oversight office within the Air Force Surgeon
    General's Office: the Component Office of Human Research Protections
    (COHRP). Each Service has their own COHRP IAW DODI 3216.02, Protection
    of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DOD-Conducted
    and--Supported Research.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                                space readiness
        32. Senator Hirono. General Guetlein, Space Force is increasing in
    size to address the significant threats posed by China and Russia.
    However, your service is faced with challenges to grow beyond the
    roughly 10,000 Guardians and 5,000 civilians it has today. While your
    current retention rate may be high, what challenges are you
    experiencing with growing the Space Force, and how can Congress better
    support your force structure and training efforts?
        General Guetlein. Funds in the Space Force's MILPERS, Operations &
    Maintenance (O&M), and military construction (MILCON) appropriations
    are necessary to support space-focused training, education, manpower,
    and infrastructure needed to sustain growth. Congressional support for
    the President's Budget will allow the Space Force to continue to grow
    in order to meet expanding mission demands and enable credible force
    presentation in the space domain.

        33. Senator Hirono. General Guetlein, how are you ensuring your
    ground-based capabilities and infrastructure to support space assets
    are more energy and water-resilient?
        General Guetlein. Investments in installation energy programs are
    critical to the success of operational missions and the effectiveness
    of our warfighter capabilities. These programs provide enduring mission
    capabilities through energy resilience, by deploying innovative
    technologies and alternative generation sources to protect against
    failures caused by commercial power grid outages or disruptions.
        The USSF adopts a mission-centric approach to enhance the security
    of energy and water systems by conducting Energy Resilience Readiness
    Exercises (ERREs) and Water Resilience Readiness Exercises. These
    exercises simulate emergency scenarios to identify and mitigate
    vulnerabilities in critical assets. We have completed ERREs at
    Vandenberg, Schriever, Peterson, Buckley, and Patrick, Space Force
    Bases (SFBs) and at Clear, Cape Cod, and Cape Canaveral Space Force
    Stations (SFSs). The USSF is installing microgrids with onsite energy
    generation capacity at Vandenberg and Buckley SFB, and Cape Cod SFS.
        Additionally, resilience threats to mission continuity are assessed
    through Installation Energy Plans. This strategic planning process
    provides a comprehensive roadmap for future energy and water needs,
    enabling proactive investments that align with shifting priorities.
                      operational energy demand reduction
        34. Senator Hirono. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, Lieutenant General Spain, and Ms. Maurer, energy
    demand reduction extends operational reach for warfighters and enables
    our military's lethality and readiness. Hybrid vehicles lower costly
    fuel consumption and offer longer operational duration. This saves the
    U.S. military time, money, and most importantly--servicemembers' lives.
    Can each of you briefly talk about how your operational and
    installation energy programs support the warfighter and base resiliency
    and why they are worth funding?
        General Mingus. The Army is transforming how the Army sources,
    stores, distributes, converts, and manages battlefield energy to
    provide resilient, assured power at the tactical edge. The Army is
    exploring hybrid powertrains for the XM30 Infantry Combat Vehicle and
    M1E3 Abrams. Besides potentially lower fuel consumption, hybrid
    vehicles could have extended silent watch capabilities.
        The effort to reduce sustainment demands extends beyond investing
    and deploying technologies and practices that reduce fuel consumption.
    Reducing the demand for supplies and services or providing Soldiers the
    means to meet that demand at or closer to their point of need, reduces
    the frequency of logistics operations. Such efforts reduce Soldier
    exposure to enemy action, extend the range and endurance of the
    formation, and provide commanders greater flexibility and freedom of
    action.
        For our installations, the Army continues to explore all power
    generation assets that can be combined with specific circuity to allow
    the islanding of our installations, which provides resilient energy for
    critical functions. Areas under consideration include investment in two
    key advanced technologies: nuclear energy and microgrids. Currently the
    Army has 31 operational microgrids deployed across 24 installations
    worldwide. Additionally, the Army plans for and measures installations'
    energy resilience through black start exercises. These exercises test
    our energy generation and distribution systems to ensure mission
    continuity is not interrupted when the commercial grid on which they
    rely is disrupted.
        Admiral Kilby. The Navy's installation energy programs prioritize
    reliable energy access, minimize vulnerable fuel supply chains, lower
    utility costs, mitigate cyber threats, and enhance mission execution
    through resilient infrastructure. We conduct regular assessments and
    exercises to improve adaptability and long-term operational
    effectiveness to support the warfighter with the delivery of critical
    energy loads on time and on target, including mitigating any loss of
    productivity in our four Navy shipyards from power outages. Resilient
    installations are crucial for projecting power, defending national
    interests, and sustaining warfighting operations.
        The Navy's operational energy investments target a 15 percent
    operational efficiency improvement across platforms, increasing time-
    on-station and availability of precision fires for strike groups and
    fleet commanders. We've already achieved an 8 percent efficiency
    improvement in destroyers, demonstrating tangible progress toward our
    goal. Our research investments, including autonomous refueling and
    advanced battery technology, directly support warfighter lethality and
    readiness by maximizing available power in contested environments and
    enabling future platforms to field directed energy technology.
    Continued funding is crucial to maintaining energy dominance and
    meeting evolving threats.
        General Mahoney. For the Marine Corps, supporting the Fleet Marine
    Force and ensuring the resiliency of our installations means preparing
    for a future where reliable power, both in the field and at our bases,
    is increasingly contested. Our energy programs directly support the
    warfighter by:

          Extending Operational Reach: By investing in efficient
    power generation and advanced battery storage, we reduce our reliance
    on vulnerable fuel convoys, increasing the operational range and
    endurance of our units. This allows us to operate in austere
    environments for longer periods, maintain battlefield superiority, and
    achieve mission objectives with less logistical burden.

          Enhancing Base Resiliency: Our installations are critical
    nodes for power projection. We are hardening our bases against a
    growing range of threats, both physical and cyber, that could disrupt
    power supply. Resilient bases mean resilient warfighters.

          Increasing Lethality & Readiness: Reliable power is the
    backbone of modern warfare. Our programs ensure that our weapons
    systems, communication networks, and critical infrastructure remain
    operational, giving our marines the edge they need to prevail in any
    conflict.

        To achieve these goals, we leverage available congressional
    authorities like Energy Savings Performance Contracts, Utility Energy
    Service Contracts, and Enhanced Use Leasing agreements, in conjunction
    with appropriated funding. These strategic investments in energy
    resilience are not just about saving money; they are about saving lives
    and ensuring the Marine Corps remains the Nation's premier fighting
    force. Continued funding for these programs is critical to maintaining
    our competitive advantage and fulfilling our commitment to the
    warfighter.
        General Guetlein. Uninterrupted and reliable electric power is a
    mission-critical necessity for the USSF. We rely on dependable power to
    perform our core functions--e.g., space control, global mission
    operations, space access, and enterprise functions.
        The USSF is making investments in energy infrastructure and
    initiatives that fund microgrids, onsite generation projects, battery
    energy storage systems, base-wide energy efficiency programs, advanced
    controls, and distribution networks. In particular, the USSF is
    installing microgrids with onsite energy generation at Vandenberg and
    Buckley SFBs, and Cape Cod SFS. Electric power also supports space
    launch facilities, ground control stations, autonomous data and
    artificial intelligence processes, all vital to maintaining national
    security and overseeing global military and space operations. To ensure
    resilience in a contested environment, the USSF prioritizes against
    cyber threats and physical disruptions to power infrastructure,
    enabling continuous and secure operations.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Our operational energy efforts are
    focused on increasing capability and lethality per gallon and
    minimizing impacts to our airmen who deliver fuel in the battlespace to
    support operations. Initiatives such as legacy aircraft drag reduction,
    mission planning software improvements, and focused training/behavior
    changes are increasing combat capability per gallon, and saving service
    member lives.
        Our recent efforts have resulted in $222 million in fuel cost
    avoidance, with $64 million of prior year expired funds recouped and
    reinvested to further enhance combat capability and mission assurance.
        Our vision of ``Mission Assurance through Energy and Water
    Assurance'' focuses on sustaining warfighting capabilities through
    advanced planning, innovative technology, and process enhancements. We
    evaluate both near-and long-term energy and water requirements,
    emphasizing resilience, cost effectiveness, and streamlined deployment
    of domestic energy sources to ensure secure, reliable, and affordable
    power for our installations.
        The DAF is spearheading several initiatives to harness domestic
    energy resources. For example, the Department is piloting advanced
    geothermal projects to deliver consistent, around-the-clock power,
    increase installation readiness and resilience, and bolster behind-the-
    fence capabilities for emergency responses. Geothermal energy, a
    domestic and abundant resource, offers the dual benefit of potential
    revenue generation while utilizing existing equipment and expertise
    from the oil and gas industry.
        Ms. Maurer. GAO has recently reported on Department of Defense
    (DOD) efforts to support the warfighter via operational and
    installation energy programs.
    Operational Energy
        With respect to operational energy, GAO currently has ongoing work
    looking at DOD's supply and distribution of fuel during a contested
    Indo-Pacific conflict, with a classified report expected to be
    delivered to the Congress by June 2025. While DOD works on energy
    demand reduction, the use of fuel remains important during operations.
        GAO also reported in 2020 on the Navy's hybrid electric drive (HED)
    program. In 2009, the Secretary of the Navy established goals that, in
    part, focused on reducing the energy consumption of the Navy's forces.
    Two years later, the Navy initiated a program to develop and install
    HED systems on its fleet of Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51 Flight IIA)
    destroyers. The Navy's HED system is designed to save fuel by using
    excess power from the ship's electrical system to propel the ship. In
    October 2018, the Navy completed installation of one of the systems on
    the USS Truxtun. Senate Report 115-262 accompanying the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 asked the Navy to submit
    a report on the HED system installed on the USS Truxtun and asked GAO
    to review the Navy's report.
        We issued a report in 2020 in which we (1) assessed the extent to
    which the Navy's report on the USS Truxtun included information
    regarding the assessment areas as requested by Congress, and (2)
    described the Navy's decision to suspend the HED program and use the
    systems for a different effort. \1\ We found that the Navy did not
    include a summary of the investment planned for the HED system
    installed on the USS Truxtun in its January 2020 report to Congress, as
    requested by Congress. Specifically, the Navy's report on the HED
    system installed on the USS Truxtun did not contain an assessment of
    the costs and benefits of the HED system or an assessment of the
    funding needed to execute the program. We also found that the Navy's
    report on the HED system installed on the USS Truxtun provided some
    performance information that was not based on comprehensive testing. We
    did not make any recommendations in this report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers: Observations on the Navy's
    Hybrid Electric Drive Program, GAO-21-79R, Washington, DC, Nov.. 5,
    2020).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Installation Energy
        With respect to installation energy, GAO issued a report in 2023.
    \2\ GAO found that DOD had efforts underway to achieve sustainability
    goals associated with greenhouse gas emissions reductions, energy and
    water efficiencies, and waste reduction in the December 2021 Executive
    Order 14057. Specifically, DOD had (1) established an organizational
    structure that supports implementation of the order, (2) developed some
    implementation plans, (3) started dedicating staff to support
    implementation of the order, and (4) increased funding and updated
    guidance for key energy resilience and conservation installation
    projects.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Environmental Sustainability: DOD Should Identify
    Workforce Capacity Needed to Achieve Goals,'' GAO-23-105239
    (Washington, DC. May 31, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        GAO has also reported in 2016 on DOD's Energy Resilience and
    Conservation Investment Program (ERCIP), then known as the Energy
    Conservation Investment Program (ECIP). \3\ In that report, GAO noted
    that, while DOD and the military services made use of several different
    programs to accomplish their energy goals, ECIP was DOD's primary
    source of directly appropriated military construction funding for
    energy conservation projects. DOD is required to notify congressional
    committees of the ECIP projects that it plans to construct, although it
    is not required by either law or its own guidance to include in its
    project notifications information on the anticipated performance of
    those projects, including the anticipated returns on investment,
    estimates of the energy or water savings, or renewable energy
    production. However, providing project notifications without including
    performance information reduced Congress's ability to review in a
    single source what to expect from the ECIP program, such as whether DOD
    components expect their respective overall portfolios to meet the
    minimum return on investment. Further, anticipated performance
    information would provide a baseline from which DOD and the committees
    could later evaluate ECIP program implementation. GAO recommended that
    the Secretary of Defense should review the strategic goals for the ECIP
    program and make any needed adjustments to reflect current DOD
    priorities to help improve DOD's ability to report on and measure
    anticipated and actual savings from ECIP projects and to provide
    guidance to inform further project selection.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Energy Conservation Investment
    Program Needs Improved Reporting, Measurement, and Guidance, GAO-16-162
    (Washington, DC, Jan. 29, 2016).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DOD concurred with and implemented GAO's recommendation.
    Specifically, DOD updated the ``Strategic Vision for the Program''
    section in the ECIP annual guidance for fiscal years 2019 and 2020 to
    reflect current DOD priorities. Additionally, DOD's proposed funding
    allocation for Fiscal Year 2021 aligned with its strategic vision to
    boost energy resilience and met the intent of our recommendation.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                 price gouging
        35. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, do you support efforts
    to ensure contracting officers have the cost and pricing data they need
    to negotiate fair deals for taxpayers?
        General Mingus. I fully support all efforts by Army contracting
    officers to obtain the necessary cost and pricing data required to
    establish a fair and reasonable price as it is in the best interest of
    both the Government and the U.S. taxpayer. Any exceptions for certified
    data must be approved by the Head of the Contracting Activity, and any
    exceptions for other than certified cost or pricing data must be
    approved by the Senior Contracting Official. Requiring exceptions to be
    approved at these senior levels demonstrates the Army's strong
    commitment to requiring cost and pricing data whenever it is necessary
    and appropriate to do so.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes. The Navy will leverage Commercial and
    Competitive procedures wherever possible and appropriate. When those
    procedures are not possible, access to cost and pricing data is
    critical in determining the fair and reasonable price of products and
    services.
        General Mahoney. Yes. DOD has established comprehensive resources
    to support contracting officers' decision making process with
    establishing a fair and reasonable cost or price for contracts.
    Specifically, from an enterprise perspective, resources include field
    pricing team support from Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).
    DCMA support includes proposal review, overhead should-cost reviews and
    negotiation support; Contract Business Analysis Repository a tool
    maintained by DCMA which provides Contracting Officers with negotiation
    data for Defense contractors across the DOD; Navy Price Fighters, who
    support providing cost and price analysis, should-cost amounts,
    commercial price analysis, commerciality reviews and market analysis.
    Additionally, Defense Acquisition University provides a baseline of
    training for contracting officers and continuous learning on a cadre of
    functional areas relating to cost and pricing to equip the contracting
    workforce with the skill set to be successful in negotiating fair and
    reasonable contracts.
        General Guetlein. Yes. Space Force Contracting Officers (COs) must
    have current, complete, and accurate cost and pricing data, to obtain
    fair deals for our taxpayers. The USSF employs several strategies to
    negotiate fair and reasonable prices on sole-source contracts for the
    required products and services we use. Our COs use statutory and
    regulatory authority to secure and analyze data to determine and
    negotiate fair and reasonable prices to the best of their ability.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring Air Force Contracting
    Officers (COs) have access to current, complete, and accurate cost and
    pricing data is integral to having negotiation parity to obtain fair
    deals for our taxpayers.

        36. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, the Government
    Accountability Office's 2023 High-Risk Report identifies
    vulnerabilities in DOD's contracting processes, emphasizing systemic
    risks of fraud, waste, and abuse. Notably, it highlighted that
    sustained leadership commitment and robust internal controls are
    critical for addressing contractor misconduct and preventing
    overcharges in government contracts. In light of the steps laid out in
    this GAO report and the scale at which defense contractors are fleecing
    the Pentagon and taxpayers, what measures is your service implementing
    to ensure contractors do not engage in price gouging of your service
    and U.S. taxpayers?
        General Mingus. The Army takes overcharging and price gouging very
    seriously. The Army conducts regular training on best practices to
    recognize and address these issues and utilizes the Army's peer review
    process to obtain insights into potential systemic or material
    challenges across the acquisition enterprise. Contracting officers rely
    upon the guidance provided by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and
    its DOD and Army supplements, along with input from technical teams, in
    reviewing cost/price proposals. Additionally, the Army collaborates
    with the Defense Contract Audit Agency when a contract is determined to
    be at risk for potential overcharging or price gouging to request a
    Truth in Negotiations Act audit, otherwise known as a defective pricing
    audit.
        Admiral Kilby. In order to ensure the Navy obtains fair and
    reasonable pricing for products and services, the Navy leverages
    competition and commercial procurement practices as appropriate. If
    neither competition nor commercial practices are appropriate for the
    procurement in question, the Navy will ensure that it obtains whatever
    cost and pricing data is necessary to support meaningful analysis and
    establish a fair and reasonable price. Additionally, the Navy will
    utilize organizations like Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
    and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to assist in both pre-award
    reviews and post-award monitoring.
        General Mahoney. The DOD takes the GAO's 2023 High-Risk Report
    seriously and is committed to addressing the vulnerabilities identified
    in our contracting processes. The Marine Corps recognizes the
    importance of preventing fraud, waste, and abuse, and we are actively
    implementing measures to ensure contractors do not engage in price
    gouging. These measures are grounded in the Federal Acquisition
    Regulation (FAR) and are designed to strengthen our internal controls
    and promote accountability. One key area of focus is:

          Rigorous Cost and Price Analysis (FAR 15.404): We are
    reinforcing our commitment to thorough cost and price analysis,
    including the use of appropriate techniques like price comparisons,
    parametric estimating, and cost realism analysis. This helps us
    determine fair and reasonable prices and identify potential
    overcharges. We are also ensuring our contracting officers receive
    appropriate training and support in these areas.

        We recognize this is an ongoing effort that requires continuous
    improvement. We are committed to working with all stakeholders to
    strengthen our contracting processes and ensure that we are getting the
    best value for taxpayer dollars.
        General Guetlein. The DOD has made significant strides addressing
    systemic risks identified in the 2023 GAO review. With the
    establishment of policies, boards, and regular reviews of service
    contracts, GAO assessed that DOD met all Operational Contract Support
    criteria and improved to meeting three of five service contract
    criteria. The Space Service Acquisition Executive initiated annual
    service contract requirement reviews for accountability. The Space
    Force continues to support efforts and use tools such as the Contractor
    Responsibility Watch List, a tool provided by Congress, to hold
    contractors accountable for delivering on commitments. Additionally,
    the U.S. Space Force continues to look for opportunities to foster
    competition, which reduces the probability of price gouging.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The DAF utilizes existing regulatory and
    statutory authorities that permit Contracting Officers (COs) to request
    data needed to determine fair and reasonable prices. The DAF has
    published training and guidance to reinforce the CO's authority to
    obtain the necessary data to ensure they can determine a fair and
    reasonable price. The DAF also conducts training for its Major Defense
    Systems' Multi-Functional Teams. This training provides in-depth
    analysis of industry trends, market dynamics, and major vendor
    financial strategies to inform our acquisition and negotiation
    strategies to obtain fair and reasonable prices.
        The DAF also supported DOD's work with Congress to strengthen the
    Department's ability to obtain pricing data for commercial subsystems,
    subcomponents, and spare parts. In commercial acquisitions when other
    than cost and pricing data is not provided, DAF COs follow data denial
    procedures while elevating through DAF and vendor leadership to seek
    resolution. Unresolved data denials are reported to the Office of the
    Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment), Defense Pricing,
    Contracting, and Acquisition Policy (DPCAP) for congressional
    reporting.

        37. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, have you identified any
    methods your service can use to enhance competition in the defense
    industrial base?
        General Mingus. A healthy and competitive defense industrial base
    (DIB) is crucial and enhancing competition within the DIB is a critical
    priority. Market research has always played a vital role in achieving
    this goal. Market research helps us identify existing and emerging
    technologies, products, and services that can meet the Army's needs in
    potentially more efficient and cost-effective ways. This can lead to
    the adoption of cutting-edge solutions that might not have been
    considered otherwise.
        Army reviews requirements that are currently met using a sole
    source (vendor locked) solution. Acquisition plans and requested
    approvals for sole source contracts are required include a plan to
    compete the requirement in the future. Additionally, the acquisition
    planning process must include a review of the Army's needs for data
    rights and access to a contractor's intellectual property to ensure the
    Army is able to compete future requirements to the maximum extent
    possible.
        Admiral Kilby. The current industrial base is designed for
    efficient peacetime production of ships and munitions. Historic
    underinvestment and industry consolidation following the end of the
    cold war have reduced competition and capacity at the Tier 1 shipyards
    and their suppliers, leading to workforce-constrained build schedules
    that do not meet Navy targets. In response to these challenges, the
    Navy recently stood up the Maritime Industrial Base Office, which is
    charged with addressing, developing, integrating, and managing
    enterprise maritime industrial base efforts. MIB's six lines of effort
    are focused on having dedicated teams and initiatives for the major
    issues that are impacting our industry partners and the ability of our
    shipbuilding programs to deliver ships on time and on budget:
    workforce, supplier development, shipbuilder infrastructure, strategic
    outsourcing, advanced manufacturing, and government oversight. These
    efforts include identifying opportunities to increase competition by
    increasing overall industrial base capacity, which also lowers barriers
    to entry for small businesses, and other innovative and non-traditional
    suppliers.
        General Mahoney. Yes. Improving communication and relationships
    with our industry partners has been a goal for the Department. Our
    contracting offices hold contracts and small business industry days,
    and the Director of Contracts has recently instituted reverse industry
    days to listen to challenges and opportunities from our DOD industry
    partners, so we can better define our requirements and communicate
    upcoming procurement opportunities.
        General Guetlein. The USSF is always looking for opportunities to
    leverage our domestic suppliers in our acquisition mission. Our Service
    is implementing the DOD Commercial Space Integration Strategy and the
    USSF Commercial Space Strategy to enhance competition in the defense
    industrial base.
        Our space acquisition Program Executive Officers and program
    offices are actively seeking every option to use domestic commercial
    products in their technical baselines. They submit requests for
    proposal (RFPs) to industry to solicit innovative warfighting
    capabilities to meet program requirements as well as directly and in
    partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) utilizing Other
    Transaction Authority. These advanced technologies will be cross-
    cutting, meaning that they will affect multiple mission areas across
    the Space Enterprise. For our more traditional space programs, the
    Service has pursued acquisition strategies that provide for competition
    to the maximum extent possible.
        The NSSL Phase 3 dual-lane acquisition strategy enables USSF to
    grow the industry base by onboarding new launch service providers, put
    capabilities on orbit more efficiently, and enhance resiliency while
    decreasing costs. Phase 3 Lane 1 allows the USSF to flexibly contract
    launch services for more risk-tolerant commercial-like payloads,
    putting more capabilities into orbit when needed for national security.
    Phase 3 Lane 2 provides the full complement of mission assurance for
    our Nation's most critical warfighting space assets.
        Our most recent initiative, the Commercial Space Office, looks to
    incorporate small businesses into capabilities through the Space
    Systems Command Front Door, SpaceWERX, and DIU, which not only
    increases our domestic industrial capacity, but also creates more jobs
    across the country.
        In addition, the USSF is an active member of the Space Industrial
    Base Working Group and collaborates with other mission partners like
    National Reconnaissance Office, National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration, and Missile Defense Agency to address joint space
    issues and work with industry to mitigate risks, adding resiliency to
    our defense industrial base.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force can enhance competition
    within the defense industrial base by promoting a clear and consistent
    demand signal for industry, incentivizing capital investment in key
    industrial capabilities, and promoting multiple competitive
    opportunities throughout the lifecycle of its programs. This approach,
    coupled with strategic efforts to lower barriers to entry for non-
    traditional contractors and new acquisition pathways such as the
    Software Acquisition Pathway and utilizing Other Transaction Authority,
    will help foster a more robust and diverse industrial base.
    Additionally, prioritizing direct engagement with contractors at all
    levels of the supply chain, including small businesses, will help us
    understand and mitigate risks and constraints. By proactively
    addressing potential bottlenecks and shaping incentives for innovation
    and production, the Air Force can ensure a healthy and competitive
    industrial base capable of meeting current and future national security
    needs.

        38. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, should your service's
    contracting officers have more access to cost and pricing data for sole
    source contracts?
        General Mingus. The Army fully supports gaining access to better
    and more thorough cost and pricing data. Actual costs on both fixed and
    cost type contracts provides valuable cost and pricing data and will
    help the Army better negotiate a fair and reasonable price. This data
    is valuable at the whole contract level but individual cost element
    data it is highly preferred. Cost performance on a contract has
    influence beyond just a fair and reasonable determination; it informs
    the Army of the overall risk to the contractor, which can shape the
    contract type and be factored in the overall negotiated profit.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes. The Navy will leverage Commercial and
    Competitive procedures to the maximum extent, which obviates the need
    for cost and pricing data. However, when those procedures are not
    possible, access to cost and pricing data is critical in determining
    the fair and reasonable price of products and services for sole source
    contracts.
        Providing, in a consistent manner, greater access to cost and
    pricing data to the DOD would assist in speed to award at fair and
    reasonable prices.
        General Mahoney. Yes, contracting officers should have access to
    cost and pricing data for sole-source contracts, when applicable.
    Contracting officers currently have access to cost and pricing data in
    support of sole source contracts exceeding $2 million. The FAR
    emphasizes the importance of obtaining cost and pricing data to
    determine fair and reasonable prices, especially in sole-source
    situations where the usual market forces of competition are absent.
    With the implementation of AI tools, we believe the speed of access
    will continue to improve.
        General Guetlein. For sole-source contracts, our contracting
    officers seek to obtain certified cost or pricing data or other than
    certified cost or pricing data as required and appropriate. DAF COs use
    the statutory language in 10 U.S. Code Sec.  3455 to pursue product
    technical and pricing data to ensure accurate commercial product and
    price reasonableness determinations for sole-source, military unique
    major weapon subsystem, components, and spare parts. The DAF works
    actively to expand competition across the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
    as competition is a powerful tool critical to gaining the best value
    for the taxpayer and our warfighters as one of our best methods of
    proving prices fair and reasonable. The DAF holds our prime contractors
    accountable for pursuing competition to the maximum extent possible and
    ensuring fair prices at the subcontract and vendor levels. Congress can
    help by maintaining and strengthening the ability of the DAF
    acquisition workforce to gain insight into contractors' cost and
    pricing data so that we can effectively evaluate industry's proposals.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring Air Force Contracting
    Officers (COs) have access to current, complete, and accurate cost and
    pricing data is integral to having negotiation parity to obtain fair
    deals for taxpayers.

        39. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney, General
    Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, does getting better access to a
    program's cost or pricing data help enhance your service's readiness?
        General Mingus. Better access to a program's cost or pricing data
    has the potential to help enhance readiness. The Army may, through a
    better understanding of actual costs, achieve cost savings, which could
    be allocated to procurement of additional goods and services or enhance
    the Army's efficiency in meeting its objectives and requirements.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes. If neither competition nor commercial practices
    are appropriate for the procurement in question, the Navy will ensure
    that it obtains whatever cost and pricing data is necessary to support
    meaningful analysis and establish a fair and reasonable price. Ensuring
    fair and reasonable pricing is critical to being a good steward of the
    taxpayer's funding and executing programs in accordance with their
    budgets. Ensuring access to adequate cost or pricing data is a critical
    enabler to protecting limited resources and being able to maximize the
    goods and services the Navy can procure to improve readiness and
    availability.
        General Mahoney. Yes. Speed of access will assist in improved
    negotiation positions and access to detailed cost data strengthens the
    government's negotiating position. Contracting officers can leverage
    this data to challenge unreasonable costs, negotiate fairer prices, and
    avoid overpaying for goods and services. This directly impacts
    readiness by freeing up funds for other critical requirements. This
    also allows for better contract performance; by tracking actual costs
    against proposed costs, the government can identify potential cost
    overruns or inefficiencies early on and take corrective actions. This
    helps ensure programs stay on track and deliver the required
    capabilities to support readiness.
        General Guetlein. Yes, understanding cost or pricing data can help
    enhance a Service's readiness. Depending on the capability and
    acquisition strategy, there may be several ways a Service can obtain
    cost or pricing data. As a service, we are implementing the DOD
    Commercial Space Integration Strategy and USSF Commercial Space
    Strategy. By increasing competition, leveraging commercial
    capabilities, and using firm-fixed price contracts where appropriate,
    the USSF is benefiting from a competitive environment to understand
    market prices. Expanding competition across the DIB is a powerful tool
    critical to gaining the best value for the taxpayer and our warfighters
    since competition is one of our best methods of proving prices fair and
    reasonable. Paying fair and reasonable prices ensures each dollar spent
    on readiness is enhancing the personnel, training, equipment, and
    sustainment to accomplish our missions in anticipated threat
    environments.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Being able to project costs helps us to
    program and budget more effectively, which allows us to gain and
    maintain readiness through efficient resourcing of our programs.
    Improving access to a program's cost and pricing information will
    significantly boost our service's readiness. While we have decent
    access to the cost and pricing data already, enhancing visibility into
    cost and pricing data will further improve the DAF's ability to
    negotiate better prices. The savings achieved through more advantageous
    procurement can be allocated to additional end items or other critical
    procurements. Furthermore, the availability of spare parts directly
    influences our operational mission effectiveness and readiness. With
    improved pricing, our program offices will have the capacity to acquire
    more parts, thereby enhancing our operational readiness.
                                right-to-repair
        40. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, your testimoneys
    highlighted servicemembers' ability and willingness to defend our
    Nation even when facing increasing sustainment and maintenance
    challenges. For instance, Admiral Kilby discussed a focus on reducing
    maintenance delays and procuring spare parts earlier; General Mahoney
    pointed to lack of amphibious ship availability; and Lieutenant General
    Spain cited prioritization of parts and supply in the Flying Hour
    program. As Chairman Sullivan said during the hearing, half of the
    Navy's amphibious warfare ships are in unsatisfactory condition, and
    the KC-46 and KC-135 tanker fleets are available less than 60 percent
    of the time. Do provisions in procurement contracts that restrict
    servicemembers' ability to repair services' own equipment contribute to
    these readiness challenges?
        General Mingus. Yes, provisions in procurement contracts that
    restrict Servicemembers' ability to repair their own equipment can
    contribute to readiness challenges. Such restrictions and dependency on
    external contractors can lead to increased maintenance delays, which in
    turn can result in longer equipment downtimes and reduced availability.
    To mitigate these challenges, Army contracting works closely with Army
    programs to ensure that the included provisions are based on the needs
    of the program office as outlined in the product support strategy and
    lifecycle sustainment plan. Carefully negotiating these provisions is
    critical to enabling sustainment and ensuring readiness.
        Admiral Kilby. Access to technical data is a key enabler in
    assuring the Navy has the ability to procure the products and services
    needed to support the warfighters and certain technical data is needed
    to perform organic repair.
        The Navy continually assesses the feasibility and business case for
    procurement of technical data packages and associated license rights
    throughout the program's life cycle in an effort to reduce sustainment
    and repair costs and to improve operational availability.
        The Navy continuously considers repair costs attributable to lack
    of access to technical data or limited rights in delivered technical
    data associated with weapon systems in its mandatory sustainment
    reviews and assessments of life cycle sustainment plans.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps fully supports initiatives that
    speed maintenance and procuring of spare parts. Additive manufacturing,
    3D printing, and the owning of technical data rights for its platforms
    play a key role in accelerating this process. To ensure marines can
    effectively repair equipment, the program office must, from the very
    beginning of the procurement process, clearly identify and prioritize
    the need for organic repair capabilities when defining the
    requirements.
        General Guetlein. Possibly; however, it's worth noting that many
    commercial components that support space capabilities include
    warranties that would be voided should a Guardian attempt to repair the
    equipment. This indeed can increase readiness challenges. The Lifecycle
    Sustainment Management Plan or similar documents help space systems and
    programs align repair risks to maintain readiness and ensure Guardians
    are focused on their warfighting and Joint Force contribution.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes, provisions in procurement contracts
    that restrict the Air Force's ability to repair its own equipment can
    contribute to readiness challenges. The Air Force has a skilled
    workforce of maintenance personnel who are capable of accomplishing
    maintenance tasks both in the field and in the depots. This workforce
    cannot be used effectively when contractual limitations preclude these
    personnel from access to technical data, the associated Intellectual
    Property (IP), and the rights to use them, to support maintenance.

        41. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, in the hearing,
    Director Maurer discussed the need for DOD to ``ensure maintainers have
    access to the technical data they need to meet operational mission
    needs.'' Do you believe ensuring your service has access to the
    technical data rights needed for servicemembers to repair the service's
    own equipment could advance your service's sustainment and readiness?
        General Mingus. Yes, ensuring that Servicemembers have access to
    the necessary technical data and license rights to repair equipment is
    crucial for advancing the Army's sustainment and readiness. Having the
    necessary technical data and license rights allows for timely and
    efficient maintenance and repairs, reducing downtime and dependency on
    external contractors. This capability enhances operational readiness by
    ensuring that equipment is in optimal condition and can be quickly
    returned to service when needed.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes. The Navy is actively working through our
    program managers to ensure we are procuring the technical data packages
    and obtaining associated data rights necessary to support efficient and
    affordable sustainment of our weapons systems.
        General Mahoney. Yes, in most cases, enabling Service members to
    access the technical data package to conduct repairs themselves would
    significantly enhance the Marine Corps' ability to sustain the weapons
    systems and maintain higher readiness rates.
        General Guetlein. Yes, access to technical data rights is helpful
    for those capabilities that a Space Force Guardian might be able to
    repair. As the smallest service, our Guardians are focused on
    developing their proficiency, skillsets, and readiness in space
    warfighting and contributing as part of the Joint Force.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring the Air Force has access to
    necessary technical data, the associated IP, and the rights to use
    them, is essential for enhancing sustainment and readiness. Empowered
    maintainers who have access to the data they need, translate to reduced
    downtime, increased equipment availability, and improved responsiveness
    to mission needs. The Air Force's organic maintenance capability
    strengthens our resilience and agility, ultimately contributing to a
    more ready and capable force and our national security.

        42. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, do you believe ensuring
    your service has access to the technical data rights needed for
    servicemembers to repair the service's own equipment could help reduce
    your service's repair and sustainment costs?
        General Mingus. Yes, ensuring that Servicemembers have access to
    technical data and license rights to repair equipment can help reduce
    sustainment costs. By leveraging organic maintenance and repairs, the
    Army can avoid the high costs associated with outsourcing these tasks
    to contractors. Additionally, timely access to technical data and
    license rights can lead to quicker repairs, reducing equipment downtime
    and associated costs. Overall, this approach promotes cost-efficiency
    and enhances the Army's ability to maintain operational readiness.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes. Access to technical data is a key enabler in
    assuring the Navy has the ability to procure the products and services
    needed to support the warfighters. Access to technical data enables
    organic repair capability or to have a vendor perform the required
    efforts on the Navy's behalf.
        General Mahoney. Yes. Having the right technical data package and
    rights needed for Service members to repair Marine Corps equipment
    would reduce repair and sustainment costs.
        General Guetlein. Yes, access to technical data rights could help
    reduce costs for those capabilities that a Space Force Guardian might
    be able to repair.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. The Air Force believes that
    outfitting our skilled maintainers with technical data, the associated
    IP, and the rights to use them, are essential to repairing our own
    equipment and cost-effective sustainment. The Air Force's dedicated
    maintenance workforce, both in the field and at depot-level facilities,
    represent a valuable and often more affordable alternative to relying
    solely on contractor support.

        43. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, do you believe ensuring
    your service has access to the technical data rights needed for
    servicemembers to repair the service's own equipment could help improve
    servicemember proficiency, skillsets, and readiness?
        General Mingus. Yes, ensuring that Servicemembers have access to
    the technical data and license rights needed to repair their own
    equipment can significantly improve their proficiency, skillsets, and
    readiness. Access to products, such as technical manuals, allows
    Servicemembers to gain hands-on experience and develop a deeper
    understanding of the equipment they operate and maintain. This
    knowledge enhances their technical skills and problem-solving
    abilities, leading to more effective and efficient maintenance
    practices. Additionally, it empowers servicemembers with the knowledge
    and skills required to address technical issues independently,
    fostering a more self-reliant, ready, and capable force.
        Admiral Kilby. Ensuring the Navy has access to technical data
    packages under the appropriate data rights licensing agreements ,
    especially early in the acquisition lifecycle of our programs, affords
    the acquisition workforce the ability to execute maintenance planning
    and task analysis to ensure informed decisionmaking and business case
    analysis to select the most effective product support strategy for a
    weapons system. It will help ensure that the Navy can meet its core
    logistics capabilities requirements to ensure a ready and controlled
    source of technical competence per 10 USC 2464. Additionally, assured
    access provides the Navy the opportunity to standardize maintenance
    procedures and practices, which can accelerate diagnostics and repairs.
    In short, servicemembers would be better able to develop and refine
    their expertise and skillsets if the Navy is assured access to
    technical data packages needed to repair their equipment.
        General Mahoney. Yes, ensuring our service has access to the
    necessary technical data rights is essential to enhancing servicemember
    proficiency, skillsets, and overall readiness. When Service members are
    empowered with the technical information required to maintain and
    repair equipment, they not only develop deeper operational
    understanding but also foster a more resilient and self-sufficient
    force. This access directly contributes to faster maintenance cycles,
    reduced downtime, and more mission-capable units in both training and
    operational environments.
        General Guetlein. Yes, access to technical data rights for those
    capabilities that a Space Force Guardian might be able to repair could
    help improve Guardians' proficiency, skillsets, and readiness. While
    the Space Force is unique because many of our capabilities cannot be
    serviced once launched, our Guardians are focused on developing their
    proficiency, skillsets, and readiness in space warfighting and
    contributing as part of the Joint Force.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. Ensuring access to technical data,
    the associated IP, and the rights to use them, is essential for
    improving Service member proficiency, skillsets, and overall readiness.
    Hands-on maintenance experience, enabled by access to and the right to
    use the necessary data, provides invaluable training and development
    opportunities for Air Force maintainers while they provide life cycle
    support.

        44. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how will you ensure
    servicemembers who are stationed abroad repair equipment that is
    damaged, in a timely and cost-effective fashion, especially in a
    contested logistics environment?
        General Mingus. The Army remains focused on conducting repairs
    forward, reducing reliance on reconstitution or sending unserviceable
    weapon systems and parts to Continental United States industrial base
    facilities for repair. The Army employs expeditionary maintenance teams
    and advanced manufacturing capabilities to theaters to assist units
    with repairs and sustainment actions. In addition, the Army is planning
    to establish theater distribution centers to increase logistics
    capacity in austere locations. Our goal is to leverage in-theater
    capabilities, with allies and partners, to reduce maintenance costs,
    reduce repair times, and increase readiness at the point of need. We
    also conduct periodic reviews of theater authorized stockage lists to
    ensure adequate levels of repair parts are available to support units.
        The Army recognizes the value of advanced manufacturing (AM) at the
    point of need and is scaling AM capabilities at echelon. US Army Tank
    Automotive and Armaments Command's Joint Manufacturing and Technology
    Center at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois is leading this effort for our
    organic industrial base. Further fielding of the Metal Working and
    Machine Shop Set positions the Army to conduct AM in large scale combat
    operations.
        The Army increasingly leverages tele-maintenance to assist units--
    through virtual contact with assistance representatives and
    technicians--with fault isolating and troubleshooting equipment
    failures for corrective action. The knowledge transfer from equipment
    manufacturers and depot level experts to maintainers at forward
    locations enables rapid repair in real-time, reduces downtime, and
    increases readiness. The Army continues to balance the need for
    commercial expertise with the necessity to sustain a capable organic
    workforce.
        Finally, the Army maintains the inherent right to repair equipment
    in contested environments leveraging battle damage and repair
    authorities.
        Admiral Kilby. The maintenance capability provided by
    servicemembers is integral to ensure damaged equipment can be repaired
    in a contested logistics environment. Therefore, service members are
    trained and equipped to conduct organizational and intermediate
    maintenance actions abroad.
        The Surface Training Advanced Virtual Environment (STAVE) program
    provides surface enlisted apprentice, journeyman, and master level
    training to increase sailor's capability to conduct organizational and
    intermediate maintenance actions. Additionally, through the Navy Afloat
    Maintenance Training Strategy (NAMTS), sailors are trained by utilizing
    I-Level hands-on maintenance production to ``forge maintenance
    warriors,'' who can maintain and repair shipboard equipment.
        The Navy's capital ships, such as aircraft carriers and amphibious
    assault ships, have significant repair capability and use the Strike
    Force Intermediate Maintenance Activity, to pull damaged parts from
    nearby activities to repair them in-theater. These platforms also have
    synthetic and metal advanced manufacturing (AM) equipment and even
    smaller Navy platforms are being outfitted with limited AM equipment to
    increase self-sufficiency. The Navy is also increasing investments for
    spares and repair parts for ships and aircraft to increase onboard
    inventories and sustain operations at sea. In addition, forward
    deployed maintenance activities assist service members in conducting
    repair requirements at oversees locations.
        General Mahoney. The ability to repair equipment in a contested
    environment is just as critical as the ability to find, fix, and
    destroy adversary formations. To ensure persistence in such
    environments, the Marine Corps is shifting from traditional supply
    chains to a more resilient sustainment web. Marine Forces Pacific's
    operational concept--designed to deter conflict and, if necessary,
    fight and win--is reliant on the integration of maneuver, mobility, and
    sustainment accomplished through, in part, the Global Positioning
    Network, the Global Resiliency Initiative, and the Regional Sustainment
    Framework:

          Global Positioning Network--A logistics concept designed
    to provide sustainable logistics in a contested environment by
    integrating pre-positioned stocks into diversified distribution models,
    resourcing and improving sustainment capabilities, and ensuring
    resilient installations.

          Global Resiliency Initiative--DOD's efforts to enhance
    the resilience of its forces, infrastructure, and operations against a
    wide range of threats and disruptions, both physical and cyber. Key
    aspects of the DOD's Global Resiliency Initiative include:

          -  Cybersecurity: Protecting DOD networks and systems from cyber
    attacks.

          -  Infrastructure Resilience: Hardening military bases and
    critical infrastructure against natural disasters, terrorist attacks,
    and other threats.

          -  Supply Chain Security: Ensuring the reliability and security
    of the DOD's supply chains.

          -  Energy Resilience: Improving the resilience of military energy
    systems to ensure reliable power for critical operations.

          -  Personnel Resilience: Enhancing the physical, mental, and
    emotional well-being of military personnel and their families.

          -  Operational Resilience: Developing redundant systems and
    procedures to ensure that critical missions can continue even if some
    systems are disrupted.

          Regional Sustainment Framework--The DOD's Regional
    Sustainment Framework contributes opportunities for greater allied
    burden sharing by focusing on bi-lateral agreements to ensure the
    highest-level combat readiness and lethality in a contested logistics
    environment, representing a global advancement in DOD's sustainment
    strategy. Prior sustainment strategies relied on the ability to return
    materiel to the Continental United States (CONUS) for repair,
    retrograde, and replenishment and then send back outside the
    Continental United States (OCONUS) for the end user, costing
    considerable amounts of time in priority theaters such as the Indo-
    Pacific. By developing distributed co-sustainment capabilities, such as
    maintenance, repair and overhaul, supply, and storage capabilities,
    closer to the warfighter's point of need with allies and partners, RSF
    seeks to decrease sustainment timelines, improving readiness and
    helping to reestablish deterrence.
        These three undertakings tie service operating concepts to joint
    sustainment efforts and leverage commercial partners, as well as allied
    sustainment capabilities, to enable the operations of Combatant
    Commanders.
        General Guetlein. Most USSF assets are deployed-in-place at
    respective bases. For deployed assets, the Space Force is heavily
    reliant on Contract Logistics Support (CLS) to repair equipment. CLS
    provides onsite technical support, onsite sparing, routine preventative
    maintenance activities, depot field teams, and subject matter expertise
    reach-back support as required to support warfighter demands. Depot
    Field teams provide onsite scheduled and unscheduled depot maintenance
    of weapon systems to include emergency/urgent type repairs as required.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Repairing aircraft in a timely and cost-
    effective fashion, especially in a contested logistics environment
    requires skilled maintainers who combine the use of established
    procedures and guidance with constant assessment to ensure that policy,
    training and resources support rather than hinder our Airmen. It
    requires Proactive Logistics, a Regional Sustainment Framework,
    prepositioning, Inter-service operability agreements/processes, and
    exploration of new and unconventional concepts to ensure rapid access
    to parts and expertise.
        It also requires the forward deployment and posturing of Aircraft
    Battle Damage Repair and Depot Field Teams who bring technical
    assistance and specialized repair capabilities forward when and where
    required. And finally, it requires Tech-Enabled support and Augmented/
    Virtual Reality applications to connect maintainers with Subject Matter
    Experts and to obtain real-time expertise and guidance. This multi-
    faceted approach--emphasizing agile logistics and emerging technology--
    maximizes aircraft availability, even in challenging environments.

        45. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how would including a
    right-to-repair or technical data rights clause (that provides fair and
    reasonable access to technical data rights to repair and maintain
    equipment) in your services' acquisition contracts benefit your
    service?
        General Mingus. Including appropriate contract language and Defense
    Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clauses in acquisition
    contracts benefits the Army by facilitating access to the necessary
    technical data and license rights for equipment repair and maintenance.
    These help to provide Servicemembers with the needed technical data and
    license rights to perform timely and efficient repairs, reducing
    reliance on external contractors and associated costs. As a result, the
    Army enhances operational readiness by minimizing equipment downtime
    and ensuring that maintenance can be conducted by servicemembers.
        Admiral Kilby. Access to technical data is a key enabler in
    assuring the Navy has the ability to procure the products and services
    needed to support the warfighters. Access to technical data enables
    organic repair capability or to have a vendor perform the required
    efforts of the Navy's behalf.
        General Mahoney. Including right-to-repair and technical data
    rights clauses in our service's acquisition contracts offers
    significant advantages in terms of cost, readiness, and operational
    flexibility. These clauses directly benefit the Marine Corps by:

          Reducing Lifecycle Costs: By securing access to technical
    data, we can perform repairs and maintenance in-house or through
    competitive bidding, rather than being locked into sole-source
    contracts with the original equipment manufacturer. This dramatically
    reduces the long-term costs of owning and operating our equipment.

          Improving Readiness and Sustainment: With the ability to
    repair equipment ourselves or through multiple vendors, we can minimize
    downtime and ensure that our warfighters have the equipment they need,
    when they need it. This enhances readiness and improves our ability to
    sustain operations in the field.

          Promoting Competition and Innovation: Right-to-repair
    clauses foster a more competitive marketplace for maintenance and
    repair services. This encourages innovation and drives down costs, as
    multiple vendors can compete for our business.

          Enhancing Operational Flexibility: Access to technical
    data allows us to modify and adapt equipment to meet specific
    operational needs. This gives us greater flexibility and agility in
    responding to evolving threats.

        The Marine Corps uses the appropriate FAR and DFARS clauses, like
    DFARS 252.227-7013 and others, to carefully manage technical data
    rights and ensure we get what we need without infringing on legitimate
    proprietary rights. We ensure that we secure the necessary data rights
    prior to contract award by including these requirements in the
    contract's terms, documented in the Contract Data Requirements List
    (CDRL) and Data Item Description (DID).
        In short, right-to-repair and technical data rights clauses are not
    just about saving money; they are about empowering our service to be
    more self-sufficient, resilient, and adaptable. They are a critical
    investment in our long-term readiness and operational effectiveness.
    This is a strategic advantage that pays dividends in terms of cost
    savings, improved readiness, and enhanced warfighting capabilities.
        General Guetlein. Including a right-to-repair or a similar
    technical-data-rights clause would allow the Service to solicit third
    parties for equipment maintenance but may drive additional costs to
    obtain such data rights.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force strongly supports the
    concept of a ``right to repair'' and believes Air Force personnel
    should be able to repair their own equipment. For certain weapon
    systems, lack of access to technical data and the associated IP, and
    rights to use them, has forced the Air Force to rely on prime
    contractors for maintenance services, stifling competition and
    hindering the use of organic maintenance capabilities. A carefully
    crafted right-to-repair clause has the potential to ameliorate these
    issues.

        46. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how do you ensure
    contractors deliver technical data rights to your service when a
    contract requires or allows it?
        General Mingus. The Army requires activities to identify the
    minimum needs for technical data and license rights and consider
    availability and delivery of the identified data and rights during
    source selection. To ensure contractors deliver technical data and
    license rights, it is essential to include clear and specific language
    in the contract that outlines the delivery requirements. Regular
    monitoring and compliance checks should be conducted to verify that
    contractors are adhering to these requirements. Additionally,
    establishing a robust contract management process with defined
    milestones and deliverables can help track the progress and ensure
    timely delivery of technical data. Effective communication and
    collaboration with contractors are crucial to addressing any issues or
    discrepancies promptly.
        Admiral Kilby. The Navy ensures that all requirements of contracts
    have been satisfied and delivered with the appropriate markings. Navy
    is working with industry to include data rights in our contracts to
    enable Navy to repair equipment and not be reliant upon contractors for
    technical assistance and repair. If contractors are not delivering the
    technical data required by the contract, the Navy has mechanisms to
    support enforcement of data delivery such as withholding of financing
    payments or termination of the contract. Navy appreciates the support
    of Congress for ``right to repair.''
        General Mahoney. The solicitation and resulting contract would
    include CDRLs and DIDs which would define what and when the data is
    required.
        General Guetlein. Our acquisition community, under the authority of
    the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
    Integration, ensures our contracts include Contract Data Requirements
    Lists for delivering technical data rights when required or allowed.
    The Service provides intellectual property resources such as the DAF
    Intellectual Property Cadre, a multi-functional team of intellectual
    property experts, that assist with acquisition strategy planning,
    negotiation, and execution.
        Lieutenant General Spain. We anticipate delivery of technical data
    and the associated IP, and rights to use them, based on specified
    contract terms. Unfortunately, we routinely encounter data and IP
    rights controversies, often involving contractors failing to provide
    the government with the actual deliverable, technical data and the
    associated IP, and/or the rights to use them. This occurs even when the
    Air Force has paid for such deliverables. The only recourse is for the
    Air Force to issue a Contracting Officer's Final Determination and
    await contractor-initiated litigation at the Court of Federal Claims or
    Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. However, those tribunals do
    not have the statutory authority to order contractors to deliver
    mission-critical data needed by the warfighter; the relevant statute
    provides for only monetary relief and contract interpretation (i.e.,
    declaratory relief), which take years to resolve. Sometimes, the
    failure to deliver is a result of the prime contractor not properly
    requesting or obtaining the necessary rights from its subcontractor. If
    delivered, the Air Force can only use the deliverable according to the
    markings placed on the data, which may not accurately reflect the
    rights granted in the contract. If improperly marked, the Air Force
    must seek to have the contractor delete the marking or change it to the
    marking required by the contract, thereby allowing the Government the
    ability to use the deliverable as contracted.

        47. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, does your service have
    an assessment that outlines the costs incurred due to lack of access to
    technical data rights needed for your servicemembers to repair or
    sustain equipment? If yes, what did the assessment conclude?
        General Mingus. The Army does not currently have an assessment that
    specifically outlines the costs incurred due to lack of access to
    technical data and license rights. However, the Army assesses
    operations and sustainment costs with a focus on identifying
    contributing factors to cost growth during Sustainment Reviews.
    Sustainment decisions related to technical data and license rights are
    program dependent and may change over the weapon system's life cycle.
        Admiral Kilby. The Navy continuously considers repair costs
    attributable to lack of access to technical data or limited rights in
    delivered technical data associated with weapon systems in its
    mandatory sustainment reviews and assessments of life cycle sustainment
    plans. To date, there is not a single Navy-wide assessment. However,
    the Navy looks forward to discussing the results of any assessment
    performed in this area with Congress.
        General Mahoney. We are unaware of any service-level assessment
    capturing incurred costs due to lack of technical data rights.
        General Guetlein. While the USSF does not have a single,
    comprehensive assessment that quantifies all costs associated with
    limited technical data rights across every system, we recognize limited
    technical data rights is an issue. Each program tracks sustainment
    costs, including those driven by reliance on Original Equipment
    Manufacturers (OEMs); however, compiling a service-wide assessment is
    difficult because isolating the specific cost premium attributable
    solely to data rights, as opposed to other sustainment factors, is
    challenging.
        However, the data we have consistently demonstrate that
    insufficient technical data rights lead to higher sustainment costs,
    longer downtimes, and reduced competition.
        We are working to include stronger data rights provisions into our
    contracts up front, learning from past challenges. Where feasible, we
    are investing in training and facilities to allow for more in-house
    maintenance and repair, reducing reliance on OEMs, and we are
    developing a comprehensive data strategy to better manage technical
    data throughout a system's lifecycle.
        Lieutenant General Spain. While a formal assessment specifically
    focused on the costs incurred due to a lack of access to technical
    data, the associated IP, and the rights to use them, has not been
    conducted, the Air Force recognizes the impact this lack of access can
    have on lifecycle support and sustainment costs while negatively
    impacting overall readiness.

        48. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, if your service does
    not have such an assessment, would you commit to ensuring an assessment
    is conducted and the results of that assessment are made public?
        General Mingus. I commit to ensure that the Army continues to
    review the operational limitations, challenges, and obstacles our
    Soldiers face with maintenance of our equipment. I also will ensure
    that such information is conveyed up the chain-of-command so Army
    Senior Leaders have the details necessary to tackle these issues
    properly. It is vital that the proper data is conveyed in a manner
    which fully supports the continued development of our systems and our
    Soldiers. Promptly addressing any issues or discrepancies which present
    themselves is crucial to the Army's continued success.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, the Navy is committed to continually conducting
    necessary assessments to fully understand the costs associated with not
    having technical data. This analysis would further improve the Navy's
    ability to assess the value of technical data delivery requirements
    during contract formation.
        General Mahoney. Yes. The Marine Corps, through our acquisition
    activities, would support such an assessment to the maximum extent
    possible.
        General Guetlein. Yes, we will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to
    evaluate the financial implications of limited technical data rights
    across the USSF. We believe this assessment would provide valuable
    insights to guide future policy and acquisition decisions we. We are
    committed to transparency and will share the results of this assessment
    with Congress with appropriate safeguards for classified data.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force strives to ensure its
    programs deliberately assess their long-term technical data needs and
    execute acquisition strategies that provide for the necessary technical
    data rights, required IP, and the rights to use them for sustainment.
    The Air Force is focused on empowering our skilled maintainers with the
    technical data and the associated IP and rights to use them as
    necessary to repair our own equipment and plans to continue working to
    achieve optimal outcomes in this area. The Air Force will continue to
    work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Pricing,
    Contracting, and Acquisition Policy (DPCAP) IP Cadre for assessments
    and make any results public.

        49. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, the Navy has the
    Taxpayer Advocacy Project to ensure cost-efficiency in the service.
    What programs or initiatives does your service have to protect taxpayer
    dollars from contractor tactics that drive up costs, such as right-to-
    repair restrictions?
        General Mingus. The Army takes measures to protect taxpayer dollars
    and avoid excessive costs associated with contractor dependencies,
    including those stemming from right-to-repair restrictions and has
    initiatives to address these challenges.
        The Army is refining its intellectual property (IP) policy on
    planning, acquiring, and managing IP, emphasizing a tailored approach
    and early consideration of technical data and license rights in the
    acquisition life cycle. The policy includes defining required data
    deliverables in solicitations and negotiating favorable license terms
    for maintenance and repair flexibility. Additionally, the Army is
    investing in workforce training on IP management, including contract
    requirements, cost-effective pricing, data rights assertions, and
    licensing agreements.
        The Army promotes the use of Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)
    principles to reduce the reliance on single-source vendors and
    proprietary systems. MOSA encourages the use of open standards and
    interoperable components, enabling greater competition and maintenance
    flexibility.
        The Army actively adopts refined acquisition and sustainment
    policies to emphasize early planning for product support analysis
    necessary for sustainment planning, data rights acquisition, and life
    cycle cost considerations.
        Admiral Kilby. The Taxpayer Advocacy Project (TAP) was developed by
    the Navy to ensure that the taxpayer gets the best value for their
    investment by providing Program Executive Officers, Program Managers,
    Contracting Officers, and Attorneys with legal tools and strategies to
    improve and enhance negotiations with the industrial base. TAP's goal
    was accomplished through an updated and implemented matrix of legal
    authorities, public engagement with other agencies and Congress,
    analysis of contractor financial data, and analysis of contract
    deliverables. TAP initially focused on contractors' refusal to deliver
    technical data despite statutes and regulations allowing for such
    delivery and contract clauses mandating delivery. Original Equipment
    Manufacturers (OEMs) refused to agree to deliver complete Technical
    Data Packages (TDPs) to the Navy, or expressed concern over what is
    necessary to constitute a complete TDP that would enable the Navy to
    operate, maintain, and sustain deliverables. When the Navy attempted to
    include such technical data delivery requirements in contracts, the
    OEMs declined to bid on these requirements, holding up contract award.
    The OEMs characterized the Navy's delivery requirements as an attempt
    to force the OEMs to relinquish their intellectual property rights.
    This was inaccurate. The Navy was willing to accept the level of
    license rights to which it would be entitled by operation of the
    technical data statutes, regulations, and clauses. Eventually, the Navy
    was successful in negotiating a special license agreement to define TDP
    requirements such that the OEM's most significant intellectual property
    concerns were addressed while ensuring that the Navy was able to use
    the delivered technical data to sustain and maintain weapons systems.
        General Mahoney. In addition to ensuring the service remains on
    track for another successful audit opinion, the Marine Corps has also
    taken a multifaceted approach to reducing sustainment costs through
    service level guidance and adoption of key programs to improve
    operational readiness and availability through more cost-effective
    means. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 4700.4 Advanced Manufacturing directs
    commanders at all levels to employ additive manufacturing to fullest
    extent possible to increase readiness in support of operations, and MCO
    4151.22 Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) direct the integration
    of predictive maintenance capabilities to reduce life cycle sustainment
    costs over time and increase lethality through improved operational
    readiness. In support of implementation, Marine Corps Systems Command
    (MARCORSYSCOM) has delivered to DASN(S) their CBM+ Strategic
    Implementation Plan for ground acquisitions and is coordinating with
    Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) on
    the development of a service level CBM+ implementation strategy.
        General Guetlein. Through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
    for Space Acquisition and Integration, acquirers are implementing nine
    (9) space acquisition tenets focused on best practices to ensure
    taxpayer dollars are providing warfighter capabilities. Thank you for
    the authorities in the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization
    Act (FY25 NDAA) that elevated the Contractor Responsibility Watch List
    (CRWL) from Space Systems Command to the Service Acquisition Executive.
        The CRWL provides a unique authority for holding contractors
    accountable for performance, including by managing costs. Additionally,
    by increasing competition, leveraging commercial capabilities, and
    using firm-fixed price contracts where appropriate, the USSF is
    benefiting from a competitive environment to reduce the probability of
    price gouging and vendor-lock.
        Lieutenant General Spain. While the Air Force does not have a
    similar project to the one described, we are committed to making sound
    sustainment strategy decisions and are continuing work to ensure that
    the right-to-repair resides with the Air Force to avoid readiness
    delays and single-source repairs. Therefore, the Air Force's
    Intellectual Property (IP) Cadre is working with acquisition leadership
    to develop an IP pricing ``tiger team'' to support programs in the IP
    valuation team. The aim is to acquire the necessary IP license rights,
    technical data, and software (IP) at reasonable prices in order to
    specifically repair our weapons systems when needed, and more generally
    to be better able to compete or in-source future sustainment efforts
    for our mission critical platforms, thereby protecting taxpayer
    dollars.

        50. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what is your service's
    strategy to reduce acquisition and sustainment costs?
        General Mingus. Early and continuous planning throughout the
    acquisition life cycle can significantly reduce acquisition and
    sustainment costs. First, we consider sustainment as a performance
    parameter and consider tradeoffs early in system design to improve
    durability and reduce future operations and maintenance costs. Second,
    we encourage competition to the maximum extent practicable and use
    commercial technology when available to drive down acquisition and
    procurement costs. Finally, we design our systems to incorporate a
    modular open system approach to enable iterative upgrades, enable
    continuous competition, and incorporate new technology to keep systems
    relevant over the long term.
        Admiral Kilby. The Navy follows statute and policy focusing on
    reducing acquisition and sustainment costs. The Independent Logistics
    Assessment (ILA) is directed by Title 10 U.S.C. Sec.  4325, and policy
    is provided in DODI 5000.91. ILAs are conducted on all major weapon
    systems through the acquisition process in order to analyze product
    support outcomes as identified by the product support strategy, as well
    as identifying features that are likely to drive future operating and
    support costs. Recommending changes to a system design or support
    concept could reduce costs. During sustainment, Title 10 U.S.C. 4325
    requires periodic reviews of sustainment costs of major weapon systems
    after such systems achieve initial operational capability. This enables
    the program to identify and address factors resulting in growth in
    sustainment costs and adapt support strategies to reduce such costs.
    Title 10 U.S.C. 4323 requires Sustainment Reviews (SR) for covered
    systems beginning 5 years after achieving iniital operation capablity
    and every 5 years thereafter. SRs examine sustainment cost drivers, and
    programs must provide remediation plans if cost growth has occurred.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps strategy for reducing acquisition
    and sustainment costs is multifaceted. MCO 4700.4 Advanced
    Manufacturing and MCO 4151.22 CBM+ both establish programs to address
    key tenants necessary for the reduction of acquisition and sustainment
    costs. MARCORSYSCOM recently delivered to DASN(S) their CBM+ Strategic
    Implementation Plan for ground acquisitions. Concurrently, DC CD&I is
    developing the service level CBM+ implementation strategy.
        Multiple MARCORSYSCOM orders are in the process of being
    established or updated to address improvements to sustainment and
    readiness at an affordable cost. MARCORSYSCOM Order 4105.2, Product
    Support Strategy (PSS), requires program managers (PMs) to develop a
    robust PSS based on analyses conducted with vendors, program office
    representatives, and subject matter experts from the Fleet Marine
    Force. MARCORSYSCOM Order 4151.22, Reliability Centered Maintenance,
    emphasizes the requirement for Fleet Marines to provide subject matter
    expertise in the execution of this analysis to ensure increased
    readiness at an affordable cost. These lines of efforts between
    Headquarters Marine Corps and MARCORSYSCOM will directly increase
    readiness in support of our Nation's warfighters.
        General Guetlein. The USSF implemented a Commercial Space Strategy
    with four guiding principles of balance, interoperability, resilience,
    and responsible conduct. This strategy supports a robust industrial
    base where competition drives down costs. Additionally, the Assistant
    Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration has
    implemented nine (9) tenets for space systems and programs to improve
    acquisition outcomes by delivering programs on cost and schedule
    through rigorous program management discipline and execution.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Operations and Sustainment (O&S) costs
    are the largest cost for programs and our military understands the
    importance of bringing those costs down as much as possible. Throughout
    the acquisition lifecycle process, and even in the early stages, we
    look for efficiencies to reduce those costs prior to entering O&S. One
    of the primary objectives of the DAF is to decrease cost for both
    acquisition and sustainment, as highlighted in several initiatives and
    strategies. This involves leveraging partnerships and commercial
    solutions, providing opportunities for rapid prototyping and
    experimentation, enhancing production capabilities and capacity, and
    adopting strategies such as digital engineering to promote efficiency
    and reduce costs in acquisition. Further, the DAF has prioritized life-
    cycle costs by improving reliability, availability, maintainability,
    and supportability to achieve reductions in sustainment expenses.

        51. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, Director Maurer stated
    that at least one service ``needs an industrial base strategy to help
    get better results from the private companies that repair ships,'' and
    for at least one program, ``DOD needs to reassess the balance of
    sustainment responsibilities between contractors and services.'' Please
    provide an example of when your service did not have the technical data
    rights needed to repair or sustain a piece of equipment and describe
    any resulting wasted time, extra costs, or reduced readiness.
        General Mingus. There are instances by which the Army may choose
    not to procure the technical data rights needed to repair or sustain a
    piece of equipment. Specific example is with centrally purchased or
    non-centrally managed equipment, information technology assets, and
    commercial off the shelf equipment with vendor or manufacturer
    warranties. The Army uses this strategy in accordance with Federal
    acquisition regulation and only when the benefits to be derived from a
    warranty are commensurate with the cost of the warranty.
        Admiral Kilby. OEMs for programs such as F/A-18 and JSF have in the
    past refused to agree to deliver complete technical data packages or,
    like on MQ-25, expressed concern over what is necessary to constitute a
    complete TDP that would enable the government to operate, maintain, and
    sustain the aircraft. This can generate significant contracting delays
    while negotiations endure, ultimately impacting Fleet readiness.
        One example involving sustainment of a system is the Main Rotor
    Actuator (MRA) for AH-1Z (Viper)/UH-1Y(Venom), managed by PMA-276.
        These components have sporadically been responsible for requests
    for priority assistance over fiscal year 24. There was an uptick in
    demand while the OEM (Woodward) had issues with their sub-vendor that
    produces manifolds for the MRA. This caused delays and increased
    turnaround time. This drove cannibalization actions to prevent
    readiness impacts. NAVSUP and Woodward have worked with the sub-vendor
    to remedy the issues.
        General Mahoney. The ACV Family of Vehicles (FoV) was procured as a
    Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)/Non-Developmental Item (NDI) vehicle.
    As such the U.S. Government had not funded the initial development of
    the vehicle offered by the Original Equipment Manufacturer, but did opt
    to incorporate critical survivability needs, resulting in extended
    maintenance periods and increased costs. This experience highlights the
    critical importance of securing adequate technical data rights, even
    for COTS acquisitions, to ensure timely, cost-effective sustainment and
    maintain operational readiness.
        General Guetlein. Director Maurer raises an important issue that
    resonates with the USSF as well. Access to technical data rights is
    essential for effective and affordable sustainment of space systems.
    The service has encountered challenges with programs where limited
    access to proprietary technical data held by the OEM created
    sustainment obstacles. This experience underscored the criticality of
    securing appropriate technical data rights up front in the acquisition
    process. We are taking steps to prevent similar situations in the
    future.
        Lieutenant General Spain. The Air Force awarded a contract to
    modernize a sensitive sensor system. The contract required delivery of
    firmware and software in appropriate detail to ensure operational needs
    were met. Unfortunately, some subsystems were delivered without this
    required information. When challenged, the vendor stated the items were
    considered firmware and therefore did not meet the definition of
    ``computer software.'' After multiple engagements, this issue was
    finally resolved with the program deciding to buy all the components in
    the sub-system with firmware pre-installed. While this satisfied the
    immediate need, it unfortunately will cost the Air Force the ability to
    have additional suppliers for these items in the future and allows the
    contractor to charge other government entities for the same units.

        52. Senator Warren. Ms. Maurer, you testified during the hearing
    that GAO's ``independent nonpartisan role'' is to ``help improve the
    government.'' What additional information would be helpful in order to
    continue assessing to what degree failure to access technical data
    rights harms our military readiness?
        Ms. Maurer. Our work has shown that the Department of Defense's
    (DOD) access to intellectual property or technical data--such as user
    manuals, engineering design data, models, and computer software--has
    been a long-standing issue negatively affecting the ability of
    maintainers to conduct maintenance on weapon systems, limiting the
    availability of those systems to the warfighter. Acquiring and
    licensing technical data is critical for ensuring weapon systems and
    equipment remain functional, sustainable, upgradable, and affordable.
        We have generally been provided the necessary information by the
    Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services to conduct our
    work on this issue. However, DOD and the military services have not
    taken action to fully implement our recommendations. For example:

          In 2022 (GAO-23-106217), we reported that access to
    technical data posed sustainment challenges for 15 of 45 aircraft,
    having an effect on the availability of the aircraft and costs required
    to sustain those aircraft according to program officials. There are a
    variety of reasons across military aircraft programs that result in
    access to technical data being a limiting factor in sustaining those
    systems. For example, in 2014 (GAO-14-778), we found that DOD had not
    fully addressed access to technical data for the F-35 aircraft, which
    has impacted affordability and operational readiness of the aircraft.
    We recommended that DOD develop a long-term Intellectual Property
    Strategy to include, but not be limited to, the identification of (1)
    current levels of technical data rights ownership by the Federal
    Government and (2) all critical technical data needs and their
    associated costs. Over a decade later--as of May 2025--this
    recommendation has not been implemented by DOD. In part due to this,
    DOD and the military services continue to struggle in its efforts to
    sustain the F-35 and meet availability goals of the military services.

          In 2020 (GAO-20-2), we reported on 11 different
    shipbuilding programs--including the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), Wasp (LHD
    8), America (LHA 6), San Antonio (LPD 17), Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), and
    Virginia (SSN 774)--and found that nearly all of them experienced
    sustainment issues due to a lack of technical data that resulted from
    poor planning in the early stages of the acquisition process.
    Specifically, the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) for these ships
    did not consistently address the full spectrum of potential
    intellectual property and technical data related issues, such as
    attaining the technical data needed to repair and replace ship systems.
    Nearly all of the LCSPs we reviewed stated, in general terms, that the
    Navy would obtain the technical data to which it had rights. However,
    in these LCSPs, the Navy did not address how this strategy met the
    Navy's needs for competitive and affordable acquisition and sustainment
    over the life cycle of a ship class, such as to ensure maintenance
    could be carried out as planned by a ship's crew. We made 11 of
    recommendations to the Navy to improve sustainment planning for ships,
    including addressing deficiencies in LCSPs and sustainment risks
    associated with the lack of technical data. However, only 1 of the 11
    recommendations are fully implemented, as of May 2025.

        In addition, we have an on-going review examining DOD weapon system
    programs in sustainment and their planning for intellectual property
    acquisition, efforts to ensure data procured is received and reviewed
    for accuracy by DOD, and challenges faced by weapon systems in
    sustainment due to data rights shortfalls. We plan to report on the
    results of that work later in 2025.
                          modular open system approach
        53. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, how will a Modular Open
    System Approach (MOSA) to contracts for equipment benefit your service?
        General Mingus. The Army values the MOSA as it provides important
    development benefits throughout the lifecycle of the program. One, it
    enhances competition as individual subcomponents can be recompeted as
    it avoids long-term vendor lock and allows opportunity for industry
    partners to enter into the space. Second, it improves interoperability
    with other systems as hardware and software can be changed out
    independently to coincide with both legacy systems and that of partner
    nations. Third, it allows the Army to incorporate innovation at a
    higher speed as the flexibility with MOSA allows for easier
    reconfiguration as new technology becomes available. Fourth, it
    provides cost savings/avoidance as the Army is not locked into one
    vendor should supply chain or cost becomes an issue.
        Admiral Kilby. A Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) enables our
    equipment to be adapted, updated and modernized to the needs of our
    operational forces in a more cost-effective manner. By rapidly fielding
    emerging technologies, we ensure our warfighting forces remain the
    strongest and most lethal in the world. By designing and acquiring our
    systems to be modular and open, we both support the revival of the
    industrial base where vendors can compete in areas that were once more
    challenging to gain footing, as well as enable new partners who can
    offer unique solutions to address our needs. Finally, a MOSA supports
    incorporation of cost-effective and efficient solutions that are
    vetted, tested and fielded more quickly than traditional acquisition
    methods.
        General Mahoney. The Modular Open System Approach (MOSA) encourages
    the development of open, standardized system architectures that enable
    flexibility in integrating emerging technologies, evolving requirements
    and advanced capabilities without the need for a full system redesign.
    MOSA is particularly crucial in a dynamic defense environment, where
    the ability to quickly adapt to changing threats and operational needs
    is vital for mission success. By leveraging modularity in system
    architecture, the Marine Corps can ensure that different modules
    (hardware and software) can be swapped in or upgraded independently.
    This reduces time to field capability while promoting the reuse of
    design elements across multiple platforms. An open system architecture
    allows for increased competition among vendors and broadens the
    Industrial Base, making it easier to incorporate solutions from a range
    of suppliers while maintaining interoperability. This also minimizes
    dependency on specific vendors, creating a more resilient and
    competitive procurement environment and enabling a more sustainable,
    cost-effective procurement processes.
        Incorporating MOSA requirements into contracts helps align system
    development with operational needs, ensuring systems remain agile and
    adaptable. By focusing on architectural flexibility and
    standardization, the Marine Corps gains the ability to stay ahead of
    technological advances, enhance mission readiness and respond to
    evolving threats effectively. This results in faster modernization and
    more timely responses to operational challenges, keeping the Marine
    Corps ready and capable.
        General Guetlein. Embracing MOSA in our acquisition strategies is
    not simply a technological shift, it's a strategic imperative for the
    USSF. MOSA provides enhanced competition and innovation, improved
    affordability and lifecycle costs, and increased flexibility and
    resilience. MOSA also fosters collaboration and interoperability
    because it shifts the Space Force from expensive, proprietary systems
    to a more agile, affordable, and adaptable approach to space
    acquisition. This is crucial for the Space Force to maintain
    technological superiority and address the evolving challenges in the
    space domain.
        Lieutenant General Spain. A Modular Open System Approach (MOSA)
    provides an important benefit for the DAF, enabling us to reduce costs
    and risk associated with technology refresh and system capability
    upgrades. MOSA provides a unified framework enabling interoperability
    among systems to achieve joint and coalition missions. MOSA also
    increases opportunities for competition and innovation from industry by
    opening up systems that have traditionally been vendor locked.

        54. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, does your service
    provide any justification or analysis to back up the determination that
    a MOSA is not practicable in a contract?
        General Mingus. The Army values the MOSA as it provides important
    development benefits throughout the lifecycle of the program, however,
    sometimes it's not feasible to be required in a contract agreement. For
    example, as we look to leverage buying commercial off the shelf
    capabilities, utilizing MOSA may not be available at the speed to which
    we are procuring a system or simply an option based on the technology.
        Admiral Kilby. Our teams have been working to develop guidance for
    programs on the business case and value proposition of MOSA. Dictating
    how a contractor applies a MOSA for a given system may be limiting and
    stifle innovative approaches. Instead, our goal is to ensure strategies
    for system acquisition, design, and sustainment to support a MOSA that
    enables interoperability, reusability, and open standards The guidance
    we provide to programs for use in their statements of work and
    solicitation requirements will be aimed at showing how a MOSA can
    benefit the full system lifecycle, from development through
    sustainment. This comprehensive approach enables and empowers programs
    to craft requirements and contracts that best align to their
    acquisition strategy, strengthens the industrial base, and provides
    best value to the Government.
        General Mahoney. MARCORSYSCOM (MCSC) is contributing a
    representative to the Naval MOSA Working Group, under the Office of the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
    Engineering. The goal is to ensure that system acquisition and
    sustainment strategies align with MOSA principles that promote
    interoperability and reusability. Guidance to Program Management
    Offices will include business case and contract considerations to
    demonstrate how MOSA implementation can benefit the full system
    lifecycle.
        General Guetlein. The USSF understands the long-term benefits of
    open systems and only pursues a non-MOSA approach in limited
    circumstances, supported by rigorous analysis. Our default position is
    to incorporate MOSA to the maximum extent practicable while recognizing
    that a tailored approach is sometimes necessary. If a program
    determines that MOSA is not suitable for a specific contract or
    subsystem, they are required to provide a clear and compelling
    justification. We are dedicated to ensuring our decisions are driven by
    data, analysis, and a focus on mission effectiveness.
        Lieutenant General Spain. In accordance with DOD and DAF MOSA
    policy and standard engineering practice, all programs evaluate their
    architectures at the technical, programmatic, and contractual levels to
    ensure maximum value from MOSA. These findings directly inform
    acquisition, support, and modernization contract strategies and are
    documented in engineering artifacts. MOSA is a core element of DAF
    Digital Materiel Management.

        55. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what challenges is your
    service facing in implementing MOSA requirements?
        General Mingus. The Army has embraced implementing MOSA as it
    brings needed flexibility to the development of our systems, but it
    doesn't come without its challenges. For example, depending on the
    resources, schedule and requirements, implementing MOSA either
    partially or entirely for the system may not be a feasible option. The
    Army also has to be mindful of negotiating IP rights that allow modular
    system design that recognizes industry investment while also allows the
    government to maintain flexibility to meet its needs.
        Admiral Kilby. We identified several challenges in implementing
    MOSA requirements, including awareness of the requirement, the breadth
    of considerations when developing a MOSA, a trained and equipped
    workforce, and implementation guidance from both technical and business
    perspectives. We recently developed and released the Naval Open Systems
    Implementation Guidebook Version One to bring awareness and guide the
    workforce on the scope and elements of MOSA. Presently, an update of
    the Guidebook is underway and scheduled to be released later this year
    with additional guidance for requirements development, business case
    analyses, the importance of system architectures, and how MOSA can be
    leveraged for different acquisition pathways. Finally, the Navy is
    reviewing training material, such as courses and webinars, and
    developing new training where it would most benefit the workforce.
        General Mahoney. Determining what constitutes acceptable MOSA
    compliance is often a gray area, and with few successful examples to
    learn from make it harder to build a clear path forward.
        The urgency of meeting operational timelines can often clash with
    the time required to fully integrate MOSA principles, leading to
    tradeoffs in both design and implementation. The imperative to rapidly
    field systems, particularly in high-stakes, high-risk scenarios,
    creates pressures that hinder the depth of analysis necessary for
    robust MOSA implementation, such as modularity decomposition and
    ensuring appropriate data rights.
        To address these challenges, MARCORSYSCOM is contributing a
    representative to the Naval MOSA Working Group, under the Office of the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
    Engineering. A key step in this effort has been the release of the
    Naval MOSA Guidebook Version 1.0, signed by the Assistant Secretary of
    the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition in January 2025,
    which provides introductory guidance in implementing MOSA from both
    technical and business perspectives. MARCORSYSCOM is also participating
    in updating the Naval MOSA Guidebook, incorporating additional support
    tools and resources for workforce development.
        General Guetlein. While the USSF is fully committed to implementing
    MOSA, transitioning to a MOSA-driven architecture takes time and
    presents challenges. The Space Force is working to overcome these
    challenges to ensure our systems are affordable, adaptable, and
    resilient for the future. The challenges include:
        1. Legacy Systems and Culture: Many of our existing systems were
    designed before MOSA became a priority. Retrofitting them for
    modularity is complex, expensive, and sometimes impossible. Shifting
    from traditional ``build-to-spec'' acquisition to a more modular
    approach requires cultural change both within the Space Force and
    across our industry partners.
        2. Defining and Enforcing Standards: Establishing clear,
    consistent, and enforceable MOSA standards across various domains
    (e.g., software, hardware, interfaces) is an ongoing effort. Balancing
    flexibility for innovation with standardization for interoperability
    requires careful consideration.
        3. Workforce Expertise: Developing and acquiring systems built on
    MOSA principles demands a workforce proficient in these concepts. We
    are working to establish training and education to address this gap.
        4. Ensuring Security: Modularity can introduce new attack surfaces
    and vulnerabilities. We are meticulously addressing cybersecurity
    concerns associated with MOSA implementation.
        5. Measuring Success: Quantifying the benefits of MOSA--such as
    reduced costs, increased competition, and faster technology insertion--
    can be challenging. We are developing metrics to track our progress and
    demonstrate value.
        The USSF initiatives to address these challenges include investing
    in research and development of MOSA standards and technologies,
    partnering with industry leaders to foster a robust and competitive
    MOSA ecosystem, implementing robust cybersecurity measures designed for
    modular systems, and developing clear metrics to track our progress and
    demonstrate the value of MOSA.
        Lieutenant General Spain. MOSA implementation is unique to every
    program and there are varying degrees of modularity, openness, and
    approaches. We are continuing to strengthen our governance of open
    architecture standards and government reference architectures (GRAs) to
    efficiently use DAF resources to address the opportunity cost
    associated with a long-term MOSA framework. Key to the long-term
    strategy is commitment and continued adoption of the state-of-the-art
    within both the public and private sectors.

        56. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what guidance does your
    service have when deciding whether to include MOSA in a request for
    proposals?
        General Mingus. The Army's guidance on incorporating MOSA into
    solicitations is aligned with DOD's policies to enhance flexibility,
    competition, and innovation in system design and acquisition in
    accordance with Title 10 U.S.C. 4401 and DOD Instruction 5000.02,
    ``Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Function Framework.'' The Army
    adopts MOSA into solicitations and tailors MOSA requirements to
    individual programs with comprehensive consideration of IP
    requirements, including MOSA objectives and the support of operational
    and lifecycle needs. Army Directive 2020-06, Modular Open Systems
    Approach'' and the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
    (AFARS) Appendix AA--The Army Source Selection Supplement (AS3)
    Appendix E--Intellectual Property (updated Sep 2024) reinforces DOD
    policies and provides specific MOSA implementation guidance for Army
    programs.
        Admiral Kilby. Our approach has been to require the addition of
    MOSA into solicitation requirements and allow the contractors to offer
    solutions on how they intend to provide the Navy with solutions that
    meet our requirements using MOSA approaches. The Navy developed sample
    language for programs to use in solicitations and is continuing to
    engage with partners to ensure the Navy is best positioned to develop
    and field rapidly adaptable, lethal systems. The Navy will continue to
    aggressively pursue incorporation of MOSA into solicitations for
    systems design and development.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps is planning to leverage broader
    Department of the Navy efforts, particularly the initiatives of the
    Naval MOSA Working Group, under the Office of the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Engineering. These
    efforts include the development and refinement of MOSA-related
    guidance, best practices and tools to facilitate better integration of
    MOSA into both Navy and Marine Corps acquisition processes.
        As an initial step, the Naval MOSA Guidebook Version 1.0 was signed
    and released by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
    Development and Acquisition in January 2025 and provides a process for
    implementing MOSA applicable to all Naval acquisition programs across
    the Naval Systems Commands (including MARCORSYSCOM). The Naval MOSA
    Working Group plan of action involves creating a collaborative digital
    environment for MOSA, updating acquisition processes to incorporate
    MOSA principles and capturing MOSA training, with MARCORSYSCOM
    contributing a representative to these efforts.
        General Guetlein. The USSF is fully committed to leveraging the
    advantages of MOSA in our systems and acquisitions. Our guidance for
    including MOSA in RFPs hinges on a few key principles, including
    mission need and suitability, cost-effectiveness and sustainability,
    risk management, and collaboration and interoperability.
        We are focused on implementing MOSA principles in a way that
    maximizes operational effectiveness and long-term value for the Space
    Force. We have taken concrete steps to integrate MOSA into our
    acquisition process, such as incorporating MOSA principles into our
    acquisition guidance to incorporate and engage with industry to foster
    a robust and competitive MOSA ecosystem.
        Lieutenant General Spain. In accordance with DOD and DAF MOSA
    policy and standard engineering practice, all programs evaluate their
    architectures at the technical, programmatic, and contractual levels to
    ensure maximum value from MOSA. The DAF MOSA Guidebook provides
    decision support and management of open architecture standards and
    GRAs. Program managers, contracting officers, and systems engineers use
    this guidance to craft Requests for Proposals that include compliance
    with MOSA-enabling interfaces, identify appropriate data rights, and
    use business models that allow for system components to be severable.
                               v-22 osprey safety
        57. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, would you support
    keeping information about witnesses to investigations confidential but
    sharing overall conclusions of Safety Investigation Boards to enhance
    congressional oversight and identify problems that need to be fixed?
        General Mingus. I fully support protecting the confidentiality of
    witness information. I also welcome the opportunity to work with this
    Committee to identify problems and develop solutions to fix those
    problems. The lessons learned from safety investigations help inform us
    on how to not only fix, but prevent, mishaps. I look forward to
    collaborating with Congress, the Secretary, and the Chief on ways to
    ensure our force is safer and stronger as our warfighter needs continue
    to evolve.
        Admiral Kilby. It is executive branch policy to protect Department
    of Defense personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational
    illness; to protect the public from risk of death, injury, illness, or
    property damage caused by Department activities; and to protect
    Department property from damage. Military safety investigations are
    conducted solely to support this policy.
        The Department recognizes that there are other compelling needs for
    transparency in the event of most serious mishaps, so each Service also
    conducts a separate independent legal investigation for those other
    purposes, including public release and preservation of evidence for use
    in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative
    action. Of note, all non-privileged evidence gathered by a safety
    investigation is handed over to and included in the associated legal
    investigation.
        The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
    privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
    the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to prevent mishaps, saving
    lives and treasure. It is so effective not only because certain safety
    investigations can offer confidentiality to witnesses, but also because
    of the candid analysis of investigators and privileged technical
    evaluations. The military safety privilege fosters their unsparing
    candor, secure in the knowledge that the resulting analysis will be
    used solely within the Department to prevent future mishaps. Those
    aspects of the safety investigation are not releasable outside of the
    Department, and even within the Department may not be used for any
    other purpose, including disciplinary or adverse administrative
    actions, contract actions, or claims for or against the United States.
    Compromising that assurance that investigators' privileged analysis
    will remain in-house would most assuredly devaState that candor and
    result in cautious, measured analysis intended for public distribution.
        The Department also respects the congressional oversight role. To
    that end, the Department and the Armed Services Committees agreed on a
    procedure to discuss certain privileged safety information with the
    Chair and Ranking Member of the SASC and HASC, memorialized in the
    Aspin-Rice Agreement.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps respects the congressional armed
    services oversight role. To that end, the DOD and the Armed Services
    Committees agreed on a procedure to discuss certain privileged safety
    information with the chairman and ranking member, memorialized in the
    Aspin-Rice Agreement. The Marine Corps will comply with the current
    policy.
        It is executive branch policy to protect DOD personnel from
    accidental death, injury, or occupational illness; to protect the
    public from risk of death, injury, illness, or property damage caused
    by Department activities; and to protect Department property from
    damage. Military safety investigations are conducted solely to support
    this policy.
        The Department recognizes there are other compelling needs for
    transparency in the event of most serious mishaps, so each service also
    conducts a separate independent legal investigation for those other
    purposes, including public release and preservation of evidence for use
    in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative
    action. Of note, all non-privileged evidence gathered by a safety
    investigation is handed over to, and included in, the associated legal
    investigation.
        The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
    privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
    the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to prevent mishaps, saving
    lives and treasure. It is so effective not only because certain safety
    investigations can offer confidentiality to witnesses, but also because
    of the candid analysis of investigators and privileged technical
    evaluations. The military safety privilege fosters their unsparing
    candor, secure in the knowledge that the resulting analysis will be
    used solely within the Department to prevent future mishaps. Those
    aspects of the safety investigation are not releasable outside of the
    Department, and even within the Department may not be used for any
    other purpose, including disciplinary or adverse administrative
    actions, contract actions, or claims for or against the United States.
    Compromising that assurance that investigators' privileged analysis
    will remain in-house would most assuredly devastate that candor and
    result in cautious, measured analysis intended for public distribution.
        Lieutenant General Spain. It is executive branch policy to protect
    DOD personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational illness;
    to protect the public from risk of death, injury, illness, or property
    damage caused by Department activities; and to protect Department
    property from damage. Military safety investigations are conducted
    solely to support this policy.
        The Department of the Air Force recognizes there are other
    compelling needs for transparency in the event of most serious mishaps,
    so each Service also conducts a separate independent legal
    investigation for those other purposes, including public release and
    preservation of evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary
    action, and adverse administrative action. Of note, all of the non-
    privileged evidence gathered by a safety investigation is handed over
    to and included in the associated legal investigation. Similarly, a
    report redacted of safety privilege information can be made available.
        The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
    privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
    the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to preventing mishaps and
    saving lives and treasure. Compromising, the assurance that
    investigators' privilege will remain in-house would most assuredly
    devaState that candor and would result in cautious, measured analysis
    if public releasability is a concern. The military safety privilege
    fosters their unsparing candor, secure in the knowledge that the
    resulting analysis will be used solely within the Department to prevent
    future mishaps. Those aspects of the safety investigation are not
    releasable outside of the Department, and even within the Department
    may not be used for any other purpose, including disciplinary or
    adverse administrative actions, contract actions, or claims for or
    against the United States. Compromising the assurance that
    investigators' privileged analysis will remain in-house would most
    assuredly devaState that candor and result in cautious, measured
    analysis intended for public distribution.
        The Department also respects the congressional armed services
    oversight role. To that end, the Department and the Armed Services
    Committees agreed on a procedure to discuss certain privileged safety
    information with the Chair and Ranking Member of the SASC and HASC,
    memorialized in the Aspin-Rice Agreement.
        General Guetlein. It is executive branch policy to protect DOD
    personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational illness; to
    protect the public from risk of death, injury, illness, or property
    damage caused by Department activities; and to protect Department
    property from damage. Military safety investigations are conducted
    solely to support this policy.
        The Department recognizes there are other compelling needs for
    transparency in the event of most serious mishaps, so each service also
    conducts a separate independent legal investigation for those other
    purposes, including public release and preservation of evidence for use
    in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative
    action. Of note, all of the non-privileged evidence gathered by a
    safety investigation is handed over to and included in the associated
    legal investigation.
        The cornerstone of the safety investigation is the military safety
    privilege, recognized in U.S. case law since 1963. That privilege is
    the crown jewel in the Department's efforts to prevent mishaps, saving
    lives and treasure. Compromising the assurance that investigators'
    privilege will remain in-house would most assuredly devaState that
    candor and would result in cautious, measured analysis if public
    releasability is a concern. The military safety privilege fosters their
    unsparing candor, secure in the knowledge that the resulting analysis
    will be used solely within the Department to prevent future mishaps.
    Those aspects of the safety investigation are not releasable outside of
    the Department, and even within the Department may not be used for any
    other purpose, including disciplinary or adverse administrative
    actions, contract actions, or claims for or against the United States.
    Compromising the assurance that investigators' privileged analysis will
    remain in-house would most assuredly devaState that candor and result
    in cautious, measured analysis intended for public distribution.
        The Department also respects the congressional armed services'
    oversight role. To that end, the Department and the Armed Services
    Committees agreed on a procedure to discuss certain privileged safety
    information with the Chair and Ranking Member of the SASC and HASC,
    memorialized in the Aspin-Rice Agreement.

        58. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, have your service's
    policies or procedures changed based on findings or recommendations
    released by the Joint Safety Council? If so, please describe which
    policies.
        General Mingus. The Army does not fly or maintain the V-22 Osprey.
    However, the Joint Safety Council (JSC) is taking an opportunity to
    review select completed Service or Joint mishap investigations, such as
    mishaps involving the V-22, to provide lessons learned that inform
    actions and recommendations to improve policy, streamline systems and
    processes, identify resources, and refine overall support mechanisms to
    the investigative process. As this process matures, we can expect the
    JSC to establish routine sharing of the results, trends, and lessons
    learned from key mishap investigations and discuss mishap data,
    information, and products that enable informed mishap prevention
    strategies across the DOD.
        Admiral Kilby. The Defense Analytics Working Group (DAWG) under the
    auspices of the Joint Safety Council (JSC) officially stood up on 22
    April 2024 to establish consistent cross-service analytical initiatives
    that help drive proactive measures to identify factors that positively
    affect the cross-service safety missions of safeguarding our
    Warfighters, protecting resources and improving readiness. Jointly led
    reviews enabled insightful discussions across the services regarding
    mishap types/rates as well as solutions in-work and safety processes in
    place which would not have been possible otherwise due to current data
    sharing limitations
        Additionally, the Department and the Joint Safety Council undertook
    an initiative to create service-level operational mishap information
    sharing forums for communities of interest. In July 2023, the U.S. Army
    shared several mishap events with U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S.
    Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard aviation leaders at the general
    officer/flag officer level. Although platform specific, the key
    causalities of the presented mishaps were of universal applicability.
    The operational aviation leaders were extremely receptive to the brief
    and found value in sharing.
        The Joint Safety Council has also worked with the services to
    develop a process to debut and share standardized executive summaries
    of major Service mishaps to increase cross-service visibility and
    awareness of mishaps to address a National Commission on Military
    Aviation Safety recommendation. The executive summaries allow for
    quick, concise information sharing to identify trends and opportunities
    for Services to work collaboratively to solve common causal factors
    influencing multiple mishaps. The Joint Safety Council has reviewed
    Comprehensive Review safety findings for the V-22 program which has
    enhanced sharing of lessons learned across the Services. During 2025,
    this process will continue to mature allowing opportunities for the
    Joint Safety Council to work across the services to develop mitigations
    for common hazards and causalities through the establishment of ad-hoc
    working groups.
        General Mahoney. The Marine Corps, in close coordination with the
    other Services and under the leadership of the JSC, has participated in
    several efforts shaping the way we share safety data, identify trends,
    and implement solutions. Rather than acting independently, the Marine
    Corps has prioritized joint approaches to safety policy development
    that reflect shared risks and lessons learned. These cross-service
    collaborations are already informing internal practices and will be
    further codified into policy by the end of 2025.
        The Defense Analytics Working Group under the auspices of the JSC
    officially stood up on April 22, 2024, to establish consistent cross-
    service analytical initiatives that help drive proactive measures to
    identify factors that positively affect the cross-service safety
    missions of safeguarding our warfighters, protecting resources and
    improving readiness. Jointly led reviews enabled insightful discussions
    across the services regarding mishap types/rates as well as solutions
    in-work and safety processes in place which would not have been
    possible otherwise due to current data sharing limitations.
        Additionally, the Department and the JSC undertook an initiative to
    create service-level operational mishap information sharing forums for
    communities of interest. In July 2023, theU.S. Army shared several
    mishap events with U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and
    U.S. Coast Guard aviation leaders at the general officer/flag officer
    level. Although platform specific, the key causalities of the presented
    mishaps were of universal applicability. The operational aviation
    leaders were extremely receptive to the brief and found value in
    sharing. The JSC adopted a plan to codify service-level aviation,
    space, ground (e.g., troops, armor, and government motor vehicles), and
    maritime (e.g., ships, small craft, and barges) communities of interest
    to provide a cross-service operational safety information forum. The
    JSC expects to codify these forums in policy by the end of 2025.
        The JSC has also worked with the Services to develop a process to
    debut and share standardized executive summaries of major Service
    mishaps to increase cross-Service visibility and awareness of mishaps
    to address a National Commission on Military Aviation Safety
    recommendation. The executive summaries allow for quick, concise
    information sharing to identify trends and opportunities for Services
    to work collaboratively to solve common causal factors influencing
    multiple mishaps. During 2025, this process will continue to mature
    allowing opportunities for the JSC to work across the services to
    develop mitigations for common hazards and causalities through the
    establishment of ad-hoc working groups.
        General Guetlein. In calendar year 2022, the newly established
    Joint Safety Council (JSC) commenced collaborative actions to enhance
    the effectiveness and synergy of multiple operational safety efforts
    across all the Services, encompassing safety analysis, information
    sharing, protection of safety information, and standardization of
    mishap report information, with the ultimate aim to further improve
    mishap prevention across the entire DOD.
        The JSC accomplished a number of joint initiatives that enhanced
    mishap prevention. Through the JSC, the services work together to
    establish data standards and provide data streams to DOD's FR2 System.
    This effort not only baselined data categorization and requirements,
    but it also bolstered Force Support and Occupational Health office's
    ability to conduct oversight of service safety organizations. The JSC
    provided a unique opportunity to identify information-access needs
    across the services and a forum for seamlessly increasing access to
    joint Privileged Safety Information, through a JSC-sponsored Memorandum
    of Agreement.
        Additionally, the JSC provided a unique joint forum to share mishap
    lessons on joint systems. Since services investigate their own mishaps,
    relevant information was not guaranteed to flow in a timely manner to
    other service safety teams whose service may also operate that system.
    The JSC institutionalized a joint mishap review working group to cull
    relevant mishap prevention data from joint platform mishaps. This
    working group also extracts mishap investigation best practices and
    opportunities for improvement it can share with service safety
    organizations.
        Last, the JSC is uniquely positioned to determine shared issues
    that could be better addressed through research and studies. The JSC is
    able to leverage its relationship with the Defense Safety Oversight
    Council governance structure to seek advocacy and funding for studies.
    The joint equity ensures a large return on investment, and it expands
    the stakeholder perspectives involved in the study. The results of the
    studies are shared across the services, and the JSC has an opportunity
    to shape and implement recommendations for the DOD.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Yes. The Joint Safety Council (JSC)
    accomplished a number of joint initiatives that enhanced mishap
    prevention. Through the JSC, the services worked together to establish
    data standards, and to provide data streams to DOD's Force Risk
    Reduction system (FR2). This effort not only baselined data
    categorization and requirements, but it also bolstered Force Support
    and Occupational Health's office ability to conduct oversight of
    service safety organizations. The JSC provided a unique opportunity to
    identify a need for better information access across the services and a
    forum by which they could seamlessly execute the increased access to
    joint Privileged Safety Information through a JSC-sponsored Memorandum
    of Agreement.
        Additionally, the JSC provided a unique joint forum to share mishap
    lessons on joint systems. Since services investigate their own mishaps,
    relevant information was not guaranteed to flow in a timely manner to
    other service safety teams whose service may also operate that system.
    The JSC institutionalized a joint mishap review working group to cull
    out relevant mishap prevention data from joint platform mishaps. This
    working group also extracts mishap investigation best practices and
    opportunities for improvement so it can share it with service safety
    organizations.
        Last, the JSC is uniquely positioned to determine shared issues
    that could be better addressed through research and studies. The JSC is
    able to leverage its relationship with the Defense Safety Oversight
    Council governance structure to seek advocacy and funding for studies.
    The joint equity ensures a large return on investment, and it expands
    the stakeholder perspectives involved in the study. The results of the
    studies get shared across the services, and the JSC has an opportunity
    to shape and implement recommendations for the DOD.
                               program management
        59. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, when a program has a
    significant cost overrun, does that hurt military planning and
    readiness?
        General Mingus. Cost overruns create a cascading effect on military
    planning and readiness. It impacts the availability of modernized
    capabilities and disrupts equipment fielding timelines which are
    synchronized with leader development, unit training, and deployment
    timelines. Units maintain older or obsolete equipment longer than
    anticipated impacting readiness of the organizations and overall
    modernization of the force.
        The Army is not interested in any unanticipated costs as it
    prevents flexibility in budget execution. The Army programs and
    estimates cost to the best of its ability in a volatile and challenging
    environment. Cost over-runs, either due to inflationary pressures,
    technological volatility or evolving requirements, always place
    pressure on the prioritized investments within the Secretary's budget.
    The Army regularly works to create opportunities for budgetary
    flexibility and resilience to mitigate the threat of cost over-runs and
    still deliver the necessary resources to support plans and highly
    prioritized readiness.
        Admiral Kilby. Significant cost overruns in Navy programs are a
    serious concern that triggers extensive review and consideration. They
    can have cascading negative effects on military planning by creating
    budgetary pressures, delaying crucial capabilities, and ultimately
    impacting the readiness of the armed forces to meet their missions. The
    Navy constantly seeks strategies to prevent and mitigate cost overruns
    to ensure efficient resource allocation and maintain a strong and ready
    military.
        General Mahoney. Program cost overruns are a serious challenge that
    requires a multifaceted approach to address. They can significantly
    impact the ability to maintain operational readiness, diverting funds
    from other critical programs, delaying planned modernization efforts,
    and compromising the ability to meet operational requirements.
        General Guetlein. Yes, every dollar spent on an overrun is a dollar
    less that could be spent on another warfighter priority.
        Lieutenant General Spain. These cost overruns can significantly
    affect our ability to plan, prepare, and execute missions effectively,
    potentially leading to gaps in readiness and capability. For example,
    cost overruns can: 1) force reallocation of funds from other areas,
    potentially affecting programs that deliver equipment, supplies and
    other technologies essential to military readiness 2) disrupt long term
    strategic planning, which can effect execution of critical mission
    threads and kill-chains 3) cause delays in getting the latest
    technology deployed to our troops, leaving them at a significant
    disadvantage.

        60. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what do you consider
    the role of independent analysis in program management?
        General Mingus. The role of independent analysis in program
    management is to provide DOD leadership, Service leadership, and
    program management with independent perspectives on program performance
    through the lens of the overarching strategic defense posture.
    Organizations like OSD Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
    the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense Contract Audit
    Agency, and OSD analysts provide valuable updates and feedback to
    ensure programs are providing the best capability to our warfighters at
    the best value to the taxpayer to ensure national security.
        Admiral Kilby. Independent analysis acts as a vital check and
    balance within the complex landscape of DOD program management. It
    fosters objectivity, rigor, and informed decisionmaking, ultimately
    contributing to more effective and efficient use of resources in
    support of national security. Furthermore, independent analysis plays a
    critical role across the spectrum of Navy program management, extending
    beyond just programs with overruns or delays. It serves to provide
    objective insights, challenge assumptions, and ultimately improve the
    efficiency and effectiveness of defense acquisitions and operations.
        General Mahoney. Independent analysis ensures analytic rigor in a
    program's cost position/baseline by removing bias through leveraging
    cost and schedule experiences from analogous historical program
    acquisitions and applying the lessons learned to their cost estimates.
    Incorporating a best practice would then involve a reconciliation
    between the PM's cost estimate and the independent analysis.
        General Guetlein. Independent analysis is an essential tool in
    program management, serving as an objective and unbiased reality check
    throughout a projects lifecycle. It helps validate initial assumptions,
    identify hidden risks and opportunities, and provide an accurate
    measurement of progress, all while enhancing credibility and trust with
    stakeholders. By offering a fresh perspective and expert insights,
    independent analysis empowers program managers to make informed
    decisions, mitigate potential problems, and ultimately increase the
    likelihood of achieving successful outcomes.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Independent data-based studies outside
    the program manager's chain of command can augment specific analysis
    goals to assist in setting cost and schedule baselines that are
    executable to be able to plan effectively and deliver the capability to
    the warfighter. Also, strategic, long-term planning depends on
    successful program management since military readiness is directly
    affected by the ability of individual programs to deliver on schedule.

        61. Senator Warren. General Mingus, Admiral Kilby, General Mahoney,
    General Guetlein, and Lieutenant General Spain, what do you consider
    the role of independent analysis in reviewing a program with
    significant cost overruns or schedule delays?
        General Mingus. The role of independent analysis in reviewing a
    program with significant cost overruns or schedule delays is to provide
    DOD leadership, service leadership, and program management with
    independent perspectives on the impact to cost and delivery schedules
    as weighed against the national security need. Organizations like the
    OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Cost & Economics help assess if the
    capability the materiel solution is providing is commensurate with the
    investment of resources, time, and criticality to national defense.
    Similarly, organizations like Army G-8 and Army G-3/5/7 provide
    independent insight into the impact of weapon systems' fielding delays
    on the Army's readiness and defense posture.
        Admiral Kilby. Independent analysis serves as a crucial mechanism
    for ensuring responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars and effective
    program management within the Department of the Navy. By providing
    objective assessments, alternative perspectives, and enhanced
    transparency, it empowers our decisionmakers to address costly overruns
    and schedule delays and to improve the overall acquisition process
    going forward.
        General Mahoney. The role of independent analysis is to ensure bias
    for the program is removed while reviewing significant cost overruns
    and schedules. Independent analysis provides analytical rigor by
    leveraging cost and schedule experiences from historical analogous
    program acquisitions and then applies the lessons learned to the cost
    and schedule estimating methodologies.
        General Guetlein. Independent analysis is crucial for reviewing
    programs facing cost or schedule overruns. It provides an objective
    perspective, free from internal biases, to uncover the root causes of
    problems, whether poor planning, unrealistic goals, or technical
    issues. This analysis helps determine if overruns stem from internal or
    external factors. Independent analysis rebuilds stakeholder trust
    through transparency and informs critical decisions like course
    correction or program termination, ensuring responsible resource use
    and successful project delivery.
        Lieutenant General Spain. Programs troubled with cost overruns and
    schedule delays can significantly benefit from independent analysis,
    especially when an additional perspective is required to determine root
    causes and assess a realistic cost and schedule to accurately re-
    baseline the program. This independence builds credibility and
    transparency, augmenting the assessment of whether the current program
    should continue or if a different approach would be more effective.
    Analysis performed outside the Program Executive Office chain of
    command allows the right balance of optimism and realism for these
    programs so that leadership can make data-driven decisions about the
    most effective solution for the warfighter.

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