[Senate Hearing 119-145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 119-145
PIPELINE SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION:
ENSURING THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT MOVEMENT
OF AMERICAN ENERGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION,
FREIGHT, PIPELINES, AND SAFETY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 15, 2025
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
61-428 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Liam McKenna, General Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
Jonathan Hale, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, FREIGHT, PIPELINES, AND SAFETY
TODD YOUNG, Indiana, Chairman GARY PETERS, Michigan, Ranking
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio ANDY KIM, New Jersey
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 15, 2025..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Young....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 29
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 37
Statement of Senator Moreno...................................... 40
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 42
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 44
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 45
Witnesses
Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream Policy, American
Petroleum Institute............................................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid
Energy Pipeline Association.................................... 0
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Richard Leger, Senior Vice President, Natural Gas Business,
CenterPoint Energy, on behalf of the American Gas Association.. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust............ 19
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Appendix
Letter dated May 13, 2025 to Chairman Todd Young and Ranking
Member Gary Peters from GPA Midstream Association.............. 51
Letter dated May 19, 2025 to Chairman Todd Young and Ranking
Member Gary Peters from Alex Etchen, Vice President, Government
Relations, Associated General Contractors of America........... 52
Response to written questions submitted to Robin Rorick by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 53
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 55
Response to written questions submitted to Andrew J. Black by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 56
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 57
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 57
Response to written questions submitted to Richard Leger by:
Hon. Todd Young.............................................. 58
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 59
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 61
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 62
Response to written questions submitted to Bill Caram by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 63
PIPELINE SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION:
ENSURING THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT MOVEMENT
OF AMERICAN ENERGY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Freight,
Pipelines, and Safety,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Todd Young,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Young [presiding], Cruz, Fischer, Moreno,
Peters, Cantwell, Markey, and Lujan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Young. Good morning, everyone. I want to welcome
everyone to today's pipeline safety hearing where we will be
examining ways to increase the safe and efficient movement of
American energy.
This is our first subcommittee hearing and it is great to
be with my colleague Senator Peters. We have worked
constructively on so many projects and I think this is such an
important one.
So I am especially appreciative of our witnesses today so
that you can help educate us on this important topic.
Nearly 3.3 million miles of pipelines traverse our country,
bringing essential resources to communities to ensure Americans
receive basic needs, needs like heat and electricity, and to
drive economic activity and create the jobs we all care about.
While this infrastructure is vital to the success of the
American people, our economy, and our national security, there
are some inherent risks tied to such a vast ecosystem of
pipeline networks.
At the end of last year in Whiting, Indiana, a pipeline
leak within the BP tank field occurred, generating concerns
from many in the community. While the repercussions were
limited, largely, thanks to the quick work of emergency
responders and talented technicians, not every leak has
similarly fortunate outcomes.
Pipelines are the safest and the most efficient way to
transport materials and the operators are, obviously,
incentivized to keep the resources within the pipes.
That being said, these instances should serve as a stark
reminder that we must remain vigilant in our efforts to uphold
the highest level of safety standards for our Nation's pipeline
network and secure the American people's trust in the operation
of this critical infrastructure.
Our subcommittee plays a vital role in this work, which is
why we are here today examining the need to secure the safety
and resiliency of our pipeline infrastructure.
I am hopeful this hearing will shine a light on areas
Congress should focus on as we look to reauthorize and,
hopefully, improve upon existing pipeline safety laws, whether
that is an examination of outstanding rulemakings, prohibitive
processes and red tape for preventing advancements in industry,
or inefficient tools for law enforcement to hold malicious
actors accountable when they seek to harm our Nation.
I am also hopeful that we can use this hearing to learn how
emerging technologies can play a role in mitigating and
preventing risks to pipeline infrastructure.
For example, how might artificial intelligence be used to
best detect areas of pipeline infrastructure that should be
inspected after severe weather or shifts in environmental
conditions like landslides or earthquakes, or where extensive
strain or shifts in pressure have occurred?
We do not know what incident may knock on our door next,
but I believe investing in our country's ability to research
and develop the next innovative application of technology or
new technologies themselves will arm us with the tools to keep
our pipelines and infrastructure safe.
And we should be fostering an environment that allows
industry to explore different means to keep pipelines safe.
Indiana has been at the forefront of adopting innovative
monitoring technologies and fostering partnerships between
relevant parties to enhance safety and preparedness.
But we need to ensure our country across the board can look
forward and innovate new solutions to increase safety, too.
So thank you again to our witnesses for your expertise and
willingness to contribute to this dialog. I now recognize the
Ranking Member, Mr. Peters.
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Young,
and certainly appreciate the opportunity to work with you again
on other issues and I look forward to working on this one
because it is particularly important, and that is why I want to
thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
And I can say for sure that this is an issue that hits home
very directly for my state. In Michigan we understand all too
well the lasting damage an oil spill can cause.
In 2010 a pipeline ruptured in Marshall, releasing over 1
million gallons of oil into the Kalamazoo River. This was the
largest inland oil spill in the United States' history and it
took years as well as over $1 billion to clean up.
As many of you know, Michigan is also home to Enbridge Line
5, a 70-year-old oil and gas pipeline that crosses through the
Great Lakes.
The Great Lakes is a source of drinking water for over 40
million people and that line underneath the Straits of Mackinac
is particularly concerning.
In fact, a pipeline failure there would be nothing short of
catastrophic. The University of Michigan experts have actually
identified the Straits of Mackinac as the single worst place
for an oil spill in the entire Great Lakes basin and,
unfortunately, we have had some very close calls in the past.
In 2014, Enbridge found gaps in the protective coating on a
segment of the pipeline underneath the Straits. In 2018, the
pipeline was badly damaged by a boat anchor that was dragged
along the lake bottom, resulting in three gouges to the
pipeline.
And in 2020 Enbridge discovered that a Line 5 anchor
support had been mangled and that the pipeline had physically
shifted, and that part of its protective coating had been
completely removed, exposing bare metal.
In the midst of these incidents, in 2017 the then
Commandant of the Coast Guard told me flat out at a hearing
when I asked him the question--he told me flat out that the
agency was not prepared for an oil spill in the Great Lakes and
that more research was needed to improve our response.
That is when I led efforts to establish the Great Lakes
Center of Expertise. The Center of Expertise will conduct
research and develop responses to ensure that we are prepared
to quickly and effectively address an oil spill in the Great
Lakes.
But rather than having to utilize the Center's knowledge
during a worst case scenario, I would certainly rather have a
situation where we never have to deal with a spill in the first
place and never have to respond to a Line 5 incident or another
case like we saw in the Kalamazoo River.
Simply put, we need standards. We need standards in place
to ensure that these sorts of events never happen, and while
pipelines are a widely adopted mode of transporting hazardous
materials there are still safety concerns associated with their
use.
Over the past 20 years the pipeline incidents have caused
257 deaths, over 1,000 injuries, and over $11 billion in
damages.
That is to say we still have a heck of a lot of work to do
when it comes to safety, because I do not think you will find
too many folks in Michigan that hear those numbers that in any
way think we are at mission accomplished.
They certainly want to make sure that their families and
communities will be safe in the future, and that is why I hope
we will all keep on top of mind during this hearing and
throughout the pipeline safety reauthorization process that
safety is always paramount and as such there can be no
backsliding on safety in any reauthorization bill that we put
forward.
I look forward to working with Chairman Young as I have
over the last few years. I look forward to working with our
witnesses that are here today, PHMSA, our state agencies, and
other stakeholders to make sure that this pipeline safety
reauthorization effort is better and it better protects
Michigan, our Great Lakes, as well as the Nation as a whole,
and I am certainly very optimistic we can do that.
I yield back.
Senator Young. Well, thank you again, Senator Peters, for
your leadership on this issue.
I am going to go ahead and introduce briefly each of our
witnesses and then ask you to make your opening statements.
They are in order Mr. Robin Rorick, Vice President of
Midstream Policy, the American Petroleum Institute; Mr. Andrew
J. Black, President and CEO of Liquid Energy Pipeline
Association; Mr. Richard Leger--how do you say it, sir?
Mr. Richard--that was my second choice. Mr. Richard Leger,
Senior Vice President of Natural Gas Business, CenterPoint
Energy on behalf of the American Gas Association. Thank you,
sir.
And Mr. Bill Caram. Caram?
Mr. Caram. Caram. You got it.
Senator Young. Yes. OK. Executive Director of Pipeline
Safety Trust. Thank you, sir.
So I recognize Mr. Robin Rorick for your opening statement.
Five minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF ROBIN RORICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF MIDSTREAM POLICY,
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
Mr. Rorick. Thank you.
Chairman Young, Ranking Member Peters, members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation today.
My name is Robin Rorick and I am Vice President of
Midstream Policy at the American Petroleum Institute. API
represents all segments of America's oil and natural gas
industry, from integrated global companies to independent
producers, supporting 11 million jobs across all 50 states.
Pipelines make it possible to safely deliver the affordable
energy our families, businesses, and economy rely on day and
night.
With over 3 million miles of pipelines crisscrossing
America, the safe and reliable transport of oil and natural gas
is essential not just to America's economy but to our national
security.
Pipelines operators know safety must always come first. Our
goal is clear, zero incidents, and we are making progress.
Recent data from PHMSA confirms this.
Between 2020 and 2024 liquid pipeline incidents affecting
people or the environment dropped 13 percent. Incident rates
per million barrels delivered fell by 33 percent since 2019
even as mileage and delivery volumes increased.
Similarly, natural gas transmission incidents have declined
23 percent since 2020. These results did not happen by chance.
A regulatory foundation coupled with the adoption and
continual updating of API's industry safety standards has
played a major role in this continuous improvement across the
industry.
In fact, API has developed more than 800 standards, many of
which are used globally to improve pipeline safety and
environmental protection. But to fully leverage their benefits
PHMSA must routinely and efficiently incorporate updated
standards into Federal regulations.
Currently, approximately half of API standards cited in
PHMSA rules are outdated. Congress should direct PHMSA to
commit to reviewing and updating its references to standards
every 3 years.
If an updated standard is not adopted the agency should
publicly explain why to provide clarity on its perspective and
help industry determine a path forward to ideally avoid
conflict between the standard and the regulation.
More broadly, we appreciate PHMSA's recent efforts toward
regulatory reform, in particular the agency's consideration of
updating and modernizing repair criteria for hazardous liquid
and natural gas pipelines and allowing for the use of risk-
based inspections for PHMSA regulated breakout tanks.
But Congress can help accelerate further safety
improvements on multiple fronts. First, Congress should direct
PHMSA to update pipeline operating statuses.
Today, pipelines are categorized only as active or
abandoned. We need an official status for idle pipelines
clearly defined using API's Recommended Practice 1181.
This common sense update would allow pipeline operators to
safely pause certain activities when risk levels are lower,
aligning regulation with real world operational needs.
We also see significant room to standardize the damage
prevention processes across the country by incorporating
leading industry practices, reducing exemptions, and improving
enforcement.
There are also opportunities to streamline the regulatory
process itself, especially in PHMSA's pipeline inspection
program. Currently, operators often undergo repetitive
inspections by multiple Federal, state, and community
authorities reviewing the same procedures.
These redundant efforts consume valuable time and resources
which could be better directed toward safety improvements. API
supports an independent evaluation of PHMSA's inspection
processes to identify ways to streamline inspections, improve
collaboration, and maintain a laser focus on achieving safety
outcomes.
Beyond these priorities, several complementary regulatory
improvements would enhance pipeline safety and operations such
as reforming PHMSA's special permit process, strengthening
criminal penalties for vandalism, clarifying jurisdictional
overlaps for implant piping, and ensuring responsible right-of-
way maintenance through conservation and habitat management
programs.
In closing, I want to stress that America leads the world
in oil and natural gas production and pipelines are central to
this success. The improvements we have seen in pipeline safety
are significant but our industry remains committed to doing
even more.
As Congress works to reauthorize PHMSA, API urges the
adoption of smart updated references to standards in the
regulations, completion of overdue rulemakings, and
streamlining inspections. These steps will help America safely
meet growing energy demands and demonstrate leadership to the
world.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions and your continued bipartisan work to
advance pipeline safety and elevate American energy leadership.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rorick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robin Rorick, Vice President, Midstream Policy,
American Petroleum Institute
Introduction
Chairman Young, Ranking Member Peters and esteemed members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. My
name is Robin Rorick, and I am the Vice President of Midstream Policy
at the American Petroleum Institute (API). On behalf of API, I am
honored to have this opportunity to submit testimony as part of this
important hearing on pipeline safety and the reauthorization of the
Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA).
API is a national trade association representing all segments of
America's oil and natural gas industry. From large integrated companies
to small independent operators, 11 million hardworking men and women
across all 50 states provide and support the energy that powers every
district in this Nation.\1\ API has developed more than 800 standards
that enhance operational safety, environmental protection and
sustainability across 140 countries. Promoting technological,
environmental and regulatory innovations is a driving force for API and
our industry to ensure we have safe, reliable and affordable energy
that tens of millions of families and businesses need to survive and
thrive, today and well into the future.
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\1\ PwC for API, ``Impacts of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry on
the U.S. Economy in 2021,'' available at: https://www.api.org/-/media/
Files/Policy/American-Energy/PwC/2023/API-PWC-Economic-Impact-Report-
2023.pdf
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The U.S. remains the world's leader in oil and natural gas
production, providing immense benefits not only to our citizens here in
the U.S. but also to our allies across the world. Pipelines make these
capabilities a reality, and they play a critical role in achieving the
goals of energy dominance and energy security. Our nation's network of
over 500,000 miles of oil, petroleum products and natural gas
transmission pipelines transport the energy we rely on every day to
fuel modern life. As one of the safest, most environmentally
responsible ways to transport energy to families and businesses,
pipelines are in every U.S. state and total over 13 million miles
across the country. They reliably connect areas of production with
refineries and processing centers, and ultimately with airports,
manufacturers, gas stations, farms, businesses and homes.
Pipeline Safety Improvements
The pipeline industry is committed to safety and continuous
improvement, which includes maintaining a standard of operational
excellence through comprehensive safety management systems, pipeline
design and construction standards and specifications, and robust safety
programs such as integrity management and geohazard mitigation. Data
from PHMSA illustrates that this daily commitment is showing results.
Both total liquid pipeline incidents as well as those impacting people
or the environment decreased 13 percent between 2020 and 2024.\2\
Looking further, integrity management incidents for liquid pipelines
dropped 33 percent, and operations and maintenance incidents declined
22 percent within this time. These safety improvements come as the
industry operated 3,000 more miles of liquid pipeline and delivered
over 15 percent more barrels of liquids between 2019 and 2023, the most
recent year this data is available. In fact, the rate of total
incidents per million barrels of energy delivered has fallen 33 percent
since 2019, showing that liquid pipelines are getting safer while
meeting increasing energy demand. Natural gas transmission lines are
showing similar safety improvements, with incidents down 23 percent
between 2020 and 2024.
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\2\ ``2024 Pipeline Performance Report & 2023-2025 Pipeline
Excellence Strategic Plan,'' available at API/LEPA 2024 Performance
Report
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While we are proud of this progress, pipeline operators recognize
the need to remain vigilant in continuous improvement. Our industry
continues to voluntarily implement safety management systems and
reinforce safety culture through a comprehensive framework to manage
risk. It has undertaken initiatives to mitigate pipeline corrosion,
improve leak detection tools and technologies, prevent cyberattacks,
promote sustainable operations using conservation programs and advocate
for risk-based tank inspections--capitalizing on the use of the latest
industry standards and advanced technologies. Following the publication
of a first-of-its-kind industry standard on public engagement,
Recommended Practice (RP) 1185, pipeline operators are actively working
on implementation, fostering meaningful, two-way communication and
trust-building within the communities where we work and live.
Additionally, with the expected growth in the construction of carbon
dioxide (CO2) pipelines, we are working on maximizing the
safe transportation of CO2 by pipeline through the
publication of a new RP for transportation of CO2 by
pipeline this year.
As part of our efforts to promote pipeline safety improvements, API
has responded to a recent U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
Request for Information (RFI) seeking comments to assist DOT in
identifying existing regulations, guidance, paperwork requirements or
other regulatory obligations that could be modified or repealed to
improve pipeline safety and eliminate unnecessary burdens. In our
response to the RFI, which was jointly filed with the Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association, we identified numerous opportunities for updating
outdated and inefficient regulations that should reflect the current
state of technology, engineering science and advanced analytical tools,
focus resources on the highest risk items and support a performance-
based approach to managing pipeline safety. PHMSA has stated that the
Administration plans to issue an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) to gather information in support of a planned future rulemaking
to modernize pipeline repair requirements for liquids and natural gas
pipelines to improve safety and efficiency, and API plans to submit a
response to the ANPRM as well.
Energy demand is growing, placing this industry at an inflection
point. The reshoring of advanced manufacturing in the U.S., coupled
with the installation and operations of data centers and energy
consumption from artificial intelligence utilization, will only
increase demand. Our industry continues to work with federal, state and
local policymakers and regulators to protect the environment and
communities where we live and work. We welcome this opportunity to
demonstrate American energy leadership, building off the progress we
have already achieved, to meet ever-increasing demand using smart,
predictable and commonsense energy policies.
API Supports PHMSA Reauthorization
Recognizing the Importance of Standards
As Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and pipeline
safety programs, we encourage policymakers to enact legislation that
maximizes our industry's investments in people and technology to
effectively advance pipeline safety. We support comprehensive,
bipartisan efforts to help make our Nation's pipeline network safer as
it provides reliable energy supply to every community in America. It is
thus imperative that the regulatory environment remains cognizant of
and responsive to both current and potential future safety challenges
faced by operators.
API supports timely and more frequent updates for industry
standards that are incorporated by reference into PHMSA regulations.
Since 1924, API has been the leader in developing voluntary, consensus-
based, internationally recognized standards covering all segments of
the oil and natural gas industry. Our standards are the most widely
cited petroleum industry standards by state regulators, with 240 API
standards cited over 3,800 times in state-based regulations. There are
more than 650 references to API standards in Federal regulations and
more than 1,300 international references.\3\ These standards are
reviewed at least every five years through API's American National
Standards Institute-accredited process and revised and improved as part
of industry's continuous learning culture when improvement or
advancements, such as in technology and innovation, are warranted.
However, regulators struggle to keep pace with the advances in pipeline
safety technology and modern engineering practices that are regularly
incorporated into these standards; approximately 50 percent of the
instances where PHMSA cites API standards in its regulations remain out
of date and do not reference the most recent edition. As a result,
critical safety regulations may fail to reflect advances in safety,
technology and engineering, forcing operators to comply with often
antiquated practices. Instead, Congress should direct PHMSA to review
standards that have been incorporated by reference every three years on
a routine basis through the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) and
Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee (LPAC) process to determine if
updates are needed. If PHMSA chooses to ignore an updated standard and
proceed without an update, PHMSA should publish an explanation of this
decision on the agency's website.
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\3\ OGP Report No. 426, Regulators' Use of Standards, March 2010 &
``Participate in API Standards Development'', available at https://
www.api.org/-/media/apiwebsite/products-and-services/2025_intnl-
usage_report_web-final.pdf
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Similarly, PHMSA should allow operators to base breakout tank
inspection frequency on risk modeling as outlined by the 5th edition of
API Standard 653. Operators are investing in the latest tank coatings
and liners, applying advanced materials engineering principles to
reduce the risk of leaks and utilizing drone and robotics capabilities
to improve tank inspection effectiveness. Yet, PHMSA has not adapted to
encourage innovation and future investment by incorporating the latest
version of this standard, instead requiring unnecessary inspections and
failing to prioritize safety. Directing PHMSA to update its regulations
concerning tank inspections will maintain the current safety level
while minimizing occupational safety risks and environmental impacts
associated with breakout tank inspections.
Completing Outstanding Rulemakings
API applauds PHMSA's efforts to date to advance regulatory reform
and consider rulemakings that recognize the important role that leading
industry practices, innovation and technology play in advancing safety.
API also supports PHMSA's recent submission of an advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking on modernizing repair criteria to the Office of
Management and Budget and planned publication of a rulemaking on class
location, both reflecting their commitment to updating outdated and
overly prescriptive regulations. Even so, API welcomes this
subcommittee's role in facilitating PHMSA action on other important
rulemakings. Congress should direct PHMSA to initiate a rulemaking on
pipeline operating status that would incorporate the 1st edition of API
RP 1181, Pipeline Operational Status Determination, an outstanding
mandate from the PIPES Act of 2020. A rulemaking is necessary to create
a new operating status for pipelines that are ``idled,'' in addition to
the ``active'' and ``abandoned'' status currently recognized by the
agency. PHMSA should specify which operations and maintenance
activities an operator can defer to maintain safety while accounting
for the lower risk posed by ``idled'' pipelines, consistent with the
agency's 2016 Advisory Bulletin.
Additionally, we invite Congressional direction to PHMSA to update
existing pipeline safety regulations for CO2 transportation
by pipeline (49 CFR Part 195). Current regulations cover the design,
construction and operations of supercritical CO2 pipelines,
but there remains a gap in gas-phase CO2 transportation by
pipeline, and there are recognized opportunities for improving the
current regulations. PHMSA recently published a draft version of a
notice of proposed rulemaking to improve existing pipeline safety
regulations for the transportation of CO2 by pipeline which
was withdrawn as part of the Trump administration regulatory freeze. We
encourage this subcommittee to support moving this proposed rulemaking
forward as the development of CO2 pipeline infrastructure is
an important element of API member companies' commitment to emission
reduction and environmental performance while maximizing oil recovery.
API expects to publish an industry consensus standard on the
transportation of CO2 by pipeline, which could be
incorporated into PHMSA regulation by reference and provide a framework
for safe transportation of CO2 by pipeline.
Other Critical Provisions for Consideration
There are other areas that we believe the subcommittee should
evaluate for consideration during reauthorization, including criminal
penalties for vandalism, attacks on construction sites and other
activities that disrupt service, inspection protocols and
jurisdictional issues. Current law only allows for penalties for
``damaging or destroying'' interstate pipelines, and new legislation
could better protect critical facilities and deter criminal behavior
that poses a safety hazard to people and the environment. Legislation
should also codify operators' ability to maintain rights-of-way using
conservation, habitat management and other related programs, enhancing
pipeline safety while benefiting local communities and the environment.
Multiple repetitive and often redundant inspections are conducted
by PHMSA regional offices, state regulatory agencies, and local
authorities, all evaluating the same set of company procedures and
programs. Having a process for better coordination among regulators
could improve efficiency for the regulatory agencies themselves while
also allowing operators to focus finite resources on improving safety
programs rather than repeatedly reviewing them. API supports PHMSA
undergoing an independent evaluation of its inspection programs and
streamlining of its special permit process to identify opportunities
for improved collaboration to reduce inefficiency, maximize resources
and reduce delays in permit issuance.
API also encourages this subcommittee to clarify jurisdiction and
improve multi-agency jurisdiction. Short segments of pipeline within
gas processing and refining facilities, known as ``in-plant'' piping,
may cross a street or railroad in the public domain to transfer
products from one process unit of a refinery to another. While the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates liquid
in-plant piping, there is regulatory uncertainty for its gas
counterparts. These gas lines, often in the same right-of-way as liquid
lines, can lead to jurisdictional overlaps, uncertainty, and disputes,
requiring subcommittee action to address them the same way as liquid
pipes and to clarify OSHA's jurisdiction. Additionally, Congress should
clarify regulatory jurisdiction over liquified natural gas facilities.
A joint memorandum of understanding and recurring working group between
PHMSA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Coast
Guard would improve multi-agency coordination and minimize duplicative
regulatory oversight to maintain American energy dominance, both here
at home as well as for our allies abroad.
Safely Demonstrating American Energy Leadership
As the world leader in both oil and natural gas production as well
as emissions reductions, America is demonstrating energy leadership
every day. For our country to continue this leadership and achieve the
goal of energy dominance, Congress should consider policies that
capitalize on the power of America's oil, natural gas and other
resources in the reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act. Fit-for-
purpose regulations based on facts and backed by sound science and
engineering principles have enabled our country's record-breaking
production and emissions reductions through the transportation of
energy in one of the safest and most environmentally responsible modes
possible. The provisions offered today through this testimony will
maximize our investment in state-of-the-art technology and sustainable
operations while recognizing the important role our communities play in
advancing safety.
While operators are proud of their safety record, we remain
committed to continuous safety improvement. Pipeline safety is not a
partisan issue, and API remains eager to partner with Federal and state
legislators and policymakers to help ensure pipelines are regulated
effectively, efficiently and operated safely. Importantly, though, any
regulations must be balanced to ensure that the industry can achieve
these objectives while continuing to bring affordable, reliable energy
to American families and businesses. To that end, API has responded to
DOT's request for information on modernizing the regulatory framework
and looks forward to continuing our engagement with PHMSA and
congressional staff on promoting regulatory reform. Only with an
effective Pipeline Safety Act and regulatory approach can our industry
meet the dual challenge of answering the growth in energy demand while
improving safety and environmental protection.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this hearing to discuss industry's pipeline
safety efforts and priorities moving forward. I look forward to the
continued bipartisan efforts to pass a comprehensive Pipeline Safety
Act and working together with all of you to demonstrate American energy
leadership and dominance for years to come.
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Rorick.
Mr. Black, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIATION
Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
I am Andy Black, President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and
operators delivering transportation fuels like gasoline,
diesel, jet fuel, transportation feed stocks like crude oil,
home heating fuels like propane and heating oil, industrial
feed stocks like ethane and butane, and low-carbon solutions
like renewable diesel, LP gas, and carbon dioxide.
We have over 50 member companies delivering over 20 billion
barrels annually across a nearly 230,000-mile network of
pipelines.
The states of every member of this subcommittee play a role
in delivering, by pipeline, the energy Americans need and want.
Pipelines deliver energy from where it is produced,
especially in states like Alaska, Texas, New Mexico, to where
that energy is turned into useful products like refineries in
Michigan, Texas, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Illinois, and New
Jersey.
Different liquid pipelines then carry those refined
products to local regions across America, pipelines serving
America across states like South Dakota, Nebraska, and
Missouri.
Even if energy products travel those last miles by truck or
ship to states like West Virginia, Hawaii, or Massachusetts,
that energy had to travel at least some point on a pipeline.
Indiana, the Subcommittee Chair's home state, is a terrific
example of the importance of pipelines. As a crossroads for
America, Indiana is also a crossroads of pipelines.
Crude oil pipelines cross Indiana to deliver to refineries
in Gary, Mount Vernon, in neighboring Ohio and Michigan.
Refined products pipelines deliver gasoline, diesel, and jet
fuel from these refineries to major population centers across
Indiana.
Natural gas liquids pipelines deliver propane from as far
away as Texas to homes across rural Indiana and elsewhere.
Pipeline-delivered propane is also vital to the farmers of
Indiana and other states, drying crops after harvest and
keeping barns warm in the winter.
As this committee considers the role of pipeline
infrastructure and what changes to make to Federal pipeline
safety laws it is important to recognize that pipelines are the
safest way to deliver energy.
More than 99.999 percent of crude oil and petroleum
products delivered by pipeline reaches its destination safely.
A report prepared for Congress by PHMSA analyzing 10 years
of incident data found that pipelines were 13 times safer than
both trains and trucks with pipelines experiencing only one
incident for every 720 million gallons delivered.
An Obama administration analysis found that rejecting a
major pipeline and shipping the same crude oil by rail would
increase the risk of oil release by over 800 times and a barrel
is released by 2.6 times.
Current PHMSA pipeline incident statistics also show that
pipeline safety is improving. According to publicly available
PHMSA data, total liquid pipeline incidents are down 13 percent
over the last 5 years and liquid pipeline incidents impacting
people or the environment are also down 13 percent over the
last 5 years.
Declining pipeline incidents over the last 5 years supports
a measured approach to reauthorizing pipeline safety laws
without major changes or new mandates.
LEPA believes Congress can do more to help modernize
pipeline safety programs. Key parts of PHMSA's safety
regulations are over 20 years old and do not reflect the latest
advances in safety technology or know-how.
LEPA recognizes that America is blessed with an abundance
of energy. Smart pipeline policies will promote pipeline energy
infrastructure needed to deliver American energy dominance.
LEPA believes Congress can help PHMSA increase the
effectiveness and transparency of its pipeline safety programs
and requirements.
We welcome the Committee's interest in pipeline safety
reauthorization. My written testimony details the many
provisions LEPA supports. I will name five.
Number one, reforming PHMSA's special permit program.
Number two, strengthening penalties for pipeline safety
violations that impair operation of facilities or damage
construction sites.
Number three, establish inspection and maintenance required
for idled pipelines after Congress directed PHMSA to do so and
it did not.
Number four, reauthorize, this time without extraneous
conditions, a PHMSA technology demonstration pilot program to
restore the will of Congress and harness the latest high-tech
inspection technologies without bureaucratic red tape.
And number five, allow risk-based inspections of in-service
breakout tanks to reduce worker safety threats, avoid air
pollutant emissions, minimize unnecessary greenhouse gas
emissions, and prevent creation of hazardous waste, conforming
PHMSA's regulations with that of EPA.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
today on the benefits of pipelines including their safety.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association
Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee.
My name is Andy Black and I am President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators
delivering transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel,
transportation feedstocks like crude oil, home heating fuels like
propane and home heating oil, industrial feedstocks like ethane and
butane, and low carbon solutions like renewable diesel, liquified
petroleum gas and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member companies
delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across a nearly a 230,000-
mile network of pipelines.
Thank you for holding this hearing today and highlighting the vital
role this Committee has promoting the infrastructure that leads to
American prosperity. Liquid energy pipelines deliver transportation
fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel that families, commuters,
businesses and travelers use to drive and fly where they need to go.
Pipelines deliver transportation fuel feedstocks like crude oil and
industrial feedstocks like ethane, propane and butane to make
everything from plastics to pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, paints and
fabrics. Rural home heating and agricultural fuels like propane
delivered regionally by pipeline before traveling locally by truck heat
rural homes and farms, dry crops after harvest, and keep livestock
barns warm throughout the winter.
Every constituent of every member of this Subcommittee in some way
depends on pipelines to meet the needs of their daily lives. From
Alaska to Mississippi, from Massachusetts to New Mexico, even in
Hawaii, Americans benefit from pipeline delivered energy. Pipelines
deliver energy from where it is produced, especially in states like
Alaska, Texas and New Mexico, to where that energy is turned into
useful products, like refineries in Texas, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio,
Illinois and New Jersey. Different liquids pipelines then carry those
refined products to local regions across America. Pipelines serving
America cross states like South Dakota, Nebraska, Missouri. Even if
energy products travel those last miles by truck or ship to states like
West Virginia, Hawaii or Massachusetts, that energy had to travel at
some point on a pipeline.
Indiana, the Subcommittee Chair's home state, is a terrific example
of the importance of pipelines. As a crossroads for America, Indiana is
also a crossroads of pipelines. Crude oil pipelines cross Indiana to
deliver to refineries in Gary, Mt Vernon and neighboring Ohio and
Michigan. Refined products pipelines deliver gasoline, diesel and jet
fuel from these refineries to major population areas across Indiana.
Natural gas liquids pipelines deliver propane from as far away as Texas
to homes across rural Indiana. Pipeline delivered propane is also vital
to the farmers of Indiana keeping barns warm in the winter and drying
crops after harvest. LEPA member companies operating pipelines in
Indiana include BP, Buckeye, Citgo, Enbridge, Enterprise, Explorer,
Flint Hills, Marathon, Kinder Morgan, Energy Transfer, Tallgrass,
Valero and Wolverine (click on map image for link to view file).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
When thinking about energy, the American people, including those in
Indiana, tell us what they care most about is safety, followed by
affordability and reliability. Each year, LEPA commissions a nationwide
poll of public sentiment on energy and pipelines. The American public's
preference for safe energy supports this Committee's work to
reauthorize Federal pipeline safety law.
As the Committee considers the role of pipeline infrastructure and
what changes to make to Federal pipeline safety laws, it is important
to remember pipelines are the safest way to deliver energy. More than
99.999 percent of crude oil and petroleum products delivered by
pipeline reaches its destination safely.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A 2018 report prepared for Congress by PHMSA analyzing 10 years of
incident data found pipelines were 13 times safer than both trains and
trucks with pipelines experiencing 1 incident for every 720 million
gallons delivered and rail incidents occurring every 50 million gallons
delivered. An Obama administration analysis found rejecting a major
pipeline and shipping the same crude oil by rail would increase the
risk of oil release by over 800 times and barrels released by 2.6
times.
Current PHMSA pipeline incident statistics also show pipeline
safety is improving. Federal law and regulations require operators to
report pipeline incident data to PHMSA. Full year data for 2024 is now
available, which allows us to examine current trends in pipeline
safety.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
According to publicly available PHMSA data, total liquids pipeline
incidents are down 13 percent over the last 5 years. Liquids pipeline
incidents Impacting People or the Environment (IPE) are also down 13
percent over the last 5 years. When comparing incidents to volume
delivered, the decrease is even more striking, with liquids pipeline
incidents per barrel delivered down 33 percent over the preceding 5
years. Or put another way, liquids pipeline incidents are decreasing at
the same time America's pipelines are delivering more and more energy.
These safety metrics are available in a new report, the API-LEPA
2024 Pipeline Performance Report & 2023-2025 Pipeline Excellence
Strategic Plan. Each year, LEPA and API download PHMSA incident data to
check on how we are doing, where we are doing well and where we need
improvement. Those areas of need, both appearing in the data and
collected through engagement of our stakeholders, help guide industry-
wide safety initiatives. In this report, you can see how the liquids
pipeline industry is addressing key challenges like corrosion, leak
detection and geohazards. You can see how operators are improving
pipeline by harnessing new technologies, artificial intelligence,
safety management systems and new recommended practices. You can also
see how we are trying to do better on public engagement, cybersecurity,
conservation and attracting our future workforce.
Declining pipeline incidents over the last 5 years supports a
measured approach to reauthorizing pipeline safety laws without major
changes or new mandates. LEPA does believe Congress can do more to help
modernize pipeline safety programs. Hi-tech inspection and analytical
tools, like an MRI or ultrasound in the doctor's office, are available
for pipeline safety. Analytic methods harnessing machine learning and
other forms of artificial intelligence can help operators digest data
to show when a pipeline might be leaking or when it needs new
maintenance. However, key parts of PHMSA safety regulations are over 20
years old and do not reflect the latest advances in safety technology
or know-how.
LEPA also recognizes that America is blessed with an abundance of
energy. Pipelines are the vital link from where that energy is
produced, to where it is refined into usable products, and on to
consumers and businesses in their home regions. Smart pipeline policies
will promote the pipeline energy infrastructure needed to deliver
American energy dominance. Lastly, LEPA believes Congress can help
PHMSA increase the effectiveness and transparency of its pipeline
safety programs and requirements. The administration is proposing
regulatory actions to help PHMSA become a smarter, more efficient, more
modern regulatory agency and Congress can support those efforts.
LEPA welcomes pipeline safety reauthorization provisions that
would:
Reform PHMSA's Special Permit program to impose permit
review shot clock and limit unrelated permit requirements
Strengthen penalties for pipeline safety violations that
impair operation of facilities or damage construction sites
Fulfill the 2020 Congressional mandate of a safety program
for idled pipelines
Reauthorize without extraneous conditions a PHMSA technology
demonstration pilot program
Provide defendants the opportunity for a formal PHMSA
hearing, and protect security or commercially sensitive
information presented as evidence in PHMSA hearings open to the
public
Authorize a Voluntary Information Sharing program to convene
stakeholders to collaborate on safety initiatives, similar to
FAA's successful program
Allow risk-based inspections of in-service breakout tanks to
reduce unnecessary greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions,
worker safety threats, and hazardous waste when shown to
achieve an equivalent level of safety
Increase the transparency of PHMSA inspection program with
reporting on inspection priorities, dates and locations
Require PHMSA review of consensus safety improvement
standards
Provide a targeted update of Federal CO2 pipeline
requirements to extend regulatory coverage to gaseous
CO2 and require CO2-specific incident
dispersion modeling (topography, weather, operating conditions,
trace compounds)
An additional note on leveraging new technologies that provides a
case study on the frustrating reality of bureaucracy and red tape in
government. In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety
could benefit from harnessing the latest hi-tech inspection
technologies and analytics. As I mentioned, there's so much modern
technology and analytics like artificial intelligence can benefit
pipeline safety. Congress authorized PHMSA to conduct a pipeline safety
technology demonstration pilot program under certain conditions.
However, in implementing the technology demonstration program,
PHMSA under the previous administration imposed a host of additional
administrative, regulatory and legal conditions beyond what Congress
itself mandated. As a result, PHMSA received no applications to conduct
technology pilots and the program sunsetted. Pipeline operators cited
the additional conditions PHMSA imposed in its implementation guidance
as making the program infeasible. PHMSA bureaucratic red tape
effectively strangled this program in its crib. An opportunity now
exists and LEPA supports restoring the will of Congress and
reauthorizing this program without additional bureaucratic red tape or
conditions.
Thank you again for the Committee's support of pipeline energy
infrastructure and the opportunity to testify before you today on the
benefits of pipelines, including their safety.
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Black.
Mr. Leger, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD LEGER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
NATURAL GAS BUSINESS, CENTERPOINT ENERGY,
ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Leger. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Young, Ranking Member Peters, members of the
Subcommittee, I am Richard Leger, Senior Vice President of
Natural Gas Business for CenterPoint Energy, testifying on
behalf of the American Natural Gas Association.
AGA represents more than 200 utilities that deliver natural
gas to 74 million customers. Natural gas pipelines deliver
essential energy to 177 million Americans through a 2.5
million-mile pipeline system including 2.2 million miles of
local distribution pipelines operated by natural gas utilities.
An integral part of this Nation's pipeline infrastructure,
CenterPoint Energy operates 74,000 miles of distribution
pipeline and is privileged to serve nearly 4 million customers
in Indiana, Texas, Ohio, and Minnesota. We also manage nearly
1,100 miles of transmission lines and approximately 300 storage
wells.
In 2024, we delivered 571 BCF to our customers, and during
the January 21st winter storm where Minnesotans experienced 62
consecutive hours below zero we successfully delivered 1.5 BCF,
which is the equivalent of 460 gigawatt hours of energy
delivered, representing more than the electric capacity for the
state of Minnesota.
Gas utility distribution pipelines are the last critical
link in the delivery chain that brings natural gas from the
wellhead to the burner tip. Companies like CenterPoint Energy
are the face of the natural gas industry.
We live in the communities that we serve. We interact daily
with both customers and state authorities who oversee pipeline
safety locally. They are our customers, our neighbors, our
friends, and our family.
As such, pipeline safety is and must be our number-one
priority. The primary safety tool for gas utility operators is
a Distribution Integrity Management Program, or DIMP.
DIMP is a regulatory process that allows an operator to
develop a safety plan that addresses the unique operating
characteristics of their individual gas system.
From a CenterPoint perspective, each of our four systems
have different operating environments, customer requirements,
and infrastructure needs. DIMP allows us to appropriately plan
and prioritize pipeline safety, resiliency, and reliability
work that strengthens each of our unique individual systems.
Upgrading distribution pipelines is also critical to
pipeline safety. Forty-three states and the District of
Columbia have expedited pipeline replacement programs.
In the past 17 years the amount of cast iron and bare steel
pipeline replacement in use has declined over 50 percent,
replaced by newer technology pipelines which increase system
safety and reliability.
CenterPoint Energy is investing hundreds of millions of
dollars every year to modernize our gas systems to enhance
safety and reliability. For example, we will eliminate cast
iron and bare steel from our systems by the end of 2026 and we
will modernize our remaining low pressure systems by 2030.
The natural gas distribution industry has proved it can
simultaneously increase natural gas delivery and improve safety
but more needs to be done.
CenterPoint natural gas utilities support the following
concepts in upcoming pipeline safety reauthorization
legislation, policy priorities that will measurably improve
pipeline safety and industry operations.
Number one, limiting serious injuries and fatalities,
property damage, and environmental impacts caused by unintended
excavation damage incidents.
Number two, strengthening criminal penalties on those who
purposely sabotage or intentionally damage pipeline operations.
Number three, identifying technology alternatives that if
utilized will meet the intent of existing pipeline safety
regulations and provide an equal or greater level of pipeline
safety.
Number four, study in how natural gas, hydrogen blending,
and distribution systems worldwide are safely operated.
Number five, creating a voluntary information sharing
system to collect and share pipeline safety, operational best
practices, and lessons learned with industry partners.
And finally, number six, establishing a four- or preferably
5-year reauthorization period so PHMSA and industry have
sufficient time to complete work authorized by the previous
reauthorization.
CenterPoint Energy and AGA members support fact-based,
reasonable, and practical updates to pipeline safety
legislation that build upon lessons learned and evolving
technologies.
In that spirit, we look forward to our continued work with
this committee as well as your counterparts in the House of
Representatives to help facilitate pipeline safety
reauthorization legislation.
Please use us as a technical resource whenever and wherever
we can be helpful. Thank you for the opportunity to participate
in this hearing and I look forward to this conversation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Leger, Senior Vice President, Natural Gas
Business, CenterPoint Energy, on behalf of the American Gas Association
On behalf of the American Gas Association (AGA), CenterPoint Energy
is pleased to provide our input for the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, & Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation, Freight, Pipelines, and Safety (Senator Todd Young,
Chairman) hearing on Pipeline Safety Reauthorization: Ensuring the Safe
and Efficient Movement of American Energy. CenterPoint Energy and AGA
share the same goals as safety advocates, the public, pipeline sector
industry partners, and Congress: Ensuring America's pipeline system
remains the safest, most secure, and most reliable in the world. We
look forward to working with the Committee in the 119th Congress to
help push pipeline safety reauthorization through the legislative
process and into law.
CenterPoint Energy is a combination electric and natural gas
utility operating in Indiana, Texas, Ohio and Minnesota. Across our 4-
state footprint, we operate nearly 74,000 miles of distribution main
pipelines and are privileged to serve nearly 4 million customers. We
also manage nearly 1,100 miles of transmission lines and approximately
300 storage wells.
AGA, founded in 1918, represents more than 200 local energy
companies that deliver natural gas throughout the United States. There
are more than 77 million residential, commercial, and industrial
natural gas customers in the U.S., of which 96 percent--more than 74
million customers--receive their gas from AGA members. AGA advocates
for natural gas utility companies and their customers and provides a
broad range of programs and services for member natural gas pipelines,
marketers, gatherers, international natural gas companies, and industry
associates. Today, natural gas meets more than one-third of the U.S.'
energy needs. Natural gas pipelines are an essential part of the
Nation's energy infrastructure. Indeed, natural gas is delivered to
customers through a safe, approximately 2.7-million-mile underground
pipeline system, including 2.3 million miles of local utility
distribution pipelines, 100,000 miles of gathering lines, and 300,000
miles of transmission pipelines providing service to more than 189
million Americans.
Distribution pipelines are operated by natural gas utilities, or
``local distribution companies (LDCs).'' Gas utility distribution pipes
are the last, critical link in the natural gas delivery chain that
brings natural gas from the wellhead to the burner tip. AGA member
utilities like CenterPoint Energy are the ``face of the gas industry,''
embedded in the communities they serve, and interact daily with
customers and the state regulators who oversee pipeline safety locally.
The distribution industry takes very seriously the responsibility of
continuing to deliver natural gas to our families, neighbors, and
business partners as safely, reliably, and responsibly as possible. The
industry is committed to providing life-sustaining energy to the
thousands of communities in our country who count on it, every second
of every day of the year.
Our Number One Priority: Pipeline Safety
The domestic shale revolution has resulted in an abundant supply of
natural gas. This robust supply has translated into stable natural gas
prices and an increasing number of utility customers who use this
resource for residential and commercial applications like cooking,
space and water heating, and manufacturing. Last year alone, natural
gas utilities added 730,000 customers and 20,700 miles of pipeline to
serve these new customers. Alongside this tremendous opportunity comes
the absolute necessity of operating safe and reliable pipeline
infrastructure to support dependable natural gas delivery to homes,
businesses, and essential facilities like hospitals.
Every year the gas utility industry invests $33 billion on the
safety of our pipeline systems. At CenterPoint Energy alone, we spend
hundreds of millions of dollars every year to modernize our gas systems
to enhance safety and reliability. For example, we will eliminate cast
iron and bare steel from our system by the end of 2026 and will
modernize our remaining low pressure systems by 2030. Unquestionably,
pipeline safety is our industry's number one priority, and through
critical partnerships with state and Federal regulators, legislators,
and other stakeholders, CenterPoint Energy and other AGA member
companies are continually working to enhance pipeline safety,
integrity, and system resiliency.
Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
AGA and its members support fact-based, reasonable, flexible, and
practicable updates to pipeline safety regulation that build upon
lessons learned and evolving improvements to pipeline safety and
related programs and technology. In that spirit, AGA wishes to
highlight 5 high-level priorities as the House-Senate reauthorization
process moves forward.
Support Limiting Pipeline Excavation Damage Incidents. Across the
gas utility industry, excavation damage is the primary cause of
distribution pipeline incidents. From 2020-2024, CenterPoint Energy
alone experienced nearly 46,000 damages from excavation activity. For
approximately one third of these damages no locate was called in by the
excavator. According to PHMSA data, in the past 20 years, excavation
damage incidents on natural gas pipelines have resulted in 57 deaths,
254 injuries, and over $300 million in property damage. These often
tragic incidents are preventable. States that have strong excavation
damage prevention and enforcement programs typically experience lower
rates of damages to pipelines. AGA supports directing PHMSA to
incentivize states to adopt One Call program leading practices, derived
from the best state excavation damage programs, and condition their
grants to State One Call programs based upon adoption of these best
practices. Our company and our industry are confident this proposed
program will reduce damages and save lives.
Support Pipeline Technology Alternatives. Modern pipeline safety
technologies--not contemplated when many pipeline safety regulations
were first implemented--can, if deployed, meet the intent of these
older existing regulations and improve the overall safety of natural
gas, hazardous liquid, underground storage, and liquefied natural gas
infrastructure. For example, advanced pipeline leak detection
technologies have advanced to the point where they can be used to
comply with leak detection regulation. CenterPoint Energy began
implementing advanced leak detection, which detects natural gas in the
parts per billion range instead of the parts per million range of
traditional leak detection technology, over a decade ago. With advanced
leak detection,
CenterPoint Energy detects approximately 2.5 times as many leaks
and repairs more leaks that would not have been detected using
traditional leak detection technologies. Additionally, breakaway meter
technologies and excess flow valves can stop the flow of gas if a meter
is struck, eliminating the need for physical meter protection barriers.
Industry supports a PHMSA-led process to identify technology
alternatives that, if utilized, will meet the intent of existing
pipeline safety regulations and provide an equal or greater level of
pipeline safety.
Strengthen Criminal Penalties for Intentional Damage to Pipelines.
CenterPoint Energy strongly supports strengthening criminal penalties
for intentionally damaging pipeline infrastructure. Natural gas
utilities are experiencing an increase in criminal attacks on their
property, equipment and facilities. These activities range from
gunshots targeting pipelines, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
placed on gas delivery equipment, and the damaging of facilities and
equipment necessary for safe natural gas delivery. These activities not
only are hazardous to the safety and property of the public and member
company employees, but they also threaten an LDC's ability to deliver
natural gas to thousands of homes, hospitals, schools, government and
military facilities, and other critical infrastructure customers. AGA
supports increased criminal penalties on bad actors who intentionally
damage, destroy or impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, including
those under construction.
Hydrogen-Natural Gas Blending R&D Study. Hydrogen is an emerging
solution for achieving gas LDC energy storage and decarbonization
goals. Natural gas projects in North America and worldwide demonstrate
successful blending of hydrogen into the existing natural gas
distribution network or utilizing natural gas that has a naturally
occurring higher hydrogen content. Hawai'i Gas has successfully
utilized a natural gas hydrogen blend of 15 percent for decades and
many systems overseas are operating at approximately a 20 percent
blend. It is important to understand how companies operating natural
gas distribution systems with a higher hydrogen content are operating
these systems safely. As such, we suggest the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) conduct a review of natural gas distribution systems
worldwide that utilize hydrogen-natural gas blending applications, or
utilize gas with a higher hydrogen content, to identify processes,
materials, and standards the operators have implemented to operate
safely. The results of this study will help underpin the safety of
ongoing domestic hydrogen R&D and blending operations.
Authorize a Pipeline Safety Voluntary Information-Sharing System.
Congress should authorize a Voluntary Information-sharing System (VIS)
based on the recommendations of the public advisory committee formed
pursuant to the 2016 pipeline safety reauthorization law. A VIS will
engage multiple stakeholders (e.g., government, industry, and pipeline
safety NGOs) to collect and share best practices and lessons learned,
promote improved pipeline safety, and will importantly include
sufficient legal and regulatory safe harbors for information sharing to
encourage industry participation. VIS will support industry's
implementation of Pipeline Safety Management Systems by encouraging
information sharing and facilitating understanding and management of
pipeline safety risks.
5-Year Reauthorization for PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Program. PHMSA's
Pipeline Safety program was reauthorized most recently in the PIPES Act
of 2016 and PIPES Act of 2020. As PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program
expired again in 2023, the frequency of reauthorization has been
reduced to just 3 years. This interval is inadequate given the
significant time it takes to conduct studies, publish reports, move
reauthorization priorities from legislation to Proposed Rulemaking,
address comments, and develop and publish Final Rules. Acknowledging
the time required to conduct studies, publish reports, and develop
feasible, reasonable, cost effective, and practical rulemaking
(including stakeholder input), and in keeping with reauthorization
intervals that preceded the PIPES Act of 2016 (1996, 2002, 2006, 2011),
Congress should reauthorize PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program for not
less than 5 years.
Conclusion
America's gas utilities' commitment to pipeline safety relies on
sound engineering principles and best in class technology, a trained
professional workforce, effective community relationships, and a strong
partnership with state pipeline safety authorities and PHMSA. As
pipeline safety reauthorization legislation is drafted this year,
CenterPoint Energy, and our partners at the American Gas Association,
encourage Congress to work in a bipartisan fashion to advance
reasonable and consensus changes to pipeline safety law and regulation,
support PHMSA's primary role as pipeline safety regulator, and
recognize the great strides in pipeline safety engineering and
operating practices that pipeline companies are putting into practice
across the country. We stand ready to assist in this process with real
world operations, engineering and safety data and experience. Please
use us as a resource.
Senator Young. Thanks so much, Mr. Leger.
Mr. Caram, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY
TRUST
Mr. Caram. Thank you.
Good morning, Chair Young, Ranking Member Peters, and
members of the Subcommittee.
I am Bill Caram, Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety
Trust, which was created after the 1999 Olympic pipeline
tragedy in Bellingham, Washington, that killed three boys.
We serve as an independent national watchdog over the
pipeline industry and its regulators. On average, a significant
pipeline incident occurs every 32 hours in America, nearly one
every day.
Since this subcommittee's last Markup in July 2019, 67
people have been killed and 182 hospitalized from pipeline
incidents. That is 67 families forever changed and 182 lives
altered, many permanently.
The past two years have been the deadliest in nearly 15
with 30 deaths, including a 5-year-old in Missouri, a 15-year-
old in Utah, and an 82-year-old pastor's wife in Mississippi.
Our shared goal of zero incidents feels unreachable when we
have not yet been able to prevent these tragic deaths. Making a
meaningful difference on pipeline safety will require three
essential and interconnected elements: improved regulations,
effective enforcement, and widespread adoption of pipeline
safety management systems, or PSMS.
In many cases Congress has hamstrung PHMSA from developing
effective regulations. Provisions in the pipeline safety
statute like the extra burdensome cost-benefit requirement make
it extremely difficult for PHMSA to develop lifesaving
regulations.
Also, the nonapplication clause, which permanently exempts
approximately half our Nation's transmission pipelines
including some at the highest risk for meeting some modern
safety standards.
There certainly are operators leading the way on safety,
but this is not universal. We need regulations that allow
flexibility for innovation while ensuring the product stays in
the pipelines of all operators.
I have included practical, common sense ideas for improving
regulations that would make a real difference on safety in my
written testimony such as fire shut-off valves.
These simple devices automatically close when exposed to
heat, preventing gas from fueling house fires. They are
inexpensive, require no ongoing maintenance, and can be easily
installed on service lines.
As recently recommended by the NTSB, natural gas alarms or
methane detectors if installed in homes and businesses with or
near gas service would undoubtedly save lives.
We need modernized regulations for carbon dioxide and
hydrogen blended pipelines. Congress has incentivized this
infrastructure without identifying--without addressing the
regulatory and research gaps that put communities on the front
lines of significant safety risks.
This year marks 5 years since the Denbury carbon dioxide
failure in Satartia, Mississippi that sent nearly 50 people to
the hospital. That harrowing night laid bare many of the risks
and regulatory shortfalls with these pipelines.
Increasing authorized resources to PHMSA is also necessary.
Not only has the agency been chronically underfunded but the
additional miles of jurisdictional pipe and the potential build
out of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines demand an increase
in resources from Congress both to the agency and, just as
significantly, to the state programs.
Even the best regulations, however, can be meaningless
without robust enforcement. When we try to chart penalties
levied on operators against their quarterly earnings after
tragic incidents we often cannot even visualize the penalty, it
is such a tiny percentage of earnings even when PHMSA is fully
using its enforcement authority.
Recently, PHMSA's enforcement shows a concerning trend.
Enforcement case initiations have declined by as much as 90
percent compared to historical averages across multiple prior
administrations.
Meanwhile, incident rates remain relatively consistent.
This enforcement gap warrants the Subcommittee's attention.
According to a recent PHMSA report to Congress on the
adoption of pipeline safety management systems, or PSMS, among
gas distribution operators, while most pipeline mileage is
owned by operators committed to PSMS only half of all operators
have made this commitment.
To improve safety we need widespread industry adoption--all
systems, all operators, large and small. This subcommittee has
an opportunity to save lives and make a meaningful difference
on pipeline safety by streamlining rule development, making
enforcement more effective, and driving adoption of PSMS.
As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's
pipeline safety program and make improvements to the law, I
implore you to think of the empty seats at dinner tables across
the country because of pipeline failures.
Thirty dinner tables are missing someone from the last two
years alone. I have been with families who have lost loved ones
recently and some 25 years ago, and I can assure you the pain
never goes away.
Please ensure PHMSA meets its responsibility to the
American people. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Caram follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director,
Pipeline Safety Trust
Good morning, Committee Chair Cruz, Subcommittee Chair Young,
Committee Ranking Member Cantwell, Subcommittee Ranking Member Peters,
and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak
today on the vital subject of pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram,
and I am the Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line
tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable
failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a
beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually
ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so
appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled
at the lax oversight from the Federal government, that they asked the
Federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the
Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization
over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless
grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy.
Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters
since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work
together to help move towards our shared goal of zero incidents.
Recent Pipeline Failures
Since this subcommittee held its markup of the last authorization
of PHMSA's pipeline safety program on July 31, 2019, 67 people have
been killed, and 182 people have been injured to the point of in-
patient hospitalization. There have been over 3,000 reportable
incidents, with nearly 1,600 of those deemed ``significant'' by PHMSA
standards. That means there has been a significant incident nearly
every day (a significant incident every 1.33 days, on average) and
nearly four people killed or seriously injured every month over the
last six years.
In fact, the past two years have been the deadliest for pipelines
in nearly 15 years--surpassed only by the two-year period that included
the devastating PG&E explosion in San Bruno, California, which killed
eight people and destroyed an entire neighborhood--a time that I think
all of today's witnesses would agree was a low point for pipeline
safety. We continue to languish with consistently poor performance,
with a significant incident almost every day and 30 people killed over
the last two years.
A look at the National Transportation Safety Board's docket will
give a glimpse into the current state of pipeline safety. The NTSB has
eight open investigations, from a million-gallon oil spill off the
coast of Mississippi, to a host of pipeline-caused explosions in
Jackson, MS, Youngstown, OH, Bel Air, MD, South Jordan, UT, Avondale,
LA, Hutchinson, KS, and most recently, Lexington, MO. The NTSB
investigators, sadly, have their hands full.
In December, the NTSB held a Board meeting to discuss the 2023 UGI
Utilities pipeline failure in West Reading, PA that resulted in an
explosion that killed seven people and injured 11.\1\ Family members of
the victims attended the meeting where the NTSB discussed the failed
piece of pipeline infrastructure made from Aldyl A plastic. PHMSA has
known these Aldyl A components are prone to failure for decades.
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\1\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., UGI Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled
Explosion and Fire https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/
PLD23LR002.aspx.
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The NTSB is also investigating an Enbridge pipeline failure that
occurred in November 2024 in South Jordan, UT that killed a 15-year-old
child. The preliminary report finds that the failed pipeline was also
Aldyl A.\2\
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\2\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas-Fueled Home
Explosion https://www
.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD25FR001.aspx.
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Just last year, in Jackson, MS, pipelines operated by Atmos Energy
appears to have fueled two home explosions, one of which killed the 81-
year-old wife of a community pastor. An NTSB preliminary report
describes what appears to an under-maintained system full of leaks.
Neighbors had complained repeatedly about the smell of gas. Atmos
didn't find any leaks it deemed to be hazardous before the home
exploded.\3\
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\3\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Atmos Energy Corporation Natural Gas-
Fueled Home Explosions and Fires (Feb. 14, 2024) https://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/Pages/PLD24FR003.aspx.
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On the hazardous liquids side, we've seen two recent failures that
have contaminated drinking water wells, and another incident on a
chronically failing system. An Energy Transfer pipeline in Pennsylvania
was discovered to have been leaking jet fuel. Evidence suggests this
pipeline may have been leaking for at least 16 months, possibly much
longer, after many complaints about the taste and smell of residents'
water. And in December, an Enterprise Products pipeline spilled 23,000
gallons of gasoline, contaminating nine drinking wells. And just last
month, the Keystone Pipeline failed yet again, this time spilling about
110,000 gallons of crude oil in North Dakota.
This is just a selection of the approximately 1,500 significant
pipeline incidents that have happened in the last six years.
5 Year Anniversary of the Denbury Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Failure in
Satartia, MS
I want to take a moment to acknowledge the five-year anniversary of
the harrowing carbon dioxide pipeline failure in Satartia, MS. Five
years have passed since nearly 50 people went to the hospital
experiencing seizures, loss of consciousness, foaming at the mouth, and
many other terrifying effects of carbon dioxide exposure.\4\ Denbury's
failure in Satartia laid bare many glaring regulatory shortfalls that
have been clearly identified, but five years later we haven't
modernized the regulations. It took over 12 years for PHMSA to
modernize regulations with lessons learned from PG&E's devastation in
San Bruno. I hope it doesn't take nearly as long for PHMSA to modernize
carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations with lessons learned from
Denbury's disaster.
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\4\ U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Admin, Failure Investigation Report--Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines,
LLC--Pipeline Rupture/Natural Force Damage (May 26, 2022) https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/
Failure%20Investigation
%20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf.
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Congressional Oversight
The Pipeline Safety Trust urges Congress to fulfill its oversight
responsibilities regarding PHMSA by requesting information about the
status of staff reductions. We have heard very little official news
from PHMSA about how many staff members have accepted retirement offers
or been terminated. We have heard from news sources about the high
level of turnover at the senior leadership level, which, if true,
represents an enormous drain of knowledge and experience from the
agency. We haven't heard anything about the losses from elsewhere
within the agency. Full staff levels at a small safety agency such as
PHMSA are essential to meet its responsibilities to the public.
Also, we encourage PHMSA to seek answers from PHMSA to explain the
sudden drop in enforcement case initiations under the first few months
of new leadership. The number of cases posted to PHMSA's Enforcement
Transparency website\5\ represents as much as a 90 percent drop in the
number of cases initiated within the first months of previous
administrations, regardless of party.
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\5\ U.S. Dep't of Transp, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Admin., Summary of Enforcement Activity: Nationwide (May 1, 2025)
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/summaries.
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We firmly believe, and expect wide agreement among stakeholders,
that pipeline safety is a bipartisan issue that we can all support.
Legislative Priorities to Improve Pipeline Safety
While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero
incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. I commend this
subcommittee for working on pipeline safety legislation.
The Pipeline Safety Trust believes that making a meaningful
difference on pipeline safety involves three components: improved
safety regulations, financially meaningful enforcement, and widespread
adoption of Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS). Congress can
play a key role in each of these efforts.
Critical to each of these is the existence of a strong regulator,
both in PHMSA and each of the state programs. Not only has the agency
been chronically underfunded, Congress has also hamstrung PHMSA with
statutory restrictions such as the extra burdensome cost-benefit
requirement, of which PHMSA is the only safety agency laden with this
onerous and overly restrictive obligation. Also, the non-application
clause, forbidding PHMSA from applying certain standards from existing
pipelines also prevents the agency from being as strong a regulator as
necessary to ensure safe communities and a healthy environment.
For many of the legislative priorities described, there is a fact
sheet with recommended legislative language included in the Appendix.
PHMSA Funding and State Programs
Beyond revoking these two restrictive provisions, Congress can
empower PHMSA to be a stronger regulator by giving it the resources it
needs, which involves a substantial increase in funding. PHMSA has had
large increases in Congressional mandates without a corresponding
increase in funding. For example, nearly 100,000 miles of gas gathering
lines have finally come under PHMSA regulations and another
approximately 300,000 miles are under new reporting requirements. Also
on the horizon is a new generation of pipelines carrying carbon dioxide
and hydrogen, requiring new expertise and personnel. State programs,
responsible for oversight of more than 80 percent of the Nation's
pipeline mileage, are also feeling the squeeze on their capacity.
Because of the lack of resources, PHMSA has been reliant on the
industry it is tasked to regulate for technical expertise on
rulemaking. A 2015 Politico investigation\6\ found that PHMSA is an
agency ``that lacks the manpower to inspect the nation's . . . oil and
gas lines, that grants the industry it regulates significant power to
influence the rule-making process, and that has stubbornly failed to
take a more aggressive regulatory role, even when ordered by Congress
to do so.'' PHMSA has also long had difficulty in attracting and
retaining experienced personnel as the industry often hires staff away
at higher salaries.
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\6\ Andrew Restuccia & Elana Schor, Pipelines Blow up and People
Die, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2015) https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/
the-little-pipeline-agency-that-couldnt-217227.
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Currently, state utility commissions and state pipeline inspectors
have the ability to take over direct safety authority and oversight of
gas pipelines from PHMSA. State programs can be reimbursed by PHMSA for
up to 80 percent of their spending. However, in recent years, no state
has been reimbursed at the maximum level. In 2023, the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) wrote a
letter\7\ to Congress requesting sufficient funding for PHMSA to be
able to reimburse state safety grants at the 80 percent rate. PST
agrees that state inspection programs in good standing with PHMSA
should be granted 80 percent of their expenditures. Thus, Congress
should appropriate PHMSA with enough funding to accomplish this.
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\7\ Letter from Greg White on behalf of the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) to House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee (Sept. 18, 2023) (regarding pipeline safety/
PHMSA reauthorization legislation.
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The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's PIPES
Act of 2023\8\ proposed a funding increase of about 10 percent. PST
would like to see PHMSA's budget be increased by at least 30 percent.
This recommendation is based on factors such as inflation, PHMSA's
increased authority for regulating new types of pipelines, and PHMSA's
historic underfunding. Inflation has increased costs 23 percent since
PHMSA was last authorized in December 2020.\9\ Accounting for
inflation, a 10 percent increase would not even be equivalent to
PHMSA's previous funding levels and would in fact place PHMSA even more
behind.
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\8\ Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of
2023 (PIPES Act of 2023), H.R. 6494, 118th Cong. (2023) https://
www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/6494/
text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22pipes+2024%22%7D.
\9\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation
Calculator https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
(calculating the rate of inflation from December 2020 to March 2025).
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Rupture Mitigation Valves
Because of the statutory limitations described above, PHMSA's
improved regulations on rupture mitigation valves do not apply to
existing pipelines, including on older pipes in areas that could affect
densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Arguably these are
the pipelines that need this technology the most.
In 2022, PHMSA revised its pipeline safety regulations to require
rupture mitigation valves (RMVs), or alternative equivalent
technologies, to newly constructed or entirely replaced onshore gas
transmission, Type A gas gathering, and hazardous liquid pipelines with
diameters of 6 inches or greater.\10\ The rule did not, however,
require operators to retrofit older pipes because of the nonapplication
clause found at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60104(b), which prohibits PHMSA from
promulgating regulations to existing facilities. Because of this, PHMSA
fell short of adequately implementing the NTSB's recommendations made
after the San Bruno tragedy.\11\
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\10\ Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum
Rupture Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940-992 (Apr. 8, 2022).
\11\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Press Release: NTSB Issues Response
to PHMSA's Valve and Rupture Detection Rule, (Apr. 1, 2022) https://
www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR202
20401B.aspx.
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Excluding certain pipelines from implementation of critical safety
technology based on age is dangerous. Older pipes are likely more prone
to failure, and it is arbitrary to require critical safety technology
on some but not all pipelines. Requiring operator to retrofit older
pipelines with RMVs in high consequence areas (HCAs) would protect
areas with more people and buildings that could be affected by a
failure. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 192.903. Because of the nonapplication clause,
however, Congress must draft self-executing language for PHMSA to have
the authority to promulgate these regulations.
Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety
PHMSA regulations for CO2 pipelines lack the detail
necessary to ensure the safe operation of these pipelines. Given the
Congressional incentives driving carbon capture and sequestration
investment, many experts expect a large increase in the mileage of the
Nation's carbon dioxide pipelines. Once relatively rare and remote,
these pipelines could soon be much closer to people and communities.
The Denbury CO2 pipeline failure in Satartia, MS
demonstrated the unique safety risks that these pipelines pose. An
asphyxiant that is heavier than air, CO2 can move as a plume
in a dangerous and even lethal concentration close to the ground for
long distances after a failure. Current PHMSA safety regulations are
inappropriate and insufficient, as described in a Pipeline Safety Trust
report.\12\
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\12\ Richard B. Kuprewicz, Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of
Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as it
Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration within the
U.S. (Mar. 23, 2022) available at https://pstrust.org/wp-content/
uploads/2022/03/3-23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-Pipeline-
Report2.pdf.
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In early 2025, PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
CO2 pipelines. PST supported the NPRM, as it contained
provisions that would have drastically improved CO2 pipeline
safety but believed there was still room for improvement.
Unfortunately, on January 23, 2025, the NPRM was withdrawn as part of
the Trump administration's ``Regulatory Freeze Pending Review''
Executive Order.\13\
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\13\ Exec. Order, Regulatory Freeze Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2025)
https://www.whitehouse.gov presidential-actions/2025/01/regulatory-
freeze-pending-review/.
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Congress should require PHMSA to re-issue its notice of proposed
rulemaking on CO2 pipelines, accept public comment, and
finalize the rule within the next eighteen months.
Hydrogen Blending Pipeline Safety
Hydrogen has been highly incentivized in recent legislation such as
the Production Tax Credit in the Inflation Reduction Act. Gas
distribution operators are considering blending hydrogen into existing
gas distribution infrastructure and the trade group the American Gas
Association includes hydrogen blends of 20 percent as a key component
of their Net Zero plan for the industry. However, hydrogen
transportation by pipeline poses many safety risks and key knowledge
gaps remain. The risks run highest when the pipelines are near people.
At least one operator has blended hydrogen, however that system in
Hawaii is unique enough that it cannot serve as a model for the rest of
the country.
Hydrogen has a much higher flammability range than methane and is
known to embrittle certain types of steel and plastic pipelines. A
report on blending hydrogen commissioned by the California Public
Utility Commission from University of California Riverside found an
alarming number of safety risks and knowledge gaps. A report by
Accufacts commissioned by the Pipeline Safety Trust stated that the
weakest safety link for hydrogen blends in the distribution system were
the pipes inside residences.
Congress should not allow hydrogen blends into gas distribution
systems until the National Academy of Sciences has issued a report on
the safety risks and knowledge gaps and PHMSA has updated its
regulations.
In-Home Methane Detectors
Although pipeline operators may discover or be alerted to leaks
through various activities, such as maintenance or odor complaints,
these strategies will not consistently locate all hazardous leaks. When
natural gas migrates through the soil into a home, the odorant may be
stripped from the gas, and the resident would not be aware of the need
to evacuate and alert the pipeline operator. In-home methane detectors
are one method of continuous monitoring that can help the public and
pipeline operators identify leaks and improve public safety. 2023 and
2024 was the deadliest two-year period for pipelines in over a
decade,\14\ with much of those fatalities from building explosions that
could have benefited from in-home methane detection.
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\14\ U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Admin., Serious Incidents 20 Year Trends https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/
analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2
Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website52F_portal%2FSC%20Incident%20Trend&Page=
Serious.
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The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended the
use of in-home methane detectors,\15\ sometimes also referred to as
natural gas detectors, to alert the public of dangerous gas leaks and
prevent home explosions. Methane detectors are similar to smoke and
carbon monoxide detectors in that they are easy to install and
relatively inexpensive. Where they differ is that they can detect a gas
leak well before it ignites, preventing a potentially catastrophic
explosion. Multiple NTSB investigations of home explosions have
determined that the presence of an in-home methane detector could have
helped mitigate the consequences.
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\15\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Improve Pipeline Leak Detection and
Mitigation (Dec. 22, 2022) https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/mwl-
21-22/mwl-rph-01.aspx.
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Congress should mandate the installation of in-home methane
detectors in all residential and commercial occupancies receiving gas
service.
Fire Shutoff Valves
In the event of a fire in a structure that has natural gas service,
gas distribution piping is often compromised and serves as fuel. This
adds literal fuel to the fire and puts occupants and first responders
at increased risk of injury and death. According to PHMSA, for this
reason, it is necessary to quickly shut off the flow of gas to the
structure.
It may take considerable time to complete the shutoff of gas,
including notification of first responders and the gas company, arrival
of first responders and gas company at the scene, determining the
appropriate method to shut off the gas, executing shut off, and release
of the gas in the pipe between the shutoff location and the structure.
Reviews of accident reports have shown that it is not unusual for this
to take hours, prolonging the emergency. Use of automated shutoff
valves can significantly reduce the time to shut off gas to the
structure. One such device is a fire shutoff valve (FSV), also known as
a thermal shutoff valve.
A typical FSV uses a spring-loaded plug held in place by a fusible
link made of a low melting point alloy. When the fire shutoff valve is
exposed to fire, the link melts and the spring closes the valve,
shutting off the gas. FSVs are typically installed in the service line
either before the regulator, before the meter, or after the meter.
FSVs are commercially available and have been used in gas service
lines before the gas meter and in gas supplies to appliances.
Currently, there are no Federal regulations requiring their use in
natural gas distribution systems. They are required in
Massachusetts\16\ and have been used in Germany since the 1990s. The
Pipeline Safety Trust supports the widespread use of these safety
devices and advocates for Federal regulations that would make their use
mandatory.
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\16\ General Laws of Massachusetts Part 1, Title XXII, Chapter 164,
Section 75 A.
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Congress should require PHMSA to amend 49 CFR Part 192(H) to
require operators to install fire shutoff valves on all gas
distribution service lines. Alternatively, congress could require PHMSA
to amend 49 CFR 192.1007(b) to identify fires as a threat to their
distribution system.
Financially Meaningful Enforcement
With few exceptions, civil penalties are not financially meaningful
to operators. When we try to chart penalties levied on operators
because of fatal pipeline failures against their quarterly earnings, we
often can't even visualize the penalty since it's such a tiny
percentage of earnings. Giving PHMSA more enforcement authority is
critical tom improving pipeline safety.
Pipeline Safety Management Systems
Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS) have been developed over
the last ten years. Lessons have been incorporated and updated. When
implemented properly it leads to better safety outcomes. However
widespread adoption still eludes the pipeline industry.
PHMSA recently released its required report to Congress on the
progress of the gas distribution pipeline industry towards adoption of
PSMS. While progress has been made on total mileage of pipelines that
are under control of an operator that has made a commitment to PSMS,
only about half of the distribution operators have made that
commitment. PHMSA also recently released an Advisory Bulletin
encouraging the voluntary adoption of PSMS by the pipeline industry.
Congress could make a meaningful difference in pipeline safety by
directing PHMSA to take steps towards widespread industry adoption
beyond voluntary efforts.
Conclusion
As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's pipeline
safety program and make improvements to the law, I implore you to think
of the empty seats at dinner tables across the country because of
pipeline failures. I've been with families who have lost their loved
ones recently and some who lost their loved ones 25 years ago. I can
tell you; the pain never goes away. Please give PHMSA the authority and
the resources it needs to meet its responsibility to the American
people.
Thank you.
______
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
I will now recognize Senator Cruz, the Full Committee
Chairman, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Americans have been abundantly clear that they want
cheaper, reliable, and safe energy. That is what we are here
today to discuss, what Federal policies would ensure that
energy America needs is affordable, reliable, and safe.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
or PHMSA, is the agency within the Department of Transportation
responsible for overseeing pipeline safety.
This is no small task with over 3 million miles of oil,
natural gas, and other hazardous liquid pipelines all across
this Nation.
Good Federal policy would ensure that pipeline operators
have a clear understanding of the safety requirements. Federal
regulations are based on data and address risk appropriately,
and the regulations are cost effective.
So what was the previous administration's policy on
pipeline safety? One maxim of politics is that personnel is
policy. If that is the case then the Biden administration did
not give a damn about pipeline safety because they did not
nominate anyone to be the PHMSA Administrator.
That is right. It is not that they nominated someone and
then withdrew that person. They simply never bothered to
nominate any human being to lead the pipeline safety agency.
Instead, they relied on a Deputy Administrator for the
entire four years, a position that is not confirmed by the U.S.
Senate. That was a shameful dereliction of duty.
Unfortunately, in that entire time this committee never
held a single hearing on pipeline safety for those entire four
years, denying us any opportunity for oversight.
So there was nobody nominated by the President in the
position, nobody confirmed by the Senate in the position, and
this committee held zero hearings on pipeline safety. That
gives you an indication of what priority they put on this
topic.
President Trump has corrected this error by nominating Paul
Roberti to lead PHMSA. I hope to hold a hearing on his
nomination very soon.
The unaccountable Biden PHMSA also attempted to remake the
pipeline safety agency into a climate change agency because
every agency in the Federal Government under Biden was a
climate change agency instead of doing what its damn purpose
was. Not only duplicating the work of other agencies, but
disregarding the explicit statutory language that Congress
carefully negotiated.
One egregious example of the Biden PHMSA's overreach is the
natural gas leak detection and repair rule in which PHMSA
included the regulation of underground natural gas storage and
liquefied natural gas facilities despite the statute explicitly
not including those among the list of facilities to be
addressed by that rulemaking.
It is notable that more actions finalized during the Biden
PHMSA were overturned by a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals than
any other administration since Congress created the agency in
2004.
Listen to that again. Twenty-one years ago Congress created
that agency. The last 4 years under President Biden they had
more of their actions overturned by a Federal court of appeals
than any administration in history.
I suppose that is not surprising, given that they did not
have anyone named to run the agency and they did not have the
Senate engaged in oversight on them. Fortunately, President
Trump stopped the leak detection rule before it could be
promulgated.
This Congress we have the opportunity to debate and to pass
a pipeline safety reauthorization. Today's hearing is designed
to help inform that discussion.
One topic I expect to hear from the witnesses is the threat
to pipeline safety from ecoterrorists. Though the current
statute has penalties against individuals, quote, ``damaging or
destroying an operational pipeline'' it does not expressly
address ecoterrorists who tamper with pipelines or damage
pipelines under construction.
The unauthorized turning of pipeline valves is a major
safety concern that threatens the very environment that the
ecoterrorists claim they are trying to protect.
Pipeline operators have been forced to shut down their
lines in response to threats from ecoterrorists. I am proud to
co-sponsor Senator Sheehy's ``Safe and Secure Transportation of
Energy Act'', which would close this gap in statute by adding,
quote, ``vandalizing, tampering with, disrupting the operation
or construction of, or preventing the operation or construction
of a pipeline'' to the list of actions for which penalties
could be applied.
I also want to hear from the witnesses about ways that
pipeline operators are seeking to improve the safe operation of
their pipelines but for which outdated or misguided regulations
are currently barriers to greater safety.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony and their
response to questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Young. Well, thank you, Senator Cruz, for that
opening statement.
We will now move to member questions and I will begin with
Mr. Leger.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I am interested in
using this PHMSA reauthorization to modernize our pipeline
safety laws and to seize on opportunities that would allow
industry to deploy innovative technologies to enhance safety
within the broader ecosystem.
Mr. Leger, can you provide an example of a promising safety
technology and what legislative changes might be needed to
promote further adoption of this technology or new technologies
in general?
Mr. Leger. Absolutely, Senator Young. Thank you for the
question.
At CenterPoint Energy we have certainly embraced new
technology as well as our other member companies that are
associated with AGA. Have a couple of things that we work on.
Number one, one of the things that I am really most proud
of that would certainly be helpful to have PHMSA weigh in on is
we are currently deploying advanced metering technology, and
that is a first in the industry and we plan to install the one
millionth meter of that this year. Over a seven-year period we
plan to replace every single one of our meters on our system
with this advanced meter technology.
So one of the things that this does it directly affects
what you were talking about is the safe operation of our
system.
So the meter that we are working with has a couple of
sensors on the inside. One is a heat sensor, and if there is a
fire on the inside of the house and the building log gets to a
certain temperature it will automatically shut that meter off.
Additionally, there is a flow sensor in there and when it
gains flow that is excessive of what is normal through that
meter it will automatically shut that meter off, thereby
providing safety features for the homeowner.
Senator Young. And so those are solutions. Clearly, as you
have articulated, they are designed to enhance safety and
sufficient incentive already exists it seems for your
adoption--your deployment of those technologies.
Are there any changes either to regulation or to our
statutes that pertain to pipeline safety that you or, perhaps,
other members think might be appropriate to enable adoption of
those technologies or similar technologies?
Mr. Leger. I would say that legislation or rulemaking at
the Federal level that allows new technologies to be approved--
the streamlined process approved at the PHMSA level only helps
us at the local level to get them approved and I will give you
a for instance.
Anytime we bring on a new technology, if it is not already
approved by PHMSA then I need to go to each and every state
that I operate in and then individually get them approved. So
it is efficiency.
Senator Young. OK. Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. In the 2020 PIPES Act Congress authorized a
technology pilot demonstration program for pipeline operators
to show to PHMSA how new technologies should be reflected in
pipeline repair criteria regulations, right.
Pipelines are inspected from the inside--in line
inspection, so-called smart pigs traveling inside the
pipeline----
Senator Young. Right. Right.
Mr. Black.--collecting all that information. The pilot
program authorized by Congress was time limited. PHMSA ruined
it.
PHMSA required it to go through the special permit process
in the last administration and they were going to apply NEPA
reviews to what is an R&D project. We need Congress to
reauthorize that and to tell PHMSA not to do that so that we
can show PHMSA how to benefit.
Senator Young. This is--yes, this is a systemic issue
within the Federal Government. We do pilot programs all the
time. We defund the pilot programs before they play it out.
Sometimes we allow pilot programs to occur without a study
to analyze how they have done. When there is a study and we
have a very successful pilot program we never scale.
I mean, who runs an organization like this? Well, it is a
rhetorical question.
So, Mr. Rorick, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Rorick. Yes. I think that there are many improvements
that can be made to existing regulations where we take a risk-
based approach that allow us to use the latest technology.
Mr. Black and Mr. Leger talked about some of those
technologies, not only on pipelines. There also exists a lot of
technologies that we can use--drones, robotics--on tanks as
well.
You mentioned, Senator, the use of AI. There are huge
opportunities to use AI and industry is exploring the
opportunities to use AI for data management and then also use
AI to help us to look at that data and then preemptively
address issues.
So we just need to free up the process to let us use these
technologies.
Senator Young. Great. Very briefly, anything to add, Mr.
Caram, on this topic? It is OK if not.
Mr. Caram. Very briefly. I will just say, you know,
obviously, we support technological innovation to improve
safety.
We understand the importance of having a good process in
place if you are going to allow operators to not follow the
current minimum safety regulations. There needs to be a robust
process to make sure that technology is safe.
Senator Young. One very pointed point of clarification or,
perhaps, education for me, Mr. Leger, did you say cast iron
belch?
Mr. Leger. I am sorry. Cast iron and bare steel.
Senator Young. And bare steel?
Mr. Leger. Yes, sir.
Senator Young. OK. All right. And so we have pipes that are
not in the latest--they do not have the appropriate form of
steel or the most modern and resilient steel. Unpack this for
me----
Mr. Leger. Yes, sir. We----
Senator Young.--as someone who does not make steel for a
living.
Mr. Leger. Absolutely. So bare steel and cast iron are both
pipes that have been in the ground for 60, 80, sometimes 100
years, and we have eliminated the vast majority of that in our
system and will have it out in 2026.
Senator Young. Why do we need to eliminate it?
Mr. Leger. Because it is not the safest and most modern
technology that is available right now, and so we are putting
that in with high-density plastic and plastic and then also
steel--properly coated steel.
Senator Young. Well, we may have to follow up on that. I am
told they make some steel in the state of Indiana.
Mr. Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, currently state utility commissions and state
pipeline inspectors oversee, roughly, 85 percent of the
Nation's pipeline infrastructure.
This Federal-state partnership is critical as our state
inspectors are usually intimately familiar with the local
pipeline operations and their work can lead to often more
thorough and frequent inspections than PHMSA could possibly do
by themselves.
So to our industry panelists--Mr. Black, Mr. Leger, and Mr.
Rorick--as the industry works toward zero incidents can you
speak to the important role that state agencies play in working
with you to keep the pipeline system safe and operational?
We will start with Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. Thank you, Senator.
Two things come to mind on states. One, states maintain
excavation damage programs where we are trying to protect
underground pipelines and other utility infrastructure from
damage.
Those programs are weak if there are exemptions to parties
that do not have to participate in the one call program or if
those programs are inaccurately enforced.
There is legislation that was introduced in a committee in
the House last year that puts the right pressure on states to
improve their excavation damage programs and we call that to
your attention.
Second, as you mentioned, sometimes states are approved by
PHMSA to inspect even interstate pipelines and that helps free
up resources. It does not help when there is duplication.
We have operators sometimes being investigated by the feds
and the states. If we can align that we can spread those state
and Federal inspection resources more broadly.
Senator Peters. But to the question, states do play a
pretty important role?
Mr. Black. Absolutely, Senator. Yes.
Senator Peters. Mr. Leger.
Mr. Leger. Thank you.
Senator Peters. States play an important role?
Mr. Leger. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Peters, they absolutely do
play an important role and we work with our state regulators on
a daily basis for pipeline safety.
I do want to echo the damage prevention rules. I think that
is something that is--certainly, that we can improve upon and I
only call to attention Chairman Young's state, Indiana, which
is one of the top states in damage prevention and you can see
that by their damage prevention rates.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Mr. Rorick?
Mr. Rorick. Yes, I would also agree, Senator. The points
that Mr. Leger and Mr. Black raised on the damage prevention
program I do not think--cannot be emphasized enough and there
are--I think there are opportunities to reduce some of the
exemptions that occur to the damage prevention program,
opportunities to improve the enforcement, and there are
certainly opportunities to improve the coordination between the
feds and the states for not only the inspection.
States do have the authority to increase their regulations
on pipelines. I think it is important, though, that the feds
and the states work collaboratively to ensure that there is no
conflict in those regulations and in the enforcement.
Senator Peters. So work more collaboratively. But I think
you all agree that states are an important part of this
equation?
Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. So, Mr. Caram, turning to you now because
you raised this very topic in your written testimony, how would
fully funding states at the allowed 80 percent serve to help
the industry in achieving these zero incident targets that they
all want to achieve?
Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for that question.
As mentioned, the majority of the Nation's pipelines are
under state oversight. They all need to follow minimum Federal
safety regulations set by PHMSA, but the inspection and
enforcement in most of these pipelines are run by the state.
In addition to that, nearly all of the Nation's
distribution pipelines--those pipelines that bring gas into
people's homes and businesses--are those that are under the
inspection and enforcement authority of the state programs, and
these are the pipelines that are closest to people and that
lead to most of the fatalities and injuries.
So I cannot overstate enough the importance of a well-
funded state program.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
A bit more than four years ago on May 7th of 2021 a
ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline caused significant
impacts on communities from Texas to New York and highlighted,
certainly, the importance of robust, timely cyber threat
information and the sharing between private sector as well as
Federal agencies.
I am very concerned that the upcoming expiration of the
CISA 2015 liability protections for public-private cyber threat
information could enable another attack like we saw on the
Colonial Pipeline.
Mr. Rorick, Mr. Leger, would you agree that the expiration
of information sharing and the liability protections associated
with that under CISA 2015 would negatively impact pipeline
cybersecurity?
Mr. Rorick. Yes, certainly we would and we would like to
see that piece of legislation reauthorized as well. That
legislation provides some criminal protections through privacy,
through confidentiality, antitrust, that allow the information
sharing to occur between the private and public sector.
The nation, as we are all well aware, is under constant
threat and attack from cyber criminals. Our industry is
certainly not immune to it and allowing the statute to get
reauthorized will allow those protections to stay in place,
which will enable industry to participate more robustly in that
information sharing.
Senator Peters. And we just have a few more months before
it expires.
Mr. Leger, do you want to add anything to that?
Mr. Leger. I cannot really add anything. I will say I am
not the proper witness to talk about cybersecurity--I am an
operator--but we are happy to get back with you and your office
and this committee with a QFR.
Senator Peters. Great. Great. Well, thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Young. Senator Cruz.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of
the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Rorick, Mr. Leger, and Mr. Black, can you tell me about
your members' experiences with unauthorized valve turners or
protesters who damage pipeline construction sites? How often
does this happen and what type of risks does this activity pose
to pipeline safety?
Mr. Black. We have had a number of dangerous and
destructive situations from attacks on pipelines. In 2016,
opponents in four northern states cut through fences, cut
through locks to turn valves on pipelines that brought 15
percent of our consumed crude oil.
In 2017, an activist in Iowa torched into pipeline
components awaiting construction on Dakota Access Pipeline.
Also in 2017 a pipeline protester armed with a high-powered
rifle shot at the Sable Trail natural gas pipeline.
And, sadly, in 2022 there was a movie called ``How to Blow
up a Pipeline'' that was released nationwide and that glorified
violent action.
Attacks on pipelines risk hurting the environment, the
people there, and even the perpetrators themselves.
Mr. Rorick. And if I could add, this issue tends to be
somewhat sensitive, I think, unnecessarily. So we are not
talking about the changes that we are proposing. We are not
talking about squashing First Amendment rights to speech.
What we are talking about are things like this is just--
this is a recent unclassified document from the Tennessee
Fusion Center identifying a May 9 incident and just to read a
couple of quick lines here. And this is an individual who went
into the facility, tampered with it with a gas pipeline.
Local businesses and approximately 430 residents were
evacuated due to gas in the air. The tampering impacted gas
flow pressure, resulting in safety systems being activated.
Responding gas company officials resolved the issues and
restored system functions.
This is an example that happened just a few weeks ago where
not only was there a safety risk and health and potentially
life threatening issues that occurred not only to the
individual, to the workers that had--fortunately, the safety
systems kicked in.
The workers then had to go in and manage this and
ameliorate the situation, but then it provided risk to all of
those residents that are in the surrounding areas, not to
mention the impacts to their service.
Mr. Leger. Beyond what was mentioned here, what I want to
talk about is reiterate the cascading events of something like
that, not to mention what was already said about the risk to
the person completing the act but also the risk to our
communities and the rest of my employees that have to respond
to something like that.
Beyond that, you have cascading events where you have
hospitals, critical care facilities, local police departments
that were without gas that can no longer protect us and take
care of our citizens.
And then if you have a really bad incident where you have
to shut down a pipeline now you also have the danger of
critical generating facilities that are now down and then now
you do not have power for the area.
So it is a cascading event that I worry about.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Black mentioned the outrageous
movie ``How to Blow up a Pipeline.'' I am embarrassed to say my
alma mater, Harvard, proudly screened that movie on campus and
people wonder why so many Americans are losing faith in our so-
called elite academic institutions when they are getting so
extreme as trying to train young people on how to be
ecoterrorists.
Mr. Caram, you testified before the House Transportation
Infrastructure Committee that you agreed with the statement
that people who damaged pipelines or threatened to damage
pipelines, such as unauthorized valve turners, should be
prosecuted to the full extent of the law because of the danger
they put the public in. Do you still agree with that statement?
Mr. Caram. I do. The Pipeline Safety Trust does not support
the creation of unsafe conditions on any pipelines.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Black and Mr. Rorick, PHMSA is authorized to grant
special permits to pipeline operators in which PHMSA waives
compliance with statute or regulation if PHMSA determines that
the waiver is consistent with pipeline safety.
I have heard that PHMSA, particularly under the Biden
administration, would add numerous additional requirements to
special permits that were unrelated to the underlying
regulation the permit was designed to address.
Can the two of you speak to this issue with special
permits, particularly what extraneous requirements were added
and what you propose to fix the special permit process?
Mr. Black. Congress created special permits for a good
reason, right. There are so many different operating conditions
of a pipeline. The types of--in operating conditions the types
of pipe, is it a liquid, is it moving crude oil, is it
products, is it hot, is it cold.
And so this has been a way for pipeline operators to go to
PHMSA and say, I have got an equivalent way to do this that is
different and that is better.
But PHMSA has ruined the special permit program. Other than
special permits for class locations there have been very few
because PHMSA was applying unrelated conditions and PHMSA was
taking forever.
I have got a sad example of how PHMSA applied something
that was just so loaded down with unrelated conditions that it
was unusable.
Somebody had an application to deal with a dent a certain
way and the regulations required something that they knew from
their engineering assessment was not appropriate.
A simple permit request turned into 56 pages including 54
unrelated conditions that were not even the right type of
pipeline. This was a liquids pipeline and they applied natural
gas conditions.
Congress can fix this. Congress can tell PHMSA to not
require extraneous conditions, unrelated conditions, to the
issue being addressed in a special permit, and to act in a
timely basis.
Senator Young. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr.
Black.
Mr. Lujan.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Caram, New Mexico, as you know, is home to the Permian
Basin and the Nation's second largest oil producer. In 2023
there was a study conducted of a comprehensive aerial
measurement of oil and gas producing basins across the United
States including the Permian Basin.
Those surveys found that the Permian Basin oil and gas
operation had the highest total emissions observed anywhere in
the United States. So even though New Mexico is not the largest
producer, they were creating the largest methane plumes.
Mr. Caram, yes or no, is leaking methane from pipeline a
public safety hazard?
Mr. Caram. It is, yes. We continue to have home explosions
and pipeline failures from known leaks that have not been
repaired.
Senator Lujan. Yes or no, does leaking methane from
pipelines cause environmental harm?
Mr. Caram. Yes. Yes, it does.
Senator Lujan. Yes or no, is leaking methane from pipelines
a waste of a natural resource into the air?
Mr. Caram. Yes.
Senator Lujan. So, arguably, it is also a taking of
resources. When there is state land involved and there is
leaking taking place that it is like taking taxpayer money,
right?
Mr. Caram. Yes.
Senator Lujan. Yes or no, is advanced technology available
to detect leaks in pipelines so operators can fix them?
Mr. Caram. Yes. Methane detection has come a long way in
development.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Caram, how old are the existing rules
and requirements for operators to conduct leak surveys of
pipelines?
Mr. Caram. That particular part of the code is very old,
has not been updated in decades.
Senator Lujan. And in one word how would you characterize
the requirements on operators to survey for leaks in their
pipelines and repair them?
Mr. Caram. Vague.
Senator Lujan. In the decades since those vague
requirements were enacted we have seen preventable hazards and
explosions that have taken lives and endangered people. Is that
correct?
Mr. Caram. Sadly, yes.
Senator Lujan. In the decade since those vague requirements
were enacted, have we seen technology to detect leaks advance?
Mr. Caram. Yes. Yes. That has come a long way.
Senator Lujan. Now, the last time the pipeline safety bill
was reauthorized was in 2020, correct?
Mr. Caram. Correct.
Senator Lujan. That bill was signed by President Trump,
correct?
Mr. Caram. Correct.
Senator Lujan. And that bill included a provision requiring
the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration to
write rules and regulations to leak--or sorry, regulations on
leak detection and repair. Is that correct?
Mr. Caram. Yes.
Senator Lujan. And your organization was supportive of
these measures, correct?
Mr. Caram. Yes, we were and are.
Senator Lujan. And those rules have been updated. Is that
correct?
Mr. Caram. No. We went through a very long process. There
was two weeks of advisory committee meetings, a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, and a final rule was submitted to the
Federal Register but at the very end of the last administration
and it has since been withdrawn.
Senator Lujan. Now, this has been brought up in this
hearing today. I think I read article after article that
suggested the administration withdrew that rule because they
were worried that under a new Republican Congress that there
would be a CRA that would pull that rule out, and once that is
done cannot touch it ever again.
I think that is important for the record for us to talk
about these things. It was bipartisan. The Chair of this
Committee was instrumental in important provisions and he is
going to be instrumental in getting it again of the
Subcommittee, and I look forward to working with him on this as
well. It is critically important and that is why I appreciate
this hearing so much.
Mr. Leger, your company CenterPoint Energy recently
deployed an advanced leak detection technology, state-of-the-
art, vehicle-mounted technology. Is that correct?
Mr. Leger. That is correct.
Senator Lujan. And how prepared after a long, transparent
stakeholder engagement process is the industry to adopt the
optimized leak detection and repair practices as issued by the
agency in January?
Mr. Leger. Well, one thing I want to say it was not
recently. We have actually been--deployed that system 10 years
ago. So but I would say that we have valuable data that we are
willing and able to share with our partners on that adoption of
that technology.
Senator Lujan. That might encourage others to do the same.
So I appreciate that good example that you have there, sir.
One of the questions that I also have in this area is how
we work together. I am always reminded of how important our
word is when we are working on legislation, when we are working
on rules, things of that nature.
With your responsibility that you are here with today, can
I get your commitment to work with me and with this committee
to ensure that the industry does not backslide on commitments
and agreements to update these rules?
Mr. Leger. Senator, myself and my partner companies across
the United States as well as AGA are always willing to work
with you guys. I will say that collaboration among the
utilities is one of the beauties of our industry.
Senator Lujan. I appreciate that very much. Now, since I
have a little time left one question that I have goes back to
2021. Are you all aware that there were frozen pipes out in
Texas in 2021 of gas, Mr. Rorick?
Mr. Rorick. Yes.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Black, yes or no?
Mr. Black. Yes.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Leger?
Mr. Leger. Yes, sir.
Senator Lujan. Mr. Caram?
Mr. Caram. Yes.
Senator Lujan. Is there anything that should be done with
weatherization? Because it impacted New Mexico as well.
Now, it just did not get as cold in New Mexico as it did in
Texas with that liquid that was still in there. Is there
something we could do around weatherization?
Mr. Leger? I think you know that CenterPoint had a pipe
freeze.
Mr. Leger. Yes, absolutely. I will say that our
distribution pipe system was not frozen up. We could have
delivered the gas and we did deliver the gas during that
timeframe, and I would say that as my opening comments when I
mentioned in Minnesota gets very cold, right?
Sixty hours below zero and we successfully delivered 1.5
BCF. So yes, we can help.
Senator Lujan. And just, Mr. Chairman, I think this is one
area that we might be able to find some commonality as well,
understanding that some states, you know, like ERCOT or others
depending on how those pipelines are done. But look forward to
working with you there.
Senator Young. You know, and that--I will ask our Indiana
steel makers whether there might be certain qualities of newer
steel grades that could insulate, you know, the various
products that go through pipes from the elements.
Yes, I have become an alchemist up here. OK. So Senator
Moreno, you are recognized for questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNIE MORENO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Moreno. Thank you.
And before you leave, Mr. Lujan, I will invite you to Ohio
if you want to know what cold is.
[Laughter.]
Senator Moreno. There you go. And then I will invite the
Chairman to Ohio if he wants to learn about steel making. I am
just kidding.
Senator Young. Top steel producer in the country. Go ahead.
Please proceed.
[Laughter.]
Senator Moreno. I should not be so bold, given what the
Pacers did to the Cavs.
Senator Fischer. Nebraska has a steel plant, too.
Senator Moreno. There you go. So I think maybe bring the
conversation up from--no pun intended, from the underground
level to maybe a little bit broader level and if I could have
each of you just quickly respond to the following question.
What do you see coming in the next decade in terms of
energy demand in America? We will start with from the left to
right--our left to right. OK.
Mr. Leger. We see incredible growth in energy throughout
the country. If you look at data centers, return to
manufacturing, AI, these are all adding incredible amounts of
demand.
This kind of if you build it they will come that has
happened on the manufacturing and the data side and now we need
to meet that with growing infrastructure developments as well
to provide that energy.
Mr. Black. We expect growth and need pipeline operators to
grow to meet it.
Mr. Leger. Yes. I mean data centers--and I am fortunate to
serve some great areas in Indiana and Texas and Ohio and
Minnesota. In particular, in Texas there is a ton of growth,
and we are in the process of building pipeline--of planning to
build a pipeline around the City of Houston to better serve.
But that being said, you have also got an energy transition
going on that will rely on the natural gas industry to be able
to serve industry as the country continues to grow and onshore
more manufacturing.
Mr. Caram. This is outside of the mission of the Pipeline
Safety Trust but I will say that we need to see improvements to
the laws and regulations before the buildout of more energy
infrastructure to keep communities safe.
Senator Moreno. OK. And I will go back to Mr. Black because
I think it is important for you to repeat what you said in your
opening statement.
If we have to deliver energy, right, energy does not just
show up, right? You have to get it to some place. I used to
live in New England for 12 years and I find it interesting that
a lot of my colleagues from that neck of the woods talk about
the importance of climate change and safety and delivery when a
lot of energy is still delivered by truck.
You have people showing up at your door with energy that is
delivered on a diesel vehicle with all kinds of perilous
issues.
So if you had to deliver energy what is the safest way?
Safety. Forget cost. Just the safest way to deliver energy?
Mr. Caram. By pipeline, and government reports confirm
that.
Senator Moreno. So then it seems counterintuitive that if
you cared about safety you would cripple pipelines, correct?
Mr. Caram. Correct.
Senator Moreno. And then let us take it now to the point of
cost, because for a lot of working Americans that is the
number-one issue.
So for a lot of us we can say, well, safety matters and, of
course, nobody does not want safety. That is, obviously,
nonsense. Nobody would want these disasters to happen. But what
is the cost difference of getting this wrong?
Mr. Black, I will ask you.
Mr. Black. Liquid pipelines are not just the safest way to
move the fuels that we use. They are also the least costly.
So liquid fuels will move on other modes that cost more and
have poor safety records and those costs will ultimately be
passed on to consumers and the poorest of us pay the most for
energy.
Senator Moreno. And as a proud Ohioan, we, with West
Virginia and Pennsylvania, have the largest reserves of natural
gas in America and yet our producers have been absolutely
hammered with their inability to get affordable, abundant,
cost-effective natural gas to New England specifically and they
rely on Canada for the vast majority of their energy demands,
and the reason for that is simple. They refuse to allow
pipelines to be built to get and service those consumers.
Is that--explain to me how that works. Explain to me how
the logic of saying we would rather get energy from Canada
through diesel trucks and through rail and, by the way, through
ships across the Great Lakes. How does that make any sense?
Mr. Black. Our country is blessed with energy abundance but
we need pipelines to get it from where it is produced to where
it is used.
And I do not represent natural gas pipelines. Mr. Rorick
does. But it is just a few hundred miles where we have got
surpluses of natural gas to where they are needed in New
England.
Senator Moreno. And my final question is this and whomever
wants to answer it can answer it.
We had Senator Peters talk about Line 5, something I care a
lot about--I think the Chairman cares a lot about. What would
be the impact? Right now, there is something that is not very
well reported.
You have the Governor of one state wanting to shut down
that pipeline. What would be the impact of shutting down that
pipeline?
Mr. Black. Lots of Midwest Americans use Canadian crude for
the gasoline in their car. Lots of propane users and farmers in
Michigan depend on Line 5. So the impact of Line 5 being shut
down would be dramatic to the Midwest economy.
But there is an answer. There is a tunnel that is being
proposed. Sadly, it has been under review for 5 years. If that
tunnel can be developed we will have an even safer way to move
the fuel that Ohio and Michiganders and others need.
Senator Moreno. And just--I know I am out of time but just
quick follow up. Who is holding up the building of that tunnel?
Mr. Black. The state of Michigan.
Senator Moreno. So the same Governor who is trying to shut
down the pipeline is refusing to approve the tunnel that would
fix said pipeline. Seems to me the agenda is not about safety.
It is not about affordability. It is about an attack on fossil
fuels.
And with that, I will yield my time back.
Senator Young. Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Yes. So, thank you.
So let me just explain what the natural gas industry is
doing to New England. The natural gas industry was asked by
Donald Trump to pony up tens of millions of dollars last year
for his campaign and if he did it--if they did it in the
natural gas industry he would destroy the offshore wind
industry.
He would destroy the clean energy revolution. And by the
way, he is doing it. He is asking House Republicans on the
Energy and Commerce Committee and the Ways and Means Committee
to destroy the clean energy industry. They are doing it. They
did it yesterday. Did it today, just destroy it.
It is not all of the above. Here is why. The natural gas
industry is used to generate electricity. We were, until Trump
showed up, going to have 30,000 megawatts of offshore winds and
Trump is saying, no, it is all debt.
And who is the beneficiary? The natural gas industry. Oh,
we need to build more pipelines in. See the need in New
England. And we are saying to the natural gas industry, we do
not need you anymore. OK. We have offshore wind.
So the natural gas industry has paid to have Trump through
his Department of Interior and Department of Energy kill the
offshore wind industry. Now, we have one more final plant,
Vineyard Wind. That is 800 megawatts. That is equal to a
nuclear power plant ready to go.
But he wants to kill the battery storage industry, wants to
kill all of it. It is not all of the above, OK, and the natural
gas industry just cannot accept the fact that we have figured
out how to do it.
And by the way, Trump is also imposing tariffs on and
having a trade war with Canada. Quebec Hydro and northern
Maine--northern New England--that is how we do it. We have
partnerships with them, right.
So Trump is killing us and then the natural gas industry
says, we will come in. We will solve the problem for you.
You know, we do not need anything from Canada. We do not
need any electricity from offshore wind even though that is
what we want, that is what the states want, that is what the
states are investing in. That is what they are trying to permit
for.
Natural gas is asking for Trump to come in to kill it
saying, we do not need any more natural gas. OK. We already
have our indigenous resources. Quebec Hydro, offshore wind,
solar. Massachusetts is number two per capita in installation
of solar.
We will figure it out. We just need some--we need some
cooperation. OK. So just understand the natural gas industry
with crocodile tears appears here, you know, as though they
really care about New England and they want to make sure they
can deal with our energy issues.
We already figured it out. They are trying to kill our plan
so that they can substitute their plan which is more fossil
fuels, more greenhouse gasses and, by the way, hurricane season
starts in two more weeks, OK, and they are gutting FEMA. So
that is a recipe for disaster as well.
So let me--I will ask one quick question. Pipelines pose a
significant risk to public safety and the environment, an issue
that is personal here in Massachusetts.
A constituent of mine, an 18-year-old, Leonel Rondon, died
in the Merrimack Valley gas explosions in 2018 as a result of
negligence and missing pipeline safety rules.
As we transition to clean energy we have to limit the
significant risk that pipelines pose to public safety and the
environment, and this is why last year I introduced my Pipeline
Accountability, Safety and Environmental Standards Act to
enhance public safety, environmental integrity, transparency of
pipeline operations across the United States, and I will
reintroduce it again very soon.
Here is what the bill does. Mandates updated safety
standards to apply to existing pipelines. Require technology
that isolates pipelines during catastrophic failure so it does
not spread.
Mandate disclosures of pipeline safety data to the public
and to do so much more to improve pipeline safety and
accountability.
Mr. Caram, do you agree that these provisions in my bill
are necessary in order to serve as a preventative against the
reoccurrence of what happened in Lawrence just a few years ago?
Mr. Caram. I do, yes, and the Pipeline Safety Trust does
believe that, and thank you for your leadership, Senator
Markey, in the aftermath of Merrimack Valley and continuing in
pipeline safety.
Senator Markey. Yes. And a lot of the law that we passed,
the regulations that are put in place, are basically educated
by what happened in Lawrence.
To a certain extent it was the trigger for all the reforms
that we have in place. Could you expand on that, Mr. Caram?
Mr. Caram. Yes. It is said often that the regulations we
have are written in blood, and often after awful tragedies like
what we saw in Merrimack Valley there are lessons learned and
regulations updated.
A lot of--my written testimony is trying to stay ahead of
those kinds of tragedies and preventing them from happening in
the first place.
But the way the system is set up and the way it has
functioned is that often we wait until the awful happens and
then the regulations are updated.
Senator Markey. Yes, and the job of this committee is to
look ahead and lead the way, to not wait for the catastrophe to
inform us but to take the evidence from experts and then to put
the safeguards in.
Senator Young. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Fischer, you are recognized for questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman Young, for conducting
this hearing today.
As the former chairman of this subcommittee I had the
opportunity to lead the authorization of PHMSA in both 2015 and
2020. In each case this subcommittee and this full committee
worked diligently to reach a bipartisan product that passed the
Senate unanimously.
But, unfortunately, following the passage of the PIPES Act
in 2020 the Biden administration undercut those bipartisan
efforts through a heavy-handed regulatory approach, acting
outside the bipartisan congressional intent.
Mr. Rorick and Mr. Black, could you speak to the effects of
this approach and steps this committee can take to rectify
those impacts?
Mr. Leger. Absolutely, Senator Fischer. Thank you for the
question, and we touched on this a little bit earlier.
The administration--the previous administration really
expanded the remit--expanded PHMSA's remit beyond their
congressional mandate into environmental issues like climate
change.
We talked about the leak detection and repair rule. It is a
great example where PHMSA, under the Biden administration,
expanded beyond the focus of this committee and PHMSA's role to
address safety and look at issues like the social cost of
carbon to then expand the purview of that particular rule and
thus diluting not only the effectiveness of the rule but then
diluting the focus and the resources on issues beyond safety.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. I have been doing this a while. I remember your
leadership on both of those bills. Thank you.
Two things come to mind about the 2020 PIPES Act. First is
pipelines. PHMSA was authorized to do pipeline safety
technology demonstrations----
Senator Fischer. And under the Biden administration they
did not address the requirement from the law.
Mr. Black.--and they ruined it. Absolutely. And you have
got the opportunity, sadly and please, to reauthorize that and
this time tell them not to do the things that they did wrong.
Second, you had a provision called ``operating status''
which called upon PHMSA to have regulations unique to pipelines
that are idled for market conditions but will one day come onto
the market--come back onto the market. It is wasteful to
everybody, to PHMSA and to pipeline operators, to be applying
rules that do not fit there.
PHMSA never acted on that even though Congress told them to
do it and gave them a deadline. So it would help if you would
tell them again to do it, and we are encouraged that they
might. But it is important, like you say, for PHMSA to do what
Congress says.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Rorick, PHMSA--during the Biden administration they
also acted outside that primary mission, as you said, so many
of the requirements that they set and enacted under authorities
which were not in the law that was passed they duplicated
existing authorities that, for example, EPA has or DOE has.
As we move forward as a committee we want to make sure that
those safety standards are met, that pipelines remain the safe
way to transport these fuels. Do you have any suggestions on
what we can do with it?
Mr. Rorick. Yes, ma'am. There are certainly some great
opportunities, as we have discussed, to improve and move
forward with those unfinished mandates that you all have laid
out that PHMSA has yet to fulfill. There are other great
opportunities.
As you are well aware, API is a standard setting
organization. We have a number of standards that PHMSA directly
references in their regulations. In many instances they have
referenced standards that are two or three editions old.
That creates conflict within our industry in these
standards which move faster than the regulations. We are able
to use, as Mr. Young talked about earlier, the latest
technologies, the latest engineering practices.
It would be very helpful if PHMSA--and we talked about it
in our written testimony--were to be able to move forward with
the program to periodically review those regulations and ensure
that they are referencing the latest standards, and if they are
not then we need to have that dialog to ensure that what
industry is talking about doing and what we are using does not
conflict with the regulations, as another great example.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Young. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Cantwell, you are recognized for questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
this hearing very much.
In 1999 the Olympic Pipeline exploded, killing three people
in Bellingham, Washington. In response to this tragedy the
Pipeline Safety Trust was created to hold pipeline companies
and the government accountable in improving pipeline safety.
So very much appreciate, Mr. Caram, you being here today.
A few years later in 2004, following the increased calls
for better oversight, Congress established the Pipeline
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--PHMSA--a new agency
dedicated to pipeline safety.
So, however, as we sit here today 26 years later it is
clear that we still need to do more because these incidents can
have unbelievable impacts.
Over the last 20 years pipeline incidents have caused 257
deaths and more than 1,000 injuries and over $11 billion in
damages. Excuse me if this has been brought up in the hearing
thus far. I do not know if it has, but this is really important
data.
And that is an average of 12 fatalities and 51 injuries and
$550 million of property damage per year. So we need to do
better.
Just last month in Lexington, Missouri, a 5-year-old boy
died when a contractor hit a pipeline that had not been
properly marked by a pipeline company, causing a leak and an
explosion, and since 2019, the last time the Committee
considered pipeline safety, a number of significant issues have
merged and I know from your testimony that those have been
discussed today.
But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Caram, since just this year we
know those averages I just mentioned, but during the Trump
administration in the first three months I feel like we have
less than two enforcement cases.
Are you concerned about this?
Mr. Caram. Yes. Thank you for bringing that up.
We are concerned about the drop off of enforcement. This
is--we have not seen it in previous administrations.
Enforcement cases initiated have generally been consistent
throughout administrations regardless of party, and so we are
concerned to see this drastic sudden drop off.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I am sending a letter to Mr.
Kochman today asking him about this and asking him about the
recent data, and just--you know, I want to do everything we can
to prevent and if there is something that has happened that is
actually preventing this or we are just not seeing the
enforcement.
So we need to understand what is happening. So I will be
sending him a letter today asking about enforcement actions.
I also wanted to ask you--my state is very prone to
landslides and, certainly, a potential--as we call it, the big
one--earthquake.
According to the USGS, 44 percent of the country is at
risk, though, of experiencing landslides and people who live in
these earthquake prone zones.
So what--they have a, I think, a voluntary standard at
PHMSA but what should we be doing to think about this? And I do
not know whether that Missouri case had anything to do with
land moving or not but----
Mr. Caram. The Missouri case did not, but many recent
pipeline incidents have been caused by these factors called
geohazards. I think we have learned a lot more about pipeline
failures and we are attributing more--able to attribute more
and more to geohazards.
It is not specifically called out in the regulations.
Operators on high-consequence areas are required to identify
all potential risks and mitigate against those and that
ostensibly would include geohazards.
But we would like to see specific geohazard regulations
called out by name and spelled out prescriptively and
performance-based throughout the regulations.
PHMSA has issued a voluntary advisory bulletin. The
industry has developed a relatively strong standard around
geohazard mitigation and it is time to incorporate geohazard
regulations.
Senator Cantwell. Well, we probably did not quite imagine
it either until we had Oso, Washington how devastating a
landslide could be. It killed 40 people when literally the side
of a mountain exploded.
And so I do think with change in conditions we definitely
need to think about this. What about material issues, this
candy factory in Reading, Pennsylvania killing seven people and
injuring 10 others.
NTSB found the cause was a pipe made out of Aldyl A, which,
I guess, is subject to failure. What do we need to do to make
sure that that kind of material does not exist in pipes?
Mr. Caram. Yes. Aldyl A plastic has been known to be an
issue of material prone to failure for decades. Again, in a
voluntary advisory PHMSA bulletin it has been out for quite
some time.
In addition to that awful West Reading failure there was a
failure in South Jordan, Utah, that killed a 15-year-old boy.
We do not know the exact cause, but we do know Aldyl A was also
part of that failure.
I think we know enough and we have seen enough failures
that it is time to have operators find all of this Aldyl A and
take it out of their system.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you.
All of these statistics, Mr. Chairman, are just striking to
me that we still have this much--you know, 12 fatalities, 51
injuries, and $550 million in property damage every year. It is
too many.
So I look forward to working with you and the Chairman on
these issues. Thank you.
Senator Young. Well, likewise. Thanks so much, Senator
Cantwell, for your leadership on this and so many other
important issues.
Senator Peters earlier brought up the issue of
cybersecurity and I am glad he did. PHMSA is a pipeline safety
regulator. TSA is, however, the primary regulator of pipeline
security including cybersecurity.
While both agencies have distinct roles, I want to know
from our witnesses, any that wish to speak on this topic, do
you think there could be better coordination between TSA and
PHMSA or, perhaps, other agencies?
Mr. Leger. So I can speak to that, Senator, and you bring
up a great point. We have seen over the last few years that TSA
has really increased their oversight on cybersecurity issues.
They worked extremely well with the industry to not only
address threats or address incidents when they occur but really
proactively address the threats as well.
There is always opportunities for better improvement on
coordination and collaboration between the agencies and,
frankly, between the private and the public sector and so we
would look forward to working with both of those agencies to do
that.
Senator Young. I expect all of you will agree that there
are opportunities for better coordination--there is in every
organization so I--but any specific recommendations folks can
think of that--OK, great.
What role should the Federal Government have in pipeline
security and what are operators doing right now on this issue,
if anything?
Mr. Black. Pipeline security and cybersecurity are both
very important. TSA is on the case. Pipeline operators are
looking at TSA guidelines or having visits from TSA inspectors,
and we know that it is an important part of maintaining the
operations of pipelines.
Mr. Leger. We have active physical security and
cybersecurity programs in place that are actually protecting
our facilities.
Senator Young. OK. I will continue to educate myself on
this issue. I know that other members will be emphasizing the
importance of this.
I mean, pipelines, after all, they are critical security to
our economic security, to our national security, and so the
Federal Government has an inherently important role here.
Yes, Mr. Black.
Mr. Black. I thought of one way that Congress can help on
security, right. Senator Cruz talked about loopholes that are
not deterring those who might damage a pipeline, right?
The pipeline safety laws against damaging pipelines do not
cover when a pipeline is in preoperational status and does not
cover attacks that do not damage at the time.
We know that if something was damaged before it was
constructed and it came into operation there could be an
incident hurting people, the environment, and the perpetrators
if they are still there.
We also know that there can be valve turning that does not
cause damage then but can weaken the pipeline and later
contribute to a rupture.
Senator Cruz talked about a Sheehy bill that he co-
sponsored. I encourage the Committee to look at this. That is a
way that the Senate can help secure pipelines from attacks.
Senator Young. Absolutely. Well, I will consult with both
Senators Cruz and Sheehy on that. It sounds like an area of
vulnerability that we may need to button up.
You know, the last thing I would like to discuss with you
is outdated rulemakings. The PIPES Act of 2020, which Senator
Fischer showed great leadership on, that reauthorization
required PHMSA to hold a gas pipeline advisory committee, or
GPAC, meeting on the class location rule.
While GPAC has meant to address class location PHMSA has
yet to complete this rulemaking, probably unsurprising since
PHMSA did not have a Senate confirmed leader over recent years.
If it was finalized, pipeline companies could employ modern
inspection technologies to prove the safety of existing
infrastructure when population changes occur nearby instead of
outdated, expensive, and environmentally unhelpful methods.
Mr. Rorick, do you think that this rulemaking would improve
safety and avoid disruptions to communities by employing
modernized practices?
Mr. Rorick. Absolutely, Senator, and thank you for bringing
up that critical issue.
Since that rule--since the original requirements were
developed they were very prescriptive in their approach, and as
we have talked a lot about technology and as you focused a lot
about technology it has advanced rapidly.
The rules--the way they are written require when certain
criteria are met for those pipes to automatically be pulled out
of service and replaced.
In many instances those pipes do not need to be pulled out
of service and the latest technologies that we have can assess
those pipelines in a way that is less invasive, and we can make
those determinations that many of those pipelines do not have
to be pulled out.
Unnecessarily pulling out pipeline increases risk for the
workers. It creates disruption in service. There is--a study
was recently completed that shows that the amount of pipe that
is replaced and the gas that has to get blown down from those
service--in other words, we have to clear that gas so that we
can replace that pipe--there is enough gas that is released on
an annual basis to provide energy for 10,000 homes.
That is unnecessary risk, unnecessary interruptions to
energy deliverability that we can avoid, and unnecessary costs
for the industry where we can redirect those attentions to
other safety issues that really demand our attention.
Mr. Caram. Chair Young, may I just quickly add something?
Senator Young. You may, sir. Yes.
Mr. Caram. Thank you. I just want to provide a little
context there and just remind everyone what we are talking
about.
This is--we have different standards on pipelines based on
how--the population density around that pipeline and in a very
rural area it is generally thinner walled pipe and the more
populated the area the stronger the pipe needs to be.
So when we are talking about class location change we are
talking about when a neighborhood or population has built up
around this pipeline that was--has the thickness set for a very
rural area.
So while we do not oppose some, you know, reforms to class
location and the class location rule process, we just want to
caution this is a very sensitive issue and could be--we have
some serious safety issues and so we appreciate care and
concern on that.
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
That will be--we will keep that thought in mind as well.
Thank you so much.
Well, listen, were there things--before we close here today
were there any particular points that our witnesses who offered
very intelligent testimony today wished to make throughout the
course of this hearing but did not have the opportunity?
I will give you an opportunity. Thirty seconds each if
any--like, Mr. Rorick?
Mr. Rorick. Yes, we have a list of items that the
Committee--that we would welcome the Committee to consider. We
have got them written down in a pamphlet here.
We will be happy to share those with you. But there are a
number of issues that we would be happy to discuss with you
further.
Senator Young. We will give everyone that opportunity until
the end of the day on Thursday, June 5, to respond to our
questions and to make additional submissions that can go into
the record.
But, Mr. Black, anything right now?
Mr. Black. We encourage you to reauthorize pipeline safety
demonstration pilot projects, to fix the special permit
process, to deter attacks and improve criminal penalties and
reauthorize the pipeline safety laws.
This committee has an important role in assuring the public
that the laws and regulations are good. Thank you for acting on
it.
Mr. Leger. I concur with everything that my panelists have
said, but I would add the creating a voluntary information
sharing system--we did not talk about that--and I believe that
is a best practice. It is something that we do as a utility and
I think when you--you know, for us, like, it was mentioned
earlier about SMS.
We are reaching out outside of the utility industry to talk
about airlines on SMS. Just different perspectives, different
things that you can learn to only make us all better.
Senator Young. I am glad you brought that up.
Mr. Caram.
Mr. Caram. Thank you, Chair Young.
I just want to refocus a bit. There was a lot of time spent
talking about these unsafe terror attacks which, of course, we
do not support those creation of unsafe conditions on
pipelines.
But all the fatalities we have talked about today, you
know, the vast majority, if not all, of the 3,000 reportable
incidents that have happened over the last five or six years
those are not attributable to this.
And so I just want to refocus on the conditions that are
causing these fatalities and failures.
And the last thing I will say, I think, is the--a big low-
hanging fruit following an NTSB recommendation would be the
required adoption of in-home methane detectors will undoubtedly
save lives and make a big difference.
Senator Young. Thank you.
Thanks again to all our witnesses for their testimony here
today. Senators will have until the close of business on
Thursday, May 22, to submit questions for the record. The
witnesses, again, have until the end of the day Thursday, June
5, to respond to those questions.
This concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
GPA Midstream Association
May 13, 2025
Chairman Todd Young,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Ranking Member Gary Peters,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Re: Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Freight, Pipelines, and
Safety hearing titled ``Pipeline Safety Reauthorization:
Ensuring the Safe and Efficient Movement of American
Energy''
Dear Chairman Young and Ranking Member Peters,
On behalf of GPA Midstream (GPA or the Association), we appreciate
the opportunity to submit comments on this important hearing, which
will review pipeline safety regulations and operations at the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and evaluate what
policy priorities should be included in an upcoming PHMSA pipeline
safety reauthorization. We are grateful for the Subcommittee's work
towards developing pipeline safety legislation.
GPA Midstream has served the U.S. energy industry since 1921 and
represents more than 50 domestic corporate members that directly employ
57,000 employees engaged in the gathering, transporting, processing,
treating, storage, and marketing of natural gas, natural gas liquids,
crude oil and refined products, commonly referred to as ``midstream
activities.'' The work of our members indirectly creates or impacts an
additional 400,000 jobs across the U.S. economy. In 2023, GPA Midstream
members had an economic impact of $206.2 billion through operating more
than 506,000 miles of gas gathering pipelines, gathering more than 91
billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, and operating more than 365
natural gas processing facilities that delivered pipeline quality gas
into markets across a majority of the U.S. interstate and intrastate
pipeline systems.
Safety is Paramount
Pipeline safety is the top priority of GPA's members. According to
the U.S. Department of Transportation, pipelines are the safest way to
transport crude oil, refined products, and natural gas over the long
distances necessary to deliver energy to everyone who needs it.\1\
Midstream companies invest in technological advancements that
significantly increase pipeline safety through monitoring operating
conditions and product flows. GPA's members are focused on ensuring
regulatory compliance and collaborate with other industry stakeholders
on proactive, voluntary efforts to further the safety of their assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Data and Statistics Overview.'' PHMSA's Office of Pipeline
Safety (OPS). https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/
data-and-statistics-overview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unleashing American Energy
GPA is appreciative of the Subcommittee's support of pipelines
playing a key role in unleashing America's energy independence and
ensuring Americans have access to reliable and affordable energy. We
look forward to working with all of Congress, as well as the
Administration to restore American energy independence. Practical
public policy can be implemented to allow for America's energy
dominance.
Key Issues and Recommendations
1. Remove duplicative in-plant piping oversight
GPA asks the Subcommittee to use this opportunity to align
gas and liquid in-plant piping exceptions and confirm that
all piping within a plant boundary qualifies as in-plant
piping and should not be subject to PHMSA oversight.
Many GPA members operate processing, refining, and other types of
plant facilities. These facilities include gas piping on
plant grounds that serves plant facilities, or transfers
gas among adjacent or nearby plants. While the U.S. Code
includes exemptions for hazardous liquid in-plant piping
systems at production, refining, or manufacturing
facilities, gas in-plant piping does not have the clarity
of similar exemptions.
In-plant gas piping systems are a low risk to the public, which
supports their exemption from PHMSA regulation. The systems
are mostly located within plant boundaries and often
operate at lower pressures than cross-country, PHMSA
regulated pipelines. Additionally, plant facilities are
often subject to other safety regulatory programs, such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA's) Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements.
2. Appropriate representation on the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee
(GPAC):
GPA asks that the Subcommittee provide direction to PHMSA
to ensure appropriate stakeholders are included in the
conversation of regulatory actions that impact gathering
and processing.
PHMSA utilizes two technical safety standards committees in its
rulemaking efforts, and GPA is appreciative of how these
groups support this work. However, during recent rulemaking
efforts, which have had significant impacts on the
gathering lines GPA members operate, there has been no
representation from a stakeholder focused on operation of
gathering lines.
Given the potential for certain rulemakings to substantially
impact GPA members, either positively or negatively,
representation should be afforded to an operator engaged in
gathering and processing.
3. Longer Reauthorization Period:
GPA requests the Subcommittee reauthorize PHMSA for a
longer period.
PHMSA plays a critical role in ensuring the safe transportation
of natural gas and liquids across the United States.
Extending its authorization for a longer time would provide
an opportunity for the regulator to complete Congressional
mandates before being given other obligations. A longer
reauthorization period could also unleash technology
adoption and utilization of innovation. While innovation
can happen quickly, there needs to be proper time allotted,
whether for technology to advance or the market to adopt.
Providing more time between reauthorizations will ensure
technology can mature to a point for operators to be
comfortable to incorporate in their operations. Lastly, a
longer authorization window allows industry stakeholders to
gain experience and ensure compliance with new
requirements, ultimately benefiting public safety.
Conclusion
Reauthorizing pipeline safety programs is vital for protecting our
communities. GPA urges the Subcommittee to consider the recommendations
outlined above to support PHMSA's work. Thank you for allowing us to
provide this input, and we are happy to be a resource as the
legislative process progresses.
______
Associated General Contractors of America
May 19, 2025
Chairman Todd Young,
Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation, Freight, Pipelines,
and Safety,
United States Senate,
Wahington, DC.
Ranking Member Gary Peters,
Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation, Freight, Pipelines,
and Safety,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
RE: AGC Statement for the Record for the Hearing Entitled ``Pipeline
Safety Reauthorization: Ensuring the Safe and Efficient
Movement of American Energy''
Dear Chairman Young and Ranking Member Peters:
On behalf of the Associated General Contractors of America--the
leading association in the construction industry representing more than
28,000 firms, including America's leading general contractors and
specialty-contracting firms--I thank you for holding the hearing
entitled, ``Pipeline Safety Reauthorization: Ensuring the Safe and
Efficient Movement of American Energy.''
AGC members are engaged in utility construction, including water
and wastewater facilities and pipelines, energy generation and
transmission, and telecommunications infrastructure. For pipeline
construction, this includes maintenance and repair, excavation,
tunneling, boring and site preparation. Contractors are on the front
lines of pipeline safety, and reauthorizing Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) would ensure the continued
support of important safety programs related to our Nation's pipeline
infrastructure.
Robust Funding for State One-Call Notification Programs
AGC urges robust funding for state One-Call Notification Programs,
which are key in mitigating damages from excavation nationwide and
ensuring timely locates. According to a survey of AGC members published
in January 2025, contractors are aware of 811 requirements and the
local laws they are required to follow. However, 87 percent of
contractors report that it takes longer than one business day for
locators to arrive at job sites to mark underground utility lines,
including gas and other hazardous materials pipelines, while one-
quarter of respondents' state that it takes five or more business days
for location crews to arrive and mark utilities.
Supporting One-Call Notification programs through PHMSA
reauthorization will ensure that underground pipeline lines have more
support to be correctly and expeditiously marked, mitigating challenges
and weaknesses that could cause a critical accident.
Require Vertical Line Locating, Marking and Mapping
Congress should require vertical line marking in the
reauthorization of PHMSA, which would improve safety planning and
operations for contractors, locators and pipeline operators. PHMSA
reauthorization has previously included strict requirements for the
correct marking of horizontal utility and construction lines, which
locate underground infrastructure systems. While these lines make it
easier for contractors and utility locators to know where utilities
are, horizontal markings do not indicate their depth. Requiring
vertical line markings allows locators and contractors to see how deep
utilities are buried, improving the safe development of pipelines and
ensuring safety efforts are strictly implemented throughout all levels
of the construction process. Additionally, Congress should require
vertical lines be mapped by locators and made publicly available for
all pipeline stakeholders. Requiring and publishing vertical maps will
allow contractors to see the depth of utility lines and pipelines that
need to be expanded, better preparing them for work and mitigating
damage that could arise due to conducting digging activities that can
severely damage pipes at improper vertical depths.
AGC thanks the subcommittee for holding this important hearing and
looks forward to working with its members on the reauthorization of
PHMSA. Congress must ensure that the construction and safety of our
pipeline system remains efficient.
Sincerely,
Alex Etchen,
Vice President, Government Relations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Robin Rorick
PHMSA Inspector Resources
Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
pipeline industry.
Question 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
experts?
Answer. Safety is our industry's top priority, and API agrees a
PHMSA that is properly resourced with individuals with necessary levels
of competency and knowledge of operations under their remit is
critical. In particular, pipeline safety inspections require a
significant understanding of engineering technologies and processes,
and API supports PHMSA's efforts to recruit a qualified and capable
workforce.
Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
highly skilled employees?
Answer. PHMSA struggles to retain quality inspectors under current
government personnel rules and pay scales, especially when competing
with industry for quality employees. Congress may want to consider an
approach to allow inspectors to be in a more competitive service pay
scale.
Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
provide increased funding for state inspectors?
Answer. Under current regulation, PHMSA has the ability to
reimburse states up to 80 percent of the total cost of the personnel,
equipment, and activities reasonably required by the State agency for
conducting its pipeline safety or underground natural gas storage
program during a given calendar year. With PHMSA's authority to
reimburse up to 80 percent under its current program, API would support
funding with the use of appropriated funds and coordinate with state-
based resources to improve efficiencies in the inspection program.
Criminalizing Pipeline Protests
As you testified at the hearing, you support criminal penalties for
the unauthorized turning of valves on pipelines, which can present a
safety risk. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
goes further than unauthorized valve turning and would sentence
individuals found to be ``disrupting or preventing the construction of
pipelines.''
Question 1. Do you think the Standing Rock protesters were
disrupting or preventing the construction of the Dakota Access
Pipeline?
Answer. Any vandalism, attacks on or damage to construction sites
and other activities that disrupt service, inspection protocols and
jurisdictional issues should be considered criminal and penalized
accordingly. Vandalism or damage to construction sites or equipment and
materials significantly increases the risk of harm to the pipeline and
those operating at the facility. Importantly, this activity could also
lead to an incident from damage caused by these events, potentially
causing a safety hazard to the public and/or the environment. As such,
this type of activity should be penalized criminally.
Question 2. Do you think landowners and lawmakers fighting eminent
domain for new carbon pipelines in South Dakota are preventing the
construction of pipelines?
Answer. Most of the time, agreements over an easement can be
reached voluntarily between the landowner and pipeline operator, with
eminent domain only utilized as a last resort. For decades, eminent
domain has and continues to be imperative to U.S. economic growth and
critical infrastructure development, enabling the construction of
highways, dams, airports, railroads, telephone, electricity lines and
more. These projects have become the integrated infrastructure system
Americans rely on daily to communicate with distant relatives, heat our
homes, transport food, and provide clothing and other essential needs.
API supports two-way engagement between a pipeline operator and
landowner, based on transparency, respect, reciprocity, inclusiveness,
and accessibility. In 2024, API published the first edition of
Recommended Practice 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, in partnership
with regulators and public stakeholders, to support operators creating
long-term, meaningful, and durable community relationships on both
planned and existing pipelines.
Question 3. Do you support the Safe and Secure Transportation of
American Energy Act, which could easily be interpreted as criminalizing
protests and any other action that could be seen as disrupting or
preventing construction?
Answer. API supports the criminalization of behavior that causes
safety hazards to people and the environment, and the protection of
critical facilities and equipment. The right to free speech and protest
is one of the many foundational tenets that makes our country
exceptional, and our position does not infringe on that foundational
right. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
clearly delineates lawful protest with criminal behavior that could
damage a pipeline or lead to an incident.
Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety
On the last day of the Biden administration, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposed new safety
requirements for Carbon Dioxide pipelines. However, the Trump
administration has rescinded that proposal, continuing to leave
communities vulnerable to incidents like the 2020 Sataria, Mississippi
carbon dioxide leak that forced the evacuation of a town and
hospitalized 40 people.
Question 1. States like California and Illinois have banned new
carbon pipelines until DOT issues safety requirements. Are you
concerned that the delay of these requirements will prevent your
members' ability to build new pipelines?
Answer. There are currently over 5,000 miles of pipeline that have
been operating safely for decades under existing PHMSA regulations.
Although API supports a review and potential update to current
regulations, they have a long-standing proven track record in ensuring
pipelines transporting CO2 are constructed and operated
safely. Also, API expects to publish an industry consensus standard on
the transportation of CO2 by pipeline later this year, which
could be incorporated into PHMSA regulation by reference and strengthen
the existing regulations with updates that further enhance the current
regulatory framework for safe transportation of CO2 by
pipeline.
Question 2. Did you have concerns with the Biden administration's
proposal? If so, what concerns did you have?
Answer. Yes, API does have concerns with the proposal as presented
in the unofficial copy of the NPRM that was released by PHMSA in
January 2025. While the NPRM included improvements to the regulations
that API supports--conversions of service, fracture propagation and
control, dispersion modeling, and other topic areas--several of the
proposed changes are overreaching and some items were included in the
proposal that do not relate to transportation of CO2 by
pipeline and should be the subject of separate rulemaking. API expects
to work with PHMSA pending any future rulemaking to address
opportunities for improvement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Robin Rorick
Incomplete Regulations:
Question 1. There are at least six incomplete congressionally
mandated regulations currently stalled at PHMSA, including on carbon
dioxide pipelines, leak detection and repair, and liquefied natural
gas. Do you think these rules--which you initially supported and, based
on your testimony, continue to support--should be finalized?
Answer. API continues to support comprehensive, bipartisan efforts
to help make our Nation's pipeline network safer as it provides
reliable energy supply to every community in America. It is thus
imperative that the regulatory environment remains cognizant of and
responsive to both current and potential future safety challenges faced
by operators. That said, API applauds PHMSA's efforts to date to
advance regulatory reform and consider rulemakings that recognize the
important role that leading industry practices, innovation and
technology play in advancing safety including repair criteria and LNG
safety. API would also support additional efforts by PHMSA to move
forward with Congressionally mandated rulemakings, ensuring they are
fit for purpose, meet the intent of Congress, and ultimately advance
safety.
Staffing:
Question 2. PHMSA has long been an underfunded agency, with not
enough staff to properly ensure pipeline safety. Given the agency has
just over a few hundred employees, even small cuts can have a
significant impact. Given PHMSA's mission to protect people and the
environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
hazardous materials, do you support enforceable staffing requirements
for PHMSA to ensure the agency can keep communities safe?
Answer. Safety is our industry's top priority, and API agrees that
PHMSA should be properly resourced with individuals with necessary
levels of competency and knowledge of operations under their remit. In
particular, a high-quality inspection workforce is critical in
conducting ever more sophisticated inspections of performance-based
regulations.
Criminalization:
Question 3. Under existing law, it is already a felony to damage or
destroy a pipeline. There are proposals to expand criminal penalties to
``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' a pipeline. Do you agree
``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' are too broad given the following
examples?
A. local landowner who refuses to sell farmland, ranchland, or
private property to a pipeline company or opposes an eminent domain
action count
B. A concerned citizen speaking up at a local hearing in opposition
to a pipeline
C. An individual who writes an op-ed or posts on social media about
their opposition to a pipeline
D. A lawyer who files a lawsuit challenging a pipeline's permit or
zoning approval
E. A community member who reports environmental pollution or a
hazardous waste spill to local authorities
F. A pipeline employee who raises concerns about workplace safety
Answer. Any vandalism, attacks on or damage to construction sites
and other activities that disrupt service, inspection protocols and
jurisdictional issues should be considered criminal and penalized
accordingly. Easement negotiations, public hearings, media posts or
safety reporting are lawful expressions of First Amendment rights to
free speech, which API does not believe should be included in this
provision. However, any vandalism or damage to construction sites or
equipment could increase the risk of an incident that could, in turn,
cause a safety hazard to the public, pipeline personnel or the
environment, and this should be penalized criminally.
Most of the time, agreements over an easement can be reached
voluntarily between the landowner and pipeline operator, with eminent
domain only utilized as a last resort. For decades, eminent domain has
and continues to be imperative to U.S. economic growth and critical
infrastructure development, enabling the construction of highways,
dams, airports, railroads, telephone, electricity lines and more. These
projects have become the integrated infrastructure system Americans
rely on daily to communicate with distant relatives, heat our homes,
transport food, clothing and other essential needs.
API supports two-way engagement between a pipeline operator and
landowner, based on transparency, respect, reciprocity, inclusiveness,
and accessibility. In 2024, API published the first edition of
Recommended Practice 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, in partnership
with regulators and public stakeholders, to support operators creating
long-term, meaningful, and durable community relationships on both
planned and existing pipelines.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Andrew J. Black
PHMSA Inspector Resources
Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
pipeline industry.
Question 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
experts?
Answer. Yes. Pipeline safety regulation is a technical field
dependent on expertise and experience. Engineering or science
backgrounds are needed to understand the physical and environmental
stresses placed on pipelines. Additional PHMSA personnel expert in
pipeline engineering with experience operating pipelines would benefit
the quality and timeliness of PHMSA regulatory actions.
Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
highly skilled employees?
Answer. PHMSA can attract and retain highly skilled employees with
new authority to hire and compensate personnel at competitive levels.
In the past, DOT personnel restrictions prevented PHMSA from hiring
technical experts at higher GS levels. Congress can provide such
authority directly to PHMSA. Congress can also provide authority to
PHMSA directly, and not through the Office of Personnel Management, to
compensate technical experts above the GS scale using mechanisms
similar to those employed by DOJ or SEC for legal or financial
employees.
Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
provide increased funding for state inspectors?
Answer. LEPA does not have a position on state inspection
reimbursement levels.
Criminalizing Pipeline Protests
As you testified at the hearing, you support criminal penalties for
the unauthorized turning of valves on pipelines, which can present a
safety risk. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
goes further than unauthorized valve turning and would sentence
individuals found to be ``disrupting or preventing the construction of
pipelines.''
Question 1. Do you think the Standing Rock protesters were
disrupting or preventing the construction of the Dakota Access
Pipeline?
Answer. Multiple news outlets documented some Dakota Access
construction protesters engaging in physical or violent activities such
as blocking roadways, chaining persons to vehicles, setting fires,
throwing objects at law enforcement or discharging firearms. Each of
these activities fits within a definition of ``disrupting or
preventing'' construction. To the extent the Senator feels there are
peaceful, legal, First Amendment free speech activities that could fall
under interpretations of ``disrupting or preventing'', LEPA is
supportive of clarifying language.
Question 2. Do you think landowners and lawmakers fighting eminent
domain for new carbon pipelines in South Dakota are preventing the
construction of pipelines?
Answer. A reasonable person could not interpret landowners and
lawmakers fighting eminent domain through free speech, legislating or
legal challenges as preventing construction of a pipeline.
Additionally, no activity occurring during the planning, approval or
permitting of a pipeline before its construction could reasonably be
interpreted as preventing the construction of pipelines.
Question 3. Do you support the Safe and Secure Transportation of
American Energy Act, which could easily be interpreted as criminalizing
protests and any other action that could be seen as disrupting or
preventing construction?
Answer. LEPA supports the Safe and Secure Transportation of
American Energy Act, which establishes that criminal penalties apply to
``damaging, destroying, vandalizing, tampering with, disrupting the
operation or construction of, or preventing the operation or
construction'' of a pipeline. LEPA disagrees a reasonable person could
easily interpret it as criminalizing protests, not least because
peaceful protests are protected under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. LEPA would oppose legislation that allows physical or
violent protest of pipeline construction. To the extent the Senator
feels the language of the bill could infringe on a citizen's right to
protest peacefully, LEPA is supportive of making that clarification.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Andrew J. Black
Artificial Intelligence & Pipeline Safety
It is critical that we explore every avenue to reduce potential
risks and prevent future pipeline failures. One way of doing this is
through the improvement and adoption of technology. You mentioned in
your testimony that you are employing artificial intelligence in
pipeline maintenance and safety.
Question 1. How is AI currently being employed with pipelines?
Answer. Pipeline operators are currently using artificial
intelligence to detect leaks. Examples include using AI to monitor
cameras at facilities to detect equipment failures that result in a
leak. Operators are also using AI to scan imaging collected from aerial
surveillance to detect signs of a pipeline leak or encroachment on a
pipeline right of way that may present a hazard. LEPA would welcome the
Senator's support of provisions to ensure pipeline operators can fully
leverage advanced technology, including AI, to improve pipeline safety.
Examples include clarifying that pipeline operators can use drones and
satellites to monitor their rights of way and reauthorizing the
technology pilot program to demonstrate the effectiveness of new
technologies.
Question 2. How else might this technology be used to enhance
pipeline safety in the future?
Answer. Pipeline operators are exploring the use of machine
learning and artificial intelligence to improve pipeline safety.
Pipeline operators collect a tremendous amount of data from their
operations and inspection technology. Machine learning has the
potential to detect signs of a potential problem otherwise
imperceptible to current techniques. For example, pipeline operators
hope to use machine learning to sift through operations data on flow
rate, pipeline pressure, valve status and pump status to detect the
signals or signs of small leaks otherwise imperceptible through
pressure drops or flow changes. Pipeline operators also hope to sift
through inline inspection tools that generate terabytes of data as they
scan pipe walls to detect signs of corrosion or cracking earlier than
currently possible. LEPA would welcome the Senator's support of PHMSA
research and development in these areas.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Andrew J. Black
Incomplete Regulations:
Question 1. There are at least six incomplete congressionally
mandated regulations currently stalled at PHMSA, including on carbon
dioxide pipelines, leak detection and repair, and liquefied natural
gas. Do you think these rules--which you initially supported and, based
on your testimony, continue to support--should be finalized?
Answer. LEPA supports the proposal and finalization of a rulemaking
that provides targeted updates to PHMSA's CO2 pipeline
regulations. LEPA does not have positions on the methane monitoring and
mitigation rule or LNG rule, which are outside the scope of LEPA.
Staffing:
Question 2. PHMSA has long been an underfunded agency, with not
enough staff to properly ensure pipeline safety. Given the agency has
just over a few hundred employees, even small cuts can have a
significant impact. Given PHMSA's mission to protect people and the
environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
hazardous materials, do you support enforceable staffing requirements
for PHMSA to ensure the agency can keep communities safe?
Answer. LEPA supports PHMSA having the staff necessary to fulfill
its pipeline safety mission. More important than the number of PHMSA
staff is the qualifications of its staff. Pipeline safety regulation is
a technical field dependent on expertise and experience.
Engineering or science backgrounds are needed to understand the
physical and environmental stresses placed on pipelines. Additional
PHMSA personnel expert in pipeline engineering with experience
operating pipelines would benefit the quality and timeliness of PHMSA
regulatory and enforcement actions.
PHMSA can attract and retain highly skilled employees with new
authority to hire and compensate personnel at competitive levels. In
the past, DOT personnel restrictions prevented PHMSA from hiring
technical experts at higher GS levels. Congress can provide such
authority directly to PHMSA. Congress can also provide authority to
PHMSA directly, and not through the Office of Personnel Management, to
compensate technical experts above the GS scale using mechanisms
similar to those employed by DOJ or SEC for legal or financial
employees.
Criminalization:
Question 3. Under existing law, it is already a felony to damage or
destroy a pipeline. There are proposals to expand criminal penalties to
``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' a pipeline. Do you agree
``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' are too broad given the following
examples?
A: A local landowner who refuses to sell farmland, ranchland, or
private property to a pipeline company or opposes an eminent domain
action count
B: A concerned citizen speaking up at a local hearing in opposition
to a pipeline
C: An individual who writes an op-ed or posts on social media about
their opposition to a pipeline
D: A lawyer who files a lawsuit challenging a pipeline's permit or
zoning approval
E: A community member who reports environmental pollution or a
hazardous waste spill to local authorities
F: A pipeline employee who raises concerns about workplace safety
Answer. Pipeline protests at operating facilities or construction
sites have included protesters engaging in physical or violent
activities such as blocking roadways, chaining persons to facilities or
vehicles, setting fires, throwing objects at law enforcement or
discharging firearms. Each of these activities fits within a definition
of ``disrupting or preventing'' construction.
A reasonable person could not interpret concerned citizens,
landowners and lawmakers opposing or protesting a pipeline through free
speech, legislating or legal challenges as disrupting or preventing
construction of a pipeline. Additionally, no activity occurring during
the planning, approval or permitting of a pipeline before its
construction could reasonably be interpreted as preventing the
construction of pipelines. Likewise, no reasonable person would
consider a whistle-blower in good faith reporting a safety concern as
disrupting or preventing construction.
To the extent the Senator feels there are peaceful, legal, First
Amendment free speech activities that still could fall under
interpretations of ``disrupting or preventing'', LEPA is supportive of
clarifying language.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Todd Young to
Richard Leger
Safe Digging
I recently introduced a resolution designating April as National
Safe Digging Month, to build awareness of safe digging practices that
protect homeowners and utility workers from damaging underground
utility lines during excavation projects. Excavation damage to
underground infrastructure, not only pipelines but other critical
systems like water and broadband, is both dangerous and costly. The One
Call/811 system was created to prevent that damage by connecting
excavators with underground utilities before digging. Yet since then,
81 percent of excavation damage incidents involving pipelines have been
caused by third party excavators. Even with PHMSA's 2015 final rule
intended to evaluate state 811 programs and enforce minimum Federal
standards, significant excavation related incidents continue to occur.
Question 1. Mr. Leger, given these persistent risks and need for
consistent enforcement, what should be done to strengthen the One Call/
811 program and ensure states are effectively preventing excavation
damage across all underground utilities?
Answer. A regulatory framework for incentivizing prevention of
excavation damage already exists in the Code of Federal Regulations (49
CFR 198--Regulations for Grants to Aid State Pipeline Safety Programs).
Congress should direct PHMSA to amend Part 198 to update State One
Call program requirements (Sec. 198.37), enhance damage prevention
program effectiveness criteria (Sec. 198.55), and require recipients of
One Call grants (Sec. 198.35) to implement the best practices of
effective One Call programs identified in the 2023 AGA white paper
Working with Other Stakeholders to Advance Pipeline Safety in Damage
Prevention. Effective state One-Call program elements include:
1) Size/scope of One-Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
standard infrastructure locate requests (possible process
exceptions for special large project tickets)
2) Longevity of One Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
standard locate requests (possible process exceptions for
special Large Project Tickets)
3) Tolerance (hand-dig only) zone horizontal dimension requirements
4) Tolerance zone requirements
5) Emergency excavation notification requirements
6) Excavator responsibilities explained
7) Definitions of ``excavator''/''excavation''
8) White-lining requirements
9) Positive response requirements
10) Locatability of newly installed underground facilities
11) Sewer line marking requirements
12) Effective, active, meaningful enforcement of state dig laws
13) Specific qualifications/requirements for excavators performing
trenchless excavation activities that are not subject to
pipeline construction requirements in 49 CFR 192/195
Legislative language that sought to codify these recommended
excavation damage prevention best practices was included in H.R. 6494,
the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023
(Section 18) and H.R. 7655, the Pipeline Safety, Modernization, and
Expansion Act of 2024 (Section 15), pipeline safety bills that passed
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and Energy and
Commerce Committees respectively, last Congress. In the 119th Congress,
we look forward to working with the Senate Commerce Committee, as well
as your House counterparts, to ensure that common sense and critical
excavation damage prevention provisions become law.
Question 2. Mr. Leger, as an operator across several states, what
challenges do you face in working with different state 811 programs,
and what policy changes would help reduce excavation damage across your
service areas?
Answer. CenterPoint Energy has firsthand experience with the
various maturities of state programs in the areas in which it operates.
CenterPoint reaffirms the necessity for One Call (Dial 811) programs to
have a prescriptive framework of core program requirements, ticket
scope/longevity, and excavator accountability. CenterPoint Energy's
exposure to multiple state programs provides us an opportunity to
attest that those programs with equal excavator accountability
typically experience lower rates of damage to pipelines.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Richard Leger
PHMSA Inspector Resources
Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
pipeline industry.
Quesstion 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
experts?
Answer. While AGA supports a properly staffed and capable regulator
in PHMSA, natural gas distribution pipeline operations in the United
States are primarily overseen by state-level pipeline safety programs,
and not directly by PHMSA inspectors. States account for about 75
percent of all pipeline safety inspectors in the country and, as state
regulated entities, natural gas utilities support appropriate staffing
of these state programs because they are critical partners in public
safety and energy infrastructure reliability.
Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
highly skilled employees?
Answer. AGA and AGA member utilities maintain a long-term positive,
productive and technically capable partnership with our Federal
pipeline safety partners at PHMSA. While we have very little insight on
the Federal government's ability to recruit and retain talent, we urge
Congress to provide PHMSA with the resources and personnel necessary to
provide effective pipeline safety oversight.
Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
provide increased funding for state inspectors?
Answer. As AGA members are primarily state regulated entities, AGA
and AGA members do not take a position on specific Federal funding for
state pipeline safety activities and personnel beyond ensuring that
combined state and Federal funding is sufficient for states to operate
successful safety programs.
With regard specifically to state excavation damage programs (i.e.,
Dial-811 or ``call before you dig'' programs), AGA believes it is
appropriate that Federal funding be contingent on the effectiveness of
those programs. 49 CFR Sec. 198 provides a reasonable framework for
conditioning grants to state pipeline safety programs. We believe
Congress should direct PHMSA to amend Part 198 to update State One Call
program requirements (Sec. 198.37), enhance damage prevention program
effectiveness criteria (Sec. 198.55), and require recipients of One
Call grants (Sec. 198.35) to implement the elements of effective One
Call programs identified in the 2023 AGA white paper Working with Other
Stakeholders to Advance Pipeline Safety in Damage Prevention. These
elements include:
1) Size/scope of One-Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
standard infrastructure locate requests (possible process
exceptions for special large project tickets)
2) Longevity of One Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
standard locate requests (possible process exceptions for
special Large Project Tickets)
3) Tolerance (hand-dig only) zone horizontal dimension requirements
4) Tolerance zone requirements
5) Emergency excavation notification requirements
6) Excavator responsibilities explained
7) Definitions of ``excavator''/''excavation''
8) White-lining requirements
9) Positive response requirements
10) Locatability of newly-installed underground facilities
11) Sewer line marking requirements
12) Effective, active, meaningful enforcement of state dig laws
13) Specific qualifications/requirements for excavators performing
trenchless excavation activities that are not subject to
pipeline construction requirements in 49 CFR 192/195
Legislative language that sought to codify these recommended
excavation damage prevention best practices was included in H.R. 6494,
the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023
(Section 18) and H.R. 7655, the Pipeline Safety, Modernization, and
Expansion Act of 2024 (Section 15), pipeline safety bills that passed
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and Energy and
Commerce Committees respectively, last Congress. In the 119th Congress,
we look forward to working with the Senate Commerce Committee, as well
as your House counterparts, to ensure that common sense and critical
excavation damage prevention provisions become law.
Criminalizing Pipeline Protests
As you testified at the hearing, you support criminal penalties for
the unauthorized turning of valves on pipelines, which can present a
safety risk. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
goes further than unauthorized valve turning and would sentence
individuals found to be ``disrupting or preventing the construction of
pipelines.''
Question 1. Do you think the Standing Rock protestors were
disrupting or preventing the construction of the Dakota Access
Pipeline?
Answer. The Dakota Access pipeline is an upstream pipeline that
transports crude oil. AGA member company natural gas utilities were not
involved in the planning or construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline
and do not receive any product from it currently. As such, we do not
have any relevant experience to share about how the pipeline was
planned and built and what impact any protests had on that process.
Question 2. Do you think that landowners and lawmakers fighting
eminent domain for new carbon pipelines in South Dakota are preventing
the construction of pipelines?
Answer. AGA member natural gas utilities do not plan, permit,
construct or operate CO2 pipelines. As such, we do not have
any relevant experience to share about how upstream oil and refined
product pipeline companies pursue building CO2 pipelines or
the related eminent domain challenges they may face as part of the
process.
Question 3. Do you support the Safe and Secure Transportation of
American Energy Act, which could easily be interpreted as criminalizing
protests and any other action that could be seen as disrupting or
preventing construction?
Answer. Broadly speaking, pipeline construction involves highly
technical and controlled activities. Uninterrupted and timely execution
of construction tasks is vital to ensuring the safe operation of a
pipeline, and requires skilled labor and appropriate worker
qualification, reliable operation of construction equipment and,
importantly, a safe and secure working environment. Disrupting or
interfering with this process can have grave consequences on worker and
public safety, both during construction and during future operations.
More specifically, the Safe and Secure Transportation of American
Energy Act has limited application to local natural gas utilities. In
short, the legislation, would increase criminal penalties on those who
knowingly and willfully damage, destroy, vandalize, tamper with,
disrupt or prevent the construction of or operation of interstate
pipelines or intrastate pipelines engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce. AGA member natural gas utilities do not operate interstate
natural gas pipelines and those intrastate gas pipelines our companies
do operate are intended to serve in-state natural gas utility
customers.
While the Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act has
limited applicability for natural gas utilities, AGA notes that
criminal attacks on natural gas utility property, equipment and
facilities continue to occur. These activities are not only hazardous
to public safety and utility company employees, they threaten an LDC's
ability to deliver natural gas to thousands of homes, government and
military facilities, and other critical infrastructure customers. AGA
supports increased criminal penalties on individuals who intentionally
damage, destroy or impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, or disrupt
their safe operation, including those under construction.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Richard Leger
Updating Aging Pipeline Infrastructure
The use of aging cast iron pipes presents a safety risk in the
transport of natural gas. You mention in your testimony that
CenterPoint is on track to eliminate cast iron and bare steel from its
system by the end of 2026.
Question 1. Can you expand on how CenterPoint has been able to make
progress modernizing its systems?
Answer. CenterPoint Energy uses probabilistic modeling to help
evaluate risk associated with different types of assets and assist with
prioritizing our modernization efforts. Using this risk-based approach,
we develop replacement programs with dedicated timelines and discuss
them with our regulators so they are aware of our intent and
prioritization of modernization of our system. Because these
replacement programs are capital-intensive and require upfront
investment by the utilities, having efficient rate recovery mechanisms
and constructive regulatory relationships support the ability of the
utilities to proactively modernize their systems.
Question 2. How can we ensure other companies modernize their
pipelines quickly and safely?
Answer. It would be ideal if states, counties and local
municipalities can respond in a timely fashion and grant permits to
utilities so that they can perform the work necessary in the public
right of way, with the least amount of disruption possible to the local
community. Additionally, effective rate recovery mechanisms can aid in
facilitating the replacement of legacy infrastructure such as cast iron
and bare steel pipelines.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Richard Leger
Incomplete Regulations:
Question 1. There are at least six incomplete congressionally
mandated regulations currently stalled at PHMSA, including on carbon
dioxide pipelines, leak detection and repair, and liquefied natural
gas. Do you think these rules--which you initially supported and, based
on your testimony, continue to support--should be finalized?
Answer. Generally speaking, AGA continues to believe that PHMSA
should work expeditiously to fulfill Congress's existing regulatory
mandates. Specifically, AGA and its members are looking forward to
continuing our work with PHMSA on finalizing a leak detection and
repair rule that is reasonable, technically feasible, and consistent
with the plain language and intent of Section 113 of the PIPES Act of
2020. Additionally, AGA members support PHMSA's efforts to finalize
critical updates to modernize 49 U.S.C. part 193, pertaining to
liquified natural gas. We note that PHMSA has recently issued an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding reforms to part 193
and we look forward to supporting PHMSA on this rulemaking process by
providing feedback that leads to a risk-based regulatory approach for
LNG facilities.
Staffing:
Question 2. PHMSA has long been an underfunded agency, with not
enough staff to properly ensure pipeline safety. Given the agency has
just over a few hundred employees, even small cuts can have a
significant impact. Given PHMSA's mission to protect people and the
environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
hazardous materials, do you support enforceable staffing requirements
for PHMSA to ensure the agency can keep communities safe?
Answer. As AGA members are primarily state regulated entities, AGA
does not take a position on specific PHMSA budgeting and personnel
matters beyond ensuring that combined state and Federal funding is
sufficient for states to operate successful pipeline safety programs.
While AGA supports a properly staffed and capable regulator in PHMSA,
natural gas distribution pipeline operations in the United States are
primarily overseen by state-level pipeline safety programs, and not
directly by PHMSA inspectors. States account for about 75 percent of
all pipeline safety inspectors in the country, and, as state regulated
entities, natural gas utilities support appropriate staffing of these
state programs because they are critical partners in helping keep our
infrastructure and our customers safe.
Criminalization:
Question 3. Under existing law, it is already a felony to damage or
destroy a pipeline. There are proposals to expand criminal penalties to
``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' a pipeline. Do you agree
``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' are too broad given the following
examples?
A: A local landowner who refuses to sell farmland, ranchland, or
private property to a pipeline company or opposes an eminent domain
action count
B: A concerned citizen speaking up at a local hearing in opposition
to a pipeline
C: An individual who writes an op-ed or posts on social media about
their opposition to a pipeline
D: A lawyer who files a lawsuit challenging a pipeline's permit or
zoning approval
E: A community member who reports environmental pollution or a
hazardous waste spill to local authorities
F: A pipeline employee who raises concerns about workplace safety
Answer. AGA respectfully suggests that the examples given reflect
common, constitutionally protected activities that landowners, impacted
citizens, and activists may engage in to oppose pipeline use and
pipeline construction. None of these examples directly disrupt or
prevent safe pipeline operations, including construction or
maintenance. Activities that physically damage pipelines or prevent
access to pipeline infrastructure or facilities can prevent gas
utilities from running safe pipeline construction and maintenance
operations and prevent operators from performing critical safety
functions such as leak detection and repair and emergency gas leak
response. Gas utilities operate 2.3 million miles of local distribution
pipelines providing service to more than 189 million Americans.
Physical disruption to the construction, operations, or maintenance of
pipelines or pipeline or pipeline facilities, may threaten the safety
of the public and pipeline workers, both at the time of the act and
during future operations.
Unfortunately, criminal attacks on natural gas utility property,
equipment, and facilities continue to occur. These activities are not
only hazardous to public safety and gas utility company employees, they
can also threaten natural gas local distribution companies' ability to
deliver natural gas to thousands of homes, government and military
facilities, and other critical infrastructure customers. AGA supports
increased criminal penalties on bad actors who intentionally damage,
destroy or impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, or disrupt their
safe operation, including those under construction.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Bill Caram
PHMSA Inspector Resources
Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
pipeline industry.
Question 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
experts?
Answer. PHMSA urgently needs to hire additional experts in several
areas across the agency, including inspectors, engineers, scientists,
and other professionals. First, as evidenced by the recent Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemakings, PHMSA is seeking stakeholder input on
cost of compliance to facilitate rulemaking efforts. PHMSA needs more
economists on the standards and rulemaking team to independently
produce this information. Relying on the industry it regulates to
provide this information, when they have a clear interest in the
results of the process, is problematic.
Second, PHMSA just experienced a talent drain because of Reductions
in Force efforts. We don't know the full impact yet, but we do know
that these reductions hit two areas particularly hard. One is the
Community Liaison program, PHMSA's public engagement department. Based
on PHMSA's website, this department went from 10 before the reductions
in force\1\ to three.\2\ The service area for these Community Liaisons
is the entire country and there are three people, including the Program
Manager. This dramatic reduction compromises PHMSA's ability to engage
with communities, particularly around incidents and emergency response.
Another area hit particularly hard is PHMSA leadership. Though not
officially announced, as far as we know, two of the top three leaders
at PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety have left. Other senior leaders
whose roles supported the Office of Pipeline Safety have also retired.
PHMSA needs to be hiring to backfill positions and develop future
leaders.
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\1\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2024-03/
PHP-Org-Chart-March-24-2024.pdf
\2\ https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/cats.htm
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Finally, Congress has incentivized a buildout of non-hydrocarbon
pipelines such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen. While some mileage of
these types of pipelines currently exists, they are relatively rare and
rural. These products possess unique properties and pose unique risks
compared to hydrocarbon pipelines and require specialists, including
engineers and scientists, to modernize regulations, drive productive
research and development, conduct effective inspections, and issue
meaningful enforcement.
Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
highly skilled employees?
Answer. Pipeline Safety Trust agrees that compensation is one of
the most important methods for retaining and attracting talented
employees. While compensation is crucial, PHMSA also faces competition
from industry in terms of career advancement opportunities and
resources. However, pay flexibility would be the most immediate and
impactful step Congress could take. We encourage Congress to authorize
the Secretary, in Section 60101 of title 49, the ability to establish
higher rates of pay for the employees of PHMSA. One way of achieving
this would be to mirror the language used in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2012 (Public Law 112-74, 125 Stat. 1012) for the
employees of the Department of the Interior in the applicable job
series described in the subsection. Additionally, Congress could carve
out flexibility for the administration such as allowing up to 30
percent, for example, above the rate of pay normally scheduled for the
applicable employee.
Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
provide increased funding for state inspectors?
Answer. State programs carry out inspections on more than 85
percent of the Nation's pipeline system. They are beyond critical to
pipeline safety. The last numbers we have (2023) show Federal funds
only reimbursing less than 55 percent of state program activities, even
though PHMSA has the authority to reimburse up to 80 percent.
Underfunded state programs can create inspection and enforcement gaps
that directly impact public safety. Congress has not authorized or
appropriated PHMSA enough resources to cover its fair share of state
program funding, and the program has not been fully appropriated.
However, last fall, Congress made a big step towards properly funding
these programs with a large increase in appropriations. Even with this
large increase, PHMSA will still fall short of meeting the 80 percent
target. On top of this, state programs are facing many of the same
issues that face PHMSA. Many states are seeing an expansion of
authority with gathering lines coming under regulations for the first
time and a potential buildout of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines.
State programs also face similar recruitment and retention issues with
the pipeline industry often offering employees more money. Congress
must provide more funding to state programs to make a meaningful
difference in pipeline safety.
[all]