    [Senate Hearing 119-145]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 119-145

                        PIPELINE SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION:
                    ENSURING THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT MOVEMENT
                               OF AMERICAN ENERGY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION,
                         FREIGHT, PIPELINES, AND SAFETY

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 15, 2025

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    61-428 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2025

           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                           TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman

    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
    ROGER WICKER, Mississippi                Ranking
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          GARY PETERS, Michigan
    TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    TED BUDD, North Carolina             TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
    JOHN CURTIS, Utah                    BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
    BERNIE MORENO, Ohio                  JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
    TIM SHEEHY, Montana                  JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  ANDY KIM, New Jersey
    CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming              LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware

                     Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
               Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                         Liam McKenna, General Counsel
                       Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
                     Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
                         Jonathan Hale, General Counsel

                                     ------

     SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION, FREIGHT, PIPELINES, AND SAFETY

    TODD YOUNG, Indiana, Chairman        GARY PETERS, Michigan, Ranking
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    ROGER WICKER, Mississippi            BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri               BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
    BERNIE MORENO, Ohio                  ANDY KIM, New Jersey
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on May 15, 2025.....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Young.......................................     1
    Statement of Senator Peters......................................     2
    Statement of Senator Cruz........................................    29
    Statement of Senator Lujan.......................................    37
    Statement of Senator Moreno......................................    40
    Statement of Senator Markey......................................    42
    Statement of Senator Fischer.....................................    44
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    45

                                   Witnesses

    Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream Policy, American
      Petroleum Institute............................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     6
    Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid
      Energy Pipeline Association....................................     0
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
    Richard Leger, Senior Vice President, Natural Gas Business,
      CenterPoint Energy, on behalf of the American Gas Association..    14
        Prepared statement...........................................    16
    Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust............    19
        Prepared statement...........................................    20

                                    Appendix

    Letter dated May 13, 2025 to Chairman Todd Young and Ranking
      Member Gary Peters from GPA Midstream Association..............    51
    Letter dated May 19, 2025 to Chairman Todd Young and Ranking
      Member Gary Peters from Alex Etchen, Vice President, Government
      Relations, Associated General Contractors of America...........    52
    Response to written questions submitted to Robin Rorick by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    53
        Hon. Edward Markey...........................................    55
    Response to written questions submitted to Andrew J. Black by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    56
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    57
        Hon. Edward Markey...........................................    57
    Response to written questions submitted to Richard Leger by:
        Hon. Todd Young..............................................    58
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    59
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    61
        Hon. Edward Markey...........................................    62
    Response to written questions submitted to Bill Caram by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    63

                        PIPELINE SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION:
                    ENSURING THE SAFE AND EFFICIENT MOVEMENT
                               OF AMERICAN ENERGY

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025

                                   U.S. Senate,
      Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Freight,
                                 Pipelines, and Safety,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Todd Young,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Young [presiding], Cruz, Fischer, Moreno,
    Peters, Cantwell, Markey, and Lujan.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

        Senator Young. Good morning, everyone. I want to welcome
    everyone to today's pipeline safety hearing where we will be
    examining ways to increase the safe and efficient movement of
    American energy.
        This is our first subcommittee hearing and it is great to
    be with my colleague Senator Peters. We have worked
    constructively on so many projects and I think this is such an
    important one.
        So I am especially appreciative of our witnesses today so
    that you can help educate us on this important topic.
        Nearly 3.3 million miles of pipelines traverse our country,
    bringing essential resources to communities to ensure Americans
    receive basic needs, needs like heat and electricity, and to
    drive economic activity and create the jobs we all care about.
        While this infrastructure is vital to the success of the
    American people, our economy, and our national security, there
    are some inherent risks tied to such a vast ecosystem of
    pipeline networks.
        At the end of last year in Whiting, Indiana, a pipeline
    leak within the BP tank field occurred, generating concerns
    from many in the community. While the repercussions were
    limited, largely, thanks to the quick work of emergency
    responders and talented technicians, not every leak has
    similarly fortunate outcomes.
        Pipelines are the safest and the most efficient way to
    transport materials and the operators are, obviously,
    incentivized to keep the resources within the pipes.
        That being said, these instances should serve as a stark
    reminder that we must remain vigilant in our efforts to uphold
    the highest level of safety standards for our Nation's pipeline
    network and secure the American people's trust in the operation
    of this critical infrastructure.
        Our subcommittee plays a vital role in this work, which is
    why we are here today examining the need to secure the safety
    and resiliency of our pipeline infrastructure.
        I am hopeful this hearing will shine a light on areas
    Congress should focus on as we look to reauthorize and,
    hopefully, improve upon existing pipeline safety laws, whether
    that is an examination of outstanding rulemakings, prohibitive
    processes and red tape for preventing advancements in industry,
    or inefficient tools for law enforcement to hold malicious
    actors accountable when they seek to harm our Nation.
        I am also hopeful that we can use this hearing to learn how
    emerging technologies can play a role in mitigating and
    preventing risks to pipeline infrastructure.
        For example, how might artificial intelligence be used to
    best detect areas of pipeline infrastructure that should be
    inspected after severe weather or shifts in environmental
    conditions like landslides or earthquakes, or where extensive
    strain or shifts in pressure have occurred?
        We do not know what incident may knock on our door next,
    but I believe investing in our country's ability to research
    and develop the next innovative application of technology or
    new technologies themselves will arm us with the tools to keep
    our pipelines and infrastructure safe.
        And we should be fostering an environment that allows
    industry to explore different means to keep pipelines safe.
    Indiana has been at the forefront of adopting innovative
    monitoring technologies and fostering partnerships between
    relevant parties to enhance safety and preparedness.
        But we need to ensure our country across the board can look
    forward and innovate new solutions to increase safety, too.
        So thank you again to our witnesses for your expertise and
    willingness to contribute to this dialog. I now recognize the
    Ranking Member, Mr. Peters.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

        Senator Peters. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Young,
    and certainly appreciate the opportunity to work with you again
    on other issues and I look forward to working on this one
    because it is particularly important, and that is why I want to
    thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
        And I can say for sure that this is an issue that hits home
    very directly for my state. In Michigan we understand all too
    well the lasting damage an oil spill can cause.
        In 2010 a pipeline ruptured in Marshall, releasing over 1
    million gallons of oil into the Kalamazoo River. This was the
    largest inland oil spill in the United States' history and it
    took years as well as over $1 billion to clean up.
        As many of you know, Michigan is also home to Enbridge Line
    5, a 70-year-old oil and gas pipeline that crosses through the
    Great Lakes.
        The Great Lakes is a source of drinking water for over 40
    million people and that line underneath the Straits of Mackinac
    is particularly concerning.
        In fact, a pipeline failure there would be nothing short of
    catastrophic. The University of Michigan experts have actually
    identified the Straits of Mackinac as the single worst place
    for an oil spill in the entire Great Lakes basin and,
    unfortunately, we have had some very close calls in the past.
        In 2014, Enbridge found gaps in the protective coating on a
    segment of the pipeline underneath the Straits. In 2018, the
    pipeline was badly damaged by a boat anchor that was dragged
    along the lake bottom, resulting in three gouges to the
    pipeline.
        And in 2020 Enbridge discovered that a Line 5 anchor
    support had been mangled and that the pipeline had physically
    shifted, and that part of its protective coating had been
    completely removed, exposing bare metal.
        In the midst of these incidents, in 2017 the then
    Commandant of the Coast Guard told me flat out at a hearing
    when I asked him the question--he told me flat out that the
    agency was not prepared for an oil spill in the Great Lakes and
    that more research was needed to improve our response.
        That is when I led efforts to establish the Great Lakes
    Center of Expertise. The Center of Expertise will conduct
    research and develop responses to ensure that we are prepared
    to quickly and effectively address an oil spill in the Great
    Lakes.
        But rather than having to utilize the Center's knowledge
    during a worst case scenario, I would certainly rather have a
    situation where we never have to deal with a spill in the first
    place and never have to respond to a Line 5 incident or another
    case like we saw in the Kalamazoo River.
        Simply put, we need standards. We need standards in place
    to ensure that these sorts of events never happen, and while
    pipelines are a widely adopted mode of transporting hazardous
    materials there are still safety concerns associated with their
    use.
        Over the past 20 years the pipeline incidents have caused
    257 deaths, over 1,000 injuries, and over $11 billion in
    damages.
        That is to say we still have a heck of a lot of work to do
    when it comes to safety, because I do not think you will find
    too many folks in Michigan that hear those numbers that in any
    way think we are at mission accomplished.
        They certainly want to make sure that their families and
    communities will be safe in the future, and that is why I hope
    we will all keep on top of mind during this hearing and
    throughout the pipeline safety reauthorization process that
    safety is always paramount and as such there can be no
    backsliding on safety in any reauthorization bill that we put
    forward.
        I look forward to working with Chairman Young as I have
    over the last few years. I look forward to working with our
    witnesses that are here today, PHMSA, our state agencies, and
    other stakeholders to make sure that this pipeline safety
    reauthorization effort is better and it better protects
    Michigan, our Great Lakes, as well as the Nation as a whole,
    and I am certainly very optimistic we can do that.
        I yield back.
        Senator Young. Well, thank you again, Senator Peters, for
    your leadership on this issue.
        I am going to go ahead and introduce briefly each of our
    witnesses and then ask you to make your opening statements.
        They are in order Mr. Robin Rorick, Vice President of
    Midstream Policy, the American Petroleum Institute; Mr. Andrew
    J. Black, President and CEO of Liquid Energy Pipeline
    Association; Mr. Richard Leger--how do you say it, sir?
        Mr. Richard--that was my second choice. Mr. Richard Leger,
    Senior Vice President of Natural Gas Business, CenterPoint
    Energy on behalf of the American Gas Association. Thank you,
    sir.
        And Mr. Bill Caram. Caram?
        Mr. Caram. Caram. You got it.
        Senator Young. Yes. OK. Executive Director of Pipeline
    Safety Trust. Thank you, sir.
        So I recognize Mr. Robin Rorick for your opening statement.
    Five minutes, sir.

    STATEMENT OF ROBIN RORICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF MIDSTREAM POLICY,
                      AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

        Mr. Rorick. Thank you.
        Chairman Young, Ranking Member Peters, members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation today.
        My name is Robin Rorick and I am Vice President of
    Midstream Policy at the American Petroleum Institute. API
    represents all segments of America's oil and natural gas
    industry, from integrated global companies to independent
    producers, supporting 11 million jobs across all 50 states.
        Pipelines make it possible to safely deliver the affordable
    energy our families, businesses, and economy rely on day and
    night.
        With over 3 million miles of pipelines crisscrossing
    America, the safe and reliable transport of oil and natural gas
    is essential not just to America's economy but to our national
    security.
        Pipelines operators know safety must always come first. Our
    goal is clear, zero incidents, and we are making progress.
    Recent data from PHMSA confirms this.
        Between 2020 and 2024 liquid pipeline incidents affecting
    people or the environment dropped 13 percent. Incident rates
    per million barrels delivered fell by 33 percent since 2019
    even as mileage and delivery volumes increased.
        Similarly, natural gas transmission incidents have declined
    23 percent since 2020. These results did not happen by chance.
        A regulatory foundation coupled with the adoption and
    continual updating of API's industry safety standards has
    played a major role in this continuous improvement across the
    industry.
        In fact, API has developed more than 800 standards, many of
    which are used globally to improve pipeline safety and
    environmental protection. But to fully leverage their benefits
    PHMSA must routinely and efficiently incorporate updated
    standards into Federal regulations.
        Currently, approximately half of API standards cited in
    PHMSA rules are outdated. Congress should direct PHMSA to
    commit to reviewing and updating its references to standards
    every 3 years.
        If an updated standard is not adopted the agency should
    publicly explain why to provide clarity on its perspective and
    help industry determine a path forward to ideally avoid
    conflict between the standard and the regulation.
        More broadly, we appreciate PHMSA's recent efforts toward
    regulatory reform, in particular the agency's consideration of
    updating and modernizing repair criteria for hazardous liquid
    and natural gas pipelines and allowing for the use of risk-
    based inspections for PHMSA regulated breakout tanks.
        But Congress can help accelerate further safety
    improvements on multiple fronts. First, Congress should direct
    PHMSA to update pipeline operating statuses.
        Today, pipelines are categorized only as active or
    abandoned. We need an official status for idle pipelines
    clearly defined using API's Recommended Practice 1181.
        This common sense update would allow pipeline operators to
    safely pause certain activities when risk levels are lower,
    aligning regulation with real world operational needs.
        We also see significant room to standardize the damage
    prevention processes across the country by incorporating
    leading industry practices, reducing exemptions, and improving
    enforcement.
        There are also opportunities to streamline the regulatory
    process itself, especially in PHMSA's pipeline inspection
    program. Currently, operators often undergo repetitive
    inspections by multiple Federal, state, and community
    authorities reviewing the same procedures.
        These redundant efforts consume valuable time and resources
    which could be better directed toward safety improvements. API
    supports an independent evaluation of PHMSA's inspection
    processes to identify ways to streamline inspections, improve
    collaboration, and maintain a laser focus on achieving safety
    outcomes.
        Beyond these priorities, several complementary regulatory
    improvements would enhance pipeline safety and operations such
    as reforming PHMSA's special permit process, strengthening
    criminal penalties for vandalism, clarifying jurisdictional
    overlaps for implant piping, and ensuring responsible right-of-
    way maintenance through conservation and habitat management
    programs.
        In closing, I want to stress that America leads the world
    in oil and natural gas production and pipelines are central to
    this success. The improvements we have seen in pipeline safety
    are significant but our industry remains committed to doing
    even more.
        As Congress works to reauthorize PHMSA, API urges the
    adoption of smart updated references to standards in the
    regulations, completion of overdue rulemakings, and
    streamlining inspections. These steps will help America safely
    meet growing energy demands and demonstrate leadership to the
    world.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
    forward to your questions and your continued bipartisan work to
    advance pipeline safety and elevate American energy leadership.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rorick follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Robin Rorick, Vice President, Midstream Policy,
                          American Petroleum Institute
    Introduction
        Chairman Young, Ranking Member Peters and esteemed members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. My
    name is Robin Rorick, and I am the Vice President of Midstream Policy
    at the American Petroleum Institute (API). On behalf of API, I am
    honored to have this opportunity to submit testimony as part of this
    important hearing on pipeline safety and the reauthorization of the
    Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Administration (PHMSA).
        API is a national trade association representing all segments of
    America's oil and natural gas industry. From large integrated companies
    to small independent operators, 11 million hardworking men and women
    across all 50 states provide and support the energy that powers every
    district in this Nation.\1\ API has developed more than 800 standards
    that enhance operational safety, environmental protection and
    sustainability across 140 countries. Promoting technological,
    environmental and regulatory innovations is a driving force for API and
    our industry to ensure we have safe, reliable and affordable energy
    that tens of millions of families and businesses need to survive and
    thrive, today and well into the future.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ PwC for API, ``Impacts of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry on
    the U.S. Economy in 2021,'' available at: https://www.api.org/-/media/
    Files/Policy/American-Energy/PwC/2023/API-PWC-Economic-Impact-Report-
    2023.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The U.S. remains the world's leader in oil and natural gas
    production, providing immense benefits not only to our citizens here in
    the U.S. but also to our allies across the world. Pipelines make these
    capabilities a reality, and they play a critical role in achieving the
    goals of energy dominance and energy security. Our nation's network of
    over 500,000 miles of oil, petroleum products and natural gas
    transmission pipelines transport the energy we rely on every day to
    fuel modern life. As one of the safest, most environmentally
    responsible ways to transport energy to families and businesses,
    pipelines are in every U.S. state and total over 13 million miles
    across the country. They reliably connect areas of production with
    refineries and processing centers, and ultimately with airports,
    manufacturers, gas stations, farms, businesses and homes.
    Pipeline Safety Improvements
        The pipeline industry is committed to safety and continuous
    improvement, which includes maintaining a standard of operational
    excellence through comprehensive safety management systems, pipeline
    design and construction standards and specifications, and robust safety
    programs such as integrity management and geohazard mitigation. Data
    from PHMSA illustrates that this daily commitment is showing results.
    Both total liquid pipeline incidents as well as those impacting people
    or the environment decreased 13 percent between 2020 and 2024.\2\
    Looking further, integrity management incidents for liquid pipelines
    dropped 33 percent, and operations and maintenance incidents declined
    22 percent within this time. These safety improvements come as the
    industry operated 3,000 more miles of liquid pipeline and delivered
    over 15 percent more barrels of liquids between 2019 and 2023, the most
    recent year this data is available. In fact, the rate of total
    incidents per million barrels of energy delivered has fallen 33 percent
    since 2019, showing that liquid pipelines are getting safer while
    meeting increasing energy demand. Natural gas transmission lines are
    showing similar safety improvements, with incidents down 23 percent
    between 2020 and 2024.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``2024 Pipeline Performance Report & 2023-2025 Pipeline
    Excellence Strategic Plan,'' available at API/LEPA 2024 Performance
    Report
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While we are proud of this progress, pipeline operators recognize
    the need to remain vigilant in continuous improvement. Our industry
    continues to voluntarily implement safety management systems and
    reinforce safety culture through a comprehensive framework to manage
    risk. It has undertaken initiatives to mitigate pipeline corrosion,
    improve leak detection tools and technologies, prevent cyberattacks,
    promote sustainable operations using conservation programs and advocate
    for risk-based tank inspections--capitalizing on the use of the latest
    industry standards and advanced technologies. Following the publication
    of a first-of-its-kind industry standard on public engagement,
    Recommended Practice (RP) 1185, pipeline operators are actively working
    on implementation, fostering meaningful, two-way communication and
    trust-building within the communities where we work and live.
    Additionally, with the expected growth in the construction of carbon
    dioxide (CO2) pipelines, we are working on maximizing the
    safe transportation of CO2 by pipeline through the
    publication of a new RP for transportation of CO2 by
    pipeline this year.
        As part of our efforts to promote pipeline safety improvements, API
    has responded to a recent U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
    Request for Information (RFI) seeking comments to assist DOT in
    identifying existing regulations, guidance, paperwork requirements or
    other regulatory obligations that could be modified or repealed to
    improve pipeline safety and eliminate unnecessary burdens. In our
    response to the RFI, which was jointly filed with the Liquid Energy
    Pipeline Association, we identified numerous opportunities for updating
    outdated and inefficient regulations that should reflect the current
    state of technology, engineering science and advanced analytical tools,
    focus resources on the highest risk items and support a performance-
    based approach to managing pipeline safety. PHMSA has stated that the
    Administration plans to issue an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
    (ANPRM) to gather information in support of a planned future rulemaking
    to modernize pipeline repair requirements for liquids and natural gas
    pipelines to improve safety and efficiency, and API plans to submit a
    response to the ANPRM as well.
        Energy demand is growing, placing this industry at an inflection
    point. The reshoring of advanced manufacturing in the U.S., coupled
    with the installation and operations of data centers and energy
    consumption from artificial intelligence utilization, will only
    increase demand. Our industry continues to work with federal, state and
    local policymakers and regulators to protect the environment and
    communities where we live and work. We welcome this opportunity to
    demonstrate American energy leadership, building off the progress we
    have already achieved, to meet ever-increasing demand using smart,
    predictable and commonsense energy policies.
    API Supports PHMSA Reauthorization
    Recognizing the Importance of Standards
        As Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and pipeline
    safety programs, we encourage policymakers to enact legislation that
    maximizes our industry's investments in people and technology to
    effectively advance pipeline safety. We support comprehensive,
    bipartisan efforts to help make our Nation's pipeline network safer as
    it provides reliable energy supply to every community in America. It is
    thus imperative that the regulatory environment remains cognizant of
    and responsive to both current and potential future safety challenges
    faced by operators.
        API supports timely and more frequent updates for industry
    standards that are incorporated by reference into PHMSA regulations.
    Since 1924, API has been the leader in developing voluntary, consensus-
    based, internationally recognized standards covering all segments of
    the oil and natural gas industry. Our standards are the most widely
    cited petroleum industry standards by state regulators, with 240 API
    standards cited over 3,800 times in state-based regulations. There are
    more than 650 references to API standards in Federal regulations and
    more than 1,300 international references.\3\ These standards are
    reviewed at least every five years through API's American National
    Standards Institute-accredited process and revised and improved as part
    of industry's continuous learning culture when improvement or
    advancements, such as in technology and innovation, are warranted.
    However, regulators struggle to keep pace with the advances in pipeline
    safety technology and modern engineering practices that are regularly
    incorporated into these standards; approximately 50 percent of the
    instances where PHMSA cites API standards in its regulations remain out
    of date and do not reference the most recent edition. As a result,
    critical safety regulations may fail to reflect advances in safety,
    technology and engineering, forcing operators to comply with often
    antiquated practices. Instead, Congress should direct PHMSA to review
    standards that have been incorporated by reference every three years on
    a routine basis through the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) and
    Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee (LPAC) process to determine if
    updates are needed. If PHMSA chooses to ignore an updated standard and
    proceed without an update, PHMSA should publish an explanation of this
    decision on the agency's website.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ OGP Report No. 426, Regulators' Use of Standards, March 2010 &
    ``Participate in API Standards Development'', available at https://
    www.api.org/-/media/apiwebsite/products-and-services/2025_intnl-
    usage_report_web-final.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Similarly, PHMSA should allow operators to base breakout tank
    inspection frequency on risk modeling as outlined by the 5th edition of
    API Standard 653. Operators are investing in the latest tank coatings
    and liners, applying advanced materials engineering principles to
    reduce the risk of leaks and utilizing drone and robotics capabilities
    to improve tank inspection effectiveness. Yet, PHMSA has not adapted to
    encourage innovation and future investment by incorporating the latest
    version of this standard, instead requiring unnecessary inspections and
    failing to prioritize safety. Directing PHMSA to update its regulations
    concerning tank inspections will maintain the current safety level
    while minimizing occupational safety risks and environmental impacts
    associated with breakout tank inspections.
    Completing Outstanding Rulemakings
        API applauds PHMSA's efforts to date to advance regulatory reform
    and consider rulemakings that recognize the important role that leading
    industry practices, innovation and technology play in advancing safety.
    API also supports PHMSA's recent submission of an advanced notice of
    proposed rulemaking on modernizing repair criteria to the Office of
    Management and Budget and planned publication of a rulemaking on class
    location, both reflecting their commitment to updating outdated and
    overly prescriptive regulations. Even so, API welcomes this
    subcommittee's role in facilitating PHMSA action on other important
    rulemakings. Congress should direct PHMSA to initiate a rulemaking on
    pipeline operating status that would incorporate the 1st edition of API
    RP 1181, Pipeline Operational Status Determination, an outstanding
    mandate from the PIPES Act of 2020. A rulemaking is necessary to create
    a new operating status for pipelines that are ``idled,'' in addition to
    the ``active'' and ``abandoned'' status currently recognized by the
    agency. PHMSA should specify which operations and maintenance
    activities an operator can defer to maintain safety while accounting
    for the lower risk posed by ``idled'' pipelines, consistent with the
    agency's 2016 Advisory Bulletin.
        Additionally, we invite Congressional direction to PHMSA to update
    existing pipeline safety regulations for CO2 transportation
    by pipeline (49 CFR Part 195). Current regulations cover the design,
    construction and operations of supercritical CO2 pipelines,
    but there remains a gap in gas-phase CO2 transportation by
    pipeline, and there are recognized opportunities for improving the
    current regulations. PHMSA recently published a draft version of a
    notice of proposed rulemaking to improve existing pipeline safety
    regulations for the transportation of CO2 by pipeline which
    was withdrawn as part of the Trump administration regulatory freeze. We
    encourage this subcommittee to support moving this proposed rulemaking
    forward as the development of CO2 pipeline infrastructure is
    an important element of API member companies' commitment to emission
    reduction and environmental performance while maximizing oil recovery.
    API expects to publish an industry consensus standard on the
    transportation of CO2 by pipeline, which could be
    incorporated into PHMSA regulation by reference and provide a framework
    for safe transportation of CO2 by pipeline.
    Other Critical Provisions for Consideration
        There are other areas that we believe the subcommittee should
    evaluate for consideration during reauthorization, including criminal
    penalties for vandalism, attacks on construction sites and other
    activities that disrupt service, inspection protocols and
    jurisdictional issues. Current law only allows for penalties for
    ``damaging or destroying'' interstate pipelines, and new legislation
    could better protect critical facilities and deter criminal behavior
    that poses a safety hazard to people and the environment. Legislation
    should also codify operators' ability to maintain rights-of-way using
    conservation, habitat management and other related programs, enhancing
    pipeline safety while benefiting local communities and the environment.
        Multiple repetitive and often redundant inspections are conducted
    by PHMSA regional offices, state regulatory agencies, and local
    authorities, all evaluating the same set of company procedures and
    programs. Having a process for better coordination among regulators
    could improve efficiency for the regulatory agencies themselves while
    also allowing operators to focus finite resources on improving safety
    programs rather than repeatedly reviewing them. API supports PHMSA
    undergoing an independent evaluation of its inspection programs and
    streamlining of its special permit process to identify opportunities
    for improved collaboration to reduce inefficiency, maximize resources
    and reduce delays in permit issuance.
        API also encourages this subcommittee to clarify jurisdiction and
    improve multi-agency jurisdiction. Short segments of pipeline within
    gas processing and refining facilities, known as ``in-plant'' piping,
    may cross a street or railroad in the public domain to transfer
    products from one process unit of a refinery to another. While the
    Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates liquid
    in-plant piping, there is regulatory uncertainty for its gas
    counterparts. These gas lines, often in the same right-of-way as liquid
    lines, can lead to jurisdictional overlaps, uncertainty, and disputes,
    requiring subcommittee action to address them the same way as liquid
    pipes and to clarify OSHA's jurisdiction. Additionally, Congress should
    clarify regulatory jurisdiction over liquified natural gas facilities.
    A joint memorandum of understanding and recurring working group between
    PHMSA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Coast
    Guard would improve multi-agency coordination and minimize duplicative
    regulatory oversight to maintain American energy dominance, both here
    at home as well as for our allies abroad.
    Safely Demonstrating American Energy Leadership
        As the world leader in both oil and natural gas production as well
    as emissions reductions, America is demonstrating energy leadership
    every day. For our country to continue this leadership and achieve the
    goal of energy dominance, Congress should consider policies that
    capitalize on the power of America's oil, natural gas and other
    resources in the reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act. Fit-for-
    purpose regulations based on facts and backed by sound science and
    engineering principles have enabled our country's record-breaking
    production and emissions reductions through the transportation of
    energy in one of the safest and most environmentally responsible modes
    possible. The provisions offered today through this testimony will
    maximize our investment in state-of-the-art technology and sustainable
    operations while recognizing the important role our communities play in
    advancing safety.
        While operators are proud of their safety record, we remain
    committed to continuous safety improvement. Pipeline safety is not a
    partisan issue, and API remains eager to partner with Federal and state
    legislators and policymakers to help ensure pipelines are regulated
    effectively, efficiently and operated safely. Importantly, though, any
    regulations must be balanced to ensure that the industry can achieve
    these objectives while continuing to bring affordable, reliable energy
    to American families and businesses. To that end, API has responded to
    DOT's request for information on modernizing the regulatory framework
    and looks forward to continuing our engagement with PHMSA and
    congressional staff on promoting regulatory reform. Only with an
    effective Pipeline Safety Act and regulatory approach can our industry
    meet the dual challenge of answering the growth in energy demand while
    improving safety and environmental protection.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for this hearing to discuss industry's pipeline
    safety efforts and priorities moving forward. I look forward to the
    continued bipartisan efforts to pass a comprehensive Pipeline Safety
    Act and working together with all of you to demonstrate American energy
    leadership and dominance for years to come.

        Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Rorick.
        Mr. Black, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                STATEMENT OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT

                      AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

                   LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIATION

        Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
        I am Andy Black, President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
    Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and
    operators delivering transportation fuels like gasoline,
    diesel, jet fuel, transportation feed stocks like crude oil,
    home heating fuels like propane and heating oil, industrial
    feed stocks like ethane and butane, and low-carbon solutions
    like renewable diesel, LP gas, and carbon dioxide.
        We have over 50 member companies delivering over 20 billion
    barrels annually across a nearly 230,000-mile network of
    pipelines.
        The states of every member of this subcommittee play a role
    in delivering, by pipeline, the energy Americans need and want.
        Pipelines deliver energy from where it is produced,
    especially in states like Alaska, Texas, New Mexico, to where
    that energy is turned into useful products like refineries in
    Michigan, Texas, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Illinois, and New
    Jersey.
        Different liquid pipelines then carry those refined
    products to local regions across America, pipelines serving
    America across states like South Dakota, Nebraska, and
    Missouri.
        Even if energy products travel those last miles by truck or
    ship to states like West Virginia, Hawaii, or Massachusetts,
    that energy had to travel at least some point on a pipeline.
        Indiana, the Subcommittee Chair's home state, is a terrific
    example of the importance of pipelines. As a crossroads for
    America, Indiana is also a crossroads of pipelines.
        Crude oil pipelines cross Indiana to deliver to refineries
    in Gary, Mount Vernon, in neighboring Ohio and Michigan.
    Refined products pipelines deliver gasoline, diesel, and jet
    fuel from these refineries to major population centers across
    Indiana.
        Natural gas liquids pipelines deliver propane from as far
    away as Texas to homes across rural Indiana and elsewhere.
    Pipeline-delivered propane is also vital to the farmers of
    Indiana and other states, drying crops after harvest and
    keeping barns warm in the winter.
        As this committee considers the role of pipeline
    infrastructure and what changes to make to Federal pipeline
    safety laws it is important to recognize that pipelines are the
    safest way to deliver energy.
        More than 99.999 percent of crude oil and petroleum
    products delivered by pipeline reaches its destination safely.
        A report prepared for Congress by PHMSA analyzing 10 years
    of incident data found that pipelines were 13 times safer than
    both trains and trucks with pipelines experiencing only one
    incident for every 720 million gallons delivered.
        An Obama administration analysis found that rejecting a
    major pipeline and shipping the same crude oil by rail would
    increase the risk of oil release by over 800 times and a barrel
    is released by 2.6 times.
        Current PHMSA pipeline incident statistics also show that
    pipeline safety is improving. According to publicly available
    PHMSA data, total liquid pipeline incidents are down 13 percent
    over the last 5 years and liquid pipeline incidents impacting
    people or the environment are also down 13 percent over the
    last 5 years.
        Declining pipeline incidents over the last 5 years supports
    a measured approach to reauthorizing pipeline safety laws
    without major changes or new mandates.
        LEPA believes Congress can do more to help modernize
    pipeline safety programs. Key parts of PHMSA's safety
    regulations are over 20 years old and do not reflect the latest
    advances in safety technology or know-how.
        LEPA recognizes that America is blessed with an abundance
    of energy. Smart pipeline policies will promote pipeline energy
    infrastructure needed to deliver American energy dominance.
        LEPA believes Congress can help PHMSA increase the
    effectiveness and transparency of its pipeline safety programs
    and requirements.
        We welcome the Committee's interest in pipeline safety
    reauthorization. My written testimony details the many
    provisions LEPA supports. I will name five.
        Number one, reforming PHMSA's special permit program.
        Number two, strengthening penalties for pipeline safety
    violations that impair operation of facilities or damage
    construction sites.
        Number three, establish inspection and maintenance required
    for idled pipelines after Congress directed PHMSA to do so and
    it did not.
        Number four, reauthorize, this time without extraneous
    conditions, a PHMSA technology demonstration pilot program to
    restore the will of Congress and harness the latest high-tech
    inspection technologies without bureaucratic red tape.
        And number five, allow risk-based inspections of in-service
    breakout tanks to reduce worker safety threats, avoid air
    pollutant emissions, minimize unnecessary greenhouse gas
    emissions, and prevent creation of hazardous waste, conforming
    PHMSA's regulations with that of EPA.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
    today on the benefits of pipelines including their safety.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
                  Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association
        Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee.
    My name is Andy Black and I am President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
    Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators
    delivering transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel,
    transportation feedstocks like crude oil, home heating fuels like
    propane and home heating oil, industrial feedstocks like ethane and
    butane, and low carbon solutions like renewable diesel, liquified
    petroleum gas and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member companies
    delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across a nearly a 230,000-
    mile network of pipelines.
        Thank you for holding this hearing today and highlighting the vital
    role this Committee has promoting the infrastructure that leads to
    American prosperity. Liquid energy pipelines deliver transportation
    fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel that families, commuters,
    businesses and travelers use to drive and fly where they need to go.
    Pipelines deliver transportation fuel feedstocks like crude oil and
    industrial feedstocks like ethane, propane and butane to make
    everything from plastics to pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, paints and
    fabrics. Rural home heating and agricultural fuels like propane
    delivered regionally by pipeline before traveling locally by truck heat
    rural homes and farms, dry crops after harvest, and keep livestock
    barns warm throughout the winter.
        Every constituent of every member of this Subcommittee in some way
    depends on pipelines to meet the needs of their daily lives. From
    Alaska to Mississippi, from Massachusetts to New Mexico, even in
    Hawaii, Americans benefit from pipeline delivered energy. Pipelines
    deliver energy from where it is produced, especially in states like
    Alaska, Texas and New Mexico, to where that energy is turned into
    useful products, like refineries in Texas, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio,
    Illinois and New Jersey. Different liquids pipelines then carry those
    refined products to local regions across America. Pipelines serving
    America cross states like South Dakota, Nebraska, Missouri. Even if
    energy products travel those last miles by truck or ship to states like
    West Virginia, Hawaii or Massachusetts, that energy had to travel at
    some point on a pipeline.
        Indiana, the Subcommittee Chair's home state, is a terrific example
    of the importance of pipelines. As a crossroads for America, Indiana is
    also a crossroads of pipelines. Crude oil pipelines cross Indiana to
    deliver to refineries in Gary, Mt Vernon and neighboring Ohio and
    Michigan. Refined products pipelines deliver gasoline, diesel and jet
    fuel from these refineries to major population areas across Indiana.
    Natural gas liquids pipelines deliver propane from as far away as Texas
    to homes across rural Indiana. Pipeline delivered propane is also vital
    to the farmers of Indiana keeping barns warm in the winter and drying
    crops after harvest. LEPA member companies operating pipelines in
    Indiana include BP, Buckeye, Citgo, Enbridge, Enterprise, Explorer,
    Flint Hills, Marathon, Kinder Morgan, Energy Transfer, Tallgrass,
    Valero and Wolverine (click on map image for link to view file).

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        When thinking about energy, the American people, including those in
    Indiana, tell us what they care most about is safety, followed by
    affordability and reliability. Each year, LEPA commissions a nationwide
    poll of public sentiment on energy and pipelines. The American public's
    preference for safe energy supports this Committee's work to
    reauthorize Federal pipeline safety law.
        As the Committee considers the role of pipeline infrastructure and
    what changes to make to Federal pipeline safety laws, it is important
    to remember pipelines are the safest way to deliver energy. More than
    99.999 percent of crude oil and petroleum products delivered by
    pipeline reaches its destination safely.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        A 2018 report prepared for Congress by PHMSA analyzing 10 years of
    incident data found pipelines were 13 times safer than both trains and
    trucks with pipelines experiencing 1 incident for every 720 million
    gallons delivered and rail incidents occurring every 50 million gallons
    delivered. An Obama administration analysis found rejecting a major
    pipeline and shipping the same crude oil by rail would increase the
    risk of oil release by over 800 times and barrels released by 2.6
    times.
        Current PHMSA pipeline incident statistics also show pipeline
    safety is improving. Federal law and regulations require operators to
    report pipeline incident data to PHMSA. Full year data for 2024 is now
    available, which allows us to examine current trends in pipeline
    safety.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        According to publicly available PHMSA data, total liquids pipeline
    incidents are down 13 percent over the last 5 years. Liquids pipeline
    incidents Impacting People or the Environment (IPE) are also down 13
    percent over the last 5 years. When comparing incidents to volume
    delivered, the decrease is even more striking, with liquids pipeline
    incidents per barrel delivered down 33 percent over the preceding 5
    years. Or put another way, liquids pipeline incidents are decreasing at
    the same time America's pipelines are delivering more and more energy.
        These safety metrics are available in a new report, the API-LEPA
    2024 Pipeline Performance Report & 2023-2025 Pipeline Excellence
    Strategic Plan. Each year, LEPA and API download PHMSA incident data to
    check on how we are doing, where we are doing well and where we need
    improvement. Those areas of need, both appearing in the data and
    collected through engagement of our stakeholders, help guide industry-
    wide safety initiatives. In this report, you can see how the liquids
    pipeline industry is addressing key challenges like corrosion, leak
    detection and geohazards. You can see how operators are improving
    pipeline by harnessing new technologies, artificial intelligence,
    safety management systems and new recommended practices. You can also
    see how we are trying to do better on public engagement, cybersecurity,
    conservation and attracting our future workforce.
        Declining pipeline incidents over the last 5 years supports a
    measured approach to reauthorizing pipeline safety laws without major
    changes or new mandates. LEPA does believe Congress can do more to help
    modernize pipeline safety programs. Hi-tech inspection and analytical
    tools, like an MRI or ultrasound in the doctor's office, are available
    for pipeline safety. Analytic methods harnessing machine learning and
    other forms of artificial intelligence can help operators digest data
    to show when a pipeline might be leaking or when it needs new
    maintenance. However, key parts of PHMSA safety regulations are over 20
    years old and do not reflect the latest advances in safety technology
    or know-how.
        LEPA also recognizes that America is blessed with an abundance of
    energy. Pipelines are the vital link from where that energy is
    produced, to where it is refined into usable products, and on to
    consumers and businesses in their home regions. Smart pipeline policies
    will promote the pipeline energy infrastructure needed to deliver
    American energy dominance. Lastly, LEPA believes Congress can help
    PHMSA increase the effectiveness and transparency of its pipeline
    safety programs and requirements. The administration is proposing
    regulatory actions to help PHMSA become a smarter, more efficient, more
    modern regulatory agency and Congress can support those efforts.
        LEPA welcomes pipeline safety reauthorization provisions that
    would:

       Reform PHMSA's Special Permit program to impose permit
            review shot clock and limit unrelated permit requirements

       Strengthen penalties for pipeline safety violations that
            impair operation of facilities or damage construction sites

       Fulfill the 2020 Congressional mandate of a safety program
            for idled pipelines

       Reauthorize without extraneous conditions a PHMSA technology
            demonstration pilot program

       Provide defendants the opportunity for a formal PHMSA
            hearing, and protect security or commercially sensitive
            information presented as evidence in PHMSA hearings open to the
            public

       Authorize a Voluntary Information Sharing program to convene
            stakeholders to collaborate on safety initiatives, similar to
            FAA's successful program

       Allow risk-based inspections of in-service breakout tanks to
            reduce unnecessary greenhouse gas and air pollutant emissions,
            worker safety threats, and hazardous waste when shown to
            achieve an equivalent level of safety

       Increase the transparency of PHMSA inspection program with
            reporting on inspection priorities, dates and locations

       Require PHMSA review of consensus safety improvement
            standards

       Provide a targeted update of Federal CO2 pipeline
            requirements to extend regulatory coverage to gaseous
            CO2 and require CO2-specific incident
            dispersion modeling (topography, weather, operating conditions,
            trace compounds)

        An additional note on leveraging new technologies that provides a
    case study on the frustrating reality of bureaucracy and red tape in
    government. In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety
    could benefit from harnessing the latest hi-tech inspection
    technologies and analytics. As I mentioned, there's so much modern
    technology and analytics like artificial intelligence can benefit
    pipeline safety. Congress authorized PHMSA to conduct a pipeline safety
    technology demonstration pilot program under certain conditions.
        However, in implementing the technology demonstration program,
    PHMSA under the previous administration imposed a host of additional
    administrative, regulatory and legal conditions beyond what Congress
    itself mandated. As a result, PHMSA received no applications to conduct
    technology pilots and the program sunsetted. Pipeline operators cited
    the additional conditions PHMSA imposed in its implementation guidance
    as making the program infeasible. PHMSA bureaucratic red tape
    effectively strangled this program in its crib. An opportunity now
    exists and LEPA supports restoring the will of Congress and
    reauthorizing this program without additional bureaucratic red tape or
    conditions.
        Thank you again for the Committee's support of pipeline energy
    infrastructure and the opportunity to testify before you today on the
    benefits of pipelines, including their safety.

        Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Black.
        Mr. Leger, you are recognized for five minutes.

           STATEMENT OF RICHARD LEGER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

               NATURAL GAS BUSINESS, CENTERPOINT ENERGY,

               ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION

        Mr. Leger. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Young, Ranking Member Peters, members of the
    Subcommittee, I am Richard Leger, Senior Vice President of
    Natural Gas Business for CenterPoint Energy, testifying on
    behalf of the American Natural Gas Association.
        AGA represents more than 200 utilities that deliver natural
    gas to 74 million customers. Natural gas pipelines deliver
    essential energy to 177 million Americans through a 2.5
    million-mile pipeline system including 2.2 million miles of
    local distribution pipelines operated by natural gas utilities.
        An integral part of this Nation's pipeline infrastructure,
    CenterPoint Energy operates 74,000 miles of distribution
    pipeline and is privileged to serve nearly 4 million customers
    in Indiana, Texas, Ohio, and Minnesota. We also manage nearly
    1,100 miles of transmission lines and approximately 300 storage
    wells.
        In 2024, we delivered 571 BCF to our customers, and during
    the January 21st winter storm where Minnesotans experienced 62
    consecutive hours below zero we successfully delivered 1.5 BCF,
    which is the equivalent of 460 gigawatt hours of energy
    delivered, representing more than the electric capacity for the
    state of Minnesota.
        Gas utility distribution pipelines are the last critical
    link in the delivery chain that brings natural gas from the
    wellhead to the burner tip. Companies like CenterPoint Energy
    are the face of the natural gas industry.
        We live in the communities that we serve. We interact daily
    with both customers and state authorities who oversee pipeline
    safety locally. They are our customers, our neighbors, our
    friends, and our family.
        As such, pipeline safety is and must be our number-one
    priority. The primary safety tool for gas utility operators is
    a Distribution Integrity Management Program, or DIMP.
        DIMP is a regulatory process that allows an operator to
    develop a safety plan that addresses the unique operating
    characteristics of their individual gas system.
        From a CenterPoint perspective, each of our four systems
    have different operating environments, customer requirements,
    and infrastructure needs. DIMP allows us to appropriately plan
    and prioritize pipeline safety, resiliency, and reliability
    work that strengthens each of our unique individual systems.
        Upgrading distribution pipelines is also critical to
    pipeline safety. Forty-three states and the District of
    Columbia have expedited pipeline replacement programs.
        In the past 17 years the amount of cast iron and bare steel
    pipeline replacement in use has declined over 50 percent,
    replaced by newer technology pipelines which increase system
    safety and reliability.
        CenterPoint Energy is investing hundreds of millions of
    dollars every year to modernize our gas systems to enhance
    safety and reliability. For example, we will eliminate cast
    iron and bare steel from our systems by the end of 2026 and we
    will modernize our remaining low pressure systems by 2030.
        The natural gas distribution industry has proved it can
    simultaneously increase natural gas delivery and improve safety
    but more needs to be done.
        CenterPoint natural gas utilities support the following
    concepts in upcoming pipeline safety reauthorization
    legislation, policy priorities that will measurably improve
    pipeline safety and industry operations.
        Number one, limiting serious injuries and fatalities,
    property damage, and environmental impacts caused by unintended
    excavation damage incidents.
        Number two, strengthening criminal penalties on those who
    purposely sabotage or intentionally damage pipeline operations.
        Number three, identifying technology alternatives that if
    utilized will meet the intent of existing pipeline safety
    regulations and provide an equal or greater level of pipeline
    safety.
        Number four, study in how natural gas, hydrogen blending,
    and distribution systems worldwide are safely operated.
        Number five, creating a voluntary information sharing
    system to collect and share pipeline safety, operational best
    practices, and lessons learned with industry partners.
        And finally, number six, establishing a four- or preferably
    5-year reauthorization period so PHMSA and industry have
    sufficient time to complete work authorized by the previous
    reauthorization.
        CenterPoint Energy and AGA members support fact-based,
    reasonable, and practical updates to pipeline safety
    legislation that build upon lessons learned and evolving
    technologies.
        In that spirit, we look forward to our continued work with
    this committee as well as your counterparts in the House of
    Representatives to help facilitate pipeline safety
    reauthorization legislation.
        Please use us as a technical resource whenever and wherever
    we can be helpful. Thank you for the opportunity to participate
    in this hearing and I look forward to this conversation.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Leger follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Richard Leger, Senior Vice President, Natural Gas
    Business, CenterPoint Energy, on behalf of the American Gas Association
        On behalf of the American Gas Association (AGA), CenterPoint Energy
    is pleased to provide our input for the U.S. Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science, & Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface
    Transportation, Freight, Pipelines, and Safety (Senator Todd Young,
    Chairman) hearing on Pipeline Safety Reauthorization: Ensuring the Safe
    and Efficient Movement of American Energy. CenterPoint Energy and AGA
    share the same goals as safety advocates, the public, pipeline sector
    industry partners, and Congress: Ensuring America's pipeline system
    remains the safest, most secure, and most reliable in the world. We
    look forward to working with the Committee in the 119th Congress to
    help push pipeline safety reauthorization through the legislative
    process and into law.
        CenterPoint Energy is a combination electric and natural gas
    utility operating in Indiana, Texas, Ohio and Minnesota. Across our 4-
    state footprint, we operate nearly 74,000 miles of distribution main
    pipelines and are privileged to serve nearly 4 million customers. We
    also manage nearly 1,100 miles of transmission lines and approximately
    300 storage wells.
        AGA, founded in 1918, represents more than 200 local energy
    companies that deliver natural gas throughout the United States. There
    are more than 77 million residential, commercial, and industrial
    natural gas customers in the U.S., of which 96 percent--more than 74
    million customers--receive their gas from AGA members. AGA advocates
    for natural gas utility companies and their customers and provides a
    broad range of programs and services for member natural gas pipelines,
    marketers, gatherers, international natural gas companies, and industry
    associates. Today, natural gas meets more than one-third of the U.S.'
    energy needs. Natural gas pipelines are an essential part of the
    Nation's energy infrastructure. Indeed, natural gas is delivered to
    customers through a safe, approximately 2.7-million-mile underground
    pipeline system, including 2.3 million miles of local utility
    distribution pipelines, 100,000 miles of gathering lines, and 300,000
    miles of transmission pipelines providing service to more than 189
    million Americans.
        Distribution pipelines are operated by natural gas utilities, or
    ``local distribution companies (LDCs).'' Gas utility distribution pipes
    are the last, critical link in the natural gas delivery chain that
    brings natural gas from the wellhead to the burner tip. AGA member
    utilities like CenterPoint Energy are the ``face of the gas industry,''
    embedded in the communities they serve, and interact daily with
    customers and the state regulators who oversee pipeline safety locally.
    The distribution industry takes very seriously the responsibility of
    continuing to deliver natural gas to our families, neighbors, and
    business partners as safely, reliably, and responsibly as possible. The
    industry is committed to providing life-sustaining energy to the
    thousands of communities in our country who count on it, every second
    of every day of the year.
    Our Number One Priority: Pipeline Safety
        The domestic shale revolution has resulted in an abundant supply of
    natural gas. This robust supply has translated into stable natural gas
    prices and an increasing number of utility customers who use this
    resource for residential and commercial applications like cooking,
    space and water heating, and manufacturing. Last year alone, natural
    gas utilities added 730,000 customers and 20,700 miles of pipeline to
    serve these new customers. Alongside this tremendous opportunity comes
    the absolute necessity of operating safe and reliable pipeline
    infrastructure to support dependable natural gas delivery to homes,
    businesses, and essential facilities like hospitals.
        Every year the gas utility industry invests $33 billion on the
    safety of our pipeline systems. At CenterPoint Energy alone, we spend
    hundreds of millions of dollars every year to modernize our gas systems
    to enhance safety and reliability. For example, we will eliminate cast
    iron and bare steel from our system by the end of 2026 and will
    modernize our remaining low pressure systems by 2030. Unquestionably,
    pipeline safety is our industry's number one priority, and through
    critical partnerships with state and Federal regulators, legislators,
    and other stakeholders, CenterPoint Energy and other AGA member
    companies are continually working to enhance pipeline safety,
    integrity, and system resiliency.
    Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
        AGA and its members support fact-based, reasonable, flexible, and
    practicable updates to pipeline safety regulation that build upon
    lessons learned and evolving improvements to pipeline safety and
    related programs and technology. In that spirit, AGA wishes to
    highlight 5 high-level priorities as the House-Senate reauthorization
    process moves forward.
        Support Limiting Pipeline Excavation Damage Incidents. Across the
    gas utility industry, excavation damage is the primary cause of
    distribution pipeline incidents. From 2020-2024, CenterPoint Energy
    alone experienced nearly 46,000 damages from excavation activity. For
    approximately one third of these damages no locate was called in by the
    excavator. According to PHMSA data, in the past 20 years, excavation
    damage incidents on natural gas pipelines have resulted in 57 deaths,
    254 injuries, and over $300 million in property damage. These often
    tragic incidents are preventable. States that have strong excavation
    damage prevention and enforcement programs typically experience lower
    rates of damages to pipelines. AGA supports directing PHMSA to
    incentivize states to adopt One Call program leading practices, derived
    from the best state excavation damage programs, and condition their
    grants to State One Call programs based upon adoption of these best
    practices. Our company and our industry are confident this proposed
    program will reduce damages and save lives.
        Support Pipeline Technology Alternatives. Modern pipeline safety
    technologies--not contemplated when many pipeline safety regulations
    were first implemented--can, if deployed, meet the intent of these
    older existing regulations and improve the overall safety of natural
    gas, hazardous liquid, underground storage, and liquefied natural gas
    infrastructure. For example, advanced pipeline leak detection
    technologies have advanced to the point where they can be used to
    comply with leak detection regulation. CenterPoint Energy began
    implementing advanced leak detection, which detects natural gas in the
    parts per billion range instead of the parts per million range of
    traditional leak detection technology, over a decade ago. With advanced
    leak detection,
        CenterPoint Energy detects approximately 2.5 times as many leaks
    and repairs more leaks that would not have been detected using
    traditional leak detection technologies. Additionally, breakaway meter
    technologies and excess flow valves can stop the flow of gas if a meter
    is struck, eliminating the need for physical meter protection barriers.
    Industry supports a PHMSA-led process to identify technology
    alternatives that, if utilized, will meet the intent of existing
    pipeline safety regulations and provide an equal or greater level of
    pipeline safety.
        Strengthen Criminal Penalties for Intentional Damage to Pipelines.
    CenterPoint Energy strongly supports strengthening criminal penalties
    for intentionally damaging pipeline infrastructure. Natural gas
    utilities are experiencing an increase in criminal attacks on their
    property, equipment and facilities. These activities range from
    gunshots targeting pipelines, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
    placed on gas delivery equipment, and the damaging of facilities and
    equipment necessary for safe natural gas delivery. These activities not
    only are hazardous to the safety and property of the public and member
    company employees, but they also threaten an LDC's ability to deliver
    natural gas to thousands of homes, hospitals, schools, government and
    military facilities, and other critical infrastructure customers. AGA
    supports increased criminal penalties on bad actors who intentionally
    damage, destroy or impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, including
    those under construction.
        Hydrogen-Natural Gas Blending R&D Study. Hydrogen is an emerging
    solution for achieving gas LDC energy storage and decarbonization
    goals. Natural gas projects in North America and worldwide demonstrate
    successful blending of hydrogen into the existing natural gas
    distribution network or utilizing natural gas that has a naturally
    occurring higher hydrogen content. Hawai'i Gas has successfully
    utilized a natural gas hydrogen blend of 15 percent for decades and
    many systems overseas are operating at approximately a 20 percent
    blend. It is important to understand how companies operating natural
    gas distribution systems with a higher hydrogen content are operating
    these systems safely. As such, we suggest the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) conduct a review of natural gas distribution systems
    worldwide that utilize hydrogen-natural gas blending applications, or
    utilize gas with a higher hydrogen content, to identify processes,
    materials, and standards the operators have implemented to operate
    safely. The results of this study will help underpin the safety of
    ongoing domestic hydrogen R&D and blending operations.
        Authorize a Pipeline Safety Voluntary Information-Sharing System.
    Congress should authorize a Voluntary Information-sharing System (VIS)
    based on the recommendations of the public advisory committee formed
    pursuant to the 2016 pipeline safety reauthorization law. A VIS will
    engage multiple stakeholders (e.g., government, industry, and pipeline
    safety NGOs) to collect and share best practices and lessons learned,
    promote improved pipeline safety, and will importantly include
    sufficient legal and regulatory safe harbors for information sharing to
    encourage industry participation. VIS will support industry's
    implementation of Pipeline Safety Management Systems by encouraging
    information sharing and facilitating understanding and management of
    pipeline safety risks.
        5-Year Reauthorization for PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Program. PHMSA's
    Pipeline Safety program was reauthorized most recently in the PIPES Act
    of 2016 and PIPES Act of 2020. As PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program
    expired again in 2023, the frequency of reauthorization has been
    reduced to just 3 years. This interval is inadequate given the
    significant time it takes to conduct studies, publish reports, move
    reauthorization priorities from legislation to Proposed Rulemaking,
    address comments, and develop and publish Final Rules. Acknowledging
    the time required to conduct studies, publish reports, and develop
    feasible, reasonable, cost effective, and practical rulemaking
    (including stakeholder input), and in keeping with reauthorization
    intervals that preceded the PIPES Act of 2016 (1996, 2002, 2006, 2011),
    Congress should reauthorize PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program for not
    less than 5 years.
    Conclusion
        America's gas utilities' commitment to pipeline safety relies on
    sound engineering principles and best in class technology, a trained
    professional workforce, effective community relationships, and a strong
    partnership with state pipeline safety authorities and PHMSA. As
    pipeline safety reauthorization legislation is drafted this year,
    CenterPoint Energy, and our partners at the American Gas Association,
    encourage Congress to work in a bipartisan fashion to advance
    reasonable and consensus changes to pipeline safety law and regulation,
    support PHMSA's primary role as pipeline safety regulator, and
    recognize the great strides in pipeline safety engineering and
    operating practices that pipeline companies are putting into practice
    across the country. We stand ready to assist in this process with real
    world operations, engineering and safety data and experience. Please
    use us as a resource.

        Senator Young. Thanks so much, Mr. Leger.
        Mr. Caram, you are recognized for five minutes.

     STATEMENT OF BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY
                                 TRUST

        Mr. Caram. Thank you.
        Good morning, Chair Young, Ranking Member Peters, and
    members of the Subcommittee.
        I am Bill Caram, Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety
    Trust, which was created after the 1999 Olympic pipeline
    tragedy in Bellingham, Washington, that killed three boys.
        We serve as an independent national watchdog over the
    pipeline industry and its regulators. On average, a significant
    pipeline incident occurs every 32 hours in America, nearly one
    every day.
        Since this subcommittee's last Markup in July 2019, 67
    people have been killed and 182 hospitalized from pipeline
    incidents. That is 67 families forever changed and 182 lives
    altered, many permanently.
        The past two years have been the deadliest in nearly 15
    with 30 deaths, including a 5-year-old in Missouri, a 15-year-
    old in Utah, and an 82-year-old pastor's wife in Mississippi.
        Our shared goal of zero incidents feels unreachable when we
    have not yet been able to prevent these tragic deaths. Making a
    meaningful difference on pipeline safety will require three
    essential and interconnected elements: improved regulations,
    effective enforcement, and widespread adoption of pipeline
    safety management systems, or PSMS.
        In many cases Congress has hamstrung PHMSA from developing
    effective regulations. Provisions in the pipeline safety
    statute like the extra burdensome cost-benefit requirement make
    it extremely difficult for PHMSA to develop lifesaving
    regulations.
        Also, the nonapplication clause, which permanently exempts
    approximately half our Nation's transmission pipelines
    including some at the highest risk for meeting some modern
    safety standards.
        There certainly are operators leading the way on safety,
    but this is not universal. We need regulations that allow
    flexibility for innovation while ensuring the product stays in
    the pipelines of all operators.
        I have included practical, common sense ideas for improving
    regulations that would make a real difference on safety in my
    written testimony such as fire shut-off valves.
        These simple devices automatically close when exposed to
    heat, preventing gas from fueling house fires. They are
    inexpensive, require no ongoing maintenance, and can be easily
    installed on service lines.
        As recently recommended by the NTSB, natural gas alarms or
    methane detectors if installed in homes and businesses with or
    near gas service would undoubtedly save lives.
        We need modernized regulations for carbon dioxide and
    hydrogen blended pipelines. Congress has incentivized this
    infrastructure without identifying--without addressing the
    regulatory and research gaps that put communities on the front
    lines of significant safety risks.
        This year marks 5 years since the Denbury carbon dioxide
    failure in Satartia, Mississippi that sent nearly 50 people to
    the hospital. That harrowing night laid bare many of the risks
    and regulatory shortfalls with these pipelines.
        Increasing authorized resources to PHMSA is also necessary.
    Not only has the agency been chronically underfunded but the
    additional miles of jurisdictional pipe and the potential build
    out of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines demand an increase
    in resources from Congress both to the agency and, just as
    significantly, to the state programs.
        Even the best regulations, however, can be meaningless
    without robust enforcement. When we try to chart penalties
    levied on operators against their quarterly earnings after
    tragic incidents we often cannot even visualize the penalty, it
    is such a tiny percentage of earnings even when PHMSA is fully
    using its enforcement authority.
        Recently, PHMSA's enforcement shows a concerning trend.
    Enforcement case initiations have declined by as much as 90
    percent compared to historical averages across multiple prior
    administrations.
        Meanwhile, incident rates remain relatively consistent.
    This enforcement gap warrants the Subcommittee's attention.
        According to a recent PHMSA report to Congress on the
    adoption of pipeline safety management systems, or PSMS, among
    gas distribution operators, while most pipeline mileage is
    owned by operators committed to PSMS only half of all operators
    have made this commitment.
        To improve safety we need widespread industry adoption--all
    systems, all operators, large and small. This subcommittee has
    an opportunity to save lives and make a meaningful difference
    on pipeline safety by streamlining rule development, making
    enforcement more effective, and driving adoption of PSMS.
        As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's
    pipeline safety program and make improvements to the law, I
    implore you to think of the empty seats at dinner tables across
    the country because of pipeline failures.
        Thirty dinner tables are missing someone from the last two
    years alone. I have been with families who have lost loved ones
    recently and some 25 years ago, and I can assure you the pain
    never goes away.
        Please ensure PHMSA meets its responsibility to the
    American people. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Caram follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director,
                             Pipeline Safety Trust
        Good morning, Committee Chair Cruz, Subcommittee Chair Young,
    Committee Ranking Member Cantwell, Subcommittee Ranking Member Peters,
    and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak
    today on the vital subject of pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram,
    and I am the Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
        The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line
    tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable
    failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a
    beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually
    ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so
    appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled
    at the lax oversight from the Federal government, that they asked the
    Federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the
    Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization
    over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
        We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless
    grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy.
    Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters
    since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work
    together to help move towards our shared goal of zero incidents.
    Recent Pipeline Failures
        Since this subcommittee held its markup of the last authorization
    of PHMSA's pipeline safety program on July 31, 2019, 67 people have
    been killed, and 182 people have been injured to the point of in-
    patient hospitalization. There have been over 3,000 reportable
    incidents, with nearly 1,600 of those deemed ``significant'' by PHMSA
    standards. That means there has been a significant incident nearly
    every day (a significant incident every 1.33 days, on average) and
    nearly four people killed or seriously injured every month over the
    last six years.
        In fact, the past two years have been the deadliest for pipelines
    in nearly 15 years--surpassed only by the two-year period that included
    the devastating PG&E explosion in San Bruno, California, which killed
    eight people and destroyed an entire neighborhood--a time that I think
    all of today's witnesses would agree was a low point for pipeline
    safety. We continue to languish with consistently poor performance,
    with a significant incident almost every day and 30 people killed over
    the last two years.
        A look at the National Transportation Safety Board's docket will
    give a glimpse into the current state of pipeline safety. The NTSB has
    eight open investigations, from a million-gallon oil spill off the
    coast of Mississippi, to a host of pipeline-caused explosions in
    Jackson, MS, Youngstown, OH, Bel Air, MD, South Jordan, UT, Avondale,
    LA, Hutchinson, KS, and most recently, Lexington, MO. The NTSB
    investigators, sadly, have their hands full.
        In December, the NTSB held a Board meeting to discuss the 2023 UGI
    Utilities pipeline failure in West Reading, PA that resulted in an
    explosion that killed seven people and injured 11.\1\ Family members of
    the victims attended the meeting where the NTSB discussed the failed
    piece of pipeline infrastructure made from Aldyl A plastic. PHMSA has
    known these Aldyl A components are prone to failure for decades.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., UGI Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled
    Explosion and Fire https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/
    PLD23LR002.aspx.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The NTSB is also investigating an Enbridge pipeline failure that
    occurred in November 2024 in South Jordan, UT that killed a 15-year-old
    child. The preliminary report finds that the failed pipeline was also
    Aldyl A.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas-Fueled Home
    Explosion https://www
    .ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD25FR001.aspx.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Just last year, in Jackson, MS, pipelines operated by Atmos Energy
    appears to have fueled two home explosions, one of which killed the 81-
    year-old wife of a community pastor. An NTSB preliminary report
    describes what appears to an under-maintained system full of leaks.
    Neighbors had complained repeatedly about the smell of gas. Atmos
    didn't find any leaks it deemed to be hazardous before the home
    exploded.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Atmos Energy Corporation Natural Gas-
    Fueled Home Explosions and Fires (Feb. 14, 2024) https://www.ntsb.gov/
    investigations/Pages/PLD24FR003.aspx.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On the hazardous liquids side, we've seen two recent failures that
    have contaminated drinking water wells, and another incident on a
    chronically failing system. An Energy Transfer pipeline in Pennsylvania
    was discovered to have been leaking jet fuel. Evidence suggests this
    pipeline may have been leaking for at least 16 months, possibly much
    longer, after many complaints about the taste and smell of residents'
    water. And in December, an Enterprise Products pipeline spilled 23,000
    gallons of gasoline, contaminating nine drinking wells. And just last
    month, the Keystone Pipeline failed yet again, this time spilling about
    110,000 gallons of crude oil in North Dakota.
        This is just a selection of the approximately 1,500 significant
    pipeline incidents that have happened in the last six years.
    5 Year Anniversary of the Denbury Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Failure in
            Satartia, MS
        I want to take a moment to acknowledge the five-year anniversary of
    the harrowing carbon dioxide pipeline failure in Satartia, MS. Five
    years have passed since nearly 50 people went to the hospital
    experiencing seizures, loss of consciousness, foaming at the mouth, and
    many other terrifying effects of carbon dioxide exposure.\4\ Denbury's
    failure in Satartia laid bare many glaring regulatory shortfalls that
    have been clearly identified, but five years later we haven't
    modernized the regulations. It took over 12 years for PHMSA to
    modernize regulations with lessons learned from PG&E's devastation in
    San Bruno. I hope it doesn't take nearly as long for PHMSA to modernize
    carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations with lessons learned from
    Denbury's disaster.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Admin, Failure Investigation Report--Denbury Gulf Coast Pipelines,
    LLC--Pipeline Rupture/Natural Force Damage (May 26, 2022) https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/
    Failure%20Investigation
    %20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional Oversight
        The Pipeline Safety Trust urges Congress to fulfill its oversight
    responsibilities regarding PHMSA by requesting information about the
    status of staff reductions. We have heard very little official news
    from PHMSA about how many staff members have accepted retirement offers
    or been terminated. We have heard from news sources about the high
    level of turnover at the senior leadership level, which, if true,
    represents an enormous drain of knowledge and experience from the
    agency. We haven't heard anything about the losses from elsewhere
    within the agency. Full staff levels at a small safety agency such as
    PHMSA are essential to meet its responsibilities to the public.
        Also, we encourage PHMSA to seek answers from PHMSA to explain the
    sudden drop in enforcement case initiations under the first few months
    of new leadership. The number of cases posted to PHMSA's Enforcement
    Transparency website\5\ represents as much as a 90 percent drop in the
    number of cases initiated within the first months of previous
    administrations, regardless of party.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ U.S. Dep't of Transp, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Admin., Summary of Enforcement Activity: Nationwide (May 1, 2025)
    https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/summaries.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We firmly believe, and expect wide agreement among stakeholders,
    that pipeline safety is a bipartisan issue that we can all support.
    Legislative Priorities to Improve Pipeline Safety
        While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero
    incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. I commend this
    subcommittee for working on pipeline safety legislation.
        The Pipeline Safety Trust believes that making a meaningful
    difference on pipeline safety involves three components: improved
    safety regulations, financially meaningful enforcement, and widespread
    adoption of Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS). Congress can
    play a key role in each of these efforts.
        Critical to each of these is the existence of a strong regulator,
    both in PHMSA and each of the state programs. Not only has the agency
    been chronically underfunded, Congress has also hamstrung PHMSA with
    statutory restrictions such as the extra burdensome cost-benefit
    requirement, of which PHMSA is the only safety agency laden with this
    onerous and overly restrictive obligation. Also, the non-application
    clause, forbidding PHMSA from applying certain standards from existing
    pipelines also prevents the agency from being as strong a regulator as
    necessary to ensure safe communities and a healthy environment.
        For many of the legislative priorities described, there is a fact
    sheet with recommended legislative language included in the Appendix.
    PHMSA Funding and State Programs
        Beyond revoking these two restrictive provisions, Congress can
    empower PHMSA to be a stronger regulator by giving it the resources it
    needs, which involves a substantial increase in funding. PHMSA has had
    large increases in Congressional mandates without a corresponding
    increase in funding. For example, nearly 100,000 miles of gas gathering
    lines have finally come under PHMSA regulations and another
    approximately 300,000 miles are under new reporting requirements. Also
    on the horizon is a new generation of pipelines carrying carbon dioxide
    and hydrogen, requiring new expertise and personnel. State programs,
    responsible for oversight of more than 80 percent of the Nation's
    pipeline mileage, are also feeling the squeeze on their capacity.
        Because of the lack of resources, PHMSA has been reliant on the
    industry it is tasked to regulate for technical expertise on
    rulemaking. A 2015 Politico investigation\6\ found that PHMSA is an
    agency ``that lacks the manpower to inspect the nation's . . . oil and
    gas lines, that grants the industry it regulates significant power to
    influence the rule-making process, and that has stubbornly failed to
    take a more aggressive regulatory role, even when ordered by Congress
    to do so.'' PHMSA has also long had difficulty in attracting and
    retaining experienced personnel as the industry often hires staff away
    at higher salaries.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Andrew Restuccia & Elana Schor, Pipelines Blow up and People
    Die, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2015) https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/
    the-little-pipeline-agency-that-couldnt-217227.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Currently, state utility commissions and state pipeline inspectors
    have the ability to take over direct safety authority and oversight of
    gas pipelines from PHMSA. State programs can be reimbursed by PHMSA for
    up to 80 percent of their spending. However, in recent years, no state
    has been reimbursed at the maximum level. In 2023, the National
    Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) wrote a
    letter\7\ to Congress requesting sufficient funding for PHMSA to be
    able to reimburse state safety grants at the 80 percent rate. PST
    agrees that state inspection programs in good standing with PHMSA
    should be granted 80 percent of their expenditures. Thus, Congress
    should appropriate PHMSA with enough funding to accomplish this.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Letter from Greg White on behalf of the National Association of
    Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) to House Transportation and
    Infrastructure Committee (Sept. 18, 2023) (regarding pipeline safety/
    PHMSA reauthorization legislation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's PIPES
    Act of 2023\8\ proposed a funding increase of about 10 percent. PST
    would like to see PHMSA's budget be increased by at least 30 percent.
    This recommendation is based on factors such as inflation, PHMSA's
    increased authority for regulating new types of pipelines, and PHMSA's
    historic underfunding. Inflation has increased costs 23 percent since
    PHMSA was last authorized in December 2020.\9\ Accounting for
    inflation, a 10 percent increase would not even be equivalent to
    PHMSA's previous funding levels and would in fact place PHMSA even more
    behind.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of
    2023 (PIPES Act of 2023), H.R. 6494, 118th Cong. (2023) https://
    www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/6494/
    text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22pipes+2024%22%7D.
        \9\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation
    Calculator https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
    (calculating the rate of inflation from December 2020 to March 2025).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rupture Mitigation Valves
        Because of the statutory limitations described above, PHMSA's
    improved regulations on rupture mitigation valves do not apply to
    existing pipelines, including on older pipes in areas that could affect
    densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Arguably these are
    the pipelines that need this technology the most.
        In 2022, PHMSA revised its pipeline safety regulations to require
    rupture mitigation valves (RMVs), or alternative equivalent
    technologies, to newly constructed or entirely replaced onshore gas
    transmission, Type A gas gathering, and hazardous liquid pipelines with
    diameters of 6 inches or greater.\10\ The rule did not, however,
    require operators to retrofit older pipes because of the nonapplication
    clause found at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60104(b), which prohibits PHMSA from
    promulgating regulations to existing facilities. Because of this, PHMSA
    fell short of adequately implementing the NTSB's recommendations made
    after the San Bruno tragedy.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum
    Rupture Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940-992 (Apr. 8, 2022).
        \11\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Press Release: NTSB Issues Response
    to PHMSA's Valve and Rupture Detection Rule, (Apr. 1, 2022) https://
    www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR202
    20401B.aspx.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Excluding certain pipelines from implementation of critical safety
    technology based on age is dangerous. Older pipes are likely more prone
    to failure, and it is arbitrary to require critical safety technology
    on some but not all pipelines. Requiring operator to retrofit older
    pipelines with RMVs in high consequence areas (HCAs) would protect
    areas with more people and buildings that could be affected by a
    failure. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 192.903. Because of the nonapplication clause,
    however, Congress must draft self-executing language for PHMSA to have
    the authority to promulgate these regulations.
    Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety
        PHMSA regulations for CO2 pipelines lack the detail
    necessary to ensure the safe operation of these pipelines. Given the
    Congressional incentives driving carbon capture and sequestration
    investment, many experts expect a large increase in the mileage of the
    Nation's carbon dioxide pipelines. Once relatively rare and remote,
    these pipelines could soon be much closer to people and communities.
    The Denbury CO2 pipeline failure in Satartia, MS
    demonstrated the unique safety risks that these pipelines pose. An
    asphyxiant that is heavier than air, CO2 can move as a plume
    in a dangerous and even lethal concentration close to the ground for
    long distances after a failure. Current PHMSA safety regulations are
    inappropriate and insufficient, as described in a Pipeline Safety Trust
    report.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Richard B. Kuprewicz, Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of
    Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as it
    Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration within the
    U.S. (Mar. 23, 2022) available at https://pstrust.org/wp-content/
    uploads/2022/03/3-23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-Pipeline-
    Report2.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In early 2025, PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
    CO2 pipelines. PST supported the NPRM, as it contained
    provisions that would have drastically improved CO2 pipeline
    safety but believed there was still room for improvement.
    Unfortunately, on January 23, 2025, the NPRM was withdrawn as part of
    the Trump administration's ``Regulatory Freeze Pending Review''
    Executive Order.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Exec. Order, Regulatory Freeze Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2025)
    https://www.whitehouse.gov presidential-actions/2025/01/regulatory-
    freeze-pending-review/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should require PHMSA to re-issue its notice of proposed
    rulemaking on CO2 pipelines, accept public comment, and
    finalize the rule within the next eighteen months.
    Hydrogen Blending Pipeline Safety
        Hydrogen has been highly incentivized in recent legislation such as
    the Production Tax Credit in the Inflation Reduction Act. Gas
    distribution operators are considering blending hydrogen into existing
    gas distribution infrastructure and the trade group the American Gas
    Association includes hydrogen blends of 20 percent as a key component
    of their Net Zero plan for the industry. However, hydrogen
    transportation by pipeline poses many safety risks and key knowledge
    gaps remain. The risks run highest when the pipelines are near people.
    At least one operator has blended hydrogen, however that system in
    Hawaii is unique enough that it cannot serve as a model for the rest of
    the country.
        Hydrogen has a much higher flammability range than methane and is
    known to embrittle certain types of steel and plastic pipelines. A
    report on blending hydrogen commissioned by the California Public
    Utility Commission from University of California Riverside found an
    alarming number of safety risks and knowledge gaps. A report by
    Accufacts commissioned by the Pipeline Safety Trust stated that the
    weakest safety link for hydrogen blends in the distribution system were
    the pipes inside residences.
        Congress should not allow hydrogen blends into gas distribution
    systems until the National Academy of Sciences has issued a report on
    the safety risks and knowledge gaps and PHMSA has updated its
    regulations.
    In-Home Methane Detectors
        Although pipeline operators may discover or be alerted to leaks
    through various activities, such as maintenance or odor complaints,
    these strategies will not consistently locate all hazardous leaks. When
    natural gas migrates through the soil into a home, the odorant may be
    stripped from the gas, and the resident would not be aware of the need
    to evacuate and alert the pipeline operator. In-home methane detectors
    are one method of continuous monitoring that can help the public and
    pipeline operators identify leaks and improve public safety. 2023 and
    2024 was the deadliest two-year period for pipelines in over a
    decade,\14\ with much of those fatalities from building explosions that
    could have benefited from in-home methane detection.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Admin., Serious Incidents 20 Year Trends https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/
    analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2
    Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website52F_portal%2FSC%20Incident%20Trend&Page=
    Serious.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended the
    use of in-home methane detectors,\15\ sometimes also referred to as
    natural gas detectors, to alert the public of dangerous gas leaks and
    prevent home explosions. Methane detectors are similar to smoke and
    carbon monoxide detectors in that they are easy to install and
    relatively inexpensive. Where they differ is that they can detect a gas
    leak well before it ignites, preventing a potentially catastrophic
    explosion. Multiple NTSB investigations of home explosions have
    determined that the presence of an in-home methane detector could have
    helped mitigate the consequences.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Improve Pipeline Leak Detection and
    Mitigation (Dec. 22, 2022) https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/mwl-
    21-22/mwl-rph-01.aspx.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should mandate the installation of in-home methane
    detectors in all residential and commercial occupancies receiving gas
    service.
    Fire Shutoff Valves
        In the event of a fire in a structure that has natural gas service,
    gas distribution piping is often compromised and serves as fuel. This
    adds literal fuel to the fire and puts occupants and first responders
    at increased risk of injury and death. According to PHMSA, for this
    reason, it is necessary to quickly shut off the flow of gas to the
    structure.
        It may take considerable time to complete the shutoff of gas,
    including notification of first responders and the gas company, arrival
    of first responders and gas company at the scene, determining the
    appropriate method to shut off the gas, executing shut off, and release
    of the gas in the pipe between the shutoff location and the structure.
    Reviews of accident reports have shown that it is not unusual for this
    to take hours, prolonging the emergency. Use of automated shutoff
    valves can significantly reduce the time to shut off gas to the
    structure. One such device is a fire shutoff valve (FSV), also known as
    a thermal shutoff valve.
        A typical FSV uses a spring-loaded plug held in place by a fusible
    link made of a low melting point alloy. When the fire shutoff valve is
    exposed to fire, the link melts and the spring closes the valve,
    shutting off the gas. FSVs are typically installed in the service line
    either before the regulator, before the meter, or after the meter.
        FSVs are commercially available and have been used in gas service
    lines before the gas meter and in gas supplies to appliances.
    Currently, there are no Federal regulations requiring their use in
    natural gas distribution systems. They are required in
    Massachusetts\16\ and have been used in Germany since the 1990s. The
    Pipeline Safety Trust supports the widespread use of these safety
    devices and advocates for Federal regulations that would make their use
    mandatory.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ General Laws of Massachusetts Part 1, Title XXII, Chapter 164,
    Section 75 A.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should require PHMSA to amend 49 CFR Part 192(H) to
    require operators to install fire shutoff valves on all gas
    distribution service lines. Alternatively, congress could require PHMSA
    to amend 49 CFR 192.1007(b) to identify fires as a threat to their
    distribution system.
    Financially Meaningful Enforcement
        With few exceptions, civil penalties are not financially meaningful
    to operators. When we try to chart penalties levied on operators
    because of fatal pipeline failures against their quarterly earnings, we
    often can't even visualize the penalty since it's such a tiny
    percentage of earnings. Giving PHMSA more enforcement authority is
    critical tom improving pipeline safety.
    Pipeline Safety Management Systems
        Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS) have been developed over
    the last ten years. Lessons have been incorporated and updated. When
    implemented properly it leads to better safety outcomes. However
    widespread adoption still eludes the pipeline industry.
        PHMSA recently released its required report to Congress on the
    progress of the gas distribution pipeline industry towards adoption of
    PSMS. While progress has been made on total mileage of pipelines that
    are under control of an operator that has made a commitment to PSMS,
    only about half of the distribution operators have made that
    commitment. PHMSA also recently released an Advisory Bulletin
    encouraging the voluntary adoption of PSMS by the pipeline industry.
        Congress could make a meaningful difference in pipeline safety by
    directing PHMSA to take steps towards widespread industry adoption
    beyond voluntary efforts.
    Conclusion
        As you discuss how to move forward on authorizing PHMSA's pipeline
    safety program and make improvements to the law, I implore you to think
    of the empty seats at dinner tables across the country because of
    pipeline failures. I've been with families who have lost their loved
    ones recently and some who lost their loved ones 25 years ago. I can
    tell you; the pain never goes away. Please give PHMSA the authority and
    the resources it needs to meet its responsibility to the American
    people.
        Thank you.
                                     ______

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
        I will now recognize Senator Cruz, the Full Committee
    Chairman, for his opening statement.

                      STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
        Americans have been abundantly clear that they want
    cheaper, reliable, and safe energy. That is what we are here
    today to discuss, what Federal policies would ensure that
    energy America needs is affordable, reliable, and safe.
        The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
    or PHMSA, is the agency within the Department of Transportation
    responsible for overseeing pipeline safety.
        This is no small task with over 3 million miles of oil,
    natural gas, and other hazardous liquid pipelines all across
    this Nation.
        Good Federal policy would ensure that pipeline operators
    have a clear understanding of the safety requirements. Federal
    regulations are based on data and address risk appropriately,
    and the regulations are cost effective.
        So what was the previous administration's policy on
    pipeline safety? One maxim of politics is that personnel is
    policy. If that is the case then the Biden administration did
    not give a damn about pipeline safety because they did not
    nominate anyone to be the PHMSA Administrator.
        That is right. It is not that they nominated someone and
    then withdrew that person. They simply never bothered to
    nominate any human being to lead the pipeline safety agency.
        Instead, they relied on a Deputy Administrator for the
    entire four years, a position that is not confirmed by the U.S.
    Senate. That was a shameful dereliction of duty.
        Unfortunately, in that entire time this committee never
    held a single hearing on pipeline safety for those entire four
    years, denying us any opportunity for oversight.
        So there was nobody nominated by the President in the
    position, nobody confirmed by the Senate in the position, and
    this committee held zero hearings on pipeline safety. That
    gives you an indication of what priority they put on this
    topic.
        President Trump has corrected this error by nominating Paul
    Roberti to lead PHMSA. I hope to hold a hearing on his
    nomination very soon.
        The unaccountable Biden PHMSA also attempted to remake the
    pipeline safety agency into a climate change agency because
    every agency in the Federal Government under Biden was a
    climate change agency instead of doing what its damn purpose
    was. Not only duplicating the work of other agencies, but
    disregarding the explicit statutory language that Congress
    carefully negotiated.
        One egregious example of the Biden PHMSA's overreach is the
    natural gas leak detection and repair rule in which PHMSA
    included the regulation of underground natural gas storage and
    liquefied natural gas facilities despite the statute explicitly
    not including those among the list of facilities to be
    addressed by that rulemaking.
        It is notable that more actions finalized during the Biden
    PHMSA were overturned by a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals than
    any other administration since Congress created the agency in
    2004.
        Listen to that again. Twenty-one years ago Congress created
    that agency. The last 4 years under President Biden they had
    more of their actions overturned by a Federal court of appeals
    than any administration in history.
        I suppose that is not surprising, given that they did not
    have anyone named to run the agency and they did not have the
    Senate engaged in oversight on them. Fortunately, President
    Trump stopped the leak detection rule before it could be
    promulgated.
        This Congress we have the opportunity to debate and to pass
    a pipeline safety reauthorization. Today's hearing is designed
    to help inform that discussion.
        One topic I expect to hear from the witnesses is the threat
    to pipeline safety from ecoterrorists. Though the current
    statute has penalties against individuals, quote, ``damaging or
    destroying an operational pipeline'' it does not expressly
    address ecoterrorists who tamper with pipelines or damage
    pipelines under construction.
        The unauthorized turning of pipeline valves is a major
    safety concern that threatens the very environment that the
    ecoterrorists claim they are trying to protect.
        Pipeline operators have been forced to shut down their
    lines in response to threats from ecoterrorists. I am proud to
    co-sponsor Senator Sheehy's ``Safe and Secure Transportation of
    Energy Act'', which would close this gap in statute by adding,
    quote, ``vandalizing, tampering with, disrupting the operation
    or construction of, or preventing the operation or construction
    of a pipeline'' to the list of actions for which penalties
    could be applied.
        I also want to hear from the witnesses about ways that
    pipeline operators are seeking to improve the safe operation of
    their pipelines but for which outdated or misguided regulations
    are currently barriers to greater safety.
        I look forward to the witnesses' testimony and their
    response to questions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Young. Well, thank you, Senator Cruz, for that
    opening statement.
        We will now move to member questions and I will begin with
    Mr. Leger.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, I am interested in
    using this PHMSA reauthorization to modernize our pipeline
    safety laws and to seize on opportunities that would allow
    industry to deploy innovative technologies to enhance safety
    within the broader ecosystem.
        Mr. Leger, can you provide an example of a promising safety
    technology and what legislative changes might be needed to
    promote further adoption of this technology or new technologies
    in general?
        Mr. Leger. Absolutely, Senator Young. Thank you for the
    question.
        At CenterPoint Energy we have certainly embraced new
    technology as well as our other member companies that are
    associated with AGA. Have a couple of things that we work on.
        Number one, one of the things that I am really most proud
    of that would certainly be helpful to have PHMSA weigh in on is
    we are currently deploying advanced metering technology, and
    that is a first in the industry and we plan to install the one
    millionth meter of that this year. Over a seven-year period we
    plan to replace every single one of our meters on our system
    with this advanced meter technology.
        So one of the things that this does it directly affects
    what you were talking about is the safe operation of our
    system.
        So the meter that we are working with has a couple of
    sensors on the inside. One is a heat sensor, and if there is a
    fire on the inside of the house and the building log gets to a
    certain temperature it will automatically shut that meter off.
        Additionally, there is a flow sensor in there and when it
    gains flow that is excessive of what is normal through that
    meter it will automatically shut that meter off, thereby
    providing safety features for the homeowner.
        Senator Young. And so those are solutions. Clearly, as you
    have articulated, they are designed to enhance safety and
    sufficient incentive already exists it seems for your
    adoption--your deployment of those technologies.
        Are there any changes either to regulation or to our
    statutes that pertain to pipeline safety that you or, perhaps,
    other members think might be appropriate to enable adoption of
    those technologies or similar technologies?
        Mr. Leger. I would say that legislation or rulemaking at
    the Federal level that allows new technologies to be approved--
    the streamlined process approved at the PHMSA level only helps
    us at the local level to get them approved and I will give you
    a for instance.
        Anytime we bring on a new technology, if it is not already
    approved by PHMSA then I need to go to each and every state
    that I operate in and then individually get them approved. So
    it is efficiency.
        Senator Young. OK. Mr. Black.
        Mr. Black. In the 2020 PIPES Act Congress authorized a
    technology pilot demonstration program for pipeline operators
    to show to PHMSA how new technologies should be reflected in
    pipeline repair criteria regulations, right.
        Pipelines are inspected from the inside--in line
    inspection, so-called smart pigs traveling inside the
    pipeline----
        Senator Young. Right. Right.
        Mr. Black.--collecting all that information. The pilot
    program authorized by Congress was time limited. PHMSA ruined
    it.
        PHMSA required it to go through the special permit process
    in the last administration and they were going to apply NEPA
    reviews to what is an R&D project. We need Congress to
    reauthorize that and to tell PHMSA not to do that so that we
    can show PHMSA how to benefit.
        Senator Young. This is--yes, this is a systemic issue
    within the Federal Government. We do pilot programs all the
    time. We defund the pilot programs before they play it out.
        Sometimes we allow pilot programs to occur without a study
    to analyze how they have done. When there is a study and we
    have a very successful pilot program we never scale.
        I mean, who runs an organization like this? Well, it is a
    rhetorical question.
        So, Mr. Rorick, do you have anything to add?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes. I think that there are many improvements
    that can be made to existing regulations where we take a risk-
    based approach that allow us to use the latest technology.
        Mr. Black and Mr. Leger talked about some of those
    technologies, not only on pipelines. There also exists a lot of
    technologies that we can use--drones, robotics--on tanks as
    well.
        You mentioned, Senator, the use of AI. There are huge
    opportunities to use AI and industry is exploring the
    opportunities to use AI for data management and then also use
    AI to help us to look at that data and then preemptively
    address issues.
        So we just need to free up the process to let us use these
    technologies.
        Senator Young. Great. Very briefly, anything to add, Mr.
    Caram, on this topic? It is OK if not.
        Mr. Caram. Very briefly. I will just say, you know,
    obviously, we support technological innovation to improve
    safety.
        We understand the importance of having a good process in
    place if you are going to allow operators to not follow the
    current minimum safety regulations. There needs to be a robust
    process to make sure that technology is safe.
        Senator Young. One very pointed point of clarification or,
    perhaps, education for me, Mr. Leger, did you say cast iron
    belch?
        Mr. Leger. I am sorry. Cast iron and bare steel.
        Senator Young. And bare steel?
        Mr. Leger. Yes, sir.
        Senator Young. OK. All right. And so we have pipes that are
    not in the latest--they do not have the appropriate form of
    steel or the most modern and resilient steel. Unpack this for
    me----
        Mr. Leger. Yes, sir. We----
        Senator Young.--as someone who does not make steel for a
    living.
        Mr. Leger. Absolutely. So bare steel and cast iron are both
    pipes that have been in the ground for 60, 80, sometimes 100
    years, and we have eliminated the vast majority of that in our
    system and will have it out in 2026.
        Senator Young. Why do we need to eliminate it?
        Mr. Leger. Because it is not the safest and most modern
    technology that is available right now, and so we are putting
    that in with high-density plastic and plastic and then also
    steel--properly coated steel.
        Senator Young. Well, we may have to follow up on that. I am
    told they make some steel in the state of Indiana.
        Mr. Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, currently state utility commissions and state
    pipeline inspectors oversee, roughly, 85 percent of the
    Nation's pipeline infrastructure.
        This Federal-state partnership is critical as our state
    inspectors are usually intimately familiar with the local
    pipeline operations and their work can lead to often more
    thorough and frequent inspections than PHMSA could possibly do
    by themselves.
        So to our industry panelists--Mr. Black, Mr. Leger, and Mr.
    Rorick--as the industry works toward zero incidents can you
    speak to the important role that state agencies play in working
    with you to keep the pipeline system safe and operational?
        We will start with Mr. Black.
        Mr. Black. Thank you, Senator.
        Two things come to mind on states. One, states maintain
    excavation damage programs where we are trying to protect
    underground pipelines and other utility infrastructure from
    damage.
        Those programs are weak if there are exemptions to parties
    that do not have to participate in the one call program or if
    those programs are inaccurately enforced.
        There is legislation that was introduced in a committee in
    the House last year that puts the right pressure on states to
    improve their excavation damage programs and we call that to
    your attention.
        Second, as you mentioned, sometimes states are approved by
    PHMSA to inspect even interstate pipelines and that helps free
    up resources. It does not help when there is duplication.
        We have operators sometimes being investigated by the feds
    and the states. If we can align that we can spread those state
    and Federal inspection resources more broadly.
        Senator Peters. But to the question, states do play a
    pretty important role?
        Mr. Black. Absolutely, Senator. Yes.
        Senator Peters. Mr. Leger.
        Mr. Leger. Thank you.
        Senator Peters. States play an important role?
        Mr. Leger. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Peters, they absolutely do
    play an important role and we work with our state regulators on
    a daily basis for pipeline safety.
        I do want to echo the damage prevention rules. I think that
    is something that is--certainly, that we can improve upon and I
    only call to attention Chairman Young's state, Indiana, which
    is one of the top states in damage prevention and you can see
    that by their damage prevention rates.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. Mr. Rorick?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes, I would also agree, Senator. The points
    that Mr. Leger and Mr. Black raised on the damage prevention
    program I do not think--cannot be emphasized enough and there
    are--I think there are opportunities to reduce some of the
    exemptions that occur to the damage prevention program,
    opportunities to improve the enforcement, and there are
    certainly opportunities to improve the coordination between the
    feds and the states for not only the inspection.
        States do have the authority to increase their regulations
    on pipelines. I think it is important, though, that the feds
    and the states work collaboratively to ensure that there is no
    conflict in those regulations and in the enforcement.
        Senator Peters. So work more collaboratively. But I think
    you all agree that states are an important part of this
    equation?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. So, Mr. Caram, turning to you now because
    you raised this very topic in your written testimony, how would
    fully funding states at the allowed 80 percent serve to help
    the industry in achieving these zero incident targets that they
    all want to achieve?
        Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for that question.
        As mentioned, the majority of the Nation's pipelines are
    under state oversight. They all need to follow minimum Federal
    safety regulations set by PHMSA, but the inspection and
    enforcement in most of these pipelines are run by the state.
        In addition to that, nearly all of the Nation's
    distribution pipelines--those pipelines that bring gas into
    people's homes and businesses--are those that are under the
    inspection and enforcement authority of the state programs, and
    these are the pipelines that are closest to people and that
    lead to most of the fatalities and injuries.
        So I cannot overstate enough the importance of a well-
    funded state program.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        A bit more than four years ago on May 7th of 2021 a
    ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline caused significant
    impacts on communities from Texas to New York and highlighted,
    certainly, the importance of robust, timely cyber threat
    information and the sharing between private sector as well as
    Federal agencies.
        I am very concerned that the upcoming expiration of the
    CISA 2015 liability protections for public-private cyber threat
    information could enable another attack like we saw on the
    Colonial Pipeline.
        Mr. Rorick, Mr. Leger, would you agree that the expiration
    of information sharing and the liability protections associated
    with that under CISA 2015 would negatively impact pipeline
    cybersecurity?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes, certainly we would and we would like to
    see that piece of legislation reauthorized as well. That
    legislation provides some criminal protections through privacy,
    through confidentiality, antitrust, that allow the information
    sharing to occur between the private and public sector.
        The nation, as we are all well aware, is under constant
    threat and attack from cyber criminals. Our industry is
    certainly not immune to it and allowing the statute to get
    reauthorized will allow those protections to stay in place,
    which will enable industry to participate more robustly in that
    information sharing.
        Senator Peters. And we just have a few more months before
    it expires.
        Mr. Leger, do you want to add anything to that?
        Mr. Leger. I cannot really add anything. I will say I am
    not the proper witness to talk about cybersecurity--I am an
    operator--but we are happy to get back with you and your office
    and this committee with a QFR.
        Senator Peters. Great. Great. Well, thank you. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Young. Senator Cruz.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of
    the witnesses for being here.
        Mr. Rorick, Mr. Leger, and Mr. Black, can you tell me about
    your members' experiences with unauthorized valve turners or
    protesters who damage pipeline construction sites? How often
    does this happen and what type of risks does this activity pose
    to pipeline safety?
        Mr. Black. We have had a number of dangerous and
    destructive situations from attacks on pipelines. In 2016,
    opponents in four northern states cut through fences, cut
    through locks to turn valves on pipelines that brought 15
    percent of our consumed crude oil.
        In 2017, an activist in Iowa torched into pipeline
    components awaiting construction on Dakota Access Pipeline.
    Also in 2017 a pipeline protester armed with a high-powered
    rifle shot at the Sable Trail natural gas pipeline.
        And, sadly, in 2022 there was a movie called ``How to Blow
    up a Pipeline'' that was released nationwide and that glorified
    violent action.
        Attacks on pipelines risk hurting the environment, the
    people there, and even the perpetrators themselves.
        Mr. Rorick. And if I could add, this issue tends to be
    somewhat sensitive, I think, unnecessarily. So we are not
    talking about the changes that we are proposing. We are not
    talking about squashing First Amendment rights to speech.
        What we are talking about are things like this is just--
    this is a recent unclassified document from the Tennessee
    Fusion Center identifying a May 9 incident and just to read a
    couple of quick lines here. And this is an individual who went
    into the facility, tampered with it with a gas pipeline.
        Local businesses and approximately 430 residents were
    evacuated due to gas in the air. The tampering impacted gas
    flow pressure, resulting in safety systems being activated.
    Responding gas company officials resolved the issues and
    restored system functions.
        This is an example that happened just a few weeks ago where
    not only was there a safety risk and health and potentially
    life threatening issues that occurred not only to the
    individual, to the workers that had--fortunately, the safety
    systems kicked in.
        The workers then had to go in and manage this and
    ameliorate the situation, but then it provided risk to all of
    those residents that are in the surrounding areas, not to
    mention the impacts to their service.
        Mr. Leger. Beyond what was mentioned here, what I want to
    talk about is reiterate the cascading events of something like
    that, not to mention what was already said about the risk to
    the person completing the act but also the risk to our
    communities and the rest of my employees that have to respond
    to something like that.
        Beyond that, you have cascading events where you have
    hospitals, critical care facilities, local police departments
    that were without gas that can no longer protect us and take
    care of our citizens.
        And then if you have a really bad incident where you have
    to shut down a pipeline now you also have the danger of
    critical generating facilities that are now down and then now
    you do not have power for the area.
        So it is a cascading event that I worry about.
        The Chairman. Well, Mr. Black mentioned the outrageous
    movie ``How to Blow up a Pipeline.'' I am embarrassed to say my
    alma mater, Harvard, proudly screened that movie on campus and
    people wonder why so many Americans are losing faith in our so-
    called elite academic institutions when they are getting so
    extreme as trying to train young people on how to be
    ecoterrorists.
        Mr. Caram, you testified before the House Transportation
    Infrastructure Committee that you agreed with the statement
    that people who damaged pipelines or threatened to damage
    pipelines, such as unauthorized valve turners, should be
    prosecuted to the full extent of the law because of the danger
    they put the public in. Do you still agree with that statement?
        Mr. Caram. I do. The Pipeline Safety Trust does not support
    the creation of unsafe conditions on any pipelines.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Black and Mr. Rorick, PHMSA is authorized to grant
    special permits to pipeline operators in which PHMSA waives
    compliance with statute or regulation if PHMSA determines that
    the waiver is consistent with pipeline safety.
        I have heard that PHMSA, particularly under the Biden
    administration, would add numerous additional requirements to
    special permits that were unrelated to the underlying
    regulation the permit was designed to address.
        Can the two of you speak to this issue with special
    permits, particularly what extraneous requirements were added
    and what you propose to fix the special permit process?
        Mr. Black. Congress created special permits for a good
    reason, right. There are so many different operating conditions
    of a pipeline. The types of--in operating conditions the types
    of pipe, is it a liquid, is it moving crude oil, is it
    products, is it hot, is it cold.
        And so this has been a way for pipeline operators to go to
    PHMSA and say, I have got an equivalent way to do this that is
    different and that is better.
        But PHMSA has ruined the special permit program. Other than
    special permits for class locations there have been very few
    because PHMSA was applying unrelated conditions and PHMSA was
    taking forever.
        I have got a sad example of how PHMSA applied something
    that was just so loaded down with unrelated conditions that it
    was unusable.
        Somebody had an application to deal with a dent a certain
    way and the regulations required something that they knew from
    their engineering assessment was not appropriate.
        A simple permit request turned into 56 pages including 54
    unrelated conditions that were not even the right type of
    pipeline. This was a liquids pipeline and they applied natural
    gas conditions.
        Congress can fix this. Congress can tell PHMSA to not
    require extraneous conditions, unrelated conditions, to the
    issue being addressed in a special permit, and to act in a
    timely basis.
        Senator Young. Thank you, Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr.
    Black.
        Mr. Lujan.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

        Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Caram, New Mexico, as you know, is home to the Permian
    Basin and the Nation's second largest oil producer. In 2023
    there was a study conducted of a comprehensive aerial
    measurement of oil and gas producing basins across the United
    States including the Permian Basin.
        Those surveys found that the Permian Basin oil and gas
    operation had the highest total emissions observed anywhere in
    the United States. So even though New Mexico is not the largest
    producer, they were creating the largest methane plumes.
        Mr. Caram, yes or no, is leaking methane from pipeline a
    public safety hazard?
        Mr. Caram. It is, yes. We continue to have home explosions
    and pipeline failures from known leaks that have not been
    repaired.
        Senator Lujan. Yes or no, does leaking methane from
    pipelines cause environmental harm?
        Mr. Caram. Yes. Yes, it does.
        Senator Lujan. Yes or no, is leaking methane from pipelines
    a waste of a natural resource into the air?
        Mr. Caram. Yes.
        Senator Lujan. So, arguably, it is also a taking of
    resources. When there is state land involved and there is
    leaking taking place that it is like taking taxpayer money,
    right?
        Mr. Caram. Yes.
        Senator Lujan. Yes or no, is advanced technology available
    to detect leaks in pipelines so operators can fix them?
        Mr. Caram. Yes. Methane detection has come a long way in
    development.
        Senator Lujan. Mr. Caram, how old are the existing rules
    and requirements for operators to conduct leak surveys of
    pipelines?
        Mr. Caram. That particular part of the code is very old,
    has not been updated in decades.
        Senator Lujan. And in one word how would you characterize
    the requirements on operators to survey for leaks in their
    pipelines and repair them?
        Mr. Caram. Vague.
        Senator Lujan. In the decades since those vague
    requirements were enacted we have seen preventable hazards and
    explosions that have taken lives and endangered people. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Caram. Sadly, yes.
        Senator Lujan. In the decade since those vague requirements
    were enacted, have we seen technology to detect leaks advance?
        Mr. Caram. Yes. Yes. That has come a long way.
        Senator Lujan. Now, the last time the pipeline safety bill
    was reauthorized was in 2020, correct?
        Mr. Caram. Correct.
        Senator Lujan. That bill was signed by President Trump,
    correct?
        Mr. Caram. Correct.
        Senator Lujan. And that bill included a provision requiring
    the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration to
    write rules and regulations to leak--or sorry, regulations on
    leak detection and repair. Is that correct?
        Mr. Caram. Yes.
        Senator Lujan. And your organization was supportive of
    these measures, correct?
        Mr. Caram. Yes, we were and are.
        Senator Lujan. And those rules have been updated. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Caram. No. We went through a very long process. There
    was two weeks of advisory committee meetings, a Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, and a final rule was submitted to the
    Federal Register but at the very end of the last administration
    and it has since been withdrawn.
        Senator Lujan. Now, this has been brought up in this
    hearing today. I think I read article after article that
    suggested the administration withdrew that rule because they
    were worried that under a new Republican Congress that there
    would be a CRA that would pull that rule out, and once that is
    done cannot touch it ever again.
        I think that is important for the record for us to talk
    about these things. It was bipartisan. The Chair of this
    Committee was instrumental in important provisions and he is
    going to be instrumental in getting it again of the
    Subcommittee, and I look forward to working with him on this as
    well. It is critically important and that is why I appreciate
    this hearing so much.
        Mr. Leger, your company CenterPoint Energy recently
    deployed an advanced leak detection technology, state-of-the-
    art, vehicle-mounted technology. Is that correct?
        Mr. Leger. That is correct.
        Senator Lujan. And how prepared after a long, transparent
    stakeholder engagement process is the industry to adopt the
    optimized leak detection and repair practices as issued by the
    agency in January?
        Mr. Leger. Well, one thing I want to say it was not
    recently. We have actually been--deployed that system 10 years
    ago. So but I would say that we have valuable data that we are
    willing and able to share with our partners on that adoption of
    that technology.
        Senator Lujan. That might encourage others to do the same.
    So I appreciate that good example that you have there, sir.
        One of the questions that I also have in this area is how
    we work together. I am always reminded of how important our
    word is when we are working on legislation, when we are working
    on rules, things of that nature.
        With your responsibility that you are here with today, can
    I get your commitment to work with me and with this committee
    to ensure that the industry does not backslide on commitments
    and agreements to update these rules?
        Mr. Leger. Senator, myself and my partner companies across
    the United States as well as AGA are always willing to work
    with you guys. I will say that collaboration among the
    utilities is one of the beauties of our industry.
        Senator Lujan. I appreciate that very much. Now, since I
    have a little time left one question that I have goes back to
    2021. Are you all aware that there were frozen pipes out in
    Texas in 2021 of gas, Mr. Rorick?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes.
        Senator Lujan. Mr. Black, yes or no?
        Mr. Black. Yes.
        Senator Lujan. Mr. Leger?
        Mr. Leger. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lujan. Mr. Caram?
        Mr. Caram. Yes.
        Senator Lujan. Is there anything that should be done with
    weatherization? Because it impacted New Mexico as well.
        Now, it just did not get as cold in New Mexico as it did in
    Texas with that liquid that was still in there. Is there
    something we could do around weatherization?
        Mr. Leger? I think you know that CenterPoint had a pipe
    freeze.
        Mr. Leger. Yes, absolutely. I will say that our
    distribution pipe system was not frozen up. We could have
    delivered the gas and we did deliver the gas during that
    timeframe, and I would say that as my opening comments when I
    mentioned in Minnesota gets very cold, right?
        Sixty hours below zero and we successfully delivered 1.5
    BCF. So yes, we can help.
        Senator Lujan. And just, Mr. Chairman, I think this is one
    area that we might be able to find some commonality as well,
    understanding that some states, you know, like ERCOT or others
    depending on how those pipelines are done. But look forward to
    working with you there.
        Senator Young. You know, and that--I will ask our Indiana
    steel makers whether there might be certain qualities of newer
    steel grades that could insulate, you know, the various
    products that go through pipes from the elements.
        Yes, I have become an alchemist up here. OK. So Senator
    Moreno, you are recognized for questions.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. BERNIE MORENO,
                         U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

        Senator Moreno. Thank you.
        And before you leave, Mr. Lujan, I will invite you to Ohio
    if you want to know what cold is.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Moreno. There you go. And then I will invite the
    Chairman to Ohio if he wants to learn about steel making. I am
    just kidding.
        Senator Young. Top steel producer in the country. Go ahead.
    Please proceed.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Moreno. I should not be so bold, given what the
    Pacers did to the Cavs.
        Senator Fischer. Nebraska has a steel plant, too.
        Senator Moreno. There you go. So I think maybe bring the
    conversation up from--no pun intended, from the underground
    level to maybe a little bit broader level and if I could have
    each of you just quickly respond to the following question.
        What do you see coming in the next decade in terms of
    energy demand in America? We will start with from the left to
    right--our left to right. OK.
        Mr. Leger. We see incredible growth in energy throughout
    the country. If you look at data centers, return to
    manufacturing, AI, these are all adding incredible amounts of
    demand.
        This kind of if you build it they will come that has
    happened on the manufacturing and the data side and now we need
    to meet that with growing infrastructure developments as well
    to provide that energy.
        Mr. Black. We expect growth and need pipeline operators to
    grow to meet it.
        Mr. Leger. Yes. I mean data centers--and I am fortunate to
    serve some great areas in Indiana and Texas and Ohio and
    Minnesota. In particular, in Texas there is a ton of growth,
    and we are in the process of building pipeline--of planning to
    build a pipeline around the City of Houston to better serve.
        But that being said, you have also got an energy transition
    going on that will rely on the natural gas industry to be able
    to serve industry as the country continues to grow and onshore
    more manufacturing.
        Mr. Caram. This is outside of the mission of the Pipeline
    Safety Trust but I will say that we need to see improvements to
    the laws and regulations before the buildout of more energy
    infrastructure to keep communities safe.
        Senator Moreno. OK. And I will go back to Mr. Black because
    I think it is important for you to repeat what you said in your
    opening statement.
        If we have to deliver energy, right, energy does not just
    show up, right? You have to get it to some place. I used to
    live in New England for 12 years and I find it interesting that
    a lot of my colleagues from that neck of the woods talk about
    the importance of climate change and safety and delivery when a
    lot of energy is still delivered by truck.
        You have people showing up at your door with energy that is
    delivered on a diesel vehicle with all kinds of perilous
    issues.
        So if you had to deliver energy what is the safest way?
    Safety. Forget cost. Just the safest way to deliver energy?
        Mr. Caram. By pipeline, and government reports confirm
    that.
        Senator Moreno. So then it seems counterintuitive that if
    you cared about safety you would cripple pipelines, correct?
        Mr. Caram. Correct.
        Senator Moreno. And then let us take it now to the point of
    cost, because for a lot of working Americans that is the
    number-one issue.
        So for a lot of us we can say, well, safety matters and, of
    course, nobody does not want safety. That is, obviously,
    nonsense. Nobody would want these disasters to happen. But what
    is the cost difference of getting this wrong?
        Mr. Black, I will ask you.
        Mr. Black. Liquid pipelines are not just the safest way to
    move the fuels that we use. They are also the least costly.
        So liquid fuels will move on other modes that cost more and
    have poor safety records and those costs will ultimately be
    passed on to consumers and the poorest of us pay the most for
    energy.
        Senator Moreno. And as a proud Ohioan, we, with West
    Virginia and Pennsylvania, have the largest reserves of natural
    gas in America and yet our producers have been absolutely
    hammered with their inability to get affordable, abundant,
    cost-effective natural gas to New England specifically and they
    rely on Canada for the vast majority of their energy demands,
    and the reason for that is simple. They refuse to allow
    pipelines to be built to get and service those consumers.
        Is that--explain to me how that works. Explain to me how
    the logic of saying we would rather get energy from Canada
    through diesel trucks and through rail and, by the way, through
    ships across the Great Lakes. How does that make any sense?
        Mr. Black. Our country is blessed with energy abundance but
    we need pipelines to get it from where it is produced to where
    it is used.
        And I do not represent natural gas pipelines. Mr. Rorick
    does. But it is just a few hundred miles where we have got
    surpluses of natural gas to where they are needed in New
    England.
        Senator Moreno. And my final question is this and whomever
    wants to answer it can answer it.
        We had Senator Peters talk about Line 5, something I care a
    lot about--I think the Chairman cares a lot about. What would
    be the impact? Right now, there is something that is not very
    well reported.
        You have the Governor of one state wanting to shut down
    that pipeline. What would be the impact of shutting down that
    pipeline?
        Mr. Black. Lots of Midwest Americans use Canadian crude for
    the gasoline in their car. Lots of propane users and farmers in
    Michigan depend on Line 5. So the impact of Line 5 being shut
    down would be dramatic to the Midwest economy.
        But there is an answer. There is a tunnel that is being
    proposed. Sadly, it has been under review for 5 years. If that
    tunnel can be developed we will have an even safer way to move
    the fuel that Ohio and Michiganders and others need.
        Senator Moreno. And just--I know I am out of time but just
    quick follow up. Who is holding up the building of that tunnel?
        Mr. Black. The state of Michigan.
        Senator Moreno. So the same Governor who is trying to shut
    down the pipeline is refusing to approve the tunnel that would
    fix said pipeline. Seems to me the agenda is not about safety.
    It is not about affordability. It is about an attack on fossil
    fuels.
        And with that, I will yield my time back.
        Senator Young. Senator Markey.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

        Senator Markey. Yes. So, thank you.
        So let me just explain what the natural gas industry is
    doing to New England. The natural gas industry was asked by
    Donald Trump to pony up tens of millions of dollars last year
    for his campaign and if he did it--if they did it in the
    natural gas industry he would destroy the offshore wind
    industry.
        He would destroy the clean energy revolution. And by the
    way, he is doing it. He is asking House Republicans on the
    Energy and Commerce Committee and the Ways and Means Committee
    to destroy the clean energy industry. They are doing it. They
    did it yesterday. Did it today, just destroy it.
        It is not all of the above. Here is why. The natural gas
    industry is used to generate electricity. We were, until Trump
    showed up, going to have 30,000 megawatts of offshore winds and
    Trump is saying, no, it is all debt.
        And who is the beneficiary? The natural gas industry. Oh,
    we need to build more pipelines in. See the need in New
    England. And we are saying to the natural gas industry, we do
    not need you anymore. OK. We have offshore wind.
        So the natural gas industry has paid to have Trump through
    his Department of Interior and Department of Energy kill the
    offshore wind industry. Now, we have one more final plant,
    Vineyard Wind. That is 800 megawatts. That is equal to a
    nuclear power plant ready to go.
        But he wants to kill the battery storage industry, wants to
    kill all of it. It is not all of the above, OK, and the natural
    gas industry just cannot accept the fact that we have figured
    out how to do it.
        And by the way, Trump is also imposing tariffs on and
    having a trade war with Canada. Quebec Hydro and northern
    Maine--northern New England--that is how we do it. We have
    partnerships with them, right.
        So Trump is killing us and then the natural gas industry
    says, we will come in. We will solve the problem for you.
        You know, we do not need anything from Canada. We do not
    need any electricity from offshore wind even though that is
    what we want, that is what the states want, that is what the
    states are investing in. That is what they are trying to permit
    for.
        Natural gas is asking for Trump to come in to kill it
    saying, we do not need any more natural gas. OK. We already
    have our indigenous resources. Quebec Hydro, offshore wind,
    solar. Massachusetts is number two per capita in installation
    of solar.
        We will figure it out. We just need some--we need some
    cooperation. OK. So just understand the natural gas industry
    with crocodile tears appears here, you know, as though they
    really care about New England and they want to make sure they
    can deal with our energy issues.
        We already figured it out. They are trying to kill our plan
    so that they can substitute their plan which is more fossil
    fuels, more greenhouse gasses and, by the way, hurricane season
    starts in two more weeks, OK, and they are gutting FEMA. So
    that is a recipe for disaster as well.
        So let me--I will ask one quick question. Pipelines pose a
    significant risk to public safety and the environment, an issue
    that is personal here in Massachusetts.
        A constituent of mine, an 18-year-old, Leonel Rondon, died
    in the Merrimack Valley gas explosions in 2018 as a result of
    negligence and missing pipeline safety rules.
        As we transition to clean energy we have to limit the
    significant risk that pipelines pose to public safety and the
    environment, and this is why last year I introduced my Pipeline
    Accountability, Safety and Environmental Standards Act to
    enhance public safety, environmental integrity, transparency of
    pipeline operations across the United States, and I will
    reintroduce it again very soon.
        Here is what the bill does. Mandates updated safety
    standards to apply to existing pipelines. Require technology
    that isolates pipelines during catastrophic failure so it does
    not spread.
        Mandate disclosures of pipeline safety data to the public
    and to do so much more to improve pipeline safety and
    accountability.
        Mr. Caram, do you agree that these provisions in my bill
    are necessary in order to serve as a preventative against the
    reoccurrence of what happened in Lawrence just a few years ago?
        Mr. Caram. I do, yes, and the Pipeline Safety Trust does
    believe that, and thank you for your leadership, Senator
    Markey, in the aftermath of Merrimack Valley and continuing in
    pipeline safety.
        Senator Markey. Yes. And a lot of the law that we passed,
    the regulations that are put in place, are basically educated
    by what happened in Lawrence.
        To a certain extent it was the trigger for all the reforms
    that we have in place. Could you expand on that, Mr. Caram?
        Mr. Caram. Yes. It is said often that the regulations we
    have are written in blood, and often after awful tragedies like
    what we saw in Merrimack Valley there are lessons learned and
    regulations updated.
        A lot of--my written testimony is trying to stay ahead of
    those kinds of tragedies and preventing them from happening in
    the first place.
        But the way the system is set up and the way it has
    functioned is that often we wait until the awful happens and
    then the regulations are updated.
        Senator Markey. Yes, and the job of this committee is to
    look ahead and lead the way, to not wait for the catastrophe to
    inform us but to take the evidence from experts and then to put
    the safeguards in.
        Senator Young. Thank you, Senator Markey.
        Senator Fischer, you are recognized for questions.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Chairman Young, for conducting
    this hearing today.
        As the former chairman of this subcommittee I had the
    opportunity to lead the authorization of PHMSA in both 2015 and
    2020. In each case this subcommittee and this full committee
    worked diligently to reach a bipartisan product that passed the
    Senate unanimously.
        But, unfortunately, following the passage of the PIPES Act
    in 2020 the Biden administration undercut those bipartisan
    efforts through a heavy-handed regulatory approach, acting
    outside the bipartisan congressional intent.
        Mr. Rorick and Mr. Black, could you speak to the effects of
    this approach and steps this committee can take to rectify
    those impacts?
        Mr. Leger. Absolutely, Senator Fischer. Thank you for the
    question, and we touched on this a little bit earlier.
        The administration--the previous administration really
    expanded the remit--expanded PHMSA's remit beyond their
    congressional mandate into environmental issues like climate
    change.
        We talked about the leak detection and repair rule. It is a
    great example where PHMSA, under the Biden administration,
    expanded beyond the focus of this committee and PHMSA's role to
    address safety and look at issues like the social cost of
    carbon to then expand the purview of that particular rule and
    thus diluting not only the effectiveness of the rule but then
    diluting the focus and the resources on issues beyond safety.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. Black.
        Mr. Black. I have been doing this a while. I remember your
    leadership on both of those bills. Thank you.
        Two things come to mind about the 2020 PIPES Act. First is
    pipelines. PHMSA was authorized to do pipeline safety
    technology demonstrations----
        Senator Fischer. And under the Biden administration they
    did not address the requirement from the law.
        Mr. Black.--and they ruined it. Absolutely. And you have
    got the opportunity, sadly and please, to reauthorize that and
    this time tell them not to do the things that they did wrong.
        Second, you had a provision called ``operating status''
    which called upon PHMSA to have regulations unique to pipelines
    that are idled for market conditions but will one day come onto
    the market--come back onto the market. It is wasteful to
    everybody, to PHMSA and to pipeline operators, to be applying
    rules that do not fit there.
        PHMSA never acted on that even though Congress told them to
    do it and gave them a deadline. So it would help if you would
    tell them again to do it, and we are encouraged that they
    might. But it is important, like you say, for PHMSA to do what
    Congress says.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. Rorick, PHMSA--during the Biden administration they
    also acted outside that primary mission, as you said, so many
    of the requirements that they set and enacted under authorities
    which were not in the law that was passed they duplicated
    existing authorities that, for example, EPA has or DOE has.
        As we move forward as a committee we want to make sure that
    those safety standards are met, that pipelines remain the safe
    way to transport these fuels. Do you have any suggestions on
    what we can do with it?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes, ma'am. There are certainly some great
    opportunities, as we have discussed, to improve and move
    forward with those unfinished mandates that you all have laid
    out that PHMSA has yet to fulfill. There are other great
    opportunities.
        As you are well aware, API is a standard setting
    organization. We have a number of standards that PHMSA directly
    references in their regulations. In many instances they have
    referenced standards that are two or three editions old.
        That creates conflict within our industry in these
    standards which move faster than the regulations. We are able
    to use, as Mr. Young talked about earlier, the latest
    technologies, the latest engineering practices.
        It would be very helpful if PHMSA--and we talked about it
    in our written testimony--were to be able to move forward with
    the program to periodically review those regulations and ensure
    that they are referencing the latest standards, and if they are
    not then we need to have that dialog to ensure that what
    industry is talking about doing and what we are using does not
    conflict with the regulations, as another great example.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Young. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Cantwell, you are recognized for questions.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
    this hearing very much.
        In 1999 the Olympic Pipeline exploded, killing three people
    in Bellingham, Washington. In response to this tragedy the
    Pipeline Safety Trust was created to hold pipeline companies
    and the government accountable in improving pipeline safety.
        So very much appreciate, Mr. Caram, you being here today.
        A few years later in 2004, following the increased calls
    for better oversight, Congress established the Pipeline
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--PHMSA--a new agency
    dedicated to pipeline safety.
        So, however, as we sit here today 26 years later it is
    clear that we still need to do more because these incidents can
    have unbelievable impacts.
        Over the last 20 years pipeline incidents have caused 257
    deaths and more than 1,000 injuries and over $11 billion in
    damages. Excuse me if this has been brought up in the hearing
    thus far. I do not know if it has, but this is really important
    data.
        And that is an average of 12 fatalities and 51 injuries and
    $550 million of property damage per year. So we need to do
    better.
        Just last month in Lexington, Missouri, a 5-year-old boy
    died when a contractor hit a pipeline that had not been
    properly marked by a pipeline company, causing a leak and an
    explosion, and since 2019, the last time the Committee
    considered pipeline safety, a number of significant issues have
    merged and I know from your testimony that those have been
    discussed today.
        But I wanted to ask you, Mr. Caram, since just this year we
    know those averages I just mentioned, but during the Trump
    administration in the first three months I feel like we have
    less than two enforcement cases.
        Are you concerned about this?
        Mr. Caram. Yes. Thank you for bringing that up.
        We are concerned about the drop off of enforcement. This
    is--we have not seen it in previous administrations.
    Enforcement cases initiated have generally been consistent
    throughout administrations regardless of party, and so we are
    concerned to see this drastic sudden drop off.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I am sending a letter to Mr.
    Kochman today asking him about this and asking him about the
    recent data, and just--you know, I want to do everything we can
    to prevent and if there is something that has happened that is
    actually preventing this or we are just not seeing the
    enforcement.
        So we need to understand what is happening. So I will be
    sending him a letter today asking about enforcement actions.
        I also wanted to ask you--my state is very prone to
    landslides and, certainly, a potential--as we call it, the big
    one--earthquake.
        According to the USGS, 44 percent of the country is at
    risk, though, of experiencing landslides and people who live in
    these earthquake prone zones.
        So what--they have a, I think, a voluntary standard at
    PHMSA but what should we be doing to think about this? And I do
    not know whether that Missouri case had anything to do with
    land moving or not but----
        Mr. Caram. The Missouri case did not, but many recent
    pipeline incidents have been caused by these factors called
    geohazards. I think we have learned a lot more about pipeline
    failures and we are attributing more--able to attribute more
    and more to geohazards.
        It is not specifically called out in the regulations.
    Operators on high-consequence areas are required to identify
    all potential risks and mitigate against those and that
    ostensibly would include geohazards.
        But we would like to see specific geohazard regulations
    called out by name and spelled out prescriptively and
    performance-based throughout the regulations.
        PHMSA has issued a voluntary advisory bulletin. The
    industry has developed a relatively strong standard around
    geohazard mitigation and it is time to incorporate geohazard
    regulations.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, we probably did not quite imagine
    it either until we had Oso, Washington how devastating a
    landslide could be. It killed 40 people when literally the side
    of a mountain exploded.
        And so I do think with change in conditions we definitely
    need to think about this. What about material issues, this
    candy factory in Reading, Pennsylvania killing seven people and
    injuring 10 others.
        NTSB found the cause was a pipe made out of Aldyl A, which,
    I guess, is subject to failure. What do we need to do to make
    sure that that kind of material does not exist in pipes?
        Mr. Caram. Yes. Aldyl A plastic has been known to be an
    issue of material prone to failure for decades. Again, in a
    voluntary advisory PHMSA bulletin it has been out for quite
    some time.
        In addition to that awful West Reading failure there was a
    failure in South Jordan, Utah, that killed a 15-year-old boy.
    We do not know the exact cause, but we do know Aldyl A was also
    part of that failure.
        I think we know enough and we have seen enough failures
    that it is time to have operators find all of this Aldyl A and
    take it out of their system.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you.
        All of these statistics, Mr. Chairman, are just striking to
    me that we still have this much--you know, 12 fatalities, 51
    injuries, and $550 million in property damage every year. It is
    too many.
        So I look forward to working with you and the Chairman on
    these issues. Thank you.
        Senator Young. Well, likewise. Thanks so much, Senator
    Cantwell, for your leadership on this and so many other
    important issues.
        Senator Peters earlier brought up the issue of
    cybersecurity and I am glad he did. PHMSA is a pipeline safety
    regulator. TSA is, however, the primary regulator of pipeline
    security including cybersecurity.
        While both agencies have distinct roles, I want to know
    from our witnesses, any that wish to speak on this topic, do
    you think there could be better coordination between TSA and
    PHMSA or, perhaps, other agencies?
        Mr. Leger. So I can speak to that, Senator, and you bring
    up a great point. We have seen over the last few years that TSA
    has really increased their oversight on cybersecurity issues.
        They worked extremely well with the industry to not only
    address threats or address incidents when they occur but really
    proactively address the threats as well.
        There is always opportunities for better improvement on
    coordination and collaboration between the agencies and,
    frankly, between the private and the public sector and so we
    would look forward to working with both of those agencies to do
    that.
        Senator Young. I expect all of you will agree that there
    are opportunities for better coordination--there is in every
    organization so I--but any specific recommendations folks can
    think of that--OK, great.
        What role should the Federal Government have in pipeline
    security and what are operators doing right now on this issue,
    if anything?
        Mr. Black. Pipeline security and cybersecurity are both
    very important. TSA is on the case. Pipeline operators are
    looking at TSA guidelines or having visits from TSA inspectors,
    and we know that it is an important part of maintaining the
    operations of pipelines.
        Mr. Leger. We have active physical security and
    cybersecurity programs in place that are actually protecting
    our facilities.
        Senator Young. OK. I will continue to educate myself on
    this issue. I know that other members will be emphasizing the
    importance of this.
        I mean, pipelines, after all, they are critical security to
    our economic security, to our national security, and so the
    Federal Government has an inherently important role here.
        Yes, Mr. Black.
        Mr. Black. I thought of one way that Congress can help on
    security, right. Senator Cruz talked about loopholes that are
    not deterring those who might damage a pipeline, right?
        The pipeline safety laws against damaging pipelines do not
    cover when a pipeline is in preoperational status and does not
    cover attacks that do not damage at the time.
        We know that if something was damaged before it was
    constructed and it came into operation there could be an
    incident hurting people, the environment, and the perpetrators
    if they are still there.
        We also know that there can be valve turning that does not
    cause damage then but can weaken the pipeline and later
    contribute to a rupture.
        Senator Cruz talked about a Sheehy bill that he co-
    sponsored. I encourage the Committee to look at this. That is a
    way that the Senate can help secure pipelines from attacks.
        Senator Young. Absolutely. Well, I will consult with both
    Senators Cruz and Sheehy on that. It sounds like an area of
    vulnerability that we may need to button up.
        You know, the last thing I would like to discuss with you
    is outdated rulemakings. The PIPES Act of 2020, which Senator
    Fischer showed great leadership on, that reauthorization
    required PHMSA to hold a gas pipeline advisory committee, or
    GPAC, meeting on the class location rule.
        While GPAC has meant to address class location PHMSA has
    yet to complete this rulemaking, probably unsurprising since
    PHMSA did not have a Senate confirmed leader over recent years.
        If it was finalized, pipeline companies could employ modern
    inspection technologies to prove the safety of existing
    infrastructure when population changes occur nearby instead of
    outdated, expensive, and environmentally unhelpful methods.
        Mr. Rorick, do you think that this rulemaking would improve
    safety and avoid disruptions to communities by employing
    modernized practices?
        Mr. Rorick. Absolutely, Senator, and thank you for bringing
    up that critical issue.
        Since that rule--since the original requirements were
    developed they were very prescriptive in their approach, and as
    we have talked a lot about technology and as you focused a lot
    about technology it has advanced rapidly.
        The rules--the way they are written require when certain
    criteria are met for those pipes to automatically be pulled out
    of service and replaced.
        In many instances those pipes do not need to be pulled out
    of service and the latest technologies that we have can assess
    those pipelines in a way that is less invasive, and we can make
    those determinations that many of those pipelines do not have
    to be pulled out.
        Unnecessarily pulling out pipeline increases risk for the
    workers. It creates disruption in service. There is--a study
    was recently completed that shows that the amount of pipe that
    is replaced and the gas that has to get blown down from those
    service--in other words, we have to clear that gas so that we
    can replace that pipe--there is enough gas that is released on
    an annual basis to provide energy for 10,000 homes.
        That is unnecessary risk, unnecessary interruptions to
    energy deliverability that we can avoid, and unnecessary costs
    for the industry where we can redirect those attentions to
    other safety issues that really demand our attention.
        Mr. Caram. Chair Young, may I just quickly add something?
        Senator Young. You may, sir. Yes.
        Mr. Caram. Thank you. I just want to provide a little
    context there and just remind everyone what we are talking
    about.
        This is--we have different standards on pipelines based on
    how--the population density around that pipeline and in a very
    rural area it is generally thinner walled pipe and the more
    populated the area the stronger the pipe needs to be.
        So when we are talking about class location change we are
    talking about when a neighborhood or population has built up
    around this pipeline that was--has the thickness set for a very
    rural area.
        So while we do not oppose some, you know, reforms to class
    location and the class location rule process, we just want to
    caution this is a very sensitive issue and could be--we have
    some serious safety issues and so we appreciate care and
    concern on that.
        Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
        That will be--we will keep that thought in mind as well.
    Thank you so much.
        Well, listen, were there things--before we close here today
    were there any particular points that our witnesses who offered
    very intelligent testimony today wished to make throughout the
    course of this hearing but did not have the opportunity?
        I will give you an opportunity. Thirty seconds each if
    any--like, Mr. Rorick?
        Mr. Rorick. Yes, we have a list of items that the
    Committee--that we would welcome the Committee to consider. We
    have got them written down in a pamphlet here.
        We will be happy to share those with you. But there are a
    number of issues that we would be happy to discuss with you
    further.
        Senator Young. We will give everyone that opportunity until
    the end of the day on Thursday, June 5, to respond to our
    questions and to make additional submissions that can go into
    the record.
        But, Mr. Black, anything right now?
        Mr. Black. We encourage you to reauthorize pipeline safety
    demonstration pilot projects, to fix the special permit
    process, to deter attacks and improve criminal penalties and
    reauthorize the pipeline safety laws.
        This committee has an important role in assuring the public
    that the laws and regulations are good. Thank you for acting on
    it.
        Mr. Leger. I concur with everything that my panelists have
    said, but I would add the creating a voluntary information
    sharing system--we did not talk about that--and I believe that
    is a best practice. It is something that we do as a utility and
    I think when you--you know, for us, like, it was mentioned
    earlier about SMS.
        We are reaching out outside of the utility industry to talk
    about airlines on SMS. Just different perspectives, different
    things that you can learn to only make us all better.
        Senator Young. I am glad you brought that up.
        Mr. Caram.
        Mr. Caram. Thank you, Chair Young.
        I just want to refocus a bit. There was a lot of time spent
    talking about these unsafe terror attacks which, of course, we
    do not support those creation of unsafe conditions on
    pipelines.
        But all the fatalities we have talked about today, you
    know, the vast majority, if not all, of the 3,000 reportable
    incidents that have happened over the last five or six years
    those are not attributable to this.
        And so I just want to refocus on the conditions that are
    causing these fatalities and failures.
        And the last thing I will say, I think, is the--a big low-
    hanging fruit following an NTSB recommendation would be the
    required adoption of in-home methane detectors will undoubtedly
    save lives and make a big difference.
        Senator Young. Thank you.
        Thanks again to all our witnesses for their testimony here
    today. Senators will have until the close of business on
    Thursday, May 22, to submit questions for the record. The
    witnesses, again, have until the end of the day Thursday, June
    5, to respond to those questions.
        This concludes today's hearing. The Committee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                      GPA Midstream Association
                                                           May 13, 2025
    Chairman Todd Young,
    Dirksen Senate Office Building,
    Washington, DC.

    Ranking Member Gary Peters,
    Dirksen Senate Office Building,
    Washington, DC.

    Re: Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Freight, Pipelines, and
                Safety hearing titled ``Pipeline Safety Reauthorization:
                Ensuring the Safe and Efficient Movement of American
                Energy''

    Dear Chairman Young and Ranking Member Peters,

        On behalf of GPA Midstream (GPA or the Association), we appreciate
    the opportunity to submit comments on this important hearing, which
    will review pipeline safety regulations and operations at the Pipeline
    and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and evaluate what
    policy priorities should be included in an upcoming PHMSA pipeline
    safety reauthorization. We are grateful for the Subcommittee's work
    towards developing pipeline safety legislation.
        GPA Midstream has served the U.S. energy industry since 1921 and
    represents more than 50 domestic corporate members that directly employ
    57,000 employees engaged in the gathering, transporting, processing,
    treating, storage, and marketing of natural gas, natural gas liquids,
    crude oil and refined products, commonly referred to as ``midstream
    activities.'' The work of our members indirectly creates or impacts an
    additional 400,000 jobs across the U.S. economy. In 2023, GPA Midstream
    members had an economic impact of $206.2 billion through operating more
    than 506,000 miles of gas gathering pipelines, gathering more than 91
    billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, and operating more than 365
    natural gas processing facilities that delivered pipeline quality gas
    into markets across a majority of the U.S. interstate and intrastate
    pipeline systems.
    Safety is Paramount
        Pipeline safety is the top priority of GPA's members. According to
    the U.S. Department of Transportation, pipelines are the safest way to
    transport crude oil, refined products, and natural gas over the long
    distances necessary to deliver energy to everyone who needs it.\1\
    Midstream companies invest in technological advancements that
    significantly increase pipeline safety through monitoring operating
    conditions and product flows. GPA's members are focused on ensuring
    regulatory compliance and collaborate with other industry stakeholders
    on proactive, voluntary efforts to further the safety of their assets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``Data and Statistics Overview.'' PHMSA's Office of Pipeline
    Safety (OPS). https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/
    data-and-statistics-overview.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unleashing American Energy
        GPA is appreciative of the Subcommittee's support of pipelines
    playing a key role in unleashing America's energy independence and
    ensuring Americans have access to reliable and affordable energy. We
    look forward to working with all of Congress, as well as the
    Administration to restore American energy independence. Practical
    public policy can be implemented to allow for America's energy
    dominance.
    Key Issues and Recommendations
      1.  Remove duplicative in-plant piping oversight

         GPA asks the Subcommittee to use this opportunity to align
                gas and liquid in-plant piping exceptions and confirm that
                all piping within a plant boundary qualifies as in-plant
                piping and should not be subject to PHMSA oversight.

          Many GPA members operate processing, refining, and other types of
                plant facilities. These facilities include gas piping on
                plant grounds that serves plant facilities, or transfers
                gas among adjacent or nearby plants. While the U.S. Code
                includes exemptions for hazardous liquid in-plant piping
                systems at production, refining, or manufacturing
                facilities, gas in-plant piping does not have the clarity
                of similar exemptions.

          In-plant gas piping systems are a low risk to the public, which
                supports their exemption from PHMSA regulation. The systems
                are mostly located within plant boundaries and often
                operate at lower pressures than cross-country, PHMSA
                regulated pipelines. Additionally, plant facilities are
                often subject to other safety regulatory programs, such as
                the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
                (OSHA's) Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements.

      2.  Appropriate representation on the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee
            (GPAC):

         GPA asks that the Subcommittee provide direction to PHMSA
                to ensure appropriate stakeholders are included in the
                conversation of regulatory actions that impact gathering
                and processing.

          PHMSA utilizes two technical safety standards committees in its
                rulemaking efforts, and GPA is appreciative of how these
                groups support this work. However, during recent rulemaking
                efforts, which have had significant impacts on the
                gathering lines GPA members operate, there has been no
                representation from a stakeholder focused on operation of
                gathering lines.

          Given the potential for certain rulemakings to substantially
                impact GPA members, either positively or negatively,
                representation should be afforded to an operator engaged in
                gathering and processing.

      3.  Longer Reauthorization Period:

         GPA requests the Subcommittee reauthorize PHMSA for a
                longer period.

          PHMSA plays a critical role in ensuring the safe transportation
                of natural gas and liquids across the United States.
                Extending its authorization for a longer time would provide
                an opportunity for the regulator to complete Congressional
                mandates before being given other obligations. A longer
                reauthorization period could also unleash technology
                adoption and utilization of innovation. While innovation
                can happen quickly, there needs to be proper time allotted,
                whether for technology to advance or the market to adopt.
                Providing more time between reauthorizations will ensure
                technology can mature to a point for operators to be
                comfortable to incorporate in their operations. Lastly, a
                longer authorization window allows industry stakeholders to
                gain experience and ensure compliance with new
                requirements, ultimately benefiting public safety.
    Conclusion
        Reauthorizing pipeline safety programs is vital for protecting our
    communities. GPA urges the Subcommittee to consider the recommendations
    outlined above to support PHMSA's work. Thank you for allowing us to
    provide this input, and we are happy to be a resource as the
    legislative process progresses.
                                     ______

                      Associated General Contractors of America
                                                           May 19, 2025

    Chairman Todd Young,
    Subcommittee on Surface
    Transportation, Freight, Pipelines,
    and Safety,
    United States Senate,
    Wahington, DC.

    Ranking Member Gary Peters,
    Subcommittee on Surface
    Transportation, Freight, Pipelines,
    and Safety,
    United States Senate,
    Washington, DC.

    RE: AGC Statement for the Record for the Hearing Entitled ``Pipeline
                Safety Reauthorization: Ensuring the Safe and Efficient
                Movement of American Energy''

    Dear Chairman Young and Ranking Member Peters:

        On behalf of the Associated General Contractors of America--the
    leading association in the construction industry representing more than
    28,000 firms, including America's leading general contractors and
    specialty-contracting firms--I thank you for holding the hearing
    entitled, ``Pipeline Safety Reauthorization: Ensuring the Safe and
    Efficient Movement of American Energy.''
        AGC members are engaged in utility construction, including water
    and wastewater facilities and pipelines, energy generation and
    transmission, and telecommunications infrastructure. For pipeline
    construction, this includes maintenance and repair, excavation,
    tunneling, boring and site preparation. Contractors are on the front
    lines of pipeline safety, and reauthorizing Pipeline and Hazardous
    Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) would ensure the continued
    support of important safety programs related to our Nation's pipeline
    infrastructure.
    Robust Funding for State One-Call Notification Programs
        AGC urges robust funding for state One-Call Notification Programs,
    which are key in mitigating damages from excavation nationwide and
    ensuring timely locates. According to a survey of AGC members published
    in January 2025, contractors are aware of 811 requirements and the
    local laws they are required to follow. However, 87 percent of
    contractors report that it takes longer than one business day for
    locators to arrive at job sites to mark underground utility lines,
    including gas and other hazardous materials pipelines, while one-
    quarter of respondents' state that it takes five or more business days
    for location crews to arrive and mark utilities.
        Supporting One-Call Notification programs through PHMSA
    reauthorization will ensure that underground pipeline lines have more
    support to be correctly and expeditiously marked, mitigating challenges
    and weaknesses that could cause a critical accident.
    Require Vertical Line Locating, Marking and Mapping
        Congress should require vertical line marking in the
    reauthorization of PHMSA, which would improve safety planning and
    operations for contractors, locators and pipeline operators. PHMSA
    reauthorization has previously included strict requirements for the
    correct marking of horizontal utility and construction lines, which
    locate underground infrastructure systems. While these lines make it
    easier for contractors and utility locators to know where utilities
    are, horizontal markings do not indicate their depth. Requiring
    vertical line markings allows locators and contractors to see how deep
    utilities are buried, improving the safe development of pipelines and
    ensuring safety efforts are strictly implemented throughout all levels
    of the construction process. Additionally, Congress should require
    vertical lines be mapped by locators and made publicly available for
    all pipeline stakeholders. Requiring and publishing vertical maps will
    allow contractors to see the depth of utility lines and pipelines that
    need to be expanded, better preparing them for work and mitigating
    damage that could arise due to conducting digging activities that can
    severely damage pipes at improper vertical depths.
        AGC thanks the subcommittee for holding this important hearing and
    looks forward to working with its members on the reauthorization of
    PHMSA. Congress must ensure that the construction and safety of our
    pipeline system remains efficient.
                Sincerely,
                                                   Alex Etchen,
                                  Vice President, Government Relations.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                  Robin Rorick
    PHMSA Inspector Resources
        Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
    needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
    result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
    pipeline industry.

        Question 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
    experts?
        Answer. Safety is our industry's top priority, and API agrees a
    PHMSA that is properly resourced with individuals with necessary levels
    of competency and knowledge of operations under their remit is
    critical. In particular, pipeline safety inspections require a
    significant understanding of engineering technologies and processes,
    and API supports PHMSA's efforts to recruit a qualified and capable
    workforce.

        Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
    money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
    highly skilled employees?
        Answer. PHMSA struggles to retain quality inspectors under current
    government personnel rules and pay scales, especially when competing
    with industry for quality employees. Congress may want to consider an
    approach to allow inspectors to be in a more competitive service pay
    scale.

        Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
    their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
    provide increased funding for state inspectors?
        Answer. Under current regulation, PHMSA has the ability to
    reimburse states up to 80 percent of the total cost of the personnel,
    equipment, and activities reasonably required by the State agency for
    conducting its pipeline safety or underground natural gas storage
    program during a given calendar year. With PHMSA's authority to
    reimburse up to 80 percent under its current program, API would support
    funding with the use of appropriated funds and coordinate with state-
    based resources to improve efficiencies in the inspection program.
    Criminalizing Pipeline Protests
        As you testified at the hearing, you support criminal penalties for
    the unauthorized turning of valves on pipelines, which can present a
    safety risk. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
    goes further than unauthorized valve turning and would sentence
    individuals found to be ``disrupting or preventing the construction of
    pipelines.''

        Question 1. Do you think the Standing Rock protesters were
    disrupting or preventing the construction of the Dakota Access
    Pipeline?
        Answer. Any vandalism, attacks on or damage to construction sites
    and other activities that disrupt service, inspection protocols and
    jurisdictional issues should be considered criminal and penalized
    accordingly. Vandalism or damage to construction sites or equipment and
    materials significantly increases the risk of harm to the pipeline and
    those operating at the facility. Importantly, this activity could also
    lead to an incident from damage caused by these events, potentially
    causing a safety hazard to the public and/or the environment. As such,
    this type of activity should be penalized criminally.

        Question 2. Do you think landowners and lawmakers fighting eminent
    domain for new carbon pipelines in South Dakota are preventing the
    construction of pipelines?
        Answer. Most of the time, agreements over an easement can be
    reached voluntarily between the landowner and pipeline operator, with
    eminent domain only utilized as a last resort. For decades, eminent
    domain has and continues to be imperative to U.S. economic growth and
    critical infrastructure development, enabling the construction of
    highways, dams, airports, railroads, telephone, electricity lines and
    more. These projects have become the integrated infrastructure system
    Americans rely on daily to communicate with distant relatives, heat our
    homes, transport food, and provide clothing and other essential needs.
        API supports two-way engagement between a pipeline operator and
    landowner, based on transparency, respect, reciprocity, inclusiveness,
    and accessibility. In 2024, API published the first edition of
    Recommended Practice 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, in partnership
    with regulators and public stakeholders, to support operators creating
    long-term, meaningful, and durable community relationships on both
    planned and existing pipelines.

        Question 3. Do you support the Safe and Secure Transportation of
    American Energy Act, which could easily be interpreted as criminalizing
    protests and any other action that could be seen as disrupting or
    preventing construction?
        Answer. API supports the criminalization of behavior that causes
    safety hazards to people and the environment, and the protection of
    critical facilities and equipment. The right to free speech and protest
    is one of the many foundational tenets that makes our country
    exceptional, and our position does not infringe on that foundational
    right. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
    clearly delineates lawful protest with criminal behavior that could
    damage a pipeline or lead to an incident.
    Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety
        On the last day of the Biden administration, the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposed new safety
    requirements for Carbon Dioxide pipelines. However, the Trump
    administration has rescinded that proposal, continuing to leave
    communities vulnerable to incidents like the 2020 Sataria, Mississippi
    carbon dioxide leak that forced the evacuation of a town and
    hospitalized 40 people.

        Question 1. States like California and Illinois have banned new
    carbon pipelines until DOT issues safety requirements. Are you
    concerned that the delay of these requirements will prevent your
    members' ability to build new pipelines?
        Answer. There are currently over 5,000 miles of pipeline that have
    been operating safely for decades under existing PHMSA regulations.
    Although API supports a review and potential update to current
    regulations, they have a long-standing proven track record in ensuring
    pipelines transporting CO2 are constructed and operated
    safely. Also, API expects to publish an industry consensus standard on
    the transportation of CO2 by pipeline later this year, which
    could be incorporated into PHMSA regulation by reference and strengthen
    the existing regulations with updates that further enhance the current
    regulatory framework for safe transportation of CO2 by
    pipeline.

        Question 2. Did you have concerns with the Biden administration's
    proposal? If so, what concerns did you have?
        Answer. Yes, API does have concerns with the proposal as presented
    in the unofficial copy of the NPRM that was released by PHMSA in
    January 2025. While the NPRM included improvements to the regulations
    that API supports--conversions of service, fracture propagation and
    control, dispersion modeling, and other topic areas--several of the
    proposed changes are overreaching and some items were included in the
    proposal that do not relate to transportation of CO2 by
    pipeline and should be the subject of separate rulemaking. API expects
    to work with PHMSA pending any future rulemaking to address
    opportunities for improvement.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
                                  Robin Rorick
    Incomplete Regulations:
        Question 1. There are at least six incomplete congressionally
    mandated regulations currently stalled at PHMSA, including on carbon
    dioxide pipelines, leak detection and repair, and liquefied natural
    gas. Do you think these rules--which you initially supported and, based
    on your testimony, continue to support--should be finalized?
        Answer. API continues to support comprehensive, bipartisan efforts
    to help make our Nation's pipeline network safer as it provides
    reliable energy supply to every community in America. It is thus
    imperative that the regulatory environment remains cognizant of and
    responsive to both current and potential future safety challenges faced
    by operators. That said, API applauds PHMSA's efforts to date to
    advance regulatory reform and consider rulemakings that recognize the
    important role that leading industry practices, innovation and
    technology play in advancing safety including repair criteria and LNG
    safety. API would also support additional efforts by PHMSA to move
    forward with Congressionally mandated rulemakings, ensuring they are
    fit for purpose, meet the intent of Congress, and ultimately advance
    safety.
    Staffing:
        Question 2. PHMSA has long been an underfunded agency, with not
    enough staff to properly ensure pipeline safety. Given the agency has
    just over a few hundred employees, even small cuts can have a
    significant impact. Given PHMSA's mission to protect people and the
    environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
    hazardous materials, do you support enforceable staffing requirements
    for PHMSA to ensure the agency can keep communities safe?
        Answer. Safety is our industry's top priority, and API agrees that
    PHMSA should be properly resourced with individuals with necessary
    levels of competency and knowledge of operations under their remit. In
    particular, a high-quality inspection workforce is critical in
    conducting ever more sophisticated inspections of performance-based
    regulations.
    Criminalization:
        Question 3. Under existing law, it is already a felony to damage or
    destroy a pipeline. There are proposals to expand criminal penalties to
    ``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' a pipeline. Do you agree
    ``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' are too broad given the following
    examples?

        A. local landowner who refuses to sell farmland, ranchland, or
    private property to a pipeline company or opposes an eminent domain
    action count

        B. A concerned citizen speaking up at a local hearing in opposition
    to a pipeline

        C. An individual who writes an op-ed or posts on social media about
    their opposition to a pipeline

        D. A lawyer who files a lawsuit challenging a pipeline's permit or
    zoning approval

        E. A community member who reports environmental pollution or a
    hazardous waste spill to local authorities

        F. A pipeline employee who raises concerns about workplace safety

        Answer. Any vandalism, attacks on or damage to construction sites
    and other activities that disrupt service, inspection protocols and
    jurisdictional issues should be considered criminal and penalized
    accordingly. Easement negotiations, public hearings, media posts or
    safety reporting are lawful expressions of First Amendment rights to
    free speech, which API does not believe should be included in this
    provision. However, any vandalism or damage to construction sites or
    equipment could increase the risk of an incident that could, in turn,
    cause a safety hazard to the public, pipeline personnel or the
    environment, and this should be penalized criminally.
        Most of the time, agreements over an easement can be reached
    voluntarily between the landowner and pipeline operator, with eminent
    domain only utilized as a last resort. For decades, eminent domain has
    and continues to be imperative to U.S. economic growth and critical
    infrastructure development, enabling the construction of highways,
    dams, airports, railroads, telephone, electricity lines and more. These
    projects have become the integrated infrastructure system Americans
    rely on daily to communicate with distant relatives, heat our homes,
    transport food, clothing and other essential needs.
        API supports two-way engagement between a pipeline operator and
    landowner, based on transparency, respect, reciprocity, inclusiveness,
    and accessibility. In 2024, API published the first edition of
    Recommended Practice 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, in partnership
    with regulators and public stakeholders, to support operators creating
    long-term, meaningful, and durable community relationships on both
    planned and existing pipelines.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                Andrew J. Black
    PHMSA Inspector Resources
        Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
    needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
    result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
    pipeline industry.

        Question 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
    experts?
        Answer. Yes. Pipeline safety regulation is a technical field
    dependent on expertise and experience. Engineering or science
    backgrounds are needed to understand the physical and environmental
    stresses placed on pipelines. Additional PHMSA personnel expert in
    pipeline engineering with experience operating pipelines would benefit
    the quality and timeliness of PHMSA regulatory actions.

        Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
    money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
    highly skilled employees?
        Answer. PHMSA can attract and retain highly skilled employees with
    new authority to hire and compensate personnel at competitive levels.
    In the past, DOT personnel restrictions prevented PHMSA from hiring
    technical experts at higher GS levels. Congress can provide such
    authority directly to PHMSA. Congress can also provide authority to
    PHMSA directly, and not through the Office of Personnel Management, to
    compensate technical experts above the GS scale using mechanisms
    similar to those employed by DOJ or SEC for legal or financial
    employees.

        Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
    their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
    provide increased funding for state inspectors?
        Answer. LEPA does not have a position on state inspection
    reimbursement levels.
    Criminalizing Pipeline Protests
        As you testified at the hearing, you support criminal penalties for
    the unauthorized turning of valves on pipelines, which can present a
    safety risk. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
    goes further than unauthorized valve turning and would sentence
    individuals found to be ``disrupting or preventing the construction of
    pipelines.''

        Question 1. Do you think the Standing Rock protesters were
    disrupting or preventing the construction of the Dakota Access
    Pipeline?
        Answer. Multiple news outlets documented some Dakota Access
    construction protesters engaging in physical or violent activities such
    as blocking roadways, chaining persons to vehicles, setting fires,
    throwing objects at law enforcement or discharging firearms. Each of
    these activities fits within a definition of ``disrupting or
    preventing'' construction. To the extent the Senator feels there are
    peaceful, legal, First Amendment free speech activities that could fall
    under interpretations of ``disrupting or preventing'', LEPA is
    supportive of clarifying language.

        Question 2. Do you think landowners and lawmakers fighting eminent
    domain for new carbon pipelines in South Dakota are preventing the
    construction of pipelines?
        Answer. A reasonable person could not interpret landowners and
    lawmakers fighting eminent domain through free speech, legislating or
    legal challenges as preventing construction of a pipeline.
    Additionally, no activity occurring during the planning, approval or
    permitting of a pipeline before its construction could reasonably be
    interpreted as preventing the construction of pipelines.

        Question 3. Do you support the Safe and Secure Transportation of
    American Energy Act, which could easily be interpreted as criminalizing
    protests and any other action that could be seen as disrupting or
    preventing construction?
        Answer. LEPA supports the Safe and Secure Transportation of
    American Energy Act, which establishes that criminal penalties apply to
    ``damaging, destroying, vandalizing, tampering with, disrupting the
    operation or construction of, or preventing the operation or
    construction'' of a pipeline. LEPA disagrees a reasonable person could
    easily interpret it as criminalizing protests, not least because
    peaceful protests are protected under the First Amendment to the U.S.
    Constitution. LEPA would oppose legislation that allows physical or
    violent protest of pipeline construction. To the extent the Senator
    feels the language of the bill could infringe on a citizen's right to
    protest peacefully, LEPA is supportive of making that clarification.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                                Andrew J. Black
    Artificial Intelligence & Pipeline Safety
        It is critical that we explore every avenue to reduce potential
    risks and prevent future pipeline failures. One way of doing this is
    through the improvement and adoption of technology. You mentioned in
    your testimony that you are employing artificial intelligence in
    pipeline maintenance and safety.

        Question 1. How is AI currently being employed with pipelines?
        Answer. Pipeline operators are currently using artificial
    intelligence to detect leaks. Examples include using AI to monitor
    cameras at facilities to detect equipment failures that result in a
    leak. Operators are also using AI to scan imaging collected from aerial
    surveillance to detect signs of a pipeline leak or encroachment on a
    pipeline right of way that may present a hazard. LEPA would welcome the
    Senator's support of provisions to ensure pipeline operators can fully
    leverage advanced technology, including AI, to improve pipeline safety.
    Examples include clarifying that pipeline operators can use drones and
    satellites to monitor their rights of way and reauthorizing the
    technology pilot program to demonstrate the effectiveness of new
    technologies.

        Question 2. How else might this technology be used to enhance
    pipeline safety in the future?
        Answer. Pipeline operators are exploring the use of machine
    learning and artificial intelligence to improve pipeline safety.
    Pipeline operators collect a tremendous amount of data from their
    operations and inspection technology. Machine learning has the
    potential to detect signs of a potential problem otherwise
    imperceptible to current techniques. For example, pipeline operators
    hope to use machine learning to sift through operations data on flow
    rate, pipeline pressure, valve status and pump status to detect the
    signals or signs of small leaks otherwise imperceptible through
    pressure drops or flow changes. Pipeline operators also hope to sift
    through inline inspection tools that generate terabytes of data as they
    scan pipe walls to detect signs of corrosion or cracking earlier than
    currently possible. LEPA would welcome the Senator's support of PHMSA
    research and development in these areas.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
                                Andrew J. Black
    Incomplete Regulations:
        Question 1. There are at least six incomplete congressionally
    mandated regulations currently stalled at PHMSA, including on carbon
    dioxide pipelines, leak detection and repair, and liquefied natural
    gas. Do you think these rules--which you initially supported and, based
    on your testimony, continue to support--should be finalized?
        Answer. LEPA supports the proposal and finalization of a rulemaking
    that provides targeted updates to PHMSA's CO2 pipeline
    regulations. LEPA does not have positions on the methane monitoring and
    mitigation rule or LNG rule, which are outside the scope of LEPA.
    Staffing:
        Question 2. PHMSA has long been an underfunded agency, with not
    enough staff to properly ensure pipeline safety. Given the agency has
    just over a few hundred employees, even small cuts can have a
    significant impact. Given PHMSA's mission to protect people and the
    environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
    hazardous materials, do you support enforceable staffing requirements
    for PHMSA to ensure the agency can keep communities safe?
        Answer. LEPA supports PHMSA having the staff necessary to fulfill
    its pipeline safety mission. More important than the number of PHMSA
    staff is the qualifications of its staff. Pipeline safety regulation is
    a technical field dependent on expertise and experience.
        Engineering or science backgrounds are needed to understand the
    physical and environmental stresses placed on pipelines. Additional
    PHMSA personnel expert in pipeline engineering with experience
    operating pipelines would benefit the quality and timeliness of PHMSA
    regulatory and enforcement actions.
        PHMSA can attract and retain highly skilled employees with new
    authority to hire and compensate personnel at competitive levels. In
    the past, DOT personnel restrictions prevented PHMSA from hiring
    technical experts at higher GS levels. Congress can provide such
    authority directly to PHMSA. Congress can also provide authority to
    PHMSA directly, and not through the Office of Personnel Management, to
    compensate technical experts above the GS scale using mechanisms
    similar to those employed by DOJ or SEC for legal or financial
    employees.
    Criminalization:
        Question 3. Under existing law, it is already a felony to damage or
    destroy a pipeline. There are proposals to expand criminal penalties to
    ``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' a pipeline. Do you agree
    ``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' are too broad given the following
    examples?

        A: A local landowner who refuses to sell farmland, ranchland, or
    private property to a pipeline company or opposes an eminent domain
    action count

        B: A concerned citizen speaking up at a local hearing in opposition
    to a pipeline

        C: An individual who writes an op-ed or posts on social media about
    their opposition to a pipeline

        D: A lawyer who files a lawsuit challenging a pipeline's permit or
    zoning approval

        E: A community member who reports environmental pollution or a
    hazardous waste spill to local authorities

        F: A pipeline employee who raises concerns about workplace safety
        Answer. Pipeline protests at operating facilities or construction
    sites have included protesters engaging in physical or violent
    activities such as blocking roadways, chaining persons to facilities or
    vehicles, setting fires, throwing objects at law enforcement or
    discharging firearms. Each of these activities fits within a definition
    of ``disrupting or preventing'' construction.
        A reasonable person could not interpret concerned citizens,
    landowners and lawmakers opposing or protesting a pipeline through free
    speech, legislating or legal challenges as disrupting or preventing
    construction of a pipeline. Additionally, no activity occurring during
    the planning, approval or permitting of a pipeline before its
    construction could reasonably be interpreted as preventing the
    construction of pipelines. Likewise, no reasonable person would
    consider a whistle-blower in good faith reporting a safety concern as
    disrupting or preventing construction.
        To the extent the Senator feels there are peaceful, legal, First
    Amendment free speech activities that still could fall under
    interpretations of ``disrupting or preventing'', LEPA is supportive of
    clarifying language.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Todd Young to
                                 Richard Leger
    Safe Digging
        I recently introduced a resolution designating April as National
    Safe Digging Month, to build awareness of safe digging practices that
    protect homeowners and utility workers from damaging underground
    utility lines during excavation projects. Excavation damage to
    underground infrastructure, not only pipelines but other critical
    systems like water and broadband, is both dangerous and costly. The One
    Call/811 system was created to prevent that damage by connecting
    excavators with underground utilities before digging. Yet since then,
    81 percent of excavation damage incidents involving pipelines have been
    caused by third party excavators. Even with PHMSA's 2015 final rule
    intended to evaluate state 811 programs and enforce minimum Federal
    standards, significant excavation related incidents continue to occur.

        Question 1. Mr. Leger, given these persistent risks and need for
    consistent enforcement, what should be done to strengthen the One Call/
    811 program and ensure states are effectively preventing excavation
    damage across all underground utilities?
        Answer. A regulatory framework for incentivizing prevention of
    excavation damage already exists in the Code of Federal Regulations (49
    CFR 198--Regulations for Grants to Aid State Pipeline Safety Programs).
        Congress should direct PHMSA to amend Part 198 to update State One
    Call program requirements (Sec. 198.37), enhance damage prevention
    program effectiveness criteria (Sec. 198.55), and require recipients of
    One Call grants (Sec. 198.35) to implement the best practices of
    effective One Call programs identified in the 2023 AGA white paper
    Working with Other Stakeholders to Advance Pipeline Safety in Damage
    Prevention. Effective state One-Call program elements include:

       1)  Size/scope of One-Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
            standard infrastructure locate requests (possible process
            exceptions for special large project tickets)

       2)  Longevity of One Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
            standard locate requests (possible process exceptions for
            special Large Project Tickets)

       3)  Tolerance (hand-dig only) zone horizontal dimension requirements

       4)  Tolerance zone requirements

       5)  Emergency excavation notification requirements

       6)  Excavator responsibilities explained

       7)  Definitions of ``excavator''/''excavation''

       8)  White-lining requirements

       9)  Positive response requirements

      10)  Locatability of newly installed underground facilities

      11)  Sewer line marking requirements

      12)  Effective, active, meaningful enforcement of state dig laws

      13)  Specific qualifications/requirements for excavators performing
            trenchless excavation activities that are not subject to
            pipeline construction requirements in 49 CFR 192/195

        Legislative language that sought to codify these recommended
    excavation damage prevention best practices was included in H.R. 6494,
    the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023
    (Section 18) and H.R. 7655, the Pipeline Safety, Modernization, and
    Expansion Act of 2024 (Section 15), pipeline safety bills that passed
    the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and Energy and
    Commerce Committees respectively, last Congress. In the 119th Congress,
    we look forward to working with the Senate Commerce Committee, as well
    as your House counterparts, to ensure that common sense and critical
    excavation damage prevention provisions become law.

        Question 2. Mr. Leger, as an operator across several states, what
    challenges do you face in working with different state 811 programs,
    and what policy changes would help reduce excavation damage across your
    service areas?
        Answer. CenterPoint Energy has firsthand experience with the
    various maturities of state programs in the areas in which it operates.
    CenterPoint reaffirms the necessity for One Call (Dial 811) programs to
    have a prescriptive framework of core program requirements, ticket
    scope/longevity, and excavator accountability. CenterPoint Energy's
    exposure to multiple state programs provides us an opportunity to
    attest that those programs with equal excavator accountability
    typically experience lower rates of damage to pipelines.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                 Richard Leger
    PHMSA Inspector Resources
        Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
    needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
    result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
    pipeline industry.

        Quesstion 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
    experts?
        Answer. While AGA supports a properly staffed and capable regulator
    in PHMSA, natural gas distribution pipeline operations in the United
    States are primarily overseen by state-level pipeline safety programs,
    and not directly by PHMSA inspectors. States account for about 75
    percent of all pipeline safety inspectors in the country and, as state
    regulated entities, natural gas utilities support appropriate staffing
    of these state programs because they are critical partners in public
    safety and energy infrastructure reliability.

        Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
    money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
    highly skilled employees?
        Answer. AGA and AGA member utilities maintain a long-term positive,
    productive and technically capable partnership with our Federal
    pipeline safety partners at PHMSA. While we have very little insight on
    the Federal government's ability to recruit and retain talent, we urge
    Congress to provide PHMSA with the resources and personnel necessary to
    provide effective pipeline safety oversight.

        Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
    their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
    provide increased funding for state inspectors?
        Answer. As AGA members are primarily state regulated entities, AGA
    and AGA members do not take a position on specific Federal funding for
    state pipeline safety activities and personnel beyond ensuring that
    combined state and Federal funding is sufficient for states to operate
    successful safety programs.
        With regard specifically to state excavation damage programs (i.e.,
    Dial-811 or ``call before you dig'' programs), AGA believes it is
    appropriate that Federal funding be contingent on the effectiveness of
    those programs. 49 CFR Sec. 198 provides a reasonable framework for
    conditioning grants to state pipeline safety programs. We believe
    Congress should direct PHMSA to amend Part 198 to update State One Call
    program requirements (Sec. 198.37), enhance damage prevention program
    effectiveness criteria (Sec. 198.55), and require recipients of One
    Call grants (Sec. 198.35) to implement the elements of effective One
    Call programs identified in the 2023 AGA white paper Working with Other
    Stakeholders to Advance Pipeline Safety in Damage Prevention. These
    elements include:

       1)  Size/scope of One-Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
            standard infrastructure locate requests (possible process
            exceptions for special large project tickets)

       2)  Longevity of One Call ticket requirements (i.e., min/max) for
            standard locate requests (possible process exceptions for
            special Large Project Tickets)

       3)  Tolerance (hand-dig only) zone horizontal dimension requirements

       4)  Tolerance zone requirements

       5)  Emergency excavation notification requirements

       6)  Excavator responsibilities explained

       7)  Definitions of ``excavator''/''excavation''

       8)  White-lining requirements

       9)  Positive response requirements

      10)  Locatability of newly-installed underground facilities

      11)  Sewer line marking requirements

      12)  Effective, active, meaningful enforcement of state dig laws

      13)  Specific qualifications/requirements for excavators performing
            trenchless excavation activities that are not subject to
            pipeline construction requirements in 49 CFR 192/195

        Legislative language that sought to codify these recommended
    excavation damage prevention best practices was included in H.R. 6494,
    the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023
    (Section 18) and H.R. 7655, the Pipeline Safety, Modernization, and
    Expansion Act of 2024 (Section 15), pipeline safety bills that passed
    the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and Energy and
    Commerce Committees respectively, last Congress. In the 119th Congress,
    we look forward to working with the Senate Commerce Committee, as well
    as your House counterparts, to ensure that common sense and critical
    excavation damage prevention provisions become law.
    Criminalizing Pipeline Protests
        As you testified at the hearing, you support criminal penalties for
    the unauthorized turning of valves on pipelines, which can present a
    safety risk. The Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act
    goes further than unauthorized valve turning and would sentence
    individuals found to be ``disrupting or preventing the construction of
    pipelines.''

        Question 1. Do you think the Standing Rock protestors were
    disrupting or preventing the construction of the Dakota Access
    Pipeline?
        Answer. The Dakota Access pipeline is an upstream pipeline that
    transports crude oil. AGA member company natural gas utilities were not
    involved in the planning or construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline
    and do not receive any product from it currently. As such, we do not
    have any relevant experience to share about how the pipeline was
    planned and built and what impact any protests had on that process.

        Question 2. Do you think that landowners and lawmakers fighting
    eminent domain for new carbon pipelines in South Dakota are preventing
    the construction of pipelines?
        Answer. AGA member natural gas utilities do not plan, permit,
    construct or operate CO2 pipelines. As such, we do not have
    any relevant experience to share about how upstream oil and refined
    product pipeline companies pursue building CO2 pipelines or
    the related eminent domain challenges they may face as part of the
    process.

        Question 3. Do you support the Safe and Secure Transportation of
    American Energy Act, which could easily be interpreted as criminalizing
    protests and any other action that could be seen as disrupting or
    preventing construction?
        Answer. Broadly speaking, pipeline construction involves highly
    technical and controlled activities. Uninterrupted and timely execution
    of construction tasks is vital to ensuring the safe operation of a
    pipeline, and requires skilled labor and appropriate worker
    qualification, reliable operation of construction equipment and,
    importantly, a safe and secure working environment. Disrupting or
    interfering with this process can have grave consequences on worker and
    public safety, both during construction and during future operations.
        More specifically, the Safe and Secure Transportation of American
    Energy Act has limited application to local natural gas utilities. In
    short, the legislation, would increase criminal penalties on those who
    knowingly and willfully damage, destroy, vandalize, tamper with,
    disrupt or prevent the construction of or operation of interstate
    pipelines or intrastate pipelines engaged in interstate or foreign
    commerce. AGA member natural gas utilities do not operate interstate
    natural gas pipelines and those intrastate gas pipelines our companies
    do operate are intended to serve in-state natural gas utility
    customers.
        While the Safe and Secure Transportation of American Energy Act has
    limited applicability for natural gas utilities, AGA notes that
    criminal attacks on natural gas utility property, equipment and
    facilities continue to occur. These activities are not only hazardous
    to public safety and utility company employees, they threaten an LDC's
    ability to deliver natural gas to thousands of homes, government and
    military facilities, and other critical infrastructure customers. AGA
    supports increased criminal penalties on individuals who intentionally
    damage, destroy or impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, or disrupt
    their safe operation, including those under construction.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                                 Richard Leger
    Updating Aging Pipeline Infrastructure
        The use of aging cast iron pipes presents a safety risk in the
    transport of natural gas. You mention in your testimony that
    CenterPoint is on track to eliminate cast iron and bare steel from its
    system by the end of 2026.

        Question 1. Can you expand on how CenterPoint has been able to make
    progress modernizing its systems?
        Answer. CenterPoint Energy uses probabilistic modeling to help
    evaluate risk associated with different types of assets and assist with
    prioritizing our modernization efforts. Using this risk-based approach,
    we develop replacement programs with dedicated timelines and discuss
    them with our regulators so they are aware of our intent and
    prioritization of modernization of our system. Because these
    replacement programs are capital-intensive and require upfront
    investment by the utilities, having efficient rate recovery mechanisms
    and constructive regulatory relationships support the ability of the
    utilities to proactively modernize their systems.

        Question 2. How can we ensure other companies modernize their
    pipelines quickly and safely?
        Answer. It would be ideal if states, counties and local
    municipalities can respond in a timely fashion and grant permits to
    utilities so that they can perform the work necessary in the public
    right of way, with the least amount of disruption possible to the local
    community. Additionally, effective rate recovery mechanisms can aid in
    facilitating the replacement of legacy infrastructure such as cast iron
    and bare steel pipelines.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
                                 Richard Leger
    Incomplete Regulations:
        Question 1. There are at least six incomplete congressionally
    mandated regulations currently stalled at PHMSA, including on carbon
    dioxide pipelines, leak detection and repair, and liquefied natural
    gas. Do you think these rules--which you initially supported and, based
    on your testimony, continue to support--should be finalized?
        Answer. Generally speaking, AGA continues to believe that PHMSA
    should work expeditiously to fulfill Congress's existing regulatory
    mandates. Specifically, AGA and its members are looking forward to
    continuing our work with PHMSA on finalizing a leak detection and
    repair rule that is reasonable, technically feasible, and consistent
    with the plain language and intent of Section 113 of the PIPES Act of
    2020. Additionally, AGA members support PHMSA's efforts to finalize
    critical updates to modernize 49 U.S.C. part 193, pertaining to
    liquified natural gas. We note that PHMSA has recently issued an
    Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding reforms to part 193
    and we look forward to supporting PHMSA on this rulemaking process by
    providing feedback that leads to a risk-based regulatory approach for
    LNG facilities.
    Staffing:
        Question 2. PHMSA has long been an underfunded agency, with not
    enough staff to properly ensure pipeline safety. Given the agency has
    just over a few hundred employees, even small cuts can have a
    significant impact. Given PHMSA's mission to protect people and the
    environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other
    hazardous materials, do you support enforceable staffing requirements
    for PHMSA to ensure the agency can keep communities safe?
        Answer. As AGA members are primarily state regulated entities, AGA
    does not take a position on specific PHMSA budgeting and personnel
    matters beyond ensuring that combined state and Federal funding is
    sufficient for states to operate successful pipeline safety programs.
    While AGA supports a properly staffed and capable regulator in PHMSA,
    natural gas distribution pipeline operations in the United States are
    primarily overseen by state-level pipeline safety programs, and not
    directly by PHMSA inspectors. States account for about 75 percent of
    all pipeline safety inspectors in the country, and, as state regulated
    entities, natural gas utilities support appropriate staffing of these
    state programs because they are critical partners in helping keep our
    infrastructure and our customers safe.
    Criminalization:
        Question 3. Under existing law, it is already a felony to damage or
    destroy a pipeline. There are proposals to expand criminal penalties to
    ``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' a pipeline. Do you agree
    ``disrupting'' or ``preventing'' are too broad given the following
    examples?

        A: A local landowner who refuses to sell farmland, ranchland, or
    private property to a pipeline company or opposes an eminent domain
    action count

        B: A concerned citizen speaking up at a local hearing in opposition
    to a pipeline

        C: An individual who writes an op-ed or posts on social media about
    their opposition to a pipeline

        D: A lawyer who files a lawsuit challenging a pipeline's permit or
    zoning approval

        E: A community member who reports environmental pollution or a
    hazardous waste spill to local authorities

        F: A pipeline employee who raises concerns about workplace safety
        Answer. AGA respectfully suggests that the examples given reflect
    common, constitutionally protected activities that landowners, impacted
    citizens, and activists may engage in to oppose pipeline use and
    pipeline construction. None of these examples directly disrupt or
    prevent safe pipeline operations, including construction or
    maintenance. Activities that physically damage pipelines or prevent
    access to pipeline infrastructure or facilities can prevent gas
    utilities from running safe pipeline construction and maintenance
    operations and prevent operators from performing critical safety
    functions such as leak detection and repair and emergency gas leak
    response. Gas utilities operate 2.3 million miles of local distribution
    pipelines providing service to more than 189 million Americans.
    Physical disruption to the construction, operations, or maintenance of
    pipelines or pipeline or pipeline facilities, may threaten the safety
    of the public and pipeline workers, both at the time of the act and
    during future operations.
        Unfortunately, criminal attacks on natural gas utility property,
    equipment, and facilities continue to occur. These activities are not
    only hazardous to public safety and gas utility company employees, they
    can also threaten natural gas local distribution companies' ability to
    deliver natural gas to thousands of homes, government and military
    facilities, and other critical infrastructure customers. AGA supports
    increased criminal penalties on bad actors who intentionally damage,
    destroy or impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, or disrupt their
    safe operation, including those under construction.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                   Bill Caram
    PHMSA Inspector Resources
        Not only does PHMSA need trained pipeline safety inspectors, but it
    needs engineers and scientists who understand how pipelines work. The
    result will be improved safety requirements and more oversight over the
    pipeline industry.

        Question 1. Do you believe PHMSA should be hiring additional
    experts?
        Answer. PHMSA urgently needs to hire additional experts in several
    areas across the agency, including inspectors, engineers, scientists,
    and other professionals. First, as evidenced by the recent Advanced
    Notice of Proposed Rulemakings, PHMSA is seeking stakeholder input on
    cost of compliance to facilitate rulemaking efforts. PHMSA needs more
    economists on the standards and rulemaking team to independently
    produce this information. Relying on the industry it regulates to
    provide this information, when they have a clear interest in the
    results of the process, is problematic.
        Second, PHMSA just experienced a talent drain because of Reductions
    in Force efforts. We don't know the full impact yet, but we do know
    that these reductions hit two areas particularly hard. One is the
    Community Liaison program, PHMSA's public engagement department. Based
    on PHMSA's website, this department went from 10 before the reductions
    in force\1\ to three.\2\ The service area for these Community Liaisons
    is the entire country and there are three people, including the Program
    Manager. This dramatic reduction compromises PHMSA's ability to engage
    with communities, particularly around incidents and emergency response.
    Another area hit particularly hard is PHMSA leadership. Though not
    officially announced, as far as we know, two of the top three leaders
    at PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety have left. Other senior leaders
    whose roles supported the Office of Pipeline Safety have also retired.
    PHMSA needs to be hiring to backfill positions and develop future
    leaders.
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    PHP-Org-Chart-March-24-2024.pdf
        \2\ https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/cats.htm
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        Finally, Congress has incentivized a buildout of non-hydrocarbon
    pipelines such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen. While some mileage of
    these types of pipelines currently exists, they are relatively rare and
    rural. These products possess unique properties and pose unique risks
    compared to hydrocarbon pipelines and require specialists, including
    engineers and scientists, to modernize regulations, drive productive
    research and development, conduct effective inspections, and issue
    meaningful enforcement.

        Question 2. Federal pipeline safety officials' ability to make more
    money in the industry, how can we better retain and recruit these
    highly skilled employees?
        Answer. Pipeline Safety Trust agrees that compensation is one of
    the most important methods for retaining and attracting talented
    employees. While compensation is crucial, PHMSA also faces competition
    from industry in terms of career advancement opportunities and
    resources. However, pay flexibility would be the most immediate and
    impactful step Congress could take. We encourage Congress to authorize
    the Secretary, in Section 60101 of title 49, the ability to establish
    higher rates of pay for the employees of PHMSA. One way of achieving
    this would be to mirror the language used in the Consolidated
    Appropriations Act, 2012 (Public Law 112-74, 125 Stat. 1012) for the
    employees of the Department of the Interior in the applicable job
    series described in the subsection. Additionally, Congress could carve
    out flexibility for the administration such as allowing up to 30
    percent, for example, above the rate of pay normally scheduled for the
    applicable employee.

        Question 3. States are currently only reimbursed for 55 percent of
    their pipeline inspection activities. Do you think Congress should
    provide increased funding for state inspectors?
        Answer. State programs carry out inspections on more than 85
    percent of the Nation's pipeline system. They are beyond critical to
    pipeline safety. The last numbers we have (2023) show Federal funds
    only reimbursing less than 55 percent of state program activities, even
    though PHMSA has the authority to reimburse up to 80 percent.
    Underfunded state programs can create inspection and enforcement gaps
    that directly impact public safety. Congress has not authorized or
    appropriated PHMSA enough resources to cover its fair share of state
    program funding, and the program has not been fully appropriated.
    However, last fall, Congress made a big step towards properly funding
    these programs with a large increase in appropriations. Even with this
    large increase, PHMSA will still fall short of meeting the 80 percent
    target. On top of this, state programs are facing many of the same
    issues that face PHMSA. Many states are seeing an expansion of
    authority with gathering lines coming under regulations for the first
    time and a potential buildout of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines.
    State programs also face similar recruitment and retention issues with
    the pipeline industry often offering employees more money. Congress
    must provide more funding to state programs to make a meaningful
    difference in pipeline safety.

                                   [all]